PRICE, 25 CENTS.

MILITARY REVIEW

CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA & MARYLAND

&ENERALS J. C. FREMONT, N. P. BANKS, IRWIN McDOWELL,
FRANZ SI&EL, JOHN POPE, JAMES S. WADSWORTH,
WM. H. HALLECK, GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
AND AMBROSE BURNSIDE.
In 18 6 2,

PRED'K A. PETERSEN.

PART II.

He that is truly dedicated to war
Hath no self-love ; nor he that loves himself
Hath not essentially, hut hy circumstances,
The name of valor.

Q Contribution to ilje future Pistoig of fyz ®nite& JStatts.

WHOLESALE AGENTS

NEW-YORK:
C SINCLAIR TOUSEY, 121 NASSAU STREET,
/ H. DEXTER, 113 NASSAU STREET.

Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1862, by F. A. I'stbrhrh, in the Clerk'a Office of the District
Court of the Southern District of f)ew*\ork.

Uc

n.z.

MILITARY REVIEW
or thjc
CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA & MARYLAND
In 1863.

PART II.

" Time alone can show how such promises will be carried out while
Edwin M. Stanton remains Secretary of War." We said in October
last* speaking of the promises made to General McClellan by-
President Lincoln on the first day of September last, when he de
clared the country the government and the army to be lost, unless
the General would apply his genius and skill as a commander, and
his irresistible influence over our soldiers to the reorganization of the
army, which, demoralized under Mr. Stanton and General Halleck
from April to August, had, under General Pope been disastrously
defeated, and had been driven behind the fortifications near Wash
ington ; and then, with the reorganised army to protect the Capital
from occupation by the rebels, and to save that Administration which
had prevented the success of his campaign in the Peninsula.
The ink with which the above statement was written, had scarcely-
dried, when events demonstrated that the fulfilment of the promises
made by our President ceased as soon as the capital and the cabinet
" were not any longer in imminent danger, and that plots and machina-
tions against McClellan commenced anew and with increased bold
ness. We beg the reader will remember the following facts. Large
quantities of provisions, forage, equiprnents and ammunition, on their
return from Harrison's Landing, by the army of the Potomac, stored
* Page 47 Part 1st.

at Aquia Creek, and by the army under General McDowell taken to
Fredericksburg, had to be destroyed by our own troops to prevent the
enemy from getting them, at the time when both places were suddenly
abandoned in consequence of the disastrous defeat of all the brave
troops, in July and August last, entrusted to the command of General
Pope. Also that the visit paid by the rebels to General Pope's
headquarters at Catlett's Station caused great loss of subsistence,
equipments and ammunition of every kind ; also '¦• that all which had
not been destroyed or lost already, was taken from him during the
the last five days in August, when Lee drove General Pope rapidly"
and with fearful losses from Thoroughfare Gap to- the fortifications
near Washington ; that this very- large quantity of subsistance, equip
ments and ammunition was lost in the short space of little over two
weeks ; that the long and forced marches and cuonter-marches of the
corps under General Pope had caused unusual wear and tear in their
equipments of every kind.
It will further be remembered that Gen. McClellan and his reorgan
ized army left Washington for the Maryland campaign only one week
after General Pope's retreating army had found shelter behind the for
tifications near the city, and that consequently the government had
very little time to replace the enormous losses of every description ; —
that the Maryland Campaign, in consequence of the extraordinary
rapidity of movements, f.nd the quick succession of its battles, had
consumed in equipments and in ammunition, all that the Government
might have furnished during that one week in Washington. That
McClellan's army on its march from Frederick City to South Moun
tain and Antietam Creek, had to abandon the railroad line, whereby
the transportation of new supplies was of necessity retarded.
It is natural that in consequence of all these circumstances,. and iu
consequence of the' fierceness and long duration of the great battle of
Antietam, the army of the Potomac, after it had followed Lee to the
left bank of the Potomac, should stand sorely in need of shoes, uni
forms, ammunition, arms, and of .materials of every kind. The fact is,
large numbers of soldiers had to go barefooted because they had no
shoes. That such was the actual condition of the army, McClellan
represented to tne Government, and the nation at large was by the
thousand means of communication between the army and the people,
in every section of the country, fully aware of the fact.
"Deeply deploring the imbecile management of .the War Depart
ment, which had placed the army of the most liberal nation in such
v condition, the people expected the Government to make every pos-

sible exertion, to place the army of the Potomac, in the shortest pos- ,
sible timei in condition to open a new campaign.
The same evil spirits, • however, who by their "on to Richmond"
caused the disgraceful " Bull Run," the same who in March last in
duced the president to relieve McClellan from the command as Gen
eral-in-Chief of the army ; who thereby deprived the Country of the
services of the General best qualified for that office, and caused our
failure in suppressing the rebellion— the same evil spirits who in
August last made the President degrade McClellan and deprive him
of his command — the same who cowed down when Leer's army stood
in front of Washington, and when personal danger made Mr.
Lincoln discard the opinion of his irresponsible advisers and reinstate
McClellan — these same evil spirits circulated rumors about the in
activity of the army of the Potomac ; about the loss of the favorable
season for a fall campaign ; about McClellan's disinclination to pursue
or to fight Lee ; about the exaggeration of the wants of the army
et cetera.The people, that is a large majority of them, had too much common
sense to doubt the General, who, during the entire war, has proved him
self a self-sacrificing patriotic soldier. A few, however, bound to
prevent this war from being brought to a satisfactory termination .by
McClellan, based upon the above-stated rumors their new plans
against him.
The fearful losses from June to September sustained by the armies
of the Potomac and by those other corps that by degrees had been
attached to.it, amounting in the' aggregate to not less than 100,000
men — the ldss of many of the best officers — the incorporation of new
volunte'er regiments, under' inexperienced officers — all this forced upon
General McClellan the duty, to properly reorganize, discipline and
strengthen his army, to fill up the thinned ranks of the old regiments,
and to prepare the new ones for actual service. At the same time he
had to guard the, (at this season in many places fordable) Potomac ;
and he had to impress the rebel General Lee with the apprehension
that at any moment he would be attacked by the army of the Poto
mac. In September, when he accepted the command of all the troops
concentrated in Virginia,the President expressly placed Gen.McOlellan ''
above the official interference of Messrs. Stanton and Halleck, and it
was therefore, also McClellan's duty, aside from all the above sped- '
fied business, to devise a plan for the new campaign.
The campaign in Maryland was at an end ; and there can be but

one opinion among military men, that this war will never be brought
to a satisfactory end, and that the rebellion can never be conquered,
if the Union armies follow, in whatever direction the commanders
of the rebels may draw them. To destroy the rebel army we have to
compel their generals to meet us, and accept battle wherever the
strategical combinations of cur generals shall designate the field of
operations. In ouropinion there exists only one strategical combina
tion. To defeat the rebel army in Virginia General McClellan had to in
crease and in every manner to perfect his army as rapidly as possible
under all circumstances, before the Potomac should rise high enough to
make all the fords impracticable ; to have collected, somewhere on the
Totomac, say at Alexandria, the largest possible number of transports ;
to direct a great many of the new volunteer regiments toward his posi
tion on the Upper Potomac, for the purpose of occupying the front
when and where vacated by the efficient old regiments sent to Alex
andria for embarkation ; to direct frequent and strong reconnoisances
against the enemy's position on the right bank of the Potomac, for
the purpose of strengthening their apprehension of an impending at
tack en masse. Whenever the river shall have risen to high water
mark, that it can be crossed only on bridges, which the enemy does
not possess, then to float down the Potomac from Alexandria as large
and as efficient an army as can be carried, accompanied by the pon
toon trains and by some half-a-dozen iron gunboats ; to ascend the
James river to a point as near fort Darling as practicable ; there dis
embark, and thence move on Richmond. The new regiments on the
upper Potomac to be left there, to screen the withdrawal of the main
army, and by their presence to keep General Lee as long as possible
in front of them, on the opposite shore ; eventually these new regi
ments to form a reserve corps for cooperation with the army when
and where needed. To direct the army at and near Suffolk, to ad
vance towards Petersburg, and thereby to cooperate with the army
of the Potomac.
We consider this the only sound and effective strategical combi
nation that under all the existing circumstances General McClellan
could entertain. Here are our reasons :
It cannot be doubted that, if Gen. McClellan's plan for his Peninsu
lar campaign had not been betrayed to the rebel General Johnsonr
before its execution had commenced, the army of the Potomac would
have taken Richmond in May last, and that thereby the back-bone of
the rebellion would have been broken. Even after Johnson, with his

army, had reached Richmond from Manassas,, the rebel capital would
have been in possession of the army of the Potomac, before
the rebel reinforcement from the West could have reached it, had
not the President and Mr. Stanton, by their meddling with matters of
which they are profoundly ignorant,prevented the execution of McClel
lan's plan, in depriving him, as soon as he. himself had embarked for
the Peninsula, of the largest corps of his entire army, as proved by
the evidence in the McDowell court of enquiry.
In March, as well as in October last, the main rebel army was
threatening Washington, but the fortifications protecting the capital
were more perfect and stronger, in October than they had been last '
spring. In March the defence of these fortifications had to be entrust- '
ed to James S. Wadsworth, a politician ; while in October, Heintzel-
man and Sigel, both of them experienced and tried Generals, had
command of these fortifications and the troops cooperating for the
protection of the capital. Their forces could be rapidly increased by
the daily reporting new volunteer regiments, organized under the Pres
ident's call for 600,000 men.
Moving to the Peninsula last spring, the army of the Potomac in
stantaneously drew the rebel army away from Manassas to Richmond,
and thereby liberated Virginia, to the Rappahannock, . from rebel
forces.f Returning to the Potomac, it was followed, by the same
army, to the gates of Washington. The same cause would have pro
duced the same effect in October or November. The fortifications
near Fort Darling and around Richmond, probably have been ma
terially strengthened and extended since August last, when the army
of the Potomac was withdrawn from Harrison's Landing, by a strat
egical blunderer, who had his eyes wide open, but did not see, and
who had the ruinous consequences of his evil designs plainly foretold
him, but heeded them not.
The Merrimac's blockade of the James River compelled the army
-of the Potomac to operate against Richmond from the York river
After the destruction of the Merrimac by her commander, the Mon-

t Washington was never safer than while the army ofthe Potomac was
at the Peninsula. Strategical blockheads only, could consider the raid in
the Shenandoah Valley of 15.000 men under Stonewall Jackson, as direct
ed against the capital, surrounded with strongly garrisoned fortifications.
General Lee's instructions to Jackson- have shown that it was intended to
prevent the corps of General McDowell from being sent to Hanover Court
House, there to join our army of the Potomac. The result proves that
Robert knows how to play "soldier" with Master Lincoln, and with Master
Stanton.

itor, Galena, and Naugatuck unsuccessfully attacked Fort Darling,
but there was no arfny'on land to cooperate with them. Afterwards,
when the army of the Potomac had moved to the James river, the
gunboats were not in condition to renew the attack. In November
last several Monitors and other iron gunboats could have attacked the
river front, while the army simultaneously would have attacked it by
land, and we have no doubt would have taken it. The gunboats
thereby would have been enabled to continue their cooperation
against Richmond with the armies on both banks of the river.
Active operations of cur armies and of our river fleet in the West,
facilitated by the rise of the rivers, would have held and occupied
the rebel forces there, and would have prevented their concen
tration near Richmond, so dangerous to the army of the Potomac
last summer.
Simultaneous naval demonstrations against Mobile, Charleston and
Savannah would have detained a considerable portion of the rebel
armies at those ports, and thereby would have contributed to the suc
cess of the campaign.
The large number of transports required to float the army of the
Potomac from Alexandria to the James river, it is true, might have
considerably delayed orperhaps entirely prevented the sailing of the
expedition under General Banks ; but we firmly believe that the
occupation of Richmond by our army,and- as a necessary prelude there
to, a decisive defeat of the army under General Lee, would have
been a more destructive blow to the rebellion, and would constitute a
more comprehensive and effective protest against fhe hostile
intentions of the governments in Europe, than any achievement
reasonably to be expected by General Banks, at any point of rebeldom
can ever produce.
That no other combination can accomplish the object in view, will
be admitted when we consider that the army of the Potomac, cross
ing the river while it is yet low and fordable above Harpers' Ferry,
to follow General Lee in the Shenandoah Valley, will have to leave
not less than 30,000 men on the left bank for the protection of Mary
land, Pennsylvania, and thereby loses so much of its effective strength.
When it reaches Winchester it will find Lee's army between that place
and Washington, certainly a very undesirable position for an army that
depends for its entire subsistence upon the latter city. This relative
position of the . two armies on the movement down the valley
continues to Front Royal ; the various gaps in the " Blue Ridge "
offer to the rebels facilities to pass to the south side of the said

