v--^!?® 0 fpZ' Vie fanning nf-m C(!liii^:m0i^£^li>n.y' Gift of :i, Ckjvuj3ur "1 \'^- ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA THE MIDDLE COLONIES ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA By J. A. DOYLE, M.A. FELLOW OF ALL SOULS' COLLEGE, OXFORD 8vo. $3.50 per volume VOL. I.— VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, AND THE CAROLINAS. VOL. II.— THE PURITAN COLO NIES, VOL. I. VOL. III.— THE PURITAN COLO NIES, VOL. II. VOL. IV.— THE MIDDLE COLO NIES. VOL. v.— THE COLONIES UNDER THE HOUSE OF HANOVER'. HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY Publishers New York ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA VOLUME IV. THE MIDDLE COLONIES BY J. A. DOYLE, M.A. FELLOW OF ALL SOCls' COLLEGE, 0XFOEI> AUTHOE OF "VIKGINIA, MAETLAND, AND THE CAEOLINAS," "the PUEITAN colonies," ETC. NEW YORK HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 1907 Copyright, 1907, BV HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY Published January, iqffj THE QUINN-BODEN COMPANY PRESS RAHWAY, N. *. PREFACE. This volume is the fourth of the series, three of which appeared some time ago, under the title of "English Colonies in America.'" It brings the history of the Middle Colonies down to the point where 1 left that of the Northern and Southern, i.e. the accession of the House of Hanover. A fifth volume, "The Colonies under the House of Hanover," which is published at the same time as this, deals collectively with the whole body of colonies from that date down to the beginning of those disputes which ended in separation from the Mother Country. JON. A. DOYLE. All Souls' College, Oxford : October 1906. ' Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, 1882 ; The Puritan Colonies, 2 vols, 1886. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. PAGE Dutch as colonists i The early Dutch voyagers 3 Henry Hudson 5 The Dutch in the Hudson River 7 The Northern Company . 7 Treaty at Tawasentha 8 The Dutch West India Company 9 Colonial progress of the Company . II The patroons 12 Small proprietors .... . 14 Increase of population • 15 Position of the Governor . IS Peter Minuit . 16 Wouter Van Twiller . 16 Van Twiller and De Vries ¦ 17 Encroachments from New England 17 William Kieft .... 18 The Twelve and the Indian War . ig The Twelve and Kieft 20 Troubles with the Indians 21 Attacks on Kieft 22 The Council of Eight 22 End of the Indian war . 23 Want of constitutional machinery . . 25 Report of the "Rekenkammer" 25 Peter Stuyvesant .... . 26 Representative government introduced . 27 Municipal institutions . 28 New Amsterdam becomes a city 30 Action of the town council 31 Stuyvesant's reform ¦ 33 Conference of delegates • 34 Second conference .... . 35 vm CONTENTS. English influence The greater burghership . Inefficiency of the Company Increase of population Religious condition of the colony Independent congregations Quakers in New Netherlands . Education Industrial life Dealings with Indians Outbreak of war, 1655 Troubles with Indians in 1658 Dealings with the Five Nations The Swedish colony William Usselinx ... . . Usselinx and Gustavus Adolphus The Swedes at Swanendael Formation of a Swedish Company The Swedes on the Schuylkill Growth of the Swedish colony Hostility between Dutch and Swedes Policy of Stuyvesant towards the Swedes Further efforts by Sweden .... Overthrow of the Swedish colony by Stuyvesant Foundation of New Amstel .... Difficulties besetting New Amstel Proposed migration from New Haven The Mennonites . .... Outward appearance of New Amsterdam Education in New Netherlands PAGE 36 373941414244 4748 505152 S35454 565758 S8 60 62 636466 70 7072IZ75 76 CHAPTER II. THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. New Netherlands gradually Anglicized . Treaty of Hartford ..... English settlers in New Netherlands Stuyvesant favors the English Disputes between Dutch and English English territorial claims Disputes between the Dutch and Maryland Changed policy of England Disputes between the Dutch and Connecticut John Scott 78797982828485 8787 89 CONTENTS. Carteret and Berkeley .... Calumnies against New Netherlands Duke of York's patent Moral aspect of the conquest . Grant to Carteret and Berkeley Arrangements for enforcing the Duke's claim Richard Nicolls ..... Defenseless condition of New Netherlands Nicolls opens negotiations Convention at Gravesend Conquest at New Amsterdam . Submission of the rest of the colony Carr on the Delaware NicoUs's policy ... System of legislation Convention at Heemstede Influence of New England The Duke's laws Ecclesiastical system Penal system .... Nicolls's treatment of the Dutch Affairs at Albany New York to be a check on New England No disaffection among the Dutch Treaty of Breda ..... Altered relations of the English colonies to France Dealings with the Five Nations The French and the Indians Effect of the grant to Carteret and Berkeley The New Jersey concessions Settlement of New Jersey Career and character of Nicolls PAGE 9091 929394 9495 9799 lOI 102 104 106 107107 108noIII 112 113 114 114116117118118119119125 126 126128 CHAPTER III. THE DUTCH RECONQUEST. Francis Lovelace Disaffection on Long Island General policy of the Proprietor Affairs of New Jersey Insurrection on the Delaware Attack from Maryland Outbreak of war with Holland Dutch fleet threatens New York 130130133133 13413s136 137 CONTENTS. Capture of New York Action of the Dutch commanders The colony under Colve . • • Disaffection among the English inhabitants Motives of the Dutch for retaining the colony Final cession of the colony by the Dutch PAGE 138 139140141 143144 CHAPTER IV. NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. Altered position of New York Position of Carteret and Berkeley Fresh grant to Carteret . Andros appointed Governor He reaches New York Negotiations with Colve Court martial on Manning Demand for representative institutions Dealings of Andros with New England . Ecclesiastical matters .... Grievances of the colonists against Andros Dispute about custoras Further demand for representation . Probable influence of Penn with the Duke Dongan becomes Governor His instructions First Assembly summoned Composition of the Assembly . The "Charter of Liberties" Revenue Act ...... Growth of English feeling and influence Proposed incorporation of New York Disputes with New Jersey Disputes with Connecticut The Proprietor becomes King . Incorporation of New York and Albany Fresh land patents Representative system annulled James II.'s policy of consolidation . Dongan's anti-Canadian policy The French and the Five Nations Policy of Frontenac .... French missions among the Five Nations Frontenac replaced by De la Barre . / . 145146147148 148149ISOISO 152154156157158 159160161 162163 163164165 166166 166 168168169 170171 171172 173175176 CONTENTS. Dongan's dealings with the French and the Indians Policy of the Iroquois . Denonville succeeds De la Barre Treaty of Whitehall Policy of Dongan . He is supported by the King . James II.'s projects of colonial union PAGE 176178179180181 183 183 CHAPTER V. THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK. Constitution of the new province Andros appointed Governor . French scheme of invasion Mohawks invade Canada News of the Revolution reaches New York Nicholson's dispute with Leisler Disaffection on Long Island Malcontents seize the fort Progress of the Revolution Assumption of authority by Leisler The New York convention Anti-Papal panic Elections held under Leisler Position of Albany The Albany convention . Preparations against French invasion Albany makes itself independent of Leisler Further encroachments by Leisler . Proceedings of the Home Government Leisler usurps the governorship An anti-Leislerite party . Dealings with the Five Nations French scheme of invasion Destruction of Schenectady Violent conduct of Leisler He calls an Assembly Proposes a colonial convention Failure of the campaign John Schuyler's raid The Assembly meet Decline of Leisler's influence Apathy of the English Government Col. Sloughter appointed Governor 187 187 189 189190191 192192 193 194195196198198199 200 200 202202 20320s206206207208209210 210 211211 212212 213 CONTENTS. His arrival delayed Defiant attitude of Leisler He fires on the troops Arrival of Sloughter Submission of Leisler His trial Sentence on Leisler An Assembly summoned Discussion as to Leisler's execution Leisler and Millborne executed PAGE 214215216217218218220221 221 222 CHAPTER VL NEW YORK AFTER THE REVOLUTION. Effect of Leisler's rebellion Attempts to define the constitution Bill of Rights Death of Sloughter Appointment of Fletcher His instructions .... Dispute about Church endowments John Nelson and his Indian policy . Brooke's and Nicolls's memorial Fletcher advocates consolidation Difficulties with the Five Nations French invasion in 1692 . Expedition under Peter Schuyler Difficulties of the situation Fletcher and the Mohawks French negotiations with the Mohawks . Conference at Albany, 1694 Indian envoys at Quebec Mohawk prisoner tortured by the French Frontenac restores Fort Cataracouy Frontenac's progress through the Mohawk country Raid against Albany Fletcher's corrupt dealings His alliance with the Assembly Bellomont succeeds Fletcher .... The election of 1699 Changes in the Council and Assembly The French and the Five Nations . Bellomont's Indian and anti-French policy Lack of missionary enterprise 22422S226227 22722S228230231231234-23523s 237237238239239240241 242 243 24s24s246247 249250 251252. CONTENTS. XUI PAGE Livingstone's policy 253 Cornbury becomes Governor . 254 An interregnum 256 Revival of the Leislerite party 257 Trial of Bayard 259 Cornbury's policy 261 His financial misdeeds 263 His dealings with the Assembly 263 Ecclesiastical dispute 26s Trial of M'Kemie 266 Cornbury's disputes with the Assembly . 268 Cornbury recalled . 270 Appointment and death of Lovelace . 271 Unsuccessful expedition against Canada, 1709 272 Peter Schuyler takes Mohawk chiefs to England 273 Character of Hunter 274 He visits Albany 275 Lewis Morris . . ... 276 Dispute about salaries and fees 277 Treaty of Utrecht 280 Dispute with the French about Fort Frontenac 280 Hunter's land policy 281 The negro plot 281 The Palatines ... . . 284 General effect of Hunter's policy 28s CHAPTER VII. SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. Quakerism as a power in colonial history New Jersey the earliest Quaker colony The first settlement of New Jersey Dealings of the Proprietors with the existing settlers -First General Assembly .... Difficulties with Proprietors and settlers . Rebellion headed by James Carteret The Dutch reconquest .... Recovery of the colony by the Proprietors Transfer to Penn and his partners Fenwick's proceedings Andros's dealings with Fenwick Division of the province Policy of Penn and his associates Articles of the constitution 287289 290290 292294 294 296 298 299 299300301 302 303 xiv CONTENTS. Foundation of Burlington .... Fresh disputes between Andros and Fenwick Position of Penn and his partners Dispute with Andros about customs Penn's remonstrance ... Settlement of the dispute .... Andros attempts to levy customs in East Jersey Andros arrests Philip Carteret and summons an Assembly Further disputes between Carteret and the settlers . Working of the proprietary system Transfer of Carteret's proprietorship Penn and some Scotchmen purchase East Jersey Barclay appointed Governor . Assembly called; its proceedings The Fundamental Constitutions They are modified . Material condition of the colony Effect of the change of Proprietors Further emigration from Scotland New York jealous of New Jersey Dongan's dealings with New Jersey Contest for Staten Island State of West Jersey Fenwick's settlement incorporated New Jersey forms part of Andros's province Surrender by the Proprietors . Daniel Coxe .... Dealings of Andros with New Jersey The Revolution of 1688 in New Jersey Formation of a new proprietary Hamilton Governor of both provinces Bass succeeds him . . . , Difficulty with New York about customs . The case of the Hester Disunited state of New Jersey Morris and Bass ..... Disputes about the governorship Surrender of the colony by the Proprietors 305,305 306 306307 309-310312313 31s 31631731932a 32132332432s326.329 329329332333 334336336337 337338339- 340341 341343; 344 345347 CHAPTER VIII. NEW JERSEY A CROWN COLONY. General condition of the colony Want of money Dealings with Indians 3Sr351352 CONTENTS. XV State of education . Religious condition of the colony Cornbury appointed Governor His instructions Difficulties of his position Cornbury and the Quakers His quarrel with the Assembly Assembly elected Its proceedings Action of the English Government Assembly of 1707 Its dispute with Cornbury Assembly of 1708 .... ... Lovelace's instructions . . .... Importance of the dispute between Cornbury and the Assembly Interregnum between Lovelace and Hunter Hunter appointed Governor . . . . His attitude towards parties Sandford expelled from the Assembly Disputes between the Council and the Representatives Triumph of Hunter's party . . . . PAGE 353.353354357358 359359 359- 360' 363364^ 36s367 368;369' 371 372:372;373375 Z7^ CHAPTER IX. THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. Absence of biographical interest in American history Character of Penn His scheme of colonization His grant of territory His charter His intentions as a colonizer His "concessions" . His policy towards the natives The first emigration Constitutional arrangements Frame of government . ... Further grant of territory from the Duke of York Welsh settlers Incorporation of Newcastle The first Assembly "The Great Body of Laws" Foundation of Philadelphia .... Penn's treaty with the Indians The second Assembly ..... 379- 380-383384 38s 387'387-388 388.388.38t^393 394.395395396397-397 399> CONTENTS. The new charter Penn's account of the colony . His descriptions of the natives Penn accused of Popery Difficulty about the Indian trade Establishment of a small Privy Council Lack of activity in public life . Legislative measures Growth of the colony Alarm from the Indians Penn's instructions to his deputy George Keith .... Dispute between the province and the territories Pennsylvania included in Fletcher's commission Penn's remonstrance Fletcher at Philadelphia . His disputes with the Assembly Restoration of Penn Act of Settlement Penn's protest against smuggling Penn revisits the colony . His proprietorship in danger His territorial dispute with the settlers Demand of Delaware for separation The new constitution Charter granted to Philadelphia Penn finally departs His dispute with Quarry Hamilton becomes Governor . Succeeded by Evans Evans falls out with the Assembly The Assembly attack Logan . Further disputes French intrigues with Indians Gookin becomes Governor Disputes in the colony Penn's difficulties Further disputes in the colony Question about oaths Appendix I. Peter Heyn's Memorial Appendices II and III . Appendix IV. Middletown and Shrewsbury Appendix V. Value of Land in Pennsylvania Index page 400401402 403404 40s40s406406407 408409 411413 413 414415418419420420 421422 422 423 424 424 42442s426 426 428429 430430 431 432434434437438 438 439441 ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA. CHAPTER I. FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS.^ In estimating the fitness of the Dutch for the task of coloniza tion we must not mislead ourselves by picturing the Holland of The Dutch the sixteenth after the Holland of the nineteenth mists. °" century. The Holland that threw ofE the Spanish yoke was made up of city oligarchies, full of burgess pride and burgess luxury, yet self-denying and pitiless in their public spirit. That pomp, that material well-being which made Holland the wonder of foreign lands, brought with it no languor: a craving ior wealth made the Dutchman a voyager and a discoverer: inborn energy and a spirit trained in strife made the struggle as welcome as the prize. The Hollander had indeed more than we readily see in common with his oppressor. Likeness of tem per with unlikeness of principle, causes acting as surely with nations as with persons, severed the insurgent provinces from 1 The loss of the records of the Dutch West Indian Company has most un happily curtailed our sources of knowledge as to the establishment of the ¦colony of New Netherlands. We have, however, a most valuable magazine of information in the Collection of Documents (fifteen volumes) by Mr. Brod- head, Mr. O'Callaghan, and Mr. Fernow on the history of New Netherlands and New York. They consist of transcripts from Dutch, English, French, and Swedish archives, carefully arranged, extending down to 1776. A some what similar collection, but much inferior in extent, arrangement, and value, is Mr. O'Callaghan's Documentary History of New York. The Minutes of the City Council of New Amsterdam from 1653 to 1674. They have been translated from Dutch into English, partly by Mr. O'Cal laghan, partly by Mr. Fernow, and published in six volumes. In addition to the above records the first volume includes the ordinances of the Director- General and his Council from 1647 to 1653. I refer to them as Court Minutes. These ordinances have also been collected and edited by Mr. O'Callaghan in A separate volume, published in 1868. Mr. Brodhead's History of New York (two volumes), extending from the 2 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. Spain. So, too, what the Moor had done for Spain, the Spaniard was doing for Holland. Tyranny successfully re sisted, acting on the temper of an oligarchy, molded a race of men ready to hold their own against the world, with a spirit of defiance which made the struggle in no wise distasteful. There were indeed wide differences between the Spanish and the Dutch discoverer. The Spaniard was on his best side a crusader, on his worst — and that was often uppermost — a self-seeking ad venturer. A steady regard for corporate aims and commercial results underlay all that was done by Dutch explorers. Yet the dealings of Kieft with the natives of the Hudson Valley were a faint copy of Spanish brutality, and the fate of Towerson and his comrades at Amboyna recalls the tragedy which swept away the French colony from Florida. There was a yet stronger point of likeness. Spain and Holland alike fell into the snare which England alone of colonizing nations wholly avoided. W^ith both the era of colonization set in before the full tide of discovery, with its romance and its eager passions, had begun to slacken. Those who had the control of New Netherlands never learnt to regard the settlement as a de tached, self-sufKcing community. To them it was primarily a trading station. A state might grow up as best it could under the shadow of the factory. In other respects Holland was ill-fitted for the task of colonization. She had no rural communities with those in- foundation of the colony down to the suppression of Leisler's Rebellion in 1692, is a work of inestimable value. It is monotonous in style, and the writer too often hampers himself by a strict adherence to chronological arrangeraent. But its fullness, sobriety and impartiality, and the writer's clear perception of the political influences at work are beyond praise. Mr. Brodhead uses a great number of documents which are still in manuscript in the New York State Records. I felt that to investigate these, when the subject in hand was no more than an outlying province of my main work, would be superfluous la bor, and I have, tlierefore, trusted largely to Mr. Brodhead's guidance. His references and quotations are, indeed, so full that his work may almost be re garded as a collection of documents. There is useful material to be found in the Collections of the New York Historical Society, as also in Mr. Fernow's History of the City of New York, and Mr. Tuckerman's Life of Stuyvesant. For the history of the Swedish settlement much useful material is to be found in the Pennsylvanian Archives. Several documents of importance are pub lished in Hazard's Register of Pennsylvania, vol. iv. Acrelius's History of New Sweden was originally published in 1759, and republished by the Pennsyl vania Historical Society in 1874. The writer was tlie pastor of the Swedish Church at Christiania, and as such had access to written archives and was in a position to collect oral tradition. Ferris's History of ihe Original Settle ments on the Delaware is a book of sound historical authority. HOLLAND AND COLONIZATION. 3 Stitutions and instincts of self-government which enabled the English village to reproduce itself so effectually on the shores of Boston Bay and on the banks of the Connecticut. She had no gentry to play the part of Winthrop, men whose tastes and associations were of the country, but who yet had a share in all that was best and strongest in the national life. It was certain that in any Dutch colony the interests of the farmer would give way to the interests of the merchant. Nor had even the urban and mercantile part of Holland that training in self- government needful for colonists. The whole political life of Holland existed in oligarchies; each city was ruled by a close, self-electing order ; and so far as it formed part of the province, and through the province of the whole Federation, was solely represented by these oligarchies. The unflinching patriotism with which they had sustained the struggle with Spain gave them a hold on the national sympathy, which made full amends for their lack of any representative character. But to say that is only to urge the defense often put forward on behalf of a benevolent despotism. They who use that plea forget that it is not enough that a system should have secured good administration when the ruler and the ruled are at one; it must contain in itself some guarantee that it will work well under less favorable conditions. Study the early history of New Netherlands; compare its life with that of the English colonies on its north-eastern frontier. At every turn we are reminded that the Dutch settlers suc cumbed to difficulties which the English escaped, because the latter easily, almost spontaneously, adopted machinery which enabled the popular voice to make itself heard, while the Dutch in like circumstances were feeling for such machinery helplessly and blindly. Up to a certain period Holland and England ran almost identical courses, not in colonization, but in those preliminary The early stages of discovery which introduce colonization. voyagers. With the early Dutch explorers, as with their English rivals, the prospects of colonization counted for little. Far more important in their eyes was the discovery of new routes for trade. The Dutch entered on the field of Arctic discovery just at the time when it seemed to be abandoned by the English. In 1594 voyagers were sent out both from Amsterdam and Enchuysen in quest of a north-east passage to 4 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. ' Cathay.' All that accrued was a fuller knowledge of the northern seas, of the coast of Nova Zembla and Spitzbergen, and of the sea of Kara. Then comes a lull of ten years. Mean while another motive was at work identical with that which had impelled the great English voyagers of the Elizabethan age. It was manifest to Englishman and Dutchman alike that the American empire of Spain might be the vulnerable point in her armor. It would seem indeed to have been an English sea-cap- tain(Beets or Bates)who, in 1581, first definitely put the idea in shape and laid it as a practical scheme before the rulers of the revolted provinces. That policy was followed up a few years later by one who might be called the Dutch Gilbert, William Usselinx." The two men were no doubt severed by wide dif ferences — difference of character, training, and circumstances. Gilbert was an English gentleman, anchored to high and un selfish purposes and to public duty, alike by hereditary tradi tion and those conceptions of chivalry which formed the better side of the English Renaissance. Usselinx was a citizen of the world, an adventurer, who had seen the ways and cities of men. He had been a merchant in the Azores, he had traveled in Spain and Portugal, possibly even in Brazil and the West Indies. Yet with all these differences there were between the two men points of likeness in temper, and even more in policy. Each was sanguine and impetuous, aiming at great schemes full-blown, not content to lay unpretending foundations and leave time to do its work. Each, too, strove for a combination of objects which events showed to be irreconcilable, for a scheme which should be at once colonial, commercial, and war like. To neither Gilbert nor Usselinx was it granted to have any share in such success as their projects achieved. There was nothing in Usselinx's career as strikingly tragic as Gilbert's end. Yet Gilbert, swept away as he sailed back from that enterprise which was heroic even in its failure, is not so sad a figure as Usselinx, branded as an unsuccessful and disappointed dreamer, hawking his schemes and his services at a foreign court, ready at last to be the rival of his countrymen who had 1 Mr. Asper gives a full account of these voyages, but most unfortunately does not give his authority, or authorities, for them. 'All that is to be known about Usselinx is brought together in a monograph by Mr. Franklin Jameson in the second volume of the Papers of thc American Historical Association. HENRY HUDSON. 5 first neglected and then imitated him. Usselinx, willing to work for Sweden when his own country would have none of him, willing when Sweden hung back to build up a company taken from among the various nations of Europe, was a type of that cosmopolitanism which was fatal to the colonial career of Holland. It was that spirit which made New Netherlands, with its eighteen languages,' a mart for men of every race who chose to seek it, not, like the English colonies, a community striving to reproduce the social and political life of the parent state. If the schemes of Dutch projectors and the exploits of Dutch seamen suggest an English parallel, the likeness may be carried Dutch coio- a stage further. The hindrances which fought hindered agalnst Usselinx were closely akin to those which consWera-' fought against Gilbert's successors. James I., dread- tions. jng lest Virginian colonization should excite the wrathful jealousy of Spain, has his counterpart In the Dutch Arminians anxious to avoid any measure which might drive the enemy to extremities. Yet theirs was something better than the timid servility which sacrificed Raleigh, and all those ends which Raleigh held most dear, to the hopes of the Spanish Marriage. The motive of Barneveldt and his followers was patriotic, though their patriotism may have been somewhat nar row and short-sighted. They looked on the question as Hol landers, just as Usselinx looked on It as a Belgian. They had no wish to see continued hostility with Spain, since such hos tility if successful meant the return to Belgium of those exiles who had just furnished a new element of industry and enterprise to the population of Holland. To keep the Belgians was, in the judgment of the peace party, more gainful to Holland than to form part of a liberated and united Netherlands. The course of Dutch discovery, interrupted for more than ten years, was renewed by one of the most brilliant of those Henry great Seamen of whom the sixteenth century was Hudson. gQ fruitful, Henry Hudson. Although Hudson achieved his greatest exploits in the service of a foreign nation, yet England can claim him as hers not only by birth but by train ing. He was a pupil in that school of seamanship, as we may ' See p. 15. 6 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. call it, founded by Cabot — the Muscovy company. That which has given Hudson's name an abiding place in colonial history — the exploration of the river now called after him — was a chance incident in a voyage undertaken with wholly different aims. In two successive years, in 1607 and 1608, Hudson had en deavored to solve that problem which so many of his country men had set before them to no purpose, and to make his way to Cathay by the north-east. Baffled each time. In 1609 he renewed the effort.' He was then acting on behalf of the Dutch East India Company, with a crew half Dutch, half English. Some discord crept in; It may be that there were faults of temper and character in Hudson which led to trouble here, as they did to the tragedy of his last voyage. Through out the voyage he was hampered in his exploration by the backwardness of his men, and by breaches of discipline which perpetually threatened to embroil them with the savages. This time he attempted a passage in a new direction. He was acquainted with John Smith, and had learnt from him the existence of a river, north of Virginia, which Smith believed would lead to the Pacific. Hudson accordingly abandoned his scheme of finding a passage to the north, and coasted along the shore of Virginia. From the mouth of "the King's river In Virginia where our Englishmen are" he turned north, and then, hoping In all likelihood that he had found the passage suggested by Smith, he sailed up the river which now bears his name. Relations with the natives opened badly, and In a midnight skirmish an Englishman was killed. Hudson then unwisely captured some of the natives, and, as so often, a petty act of pilfering by a savage led to further violence. However, no serious obstacle was offered to the progress of the discoverers up the river till at what was afterwards the site of Albany the exploring party which he had sent on in a boat reported the stream too shallow for further navigation. With Hudson's departure from the river his connection with American colonization ends. The re port which he brought home of the river, and his descrip tion of the Chesapeake Bay, disclosed a country which might ' Mr. Asper publishes the original accounts of these voyages. That of the first is written by Hudson to one of his crew, of the second wholly by Hud son, of the third by his mate, Robert Juet of Limehouse, probably an English- THE DUTCH NORTHERN COMPANY. 7 amply repay Its occupants. The sailors had "caught great store of very good fish," the natives had been. In the main, friendly. The country appeared fertile and rich in timber, and on the banks of the river Hudson had marked "a very pleasant place to build a town." The inducement most likely of all to operate with the Dutch was the abundance of furs, and the readiness of the natives to exchange them for knives and hatchets. Cautiously and gradually Holland felt its way along the path which Hudson had opened. Trading voyages were sent The Dutch GUt ; young savages were brought home to Holland,' Hudson. and the Dutch became familiar not only with the Hudson and Manhattan Island, but with Narragansett Bay ^ and the Connecticut. Holland claimed the river which Hudson had discovered and made it her own in title, calling It after her young stadtholder, Mauritius. The highest point of the river which Hudson had touched was chosen as a permanent trading station, and received the name of Fort Nassau. There, In a moated and stockaded house, with thirteen cannon and a garrison of twelve men, a merchant clerk from Amsterdam trafficked with the natives for their beaver-skins.' On Manhattan Island a few huts were thrown up which served as winter shelter for a crew whose vessel had been burnt," and though their exact site and character Is unknown, there is ground for thinking that one or two more factory stations were In existence on the southern bank of the Hudson and in Delaware Bay." So far, however, nothing had been done towards the creation of a permanent and self-supporting settlement. That was only The to come as the indirect result of an extended com- company. mctcc. In 1614 that scheme for which Usselinx had failed to gain a hearing was revived. Early in that year a company was incorporated under a charter from the States- General, with the right of whale-fishing In the northern seas, and with the further object of discovering a north-east passage.' The success of the Dutch East India Company, formed In 1602, gave encouragement to such a scheme. The States- 1 Wassenaar in Callaghan, vol. iii. p. 25. * De Laet, vol. i. pp. 7, 8. ' Brodhead, vol. i. p. 55. * Ih. p. 48. Mr. Brodhead quotes original authorities. * See the appendices to Asper's translation of Wassenaar. " Brodhead, vol. i. p. 59. He refers to the Dutch archives. 8 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. General, too, offered inducements to private explorers by promis ing that any discoverer of new lands should have a monopoly of trade there for four voyages.' The principle of co-operation was soon carried further. In the autumn of 1614 some of those merchants whose ships had The Am- been trading with the lands discovered by Hudson clmpa"y. formed themselves Into a company. The privileges which they received may be said to have called into existence the province of New Netherlands." Their charter for the first time recognized and asserted on behalf of Holland a title to a tract of land on the American coast. It granted to the Com pany the exclusive right of trading with New Netherlands, and it defined that territory as lying between New France and Virginia, and extending from the fortieth to the forty-fifth degree of latitude. The name of the territory was beyond doubt an implied claim. Yet the document said nothing of adverse possession against the possible title of other nations, nor did it give any sort of territorial right nor any jurisdiction to the grantees. It did nothing but establish a commercial monopoly. Such rights as were granted to this body known as the Amsterdam Company were limited to four years. The scheme Treaty of did not therefore profess to have in It any element sentha. of permanence. It could not possibly serve as a basis for colonization. Yet one of its proceedings had an abiding influence in colonial history. In 161 7 it became clear that the settlement at Fort Nassau was unsafe against winter floods. The factory was moved to the western bank, near the mouth of a tributary stream, the Tawasentha." In dealing with savages one cannot speak with strict propriety of territorial bounds. But the site of the settlement, if not in the lands of the Mohawks, was within their control, and an alliance with them was a needful condition for the safety of the foreign traders. Of the treaty ratified at the Tawasentha between the Dutch factors and the Mohawks nothing Is known In detail.* But ^ New York Documents, vol. i. p. 5. ^The charter (translated) is among the New York Documents, vol. i. p. 11. ' Wassenaar, p. 9. * Mr. Brodhead (vol. i. p. 88) gives a full account ot this treaty. The only specific authorities whom he quotes are Moulton and Schoolcraft. I cannot discover who Moulton is, and the reference to Schoolcraft is too vague to be of any service. I am, however, prepared to accept Mr. Brodhead's judgment as authority for the existence of the treaty. THE DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY. 9 the alliance thus begun had an Influence which cannot be over rated. The conquest of New Netherlands gave the English colonies a continuous sea-board. It gave them what was of even greater value in the coming struggle with France, the control of the Hudson and the friendship of the Five Nations. The privileges of the Amsterdam Company came to an end in 1618. It soon had a successor with far wider aims and The Dutch powers. The body Incorporated as the Dutch West West India ti-/-i , i-i ^ r ¦ Company. India Company was not endowed with any dehnite territorial grant.' Nor was it confined by Its charter to America. It might extend Its action not only to any portion of the American sea-board, but to the coast of Africa between the Tropic of Cancer and the Cape of Good Hope. Within these limits It was secured against any Dutch competitor. Within the same limits It might establish settlements over which it could exercise sovereign power, administering justice, making alliances and conducting wars, with no restraint beyond the obligation to report its doings to the States-General. Technically Indeed a declaration of war must be approved by the States-General, but how could such a restraint act when barbarians many thousand miles away were the enemy? It Is clear that there was not In this charter any special assertion of a territorial claim over New Netherlands. The document must be held to mean that all the territories referred to were vacuum domicilium, except where any other nation could urge some special claim of oc cupancy or possession. One great fault underlay the constitu tion of the Company. Conforming too closely to that of the States-General themselves, It was a federation without an •effective center. The affairs were managed by five separate chambers of directors, representing Amsterdam, Zeeland, Dordrecht, and North Holland, with a fifth joint chamber for Friesland and Groningen. The business of these chambers was mainly financial. The capital of the Company was divided into nine shares; of these four were allotted to Amsterdam, two to Zeeland, and one to each of the other chambers. The directors were elected by the various chambers. Amsterdam had twenty, Zeeland twelve, each of the other chambers fourteen. The executive was a board to which the Amsterdam chamber sent eight representatives, Zeeland four and each of the others ^ The charter is given both by Hazard and by O'Callaghan. IO FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. two, while one attended on behalf of the States-General. Such a constitution was Ill-fitted to give promptness or efliciency of action. An elaborate federal constitution was not the only hindrance to the success of the Company. It belonged to a party rather The Com- than to the nation. It represented the views and «nt^ th^'^'" gave effect to the schemes of the thoroughgoing war war party, party, of those who were fain to force Spain to the last extremity, and thus it lost the support of the many wealthy merchants who favored the policy of Barneveldt. Such hin drances told against the vitality of the Company, against its efficiency as an instrument for colonization. They did not abate its successful ambition, or check a stream of wealth which flowed from war rather than trade. Not our own East India Company in the days when it overturned thrones, and held the descendants of an emperor for its vassals, made more daring claims or furthered them with more high-handed gallantry. We read of the Company with Its navy of a hundred ships and its army of fifteen thousand men, of Peter Heyn capturing the Spanish treasure fleet, and returning with seventeen captive galleons bearing a treasure of twelve million dollars.' As we look on Heyn's stately memorial in Delft Church, and read how he, a second Jason, sailing to the colonies of the New World, tore from the King of Spain that Golden Fleece which had been a terror to other voyagers, and bore it home, not to Greece but to the United Provinces, we feel that the spirit of Drake and Hawkins had passed from the shores of Devon to the banks of the Texel.'' The directors of the Company, indeed, openly avowed that they had changed the purpose with which they had set out, that the career of a patriotic buccaneer was better than that of a merchant, and that it was cheaper for the States-General to entrust the war to a company who spent their winnings at home than to subsidize foreign m.ercenaries. Their object was not "trifling trade with the Indians nor the tardy cultivation of uninhabited regions," but "acts of hostility against the ships and property of the King of Spain and his subjects.'" Thus, too ' Brodhead (who quotes authorities), vol. i. p. 184. ^ I give the text of the monumental inscription in an Appendix. 'Remonstrance of the West India Company against a peace with Spain, Brodhead, Documents, vol. i. p. 62. COLONIAL PROGRESS OF THE COMPANY. n a shrewd and somewhat unfriendly critic notices that the Company having come into possession of Peter Heyn's booty Jbestowed not a thought upon their best trading port at Fort Orange.' Such gains and such hopes were rendering the Company utterly unfit for the slow, dull task of colonization, with no Immediate hopes of profit. At the very time that the Company was thus matching itself against the whole might of the Spanish Empire, and overawing the conquerors of Mexico and Peru, Its settlers on the Hudson were hemmed into a ruinous village; that which should have been a fort, open on every side to the enemy, the farms tenantless and unfenced, the site of its one warehouse hardly to be found, the only trace of prosperity In the estate of the resident director. Moreover the administration of New Netherlands was vested, not In the whole Company, -but only In a section of it. That part of the corporate business was handed over to the Amsterdam chamber. Thus the Com pany as a whole had no direct control over the colony, and felt no responsibility for it. If any dispute arose between the •chambers, or any lack of harmony in the working of the Com pany, New Netherlands as a dependency of Amsterdam would be looked on not merely with Indifference, but with jealousy and Ill-will. All that the Company could claim to have done for coloniza tion was to have set on foot a movement which had in it an •Colonial element of vitality, a principle, though weak and progress torpid, of growth. In the history of New Nether- company. j^^jg (j^g^g ^.^ nothing like that solid and effective progress with which New England stretched her robust grasp over the wilderness. Yet something was done. During the first seventeen years of the Company's corporate life settlements were established not only on the Hudson, but on Long Island and on Delaware Bay. A fresh post, called Fort Orange, was established on the west bank of the Hudson, to the north of Fort Nassau, which It superseded.' The name of Nassau was transferred to a fort near the union of the Schuylkill and the Delaware, founded in 1623, but deserted after three years' oc- ^ De Vries in N. Y. Docs. i. 145. '^Journal of New Netherlands, Holland Documents, vol. i. p. 181. 12 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. cupatlon.' By 1626 there were at Manhattan some thirty scattered houses.' In that year the place was regularly secured by a fortification and a battery." Beside the farmers of Man hattan there was another agricultural settlement, that at Waal- boght on Long Island, formed by Walloons settled there in 1623.* Nassau was not the only settlement towards the south. Another called Swanendael was formed on Delaware Bay, at what Is now Lewlstown. That, however, was, as we shall see, but short-lived. The fur trade was the one means through which the colony seemed in any way likely to repay Its founders. Its only other productive industry was ship-building. That for a while throve, though it was in all likelihood ostentation rather than reasonable enterprise which built and launched a vessel of at least six hundred tons.° Sawmills also were tried but did not answer. The Company, too, traded with New England, importing hither tobacco and live stock. That, however, was no benefit to New Netherlands, but rather to its prejudice, as giving the settlers competitors for the necessaries of life. It is not a little to be regretted that the continuous records of the Company are no longer extant. Thus we have nothing like a clear history of the early economical life of the settlement, nor of the terms on which the first settlers occupied their hold ings. It would seem, however, that not only the land, but the stock upon it, belonged to the Company. The so-called farmer was not so much a tenant as a servant paid by certain allowances- in kind. The whole business of the Company, Its land and Its. fur trade, was under the control of one official, the Director. He was assisted by a Council, and in conjunction with them had certain limited judicial powers. Below him were two other executive officers — the Koopman, that is, the bookkeeper and secretary, and the Schout, responsible for the observance of the cnminal law. All these functionaries were directly appointed by the Company, and seem to have been removable at pleasure. It was plainly impossible that with this constitution the Com pany could extend its agricultural operations far. To supple- The ment this, a scheme was introduced In 1629 for estab- patroons. lishing a class of landed proprietors. Like a medl- ^ Journal of New Netherlands, Holland Documents, vol. i. p. i8i. ^ Ihid. 3 Wassenaar, p. 37. * 'Brodhead, i. 155. He quotes the Albany Records. ' Letter from Mason, the proprietor of New Hampshire. N. Y. Docs. iii. 27. THE PATROONSHIPS. 13 aeval king, the Company allotted portions of Its territory to indi viduals, on whom it conferred not only proprietary rights but also certain subordinate jurisdiction. These grantees — patroons as they were called — were tempted by an exceedingly restricted share in the Company's monopoly of trade. Each was to bring out fifty adult emigrants, and in return was to receive a tract of land reaching sixteen miles along the river, all on one bank or half on each, with no fixed limit of width. The colonists whom the patroon took out were to be ascriptt glebce. The patroon himself was to hold manorial courts, from which there was a right of appeal to the Company. If he could found townships within his territory, he might himself appoint in them a staff of officials. A privilege of the Old World, too, was renewed for the benefit of the patroon. The tenant might grind corn nowhere but at his mill. On the patroons the Com pany cast a duty which they might themsel\jes have fitly dis charged, that of providing ministers and schoolmasters.' The objections to these arrangements were many and obvious. It meant the Introduction of a landed aristocracy among a people whose life in the Old World had done nothing to familiarize them with such a system. To leading members of the Company it offered opportunities for large and lucrative speculation in land. Thus we find one director, Killaen van Rensselaer, an Amsterdam jeweler, acquiring a territory on the upper Hudson so vast that as a concession to the general outcry he had to slice it up Into five patroonships. It was a system, too, which went to make any effective central government im possible, alike for civil or military purposes. There was no cohesion between the patroonships, no interdependence: one might prosper without, benefiting Its neighbors. Moreover, the patroon was usually an absentee, and the conditions of a new country leave no margin for rent. The patroon often delegated his post to an agent; the land had, in modern phrase, to keep two gentlemen. One indirect and remote gain the system brought. The Inhabitants of each patroonship might appoint a deputy to confer upon Its own affairs with the Director and Council of the Colony. It is a long step from that to a stable system of 1 The Charter of Patroons is in the Collections of the New York Historical Society, 2nd series, vol. i. p. 370. 14 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. representative government. But in New Netherlands represent ative government was attained so slowly, and through so many Incomplete experiments, that one may reckon even a faint and Imperfect approach towards It as a step In advance. Two attempts were made to modify the system, not wholly without success. In 1640 the patroonships were reduced in ex- - ,„ „„ tent and a smaller class of proprietor was introduced, omaii pro- "ii' • ' '\^ n prietors. holding two hundred acres, and tilling it with hve servants brought out at his own expense. Ten years later the Company tried the experiment of supplying tenants with stock. A tract of land was granted to a farmer. The ground was partly cleared, and there was on it a house and a barn. The tenant was to be supplied with implements and with live stocky four horses, as many cows, and a certain number of sheep and pigs. He was to pay a fixed rent, partly In money, partly in butter. For six years the stock were to remain on the tenant's hands at the joint risk of himself and the Company. At the end of that time the Company is to receive back the stock or an equivalent.' But the system, however modified, had in it no element of success. The agricultural prosperity of New Netherlands did not begin till rural communities sprung up like those of New England, some actually formed by emigrants thence, others fashioned on that model. In 1638 the Company granted to its subjects a strictly limited share in Its own commercial advantages. Private persons might The Com- import and export In the Company's ships, paying a pany modi- , . i i i • 1 fies its duty of ten per cent, on goods brought into the of°rade.'' colony, fifteen on exports. But Inasmuch as It was at the same time enacted that each colonist was to pledge him self voluntarily to submit to the regulations and commands of the Company's officers, the scanty privileges rested on a pre carious basis.' Moreover, even if such a measure did something for the com mercial prosperity of the colony, yet it failed to meet the chief need and to give life, strength, and cohesion to the several parts of the settlement. For a community which has yet to grow Into civic life there is no little truth in the Greek theory, that It is ' These conditions are set forth in a pamphlet written by Tienhoven, the Secretary to the Colony, in 1650. O'Callaghan, vol. iv. p. 26. 2 Brodhead, vol. i. p. 288. COSMOPOLITANISM OF THE COLONY. 1$, against good order to have a crowd of traders coming and going.' The change, however, did at least stimulate Immigration. In eight years the number of farms had multiplied fourfold.' Increase of ^ut even this brought Its drawbacks. It complicated population, jjjg relations with the savages. The peace of the colony might at any time be imperiled by one unscrupulous trader. Commerce, too, brought in a miscellaneous horde with no sense of corporate life, of a common origin, of common tradi tions. One is compelled to think that the statement of a Jesuit visitor In 1644 who found eighteen different tongues must have been colored by a Frenchman's rhetoric.' But several of these tributary streams can be clearly identified. English there were, many no doubt, like Underbill, men whom the rigid ecclesiastical corporations of New England with their exacting tests excluded. Others, French Huguenots, Walloons, Scotch peddlers, Jews, ,have left the trace of their existence in the records of the community. The result was a total absence of that unity which In New England was so Intense. She with all her errors, and In a. measure by those errors, created that "cake of custom," as a thoughtful writer has called it,* so needful to give firmness and cohesion where the conventional ties of old countries are absent, the want of which made the early political life of New Nether lands so weak and unstable. Since the records of the Dutch West India Company have perished, nearly all the documentary evidence as to Its early impor- proceedings that survives consists of controversial Governors. Writings, attacks on officials and their defense. In deed in the absence of records the whole subject becomes in tensely personal: the characters and motives of the Governors assume a preponderating importance. To speak of the Gov ernors at the outset by that name is almost misleading. It calls up associations of the full and vigorous political life of Mas sachusetts or Virginia. For some years the Governor, or, to give him his proper title, the Director of New Netherlands, was really but the manager of a large trading house. ^ Aristotle's Politics, b. vii. ch. 6. ^ Brodhead, vol. i. p. 290. ° Father Jogues. His report is in O'Callaghan, vol. iv. p. 15. * Bagehot, in Physics and Politics. 1 6 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. That is certainly true of the first Governor, Jacobsen May, and his successor William Verhulst. We can hardly say more Peter of the third, Peter Minuit. Yet there was enough Minuit. that was noteworthy and typical In Minult's career and character to deserve notice. His course was not unlike that of Usselinx; each illustrates the fatal cosmopolitanism which marred the fortunes of New Netherlands. Sent out as Director- General in 1626, In 163 1 he Incurred the displeasure of the Company by favoring the patroons in their schemes for ac cumulating landed property.' Dismissed on this ground, like Usselinx he transferred his services to another country, and thus became one of the chief instruments in overthrowing the Dutch settlement. "For while the Swedish colony itself fell easily before the energy of New Netherlands, the effort of that struggle left the conqueror In turn defenseless. Despite Minult's lack of patriotism, his strenuous energy makes him stand out a vivid figure In annals which till then are Wouter void of biographical interest. His successor, Van Twiller. Twiller, is saved from nonentity by strange incon gruity of character and position. There is nothing to show him unfit to have carried on the affairs of the Company in ordinary times. In the mere head of a factory, his hard drink ing, his bluster, and his cowardice might have been atoned for by his tradesmanlike shrewdness. By the irony of fate he was placed at the head of affairs just as the colony was emerging from the purely trading stage, just as It was first entangled in conflicts which heralded the transfer of European battles to the New World. Full justice, too, was done to his grotesque failure by a shrewd and unfriendly observer. During his term of office the colony was revisited by David de Vries, that resolute and enterprising man, the leading partner in the abortive attempt to form a settlement at Swanendael. With views that took in more than trade, he explored the Hudson, the Delaware, and the shores of Chesapeake Bay, planning the establishment of a whale fishery, making friends with the savages, and opening Intercourse with the English in Virginia. We learn from his writings how, during his stay at Fort Amsterdam, an English ship sailed into the Hudson. Her captain, Eelkens, was a discharged servant of the Company. Like Minuit, he did not .. ^Brodhead, vol. i. p. 213. DE VRIES. 17 scruple to turn his local experience against his former employers. The voyage was more than an unauthorized Intrusion on Dutch trade. It was accompanied by a claim on the part of Eelkens and his employers to equal rights with the Dutch on the river discovered by the Englishman, Hudson. De Vries tells us how Eelkens demanded a pass from Van Twiller ; how, after a week's delay, no pass came, and how, thereupon, Eelkens sailed under the guns of Fort Amsterdam with the English flag flying, while the Director on the quay stood before an open cask of wine, drinking with his friends the health of the Prince of Orange, and appealing to them to protect him against violence. The Director's underlings did something to supply his own lack of courage. By judicious and persistent Interference they with held the Indians from trade with the new-comer. The dealings of the Director with De Vries himself were marked by the same spirit of Ineffective bluster. The Director His deal- demanded that De Vries's ship should be Inspected De Vries. before she sailed. De Vries refused; twelve mus keteers were sent down to enforce the order; In quiet defiance of the threat De Vries rowed from the shore and bade his crew weigh anchor. Two years later Van Twiller had thankfully to accept the services of the man who defied him. Fort Nassau, the Dutch station on the Delaware, was now deserted, and a small party from Maryland seized on the vacant site. One of them, a deserter whose motives are nowhere explained, brought news to New Amsterdam of the encroachment. Van Twiller at once sent De Vries to deal with the matter. A second party of twenty men was just ready to assist the new settlement. But the assailants arrived before the relieving force could sail, and the Intruders were peacefully removed and transported back to Maryland.' Like encroachments were being attempted with more success to the north by the New England settlers in the valley of the Encroach- Connecticut. With no better resources, his em- nIw Eng" ployers supine about everything but the beaver trade, '*"'*• his colony a number of scattered outposts, with no ' For all these transactions De Vries himself is our authority. I cannot find any explicit statement to the effect that the Dutch reoocupied Fort Nassau. 3ut that they did so is clear from what follows (i»/^. p. 58). 1 8 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. actual organization and no corporate life, one may doubt If Van Twiller could have done anything to check the stren uous advance of English Puritanism. Yet one may well be lieve that his known incapacity encouraged that defiant pol icy against which his more energetic successors were pow erless. Van Twiller's successor, William Kieft, was a man of widely different character. He had no lack of energy. If good Wiiiiam government lay In the contriving of administrative Kieft. machinery, he would have been a good governor. Within the little sphere of his province he aimed at ubiquitous despotism. His very first step was to reduce the Council to a nullity by nominating only one councilor and reserving to him self a double vote. Since the Council was the one judicial body, this practically made Kieft supreme and Irresponsible in civil and criminal cases. He may not have been personally corrupt, though, even there, his character was not beyond suspicion. But he had no scruple about acting through corrupt instruments. In his secretary, Van Tienhoven, he had a sub ordinate who saw clearly that a minute and pervading despotism such as Kieft aimed at left room for plenty of official corruption. Thus, for instance, Kieft ordered that no deposition or other document should be valid as evidence unless written by the Secretary. Here the Secretary's greed and the Governor's love of official interference worked together. Kieft, too, was mani festly one of those who think that a community can be drilled into prosperity and morality. He fenced In trade with severe edicts. Many of his orders were in themselves reasonable. His error lay in forcing them simultaneously and with ostenta tious severity on a community used only to lax authority. No officials were to trade in furs, and the right of exportation, lately granted to private persons, was withdrawn. To sell guns or powder to the Indians was made a capital crime. Kieft was plainly a man of austere private life. New Amsterdam, with its mixed population of sailors and traders, left plenty of scope for an earnest moral reformer. The Governor exercised the right of licensing vintners at his own discretion; hours were fixed for work. A proclamation was issued with a list of prohibited vices, including lewdness and calumny, and ending with the comprehensive form, "all other immoralities." Sailors, WILLIAM KIEFT. 19 who no doubt contributed their full share to the catalogue, were to be on land only In the daytime.' A man of winning tact or of commanding dignity and re strained temper might possibly have carried out such a policy. The Kieft, It Is plain, was neither. His only positive influ- Council of .... 11.,,. Twelve and encc was that indirect one by which despotism works war." '^° its own cutc. HIs harsh and ill-judged interference woke in the settlers a spirit of resistance which under mere neg lect and bad administration might have slumbered. Thus it came that under the most despotic of Its early rulers the colony took Its first steps, slight Indeed, but yet containing the seeds of better things, towards representative government. As usual, external danger gave the opening for resistance. In 1641 a settler was murdered by an Indian in fulfillment of an ancient blood feud. Fifteen years before, a chief of the same tribe bringing furs to sell at Manhattan was robbed and murdered by three servants of Minuit. With the victim was his nephew, a young lad. He escaped and grew to manhood with a fixed purpose of revenge for the deed which he had beheld. His vengeance, however, fell on one who seems to have been in no way connected with the original outrage. One Claus Smit, a wheelwright, had settled in an isolated hut, north-east of Man hattan. The Indian visited him on the pretext of trade and, getting behind him, treacherously drove his tomahawk Into Smit's head. Kieft was not the man to pass over such a matter. Yet he might well feel that it was a hopeless task to retaliate with an exasperated population at his back, and with no ma terials better than these at hand he might well refuse to be personally responsible for the security of the colony. His first need was popular support. Kieft at once called a general meet ing of householders and laid the case before them, suggesting a demand for the surrender of the murderer ; if that were refused, retaliation. The meeting at once appointed twelve representa tives under the presidency of De Vries to act for them. It is clear that Kieft had little intention of submitting his own judgment to that of the colonists or their delegates: he wanted ^ For Kieft's regulation see Brodhead, vol. i. pp. 277-8. - Our knowledge of these proceedings is partly due to De Vries, partly to a letter or pamphlet in the N. Y. Docs. vol. i. p. 179. It is calendared by Mr. Brodhead by the title of lournal of New Netherlands. I refer to it by that title. 20 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. support, not advice. Kieft's own policy was one of merciless retaliation and intimidation. The consent of the Twelve was reluctantly given. A troop of eighty soldiers was sent out to obtain redress; Ignorance of the country, and one may well believe the backwardness of the settlers, brought the expedition to nothing. But though they returned to New Amsterdam without striking a blow, yet the attempt was enough to terrify the offending tribe. Peace was made, with a promise, never fulfilled, to give up the murderer. Meanwhile the Twelve were availing themselves of the position which they had gained to make certain demands on Demands behalf of the settlers. In the Fatherland, they said. Twelve. 1 every small village had Its five or seven schepens. Yet the citizens of New Netherlands were allowed no share in the control of their own aft'airs. Even such a slight check on the Governor as was imposed by the existence of the Council was frustrated since places in that body were allowed to remain vacant. Let the Council be filled up and let the freemen elect four members of It. Let the elected Twelve representatives have a right of veto upon any taxes Imposed. Let there be an annual muster under arms. These indeed would be the best security for popular rights. A people capable of bearing arms surrounded by enemies could with due perseverance make their own terms against a governor unsupported by mercenary troops. Kieft, strong In his own despotic temper and in the anticipated support of the Company, hardly yielded an inch of ground. The Kieft's muster might be held, but the Company could not af- answer. {qx^ to glve powdet. No control over taxation can be granted to the popular representatives. The Council Kieft admits Is small. He is hoping for the arrival of some persons of rank. Then he will fill it up. The freemen may appoint four Councilors, two to retire each year. He winds up with the conventional plea for an arbitrary system : "of what practical in jury can the settlers complain ?" The only point on which Kieft gave way was In connection with certain questions of trade. The Twelve had petitioned for trade with foreign vessels. This was granted with certain restrictions necessary for good order. The Twelve also treated the importation of English cattle as a grievance to the farmer. ^ For these demands and Kieft's ansv/er, see Brodhead, voi. i. pp. 326-8. TROUBLES WITH THE INDIANS. 21 Accordingly it was provided that such importation should be limited to bulls and he-goats. There had been certain attempts to regulate arbitrarily the value of money. This had led to the exportation of specie. Kieft promised that It should be dis continued. With these bare installments of reform the Twelve were dismissed. It was not long before the troubles with the Indians were renewed. A native, who had been made drunk and cheated Further by a Dutchman, took the law Into his own hands; wft'h'the and murdered the offender. His tribesmen were re- indians. quired to give up the murderer. They offered a large store of wampum as compensation, but were unable or unwilling to arrest the criminal. There was reason to fear that this was not an isolated outrage. Rumors of an Impending massacre ran through the scattered Dutch plantations. Meanwhile their Indian enemies were themselves threatened on the other side by the Mohicans, and were fleeing from their villages to the coast. Two lines of policy presented themselves to the settlers. Some, headed by De Vries, saw in the danger of these Indians an opportunity for winning their gratitude. The houseless fugitives might be sheltered and abide in safety till the tide of Mohawk Invasion flowed back. Others saw In the weakness of the enemy an opportunity for exacting retribution and striking terror. Kieft, having by his own act dismissed the Twelve, could not with any show of reason throw himself on their advice or require them to share his responsibility. Never theless when three members of that body petitioned him to de clare war, he at once accepted their policy and justified himself by pleading popular approval. The result was a hideous and undlscriminating massacre, well-nigh as black a chapter as any in the history of civilized men and barbarians. Nor was Kieft alone In his folly. A wanton raid by the Long Island settlers on the granaries of the friendly Indians brought another attack upon the settlers. On every side the colony was hemmed in with enemies of Its own making. From a multitude of tribes owning no common allegiance It was impossible to obtain a secure peace. Terms Indeed were made with the Long Island savages, but with little confidence or good will on either side. Later on In the summer news came that the savages about Fort Orange were up in arms, and that fifteen of the Dutch had 2 2 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. perished. The settlers could only cower together within the fortifications of New Amsterdam, leaving behind a wilderness of wasted fields and burning houses. In like trials the people of New England had ever been borne up by a strong sense of corporate unity and an unshaken con- Attacks fidence in rulers of their own choice. The unhappy on Kieft. New Netherlanders had no such stay in their distress. Hints at the expediency of deposing the Governor were heard. He who had ever turned a deaf ear to all popular remonstrance or demand now tried to shift the blame of his failure on his advisers. The plea roused the fury of one who had been at once the partner and the victim of Kieft's misdeeds. One of the three who had counseled war, Adriaensen, had seen his own plantation in flames and desolate. Kieft's attempt to shield himself was practically giving up Adriaensen to popular fury. The injured man broke in on Kieft, charged him with calumny, and then, supported by two of his followers, attempted the Governor's life.' In these straits, beset by savages without and disaffected sub jects within, Kieft as before sought to shift his responsibility Councilor °" *"° ^^^ people. He again called a meeting of Eight. householders and asked for a committee. The set tlers might well feel that it was useless to co-operate with one so arbitrary and so untrustworthy, one who thus evaded responsi bility and defied control. They demanded that the Governor should nominate the board, leaving the householders a veto. At length after some wrangling the householders accepted Kieft's proposal and chose a board of eight.' They at once took an important step. Hitherto the colony had no relations with the mother-country save through the Com- The Eight pany. The Eight now sent a letter to the Company thfs^tates. setting forth their woes and their dangers. But at Generai.3 ^j^g g^jj^g jjj^^g ^j^g^ ^^^^ ^ j.^^^^ appeal to the States- General. Though it was not formally and avowedly an attack on the Company, yet every line of it told of the Company's neglect. There was, they said, no effective resistance. The garrison was insufficient and had no powder, while, thanks to ^ Brodhead, vol. i. p. 357. ^n. p. 365. 'Mr. Brodhead gives the text of the appeal, vol. i. p. 371, &c. END OF THE INDIAN WAR. 23 the contraband trade, the enemy was abundantly supplied. Aid might have been got from New England, but the colony had no means of paying. Last came a prophetic warning, which, even though the Company were deaf to it, might touch patriotic statesmen. If the colonists were left unaided, they would have to desert their homes and join their neighbors to the east. The whole country, with its fertile soil, its harbors, and Its fur trade, would become English territory. All through the next year the war dragged on. It was not as when the Pequods threatened Connecticut, or when the End ofthe varlous tribes on the New England frontier were war. marshaled under the dominant will of Philip. Here the settlers were menaced in every quarter by enemies acting with little concert. This, while It saved the settlers from one overwhelming attack, increased the ever present sense of insecurity and the difficulty of making an abiding peace. Mercenaries were hired from New England, among them that •strange Puritan soldier of fortune, John Underbill. The strategy which he had learned under Mason stood him in good stead. On a March night, with snow-covered ground, a force of a hundred and fifty men surrounded an Indian village near the Connecticut. The occupants were over five hundred. Mason with greater Inequality of numbers had boldly forced the palisade, and only resorted to fire when his troops seemed in ^danger of being overwhelmed. Underbill's strategy was more ¦cautious and more merciless. The place was surrounded and every Indian that tried to break through was shot. Then fire was used to coraplete the work.' Underbill's unsparing blow was effective. It at once brought the savages on Long Island and the adjacent mainland to terms, leaving the colony only threatened on the south and west. There, however, things were little better. But the opportune arrival of a hundred and thirty soldiers, sent by the Governor of Curagoa, brought with it some security. During the whole of 1644 the settlers were clamoring for vigorous measures. Indifferent as Kieft no doubt was to the real well-being of the ¦colony, yet one may well believe that he felt sorely hampered by the disunion among the settlers, and by the total want of any vigorous corporate life. We have evidence that, at least in 1 Brodhead, vol. i. pp. 390-1. 24 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. the case of the patroons, desire for gain had swept away all sense of public responsibility and common interest. In the very thick of the Indian trouble a ship sent out by Rensselaer reached Manhattan. Amongst her freight were shoes. These were urgently needed for the soldiers. The supercargo refused to sell them. A dispute followed which led to a complete search of the vessel, and the discovery of a supply of arms and am munition. There was at that time an extensive fur trade at Rensselaerwyck, and we cannot doubt that the guns and powder would have soon been In the hands of the men before whom the colony was cowering.' Had the savages been actuated by any well-defined common purpose, had tbey been under the guidance of a leader with a deliberate scheme for exterminating the intruders, the case of the Dutch settlement would in all likelihood have been hopeless. Happily for the colonists the anger of the savages was, like their friendship, fickle and wayward: resentment led them to harass and to plunder. It could not give them the steady patience to carry a long war to a successful issue. In the summer of 1645 peace was made first with the Indians on the upper Hudson, soon after with those about Manhattan. The principle of the latter treaty was to restrict as far as might be all private and unauthorized intercourse between the settlers and the natives. No armed Indian was to enter the Dutch settlement: no Dutchman was to visit a native village unless under the escort of a native.' This was followed by a treaty with the Mohawks.' Five years of war such as had been waged had shattered the commercial prosperity of the colony in every direction. Its ex port trade depended on the purchase of beaver skins from the savages, Its Internal prosperity on agriculture, and both were at a standstill. Nor was the material loss and suffering all. Seven years before Connecticut had gone through like trials. She had emerged from them strengthened, schooled In endurance and self-reliance, in military discipline and civil cohesion. For New Netherlands there was no such compensation. The best ^ Brodhead, vol. i. p. 390. ^ Ih. vol. i. p. 407. '/b. vol. i. p. 408. The treaty is referred to in Van Der Donck's account of New Netherlands. N. Y. Hist. Coll., 2nd series, vol. i. p. 161. WANT OF CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY. zj that could be said was that harsh schooling had brought home- clearly to men's minds the faults of their political system. We have seen how imperfect was the amount of representation granted to the people. The Twelve and the Eight were in Want of truth nothing more than executive committees ap- tuTna*]"" pointed for a special purpose. They had no per- machinery. manent Constitutional functions. Nor did they serve to bind together the different parts of the colony. As a part of the machinery of government they were worthless: their value was that they did something towards enabling the people to make their complaints heard. They did not secure the forms of responsible government, but they taught the Company that it was not safe to leave the voice of the settlers unheeded. The remonstrance already mentioned was followed up by another petition, repeating even more emphatically the tale of the colo nists' sufferings. The Eight charged Kieft with having through wanton brutality changed the Indians from friends to foes, with turning a deaf ear to the wishes of the people, and misleading the Company with false reports. They petitioned for his re moval, and for a fresh governor with more emigrants, not to be scattered abroad in patroonships or scattered holdings, but grouped as in New England in Jtownshlps, each with Its own elected officials, who, all in combination, should make up the government of the colony. It Is to be noticed, too, that while the Twelve only addressed Kieft, the Eight went a step further,. and petitioned the Council.' Supine as the Company had been in care for their colonists,. they at least saw that It was useless to retain Kieft. The whole Report of question was referred to the "Rekenkammer," a com- kammer.2' mittee of the Company appointed, strictly speaking, for the control of finance, but allowed to go beyond that and deal with general questions of organization. They produced a report, proposing certain administrative reforms. Kieft was to be superseded and called to account for his first attack on the Indians. Trade was to be thrown open to all permanent resi dents In the colony, but there was to be no sale of arms to the natives. New Amsterdam was to be fortified and garrisoned: ' Brodhead (vol. i. pp. 397-400) reproduces this memorial almost textu- ally. ^ N. Y. Docs, vol. i, p. 149. 26 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. every settler throughout the colony was to have a musket and side arms; their efficiency was to be tested by two annual In spections. Kieft's successor was to take out with him a body of colonists who were to be grouped in townships as in New Eng land. Lastly, representative government was to be instituted. The "Freedoms," the conditions that is by which the patroons held their estates, already provided that each township should appoint one or two delegates to represent it at Manhattan. This somewhat vague condition was now made definite by the proposal that deputies should meet every six months to confer with the Governor and Council on public affairs.' The reforms granted by the Company fell far short of these recommenda tions. They did not in fact amount to much more than a change of governor. But that change brought vs'ith it a change of system. Kieft's successor had in theory as little love for popular government as Kieft himself. But, unlike Kieft, he had an honest desire to govern the colony in the interests of the settlers, and practice showed that he could reach that end only through a concession of popular rights. In 1645 Kieft was superseded and replaced by Peter Stuy vesant. The personal misconduct of Kieft and the selfish Peter ocglect of the Coi^any had prepared the settlers to stuyvesant. ggg gjj enemy in any governor. There was nothing in the personal character of Stuyvesant to efface such impressions. An austere Puritan in a community of lax morals, an educated gentleman with a strong dash of pedantry among tradesmen and boors, a martinet in a shifting crowd of varied origin with no fixed political institutions, Stuyvesant was at every step severed from his subjects by some barrier of principle or sentiment. Yet two things more than made amends. Stuyvesant had shown himself a good soldier : his loss of a leg, shot away by a Portu guese gunner before St. Martin's, impressed that side of his character on men's imaginations, and they soon had better reason for knowing that he could give the colony that security vi'hich was its first need. He had a still higher claim to honor. He, almost alone among all who controlled the destinies of New Netherlands, regarded the colony as a political society, not a trading station. His narrow and unsympathetic temper with held him from entering fully Into the life of the settlers. But ^N. Y. Docs. vol. i. p. 149. PETER STUYVESANT. 27 if he did not trouble himself about their wishes, he was clear sighted enough to understand their needs, and honest and public- spirited enough to struggle for them. He was in a sense the founder of the colony: he freed it from a commercial tyranny, from the dominion of traders and clerks; the colonists did the rest for themselves. The new Governor took out instructions, embodying in some measure the reforms suggested by the Rekenkammer. The dif- Hisin- ferent townships were to send delegates to the structions. 