7 ;
ip
ridge and to mask such a movement by a comparatively insignifi
cant force.
Apart from .these geographical and topographical disadvantages to
the Union army, Lee is in the valley, master of, the situation ; he can
wait for us, and only accept battle on a f e^d, or in the mountain
passes of his own choice. In case the army of the Potomac is vic
torious in a battle, the result will, be simply a loss of men and material"
with many subsequent battles farther down the valley, in all of which
the rebels would have the choice of position. The further the army
of the Potomac pursues him, the greater becomes the insecurity of its
communication with Harper's Ferry, the base of its operations. The
idea that General Sigel or General Heintzelman could .move through
Manassas Gap and cut off Lee's line of retreat,, is untenable. Lee is in
formed of all the movements of our armies in Virginia ; he will move
one of his corps through one or more of the" gaps, and so get between
Washington and both the Union armies ; placing Sigel between two
fires while the army of the Potomac is held in check in the mountain
passes. If the Union armies succeed in escaping all these dangers
with moderate loss, and force Lee to retreat beyond Front Royal
towards Staunton, they are all the time, moving away from their base
of operations, and \t becomes more and more difficult for them to
subside, while the rebel army is steadily approaching their own base
of operations and their strongly defended position, near Gordonsville.
Here they will stand a long siege with comparatively trifling loss, and
whenever they conclude to fall back, the destruction of a single bridge
in the railroad, will bring the army of the Potomac to a new halt, and
all the dangers of this line to Richmond, per Fredericksburg, (alluded
to on page 37, 38, part 1st,) will, on the Gordonsville -line, threaten
the destruction of that army.
If the army of the Potomac 'crosses the low and fordable river,
below .Harper's Ferry — after Lee has moved to Winchester — the
30,000 men for the protection of Maryland and Pennsylvania have
also to be left on the left bank, and an other considerable force has
to be moved to Charlestown- to protect Harper's Ferry and its
approaches. Moving dowfi on the south side of the Blue Ridge
the army has to take possession and hold in strength all the numer
ous gaps fromGregories to Manassas — an accomplishment requiring
rapidity of movement and. good luck, because every one of these
gaps, when in possession of the rebel army, will afibrd General Lee
an opportunity to move his force thrqugh it to the south side of the
ridge, divide the army of the Potomac, and. in all probability cause

them great losses. The turnpike running parallel with the Blue
Sidge in the valley of the Shenandoah, facilitates the concentration of
bis army at any point, while the want of a parallel road on the south
side of the ridge, prevents a speedy concentration of the Union army.
In case the army of the Potomac succeeds to get possession and to
hold all the passes above mentioned, the march of Lee's army on
the turnpike north of the ridge will be easy and rapid, compared with
the march of the army of the Potomac over the cross-roads south of
' the ridge. The rebels will comfortably reach the Robertson River
and their previously mentioned position near Gordonsville, before the
army of the Potomac can come up with them.
It is true, On this second line of operations, the army of the Poto
mac is always nearer to Washington than the rebel army ; its line of
communication is not threatened so much asthe line in the valley ;
but on the other hand it can only march along side and after the
rebel army, without a chance to fight a battle before the enemy has
reached its stronghold.
In the execution of either one of the two last mentioned combina
tions, the army of the Potomac, on its approach to Culpepper Court
House and vicinity, will have to be concentrated, and all the forces
left on the various gaps will have to be recalled, because it is ridiculous
to suppose that a line from Harper's Ferry to Thornton Gap, Sperry-
ville, Woodville, Culpepper and.Acquia Creek, that is a line of more
than 120 miles in length can be properly held and protected against
rebel invasion.
The country south and east of the line above indicated, and north
west of the Potomac will, therefore, in all three possible combinations
for a new campaign, be unprotected, and will be subject to more or
less frequent occupation by the rebels ; but when the rebel army fol
lows the army of the Potomac to the peninsula, General Lee will
hardly leave any of his men east of Gordonsville, to molest the inhab
itants in the district above designated.
To march the army of the Potomac at this late season of the year,
poorly equipped, from their position above Harper's Ferry on either
one of the last described two lines towards Gordonsville, will involve
an amount of hardship, privations and suffenng, particularly to the new
regiments, which the impossibility of gaining any military advantage
should prevent from being inflicted upon those brave heroic soldiers.
General Pleasanton's skirmish near Martinsburg, October 1st, the
successful raid to Leesburg, and the capture of a rebel wagon train,
and of General Longstreet's official papers by Colonel Egan. October 5 ';

9
and several similar reconnoissances to the -right bank of the Poto
mac, we naturally considered as indicative that General McClellan
was preparing the execution of the strategical combination which we
are firmly convinced to be the only sound one for the new cam
paign. In the latter part of October, the army of the Potomac crossed the
river and rapidly moved up to and took possession of the several
gaps on the south side of the Blue Ridge. Grave doubts, we must
confess, then arose in our mind as to, the strategical capacity of Gen
eral McClellan.
The report presented by this Commission, consisting of Major-General
'Hunter as President, and four other General and Staff Officers of Volun
teers, to investigate the conduct of certain officers in connection with the
surrender of Harper's Perry in September last, confirming in substance
what we said about the surrender of that position reads thus :
" The Commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, an old officer,
who has been killed in the service of his country, and it can not, from any
motives of delicacy, refrain from censuring those in high command, when it
thinks such censure deserved. The General-in-Chief has testified that
General McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy invad
ing the State of Maryland, marched only six miles per day, on an average,
when pursuing this invading enemy. The General-in-Chief also testifies
that in his opinion, he could and should have relieved and protected Harper's
Ferry, and in this opinion the Commission fully concur."
" By reference to the evidence it will be seen that at this very moment Col
onel Ford abandoned Maryland Heights, his little army was in reality
relieved by General Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap,
within seven miles of his position."
When we remind the reader of the fact, that the corps of Generals
Franklin and Sumner belong to the Army of the Potomac, and acted
under command of General McClellan, he1 will at once see that the
Commission contradict themselves ; in the last sentence of the first
citation they intend to censure McClellan because he could and should
have relieved Harper's Ferry ; and in the latter citation, they say
that Generals Franklin and Sumner — that is, General McClellan —
actually had relieved Colonel Ford's little army. The latter assertion
is based upon actual facts ; the previous one based upon the opinion
of the General-in-Chief — H. W. Halleck.
It is well known that General Halleck was not with McClellan's
army in Maryland, nor was he at or near Harper's Ferry; he therefore
could not give evidence as an eye-witness, from his own personal
knowledge of facts. As an expert he cannot very well have given
an opinion, -because in that character he does not possess one.
General Halleck never in his life had to defend a besieged place,

10
wherein he was relieved; he never led a command to the relief of a
besieged br6ther officer ; he never besieged a place held by an armed
enemy — his investments having all been of a pacific character, and
upon convertible' security; consequently in matters of siege and
relief he cannot, speak from experience. As to General Halleck's
superior judgment on military and strategical matters in general, and
as to the respect to which his opinion is entitled on that account, we
shall take occasion to say a few words on another page. ,
We cannot understand why the Commission — by ,the shameful
imbecility of an old officer who disgracefully surrendered a strong
position; forced to remark freely on that old officer, should com
mit themselves, on General Halleck's opinion, to censure General
McClellan; who, although a young officer, had just accomplished
what General Halleck had utterly despaired of ( to save the capital,
the administration, and General Halleck himself) — when the evidence
of facts, elicited by themselves, compels them to contradict that
opinion in substance. In our opinion it was tne duty of the Com
mission to censure the person high in office who appointed the old
imbecile officer to the command of an important strategical position,
and also hirn who did not carry out General McClellan's suggestion
to permit Miles with all his force to join thp.Army of the Potomac.
Colonel Miles, as General Wool says (whom the Commission had
to admit they erroneously censured), was appointed to the command
of Harper's Ferry by Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, and by him, per special
order, relieved from the control of any other officer, so that he had to
report direct to the Secretary of War. This order has never been
repealed. The remark, in General Halleck's Report to the Secretary
of War, Dec. 2d., that he " directed McClellan to assume control of
" ail troops within Ms reach, without regard to departmental lines,"
can evidently be intended only to throw the responsibility for the
Harper's Ferry affair upon McClellan; it is not accompanied with
the candid statement that the command at Harper's Ferry was dis
tinctly excluded by General Halleck's superior, the Secretary of War,
from departmental control. That this was the case, that General
Halleck was cognizant of it— and that General McClellan understood
it to be so— and that the insinuations in the Report of the General-in-
chief of the Army of the United States to the Honorable Secretary
of War are false— that the General-in-Chief knew them to be false—
and that Mr. Stanton must, of neeessity, have known them to be false,
because by him Colonel Miles had been removed from'the control of
General Wool and thereby from. General McClellan— all this is

11
established by the witness Halleck, before the Harper's Fe/ry Com
mission, who there testifies that on the llth of September, three days
before the battle of South Mountain, General McClellan telegraphed
to him " to give permission to Colonel Miles and his command to join
the Army of the Potomac." If McClellan had possessed .authority
to give orders to the commander of Harper's Ferry, as General
Halleck insinuates in his report he did have, there would have been no
necessity to ask somebody to give permission to Colonel Miles. -The
General-in-Chief's want of any strategical* idea prevented him from
comprehending the wisdom of McClellan's suggestion on this as on a
previous occasion. As an excuse for this, he says in his report, Dec.
2, " To withdraw him (Miles) entirely fropp that position, would not
only expose the garrison to capture, but all the stores and, artillery
collected at that place must either be destroyed or left to the enemy."
That the garrison could have joined McClellan on the llth is proved
by the fact that some 1,500 men left Harper's Ferry on the 14th, the
day previous to the surrender, and reached the Army of the Potomac ;
the stores and artillery actually fell into the enemy's hand by the
surrender, before any damage whatever had been done to them ; but
in addition to this, the arms of 11,000 soldiers fell into the enemy's
hands ; the Army of the Potomac was deprived of the assistance of
that force, and the nation was insulted by a surrender, in the fact
that , the besieger did not even ask for it, so disgraceful that it ex
ceeds anything recorded in history.
The Commission knew, by official documents at their control, when
General McClellan left Washington for Maryland, and when his two
corps of Sumner and Franklin were at Crampton Gap. The maps
at their control gave them the distance performed by the army, and
the Committee themselves could with the same mathematical accuracy
as'General Halleck for them, ascertain the average number of miles
per day marched by the ,arrny under McClellan. General Halleck
only, we think, could testify that prior to the battle of Antietam* — to
that time alone his testimony refers ; Mc01ellan was pursuing Lee's
army. That army was not retreating before nor avoiding the army
under McClellan — such a movement alone could enable the latter to
pursue him ; while on the other hand it would make it impossible to
repel him ; what Mr. Halleck testifies McClellan was ordered to' do
— and what all the world knows he actually did do.

* Harper's Ferry was surrendered Sept. 15; the1 battle of Antietam
took place Sept. 17, 1862.

12
General Lee, when he heard of the approach of Union troop", selected
a position on his road to Annapolis Junction, there to fight and to
annihilate whatever small fprce of our army might put themselves in
his way. That the demoralized army of General Pope — which he
had, only a few days ago, driven before him to; Washington — could
be reorganized and moved to Maryland in time to dispute his advances
Lee considered ah utter impossibility. So strong was he impressed
with this, that he detached large forces of his army to Harper's Ferry
and to Maryland Heights (who, the moment he found McClellan with
his army before him-, as the Commission states, were hurried to the
support of Lee); and that from Frederick City, Sept. llth, he issued
his proclamation to the people of Maryland. The witness Halleck
was very erratic when he testified that McClellan was pursuing the
enemy. ,
After the logic of events had compelled the so-called military heads
in Washington — Mr. Stanton, Mr. Halleck, and his other most bitter
enemies and unscrupulous slanderers included — either openly to
express their conviction, or silently to admit, that if it could be
accomplished at all, McClellan was the only man capable to repel
the' victorious rebel army on their march north ; after — under the
pressure of this universal and unhesitatingly expressed conviction —
Mr. Lincoln had solicited him to assume supreme'command of all
that was left of the several armies destroyed under Mr. Pope ; after
that, we say, it seems preposterous to doubt that McClellan was ths
best judge of the rapidity with which his new regiments could move ;
of how much time it required to discipline and militarize them on
the march ; how rapid, under the known mismanagement of the
departments in Washington, his ammunition and subsistence trains
would come forward ; in fine, when and what distance, with the
immeasurable responsibilities piled upon his shoulders, he could
advance. For a person in General Halleck's peculiar position — after McGlel-
lan has succeeded in repelling the dangerous enemy, thereby saving
among others the General himself — to step upon the witness-stand
and try by his testimony, to criticise McClellan'o movements, Is, to
say the least, very unique.
Leaving the correctness or incorrectness of the average march
of six miles per day, as completely irrelevant, untested, we shall
consider how General Halleck is justified in designating, as he does
an average march of six miles per day as censurably slow, by placing
the word only before six miles ; we will beforehand give him credit

13
however, for the new idea that there ever has existed, or does now
exist, any regulation as to the rate of speed with which an army has
to repel an invading enemy. Comparison with the movements of
other armies under similar circumstances will best enable us to come
to a proper conclusion on this point.
General Pope, if we are well informed, was put in command of the
Army of Virginia and was ordered to repel the rebel forces crossing
the Rappahannock : on the 14th day of July last, he, in his first order
to the officers and soldiers of his army, says :
" I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your con
dition and your wants ; in preparing you for active operations and in
placing you in positions from which you can act promptly and to the
purpose." That dashing general, when ordered " to repel an invading enemy,"
with an army in fine condition, two thirds of which had hardly lost a
man in an engagement, required two weeks to put himself and his
army in, what he considered, a proper position. Toward the enemy
he had not advanced an inch.
General MeClellan was put in command of that same army after it
had been routed and demoralized, and far more than decimated,
under Mr. Pope, on the 2d day of September. On the 4th he assumed
command, and on the 17th day of September, after having won
two others, he fought and won the great battle~of Antietam ; on the
19th he occupied the banks of the Potomac, had actually repelled the
mvading enemy, and had completed in two weeks, one of the most
brilliant campaigns on record. Halleck, in his report of the Pope
campaign, does not say a single word about the average rate of speed
per day with which he moved in pursuit of the invader, nor with
which he performed the reverse movement.
If our conceptions of military operations are not entirely wrong, it
was General Halleck's object, and he was under orders, to repel the
invading army under Beauregard after their attempt to drive Grant's
corps of Halleck's army, into the Tennessee River at Pittsburgh
Landing, April 5th, 1862. It took General Halleck until May 29th,
that is fifty-five days, to, what he calls, pursue the invading enemy
to Corinth, a distance of about twenty miles, or at a rate of speed of
a little over. a third part of a mile •per day. At Corinth, for reasons
publicly as yet unknown, he stopped repelling and pursuing alto
gether, allowed his generals to go a-travelling, his large army
gradually to dwindle away, and permitted the enemy unmolested tb
reinforce the rebel army massed around Richmond against the Army
of the Potomac-

14
Between May 7th and July 2nd, 1862, in fifty six days, McClellan,
with the' army of the Potomac, fought the battles pf Williamsburg,
West Point, Fair Oaks, Mechanicsville, Hanover Court-House, Sav
age Station, Gaine's Mill, White Oak Swamp, Cross-roads and Mal
vern Hill ; and thereby secured for his name a place in history, on
her scroll of fame, side by side with the few great strategists endowed
with a military genius of the highest order,, Never for a day would
he leave his noble army, not even to see the President : Mr. -Lincoln
had to go to see, the General in camp, at Harrison's Landing, as well
as on the upper Potomac among the half-clad, bare-footed heroes of
Antietam. Such is McClellan, whose strategic movements on his march to save
the Administration, had to be criticised before a commission ; who had
not asked the General to appear before them, and thereby showed
that they considered his acts entirely unconnected with the Harper's
Ferry affair, which they had to investigate ; and such is William H.
Halleck, General-in- Chief of the army of the United States, the wit
ness upon whose opinion the censure of George B. McClellan is based
because he pursues too slow.
We have investigated the report of the Harper's Ferry commis
sioners at some length, because this report convinced us that the in
trigues in Washington were at work again, at work against McClel
lan, against the army, -and consequently against 'the best interests of
the country. It showed that the President's promises would not be
fulfilled ; it threw the first light on the origin of what we consider a
most unpardonable strategical blunder ; it showed us that the miser
able plan for the Fall campaign can not be charged against General
McClellan. In the execution 6f this plan, the army of the Potomac had with
brilliant success occupied all the mountain passes from Gregory Gap
to Manassas Gap. Thoroughfare Gap and Warrenton were in our
possession ; the headquarters of the commanding General were at
Rectertown. A snow storm swept over the mountains, when at mid
night of Nov. 7, General Buckingham arrived at headquarters and
handedto McClellan the following order :
GENERAL ORDERS -No. 182.
War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, J
Washington, Nov. 5, 1862. j
By direction of 'the President of the United States, it is. ordered that
Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the army
of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command
of that army. By, order of the Secretary of War.
E. M. Townsend, A. A. General.

15
McClellan at once surrendered his command to General Burnside,
and issued the following address to his army.:
Headquarters Army of the Potomac, )
Camp near Rectortown, Va.. Nov. 7, 1862. $
Officers. and Soldiers of ihe Army of the Potomac^:
An order of the President devolves upon Major-General Burnside the
command of this army. In parting from you I cannot express the love
and gratitude I bear to you. As an army, you have grown up under my
care* In you I have never fcund doubt or coldness. The battles you
have fought under my command will proudly live .in our nation's history.
The glory you have achieved ; our mutual perils and fatigues ; the graves
of pur comrades fallen in battle and by disease ; the broken forms of those
wounds and sickness have disabled — the strongest associations which can
exist among men, unite us still by an /indissoluble tie. We shall ever be
comrades jn supporting the Constitution of our country and the national
ity of its -people. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Major-General U. S. A.

He then went with Burnside and all the staff officers to bid fare
well, to the several corps of the army, who were drawn up inline, and
received him with military salutes. "Don't let him go !" "Bring him
back !" "He must not .go !" and similar were the exclamations of
thousands upon thousands of our brave veteran soldiers, who under
their General, and by his example had learned to stand cool and firm
in the face of death, because their country's cause demanded it, and
to be humane and courteous towards an unarmed enemy because their
country's cause demanded that also.
We have seen letters of officers and ' private soldiers belonging to
" that army ; they all express the grief, the sorrow, the deep dissatis
faction of the army over the removal of their beloved General.
On reaching the railway station to take the cars, a salute was fired ;
the troops drawn up in line, afterwards broke ranks and many called
for a few parting words. While on the platform of the railroad depot
he laid in response :
"Stand by Burnside as you have stood by me, and all will be well.
Goodbye." When the news of General McClellan's removal from command was
published, it was accompanied by the following letter from General
Halleck to the Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, and a tele
graphic dispatch from General McClellan to General Meigs, Quarter-
Master General :-

16
Headquarters of the Army, ?
Washington, October 28, 1862. $
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
Sir : — In reply to the general interrogatories contained in your letter of
yesterday, I have to report :
1. That requisitions for supplies' to the army under General McClellan
are made by his staff officers on the Chiefs of Bureaus here ; that is, for
Quartermaster's supplies, by his Chief Quartermaster on the Quartcr-
Master-General ; for Commissary- supplies, by his Chief Commissary on
the Commissary-General, &c. No such requisitions have been, to my
knowledge, made upon the Secretary of War, and none upon the General-
in-Chief. 2. On several occasions Gen. McClellan has telegraphed to me that his
army was deficient in certain supplies. All these telegrams were imme
diately referred to the heads of Bureaus with orders to report. It was
ascertained that in every instance the requisitions had been immediately
filled, except one, where the Quartermaster-General had been obliged to
send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing,, tents, &c, not having
a, full supply here. There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any
neglect or delay in any Department or Bureau, in issuing all supplies
aaked for by Gen. McClellan or by the officers of his staff. Delays have
occasionally occurred in forwarding supplies by rail, on account of the
crowded- condition of the depots, or of a want of cars; but whenever
notified of this, agents have been sent out to remove the difficulty. Under
the excellent superintendence of General Haupt, I think these delays
have been less frequent and of shorter duration than is usual with freight
trains. An army of the size of that under General McClellan will fre
quently be for some days without the* supplies asked, on account of ne
glect in making timely requisitions, and unavoidable delays in forwarding
them, and in distributing them to the different brigades and regiments.
From all the information I can obtain, I am of opinion that the requi
sitions from that army have been filled more promptly, and that the men,
as a general rule, have been better supplied, than our armies operating in
the West. The latter have operated at much greater distances from the
the sources of supply, and have had far less facilities for transportation.
In fine, I believe no armies in the world, while in campaign, have been
more promptly or better supplied than ours.
3. Soon after the battle of Antietam, Gen. McClellan was urged to give
me information of his intended movements, in order that if he moved be
tween the enemy and Washington, reinforcements could be sent from this
place. On the first of October, finding that he purposed to operate from
Harper's Perry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to
the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantages of delaying till the
Autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On Jhe
6th of October he was peremptorily ordered to " cross the Potomac and
give battle to the enemy or drive him South. Your army must move now
while tha roads are good." It will be observed that three weeks have
passed since this order was given.
4. In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army
under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to
advance against the enemy, Had he moved to the South side of the
Potomac, he could have received his supplies almost as regularly as by
remaining inactive on the north.
On the 7th of October, in a telegram in regard to his: intended move
ments, Gen. McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to

• 17
supply the First, Fifth and Sixth Corps, that they needed shoes and other
indispensable artioles of clothing, as well as shelter tents. No complaint
was made that any requisitions had not been filled, and it was inferred from
his language thathe was only waiting for the distribution of his supplies.
On the llth' he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies sent by rail had
been delayed. '"
As already stated, agents were immediately sent from here to investi
gate this complaint, and they reported that everything had gone forward.
On the same day (the llth)' he spoke of many of his horses being broken
down by fatigue. On the 12th he complained that the rate of supply was
only " 150 horses per week for the entire army there and in frbnt of
Washington." I immediately directed the Quartermaster-General to-
inquire into this matter, and report why a larger supply was not furnished.
Gen. Meigs reported on the 14th that the average issue of horses to Gen.
McClellan's army in the field and in front of Washington for the previous
six weeks, had been 1,450 per week, or 8,754 in all. In addition, that
large number of mules had been supplied, and that the number of ani
mals with General McClellan's army on the Upper Potomac was over
thirty-one thousand. He also reported that he was then sending to that
army all the horses he could procure. ,
On the 18th, Gen. McClellan stated, in regard to Gen. Meigs' report
that he had filled every requisition for shoes and clothing, '' Gen. MeigS
may have ordered these articles to be forwarded, but they have not reach
ed our depots ; and unless greater effort to insure prompt transmission is
made by the department of which Gen. Meigs is the head, they might as
well remain in New York or Philadelphia, so for as this army is concerned. "
I immediately called General Meigs' attention to this apparent neglect of
his department. On the 25th he reported as the result of his investiga
tion that 48,000 pairs of boots and shoes had been received by the Quar
termaster of Gen. McClellan's army at Harper's Perry, Frederick, and
Hagerstown ; that 20,000 pairs were at Harper's Perry depot on the
21st ; that 10,000 more were on their way, and 15,000 more ordered. Col.
Ingals, Aid-de-Camp, and Chief Quartermaster to Gen. McClellan, tele
graphed on the 25th, ''The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated,
I think, and certainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions of
regimental and brigade commanders." On the 26th he telegraphed" to the
Quartermaster-General that the clothing was not detained in cars at the
depots. '' Such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing
arrives and is issued, but more is still wanted. I have ordered more than
would seem necessary from any data furnished me, and I beg to remind
you that you have always very promptly met my requisitions so far as
clothing is concerned. Our depot is not at fault. It provides as soon as
due notice is given. I foresee no time when an army of over 100,000
men will not call for clothing and other articles."
In regard to General McClellan's means of promptly communicating
the wants of his army to me or to the proper Bureaus of the War Depart
ment, I report that, in addition to the ordinary mails, he has been in hourly
communication with Washington by telegraph.
It is due to Gen. Meigs that I should submit herewith a copy of a tele-*
gram received by him from Gen. McClellan.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief..

18
UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.
v [Received Oct, 22, 1862—9:40 P. M.]
From McClellan's Headquarters.
To Brigadier-General Meigs: — Your dispatch of this date is re
ceived. I have never intended, in any letter or dispatch, to make any ac
cusation against yourself or your Department for not furnishing or for
warding clothing as rapidly as it was possible for you to do. I believe that
everything has been done that could be done in this respect. The idea
that I have tried to convey was, -that certain portions of the command were
without clothing, and the army could not move until it was supplied.
G. B. McCLELLAN, M. G.
" The removal of the commanding General of a large army, moving
against a not distant enemy, is an event, of necessity pregnant with
grave consequences for good or for evil, to the power ordering the
removal, to the country, and to the General deprived of command.
This threefold importance demands a minute investigation and scru-
. tiny of everything conducive to the development of the motives and
reasons for so consequential proceedings. The publication ofthe two
documents referred to, simultaneously with the news of the removal
of McClellan, point them out as explaining the culminating cause,
that justifies the all important step.
General Halleck's letter of October 28 is written in reply to general
interrogatories presented by Mr. Stanton on the day previous. Its
extent, its completeness, the numerous facts contained therein, re
quiring references to book's, and an extensive correspondence, the un-\
usual importance of the object for which, undoubtedly, it is intended,
demanding great care and deliberation in its preparation — all this
proves either, that General Halleck is a man of astonishing business
qualification, who has all the minutiae of his extensive official transac
tions at his finger's ends, and who posseses an enviable and unerring
memory for executive details ; or that the document had been care
fully prepared, anterior to its date, to serve an important end in
view. For the better understanding of the document in question, we
give Mr. Edwin M. Stanton's letter containing the several interroga
tories to which General Halleck's forms the reply:
EXHIBIT NO. 5.
War Department, Washington City, Oct. 27, 1862.
General : It has been publicly stated that the army under GeneraF
McClellan has been unable to move during the fine weather of this fall,
for want of shoes, clothing and other supplies. You will please report to
this Department upon the following points :
1. To whom and in what, manner the requisitions for supplies to the
army under General McClellan have been made since you assumed com-

19
mand as General-in-Chief, aud whether any requisition for supplies of apy
kind has since that time been made upon the Secretary of War, or com
munication had with him, except through you. \
2. If you, as General-in-Chief, have taken pains to ascertain the con
dition of the army in respect to supplies of shoes, clothing, arms, and
other necessaries, and whether there has been any neglect or delay by any
Department or Bureau, in filling the requisitions for supplies ; and what
has been and is the condition of that army, as compared with other armies
in respect to supplies. .
3. At what time after the battle of Antietam the orders to advance
against the enemy were given to General McClellan, and how often have
they been repeated.
4. Whether, in your opinion, there has been any want in the army,
under General McClellan, of shoes, clothing, arms, or other equipments '
or Supplies, that ought to have prevented its advance against the enemy,
when the order was given.
5. How long was it after the orders to advance were .given to General
McClellan, beiore he informed you that any shoes or clothing were wanted
in his army, and what are his means of communicating the wants of the
army to you, or the proper bureau of the War Department.
Yours truly, EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief.
Official. This letter to the General-in-Chief, for transparent reasons, was
not given to the public when the reply thereto was ordered to be
published : its later appearance in the Report of General Halleck, to,
the author of the letter, completes a chain of evidence which would
have been imperfect without it.
We see the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief of the
army of the United States enter into a correspondence with each
other for the purpose of asking questions and eliciting answers- on
matters about which the questioner ought to be by far better informed
than the respondent ; evidently with the intention to convince the
people that General McClellan, or some one on his behalf, has without
actual cause, complained of want in the army of the Potomac
of shoes, clothing and other supplies ; and that this imaginary want
has been used as a pretext why the army was not led into Virginia ;
that General McClellan in not moving the army across the Potomac
has become guilty of disobedience to orders, and that consequently
the Administration had to deprive him of his command.
As to the first part, we have already stated that the want existed,
and we have enumerated some of the causes by which it had been
produced.* Let us see how the two high correspondents succeeded

* General Pope's orders to General Banks, and General Porter's report
to General Burnside, produoed in Porter's court martial, fully confirms
our statements.

20
in disproving by the pea what a hundred thousand soldiers by their
pains and sufferings knew to be the truth. .
To Mr. Stanton's first question, the Secretary of War -is
the most competent person to give a satisfactory answer. To
designate the persons to whom, and regulate the manner in
which, requisitions for supplies are to be made by the com
manders of all armies ; to see that they are properly made and
punctually supplied, is one of the most important duties of that
functionary. The Secretary of War is in all countries considered,
and frequently called the mother of the army, and the commander-in-
chief the father ; the mother has to procure, prepare and serve out
her supplies, that with the well clad, well fed, and well armed boys
the father may protect against the enemy, the common fireside,
our country. The paft Mr. Stanton has undertaken to act as command
er-in-chief over the corpsjinder Gens. McDowell, Banks and Fremont
had brought disgrace and ruin over the country, and had filled tens
of thousands of new dug graves while it lasted ; but it can never
relieve the honorable Secretary of his duties, after he had so mis
carried as a commander that even Mr. Lincoln could not endure it any
longer, and had to stop him in his mad career. The chief Quarter
master, the chief Commissary, the chief of Ordnance, and all the
other chiefs of Bureaus, are the subordinates, and perform every
official act in behalf, and under the instructions of the Secretary of
War, and in his name they report to him, who is just as much ac
countable for all their performances as the commanding general of
an army is accountable forthe official acts of any of his staff officers,
which are all performed in his name and on his behalf, and re-
' ported to him.
For the .very purpose that the Secretaiy of War should be
entirely relieved from all connection with and care of the strategical
and purely military affairs of the army, General Halleck was ap
pointed General-in-Chief ; and the supervision and general direction
pf the strategical and military affairs vested in him. If, as Mr. Stan
ton tries to make us believe, the care for supplies, etc, had also been
put upon General Halleck's shoulders, then it is clear that the latter
would have to perform all the duties heretofore exercised by our Sec
retary of war, and that Mr. Stanton would occupy a perfect sinecure.
The sentence attached to this first question is intended to shield the
honorable Secretary from the consequences, which on account of his
previous unpardonable interference with the purely military affairs
of the army, the future may yet have in store for him. He desired

21
to prove that of late he has not interfered.' The answer of General
Halleck to this question shows that the communications of General
McClellan with the Secretary of War have been carried on as they
ought to be, through their respective representative quarter-masters'
commissaries. It also states that no requisitions have been made
upon him.
Mr. Stanton's second question is in its first sentence, rather perplex
ing for General Halleck: — "Have you as Commander-in-Chief ta
ken pains to ascertain the condition of the army in regard to certain
supplies V The General not being able to answer this delicate but di
rect question in the affirmative, does not answer it at all ; of which
neglect the Secretary, far the present, does not seem to take any
further notice, and slides immediately to the second section of his
qrtestion ; to which he answers that on several occasions McClellan
has telegraphed to him that his army was deficient in certain sup
plies, and that he (Halleck) had referred all these telegrams immedi
ately to the heads of Bureaus, to report— not to supply. Also that
it was ascertained that in one instance the requisition for certain ar
ticles of clothing, tents et cetera, (which may mean, some very im
portant things) had to be got from Philadelphia ; that occasionally de
lays in forwarding supplies by rail had occurred, but that whenever
notified of this — (by whom ?) — agents have been sent out to remove th'e
difficulty— (on the railroad ?)— that delays have been less frequent,
and of shorter duration than is usual with freight trains. Freight
trains usually are slow but not sure ; supplies for the army ought to
be rapid and sure,: this sentence shows how incompetent are the
heads and hands upon whom our soldiers rely for their necessaries,*
That the armies in the West have been supplied less promptly than
the army under McClellan may be correct, as far as the operations of
those armies led, them away from the navigable rivers.; but we be
lieve, in favor of General Hallock, that the slow and imperfect sup
plies of his army of the West, contributed to the fact that it took him
as we have shown above, fifty-two days to move twenty miles, while
McClellan's army iu the same number of days fought ten battles, and
marched several hundred miles ; and at another time commenced and
completed a brilliant campaign in a fortnight.