1 Council. That, however, was a far less effectual guarantee for liberty than would have been a chamber of repre sentatives sitting as a separate and independent body. A formal boundary was to be arranged with the Indians, and the settlers were to be organized as a militia. The colonists were to be per suaded to group themselves in townships "as the English do." Unluckily the Company forgot that these townships were only part and parcel of a system of self-government, and that they would never have existed but for the strong corporate feeling which actually called the community Into existence before it had a local habitation. As I have said, Stuyvesant had no faith in popular govern ment. On that subject his doctrines were as vigorous and as de- introduc- cided as those which Herodotus puts into the mouth represent- of Mcgabyzus. GIvc the election of rulers to the ernme^ntT' commons, and every scoundrel will vote for his like. The thief, the drunkard, and the cheat will each wish for a representative who shares his Infamy.' Stuyvesant, however, soon found that his trenchant theories must give way to practical necessities. The first thing to be done was to make the fortifications of New Amsterdam secure against attack. The Company could not or would not bear the whole cost: money had to be raised and the necessities of the ruler, according to regular historical precedent, made for the constitutional rights of the subject. A chamber of representa tives was appointed by a process which divided the choice be tween the Governor and the freemen. Tbe whole body of free men from Manhattan and three adjacent districts were to nomi nate eighteen representatives. Of these, the Governor was to elect nine who were to form a second chamber, tribunes of the 1 Brodhead, vol. i. p. 414. ' -f^- P- 574- 28 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. commons, as Stuyvesant, with a characteristic touch of pedantry, called them.' This was undoubtedly a step In advance of anything that had gone before. The Nine were more like constitutional repre sentatives of the people than the Twelve or the Eight who had preceded them. Their functions were general: they were not called into existence by one special emergency. But if the change was a step towards representative government, there was yet a long distance to be traversed. The Nine were to deliberate with the Council on public affairs ; three of them were to share the judicial functions of the Council, sitting In turn, one for a week. They had, however, no legislative powers : there was no provision for any exact division of powers between the Council and the Nine. Their undefined position was shown, too, by the fact that the qualifications of electors were not specified. Indeed, it was hardly worth while to define the qualifications of the freemen since their function did not extend beyond the first election. After that the body was to become self-electing, with certain right of veto vested in the Governor. Every year six were to retire; before that retirement the Nine were to nominate twelve candidates for the vacancies, and of these half were to be chosen by the Governor. Another element was wanting. There was nothing of local representation in the system. The inhabitants of four districts elected, but they elected collectively, and there was nothing to hinder the whole nine from being residents in New Amsterdam. Yet the system was a gain, not only as an earnest of better things, but in Itself. Even If we regard it as only the appoint ment of a standing executive committee that was something. In such a community as New Netherlands It was something to spread power. Granted that the Nine were In theory an Irre sponsible body, yet public opinion could act upon them far more quickly and effectively than It could on the Governor and Council. Popular rights in New Netherlands advanced on two distinct lines. The commonalty as a whole were slowly and Imperfectly Municipal acquiring certain rights of self-government. Mean- institu- L-1 L i-rr • r i tions. while the different sections of the community were 'Brodhead, vol. i. p. 474; N. Y. Docs. vol. i. p. 309. STUYVESANT AND THE PATROONS. 29 acquiring like rights, locally, and in a restricted form. In New Netherlands the municipal freedom of the towns was acquired partly because circumstances made It a necessity, partly as the result of intercourse with New England. As early as 1645 Kieft granted a charter to a body of emigrants from Massa chusetts. Their leader. Lady Deborah Moody, described by Winthrop as "a wise and anciently' religious woman," had been censured by the Church of Salem as an Anabaptist. She was ap parently not banished, but withdrew peacefully of her own ac cord with a number of those who shared her religious views. They established themselves on Long Island at a place called by the Dutch Gravesand, a name which the new-comers anglicized Into Gravesend. In 1644 the settlement was attacked by the savages. Lady Moody, however, escaped the fate of her sister heretic, Anne Hutchinson. Her new home was well garrisoned with forty men, and after a stubborn resistance the assailants were beaten off. In the next year the freemen at Gravesend were incorporated as a township, with power to make such "civil ordinances" as the majority should think good. They were to elect from among themselves three magistrates, approved by the Governor, who should act as a court.' In the same year the like privileges were granted to the settlers at Breuckelen. In their case we have direct evidence that joint tenure was one of the Incidents of their corporate existence, since the deprivation of a share on the common land was the penalty attached to disobedience to the elected magis trates.' The policy of creating municipalities with certain rights ¦of self-government was carried further by Kieft's successor. Stuyvesant had, as we have seen, little liking for democratic in stitutions. But he had equally little liking for the independent Jurisdiction of the patroons. Just as a mediaeval king built up extra-feudal communities with certain rights of self-govern ment as a check on the nobles, so now Stuyvesant strengthened the townships as a check on the patroons. We have seen already how the Independent patroonship of Rensselaerwyck became ob noxious to Kieft. Under Stuyvesant the struggle between the rights of the Company and the privileges of the patroons went ' Anciently, i.e. formerly, with reference to her lapse into heresy. ^ Doc. Hist. vol. i. pp. 4-12. ^ Brodhead, vol. i. p. 422. 30 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. on. The independent jurisdiction of the patroons was an obstacle to any common system of defense, and it also inter fered with the commercial supremacy of the Company. Indeed, the trade with the natives in arms and ammunition was ob noxious in both of these ways. The principal offenders In these matters were the agents of Rensselaer, whose territory on the upper Hudson commanded the highway of the Indian fur trade. They refused to fulfill a stipulation specially inserted in the grant of territory binding the patroon to give an annual report of the condition of his settlement to the Company. Moreover they endeavored to bind over their settlers not to appeal against any of their proceedings to the Governor and Council. One special act of insubordination brought matters to a head. Within the territory of Rensselaerwyck stood a little group of farmhouses forming the hamlet of Beverswyck. In March 1648 the Governor proclaimed a fast throughout the colony. The proclamation was posted in Beverswyck. Thereupon Van Slech- tenhart, the agent for the settlement, declared that Stuyvesant had encroached on the rights of the patroon. A further dispute arose. Fort Orange actually stood within the territory of Rensselaerwyck. It was plainly needful that the authorities who were responsible for the safety of the fort should have some control over the land around. Stuyvesant with good reason for bade the erection of any houses within musket-shot of the fort. The agent defied this order, and was arrested and brought to New Amsterdam. Under these circumstances it was natural that Stujrvesant should assert the direct authority of the Company over the settlers at Beverswyck, and It was natural too that he should purchase their loyalty by a grant of privileges. In April 1652 the Director on his own authority proclaimed Beverswyck a. township independent of the patroon.' In the same year the privileges which had been granted to Breuckelen were extended to New Amsterdam. An order had New Am- been Issued by the Company In 1650 that New Am- belTomirs sterdam should be made a municipal government a "ty- with a Schout — that is to say, an official responsible for the administration of ordinary criminal justice, a Burgo master and Schepens, functionaries who may, by a convenient ' Brodhead, vol. i. pp. 491-4, 533-5. NEW AMSTERDAM A CITY. 31 analogy. If not with scientific precision, be called a Mayor and Aldermen. Stuyvesant, as it would seem, considered that he might put his proposed constitution in force or not, as he pleased. It was not till two years after the issue of the order, till as we have seen the system of municipal government was es tablishing itself in other parts of the colony, that the privileges thus granted to New Amsterdam were actually enjoyed. One cannot doubt that the example of Breuckelen had a direct in fluence on her more important neighbor. As early as 1642 the Twelve in their remonstrance to the Company had pointed out that In the Fatherland every village had its five or seven Schepens. Now they saw a mere hamlet at their own doors en joying like privileges. Were they to be withheld from the capital of the colony, with its five stone warehouses and its harbor, where twenty merchantmen might be seen riding at anchor? Stuyvesant can hardly be said to have yielded to the demand for popular government. Rather he stayed that demand by a partial and almost deceptive concession. New Amsterdam was to have two Burgomasters and five Schepens, but they were to be nominated by the Governor. Such a change did not in theory shift the basis of sovereignty. Yet, as was said before, in such a community as New Netherlands to delegate the exercise of power is an important change. Let the Governor choose his municipal staff with never so little regard to the wishes of the people, yet such a body must be in some measure amenable to public opinion.' The value of the point gained was soon seen. Within six months of their appointment the new officials — the Town Action of Council as one may for convenience call them — sent Council. one of their number to Amsterdam to lay before the Company various grievances and complaints against the Gov ernor.' Soon after they showed in another matter that though they might be Stuyvesant's nominees, they were not his obedi ent servants. The defenses of the city were a subject of jeal ousy and dispute. The settlers were willing to spend money on palisading the city itself. They not unnaturally demanded that the Fort which existed mainly to secure the commerce of ' Memorial History, vol. i. p. 278. The author, Mr. Fernow, refers to New York Documents. ' Brodhead, vol. i. p. 559. ,32 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. the Company should be fortified at the Company's expense. When the Town Council was called on to contribute to that end they refused. In a New England township thc town meeting would at once furnish a ready means for the expression of popular feeling. As it was, the Burgomasters and Schepens summoned certain lead ing citizens to devise means for meeting the public expenditure. Twenty-four townsmen attended the meeting. It was agreed to propose to Stuyvesant that the Excise be handed over to the Burgomasters and Schepens, to be applied to the payment of public expenses. This was submitted to Stuyvesant, but re fused. Two months later another meeting of town delegates chosen by tbe Burgomasters and Schepens was held. Their policy was a mere renewal of their past offer. But apparently the Burgo masters and Schepens only gave their consent to the arrange ment on condition that the townsmen agreed to submit to such expenditure and such measures as should be enacted and adopted by them for the support of the city. This second attempt was more successful than the first. Des potic as the government of New Netherlands was, yet leavened as her nationality was with alien elements, there was too much of the old Dutch temper, of the spirit of the men who had defied Charles and Philip, to suffer the power of the purse wholly to pass out of their hands. According to what one may call the customary precedent of the Old World, external danger furnished the community with an effective weapon against its rulers. At the very time when the colonists were pressing their ¦demands the New England confederation was only withheld from active hostility by the fortunate disloyalty of Massachu setts to its associates.' That danger was materially increased by the existence of settlements on Long Island, nominally under Dutch jurisdiction, but English in origin and sympathies. Ob stinate Stuyvesant might be, but he was clear-sighted enough to see that, without some measure of popular support, his own po sition and that of the colony was desperate, and that he could only win that support by concessions on the lines suggested by the townsmen. On November 1 1 Stuyvesant announced that he was prepared to surrender a portion of the Excise to be ad- ^ See The Puritan Colonies, vol. i. pp. 299-301. STUYVESANT AND THE TOWNSMEN. 33 ministered by the Burgomasters and Schepens — the Town Council as we may for convenience call them. But the conces sion was fettered with conditions which went far to destroy Its value. The Company must give their consent. The townsmen must maintain at their own cost a preacher and a schoolmaster. These charges the townsmen at first said would swallow up the whole sum made over to them. Finally, however, after some demur they agreed to the terms.' Later on In the year the Burgomasters and Schepens addressed a petition to the Company asking on behalf of the city fuller rights, modeled on those of Amsterdam. They asked tbat the turghers should choose their own Schout, that the Excise should be made over to them unconditionally, and that they should have power to levy rates and expend the proceeds.' On January 24, before an answer could be received to these requests, the Burgomasters and Schepens again approached Stuyvesant. They proposed that the Council of the Colony should still be nominated by the Director, but from a list con taining twice the number of names necessary, sent in by them selves. This Stuyvesant refused. As a minor concession he granted salaries to the officials, to the Burgomaster three hun dred and fifty guilders a year, to the Schepens two hundred and fifty. This sounds like an attempt to bribe the recipients into an abandonment of popular rights. In answer to the petition the Company made but a petty con cession. The Schout was to be appointed as before by the Com pany, but was to be In some measure under the control of the Burgomasters and Schepens.' The somewhat harsh and dictatorial temper of the new Di rector made almost impossible a task already difficult enough in stuyvesant itself. He was, like Dale, a resolute martinet, Teformer. trained In military methods and determined to Intro duce discipline and something of austerity Into the life of a lax and somewhat corrupt society. Attendance at Divine worship was made compulsory. The problem of enforcing sobriety and controlling taverns was dealt with in a manner which curiously anticipated the Ideas of modern temperance reformers. Taverns ' For all these negotiations see Court Minutes. ' Court Minutes, vol. i. pp. 92-5. ' lb. p. 157. 34 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. were to close at nine in the evening. Inasmuch as brawling and fighting In taverns even on the Lord's day of rest was common, they were to be closed on Sunday till two In the afternoon, except for travelers, and for the sale of drink to be consumed in private houses. Other ordinances Imposed by Stuyvesant throw Hght on the life of the community. The danger of fire Is shown by a regula tion which enforced the sweeping of chimneys, and by a pro hibition of any further building of wooden chimneys. By a later ordinance, thatched roofs and wooden chimneys are to be re moved. An attempt is made to check the promiscuous Influx of foreign traders by an ordinance permitting no one to engage in trade unless he has a house in the colony and resides for three years. In conformity with the instruction of the Company an ordi nance was issued urging the settlers to consolidate themselves into villages, but there is no trace of any attempt to enforce this. The mixture of urban and rural conditions which prevailed In New Amsterdam itself is shown by the prohibition of hayricks within the town, and of stray hogs, as unwholesome and un sightly, and likely to injure the fortification.' The Excise was to be handed over to the Council and applied to the payment of salaries, and they might with the approval of the commons impose certain rates.' The disposition of the Excise soon gave rise to further disputes. The Town Council, it was alleged, expended the money exclusively on the city de fenses and neglected those of Fort Amsterdam. Accordingly the Governor, supported by his Council, resumed the Excise, and as before sold the right of levying It to the highest bidder.' If, however, this portion of the popular demands appeared to have been lost almost as soon as gained, there were compensa- conference tlons elscwhere. Hitherto such assertions of popular Amster- rights as had been made had been limited to the '^^™- capital of the colony. In November 1653 the agita tion entered on a new phase. A conference of delegates met at New Amsterdam.' There were two from New Amsterdam itself, two each from Gravesend and Flushing, and two from a third English settlement on Long Island, Incorporated by ^ For all these regulations see Court Minutes, vol. i. p. 135. ' Ih. p. 218. ' Ib. p. 341. 'Brodhead, vol. i. p. 569. CONVENTION OF DELEGA TES. 35 Stuyvesant in 1650, by the name of MIddelburg. There were also two representatives of the Council of New Netherlands. It would not be easy to imagine a more curiously complicated situation. Stuyvesant throughout showed himself Inclined to favor the settlements of English origin. Puritan rigidity ap pealed to him far more effectively than did the lax cosmopoli tanism of New Netherlands. Between the Dutch settlers and the English Immigrants there was little jealousy. Yet here were Stuyvesant's clients, one may almost call them, the English- settlers, making common cause with their Dutch rivals. The Immediate object of the conference was one which did not directly touch the question of either popular rights or English encroachment. It was to take measures for protecting the colony against attacks by the Indians and by pirates. No definite measures of defense were adopted, and the con gress adjourned till the following month. But when once machinery is constructed which lends Itself even incompletely to the assertion of popular rights, it Is no easy matter to limit its action. The English representatives hinted that unless some thing was done for their protection the Long Island townships would have to form themselves into some kind of corporate as sociation. Stuyvesant might look with undue favor on English claims. But an assertion of the rights of self-government, coupled with a scarcely veiled threat of secession, could not fail to move him. To balance the three English-speaking townships Stuyvesant announced his Intention of Incorporating three Dutch townships of Amersfort, Breuckelen, and Midwout.' Although these concessions were only promised and not form ally granted, yet the inhabitants now ventured to act as a conven- corporate body. Consequently, when the convention deiegates.2 reassembled In December Its composition differed widely from what it had been a month before. Amersfort, Breuckelen, and Midwout all sent representatives. So did the English settlement of Heemstede, which, though It had a share In summoning the first meeting, took no active part therein. Amersfort for some reason was allowed three repre sentatives. This brought the whole number up to seventeen, of ' Breuckelen, it is scarcely needful to say, is the modern Brooklyn. Amers fort and Midwout are now Flatlands and FJatbush, at the south-east extremity of Long Island. ' Brodhead, vol. i. pp. 571-5. 36 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. whom nine were Dutch, eight English. We may fairly con jecture that Stuyvesant's object In Incorporating the three town ships was to Insure that neither party should preponderate, and also to grarit no popular rights save such as were absolutely needful for the protection of the colony from invasion. An historical paradox-monger, whom it would be flattery to call Ingenious, has maintained the thesis that North America English owes everything that Is wholesome In her political influence, j^jjj intellectual life to Holland.' It would be nearer to the truth, though an exaggeration, to say that such political freedom as the Dutch colony enjoyed was won for It by the efforts of those English allies who came In the guise of Invaders. We cannot doubt that the practical training In the arts of self- government which the English delegates brought with them from their earlier colonial home, the habit of readily translating the abstract doctrines of political freedom into concrete form, the comprehension of the value and limits of political machinery, made them now Invaluable allies. That view is confirmed by the fact that the drafting of a petition of rights and grievances was intrusted to George Baxter. The document was in six heads. It complained of the arbitrary action of the Director both In making enactments and appoint ments, and granting lands to favored Individuals. Proclamations remained In force without the inhabitants being duly notified of their existence. There was no proper system of public defense. Settlements had been made on the strength of promised patents, and these had been delayed without reason.' In no one specific Instance did Stuyvesant acknowledge the justice of these complaints or offer a remedy of the alleged grievance. Yet we are not to suppose that the action of the delegates bore no fruit. We can distinctly trace In the subse quent policy of the Director a tendency to concession which we may fairly set down to the resolute attitude of the settlers. Breuckelen already had two Schepens elected by the towns men. In 1654 the number was raised to four, and they were al lowed to elect a Schout. Privileges of the same kind were ' Mr. Campbell in The Puritan in Holland, England and America. • it was in answer to these representations that Stuyvesant delivered himself of his comprehensive condemnation of the system of popular election, v.s. p. 27. DEVELOPMENT OF MUNICIPAL RIGHTS. 37 granted to Midwout and Amersfort, and the three villages were to unite Into a district with an administrative council of elected delegates.' The privileges of these outlying settlements formed In turn a standard to be arrived at by New Amsterdam. Thus in 1656 we find the Council complaining with good reason that, while almost every village in the colony had a municipal government of its own election, that of New Amsterdam was nominated by the Governor.' After some dispute a compromise was reached which prac tically meant that the Burgomasters and Schepens should elect their successors, but that Stuyvesant should have a right of veto.' Two years later this was modified. An arrangement which had been before suggested was now adopted. The Town Council sent a list of names, twice as many as there were places, and Stuyvesant chose one half.* The gradual and piecemeal growth of popular government in New Netherlands was strictly according to mediseval precedent. The greater The parallel went a stage further. In the Old ship. World the change from serfdom to municipal free dom was too often followed by a change from a democratic to an oligarchical municipality. New Netherlands did not escape the danger. From almost Its earliest days the city had numbered among its population traders who had no fixed connection with the colony, and contributed nothing to its permanent stability and prosperity. In 1657 the Town Council sent an address to Stuyvesant calling attention to this, and petitioning that the right of trade should be restricted to burghers. We learn incidentally from this petition that Scotch traders were a special object of jealousy and disapproval. "They sail hither and thither to the best trading places, taking the bread as it were out of the mouths of the good burghers and resident in habitants, without being subject In time of peace or war to any trouble or expense." "They carry away the profits in time of peace, and in time of war abandon the country and the in habitants thereof."' ^Brodhead, vol. i. p. 580. - Ih. p. 613. '/fc. p. 613. *Ib. p. 639. ° The petition and Stuyvesant's answer to it are in the Court Minutes, vol. ii. pp. 286-7. 38 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. The proposal of the Town Council fell in with Stuyvesant's love of rigid discipline and his oligarchical prejudices. He saw In It, too, an opportunity for increasing the revenue. Any trader might acquire the rights of burghership by paying a fee of twenty guilders. The same privileges were granted without payment to all who were born in the city or dwelt there for the oddly devised term of a year and six weeks, and to all who married the daughters of burghers. This restriction was undoubtedly fair and expedient. Un fortunately it was made the occasion for a thoroughly unwise extension of the principle of oligarchy. Nor was this forced on by Stuyvesant; it was approved and In part suggested by the Town Council. The scheme created a class of great burghers as they were called, in distinction to the common or small burghers above described. This right was to be obtained by a payment of fifty guilders; those who enjoyed It were to be exempt from military service and from arrest, and they only were to be eligible for the city offices. This greater burghership was to be extended to the officers of the Company and to minis ters of the Gospel, to those holding military commissions, and to all who had as yet served as Burgomasters and Schepens, and it was to be continued to all their male descendants. Since the Town Council was a self-creating and not an elective body, the system practically disfranchised for municipal purposes all but the richer citizens and the officials of the Company.' Happily the mistake was soon seen and repaired. It Is not unlikely that the purpose of the scheme was as much financial as political. Few took up the greater burghership ; the scheme was unremunerative, and It Inconveniently limited the choice of public officials. To meet this difficulty Stuyvesant at his own discretion nominated no persons to the greater burgher right, a proceeding approved of by the Burgomaster and Schepens.' This may perhaps be taken as an evidence of the establishment of more friendly relations between the Director and those under him.' * On the ordinance creating the greater and smaller burghers see haws and Ordinances, p. 301. '^ Court Minutes, vol. ii. p. 315. ^ Brodhead, vol. i. p. 271-2. He gives the text of the more important por* tions, and epitomizes the rest. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT. 39 Eleven years after the convention of 1653, when the storm- cloud of invasion, soon to burst with overwhelming force, over- vl'nti"n" ^""2 ^^^ colony, another meeting of a like kind was of 1664. called. Its proceedings will more fitly come be fore us as an Incident in the struggle which made New Nether lands English territory. It is enough for the present to notice how Imperfect an approach these conventions were to an effect ive system of representative government. They were called merely to meet an emergency; they had no defined functions or specified rights; they failed to give the citizens any certain or continuous training In self-government. Yet It would be a great mistake to set them down as useless. We fail to understand the constitutional history of New Nether lands unless we look at It as a struggle for popular rights against a body of commercial monopolists, fought not on any one battle field, but here and there as occasion offered. There was not, as in the New England colonies, a comprehensive and systematic machinery of self-government under which the citizen had a double set of rights, the one as a townsman, the other as a free man of the colony, while at the same time the relations of the municipality to the State were harmoniously adjusted. In New Netherlands we must cast aside all these Ideas, and be content to study the measures by which at any time and In any fashion, whether as freemen of their town or citizens of New Nether lands, the settlers asserted and gained the right of managing their own affairs. Looked at from one point of view, all these Incidents are stages in the political development of the colony. From another, ineffi- they mark a continuous struggle against the narrow Comp^Sy. ' and selfish policy of the Company. Any care which they might have felt for the permanent advancement of the colony was dwarfed and thrust Into the background by other Interests, first by the struggle with Spain, then by the contest with the Portuguese for trade and territory In Brazil. When the Finance Board of the States-General urged the Company to a more liberal and public-spirited policy, the appeal was met with Indifference and evasion. Certain definite reforms were proposed. The trade which supplied the Indians with guns and powder was to be abolished. The Amsterdam Chamber, speak ing for the Company, simply answered by pointing out the Im- 40 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. mense price which the Indians were ready to pay. There should be more clergymen and schoolmasters: none were wanted. Stuyvesant should be recalled to report on the real state of the colony: bis Information was needless. Fifteen thousand guilders should be spent every year by the Company In exporting farmers and husbandmen: the Company could not meet such a charge.' The colonists, too, could not appeal with any effect against the Company's officials. The Governor and the other servants could plead their instructions: the Company could plead that these instructions had been misunderstood or could disavow them altogether; between them the settlers looked in vain for redress or reform. The colonists did indeed succeed In obtaining the recall of Kieft, but tbat was hardly from regard for the settlers; rather because bis misgovernment was so manifestly making the colony a source of scandal and loss to the Company. The ineffectual struggle to get rid of an obnoxious official, Cornelius Van Tien hoven, the hopelessness of any attempt to get a fair hearing against Stuyvesant, are sufficient illustrations of the mischief Inherent in the Company's control. The charges of maladmin istration brought against Tienhoven may have been exaggerated. But it Is clear enough that he was a man of notoriously dis reputable life, that it was an open scandal to retain such an one in office. So too, in 1650, we find the Vice-Director writing pathetically to the Company that two letters of his protesting ¦against the arbitrary proceedings of Stuyvesant had met with no answer. In a letter of the same date we find tbe select men of New Amsterdam complaining that while they were endeavoring to call the attention of the Company's Directors to the miscon duct of Stuyvesant, members of that body were privately send ing him messages of encouragement.' The administrative failure of the Company was In part due to their system of choosing and promoting their servants. This is described by De Vries, who contrasts it with the method adopted by the Dutch East India Company. There every- official passed through a regular gradation of service, learning- his duties step by step. In the West India Company an untried » N. Y. Docs. vol. i. pp. 387-95. 2 7b. pp. 4^5.g, RELIGIOUS CONDITION OF THE COLONY. 41 man might be at once thrown into a position of dignity and re sponsibility without any preparation or training.' The loss of the Company's Records leaves us without adequate data by which to gauge the progress of population during the Increase of Y^ars of the Company's control. By 1664 Stuyvesant population, estimated it at full ten thousand,' a number whose symmetry naturally excites suspicion. We have already seen how that population was made up of miscellaneous nationalities. Di verse In origin, the settlers were not held together by that com munity of religion which was so terribly effective a bond of union for New England. Jogues was as much startled by the variety of sects as by that of races. Besides Presbyterian Calvinists, there were to be found Romanists, Lutherans, Anabaptists, and English Independents. In this the colony only followed the example of the mother country. As there Calvinism was the recognized creed. The Religious difficulties of the relations between Church and State the colony, were effectively illustrated on the small field of New Netherland history. The clergy were primarily responsible to the Classls of Amsterdam, the governing body, that is, of the Presbyterian Church in that city. At the same time they were paid by the Company, and were therefore in a certain sense its servants. Thus In 1638 a complaint was lodged with the Classis against Bogardus, the pastor at New Amsterdam. Bogardus wished to return and meet the charges, but was forbidden by Kieft.' Four years later the Classis licensed John of Mecklen burgh — or, to give him the name more familiar In New Nether land history, Johannes Megapolensis — as pastor of Rens selaerwyck. Thereupon the Company claimed the right to approve, and therefore by implication to veto, the appointment. Till 1628 there seems to have been no ministry and no church at Manhattan. A congregation occasionally met and Church were ministered to by two functionaries of an inferior hattan." order, called Krankbesoeckers, visitors of tbe sick.' In that year an ordained clergyman sent out from Amster- ^ De Vries, p. 151. = Brodhead, vol. i. p. 734. He quotes a letter of Stuyvesant's written June 10, 1664. 'lb. pp. 173, 278. *Ib. p. 342. . ° This is stated in the Memorial History, p. 189 (ch. v.). The editor, who is also the author of this chapter, gives the names of the two officials. 42 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. dam ministered to a mixed congregation formed of Dutch and Walloons.' Fourteen years later the outward fabric of the church was such as to call forth a remonstrance from De Vries. In New England, he told Kieft, the first thought after a settle ment had fashioned Its needful habitations was the church. The Dutch had lime, stone, and wood, why should they fall short?' Kieft, who to do him justice had some care for the dignity and good order of his settlement, answered to the appeal. His enemies tell, with grotesque indignation, how he took the oppor tunity of a great wedding feast to open a collection for the build ing of the church, how the guests responded with convivial enthusiasm, replaced next day by ineffectual repentance. It would be well for Kieft's reputation if that had been the weightiest charge brought against him.' In 1652 a second pastor was appointed at New Amsterdam, and it Is characteristically illustrative of the condition of the colony that he was chosen as able to preach In Dutch, French, and English.* As early as 1643 Beverswyck had a church, and in 1654 a fourth was founded at Midwout, and before New Netherlands other ceased to be Dutch territory there were churches at ¦churches.' Brcuckelen, and at Bergen in what is now the terri tory of New Jersey. The English emigrants, who had passed sometimes singly, sometimes in organized groups. Into the Dutch territory, were Independ- for the most part men who had withdrawn volun- gationsf tarily or under pressure from the too rigid ecclesias tical system of New England. It Is therefore no matter for sur prise that In New Netherlands we hear little of Independent ¦churches, with a regular ministry. The nearest approach to such seems to have been at West Chester, where a party from New Haven had occupied the site where Mrs. Hutchinson met with her death, and at MIddelburgh on Long Island. At neither place was there an established mininstry nor an organ- ^ His name was Jonas Michaelius. A letter from him describing his position and the condition of his church is in the N. Y. Documents, vol. ii. p. 763. It is translated by Mr. H. C. Murphy. 2 De Vries, p. 148. ' Vertoogh in N. Y. Docs. vol. i. p. 299. * Brodhead, vol. i. p. 537. 'lb. pp. 374, 581, 615, 692. TREATMENT OF NONCONFORMISTS. 43 ized church, but MIddelburgh had a preacher, and at West Chester we hear of certain collective religious exercises.' It is probable that such congregations would have been more numerous but for an ordinance, passed by the Director and Council In 1656, prohibiting private conventicles.' By 1654 the Lutherans at New Amsterdam had become numerous enough to demand a church of their own. The , ^^ petition was laid before Stuyvesant. State toleration l^utnerans. ... , , , j-, was a principle as abhorrent to the Calvinist dis ciplinarian as it could be to Endicott or Dudley. The Presby terian clergy of the colony supported the Governor, and the Company refused the request, accompanying their refusal with an Instruction to Stuyvesant to do all In his power to draw over the Lutherans to the Calvinistic faith.' New Netherlands had at least the compensating merits of her defects. If she had not the cohesion, the constraining sense of Treatment corporate existence, which bound together New Eng- formists. land, she at least escaped the hideous tragedies which deface the history of the Puritan colonies. Such persecution as there was in New Netherlands was no more than the petty and harassing interference which in the seventeenth century In every ¦country almost Inevitably followed any deviation from the ac cepted State creed. In 1656 Stuyvesant, moved by the com plaints of the orthodox ministry, forbade all conventicles not called by established authority, and where doctrines were set forth not in harmony with the Calvinistic faith as defined by the Synod of Dort. Unlicensed preachers holding such con venticles and those attending them were to be punished by fine. The ordinance did not, however, apply to family worship.* This proceeding brought upon Stuyvesant a sharp rebuke irom his superiors." Yet, when a Lutheran clergyman was sent ¦out by the members of that Church in Amsterdam, Stuyvesant was permitted to silence him.' One concession only the Lutherans could obtain : to meet their views a slight modification was Introduced into the Calvinistic liturgy.' ' Letter from Megapolensis and Drusius to the Classis at Amsterdam. O'Callaghan, vol. iii. p. 69, &c. - Court Minutes, vol. i. p. 20. ^ Brodhead, vol. i. p. 582. * Laws and Ordinances, p. 211. ^ Ib. p. 6i8. ^ Megapolensis as above. ^ Brodhead, vol. i. p. 642. 44 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. Quakerism, so appalling a portent to the New Englander with his rigid creed, his mechanical theology, and his precisely organ- Quakers in ized ecclesiastical system, was far less so to the eriands.i Dutchman, whose land was already "a staple of sects and mint of schism."' The sufferings of the Quakers in New Netherlands were light indeed compared with their fate in New England. Yet In the Dutch colony their attempts to figure as the unauthorized and self-appointed regenerators of society soon brought them into trouble. It was not till a year after tbe persecution of Fisher and Austin in Massachusetts tbat the Quakers made their first inroad upon New Netherlands. On the ist of June, 1657, five of them landed at New Amsterdam. Their first reception by Stuyvesant was friendly, and they themselves ascribed the sub sequent change to the influence of New Englanders. It is cer tain that conditions which will come before us again had forced Stuyvesant into an alliance with that section of his colony which. had Immigrated from New England, a section growing in numbers and importance. Yet the proceedings of the Quakers were in themselves so repellent to a man of Stuyvesant's temper that his action need not be assigned to foreign interference. Of the five Quakers, three were women. Two of these — Mary Weatherhead and Dorothy Waugh — two days after land ing began preaching in the streets of New Amsterdam. Thev were arrested and imprisoned, subjected not, as it would seem, to absolute cruelty but to much discomfort, and after eight days. suffered to sail for Rhode Island. In the meantime their three companions chose another field of ministration in Long Island. Two soon departed. The third, Robert Hodgson, was almost at once arrested. He contrived, however, to turn the magistrate's house where he was detained Into a place for a religious meeting. The matter was reported to Stuyvesant ; the Quakers and two of those who had befriended him were sent as prisoners to New Amsterdam, Hodgson blm- ' The Quaker historians deal very scantily with the sufferings of the Friends. in New Netherlands. I have, therefore, been compelled to rely mainly on Brodhead, and the authorities whom he quotes (vol. i. pp. 635-9, 689, 705-7). It would seem as if in the eyes of the Quakers the iniquities of New England had made so deep an impression that injustice perpetrated in other colonies was overlooked or forgotten. Besse, indeed (voi. ii. p. 182), attributes. Stuyvesant's severity to the instigation of Willett. ^ Marvell, ed 1766, vol. iii. p. 290. QUAKERS AT FLUSHING. 45 self brutally dragged for thirty miles over rough roads at the tail of a cart. The Council sat In judgment on him, and sen tenced him to a fine of six hundred guilders. In default of pay ment he was to be flogged, and publicly worked in the streets for two years, chained to a wheelbarrow. With that craving for martyrdom which somewhat mars the heroism of the early Quakers, Hodgson refused the help of certain benevolent persons who would have paid his fine. The sentence, however, was soon remitted. According to a Quaker tradition, not very probable in itself, Willett, of New England, who had been the instigator of Stuyvesant's cruelty, was now by popular clamor brought to repentance, or at least to a sense of shame. He Interceded for the prisoner; his prayer was backed by Stuyvesant's sister, and within a month Hodgson was set free. Short as were Hodgson's missionary labors on Long Island, they seem to have borne fruit. In the very same month that he was suffering at New Amsterdam, his disciples had become numerous enough and In Stuyvesant's eyes formida ble enough to make special measures needful. A proclamation was issued making It an offense punishable by a fine of fifty pounds to harbor a Quaker, while if a sea-captain landed any of the sect he was to forfeit his vessel. The proclamation had unlooked-for political effects. The citizens of Flushing had already been excited by tbe punishment Disturb- of ooc Henry Townshend, who had formerly lived Flushing. In that town. For holding Quaker meetings In his house he had been fined. In default he was to be banished, and was to be flogged if he stayed in defiance of the order. When the proclamation was posted a number of the inhabitants drew up an address to Stuyvesant, declaring the Injustice of his pro ceedings and distinctly refusing to obey his edict. Stuyvesant dealt with the recalcitrant town in a fashion for which medlEeval history offers many precedents. Not only was the Schout who had been specially forward In befriending Quakers deposed and fined, the political rights granted by Kieft were withdrawn ; the town was henceforth to be governed by a council of seven nomi nated from among its own Inhabitants by the Governor. At New Amsterdam we hear no more of Quakerism. It continued to make its way among the half Independent settlements on Long Island, harassed by fines and the dispersion of meetings, 46 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. but not, as in New England, the victim of any thoroughgoing attempt at extirpation. To suppress a sect which had no organized ministry and no fixed places of worship was Indeed a hopeless task unless the whole of the community were really in earnest in aiding the Government. Meetings were held In barns, in woods, and In fields. But in 1662, emboldened perhaps by Impunity, tbe Quakers about Flushing established a regular meeting house In the abode of one John Bowne, a yeoman who had emigrated from Derbyshire. Stuyvesant met this breach of law, as he deemed it, by a fresh proclamation. It was directed nominally at every deviation from the orthodox State creed. The conventicles of every other religion were declared illegal, and attendance at them was to be punished by fine. Seditious books were to be neither imported nor distributed, and all new-comers were to report themselves to the Secretary. At the same time Bowne was fined, and refusing to pay his fine was sent as a prisoner to Amsterdam. There by good fortune he contrived to get a hearing before the Directors of the Company. Stuyvesant's proclamation might well alarm them. In his eagerness to strike at Quakers he had asserted a doctrine which the rulers of the colony had never approved — the need of conformity as enforced by tbe State — a doctrine which must be fatal to a community composed as was New Netherlands. If the Directors were inclined to befriend the Quakers, the form in which Stuyvesant had made his attack gave them the very oppor tunity which they needed. They addressed a sharp admonition to Stuyvesant on the whole question of toleration, and of the proper method to be adopted towards sectaries. They laid down no theories of freedom of conscience. Apparently they held that the right to check heresy might be kept In reserve, a weapon to meet extreme cases. But in practice no man was to be molested as long as he created no civil disturbance. It would be better that there should be no sectaries : but If there were any let them be connived at, otherwise population, so needful to a youthful state, would be destroyed. Not a word was said of tbe Quakers, but the remonstrance of the Company gave them the protection which they needed. In that declaration we have the key to the policy which molded the life of New Netherlands, the absolute ED UCA TION IN NE W NE THER LA NDS. 47 opposite to the central principle of New England. The Ideal of the one was a numerous and materially thriving population ; religious diversity might be an evil, but, since the conditions of success required Inclusiveness, such diversity must be permitted. The ideal of the other was rigid identity of thought, belief, and purpose, running through all. If that could be won and ma terial prosperity come with it, well and good. But the State must shrink from no exclusion which could bring that Ideal one step nearer. May we not say that, even yet, in the character of the two states can be found some traces of the impress left on each by Its founders? On one point Stuyvesant and his subjects were agreed. We find each urging on the Company the need for a fuller and more effective system of education. In their remonstrance, before referred to, sent home in 1649, the Nine specify as one of the evils to be remedied the lack of continuous and systematic teaching. As early as 1633, Indeed, a schoolmaster had come out to New Amsterdam, and the necessity of maintain ing schools had been over and over again acknowledged by the Company. But there was no schoolhouse, and no regular and certain provision for teaching. The school was opened at irreg ular Intervals, at the uncertain choice or pleasure of indi viduals.' In 1650 we find a schoolmaster appointed at New Amster dam.' Two years later a higher class school was to have come Into existence, held provisionally in the city tavern.' About the same time a school was established at Rensselaerwyck, at which the post of master was combined with that of clergyman.* In 1658 we find the Town Council of New Amsterdam making a petition to the Company, which at once illustrates the lack of education and the social and economical advance of the colony. They ask for a schoolmaster competent to teach Latin. At present all who wish for a classical education must seek It at Boston." A community which has begun to feel a need for what one may call educational luxuries has emerged from that hard struggle for bare existence which Is the first stage of colonial life. 'Vertoogh, N. Y. Docs. vol. i. p. 317. 'Brodhead. vol. 1. p. S'S- » lb. p. 537. * Ih p. 538. 'Court Minutes, vol. iii. p. is- 48 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. The efforts of the settlers on behalf of education were sec onded by Stuyvesant. A Latin schoolmaster, Alexander Curtlus, was engaged. He was the joint servant of the Company and the municipality, receiving from the former five hundred, from the latter two hundred guilders, and eking out his salary by practice as a physician.' The union of leech and teacher does not seem to have worked well. In 1662 Curtlus returned to Holland. His place was filled by one Luyck, whom Stuyvesant had brought out as private tutor for his own household. Under him a high school arose, flourishing enough to attract pupils from Virginia.' As it was in religion, so was it In social and Industrial life. There was not in New Netherlands anything of that pressure of Industrial custom or of public opinion which In New England '"*• created uniformity in almost every department. In outward appearance. In productive Industry, and In daily habits the settlements on Long Island can have differed but little from those of New England. On the Hudson and on the shores of Delaware Bay the traveler would have seen perhaps more like ness to Maryland or Virginia. Their tobacco plantations might be seen worked by negro slaves. The estates of the patroons were not unlike the great plantations of the southern colonies. There was, however, this difference. There was always a tendency. Illustrated by Beverswyck, for villages to grow up within the patroonship, just as the English village or country town often grew up under the shadow of the manor. There were also an other class of farmers, the tenants of the Company, already described, chiefly It would seem In the neighborhood of Man hattan. One cause which undoubtedly depressed the free laborer, and prevented the growth of an industrial and territorial system like that of New England, was the presence of negro slavery. The slave, cheaply fed and slightly housed, is a formidable rival to the free laborer, and the large estate with Its staff of servile labor crushes by its rivalry the small farm. The latter Is incomparably better In its social results. It may be even a more efficient instrument of production, but of the 'Brodhead, vol. i. p. 656 ^Ib. p. 634. FOREIGN TRADE OF NEW NETHERLANDS. 49 product a larger portion is Intercepted by the wants of the laborer himself, and a smaller margin left for mere return on capital. There are no statistics of sufficient fullness to show at what rate the importation of negro slaves went on. We know that In the original instrument defining the privileges of the patroons the Company pledged itself to supply the settlers with negroes. That promise was repeatedly renewed in a manner which shows that It was a concession specially valued. It was also in a great measure by Dutch ships that Virginia was supplied with slaves from Africa. In practice the heavy duty Imposed by the Com pany seems to have discouraged any large Importation. As a natural consequence, too, most of those imported seem to have been in the employment of the Company. Thus we learn that the fort at New Amsterdam was mainly built by negro labor. The Company seems wisely to have made arrangements whereby its slaves should be gradually absorbed in the free population. In 1644 an ordinance was passed emancipating the slaves of the Company after a fixed period of service. They were still, how ever, to pay certain dues in kind, and their children were to re main slaves. By a like arrangement In 1663 certain of the •Company's slaves were granted a qualified form of freedom, working alternate weeks, one for themselves, one for the Com pany. One entry in the Records clearly shows that difference of climate and of economical conditions rather than any moral or religious motives excluded slavery from New England, since we find the settlers at Gravesend, in a petition addressed in 165 1 to the Company, specially asking for an increased supply of negroes.' The foreign trade of New Netherlands differed not only in its details, but in Its whole principle, from that of New England. The system on which New England was organized left little place for non-resident merchants, or for any whose connection with the colony was but temporary. At Bos ton the man who did not belong to a church must have felt him self one of a grade lower than his neighbors. Even a sea- captain and his crew we may be sure can have found Boston no ' Letter from the townsmen of Gravesend to the Company referred to by Srodhead, vol. i. p. 526. 50 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. pleasant port if they were wholly out of harmony with Its popu lation. Thus the trade of Massachusetts was mainly In the hands of residents; the capital that sustained it was largely sup plied by the profits of the New England farmer. In New Netherlands it was otherwise. In the Fatherland there was little community between the burgesses or artisans of Amster dam and the farmers and hinds of the adjacent country. So it was at Manhattan. The fact that trade was largely in the hands of a shifting crowd of divers nationalities went far to justify the rigid commercial policy of the Company. There was another reason for that. The whole commercial prosperity of New Netherlands turned on that most perilous Trade form of trade, trade with the Indians. On the part Indians' of the Dutch there was an unlimited demand for furs, and on the side of the savages an equally unlimited demand for guns, powder, and strong drink. Thus Illicit trade was not only an offense against the revenue. It was far worse: the smuggler as an inevitable incident of his crime entangled the colony in the dangers of war, and supplied the enemy with munitions. That the Company and those who administered Its affairs in the colony should have steered the colony safely through these dangers atones for many of their shortcomings. The most im portant legacy which the Dutch rulers left to their English suc cessors was the relations of the colony to the Indians, and it Is to their high praise that these were relations of mutual trust and good will. That in spite of Kieft's errors, a name perhaps too lenient, this should have been so was in no small measure due to the stuyve- personal influence of Stu5rvesant. Harsh, masterful, fngs wtth'' narrow In views and sympathy, yet he was essentially the natives. ^ jygj man. HIs self-reliance, his experience as a soldier, his stolid Indifference to popular feeling, made him panic- proof. And no one can follow the relations between the Euro pean and the savage in every part of North America without seeing that justice far more than humanity was the key-stone of stable relations. The Indian might be treacherous himself, though his imputed treachery was often no more than the neces sary consequence of negotiations In a language Imperfectly un derstood. Bui he at least clearly knew whether those with OUTBREAK OF WAR IN 1655. 51 whom he dealt were trustworthy or faithless. The unflinching devotion of the French missionary, the hearty good-fellowship with which the French trapper threw himself Into the life of the Indians, the worse compliance with which the rulers of New France made themselves accomplices in the atrocities wrought by their allies: all these were outweighed by isolated acts of treachery such as that by which Denonville and Champigny sent a band of Iroquois chiefs to the French galleys.' The peace made in 1645 between the Dutch settlers and the natives held good for ten years. The breach came, as so often, Outbreak from an Isolated outrage, harshly punished. A in 1655.2 settler, lately one of the Company's officials, had his garden plundered by a native squaw. He brutally put her to death. In an Instant an Indian force was ready to take the field. Early on a September morning sixty-four canoes carrying some five hundred armed savages appeared before New Amsterdam. The Indians landed and poured Into the streets. Stuyvesant with the little army of the colony was away on service against the Swedes by the Delaware, and the enemy reckoned on finding a wholly defenseless town. But tidings of the danger reached the Governor, and he hurried part of his force back in time to meet the invader. For a while It seemed as If the savages might be brought to terms, but in the evening hostilities broke out. Van Dyck, the author of the act which had brought about the war, fell pierced by an Indian arrow. The savages were soon driven from the town. Taking to their canoes they turned to the south-west. Staten Island and the cultivated land on the south-west bank of the river were overrun, and In three days a hundred settlers were killed and a hundred and fifty more taken prisoners. From the settlements on Long Island and from the highlands of the Hudson fugitives, leaving their farms In terror, trooped for safety Into New Amsterdam. Again the enemy seemed to threaten the capital. But before the blow fell Stuyvesant and the rest of his troop were back at Manhattan. In that crisis all his harshness, his arbitrary temper, his un genial distrust must have been forgotten; the self-reliance and sobriety of the soldier and the ruler atoned for all. All ' An account of this, with references to the original French authorities, will be found in Parkman's Prontenac, pp. 140-2. 2 Brodhead, vol. i. pp. 606-8. 52 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. Straggling was forbidden; every available man, whether In the town or on the ships in the harbor, was put under arms. The wall of the town was hastily fortified, and parties were sent out to relieve and garrison the threatened villages. The enemy at once fell back, terror-struck. Stuyvesant's moderation in using his victory was as conspicuous as his courage and promptitude in winning it. Van Tienhoven, trained In the school of Kieft, was for a war of retaliation. The Governor stood firm: he had shown the enemy that he did not and need not fear them. He now showed them that he only wanted safety, not vengeance. The captives were ransomed, save a certain number, detained among the tribes along the Hudson as pledges for peace. Three years later trouble again seemed In store for the settlers on the upper Hudson. The natives, debauched by the traders Further who sold them brandy, were becoming at once in'iess" familiar and vindictive ; the Dutch dwelt In scattered settlements, open to attack, incapable of concentration or mutual support. The settlers in their fear called on Stuyvesant for aid. He not only sent the force asked for, but went in command. Not without difficulty he constrained the inhabitants to gather themselves into a compact settlement In a bend of the river, guarded on the landward side by a palisade. He then held a conference with the Indians. In answer to his complaint of their outrages, they pleaded that such acts were pjace the work of the young chiefs debauched by the drink made. jqIj (.q (hem by the white men, and that the one murder had been committed by an Indian from a distant tribe. Stuyvesant told them plainly that their excuses could not be entertained, that if they could they must apprehend the mur derer, and make restitution for the damage they had wrought. If this was not done, speedy and severe retaliation would follow. The Indians knew that, though Stuyvesant would not strike wantonly, he could strike heavily. A few days afterwards they returned. They had come, they said, to give a piece of land for the village, a present to the great Dutch sachem to reward him for his long and toilsome journey. ' Brodhead, vol. i. pp. 647-9. His account is apparently taken from the Albany Records. THE DUTCH AND THE FIVE NATIONS. 53 Stuyvesant's efforts to secure peace for his settlers on the upper Hudson were In part frustrated by their own imbecile The brutality. A farmer near Esopus, for whom some att'a'ck^ Indians worked, foolishly gave them a cask of brandy. Esopus. Qjjg of them In his cups let off his gun and caused an alarm. The officer In command of the garrison did his best to prevent a panic, but a party of settlers, defying his orders, rushed out and fired upon the savages. The Indians were at once up in arms. But for Stuyvesant's forethought. In forcing the settlers to palisade their village, the whole settlement would in all likelihood have been cut off. As It was, a party sent to fetch help from New Amsterdam were in tercepted and several of them burnt at the stake. One survivor made his way to New Amsterdam. There was sickness in the town, and it was with difficulty that a force was raised. At length two hundred men were dispatched, but before they could reach the threatened settlement the besiegers had dispersed and were in the woods. The one inestimable benefit which New York owed to its Dutch founders, a benefit shared by the whole body of English- Dealings speaking colonists, was the secure alliance of the Five Five"'^ Nations. They alone of the nations seem to have Nations. \)^tn Capable of a continuous policy dictated by intelli gent self-interest. Holding as they did the highway between French Canada and the middle colonies, they were both to French and English allies of supreme importance. The advances of French missionary-diplomatists had no lasting effect on that reso lute, compact, and self-reliant polity. The foundations of peace with the Dutch were laid, as we have seen, at the Tawasentha, before the West India Company existed. The conditions under which the colony lived all tended to confirm the alliance. Between the Mohawks and the tribes along the Hudson, and the coast, there was continual ill-feeling. Over those tribes the Mohawks claimed a certain supremacy, and put It in force by a levy of tribute. The Dutch were com pelled in self-defense to be chary In selling munitions of war to the Indians Immediately about New Amsterdam. In the case of the Mohawks there was not the same need for caution, and Rensselaerwyck became a mart for guns and powder. Thus it was in a great measure through the Dutch alliance that the 54 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. Mohawks could maintain their authority over the dependent tribes to the east. As we have seen, in 1645, just as the horrors of the long Indian war were abating, Kieft thought it well to confirm the friendship of the Mohawks by a fresh treaty.' Five years later an alarm, due probably In part to the mischief-making jealousy of the tribes on the Hudson, in part to that perpetual source of danger the unauthorized traders, made It needful for Stuyvesant to pacify the Mohawks with a subsidy.' In 1660, when tbe neighboring savages threatened the out lying settlement at Esopus with destruction, the Company were anxious that Stuyvesant should enter into an offensive alliance with the Mohawks. Stuyvesant at once pointed out the folly of a policy which would have taught the Mohawks to regard them selves as necessary to the Dutch.' Nothing can illustrate more emphatically the difference be tween Dutch and English colonization than the early history of The Swed- t^^ Swedish colonles which grew up In the neighbor- jsh colony, hood of the Dutch settlements, and in rivalry with them. We cannot imagine Gilbert and Smith, let them have been never so much baffled and neglected, taking service under France and helping to advance her colonial empire. But the two men who did most to establish the Swedish colony were Netherlanders, men who had urged and furthered Dutch colonial schemes, one a man who had actually borne a hand in the work of colonization. Yet it would be unfair to attribute this to a lack of patriotism in the Dutch character. Rather it shows how little the schemes of colonization concerned or repre sented the whole country. In helping another nation to en croach on the territory and thwart the policy of the West India Company, they were not Interfering with a national enterprise, they were only hindering the schemes of a body of commercial monopolists. Though Usselinx had no share In the successes, such as they were, of the Dutch West India Company, though he finally William appeared as Its rival and opponent, yet he might fairly Usselinx. claim to have done something towards calling it into being. It is scarcely possible to say how far the attitude of ' P. 24. ^ Brodhead, vol. i. p. 523. = lb p. 677. Mr. Brodhead quotes Stuyvesant's actual words, or at least a translation of them, from the Albany Records. USSELINX AND HIS SCHEMES. SS Usselinx towards Dutch colonization was dictated by patriotic, how far by selfish, motives. When the charter of the West India Company was under discussion he drafted a scheme differ ing In various important points from that actually adopted. The scheme proposed by Usselinx would have given the stock holders in the Company much fuller rights of representation. Each province was to have Its own chamber in the Company. The directors in each chamber were not to be a fixed number, but were to vary In proportion to the amount of stock held by the members of the chamber, and were to be elected by these members. There was moreover to be a dual system of government. Commerce was to be left to the Directors. But what one may call the political and diplomatic affairs of the Company were to be administered by a council elected by the whole body of stock holders. That council was to make regulations for the manage ment of the Company, to appoint governors, and to control its alliances and its declarations of war. At the same time the actual task of legislating for the colony was to be vested in the colonists themselves. Such a scheme might probably have stimulated the financial prosperity of the Company. By giving shareholders a more direct control over its affairs It would In all likelihood have increased their number, and made the undertaking more attractive. But there Its advantages would have ended. Under such a system, as under that which existed, the permanent welfare of the settlers was al most certain to be sacrificed to the financial interests of the shareholders. Nor can It be thought that the system of dual government would have worked smoothly. It would have been impossible to define the spheres of business assigned to each body. That the board of Directors should have no voice in the appointment of a governor would have been practically fatal to harmony. Moreover In all dealings with the sav ages trade and defense were so inextricably mixed, that It would have been fatal to place each under a separate depart ment. The best side of Usselinx's proposal beyond doubt was that for giving certain legislative rights to the colonists themselves. That we may well believe would have made the colony more 56 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. attractive to the better sort of emigrants. It might have gained a degree of stability and life which were denied it under the rule of the Company. On the other hand It would have multiplied administrative difficulties and possibilities of dispute. A conflict between the Company and the local legislature would have been inevitable. Selfish and negligent as the Company's rule was, we may well believe that New Netherlands would have fared worse, racked by the opposing interests of directors, shareholders, and colonists. Though Usselinx's scheme failed of acceptance he did not at once turn his back on the Company. He was willing to act as its agent, to do his best in collecting subscriptions on which he should secure a percentage, and to press its claims on the Gov ernment of the United Provinces. He had, in fact, so Identified himself with American colonization, that he had learnt to regard his counsel and support as needful to any such scheme. To^ dispense with him was In his eyes at once a hopeless and an un grateful attempt. At length, in 1623, Usselinx found that he could not get what he asked from the Directors of the Company, and that the Usselinx States-General showed no Inclination to Interfere. Guttavus His own republic had failed him; he might fare Adolphus. better with a foreign kingdom, under a monarch of resolute will and far-reaching schemes. In 1624 Usselinx be took himself to Sweden and at once found a favorable hearing from Gustavus Adolphus. Usselinx laid before the King a scheme closely resembling that which he had drafted for the Dutch Company. A joint-stock company was to be created, its affairs managed in part by a board of directors elected by tbe shareholders, in part by a council nominated by the King. Colo nization was not to be the sole or even the main object, and con sequently the company was not to have any specified territory as signed to It. Rather it was to be a vast department, superin tending all the European trade and all the colonization of the country. It does not appear whether it was to be granted a monopoly of foreign trade, or whether the promoters trusted to the resources of the company to drive all competitors out of the field.' ' A translation of the proposed Charter of the Company is published in the- N. Y. Documents, vol. xii. 5 WE DISH COL ONIZA TION. 5 7 The difficulties which Usselinx encountered In Sweden were wholly different from those which had baffled him In his Hin- own country. There he was hampered by the eager- Swedish ncss of rival capitalists: In Sweden the difficulty was co^oniz . ^^ awake zeal and to find capital. The resources of Sweden were wholly unequal to setting on foot such a scheme as Usselinx projected. The Thirty Years' War and the death of Gustavus were bars even to the achievement of any smaller project. It was not till five years after the death of Gustavus that a scheme was set on foot, due, no doubt, to the suggestive proposals and Impetuous energy of Usselinx, but falling far short of his Ideal. The Swedish colony in America was but a scanty and Imperfect fulfillment of Usselinx's scheme ; It held out no hopes of that personal reward which was a large element in all those schemes; he plays no part in its accomplishment, his. connection with it is but remote and indirect. Such as the scheme of Swedish colonization was, It was largely due to the energy of Oxenstierna. The settle- The Influence of Usselinx had brought Swedes and Swanen- Hollanders interested In American colonization ^^''•' into communication. In 1630 certain members of the Dutch West India Company had bought from the natives a tract of land on the banks of the Delaware. A settlement was formed at a spot named by the patentees Swanendael, now Lewiston In the State of Delaware. Isolated from the colony at Manhattan, the Swanendael settlement formed no Integral member of New Netherlands. For a while it prospered, and in the second year of Its existence one of Its founders, De Vries, sailed from Holland Intending to winter among the settlers. He touched at Manhattan and heard evil tidings. His settle ment had been attacked and cut off by the Indians. He pur sued his voyage, and we are reminded of that gloomy day when. GrenviUe sailed In quest of Raleigh's settlers and found a row of desolate cabins. When De Vries landed he found the fort a ruin, nothing of its palisade left but charred remains, and the skeletons of his countrymen strewn among the bones of their slaughtered cattle. From an Indian he gleaned some account of the tragedy. It had begun, as such feuds usually did, with a. paltry theft by a savage. He had pulled down a tin plate bear- ' De Vries, p. 32, &c. 58 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. Ing the arms of tbe Republic and melted it for tobacco pipes. . The wrath of the Dutch commandant was such that the Indians to pacify him put to death the offender. The settlers saw the danger of this over-ready compliance and remonstrated, but too late. While the settlers were most of them working in the fields, the friends of the slain man attacked the fort. The commandant who chanced to be within was cut down with a tomahawk; the rest were surprised, and in the slaughter that followed not one escaped. The disheartened proprietors made no attempt to renew their settlement, and sold the territory to the West India Company. When Oxenstierna definitely took up the scheme of American colonization, among those to whom he turned for advice and Formation help was One of the Swanendael proprietors, Samuel s'v^edish Blomaert. That led to intercourse with the suspended company. Govcmor of New Netherlands, Peter Minuit. A scheme of colonization was set on foot which could hardly fail to bring its promoters Into conflict with the Dutch West India Company, yet which was supported not only by Minuit and Blomaert, but by other shareholders from Amsterdam. Their subscriptions amounted to twelve thousand florins, half the esti mated capital of the new company. In 1637 ^ company was embodied by charter. Unlike that designed by Usselinx, It was distinctly a colonizing body ; trade only followed so far as it was a necessary consequence. The company had a grant of land on the shores of Delaware Bay of undefined amount. The company was to appoint magistrates for the colony, from whom there was to be an appeal to the home government. There was to be civil equality between all Christian denominations. For ten years there were to be no duties, afterwards a tax of five per cent, on all Imports and exports. All trade was restricted to Swedish ports and to vessels built In the colony Itself. The second condition must for the first few years at least have been a dead letter.' In the winter of 1637 Minuit was dispatched with two ships to lay the foundation of the colony. In March he landed, and Swedish bought a tract of land from the natives near the on thr'" mouth of the Schuylkill, where Wilmington now Schuylkill, stands. As might have been expected, the intrusion 1 Acrelius in Af. Y. Hist. Coll. 2nd series, vol. i. pp. 408-9. SWEDISH SETTLEMENT ON THE SCHUYLKILL. 59 on Dutch territory did not pass unchallenged. Only three years before Fort Nassau had been rescued by the strong hand from English encroachment. If Minuit was allowed to carry out his scheme and thus to command the river. Fort Nassau might be rendered useless as a trading station. A protest was sent to Minuit ;' It was met at first with subterfuges. No colony was Intended, the ships were bound for the West Indies, and had only touched for wood and water.' The mask was soon thrown off. A fort was built and named Christina, after the Queen of Sweden.' It could hardly be called the foundation of a colony: it was rather the assertion of a territorial claim, and the estab lishment of a garrison under the shadow of which a colony might grow up. As a trading station the new venture was a success, and the Dutch trade in the Delaware was reported as "wholly ruined."* But such success left no time for agriculture, and the colony was dependent on the mother country for supplies. There was neglect at home; through the winter of 1639 no food was sent out, and in the following spring the settlers were about to abandon their settlement. Their design was changed by succor as unlocked for as that which in such another crisis saved Vir ginia from desertion. In April 1640 a ship arrived with sup plies, and brought a fresh body of emigrants.' The colony, however, was not exclusively, probably not even in the main, composed of Swedes, since the opening clause of the charter gives permission to the Intended settlers to depart from Holland. Sweden, however, was to have a monopoly of their export trade. The severe restrictions on popular rights under which the Dutch colonists lived must have been emphasized when contrasted with the privileges granted by the Swedish patent. That allowed the settlers to elect their own magistrates and officers. At the same time there was to be a governor ap pointed by the Crown, who might veto the orders of the local courts, and to whom appeals lay in judicial matters. ^ N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. p. 19. ^ Vertoogh, p. 282. ^ Report by Andrew Hudde; published in the N. Y. Hist. Coll. 2nd series, vol. ii. p. 429; cf. Acrelius, p. 409. This is also mentioned in a letter written from Jamestown to Secretary Windebank, May 8, 1638. Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, vol. v. p. 56. * Brodhead, vol. i. p. 320. ' Archives at Stockholm, quoted by Ferris, p. 52. 6o FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. It was not only in civil matters that the Swedish colony en joyed liberty denied to their neighbors. The two rival forms- of Protestantism, the Augsburg Confession and "the pretended reformed religion" — i.e. Calvinism and Lutheranism — were both to be admitted. How curiously entwined were the colonial Interests of Hol land and Sweden, how little the Dutch regarded the matter with Relations any national exclusiveness, was shown when In 1640 and Dutch, a Settlement, modeled on the patroonships of New Netherlands, was established on the Delaware under a title granted by Queen Christina.' One cause, no doubt, which made the Dutch tolerant of these Intrusions was the presence of a common enemy. It might be impossible for the Dutch to check the tide of English en croachment on Long Island or on the banks of the Connecticut.. But It was different with outlying stations for trade, such as. the Newhaven merchants were striving to establish on the Dela ware, and Kieft was glad to form an alliance whereby he secured the aid of the Swedes against these intruders.' In the summer of 1642 the Swedish Company was enlarged.. Fresh capital was subscribed, and a monopoly of the tobacco Progress of trade wIth Sweden and Finland was granted.' More ish colony, settlcts Were sent out, among them a number of skilled woodcutters from Finland, and the colony was placed under the command of an experienced soldier, John Printz.* His instructions are interesting as showing the purpose and hopes of the Swedish Government. The necessity for armed resistance to the Dutch was contemplated, and provision made accordingly. It Is clear that the colony was to be regarded as. created for the commercial benefit of the mother country, not as a self-supporting community existing for Itself. Printz Is to. encourage mining and the production of timber, wool, silk, and tobacco. A monopoly of the last-named commodity was to be granted to the Company. The attitude of the Swedish Govern ment towards this matter was not unlike that of James I. to the ' Ferris (pp. 53-54) gives an account of this colony, quoting original docu ments; cf. Hazard, p. 66. The patent itself is in the Pennsylvania Archives.. vol. V. p. 759. " Ferris, p. 59. * N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. p. 21. 'Acrelius in N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll. 2nd series, vol. i. p. 411.. SWEDISH COLONY. 