* All of this shows that the pains the Commander -in- Chief has taken
to ascertain the condition of the airmy, have been taken at a great dis
tance from the army, in his comfpirtable; office /it Washington, and-; con
sisted in receiving many requests, which he referred to the heads of bu
reaus ; hut thai he did not go near that army.

22
Mr. Stanton's third question is again of the character that the hon
orable Secretary ought to have answered it as well as anybody in the
world, because in the telegram of October 6, annexed to General
Halleck's report of Dec. 2d, which he erroneously called a peremp
tory Order, the General distinctly says.: "lam directed to add that
the Secretary of War and the General-in- Chief fully concur with the
President in these instructions. The honorable Secretary, therefore,
must have had a copy oi the telegram on file.
Mr. Stanton's fifth and last question is a leading one. He wishes
to have it understood that McClellan did not complain of want of
shoes or clothing until after he was ordered to advance. General
Halleck, in answer 5, meets the honorable Secretary half way by refer
ring at once to October 7, a day or two after the so-called peremptory
order ; hut he has, in the lengthy answer No. 2, enumerated a long
list of well-founded complaints made by McClellan, all previous to
the 6th of October, and all of which the General-in-Chief has ex
plained to his own satisfaction.
In his 6th reply General Halleck states in substance that McClel
lan telegraphed to him on Oct. 11 that his supplies by rail had been
delayed, and that many of his horses had been broken down ; Oct.
12th that he was supplied only at the rate of 150 horses per week-
The first complaint brought the Agents, (Sec. 2,) on the road,
but the delay existed and had to be endured by the army. The second
complaint, caused undoubtedly by the enormous fatigue which the
cavalry had to undergo in following General Stuart's horses in their
raid in Pennsylvania and Maryland, which took place two days before
the 12ih, seems to have been entirely misunderstood by General
Meigs, who represents to Halleck how many mules and animals are
attached to the army, and gives an average furnished during 6 weeks/
which brings it hack into August, when Pope had not yet dis
tinguished himself.
On the 18th of October, about thirty days after the battle of Antie- ¦
tam, McClellan says in substance, the supplies which General Meigs
says he has sent have not reached our depot, and they* might as well
remain in New York or Philadelphia, so far as this army was con
cerned. Meigs, who is ordered on the 18th to report immediately,
and who, in his brilliant offices in Washingten, undisturbed by war ;
from his way bills, and the return of his wagon guards and conductors
under command of General Haupt, ought to be able to tell within
a few hours when and what he has sent to the army, and if, when
and where it has been delivered and receipted for, takes till the 25th

23 ,
—as long time as it took McClellan to fight the seven battles on the
pgnmsula ; half as-*long as the entire Maryland campaign — long after
McClellan's army had entered Virginia, to make a report, that on the
21st, three days after McClellan' s complaint reached Washington,
48,000 pair of boots and shoes had been delivered to the Quarter
master of McClellan's army, that 20,000 pair were lying at the
Harper's Ferry Depot, not with McClellan's army ; that 10,000 pair
were on their way — he does not know where ; and 15,000 pair were
ordered — he does not say where and when.
As General Meigs, with the telegraph facilities referred to by General
Halleck at his disposal, does not report that any shoes or boots had
actually reached any depot of McClellan's army on or before October
18th, it is safe to say that according to General Halleck's and Gen
eral Meigs's oiyn statement, McClellan's army was four weeks after
the battle of Antietam without proper shoes and boots — and that on
the 25th of October, about half as many pair of shoes and hoots as
the army required had been delivered — and that when all the shoes
and boots which General Meigs reports^ as on their way and as
ordered, without any fixed time for delivery, (amounting to about
90,000 pairs,) should one of these days reach the army of over 100,000
men, that then some 10,000 of our brave soldiers will yet have to
go barefeoted. ,
On the 25th ef Octcber, a week after McClellan's complaint of the
18th, Colonel Ingal's Quartermaster-General to General McClellan
telegraphs, " The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated."
This officer of the Quartermaster (that is of the War Department)
has no further consolation for the Secretary of War and for Mr.
Halleck than to say, the suffering for the want of clothing is exag
gerated : not the want— the want he admits; he officially states that
the want has been so great that it has caused suffering; that the
suffering still exists, but that on the 25th day of October, two days
before, the Honorable Secretary, whose office is next door to that of
the General-in-Chief, writes the interrogation to the latter, the suffer
ing is exaggerated — relieved but not removed. But how was it five
weeks before the 25th day of October, immediately after Antietam,
when that cry of suffering first startled the country, and before, during
thirty-five long day's, urged by McClellan's again and again repeated
demands, the Secretary of War, through the Chief Quartermaster, had
gradually relieved some of the suffering, half-naked army ?
Colonel Ingal's remarks, " that he foresees no time when an army
of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing or other articles " is

24
correct. It expresses the experience made by all the armies in the
werld. But if this fact is kncwn it should have the result it produces
in ether armies : it sheuld beget the fostering care, which, under the
guidance of the Secretaty of War, through his subordinates, causes a
constant expedition of supplies to reach the army regularly at certain
short intervals without extra requisition ; which, in other ' armies,
makes the mother ofthe army, (who stays at home, and who has time
to order, to examine, and to dispatch the necessary fopd, clothing,
arms and ammunition,) the need of which she knows just as well as
the General can tell her, makes the Secretary pf War attend tp all
these matters, and thereby relieve the Commanding General and his
Staff, whp have always as much tp attend te as they possibly can
stand, frem the additienal care of asking and enumerating things
which everybody knows the army regularly wants.
General McClellan's telegram, October 22d, to Quartermaster-Gen
eral Meigs, confirms, the assertion of all the subordinates of the Secre
tary ef War, that each ef them has dene all they possibly could do to
supply the army of the Potomac, to the contrary, notwithstanding,
that certain portions ofthearmy were then without clothing, and that
the army could not move till it was supplied.
We believe we have proved, from the official statement of the
General-in-Chief himself, that the army of the Potomac has suffered
from and was unable te mpve on account of- want of shoes, clothing,
and other supplies. We have declared that according to well estab
lished rules, it is in all countries the duty of the War Department to
furnish supplies, and to regulate and supervise their transportation to
the army, which, of course, cannot have any benefit of them till they
¦have been delivered; and that the Secretary of War, under whose
orders all the different chiefs of bureaus are acting, is the officer
responsible for any want of the most systematic, effective and per
fect regulation, and execution in all matters connected with the
subsistence and supplies of the army.
To attain the means of introducing system and punctuality in the
transportation of supplies to our armies, the Secretary of War took, at an
early day, possession of all the railroads connecting the several armies
with the central depot — Washington — and established a bureau of con
struction and operation of United States Military railroads. To the
Chief of this bureau the Secretary appointed General H. Haupt, who has
his office at the War Department, immediately under the eyes of the hon
orable Secretary ; and acts, of course, under the general directions, and
on behalf of that high officer. As the representative of the Secretary of
War, he exorcises supreme control over the railroads. ' ¦

25
That there had been frequent and long delays in the transportation
of the supplies, from the want of which the army under General Mc
Clellan was suffering ; that these delays were caused by the unsys
tematic, irregular, and ineffective management of this branch of the
Department ; that these delays occurred and continued to take place
from the moment the army of the Potomac entered Maryland, till
after it had marched to Virginia ; that these delays, as well as the
fact that they were caused by an imperfect and unsystematic, and
therefore improper, management of the military railroads under the
War Department, wfere well known to the Secretary of War and to
the General-in-Chief of the army of the United States ; that conse
quently that part of the correspondence between the two last named
high personages, 27th and 28th October, 1862, referring to the suffer
ing of McClellan's army, to its causes, and to the time when it ex
isted, has been carried on under false pretences, for the purpose of
hiding their own neglect or incompetence from the public eye, and
manufacturing false evidence against General McClellan : — All this is
proved by the erder of General Haupt, to whom General Halleck re
fers in his letter October 28, to Mr.- Stanton, addressed to the post,
quartermasters, commissaries, officers and agents of military railroads,
datedt
War Department, U. S. Military Rail Roads, )
Washington, Nov. 10, 1862. j
To Post Quartermasters, Commissaries, Officers and Agents of Military
Railroads :
Gentlemen : The exceedingly critical condition of affairs compels me
to address to you this circular, and to endeavor, with all the earnestness
and force of language I can command, to explain some of the difficulties
connected with military railroad transportation, and ask your co-operation
and assistance in forwarding supplies.
The army is dependent for its supplies upon a single-track railroad, in
bad condition, without sidings of sufficient length, without wood, with a
short supply of water, and with insufficient equipments. This road is
taxed with an amount of business equal to the ordinary freights of a large
city — an amount four times as large as it has ever before been called upon
to accommodate, and twice as large as I reported to Gen. McClellan its
capacity for transportation.

fThe fact that General Haupt in behalf of the Secretary of War, did
not discover the remedy for the existing irregularities, and long and fre
quent delays — and did not instruct, his subordinates how to obviate and
overcome them till two days after General McClellan had transferred his
command, so that the army could not derive any benefit from the improv
ed management of this branch of the War Department, while he com
manded it — all of this speaks for itself. The necessity of the, numer
ous and important improvements introduced by this order proves the
wretched condition the transportation service must have been in before.

26
There cannot be the most distant prospect of keeping the army suppli
ed without constant uninterrupted movement of trains day and night.
The delicate machinery of the road must not be deranged by any deten
tion or interference ; it must be directed by one mind, and one only. No
one, not even myself, must derange the plans of the superintendent, vary
his instructions, or direct his subordinates. Cars must be loaded and un
loaded with the utmost expedition possible, and kept in motion. Conve
nience must not be consulted ; unload the cars anywhere, and move their
contents afterwards, or issue where they lie ; do not delay or require cars
to be shifted, or trains moved, simply to avoid .inconvenience. Railroad
employees must be civil ; they must do anything in their power to accom
modate officers if it will not delay trains, but if it will cause delay, their
orders are peremptory ; they must decline, Do not quarrel with them, or
refuse to unload cars because they are not in the most convenient posi
tions ; in doing this you not only prevent the forwarding of supplies, but
derange movements dependent upon the prompt return of cars. If em
ployees are uncivil or unaccommodating, report the facts to me. * *
* * Again I say that if the army is to be supplied, the condition
which, in its importance transcends all others, is that no delay, not 'even
a minute, should be allowed to occur in unloading cars, if it can be avoid
ed. Movement, unceasing movement in the trains, is our only salvation ;
without it the army must retreat or starve. Would that I could express
its importance as I felt it. * * * * The Secretary of War and
the commanding General of the army fully understand and appreciate the
fact, that the operation's of a railroad must be directed by one mind, even
if it should not be a superior one. They have declared that my control
over the railroads is "supreme," and that "no military . officer has any
authority to interfere with it." But, I do not wish to exercise "authority."
I prefer' to appeal to the patriotism and good sense of those whose busi
ness brings them in contact with the;, railway managers, and believe that
the appeal will not be in vain, when I ask their assistance and cd"-opera-
tion. * * * * I hope that I have made myself understood,
and that officers of all grades will receive these explanations in the spirit
in which they are given.
Agents on United States military railroads, at each depot station, are
required to report daily to the superintendent, as follows :
1. The exact time of arrival of each train, and the numbers of the cars
which it contains,
2. The force employed to unload it.
3. If there was a sufficient force to unload each and every car at the
same time.
4. The time actually occupied in unloading.
5. The name of the officer or officers who superintended ttie unloading.
6. All cases of detention to cars, engines or trains, and their causes.
The time occupied in unloading cars should be employed by the engi
neer and conductor, whenever practicable', in procuring wood and wafer,
and ingoing whatever else may be necessary to permit an immediate re
turn. H. HAUPT, Brigadier-General,
In charge of construction and operation of United States Military Rail
roads, In section three of the letter of October 28th, General Halleck
tries to produce the impression that McClellan had been guilty of
disobedience to his orders. If he does not succeed, it is not for want
of artful phraseology.

27
If, as he desires to make it appear, General Halleck had any right
whatever to give orders to General McClellan, after what had taken
place between the defeat of Mr. Pope, and the preservation of the
administration by McClellan, from captivity by General Lee — if he
was General-in-Chief over McClellan — it was his duty to make the
general plan of the new campaign, and order McClellan to carry it
out. In that case he did neither understand nor do his duty when
he asked McClellan for information of his intended movements. He
would not have been in a position of finding that he purposed to op
erate from Harper's Ferry, and to urge him to cross the river at
once, but he would have fixed the place whence, and at what" time
the operations were to be commenced, and would have ordered the
execution thereof. He would in that case have been able to say in
his closing sentence, "I ordered him peremptorily to cross," and he
would have been bonnd, in duty to the army, in duty to his country
and in duty to his high office as General in Chief, to have General
McClellan at once put under arrest, and tried before a court mar
tial on the grave charge "of disobedience of orders to attack the ene
my," the punishment of which is one of the most severe. Knowing,
of course, that the immediate attack was necessary for the welfare of
the army and pf the ceuntry — knowing the dangers that might fellpw
even a short delay in the execution of this movement, by his keep
ing silent for over three weeks,J — and by not taking official action in
this matter ef highest impprtance until he had received a general in-
terrogatpry frpm the hpnorable Secretary of War; (which silence
costs the country tens -of millions) General Halleck, in our opinion,
has himself become guilty of willful neglect of duty, for which
in every other army in the civilized* world, he would be court
martialed. He is even not entitled to the palliation of his offence, on
the plea of friendly sentiments towards a distinguished brother officer,
highest in rank in the army, who has always deserved well of hia
country ; because throughout these entire transactions we have been
unable to discover any but the most unfriendly and unsoldierly senti
ments on behalf of the General-in-Chief towards General McClellan.

Jit is well known that on the 28th day of October, when General Hal
leck made that statement, the army of the Potomac had crossed according
to Halleck's report to the Secretary of War, October 26, and was at Up-
perville and Snickersville in the Blue Ridge.

28
The telegraphic dispatch ef Oct. 6th, 1862, frpm General Halleck
to McClellan reads :
"lam instructed to telegraph you as follows : The President directs
that you cross * * * * It is necessary that' the plan of
your operations be positively determined upon before orders are given for
building bridges and repairing railroads. * * * * I am
directed to add that, the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully
concur with the President in these instructions.
" H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief."
General Halleck, in his Report to the Secretary of War, Dec. 2d.,
1862, of McClellan says :
" What caused him to change his views, or what his plan of campaign
was, I am ignorant, for about this time he ceased to communicate with me
in regard to his operations, sending his reports direct to the President.
On the 5th ultimo I received the written order of the President relieving
General McClellan, and placing General Burnside in command of the
Army of the Potomac."
In his examination by the Commission to investigate the disastrous
battle of Fredericksburg, General Halleck, under oath, testified, that
all the troops in Washington were "under command of General
McClellan, that he gave his orders direct to the commanding officers
at Washington, with one single exception that no troops should be
moved from the command at Washington until I was notified by
General McClellan or the commanding officer here (Washington)."
Which statement means, that besides the troops in Virginia and
Maryland, those in and around Washington were also under direct
command of General McClellan. " General Burnside, I was told,
held the same position when he relieved him." ( The General made
this statement to show that he ceuld npt be held resppnsible fer any
acticn pr pmission in the matter under investigation,)
In September last, when General McClellan left Washington for
the Maryland campaign, he entrusted the command of the forces in
' the fortifications afound that city to General Banks ; the latter issued
an order to his army stating, that by Qrder of Major-General McClel
lan he assumed command, &c.
From all these facts, and from the statements in section 3 of Gene
ral Halleck's letter ef Octpber 28th, we come to the conclusion that
on the 1st of September last when President Lincoln, forced by abso
lute necessity, requested General McClellan tp resume command, the
latter, as a cenditipn sine qua non, demanded that henceferward no
person whatever, but in particular not the Secretary of War or the
General-in-Chief, should have any right to interfere with, or to give
prders, er tp ccntrol him and the armies under his cemmand, or their

29
operations, and that all necessary deliberations, consultations and com
munications regarding his armies and their movements, should be
direct from the President to the General and vice versa, and that to
the President of the United States alone he would be accountable.
The President accepted this condition, and pledged himself strictly
to adhere to it ; the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief had
to and did submit to it.
The brilliant campaign in Maryland would have been impossible
had any one interfered with McClelJan.
As neither the Secretary of War nor the General-in-Chief had, per
special agreement, any right to give orders or instructions to General
McClellan, it is clear that, as these two officers failed to disprove the
suffering of the army from want of shoes, clothing, &c, so they have
failed to prove their insinuation that General McClellan had been
guilty of disobedience to their orders.
The imminent personal danger removed frem the portals of the
White House and the War Department, the Secretary of War and
the General-in-Chief began to feel uneasy and uncomfortable under
the agreement in question, and the President grew less exact in the
fulfillment pf his prpmise.
The General-in-Chief was curious tc knpw McClellan's plan fpr the
next campaign, and was net let inte the secret because McClellan and
the ceuntry had almpst been ruined when in March last, yielding to
official pressure, he explained his plan, whereupon it became imme
diately known to the rebel General Johnson.*
The General-in-Chief thereupon urged McClellan to decide between
two plans — either of them bad, but they alone appear within the
range of General Halleck's strategical mind. General McClellan did
not enter into any correspondence with him, and his curiosity was npt
satisfied. On the 6th of October the General-in-Chief caused himself to be
#
instructed by the President to telegraph to General McClellan a most
remarkable dispatch. Washington,' D. C, October 6, 1862.
Major-General McClellan : I am instructed to telegraph you as _
follows : The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give bat
tle to the enemy or drive him South. Your army must move 'now while
the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Wash
ington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reinforced
with 30.000 men. If you move up the valley ofthe Shenandoah, not more

" Army of the Potomac." By Prince Joinville,

30
than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the
interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it.
He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will
immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the
river. Also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is neces
sary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before
orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am
directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully
concur with the President in these instructions.
H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
" The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle
to the enemy or drive him South ; your army must now move while
ihe roads are good." This reads almost as if a definite plan of the cam
paign had been decided upon by the President, and that the execu
tion thereof had been ordered ; but the balance of the dispatch contains
numerous qnestions, suggestions and propositions, all intended to
draw from McClellan a disclosure of his actual plan for the campaign,
and all referring exclusively to the two plans previously alluded to
by the General-in-Chief, of which the President orders General Hal
leck to say, " that he advises but does not order it." (This latter
would have been contrary to agreement with General McClellan.)
" It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively deter
mined upon before orders are given for building bridges and repair
ing railroads" shows the endeavor to learn McClellan's plan, as
well as that the latter had requested bridges and railroads to be
repaired; a point, the importance of which we shall hereafter take
occasicn tp explain.
" 1 am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-'
in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions." This
closing sentence shows that the President submits his opinion in the.
matter first to Mr. Stanton and General Halleck, and asked for their
concurrence ; this secured he directs General Halleck to communicate
these views to General McClellan, and to tell him that the President
has asked Mr. Stanton's an<f Mr. Halleck's views, and that the
Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the
President. This roundabout' way tp secure to the Commander of sthe army of
the Potomac the benefit of the opinion of the Secretary of War and
the General-in-Chief on the President's strategical suggestions, proves
conclusively, .we think, that both these high officials, by special agree
ment, were noif permitted to communicate their views officially and
direct to General McClellan.
To call the contradictory suggestions and the suggestive contradic-

31
tions, forming the substance of this dispatch instructions, as the Gen
eral-in-Chief does call them, is certainly a bold stretch of imagination
— imagination is the most dangerous virtue in a general — but even
this he exceeds when he refers to this telegram as a peremptory
order. This dispatch constituted so direct a violation of stipulations
made by General McClellan, that from that time the General ceased to
have any further communication with either of the two concurring
personages. The documentary evidence from which we have drawn all the
conclusions heretofpre arrived at, it will be ebserved has all been " ex
parte," all ef it having been furnished tp us exclusively by Edwin M.
Stanten, Secretary ef War, and H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief of
the armies of the United States, who, on the 27th and 2t8h day of
October last, entered into an exchange of notes for the purpose of
demonstrating to the people that there existed good cause for the
ramdval, on the 5th day* of Npvember, ef Majpr-General McClellan
frcm the ccmmand pf the army of the Potomac. In this they have
completely failed, and they have, by their own written statements >i
proved the utter pismanagement of the War Department and the
ruinous consequences therefrom to the army and to the country.
Who can tell how much more disgusting and criminal their
conduct will appear one of these days, when the self-sacrificing, patri
otic general, whose true greatness made him the object of the hatred'
the jealousy and the intrigues of those unprincipled -men, may con
descend to open his lips and permit publicity to be given to the'
damning evidence against them which he undoubtedly holds in his
possession ?
The President, after this, was more and more pressing in-his de_
mand that General, McClellan should cross the Potomac, and. McClel.
lari was forced to choose between two evils f either to resign his
command, which would have been inconsistent with good discipline
and would have set a bad example ; oi-, after having tried with all the
arguments at his control to dissuade the President from the execution
of, under existing circumstances, so unstrategical'a movement, to act
as he did in March, 1862 — to perform his duty in the best possible
manner. The sentence in General Halleck's dispatch at the order of the
President, October 6, " it is necessary that the plan of your operations
bs fully determined upon before orders are given for building bridges
a?ii repairing railroads," seems to us to show that while McClellan
still hoped to succeed in dissuading the President from the fatal plan

32
to cross the Potomac at once, he was making all necessary prelimi
nary preparations for the execution of the only , sound strategy, the
moment the President should have assented thereto. He wanted
railroads repaired to move his army rapidly to the place of embarka
tion, say Alexandria, and bridges built for the same purppse ; still he
weuld npt disclcse his plan so that the enemy should knew it. After
full consideration of all the facts befere us, we have ne doubt that
whenever General McClellan shall one of these days think it proper
to permit his own plan for the fall campaign of 1862 to be published,
it v, ill, in all its principal points, coincide with the plan described in
detail by us, and for which we have given reasons which, in our
opinion, cannot well be disputed.
When the army of the Potomac had crossed the river near Berlin,
General McClellan made his reports direct to the President; this of
course vexed the Secretary cf War and the fteneral-in-Chief continu
ally. Their influence over the President increased in equal ratio with
the distance from Washington to the headquarters of the army of the
Potomac; it was supreme on the 5th of November, when General
Halleck succeeded in receiving the written order of the President
relieving General McClellan and placing General Burnside in com
mand of the army of the Potomac. (
The Emperor of Russia, the most despotic military monarch in
the world, would not deprive of command the ^highest officer in his
army, who only two months before, at the head of 150,000 men, had
saved his Gevernment frem destructipn by an invading army, with
out having made known to the army the guilt of theGeneral against
whom he had taken so important a step.
The President of the United States has, on the 5th day of Novem
ber, deprived of command Major-General McClellan, the highest
ranked officer in the United States army, who in September had saved
him and his Administration from the rebel General Lee.
On the first day pf December the President sent a very long mes
sage to the representatives of the people, wherein want of space for
a word of acknowledgment for their heroic devotion to the country's
cause, to the army of hMf a million of citizen soldiers, compels him
to refer the representatives, in all matters concerning the army, to the
annual Report of the Secretary of War, the business of whose de
partment exclusively comprises the army. The honorable Secretary's
report, altheugh rather brief, centains |some valuable suggestions on
the cultivatien of Sea Island cotton, and on the question whether a
liberated African is likely to establish his domicile North or South.

33
In matters concerning our Eastern armies the Secretary abstains from
reporting, what, he says, the President knows as well as he does ; on
the removal of General McClellan he keeps a profound silence, and
refers the President for all other matters, to the report made to him,
the Secretary of War, by the General-in-Chief.
The General-in-Chief s Report to the Secretary of War is full. It
contains details of great variety and interest ; it refers to the corres
pondence between him and the Secretary of War, and in some respects
it is explanatory thereto; but the General who, as we have seen, is
not reluctant to report to the Secretary of War matters which the
lafter must know better than the General himself, does not even hint
at what General McClellan has been guilty of, to deserve to be '
deprived of his command in the face of the enemy, a measure which
the General well knew caused great dissatisfaction in the army as
well as among the people at large.
The Secretary of War as well as the General-in-Chief, as we have
seen, are both hostile to General McClellan, and have gone far out of
their way for the purpose of injuring that General. The President's
acts prove clearly that his sentiments toward General McClellan were
congenial with those of Mr. Stanton and Mr. Halleck. No person-
can have the least doubt that, had it been in the power of the Presi
dent, the Secretary of War, or the Commander-in-Chief, to assign
even a half plausableexcuse for the great wrong they had^ done to
the General and to the army of the Potomac, they would willingly
have published it..
The army has a right to know the reason why this removal took
place. The silence on the subject in the Message, and in both the
Reports, is most conclusive evidence that the Commander-in-Chief did
not duly consider the welfare of the army in this unjustifiable military
measure. What an undisputable testimeny as to the far-seeing intelli
gence, professienal excellence and patrictism pf General McClellan.
What a triumph of the rectitude of his conduct, under the most provok
ing treatment and bad faith, on behalf of those whom naturally he
had to consider his cooperaters and most reliable supporters in the
energetic and successful conduct of the war. The Commander-in-
Chief, the Secretary of War and ,the General-in-Chief, however eager
they are to do so, neither by fair nor by foul means, can fasten a single
censurable act or word upon General McClellan.
Notwithstanding the silence with which the General-in-Chief passes
the reasons for the removal of General McClellan, his Report to the
3

34
Secretary of War, nevertheless, throws a flood of lighf on the opera
tions of the army during the past year. In connection, with some
others,- incidentally made public, it is the first document which
officially sets at rest all .doubts as to the men and measures that
have prevented the operations pf the army te result in the everthrew
pf the rebellien, and in the terminatien pf this unh'ply war. Tp re
view the eperatiens in the order in which they actually follow each
other, we have to lay aside General Halleck's repcrt, to return to it
very soon.
Major-General McDowell had demanded ' a Court of Enquiry as
to his conduct after the first battle of Bull Run. During the
progress of these investigatipns there was presented in evidence
elicited in the cress-examination —
1st. A letter of instructions by Major-General McClellan to the
military Gevernor of the District of Columbia, .Brigadier-General
James S. Wadsworth, dated March 16, 1862.
2nd. A letter of instructions by Major-General McClellan to Major
General Banks, commanding fifth corps, army of the Potomac, dated
March 16, 1862.
These two documents give a most complete description of the dis
positions made, and the means provided by the commander of the
army of the Potomac, for the protection, and if need be, for the de
fence of the national capital, with its distant surroundings. They
are master-pieces of clearness, of completeness, and of precision in
strategical explanations and military orders, and they show that over
70,000 men, of all arms, had been put in and around the fortifications
and strongly entrenched at Manassas and other principal points along
the various lines of approach, to keep in check and repulse any force
which might venture across the Rappahannock. So plain is the des
ignation of the various strategical points selected, so precise the num
ber of men, and the proportion in which they shall be composed of
the various armies, that there exists no possibility for any person in
sound mind, with only half a military idea, to misunderstand them or
doubt their efficiency.
On the 1st day of April, 1862, when General McClellan embarked
for the Peninsula, he sent to Brigadier-General L. Thomas, Adjutant-
General U. S. Army, with the President and the Secretary of War,
forthe purpose of laying the same before the Secretary of War, a full
And complete explanation of the disposition he had made, and of the