6i "Virginia Company. Tobacco was an obnoxious luxury. But if men will use it, let the colonial company get the benefit of It. Unhappily there was another point of likeness between the Swedish colony and Virginia. In neither case did the founders see that a young colony will, at least at the outset, need all Its labor to establish and support Itself, and that all thought of ex portation must be postponed till the primary needs of the settlers have been satisfied.' Printz shifted the headquarters of the Governor to Tinicum, some fifteen miles above Fort Christina and twelve below the site of Philadelphia. Log huts clustered round the fort, forming the village of New Gottenburg. Another fort, called Elsen- iurg, was built and garrisoned on the eastern bank of the river, near what is now Salem In New Jersey.' By this policy the "tables were completely turned upon the Dutch. Fort Nassau instead of being a check on the Swedish colony was cut off from the mouth of the river, and rendered little better than a useless •encumbrance. By 1645 the whole number of male emigrants amounted to ninety, beside women and children. There were also a few English who had been suffered to remain on submitting to the Swedish Governor. The little community had not reached the stage when there Is any need for definite constitutional ma- 'chlnery. The Governor was. In theory, responsible only to the home authorities. In fact it can never have been a matter of any .difficulty for the whole body of freemen to express their wishes and opinions. The social life of the settlers seems to have resembled that of New England rather than New Netherlands. They were gath- -Sociai and ered together in the two villages of Christina and "fe of°the Gottenburg.' There were beside three detached to- •coiony. bacco plantations. The relations of the settlers to the Indians were friendly, and the worst calamities that befell the ¦colony during its first ten years of existence were the neglect of the home authorities to send adequate supplies, and the destruc tion of New Gottenburg by fire In the dead of winter. The ^ A translation of the Instructions is published in Hazard's Register of Pennsylvania, vol. iv. pp. 64-8. " De Vries, p. 181. Hudde in N. Y. Hist. Coll. 2nd series, vol. i. pp. .428-9. ' There may have been a third village at Elsenburg. 62 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. Lutheran religion was publicly recognized. Religious service indeed was celebrated with a frequency and regularity whicli distinguished New Sweden alike from Dutch and English neighbors. Full service was said on Sundays and high days, there was preaching on Wednesdays and Fridays, and daily prayers were read, at New Gottenburg by an ordained clergy man, at the smaller settlements by lay readers especially ap pointed to that end. It is plain that this was a side of colonial life to which no small importance was attached by the authorities In Sweden. Thus we find Peter Brahe, the President of the Royal Council, In one of his dispatches, admonishing Printz to let no leaven of Calvinistic faith or practice creep In from his Dutch or English neighbors. The established faith of the settlers In New Netherlands sat so lightly upon them, that this difference could do little to affect the relations between the two colonies. But it may have had some influence on a strenuous and narrow-minded Calvinist such as Stuyvesant.' Indeed the whole character of that Governor made it certain that he would deal in a very different temper from that of his Hostility predecessors with any encroachment on Dutch ter- Neth^!"" ritory or Dutch privileges. Moreover the dlsappear- lands. ance of the common enemy, the English, from the dis puted territory removed a guarantee. If not for friendship, at least for peace. During the early days of the Swedish settlement the Government of the United Provinces had done Its best to prevent any collision. A Swedish vessel returning from America with a heavy cargo was arrested by the command of the East India Company. The Swedish Ambassador at The Hague at once protested, and by an order of the States-General the vessel was set free.' Gradually and inevitably causes for discord multiplied them selves. The position of Fort Nassau could not but give rise to trouble. Since the Swedes commanded each bank of the river the Dutch could only enjoy on sufferance any trade in the upper waters of the Delaware. In the summer of 1646 a sloop from New Amsterdam laden with goods for the Indian trade touched at Fort Nassau, and by the order of the commander there sailed into the Schuylkill. But Printz at once forbade the voyage in ^ Brahe's letter (Anglicized) is quoted in Winsor's Memorial History, vol. iv. p. 459. ^ N. Y. Docs. vol. i. p. ii6. DISPUTES BETWEEN DUTCH AND SWEDES. 63 terms so determined and threatening that it was abandoned. So, too, when the Dutch arms were set up some twelve miles above Tinicum, on the western bank of the Delaware, they were in sultingly pulled down by the order of Printz. An envoy sent by Hudde, the commander of Fort Nassau, to remonstrate was re ceived by the Swedish Governor with scoffs and threats of vio lence.' The arrogance and self-confidence of Printz seems to have effectually awed Kieft and his underlings. In Kieft's successor the Swedish Governor had to deal with an opponent of his own metal. One of Stuyvesant's first acts was to send Printz a protest against his encroachments. Printz seems to have Ignored this. There is no proof of any hostility between the Swedes and the Indians; if there had been such, It would almost certainly have been recorded. It is clear, however, that the savages looked with some suspicion on the Swedes as in truders, and sympathized with the Dutch in that rivalry which was now plainly manifest. The Dutch were occasional visitors,, who brought brandy and guns and gunpowder, and did not threaten any territorial encroachment. The Swedes were neces sarily more guarded in their dealings; the savage may have already suspected that his hunting grounds were doomed before the ax and plow of the white man. Invited by the Indians on the Schuylkill, Hudde built a wooden fort and, as it would seem, made preparations for a settlement. While the work was going, on a party of twenty-four Swedes appeared, and, after ineffectu ally threatening Hudde, cut down all the trees around the fort, probably to enable troops to act more readily against it. What ever may have been the object, it is clear from the way In which this Is reported that the Dutch viewed It as an outrage. During the whole autumn the same style of warfare was waged : houses. were built by Dutch settlers on the Schuylkill and pulled down by the Swedes.' Stuyvesant plainly saw that nothing could be done by main taining detached outposts against the enemy. If the Dutch were Policy of to keep their hold on the Delaware, it must be done sant. by establishing a secure communication with Man- ^ Oflficial Report in the New York Documents, vol. i. p. 537, &c. This was received in January 1656. It is entitled Secret. There is nothing to show who drafted it. * Hudde (referred to on p. 61) gives a very full account of these transac tions. "64 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. hattan. To this end he abandoned and demolished Fort Nas sau, and built In Its place Fort Casimir, four miles below Fort Christina.' The sound strategy of this was obvious. Ships from Manhattan could now support the Dutch in the Delaware without having to run under the enemy's guns. The position was reversed, the Swedes were now cut off from the mouth of the river. As a further measure towards strengthening his position, Stuyvesant purchased from the Indians the frontage along the west bank of the river for about twenty-five miles below Fort Christina.' How well judged was Stuyvesant's policy was shown by its ¦effect on the Swedish settlers. In 1653 we find Printz writing to his own Government that it was useless for him to attempt the ¦expulsion of the Dutch from the river unless he was re-enforced. Some of his settlers wished to withdraw and place themselves under the Government of New Netherlands; they were only withheld because Stuyvesant declined to take them without per mission from his own Government. Meanwhile the Swedish Government was doing little to Further Strengthen or encourage Its settlers. Such efforts as the p'art'of '^ did make were unfortunate. In 1649 a vessel, sent Sweden. ^yj yj^jfji seventy emigrants and large supplies, was cast away near Porto Rico. In 1653 Printz's appeal for help became so urgent that the authorities at home saw the need for resolute action. The Company by its own voluntary act placed itself under the con trol of the Swedish Board of Trade. The conclusion of the Thirty Years' War had left Sweden encumbered with a number ¦of unemployed soldiers. Those who directed her colonial policy decided to make use of these colonists on the Roman model; they were at once to till and to garrison the land. Three hun- ¦dred emigrants were chosen, of whom fifty were to be of this class. At the head of the party the Board placed their own Secretary, John Rising, with a commission as Deputy-Governor under Printz. Two vessels were chartered for the voyage. They met with that persistent ill-fortune which followed Swedish emigrant ships. One vessel could not be got ready for sea in time and a number of the emigrants had to be left behind. In the meantime Printz, worn out by old age, and disheartened ¦ Report, p. 590. HI,, FURTHER SWEDISH EFFORTS. 65 by the failure of the authorities at home to send succor, think ing too, as it would seem, that he could do more for the colony by a personal appeal than by his dispatches, had sailed for Sweden. Before doing so he had ajjandoned Fort Elsenburg. On May 21 the fleet under Rising touched at that point. Though It was no longer in military occupation. In all likeli hood there were settlers in the neighborhood, and from them the new-comers would hear of Printz's departure. This left Rising in supreme command. His orders were to do his best to secure each side of the Delaware, and if he could to persuade the Dutch to abandon Fort Casimir, while he was himself to fortify nearer the mouth of the river. But all this was to be done by peaceable means. It was better, so his orders said, to leave the Dutch in possession than to run any risk of letting in the English. Such were Rising's written instructions.' But it Is almost certain that there was a party In the Company who were for bolder measures,' and It Is plain that Rising's own wishes went that way. Before landing or holding any communication with the ¦upper settlements he bore down on Fort Casimir and summoned it to surrender. Defense was rendered Impossible by want of ammunition. This was due, It was said, to the dishonesty of the commander, Gerrit BIkker, who had traded away his powder to the Indians.' No attempt was made to hold the place ; Ris ing took possession, changed the name to Fort Trinity, and left a skilled engineer who had come with him to strengthen the de fenses. All these proceedings he reported in a dispatch to Stuy vesant, mentioning at the same time that certain Dutch settlers whom he had found near Fort Christina had taken the oath of allegiance to Sweden. Disputes with the English, which but for the fortunate, but unscrupulous, policy of Massachusetts must have resulted in Opposition war, now fully occupied Stuyvesant, and for twelve Dutch. months no attempt was made to recover Fort Casimir or to contest the possession of the Delaware. Stuyvesant, how ever, was not the man to sit down quietly under such an en croachment. It Is clear too that his superiors in Holland, * A translation of these instructions is in the Pennsylvania Register, vol. iv. p. 143- ' Otherwise it would have been impossible for Printz and Rising to adopt the aggressive policy which they did. * N. Y. Docs. vol. i. p. 605. 66 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. neglectful as they often were of the welfare of the colony, would resent anything which touched their own dignity and their own interests. In November 1654 the Governor re ceived orders to "avenge the Infamous surrender" of Fort Casimir by driving the Swedes out of the country, and to ar rest BIkker, the commander, who had so tamely surrendered the fort.' Stuyvesant had somewhat strangely chosen this time for a voyage to the West Indies, and nothing could be done till his return.' His whole conduct towards Indians, English, and Swedes showed that he was no lover of war, nor anxious for small advantages of little value, but that when he did strike he struck decisively. It was not till July 1655 that Stuyvesant re turned. He at once resolved to carry out the policy suggested by the Company, though an attack of Illness compelled him to depute some share In the task of preparing the expedition.' By the first week in September a squadron of seven vessels was ready. Between six and seven hundred men were embarked, stuyvesant and Stuyvesant himself took the command. The SwedraV"' A^et Sailed up the Delaware and were suffered with- coiony. Qyj opposition to land fifty men, who cut off Fort Casimir from the upper settlements. Schute, the commander of Fort Casimir, finding himself thus Isolated, surrendered at the first summons. Thence Stuyvesant sailed on to Fort Christina. There again he was suffered to land and erect his batteries. The first sum mons to surrender was met with refusal. Stuyvesant did not open fire, but contented himself with investing the fort while his troops pillaged the surrounding country. In nine days symp toms of mutiny within the fort compelled Rising to surrender.. The Swedish garrison marched out with the honors of war, and the Dutch flag floated over the fort.* In spite of the bloodless nature of the conquest and the leni ency shown to the Swedish settlers, certain measures of force were needed to secure the new territory. A Swedish vessel with a hundred and thirty emigrants on board was not allowed to touch within the Delaware, and certain Swedes who were found ' N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. p. 85. =76. p. 90. 'Ih. p. 91. * The authorities for the Dutch conquest are to be found in the first and the. twelfth volumes of the N. Y. Documents. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WALDENSES. 67 intriguing with the Indians were arrested and sent to New Amsterdam. A population so motley as that of New Netherlands could easily absorb and assimilate a fresh element. It was, too, for the Effects temporary peace of the colony to have converted a conquest. neighbor separated by no definite or easily kept boundary from a rival into a dependency. Yet If the lands on the Delaware could have become once more a mere hunting- ground for savages. New Netherlands would have been stronger and safer. On each side English colonies were closing in: a longer sea-board only made the Dutch colony an object of greater suspicion and jealousy. In case of an attack, too, the re sources of the colony would be divided. There were now two points too far apart for mutual help, at which a maritime in vader might strike. In another way also the conquest of New Sweden was in the long run a danger to New Netherlands. The complaints of the Swedish Government were unheeded at The Hague. The attitude of the Dutch was a practical declaration that title based on discovery — a form of title which gave scope for endless dispute and litigation — was to take precedence of title based on the plain and obvious fact of occupation. Stuyvesant and his employers set up a principle which only six years later was turned against them to their own destruction. Financially, too, the expedition against New Sweden was a heavy — events showed, a fatal — blow to the Company. The deficit created by the cost of the expedition had to be met by borrowing twenty- four thousand guilders from the city of Amsterdam. Thus the colony tied round its neck a load of debt, which crippled its military resources, and forced it to deal with its territory on com mercial rather than military and political grounds. In the cheapest, not the most efficient, fashion. The whole administrative history of the colony showed that Its weakest point was lack of centralization. The patroonships, The city of the half-Independent municipalities founded by colo- dal^f" "ms nists from New England, were sources of discord and a colony. weakness. Yet In dealing with Its newly acquired territory the Company brought In a further element of variance. The city of Amsterdam proposed to find a home for a number of Waldenses, the survivors of the "slaughtered saints," "slain by 68 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. the bloody Piedmontese." In the Old World Holland was the one consecrated asylum for the victims of religious tyranny. Gradually a wider refuge beyond the Atlantic was being opened also; that process was beginning which, as it has been said, makes the history of American colonization the history of the persecutions of Europe. The conquest of New Sweden enabled the Government to find a refuge for these outcasts. By sur rendering Fort Casimir and the territory for about twenty-five miles below it, on the south-west bank of the river,' the West India Company was able to liquidate its debt to the city of Amsterdam. This was the more necessary since the Company was embarrassed by recent losses in Guiana and Brazil. They acted, in fact, like a landlord who sells a portion of his estates to free the rest from encumbrances. Financially this was no doubt sound policy, but a government In dealing with Its terri tory cannot limit its view to finance. The cession was a con fession of administrative incapacity. The Company did not, however, wholly divest themselves of their tenantry on the Dela ware. The Swedes had built a solid log fort on Tinicum Island, about twelve miles below the spot now occupied by the city of Philadelphia. This remained under the jurisdiction of the Com pany; so also did Fort Christina, of which the name was now changed to Altona.' Since there was to be a division It would have been far better If that had gone too, and if the responsibility of maintaining order on the Delaware, and of protecting the settlers against the Indians, and holding the territory against English encroachment had been laid undivided on the city gov ernment of Amsterdam. The city at once took in hand the task of dealing with the newly acquired territory. The management of the colony was vested in a committee of six, chosen by the burgomasters from among themselves. Specific conditions were drawn up to at tract emigrants. They were to be carried out without payment, the site for a house was to be given them, and they were to be clothed and fed for one year at the expense ^The south-east boundary was the now called Boomtjes (corrupted into Bombay) Hook. Mr. Keen in his map places this at the northern extremity OI Boomtjes Hook Island. It does not appear to me quite clear that it may not have been at the southern end. In the latter case the territory would be about thirty miles. ' Brodhead, vol. i. p. 631. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WALDENSES. 69 of the city. Whether any labor on behalf of the colony In gen eral was required In return does not appear. We may be sure, however, that the promoters of the colony did not intend it to be what, if these conditions had stood alone it might become — a home for Idle paupers. After the first year the colonists were to be supplied with the necessaries of life and with seeds out of a public magazine, at a rate not higher than that current In the mother country. For ten years the colony was to be free pf taxes; after that the settlers were to be taxed at the minimum rate imposed on any Inhabitants of New Netherlands. There was to be a municipal government modeled on that of Amster dam Itself. No regular clergy were appointed, but there was to be a schoolmaster who should conduct a simple religious service. In most of these conditions there Is a certain vagueness, something which suggests an anxiety to frame attractive con ditions, with no very definite Ideas how they were to be fulfilled. The relations between the government of the new municipality and that of the West India Company were arranged with a laxity which could not fail to give rise to dispute. The city of Amsterdam was to have "high, middle, and low jurisdiction," while at the same time the sovereignty and supreme authority was to remain vested in the Company. More definite ex pression was given to this by the provision that the council of the new town should have final jurisdiction in small cases, but where the matter at Issue exceeded one hundred guilders, there should be an appeal to the Director and Council of New Nether lands.' The best part of the policy adopted by the city was their choice of a Governor, Jacob Alrlchs. Portions of a dispatch are Jacob extant from which we learn the condition In which appointed ^6 found things OH hls arrival, and the policy which Governor, jjg adopted. Fort CasImlr was occupied by a gar rison. Round the fort were grouped about a dozen families, living under a system which was a combination of municipal government and martial law. Any disputes that arose were settled by the Commander In concert with two schepens and a secretary appointed by the Company. This government Alrichs suffered to remain In force for a ' There is a translation of these conditions in the N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll. vol. i. p. 291. They are also in the Documents, vol. i. p. 630. 70 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. while, pending a definite settlement, and In such a manner as to secure the rights of the existing Inhabitants. Finally it was superseded, as It would seem peacefully, and with the approval of the settlers, by a Council of seven, from whom were chosen three schepens, a secretary, and a schout. The spiritual wants of the community were provided for by the appointment of two elders and two deacons. The colony was laid out precisely on the model of a New England village. The land was apportioned as far as might be Founda- at the choIce of the settlers themselves, and every Amstel. man fenced his own lot. But this was not allowed to cause straggling. The settlers were grouped in a town of a hundred and ten houses, built round a square, with a public storehouse and a barrack for the garrison. One may say in fact that Alrichs transformed a fort into a village.' In accordance with a principle accepted alike by Dutch, English, and Swedish settlers, the town was named, after a suburb of the parent city. New Amstel. As might have been foreseen, the system of government soon gave rise to disputes. The authorities of the city of Amsterdam Hin- held that Alrichs and his settlers were responsible the colony. Only to them. Stuyvesant appears to have contended that tbe city was only in the position of a territorial proprietor, and that the jurisdiction of the Company was Intact. Alrichs, he complained, did not, in the oath of allegiance which he ad ministered to the settlers, make any mention of the Company, and the restrictions in trade were disregarded.' Yet though Stuyvesant may have fallen short of the standard of moderation aimed at by Alrichs, he went far enough in that direction to earn the disapproval of his inferiors. We find the Council remonstrating with him for keeping Swedes in office, and also for a promise that In the event of any dispute between Holland and Sweden they might remain neutral.' The fair hopes with which New Amstel began soon came to nought. Heavy sickness fell upon the colony,* and those who were well were too busy in building and fencing to till the land. ' For these details see Alrichs's dispatches in Hazard's Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, vol. v. ^ N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. p. 68. "Penn. Archives, 2nd series, vol. vii. p. 555. * N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. pp. 225, 227. TROUBLES AT NEW AMSTEL. 7' Those in Holland who should have supplied provisions were negligent, and the colony had to depend for its food on Man hattan.' Indifferent though the West India Company might have been as to the welfare of Its settlers, the emigrants at New Amstel had no reason to congratulate themselves on being under dif ferent authority. Disheartened at the unprofitable aspect of their venture, the Town Council of Amsterdam with shameless and cruel Indifference threw to the winds their agreement with their settlers. The colonists who went out had been promised a supply of provisions: that was now limited to those who had left Holland before December 1658. The exemption from taxes was to expire before the time originally named, and all goods exported were to be sent to Amsterdam. By the strenuous pro test of their colonists, and by the more liberal example of the West India Company, the Council were shamed Into abandoning the last measure. To the other troubles of these unhappy settlers were added rumors of an attack from Maryland. We cannot wonder that men turned their backs on the colony. Alrichs made vain attempts to detain them, urging that they were bound for a fixed term by their covenants. In such a country It was a hopeless task to keep unwilling inhabitants. Some fled to Manhattan, others. Including soldiers from the garrison, to Maryland and Virginia.' Alrichs himself died.' Yet even In Its weakened condition the colony was capable of giving trouble to New Amsterdam. Alrichs' successor, Alexander D'HInoyossa, was self-willed and turbulent. He practically claimed to be Inde pendent of the Company's authority, and to control the whole trade and navigation of the Delaware.' At the same time he showed no respect for the civic authority of Amsterdam which he was supposed to represent, and he was even charged with declar ing that, unless he met with due support, he would follow In the steps of Minuit and transfer his services to a foreign Power." ^ N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. p. 236. * Alrichs's dispatches in N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. pp. 54, 64, 70. ' Letter from William Beckman, N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. p. 289. Beckman was appointed by Stuyvesant to represent him on the Delaware. * Beckman to Stuyvesant, N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. pp. 363-5, 368. ' This charge was supported by several depositions, N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. p. 3^6. It was evidently believed by Beckman, who does not seem to have started with any prejudice against Hinoyossa. 72 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. It is not surprising that the Town Council of Amsterdam should have wished to throw back their unhappy venture on the West India Company, nor more surprising that the latter would have nothing to say to the proposed transfer. In 1 66 1 the Government of Amsterdam resolved to make one further attempt for the success of their colony. A fresh agree- New condi- ment was drawn up by the West India Company and em?|rants. approved by the States-General, under which the colony was to be not so much replenished as settled afresh on a new footing. Emigrants were to be exempt from all dues to the Company; they were to have free rights of mining, fishing, and trawling, and might even, if dissatisfied with the Director, choose his successor. It does not seem clear — perhaps those who drafted the document did not wish to make It clear — ^how far these conditions were to apply to the existing inhabitants.' Such changes might do a little to lighten some of the burdens under which the colonists suffered ; they might add something to the material prosperity of the colony. They could not in them selves do anything to cure what was probably the most deeply seated of her troubles, that exaggerated cosmopolitanism which had prevented the development of any national life, and made civic unity well-nigh impossible. How far those who controlled the destinies of the colony were from understanding their needs and deficiencies was strikingly Proposed shown In the same year. The men of New Haven, f?om nLw the entertainers of the regicides, of all the New Eng- Haven. \2siA colonlcs the narrowest and most exclusive In their ecclesiastical system, were beginning to dread what the Restoration might have in store for them, and what encroach ments they might have to expect from their more compliant neighbors In Connecticut. Some of them already began to con template that policy of migration which a few years later bore such singular fruits, and a deputation of four leading men waited on Stuyvesant, proposing to avail themselves of the newly granted privileges. They asked for a grant of land, to which the Indian title should be extinguished by the Dutch Government. The townsmen were to elect their own magistrates and officers and to exclude and admit settlers at their own discretion. The township was to be, as in New England, Identical with the Con- ^ For the conditions see Brodhead, vol. i. p. 696. THE MENNONISTS.' 73 gregational Church. Lastly, there was to be a synod of all the English Churches In New Netherlands. Such an arrangement could have only one effect. It would consolidate the Englishry, as we call those of New Netherlands, Into a well-defined and homogeneous body, and enormously increase the danger of English encroachment. It was, however, only at rare Intervals and under the pressure of some exceptional excitement that the rulers of New Nether lands awoke to a sense of that danger. Stuyvesant was pre pared to grant all that the deputies from New Haven asked for, the right of self-government only excepted. The States-General, however, were prepared to grant even that with certain restrictions. The Director and Council of New Netherlands were to have a veto In the election of officers. The local court might not pass sentence of death, except where the criminal confessed his guilt, and the penal code was not to apply to any Dutch who might settle within the township. In the meantime, however, the applicants themselves seemed to have abandoned their scheme, and the concessions bore no fruit.' Another attempt to form a small imperium in imperio was more successful. Among the strange ramifications of Protes- The Men- tantlsm to which the Reformation in Germany gave nonists." birth was the sect of the Mennonists. The members of the sect claimed for It a continuous descent from the primitive Church and a share in that war of persecution which, at the opening of the thirteenth century, swept over the south of France and made itself felt, though less widely and less fiercely, in the Low Countries. It is Impossible to say what currents may have been flowing below the surface during the centuries which separated Luther from Henry the Deacon. Practically we may look on the Mennonists as a religious society called into life about 1520 by Simon Menno. He appears to have been a Dutchman who migrated to Germany. Their repudiation of Infant baptism caused them to be included in the comprehensive title of Anabaptists, but they seem never to have been even sus- ' For these negotiations with New Haven see Brodhead, vol. i. pp. 695, 708. " For the Mennonist settlement see Brodhead, vol. i. p. 698. A good ac count of the sect, its origin and early history, is given in an Appendix to Proud's History of Pennsylvania. 74 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. pected of any share in the profligacy and lawlessness commonly associated with the name. Like the Quakers, they denied the lawfulness of oaths and of war, and dispensed with an ordained clergy. Isolated members of the sect, possibly small congrega tions, seem to have found their way Into New Netherlands be fore 1640, since they are mentioned in Father Jogues' enumera tion of the numerous sects and authorities to be seen at New Amsterdam.' They are also mentioned In 1657 in a formal re port by two of the Dutch Calvinist ministers in the colony. But as they speak of "Mennonites" at Gravesend, a settlement founded from New England, it is probable that they used the name vaguely as a synonym for Baptist. At all events these were at most isolated and inorganic movements. But when the city of Amsterdam was casting in every direction for methods of reviving and replenishing the colony It entered into negotiations with a Mennonist community. They obtained a grant of land at the Hoarkill, near the mouth of the Delaware where Lewiston now stands. Thus they were effectually separated from the main body of the colony at New Amsterdam, an arrangement probably acceptable to both parties. The community was to consist of married couples and single men not under twenty-four, and free from debt. There were to be simple religious exercises, but no clergy. The officials of the community were to be In the first instance nominated by the community; a further selection was to be made by the burgo masters of Amsterdam. There was to be a primary assembly of the whole body of settlers; a majority of two-thirds was re quired for legislative purposes, and their enactments had to be ratified at Amsterdam by the municipal government. A similar majority of two-thirds might expel any person of objectionable character. Property was at the outset to be held In common. But it is clear that the Mennonists, or at least this section of them, did not hold the Anabaptist tenets of community of goods, since at the end of five years there was to be a division of property. Like the Plymouth pilgrims the Mennonists started their en terprise on borrowed capital. Twenty-five hundred guilders (a little over two hundred and sixty pounds in English money) ' See p. 15. GENERAL VIEW OF NEW NETHERLANDS. 75 was advanced by the city of Amsterdam, and the whole com munity of emigrants was liable for repayment. The Mennonist settlement on the Delaware was virtually the expiring effort of Dutch colonization. Before we pass to the Outward next phase In the history of New York, the English appearance ^ , -^ . ' *= of New conquest, it may not be amiss to see what was the out- dam.i ward aspect of the territory which changed masters. The only portion of the colony outside the capital where a traveler would have found signs of continuous habitation was Uong Island. There were to be seen agricultural communities having their origin from New England, and closely resembling the villages of New England in outer aspect. Their history, however, and their relations to the government of the Dutch ¦colony belong In reality to a later stage of our history, to the transformation of the Dutch colony of New Netherlands into the English dependency of New York, and will be more fittingly .dealt with hereafter. In the rest of the colony the settled parts formed detached bases In an unreclaimed wilderness. Along the Hudson were villages of two sorts. On the patroonships, the houses of the farmers and the cabins of the laborers were In all likelihood .grouped together for defense against the Indian, somewhat like the type of medieval town which had its origin in a manorial settlement. Elsewhere along the waterway of the Hudson and on the shores of the Delaware were fortified trading stations, with a wooden palisade and a few cannon, and grouped close to them for protection small farmsteads and the houses of the handicraftsmen, such as the smith and the carpenter, who were needed for the simple life of such a community. The patroon was often a merchant as well, with a town house in New Amsterdam. In the city there is nothing to show the actual amount of trade done In the colony, or the number of rships touching there during the period of Dutch rule. But there Is abundant evidence that a crowd of traders of divers nation alities continually came and went; as early as 1642 Kieft found it necessary to build an inn for their accommodation. Regu lations were framed Intended to confine the trade of the colony to bona-fide residents for six years; seemingly, however, traders ' For what follows I have relied to a considerable extent on Mr. Tucker- anan. 76 FOUNDATION OF NEW NETHERLANDS. in foreign vessels might land their cargoes and sell them. The prohibition of non-resident traders was In all likelihood to check those who made a temporary lodgment In the colony without any of the rights or responsibilities of citizenship. The resources of the town make It impossible that there could be anything of grandeur in Its outer aspect. The majority of the houses were of wood. In 1655 Stuyvesant passed an ordi nance prohibiting the construction of wooden chimneys, and two years later he went yet further and ordered those which were In existence to be pulled down. Only a few of the streets were paved, and those only with cobble stones, and the only drainage was a gutter down their middle. Yet the old Dutch town must have had elements of beauty which Its successor, with all its stateliness and regularity, has lost. Many of the houses stood surrounded by orchards and gardens. Trees along the sides of the streets must have recalled to the Dutch emigrant the towns of his native land. That likeness was increased by a canal filled in in 1676, and running where now Is Broad Street. Another impressive feature of the old town has vanished. Where now are the Battery and the Bowling Green, hemmed In and dwarfed by colossal trading houses, there stood Fort Amsterdam, sepa rated from the houses of the city by an open space of green sward.' In many respects New York cosmopolitanism, lacking in corporate feeling and in any sense of civic dignity and responsl- Education blllty, was Ill-fitted to assimilate with those English NetheT- colonies to which its geographical position specially lands. attached It. But New Netherlands and New Eng land had at least one point of likeness. Amid all their keen pursuit of material wealth, the rulers and citizens of New Netherlands had not wholly forgotten the claims of the mind. Before 1664 there were nine schools In existence In the colony, and amid all the difficulty and distress which beset the colony in 1659 time and money were found for the establishment of a High School with a Latin class. It would be interesting to know how after the English conquest the rival claims of the Dutch and English tongues in education were adjusted. But >This is proved by an ordinance of the Council, passed in 1648, which pro hibited the pasturing of sheep and goats between Fort Amsterdam and the "Fresh Water," i.e. evidently the Hudson and the East River. TRANSFER OF THE DELAWARE TERRITORY. 77 we may be sure that the existence of an educational system open to each nationality must have done not a little to obliterate dis tinctions and promote fusion. In March 1663 a change was made which might well have come sooner. The Company made over to the city of Amster- Transferof dam the wholc of their territory on the Delaware. war?tlr'ri- The grantees were to have no power of alienation, city of Am- ^"*^ ^^^^^ Were bound to garrison the country suf- sterdam. ficlcntly and to send out four hundred emigrants each year. As a step towards fulfilling these promises a hundred and fifty emigrants were sent out during the summer. CHAPTER II. THE ENGLISH CONQUEST.' An important chapter in American history loses all its meaning If we look on the English conquest of New York as an isolated NewNeth- event. An English King and his advisers decreed gra'd'uaiiy that Ncw Netherlands should be part of the British Anglicized. Empire, and they carried through their purpose. Their action by Itself could not have enabled the Dutch settle ment to take its place In the English group of colonies; for that change a path had been prepared by the Independent action of English citizens. For nearly thirty years before the overthrow of the Dutch power on the Hudson two processes had been at work. There had been hostile and aggressive action on the frontier, a tendency to dispute the right of the Dutch to a particular boundary, and even to deny altogether their territorial title. Besides there was the process of peaceful incursion by which an English element in troduced and established itself among the Dutch population. The territorial struggle was practically limited to the north east frontier. The debatable land was the valley of the Con- on"e* necticut. The extension of the English settlements settlement into that valley was indeed In two ways the origin of necticut. the contcst. For one thing it so placed the Dutch and English settlers that disputes were sure to arise. Further more It was a necessary condition for the formation of the New England confederacy. Without Connecticut as a third party there could have been no union between the unequally balanced powers of Massachusetts and Plymouth. The creation of the confederacy concentrated the resources of New England, and gave it a machinery with which to contest its right. * The authorities for this, and the following three chapters, are much the same. There are a few documents among the English Colonial Papers which bear on the history of New York, and which are not included eitlier in Mr^ Brodhead's or Mr. O'Callaghan's collections. THE TREATY OF HARTFORD. 79» The first ground of dispute was the settlement at Hartford. As early as 1639, In the governorship of Kieft, the Dutch had Disputes at cause to complain of encroachment and molesta- Hartford. ^.Jqjj j^ ^Jj^^. quarter. The charges were met not: with denial, scarcely with justification, but with counter charges complaining that the Dutch monopolized the trade of the Hudson and the Delaware, to the total exclusion of the English. Three years later the dispute was renewed. The English complained of isolated acts of violence by the Dutch and of the illegal detention of runaway servants. In 1650 matters were temporarily arranged at an interview which Stuyvesant had with the Federal Commissioners at Hart- Treaty of ford. A boundary line was drawn which was to hold Hartford.' good for Long Island and also for the mainland.. This boundary was to be made more effective by a sort of neu tral zone, as no permanent Dutch settlement was to be formed within six miles of the line. The question as to runaway servants. was to be settled by accepting the same rule, that of extradition, which regulated the Intercolonial dealings of the New England. confederacy. The difficulty, however, went too deep to be thus removed- Matters were being complicated by the second process of which. English I have spoken, that by which an English element was. "'Gre"S°* being Infused Into the Dutch population. The earllest- wich. English-speaking community which formed politi cally a portion of New York was Greenwich, on Long Island.. It was settled in 1640 by that Captain Patrick who had played. so unsatisfactory and discreditable a part In the Pequod war. He and his associates acquired the land which they occupied by purchase from the Indians. The demand that they should sub mit to the Dutch Government was at first met with a vague declaration of neutrality. In 1642 they took the oath of allegi ance to the States-General, with the understanding that the town was to enjoy the same rights as those granted to a patroon ship.' * The negotiations between Stuyvesant and the Commissioners and the agree ment are in Hazard, vol. ii. pp. 154-70, and are copied in the A^. Y. Hist. Coll.. 1st series, vol. i. "Records in Hazard in N. Y. Hist. CoU. as above; Brodhead, vol. i. p. 296. 8o THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. In the same year two more parties of emigrants, men whose religious opinions made New England an unsafe home for them, other founded settlements on like terms at Newtown' and fetfic!'' West Chester.' The founder of the first-named ments on settlement was Francis Doughty, a clergyman ex- isiand. pelled from New England for a somewhat obscure expression of unorthodoxy.' His daughter apparently soon after his arrival married Adrian Von der Donck, a leading Dutch col onist who held office under Kieft and Stujfvesant.* In the same year a more distinguished exile from New Eng land, Anne Hutchinson, took refuge with her family near New Rochelle. She only escaped from her Christian persecutors to fall a victim to the savage. In 1643 a war party attacked Annie's Hook, as the settlement was called, and cut off every liv ing soul save one young girl." In 1644 another English settle ment was formed at Heemstede," and in 1645 two more at Flushing and Gravesend.' It is clear that at the latter place there were also Dutch settlers, and the relations between the two sections illustrate the dangers of this state of things. In 1653, when matters stood so that war might at any time break out, the English settlers at Gravesend changed their established mode of choosing magistrates, endeavoring, it is said, by an electioneering maneuver, of which the nature Is somewhat obscure, to secure a magistracy who should be on the side of the English. The Records of these townships show to what an extent they had brought with them those traditions of self-government which were so essential^l a part of the life of New England. We see that Southampton elected annually three magistrates called Townsmen, nor is there anything to show that the consent of the Governor was required for such election. The town meeting also elected constables, it passed resolutions dealing not only with such local affairs as the fencing of the common field and ' Vertoogh, pp. 301-3. 'Brodhead, vol. i. pp. 3345; Winthrop. « According to Mr. Brodhead (vol. i. p. 333) his offense was stating that Abraham's children should have been baptized. * Brodhead speaks of them as married in 1646. 'Winthrop, vol. ii. p. 136; Brodhead, vol. i. p. 366. •The grant by Kieft of territory at Heemstede to English settlers is quoted by Thompson, vol. ii. p. 3. "^ Ih. vol. ii. pp. 68, 171. STUYVESANT AND THE NEW ENGLANDERS. 8l the preservation of highways, but with a question of such general interest as the selling of drink and ammunition to the Indians.' Besides these actual English settlements there was a large English element among the population of the colony, especially English- among the traders at Manhattan. At an early day ^u'biic" we find Englishmen taking a share in the public life N?w Nyih- °^ the colony and directly infusing English ideas and eriands. establishing English influence. We see this tendency showing Itself as early as the time of Kieft. In 1642 he appointed George Baxter as "English Secre tary" — a post which in all likelihood included that of interpreter, and which he retained under Stuyvesant.' It is easy to under stand the selection of an Englishman for such a post. But there could be no such explanation of what happened a year later. When Kieft, under the pressure of popular discontent, permitted the election of a council of eight, two of those chosen, Isaac Allerton and Thomas Hall, were immigrants from New Eng land.' In 1650, when Stuyvesant was engaged In a dispute with the confederation of the New England colonies, he appointed two men of English name and blood to act on his behalf as arbi trators. One of them, Thomas Willett, had apparently been born and brought up at Leyden. But he had come to Plymouth in 1629, and there Is nothing to show that he had any connec tion with New Netherlands, except that in the course of a some what varied commercial career he had traded In the Hudson.* His parents were in all likelihood among the original fugitives from England to Holland. During the early part of his career in America he was in charge of one of the Plymouth factories on the Kennebec. When the hostility of the French, and the dread of an Indian attack, put an end to that enterprise he re turned to Plymouth, and we soon after find him trading both on the Delaware and on the Hudson. From 1651 to 1655 he held office as an assistant In Plymouth. ^ There is in O'Callaghan's Documentary History, vol. i. p. 457, a very valu able monograph by John Lyon Gardiner written in 1798, on the early history and constitution of the English townships on Long Island. See also Bishop's History of Election in the United States. ^ Mr. Brodhead (vol. i. p. Z27) calls Baxter *'one of the exiles from New England." I do not find any mention of him either in Bradford or in Win throp. ' Brodhead, vol. i. p. 365. * All that is known about Willett is brought together in a monograph in the American Historical Magazine, vol. xxiii. p. 232. 82 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. Yet only a year before Stuyvesant, In his dispute with New England, had selected Willett to act as an arbitrator on his be half. This is all the more noteworthy because his other arbi trator was also an Englishman, that George Baxter already men tioned. He, however, would seem to have been a refugee from New England. The personal prepossessions of Stuyvesant did much to in crease the influence of this English element. To his temper the stuyvesant stern polity of New England, with its one accepted favors the r • i , • • ¦ i i i • • i ¦ r English. faith and its rigid moral discipline, was far more congenial than the lax cosmopolitanism of his own colony. Hence he was even reproached with sacrificing the interests of his own' colony at the bidding of English advisers. Moreover, his strong sense of justice and his steady preference for peaceful counsels, a preference sometimes obscured by his unconclllatory and ungracious temper, inclined Stuyvesant in all dealings with the English to choose Englishmen settled within New Nether lands as his diplomatic agents. His choice may have made the personal relations between Stuyvesant and the English smoother. That was more than outweighed by the lack of confidence and the sense of Irritation engendered in the Dutch. Thus the only props by which the autonomy of New Netherlands could possi bly have been stayed up — independence, self-reliance, and ex clusiveness — were being steadily undermined. How little the West India Company understood the danger, how the real con dition of their colony was for them a sealed book. Is illustrated by their conduct in 1661. By that time there was no room for doubt as to the danger of English rivalry and English encroach ment. Yet the Company, anxious to populate the territory on the east bank of the Delaware, held out special inducements to emigrants, promising among other things that they should if they pleased be independent of the Governor of New Netherlands. This invitation was more expressly addressed to "English Chris tians," and was approved by the States-General.' In 1653 a fresh dispute broke out between Stuyvesant and the Commissioners of the New England confederacy. Of that dis- Dispute pute I have spoken elsewhere.' The principal feature ¦n .653. of it was the attempt to accuse the Dutch of an alli ance, or an understanding of some kind, with the Indians, to the ' Brodhead, vol. i. p. 688. = The Puritan Colonies, vol. i. pp. 399-401. STUYVESANT AND ENGLISH IMMIGRANTS. 83 prejudice of the English. So far as that charge rested on any evidence. It rested on the vague statement of Indian witnesses. What the New Englanders thought of the savage is plain. The Commissioners would have been Indignant if told that any charge to their discredit could be established by such testimony. Yet Englishmen might be forgiven if the thought of Amboyna haunted their mind, and If the memory of Pequod outrages begat morbid and irrational suspicions. With New England, jealous, apprehensive, and arrogant, hostilities always lay near the surface. In 1653 they seemed likely to be kindled by the action of the mother country. Hol land and England were at war. The Protector sent orders to the New England colonies to be ready to act against New Netherlands. At the same time a fleet of four vessels was dis patched to New England, with Instructions to consult those in power there. If it then seemed well, the fleet was to attack first Manhattan, and then the other Dutch settlements on the Hudson. The persistent refusal of Massachusetts to act with her confederates caused delay, and before that difficulty could be overcome England and Holland were at peace. The conduct of the English within New Netherlands while war was Impending was such as to open the eyes of Stuyvesant Disaffection and the Company. Citizens of New Amsterdam fish'^fn^^' were In correspondence with the rulers of New Eng- Ne^w^Neth- 1^"^. Newtowu and Gravesend were openly disaf- eriands.' fectcd. The latter town had taken the opportunity to claim municipal independence by electing a council of twelve In dependent of New Amsterdam. In November 1654 Stuyvesant himself visited the place, and removed two of the most conspicu ous English partisans from the magistracy. In four months' time they were back In the town, declaring it to be subject to the English Commonwealth. This time they were imprisoned. Yet the English party there seem to have kept their ascendency, and to have used it at the next election of magistrates with tyrannical contempt for the Interests of their Dutch fellow-citizens.' As we have seen. In 1654 another English settlement had been established at West Chester, near the site of Anne Hutchin son's Ill-fated colony. In the spring of 1656 it was reported that ^ Brodhead, chap. xvii. He quotes local records. ^ Brodhead, vol. i. pp. 596-8. 84 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. the settlers there were sheltering criminals and carrying on treasonable correspondence with the natives. An armed force was sent against them. There was some slight resistance, which was soon suppressed. As in almost every other like case, Stuyvesant's policy was one of extreme, probably of erring, lenity. A few of the offenders were banished; the main body of the settlers submitted, demanding, and obtaining as the price of their submission, the same rights as the other rural munici palities of the colony.' It Is to be observed tbat each of these disaffected settlements was beyond dispute within the bounds of New Netherlands as fixed by the treaty of Hartford. Their resistence, therefore, had not strictly and technically anything to do with New England. The Inhabitants were acting just as any disaffected Dutch colo nists might in resisting the authority of the Company. Practi cally, however, it was impossible to sever the action of English men in New Netherlands from that of Englishmen across the border. Moreover, these little English townships contained all that was most vigorous in the political life of the colony. A community thus honeycombed by English influence would to a certainty be powerless against English attack. Meanwhile New Netherlands was threatened with territorial encroachment from another quarter. The peace of Hartford English pledged the members of the New England con- bas'ed^n federacy to respect the frontier claimed and defined discovery, f^^ ^^ Dutch colony. But that treaty was binding only on those who made it. It did not affect the mother country, nor any of her colonies save New England. If a claim of territorial sovereignty, asserted by a grant or patent, though not followed by occupation, be a title, then Eng land beyond question had such a title to the valley of the Hud son. The original patents of the Northern Virginia Company extended to a point somewhat north of the Merrimac. The great patent of New England in 1620 had for its southern boundary a point fifty miles south of Manhattan. Lord Balti more's patent of 1632 was worded with distinct reference to the New England patent. His territory was to extend northward till it reached the southern boundary of New England. It may be said these are trivial technicalities, that It was ^ Brodhead, vol. i. p. 628. DANGER FROM MARYLAND. 85 absurd to suffer the sovereign Powers of Europe, on the strength of vague, uncertain, and disputable claims of discovery, to parcel out the New World; to allow huge tracts to lie idle, unless those who needed them and could turn them to profit would con sent to be denationalized. The New England colonies, who in such a matter might be regarded as morally If not legally repre senting England, had in a formal document acquiesced In the Dutch occupation. On the strength of that Implied consent Dutch colonists had Invested capital and labor, had given up their homes, and reshaped their whole lives. But, pedantic as the view was under which they were dispossessed. It was the very view which the Dutch had themselves adopted in their dealings with the Swedes. Retribution for once assumed a direct and appropriate form. Till the Dutch had shown a real determination by the conquest Maryland of Ncw Sweden and the foundation of New Amstel Delaware.! to make a Settlement on Delaware Bay, the Mary land government had been content that so much of Baltimore's patent should be a dead letter. But in 1659, just as New Amstel was In the thick of its troubles, came an alarm that the Governor of Maryland was about to enforce his claim. Soon after an envoy. Colonel Utie, appeared at New Amstel. His instructions were to warn the Dutch Governor to withdraw, and to endeavor to win over the settlers peacefully by fair promises. Utie was received by Alrichs and by Beckman. The latter was acting for the Company as their commissioner in charge of that portion of the land on the Delaware which they retained. Utie pleaded the Maryland patent; the Dutch authorities pleaded their own undisturbed possession; both parties stood their ground, and Utie returned to his own colony. The matter was laid before Stuyvesant, and he decided to send two representatives to Maryland to protest against the Dispute threatened encroachment. The Governor and Sec- Marytand. retary of Maryland now showed a lack of diplomatic skill which has not been without Its lasting results. Instead of confining themselves to the claim originally made by Utie, they 'The chief authorities for these disputes are: (i) a long extract from the Maryland Records, in the A^. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll. ist series, vol. iii. p. 368, and the report of Alrichs, the representative of Stuyvesant at New Amstel; this is quoted by Hazard, p. 260, &c. ; and (2) Heerman's Journal in the N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. p. 88. 86 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. pointed out that Baltimore's patent included the whole of the Dutch territory, not only on the Delaware but on the Hudson. They reminded the Dutch envoys that Baltimore was expressly enpowered to extend his colony as far as the southern border of New England. "Where," then asked the Dutch representatives, "Is New Netherlands?" Calvert's answer, "I do not know," probably satisfied the speaker as an effective statement of an ex treme view, but there was in it little practical wisdom. Even If the two claims rested legally on the same ground, every man of common sense would see that to hand over Delaware Bay to the English and to hand over Long Island and the Hudson to them were things widely different. Nor could it really be said that each claim rested on the same legal grounds. At the time when Baltimore's patent was drawn up, the banks of the Delaware were vacant territory. Manhattan had been for nine years a settled colony. The very words of the patent expressly limited Baltimore's rights to a country hitherto uncultivated. This tactical error on the side of Maryland might well em bolden the two Dutch envoys to propose that the boundary question should be referred to arbitration. Either a court of six commissioners, chosen, three by each side, or the two home Gov ernments should decide. The Governor now tried to change his ground. He was only dealing, he said, with the question of Delaware Bay. But the false step was one which could hardly be retraced. It was clearly the interest of the Dutch to pin the Marylanders to their claim in its original and extreme form. The Governor finally contented himself with a general denial of the validity of the Dutch title, and did not specify whether his denial was total or partial. The two Dutch envoys with drew. One returned to New Netherlands; the other went on to Virginia in the hope of enlisting the sympathies of Berkeley and his Council against Maryland. The relations between the Dutch and the Virginians had always been friendly; the envoy was received with general expressions of good will, and certain arrangements were made for trade between the two colonies. But to meddle with any territorial question outside his own colony was, Berkeley said, wholly beyond his power and that of his Council.' Nothing was done by Maryland, probably in part because the ' Brodhead, vol. i. p. 684. CHANGED POLICY OF ENGLAND. 87 colony was too much weakened by Internal dissensions for any effective action. The diplomatic victory secured by the Dutch envoys did little for the profit of New Netherlands. Yet It had an abiding Influence. When, thirty-six years later, the claim of Maryland to the Delaware was urged against an English grantee, the negotiations of 1659 were held to have an important ¦bearing on the case. As yet the English Government had felt but little motive to press their alleged right to the territory of New Netherlands. Changed For whenever that question had presented itself the England practical issue had been not the claim of Maryland Restora- to the Delaware, but the claims of Connecticut tion. tQ the territory on Long Island and on the opposite mainland. To strengthen the hands of Connecticut was as suredly a policy which would never have commended Itself to Charles I. and his advisers. They were not likely to have discriminated between the tempers and characters of the New England colonies. To them the whole group were homes of ¦disaffection and Nonconformity. The attitude of the Crown towards New England was based on a vague notion of re pression ; no definite and constructive principle of administration entered Into it. But with the Restoration a new era began. The navigation laws were to be methodically and stringently administered, and thus the whole commercial resources of the plantations were to be organized for the good of the mother country. This alone furnished a strong motive for the annexation of New Nether lands. There could not be a uniform and effective system of ¦customs as long as the Manhattan Bay and mouth of the Hud son were In the hands of a foreign Power. Moreover the aggrandisement of Connecticut was a step of prime Importance In the colonial policy of the English Govern- Position ment. That colony under a loyal and courtierlike gov- necticut. crnor, and propitiated by a charter which confirmed Its existing territorial rights and conferred fresh ones, was to be a check on the -Roundheads of Massachusetts. The charter granted to Connecticut in May 1662 described the frontiers of the colony with an obscurity which seemed almost designed to create litigation. It Is scarcely possible to arrive at any precise and satisfactory view of the boundaries, or to see where the 88 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. south-west corner of the colony was. But plainly it was under stood on all hands that Connecticut was to take in a part of Long Island and certain settlements on the mainland opposite which under existing arrangements belonged to New Nether lands. In fact the charter wholly overrode the treaty of Hart ford. The government of Connecticut lost no time In the attempt to enforce their newly acquired territorial rights. A commissioner Territorial was Sent to the varlous townships hitherto under con"ec°^ Dutch rule to notify the change of jurisdiction.' ticut. 'pj^g effect of a gradual Infusion of an English ele ment now made itself felt. There was in all these settlements a Dutch and an English party. The dispute which followed re sembled In many respects the contest between Connecticut and Newhaven. There was, however, this difference. The men of Newhaven were almost unanimous In their determination not to be absorbed Into Connecticut. On the other hand it seems pretty clear that in this case the resistance came from the government of New Netherlands, while the greater part of the Inhabitants desired annexation. In October 1663 two Dutch representatives sent by Stuy vesant appeared at Hartford to protest against the proceedings Attempted of Connecticut. As in the case of New Haven, the in 1663. very man who had obtained the instrument tried to modify the application of it. Winthrop declared that the patent was not meant to encroach in any way on New Netherlands. The three commissioners who acted for the Connecticut govern ment replied with good sense tbat in such a matter the Governor could speak for himself only ; they had merely to deal with plain questions of fact.' The negotiation ended much as that between New Nether lands and Maryland did. Each party stood its ground and in sisted on the rights granted by charter. Connecticut, however, so far gave way as to propose a temporary compromise. They would for the present leave tbe settlements towards the south of Long Island unmolested, if the Dutch would In turn abstain from exercising any jurisdiction on the rest of the territory. ! Brodhead, vol. i. p. 719. ' lb. p. 720. The Journal of the envoys is in the N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. p. 385- JOHN SCOTT. 89. This compromise, however, satisfied neither party, and Stuy vesant's envoys returned to New Netherlands. Scarcely had they returned when Stuyvesant heard that cer tain members of the English party were striving to settle the Enliish question by force. In some of the disputed townships InTIng''* on Long Island they had proclaimed the King of sfit D^utch England, changed the magistrates, and given English authority.; names to the towns. Stuyvesant thereupon wrote to the General Court of Connecticut offering to accept those terms. of neutrality which his envoys had refused. Soon after, matters were complicated by the appearance on the scene of that adventurer who played so disreputable a part in John Scott New England history, John Scott.' In this Instance Island. he traded with shameless and successful audacity on the conflicting Interests of different parties. From Connecticut he obtained authority to act as a commissioner for the reduction of certain townships on the northern part of Long Island. At the same time he managed to win the favor of New Haven, then bitterly exasperated against Connecticut by threats of annexa tion, professing himself able and willing to secure for them the territory which they had long coveted on the Delaware. Scott soon made it plain that he had not the slightest intention of using the authority which he had received from Connecticut for the good of that colony. Among the Long Island settlers. there was a party favorable neither to Dutch rule nor to that of Connecticut. Many of them had fled from religious persecution In New England. There were Baptists, Quakers, and Anti nomians. At the same time Stuyvesant had taught such men that, though Dutch rule might be better than that of a Puritan settlement. It fell far short of an ideal of religious freedom. The existence of such a party was no doubt among the influences which brought about the easy conquest of New Netherlands. Scott now with no little craft turned this to his own account. ' Brodhead, vol. i. p. 720. * I have spoken of John Scott in my earlier volume. The Puritan Colonies. Mr. Palfrey, in his History of New England, has brought together a number of facts about Scott's career (vol. ii. p. 564). In 1682 a certain Colonel John Scott killed a hackney coachman on Tower Hill. An advertisement for his apprehension appeared in the London Intelligencer. It describes his appear ance, and states that he was "a great vindicator of the Salamanca doctor." It is not unlikely that this man was identical with the Captain John Scott of Long Island. 90 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. How far he was in the secret counsels of the King and his ad visers does not appear. But he seems to have had some means of knowing what was not made public till six months later. Ad dressing men who were, as he knew, ready for a change of master, and yet adverse to the claims of Connecticut, he an nounced that Long Island had been granted to the Duke of York, and he seems to have persuaded the inhabitants that he was a fit person to act as President pending the establishment of a proprietary government.' Out of all this anarchy and confusion there seemed no way save by the intervention of some power strong enough to over- The ''i'is ^ the conflicting claims. Such intervention was English a.t hand. A memorial in the State Papers shows that Govern- ^ ment before the end of 1663 the English Government was investi- ..",.,, , gates the taking mcasures to ascertain in detail what were the resources of ... r t.t xt i i i , , NewNeth- military resources of New Netherlands, and what help in the work of subjugation might be looked for from the English colonies. To this end three Commissioners — Sir John Berkeley, Sir George Carteret, and Sir William Cov entry — were appointed. They report that they have discoursed with several persons well acquainted with the affairs of New England, including inhabitants of Long Island. Of the nineteen hundred settlers on the Island, two-thirds are Dutch, the rest English. From Connecticut and New Haven they could reckon on a force of thirteen or fourteen hundred men. The other New England colonies would send volunteers, and in all likeli hood the Crown could hire an auxiliaiy body of Indians. Such a force, aided by three King's ships and three hundred regular soldiers, would be enough to reduce the Dutch colony.' One point connected with the memorial is worth noticing. Two of the Commissioners who were urging the King to annex Policy of New Netherlands had a distinct personal interest In ^arteret ^.j^^ matter. Carteret and Berkeley were already co- Berkeley lonial proprietors since, in 1663, they had. In con junction with others, received the proprietary grant for Caro lina.' The alacrity with which they secured for themselves a reversionary interest in the territory to be taken from the Dutch '¦ For Scott's proceedings see N. Y. Docs. ii. pp. 393-410. "^Calendar of Col. Papers, 1664, Jan. 27. " Ib. 1663, March 24. PRETEXTS FOR ANNEXATION, 91 showed that they must by this time have measured the profit which might accrue from annexation, and taints their advice with some suspicion of a personal motive. They in fact repre sented the better side of a movement of which the meaner was represented by such men as Scott. After the Restoration the impulse which carried men to the New World reawakened with marvelous force. The Civil War had unsettled men; It had cut short their civil careers, and deprived them of the training which fitted them for such careers. Home ties were broken ; to some England had become a strange country, to many It was filled with recollections which called forth only sorrow or vin dictiveness. Impulses were at work akin to those which urged Gilbert and Smith and Gorges, and a host of meaner men, to wards the New World. The motives of the new generation were on a lower scale ; the dreams of the crusader and the gold- seeker were replaced by the designs of the land speculator and the placeman. We may be sure that, beside those councilors whose Influence is recorded, there were many who felt that It was to their own personal interest to urge the Crown to a policy of annexation. Another document In the State Papers dating from the same time shows us the kind of argument which was used to encourage Calumnies and justify the annexation of New Netherlands. It N^w"Neth- Is a letter, the writer and the recipient of which are eriands.' neither of them named. One would fain hop.e that Scott was the author. It lies as inventively and unblushingly as his acknowledged writings, and one would wish that even in that corrupt age there were not two such on the outskirts of public life. It urges the plea of occupation, and gives a most astounding sketch of the history of English colonization. Troubles In Scotland had prevented the discoveries of Cabot being followed. But towards the end of the seventeenth cen tury. Captain White and other Englishmen took up the task with such energy that five thousand of them lost their lives. Hudson's discoveries were not made for the Dutch, but In the employment of Sir John Popham and two English merchants. Other arguments were adduced : isolated acts of wrong com mitted by the Dutch against English settlers, and against those Indian tribes who had befriended them. Even If the particular ^ Cal. Colonial Papers, 1664, p. 622. 92 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. statements were true, they could only justify the English Gov ernment In demanding restitution. The annexation of a colony was strange amends to claim for the private wrongs of two dis possessed farmers. If indeed the case had been one where men's policy was likely to be decided by argument, such lies could have done nothing but harm. Any reasonable man would see that the case which could find no better argument must be Indeed a weak one. Most of all might the Connecticut settlers who had real grievances, and who could bring forward arguments which might in some measure justify annexation, feel Irritated at such a travesty of their case. In plain truth the policy of annexation was simply one of expediency, adopted by an unscrupulous Cabinet. The wrongs of the New England colonists, the plea of discovery were pretexts, meant to give a faint show of decency. In March 1664 the purpose of annexation was definitely an nounced. A patent was granted to the Duke of York making The Duke over to him two tracts, one north of Massachusetts, patent.-^ the Other Long Island and the whole territory be tween the Connecticut and the Delaware. Over these provinces the Duke was invested with sovereignty, with the usual reserva tion that his proceedings must not be contrary to the laws of England. Also the subjects were to have a right of appeal to the Crown. Nothing was said as to the conditions or limits of such appeal. With these reservations the Duke had full power to appoint judges and executive officers, and either to exercise in person the right of making laws and ordinances, or to delegate it as he thought fit. In one Important point the whole document had a trans parent air of fiction. It spoke throughout as if the whole terri tory In question was vacant soil, now to be dealt with for the first time. Nothing was said of the necessity of conquest, noth ing of the claims of the United Provinces or the West India Company, nothing of tbe status or the liberties of the existing settlers. Their civil rights, their property, their freedom of worship were placed at the mercy of an irresponsible ruler, with only the slight and shadowy protection of an appeal to what was virtually a foreign Power. ' The patent is printed in full in N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 265, and in an Ap pendix by Brodhead, vol. ii. MORAL ASPECT OF THE CONQUEST. 93 Nor was that all. The Duke's grant dealt as recklessly with the claims of Maryland and of Connecticut as it did with those 4)f New Netherlands. It was a flat contradiction of Baltimore's •original grant. The bounds of Connecticut were so vaguely de fined by the charter that it is hard to say what did and what did not conflict with them. But at least the new Instrument raised difficulties In that quarter which it made no attempt whatever to settle. Nothing can be said in defense of such a measure. Yet, how ever much we may condemn the actors, there Is little to be in- Morai as- dlgnant at in the result. The transfer of New conquest. Netherlands only brought about at one blow what would otherwise in all likelihood have been done by a weary and wasteful process, culminating in war. The northern part of Long Island and the adjacent mainland was becoming more and more a debatable ground. Connecticut, now the most Independ ent, if not the most influential, of the New England colonies, would have been constantly on the watch for advantages, able to .support her partisans in each township, offering irresistible in ducements to come under her dominion. New Netherlands, crushed by debt, and harassed by the claims of Maryland on the other side, could do nothing for the defense of her soil. Piece meal annexation would have led at last to some open dispute, for to force on such a dispute would have been to the interests of Connecticut. New Netherlands would have passed into Eng lish hands, and the territory placed under the control of Andros in 1686 would have been substantially the same, though he would have held it by a different title. Nor can one feel that any real wrong was done to the Dutch. The colony was not a national undertaking; it was not the nation which lost. The blow fell on the Company, which had proved Itself unworthy of Its trust. The real loser was not Hol land, but a third Power which looked on with folded hands, unconscious of the great stake which It had on the struggle. To the generation of Englishmen who conquered New Netherlands, the gain seemed no more than the completion of a continuous Atlantic sea-board. Its real value was that, by acquiring the control over the valley of the Hudson, England secured for her self ascendency over the Mohawk country and the tribes that Jwelt therein. Thus, and thus only, could England check her 94 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST, rival France in that policy which aimed at connecting the upper waters of the Hudson and those of the Ohio by a continuous line of outposts, and which would thus make Impossible the extension of the English colonies towards the Pacific. The first use which the Duke made of his new rights argued ill for his future policy as a colonial proprietor, and illustrated The Duke's the motlvcs of thosc who had advised him. By an grant to , , -w /¦ /¦ -i i Berkeley instrument, dated June 1664, he conveyed to Carteret.' Berkeley and Carteret all that part of his province yet to be won, which lay between the Hudson and the Dela ware. There was a certain vagueness In the Instrument. It was In form an ordinary conveyance of land. But since the Duke's territorial rights were combined with certain political rights, it was nearly certain that an attempt would be made to interpret the transfer as carrying with it political sovereignty. Berkeley and Carteret, already In the recognized colonial sense Proprietors of Carolina, were unlikely to accept in another part of America the position of ordinary landholders. The ease with which the conquest was achieved may be held to have justified this prospective sale of the bear's hide. The Arrange- attempt was to be combined with another and, as ments for ^ ' enforcing it proved, a decIdcdly more difficult undertaking. the Duke s '^ ' . . •' . , t.t claims. Jb our Commissioners were appointed to reduce New Netherlands, and at the same time to visit the New England colonies and report upon their condition. This In Itself showed that the reduction of New Netherlands was designed as part of a comprehensive scheme for dealing with the colonies. Of the New England scheme, and of the three Commissioners to whom that part of the work was mainly intrusted, I have already spoken.' Happily for the future of New Netherlands, their colleague was a man of widely different stamp. There is hardly a character in history which presents such a web of seemingly contradictory Impulses and principles as that of James II. The part of a colonial administrator formed an important portion of his career, and there his Inconsistencies are seen to the full. We ' The original grant does not appear to be among the Colonial Papers in the Record Office. It is printed in Leaming and Spicer's Collection, not as a separate document but as cited in a later patent of the date of Queen Anne. L. and S. 3, &c. It is also printed in the New Jersey Archives with the head ing "From the New Jersey State Library." ^ Puritan Colonies, vol. ii. RICHARD NICOLLS. 95 see him always painstaking, at times generous in his policy, granting popular rights liberally and wisely, again withdrawing those rights as it would seem In arbitrary caprice, imperiling, at last overthrowing, his own position by willfully refusing to understand the motives and sentiments of those whom he had to govern. But In one respect — in the choice of officials — his conduct towards his colonial subjects Is throughout creditable. It would have been well If in this matter the house of Hanover had Imitated the last Stuart King. Two of the governors whom he appointed, Nicolls and Dongan, were not merely men of high ability and character, men whose political principles towered far above the standard of their contemporaries; they were men who approached colonial questions with exceptional width of view and statesmanlike foresight, men able to deal with questions which could only be settled by a rare union of strong will and conciliatory patience. Nicholson fell short of them somewhat In intelligence, far more In moral character, and in elevation and steadiness of aim. Lovelace and Andros were men of a meaner stamp, yet it was distinctly in capacity rather than virtue that they were lacking. Andros, indeed, failed because being a second-rate man he was set to do work which needed a first-rate one. At his worst James never launched on the colonies any of those butcherly ruffians or those greedy and self- seeking adventurers of whom scores were to be found clamor ing for such employment. In the attacks of New England pamphleteers, Andros — a man It is true of arbitrary temper and without a particle of administrative sagacity, but honest, religious, and in the main humane and courteous — figures as a bloodthirsty idolater. What would they have said had the colony fallen under the yoke of Kirke or Tyrconnel ? Richard Nicolls, who by the terms of the commission was In vested with a certain supremacy over his three colleagues, and Richard ^^^o practically enjoyed supreme control over the ex- Nicoiis pedition against New Netherlands, was one of the few Cavaliers whose character and intelligence seem to have profited by his experience of the Civil War. An Oxford student of promise, he had been compelled at nineteen to "leave the books in dust. And oil the unused armor's rust." In the Civil War he commanded a troop of horse in the royal army. He shared the exile of the royal family, and acted as groom of 96 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. the bedchamber to the Duke of York.' It Is said that he was specially fitted for his task in America by a knowledge of the Dutch tongue.' His present instructions were plain. New York was not to be merely threatened, nor occupied as a tempo rary measure with a view to extracting any concessions. Dutch authority was to be overthrown, and the settlers were "to be reduced to entire submission." At the same time there was to be no interference with private property or with freedom of trade. Four hundred and fifty soldiers, embarked on four ships, formed the attacking force.' In the middle of May they sailed The ex- from Portsmouth, and before the end of July Nicolls against reached Boston.* Thence after a short stay the fleet eriands. went On to Long Island, where they were joined by a re-enforcement from New Haven commanded by Scott. Nothing could be more helpless than the condition of New Netherlands. For years the colony had been struggling on the Financial edge of bankruptcy, and the expedition against New NewTet'h- Sweden gave the final blow. So straitened was the eriands. colonial exchequer that In 1663 Stuyvesant had to raise the money needed for the ordinary purposes of government by borrowing on the security of his cannon." All attempts to rouse the home Government were useless. Charles and his advisers befooled the Dutch Ambassador, and Apathy of Stuyvesant's cry for help was frustrated by persistent the Dutch, denials of any hostile Intention. The Company vainly flattered themselves that the Puritans of New England would take no part in a policy which must strengthen the hold of the Crown over the colonies. The English envoy Indeed, the apostate Puritan, George Downing, in some measure disclosed what was Intended by a frank declaration, like that made by Calvert, that New Netherlands had no real legal existence.' ' For Nicolls's antecedents see a note by Mr. C. D. O'Callaghan to Wooley's Journal in New York, being the second volume of Gowan's Bibliotheca Ameri cana. * This is stated by a writer in the American Historical Magazine, vol. xxi. p. 181, but no authority is given. It is not unlikely that a Royalist should have learnt Dutch during his exile. ' The number of ships is repeatedly stated by English and Dutch authorities. • Maverick writes from Piscataway on July 20, and speaks of a voyage of nearly ten weeks. N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 65. • Brodhead, vol. i. p. 720. • In a memorial addressed to the States-General, Downing had the audacity to use these words: '*As to the business of the New Netherlands this is very STATE OF FORT AMSTERDAM. 97 But even if those who guided the counsels of the States-General suspected mischief, their jealousy of the West India Company kept them Inactive. The colony was. In fact, overthrown by that narrow and short-sighted policy which had prevented It from being In any real sense a national undertaking. Not Indeed that, as things were now, a more strenuous policy on the part of the States-General or the Company could have Defense. availed much. The general body of the settlers, t"n o? thL' even so far as they were loyal to the Company, had colony. „Q military organization, they had not even that civic cohesion which may serve as a rough and imperfect basis for ^uch organization. Moreover the whole resources of the colony were centered In the capital. If an invader had seized Boston, his work would have been only half done. It would have been a heavy blow to the trade of Massachusetts, but much of her civil and economical life would have been left. She could still have harassed an enemy in a guerrilla war, possibly have worn him out. In New Netherlands, when once the capital was gone, there was no material either for defense or even for retaliation. Fort Amsterdam, the one citadel on which the security of the town, and therefore of the colony, was thus staked, was designed for defense only against the savages. It was simply valueless against a civilized enemy, with ordnance. Its walls were little more than earth mounds, barely ten feet high. Not only could they be battered from the sea, but even with the feeble cannon of that day shot could be dropped into the heart of the town from rising ground close to the walls on the western side. Private houses had been suffered to be built close to the walls, and It would have been necessary to destroy these as a preliminary to any scheme of defense, otherwise they might be seized and then utilized for purposes of attack. The fort had no proper supply of water. Moreover Stuyvesant avowed the Company had just landed four hundred negroes, and thereby created an exceptional strain on the resources of the colony. When after all was over Stuyvesant pleaded these excuses. far from being a surprise or anything of that nature, it being notoriously known that that spot of land lies within the limits, and is part of the posses sion of his [the King's] subjects of New England, as appears most evidently by their charter, and that those few Dutch that have lived there merely upon -tolerance and sufferance and not as having any rights thereunto." N. Y. Docs VOL il. p. 302. 98 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. the Company met him with the answer that he might have pro cured powder from private traders, and that he had neglected to warn his employers of the deficiencies and dangers of his situ ation. They also complained that he had listened to clergymen and other cowardly people, and that If private houses were in the way they should have been pulled down. In other words Stuy vesant was only to remember that he was a military commander, and to ignore his responsibilities as a civil governor. He was to hold the fort at any cost, quite regardless of what might happen to the inhabitants. In June 1664 Stuyvesant, having been warned that the ex pedition bad sailed from England, called the attention of the Burgomasters and Schepens to the impending danger. All that he got in return was the singularly discouraging reply that they would exert themselves as much as they had done heretofore.' A little later, in response to a further appeal by Stuyvesant, they did make some show of activity. The inhabitants were im pressed to work, one-third of them every day, at the fortifica tions ; a civic guard was formed for the town ; to increase the supply of food maltsters were forbidden to malt any grain, and at the request of the Town Council a certain quantity of arms and ammunition were transferred from the fort to the town.' The town itself on its landward side was guarded only by a decayed palisade which might possibly keep savages at bay, but was powerless against an enemy with firearms. To hold this, a defense of fully a mile in extent, there were available a hundred and fifty regular soldiers and some two hundred and fifty half- drilled volunteers. Even had the strategical frontier been stronger it would have been of little avail, since the whole stock of powder in the citadel was only six hundred pounds.' In ad dition to its own essential weakness of situation and lack of re sources, the town had no outlying forts to check an advancing enemy either by land or sea. Thus the land force advancing from New England obtained quiet possession of the whole of Long Island, while the fleet sailed unchallenged along the coast and anchored in what is now Jamaica Bay, some ten miles north- ^ Court Minutes, vol. v. p. 88. ' lb. p. 105. * For the state ot the defenses and the stock of powder, see Stuyvesant's ex. planation and a deposition of four inhabitants. N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. pp. 430, 475. For what follows I have relied mainly on Brodhead, whose account is largely based on manuscript authorities. THE ATTACK. 99 east of the mouth of the harbor. On the 19th of August Stuy vesant sent a message to Nicolls asking what was meant by his approach. The answer was sent up by Cartwright, one of the Assistant-Commissioners, accompanied by three of Nicolls's staff. It demanded a complete surrender of all territory held by the Dutch, but promised security of life and property to all private persons. The demand was met, as might have been expected, with a flat refusal from Stuyvesant; thereupon it was repeated, accompanied by the threat of an immediate attack.' Nicolls, however, had the wisdom to see that In such a case success won at the point of the sword would go far to frustrate Nicolls its own purpose. He had not only to conquer, but the Dutc" if it might be to conquer without alienating. That settlers. process by which the Dutch colony had been Anglicized now told its tale. The New England force in its march down Long Island must have had ample opportunities of learning how matters really stood within the walls of New Amsterdam. Nicolls must have known by this time that there was no real spirit or power of resistance, that if he were but patient the prize would fall into his hands. He took counsel with Winthrop. From him he learnt that the one thing which might provoke the Dutch to hold out was the dread of losing their trade with Holland. Let him only guarantee that, and there was no fear of resistance. Nicolls accepted Winthrop's view and authorized him to offer an assurance that there should be no interference with the trade between the colony and Hol land.' In promising a special dispensation from a statute Nicolls was undoubtedly going beyond his powers as an English officer; In making a stipulation of such importance without authority from his principal he was going beyond the special terms of his commission. The best excuse that can be urged is that he had to act in an emergency which conipelled hinj to take upon himself responsibility, and that his anxiety to deal fairly and liberally by the Dutch made it certain that he would spare no exertion of his own to secure the fulfillment of his pledge. ' N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. pp. 410-14. "Brodhead (vol. ii. p. 28) quotes the actual text of Nicolls's letter to Win throp. The freedom of trade stipulated for was granted for seven years. Three years later Stuyvesant reminded the English Government of this pledge. This may be taken as ample proof of the fact that such a pledge had been given. 100 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. With this authority from Nicolls, Winthrop wrote to Stuy vesant. He pointed out that resistance would only bring the Negotia- wholc force of the New England colonies down upon twelntiie the Dutch, while surrender would Involve no more Engh'lh.'"' than a nominal transfer of authority. There would be "little alteration but submission to and acknowledgment of" the King's supremacy. In using the latter argument Winthrop showed a characteristic Incapacity to see the real point at issue. It might be a very good reason why the colonists themselves should be willing to surrender: it could be no justification to Stuyvesant for abandoning the post Intrusted to him by his employers. Bearing this letter, indorsed by Nicolls and his colleagues, Winthrop was rowed up in a wherry to Manhattan wharf. With him were five leading representatives of the New England confederation chosen from all three colonies. Stuyvesant and the Town Council received the embassy at a tavern ; formal ex pressions of courtesy were exchanged ; then Winthrop handed in the letter and departed. Immediately they had heard the letter, the Burgomasters demanded that a town meeting should be called and Winthrop's Obstinacy dlspatch made public. This Stuyvesant refused to sant."^"' do. Nor was that all; so determined was the Gov ernor to keep the general body of citizens in the dark that he tore Winthrop's letter to pieces. Later tradition has represented this as an act of petulant wrath. Overbearing and arbitrary though Stuyvesant was, it is far more likely that his own version was true, and that he deliberately sought to prevent the citizens having any knowledge of the terms offered.' We must re member that throughout the aims of the citizens and those of the Governor were different. It was enough for them If they saved life, property, and commercial rights. As for political freedom, the Company had left them little ground for dreading any change. Stuyvesant, on the other hand, had to consider his duty as a servant of the Company, and his honor as a soldier. We need not believe that he was indifferent to bloodshed, or that he was prepared to expose the city to pillage and the garrison to ' N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. p. 445. Stuyvesant here implies that the destruction of the letter was approved of, not suggested, by the whole Council. It seems odd that it should not have been burnt. STUYVESANT REFUSES TO SURRENDER. loi destruction In a hopeless cause. That It was a hopeless cause he must have known well; yet he may have believed that to stimulate the citizens to some show of resistance was his best chance of securing honorable terms. But even If such a policy were expedient, the time had gone by when It was practicable. It was plainly Impossible to keep the general body of citizens in the dark when once the letter had become known to the Burgomasters. Stuyvesant's only hope now would have been to throw himself frankly on popular sup port, to make one last bid for that confidence which he had so fatally disregarded. Vague rumors of the promised concessions got abroad; the work of palisading the town ceased: a mob gathered round the council chamber and clamored for a sight of Winthrop's letter. Stuyvesant's attempts to pacify, or rather to overawe, them failed ; at length the Secretary Bayard recovered the fragments of the letter and handed a copy to the Burgo masters, to be disposed of as they pleased. Meanwhile Stuyvesant, with calm defiance and Impracticable obstinacy akin to his Calvinistic faith, sent Nicolls an elaborate protest, pointing out the soundness of the Dutch title, based as It was on discovery and purchase from the natives, and sanc tioned by continuous possession. It had, moreover, as he pointed out, been recognized In the treaty of Hartford made in 1650 between the government of New Netherlands and the New England confederacy.' Nicolls at once waived all such discussion. The question had been settled for him by the Government for which he acted, all he had to do was to carry out his orders; he would suspend operations for forty-eight hours, and thus give time for consider ation. If the city was not then surrendered, he must attack.' The delay was not merely humane and conciliatory; it was eminently politic. We may be sure that Winthrop and his col- TheCon- leagues were able to form some idea how matters vention at , . , , , , Gravesend. stood Within the fort. Time, they could see, was sure to fight for them. In another way Nicolls was able to turn the Interval to good account. It was most important to him to iso late New Amsterdam, to emphasize as far as might be the sub mission of the outlying settlements, and to show what fair terms he was ready to grant He summoned all the settlers on Long ' N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. p. 411, 'lb. p. 414. I02 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. Island to a general convention at Gravesend. Most of them at tended. Some of the townships had already accepted the author ity of Connecticut. Winthrop with characteristic compliance, and with equally characteristic readiness to substitute his own personal opinion for the authoritative voice of the colony, with drew all claim to this territory. Nicolls's policy In dealing with it foreshadowed, perhaps designedly, his treatment of New Netherlands. He kept in power all the officials appointed by Connecticut, till a convention of deputies could be held to settle a scheme of government. The townships within the Dutch border, encouraged as we may well believe by this, submitted at once. Volunteers from the newly acquired territory joined the New England troops, and the whole force advanced towards New Amsterdam and en camped at Brooklyn.' The English land force was then put on shore at Gravesend and joined the troops at Brooklyn. Two of the ships were stationed at Governor's Island. The other two The attsck. •_ • sailed up the Hudson past Fort Amsterdam. Thus the inhabitants were effectually cut off on all sides alike from succor and from escape. Stuyvesant had his guns mounted and ready. But at the last moment he was dissuaded from firing on the enemy. The English fleet lay off the fort and suffered discord within the city to fight for them. The conduct of the garrison soon showed how they looked on themselves as the servants of the Company, bound only to the defense of the fort, with no responsibility to wards the town and its inhabitants. When Stuyvesant with drew his troops from the fort to the town, ominous words were heard among the soldiers. There was wealth, they said, in the houses of the burgesses, and girls there who could afford to wear gold ornaments.' The citizens were between the upper and the nether millstone, and those who had heard of Nicolls's modera tion might well feel that the enemy without was less to be feared than the defender within. ^ Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 32. ' Stuyvesant's report, mentioned above, p. 98. This threat was accompanied by another, which throws a curious and somewhat prophetic light on the social and economical life of the colony. *'We now hope to find an opportunity to pepper the devilish Chinese who have made us smart so much." In all like lihood these Chinese were petty traders and money-lenders, who lived on the necessitous and extravagant. THE SURRENDER. 103 The main difficulty was to persuade Stuyvesant to yield. To the crowd that thronged about him with vague entreaties that stuyvesant ^c would Surrender he only answered that he would «ives way. gooner be carried out dead. But on the 5th, a formal remonstrance was handed to him signed by the Town Council and nearly ninety of the chief Inhabitants, among them Stuy vesant's own son.' Unless Stuyvesant's intention on leaving the fort was to make one last appeal to the patriotism of the citizens, it Is difficult to see his object. Within the fort the garrison might at least have died hard, or even won honorable terms. In the town, with no defense but a wretched wood paling, and cumbered by a defenseless and disloyal mob of civilians, their case was utterly hopeless. At length Stuyvesant was brought to see this and sent a message to Nicolls. A conference was agreed on and commissioners were appointed, six from each side, who met at Stuyvesant's house. The English were represented by the two Assistant-Commissioners, Carr and Cartwright, two representatives from Connecticut and two from Massachusetts.' When Stuyvesant sent commissioners it was practically an ad mission of defeat. There was little difficulty in settling the con ditions of surrender. The garrison was to march out with the honors of war. The general principle of the surrender as ap plied to civil inhabitants was to leave everything unaltered. The new Proprietor stepped into the rights and the responsi bilities of the Company. Dutch emigrants might come in as be fore, and there was to be free trade with Holland. The existing laws which controlled religious affairs and Inheritances were to remain as before, and there was to be no change in the municipal constitution. If in spite of these concessions any Dutch settler wished to leave the colony, he should meet with no hindrance.' The ease with which the transfer was effected Is best shown by the fact that on the day after the surrender the Town Effect Council,' met as though there had been no inter- conquest, ruptlon to their proceedings. Beyond doubt the con quest was an unrighteous outrage, but for the citizens it meant gaining masters who had shown themselves moderate, com pliant, and sympathetic, in place of those whose coldness, greed, ^ N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. p. 248. • Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 35. ' The articles are in the N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. pp. 250-3. • Court Minutes, vol. v. p. 107. 104 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. and neglect had well-nigh brought the colony to ruin. Formal documents addressed to those in authority cannot be taken as speaking with absolute truth. But the memorial which the citizens within two months of the conquest presented to the Pro prietor was in substance a fair expression of their views. It described Nicolls as "gentle, wise, and intelligent," and It looked forward to the time when the city, if not hampered by foolish restrictions on commerce, should count Its inhabitants by thousands, and should carry on with the whole world a trade which should yield a vast revenue to its Proprietor and still leave Its citizens wealthy.' Only one difficulty arose. Three weeks after the surrender Nicolls required from the settlers who chose to remain an oath binding them as long as they stayed within the English do minions to obey the King, the Proprietor, and their officers. The settlers thought seemingly that this was inconsistent with the terms of surrender. On this point they were reassured by Nicolls. He declared that the articles of surrender were not in the least broken, or Intended to be broken, by the words of the said oath. Thereupon two hundred and fifty Dutch citizens took the oath, among them Stujrvesant himself. There was nothing in this which need create any difficulty If the States- General ever succeeded in reasserting their authority. For the oath only bound those who took It to obedience so long as they were in British dominions. They might fairly argue that New Netherlands was not so de jure, and that the obligation wholly fell through if It ceased to be so de facto. That may have rec onciled Stuyvesant and members of the old official party to their position. No such motive for acquiescence was needed by the main body of citizens.' The overthrow of the capital shattered at once what little power of resistance there was In the colony. The conquest of The rest of the rest followed as a matter of course, with equal submits. ease and equal completeness. On the 29th of August Stuyvesant evacuated New Netherlands.' Nicolls at once di vided his available forces. Part were sent to reduce the settle ments up the valley of the Hudson, part to gain possession of the ' Court Minutes, vol. v. p. 160. • Ib. pp. 143-5: Brodhead. vol. ii. pp. 47. ' Brodhead, vol. iii. p. 42. \ CONQUEST OF THE OUTLYING DISTRICTS. 105 territory on the Delaware. The former expedition was placed under the command of Cartwright. He was preceded at Fort Orange by a member of Stuyvesant's official staff, De Decker, who had hurried thither in the hope of rallying his countrymen to resist. The attempt was useless. The settlers at Fort Orange and those at Esopus yielded as easily as the Inhabitants of Long Island. All private rights were secured and no civil officers were dismissed. The only measure of force needed was the banishment of De Decker. As at New Netherlands, the new government at once stepped into all the position and the lia bilities of its predecessor.' This had one important effect. Certain Iroquois chiefs ap peared at Fort Orange, and entered into friendship with the English. Cartwright granted the same rights of trade which the Indians had before enjoyed from the Dutch, and promised assist ance if the Iroquois were attacked by the tribes on their eastern frontier. The Five Nations had already entered into friendly relations with the colonists in Massachusetts, but this was their first formal recognition as allies by any English colony.' While Cartwright was thus completing the English conquests on the upper Hudson, Carr was dispatched with two ships and a military force to the Delaware. In touching the Dutch colo nists on the west bank Nicolls was clearly going beyond his com mission. The territory of the Duke of York was definitely bounded by the Delaware river. At the same time if the plea of discovery, on which alone the conquest of New Netherlands could be justified, was good for Long Island, it was also good for the territory on the Delaware. On that theory the Dutch were Intruders; the claims of Maryland might be dealt with hereafter. Accordingly Carr was to explain to such of the Maryland officials as he might meet that the Dutch were being evicted as Intruders, but that the Duke of York laid no claim to the territory, that inquiry should be made into the territorial rights of Maryland, and that in the meantime the land was to be held for the King. Nicolls's Instructions to Carr all made for moderation and forbearance. If the Swedes would make unqualified submission and take the oaths of allegiance and fidelity, they were to be un molested in person and estate, to enjoy freedom of conscience 'Brodhead, vol. ii. pp. 457. ^ lb. 'I06 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. ¦and equal rights of trade with English subjects ; magistrates then in office were to remain so for at least six months.' But on the loth of October the English fleet anchored off New Amstel. There things took much the same turn that they had at New Amsterdam. The civil population at once accepted the English .supremacy. But the commander of the fort, Hinoyossa, played the same part as Stuyvesant, and even carried it further. He refused to surrender. The ships opened a broadside, and a land force headed by Carr's son attacked the fort. One cannot blame the Dutch soldiers for failing to hold against a civilized enemy with firearms a wooden palisade only designed to stop savages. But their musketry must have been sadly at fault, since they lost thirteen men without a single casualty on the side of the ¦assailants.' HInoyossa's resistance gave Carr a pretext for severity of which he was not slow to avail himself. The Dutch garrison Carr's mis- were sold as slaves into Virginia.' Not only was the on'the'^' public property belonging to the corporation of Am- Deiaware. sterdam plundered, but private goods were not re spected. Without regard for Nicolls's authority or for the Duke's proprietary rights, Carr appropriated the choicest pieces of reclaimed land for himself, his son, and one of his chief followers.' Nor was the pillage confined to those who might by a strained construction be held as implicated In HInoyossa's re sistance. The unhappy community of Mennonites were cruelly .plundered by a boat's crew sent thither by Carr to take posses sion.' The men of tbat age, familiar with the horrors of the Thirty Years' War, did not think as we do of such atrocities. The Civil War, too, had done something to demoralize English men, and one should feel that Nicolls rose above the standard of his own day rather than that Carr fell below It. Happily for the settlers on the Delaware, matters were so far peacefully settled at New Amsterdam, that Nicolls was able to visit his new conquest In person, and In some measure to exact restitution from his subordinate. Had New Netherlands been a more * Pennsylvania Archives, vol. v. p. 547. * Carr's report to Nicolls, N. Y, Docs. vol. iii. p. 83. " Van Schweringen's account in N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 342. Van Schwe- ringen was the Dutch Schout at New Amstel. * .\'icolls to Arlington, N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 115. * Van Schweringen as above. NICOLLS'S POLICY. 107 linked community, Carr would have done much to prevent a peaceful settlement. But constituted as the colony was, a blow which fell on the Swedes and Mennonites on the Delaware was of little concern to the Dutch at Amsterdam, of none at all to the half-English villages on Long Island. This state of things did much to lighten Nicolls's task. The colony was In fact little more than a tabula rasa on which Nicolls's he could Impress such political principles as he policy. thought best. By giving the colony a government really capable of the task of administration and defense, by ¦binding together the loose and imperfectly jointed members of the community into a coherent whole, it was possible for Nicolls to bring home to the colonists that the English conquest was the real beginning of their national life. To this task Nicolls betook himself strenuously and soberly. One of his first steps was to make the colony English in outward appearance by a thorough change of names. The province Itself and its capital, New Amsterdam, each became New York. New Amstel, though only taken from the Dutch and not yet •claimed for the Proprietor, became Newcastle. Fort Orange and the adjacent hamlet of Esopus were named Albany. Two other local names were given In honor of the Proprietor. Long Island was called Yorkshire, and the whole territory between the Hudson and the Delaware, Albania, a title which was soon forgotten when that territory came to be settled under the grant to Berkeley and Carteret.' The absence of any fixed representative system lightened Nicolls's labors, since it freed him from any necessity of sweep- «vstem of ing away or even curtailing popular rights. He and legislation, j^jj councll Stepped by a perfectly easy process Into the place occupied by their Dutch predecessors. The supreme legislative power was vested in a newly created body. The magistrates of each township were to meet as a Court of Assize, which was to make laws for the colony. For judicial purposes there were to be Intermediate courts composed of these same mag istrates, and held triennlally in each of the three divisions called ridings of Long Island. This Court was simply the Quarter Sessions of an English county. The magistrates were appointed • For these changes of names see Nicolls to the Duke of York, N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 105. io8 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. by the Governor, and held office during his pleasure. Thus In theory the Court was a mere channel through which the sover eign power of the Proprietor was exercised Practically, how ever, it was sure to be amenable to the opinions and wishes of those from whom the magistrates were chosen, and among whom they lived. To distribute the exercise of power, though that power be delegated, has In practice many of the same effects as extending power, and is a natural and appropriate step towards such extension.' It Is to be noticed that this system only took In Long Island. For it was a radical principle in Nicolls's policy to regard the colony as consisting of two distinct halves, the English and semi- English settlements on Long Island and the Dutch settlements along the Hudson. The Court of Assize was chosen only from the former; it had to deal with the latter only so far as In conjunction with the Governor and Council it was the supreme legislative body. This distinction was more emphatically marked in Nicolls's legislative policy. He summoned a convention, which met in Convention February 1665 at Heemstede, on Long Island. Each stede 2 of the towns on Long Island sent two delegates, and two also attended from West Chester on the mainland. The Dutch settlements on the mainland were unrepresented. The convention was not in any way to form a fixed or permanent element in the constitutional machinery of the colony. It was the counterpart of the Landtag which had been summoned In the days of Stuyvesant at some special crisis in the history of the colony. Nor was its function to legislate, though it is plain that some of its members had gone there with that expectation. Nicolls clearly saw that the English half of the colony, as we may call it, required different legislation from the Dutch half. Formed as they largely were of Immigrants from New England,. he could not do better than give them a system modeled as far as might be on those which the New England colonies had framed for themselves. To this end he obtained copies of the codes in force in Massachusetts and New Haven. The code of Connecticut existed only in manuscript, and though Nicolls asked for It, no copy could be made soon enough. ' Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 64. ' lb. p. ^T. CONVENTION AT HEEMSTEDE. 109 From these, aided by his council and certain leading men act ing as magistrates, he fashioned a body of laws to be laid before Proceed- the Convention. Nicolls was no doubt a man in ad- thl\on- vance of his age, yet the whole proceeding may be vention. looked upon as marking a definite change in the re lations between the mother country and her colonies. Twenty- five years earlier such a proceeding would have been impossible. No functionary acting virtually as the servant of the Crown would have dared to admit that he could be indebted to a colo nial legislature for any knowledge of the needs of the colonies or of the principles on which they ought to be governed, least of all to a legislature composed of disaffected Puritans. Nicolls's policy was an admission of the fundamental principle that the colonists themselves best understood their own wants and their own method of life. At the same time Nicolls clearly showed that he accepted that only as a guiding principle, and that he was not prepared to act on it without limitations, or to follow it wherever It might carry him. When the code drawn up by Nicolls and his advisers was laid before the convention, the dele gates expressed themselves dissatisfied. They went back to the promise which Nicolls had given at the previous meeting at Gravesend, that the newly acquired province should enjoy "equal if not greater freedom and immunities than any of his Majesty's colonies In New England." This they interpreted as promising the Introduction of a system of municipal self-govern ment. The New England colonies, they urged, chose their own magistrates; if Nicolls's words meant anything, they themselves were entitled to the same privilege. One township Indeed (Southold) claimed that peculiar and unsatisfactory right, the nomination of military officers by the townsmen. The same township, true to those political principles which had hitherto guided New England, and which a hundred years later were to be the creed of the whole body of colonies, demanded that all taxation should be Imposed by a body of deputies, and that magistrates should be dependent for their salaries on the free men. These demands were met by Nicolls with that tact and judg ment which marked all his proceedings. Certain amendments in detail Nicolls accepted. He further gave a general promise that If any township required a change in the laws, and de- IIO THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. manded It at the General Assize through Its own magistrate, the matter should be considered. That well Illustrates the strength Nicolls's and the weakness of the system Introduced by Nicolls. w^th'the Its merits were in a measure personal. He might convention, administer the system equitably and with a due regard for the interest of all. There was no guarantee that it would be so administered by his successor. Nor could a justice nominated by the Governor be regarded on any constitu tional theory as the representative of the commonalty. Yet it was proved by events, as might have been foreseen, that magis trates chosen from the settlers among whom they lived were in practice exponents of popular feeling. That view underlay the answer which Nicolls made to the demands of the freemen. He frankly met their demands for self-government by telling them that, according to the letter of his Instructions, the choice of magistrates was vested in the Governor. Beyond that he could not go. If they wanted more they must go to the King for it. But he reminded them they were no worse off than men in Eng land, where all judicial authority emanated from the Crown. The implied reductio ad absurdum was not as effective for men living in 1665 as it would be to-day. But underlying it was the sound doctrine that, when power is widely diffused, it is sure to fall under the actual, though perhaps informal, control of public opinion. Whether that control is efficient will depend rather on the elements of which public opinion is made up, than on the machinery through which it finds expression. Confidence in their capacity for resisting any abuse of arbi trary power, together with gratitude and good will towards Influence Nicolls himsclf, led the settlers to accept a settlement England. which In theory fell far short of their demands. An other reconciling — or perhaps one should rather say restraining — influence was at work. The reduction of New Netherlands was but a part of the work Intrusted to Nicolls by his commis sion. It also gave him almost unlimited administrative power In the New England colonies. The settlers on Long Island were connected by origin and Interest with New England, and we may be sure that they were sufficiently influenced by those ties to feel the need for dealing in a spirit of conciliation with Nicolls and his colleagues. The Long Island settlers, too, looked for guidance to Connecticut, and that was the very colony which THE DUKE'S LAWS. Ill, had most inducement to take a moderate and friendly attitude towards the Commissioners. One of Nicolls's measures after the conquest had been to settle the boundary with Connecticut. As we have seen, the southern portion of that colony was very loosely defined by its new patent. There can be no doubt that if Nicolls had rigidly insisted on the Duke's legal rights to all the territory to which the Dutch could plead a title, he might have very seriously embarrassed Connecticut. Nicolls wisely saw that the same policy which had granted Connecticut such favor able terms, detaching her from Massachusetts and annihilating New Haven, made it expedient now to deal liberally In the in terpretation of those terms. He accordingly assented to an ar rangement by which five townships, lying strictly within the- limits of the Duke's patent, were ceded to Connecticut.' It was at the same time arranged that a boundary line should be drawn running at a uniform distance of twenty miles from the Hudson. Either through incapable surveying or through deliberate fraud on the part of those who acted for Connecticut, the line was. drawn some miles too far to the south-east, and thus a question was left open which gave rise to much future dispute and litiga tion.' For the present, however, the point seemed to be settled on terms peculiarly favorable to Connecticut. In winning the good graces of that colony, Nicolls was doing much to put himself on a friendly footing with the English part of his own province,. while the liberality of the Connecticut charter and the spirit in which it had been interpreted were an earnest of the good results of loyalty. The Duke's laws, as the body of enactments drawn up by Nicolls and ratified by the convention was called, were a code, The Duke's "Ot a Constitution. Yet In one or two matters It may laws. jjg sajj to have defined constitutional relations. It did not create a complete system of self-governing townships such as existed in New England, but It did Invest the townships with certain rights. Each town was to choose from Its own free men eight overseers. Of these, four were to retire each year. The eight were to choose a constable from among their own number. This body might act as a court for the trial of civil 1 Nicolls to the Duke of York, N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. io6. ''¦ Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 556. 112 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. cases concerning sums under five pounds, and might pass by-laws for their towns. Each township, too, was to assess Its own rates. In New England the township carried with it a necessary in cident, the church; we may almost say that the township and Ecciesi- the church were the same body looked at from dif- system. ferent points of view. The Duke's laws followed this as closely as was possible In a community where the various religions of the settlers made any common ecclesiastical system Impossible. There was to be in every township a church, the denomination of which should be settled by the majority of the householders. They were to elect a minister, but he could not be instituted unless he had received ordination in England or in some recognized Protestant country. Moreover ministers were so far to conform to the usages of the Church of England that they were to pray for the royal family, and to preach not only on Sundays and on the 5th of November, but on the anniversa ries of the execution of Charles I. and of the Restoration. They were also required to baptize the children of all Christian _ parents, and to marry all persons who offered themselves, and who complied with the needful legal formalities. Each town ship was to maintain its church and pay its minister, and this responsibility was to be enforced by church-wardens, appointed by the overseers. Though the obligation of contributing fell upon all, yet no professing Christian was to suffer In any way for his religious opinions. Such a system would have been thoroughly odious in the eyes of such a one as Endicott or Dudley. It left the heretic at large; it required from the ministry an open acknowledgment that they were within certain limits the servants of the Crown. Above all it introduced that "polypiety" which was abhorred by the Massachusetts Puritan. Nor did It only In theory make It possible. Composed as New York was, it was certain tbat the Calvinist, the Lutheran, and the Baptist would all be strong enough to form churches. Yet in real truth such practice came nearer the theory on which New England started, that of inde pendent religious societies, than the actual practice of Massa chusetts, where each church was independent in name only, In fact was under the control of a vague public opinion. The penal portion of the code showed something of the stringency of Puritan legislation. The clause protecting the PENAL CODE. 113 Christian of whatever creed from persecution was In practice an ample guarantee for toleration. The theory of freedom of Penal Opinion was completely set at defiance by a clause system. which made it a capital crime to deny the true God. But the clause which granted toleration within the field of Chris tianity no doubt did all that was practically needed. A clause which made It a capital crime to strike a parent showed plain traces of Its Puritan origin. The laws con tained certain restrictions on servitude; these, however, do not seem to contemplate the case of the negro, but of the hired la borer, or the Indented servant, bound for a fixed time. One restriction imposed on the first class was that they were bound to take their wages If their master pleases in merchanta ble corn. Indented servants might not trade on their own ac count, but might not be transferred from one service to another for more than a year without their own consent. The code contemplated a somewhat parental attitude on the part of the government towards master and servant. The over seers were empowered If a master "abused his servant tyrannic ally and cruelly" to admonish him, and on the second offense to interfere. If the injury amounted to maiming the servant be came free. On the other hand, if a servant complained un reasonably he might be punished by the addition of three months to his term of service. Trade with the Indians in arms, ammunition, and drink was not absolutely forbidden, but could only be carried on under a license from the Governor, and all purchases of land from them had to be formally entered in a public register. On one important point the Duke's laws throw light on the social and economical condition of the colony. They clearly contemplate the existence of a common arable field, to be pas tured by the different commoners after the corn harvest.' Though the Governor refused to accept that part of the mili tary system of New England by which each company elected its own officers, yet, as there, the inhabitants were organized into a militia, with divisions corresponding to the shire and the township. There were to be four trainings a year in each town ship, one joint one in each riding, and one every second year for the whole militia of the colony. All males over sixteen unless ^ This is noticed in Mr. Elking's monograph "The Dutch Village." 114 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. specially exempted were liable for duty. This obligation, how ever, did not bind them to serve outside the colony. For any external service, such as assisting the New England colonies against the Indians, a volunteer force might be raised.' It is plain that this code was intended to apply at once and entirely only to the half-Anglicized colonies on Long Island. It Is not altogether clear what was in the meantime the position of the Dutch. The motives which withheld Nicolls from forcing the new code on the Dutch settlers made themselves felt in his whole Nicolls's policy. It had been made a matter of reproach treatment . - , . ,. ,: ofthe against Stuyvesant that in disputes between his own settlers. Countrymen and the English he had shown a readi ness to lean towards the latter, and to be guided by their counsels. The English settlers on Long Island might with some show of reason have brought a like charge against Nicolls. His administrative policy was equitable towards all. But towards the Dutch it showed a special anxiety to smooth over difficulties. This was conspicuously illustrated in the matter of titles to land. The code decreed that all landholders must take out a patent in regular form from the new Proprietor. Under an unjust gov ernor this might easily have been made the pretext for a whole sale process of spoliation. As it was, it involved the payment of a quit rent and a fee to an official. This demand was at first disregarded. The Court of Assize found it necessary to call at tention to this at its first meeting in 1665, and again more stringently in 1666.' In Long Island and among the English settlements on the mainland it was strictly enforced. But In the city of New York, where the Inhabitants held patents from the Dutch Company, the fees were lightened, and at Albany a cer tain amount of Indulgence was shown In granting time for pay ment.' The history of Albany during the years which immediately followed the conquest furnishes a good Illustration of the tact Affairs at ^'^'1 judgment which Nicolls brought to bear upon Albany. j^jg task. From the outset the English troops there, removed like those at Delaware from under the eye of their 'The Duke's laws are to be found in the N. Y. Hist. Coll, ist series, vol. i. ^ N. Y. Hist. Coll. ist series, vol. i. pp. 410-8. ' Brodhead, vol. ii. pp. 109-10. AFFAIRS AT ALBANY. 115 commander, had been a source of annoyance to the Dutch popu lation. The existing civil officers were all retained. The mili tary authority of the conqueror and the civil authority of the conquered, face to face, could hardly fail to breed ill blood. We find Nicolls anxiously charging his chief commander in these parts, Brodhead, to restrain his soldiers from annoying the settlers In any way, to turn a deaf ear to all whispered slanders against the Dutch, not to become the head of a party, but to govern equitably In the interests of all. Brodhead's conduct soon showed how Nicolls's admonitions were needed. In the winter of 1666 the settlers at Esopus, sixty-four miles below Albany, showed a disaffected spirit. When Brodhead went out in quest of recruits, men withheld their neighbors from joining. They might have to fight for their enemies against their own friends. Brodhead showed no anxiety to profit by Nicolls's advice and example. He was fool enough to imprison a settler who insisted on keeping Christmas on the 25th of December according to the New Style, not yet adopted by England. He had an undignified quarrel with a person, throwing a dish at his opponent's head and then arresting him. The Dutch civil magistrate insisted that the prisoner should be handed over to him. This Brodhead refused. Thereupon a mob of sixty villagers gathered together and attempted a rescue, and in the tumult which followed one was killed.' As soon as the news reached New York, Nicolls sent three commissioners to hold an inquiry and to deal with the offenders. His choice of agents, one English and two Dutch, was sig nificant. There was, however, little room for national par tiality, since they were closely tied down by Instructions from the Governor. They were to suspend Brodhead. He had neglected his instructions, and had broken the law in disregarding the ap plication of the magistrates. The ringleaders were to be sent to New York for trial ; the rest were to be pardoned, but in such a manner as to show that In future authority would be strictly enforced. The settlers were to learn that henceforth any man who should take up arms against the soldiers was a rebel.' 1 Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 122. ^ The names of the commissioners and their instructions are in the N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 149. ii6 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. Four of the chief offenders were singled out and sent down as ordered to the capital. Nicolls's mode of dealing with them was characteristic. Their case came before the council. In theory Nicolls was no more than president, and had no superi ority but that given by a casting vote. We may be sure, how ever, that the sentence to be passed depended very largely on his personal wishes. A rigorous sentence would have been probably unjust, certainly Impolitic. Nicolls, however, saw that It was better for him individually to have a reputation for firmness than for clemency. He expressed his opinion that all four had been guilty of a capital crime. The council backed by the principal settlers Interceded, and Nicolls commuted the sen tence to banishment. The form of the sentence shows how com pletely and definitely the Dutch and English sections of the colony were treated as distinct. Heymans, the chief offender, was excluded from every part of the colony. The other three were only banished from Albany, with Its suburb of Esopus, and from New York.' The sentence was soon relaxed, and within two years we find Heymans holding a civil office. It Is not difficult to see the guiding principles which through out underlay Nicolls's policy. His experience as a commissioner New York fn Massachusetts must have shown him that self- check on governing townships of the New England pattern England. were not the material out of which to build a colony loyal to the Proprietor. On the other hand, the alien colony might by wise policy be made an instrument for curbing tbe dis affection of Massachusetts. Nicolls's views on this point are clearly set forth in a letter written to Arlington in the spring of 1666. He has begun "to set up a school of better religion and obedience to God and the King than were to be found in New England." With good administration New York will In time rival and ultimately overthrow the commercial prosperity of Boston. Nicolls had been willing to use the English settlers on Long Island and their kinsmen In New England as an Instru ment for the reduction of the Dutch colony. But a passage In the very same letter shows that he had no real faith in that alli ance. He had seen, he says, that he cannot depend on Con necticut. For the defense of the colony he must rely on the troops whom he brought with him from England.' 'Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 143. ^N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. pp. 113-5. DUTCH NOT DISAFFECTED. 117 The general principles set forth In this letter were the same which had led Nicolls a year before to buy from the savages a tract on the west bank of the river below Albany, and to issue invitations to emigrants calling their attention to this territory. It was his policy to build up on the foundation of the Dutch settlement in the valley of the Hudson a colony dissociated from New England, to serve as a stronghold of the royal power. How little of real national feeling there was among the Dutch settlers was plainly shown by the history of the years 1666 and No dis- 1667. All through the first-named year the settlers among°the niust havc known how things stood In Europe. Some Dutch. tidings must have reached them of those terrible days in the summer of 1667, when news came to London that the Dutch fleet had broken the chain at Chatham and that the flower of the English navy were seized or burnt ; when men at Greenwich or Wapping lay down each night believing that the morning would bring De Ruyter's ships in full sail before their eyes, and when citizens were sending their hoards into the country to be burled in the ground. All the resources that Nicolls had at his command were the regular troops whom he had brought out with him, a force of four hundred and fifty men, weakened by the loss of the detachments drawn off to gar rison Albany and Newcastle. At the same time Dutch pri vateers were threatening Virginia and making the American coast unsafe for English merchantmen. If the settlers In New York really felt the English yoke irksome. If they had any wish to return to their allegiance to Holland, can we doubt that they would at once have seized the opportunity and struck a blow? Yet while Nicolls was eagerly expecting news from Europe with a foreboding of some fearful calamity to England, and while he was apprehensive what the Dutch ships might do off the American coast, it Is plain that a rising of the Dutch settlers never entered Into his calculations. It is clear from his dis patches that he is far more anxious for the arrival of stores from England than he is about the threats of the Dutch West India Company. How secure he felt on that head we can best judge from a letter of November 1667, where he reports that he is organizing a part of the colonial militia as horse and dragoons to guard the north-west frontier against the French.' ' Nicolls to Arlington, N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 167. Il8 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. In the autumn of 1667 the treaty of Breda gave England se cure possession of her new province. The principle of that Treaty of treaty was that each country should retain all terri- Breda. ^^^y (.}j^(. Jt had Captured during the present war. When an abortive negotiation was opened in 1665 the States protested that New Netherlands should not be included in any such compact. That, they averred, had been taken from them in peace and ought, therefore, to be given back without any equivalent.' They, however, now abandoned that claim. Surinam and Poleron In the Nutmeg group of islands had been taken by the Dutch arms and were retained. The whole policy of the Dutch taught them to value such possessions far more than the comparatively unprofitable tract on the American coast, with its contentious inhabitants, ever vexing the Government with appeals against the Company, ever liable to be embroiled with New England or the savage tribes. The protestations of the West India Company were of no effect. They In vain pointed out that the possession of New Netherlands by England meant her supremacy over Northern America. France never could hold Canada against such odds; England would thus gain an addition to her resources which could confirm her empire over the seas.' One may doubt whether either of the negotiating parties could see the full force of such reasoning. In England public opinion was not altogether satisfied that the change was a gain. It was good hap, far more than any far-sighted wisdom, which at this juncture gave England what was really the keystone of her American Empire. Yet even while negotiations were going on, events must have been forcing a perception of the truth on Nicolls ; he must have Altered begun to See that any dispute with Holland was only towaV°d"s^ Important as it bore upon that mighty struggle which France. .^^gg drawing near, and which his own success was doing so much to hasten. To the Dutch colony the Mohawk alliance had been a needful condition for safe trade, for security from Invasion by savages, and by a civilized enemy as ruthless as the savages. To the English who replaced the Dutch It ' Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 93. 2 Memorial of the West India Company to the States-General, March 25, 1667. N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. pp. 511-3. NEW YORK AND CANADA. 1 19 was all this and more. With the Mohawks hostile there must be perpetual dread of invasion not only for the dwellers on the Hudson, but for the whole body of the New England colo nies. To detach the Mohawks from their old alliance would be the first step for France in that policy of aggression, which If it succeeded must be a lasting bar to the union of the English colo nies. Henceforth the history of French Canada and the history of the British colonies are inseparably connected, and in all their relations New Netherlands is the chief meeting- point. If the King of France and his advisers failed to understand the situation, it was not so with the French rulers of Canada; that can be seen from a dispatch sent by Talon, an Important official In the colony, to Colbert. Let the King, he says, arrange for the restitution of New Netherlands by the English, and then purchase it from the States-General. Thereby France would have two entrances into Canada, and would gain a monopoly of the Northern fur trade, the Five Nations would be at their mercy, and New England would be kept within bounds.' The whole situation could not be summed up more clearly and ef fectively. The conquest of New Netherlands at once brought the Eng lish into direct relations with the Mohawks. Within a month Dealings of the time that Cartwright took the command at p/ve*''' Albany, the chiefs of the Mohawks and the Senecas Nations. appeared there and confirmed by treaty that alliance which had hitherto bound them to the Dutch. There was to be peace and trade between the two nations, and the English were to aid the Mohawks if necessary against the tribes on the lower waters of the Hudson.' This alliance, however, was only binding on the Mohawks and the Senecas. There would seem at this time to have been Adminis- 3 Certain absence of unity in the action of the Iro- cifanges in quols Confederacy. The occasion was a critical one. Canada. 'pj^g transfer of the Hudson valley to the English was accompanied by a change In the administration of Canada. Hitherto the French colony had been virtually no more than a ^ N. Y. Docs. vol. ix. p. 57. ^ The treaty, with facsimiles of the marks which were the equivalents for the Indian signatures, is in the N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 67. 120 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. Station for trade and missionary work. The relations with the savages had been mainly controlled by the Jesuit, the trapper, and the hunter. The executive had been perpetually hampered by disputes with the ecclesiastical authority. But in 1664 a gov ernor was appointed of comprehensive views, and of resolute and aggressive temper, and he was furnished with military re sources equal to carrying out a vigorous policy. Though the Marquis of Tracy was seventy, yet It is clear that age had done nothing to weaken his will or his mind. He had under his command a regiment of twelve hundred men, raised originally In Savoy. It had done good service in Eastern Europe, and bore the name of Its original commander, the Prince of Carl- gnan.' Tracy's first military measure was to secure the connection between the St. Lawrence and the Hudson. To this end three Tracy forts were built along the valley of the Richelieu, the frontier, the Stream connecting Lake Champlain witb the great river of Canada. On the 30th of June Tracy landed at Quebec. By the end of July his engineers were at work upon the forts, and before the summer was out the work was com plete. Next year the same policy was carried further, and an island on Lake Champlain was occupied and fortified.' The wisdom of this measure was at once seen. Through the autumn the Hurons, the allies of the French, took refuge under Effect on cover of the new forts from the attacks of the Iro- Nations. quoIs. The IroquoIs saw, too, that they could no longer count on their woods and streams for safety. Chiefs of the Oneidas and Onondagas came to Quebec and asked humbly for peace. Henceforth they were to be the vassals and allies of France. Such at least was the interpretation which the French put on the treaty, yet it must be remembered that in dealings between civilized men and savages a strict interpretation of language Is hardly possible. But at least the savages promised in their own figurative language, as interpreted by the French, to clasp their new allies by the waist, not merely to hold them by their skirts. The Iroquois were to plant villages within the ' For the Carignan regiment see N. Y. Docs. vol. ix. p. 32, with editor's. note. " "Fort Anne, recently constructed by Sieur de la Mothe on an island in_ Lake Champlain." Report in French Archives, translated, O'Callaghan, vol. i. p. 48. THE FRENCH AND THE FIVE NATIONS. 12 r French territory, and the French were to send among them traders and missionaries.' It is scarcely possible to estimate what might have been the: effects of this treaty on the whole future of America had It been carried out fully and loyally. Though the Indian spokesmen were taken only from the Oneidas and Onondagas, yet they claimed to speak for the Senecas and Cayugas, or at least for a. section of each tribe as well.' Of the Five Nations only the: Mohawks held back. Their late dealings with the English had shown a certain disposition on their part for separate action.. Unluckily for the French the Mohawks were In fighting power the backbone of the savage confederacy. Since they could not be won they must be intimidated. In January 1666 one of Tracy's lieutenants, De Courcelles, was dispatched into the Mohawk country at the head of five^ Tracy in- hundred men. In the dead of winter a force of civl- ilfohawk' lized men set forth on a march of nine hundred miles- country.s through the wilderness. In one way the season was favorable to the enterprise. When the forests were bare of leaves the savages had not the same opportunities for attacking - from ambush. Moreover the treaty with the four tribes had secured the approaches to the Mohawk country. The Hurons,. who were to have shown the French the way, shrank back and failed them. With no guide save the sun In the heavens, in snowshoes, carrying their blankets and their food, the gallant little troop forced its way through the Mohawk country. Their scheme seems to have been to strike terror by devastating the Mohawk villages. It is hardly surprising that they should have failed to find their goal. They overshot the mark, and In less than three weeks after they left Quebec reached a point two. miles from the Dutch settlement of Schenectady. Here for the first time they heard of a hostile Indian force In their neighbor hood. A detachment was sent against them ; a portion of them fell into an ambush, and the Mohawks appeared at Schenectady ' An English translation of the treaty is in the N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 121, etc. ' I infer this from the language of the treaty. ' Probably the best authority for this expedition is an unsigned report by - an Englishman in O'Callaghan, vol. i. p. 50. This is preceded by a French report, apparently official. This is very bald, and is conveniently silent about the discomfiture by the Mohawks and the interview with the settlers from. Albany. 122 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. with the scalps of four of their victims. The surviving French were met by a deputation of three Dutch settlers protesting against the invasion of the dominion of the King of England. Courcelles replied that he had only come against the Mohawks, and added, whether truly or not one can hardly judge, that he had not heard of the English occupation. He knew, however, that France and Holland were now allied against England, and for a moment he thought of striking a blow at Albany. But he gave up the scheme when he learned that the place was gar risoned and had artillery. The Dutch settlers, relieved from the fear of invasion, received the strangers kindly ; food was supplied and quarters offered, but De Courcelles thought that discipline might suffer if his men entered the village, and that the com forts of Dutch firesides might disincline them from the home ward march. Seven, however, of his wounded men were left to be cared for at Albany. De Courcelles then turned towards the frontier. The force reached Quebec some sixty short of its full numbers, but most of the missing men had only straggled, and save a few they reached home in safety. Now that war was declared between England and France, the attitude of the savages assumed an importance which it had never had before. The Mohawk alliance was what the Afghan alli ance has been In later days to England and Russia. The English flattered themselves that the aggressive policy of Tracy had failed, and that the Mohawks would look on the Negotia- French invasion as mere wild fire, without substance thTpfve ot danger. The events of the following summer wfth°tife showed that the calculation was too sanguine, and French. that the Mohawks were wavering. Even more than before they saw themselves Isolated and threatened. The Sen ecas sent an embassy to Quebec to confirm the treaty made in their name,' and the erection of the island fort on Lake Champlain was a further source of terror. In June a second force, this time of four hundred men, was made ready to invade the Mohawk country.' But before It started news came which seemed to make It needless. The English commander at Albany, hardly understanding what was at stake, advised the Mohawks to make ' An account of this treaty, taken from the French Archives and translated into English, is in the N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 125. '^ Tracy to the commissaries at Albany, July 19, 1666, translated, N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 131. FRENCH EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MOHAWKS. 123 terms with the French, and sent a dispatch to Tracy telling what counsel he had given.' The letter was brought by the chiefs of the Oneidas. A representative of that tribe had joined in the treaty of 1665, but it seems doubtful whether the whole tribe re garded themselves as bound by his action. The letter from Albany was taken by Tracy as a guarantee for the peaceful in tentions of the Mohawks, one may almost say as a formal sur render by the English of the alliance. Negotiations were at once opened ; instead of an invading force envoys were sent to treat with the Mohawks at Albany; if they preferred It they might come in safety to Quebec' Just as the prize seemed won, an attack on a French hunting party by the Mohawks changed all. Some were captured, others Failure of killed. Among the latter was Tracy's nephew, De tiations. Chazy. The Governor at once recalled the envoys and reverted to his original scheme of an Invasion. But when the invading force was on its march it was met by a Mohawk embassy. The conduct of the Mohawks makes one think that this was no more than a feint to secure time. The envoys went on to Quebec and began dealings for peace. Before long one of them, in an outbreak of passion, avowed himself the murderer of De Chazy. He was at once put to death, and his principal colleagues thrown into prison.' The death of that one savage counted for much in the future fortunes of England and France. Accordingly In the autumn of 1666 another expedition was ar ranged against the Mohawks. This time Tracy himself took the command with six hundred regulars and as many militia. The force penetrated about a hundred miles south of Lake Champlain, and three Mohawk villages were destroyed with their granaries, containing a two years' store of corn. But noth ing was done In the way of permanent occupation, and Tracy was content to trust to the terror inspired by the raid. Mean while Nicolls had become fully alive to the need of encouraging and supporting the Mohawks. His wish that the whole body of English colonists should give them active support was hindered by Connecticut. Unfortunately the Mohawks were at enmity with the Mohicans, who were, alone of the New England tribes, the constant allies of the English. Possibly In consequence of 'Commissaries of Albany to Tracy. N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 164. ''lb. vol. ix. p. 44. 'Jb. vol. iii. p. 135. 124 THE ENGLISH CONQUEST. this, Nicolls somewhat modified the support given to the Mo hawks. They were advised to seek a good peace with the French, but to seek it, if needs were, by a show of force. They should Insist on the demolition of the newly built chain of forts,. and should tell the French that the Mohawk country was within the dominions of the King of England, and that the inhabitants of it owed him allegiance.' In spite of this advice the Mohawks sent an embassy to Que bec in 1667, asking that missionaries should be sent into their country, and making no stipulations, but offering to give hos tages for good behavior.' Immediately after this Tracy had been recalled, as his services were needed for the campaign in Europe. His successor (Courcelles) had direct instructions to make another raid into the Mohawk country and to Intimidate — even as far as might be to annihilate — that stubborn tribe.' But the submissive attitude of the Mohawks seemed to make such policy unnecessary. Instead of an armed force, the Gov ernor sent a band of Jesuit missionaries, escorted by the Mo hawks who had come to Quebec. Nicolls saw that he had no ground for opposing this peaceful invasion. When the Jesuits, in their eagerness to check the trade in spirits among their new converts, begged for an Interview with the English authorities, Nicolls acceded, and sailing up the Hudson to Schenectady gave them an audience there.' Simultaneously with the treaty of Breda peace was made be tween France and England. The terms of the peace guaranteed to the French Crown secure possession of the disputed territory of Acadia. But nothing was said of the country between Canada and the upper waters of the Hudson, and though Nicolls might acquiesce in the advance of the French missionaries, yet he and every other thoughtful Englishman must have seen that In that region the American battle of the two great nations would be fought out. ' Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 120. 2 Brodhead (vol. ii. p. 128) says that the Indian emissaries came just after- Tracy's departure. But Tracy in a dispatch, dated Quebec, April 30, 1667, says: I have granted conditions so reasonable to the Mohawks that I doubt not they will accept peace." The dispatch (translated) is in the N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 151. 'Ib. p. 130. Ih. p. 803. ' Travels of the Labadists, p. 284. ANDROS'S DEALINGS WITH CONNECTICUT. 153; patent wiped out the settlement made by Nicolls. The new grant had for its eastern boundary the Connecticut river. If strictly Interpreted that would have dismembered Connecticut. The Connecticut charter was In Its geographical provisions a. vague document. But we may be at least sure that it meant to give the colony secure possession of the townships on the western bank of the Connecticut, to say nothing of Guildford and New Haven. No court of equity would have given effect to a docu ment by which the grantor tacitly revoked that grant. On the ¦ other hand, there Is no doubt that when the frontier line was. drawn Nicolls and his colleagues were imposed on ; nor would Andros have been doing his duty by his principal If he had not striven to put that right. Andros, however, without attempt ing to negotiate or to invite a compromise, made in person a. crude assertion of the Duke's alleged rights, in a form so un qualified and Impracticable that It was impossible for the colony to acknowledge them without danger, and without a total loss. of self-respect. I have told elsewhere the details of the dis pute.' It had no immediate practical result. But it did this: it taught Connecticut what manner of man Andros was, and when his time of authority over them came thirteen years later the lesson was not forgotten. They must have seen that he was a man withheld from being formidable alike by his merits and his fallings. He was no tyrant, but a fairly good-humored Eng lish gentleman, carrying out a harsh rfieasure ungraciously, but not roughly or brutally. In caution. In diplomatic tact. In all that could really make him dangerous, Andros was wholly want ing, and the dispute with Connecticut displayed that want to the full. At the same time Andros was learning something of the character of New England, not only in his dealings with Con necticut, but also from the conduct of Massachusetts in relation to the Indian war. There he saw the Puritan polity on one of its weak sides, weak, too. In a way which to a practical soldier and an English official was peculiarly offensive. He saw their hesitation, their inability to co-operate readily, their suspicious. jealousy of English interference. He had not before his eyes, nor, If he had, could a professional soldier estimate at Its due- worth, that stubborn spirit of local resistance, whose Isolated ' The Puritan Colonies, vol. ii. pp. 183-186. 154 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. efforts were the brightest feature of the war. That hostility be tween Andros and the people of New England which at a later day had such important effects was in no small measure due to the events of his first term of office. In the opposite direction Andros was entangled in disputes with the patentees of New Jersey. Those disputes will come before us as part of the history of that colony. For the present it is enough to say that Andros asserted certain unde fined rights of sovereignty over the territories which the Duke had alienated, and that he attempted to put in force his claims by deposing Carteret and issuing writs for the election of an Assembly, and by so doing raised the whole question as to the completeness of the Duke's surrender of his rights over New Jersey. One of the most important features of Andros's administra tion was that the ecclesiastical constitution of the colony began Ecciesi- to take on that form which gave It so singular and matters. anomalous a character. In none of the colonies was the system of a State Church dependent on that of the mother country less adapted to the origin and composition of the com munity. In none except South Carolina was it carried out so rigidly. The ecclesiastical constitution introduced by Nicolls after the conquest was obviously one which contemplated a system of concurrent endowment. At the same time it had none of that definiteness and that precision which were absolutely necessary to secure permanence for a system so complex and so unfamiliar. The Duke's code of laws assumed the existence of parishes. It provided for the building of a church in every parish, and the maintenance of a minister by a public rate. The minister was to be chosen by the freeholders, and inducted by the Governors. It was further provided that he must have received ordination from some Protestant bishop or minister within the British dominions, or within the dominions of some foreign prince of the Reformed religion. In 1675 Andros, regardless of the stipulation, introduced one Nicolaus van Rensselaer to share the ministry of the Reformed Church at Albany with Dominie Schaats, the minister who al ready held office there. Van Rensselaer was by birth a Dutchman and an ordained ECCLESIASTICAL MATTERS. 