35
number of trppps designated fer every commander, and to what
place.* * Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, ?
March 16, 1862. $
Brigadier- General James S. Wadsworth, Military Governor of the Dis- ,
trict of Columbia :
Sir t The command to which you have been assigned, by instruction of
the President, as Military Governor of the District of Columbia, embraces
the geographical limits of the district, and will also include the city of
Alexandria. The defensive works south of the Potomac, from the Occoquan to Diffi
cult Creek, and the part of Port Washington. I enclose a list of the
works and defences embraced in these limits. General Banks will com
mand at Manassas Junction, with the divisions of Williams and Shields,
composing the Fifth Army corps, but you should, nevertheless, exercise
vigilance in your front, carefully guard the approaches in that quarter,
and maintain the duties of advanced guards. You will use the same pre
cautions on either flank. All troops not actually needed for the police of
Washington and Georgetown, for the garrisons north of the Potomac, and
for other indicated special duties, should be removed to the south side of
the river. In the centre of your front you should post the main body of
your troops, in proper proportions, at suitable distances, towards your
right and left flanks. Careful patrols will be made to thoroughly scour
the country in front, from right to left.
It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain the forts and their arma
ments in the best possible order, to look carefully after the instruction
and discipline of their garrisons* as well as all other troops under your
command, and by frequent and rigid inspection to insure the attainment
of these ends. '
The care of the railways, canals, depots, bridges and ferries within the
above-named limits wilL devolve upon you,' and you are to insure their
security and provide for their protection by every means within your
power. You will also protect the depots of the public stores and the
transit of the stores to the troops in actual service.
By means of patrols you will thoroughly scour the neighboring country
south of the eastern branch, and also on your right, and you will use every
possible precaution to intercept mails, goods, and persous passing unau
thorized to the enemy's lines.
The necessity of maintaining good order within your limits, and espec
ially in the capital of the nation, cannot be too 'strongly enforced. You
will forward and facilitate the movement of all troops destined for the
active part of the army of the Potomac, and especially the transits of de
tachments to their proper- regiments and corps.
The charge of all new troops arriving in Washington, and of all troops
temporarily there, will devolve upon you. You will form them into pro
visional brigades, promote their instruction and discipline, and facilitate
their equipments. Eeport all arrivals of troops, their strength, composi
tion and equipment by every opportunity. Besides the regular report
and returns which you will be required to render to the Adjutant- General
of the Army, you will make to these headquarters a consolidated morning
report of your command every Sunday morning, and a monthly return on
the first day of each month. ,
The foregoing instructions are communicated by command ^of Major-
General McClellan.

36
General McClellan made this masterly disposition of the forces
specified by him ; issued so complete and detailed instructions to the
commanding officers, and presented so comprehensive a resume of all
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, )
March i6, 1862. \
To Major- General N. P. Banks, commanding Fifth corps, Army of the
Potomac :
Sir: You will post your command in, the vicinity of Manassas, intrench
yourself strongly and throw cavalry pickets well out to the front. Your
first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to Man
assas, and to Strasburg, in order to open your communications with the
valley of, the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap Railway is in
running order,, intrench a brigade of infantry — say four regiments, with
two batteries — at or near the point where that railway crosses the Shenan
doah. Something like two regiments of cayalry should be left in that
vicinity to occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country South
of the railway, and up the Shenandoah Valley, as well as through Chester
Gap, which might, perhaps be occupied advantageously by a detachment
of infantry, well intrenched. Block houses should be built at all the rail
way bridges occupied by grand guard, Warrenton Junction, or barren-
ton itself, and also some still more advanced points on the Orange and
Alexandria Railroad, as soon as the railroad bridges are repaired.
Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Besides the two
regiments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your dispo
sal, to scout towards the Oc^oquan, and probably a fourth towards Lees-
burg. To recapitulate, the most important points that should engage your
attention are as follows :
First — A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Manassas, per
haps even Centreville, and another force. A brigade also well intrenched
near Strasburg.
Second — Block houses at railway bridges.
Third — Constant employment of cavalry well to the front.
Fourth — Grand guards at Warrenton, and in advance as far as the Rap
pahannock if possible,
Fifth — Great care to be exercised to obtain full and early information as
to the enemy.
Sixth — The general object is to cover the line of the Potomac and
Washington. The foregoing is communicated by order of Major-General McClellan.
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, i
Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862.
To Brigadier- General L. Thomas, Adjutant- General. U. S. A.:
General : I have to request that you will lay the following communica
tion before the Honorable Secretary of War. The approximate numbers
and positions of the troops left near, and in rear of the Potomac are about
as follows :
General Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, suffi
cient troops to give him five thousand men for , the defence of Baltimore,
and 1,988 available for the Eastern shore. Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware
is very well garrisoned by about four hundred men. The garrisons of the
forts around Washington amount to ten thousand men, other disposable-

37
these to the Secretary of War, in the full belief that the words
in the President's War Order, March 11, 1862,t meant what they-
troops now with General Wadsworth being about eleven thousand four
hundred men. The troops employed iu guarding the various railroads in
Maryland amount to some three thousand three hundred and fifty-nine
men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted
cavalry, and to send them forward to Manassas. General Abercrombie
occupies Warrenton with a force which, including Col. Geary's at White
Plains,, and the cavalry to be at their disposal, will amount to some seven
thousand seven hundred and eighty men, with twelve pieces of artillery.
I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in
Pennsylvania and New York, and in any of the Eastern States, may be
ordered to Washington. This force I should be glad to have sent at once
to Manassas — four thousand men from General Wadsworth to be ordered
to Manassas. These troops,- with the railroad guards above alluded to,
will make up a force under the command of General Abercrombie to some
thing like eighteen thousand six hundred and thirty-nine men. It is my
design to push General Blenker from Warrenton upon Strasburg. He
should remain at Strasburg long enough to allow matters to assume a defi
nite form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination.
The troops in the valley ofthe Shenandoah will thus — including Blenker' s
division, ten thousand and twenty-eight strong, with twenty-four pieces of
artillery ; Banks' Fifth corps, which embraces the command of General
Shields, nineteen thousand six hundred and eighty-seven strong, with
forty-one guns, some three thousand six hundred and fifty-three disposa
ble cavalry, and the railroad, guard, about twenty-one hundred men —
amount to about thirty-five thousand four hundred aud sixty-seven men.
It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment — say eight
hundred and fifty men — being, with five hundred cavalry, thirteen hundred
and fifty men on the lower Potomac. To recapitulate : At Warrenton
there is to be seven thousand seven hundred and eighty ; at Manassas, say
ten thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine ; in the Shenandoah valley, thir
ty-five thousand four hundred and sixty-seven ; on the Lower Potomac,
thirteen hundred and fifty — in all, fifty-five thousand four hundred and
fifty-six. There would then be left for the«garrisons in front of Washing
ton and under General Wadsworth some eighteen thousand men, exclusive
of the batteries, under instructions. The troops organizing orready for
service in New York, I learn, will probably number more than four thou
sand. These should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition
where their services may be most needed. I am, very respectfully, your
obedient servant, GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major General Commanding.
THE PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDER No. 3.
t Executive Mansion, Washington, March 11, 1862.
Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head
of the army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, is relieved from the
command of the other military departments, he maintaining command of
the department of the Potomac. Ordered, further, that the departments
now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter,
together With so much of that under General Buell as lies west Of a north
and south line, drawn through Knoxville, Tenn., be Consolidated and des
ignated the Department of the Mississippi, and that, until otherwise

38
expressed; and that the Secretary of War, during McClellan's ab
sence on the Peninsula, would see to it that his orders and instruc
tions were, punctually executed. Limited means of transportation
had compelled General McClellan to leave some 45,000 men, under
McDowell, and not included in the 70,000 men enumerated, and
left under command of Generals Banks and Wadsworth respectively ;
near Alexandria, to embark en the return ef the vessels in which the
rest ef the army had gene tp the Peninsula. General McDowell's corps
was selected as the ene tp bring up the rear, because, says General
McClellan he wanted tp use this ccrps as a unit for a movement in
the rear of. the enemy's fortifications on the left bank of the York
river. McClellan had hardly proceeded a few miles on his way to For
tress Monroe when, presto ! presto ! the President and the Secretary
of War overthrew McClellan's plans completely, and without notifying
him of it, prevent General McDowell from follpwing the army ef the
Pptpmac tp the Peninsula ; detached General Banks and General
Wadsworth from his command, forming an independent department for
each cf them, and thereby with ene feul blpw crippled the army un
der McClellan, en the Peninsula, by depriving it ef abput pne-third pf"
its numerical strength ; prevented the prcper disppsitipn pf trppps fpr
the pretectien pf the City ef Washingtpn, and destreyed the mest
perfect strategical cembinatipn fpr the capture ef Richmcnd, and the
terminatien pf the war.
On the 9th day ef April! President Linceln accuses McClellan cf
having pmitted and neglected certain military arrangements, while-
ordered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department. Or
dered, also, that the country west of the Department of the Potomac,.
and east of the Department of the Mississippi, be a military department
to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded
by Major-General Fremont. That all the commanders of Departments,.
after the receipt of this order by them respectively, report severally and
directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent
reports will be expected of all and each of them.
Abraham' Lincoln.
t Washington, April 9, 1862.
To Major-General McClellan:
My Dear Sir : Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly
sustained, while they do not offend me, pain me very mnch. Blenker's
Division was withdrawn before you left here, and you know the pressure
under which I did it, and as I thought, acquiesced in it, certainly not with
out reluctance. After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unor
ganized men without a field battery, were all you designed should be left
for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this,.

39
McClellan's report, April 1st, to Adjutant-General Themas, npt only
states, all the President declares neglected, to have been done ; but
while the specified number of men, of horses, and of artillery, left at
the various places designated, and the entire report show the perfect
manner in which the force of 73,400 men, including 77 pieces of
artillery have been disposed to protect Washington and its approaches,
all of which is corroborated by General William Barry's letter,* Dec.
10, 1862.

even, was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks' 'corps,
once designed for Manassas Junction, was divided and tied up on the line
of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave that position without
again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.
This presented, or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should
be gone, a great temptation for the enemy to turn back from the Rappa
hannock and sack Washington. My explicit directions that Washington,
sustained by the judgment of all the commanders of corps, should be left
secure, had been entirely neglected. It was precisely this that drove me
to detain McDowell. I do not forget that I was satisfied with your ar
rangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction. But when that arrange
ment was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was
not satisfied. I was constrained to substitute something for it myself.
And now allow me to ask you, do you really think I could permit the line
from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city, to be entirely open,
except what resistance could be presented by lessthan 20,000 unorganized
troops ? This a question which the country will not allow me to evade.
There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you.
I telegraphed you on. the 6th, saying that you had over 100,000 with you,
I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he
said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you, and en route
to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you
shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy of 35,000 be account
ed for? As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing pre
cisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command
was away.
And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike
a blow. I am powerless to help. This you will do me the justice to
remember, I was always opposed to going down the Bay in search- of a
field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, as only shifting and not sur
mounting a difficulty ; that we would find the same enemy and the same
or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note
— is noting now — that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched
enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.
I beg leave to assure you that I have never written or spoken to you in
greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain
you so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you
must act. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

* Headquarters, Inspector of Artillery, )
Washington, Dec. 10, 1862. $
Major-General McClellan, United States Army :
General : It having been stated in several public prints, and in a
speech of Senator Chandler of Michigan, in his place in the United States

40
This letter of the President, in our. opinion, solves the mystery of
the complete failure of the campaign of 1862.
' Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, after the disaster -of Bull Run
the first, said he ought to have been cashiered by President Lincoln,
for having proved himself a coward, in yielding to the pressure
brought to bear upon him, having, against his own better judgment,
permitted McDowell to advance on Manassas. When he left Wash
ington fpr Eurppe, the veteran here's last advice tp General McClel
lan wa,s, "Never permit any power to override your own well consid
ered opinions."
General Scctt was weighed dewn by pld age, an invalid, frem
wpunds received in his ceuntry's battles, confined tc a sickbed, when
he yielded. Never before had he planned a grand campaign with his
headquarters in Washington ; besieged by the Congress of the United
States. He had never had to deal with so many strategists by intu
ition. Mr. Lincoln had the experience of General Scott before him ; he
had seen the old b^ero shed tears of sorrow and self-condemnation for
his cowardice, in the face of his country's enemies. He had McClellan
commended to him by General Scett, in the strengest terms, te rely

Senate quoting what he stated to be a portion of the testimony of Briga
dier General Wadsworth, Military Governor of Washington, before the
joint Senate and House committee ''on the conduct of the War," that
Major-General McClellan had left an insufficient force for the defence of
Washington, aud '¦'¦not a' gun on wheels," I have to contradict this charge
as follows, from the official reports made at the time to me (the Chief of
the Army of the Potomac), and now in my possession, by the command
ing officer of the Army of the light artillery troops left in camp, in the
city of Washington, by your order. It appears that the following named
field batteries were left :
Battery C, First New York artillery, Captain Barnes, two guns.
Battery K, First New York. artillery, Captain Crounse, six guns.
Battery D, Second New York artillery, Captain Robinson, six guns.
Niuth New York Independent battery, Captain Shertonty, six guns.
Sixteenth New York Independent battery, Captain Locke.
Battery A, Second battalion New York Artillery, Captain Hogan, six
guns. Battery B, Second battalion New York Artillery, Captain McMahon, six
guns. Total, seven batteries, thirty-two guns.
With the exception of a few horses, which could have been procured
from the Quartermaster's Department in a few hours, the batteries were
all fit for immediate service, excepting the Sixteenth New York battery,
which, having been previously ordered on General Wadsworth' s applica
tion to report to him for special service, was unequipped with guns or
horses. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
William F. Barry.
Brigadier-General Inspector of Artillery, United States Army.

41
upon. He had seen in what masterly- manner he had organized a
large army.
McClellan, as General-in-Chief; in all matters concerning the move
ments of the army, was his only constitutional adviser.
With the vigor of manhood, with a prospect to immortalize himself
if he, as a patriot, constitutionally fulfilled his high trust ; with all
this to sustain, to steel him, and to give him strength and firmness in
his duty towards the army, Mr. Lincoln is compelled to write to Mc
Clellan, "Blenker's division was withdrawn before you left here, and
you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acqui
esced in it."
He thereby proves that at the very beginning of the campaign, the
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States (as
General Hitchcock testifies in the court of inquiry) was manifestly
under great anxiety ; that at the Department he discussed the dispo
sition to be made of part of the army, with unmilitary, irresponsible
chiefs of bureaus ; that he submitted the plan for the campaign, made
by the General-in-chief, to the discussion and approval of his subor
dinate officers, — thereby destroying discipline in the army — that he
yielded to unconstitutional pressure ; that he did that for which Win-
field Scott had sentenced himself to be cashiered.
The Commander-in-Chief destroyed the plans prepared by the
General-in-Chief; he gave to that General detailed orders in matters
of which he had np knowledge ; — he lost his head. As the Com
mander-in-Chief was unconstitutionally pressed right or left, forward
or backward, so was our brave army, unmilitarily sent forward to
day and recalled to-morrow ; moved to the East now, and ordered
West the day after. The Commander-in-Chief thus prevents the
success in the field, which the President declares to be necessary be
fore anything else.
The telegraphic orders and instructions from the Commander-in-
Chief, and from the Secretary of War to General McDowell, with
that General's replies and reports thereto — the President's letter to
McClellan, of April 9th— -all his other letters published at the court,
but in particular the Secretary of War's letter of military instruc
tions, May 17, 1862,t to Major-General McClellan, in the face of Mc-
f SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAE m'dOWELL.
War Department, April 11, 1862.
Major-General McDowell, Commanding :
Sir — For the present, and until further orders, you Will consider the
national capital as especially under your protection, and make no movement
throwing your force out of position for the discharge of this primary duty.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

42
Clellan's orders of March 16th, and April 1st, and of McDowell's tel
egraphic remonstrances — show a degree of unprincipled misrepresen-

general m howell to the president.
Headquarters, Department of the Rappahannock, )
Opposite Fredericksburg, May 24, 1862. £
His Excellency the President : •
I obeyed your order immediately ; for it was positive and urgent, and, per
haps, as a subordinate, there I ought to stop ; but I trust I may be allowed
to say something in relation to the subject, especially in view of your remark
that everything depends upon the celerity and vigor of my movements. I beg
to say that co-operation between General Fremont and myself to cut off Jack
son and Ewell is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a practicable impos
sibility ; next, that I am entirely beyond helping distance of General Banks,
and no celerity or vigor will be available so far as he is concerned ; next,
that by a glance at the map it will be seen that the line of retreat of the
enemy's forces up the valley is shorter than mine to go against him. It will
take a week or ten days for the force to get to the valley by the route which
will give it food and forage, and by that time the enemy will have retreated.
I shall gain nothing for you there and lose much for you here. It is, there
fore, not only on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the matter,
but I feel that it throws us all back, and from Richmond north we shall have
all our large mass paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just
accomplished. I have ordered General Shields to commence the movement to-morrow
morning. A second division will follow in the afternoon. Did I understand
you aright that you wish that I personally should accompany this expedition ?
Veryrespectfully, ' IRVIN M'DOWELL.
the president to general m'dowell.
Washington, May 24, 1862.
Major General McDowell :
I am highly gratified by your alacrity in obeying my orders, The
change was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to any one,
Everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movements.
A. LINCOLN.

general m'dowell to secretary stanton. Kappaha May 24, 1862.

Headquarters, Department op the Rappahannock, )

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War :
The President's order has been received and is in progress Of execution.
This is a crushing blow to us. IRVIN McDOWELL, Major-General.
THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL M'DOWELL.
Washington, May 24, 1862.
Major- General McDowell :
General Fremont has been ordered, by telegraph, to move to Franklin
and Harrisonburg, to relieve General Banks, and capture or destroy
Jackson and Ewell's forces. You are instructed, laying aside for the
present the movement on Richmond, to put twenty thousand men in motion

43
tation, self-conceit, vaccillation and military imbecility, as never before
disgraced men, controlling the armies of a great nation, engaged in a
struggle for life and death.

at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line, or in advance of the line,
of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Your object will be to capture the force
of Jackson and Ewell, either in co-operation with General Fremont, or, in
case want of sApplies or transportation interfered with his movement, it is
believed that the force which you move will be sufficient to accomplish the
object alone. The information thus far received here makes it probable
that, if the enemy operates actively against General Banks, you will not
be able to count upon much assistance from him, but may have even to
release him. Reports received this moment are that Banks is fighting
with Ewell, eight miles from Harper's Perry.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN-
War Department,
Washington, City, D. C, May 17, 1862.
Major-General George B. McClellan, Commanding Army of the Poto
mac, before Richmond :
Your dispatch to the President, asking for reinforcements, has been
received and carefully considers* The President is not willing to un
cover the capital entirely, and .it is believed that even if this were prudent,
it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and
that of the Rappahannock, by the way of the Potomac and York rivers,
than by a land march.
In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Rich
mond at the earliest possible, moment, General McDowell has been ordered
to march upon that city by the shortest route,. He is ordered— keeping
himself always in position to cover the capital from all possible attack — so
to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right, and
you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication as
soon as possible. By extending your right wing to the north of Richmond,
it is believed that this communication can be safely established, either
north or south of the Pamunkey river. In any event you will be able to
prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond, and
falling, in overwhelming force, upon McDowell. He will move with be
tween thirty-five -and forty thousand men.
A copy of the instructions to Major-General McDowell are with this.
The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any
danger to the capital of the nation. At your earnest call for reinforce
ments, he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but
charged, in attempting this, npt to uncover the city of Washington, and
you will give no orders, either before or after your junction, which can
keep him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate
- with each other by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may be neces
sary for efficient co-operation.
When General McDowell is in position on your right, his supplies must
be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff officers to be-
prepared to supply him by that route.
The President directs that General McDowell retain the "command of the
Department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves
forward. By order of the President,
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War..

44
Mr. Edwin M. Stanton prders Majer-General McClellan, then at
the head ef a large army, in the field — among other things — "to use

THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF THE ARMY TO GENERAL MCDOWELL.
Washington, April 30, 1862.
Major-General McDowell, commanding Department Rappahannock :
General : — The Secretary of War has given me authority to inform
you that you can occupy Fredericksburg with such force as in your judg
ment may be necessary to hold it for defensive purposes, but not with a
view to make a forward movement. H. VAN RENSSELAER,
Inspector-General United States Army.
SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL MCDOWELL.
Washington, April 23, 1862.
Major-General McDowell, Aquia Creek : —
The President directs that you should not throw your force across the
Rappahannock at present, but that you should get your bridges and trans
portation all ready and wait further orders.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL MCDOWELL.
-^Washington, May 24, 1862,
Major-General McDowell: —
In view of the operations of the enemy on the line of General Banks,
the President thinks that the whole force you designate to move from
Fredericksburg should not be taken away, and he therefore directs that
one brigade, in addition to the one designated to leave at Fredericksburg,
should be left there — this brigade to be the least effective of your com
mand. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
general m'dowell to general mcclellan.
Headquarters, Department of the Rappahannock,
Manassas, June 12, 1862.
Major-General G.B. McClellan, Commanding Department of Virginia, be
fore Richmond :
The delay of Major"-General- Banks to relieve the division of my command
in the valley beyond the time I had calculated on, will prevent my joining
you with the remainder of the troops I am to take below, at as early a day as
I named- My third division (McCall's) is now on the way. Please do me
the favor to so place it that it may be in a position to join the others as they
come down from Fredericksburg. IRVIN McDOWELL, Major-General Commanding.
GENERAL M'DOWELL TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN. June 10, 1862.
Major General McClellan. Commanding Department of Virginia, before
Richmond :
For the third time I am ordered to join you, and hope this time to get
through. In view of the remarks made with reference to my leaving you,
and not joining you before, by your friends, and of something I have heard as
coming from you on that subject, I wish to say I go with the greatest satis
faction, and hope to arrive with my main body in time to be of service. Mc-
Call goes in advance by water. I will be with you in ten days, with the
remainder, by Fredericksburg. IRVIN McDOWELL,
Major-General Commanding.

45
the 'corps d'armee' under .General McDowell, after it shall have
reached Hanover Court House — 140 miles from Washington — for the
reductionof Richmond ; but in attempting this, not to issue any orders
which can lead General McDowell out of position to cover the City of
Washington." We wanted testimony, given in open court, to the identity of the
above letter before we believed it possible that any person outside a
lunatic asylum, could give such instructions.
Against the talent, skill, and strategical combinations of the most
experienced and most daring of the Confederate generals, with their
large armies, intelligently and heartily supported by their govern
ment, General McClellan and his gallant army, forsaken by the
administration, had, in the seven days' battle, defeated them all, had
acccmplished what they ccnsidered impessible to be done ; because
in strategy and in tactics it eclipsed anything recorded in history.*
The Army of the Potomac had at Harrison's Landing gained an im
pregnable position, and the only > strategical base for a successful
attack upon Richmond ; which to move to at the outset, McClellan
was prevented hy the Merrimac's undisturbed control over the James
River. The army was here preparing, for a new movement against the
rebel capital, and waiting for recruits to fill up the ranks of the old
regiments, and for reinforcements by other corps:; when Major-Gene
ral Halleck, the newly -appointed General-in-Chief of the armies of the
United States, visited General McClellan's head-quarters from July
24th to 27th. Very sepn after, the army ef the Petomac was with
drawn from Harrison's Landing and from the Peninsula, and although
this dangerous movement was accomplished in the most masterly
manner and withont the loss of a single man, it has, nevertheless,
been declared by the strategists of all nations to be the most unpar
donable strategical blunder committed, so far, during this war.
The principal object of the campaign of 1862, it must not be lost
sight of, had been aggressive operation against the rebellion in gen
eral, and against Richmond, for its capture, in particular. Aggressive
warfare had been demanded by the people and by Congress ; it could
hardly be undertaken early enough to satisfy this universal demand ;
for this purpose the administration had asked, and had received,
with unexampled liberality, men and means ample in every respect.
The government had ordered aggression, and General McClellan had
* For a detailed description of these battles, see "George B. McClellan
from August, 1861, to August, 1862." N. Y., H. Dexter, 113 Nassau s't.

46
planned everything in the most perfect manner to accomplish that
distinctly stated object.
General Halleck, "although far Wesf> could not help being fully
aware of this. In his report the General says of his visit to head
quarters : " The main object of this consultation was to ascertain if
there was a possibility of an advance upon Richmond from Harrison's
Landing, and if not, to form some plan of uniting the armies of Gen
eral McClellan and General Pope on some other line."
General Halleck cannot for a moment have doubted the possibility
to advance upon Richmond from Harrison's Landing ; that possibility
existed then and exists now. The General wants to say, we think,
he went to consult with General McClellan what reinforcements he
needed to insure the capture of Richmond ; because the General at
once says ; " I took the President's estimate of the largest number
of reinforcements that could be sent to the Army ofthe Potomac;"
and, besides, he nowhere states, or even insinuates, that he discovered
it to be impossible to advance upon Richmond from Harrison's Land
ing. Thus considering the question of reinforcements, the principal
and fundamental one, hpw dpes General Halleck preceed — he bases
his actien in this the mest impprtant pperatien in the war, the first
ene he is called upen tp perfprm in his new office (tp which he has
been appcinted undeubtedly with the object to pbviate the grievous
and ruinous blunders resulting from the mismanagement of military
affairs by unmilitary men), he bases his decision in this matter-
almost of life and death to the nation — upon the estimate of the
President, of the very unmilitary man who, by his false estimates of
the enemy's strength and intentions, and of his own ability to com
prehend and direct military movements and matters, had materially
contributed to the destruction of the' army of General Banks, to the
uselessness of General McDowell's army, and to the dangerous com-
plicaticns on the Peninsula, from which General McClellan had so
miraculously extricated his army. He bases it upon this estimate,
although a few hour's careful investigation of his own, would have
convinced him that the President's estimate was far from the mark,
would have shown that-pf the 300,000 men called fer by the Presi
dent (July 2d), thousands of new volunteers were daily placed at the
disposal of the government. Pending the entire discussion cf this
matter ef reinfercement, he does not state that he ever took the pains
to ascertain for himself what forces there were disposable ; but
against the most cpnclusive argument cf the ablest general in the
natien, that his orders, if carried out will be disastrous to the best

47
interests of the country ; he always rests upon the estimates of a
third person. When it finally appeared that General McClellan con
sidered a reinforcement of 35,000, ten thousand less than under
McDowell had been taken from him, necessary to insure the occupa
tion of Richmond ; when General McClellan had explained to "him
how futile all attempts must be against Richmond from other direc
tions, how the heart of the rebellion is at Richmond, how one effective
blow struck there will accomplish what cannot be accomplished any
where else by ever so many blows, even then General Halleck does
not survey the entire field of his resources himself, and overlooks —
what afterward occurs to him — that there, is a corps under General
Cox in Western Virginia which can easily be spared, to supply the
same number of men sent from Pope's army at Fredericksburgh to
Harrison's Landing, which with General Burnside's corps and ten
thousand more of Pope's army — the rest of which ought to have been
withdrawn to the fortifications near Washington — would have
amounted te 35,000 men and would have given us Richmond.
When, resting upon this vague estimate, the General arrived at the
false conclusion that he cannot send 35,000 men to General McClel
lan, he thinks " the only alternative now left was to withdraw the
Army of the Potomac to some position where it could unite with that
of General Pope, and cover Washington at the same time that it
operated against the enemy." .Although General Wadsworth had an
army of over 20,000 men behind strong entrenchments in and near
Washington; although that city was in no manner menaced by the
enemy ; although General Pope, with about 40,000 men, was near
that city wifh ne pther reasonable; object in view but to form an army
of observation and protectien around the national capital— General
Halleck, by his ill-advised decision, changes the aggressive operations
against the rebel capital, which formed the basis of the entire cam
paign, to a strategy of defense, for which, he has to draw the attacking
forces from the enemy's capital, at once relieved by this unparalelled
strategical blindness.
We say that General Halleck drew the attacking enemy from
before Richmond because his statement that about the 3d of August,
" he received information that the enemy was preparing a large force
eo drive back General Pope, and attack either Washington or Balti
more, which gave him uneasiness for the safety , of the capital and
Maryland, and I repeatedly urged upon General McClellan the neces
sity of moving his army. The evacuation of Harrison's Landing,

48
however, was not commenced till the 14tth, eleven days after it was
ordered.''* The impression which General Halleck endeavors to create, that on
the strength of " the information he received" he ordered the junction
between the two armies, is flatly contradicted by the evidence under
oath in the Porter court-martial, where it is distinctly stated, that on
20th day of August, when General McClellan was at Fortress Monroe
and General Porter was at Newport News, the first, information was
received of movements from Richmond toward the Rappahannock ;
that, in other words, General Lee did not stir a man from Richmpnd
till General Halleck by the withdrawal cf McClellan made for him
the oppprtunity. Even if the evidence of this fact had net been fur
nished by the court-martial, a cursory reading of General Halleck's
Report shows that it contains as strong a self-contradiction of the
insinuation made by its auther.
If General Halleck learned and believed, befcre he prdered the
junction, that Lee was about to advance with his whole ferce en
General Pope, he would have ordered General McClellan to remain
at Harrison's Landing — to advance on and take Richmond the
moment Lee had left ; then turn round, cut off Lee's supplies,
attack him in the rear, and crush him between his own army ahd that
of Pope. In the attempt of ccncealing the truth, the General-in-
Chief stands self-accused, either ef a stupidity unpardpnable in a
drummer boy, or of a determination to leave Richmond in possession
of the rebels rather than that General McClellan should have the
honor of its capture.
We look in vain over the report of the General-in-Chief for an ex
planation, why he directed the forces from the peninsula, when finally
he ordered their withdrawal to Aquia Creek, and not to Alexandria.
The army of General Pope, which to strengthen was General Hal
leck's object, while he intended to cpver Washington also, was be
tween Sperryville and Warrenton Junction ; this position could be
reached from Alexandria, with its spacious wharves and railroad
facilities, by railroad in by far shorter a time, say three or four days,
tban of necessity it took the same forces to disembark at Aquia
Creek, which pcssessed none of the facilities above alluded to, whence
the troops had a longer march over ordinary roads; and while this
march lasted were completely unavailable for the protection of the

* The definite order of General Halleck is dated August 6th, therefore the
evacuation on the 14th was only eight days after it.