155 minister of the Lutheran Church of Amsterdam. But circum stances had associated him with England. It is said that when Charles II. was a fugitive Van Rensselaer, preaching before him at Brussels, had assured him of his impending restoration. The preacher came over to England, was ordained deacon and priest in the diocese of Salisbury, and was then placed in charge of the Dutch church at Westminster. His appointment at Albany was protested against by Van Niewenhuysen, the Lutheran min ister at New York. He could not deny that Van Rensselaer was an ordained minister in the Dutch Church. But he ap parently took the view that Van Rensselaer's ordination in the Church of England vitiated his Lutheran orders, and that he was Ineligible for a ministry in New Netherlands since he was no longer amenable to the Classis at Amsterdam. The matter was brought before the Council. They with singular compli ance accepted this view, and Van Rensselaer was allowed to re tain his office on condition that he conducted his ministry "con formably to the public church service of the Reformed Church of Holland." The chief historical value of the Incident is the moderation shown by Andros. The next incident in the career of Van Rensselaer is also of in terest as throwing light on the character of two conspicuous figures In New York history. For certain words used by Van Rensselaer in a sermon at Albany he was charged before the Albany magistrates of "false preaching." His accusers were Jacob Leisler, a German brewer, then a deacon in the church of New York, and Leisler's son-in-law, Jacob Millborne, an Eng lishman. The Albany magistrates found Van Rensselaer guilty and imprisoned him. He appealed to a court composed of tht Governor, Council, Mayor, Aldermen, and Ministers of New York. They referred the matter back to Albany. The magis trates, therefore, after further deliberation withdrew their con demnation, and ordered mutual forbearance. All differences were to be consumed in the fire of love. Thereupon the Court at New York which had previously dealt with the question showed their view of the merits of the case by ordering Leisler and Millborne to pay all costs, "as giving the first occasion of difference.'" ' All the authorities on these questions are brought together by Mr. Brod head, vol. ii. pp. 288, 360. Mr. Brodhead takes the view that the right of the 156 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. By his good measures and his bad alike, Andros had incurred unpopularity with the colonists. He was charged with favoring Grievances Dutch traders, at the expense of English, and the colonists Duke was told that he might by farming the revenue /fn^dros.' of the colony make more of it than was made by his present representative. The Governor also set his face against that unfair and wasteful system, whereby favored capitalists were allowed to occupy large tracts of land and leave them un reclaimed. In other matters Andros had more justly earned his unpopu larity. He was charged witb setting aside the verdicts of juries. Especially had he offended the trading classes by ill-judged in terference, if nothing worse. He himself, it was alleged, kept a store and thus became a rival to the New York traders. He anticipated in a crude fashion the mercantile policy of the next generation which fettered colonial Industry in the Interests of the English manufacturer. Tanning was an important business in the colony. The shoemakers, thinking themselves over charged, were foolish enough to Invoke the help of Andros against the alleged monopoly of the tanners. He thereupon en tirely prohibited tanning. Henceforth all hides had to be sent to England and tanned leather re-imported. It can hardly have been the same motive, but rather a belief that government could better trade, which led Andros to the most unpopular of all his measures — interference with the staple product of the country, grain. He prohibited distilling within the colony. This bad two effects. It led the settlers to Import Barbadoes rum. This was at first brought by way of Boston That, however, Andros prohibited, thinking probably that the resources of the Duke's colony ought not to go to enrich disloyal New Englanders. The Increase In the price of spirits was not the worst effect of Andros's legislation. The demand for grain was lessened, and the farmer could only find a market for it abroad. Andros then proceeded to fence in the export trade with vexatious restric tions. He prohibited all exportation except from New York Amsterdam Classis to control clerical appointments in the colony was secured by the eighth article in the capitulation to Nicolls. I can see no evidence of this. The article simply says: "The Dutch here shall enjoy the liberty of their consciences in Divine worship and Church discipline." Col. Docs. vol. ii. p. 251. 'All these are set forth by the Labadists in their account of their travels. DISPUTE ABOUT CUSTOMS. 157 itself, and he Insisted that the grain before exportation should he assayed lest the colony should be discredited by an inferior article. The state of things in the colony may have made this needful. But it was sure to be unpopular, and Andros had no gift for lightening such administrative difficulties. The questions in dispute between Andros and the patentees of New Jersey made his presence In England necessary. In the Dispute autumn of 1680 he left the colony. He intrusted •customs. affairs to his military subordinate Brockholls, under the title of Commander-in-chief and with the powers of Deputy Governor. A strange administrative oversight of which An dros was guilty had an important effect on the constitutional history of the colony. The customs duties fixed by the Governor In 1677 expired after a term of three years, and Andros neg lected to make an order continuing them.' The collector of ¦customs assumed that the renewal took effect as a matter of course. The New York merchants held that the obligation to pay was suspended. A test case soon arose. In May 168 1 the consignees of an incoming vessel refused to pay the duty de manded, whereupon the custom-house officials seized the goods. The matter was brought before the Council, who gave it as their opinion that no duty could be exacted by any official with out the express approval of the Proprietor. Thereupon a civil action was brought against the collector of customs, and a verdict given which compelled him to yield the goods. The merchants were not content to stand merely on the de fensive. Dyer was Indicted for high treason on the plea that he had illegally exercised authority over the King's subjects. His position increased the moral effect, if not the constitutional im portance, of the attack. Dyer was not only collector of customs, but also mayor of New York. Proceedings were taken in due form, a jury was empaneled, and witnesses examined. But after putting In a plea of not guilty. Dyer demurred to the juris diction of the Court. It had no power, he said, to try an official acting under a commission from the Crown. The Court accepted that view. Dyer was sent to England and his case referred to the Privy Council. At the same time the merchant who had prosecuted him was bound In a surety of five thousand pounds to follow up the matter in England.' On Dyer's reaching Eng- ' Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 351. 'N. Y, Docs. vol. in. pp. 287-9, IS8 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. land the case was brought before the Privy Council, and after, as it would seem, a perfunctory inquiry was suffered to drop.' The personal aspect of the case was the least Important part of it. The impulse that has prompted resistance to an isolated Demand exercIse of arbitrary power seldom stops there. If sentaUon. the Community has had no political training, if resist ance cannot fasten on certain specified constitutional remedies and demand them, then follows a mere destructive revolution. Wat Tyler begins by resisting the tax-gatherer, and ends as the leader of purposeless and predatory rebellion. If, on the other hand, the community has already traveled some way in the path of self-government, if its traditions and its associations enable It easily and naturally to adopt fresh institutions, then Isolated resistance will be the signal for constitutional reform. The protest against the Stamp Act lays the foundation of the Ameri can confederacy. The drama now enacted on the small field of New York fol lowed the latter course. Brockholls, Andros's deputy, a man' neither firm enough to control the people, nor intelligent enough to sympathize with them, sent home deplorable accounts of the prevailing anarchy, of his inability to get any duties paid, and of the seditious temper which pervaded the colony.' The sole justification, as it would seem, for his outcry was that the settlers were demanding, in no intemperate or dangerous fashion, an extension of their rights of self-government. On every side of them they saw communities enjoying a system modeled on that of the mother country. The oligarchy of Massachusetts, factious and disloyal, enjoyed a system harsh Indeed as against those whom It excluded, but which made it in all but name in dependent of the Crown. The line which separated New York from Connecticut was even still a matter of dispute. Yet on one side of that line men enjoyed the full privileges of English citi zens, but lately confirmed in express terms by royal charter. How could the freemen of Southold and Southampton be ex pected to acquiesce in a system which placed them under the arbi trary control of the Proprietor? The peaceful loyalty with which they had accepted English supremacy deserved some rec ognition. By slow, faltering, and imperfect steps the colony had ' N. Y. Docs. vol. in. pp 318-21. ' Brockholls's lettei is quotea by Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 355. DEMAND FOR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 159 been working its way under Dutch and English rule towards self-government. The oversight of Andros In the matter of the customs gave the final impulse that was needed. The connection between the attack on Dyer and the demand which it suggested was direct. The same grand jury which In dicted him called the attention of the Court of Assize to the absence of a representative Assembly.' The conduct of the Court shows that there was a certain rough truth in James's view, that the magistrates were really effective guardians of popular rights. It assuredly proves that the mere distribution of political power Is In Itself a gain to popular liberties. The Court presented to the Duke a petition setting forth in strong language the grievance which the colony suffered from the want of a representative Assembly. They were taxed by arbitrary and absolute power, while all about them they saw communities flourishing under systems of government modeled on that of the mother country.' Happily for the colony the Proprietor was not left to the vague and inactive policy of Brockholls, nor to that of a respect- Probabie able disciplinarian such as Andros. Among the influence t~> i > i_- r 1 • , of Penn. Uuke s chiet advisers was one whose counsel at such a time was sure to make for peace and moderation. In later times the Influence of William Penn over James may have been an evil one. The political theory and sentiments of the two men had too much In common. Penn, like James, was too ready to measure a political system by Its immediate application,, without taking Into account the abuses of It which were possible. But so far his own views on colonial government plainly were that concessions such as those asked for by the Court of Assize were safe and expedient. That he was soon to show by his treatment of his own colony, Pennsylvania. We can hardly err in believing that It was in no small measure due to him that the- Duke received the petition of the Court of Assize with approval,. and with a promise that their demand should be speedily re garded. The Intention was notified to the colonists through Brockholls. They were told at the same time that funds must be provided by the colony for the maintenance of the government and for military purposes. ' Brodhead, vol, ii. p. 354. ' The petition is given by Mr. Brodhead in an Appendix, vol. ii. p. 658. -l6o NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. The change of system brought with It, almost of necessity, a ¦change of governor. It could hardly be said that the relations between Andros and the settlers were hostile, but he had neither the breadth of mind to carry out a policy of reform, nor the temper to work cordially with a popular body. A post was found for him in the Island of Jersey, and the governorship of the newly enfranchised colony was bestowed on an Irish soldier, Thomas Dongan. When appointed Governor of New York, Dongan was forty- eight years old. He in all likelihood owed his preferment at the Thomas outset to the fact that he was the nephew of Richard Dongan. Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnel. In those traits of char acter by which Tyrconnel is best known in history, Dongan had no share. He had nothing in common with the boisterous liber tine who figures in the pages of Grammont, or with the unre- ^strained and truculent partisan whose Irish administration dis graced the Jacobite cause. Yet In one or two important fea tures Dongan was a decorous copy of his kinsman. He did not fly Into the frenzies of a spoilt child and vent his fury on his ¦own wig. But his diplomatic correspondence plainly shows traces of a sharp and arbitrary temper. Compared not merely with Tyrconnel, but with the average public men of that day, Dongan was honest and disinterested. Assuredly he was not wholly and absolutely Indifferent to personal gain. Such indif ference was almost unknown among the public men of that generation. Dongan would serve his master faithfully, but If a chance of profit offered itself as an incident of good service It would not be neglected. As usual mammon worship proved as incompatible with civil as with spiritual obligations, and Dongan found himself exposed to charges and Involved in difficulties which a purely disinterested man would have escaped. But in -spite of such drawbacks the New York settlers had good reason to be thankful for James's choice. The difficulty would have been to find among James's followers not one free from Don gan's faults, but one in whom they were so slightly developed. Taking them at their very worst they were far outweighed by his merits, his common sense, and his clear perception of what was practicable, his energy, ubiquitous yet not meddlesome, and persistent without being obstinate. His nationality, too, and •even In some measure his religion, were in his favor. The his- THOMAS DONGAN. l6i tory of India and of the British colonies has shown by many instances that in the task of ruling alien nations all the best faculties of the Irishman come Into play. The presence of a vio lent Papist In high office would no doubt have been a source of discord and danger. But it is clear that Dongan's Romanism was of a sober and somewhat conventional kind. Beside, it was no small matter to have a man who was bound by no ties of con nection or sentiment to the settlements of New England origin. One fear no doubt there was : a Papist, the nominee of James, was in danger of being amenable to French influence. In the coming struggle for the supremacy of America, the Jesuit missionaries were the advanced guard of France, New York the key of the frontier to be held by England. Luckily Dongan's experience had qualified him to understand the designs of France and had taught him to distrust them. He had been colonel of an Irish regiment which was transferred by Charles II. to the service of the French Crown. Strange to say, he does not seem during his service to have acquired enough knowledge •of the French language to embolden him to correspond in it. But we may be sure that he had studied the policy and the re sources of France. Moreover, though not actually dismissed from the French service, his career there was brought to an end in a manner which he plainly felt a grievance. When in 1678, after the treaty of Nimeguen, all British subjects in the French service were ordered by the English Government to return to England, the French King endeavored by liberal offers to retain Dongan. He refused and, as he stated. In consequence never re ceived his arrears of pay, sixty-five thousand livres — in English money upwards of five thousand pounds.' He set sail for his province in a frame of mind no wise trustful of French promises nor tolerant of French pretensions. Such was the Governor to whom was assigned the task of In troducing representative government Into New York. His In- Dongan's structlons Were a complete fulfillment of the pledges tmns""^' which the Proprietor had given to the colonists. Dongan on his arrival was to issue writs for the election of a representative Assembly, to be chosen by the freeholders. The ' See a letter by Dongan quoted by Mr. Grant Wilson in his Memorial His. tory of New York, vol. i. p. 399, ^N. Y, Docs. vol. in. p, 369, l62 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. number of representatives was limited to eighteen. Apparently the apportionment of these members was left to the discretion of Dongan and his Council. All Acts passed by the Assembly and confirmed by thc Governor and the Council became law provisionally, pending the approval of the Proprietor. The power of levying rates was exclusively vested In the Assembly. The same instructions clearly defined the functions of the Governor. He might establish law courts and custom-houses, and grant lands. He was to have military authority for defen sive purposes such as fortification and the control of the militia, but he had no power to make war except by command of the Pro prietor. There was plainly no absolute security that the system of representation, thus granted, was to be permanent. It was con ceded as a favor, not a right. Practically, however, when representative machinery has once been established. It contains within itself, if there be In the community the needful Instincts and conditions for freedom, a power of self-preservation. It was a great matter, too, that the Proprietor should recognize and approve a representative Assembly not as a special arrange ment to meet an emergency, but as part of the every-day work ing system of the community. In August 1683 Dongan reached New York.' In less than three weeks from his arrival the freeholders were apprised of The first their privileges and were instructed to prepare for an Assembly , . 2 .-r-i - i • 1 summoned, election. 1 he announcement was received with a somewhat florid declaration of gratitude by the Court of Assize. Their sense of the Duke's benevolence was "larger and more grateful" than they could express. They would "always be ready to offer up their lives and fortunes" against all enemies,. whether for the King or the Proprietor.' This spirit, however, was not universal. One township (Easthampton) regarded the change not as a concession on the part of James, but as an encroachment by him upon their con stitutional rights. They elected representatives, but they pro tested against the issue of any writ in the Proprietor's name. It might seem an illogical proceeding to elect representatives and then to deny the efficiency of the instrument under which they ' Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 375. 2 lb ' lb. p. 380. Mr. Brodhead, as usual, gives the actual text. THE CHARTER OF LIBERTIES. 163 were elected.' But to guard against this argument the represent atives were expressly to declare that the town had elected not in obedience to the Proprietor's command, but because the free men would not lose an opportunity of defending their own rights. It Is difficult to see what ground the freemen of Easthampton had for their contention. The Proprietor's patent distinctly gave him power "to govern and rule," terms amply wide enough to cover the issue of the writ. Yet the temper which made the men of Easthampton scrutinize a concession instead of accepting It eagerly and unquestloningly had Its good side. It was an ex aggerated and ill-judging display of the same spirit which five years later made the wiser Nonconformists reject the Declara tion of Indulgence. In October 1683 the deputies, eighteen in number, met. It Is to be noticed that the Dutch part of the colony was repre- Composi- sented out of proportion to its population. The Assembly," Capital alone returned four, Esopus two, Albany, with which was joined the adjacent hamlet of Rensselaerwyck, the same number, Schenectady and Staten Island one each. Thus every one of the Dutch townships on the Hudson was repre sented. Long Island, on the other hand, was represented not by towns but by Its three ridings, two members to each. Each of the three outlying dependencies, as we may call them, Pemaquid, Nantucket, and Martha's Vineyard sent a representative. If any question should arise affecting the rival Interests of the two nationalities, it is plain that the Dutch side of the house, as one may call it, would both outnumber the English and be bound to gether by a stronger principle of cohesion. The first proceeding of the Assembly was to pass a measure analogous to a Bill of Rights. This was entitled "The Charter The of Liberties and Privileges, granted by his Royal Liberties.s Highness to the inhabitants of New York and Its dependencies." This settled the future constitution of the colony. The executive power, however, was still to be vested in the Governor and his Council. There was to be an Assembly ' Brodhead, vol. ii. pp. 381-2. Here again our author quotes the actual text. ' Ib. p. 382, 'This is given by Mr, Brodhead in an Appendix to vol, i. 659. 164 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. which must meet not less than once in three years, to which every freeholder and every freeman of a town corporation should vote for a member. The colony was arranged in electoral dis tricts, corresponding closely to those which had returned members to the extant House. The only noteworthy changes were that Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket were combined into a single constituency, and that the representation of the Dutch part of the colony was increased by two. The scheme for the distribu tion of representatives was confirmed by another Act, passed in the same Assembly, dividing the colony into twelve counties. General principles were laid down as to procedure and as to the privileges of members, substantially identical with those which apply to Parliament. The Assembly did not limit itself to framing a representative system. It also declared certain general constitutional principles. No tax of any kind was to be levied except by the Governor, Council, and deputies sitting as the general Assembly. No man was to be punished arbitrarily or otherwise than by due course of law. Trial by jury was provided for, and it was also enacted that the English law of real property should be in force. Not the least important clause was the last. It provided that no one who professed his faith in Jesus Christ and abstained from disturbing the peace of his neighbors should be molested for his religion. This, however, was not to exempt Dissenters from the payment of ecclesiastical dues, nor to interfere with the existing arrangement whereby in every township a minister, chosen by two-thirds of the freemen, was maintained by a gen eral rate. The clause which claimed for the Assembly the right of taxa tion was not left a mere abstract resolution. On October 30 an Revenue -^-Ct was passed granting to the Proprietor certain A^*- specified duties. The very next day the representa tives formally communicated to their constituents the victory, as they considered it, which had been won for them. The people were summoned by sound of trumpet to the town hall, and there In the presence of those officials who formed the gov ernment of the colony and of the municipal government of the city, the charter of liberties, together with the appended Act as signing a revenue to the Proprietor, was formally published. ACT OF NATURALIZATION. 165 Immediately afterwards the obligation to pay such duties was notified by proclamation.' It Is hardly needful to point out these enactments were worthless without the sanction of the Proprietor. Nor did the Assembly pretend that It was otherwise. The liberties specified by the charter were not what the colonists actually claimed as their right, they were only what they hoped the Proprietor would confer on them as an act of grace. Perhaps the most striking feature of all in the charter Is its intensely English character. There Is nothing in It abstract or Growth of general, not a line of It that Is not distinctly modeled ^eung'and on English precedent. The whole phraseology is influence. English, It Implies a perfect familiarity with Eng lish constitutional usage In those who drafted it, a constant reference to English law in those who were to use it. Yet, as we have seen, the Assembly which drafted it was one in which the Dutch portion of the community preponderated. Nor was that all. It Is almost certain from the manner in which the Act was proclaimed that the Assembly knew that it would be re ceived with enthusiasm among the Dutch inhabitants of the capital. Nothing could show better how effectively Nicolls and his successors had done their work, with what almost incom prehensible speed the colony was becoming Anglicized. It may seem paradoxical to say that the very plurality of nationalities made this all the easier. Yet in truth It was so. A solid Dutch nationality might have held its own against English influence. There was no such power of resistance in the miscellaneous population of which the colony was made up. That feature was clearly recognized, probably Increased, by one of the Acts passed by the Assembly. It ordered that any free man, who was ready to profess Christianity and to take the oath of allegiance to the King and fidelity to the Proprietor, might without any further ceremony become a naturalized citizen. Naturalization did not merely carry with it political privileges. The unnaturalized foreigner residing In New York labored under material disad vantages. He might only deal with merchants and might not carry on retail trade.' One practical result of this naturalization Act was certain ' Brodhead, vol. iii. p. 384. I rely upon the same authority for the remain ing enactments. ' The Labadists, p, 260, i66 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. to be an Immigration of fugitive Huguenots whom the bigotry of Lewis was driving from French soil. At the same time the colony was divided into counties, and courts of justice were insti tuted. There were to be four separate tribunals in New York : monthly Town Courts to decide small cases ; quarterly or half- yearly County Courts ; a General Court of Oyer and Terminer, and a Court of Chancery. From all these an appeal was to lie to the Crown.' Hitherto such freedom as had been enjoyed by the inhabitants of New York had rested chiefly on the municipal privileges of individual townships. Now that the whole community had at length, as it seemed, acquired rights of self-government the peculiar privileges of the city were not overlooked. Special The city of attention to them was indeed enjoined on Dongan by to'bein"-''' his Instructions. Henceforth the city was to be incor- corporated. pgrated by charter and to enjoy an elaborate mu nicipal constitution. It was to be divided Into six wards, each electing one alderman. The corporation, however, was not to be wholly self-governing, since all officials but the treasurer were to be nominated by the Governor and Council.' Dongan, like Nicolls, clearly saw the administrative evils which resulted from the separation of New Jersey. His re- Difficuities monstrances, however, were of no more avail than Jersey. thosc of bls predecessor. Even If Carteret had been disposed to give way, there were now so many vested Interests created in the territory that It was wholly Impossible for the Pro prietor to recover his rights. The situation, with its tangle of political and territorial claims, reminds one what must have been the practical working of feudalism under a liberal and easy going sovereign. All that Dongan could effect in the direction of New Jersey Retention v*'as to thwart an unscrupulous attempt to annex Island. Staten Island. The history of that dispute belongs rather to New Jersey than to New York. Dongan was equally resolute in dealing with territorial ag gression In the opposite quarter and equally successful. The The Con- fraudulent encroachment, as one may not unfairly call boundary. It, made by Connecticut had hitherto gone unresisted. ' Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 386. Cf, Dongan's report in March 1687, Col. Papers, 1685-8, 1160. ^Brodhead, vol. ii, p. 390, BOUNDARY DISPUTE WITH CONNECTICUT. i6'J But Dongan Insisted that the error made In striking the line must be set right, and that they must go back to the original settlement by which New York was to have a tract of twenty clear miles north of the Hudson. Connecticut had learnt what might be gained by standing well with the Crown. It would have been a violation of all her traditions to irritate the heir presumptive. We cannot doubt that if any of Dongan's prede cessors had taken as firm a line they would have been equally successful. On the other hand, Dongan saw that it was worth some slight sacrifice of the Duke's rights to secure the good will of Connecticut. Moreover, a strict adhesion to the twenty miles condition would have Incorporated with New York townships which had grown up as part of Connecticut, and Dongan was too much of a statesman to wish for such a measure. In No vember 1683 a new line was struck. The instructions of the Connecticut Assembly to the commissioners who acted for them in the matter show that they made the surrender grudgingly. But they had the grace to acknowledge to their fellow-citizens their approval of Dongan's own conduct. It was not till fifteen months later that the agreement was ratified by the Governors of the respective colonies, nor were the boundaries formally ac knowledged by the English Government till the twelfth year of William's reign.' The Instructions given to Dongan on the subject of commerce were on the same lines as the policy prescribed for Andros. No Dongan's goods were to be allowed to pass up the river without t?on™about Paying duty at New York. If the settlers in New trade. Jersey attempt to open up any other route for In dian trade, Dongan must do his best to prevent It, "as I wish to preserve the Indian trade for the benefit of New York above all others." The Act whereby the Assembly declared, and as far as It could perpetuated. Its own existence and rights met with a favorable reception from the Proprietor. His approval was given, and there seemed every reason to believe that New York would enjoy a system of representative government as complete and as effectually secured to It as that of Connecticut. But, ' AU the details of this negotiation are to be found in the Connecticut Records, 1678-89, Dongan's original letter of demand and the final agreement are printed in an Appendix, pp, 329-32. l68 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. near as the cup was to the lip, the slip came. Within a month of the accession of James, Dongan received fresh Instructions. Effector There was nothing in them to excite any apprehen- prrefoV^s sion of change, everything to make the colonists be- accession. jjgyg that the policy of granting representative institu tions was to be followed. There was to be no change of officials, and Dongan was to Inform the settlers that their proposals were under consideraticn of the Privy Council, and that they might "expect a gracious and suitable return, by the settlement of fitting privileges and confirmation of their rights." The Assembly adjourned in October 1684, intending to meet in the following September. It was held, however, that the demise of the Crown ended their existence. Dongan issued fresh writs, and In October the Assembly met again. This time eight days apparently sufficed for all Its legislative work.' There was nothing In the policy of Dongan to excite a sus picion that the altered position of the Proprietor would bring incorpora- wlth It any change in his dealing with the settlers. Yo?k°and'"' The municipal privileges of New York were con- Aibany. firmed in December 1686 by charter.' That was ob tained or It might perhaps be fairer to say accompanied by pay ment of three hundred pounds to Dongan as an official due.' There Is nothing to show that Dongan was ever induced by any prospect of gain to betray his master's interests or those of the provinces. But he did not rise above the morality of the day, which regarded such perquisities as part of the natural gain of an official career. In the following summer, Albany was likewise created a mu nicipality with a mayor and seven aldermen. The mayor, sheriff, and other officials were to be nominated by the Governor, the aldermen to be elected by the freemen. Here again Dongan was to receive three hundred pounds, a transaction which was described in the dispatch of a Canadian official as a surrender by tbe Governor of the chief privilege of the Crown, that of nomi nating magistrates. Tbe Indian trade was intrusted to the city ' Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 427. = 7b. p. 438. = Dongan himself admits this (N. Y. Docs, vol, iii, p. 412). He also says; (p. 411) that he was promised the sarae sum in connection with the Charter of Albany, He does not say that it was paid. FRESH LAND PATENTS REQUIRED. 169 government, a dangerous measure considering all that was In volved In the Iroquois alliance.' In receiving his six hundred pounds from New York and Albany, Dongan no doubt felt that the settlers got good value Fresh land for their money, and that his patron was In no way quired. prejudiced. But for another part of his policy we can hardly urge that excuse. In March 1684 an order was issued, not by the Proprietor, but by the Governor or Council, that the townships In the colony should take out new patents for their land.' Bad as Interference with established titles is any where. It Is specially so In a new country where security of title Is an absolutely needful condition of Improvement. It is impos sible to acquit Dongan of Introducing this measure to put fees In his own pocket, and in those of the officials about him. An even worse feature of the transaction was the fact that, in two cases, the grant of the patent was preceded by a large gift of land from the township to the Governor. But with all this there was nothing to show the settlers that a wholesale attack on their privileges was at hand. The Massachusetts patent had indeed been revoked. But from its Change ot ^ery Cutset, that document had been tainted by a sus- poiicy. picion of misrepresentation attaching to its origin, and for nearly twenty years there had been a smoldering feud be tween the colony and the Crown. The constitutional rights of New York were the fresh creation of the King's own hands. Yet in the summer of 1686 a new commission was Issued to Dongan, which, coupled with the Instructions accompanying It, utterly shattered the constitution of the colony. By the commis sion, the functions which the Assembly had claimed, and had been permitted to exercise, were transferred to the Sovereign, and a council of seven nominated by the King. They were to make laws subject to the King's approval, to Impose taxes, and to create courts of justice. The Instructions to Dongan added various details as to the practical administration of the system thus created. The fate of the charter was virtually sealed by the commission, but the in structions explicitly declared It null and void. Henceforth, the ' Brodhead, vol, ii, p, 439, ' Ib. p, 437. Here again we have Dongan's own admission, N. Y, Docs. vol. iii. p. 412. 17° NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. style of all laws was to be "by the Governor and Council." Toleration was explicitly continued to all men of whatever re- .j,j_ ligion who abstained from disturbing the public sentative peace, or molcstlng those of other denominations. nulled by But Instead of the system whereby every township newln" ^ appointed a minister of Its own denomination, the structions.. (^j^^^^jj ^f England was to be established throughout the colony, and no minister of religion nor any schoolmaster admitted without a certificate from the Archbishop of Canter bury, stating that he was conformable to the doctrine and dis cipline of the Church of England. Liberty of the press was strictly fenced In by a system of licensing. No man might keep a printing press, nor might any book, pamphlet, or paper be printed without the approval of the Governor. That a ruler who had but three years before set on foot a liberal system of popular government should thus, without rea son or provocation, withdraw all the privileges then granted seems in the face of It inexplicable. One Is tempted to fancy some intrigue under the surface, or, if not, to set down the change as the wayward caprice of a madman. That James cer tainly was not, nor Is there any trace of secret influence at work. In real truth no such explanation Is needed. In the eyes of James, constitutional government was but a method, not a principle. That men should value It for anything but Its im mediate and tangible results was to him unintelligible. His ob tuse incapacity for entering into the feelings of his subjects pre vented him from seeing that his previous liberality made his present policy seem all the harsher. To revoke privileges just granted was morally, if not technically, a breach of faith. De liberate treachery was not one of James's failings. But a man who has neither the power nor the wish to understand those with whom he deals is almost certain to expose himself to such a charge. No doubt another motive operated with James. He had in all likelihood already conceived the scheme of bringing the whole of the American colonies under one centralized system of adminis tration. Already the first great obstacle to that, the charter ' For the new commission see N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. pp. 377-82, and for the instructions, ib. p, 369. The commission is dated June 10, the instructions "twelve days earlier. DONGAN S ANTI-CANADIAN POLICY. 171 •under which Massachusetts enjoyed the privileges of self-gov ernment, had been swept away. The policy of Clarendon had James s been to strengthen the loyal colony of Connecticut as ?ons7i.di- a check on Massachusetts. The dealing of James tion. .^y;th the colonies went on an entirely different prin ciple. Local rights were to be swept away to make room for a comprehensive system of despotism. Under a consolidating sys tem of administration such as James now aimed at, the liberties just granted to New York could find no place. Such an attack on the constitutional rights of a New England colony would have called forth a whole literature of pamphlets. The citizens of New York seem to have acquiesced in it with that tranquillity with which they bore their various changes. Something of this no doubt was due to the tact and capacity of Dongan. We may well believe that in the eyes of the Governor himself the change was but a detail of administration, trivial in com- Dongan's parlson with the main objects which he had in view. Canadian He was the first of English public men who clearly Policy.' ¦iz^.^ what had long been manifest to the French rulers of Canada, that a struggle was at hand In which the whole future cf the English colonies was at stake. He points •out the Importance of La Salle's ("Lassel's") discovery. "It will prove very inconvenient to us, as the river runs all along from our lakes by the back of Virginia and Carolina. The alli ance of the Five Nations is our one security." He saw, too, that a merely defensive policy would not suffice. As an inevita ble result of such a policy the French would deal with the Five Nations as they had already dealt with the Algonquins : Jesuits, hunters, and traders would permeate the country with French influence; mission stations would be supplemented by forts; with the French and Mohawks on the border united in enmity, the English colonies must abandon all hope of peaceful and se cure development. To meet this danger, Dongan clearly saw, England must borrow the tactics of her rival. Missionaries must be sent among the Indians ; the communication between the ' See Dongan's dispatch, N. Y, Docs, vol, iii, pp, 389-415, It is not dated, but evidently belongs to the latter part of Dongan's term of office. The editor of the Documents assigns it to February 22, 1687, but without giving any xeason. 172 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. upper waters of the Hudson and the Canadian lakes must be secured by a line of forts; above all the English must assume towards the Five Nations a constant attitude of friendship and protection ; the savages must be treated as the dependents of the English Crown; it must be understood on all hands that they would be supported against invasion. In Dongan's own words, the Five Nations were to be the bulwark of the English colo nies, and they were to have no Intercourse with any Christians save at Albany, and that by license of the English. Placed as the various parties were, the policy contemplated by Dongan was quite incompatible with the maintenance of any real friendship with France. There might be a conventional ex change of diplomatic courtesies, but the attitude of the two nations could only be one of watchful jealousy, with possibilities of war always near at hand. One of the first difficulties which stood in the way of Don gan's policy was the assumption by the French of some sort of Relations authority over the Five Nations based on treaty. In between the French the case of a clvIlIzed and a savage nation, an attempt Iroquois, to define relations in precise language is only mis leading. But it certainly could not be held that the French had by the negotiations in 1666 and 1667 established any claim over either the Iroquois territory or its inhabitants, which the Eng lish were bound to respect. This was practically admitted by the French Government in the instructions given to Frontenac upon his appointment as Governor of Canada in 1673. He was to hold himself in readiness to repel, and if need be to attack, the Iroquois — language which could hardly have been used of a nation bound by treaty obligations. Frontenac's abilities might have given him a place among those generals who, like De mosthenes and Dundee, Clive and Gordon, have employed and controlled with unsparing energy and clear insight the military resources of barbarism. For such work needs above all things a free hand, and Frontenac, happily for England, was fettered at every turn. His colonists were animated by no unity of pur pose, no steady loyalty to a common cause. He labored under a cumbrous system of dual government. He as Governor was re sponsible for the general administration of the colony. But he had at his right hand the Intendant, an officer appointed to pro tect the financial interests of the Crown, and to act as a check FRONTENAC AND THE FIVE NATIONS. 173 and a spy on the Governor. As a writer, who, above all others, has fathomed the Inner meaning of the history of French Can ada, says, the relations of the Governor and the Intendant "to each other were so critical, and perfect harmony so rare, that they might almost be described as natural enemies.'" Even the clergy, who virtually formed Frontenac's staff of Indian diplo matists, were not allies on whom he could reckon with certainty. The indefatigable zeal and energy of the French missionaries were marred by the jealousy of rival orders of Jesuits, Sulpicians, and Recollects, each working under a different command, and in some measure on different systems. Frontenac at once saw that in the inevitable struggle with England the Iroquois country was the key of the situation, and Policy of that the position of France would be hopeless unless Frontenac. jjjg Y'wt Nations could be cowed or propitiated. Luckily for the Governor, his political schemes and the com mercial interests of his subjects pointed to the same path. The Iroquois were at this very moment threatening those Algonquin tribes on the north-west on whom the French depended for their supply of furs. The fur trade itself was a Government monopoly, but the profits of the middleman and the various in direct advantages were enough to give the whole body of citizens an interest in It. Frontenac lost no time In establishing his influence over the Five Nations, and In Impressing them with a sense of the power of France to punish and to protect. In the summer of 1673 he made a progress up the St. Lawrence and visited the shores of Lake Erie.' The scanty resources of the colony were used to bring home to the savage the material splendor and strength of civilization. The boats which bore the Governor and his little force were gorgeously painted and armed with cannon. The Iroquois at first proposed that the Governor should visit them in their own woodland fortresses. Some of Frontenac's coun selors would have had him accede. He himself, guided both by sense of personal dignity and insight Into the savage character, sent back word that the Mohawks were the children of the French ruler, and that it behoved the father, not the son, to ' Parkman, The Old Regime in Canada, p. 266. ' The journal of Frontenac's expedition, translated, is in the N, Y, Docs. vol. ix. pp. 95-114. 174 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. dictate the place of meeting. He prevailed, and the envoys of the savage confederacy came to him on the shores of Lake Erie. Friendly speeches were made, and gifts exchanged. Frontenac assumed the title of Father of the savages. The claim was not merely accepted but approved. Other French governors, so said the Indians, had claimed to be their brother, none had granted them a title so honorable as that of children. This may In Itself be taken as proof that the Indians at least did not look on the relations thus asserted as one of sovereign and subject. Frontenac was far too shrewd and resolute to rely on the un supported influence of friendly words. Before his interview with the Iroquois the foundation of a French fort had been laid on the shores of Lake Erie. The choice of a site had been made by La Salle, not yet the explorer of the Mississippi or the dis coverer of Louisiana, but already a daring and brilliant pioneer in the Western Wilderness. In him Frontenac saw a kindred spirit, one who could carry out with patient toil schemes con ceived with the imaginative enterprise of a knight-errant. Ad vised by him, Frontenac gave orders for the building of a fort near the present site of Kingston. There the Algonquin hunter might bring his furs and meet his French customers, safe from the attack of the Iroquois. It would serve too as a visible symbol of the French advance, and as a protection to the mission aries who were carrying their spiritual invasion into the country of the confederated tribes. By July 1673 the fort was built and garrisoned. The com mand of it was intrusted by Frontenac to La Salle. Two years^ later La Salle's position was confirmed and Improved by a grant from the King. This established him in a position of something like sovereignty. He was ennobled; the fort itself and a tract of land round it were granted to him ; he was to maintain and garrison the fort, and to establish a mission station there at his. own cost. The wooden palisades were replaced by stone walls, and three Franciscan fathers were settled there. It is not out of place to dwell on the establishment of Fort Cataracouy, or as^ it was now called Fort Frontenac, in connection with New York. Fort, factory, and mission station in one, It represented the various influences which were at work doing battle for France in the coming struggle. FRENCH MISSIONS. 175. In Other quarters French missionaries were winning a hold on the Five Nations. In 1667 permanent missions were established French by the Jesuit order among the Mohawks and the among'the Oneldas. Within the next five years as many more Iroquois. mission stations were set up through the Iroquois country. There were marked differences in the readiness with which the various members of the confederacy accepted the Gospel. Among the Oneidas a leading chief, Garakanthie, be came a zealous convert, and In that tribe the labors of the mis sionaries bore some fruit. So also they did among the Cayugas and the Oneidas. The Senecas and, what was still more im portant, the Mohawks were for the most part obdurate. But In no case did the French missionaries obtain such a hold upon any of the Five Nations as to be able materially to influence their policy. There may have been Isolated cases of real conversion. But if such conversions were real, their very reality made them less. valuable as Instruments of French political aggression. The Hurons were "converted in platoons and baptized In battalions." At one swoop a whole village became nominal converts to the faith of Christ, very real converts to the French alliance. The, spectacle of the Isolated Christian among the Mohawks would rather tempt bis brethren to suspect and dislike those who had perverted him from the faith of his fathers. At length the French had In the case of the Iroquois to be content with the policy adopted by the New England mission aries, and to withdraw a certain number of converts from the in fluence of the surrounding barbarism. At first some gave ef fective proof of the reality of their conversion by joining a Chris tian village In the country of their enemies the Hurons. In 1669, a separate village of Iroquois Christians was formed on the south bank of the St. Lawrence, opposite Montreal. This was after wards moved further up the river. Another like commu nity sprang up on the shores of the basin north-west of Montreal, known as the Lake of the Two Mountains, while a third on the shores of Lake Ontario was formed of Cayuga converts. Such a system Instead of strengthening French political Influ ence among the Iroquois rather alienated and exasperated the chiefs, who saw a portion of their subjects thus with- 176 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. drawn.' Far more could have been done by the presence of such a one as Frontenac, genial In his sympathy, yet daring and mas- Frontenac tcrful In hls self-assertlon. But In an evil hour for replaced by Yxz.nzt, a happy One for her rival, Frontenac was with- Barre. drawn for a whUc from Canada. His successor, De la Barre, brought out with him a good reputation as a soldier. His policy towards the Iroquois was from the outset an aggressive one, yet he wholly failed to strike any terror or to Inspire his own supporters with any enthusiasm. On his arrival he found the Iroquois at war with the Illinois and the Miamis, Algon quin tribes and recognized allies of France. The Senecas and the Cayugas, too, had plundered the canoes of fur traders on the St. Lawrence and had attacked a French outpost.' De la Barre's policy was to divide the savage confederacy, and deal dif ferently with its various members.' The chief offenders, the Senecas and the Cayugas, were to be at once attacked. Jesuit missionaries were sent to enter into friendly relations with the other tribes. The English Court was asked to bind its represent atives to a policy of neutrality, and a letter was sent to Dongan telling him what was intended, and asking him to prevent the sale of arms and ammunition to the Iroquois.* Dongan's answer was alike guarded and firm. The Iroquois country, he affirmed, was English territory, its inhabitants Eng- Attitude of lish subjects. He would be responsible for their Dongan, good behavIor towards the French.' At the end of July 1684 Dongan, In accordance with this declaration, met the chiefs of the confederacy at Albany. With him was Lord Effingham, who as Governor of Virginia had separate grievances of his own against the Five Nations. These were satisfactorily settled. It was then arranged, at the request of the Iroquois themselves, that the arms of the Duke of York should be set up over their forts. Furthermore the Senecas claimed that Dongan promised them aid — four hundred horse and as many infantry — In case of a French invasion." 'Thus, in a conference with Dongan at Albany in 1687, a Mohawk chief says, "We are much inclined to get our Christian Indians back again from Canada," N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 444. 2 Memorandum by De la Barre, N. Y, Docs, vol, ix. p. 239. 'Ib. ' N. Y. Docs. vol. iii, p. 447, " lb. p. 448. • This was stated by the Senecas to De la Barre in a conference hereafter mentioned, N. Y. Docs, vol. ix. p. 243, DE LA BARRE'S EXPEDITION. 1 77 Dongan at once communicated the result of the conference to De la Barre.' The Senecas were to be considered under the protection of England. All territorial disputes were to be settled by the two home Governments. De la Barre answered that he had no Intention of allowing territorial conquest. He Is only concerned with the Indians, and he reaffirms his purpose of attacking the Senecas and Cayugas.' Following up this declaration the French Governor marched from Quebec with a force of twelve hundred men. The expe- De la^ dition did not get beyond Fort Frontenac. There expedition, fever broke out among the troops. Alarmed by this, and disheartened by the reports brought In by his Jesuit emis saries, De la Barre gave up his scheme. Instead of a military force, a peaceful envoy was sent to bid the Seneca chiefs and their confederates to a conference. Meanwhile Dongan had also dispatched an envoy, Arnout Viele, to secure the Indians in their allegiance to the English. In the Onondaga village, where the sachems of the Oneidas and Cayugas had come to hold counsel, Viele met the French agents. They had already won over one of the leading chiefs among the Oneidas, whose reputed eloquence had earned him a name trans lated by the French Into Grande Gueule, and thence corrupted into Grangula. In a speech delivered before the envoys he set forth the attitude of the Iroquois to their civilized neighbors. His words are noteworthy, they give the key to the Iroquois policy, and they show the difficulties with which both French and English had to contend. According to recognized customs he personified the French and English by the names of Onontio and Corlaer. Onontio was the father of the Five Nations, Corlaer their brother. When the father and one of the sons came to blows It was for the rest of the family to interfere. The Onondagas must stop the battle between Onontio and the Senecas. If Corlaer was true to his brotherhood he would support the Onondagas. But though Onontio might be the father of the Iroquois and Corlaer his brother, neither was his master. He was a free man, the land In which he lived was his own. ' N, Y, Docs, vol, iii. p. 4S8- 'lb. p. 459- 178 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. If the Iroquois did not accept that position of vassalage in which Dongan would fain have placed them, yet he had in Policy practice no cause to be dissatisfied with their attitude ?roquois. towards the French. While these negotiations were going on, De la Barre's force was encamped at Fort Frontenac, wasting away under a malarious fever. At the outset Meules, the French Intendant, had written a dispatch to the colonial minister at home, warning him that De la Barre's designs would come to nothing. He would journey as far as Fort Frontenac and then make peace with the Senecas. His warlike prepara tions were but a blind to deceive the Canadians and the authori ties in France. Whatever may have been De la Barre's original Intentions, Meules' prophecy was more than fulfilled in fact. Frontenac had refused to treat with the Indians in their own territory, deeming that he would thereby lower the dignity of France. De la Barre had no such scruples. He crossed Lake Erie and met the delegates of the Five Nations at Fort Famine on the far bank. Bruyas, a missionary acting as interpreter, charged the Iroquois with divers wrongs done against France. They had molested Frenchmen who were trading among the Algonquins,. and had Introduced English merchants as their rivals. The answer of Grande Gueule was an open defiance. Taunt ing De la Barre with the condition of his troops, the savage told him he was dreaming in a camp of sick men, whom the Great Spirit suffered to live instead of slaying them by the sword. It was true that the Iroquois had brought English traders into the- Algonquin country. So their own country had been explored by the French. Emphatically did Grande Gueule declare again that he was one of a free nation, dependent neither on Corlaer nor on Onontio. So long as they themselves were unmolested, so long and no longer would they keep the peace with both nations. The interview ended better than might have been expected from the beginning, thanks to the pacific temper of De la Barre. He withdrew his force, having received from the Iro quois a pledge that In their attack on the Illinois they would not molest the French.' ' For all these transactions see the N. Y. Docs. ; cf. Colden, History of Five Nations (ed. 1750); also Parkman's Count Frontenac and New France. DONGAN AND DENONVILLE. 179 One can hardly wonder that when the official report of these proceedings reached France, Seignelay, the colonial minister, Dela should havc indorsed it with the words "to be kept replaced secret," and that De la Barre should have been re- viiie. placed. His successor, the Marquis de Denonville, was sent out to carry through a definitely anti-English policy.' The English must be excluded from the Algonquin territory. At the same time French influence was to be used with James that the English arms should be removed from the Iroquois forts.' The first dispatch sent home by Denonville showed that he entered thoroughly into the policy prescribed for him. The Five Policy of Nations must be controlled by force of arms and by ville. 3 a chain of forts along the lakes, and English traders who were already visiting the Huron country must be expelled. Denonville pointed out, too, that there was an easy communica tion between the valley of the Hudson and the lakes. Let the English only secure the friendship of the Iroquois, and they could set up trading houses on the shore of Lake Ontario. He added the suggestion that the King should buy the province of New York from England; then France would hold the whole Iroquois country and Its fur trade. James Is known to be necessitous. That he may be held back from such a sale by any patriotic scruples never seems to occur to the French diplomatist. Meanwhile Dongan was taking effective measures to neutral ize French influence among the Iroquois. In the autumn of Dongan's 1 686 the Confederate tribes, going further than they with thi h^tl y^t done In the direction of friendship with the Iroquois. English, sent delegates to a conference at New York. Dongan promised them English missionaries of the Romish faith. He exhorted them not to visit Fort Frontenac, and to arrest and send to New York any Frenchmen who might be found in their country. Most Important of all, he promised that if the Iroquois were attacked by the French, help from New York should at once be forthcoming.* 'For his instructions see N. Y. Docs, vol, ix. p. 271, ' Seignelay to Barillon (the French Ambassador in England), ib. p. 269. 'Ih. p. 280, •This conference is shortly described by Dongan in his Report above re ferred to (N, Y, Docs. vol. iii. p. 395), and with more detail in a letter written by Lamberville to his colleague Bruyas (ib. vol. ix, p. 489), l8o NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. As might have been foreseen, Dongan and Denonville soon found themselves engaged in an unfriendly correspondence. The outward show of courtesy was maintained. Dongan promised to do his best for the safety of the French missionaries among the Iroquois. When Denonville protested against the English traders who debauched the natives with rum, Dongan contented himself with retorting that English rum was at least not more harmful than French brandy.' But there was no real attempt to conceal or Ignore the an tagonism of the two on vital points. Dongan's attitude was per fectly definite and simple. The Iroquois were English subjects and their territory English territory. Any attack on the one or the other would be treated as a casus belli. Any dispute arising to this claim must be settled by the two home Governments. Dongan's duty as Interpreted by himself was simply to accept and guard a certain frontier. It was no light task to impress this policy on a King with strong French prepossessions, swayed by the Influence of astute Treaty of ^^^ unscrupulous French diplomatists. For a while Whitehall. Jf seemed as If Lewis and Barillon had won the game. The treaty agreed on at Whitehall in November 1686 seemed to rob Dongan of all for which he had striven. It was agreed that, even If war broke out between England and France in Europe, peace should be preserved In America. Neither nation was to fish or to trade within the territory of the other, and neither was to assist any Indian tribe with whom the other might be at war. In accepting those terms the English Government wholly abandoned the policy of Dongan, since the very key stone of that policy was a defensive alliance with the Iroquois. It was well for England that her representative in this crisis was something more than a mere commonplace official. Fortunate In that, she was even more so In her opponent. Dongan had clear views and no dread of responsibility. But his resolute resistance to the pretensions of France might have availed noth ing against a wiser opponent. I have alluded elsewhere to the folly, at once a crime and a blunder, by which Denonville threw away the advantages se cured by French diplomacy. Fifty Iroquois chiefs were invited to a conference, and were then kidnapped and sent to France as ' For this correspondence see N, Y, Docs, vol. iii. pp, 455-78. DONGAN AND THE FIVE NATIONS. i8i galley-slaves. Denonville's folly was made complete by his choice of an agent. It was Jacques de Lamberville, a French Dealings of Jesult missionary, who, himself as much the dupe as ^f"h the"* any of the victims, was employed to lure the Iroquois Iroquois.' to the meeting. The Indians acquitted him of guilt, and with rare forbearance the elders of the tribe escorted him to Fort Frontenac lest he should fall a victim to the vio lence of any younger warriors. But hitherto trust in the mis sionaries had been the strongest agency by which the French could work upon the Iroquois, and that spell was now broken. In July 1687 Denonville, with a force of French soldiers and an auxiliary force of Indians, marched Into the Iroquois Denonville country. One skirmish in which the French would Iroquois.' probably have been repulsed but for their Indian allies, the capture of a few bed-ridden Senecas who could not be removed and who were handed over to the Hurons, and the destruction of much corn, a loss, however, which In July cannot have been Irreparable — this was all that Denonville could show as the fruits of his Invasion. It had, moreover, the effect of bringing him Into collision with the English. Two English parties trading on the borders Anti- of the Algonquin country were arrested and sent as poficy*of prisoners to Montreal.' Dongan at once had a con- Dongan. ference with the Iroquois chiefs at Albany. He bade them remember that they were the subjects of the English King, and that they must have no dealings with the French without the approval of Corlaer. There could be no need for French mission aries, he himself would send them English priests ; let them make peace with the Algonquins, and let them recall those converts who had gone to live in Canada. Of all Dongan's declarations perhaps the most Important was his offer to build a fort on Lake Ontario, on a spot to be chosen by the Iroquois.* Abortive as had been the warlike operations of De la Barre and Denonville, yet they had done enough to make the Iroquois ' See authorities in N. Y. Docs, vol. ix. ; cf . Parkman, Count Frontenac , p. 140; Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 476. ' Denonville's own report of the expedition is in the N, Y. Docs, vol, ix. pp. 336-44. He does not mention the number of his force. ' This is stated by Champigny (the Intendant) in a letter to Seignelay, N, Y, Docs. vol. ix. p. 332. Denonville also refers to it. * There is a full report of this conference drawn up by Livingstone, the sec retary to the colony, N, Y. Docs. vol. iii. pp. 438-41. i82 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. feel the value of the English alliance. Dongan's appeal was re ceived with hearty approval. The French were aiming, so tbe Iroquois said, at the total destruction of the Five Nations, and at gaining entire control of the beaver trade. Surely the great sachem beyond the sea would not suffer the Iroquois to be extir pated, and their lands to become French territory. They them selves could no longer receive French missionaries, and would do their best to withdraw the converts, and their dealings with the French should be subject to the approval of Dongan. The result of the conference did not end in mere friendly words. Dongan furnished the Senecas with a supply of arms and ammunition. In so doing Dongan was undoubtedly breaking the treaty of Whitehall. He might have urged with a good show of reason that it was impossible by any other means to guard his own frontier. To suffer the French to overpower the Iroquois was to lay the north-western border of New York open to invasion. The soundness of Dongan's policy was soon illustrated. A rumor spread abroad that Denonville was preparing a force of fifteen hundred men to march in snowshoes as soon as winter came. They were to overrun the Mohawk country, and then to attack and extirpate the settlers at Albany.' Thereupon Albany and Schenectady were palisaded, Dongan himself took up his residence at the former place, leaving a deputy to act for him at New York, and the Iroquois were bidden to place their non- combatants In safety within the English border.' While Don gan was thus acting on his own responsibility, he was doing bis best to force the English Government to accept his policy. In the autumn of 1687 he sent home an officer. Captain Palmer, to explain to the English Government the state and the needs of the colony. He was to submit a scheme for a complete chain of border forts, and also to press on the English Government the advantage of sending missionaries, and the need for some scheme of consolidation which should bring Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey under one common scheme of defense.' Dongan's persuasions were not wasted. Barillon, the French ' Stated in a letter from Schuyler to Dongan, September 2, 1687. N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p, 478, 'Council Minutes in O'Callaghan, vol, i. pp, 162, 166. Dongan to Sunder land, N, Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 477. ' Palmer's instructions are in the N, Y. Docs, vol, iii, 475. THE KING SUPPORTS DONGAN. 183 Ambassador In London, and De Bonrepos, who was associated with him as special commissioner for negotiating on the Ameri- james can qucstlon, did their best to keep the advantage Dongan, whIch had been gained and to persuade James to force Dongan to a neutral policy. Through all the dealings of James with France ran a faint spirit of independence, way ward indeed and uncertain, yet at least rising higher than the deliberate and selfish servility of his brother. Instructions were now sent to Dongan adopting his policy with a thoroughness which must have surprised its proposer. The Iroquois were to be distinctly acknowledged as English subjects, and as such protected. Dongan was furthermore authorized to build forts on the frontier at such places as he should select, and to require help from the other English colonies. The Governors and Pro prietors of such colonies had been or would be notified of this. In fact there was for the first time something in declaration by the English Government of a definite anti-French colonial policy. At the same time the French commissioners were in formed of this policy. They contented themselves with a some what hesitating protest declaring that the claim now made by the English Crown was at variance with previous admissions, and urging that the Iroquois had repeatedly acknowledged French sovereignty. With this protest they signed an agreement of neutrality, which provided that no commander either In Canada or In the English colonies should invade the territory of the rival nation.' One cannot doubt that the course which James thus took was for the good of the English colonies. In all likelihood It saved them from irreparable evil. How far such a course could be reconciled with the pledges given a year earlier Is a question perhaps best left in the region of speculative casuistry. Fortified with this declaration of policy Dongan met the Iro quois chiefs at Albany, and bade them henceforth look on them selves as the children of the English King.' His great point seemed gained. Henceforth he might use the confederate tribes as a defensive weapon against France without any fear that bis hands would be fettered by the timid or fickle policy of the ' The negotiations with the French Commissioners are to be found in the TJ, Y, Docs, vol, iii. pp. 505-10. Dongan's instructions are in the same vol ume, p. 503. " N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 533. 1 84 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. English Court. Emboldened by that knowledge he demanded that the French should demolish their forts at Niagara and at Frontenac' Dongan was not fated, however, to have the satisfaction of himself wielding the weapon which he had forged. French diplomacy failed of its main end, but it at least had the satisfac tion of seeing the man to whom it owed its defeat swept out of its path. Dongan's removal from office was indeed in a curious fashion a consequence of the policy which he had himself ad vocated. It would probably be unjust to James to suppose that he would have sacrificed a faithful servant to the vindictiveness of France. But among the measures which Dongan had urged was a consolidation of the colonies for purposes of defense. New York was to be strengthened by the addition of Connecticut on the north and of New Jersey on the south.' In this proposal Dongan did but give definite shape to views which were floating through the mind of every man who took an Interest in colonial politics. The colonial policy of Clarendon by strengthening the administrative control of the mother country had done some thing to break down the barriers of local peculiarity which severed colony from colony. The aggression of France had done still more to create a sense of common interests and of the need for joint action. In these days the occasion would have called out a society to promote colonial union with an organization and literature of its own. As it was, one can hardly take In hand a. batch of Colonial State Papers between 1690 and 1720 without lighting on some trace of such a project. Beyond doubt, the great obstacle to such schemes lay in the mental and moral isolation of New England, above all of Massachusetts. Fortified by a not unfounded confidence in her power of independent action, by an exaggerated and arrogant, but not wholly erring, sense of aims and principles higher than those around her, the Puritan Sparta was as yet both unwilling and unfit to join In corporate life with colonies which were, by comparison with herself, but temporal unions, living for material objects. But to one like James such unfitness and such unwill ingness went for nothing. The ruled were mere puppets to be ranked and marshaled by the superior wisdom and benevolence ' N. Y. Docs. vol. ix. p 389. ^ Col. Papers, 1685-8, 1160, 1262. POLICY OF COLONIAL UNION. 185. of the ruler. James doubtless believed in all honesty that he had taken a step towards accomplishing the policy prescribed by Don gan, when he placed the whole territory which had made up the New England confederacy, together with New Hampshire and Rhode Island, under the governorship of Andros. It was a. mere question of mechanical convenience to extend that further, and to Incorporate New York with that province. The question then rose, was New England to be attached to the government of Dongan, or New York to that of Andros? We can now see how that, whereas the attempted union under Andros was noth ing but a source of irritation and disappointment, union under Dongan might at least have fulfilled the main object to be aimed at, and might have erected an efficient barrier against: France. But what was with Dongan the supreme motive for colonial union, was with Dongan's master but one of several motives which made such union expedient. To bring the whole- body of colonies under a uniform fiscal system was a perfectly legitimate aim. To crush out that spirit of isolation and inde pendence which by Its good and its evil made Massachusetts odious to men like Randolph was an object, not perhaps so fully acknowledged by James even to himself, but which went far to determine bis policy. We judge, too, of Dongan and Andros by fuller light than was enjoyed by James and his advisers. We know the result, and the antipathy of New England to Andros seems wiser, the confidence of James more foolish, than each really was. We measure Andros by the Boston rebellion, Don gan by the events of the next half century. Those who had to. make the choice could not see the policy and character of each man as a whole. There was, moreover, one Insuperable objection to Dongan as a governor for New England in his religion. Odious as Andros might be, he would be far less so than a governor who was tak ing measures to supply the Five Nations with Jesuit missionaries. To choose a ruler for the newly combined group of colonies who should be at once efficient and acceptable was a task which might have baffled a wiser king than James. In March 1688 Dongan was recalled, and replaced by An dros. There Is no reason to think that French Influence counted for anything In this change. But the temptation to make capital out of It, by representing it as a measure friendly- l86 NEW YORK UNDER ANDROS AND DONGAN. to France, was irresistible. We find Seignelay writing to Denonville a cheering assurance that the King of England would no longer support "the chimerical pretensions" of Don gan.' In such a case the appearance of concession was almost as bad as the reality. It was not enough to resist the aggression of France and her savage allies. If that policy was to be effective the Intention of resistance must be plainly and emphatically declared. ' N. Y. Docs, vol. ix. p. 372. CHAPTER V. THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK.' The dismissal of Dongan was at once followed by the appoint ment of Andros. That appointment did not take the form of Constitu- a separate commission. Andros was not like Bel- th'°n°e'w lomont, at a later day, simultaneously Governor of province.2 ^^^ York and of Massachusetts, by different titles. The whole territory from the west bank of the Delaware to Pemaquid was formed Into a single province, called New Eng land. One may almost say that every element in the government of the various members of the new province was uprooted. The appointment of law officers was vested in the Governor himself. The work of legislation and taxation was intrusted to a council of forty-two, chosen from the whole province. Events showed what might easily have been anticipated, that such a system would be received very differently in New York and in New England. To the former the change was a mere legislative en- ' The chief authorities for Leisler's rebellion; — i. Letter from Stephen Van Cortland to Andros, July 9, 1689, N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 590. 2. "A modest and impartial narrative of several grievances and great oppressions that the peaceable inhabitants of New York lie under by the extravagant and arbi trary proceedings of Jacob Luysler and his associates." Printed at New York and reprinted in London, 1690. N. Y, Docs. iii. 665. 3. A memorial signed by Bayard, entitled: *'A brief deduction and narrative of the several disorders, abuses and enormities and insolencies lately committed by Jacob Leyseler and several of his associates at New York since the 28th of April, 1689." N. Y. Docs, iii. 636. 4. A short memorial in French, dated from The Hague, ad dressed to William and Mary, and signed by certain adherents of Leisler, entitled: "Memoir and relation of what occurred in the City and Province of New York, in America, in the years 1690 and 1691, which the relatives and agents of the good people of that city residing in Holland have been requested to communicate in a most humble address by all possible means to their Maj esties of Great Britain, protectors and defenders of the Faith." This last is a secondhand ex parte statement. O'Callaghan also publishes in his Documentary History, vol. ii., a number of documents, including the minutes of the Coun cil during Leisler's usurpation. There are also documents of value in the Col. Hist, Papers, There is a very brief official report of Leisler's Trial in Col. State Papers, 1691, p, 1379, There are also four contemporary pamphlets in the Dutch Museum under the head Leisler. None of them throw any new light on the subject. ' For Andros's commission and instructions, see N, Y. Docs. vol. iii, pp. 537-49- 1 88 THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK. croachment, such as a colony must expect and make the best of ; to the latter It was an act of sacrilege. It is easy to contrast the sobriety and moderation of New York, at this juncture, with the petulant self-will, the disposition to enlarge on and even manu facture grievances, the diplomatic sharp practice of the New Englanders. But we must not forget that the provocation and the stake were in each case wholly different. Nor must we for get that Massachusetts, witb all the needful political instincts developed and highly trained, at once showed herself able to supply an efficient substitute for the government which she over threw, while New York, for lack of such training, became the prey of a disreputable adventurer, who neither understood the wants nor represented the wishes of the colony. The system which vested the supreme authority in a council chosen by the Crown from the whole body of Incorporated colo- Eviis of nies could not work smoothly. It failed to secure the the system, j-jgjjts of the colonlcs not only as against the Crown,. but also as against one another. If union were to be carried out effectively it must be by a system which should give each colony a due share of representation In tbe common government. To do that equitably and effectively was the real difficulty. James and his advisers cut the knot by sweeping away all representa tion. To such a system no colony could be loyal since it offered to none any safeguard for its own special interests. Yet the attitude of New York to the government of Andros was one of discontent only, not of vigorous hostility. Of An- The colony dros himself New York saw but little. Admlnistra- Andros. tivc difficulties at Boston and military duties on the frontier kept him fully employed. The government of New York was left to his deputy, Nicholson, and three councilors.. Far above Andros In intelligence and power of expression,. Nicholson was not greatly superior in decision and practical capacity, and much inferior In moral character. His three as sistants, Philipse, Van Cortland, and Bayard, were all Dutch men of wealth and good station.' Their nationality Is a point of Importance, as it clearly shows that the Insurrection which fol lowed was not, as some have held, an uprising of the old Dutch settlers against English domination. Philipse seems to have been a nonentity. Van Cortland was at the time of his appointment ' Brodhead, vol. ii. p, 558, DESTRUCTION OF LA CHINE. 189 Mayor of New York. Protestant though he was, his demon strations of loyalty at the rejoicings for the birth of the Prince of Wales were so exuberant as to discredit him at a later day with the followers of William. Bayard's after career showed energy and ability. But up to this time he had little scope for display ing those or any other qualities.' He held the colonelcy of the city train-bands, and the vindictive hostility of one under his command soon entangled him in what proved a death struggle for the assailant, and little less for Bayard. Before the abdication of James could become known In Amer ica, It had materially influenced the prospects of New York by French the change which It wrought in European politics. scheme of _, ¦=¦ , .¦= .^ .. . , invasion. i here was no longer anything to restrain Lewis from carrying out to the full those schemes which the rulers of Canada had been for years maturing. Such projects would now serve a double purpose. The aggressive policy of Frontenac would no longer entangle his country with a friendly power. The action, which would secure for France the dominion of the New World, would at the same time avenge James of his enemy. Accordingly In the spring of 1689 a scheme of attack was planned. A land force was to carry out, but somewhat more effectively, the policy of Courcelles and Tracy, and to invade New York by the line of Lake Champlain and the Hudson. At the same time a French fleet was to attack from the sea.' The intended invasion was hindered by events In which no Englishman had any share. In August 1689 Denonville's The treachery met its appointed reward. Although there French 1 r • , • , invaded was On the frontier an exasperated enemy with Mohawks, cvcry mcans of making a sudden attack, yet the French seem to have taken no special precautions. On a stormy night, which concealed their preparations, fifteen hundred Mo hawk warriors In canoes crossed the St. Lawrence. Their point of attack was the prosperous village of La Chine, nine miles above Montreal. No blow so terrible had ever befallen civilized men at the hands of the American savage. La Chine was burnt ' In 1675, just after the re-establishment of English rule. Bayard and others ¦were prosecuted for signing a seditious petition. The purpose of the petition ¦was to urge the rights of the Dutch inhabitants. Tlie prisoners were dis missed on giving security for good behavior. ' De Callieres (Governor of Canada) to De Seignelay. N. Y. Docs, vol. ix. pp. 404-28, 190 THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK. and its inhabitants to the number of two hundred were mas sacred. The invaders swept on, destroying everything in their path. Montreal itself was devastated. The total loss of life was estimated at a thousand ; of the invaders only thirteen fell. The fort at Cataracouy was abandoned; at one blow all the work of Tracy and Frontenac was undone. Before the effect of this diversion was known vague rumors of the intended attack by the French reached the English colo- News of nies. Nothing could be more calculated to shatter lutlo^^i""' all confidence among a community disunited In Itself, New York,' j^gtly dlsttustlng the efficiency of Its rulers, naturally, though perhaps not justly, distrusting their loyalty. To the citizens of New York, thus unsettled, came tidings even more calculated to rouse vague expectations and vague fears. In February a merchantman from Virginia reached New York witb the news that William had landed In England. Nicholson scoffingly foretold that the attempt would but repeat Mon mouth's. The very prentice boys of London would drive out the would-be usurper. Like Andros in New England, Nichol son determined that the matter was to be kept a secret from the people.' How far he succeeded does not appear. One can hardly suppose that neither by way of England nor of Holland did any rumor of William's enterprise reach the citizens of New York; nor, wanting though they were in political and national enthusiasm, can we doubt that the success of their countrymen would have been welcome tidings. Be that as it may, while the citizens of Massachusetts were declaring them selves once again a self-governing province, no measure of resist ance was carried out, nor as far as we can learn meditated, at New York. In April the citizens of New York learnt that Andros was a prisoner at Boston.' The position of Nicholson was even more pitiable than that of his chief. Andros at least was divested of responsibility. Nicholson and his council were left, at a crisis when invasion from without and insurrection within were alike possible, ignorant under what king they were really serving. ' An official summary of these events taken from the dispatches of colonial officials is in the N. Y, Docs. vol. x. pp. 424, &c. ' Deposition of Andries Greveraet, Dec, 13, 1689, in N, Y. Docs, vol. iii. p. 660. ' Nicholson to Board of Trade, May 15, 1689, N, Y, Docs, vol. iii. p. 574, NICHOLSON'S DIFFICULTIES. 191 France they heard had declared war against England. But war against England now might mean alliance with one who would soon again be the king of England. How at such a crisis were Crown servants in a distant dependency to shape their course ? Nicholson's first step showed no lack of judgment. On the arrival of the news from Boston, the Aldermen and Council Attitude were called together. Next day, when It was re- son, ported that France had declared war, the militia of ficers were Invited to join. All were to act as a General Con vention.' To make the people as far as might be partners in his responsibility was doubtless Nicholson's best course. Unluckily it was a course slowly taken and soon abandoned. With all Dongan's strenuous exertions for the defense of the frontier, he seems to have culpably neglected the safety of the Dispute capital itself. The fortifications were. If Nicholson Leisler. may be believed, ruinous beyond all possibility of re pair, and there was no money in the treasury to meet the cost of rebuilding.' The Council accordingly decided that the Import duties should be applied to purposes of defense. This proposal at once called out resistance. This was made dangerous by the position rather than the character of the chief opponent. Jacob Leisler was a German emigrant, prosperous In his trade as a brewer, and holding office as a captain in one of the city train bands. He chanced to own a valuable cargo of wine, liable for duty to the amount of a hundred pounds. There is nothing to show that personal cupidity was among Leisler's failings. He was a fanatical Protestant, and on that ground bitterly opposed to the existing government, overbearing, noisily and ostenta tiously ambitious. In such a man the chance of playing the part of a colonial Hampderi overpowered every thought for the public welfare. Leisler refused to pay customs, basing his re fusal on the technical ground that the collector was a Papist, and that therefore bis commission was invalid.' Leisler's action seems to have been imitated by others.' Even if It had stood alone, such conduct on the part of a prominent ' Cortland's letter to Andros, N. Y. Docs, vol, iii, p. 590. ^Nicholson to Board of Trade, May 15, 1689, ih. vol, iii, pp. 575-637; cf. Cortland to Andros, ib. p. 592. ' Modest Narrative, p. 66y. I do not find any contradiction of this by the- Leislerian party. 'Nicholson to Board of Trade, v.s. 392 THE REVOLUIION IN NEW YORK. citizen must have perilously weakened the government. Mean while danger was showing itself in another quarter. Though Disaffec- there might be no active sympathy with the Dutch Long" usurper, there were many who were ready at once Island. ^Q make common cause with New England mal contents. Leisler's attack on the government might have died down for lack of support. The English settlements on Long Island were the real spring of disaffection. On Long Island and on the mainland bordering Connecticut the people, acting In their townships or counties, displaced the civil and military of ficials.' Delegates were sent to Nicholson to demand that the fort should be placed In the hands of persons chosen by the com mons.' Most alarming symptom of all, the militia, whose pay was in arrears, assembled under arms at Jamaica, and vague rumors began to spread about New York that the city would be attacked and plundered. Impoverished as the treasury was, that danger was averted by payment of arrears due.' The demand for control over the fort was met by a partial concession; tbe counties might send representatives to New York to act with the council.* To share the responsibilities of government at such a time was not a tempting offer, and no delegates came. Nicholson's hot temper and lack of judgment brought matters to a head. A dispute broke out between him and Henry Cuyler, The mal- a lieutenant of militia, as to the right of the latter to aei'^ the Post a Sentry. In the course of the dispute Nlchol- ^°'''- son, it is said, was misguided enough to use the words ¦"I would rather see the city on fire than be commanded by you." Instantly a rumor went abroad that the Deputy had endeavored to enforce his authority by a threat to burn New York." Vague discontent and alarm found a representative and spokesman in Leisler. Either, however, the enthusiasm of the people some what outran his own intentions, or he had enough tact and self- restraint to see the advantage of keeping for awhile in the back ground. On the day following the dispute Nicholson called to- ' Nicholson as above, N, Y, Docs, vol, iii, p. 575, * N. Y, Docs, vol, iii. p. 577. * Cortland to Andros, ih. p. 592, Modest Narrative, pp, 665-6, I infer from Cortland's account that a night intervened. But he is not quite clear on the point, * N. Y, Docs, vol. iii. p, 575, ° Doc. Hist. vol. ii. p. 7. Declaration of inhabitants, &c. Col. Papers, 1689- .92, p. 160. LEISLER AND HIS PARTY SEIZE THE FORT. I93 gether the militia, and denied the charges against him. Cuyler repeated them, whereupon the Deputy deprived him of his com mission.' Cuyler's cause was at once taken up by his fellow- soldiers and the citizens at large. Rising under arms they de manded and obtained the keys of the fort. Up to this point Leisler seems to have taken no part in the mutiny. He now came forward and drew up a declaration on behalf of the muti neers. It set forth the Popish character of the previous govern ment. On that ground Leisler and his followers would hold the fort till it could be delivered over to the Protestant authority in England.' Even yet the game was not so far lost that resolute action on Nicholson's part might not have retrieved it. On the day foUow- Progress ing the seizure of the fort a demand was made by a R^evolu- number of the inhabitants that Bayard should take tion. f]^g command. This he refused to do on the plea that the fort had been occupied by the malcontents without authority, and that by taking the command he should be condoning their action.' In form, no doubt, he would have been violating Nicholson's authority by consenting. Practically, Bayard would thereby have given the Deputy all the standing ground which he needed till help came from England. While Nicholson and his supporters remained passive, Leisler was kindling popular feel ings by appeals to Protestant sympathy, and by spreading rumors that a French fleet was in view. Acting on this alarm the train bands assembled before the fort. Then by Leisler's order they marched In and took possession. Many of the officers, it is said, hung back and were only forced in by threats of punishment. A declaration was then drawn up and signed by all six captains and by four hundred of their men. This pledged them to hold the fort till they could hand It over to some person authorized by the Prince of Orange. It Is to be observed that this declara tion did not accept the English Revolution as a fact and pledge the colonists to abide by the result of It. It put the government of the colony in the position of Whig partisans, pledged to the Prince of Orange. They were to obey him not as the de facto Sovereign of England, but as a Dutchman and a Protestant. So far It Is true that the movement was a national one, represent- ' Modest Narrative, p. 669. ' Doc. Hist. vol. ii. p. 7. 'Col. Papers, 1689, p. 173. 194 THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK. Ing Dutch feelings and interests as against English. But It cer tainly could not be looked on as a spontaneous outburst of national feeling. Excepting Nicholson, the authorities against whom Leisler rebelled were Dutch, while Leisler himself was a German acting in obedience to that natural law, as it would seem, whereby one who has adopted a nationality always outdoes those born to It. If Nicholson, immediately upon learning the success of William and Mary, had declared in their favor and announced that the government was to be carried on in their name, he would have cut the ground from under Leisler's feet. Instead, on June 24, be took ship for England.' That incapacity for po litical action which the rule of the Company had created and which the later rule of England had done little to remedy, now left the colony at the mercy of an aggressive and self-confident usurper. Leisler summoned a convention. Thanks, too, to- Nicholson's action, Leisler was able to represent his own attitude as no more than a proper and legitimate adhesion to William and Mary. Nicholson by his flight left in force the commissions made out in the name of James. These Leisler declared void. To annul a Jacobite government and to substitute for It one loyal to the Protestant interest was but a mere following in the footsteps of the revolutionary convention at home. Had Leisler gone no further he could have had nothing to fear save in the unlikely chance of a Jacobite counter-revolution. Even the declaration with which Leisler overbore his colleagues, "Do you talk of law? The sword must now rule,'" might be pardoned in one whose cause was morally, but not yet legally, a good one. There can be no doubt that the Insurgents in New York had been encouraged by the example, if not by the direct counsel, of Assumption their neighbors In New England. Connecticut sent ot authority . ^ by Leisler. two representatives to advise the citizens of New York. The three Councilors whom Nicholson bad left behind him met the delegates from Connecticut and, taking the part which the Deputy-Governor should have taken, proposed the proclamation of William and Mary. The Connecticut dele gates instead of now recognizing the Councilors as the reposi- 'N. Y. Docs, vol, iii, pp. 585-95. It is only fair to Nicholson to say that bis council seem to have advised him to take this course, 'Modest Narrative, p. 671, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION- 19S tories of legal authority chose to confer with Leisler.' He then by their advice proclaimed the new Sovereign.' Thus, one may say, his New England advisers urged him to the first step which put him in the wrong. The Councilors having expressed them selves willing to accept the authority of William and Mary, be came the representatives of the Crown, and in refusing to ac knowledge them Leisler was taking the first step in the direction of treason. It was a short stage onward to active disobedience. A proclamation by the new Sovereigns Issued on February 19 confirmed the appointments of all existing officials in the colo nies.' This was published by Van Cortland. Acting on the authority thus conferred he and bis colleagues removed the col lector whose religion had been an offense to Leisler, and substi tuted provisionally four commissioners of customs. Leisler thereupon, accompanied by a troop of soldiers, seized the custom house, deposed the commissioners, and substituted a creature of his own.* On June 26 a convention met at New York. The composition and action of the convention soon showed what was the real The New state of affairs In the colony. There was nothing like vention.' widespread enthusiasm on behalf of Leisler. But he had at his back a solid body of partisans. These may have been In part moved by a national Dutch feeling which had not been strong enough to prevent the English conquest, but which re sented It. More manifest elements In the attitude of the Leis lerian party were the desire of the New England Immigrants for such self-government as they had enjoyed at home, and a hatred of James which would be satisfied with nothing less than the displacement of his whole official staff. It is almost certain that those who supported Leisler were a minority. But they were an earnest and resolute minority with definite views. Their opponents had no convictions to bind them together or to waken enthusiasm. As to the actual numerical strength of parties, It must be re membered that we derive our knowledge mainly from Leisler's ' The advice of the Connecticut delegates was given by a memorandum dated June 26, 1689. N. Y. Docs, vol. iii. p. 589, ' This is stated in a letter from John Tuder to Nicholson. Tuder was a lawyer who had held office under Dongan. ' Col. Papers, 1689, p. 22. * Cortland to Andros as above, cf, p, 608. 'lb. Cf. Tuder's letter as above. 196 THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK. successful opponents. But there is nothing to discredit the statement that not more than a third of the inhabitants took part In electing a convention. When one thinks of all the suffering that might have been saved by timely resistance to Leisler one feels the justice of the Greek view, that In civil strife absti nence is Itself a crime. New York wholly lacked that feeling which in New England existed with morbid Intensity, that the State was an Inheritance wherein every citizen had a share, for which he must render an account. In one Instance the disaffection of a colony from New Eng land took the form of demanding to be restored to its parent stock. The settlers In Suffolk county sent no delegates to the convention, but petitioned the government of Connecticut to re- annex them. Connecticut had learnt the value of royal favor too well to risk it by compliance.' Eighteen delegates from seven towns formed the convention. Not only did the convention represent a minority, but the acting part of It was little more than a minority of itself. Two dele gates, seeing that the convention intended to vest supreme au thority in Leisler, formally withdrew.' Six more seem to have stood aloof. Finally, ten delegates representing nine towns formed themselves Into a committee of public safety.' The one act of the convention was to vest all authority In Leisler, He was appointed Captain of the Fort, with full Position of Power to suppress any foreign enemy and to check any Leisler. Internal disorder. Never did a party in the act of claiming its freedom make a more full and frank confession of political incapacity. Leisler's own position was thoroughly and hopelessly illogical. Claiming to be the representative of the new Whig Govern- Anti-papai nient of England, he showed not the least anxiety to panic. learn the wishes of that Government or to comply with its principles. His policy In New York was not even a crude and clumsy imitation of William's policy in England. For Its counterpart we must look not among the recognized political parties, but among that fringe of Protestant malcon tents who denounced William as a Gallio and worshiped Oates ' Brodhead, vol. ii. p. 573. ' Modest Narrative, p. 670. ' Only ten signed Leisler's commission. Col. Papers, 1689, p, 217. VIOLENCE OF LEISLER'S PARTY. 197 as a martyr. One of the first incidents of Leisler's rule was an anti-Papal panic, as extravagant, though happily not as blood thirsty, as any which had terrified Londoners In 1678. Four students from Cambridge in Massachusetts appeared in the col ony. Leisler suspected, for some unknown reason, that they were on friendly terms with certain of the deposed Jacobite officials In New England, and from this he deduced the opinion that their presence was a danger to Protestantism and to him self. Dongan, too, had not yet left the colony,' and this fact, coupled with the recent attempt of Andros to escape, seems to have increased Leisler's alarm. He appears. Indeed, to have worked himself Into a frame of mind easy to an uneducated fa natic of meager abilities. He believed that his own safety and that of the State were bound up together, that every public enemy took that view, and that he was therefore menaced on every side. Thus, while claiming to be the representative of the people's wishes, he never threw himself with loyal confidence on popular support. The four unfortunate scholars were arrested; four hundred of Leisler's supporters turned out in arms, and certain leading citizens thought to be unfavorable to the usurper were sum marily Imprisoned. The supposed danger was furthermore made a pretext for enlarging Leisler's powers. The committee of ten granted him a commission as Commander-in-Chief of the province. He was thereby empowered to administer oaths, to issue warrants, and "to order such matters as shall be neces sary and requisite to be done for the preservation of the peace of the Inhabitants, taking always reasonable advice with militia and civil authorities as occasion shall require." The commission, however, premised that this was done in the uncertainty "whether orders shall come from their Majesties." This view of Leisler's position made his authority merely provisional pend ing the formal claim of sovereignty by William and Mary. But Leisler's more enthusiastic adherents were not content with that. According to them Leisler's authority rested on popular choice, just as William's own authority did in England. That such a contention carried with it a denial that the sovereignty of Eng land Included the sovereignty of her colonies probably never once occurred to those who put it forward. ' Leisler to Burnet, Col. Papers, 1689, p, 690, 198 THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK. Leisler's government was In real truth that of a faction ruling by the sword, and resting on the sympathy of an eager minority Elections and the inertness of the rest. Yet he saw the ex- Leisie" " pedlency of observing, so far as he could, certain forms of popular government. Constitutional forms one cannot call them, since such political rights as New York had yet en joyed only existed by the pleasure of the monarchy which had been overthrown, and could only be revived by its successor. In September the counties were ordered to choose civil and mili tary officers, and did so. At the same time the freemen of the city were called on In accordance with the charter given them by Dongan to elect a mayor and aldermen. But while Leisler availed himself of the charter to hold an election In defiance of its provisions, he restricted the election to Protestants.' The effect of these elections was to place the municipal gov ernment of New York and the local government of several of the counties in the hands of Leisler's partisans. If these elections had been so carried out as to secure a real expression of the pop ular will they would not have made Leisler's position legally valid, but they certainly would have made it morally strong. But It is clear from statements which Leisler's advocates never denied that the New York election was a mere farce. Of the whole body of freeholders not one hundred voted.' In New York Leisler ruled by the power of the sword. In the county districts, so far as he could be said to rule. It was by the apathy of those who might have opposed him. There was, however, one portion of the colony which looked on Leisler with neither indifference nor fear. Albany had been Incorporated Position of Under a charter from Dongan. Commanding the Albany. upper navigation of the Hudson, it became the center of the fur trade, while at the same time it was the key of the Mohawk country and the approaches to Canada. Unlike New York, its sense of corporate unity was not impaired by a con stant Influx of alien nationalities. If Leisler had any claim to represent Dutch feeling as against English, Albany should have been a very stronghold of his par tisans. Nor was there any lack of Whig zeal there.' The news 'Bayard's Narrative, p. 645; Modest Narrative, p. 675, ' Bayard states this. ' This point is emphasized in a memorial presented by certain inhabitants of New York to the Crown, N. Y, Docs. vol. iii. p. 764. CONVENTION AT ALBANY. 199 of William's landing was gladly received and the new Sover eigns were proclaimed with public rejoicings. Albany, too, was far more than New York exclusively Protestant. But the citizens of Albany were nowise minded to come under the con trol of a German adventurer. They had, indeed, special ground for their mistrust of Leisler. Menaced as they were by the pros pect of Invasion at the hands of the French and their savage allies, internal unity was of vital importance. On August I the Mayor, Aldermen, Justices of the Peace,, and military officers at Albany met. They gave themselves the The not wholly appropriate name of a convention. The conven- really significant point, however, is that the Mayor tion.' ^jj(j Aldermen were chosen by the townsmen, that the convention included a definitely popular and representative ele ment, and that there is no trace of any attempt to resist the authority of the convention. The first act of that body was to vest the government of the colony In the existing officials until orders should arrive from the King and Queen of England. As an evidence of loyalty all the civil and military officers took an oath of allegiance to William and Mary. No course could have been taken more embarrassing to Leisler. His authority either rested on the approval of the citizens generally, or was exercised provisionally pending some definite action by the English Gov ernment. On the former view he could not claim to override the express wishes of the Inhabitants of Albany. On the latter the course taken by them was practically identical with his own. His nearest approach to a justification was the plea of necessity, and what necessity could there be for him to force his authority on loyal English subjects against their will? One need not, however, suppose that Leisler was consciously setting up his own authority against that of the Crown. A passionate temper and a confused mind had led him to identify the success of the Prot estant cause with his own ascendency, and to believe that what ever thwarted the one must be an enemy to the other. The men of Albany were assuredly justified In thinking that it was no time to fritter away their energy and resources In the ¦stage antics of Leisler's grotesque Imitation of sovereignty. A force of Canadians and Mohawks might at any moment appear ' For the composition and proceedings of the convention, see Doc. Hist. vol. ii. p. 46. 200 THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK. before the gates. The church was temporarily converted into a magazine. There every member of the convention was to de- Prepara- posIt a gun and a supply of ammunition ready for an against a emergency.' There seemed some fear that the dread Xlvllioa. of Invasion would lead the inhabitants to desert the town. To guard against this an order was issued that no able-bodied Inhabitant should leave without special permission.' The news of the Iroquois invasion of Canada removed these apprehensions. But to some extent It merely substituted one alarm for another. The lust of plunder and bloodshed once kindled among the savages might flow into unlooked-for chan nels, and the very fact that the Iroquois were set free from fear of the French might make them a source of danger. All attempts to obtain help from Leisler failed. He showed plainly that unless Albany was defended in accordance with his Albany wlshes and In deference to his authority he would iJfe'i" rather not see It defended at all. After some inef- ent^of*"'^' factual attempts to persuade the citizens of Albany by Leisler. letter to accept bis authority he decided to use force. A letter' addressed by Leisler at this time to the Assembly of Maryland Is a most significant document, full of self-revelation. At a time when the very existence of the British colonies de pended on effective common action, Leisler's uppermost thought is to prevent tbe "Papists and poplshly evil-affected adversaries to effect and bring to pass their wicked designs against their Majesties' loyal Protestant subjects." That anyone can oppose him except under some evil Influence Is to Leisler utterly unin telligible. He has "done all the diligence possible to join Albany to us, and has caused their Majesties to be proclaimed there, but they are lulled asleep by some of the former creatures to the late government." When these attempts at persuasion failed Leisler sent three sloops with an armed force of fifty men under one of his chief partisans, Millborne, to take possession of the town.* As soon as the news of Leisler's purpose reached Albany the citizens took measures of defense. By a popular vote the Mayor, ' Doc. Hist. vol. ii. p. 46. 'lb. p, 48. * Ib. p. 19. 'Bayard's Narrative, p, 646; Modest Narrative, p. 675; Doc. Hist. vol. ii. p. 63, LEISLER'S DEALINGS WITH ALBANY. 201 Peter Schuyler, was formally Installed as Commander of the Fort. On November 9 Millborne landed. He was admitted to the city and allowed to address the citizens. He told them that their charter was null and void as It had been granted by a Jacobite and a Papist. The Recorder, Wessels, speaking on be half of the city, at once put the case clearly and effectively. They would accept the authority of King William if it could be produced, but not that of a company of private men at New York.' For three days Millborne, as It would seem, contented himself with attempting, not wholly without success, to raise a party among the citizens. But though he was able to prove that the citizens of Albany were not absolutely unanimous In their ac ceptance of the convention, he could not secure any effective sup port. After an undignified and futile attempt to enter the fort and read his commission, he withdrew. Millborne's departure seems to have been accelerated, if not \ caused, by a somewhat singular intervention. A party of Mo hawks were encamped outside the town. They, apparently re garding the men of Albany as their friends, and Millborne as a spy and an invader, sent a squaw into Albany with a message. Unless Millborne at once withdraws they will fire on him. Thereupon the Mayor sent out the minister. Dr. Delllus, with the Recorder, to pacify the Indians, and to assure them that "the business was that a person without power or authority would be master over the gentlemen here." The Indians then sent a message to say that if Millborne showed himself they would shoot him.' Nothing could Illustrate more forcibly how the Mohawk alliance, the very corner-stone of English colonial policy, was imperiled by the dissensions among the colonists. Within a fortnight of Millborne's departure a troop of eighty- seven men arrived, sent by Connecticut to help in guarding Al bany against French or Indian attack. This at least shows that the government of Connecticut, whose natural prejudices would have been in favor of Leisler, did not condemn the attitude of Albany.' ' Doc. Hist, vol ii. pp. 63-67, ' lb. p. 73. 'O'Callaghan, ii. 74. ^02 THE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK. Meanwhile, Leisler was at every stage more and more thrust ing his own authority into the foreground, and ignoring that of Further the English Crown. Before Millborne returned meat's"?' from Albany Leisler had called upon his adherents to Leisler. {oxm an association, pledging themselves to obey the Committee of Safety, and himself as its representative. There was, indeed, a reservation of fidelity to William and Mary, but there was no attempt to show tbat Leisler was acting under any commission from the Sovereigns.' One cannot acquit the home Government of having by its heedlessness played Into Leisler's hands. When the news of the .Proceed. Revolution at Boston and the capture of Andros .hv quest? But a sober and impartial interpretation of treaties Is hardly to be looked for in people as deeply interested as were the colonists. To them and their savage allies. Fort Frontenac was a standing menace, and the tone in which a New York historian, writing some forty years later, speaks of the matter shows that the surrender of the claim by the English Government rankled in the minds of the colonists.' Jealousy of the home Government meant practically jealousy of Hunter. Nor was this the only administrative difficulty Hunter's whlch beset his path. He must have seen plainly land policy, that his chief hope of support lay among the wealthy merchants and landholders. Yet to his great credit Hunter was at this very time sending home advice which, if adopted, could hardly fail to alienate one of those classes, or one should perhaps rather say that class, for as things then stood in New York they were In a great measure identified. Hunter saw that the eco nomical progress of the colony was not a little hindered by land holders nominally occupying tracts of land far too large for them to cultivate, and thereby excluding settlers who would have turned the soil to account. To meet this he proposed the strict enforcement of a quit-rent of half-a-crown for every hundred acres, which, small though it sounds, would, he believed, act as a check on the existing evil." Moreover, in 17 12, a misfortune befell the colony, not one indeed for which government was really responsible. Yet The negro public Calamities, even if they are not expressly laid '''°'" to the charge of a government, never fail to bring upon It ill-will. And In this matter, as In others, Hunter showed that his courtesy and compliance did not withhold him from braving unpopularity for the sake of principle. The industrial system of New York did not suffer It to be a slave State in the same sense as the tobacco-growing colonies of Slavery in the South. While In South Carolina the negroes New York, .^ygj.g actually a majority of the population. In New York they did not form one-sixth." The Southern plantations offered a better market to the Importer, and not more than a ' Smith, p. 182. ^ See his dispatch of November 14, 1710, in N. Y. Docs. vol. v. p. 180. ' I have discussed the whole question of population, white and black, in an Appendix to the volume which accompanies this, entitled General View of the-- Colonies. 282 NEW YORK AFTER THE REVOLUTION. hundred negroes on an average were brought into the colony in a year.' Yet, as far as we can judge from the statute book, the negro in New York was viewed with just as much appre hension as In Virginia or Maryland. All trade with slaves was forbidden." Not more than three might meet together except on their master's business,' and a free negro might not entertain his countrymen who were still in slavery.' No negro could be accepted as a valid witness against a white man." Nor was the negro If accused of crime entitled to the same civil rights as the superior race. Upon arrest he might be summarily tried before a jury of five freeholders, summoned by three magistrates, nor might the prisoner challenge his jurors. His master might in deed claim for him an ordinary jury of twelve, but must pay the jurors himself." Special provision, too, was made lest the tenderness of a master should make his slave a source of danger or expense to the community. The negro might be set free, but the process was fenced in with precautions. The master who gave a slave his liberty must bind himself under a penalty of two hundred pounds to furnish him also with an allowance of twenty pounds a year, lest he should become chargeable to the State. If the master died, his executors must make the same undertaking; If they did not, the manumission became void.' The conversion of negroes was encouraged, but, as in the South, an Act was passed declaring that baptism did not carry with it any claim to freedom.' The whole tenor of the legislation about slaves in New York shows a greater degree of suspicion than was entertained in the Southern colonies. It seems at first sight strange that where they were fewest they should be viewed with most dread. Yet this is not hard to understand. The society of the South was a society in which slavery was one of the chief economical features. With the system naturally grew up appropriate safeguards. Every planter had a direct and personal interest in keeping his own slaves in check, and nearly every well-to-do man was a planter. Thus there came into existence a complete system of ' General View of the Colonies, Cornbury in N. Y, Docs. vol. v, p. 55, ' Acts of Assembly, p. 81. ' Ib. 'Ib. 'Th. p, 46, "lb. p. 81, lib. ^Ib. p, 65. NEGRO OUTBREAK IN NEW YORK. 283 control and discipline. Every plantation was a little despotism in Itself. In New York, on the other hand, slavery was but one form of Industry coexisting with others. The colony was not broken up into a number of separate jurisdictions, each with a head who was distinctly responsible for Its safety. Nor was this all. The economical condition of the colony had called Into existence a distinct and extensive class of free negroes. In the old days of Dutch rule the West India Company had made it easy for their slaves to obtain freedom. Their position. Indeed, was not unlike that of the Indented servants in the English colo nies to the South. After a certain period of service to the Com pany the negroes become free, paying a fixed sum In dues. Thus an American traveler, writing In 1679, tells us that there was on Long Island a large population of free negroes, the emancipated slaves of the West India Company.' At the same time their status was so far servile that their children apparently remained slaves." It Is easy to see how this would tend to increase the danger to be feared from the presence of slaves. The spectacle of a free black population near him would at once incite the negro to discontent, and furnish him with the means of doing harm. Thus It might well be that the smaller negro population of New York was more a source of danger and apprehension than that of Virginia or Maryland. There was, too, always the fear that negroes might escape to the French. So strongly was this felt that an Act was passed in 1705 under which any fugitive slave found forty miles north of Albany might be put to death, his owner receiving compensation." In 17 12 there was an armed outbreak of negroes In the city of New York.^ A house was set on fire, and In the confusion Punish- which followed nine white Inhabitants were put to ccmspiraV" death and more wounded. The soldiers were called *°"- out, and the rioters were dispersed and fled Into the open country. There they were without difficulty captured. Six saved themselves from certain punishment by suicide. Of the remaining twenty-seven all save one were executed. Some more fortunate than their fellows were hanged, others burnt, 'This is stated in the travels of the Labadists, Dankers and Sluyter, p. 136, ' See Appendix III, ' Acts of Assembly, p, 60. * The discovery of the plot and the various punishments of the offenders are told in Hunter's dispatch of June 23, 1712, N. Y, Docs, vol, v. p. 341. 2S4 NEW YORK AFTER THE REVOLUTION. one broken on the wheel. It is clear from the tone of Hunter's dispatch reporting it that, while he had no sentimental horror of needful severity, he was anxious to check punishment, and was not carried away by the panic which pervaded the colony. "There has been much blood shed already, I am afraid too much," were the words in which he commented on the matter to Popple, the Secretary to the Board of Trade.' While Hunter was meeting these administrative difficulties he was exposed to attack in another quarter. By order of Gov- The Paia- ernment he had taken out with him upwards of two tines. 2 thousand inhabitants of the Palatinate who had been rendered homeless by the cruelty of the French King and his councilors. These exiles were to be settled on the upper waters of the Hudson, and to be employed in making pitch and felling ship-timber for the English navy. Cornbury, to whom his suc cessor was hateful, probably as a Whig, accused Hunter of wast ing public money in the maintenance of the Palatines, as they were called, and of playing Into Livingstone's hands In the choice of a site for their settlement. Instead of receiving sup plies as they did from Government they might have been self- supporting. Livingstone, Cornbury says, had a corn mill and a brewery near the site chosen, and the increase of settlers there was a direct source of profit to him. There may have been some foundation for this last charge. But, even if it were true, one can hardly blame Hunter, new to the colony, if he took the counsel of a man whom he must have known to be a capable ad viser and a good public servant. The other charge can be easily disposed of. If the Palatines were to be purveyors for the Eng lish navy, they must be freed from the task of finding their own supplies. Dissatisfaction with the bome Government for the terms of peace was not the only ill consequence which the war left be- Financiai hind. In 1714 the condition of the public finances difficulties. .^^^^ g^^jj ^jj^j jjjg Assembly had to apply itself in real earnest to the task of making a schedule of Its debts. The whole amount was found to be nearly twenty-eight thousand pounds." This was met by issuing bills of credit. The extremity of the ' N. Y. Docs. vol. V, p, 371, ' All the documents with reference to the Palatines are to be found in the New York Historical Docrments, vol v, 'To be exact, £27,600, Acts of Assembly, p. 96. GENERAL EFFECT OF HUNTER'S POLICY. 285 case and the need for gaining the zealous support of the colonists forced Hunter to yield in part the point which he had hitherto contested. The bills of credit were placed in the hands of a treasurer appointed by the Assembly, to be paid out by him ac cording to the instructions of that body.' The maintained pros perity of the colony under this heavy burden is as strong a proof as could be found of its resources, of the stability of its com merce and industry. It is easier to understand the difficulties of Hunter's situation than to trace the precise steps by which he overcame them. We Further may be sure that his success was largely due to that .disputes .,. . . . o J between Conciliatory spirit shown In dealings with individuals Governor which leave little trace in public records. At the Assembly. Same time there was no surrender either by Hunter or by the Assembly of the main constitutional points for which they contended. The Representatives persisted in their demands that all revenue should be paid into the hands of a colonial Treasurer appointed by themselves. It is clear, however, that on this point there was an undercurrent of opposition to the dominant party among the Representatives. A number of the chief New York merchants drew up a memorial to the Lords of Trade protesting against the claim of the Assembly to be supreme in matters of taxation." Neither the tactical skill of Hunter nor the action of his allies among the colonists could do more than postpone the contest. General The Contention that in all matters of Internal finance Hunte'r's the Assembly should be supreme and the colonists pohcy, independent was, under whatever form, the vital question at issue down to the separation from England. But the fact that the difficulty was postponed, not overcome, hardly makes Hunter's work less valuable. If the conditions of the case made perfect and enduring harmony impossible, it was no small matter to secure temporary agreement. Such agreement was a needful condition of success in that coming struggle with France on which turned the whole future of the English race in -America. The support of men like Morris and Livingstone, no doubt, had its full share In strengthening Hunter's hands. It was in all 'Acts of Assembly, p. 124. ^ N, Y, Docs, voL v. pp, 522, 539, 286 NEW YORK AFTER THE REVOLUTION. likelihood the voice of a few such partisans which, in 17 19, set forth the Governor's virtues In an official address. Hunter had announced to the Assembly that he had obtained leave of absence and would visit England. He had at the same time spoken with enthusiasm of the state of the colony, where "the very name of party or faction seems to be forgotten," and of the existing Assembly as having set an example to be followed by all its successors. In reply, the address of the Assembly described Hunter as having "played the part of a prudent magistrate and an affec tionate parent." No future governor could earn higher praise than to be likened to him.' 'These proceedings are given in full by Smith, pp. 187-9. CHAPTER VII. SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY.* Of the religious movements which England in the seventeenth century brought forth, three have left abiding traces in colonial Quakerism history. We havc already seen Congregationalism TncoToSaf ^^ work zs a constructive power; we have seen the history. Baptist and the Quaker coming in as dissentients and disturbers. Each of those sects also took part in the task of colonization. But the method in which each worked was widely different. The Baptist, denied a share in the corporate life of New England, fashioned for himself in Rhode Island a community in some measure modeled on that which had cast him out. He was at once the opponent and the imitator of New England Puritanism. There was no direct community of action between the Quakerism which disturbed Boston and the Quaker- ^ The materials for the early history of New Jersey are abundant in quantity and, on the whole, satisfactory in kind. The archives of the colony from the date of the first grant to Berkeley and Carteret are published in a series con sisting of ten volumes, edited by Mr. Whitehead under the authority of the State government. Many of these documents are in our Record OfHce, some in America. Mr. Whitehead has also published two useful monographs, entitled East Jersey under the Proprietary Governm,ents, and Contributions to East Jersey History. The best history of the colony is still that by Samuel Smith, written in 1765. It is a sober, business-like work, showing a careful study of original documents. Some of these are embodied in the text, and do not, appar ently, exist elsewhere. There is also a valuable collection of documents, pub lished' about 1750, edited by Aaron Leaming and Jacob Spicer. As the proprietorship of the colony, or rather of the two provinces into which it was divided, passed at an early stage into the hands of what one may call a joint-stock company, there was a strong inducement to stimulate emi gration by descriptions of the country. The result was a number of small books» or rather pamphlets, much like those published in the early days of the Vir ginia Company. They set forth the material resources of the country, de scribe the progress hitherto made in colonization, and give practical advice ta intending emigrants. It is needless to say that they are apt to give a somewhat highly colored picture of the advantages open to settlers. Three of thent deserve special notice: George Scot of Pitlochie's Model of the Government of the Province of East New Jersey in America, 1685; Thomas Eudd's Good Or der Established in Pennsylvania and New Jersey in America, 1685; Gabriel Thomas's Historical and Geographical Account of the Province and County of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 1698. Fenwick's proceedings are described in an excellent little monograph by R. S. Johnson, published in 1839. Several original documents are incorporated with it. 288 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. Ism which founded New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The Baptist came to New England because in many respects he was in harmony with Puritanism. The Quaker went thither, as he went to Turkey, because there was spiritual darkness to be cleared away; New England was to him not a possible home, but a raission field. Nor can we speak of Quakerism as a colo nizing force as we can of Puritanism. It Is true that Quakers becarae colonists because, like Puritans, they wanted a home free from the control of a State Church, free from what they deemed the corruptions of the Old World. But their religion did not ¦of its very self suggest, one might almost say enforce, certain political forms. The Congregational system suggested and strengthened an appropriate political system. Quakerism had of its very nature no such creative power. Its strength lay in its assertion that mental and spiritual life is not to be found In forms. Its weakness lay in denying that such forms might be needful conditions of stability. In a Puritan community the legislator was sure to find the spiritual teacher at his side, jealously watching his work, eager to co-operate wherever his principles allowed him to approve. There the civil power was looked upon as a needful agent In creating the highest spiritual life. With the Quaker it was an alien influence, only needful because men had not risen to a perception of spiritual truth. There is a faint and distorted element of truth, and no more, in the view which represents Fox as a puzzle-headed fanatic, whose theological doctrines and moral teaching were made fit for decent society by educated men like Penn.' Such a view evades criticism, because it turns on arguments to which canons of criticism are hardly applicable. It is dilBcult to see how anyone can study the writings and lives of Fox and his com panion. Burrows, without tracing in them the great spiritual truths which found more definite form and more articulate, though not more eraphatic, utterance in later Quakerism. But this at least is true : the Quakerism of Fox and Burrows was so full of the elements of social and political disruption, so averse to comproraise, that a community based on it was an impossi- ' That is the view expressed by Lord Macaulay. A hearty admirer of the great Whig historian need not hesitate to admit that he was wholly out of sympathy with a manifestation of spiritual enthusiasm, such as that of the Quakers, and that where he was so out of sympathy, his critical faculties were apt to fail him. PENN AND QUAKERISM. 289 bility. Penn and those who acted with him so modified their creed that It could enter largely into the political life of a society which still fell short of their ideal standard. Yet even then Quakerism had no elements in it which blended with the political life of the community. Therein lay its great difference from Puritanism. Puritanism actually gained in force and in tensity from union with the political life of New England, be cause Its ecclesiastical forms at once allied themselves with political forms, because its moral discipline at once seized on the civil power as its instrument. It waned not because It was Im peded by union with the civil power, but because it could not satisfy the mental and spiritual wants of continued generations. Quakerism, on the other hand, was no more than a motive which Impelled men to choose a common home. It did not inform and animate their corporate life, and it was thus ever liable to be thrust into the background by temporal and secular needs. At the same time if these considerations made the ultimate course of Quaker colonization less effective, they made the initial steps more easy. The Congregational Puritan could act with no allies but those who accepted his doctrinal creed, his ecclesiastical system, and those political principles which had be come inseparably connected with that creed and that system. The individual Quaker might find it hard to adapt himself to an organized community. But Quakerism as a whole did not de mand certain specified forms of civil or religious life. It could not dominate life as Puritanism did; It could far more easily influence and modify it. We are wont when Quaker colonization is mentioned to think exclusively of Pennsylvania. But its influence extended 1^=^ Jer- to the whole territory between the Hudson and the earliest Susquchanna. Pennsylvania was hardly more truly ¦colony. a Quaker colony than West New Jersey. The per sonal influence of Penn has Indeed given it a more prominent place in the history of the sect. But in neither case was the col ony set aside by its founder as an exclusive home for those of his own faith. And if it be said that in New Jersey the Quaker did but enter into an inheritance which others had prepared for him, the same Is in a measure true of Pennsylvania. There the Quaker proprietor found the nucleus of a populatiorl already in possession, and their presence was a permanent influence in the 290 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. life of the colony. If then we deal, as for convenience we may, with a group of Quaker colonies. New Jersey ranks first among them In time. I have already described the process by which Carteret and Berkeley acquired a portion of the territory which conquest had vested in the Duke of York, and I have sketched the system on which at the outset they organized their colony. It so happened that the very epoch at which New Jersey was thrown open to English settlers witnessed a movement of emi- The first gration from New England. I have already de- tio'n°o"fNew scrlbed how Newark was founded by those resolute Jersey. citlzens of Ncw Havcn who could not brook being swallowed up by Connecticut.' Elizabethtown was peopled by another band of emigrants from the north-east. Of them we know less than we do of the Newark settlers. Some came from Jamaica on Long Island,'' some In all likelihood from New England. That this was so may be assumed almost with cer tainty from one of their first acts. In the very year following the first occupation, portions of the territory of Elizabethtown were detached to form two hamlets, Woodbridge and Plscata- qua.° Both were New England names, and their retention Illus^ trates the persistency with which the inhabitants of a New England village clung to the traditions of their home. Two other settlements were created on the mainland near Staten Island, by the names of Middletown and Shrewsbury. There was beside a Dutch settlement at Bergen,* and there Is reason to think that there were beside scattered relics of Dutch and Swedish settlements which were incorporated with New Eng land immigrants. To all this tide of colonization Carteret and Berkeley con tributed nothing. Even their claim of territorial sovereignty '^f^h''"^' was imperfectly recognized. Within four months of Propric- the grant to Carteret the inhabitants of Elizabeth- the exist- town, wlth the approval of the Governor, purchased mente. '' a title to the soil from the Indians and secured a ^ See The Puritan Colonies, vol. ii. p. 125. ' In the formal grant of territory from Nicolls two of the grantees are de scribed as of Jamaica. N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 18. ' Whitehead, Contributions, pp. 354-401. *Mr. Whitehead in a note to East Jersey (p. 17) brings together various documents which seem conclusively to show tlie continuous existence of the Dutch settlement at Bergen. EARLY CORPORATE LIFE IN NEW JERSEY. 291 confirmation of It by Nicolls.' In the following year Nicolls made a grant of land to the settlers of Middletown and Shrews bury. Nor did he limit this to territorial rights. He also gave them certain rights of Internal jurisdiction, and a guarantee against being taxed against their will for the maintenance of clergy.^ Such an assertion and acknowledgment of a certain sovereignty still vested In the Duke of York could not fail to bring about conflict between the original Proprietor and his grantees. For the present, however, the settlers by an illogicaL compromise took the oath of fidelity required by the Proprietors of New Jersey.' For two years after the arrival of Philip Carteret the various townships maintained a separate existence, with no common bond save the vague and slight one of their allegiance to the Proprietors. Such political life as they enjoyed lay in those municipal institutions which they had brought with them as part of their New England training. One would gladly know some thing more of that life than has come down to us. It would be of no little interest to mark the compact, well-organized system of the Puritan township passing Into new territory beyond the bounds of New England. One, and only one, such trace can we find. The records of Newark tell us that the settlers started on their corporate life with a declaration that they would "endeavor the carrying out of spiritual concernments, as also civil and town affairs," and that to this end none should enjoy civic rights who was not a member of a church congregation.'' New Haven had kept to the last to the rigid and impracticable severity of her founders, and she bequeathed it to the colonies which arose out of her downfall. We shall hardly err In believing that the material success of New Jersey was due to this solid and organ ized foundation. The settlers whom Carteret brought out dur ing 1667 and 1668 fell into place as recruits to a disciplined force. As the basis of the colony were men Inured to the hard- ^ The Indian grant and Nicolls's confirmation of it are given in full in the New Jersey Archives, vol. i. pp. 14-19. In the following century certain dis affected persons in New Jersey produced a document, dated 1666, by which Philip Carteret gave permission to the settlers to purchase from the Indians "what quantity of land you shall think convenient." 'The patent as confirmed by Carteret in 1672 is given in the Archives, vol. j. p. 88. ' N. J. Archives, vol. i. pp. 4B-51. * Whitehead, E. Jersey, p. 40. 292 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. ships of forest life, duly tempered alike in body and mind, and trained in the needful kinds of mechanical skill. Yet this very cohesion and self-reliance which made New Jersey materially prosperous could not fail to bring with them Difficulties political difficulties. The situation was one to which the'^oio- the history of English colonization had no parallel. nists and Where proprietary government existed as In Mary- prietors. land and in Maine, and during the short life of the Company In Virginia, the authority of the Proprietor and the life of the settlement had a coraraon origin. In the case of New York, there was the actual transfer of a sovereignty which had been already fully accepted. The colony handed over to the Duke of York had been ground into uniformity by the harsh and repressing sway of the Corapany. But the Proprietors of New Jersey were called on to exercise their authority over a body of townships whicb had each an independent civic existence. So far as the various members of the colony had any community of feeling, it rested on their past connection with New England, a connection which was sure to hinder the ready acceptance of the proprietary authority. The first attempt to bind the colony together for legislative work revealed these difficulties. The townships had their own meetings. Even more, Middletown and Shrewsbury would seem to have taken coramon action, and in 1667 to have held a joint meeting, at which certain laws were passed.' Such a proceeding made It almost impossible that the system of a coraraon legislature designed by the Proprietors could work smoothly. Local meetings would secure for the settlers all that they needed ; the General Assembly was rather the badge of a domination which they regarded with disfavor. There was no motive to outweigh the cost and inconvenience of attendance. For three years Carteret made no attempt to call together an Asserably. It is not unlikely that the action of Middletown and The First Shrewsbury made him feel the necessity for such a Assembly. 2 coursc. In May 1668 the Assembly met at Eliza bethtown. Its proceedings plainly show how largely its mem bers were imbued with the spirit of New England Puritanism. ^Whitehead, E. Jersey, p. 6i. ' Carteret's proclamation calling the Assembly is in the Archives, vol. i. p. 56. The proceedings of the Assembly are in Leaming and Spicer, p. 78. PURITANIC LEGISLATION. 293 Thus swearing, drunkenness, and fornication were all made penal, any person tippling or walking abroad after nine at night was to be punished at the discretion of the magistrate, and the child over sixteen who should curse or smite a parent was to be put to death. An Act was also passed in the true New Eng land spirit of protective legislation, forbidding Imprudent mar riages. It Is somewhat remarkable that the stealing of mankind was made a capital offense. In all likelihood this meant merely the kidnapping of free men, and did not in any way limit slavery or the employment of indented servants. Some light is thrown on the condition of the colony by other enactments. Every male over sixteen was to provide himself with a serviceable gun and ammunition. Rates might be paid in commodities estimated at a fixed value. Each township was to have a brand for Its own live stock, and all sales of horses were to be registered. We may assume that there was enough intercourse between the town ships to make It needful to provide for travelers, since every town was bound to keep an ordinary. One enactment shows that the province was still in that condition when public office is looked on as a burden rather than a privilege, since all deputies absenting themselves were fined four shillings for each day of absence. This attempt to enforce attendance seems to have been but imperfectly successful, since after a session of four days several members objected to a longer absence from their homes, and the meeting broke up.' Part of the proceedings of the Assembly was the levy of a rate for public expenses. This Middletown and Shrewsbury refused to pay. There is no record of the ground for their refusal.'' When the Assembly again met in November the same spirit prevailed. The elected Representative; from Middletown and Shrewsbury refused to take the oath of allegiance and fidelity except with certain reservations." It Is clear that In this matter they were representing the temper of their constituents. In March 1669 the Governor found It necessary to Issue an order that no inhabitant of Middletown or Shrewsbury should hold any office or have the right of voting unless he took tbe oath of allegiance to the King and fidelity to the Proprietors.' At the ' Learning and Spicer, 84. ' lb. 89. ' lb. 85. * N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 59. 294 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. same time we find a reference In the archives to a certain paper reprinted by the inhabitants of Middletown in opposition to the laws.' This was not all. The Representatives of those other districts which accepted the authority of the Proprietors quar reled with the system whereby they and the Council sat In separate chambers. It was impossible, they said, to work to gether smoothly, and after a short session they dissolved.^ So far, though there had been occasional disaffection, the real force which was certain to kindle active hostility between the Difficulties Proprietors and the settlers had not come Into play. the^"- Under the Concessions no quit-rents were to be levied and the* ^°'' ^be first five years. It was very certain that settlers. when they were called for they would be withheld. The settlers in establishing themselves had bought the soil from the Indians, whom they regarded as the equitable owners, and by their agreements with Nicolls they had satisfied the claims of the Crown. They might well resent the Intrusion of a body in whose deraands they could trace nothing of moral right. The first recorded symptom of tbe coming storm was the claim set up by the townsmen of Woodbridge to adrait as freemen In comers who had not taken out patents for their land. They were formally admonished by the Governor that no one could hold land, enjoy any office, nor have a vote at the town meet ing unless he accepted the authority of the Proprietors.' In the following year discontent grew into open defiance of authority. Under the Concessions sent out by the Proprietors Rebellion It was specially provided that there should be at the James beginning of every year an Assembly. Philip Car- carteret.i teret, however, omitted to summon one. Thereupon five of the seven towns — Elizabethtown, Newark, Woodbridge, Piscataqua, and Bergen — elected Representatives who met In session at Elizabethtown. It was further provided by the Con cessions that if the Governor should absent himself from an ' N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 6i. ' Leaming and Spicer, p. 90. ' Carteret's letter is in the Archives, vol. i. p. d^. It is addressed to "Mr. John Pike, Justice of Peace and President of the Court at Woodbridge, his assistants, and to all other the well-affected persons of that Corporation or whom it may concern." * Our knowledge of this business is derived mainly from Philip Carteret's proclamation. N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 89. The Labadists give a bad report of James Carteret. THE REBELLION AND JAMES CARTERET. 29S Assembly, It should be competent for the deputies to elect a president. The elected Representatives interpreted this to mean, not that the Assembly might supply Itself with a chair man, but that It might by Its vote supersede the Governor. Act ing on this theory they chose James Carteret, a disreputable young cadet of the Proprietor's house, who was on his way to Carolina. Without knowing more of the details of the matter than have come down to us, it is Impossible to speak with any confidence as to the equity of the case. The settlers had un doubtedly at the very outset a grievance In seeing the title which they had, as they thought, acquired from Nicolls overridden. On the other hand their choice of James Carteret did them little credit. But It Is at least clear tbat they sought redress In a «ober, constitutional fashion, limiting themselves to certain defi nite claims. Philip Carteret Issued a proclamation commanding the depu ties of the five towns to make submission and return to their allegiance. He then fled to England to obtain support from the Proprietors. If the Assembly had thought to profit themselves by putting a Carteret at the head of a movement they were deceived. The Proprietors showed no hesitation in supporting their Governor. James Carteret was ordered to resume his journey to Carolina, and the Proprietors sent the Governor back, fortified with two documents.' One was a declaration that no land grants made by Philip Carteret could be upset or revoked, and that no patent from Nicolls or from anyone but the Proprietors had any va lidity. The malcontents were to be proceeded against accord ing to Philip Carteret's declaration unless they forthwith peti tioned for the remission of their punishment. Together with this was sent a document, avowedly a declaration of the true meaning of the Concessions, that is to say, of the conditions which the Proprietors had made with the settlers, In reality an alteration of them in more than one important point. The power of appointing ministers of religion, a power which the •original Concessions vested in the Assembly, was now transferred to the Governor and Council. Formerly the Governor was tound to summon a General Assembly at the beginning of every year ; now he was left free to summon It, and to dissolve It at his ' Both are in the New Jersey Archives, vol. i. pp. 99-103. 296 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. discretion. The right to grant land and to admit freemen was transferred from the Assembly to the Governor and Council. It was also decided that the Governor and Council should con tinue to sit as a second chamber. It was further ordered that no one could be a freeman — that is, vote for Representatives In the Assembly — ^who did not hold land under a patent from the Proprietors. This was in defiance of an article in the Conces sions, which expressly granted the freedom of the colony to all who would take an oath of allegiance to the King and fidelity to the Proprietors. It is true that the sarae clause reserved to the Proprietors the right of changing this condition, but no such change was to affect any interests already existing. This en- croachraent on the Concessions was practically identical with the declaration that the patents granted by Nicolls were null and void, and those who held them must take out fresh patents from the Proprietors. The result was, at least for the time being, a victory for the Proprietors. It is noteworthy that Middletown and Shrews- Speciai bury had in the original attack made on the Governor granted to stood aloof from all the other towns. There was town and nothing In their origin to account for this. It must Shrews- j^^^^ httn due to some unrecorded personal influence. They were rewarded by a grant of special privileges which placed them on a different footing from the rest of the colony.' The patent granted them by Nicolls was confirmed in full. Thus tbe Proprietors In the case of these townships abandoned all territorial rights. They were invested with suprerae juris diction in all cases under ten pounds; in all civil and military appointraents the freeholders were to nominate two from whom the Governor was to choose, and no compulsory rate was to be levied in either township for the maintenance of a minister of religion. In 1673 the Invading Dutch force met with no raore forcible opposition frora the English settlers of New Jersey than they- The Dutch did from their countrymen on the Hudson. John reconquest.- Berry had been left by Philip Carteret to act as Deputy in his absence." If he had any purpose of resistance it ^ See Appendix IV. ' Berry's commission does not seem to be extant. He is frequently referred. to as Deputy-Governor. THE DUTCH RECONQUEST. 297 was at once frustrated by the action of the deputies. As soon as the news came that New York was occupied, the deputies of four towns — Elizabethtown, Newark, Woodbridge, and Piscata qua — sent a petition desiring to be heard in the matter of a sur render, and specially asking that till then no audience should be granted to Berry.' As In the previous year, the men of Middle- town and Shrewsbury showed themselves more loyal to the Pro prietors and took no part in the petition. The Dutch settlers of Bergen also stood aloof, probably taking the view that their allegiance would be accepted as a thing of course, without special surrender. The petition was favorably received ; the four town ships were to send delegates to treat with the Dutch authorities, and warning was sent to the other settlers to do the same on pain of attack. The threat was effective and delegates from six English settlements attended. Their surrender was received on the same terms that had been granted to the English settlers in New Netherlands. Governraent was to be carried on thus: each town was to narae six men for the office of Schepen, and of those six the Dutch Governor and his Council were to choose three. Delegates from all the towns were to nominate two men, one of whom was to be named as Schout. A Secretary was to be chosen in the same fashion. The latter office was be stowed on that Samuel Hopkins who had contributed so largely to the success of the Dutch enterprise." Bergen, of special favor, was allowed to choose its own Schepens, together with a single officer to act both as Schout and Secretary. In September the Council of New Netherlands Issued an order which practically defined the constitution of New Jersey In its The Dutch altered form.' As In New Netherlands, the Re- fixMthe formed religion as accepted by the Synod of Dort was tion of New ^^ ^^ maintained throughout the colony. Civil and Jersey. criminal jurisdiction was to be vested In the first instance In the Schepens of each township : in Important cases or on appeal, in the Schout and the Schepens of the whole colony. In all civil cases over two hundred and forty florins there was a further appeal to the Governor and Council. The townsmen ' This application is recorded in the Minutes of the Council of New Neth erlands, N. Y. Docs. vol. ii. This and all the other passages bearing on the dealings of the Council with New Jersey are given also in the New Jersey Archives, vol. i. pp. 122-51. ' V.s. p. 137. ° N. J. Archives, vol. i. pp. 135-7. ^298 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. -had in the first instance had a share In the nomination of their .'Schepens. This was not to be so in future. The Schout and .Schepens before retiring from office were to draw up a list. From this and from the retiring officers the Supreme Council were to nominate the new officers. Thus the whole jurisdiction, civil and criminal, was vested in what would become more and more an irresponsible oligarchy. The power of this body, sub divided into smaller local oligarchies, was to override the old power of the townships. In each district the laying out of high ways, the allotment of ground, the observance of the Sabbath, the erection of schools and churches — In short all that in the free New England township was left to the town meeting was here transferred to the Schepens. Nor was anything said of a general legislative assembly, while the Governor and Council reserved to themselves the right to publish ordinances which should have the full force of laws. That there was no Implied reservation of power vested In the people and exercised by their representatives is clear, since in Assembly November the Schout and Schepens met at Elizabeth- bethtown. town under the title of an Assembly,' but there is nothing to show what were its proceedings. We have already seen how New Netherlands was won back for England, how that acquisition brought with it tbe transfer of't'he""^^ of the dependencies on the Delaware, and with what •colony by craft Carteret contrived that his own territorial privi- .prietors. leges should be restored to him unimpaired. Early in 1674 Philip Carteret reappeared in the colony. It may well be that the harsh and ungenial prospect opened by Dutch rule had cleared away any feeling of dissatisfaction against the Pro prietors which had existed. The instructions issued to Philip Carteret were practically a reaffirmation of the ground taken by the Proprietors in their dispute with the colonists three years before." No one was to have the rights of a freeman unless he Jield land under a patent from the Proprietors. The patents granted by Nicolls were to be null and void. But the Proprie tors with wise moderation granted to all who held under such patents five hundred acres of land In such places as should not _ ' Mr. Whitehead gives an extract from the Albany Records showing the ex istence of this body. ' The instructions are printed in full in the Archives, vol. i. pp. 167-75. TRANSFER OF LAND TO PENN. 299 prejudice any other inhabitants. The same moderation was shown towards those who had supported James Carteret. It was only required that they should formally sue pardon from the ¦Governor, and Indemnify any private persons who had sustained loss by the outbreak. It is plain that the freeholders as repre sented by the Assembly met the Proprietors in a like spirit of conciliation. An Act was passed annulling all contracts which had been made for revolutionary purposes, and prohibiting the use of any language which could revive differences.' In the next year came the transfer of which I have already spoken from Carteret's partner Berkeley to Bylling. Bylling Transfer -w^as In difficulties, and it is said that the sale was •of land to Penn an act of charity on the part of Berkeley." It partners. Is motc likely that the charity came in elsewhere. With Bylling were associated three prosperous members of his .sect, one of them William Penn. It has always been the practice of the Quaker brotherhood to rescue insolvent members of their own sect, and in all likelihood this, Penn's first, step in the direction of colonization was taken with that raotive. Be that as it may, by a deed dated February 10, 1674, Bylling's interest was vested In Penn, Gawain Lawrie, and Nicolas Lucas." Fenwick retained an interest of one-tenth, which, mak ing worse the existing complication, he appears to have encum- tered by a mortgage or sale, involving a further subdivision.'' The only one of the new firm, as we may call them, who took any immediate action was Fenwick. Issuing highly colored Tenwick's accouots of a couotty of which in reality he knew dngs. " nothing," he soon gathered a band of Quaker emi grants. But before sailing he was arrested, and though he suc ceeded in getting free be lost his title-deeds, a loss which brought trouble with It later." In 1675 Fenwick sailed from London. To keep wholly clear "of the existing province under Carteret he pitched on the west side of the peninsula for the site of his settlement, and in the autumn landed on the north-east bank of the Delaware, nearly ^Leaming and Spicer, p. no. 'This is stated in the travels of the Labadists, p. 241. " Smith, p. 79. * Archives, vol. i. p. 233. All that is clear is that Fenwick parted with a share of his interest, and still retained a certain share. ' Travels of the Labadists, p. 242. ' lb. 30O SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. opposite the site of the Swedish colony at Newcastle. The folly against which Nicolls had vainly remonstrated, of separating the settlements on the Delaware from those on the Hudson by the creation of an intermediate province, was now fully seen. Fenwick appears to have known nothing of the condition of the country to which he was coming. He made his grants of land from an Imperfect map, and partitioned out to his settlers swamps and woods as though they had been habitable territory. Owing to this and the loss of the title-deeds, the settlers were unable to identify the tracts which they had bought.' A body of emigrants united by merely commercial motives and the ties of worldly Interest would Inevitably have fallen to Settle- pieces. But it Is plain that Fenwick's followers, or sa12m lnd at least a party among them, were bound together by cohansick. (}^g game Strong sense of corporate airas which ani mated a New England community. Some fell away, settling as it would seem in other colonies." The rest, however, accepted and did their best to remedy the defects of their position. A fresh survey of land was ordered and two towns were laid out, each with Its tract of coramon granted to it by Fenwick." One, Cohansick, seems to have been no more than a scattered rural township ; the other, Salera, was a village raethodically laid out, with its street down the middle and on either side houses, each with its sixteen-acre inclosure.^ Although the Duke, by his grant to Berkeley and Carteret, had divested himself of all control over the territory, yet there Difficulties seem to have been settlers there who regarded thera- ^'il'ting* selves as attached to the government at Newcastle ^^^i'^""-^.!, and who resented Fenwick's intrusion. According and with . Andros. to their Statement he had turned out peaceful in habitants and destroyed their buildings. The matter was brought before Cantwell, the Sheriff at Newcastle, and was promptly reported to Andros." Andros was at this very time reorganizing the government on the Delaware, and creating two subordinate courts at Upland and Hoarkill, under the jurisdic tion of Newcastle. To take Fenwick in hand fell in naturally with this policy. Accordingly Collier, the newly appointed mill- ' Travels of the Labadists. * Agreement between Fenwick and the colonists quoted by Johnson, p. i6. ' Ib. p. 17. *Ib. 'Brodhead, vol. i. p. 302. FENWICK ARRESTED. 301 tary Commander at Newcastle, was specially Instructed to arrest Fenwick and send him to New York.' Collier appears to have modified his instructions and to have contented himself with a "friendly and civil letter," In which he requested Fenwick to come to Newcastle. Fenwick, obstinate with the combined obstinacy of a Quaker and an old Ironsides, refused to come. Collier then visited him in person. Fenwick refused to accept any orders unless they came direct from the King or the Duke of York, and, having succeeded in thrusting Collier from the house, finished the colloquy through a hole in the door. Collier reported the matter to the four magistrates who formed his Council. With their approval he Issued an order for the arrest of Fenwick, who was sent prisoner to New York." His ina bility to produce the originals of his documents told against him, and he was fined forty pounds and for some time kept in custody, but was finally released on pledging himself. If we may believe Andros, to exercise no authority in New Jersey." This dispute is not unimportant since it undoubtedly did much to determine the attitude which Andros adopted in all his deal- Division ings with the settlements on the Delaware. The province. crudc and ill-considered enterprise of Fenwick was soon followed by more methodical and judicious attempts. The division of the territory was a necessary step before it could be turned to account. The formation of the country suggested the severing of it into two portions, each with its own river frontage. The south-west bank of the Hudson and the north west bank of the Delaware were each well fitted to be the home of a community living In part by agriculture, in part by trade. But between the two there was no real and integral connection. A pathless wilderness severed thera ; there could be no communi cation for trade, for common political action, nor for defense. If either -was to be united with any other territory, the north eastern half belonged naturally to New York, the south-western to the little dependency which had Its head-quarters at New- ' The letter from Andros to Collier is in the Archives, vol. i. p. 189. ' All these proceedings are described in the Minutes of a Court held at New castle, Archives, vol. i. p. 190. Fenwick's own side of the story is told in a document, drawn up by himself, called A Remonstrance and Declaration (pub lished by Johnson), pp. 37, &c. 'The proceedings at New York against Fenwick are all in the New York Documents, vol. xii., and have been reprinted in the New Jersey Archives, vol. i. pp. 235-9. 302 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. castle. If the whole territory had been under the direct control of the Crown It is possible that tbe growing sense of the necessity for colonial unity, both for purposes of defense and for purposes of trade, would have hindered any scheme for division. But Berkeley and Carteret were certain to deal with their territory on purely coramercial grounds, and on those grounds a definite apportionment of territory to Bylling and his partners was ex pedient. Accordingly, some two months after Fenwick's arrival at Salem, an agreement was drawn up by which the province was divided Into two moieties, whereof the western, that on the Delaware, was assigned to Penn and his partners, while the eastern was retained by Carteret.' As a mere division of a landed estate the arrangement was complete, and there could be no doubt that so far Its main purpose was a good one. But it wholly failed to solve an important difficulty, which as tirae showed could not be ignored. It conveyed to Penn and his partners all such rights over the western portion of the province as Carteret and Berkeley had received from the Duke. But the extent of those rights was not specified, and it is difficult to think that the omission was accidental. Nothing in the deed showed whether tbe Duke's grant to Carteret was merely territorial, or whether it carried with It political sovereignty. Yet at this very time Philip Carteret was engaged in a dispute with the Duke of York's collector of customs. Dyer." We can hardly suppose that Penn and his partners did not know that fact. If they knew It in all likelihood they saw the difficulty ahead, and avoided instead of facing It. In the suramer of 1676 the partners sent out commissioners to represent them In the colony. The designs of the new Proprie- Poiicyof tors raay be learnt from their instructions to their hiVasso-"* com.raissioners," from a letter to their Intending: ciates. scttlcrs,* and from an agreement drawn up with them and signed by each party." The commissioners, three In num ber, were to represent tbe Proprietors, and to act as an executive government for the colony till such a time as a representative Assembly should be set on foot. The commissioners were to ^ The deed of division is in the Archives, vol. i. p. 205. ' A letter from Werden, the Duke of York's Secretary, to Andros, August 31, 1676, refers to Dyer's "late bickering with Captain Carteret." N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 240. * New Jersey Archives, vol. i. p. 219. * lb. p. 231. ' Ib. p. 241.. SETTLEMENT OF THE WESTERN PROVINCE. 303-, hold office for a year and then to be reappointed. Should the Proprietors neglect to appoint, the right devolved on the free holders. It is not easy to understand the precise details of the- land system intended. Apparently the commissioners were tO' choose sites for townships, taking care to satisfy by purchase any claim which the natives might have. Each township was to be divided Into a hundred spaces. These were to be assigned by lot to the various Proprietors and then sold to the settlers. In fact It was the duty of the commissioners, first to secure an equlta-- ble partition of the soil among the Proprietors, and then a satis factory distribution of it among the freeholders. It is plain that the Proprietors considered that Fenwick In establishing- himself, and so getting first choice of land, had encroached on the rights of his colleagues. Accordingly, in portioning out the> territory the ground already occupied by his grantees was to be Included, but the actual occupants were not to be disturbed. If when the lots were cast the ground occupied by them fell to any other Proprietor, the occupying holder was to retain his land,. and the Proprietor was to receive an equivalent out of Fenwick's lot. Fixed quantities of land were to be assigned to all persons^ approved by the Proprietors, and emigrating at their own cost.. Those who went out In the first year (1677) were to receive- seventy acres, with seventy more for every able-bodied male- servant, and fifty for every woman or inferior man-servant. In the next year these quantities were to be reduced to fifty and. thirty acres, in the following year to forty and twenty. For- such land a quit-rent 'was to be paid of a penny an acre If the- land was within a township, otherwise a half-penny. But if any tenant failed adequately to occupy his land — that Is to settle It with a servant to every hundred acres — the holding was to- revert to the Proprietors for twenty years.' Besides these provisions for dealing with the land, thirty-two> articles were drawn up defining the constitution of the colony. Articles The fitst sct fotth that the constitution there de stitution, scribed was to be unalterable, and that the Assembly was to have no power to make any laws at variance with it. This was confirmed by the second, which prescribed that any person designedly, willfully, or maliciously moving anything ' It would seem that after twenty years the interest of the original tenant . has to revive. 304 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. which should subvert or contradict the fundamental constitution was to be treated as a traitor. It is needless to point out the futility of such a provision. There must in every community be some sovereign body which has among Its other powers the power to annul any law. It is certain, too, that when the time comes If men wish the constitu tion altered they will alter it. If not avowedly, by raising ques tions of interpretation. Such a declaration is only valuable as an emphatic way of saying that those who have fashioned the con stitution wish it to be permanent. The constitution went on to enact that no person should suffer In any way for his religious faith or his form of worship, that there should be trial by jury, and that the liberty of the subject should be secured by provisions analogous to those of the Habeas Corpus Act. Special provision was raade for avoiding any hostility with the Indians. No land was to be taken up till the commissioners had satisfied theraselves that the claims of the native occupants had been fully satisfied, and all cases between a native and an Eng lishman were to be tried by a mixed jury. The Proprietors ex pressly renounced all right of taxation. No impost of any kind might be imposed except with the approval of the Assembly. Till that should corae into existence the direct consent of the people theraselves was required. The existence of a representative Assembly was to be post poned till the formation of local divisions. When the surveying and allotment of the holdings were complete there would be a hundred townships, or as they were to be called proprietorships. Each of these was to return a member. The Asserably thus composed was to be the suprerae legislative body, but its powers were, as we have just seen, to be liraited by the immutable character of the fundamental constitutions. The Assembly was to elect ten coramissioners, to act as the Executive Coun cil of the Province. Judges and other officials were to be chosen by the Assembly, justices and constables by the people, probably acting in their different districts, though this is not expressed. There is in this constitution something, though far less, of the same elaborate and fantastic character as there is in the first con stitution of Carolina. It is an attempt to construct an ideal community with little regard to the peculiar needs and condition FOUNDATION OF BURLINGTON. 305 of the country. Especially was It an error to require a hundred members for the Assembly. In the same year the foundation of the new province was laid by a settlement on an eastern tributary of the Delaware above Founda- Salem. The settlers carae In two bodies, one from Bu^img- London, one from Yorkshire, each with certain terrl- ^°''' torial rights acquired by purchase from Penn and his co-Proprietors. Each occupied one side of the stream, but the whole formed a united township, named after the Yorkshire town Bridlington.' This soon passed Into the colloquial form of the original, Burlington." Fenwick's settlement remained for the present a detached community, managing its own affairs. There were thus three separate governments existing in New Jersey: the eastern colony, under Carteret, with Elizabethtown for Its capital, and the two detached settlements at Burlington and Salem. The principal incident in the history of each at this stage was a feud with Andros. Each turned on the same point: the contention of Andros that the Duke in parting with the soil of New Jersey had retained some sort of fiscal authority over the inhabitants. In the case of Fenwick the dispute was reopened in 1678. In the spring of that year he called a meeting of the settlers at Fresh Salem, and demanded from them an oath or declara- dispute , , between tlon of fidelity, and at the same time appointed Fenwick. officials." It Is clear that there were about Salem some Isolated settlers, squatters as we should call them, not con nected with Fenwick, who hitherto, so far as they acknowledged any jurisdiction, belonged to Newcastle.'' They do not seem themselves to have raised any objection to Fenwick's proceed ings. But Cantwell attended the meeting and, as it would seem, on their behalf protested against Fenwick's claim of jurisdic tion." Fenwick replied by issuing a paper ordering all settlers In and about Salera to acknowledge his rights as landlord, and it is said that he also forbade them to pay any dues at Newcastle." ^ Smith, ch. vi. He quotes letters from the original settlers, and refers to other documents. ' Burlington is used in 1683. N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 428. ' This is stated in the depositions of Cantwell and three other witnesses given in the N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. p. 592. * This is implied in Fenwick's proclamation mentioned below. The procla mation is in the New Jersey Archives, vol. i. p. 277. •'Cantwell's deposition. 'Ib. 3o6 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. This was reported at New York, and Fenwick was Immedi ately summoned to attend there, on the ground that he had vio lated the conditions on which he was set free.' Fenwick on this occasion showed himself more tractable than before. He pre sented himself at New York. There his case was submitted to the Supreme Court, who decided against him." The result was that Salem was for the time being incorporated with Newcastle. A local government of a simple kind was established. Six of the inhabitants were appointed by Andros to act as "overseers, select men or commissioners under the authority of the court at Newcastle."" To Penn and his partners the question was one of overwhelm ing importance. If the claim of Andros to exercise authority Position over Salem was allowed, it must be on the ground and his that the grant of New Jersey carried with it no polit- partners. jj-gj rights. If that Were so the whole scheme of forming a colony must fall to the ground. It was very certain that Penn and his friends would not have troubled themselves to acquire the territory if they were to be simply a company of landholders under the political sovereignty of the Duke. It was very certain, too, that their claims would be pushed with per severance and dexterity. It was no doubt fortunate for the Quaker Proprietors that the settlements in the eastern half of the province had gained a secure foothold. Philip Carteret and his companions had In fact been acting as pioneers for the Quaker colonists. To annul political rights which rested on a prescription of thirteen years would have been a manifest violation of equity. Yet any attempt to Incorporate the western half of the colony with Newcastle must carry with it as a logical consequence the Incorporation of the eastern half with New York. Having regard no doubt to these considerations Andros made no attempt to enforce, or even to raise, a general claim of sov- Dispute ereignty over the settlers at Burlington. There was, customs. however, a claim which he might make, less serious, yet enough to strike a heavy blow at the prosperity of the new colony. It might be urged that, though the Duke of York had abandoned all political authority over the territory of New ^N. Y. Docs. vol. xii. p. 595. ' lb. pp. 597-600. 'Ih. p. 610. PENN'S REMONSTRANCE. 3°? Jersey, he still kept certain fiscal rights. This claim, too, might be put forward with a show of equity, since a colony set free to frame Its own system of import duties might be a most formida ble rival to its neighbors in the paths of commerce. If the ports on the Delaware were set free from customs, they were certain to draw away the trade of New York. Andros at once saw this danger, and Issued an order that all vessels landing goods within the territory of Penn and his partners should pay the same duties as if they had landed their cargoes at New York. This was not only the assertion of a dangerous right, but also the exercise of It in a peculiarly irksome form. For the duty was to be levied not only on goods imported and exported for purposes of trade, but also on the landing of such goods as were needful for stocking the colony. The Quaker partners at once saw the importance of the issue raised and responded to the challenge. We can hardly err In assigning to the hand of Penn the re monstrance which they put forward. The document is one of the most remarkable In colonial his tory. Hitherto, in all the disputes between the New England Penn's colonles and the home Government, the colonists had strance.i limited thcmselvcs to strictly legal grounds. They had invariably pleaded the letter of their charters, and had de clined to touch on general questions of what one may fairly call Iraperial policy. Penn held firraly to his legal right as trans mitted to hira through Carteret. The conveyance made by the Duke to Carteret and Berkeley expressly gave power of govern ment, and what the Duke conveyed to Carteret they had handed on intact to Penn and his par.J;ners. "Was It likely," Penn urged, "that they would have gone to all the labor and cost of establishing a colony if it had been otherwise?" Who would leave a prosperous country and settle in a wilderness unless he were at least assured of the fruit of his own labor, free from the possibility of arbitrary taxation ? The argument waxes bolder as it advances. If the partners had not bought the right to be Independent of control from with out, what had they bought? Not the right to the soil itself, for that was vested in the natives and was not the Duke's to sell. Then, with an anticipation of the ground taken up by the colo- 'The remonstrance is given in full in Smith, p. 117. 308 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. nists a hundred years later, Penn argues that the grant to the Duke, on which he based bis claim, was limited by a reference to the laws and government of England. But those laws ex pressly protected the subject against the levy of any tax save by his own consent. Penn then passes from the declaration of the strictly legal aspect of the case to those considerations of equity and good policy which make it to the interest of the Duke to forbear, and of the Crown to enforce such forbearance. The duty is not merely one upon goods imported for the purpose of trade. It will fall also on the stock which Is absolutely needful for the settlement of a new colony. Thus to adopt a system by which any external power could levy duties on the colonists was to cut up the roots of coramercial prosperity. "There can be no trade without a people ; there will be no people where there is no encouragement, nor can there be any encouragement where people have not greater privileges by going than staying; for If their condition be not meliorated they will never forgo the com fort of their kindred they must leave behind them, nor forsake their native country, run the hazard of the seas, nor, lastly, ex pose themselves to the wants and difficulties o£ a wilderness; but, on the contrary, If they have less privileges there than at home 'tis in every way to worst themselves to go." Penn points out, too, that the claim is an unlimited one. If It is admitted "what security have we of anything we possess? We can call nothing out own, but are tenants-at-wlll not only for the soil, but for all our own personal estates." "This is to transplant not from good to better, but from good to bad; this sort of conduct has destroyed governments, but never raised one to any true greatness, nor ever will in the Duke's territories, while so many countries equally good in soil and air are sur rounded with greater freedom and security." We seem to hear the pleading of Adams and Franklin. Moreover, Penn's arguments show a conception of colonial policy clearer and more advanced than anything with which we have yet met. Yet, on the other hand, the ground taken by Andros asserted a principle which could not safely be put aside. It was needful that there should be for the whole body of colonies some uniform fiscal system. To Impress that on men's minds was Indeed one FRESH GRANT OF EAST JERSEY. 309 of the main results of the conquest of New Netherlands and the acquisition of the adjoining territory. In two ways, by making some common system of defense necessary and some common sys tem of revenue possible, that conquest was the first step towards colonial unity. In all likelihood Penn's position, and the favor with which he was regarded by the royal family, did more for him and his Legal partners than the justice of his reasoning. In August fn favor' 1680 the question was referred to Sir William Jones, of Penn. ^jjg Attorney-General. He gave It as his opinion that inasmuch as the grant to Berkeley and Carteret had contained no reservation of any profit, nor even of any jurisdiction, the Duke's claim as made by Andros was not binding in law.' Before the end of the year the question was finally set at rest. A fresh grant was made by the Duke of York conveying to The matter Bylling and his heirs and assigns, for a nominal quit- mised by rent, the territory purchased from Carteret." With grant. the land were conveyed all such political rights as the King's grant had conferred on the Duke. The document em bodied a practical comproraise which gave the Quaker Proprie tors all that they asked for, but it did not acknowledge the jus tice of their case. The Duke granted the very thing which, ac cording to their contention, he had before alienated. To the present grantees it was a matter of indifference which view was accepted, whether the Duke surrendered his claim as Altered Invalid or extinguished It by a fresh grant. But the'East"'^ Otherwise there was a very great difference between p^rtfpr^e- ^^ *^° vIews. Sir George Carteret had died early tors. Jn 1680. The grant to Bylling was an Implicit denial of the title enjoyed by Carteret's heirs. Recent doings in East Jersey showed that they had real grounds for apprehension. In West Jersey the attack, as we have seen, began with the de mand to levy customs. The vigorous action of Penn kept It from reaching a further stage. In East Jersey the strife had a like beginning, but ran a different course. For some years after the foundation of the eastern colony under Philip Carteret the question of customs remained In abey ance since there was no port. But about 1677 vessels began ' This opinion is in the N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 284. ' N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 324. 310 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. to land at Elizabethtown, and the Governor had exercised the right of clearing them there without reference to New Andros York.' Elizabethtown was a more dangerous rival ^o'levy'* to the commerce of New York than the settlements customs on {j^g Delaware could be. It is clear, too, that the fn £.ast , . , Jersey. Assembly of the colony was determined to contest any claim that might be made by the Governor of New York to levy custom duties. A sum of one hundred and fifty pounds was raised by rate, and kept as a reserve fund, to Indemnify any ship owner that might suffer by the action of the authorities of New York." Andros not improbably thought that the death of Sir George Carteret offered a favorable opening for enforcing the claims of his master. In the spring of that year (1680) he wrote a letter to Philip Carteret forbidding him to exercise any jurisdiction over the King's subjects on the ground that It would be an encroachment on the Duke's authority. He also claimed the right to establish a fort on the coast of New Jersey and to erect beacons, on the plea that these works were for tbe benefit of all the King's subjects." Whatever justice there might be In Andros's case as far as custoras were concerned, his general con tention was manifestly extravagant. He was disputing a title which for fifteen years had been uncontested, and on the strength of which raen had conveyed themselves, their goods, and house holds to a home in the wilderness. Carteret answered in a temperate letter." He had consulted his council and the chief settlers. They bore him out In the view that the Duke's grant, the letter of the King, and the pre scription of undisputed possession all justified him In refusing to accept the authority of Andros. He was willing, however, to refer the matter to the King. In the meantime, if force was used, he would raeet it with force. One expression in Carteret's answer is noteworthy. He was acting, he said, with the most eminent though not numerous part of the country. This awakens a suspicion that Andros was re lying on the help of a party within the colony who were disloyal to Carteret. Later events showed plainly that the spirit of dis- 1 See Mr. Whitehead's (£. Jersey) note, p. 82. He quotes a proclamation by Carteret and a statement made in 1698 by Graham, Attorney-General of New York, to Bellomont. N. Y. Docs. vol. iv. p. 382. ' Leaming and Spicer, p. 131. 3 n, j Archives, vol. i. p. 292. *Ih. p. 294. DISPUTE BETWEEN ANDROS AND CARTERET. 311 affection roused by James Carteret was not extinct. Those who had been his partisans had no ground for cleaving to Andros, but they were ready to make common cause with anyone In oppo sition to the Proprietors and their Deputy. Andros had not the fairness or courtesy to wait for Car teret's answer. Relying In all likelihood on his adherents within the colony, he issued a proclamation forbidding not only Car teret, but all acting under him, to exercise any jurisdiction.' For the present Andros confirmed the existing constables in their office. Presently he would take further order in accordance with the terras of his commission. In other words. New Jersey vi^as to be dealt with as forming a dependency of New York. Carteret now abandoned the somewhat submissive attitude which he had hitherto taken up. He admonished Andros to abstain from any disturbance, and notified him that if any such took place he should appeal to the King." At the same time he took measures as if against a foe from whom he anticipated In vasion. He appointed a deputy to succeed him in case of acci dent," and raised an armed force of a hundred and fifty men to act as a body-guard." A summons had been issued for the call ing of a General Assembly. This was now revoked, which makes one think the Governor feared the Influence of Andros over the people." Carteret In nowise exaggerated the danger. In April Andros set sail for New Jersey. It is hardly likely that he set forth Andros wltb any definite purpose of using^ violence, since he Ehzabeth- was attended only by his official staff, and a few ^own.» volunteers carrying no arms save swords. This seems to have allayed Carteret's suspicions, and though Andros met more than one armed party, no resistance was offered. Having reached Elizabethtown, Andros read aloud the Duke of York's title to the whole province. This, as Carteret reasonably urged, "signified little to the purpose," since it was no part of the Pro- ' N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 293. ' lb. p. 297. ' Ib. p. 295. * Carteret's letter to the Proprietor, July 9, 1680, N. J. Archives, vol. i. -p. 314- ' Carteret's letter to Andros as above. ' There are two accounts of Andros's visit published in the New Jersey Archives, vol. i. pp. 299-302 and pp. 304-6, taken from manuscripts at Albany. They appear to have been written by members of Andros's staff. We have also Carteret's own account in the letter of July 9, referred to above. 312 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. prietors' case to question the Duke's original title. Some dis cussion followed, but Andros turned a deaf ear to all remon strance, and was content to silence bis opponents by vague threats. He then returned to his vessel and set sail for New York. The next incident reads like some story of mediseval violence. Carteret lived, not in Elizabethtown, but in a detached dwelling- Arrest of place. Three weeks after Andros's departure, in the carteret.i night a party from New York, having corrupted one of Carteret's servants, gained access to this house. The Gov ernor was dragged out of bed, thrown half-naked Into a boat, and hurried off as a prisoner to New York. There he was kept for five weeks awaiting his trial. In New Jersey the hostility of an important party to Carteret had smoothed the path for Andros. In New York we may well believe that the unpopu larity of the Duke's deputy stood his enemy in good stead. Car teret was put on his trial on the count of having exercised illegal authority. The jury acquitted him, and in spite of repeated charges from Andros and refusals to accept their verdict they stood firm. Nevertheless they appended to their verdict the somewhat illogical addition that if Carteret returned to New Jersey he should give security not to assume any authority or jurisdiction, civil or military. If this authority was Illegal It Is not easy to see on what grounds he was acquitted. Meanwhile the settlers In East Jersey were taking advantage of the existing state of things to throw off the yoke of the Pro- rev^sits ptictors. In June Andros revisited the colony. His Elizabeth- purpose was avowedly peaceful, since he was accom- town and *^ f , . , . ¦ r i i • i i 2 summons paoied by his wife and her train of gentlewomen. Assembly. He had already issued writs for the election of an Assembly. Each township returned two Deputies. The pro ceedings of the Assembly opened In a curiously Illogical fashion. The Deputies presented an address to Andros, expressing their wish, or rather their demand, that the privileges granted them in ' Our knowledge of this business is derived partly from Dankers and Sluyter, ' P- 345. partly from Carteret's own account, contained in two letters, one to a certain Coustier of whom we know nothing else, one to Captain BoUen, the Secretary of West New Jersey. The incident seems, not unnaturally, to have made a great impression on the Labadist travelers, and is told by them very vividly. ' The Labadists, p. 346. CARTERETS DISPUTE WITH SETTLERS. 313:. the concessions from Berkeley and Carteret should remain unim paired. Thus, In the very moment of repudiating the authority of the Proprietors, they acknowledged the validity of past acts- done by that authority. It is impossible to say what relations Andros believed to exist between the Duke of York and the New Jersey settlers, or how he wished to arrange those relations. Probably he had himself no clear Idea on the subject. He submitted to the Assembly that code of laws drawn up after the conquest of New Netherlands. known as the Duke's laws, and he gave the members to under stand that the Court of Assizes on Long Island was now to be the supreme tribunal for the colony. In other words New Jersey was to be, like the settlements on the west bank of the Delaware, a dependency of New York. Yet It Is very certain that the Assembly would never have accepted that view, nor does Andros seem In practice to have put any restraint on their exer cise of legislative power. Meanwhile Penn and his partners In fighting their own battle were also fighting that of Carteret. The grant from the Duke- Further to Bylling was followed six weeks later by one to the be^t^een young Sir Gcorge Carteret, the grandson and heir of and'thc' ^^ Original proprietor, bestowing on him also full settlers. territorial and political rights.' This grant fully re established the authority of Philip Carteret, and the recall of Andros early in 1 68 1 left the Governor free to assert that authority without danger of molestation. In March 1681 he Issued a proclamation warning the inhabitants of the province that the supremacy of the Proprietors was again In force, that all acts done by Andros were invalid, and that no courts which he had constituted had any legal power." Later in the year Brock holls, that Incompetent deputy whom Andros had left in his stead, called In question the authority of Carteret." It was easy to meet that by producing the Duke's grant and Carteret's own commission. But the attack made by Andros had brought about troubles not to be got over so lightly. There was, as we have seen, among the settlers an anti-proprietary party. The leaders ' This grant is in the N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 337. ' J.b. p. 346- ' He writes to Carteret (July 26, 1681) that he has received certain papers from him, but can "find no power thereby for you to act in or assume the. government of New Jersey." N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 352. 314 SE TTLEMENT OF NE W J ERSE Y. of that party were shrewd enough to see danger In the recent grant to the Proprietors. It might be said that while the grant conferred future authority on the Proprietors, it annulled the authority which they had claimed in the past, and would enable them to disclaim their past obligations. It is plain that those who opposed the Proprietors were the ruling party in the Assem bly. On October 17 the Deputies met. Their very first pro ceeding was to pass a resolution asking the Governor and Council whether they were to consider the late grant as the foundation of government' The question was an embarrassing one. To admit it was to admit that Andros had been right and Carteret wrong. To deny it might reopen questions which it was far more convenient for the Governor and his party to let rest. It will be remembered that in 1672 Carteret, acting for the Pro prietor, had made certain modifications in the Concessions. If he fell back on the Concessions as the basis of his authority, it might be needful to revoke these later changes. A sense of this difficulty was clearly disclosed in the petulant tone of the an swer. The original grant on which the Concessions were based was, Carteret said, the foundation of government. Only "the seed sown by Sir Edmund Andros could have bid men raise such questions ; let thera leave such disputes, and fall upon something for the good of the province." The Deputies had now cleared the ground for an obvious and effective line of attack. They passed a resolution declaring that the changes introduced in 1672 were a violation of the Con cessions. The lack of temper which the Council had shown In their first answer becarae more and more manifest as the dispute went on. The Deputies were reminded that they alone did not form the Assembly, and they were told that, though they might, as they said, have read and weighed the documents in dispute, they had failed to understand them. On one point, however, the Council had the best of the dispute. They bade their opponents remember that the payraent of quit-rents was part of the original constitution. If the Proprietors had broken their compact, so In that matter had the settlers. The difficulty was increased by the arrangement, on which at an earlier day the Governor and Council had Insisted, whereby the Council and the Deputies ^ This and all the other documents which make up the history of this dis pute are in the New Jersey Archives, vol. i. pp. 354-65. THE PROPRIETARY SYSTEM. 31S sat as two separate chambers. Proposals were made for a con ference, but It is clear that neither side was In earnest In ask ing for it, nor was there any such wish for agreement as could make It useful. After a fortnight of profitless bickering the Governor dissolved the Assembly. The Deputies protested against the proceedings as unconstitutional, but do not seem to have made any attempt to prolong their session. Throughout the history of the proprietary colonies, every dis pute between a Proprietor and his settlers was almost certain to ¦Working of end In favor of the latter. The one exception was prfetary Ncw York, and New York was proprietary only in system. name. There no doubt the authority of the Proprie tor was really felt. But it was so mainly because the Proprietor had the supremacy of the Crown at his back, and also because the position of New York gave it exceptional importance. It was the key of the military position, and the Crown had a direct interest In the security and stability of the government. But In every other case the Proprietor was certain to be fighting at odds. Where resistance to arbitrary government may involve material loss, the suspension of works In which capital Is Invested, the waste of that time which Is the equivalent of capital, there the members of a prosperous society may acquiesce In much bad gov ernment before they risk a breach of the peace. But in a colony beginning Its life none of these restraints exist. And when it came to the ultimate resort, to force, what resources had the Proprietor? He had no armed force of his own wherewith to overawe his colonists. He must depend on the help of the Crown, and what motive had the Crown for supporting him? Even In its dealings with its own colonies, we shall see the sovereign and his advisers ever slow and reluctant to push mat ters to extremities. There was little chance that they would show a vigor in the cause of others which they failed to show in their own. Thus the Proprietor was virtually at the mercy of his colo nists. If the political arrangements which he enforced were con venient to the settlers, or not so objectionable to them as to be worth a dispute, they would be accepted with more or less good will. If the quit-rents charged fairly represented what one may call the monopoly value of the soil, they would be paid, probably with more or less grumbling. Those, It may safely be said, were 3 1 6 SE TTLEMENT OP NE W JERSE Y. the limits within which proprietary authority could be exercised. The Proprietor inevitably sinks into the position of a titular sovereign who does not govern, and a rent-charger. There was indeed one exception to this, one really valuable office which the Proprietor might discharge. He might be^ at the foundation of a colony what one may call the superintending; capitalist. He could to some extent select the emigrants, sur vey the soil, decide the apportionment of land, and be responsi ble for the needful outfit and supply of live stock. We have seen in Plymouth how a colony suffered from the lack of some one person responsible for these things, who at the same time had an interest in the permanent welfare of the colony, how it thereby fell into the hands of a body of money-lenders who had no sympathy with the wants and objects of the colony. On the other hand, in Maryland and Carolina the difficulties attending the foundation of a colony had been successfully overcome by the action of a Proprietor or body of Proprietors. We may even say that Massachusetts was in a measure an instance of success achieved in the same fashion. A proprietary government, however, can hardly fulfill these conditions, unless there be on the part of the Proprietor a desire Transfer of fot the succcss of the colony apart from personal gain. ''^rrilto^r- The most successful proprietary colonies were those ship. where leading members of sorae sect were building up a home for their brethren in the faith. No such motive had been at work upon the proprietorship of Carteret and Berkeley. It was working successfully in that part of their territory which they had sold to Penn and his partners. To Sir George Car teret no doubt the position of a colonial Proprietor had attrac tions. It conveyed dignity, and it raight be a useful piece to play in his game of political ambition. But to his heirs the colony was nothing but a troublesome property. Accordingly early in 1682 they disposed of their territorial and other rights, it is said by auction.' No stronger illustration could be found of the inconveniences of the proprietary system, or the possibili ties of abuse which attached to it as it existed. Carrying with It as it did the right of appointing officials and of granting or withholding political rights, it should have been regarded as a ' £. Jersey, p. 103. Mr. Whitehead states this but does not give his au thority. REASONS AGAINST SALE OF PROPRIETORSHIP. 31? trusteeship, only to be vested in trustworthy and competent per- -sons. The government of each colony was a link in a chain on which the whole security and welfare of the empire depended. That it should have been put up for sale in open market shows how far the Crown and Its advisers were from any distinct and comprehensive scheme of colonial administration. There was, too, another serious objection to such an arrange ment. To give a man proprietary rights over a vacant territory which was to be peopled under his own supervision, and in some measure at his own cost, was a very different thing from giving him proprietary rights over a settled province, which had already put on all the forms of political life. In the former case settlers •came at their own risk and of their own free choice. Some com munity of feeling and interest between them and the Proprietor might safely be presumed. But here a body of colonists were made over to a new sovereign without the possibility of their ex pressing consent or disapproval. The principle. It is to be ob served, was one wholly new In the history of the proprietary col onies. The nearest approach to it before was the settlement of Middletown and Shrewsbury simultaneously with the original grant of New Jersey to Berkeley and Carteret. That, however, "\vas an accident, not the result of set purpose, and it might fairly be said that the emigrants risked such' a contingency by settling on the strength of an uncertain title. There was at all events no reason for confirming and extending the precedent. A Colonial Proprietorship should have been regarded not as an ordinary landed estate, but as a trusteeship or office. If circumstances made It impossible or inexpedient for the Proprietor to continue Ills trust, his proper course was not transfer but resignation. If the Crown had Insisted on that principle. New Jersey would have escaped years of bickering and confusion. But In truth the mischief began when the Duke of York was allowed to carve his grant into provinces and to dispose of them at his pleasure. In the present case the best security against evil lay in this, that Purchase the purchase was from a mercantile point of view an New^'* unattractive one. No one was likely to become a pVnn and purchascr unless he had some interest in the colony, ¦others and some designs for its future other than those of a land speculator. The purchasers were a body of partners 3 1 8 SE TTLEMENT OF NE W JERSE Y. of whom Penn was the chief.' That was in itself some guar antee for the safety of the settlers and the good government of the province. It might, moreover, be a step towards uniting the whole territory between the Hudson and the Delaware, either by bringing it under a single government, or If not, at least by securing a certain community of origin, usage, and principle among all the settlers. The basis of this Proprietary Company was soon extended by the addition of twelve fresh partners. Among them was that Addition of corrupt and discreditable politician the Earl of Perth. Pro-^'^°*'^'' With him were associated three Scotchmen of a far prietors. vi'orthler type, Gawain Lawrie, who already had a share In West Jersey, Barclay of Ury, the soldier of fortune who had bowed his neck to the peaceful yoke of George Fox, and bis brother John Barclay. The presence of these men among the partners was possibly the cause, more probably the syraptora, of a new movement in colonial life. So far Scotland had no part in the task of colonization, nor are there frequent traces even of isolated Scotchmen figuring as colonists. But a great wave of social and economical change was now passing over that kingdom. Scotland had not — indeed, the day was far distant when she could have — the resources needful to make her a colonizing nation. Her children had not the needful training^ in trade or industry. Moreover, with the contracted and ex clusive principles of commerce which then prevailed, every colony was dependent for its markets on the parent nation. The trade and the shipping of Scotland could not maintain dependencies In prosperity. Yet Scotland was beginning to feel the need of col onies as a vent for her surplus population. A poor soil and petty Industries had long been unequal to the task of furnishing a live lihood for all whom the country produced. "The Scot abroad'" had found in mercenary soldiership that career which the Eng lishman or the Hollander found In the New World. With the cessation of the great continental wars that resource had failed. Even If Scotch commerce could have expanded, family pride would have withheld the cadets of landed houses from profiting thereby. Moreover, the country was just awakening to a sense of the Inadequacy of its resources. There is nothing to prove ^ For the deed of transfer see N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 366. I have called. it a purchase. It was really the purchase of a leasehold at a peppercorn rent- BARCLAY APPOINTED GOVERNOR. 3^9 the Scotchman of 1680 was worse off than his grandfather. But such writings as those of Fletcher of Saltoun show that one of those waves of thought was passing over Scotland, in which a country suddenly awakens to evils which It has long endured tranquilly. There was too, as was shown a little later by the tragedy of Darlen, a certain desire to prove that any path which Scotland's old rival and oppressor had trodden successfully she too could tread. It needed but a slight Impulse to turn these newly awakened wants and aspirations into the channel of American colonization. One argument which was used by the Scotch advocates of colonization to allay the doubts of their countrymen is worth special notice. It was urged that the colo nists would lose their national Independence and become Eng lish subjects. The advocate for colonization points out that this will really be a gain, since they will then share In the bene fits of the Navigation Act.' The use of that argument throws light on the motives which twenty-four years later led to the passing of the Act of Union. The appointment of Barclay as Governor would seem de signed to conciliate the two classes on whom the future of the Robert colony was to depend, the Quakers and the Scotch. appointed Apparently It was the weight of his name rather than of°East°'^ his actual ability which was valued. The terms of Jersey." hls Commission authorized him to discharge his duties by deputy." This he did, and there Is nothing to show that he even so much as set foot on the soil of America. His choice fell on Thomas Rudyard, a London attorney, who, though not him self a Quaker, had been of service to Penn when under prosecu tion in 1670.* In theory the new Proprietors were but stepping Into the Attitude position occupied by Carteret, a position of territorial prietor^"^"" posscssIon and political sovereignty, subject only to throuke ^^ rights Inherent In the Crown. But, as we have of York. seen, the view that the Duke of York had by his orlgl- * A Brief Account of the Province of East New Jersey, published by the Scots Proprietors. Reprinted in New York Historical Magazine, 2nd series, vol. i. ' Barclay's commission does not seem to be extant, but it is referred to in the Fundamental Constitutions to be mentioned hereafter. ' This is stated in the Fundamental Constitutions- * For Rudyard's commission see N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 3^6. 320 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. nal grant divested himself of all rights, though asserted when It could be useful, was not consistently held. Men evidently felt that he had a certain undefined supremacy which must be taken Into account at each fresh transfer of territory. Early in 1683 the new partners obtained from the Duke a grant making over to them, for payment of a fixed sum not specified In the grant, and for a small annual quit-rent, all his rights not only over the soil, but also of jurisdiction and government.' Rudyard's first proceeding was to call an Assembly. Their measures were in themselves of some Importance, and are of Proceed- Interest as showing that the Assembly did not regard Assembly." Its powers as provisional or anticipate any Interference from the new proprietary. The colony was divided into four counties. Laws were passed regulating the relations of servant and master. No Indented white servant was to serve for more than four years, unless under seventeen. In that case he was to serve till he was twenty-one. He might not be transported out of the colony against his will, and at the end of his term he was to have from his master an ax, a hoe, and seven bushels of corn. Injury to limb by the master was to be indemnified by the servant being set at liberty, and the infliction of unmerciful ¦chastisement was to be punished at the discretion of the magis trate. Though this protection only extended to white servants, yet something was done for the negro slave by an enactment -securing him sufficiency of food and clothes. At the same time the rights of masters were protected since it was penal to receive a runaway slave as an apprentice. Other enactments show traces either of the original Puritanism of the settlers or of later 'Quakerism. A large consolidating Act which summed up pre vious legislation made it penal to afflict the widow or fatherless. This attempt to enforce a vague precept of morality was thor oughly characteristic of New England legislation. A general prohibition of Sabbath-breaking was explained and amplified by specific enactments. No work was to be done on that day, there was to be no drinking at ordinaries, no riding save of necessity, no going abroad save for sober and religious exercise. As in New England, the drinking of healths was penal. Acting, sword-playing, games, masques, revels, bull-baitings, and cock- * N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 383. • Leaming and Spicer, pp. 229-53. NEW FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTION. 321 fightings were not explicitly forbidden, but were to be "dis couraged" by the judges and courts. Here again we have an absence of precision and a confusion of the spheres of law and morality, thoroughly characteristic of New England. In 1683 Rudyard was superseded, not apparently for any offense or shortcoming, but to be replaced by a deputy, Lawrie, The New who was hlmsclf one of the original twelve pur- r unda- o x- mentai chascrs, and who more fully understood and entered tion. I into the schemes of the Proprietors. He was charged with the task of carrying out what his colleagues regarded as a thoroughgoing and valuable scheme of constitutional reform. Instead of being content with the system of representation In use which fifteen years of practice had done something to perfect, and with which at least the settlers were familiar, they drafted a brand-new constitution. It began by defining the position of the Governor. He was to be resident and was to hold office for three years. Fears seem to have been entertained that the Gov ernor might seek to continue his office beyond the statutory time or to make It hereditary. Any person furthering the reappoint ment of the Governor or the appointment of his son was to be reputed a public enemy. The Assembly, or as it was called the Great Council, was to consist of the twenty-four Proprietors, acting personally or by proxy, and a hundred and forty-four delegates chosen by the freemen. For the present, however, in consideration of the smallness of the colony the elected representatives were to be seventy-two. It Is hard to Imagine anything more grotesquely coraplicated and unpractical than the method of election pre scribed, and the qualifications imposed on representatives. "For the full preventing of all Indirect means the election shall be after this manner : the names of all the persons qualified In each county shall be put on equal pieces of parchment, and prepared by the Sheriff and his clerk the day before, and at the day of election shall be put In a box and fifty shall be taken out by a boy under ten years of age; those fifty shall be put Into the box again, and the first five-and-twenty then taken out shall be capable to be chosen for that time, the other five-and-twenty shall by plurality of votes name (of the aforesaid twenty-five) ' N. J. Archives, vol. i. pp. 395-410. 322 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. twelve If there be three to be chosen, and eight If there be two to stand for it; these nominators first solemnly declaring before the Sheriff that they shall not name any known to them to be guilty for the time, or to have been guilty for a year before, o-f adultery, whoredom, drunkenness, or any such immorality, or who Is insolent or a fool, and then out of the twelve or eight so norainated, three or two shall be taken by the ballot as afore said." The Assembly thus composed was to meet every year. Every motion must be carried not by a simple majority, but by two- thirds. The Proprietors and the elected representatives were to sit together, but were to act so far separately that nothing could be carried without the consent of half the Proprietors. Under this system one may doubt which would be more troublesome, to? elect the legislature or to obtain any results from It when elected. There was to be also an executive committee, consisting of the Proprietors and of twelve others chosen by ballot from among the elected representatives. This was to be divided Into three sub committees, whose provinces of action were thus assigned to them. One was "for the public policy and to look to manners, education and arts," one "for trade and management of the public treasury," one "for plantations and regulating of all things." There was also to be a war department. This part of the public policy was much complicated by the views of the Quaker section of the colony. To prevent the colony from being prej udiced by their peculiar principles It was provided that they should, by a process described in very complex and cumbrous terms, be excluded from all deliberations on military questions. Their consciences were to be protected by a provision that they need not contribute to any funds raised for purposes of war. That, however, was made somewhat Illusory, since In that case they were to contribute a proportionately larger sum to other public purposes. The landed system was as fantastic and unpractical as the rest. Its general principle was to allow the subdivision of the pro prietary Interest within certain limits. Each Proprietor might alienate three-fourths of his share of land without prejudice to his political rights. If, however, be failed to retain one-fourth^ his rights came to an end. But where a proprietorship was held- CONSTITUTION OF EAST NEW JERSEY. 323 by coheirs they might elect a representative to act for them. Otherwise, the original Proprietor was to be replaced by some one who held the fourth of an original share. This qualifica tion, however, might be reduced to five thousand acres, or if necessary even below. On the other hand. Increase of territory was guarded against as much as diminution, since no one might, by purchase, amass into his own hands more than one original proprietary share. For the rest, trial by jury was provided for, no persons pro fessing a belief in God were to be in any way molested for their opinions, and a simple declaration of belief in Christianity was. to be the only qualification required for office. It is clear that the Proprietors were beset by no doubts or fears as to the merits of this scheme. Nor had they any doubts that introduc- the scttlcts would, whcn once they understood it, nlw°Vn''-° hail it as a vast improvement on the clumsy and com- stitution. nionplace constitution under which they lived. But they do seem to have felt that to force the scheme on reluctant settlers might be attended with difficulties, that it would be In some sort a breach of those obligations to which they had suc ceeded. Accordingly, Lawrie is not to put the new constitution in force at once, but to explain to the settlers Its advantages, "how much It exceeds their former commissions," and so with the approval of the Assembly to secure its acceptance. Mean while the Proprietors exercised their power of vetoing, or at least of refusing to confirm, the Acts passed by the Assembly In the previous year, avowedly on the ground that the new constitution would render them needless. At the same time they suggested that whatever deficiencies there might be In that system could be supplemented from the common law of England without special legislation.' Lawrie was not long in discovering that the new system was not accepted as eagerly as the Proprietors had expected. They A com- then changed their ground and declared that the con- adopted, stitution was not Intended to apply to the old settlers, but only to those who should come out after the late purchase of the province. In other words they proposed to set up, side by side In the same province, two systems of government, each ' See the Instruction to Lawrie in N. J. Archives, vol. i. pp. 426-34. 324 SE TTLEMENT OF NE W JERSE Y. applying to a separate section of the population. The old settlers, however, might be admitted as a special act of grace to the benefit of the new constitution on certain conditions. They must submit to a resurvey of their lands and an inquiry Into the validity of their title. They must pay up all arrears of quit- rent, and must pass an Act providing the revenue needed for the purposes of government.' As in Carolina, usage proved too strong for theory. Lawrie does not seem to have made any serious attempt to enforce the new constitution. Assemblies met annually, and the Great Council with its complicated ballots was even less of a reality than the landgraves and caciques of Locke's Imagination. Meanwhile strenuous attempts were being made to carry out one part of the Proprietors' scheme in the erection of a great sea- Estabiish- port town. So Important did the Proprietors con- ment of ^ , I . r • I a town at slder thls that it forraed the subject of a special set of Amboy. Instructions issued to Lawrie." Twenty-four houses were to be built, one for each Proprietor, and when these were finished, a house for the Governor. Markets and wharfs, too, were to be laid out. The site for the town was to be divided into one hundred and fifty lots. The purchaser of each was bound to build a house on it, on pain of forfeiting his claim, and was to hold with it three acres of upland. The town was to retain the Indian name of the site, Ambo, soon modified Into Amboy, with the prefix Perth in honor of the chief Proprietor. Meanwhile Lawrie and others were doing all In their power to stimulate interest and confidence In the colony among those Material at home." We are reminded of the early days of ofthe'°° Virginian colonization as we read the glowing ac- coiony. count of the resources of the country and of the pros perity of the settlement, sent home by Lawrie and his associates. Thanks to a good climate and soil, to the pacific temper of the natives, and to the absence of any serious Interruption or hin drance from those In authority, the course of New Jersey had doubtless been one of unbroken material prosperity. We may well believe that Lawrie hardly exaggerated when he wrote that there was "not a poor body In the province, nor one that wants." ' Additional Revisions to Constitution in Archives, vol. i. p. 443. ' N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 434. = Lawrie's Report with others is to be found in Scott's Model. LAWRIE'S REPORT. 325 His report, however, is something more than a mere eulogy. It contains In a short compass the best account that we have of the visible and material condition of the colony, and also of the mental and moral state of the settlers. There are a few stone houses, but most are of wood. The towns are not compactly built, but are straggling rural communities like many of those in New England. Between the houses are large vacant spaces, and the sheep feed where tbe street should be. Most of the towns are, as in Maryland and Virginia, on the banks of streams where small vessels can land goods. There are no large Pro prietors; a planter with ten servants and thirty cows is excep tionally wealthy. The most abundant stock are horses; these breed wild through the country. Wages are high ; a workman ean earn two shillings or half a crown a day. That being so, it is hardly surprising to learn from another writer that they are a careless and unfrugal people.' They have already fallen away from the traditions of New England Puritanism. There is not In all East Jersey a minister of religion who has not some secular calling; there is no regular public provision for schooling, but something is done by the voluntary efforts of the settlers. Other witnesses, not assuredly accustomed to a high standard of luxury, show a less favorable picture of the material condition of the colony. They tell us of the comfortless houses, built of ill-fitting logs, of the hard fare of the indented servants, living on maize-bread and water. They also mention the impoverish ment of the colony by reason of the trade restrictions Imposed by the Government of New York. Burlington, the chief town, has shrunk to a settlement of fifty wooden houses." While the transfer of East Jersey from Carteret's heirs to the new body of Proprietors did not bring with It those constitu- Effect of tional changes which were designed, we must not re- of Pro^°^' gard it as an unimportant measure. It was a step prietors. towards the consolidation of the whole body of colo nies. Though the two Jerseys and Pennsylvania were not con nected by any political bond, yet they were now exposed to influ ences which fitted them to work together at a future day. Each was largely influenced by Quakerism. Each came under the personal Influence of one man, William Penn. The records of ' Letter from Johnstone of Spotswoode, in the Model, p. 299. ^The Labadists, pp. 173-227. 326 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. each state show a certain Identity of principle guiding legislation. The colonists were drawn from the same sources ; we may in fact say that from 1680 onwards the three provinces were fed by one common stream of emigration. If the new Proprietors had erred In thinking that they could suddenly impose on the colonists a new system of government. The Pro- Constructed without regard to its existing condition, ?Jpre-" they at least deserve the credit of having soon drawn Tr'Mident h2s^ from an untenable position. They saw that no committee, good administrative results could attend the action of a body living in England and endeavoring to manage the affairs of the colony. Accordingly In 1684 the authority of the whole body of Proprietors was vested in a resident committee.' Their approval was to give teraporary validity to laws, and thus the legislature was freed from the Inconvenience of referring all Its measures to a non-resident body. They were furthermore in trusted with the duty of maintaining the territorial rights of the Proprietors, acting, in fact, as the resident agents of an absentee Proprietor. The political authority of the Proprietors was short-lived, and even while it lasted ineffectual. But by this system of delegation they saved their territorial rights, and ad ministered thera with better effect. Meanwhile the glowing pictures of colonial prosperity drawn by Lawrie and his friends were doing little to attract colonists. Lack of The contrast between the reluctance of the Scotch to si'as^'m'in Support Ncw Jcrscy and the success with which the scoUand, Darlen scheme appealed to them illustrates the national character as it then was. The Darlen scheme was ex clusive and military. It appealed to the patriot and to the soldier of fortune. There was little attraction In tbe prospect of being absorbed into a community of English farmers and tradesmen. Such emigration as there was from Scotland was hardly the result of voluntary choice. Among those who took a leading Scot of part in pressing the claims of New Jersey on his Pitiochie ' countrymen was George Scot of PItlochie. He was a ^ Leaming and Spicer, p. 195. * The main, one may indeed say the only, authority for Scot's proceedings is Wodrow. His partisan bias makes him a dangerous witness, but here one sees no special reason why it should have misled him. For Scot's own writ ing see the introductory note to this chapter. SCOT OF PITLOCHIE. 3^7 wealthy laird in Midlothian, who had three times been heavily fined and imprisoned for persistent attendance at conventicles and for harboring a Nonconformist minister. It was during his third Imprisonment that the change of proprietorship In New Jersey seemed to offer a refuge for persecuted Covenanters. The presence of Perth among the Proprietors, Royalist and High Churchman though he was, was no obstacle to such a scheme. His tenets, political and religious, were but a matter of convenience. Covenanters In Scotland were obnoxious to him as interfering with a system of government In which he was per sonally interested. He assuredly would not have thought of sacrificing to the demands of religious uniformity anything which ¦could help the material prosperity of the colony. Nor was his presence, and that of others who may have thought with him, likely to stand in the way of Scot's projects. The Proprietors of East Jersey, as we have already seen. Included men of widely different views in politics and religion, Klngsmen and Common- wealthmen. Churchmen and Quakers. Nothing is more note- •w^orthy in the history of Scotland during the seventeenth century than the ease with which men of widely different views and prin- •ciples could form temporary combinations. The men who plotted for Argyle and Monmouth and murdered Sharp in the interests of the Covenant were ready at a later day to plot against William, and to support James and Dundee for the same end. Another peculiarity of Scotland at that time no doubt made Scot's task an easier one. Predial servitude was still a recog nized institution in Scotland. In the English plantations the class of Indented servants was mainly recruited by professional kidnappers, or from men exempted from the gallows. But the Scotch laborer who voluntarily sold himself for a term of serv ice was not sinking below the level commonly occupied in his own country by a collier or saltworker. Accordingly Scot asked and obtained leave from the Privy Council to transport with him a company of men like himself iindergoing Imprisonment for their religious practices. But it was specially provided that he should not take advantage of this to remove any prisoners of importance, since none might go who had real estate of more than a hundred pounds annual value. The whole company collected amounted to two hundred. A 328 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. contemporary chronicle not likely to be unfavorable to Scot accused him of "tampering with" some of the prisoners, by promising them their liberty in New Jersey on a payment of five pounds.' This is denounced as "making merchandise of the suf fering people of God." As far as we can see, Scot asked for nothing but a very moderate recompense for the necessary cost of outfit and transport. The voyage was disastrous: violent sickness broke out, and Scot with seventy of his followers perished. Among the trage dies of the voyage was the death of Scot's daughter, Euphemia, newly nriarried to a young Scotchman of a noted Covenanting house, John Johnstone, destined to play a leading part in the his tory of New Jersey. The Presbyterian chronicler of whom I have just spoken tells us that the ship's captain made an attempt to land them in Virginia, there to be sold as slaves, and was only thwarted by weather which forced him to his original destination. One is tempted to class this with the legend which brought the Mayflower to Plymouth not of set pur pose, but as the result of Dutch malevolence and the captain's treachery. This, though the most extensive, was not the only immigration Into New Jersey brought about by the political and ecclesiastical Lord Neil troublcs of Scotland. After the extinction of Ar- campbeii. gyle's rebellion his brother, Neil Campbell, already one of the Proprietors, visited the colony, followed by many of the defeated party, and was appointed Governor." Campbell's stay in the colony was a short one. Within half a year he re signed his post, and named Andrew Hamilton as his successor, an appointment confirmed by the trustees." Andrew Hamilton was, as his name suggests, of Scotch ex traction. He himself was established as a merchant in London. Andrew HIs conncctlon with colonial politics lasted for some Hamilton, years, and he showed himself throughout a capable administrator, with clear and sound views of colonial policy; but In his present post he had little opportunity of displaying his fitness for office. ' Wodrow. " Whitehead, E. Jersey, p. 117. Mr. Whitehead says he was "Deputy Gov ernor." He was "Deputy" only in the sense of representing the Proprietors. ' N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 541. DONGAN AND NEW JERSEY. 329 The removal of Andros had as far as outward appearances went re-established peace between New York and New Jersey. Jealousy But there were underlying causes of jealousy and Ne'vyYork enmity which went far deeper than the personal feel- settiers. Jng gf any one official. New Jersey was a perpetual menace to the commercial prosperity of her neighbor. Unless the New York officials could exercise their authority over the settlers to the west of the Hudson it was wholly Impossible for them to check smuggling in their own territory. Moreover that which tbe Proprietors of New Jersey made the chief aim, the establishment of a prosperous seaport at Perth Amboy, was fraught with danger to New York. By granting more ad vantageous terms to merchants, the Proprietors could draw off the stream of trade and emigration to their own colony. For New York was not like a New England town, where the settlers were bound to the spot by ties other than those of self-interest and stronger. The New York traders and householders now felt the reality of the danger. If we may believe a memorial sent by the Mayor of New York to the Proprietors' Secretary, by 1685 the city had lost a third of its trade, and there was a manifest falling off in inhabitants and in buildings.' Thus, outrageous as had been the form of Andros's proceed ings, there was some justification for the feeling which prompted Dealings of them. There was no danger of their being imitated witifNew ''y a rnan so sagacious and self-restrained as Dongan. Jersey. jjjg relations with the rulers of New Jersey were ostensibly friendly. But he was in reality just as urgent for re union as any of his predecessors. Early in 1684 we find him sending home a memorial in which the Proprietor is urged to re- annex New Jersey, and thus prevent the ruin of New York.' The New Jersey Proprietors at once addressed an angry remon strance to Dongan." He received It courteously and with a soft answer, but none the less persisted in his advice to his master." The general dispute was embittered by a conflict of claims for a piece of territory. Staten Island, lying In the very mouth Contest for of the Hudson, might well seem to each colony an Island. Invaluable possession. Without the control of it the ^ This memorial is in the N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 491. 'N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. pp. 358-59- ' Ih. p. 348. * lb. pp. 353-6. :330 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. trade neither of New York nor of Perth Amboy could be effectu ally secured against smugglers. The Island had since the very first establishment of New Jersey formed matter of debate. It was originally occupied under tbe Dutch West India Company, and thus formed part of New Netherlands. As such it passed in the natural course to New York. Berkeley and Carteret, however, put forward such claims to it as forming part of their grant that the Duke thought it well in 1668 to get a formal ac knowledgment of his right.' Philip Carteret himself had ap parently already acknowledged the validity of this claim by buy ing the island as a private estate from the Duke's representa tives." Next year Nicolls's successor Lovelace confirmed his patron's right by a purchase of the soil from the natives. After the treaty of Westminster the territory reverted to the Duke, ;and was made by Andros into a separate jurisdiction under a ranger. That office was held by John Palmer, at a later day a ¦conspicuous and not very creditable figure in the history both of New York and New England." No attempt was made for eleven years to challenge the title or to detach Staten Island from New York. But In 168 1 Carteret's widow revived the claim. The new title created by the grant of September 1680 furnished a pretext, but in all likelihood Lady Carteret built her hopes of ^success on the recall of Andros and the disfavor which had fallen upon the Duke. Accordingly, in July 1681, Philip Car teret wrote to Brockholls, the Deputy-Governor of New York, demanding in peremptory terms the surrender of Staten Island, as being included In the recent grant." At the same time a notice was sent to the settlers on the island forbidding them in any way to acknowledge the jurisdiction of New York. Brockholls met the demand with a plain refusal, whereupon Carteret announced his Intention of appealing to the Govern ment at home, and laying before them Brockholls's "uncivil" letter. Philip Carteret's claim dealt with political sovereignty over > Maverick, in a letter to Winthrop (February 24, 1669), says "Staten Island is adjudged to belong to New York." Mass. Hist. Coll. 4th series, vol. vii. p. 315. ' Brodliead, vol. ii. p. 149. 'Ih. p. 166. Mr. Brodhead quotes the actual text of the conveyance. * Carteret's letter and the other documents to which I refer are in the N. J. Archives, vol. i. pp. 349-52. DISPUTE ABOUT STATEN ISLAND. 33^ the Island. At the same time Lady Carteret, the widow of Sir George, who had died In 1680, was advancing a territorial claim on her own account. That could easily be met. Even If Staten Island had been Carteret's to dispose of, such territorial interest as he had In New Jersey was disposed of by a will which took it all out of the hands of his widow. If any claim could be set up. It must be made not by her, but by the legatees. Both Philip Carteret and Lady Carteret seem to have quietly accepted de feat. When in 1683, under the short-lived system of represent ative government introduced by Dongan, New York was divided into electoral counties, Staten Island was incorporated with one ¦of them. In the same year East Jersey under the new Proprietors was also divided into counties. No attempt was made to include Staten Island. This might have been taken for an acknowledg ment that the claim was at an end. But In 1685 Perth and his partners without any pretext reopened the matter. Dongan might well be Indignant when he learnt that papers were being ¦distributed among the settlers In the island bidding them accept the jurisdiction of New Jersey,' nor can we wonder that he should have pressed upon his patron the necessity of resuming his grant and annexing New Jersey to New York." At the same time Dongan addressed Perth as representing the Proprietors of New Jersey, clearly and forcibly setting forth the justice of the Duke's claim to the Island and the impolicy of ¦combating that claim, and pointing out that It was as well not to force the Duke to extremities. It was better to surrender Staten Island than to run the risk of some curtailment of terri tory on the mainland. The firm front shown by Dongan answered Its purpose, and the claim of New Jersey to Staten Island was quietly allowed to 'drop. The question was one of far more practical importance than .many of the barren disputes about territory which embittered the relations between colony and colony. Staten Island contained two hundred families. It commanded the mouth of the Hud son, and might at any time become the key to the navigation of the river. ' This is stated in Dongan's letter to Perth. It is in the N. Y. Docs. vol. ^"- P- 353. 'lb. pp. 354-6. 332 SE TTLEMEN T OF NEW JERSE Y. The various elements of division and discord from which East New Jersey had been suffering were happily absent In the state of Western province. Proprietors and settlers were a Jersey. homogeoeous body. There were no Inhabitants al ready established with their own traditions and usages, and It was therefore easy for the Proprietors to mold the colony to their own wishes. Moreover, they had the wisdom to steer clear of those elaborate fantasies with which the Eastern Pro prietors encumbered themselves. The first representative As sembly met In 1681.' It at once passed a set of resolutions defin ing the principles of the constitution. These were practically a repetition and acceptance of the concession. There was to be an Assembly elected every year. Their concurrence was necessary for all purposes of legislation, finance, or foreign policy. Nor could the Assembly Itself impose any tax to last beyond the period of its own life. There was to be full liberty of belief and worship, and no religious disabilities were to exist. While it was provided as by the Concessions that all public lands should be laid out by commissioners appointed by the As sembly, certain general principles were now set forth on which these commissioners should act. No one person was to have more than a certain amount of river frontage, and the settle ments were to be as far as possible continuous. Moreover, to promote the growth of a town at Burlington, It was enacted that any land there left for six months unoccupied and unemployed should revert to the community and be apportioned by the Land Coramissioners. Two years later this last provision was ex tended further, and it was enacted that no one should have land allotted to him at Burlington unless he gave security to build a house there. The proceedings of 1681 showed the perfect unanimity of feeling which existed between Proprietors and settlers. This Harmony was further confirmed In 1683. The Assembly of theTro" that year took upon Itself to investigate and decide and^th" ^^^ question whether this purchase was of land or of settlers. Government — In other words, what was the position of the Proprietors. Their unanimous decision was that the Pro prietors had acquired not merely the soil but also political ^ Laws of W. Jersey. FENWICK'S PROVINCE INCORPORATED. 333 rights." This action of the Assembly was In itself a proof that It regarded Itself not merely as the mouthpiece of the commonalty, but also of the Proprietors. For a third party, having no judicial status, to pronounce judgment on the relations between the Proprietors and the Crown would have been absurd. The vote of the Assembly was virtually a declaration by the Proprie tors themselves claiming certain rights. In the same year the Assembly modified that provision in the Fundamental Concessions which aimed at making them unalter able." While, however, it claimed for Its successors the right to make changes, it jealously fenced in that right. It could only be exercised by a majority of six-sevenths, and It could not be extended to what was regarded as the specially vital portions of the system. The laws which were to be exempt from this change were those which provided for liberty of conscience, for the security of property, for the annual meeting of the Assembly, for trial by jury, and that which required every verdict to be based on the evidence of two witnesses. The Concessions of West Jersey differed not a little from those of the Eastern colony in their practical, businesslike character. But they differed even raore widely in the general principles on which they rested. The East Jersey constitution was a system forced upon the settlers from outside. In disregard of their wishes and in defiance of their existing Institutions. The West Jersey constitution was almost as much the work of the settlers themselves as of the Proprietors. There was a possible element of discord in the Independent attitude of Fenwick. His position, however, was not materially Fenwick's changed. The grant of territory to Penn In 1681 de- fnlorp" tached the little dependency on the Delaware from rated. New York, and incorporated it with the new province of Pennsylvania. There was now no choice for Salem but Incor poration with Pennsylvania or West Jersey. In 1682 Fenwick made over his territorial rights to Penn and his partners, whose jurisdiction was thereby effectively established over the whole of West Jersey." The moderation and the conciliatory temper of the Proprietors ^ Laws of W. Jersey, p. 468. ' Ib. ' The deed of transfer was printed for the first time in the N. J. Archives, vol. I. p. 370. 334 SE TTLEMEN T OF NEW JERSE Y. did not wholly avert disputes. The settlers claimed the right to elect their own Governor. The Proprietors had at the outset Dispute Invested Bylling with that office. He discharged about the j^j duties by a deputy, Samuel Jennings. In 1865 governor. "'^ uuii.-.j j t- j , ., _ ship.! the Assembly, apparently without any communication with Bylling or the other Proprietors, elected Jennings as Gov ernor. Bylling refused to approve of the appointment, and the Assembly thereupon sent Jennings and another representative to England to confer with the Proprietors. At the same time they in some measure prejudged the question by appointing one Thomas Oliver Deputy-Governor. According to Quaker usage the matter was referred to the arbitration of a Committee of Friends. Their decision was in favor of the Proprietors, and when Bylling nominated one John Skene as Deputy-Governor, the Assembly acquiesced. The inclusion of West Jersey was really no essential part of the scheme of consolidation suggested by Dongan and adopted New by James. West Jersey belonged as distinctly to JormYpart what One may call the Delaware Bay group of settle- °^*ll'.''^"" ments as did East Jersey to those on the Hudson. solidatea -^ ,.\t , i • i • territory g^t neither the Duke of York nor his advisers were AndVos. likely to understand the different position of the two halves of the province. If the policy of resumption of charters and consolidation of government could be justified at all, as suredly It might be in the case of East Jersey. That colony was a standing menace to the commercial prosperity of New York, its independence made any effective system of revenue impossi ble, and the recent conduct of Its government in the matter of Staten Island showed that it might be a greedy and unscrupulous competitor for territory. The Eastern province dragged down the Western In Its inevitable fall. The one thing that might have saved either or both was the personal Influence of Penn at Court. But since he had become a separate colonial Proprietor with a province of his own, his interest In New Jersey had prac tically vanished. There are no extant documents to show pre cisely how the desire of James II. to consolidate the American ^ This account is borrowed from Mr. Whitehead's chapter on New Jersey in the Memorial History, vol. iii. His statements are based on two contem porary pamphlets. I have failed to find these either in the British Museum or in the Bodleian Library. EAST JERSEY OPPOSES ANNEXATION. 3351 colonies was brought before the Proprietors of New Jersey.. But in the summer of 1687 we find the Proprietors of the Eastern province laying before the Crown a representation evi dently meant as a protest against the Intended annexation to New York.' They point out that they are not in the position of ; Proprietors who have received a free grant from the Crown., They have invested a large sum In the province, and toi interfere with their proprietary rights Is to deprive them of all hope of return. The question of customs was dealt with some what superficially and disingenuously. It might be true, the- protest urged, that if the duties imposed at the New Jersey ports were lower than those at New York, ships would land at the former and so trade would be drawn off. But if the scale of customs in New Jersey was so raised as to equalize it with that at New York, the only effect would be to enable other ports to. undersell them both. To this it might fairly be answered that there was a certain fixed amount of trade which must go to the: Hudson, and that New York and East Jersey were the only possible rivals who could compete for it. Then came a proposal which showed that the Proprietors at tached little value to their political rights In themselves. What. they really dreaded was not the loss of sovereignty, but such a. transfer as should make their province a dependency of New York, and so put her at the mercy of her commercial rival. Ac cordingly they petitioned not to retain their charter, but that the. whole of New Jersey, East and West, should be united In a single colony. Let New York have no authority over the cus toms and no appellate jurisdiction, but let New Jersey be under- the direct control of the Crown. Let the King show his respect for the interest of the Proprietors by appointing one of them Governor. The great number of them would give him an ample choice. There Is nothing to show how this document was received,. and for some time we hear no more in the way of either threat Proposed or protest. But a document Is extant which shows. of aut°h1)"- that the Proprietors had found resistance useless. In ^yj^yj*!" April 1688 they drew up a short statement setting tors. forth that as the King desired "for several weighty • N. J. Archives, vol. i. p. 535. It is headed "Representation of the case of the province of East Jersey, with their proposals." 336 SETTLEMENT OF NEW JERSEY. reasons of State" to resume the government of the colony they made a full surrender of authority.' If the records of the surrender of East Jersey are scanty, that of the Western province has left no traces. We only know that Surrender both wctc Included in the commission issued to An- provi'nces dros In March 1688," that in the following August to Andros. jjg yigited first Elizabethtown and then Burlington, and that at botb places he asserted his authority and was favor ably received." It is easy to see why the transfer was so quietly accepted. There was no interference with local institutions, and as long as that was so it was a matter of indifference to the settlers where the titular sovereignty resided. The terri torial rights of the Proprietors were respected. And though the change as made was not exactly that which the East Jersey Pro prietors had asked for, yet it was still further from that which they had dreaded. The real danger in the eyes of the Proprietors was incorporation with New York. Give the New York As sembly any sort of authority, and commercial jealousy raight check the tide of emigration into New Jersey and make the ter ritory worthless. But now New York was only one of a group of united dependencies, invested with no superiority and no jurisdiction over her neighbors. In the case of West Jersey the matter was probably simplified by the death of Bylling, which, as far as can be now learnt, hap- Daniei pened early in 1687. His share passed Into the Coxe. hands of one Daniel Coxe, who bears the title of doctor, though there is nothing to show In what faculty. His Intentions are set forth In a long letter addressed to the whole body of Proprietors." With somewhat grotesque pomposity he disclaims the inten tion of "arrogating to hiraself any absolute despotic power." Nevertheless, it is the opinion of "all intelligent disinterested persons" that the Government of England, by Sovereign and Parliament, is the best of constitutions. Since New Jersey is fortunate enough to have a government modeled on that, Coxe will not attempt any change, but will duly fall into bis place as ^ N. J. Archives, vol. ii. p. 26. ' The commission to Andros is in the N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. pp. 537-42. "Andros to the Lords of Trade, N. Y. Docs. vol. iii. p. 554. * N. J. Archives, vol. ii. p. 4. In this letter, written September 1687, Coxe uses the words "after Mr. Bylling's decease." ANDROS'S POLICY TOWARDS NEW JERSEY. 337 a constitutional monarch. There may be some doubt whether Bylling's consent to the Fundamental Concessions was really binding on him, as at the time he gave It he was not yet Invested with full authority. Coxe, however, will waive his strict rights and accept the constitutions as they stand. There is a grotesque contrast between the profession and the reality. As a matter of fact the only position that Coxe occupied was that for a few years of the chief partner in a firm of absentee landlords. There is nothing to show that his acquiescence in the surrender of New Jersey was ever asked for, even as a matter of form. It is probable that New Jersey owed something to the troubles of the northern colonies. To cope with the stubborn will of Policy of New England was a task which left Andros no lel- wards\ viction. The light indwelling In all men was not with him a conventional doctrine of the schools, but a guiding principle of action. Yet In his Indian policy he bequeathed to his successors, a legacy In which good and evil, justice and weakness, were mingled. In Its steadfast policy of fair dealing with the natives, Pennsylvania was an honorable exception to the rest of the Eng lish colonies. An optimistic conviction that justice and human ity were by themselves all that was needed in determining the attitude of the white man to the Indian was responsible for many errors and tragedies, and that conviction was a legacy be queathed to the colony by Its founder. The first Assembly was hardly intended as an ordinary meet ing for purposes of legislation and government. It was rather The second "^ the nature of a special convention met to accept Assembly.' gnd ratify the constitution as prescribed by Penn.. This, indeed, was implied in the clause which made the Assem bly of the first year a primary one, while those which succeeded it were to be of the ordinary representative pattern. Accord ingly, another Assembly was summoned early in 1683. The result of their labors was practically the remodeling of the con stitution. Time had not yet revealed all the defects Inherent In. the charter granted by Penn to his colonists. But one very practical difficulty of a kind likely to impress ordinary men had at once made Itself felt. The colonists protested that it was. Impossible to furnish the necessary number of members, either for the Council or the Assembly. Accordingly, they returned but three Councilors and nine Representatives for each county. Whether this failure showed Penn the need for remodeling- his constitution, or whether, as It was put to the test of practice, its other defects became manifest, does not appear. But Penn's opening words to the Representatives seem to Imply that changes had been suggested. They petitioned that the failure of the electors to comply with the requirements of the charter might not invalidate their rights. Penn replied that they might amend, alter, or add for the public good. If, like most founders of commonwealths, he erred somewhat In overrating his own prescience, in endeavoring to fashion an Ideal constitution with out waiting for the teaching of events. In this Instance at least ' Proud, vol. i. p. 235. 40O THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. he made ample amends by his readiness to abandon an untenable position. Penn and his colonists seem to have thought that it was wiser policy to construct a fresh instrument than to piece and patch the The new ol^ charter. When he offered the alternative of charter.' ^}jg qJJ charter or a new one, the unanimous demand was for the latter. Accordingly, a joint committee of the two houses was set to work, with general instructions to frame the required Instrument. The result of their labors was the Issue of a new charter. This removed the most obvious blot on the earlier charter, the feature which had been most productive of immediate Incon venience. The numbers of both houses were reduced. The charter only required for the present eighteen members for the Council and thirty-six for the Assembly. These might be ulti mately expanded to the original limits of seventy-two and two hundred. The cumbrous arrangement of breaking up- the Council into committees was abandoned. But a very signifi cant clause was introduced, providing that "one-third of the pro vincial Council, residing with the Governor from time to time, shall with the Governor have tbe care of the management of public affairs relating to the peace, justice, treasury, and Improve ment of the province and territories, and to the good education of youth and sobriety of the manners of the Inhabitants therein as aforesaid." This was practically the creation of a Council in the generally recognized sense of the word. At the same time there was no vital change in the system of legislation. Measures were to be introduced by the Council. The power of the Assembly was. Indeed, somewhat strengthened by a clause providing that their approval of any new law must be carried by a majority of two-thirds. This in a somewhat cumbrous fashion Increased the power of the popular Represent atives to resist encroachments by the Governor or the Council. It did not give the popular Representatives any power In the way of constructive legislation and it greatly increased the chance of a deadlock In administration. It might deter the Governor and Council from bringing forward unpopular measures; It in no way compelled them to bring forward popular ones. In the ' Printed in Proud, vol, ii. p. 21. THE NEW CHARTER. 401 matter of the appointment of officials and in the provisions for secrecy of voting the provisions of the old charter were left intact. One practical advantage there was no doubt in the formal introduction and acceptance of a new charter. The Incorpora tion of Delaware was subsequent to the passing of the old charter. The application of the charter, therefore, to those three counties was implied, not expressed, and future complica tions might be avoided if a new charter were accepted by the whole united colony. One matter of discussion, and In some measure of dispute, was the appointment of public officers. Was it to be vested in the Governor or In the Assembly? The first clause In the new charter vested the appointment of all officers in the Assembly. It was agreed, however, that this should be suspended during the life of the Proprietor, and that his power of appointment should not be curtailed. A letter which Penn sent home this summer Is, perhaps, the most Important document In the history of the colony.' Hack- Penn's neyed though It is by constant quotation. Its in- accountof "' . . , , ¦' , .^ . , \ . , the colony, terest IS neither exhausted nor impaired. It is of double interest. It Is the description of a new country, its resources and its in habitants, by a singularly acute observer, detached from all prej udices likely to Impair his judgment. It also shows us the hopes and expectations that guided Penn in his work as a constructive statesman. In bis description of the country Penn shows himself equally alive to Its picturesqueness and attractiveness as an abode and to its material resources. He dwells on the rich woodland flowers, from which even the best-stored London gardens might borrow something. March brings with it cold, but not, as In England, accompanied by north-east winds and "foul thick black weather," but dry frost, with a sky as clear as summer. The woods abound in wild fowl, and the soil is naturally productive. There are wild vines. These he hopes may with care be im proved Into yielding wine. He will not, however, rely on that but will import vines. Between the two he hopes to make as ' The letter is addressed to the Society of Friends. Proud prints it in full, vol. vi. pp. 246-64. 402 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. good wine as any European country of the same latitude can yield. Live stock, too, of every sort is Increasing; two cargoes of horses have already been exported to Barbadoes. Unfounded stories of scarcity have reached England. "The greatest hard ship we have suffered hath been salt meat." Penn's account of the natives Is of peculiar Interest. It Is pervaded by a pathetic optimism. First and almost alone among Penn's European travelers, he writes of the Indians not as ofthe''*'"" a people on a wholly lower level, but as having opin- natives. ;Qns to be respected and institutions to be seriously studied and respected. He dwells throughout on the happier side of their life and the better side of their character. Penn's con ception of the equality of man leads him In the track followed by Rousseau. He finds true happiness and true wisdom in tbe woods. If the savages are "Ignorant of our pleasures, they are also free frora our pains. They are not disquieted with bills of lading and exchange, nor perplexed with chancery suits and ex chequer reckonings. We sweat and toil to live; their pleasure feeds them ; I mean their hunting, fishing and fowling, and their table is spread ever5rwhere." Their one source of unhappiness is that which civilized men have brought araong them, drink. He dwells on their hospitality and their mirthfulness in ordi nary life. "The most merry creatures that live, they feast and dance perpetually," yet he is not less struck with their gravity in all public matters. At a conference not a man is seen to whisper and smile. He has "never seen more natural sagacity without the help (I was going to say the spoil) of tradition. It Is admirable to consider how powerful the Kings are, and yet how they move by the breath of their people." His enthusiasm extends to all details. He dwells on the personal comeliness of the natives. Their features may find a prototype in ancient Rome, their complexion In modern Italy. No European lan guage "hath words of more sweetness or greatness or accent or emphasis." A list of place-names quoted "have grandeur in them." With the taste not uncommon among Biblical students for strange ethnological speculations, Penn endeavors to trace- back the stock of the natives to the Jews. Penn's indifference to dogma, to the introduction of any met aphysical element into religion, enables him to enter Into the theology of the Indians with a sympathy far beyond the reach DISPUTE WITH MARYLAND. 403 of the ordinary missionary. He does not see dark superstitions to be extirpated. Rather he would tell the natives in the spirit of St. Paul that he had to declare to them the God whom they Ignorantly worshiped. "Without the help of metaphysics," they have arrived at the two essential articles of faith, belief In God and In a future life. Of the civilized inhabitants already In the country Penn tells us no more than we already know. But we learn something of Progress the progress of bis favorite project, the formation of of Phila- . , . T.1 -1 , , , • , , deiphia. a Capital City. Philadelphia has already four-score houses, with merchants and craftsmen following their vocations as fast as they can. It was Inevitable from the outset that Penn's grant should bring him Into conflict with the Proprietor of Maryland. Of Dispute all the disputes which had their origin In the slipshod Maryland, dealings of the Crown with American territory, that was the bitterest and the most prolonged. It can be more con veniently dealt with, not now, but as a detached episode belong ing to a later phase of our subject. In 1684 Penn left his colony. The years which followed were years of trouble and disappointment to Penn himself, years ^nd" h^' °^ anarchy in the colony. Penn's friendship with self against Jamcs brought hira into discredit with those who of Popery, would naturally have been his political allies. The old charge of Jesuitry was revived. A letter from Sir William Popple, the Secretary to the Lords of Trade, shows that the ac cusation was Influencing those who had to deal with Penn in his character of a colonial Proprietor.' Penn's reply is a thor oughly characteristic exposition of his doctrine of toleration. He plainly denies the charge of being a Papist, and in more than in one detail proves Its utter absurdity. But he shows as plainly that the charge of belonging to any particular school of Chris tianity or holding any set of dogmas is one which he esteems but lightly. "As If," he says, "a mistake about an obscure proposi tion of faith were a greater evil than the breach of an undoubted precept. Such a religion the devils themselves are not without ; for they have both faith and knowledge : but their faith doth not work by love, nor their knowledge by obedience." And one ' Popple's letter and Penn's answer are both given in full by Proud, vol. i. pp. 314-32- 404 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. may almost say that the whole doctrine of toleration is summed up when Penn says, of liberty of conscience, "I ever understood that to be the natural right of all men, and that he that had a religion without It his religion were none of his own." Un happily Penn failed to see that to many men such an attitude was Incomprehensible. That toleration was compatible with earnest ness was a conviction so deeply rooted in his own mind that he could not even iraagine others in honesty holding a contrary be lief. Confident In the stability of his own religious convictions, he could not in the least comprehend how they could become sus pected In the eyes of others. The same inability to understand the views, possibly too limited, and the suspicions, possibly unreasonable, of his fellow- Diificuity men was telling against Penn in his secular career. iSdi'an''' Discontent was showing itself among the colonists. trade. Although Penn had refused to alienate the Indian trade, yet he had allowed a body to come Into existence with cer tain restricted rights of trade and with the right to acquire land. Their President, Nicholas Moore, was also Chief Justice, a some what undesirable combination of offices. He Incurred the dis pleasure of the Representatives, and was by them impeached be fore the Council. After two refusals to appear, he was pro visionally deprived of all his public offices. Whether he made submission and was acquitted does not appear, nor Is there any evidence that he was restored to the office of Chief Justice. But in the following year he was appointed by the Proprietor one of the Commissioners to administer the colony In his absence.' The spirit in which Penn met the complaints of his settlers was characteristic. He writes to some of his principal followers exhorting them to concord. "Be not so governmentlsh, so noisy and open in your dissatisfactions." In other words, leave the forms of government to be settled for you by a well-meaning ruler who knows what you really want. One Inherent defect of the constitution at once showed itself. The Committee of the Council nominated by the Proprietor was found too large for practical work. In 1686 he cut It down to a Council of Five, or one might rather say he superseded the Coun cil by an appointment of that number, by the title of Commis- ' Proud, vol. i. pp. 295-9. LACK OF ACTIVITY IN PUBLIC LIFE. 40S sioners of State. Penn's Instructions to these Commissioners are trenchantly despotic. Three of them are to form a quorum, me*nt''ofa" ^"'^ ™^^ cxcrcise the power delegated to them by small the Proprietor of vetoing the amending laws. If the ¦ Council.' Council atc negligent In their attendance they are to be dissolved. No conference is to be held between the two chambers; each Is to be kept strictly to Its own functions, the Council to proposing laws, the Lower House to accepting or re jecting them. Furthermore the Council was to abrogate all laws passed since Penn's departure, and to pass them afresh amended by the Council In conjunction with a new Assembly. The Council are also Instructed to maintain the decisions of the law courts by "turning their severe brow upon all the troublesome and vexatious, more especially trifling appeals." No Stuart king, no minister of the school of Strafford, could have given instructions more despotic in tone, more calculated to uproot constitutional liberty. A constitution containing in it many elements of arbitrary governraent was to be so adminis tered as to deprive it of all those influences which made for freedom. Such conduct In one like Penn, a man of real and even intense benevolence, no self-seeker. In many respects humble and distrustful of his own judgment, should make us often pause before we condemn the moral principles of those whose political action we justly reprobate. One matter of coraplaint In Penn's Instructions to his Coun cilors Is "the most slothful and dishonorable attendance of the Lack of Council." We sec Other traces of thls lack of publlc public life, spirit and indifference to public duties. In 1684 the Assembly found It necessary to require that at least one Repre sentative from each county should attend under pain of a fine of one pound for every day's absence." The same temper showed Itself In the neglect of judicial duties. An Act was passed im posing a fine of thirty shillings on justices and ten shillings on jurors who should fail to attend County Courts." To curtail still further the political action of the general body of citizens, and to vest power practically in a little oligarchy nominated by the Proprietor, was assuredly not the way to cure this, or to in- ' Penn's instructions to these five Commissioners are contained in a letter of December i, 1686, printed by Proud, vol. i. p. 305. ' Laws, p. 167. ' lb. p. 176. 4o6 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. spire the settlers with an interest In public affairs, or a sense of public responsibility. The scanty records of the legislation of this time throw little light on the life of the colony. An Act limiting the rate of Legislative Interest to eight per cent, shows that the colony suf- measures. fered from that lack of money which was such an economical hindrance alike In the mercantile commonwealths of New England and the slave plantations of the south.' It may also be taken probably, though less certainly, as evi dence of the growing prosperity of the colony, or one should per haps rather say, of its increasing comraercial enterprise. Bor rowers are of two classes, those who borrow to meet unproduc tive expenditure and those who use their credit to extend their business beyond the limits of their available capital. The usages and traditions of the Quaker colony made It certain that there would be no borrowers of the first class to need what is considered the protection of the State. If raen sought to borrow It shows that the trade of the colony held out prospects, which terapted traders to strain their credit to what seemed dangerous lengths. Another Act passed about this time illustrates that unpractical optimism which not infrequently appeared in Penn's constructive Act against polIcy. It prohibited paid lawyers, by providing that lawyers. no One should plead In court till he had made a formal declaration that he had not and would not receive any reward." By 1685 Philadelphia contained over three hundred and fifty houses, and as a consequence the value of town lots had risen In Growth of sorae cases it is said as much as four thousand per ony"nd Cent." There is also indirect evidence of the rapid mor^a'i''"'^"* growth of the colony in a letter from Penn, where he decline. spcaks of the number of drinking houses and of the looseness that is committed in the caves.* It is plain that settlers, pressing in faster than houses could be built for them, took up their abodes, like the dwellers by the Loire, in caves on the bank of the Delaware. It is easy to see how the colony was peculiarly exposed to the risk of moral disorder. In com mon with New York and New Jersey, it lacked the restraints •Laws, p. 180. ^Records, vol. i. p. 172. ' This is stated in the Memorial History, vol. v. p. 493. See Appendix V. * The letter is published by Proud, vol. i. p. 296. INDIAN ALARM. 407 which operated on their northern and southern neighbors. New Hampshire was protected by its poverty and unattractiveness, and in all the other northern colonies the system of exclusive churches operated as a process of selection, and tended to make -every individual citizen in some measure responsible for the cor porate morality of the whole society. In the southern colonies all public life was in the hands of an oligarchy, with no doubt the failings, but also some of the redeeming virtues, of an oli garchy. Anarchy below was repressed by the system of servi tude. Nor were the southern colonies exposed to those tempta tions and dangers which the Greek philospher dreaded for his model state In the coming and going of a crowd of traders and sailors. But the Quaker colonies. New York and in a great measure Rhode Island, were exposed to those temptations and dangers with no counteracting influence. There men were neither restrained by the ecclesiastical machinery and the exact ing corporate morality of New England, nor by the semi-feudal ¦system of the southern plantations. Another measure shows that the possibility of danger from the Indians was wholly forgotten. An attempt was raade to repeal Alarm the Act whlch prohibited the sale of drink to the Jrom the . i .-^, . - . ^ Indians. oativcs. 1 his sense of security was for a raoment dispelled. During the year 1688 a rumor reached the colonists, ¦set on foot as it would seem by two mischief-raaking or foolish squaws In New Jersey, that the Indians were about to invade Pennsylvania and massacre the settlers." The report soon gathered substance and definiteness. Three families, it was said, had actually been cut off. In raany colonies such a panic would have led to a wild outburst of retaliation. That it was not so w^as largely due to the principles which Penn and the Quaker teachers associated with him had impressed on the colonists. A peaceful embassy was sent to the Indian head chief. Himself old and crippled, he was surrounded by an armed force of five hundred warriors. If any evil designs had been entertained this show of boldness and confidence on the part of the settlers at once put an end to them. Kindly words were exchanged, and the friendship which Penn had labored to build up suffered no hurt. ' Laws, p. 169. ' Proud, vol, i. p. 336. 4o8 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. In 1688 Lloyd, whom Penn had left as his deputy, resigned. Penn appointed in his stead one John BlackweU, who was not a Penn's in- Quaker. At a later day Penn apologized for this ap- to his pointment, pleading that no Friend would take the BlackweU. post. Yet It is clear that at the time of the appoint ment Penn felt satisfied with it, and not as It would seem with out good reason. BlackweU was in Penn's judgment "a grave, sober, wise man, I suppose independent In judgment." He was well connected, having married a daughter of General Lambert, and he had been in the paymasters' department of the Common wealth array.' In a later letter, after BlackweU had disap pointed the hopes formed of him, Penn describes him as "being in England and Ireland of great repute for integrity, ability, and virtue." Yet in this same letter Penn manifestly admits that the appointment had been a failure, owing in part to the "peevish ness" which BlackweU had shown to the Quakers." The in structions given to BlackweU are curiously illustrative of the weaker side of Penn's character as a statesman." They are per vaded by vagueness, by general declarations of principles, of which everyone would accept the propriety and almost everyone dispute the application. BlackweU Is Instructed "to be careful that speedy, as well as thorough and Impartial, justice be done; and virtue in all cherished and vice punished ; that feuds between persuasions or nations or countries be suppressed and extin guished if any be ; and if none, that by a good conduct they may be prevented." In other words, BlackweU Is, by some mysteri ous process not specified, to create a morally perfect community. The provinces of law and morality are confused by instructions "that the widow and orphan and absent raay be particularly re garded in their rights," and that BlackweU is to "rule the meek meekly, and those that will not be ruled, rule with authority." Even instructions that sound more definite are tinged by the same fault. BlackweU is to support the commissioners of prop erty where people are unruly in their settlements, or "comply not with reasonable obligations." Sheriffs and Clerks of the • "Treasurer to the Commonwealth's army in England, Scotland and Ireland," are Penn's actual words. The letter is quoted by Clarkson, vol. ii. p. 40. ' This letter is given by Proud in a note, vol. i. p. 340. It is here that Penn states that he could not find one of his own denomination to take the post. It will be seen hereafter what this peevishness in all likelihood was. ' These are given by Proud, vol. i. p. 339. GEORGE KEITH. 4C'9'i Peace are not to impose on the people, and "magistrates are tO' live peaceably and soberly, for I could not endure one loose or litigious person in authority." Penn fails to see that he is throughout using terms which in all likelihood the settlers and his representative will interpret each in his own fashion. The whole document. Indeed, illustrates that tendency of Penn's mind which made toleration seem to him so simple a matter, in tolerance so incomprehensible. He evidently thought that there was a broad ground of moral truth on which all men might: agree, disregarding theological differences. He forgot that while men may agree on the abstract doctrines of morality, any attempt to apply these doctrines to details of practice would be sure to reveal differences just as real as those which separate theologians. Meanwhile that spirit of theological discord which Penn so. dreaded, and which he believed himself to have exorcised, was. George making Itself felt among the settlers. The dispute as, Keith. recorded seems to have been from the outset per sonal. But In theological, as in political, quarrels the personal element readily comes to the front, and becomes not only the- most prominent but to many the most important feature in the contest. Earlier differences in which that personal element Is absent are forgotten. As it has come down to us, the dispute- was mainly due to the Independence and pugnacity of one man,. George Keith. Keith was, with the possible exception of Penn, the most cultivated and brilliant of all the early Quakers. He was, born about 1640, and graduated as a Master of Arts at Aberdeen. He was a born fighter, and it was probably rather opposition to authority than any positive adherence to the essential principles of Quakerism which led him to join the- brotherhood. In 1689 Keith went to Philadelphia. There he soon created scandal by holding, though not, as It would seem, very openly advocating, the doctrine of transmigration of souls. He also- quarreled with Penn's deputy, with Lloyd, and with another in fluential man, Stockdale. They retaliated by charging Keith with heresy. A large section, including. It Is said, a majority of elders, took his part. Finally, however, the magistrates, with probably an intuitive feeling that Keith's attitude and temper 4IO IHE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. were subversive of Quaker principles, had him tried fqr heresy by a tribunal specially appointed for that end. As tbe result, Keith was inhibited from teaching. Neverthe less, he and a number of followers held to their principles, call ing themselves Christian Quakers. In some respects his attitude seems to have been an application of Quaker doctrine too severely logical to be practical. He denounced the magistrates for help ing the friendly Indians against their enemies by supplying them with arms and ammunition, and for employing force against privateers. He also denounced slavery. Mixed with these moral protests were personal attacks on Lloyd. In 1694 Keith left Pennsylvania for England. There he held his ground for five years as the head of a congregation norainally Quaker, but bitterly opposed to the recognized Quaker practice and teaching. In 1 700 he abandoned this po sition and received episcopal ordination. Two years later he re turned to America, employed by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and acting as a strenuous and proselytizing repre sentative of the Church of England.' At the same time that Keith was disturbing the religious peace of the colony, it was being harassed by a series of secular disputes. In 1689, one Sarauel Richardson, a raember of the Council, was expelled by a vote of that body for having used un becoming language about the Governor. The right of the Council to take this step became the subject of much such a dis pute as raged over the expulsion of Wilkes." This was followed by a dispute prophetic of many future ones. There was an alarm of an Indian attack. BlackweU contended that the con trol of the militia was vested in the Governor, as it is in Eng land in the Crown. To this some objected on the ground that their conscience forbade them to approve of any use of force. One member of the Assembly, Dr. Hues, boldly defied public opinion, and proposed that every man should provide himself with arms and aramunition. Apparently, however, the danger passed over without the difference of opinions coming to a bead." ' There is a full account of Keith in the Dictionary of National Biography. His writings, mostly controversial, are numerous, often acute, but somewhat verbose. ' Records, vol. i. p. i88. " For this dispute see Records, vol. i. pp. 299-307. THE PROVINCE AND THE TERRITORIES. 4" A dispute which followed had more definite and abiding conse quences. Lloyd, the President of the Council, and BlackweU, Dispute the Governor, seem to have been respectively the between heads of the Quaker and the non-Quaker parties. and^'h" BlackweU endeavored in the first instance to deprive territories, Lloyd of the custody of the great seal, and then to Invalidate his election as a Councilor. Lloyd, backed by the Quakers, held his ground on both points.' BlackweU thereupon left the colony, but as it would seem without formally resigning his post as Governor. Before departing he read certain in structions which he had received from Penn. The Assembly was to choose three, out of whom Penn would appoint one Deputy-Governor. Pending the arrival of his commission that one of the three who had received most votes was to act pro visionally as Governor. At the same time that BlackweU re ported this instruction, he apologized for his own "Ignorance and weakness," and acknowledged his deserved unpopularity." The Assembly then reappointed Lloyd Deputy-Governor, as it would seem without authority from the Proprietors, and with out any acknowledgment that necessity had driven them to an Irregular step. The iraraediate result of this was a rupture be tween the two sections of the colony, between the three counties of the original royal grant and those afterwards acquired from the Duke of York." There Is little to show what determined the attitude taken up by the two parties. It may well be that sorae personal question which has left no trace in the records entered into it. Visibly and externally the main ground was the appointment of judges. The Inhabitants of the lower province seem to have thought that in this matter their due rights were overlooked. Their demand apparently was the not unreasonable one that a separate commis sion should be made out for each portion of the colony. Each commission should contain the names of all the judges In the colony, but in that for the upper half one of the judges appointed for that district should have precedence, and so for the lower half. Lloyd and those merabers of the Council who represented the wishes of the upper province resisted this concession. Six of the Councilors from that district met and, taking upon themselves ' Laws, p, 520. ' Records, vol. i. p. 312. ' See Penn's letter, 29 iv. 1682, in Proud, vol. i. p. 357. 412 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. the functions of the Council, appointed six judges for their own counties.' It Is hardly to be expected that Penh, living in England, harassed by private anxieties and hunted down as a Jacobite spy, could give much profitable attention to the affairs of his col ony, least of all to a dispute involving probably complex per sonal issues. His belief, too, that forms were all much the same, that there was always In the citizens a fund of good sense and moderation which would keep matters straight, now led him to suggest a way out of the difficulty. He suggested the adoption of one among three alternative schemes of governraent. The executive power might be vested in the Deputy-Governor, In the Council, or in a Committee of Five. The Upper Counties were In favor of a Deputy-Governor. The Lower, however, or at least seven Representatives who claimed to speak In their name, objected." They should prefer government by five Commis sioners; they would accept that by the Council. But they wholly objected to the cost of a Deputy-Governor, and to a scheme which would vest all power in the hands of one person. In all likelihood their objection lay In the certainty that a Deputy-Governor would be chosen frora the Upper Counties. Tbey further stipulated that if the Government were vested in the Council, the representatives of the lower half should have a veto in all appointments of officials within their own district. None of these terms of agreement were acceptable to the in habitants of the Upper Counties. A compromise was then ef fected, introducing a novel and peculiar arrangement. There was to be one representative Assembly legislating for the whole colony, but two executives, one for the Upper, the other for the Lower province. It was but natural that every adherent of the fallen house should be looked on with suspicion as a probable malcontent and a possible spy. There seems to have been some delay in the proc lamation of the new Sovereigns," which may have given rise to a suspicion that there was a Jacobite tendency in the colony. By ' The demand of the six Councilors for the territories is given in the Archives. Their action is condemned in a declaration drawn up by Lloyd and the Councilors for the province. This is given in Proud, vol. i. p. 352, ' This declaration is given in Proud, vol. i. p. 355. ' Records, vol. i. p. 302. PENN REMONSTRATES WITH FLETCHER. 413 3692 the tide of Whig feeling was running with such force against Penn as to bring with it the loss of his privileges as a Pennsyi- Proprietor. The mode of his deprivation was alto- Thilied'^n gether peculiar. There was no formal revocation Fletcher's ^f j^Js charter. But while his charter was left intact, commis- ision. Fletcher, the Governor of New York, received a com mission extending his authority to Pennsylvania. The only an nouncement of the extent and nature of the change was that Implied in this commission to Fletcher.' This set forth that by great neglects and miscarriages, and the absence of the Propri etor, Pennsylvania had fallen In great confusion, and that it was therefore necessary that "we (the King) should take the :government into our own hands." At the same time the system of government was modified. There was still to be a Council and an Assembly of Representa tives. But the Council was to be nominated by Fletcher. It Tvas to consist of twelve, and three were to be a quorum. The only change in the system of administration was beyond doubt an improvement. All laws were to be transmitted within three months of their passing, and the approval or dissent of the Crown was to be declared at once." Penn did not suffer this encroachment on his rights to pass un challenged. In December 1692 we find him writing to Fletcher Penn's In a tone of vigorous remonstrance. There is little .strance. of Quakerly submissiveness in the opening words, "I caution thee that I am an Englishman." Pennsylvania, the soil and the government, have been "dearly purchased" by him. There have been no judicial proceedings against him. The abrogation of bis rights can only be due to misinformation given to the Board of Trade. "I hope therefore thou wilt tread softly, •and with caution in this matter."" About the same time we find Penn writing to a friend in Pennsylvania In a more moderate and diplomatic strain : "The bearer will Inform you of the transfer of Pennsylvania to the Governor of New York during the war and my absence. Insist upon your Patent with wisdom and moderation but steady integrity. You will obey the Crown of England speaking the ' For Fletcher's commission see Col. Papers, 1696-7, 2296. ' Colonial State Papers, 1692, 2296. * lb. December 5, 1692. 414 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. language and voice of the law, which this Is not, but sic volo, sic jubeo, due doubtless to misadvice of your neighbors that the French will make their way into the colonies through you. Set forth the falsehood of It by your singular situation on land and sea, your hazards, charges, labors — that the government was your motive more than land, that you were a people who could have lived at home, and went there not upon motives of guilt or poverty, and that It will ruin the Colony which brings more customs to the Crown than revenue to the colonial government." "Friends will deliver your representations to the Lords of Trade or the King In Council, if you protest against any proceedings of the Governor of New York upon this arbitrary commission and excessive anxiety as to the French.'" In 1693 Fletcher reached Philadelphia, and was apparently well received by the settlers." The tranquillity with which they Fletcher accepted the change shows that with all Penn's visits ^ ..... Phila- benevolence and public spirit he had not succeeded In and Inspiring his colonists as a whole with reverence or authority, affcctloo. It lUustrates perhaps more strongly the absence among the Pennsylvanians of that tenacious respect for the forms of law which existed so Intensely In New England. The colonists were liable to two incompatible sets of claims, both existing as far as one can see in legal force: the claims of the Proprietor as authorized by his charter, the claims of the Crown as implied In the comraission to Fletcher. The Assembly of a New England colony would at once have seen the difficulties of the situation. The Pennsylvanian settlers can hardly be said to have questioned the legality of this procedure. All that they did was to endeavor while acquiescing to secure from Fletcher, as a matter of favor, the rights which Penn had granted to them. They petitioned that in summoning an Assembly all the forms required by the charter should be observed, and that all laws hitherto passed should be still In force." They also in the pre amble to this second request declared that it had pleased the King and Queen in the Proprietor's absence to supply his place by the appointment of Fletcher. This half-hearted effort to ' Colonial State Papers, 1689-90, 2668, The letter was probably sent to the Board of Trade by Fletcher. 'lb. 1693, 397. iii, ' Their petition is given by Proud, vol. i. p. 353. FLETCHER AND THE ASSEMBLY. 4' 5 turn the flank of the attack was wholly without effect. Fletcher showed no corresponding wish to shirk the real difficulties of the case or to take refuge in diplomatic courtesies.' He plainly told the Assembly that "their desires were grounded on great mistakes." The King, as we have seen, had not except by im plication condemned Penn's charter. Fletcher now produced, and in all likelihood devised for the occasion, a new and sweep ing plea. Charles II., he said, could only alienate the rights of the Crown for his own life. Penn's grant, so far as It was political and not merely territorial, was, he said, at an end. Of the causes for the action of the Crown, the absence of the Pro prietor was the least ; there had been dangerous neglects and mis carriages ; as for retaining the privileges granted by the Proprie tor, "the constitution of her Majesty's Government and that of Mr. Penn were In a direct opposition one to another." At the same time Fletcher at once came to close quarters with the Assembly on that ever-recurring battlefield, the need for Disputes public defense. The time was, he pointed out, one of Fletcher special danger, since the French, exasperated by the Assembly.^ rcccnt loss of Martinique, would In all likelihood re taliate on the English colonies. Quakers though they might be, they must, he said, keep soldiers and forts, just as they wall their gardens and keep watch-dogs. If any had tender consciences their contributions can be applied to civil purposes. Fletcher must have rated the intelligence of his opponents low If they could be satisfied with an arrangement whereby their own pay ments set other funds free for purposes which they condemned. One passage in Fletcher's speech tends to confirm one of the worst charges made against him, that of conniving at piracy. An Act had been drafted in England, sent out to Fletcher, and adopted by the New York Assembly, to suppress that class of crime. Pirates were allowed a certain time within which to submit and give security for good behavior. Fletcher recom mended to the Assembly of Pennsylvania the passing of a like ' Fletcher's answer to the Assembly was given in writing. It is in Proud^ vol. i. p. 355. It was prefaced by a speech reported in the Archives. It was in the speech that he propounded the doctrine of the temporary nature of Penn's grant. ' For the whole of the dispute between Fletcher and the Assembly see the Records, vol. i. pp. 399-459. 4'6 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. enactment, and suggested that the time of grace might be lengthened, with the comment "pirates and privateers may be come good men at last." One recommendation of Fletcher's deserves notice, as showing how schemes for bringing the whole body of colonists into closer union were in the air. He recommended to the Assembly a project for a postal service from Virginia to Boston. In conclusion Fletcher told the Assembly that his time was precious, and that he hoped they would desist from all unneces sary debates. The Assembly might be slow to perceive the strong constitu tional ground on which they could take their stand, but the over bearing discourtesy of Fletcher could not fail to call out a spirit of resistance. In a dignified and temperate tone the Representa tives pointed out that his charges of misgovernment and failure to administer justice were unfounded, and that in spite of the peace principles of many of the settlers the colony was exposed to no dangers from without. A public man like Fletcher, whose corrupt practices placed him at the mercy of private individuals, can hardly play the tyrant with consistency or success. Moreover his duties at New York kept him from giving much of his time to Pennsylvania, and his Interraittent violence was no match for the steady ob stinacy of his opponents. One important advantage was gained by the Assembly. Ac cording to the original constitution as devised by Penn, the As sembly was to have no right of Initiating legislation. But It seems to have been a singular and undesigned result of Fletcher's appointment that in this respect the Assembly actually gained ty It. They apparently claimed and he admitted that they had the ordinary rights of a representative Assembly, and might therefore pass bills which were to be sent up to the Council for approval and amendment. The Assembly, while prepared to fight Fletcher upon essen tials, showed a somewhat grotesque anxiety to avoid giving offense on a mere matter of form. A resolution was passed voting certain moneys to Lloyd and Markham as Deputy-Gov ernors of Pennsylvania and of the Territories respectively, and to Fletcher. In the resolution Fletcher's name appeared last. The Speaker of the Assembly, fearing that Fletcher would be DIFFICULTY ABOUT LEGISLATION. 417 offended, pointed out that in Holy Writ the name of the Baptist precedes that of Christ ! Their fears were apparently unfounded, since Fletcher pro fessed himself indifferent on the point. But another phrase -used by the Assembly did give offense. In a remonstrance ad dressed to Fletcher they referred to Penn's proprietary rights having been taken away because their Majesties were misin formed. Against this Fletcher protested, as "very unman nerly" A more serious and substantial dispute arose over the whole question of legislation. The Assembly apologized for their lack Difficulty of legislative and administrative skill on the ground isiation. that they had been "put out of their old methods," and they petitioned that the whole body of extant laws, a hun dred and two in number, should be confirraed. To this Fletcher replied that he would consent to any laws not repugnant to the laws of England, but that he could not go blindfold and accept laws of which he only knew the titles. The point was one on which the colonial legislature was at variance within itself. This appeared at a conference between the Council and the Assembly. The former took the ground that laws passed by the colonial government required special and affirmative approval by the Crown. The Assembly contended that the absence of a specific veto was sufficient. The point was of some constitu tional Importance, as the systems differed in the directness and efficiency of the control vested in the Home Government. The course of the dispute Is not very clear, but ultimately the laws came before Fletcher for approval, and the Assembly, according to sound constitutional precedent, made the granting of a supply dependent on the Governor's acceptance of their proposals. Gradually, by a process of compromise, of which the details are not recorded, the conflicting parties came together. The Final Assembly granted a subsidy of a penny in the pound, betwe™"* and Fletcher accepted some of the laws proposed. and'th" Ont recorded incident in the dispute throws a gro- Assembiy. tesque light on Fletcher's character. The legislature proposed to punish drunkenness. In the case of an official by dep rivation, of an ordinary citizen by disfranchisement. Fletcher protested against this as unduly severe. "It Is hard for a false step in drinking a cup perhaps too much a man should be de- 4l8 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. prived of his birthright." He added, with confidence hardly justified by facts, "I will give you leave to banish me out of the government when you find me drunk." Next year Fletcher had to reopen that strife which formed so long and so weary a chapter in the history of Pennsylvania, and Disputes to reprove the Assembly for their Indifference to the defe"nse common defense of the colonies against the Indians. coi'ony. The Five Nations are going over to the French. Unless the natives on the frontier of Pennsylvania see that the English can and will fight, they will in self-defense do the same. The country above Albany is deserted. "I pray God this leprosy may spread no further." New Jersey has set a good example by contributing four hundred pounds and sixty raen. If the principles of the Quaker settlers forbid war, they raay at least help the distressed Indians on their frontier, feeding the hungry and clothing the naked.' Meanwhile the influence of Penn's friends at Court so far prevailed that the question of his restoration was opened. The Restora- law officers of the Crown were requested to report on Penn. the matter. They did so, and advised that the Crown had a right in a special emergency to grant a commission such as Fletcher's ; when, however, the emergency ceased Penn's rights revived." The report was read by the Board of Trade. Penn was then, called in. He undertook. If restored, to comply with the royal commands, and to provide for the support of government. Therefore his restoration was recommended by the Board to the Crown and carried through." This, however, did not carry with it the immediate super session of Fletcher. In June 1695 the dispute between the Governor and the As sembly began again. Fletcher asked for eighty men as a contri- Fietcher's butlon to a joint military force.* The Assembly the^cllony pleaded the business of the harvest as an excuse for ceases. refusing to consider the matter. At this point ' Colonial State Papers, 1694, 2271. ' The statement of the case and the opinion upon it are among the Colonial State Papers, July 12, 1694. ' Ib. July 13, 1694. * Records, vol. i. p. 480. ACT OF SETTLEMENT PASSED. 419 Fletcher seems to have given up the contest as hopeless, and we hear no more of him in connection with Pennsylvania. The strife, however, was carried on by Deputy-Governor Markham. The Assembly refused to make a grant of money Dispute be- exccpt wlth an Act of Settlement, equivalent In its Assembly purposc to the Bill of Rights, appended. This Mark- Markham.i ham refused to accept as prejudicial to the Proprie tor's interest. Neither party would yield and the Lieutenant- Governor dissolved the Assembly. The necessities of government, however, forced him to call another Assembly In the following year, and the strife began Act of again. The dogged persistence of the Assembly pre- passed." valled, and the Act of Settlement was passed. This was a modification of the constitution of 1683. The tendency of the new instrument was wholly to strengthen the position of the electorate as against the Proprietor. The Asserably was to consist of four members from each county, elected In the usual raanner, all at once, not, as heretofore, one-third at a time. The Council was also to be an elective body of two members from each county. By the constitution of 1683, it will be re membered, the Proprietor was to select an inner council, a real council as It might be called, consisting of one-third of the elective council. As nothing is said of such a provision we must suppose that it was now abrogated. The Council and the As sembly were both to be elected annually. They were In fact two chambers, differing not In their composition, but only in the positions assigned to them. Either might Initiate legislation. The Council, however, could only do so by way of suggestion to the Assembly. Speaking broadly, the Governor and Council were to be the chief administrative body, the Assembly the legis lative. To avoid the necessity of oaths, forms of declaration were drawn up for the various public officials. One change of form Is a slight but significant illustration of the change from Quaker authority to the Anglican authority and back again. In the records till 1693 the months are in dicated by numbers. Then they receive their conventional names, till 1 701, when the use of numbers reappears." ' Records, vol. i. p. 480. ' The text of this is given by Proud in an appendix, vol. ii. p. 30. "Records, vol. i. p. 380. 420 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. The close of the century shows a soraewhat melancholy con trast between Penn the founder and the beneficent ruler of a Penn's Utopia free from the corruptions of the Old World of thr"°" and from the special dangers and temptations of the colonists.' young communities around it, and Penn with limited and debatable powers over a community which was fast yield ing to lowering influences and putting on moral and social habits not a whit better than those of the ordinary Englishmen who had crossed the Atlantic. Within less than a year of his resto ration we find Penn writing to the Council a strong protest against general laxity of life in the colony, and especially conniv ance with pirates and smugglers. The colonists, as Penn rather oddly put it, not only wink at pirates but embrace them. They violate the navigation laws, bringing goods from Holland and exporting their own produce to Scotland. A special committee of the Council was appointed to deal with these charges. The existence of piracy they denied. There The coio- might be smuggling. If so, It was due to the malad- the'charge ministration of the revenue officers appointed by Ran- of piracy. dolph. They admit, however, that the increase In the nuraber of ordinaries had brought with it laxity of morals. In the following year Penn revisited the colony. His address to the Council shortly after his arrival showed a characteristic Penn re- tendency to take refuge In generalities. "Away with colony.' all parties, and look on yourself and what is good for the body politic."" A man who had enjoyed the opportunity of observing political life for a quarter of a century might have learnt that "good" is a phrase patient of many Interpretations, and that raen embrace parties as an end to what they believe to be good. That the departure of Fletcher brought with It a certain restora tion of Quaker ascendency may be Inferred from the fact that the nurabers of the months now reappear Instead of names. Penn had not been in the colony long before he found himself in pronounced opposition to the settlers on what they deemed a fundamental article of their comraon creed. A letter from the King required from the settlers a payment of three hundred and ' Penn's letter and the reply of the colonists are in the Records, vol. i. p, 527. ' I cannot find any specific record of his arrival. But the Records (vol. i. p. 506) show that on April i, 1700, he was addressing the Council. '^ Records, vol. i. p. 506. PENNS PROPRIETORSHIP THREATENED. 421 fifty pounds towards the fortification of New York. That a demand which Infringed the rights of self-taxation was un- Assembi- Constitutional, that one colony could not be expected refuse to to Contribute money to be spent at the discretion of to the forti- the authorities In another colony, were pleas which New' York.' would have been wholly consonant with the political tradition of the colonies. To protest against military expendi ture of any sort would have been no more than consistent Quakerism demanded. The Assembly, however, took lower and less tenable ground, pleading their own poverty and the inaction of the neighboring colonies. Penn had reason to look with dread on anything which might bring the colony Into conflict with the Crown. The mere terrl- Penn's torlal rights inherent in proprietorship which had just ^mlia. httn restored to Penn might be secure. But, as we danger. learn from a letter written by him to his son, there was reason to fear that the proprietary government would be dis solved and the colony brought Into direct dependence on the Crown. To lose that would be, as Penn said, to lose everything that he valued. "The land was but as the shell or ring, the government as the kernel or stone." The rights of the Crown, Penn pointed out, were fully secured as long as the King could veto the appointment of a Deputy-Governor. Proprietary governments had thriven better and more quickly than those dependent on the Crown. In sup port of this contention he cites the cases of New England and Rhode Island, neither of which ever had the semblance of a proprietary system. When one compares the fortunes of Mary land, Carolina, and New Jersey with those of Virginia, Massa chusetts, and Connecticut, It is hard to say whether the general proposition or the selection of Instance was the more daringly Inaccurate." In February 1701 Penn announced to his colonists his In tended departure. Statesmanlike regard for the public weal was In his case too strong for sectarian theories, and he sought to impress on the settlers the need for contributing to the com mon defense. The reply was a petition from the Assembly In twenty-one heads, all dealing with means for raaking the tenure ' For this dispute see Proud, vol. i. pp. 425-6. 'The letter is in the Archives, vol. iii. p. 11. It is dated 2.11.1700. 422 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. of land by the colonists more secure. Of the main point urged by Penn, that of defense, it said nothing. When Penn became Territorial motc urgent the Assembly answered that "the b'e'twein country having been much straitened of late by the Penn nccessarv payment of their debts and taxes, and as and the j tr j ^ settlers,' nothing appears what any of the other colonies who are equally concerned have done in the like demands on them, they must for the present desire to be excused." It is clear from the general tenor of the petition above re ferred to that the Proprietor and the colonists were becoming alienated by such grievances as always arise In the case of an absentee landholder. His expenditure in the past is forgotten. All that is remembered Is the contrast between those whose labor is building up a fabric of prosperity and the man who con tributes nothing and enjoys "unearned Increment." The set tlers asked that a large part of the Proprietor's lands should be treated as comraon, that rents should be fixed once for all irre spective of increase or value, and that quit-rents may be extin guished by a fixed payraent. One clause In the petition sug gests, though the matter is open to doubt, that the existing occu piers of land were asking to be protected not against the de raands of the Proprietor, but against the original grantees from whom Penn had acquired his rights. Land, the petitioners say, had been granted as a free gift for the foundation of the city of Philadelphia. It is now "clogged with divers rents and reserva tions contrary to the first design and grant.'' The tone of Penn is curt and businesslike, dealing with the petition article by article. It clearly shows a sense of estrange ment and of irritation at what he not unjustly regarded as in gratitude. This was not the only matter embittering the Proprietor's visit. At no sraall trouble and cost to himself he had united his Demand of Original colony and the Delaware Territories In a Sr's^lra- single government. Now the inhabitants of the Ter- tion.= ritories were calling out for a repeal of that Union. The main grievance specified was this: the Assembly met alter nately at Philadelphia and Newcastle. The representatives of the upper colony were now trying to put the meetings at New- ' For the whole of this dispute see Records, vol. ii. pp. 41-4. ' Records, vol. ii. p. 49. THE TERRITORIES SEPARATED. 423 castle on a lower footing by demanding that all laws passed there should be ratified at Philadelphia. Theoretically each Assembly consisted of the whole body of colonists. Practically, we may be sure that the difficulties of traveling must have given a de cided adva'ntage to the locality in which the Assembly met. The demand for ratification was practically one for giving the Terri tories a subordinate legislature. Penn pointed out to the settlers that to effect the union of the provinces had cost him over two thousand pounds ; that the Eng lish Government in its recent administrative arrangements had dealt with Pennsylvania and the Territories as one colony, and that the demand for separation would certainly prejudice the colony with the English Government. The colonists showed that pertinacity which was their most fixed and abiding charac teristic in public affairs, and affirmed their desire for separation. Penn's answer Is so characteristic as to be worth quoting In full. "Your union Is what I desire; but your peace and accommodat ing each other is what I most expect from you ; the reputation of It is something, the reality much more. And I desire you to re member and observe what I say ; yield In circumstantials to pre serve essentials, and being safe in one another you will always be so in esteem with me. Make me not sad now I am going to leave you ; sure it Is for you as well as for your Friend and Pro prietary and Governor, William Penn.'" The vagueness and suavity, the inability to see that "essen tials" often need to be defined and guarded by "circumstantials," are thoroughly characteristic of Penn. So, too. Is the underly ing conviction that political benefits cease to be benefits when "they are forced upon men against their will and judgment. Nor did the inevitable sense of disappointment make Penn backward In gratifying the reasonable requirements of the The new settlers. That another formal exposition of the con- tion.i" stitution should have been needed, shows not so much the imperfection of the previous Instruments as the impossibility of giving a definite and final form to the political life of a young and plastic community, with ever-changing conditions and ever growing needs. In 1700 the colonists had surrendered their charter. In the following October a fresh charter was granted, ' The letter is in Proud, vol. i. p. 442. 'The text of the charter of 1701 is given in Proud, vol, i. p. 443. 424 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. setting forth, this time finally, the constitution of the colony. Neither in the act of surrender nor in the conditions of the new instrument does there seem to have been any difference of opinion between the Proprietor and the legislature. The right of all to religious toleration and freedom of worship was set forth more forraally than in previous instruments. There was, however, no modification of any Importance In the constitutional arrangements. The raode of election was left as it was, and the condition which required a majority of six-sevenths for any con stitutional alteration was retained. Two Iraportant clauses, however, were left open for subsequent change. The govern ment and Assembly might increase the number of representa tives, and the Territories might withdraw and have an Assembly of their own. Almost simultaneously with this instrument, the Proprietor granted a charter Incorporating Philadelphia as a city, with Charter Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council, nominated ImTa!"^ *° i" the first Instance by the Proprietor, but thereafter deiphia.i to bg a self-electing body. Penn departed, never to behold his colony again. His declin ing years were clouded. His mental faculties soon showed signs Penn of failure; impoverished and discredited as he was, departs. hls benevolencc could find no fitting sphere of action. His eldest son was wayward and shallow, wholly unfitted to be the legatee of Penn's beneficent schemes. From the philosophic ruler, the creator of an ideal commonwealth, Penn passes into an ordinary absentee landholder. Yet even in Penn's decline, that which, if we may not call greatness, we at least call magnanim ity, still abides. In his days of energy and hopefulness he bad consistently regarded himself as a trustee, administering his prop erty conscientiously and generously, for the public good. It is not every deposed sovereign who can contentedly accept the post of an acquiescent and benevolent onlooker, but neither disap pointment nor ingratitude could force Penn into an attitude un worthy of his past. About this time we find Penn involved In a dispute with Quarry, the judge of Admiralty cases in New York and Pennsyl- Penn'a dis- vanla. According to Penn, Quarry was without pute with , , . . ,% ,' . ¦' Quarry. legal training. Moreover, he was in two ways per- ' The charter is in Proud, appendix vi. vol. ii, p. 45. ANDREW HAMILTON. 425 sonally Interested. Being himself largely concerned in trade, he could not deal with cases Impartially. His salary consisted of a royalty of one-third on the duties received, which acted as a direct inducement to extortion. Quarry's answer was. If not evasive, at least incomplete. His Ignorance of law he practically admitted. That he was paid by a royalty of a third he denies. He could not, he said, be a great trader because he was undersold by smugglers from Curesaw («V) and Scotland. He retorts on Penn by a charge of corruption. A Danish ship had brought In a cargo of prohibited commodities worth three, thousand pounds. Penn, so Quarry avers, waited till the cargo had been landed, and the ship stripped of tackle, sails, and all fitting, and then made a show of zeal by seizing the bare hulk.' At the same time the Privy Council were addressing certain questions to Penn which showed, if not hostility, at least sus picion. Did all persons In a judicial position take an oath, or if not make an affirmation? Were all persons who were willing to take an oath permitted to do so ?" How completely Penn's last visit had brought with it a sense of failure may be inferred from the fact that in 1703 he offered to resign to the Crown that proprietorship for which a short while before he had battled so strenuously, and of whose value he had spoken so highly." The career of Hamilton, the Governor whom Penn had placed at the head of affairs when he left the colony, was In a Andrew little more than a year cut short by death. He did Hamilton, , ^ . Governor, not, however, escape the experience, common to almost every Governor of Pennsylvania, of an unsuccessful attempt to Induce the settlers to assist the neighboring colonies In the task of defense.* His death was followed by an interregnum of a year. Dur ing that time the two sections of the colony availed themselves An inter- of the right given them by the last charter and regnum. formed separate representative Assemblies." Penn's wide experience of the world had not. If we may judge ' Penn's complaint and Quarry's answer are among the Pennsylvania Papers in the Record Office. Pennsylvania, 559. 'Ib. 'Ib. * Records, vol. ii. p. 79. 'Proud, vol. i. pp. 452-57. 426 THE FOUNDATION OF PENNSYLVANIA. by his choice of subordinates, endowed him with the gift of in- Lsight Into character. His appointment of BlackweU was far Appoint- from fortunate, and he fared even worse in his selec- Evansas tlon of a succcssor to Hamilton. His choice fell on -Governor. John Evans, a Welshman, without, as far as our records show, any experience of colonial life. Evans's career as Governor was but one series of squabbles with the Assembly. At the very outset he made an unsuccessful attempt to induce the settlers to reverse the arrangement just arrived at for separation. Resistance came, we are told, not, -as we would expect, from the weaker partner, but from the in habitants of the upper province, who could no longer endure the iractlousness of their colleagues from the Territories. One of the points of dispute between Evans and the Assembly was the standing question of military defense. Evans expected Dispute the Assembly to bear their share with the neighbor- between , -^ . '^ Evans ing colonles. That he should meet with refusal was and the " . . .Assembly.' a matter of course. He then raade an acrimonious .attack, accusing the settlers of gross Ingratitude In raising un necessary disputes, and in not raising money for the expenses of the governraent or the collective defense of the colonies. The answer of the Asserably was temperate In tone. It was unfair of Evans to argue as if the Proprietor had done every thing and they nothing. Many of thera had settled at consider able cost and with rauch effort. Evans replied with a general denunciation of the Assembly as disaffected. At the same time there were other disputes touching the rela tions between the Assembly and the executive. The Governor ¦claimed the right of proroguing or dissolving the Assembly. The Representatives contended that the right was in them." As a compromise, however, they were willing to lirait any session to twenty days, unless specially e.xtended by the Governor's permis sion, and to accept the further restriction that they might not meet again within three months. They also claimed and ob tained the right to judge of their own qualifications and the validity of their own elections. Other disputes there were, all illustrating Evans's lack of judgment and tact. Wishing for a conference with the Assembly he insisted on meeting the whole ' These disputes are all very fully set forth in the Archives of the colony. ^ See Logan to Penn, 22.9.1704. Archives, vol. vii. JOHN EVANS. 427 tody, In spite of their desire to be represented by a committee. In all likelihood both parties felt that a committee would be a more effective fighting body. He prosecuted a member for language used in the Assembly, and then followed up this breach of privilege by arbitrarily demanding his expulsion. On one occasion the Speaker addressed the Governor sitting Instead of standing, and this breach of etiquette was treated by Evans as a serious offense. When the Assembly demanded that judges should be removable at their pleasure Evans objected. His ob jection was no doubt in conformity with English political prin- 'ciples. But It was a shallow piece of sophistry to charge the Assembly with hindering justice by their refusal to give way. •On that ground concession might as well have been demanded from the Governor. Trifling and paltry though these disputes might be in them selves, they were far from unimportant in their consequences. For good or evil, they were part of the political education of the colony. Just at the time when It was taking definite shape as a body politic it was forced into certain tendencies of thought and conduct. A bent was given to the tree which grew with its growth, greatly influencing its character and determining the part which it should play half a century later. Indeed, it is •¦easy to see In these bickerings a foreshadowing of the later strife. The position of the judiciary was a burning question In the dis putes which preceded Independence. Moreover, the claim of the colonists to be exempt from all taxation save that imposed by their own Representatives, formed a part of the earlier dispute. The Assembly for the Territories, urged thereto it Is said by Evans, imposed on all trading vessels not belonging to inhab itants of that district a duty of half a pound of gunpowder for