49
city of Washington ; while on the road from Alexandria, per Fairfax,
Manassas Junction, and so forth, they were always between the
enemy's forces, if there were any, en route for the Capital, or Wash
ington. Tire mistake made in the selection of Aquia Creek is a fur
ther proof that the General-in-Chief 's plau was ill-considered in the
arrangements for its execution, as it was unjustifiable in its con
ception. After a very detailed and minute description, of the lamentable
campaign under General Pope,* (almost a verbatim extract of a long
report by General Pope, September 3, 1862, to which the Qeneral
alludes a,s Exhibit No. 4, but which is not published with this report,)
of the credit for which the General-in-Chief claims a considerable share,
he says, " Although this short and active campaign was, from causes
already referred to,t less successful than we had reason to expect, it
had accomplished the great and important object cf covering ihe Cap
itol till troops could be collected for'the defence." In the report of
September 3d, 1862, dated, Headquarters Army of Virginia, (with
out stating where they are,) General Pope distinctly states at the
¦ commencement, that the object of Ms campaign, according to the in
structions .received at Washington, has been to draw the rebel army
under Lee away from Richmond to the Rappahannock, and thereby
to enable the army of the Potomac to leave Harrison's Landing,
and be saved from utter destruction ; towards the close of his report,
he congratulates himself and the army of Virginia on the successful
accomplishment of this object. With both the reports before us, and
considering that General Halleck does not dispute General Pope's
official statement to the General-in-Chief himself, we must say, either,
one or the other of the two authors perverts the truth ; or the
General-in-Chief drew the rebel army intentionally from Richmond
to Washingtpn for the great and important object of afterwards
covering that city with the army under Pope against capture.
But in this object, which he states has been accomplished, every -
* See page; 31 to 45, Part I.
-\ General- Halleck says : " For some unexplained reason, General Porter
did not comply with this order of General Pope, and his corps was not in
the battles ofthe 28th and 29th." For this so-called unexplaihedreason
of non-compliance with the order of General Pope, the latter presented
charges against General Porter, and a court-martial convened in the city of
Washington gave General Porter an opportunity to prove thai it was a physi
cal impossibility to execute the order of General Pope. The Judge Advocate.
after all the evidence was in, had not a word to sustain any of the charges .
4

50
body knows General Halleck signally failed, so much so that he had
officially to declare, although he does not say so in his report, that it
was impossible*to save Washington from invasion by Lee's army ex
cept by giving the entire command to Genera? McClellan.
In his letter from [Berkley, Virginia, August 4, 12 M., General
McClellan indicates to the General-in-Chief— as far as in his positipn he
has a right te do — the only wise plan of operations, that is, to with
draw half of Pope's army to a strict defence of the city of Washingtpn,
n case that, should be menaced, and to send the rest, with Burnside,
and all other tropps he designates, to Harrisen's Landing ; because,
said he, " here is the true defence of Washington ; it is here on ihe
bank ofthe James River that the fate of the Union should be decided,"
which is just as true te-day as it was on the 4th of August. General
Halleck is not justified in saying in reply to this letter, referring to
his plan of uniting the two armies, " only one feasible plan has been
presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a bet
ter one, I certainly should have adopted it." In the first place, it is
the business of the General-in-Chief to devise the plan ; in the second
place, General McClellan had not only suggested the only good plan,
but has, in detail, explained it. General Halleck either could not pr
wpuld not understand it. Four short weeks after McClellan had ex
plained it to the General-in-Chief, and had done so in vain, he proved
by its practical execution how good a plan it was.
When he had only a portion of the old army left yet, and that,
deprived of some of his best generals, and when the enemy, flushed
with victory, was near Washington, and actually threatening it,
General McClellan left a force about equal to half of Pope's last
army of Virginia for its defence, and with the rest he whipped Lee
out of Maryland, saved Washingtpn and Baltimpre at Antietam,
and wiped away in Maryland the shame of Halleck and Pope in
Virginia, which feat is hardly noticed in General Halleck's report. ',
Thus we see, when the direct interference of President and
Sercetary of War with the well-matured plans of General McClellan,
retarded their execution and increased the work, hardships,, and the
sufferings of the army, that General Halleck, although he was told
by General McClellan what would be the consequences, in his reck
less ambition and conceit, in ene mad order actually annulled the
entire object of the campaign, and undid all that been done in its
execution. Cedar Mountain, Gainesville, Manassas, Bull Run, Ohantilly, and
other fields drenched with the blood of brave men, for which mother's

51
tears never needed to have been shed; 35,000 in killed, wounded
and prisoners, which, had he sent them to General McClellan, would
have secured Richmond to us ; the national capital again menaced by
the foe ; the heart of rebellion saved and snatched from the grasp of
our army ; years added to a already long war at a million dollars per
day — all this we charge as a part of the result of the immeasurable
military imbecility of the General-in-Chief, that led him in the face of
the fullest argument, to annul the wise plan and override the counsel
of George B. McClellan.*

* EXBIBIT NO. 1— A COPY IN CYPHER.
•Berkeley, Va., August 4 — 12 M.
Major General Halleck, Commander-in-Chief :
Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has
caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the
order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous in the
extreme to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are
necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this,
and while they are in progress, I beg that careful consideration may be given
to my statement. This army is now in excellent discipline and condition.
We hold a debouohe on both banks of the James River, so that we are free to
act in any direction, and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our
communication as secure.
We are 25 miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in
force sufficient to fight a battle until we are fifteen to eighteen miles, which
brings us practically within ten miles of Richmond. Our largest line of land
transportation would be from this point twenty-five miles, but with the aid
of the gunboats we can supply the army by water, during its advance, cer
tainly to within twelve miles of Richmond, with land transportation all the
way. From here to Fortress Monroe is a march of about seventy miles, for
I regard it as impracticable to 'Withdraw this army and its material, except
by land. The result of the movement would thus be to march 145 miles to
reach a point now only twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves
entirely of the powerful aids of the gunboats and water transportation. Add
to this the certain demoralization of this army, which would ensue, the terri
ble depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability
that it would influence foreign Powers to recognize our adversaries ; and these
appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge inthe
strongest terms afforded in our language, that this order may be rescinded,
and that far from recalling this army, it be promptly reinforced to enable it
to resume the offensive.
It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to Gen
eral Burnside's forces, to that of General Pope, not necessary to maintain for the
strict defence in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry ; to those portions as
the army of the West not required for a strict defence there. Here, directly
in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our
resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate
of this nation. Al] poi".ta of.secondary importance elsewhere should be
abandoned, a«d every available man brought here. A decided victory here,
and the military, strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what
partial reverses we may meet elsewhere;' Sere }* the true defence of Wash
ington ; it is here on. the bank ofthe James River,"ife$ the fate ofthe Union
should be decided. " v

52
The startling evidences pf a studied attempt, by every serf pf per
version: of truths and half truths, and by the artful torsion of facts,
to throw upon General McClelJan the responsibility for the reverses
and disasters, invited by General Halleck himself, unnecessarily
and against, the most earnest warning, had hardly ceased to fprm the
principal subject of astonishment and discussion, when the news of
General Burnside's ill-fated attempt to cross the Rappahapock at
Fredericksburg, gave a fresh shock to the already trembling nation.
The army of the Potomac was on the 14th November divided in three
grand divisions under command of Major-General Sumner, Hooker
and. Franklin respectively* while Major-General Sigel had chief corn-

Clear in my conviction of .right, strong in the consciousness that I have
ever been and still am actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that
no, ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me frqm the commencement
of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this
order may be rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a sad
heart, obey yourprder to the utmost of^my power, devoting to the movement,
whatever skill I may possess, whatever the result may be, and may God grant
that I am mistaken in my forebodings, I shall at least have the internal satis
faction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought tq do the
best in my power to arrest disaster from my country.
GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen.
* This division of the army, and the appointment of the commanding
Generals took place per order and in the name ,of General Burnside — that
is, to' conform to the. well-established principle., that whatever concerns
the army entrusted to a general has to be performed by him and in his
name. The violation of this principle by the Commander-in-Chief, when
per war order No. 2, March 11, 1862, he himself designated the generals
to oommand the various corps of the -army of the Pptpmac, as well as the
divisions of which each corps should be composed, was the first petty
malice practised against General McClellan.
GENERAL ORDER— No. 184.
Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Near Warrenton, Va., ,Nov. 14, 1862.
First — The prganizatipn of a portion of this army into three grand di
visions is hereby announced. These grand divisions will be formed and
commanded as follow^ :
The Second and Ninth corps will form • the right grand division, and
will be commanded by Major-General E. V. Sumner.
r' The First and Sixth corps will form the left grand division, and will be
Commanded by MajOr-General W. B. Franklin.
The Third aud Fifth corps will form the centre grand division, and will
be commanded by'M*'Jor-Qeneral Joseph Hooker.
1 The Eleventh corps, with such other trOops as may hereafter be assign
ed to it, will constitute a reserve force, under~S'om,mand of Major-Gene
ral Sigel. . ~ • '•'
Assignments of cavalry and further details will be announced in future
orders. \

53
mand ef all the reserves. It was then concentrated, and rapidly
mpved toward Fredericksburg. General Sumner's grand division
leading, arrived at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, about the 18th
of November; the other two grand divisions soon1 followed and topk po
sition — General Sumner on the right, General Franklin on the left, and
General Hooker inthe centre. Having put their artillery in position,
the army on the 12th of December crossed tbe river under the pro
tection of a dense' fog, over six pontoon bridges, built during the\day.
On the 13th the troops formed in line of battle in an open plain within
range ef the enemy's masked infantry and artillery. They were led
to attack a pesitipn naturally, strpng, and made impregnable by three
tiers of entrenchments well mounted with heavy gung, which had
never been reconnoitred ^y the commanding general. They were
repulsed with the loss of about 12,000 men, without having reached
the enemy's lines to damage them... On the left wing General Frank
lin had succeeded in repulsing a sallying party, and taken from them
some 700 prisoners ; but he was also forced to retreat to his original
line of formation. The enemy did npt permit us to remove our wounded
from within a certain distance nearest to .their lines, but did not mo-
lest our army during the night in and near Fredericksburg, which
was completely controlled by the enemy's guns, as were, also the up
per pontoon bridges. On the 14th, by a tacit understanding, hostili
ties ceased, and at midnight on the 14th, in one of the severest storms
pn reecrd, the army ef the Potpmac recrossed tthe river, took up all
the bridges without the least molestation on behalf of the enemy, and
reached the left bank at 8 o'clock A. M. on the 15th of December. A
few hundred stragglers who had not been aware of the retrograde
mevement, fell into the hands ef the enemy.
Thus December 13, at midnight, clesed, aihidst a severe sterm, the
secpnd act of the grand military tragedy begun in Octcber, When
General McClellan was fprced, in executicn pf a miserable strategical
idea, tp cress the Upper Pptomac ; the first part of wljich concluded

Major-General Sigel will exercise all the powers in, respect to his com-
mand'aboie assigned as the commanders of the grand divisions.
The commanders of these grand divisions will • retain*, with them their
respective staffs., ,,,r . ,, \ , , , , : ,,., ..
Fourth— The 'senior, officer of the Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth corps
will take command of these corps, and will forward to these headquarters
a list of recommendations of officers to fill their staffs. ; \ ,
Eighth-^All orders conflicting with these are hereby rescinded. .
By command of Major-General BURNSIDE.
Si Williams, Assistant Adjutant General. ¦

54
Npv. 7 , at midnight, in a snow storm, by the arrival ot General
Buckingham at Reutertown.
Major-General Burnside, it has to be remembered, on more than
one occasion, refused the command of the army of the Potomac, ten
dered him by one or the other of the men in power at Washington.
Brave, honest, heroic soldier as he is, he had invariably declared that
he well knew he was not capable for such a command. At the same
time, he expressed his conviction that General McClellan, before any
body else, was the man for the highest command.
When on the 7th of November he received the President's order
assigning the command of the army to him, he intended again to de
cline, and only accepted after a long deliberation with other officer^,
hecause his resignation before the enemy might produce an evil effect
on the army just deprived of the Commander in whom they possessed
unlimited confidence.
Whatever, therefore, has been contributed to the disastrous affair
of Fredericksburg, by the shortcomings of General Burnside in ex
perience, in foresight, in decision, in proper combination, and in
tactics on so large a scale, has all to be charged against him who,
without cause, removed from command the best qualified and most
experienced general, and compelled Burnside to assume command.
Our high opinion of General Burnside as a noble, patriotic gentle
man, and as a daring, heroic officer, does not relieve us from the duty
we owe to the country, to history, to military science, and to truth, to
point out the errors and mistakes in the arrangement and in the exe
cution of the movement against Fredericksburg.
To move the entire army from the line near Gordonville, we con
sider bad strategy, because it unmasked to the enemy our real inten
tions, and enabled him to meet us in full force well prepared ; he
moved on the shorter line, and could reach Fredericksburg in less
time than our army.
The various propositions of Generals Sumner and Hooker respec
tively to cross the river with their corps above, and move on the right
bank, in our opinion prove that there existed roads by which the
entrenchments of the enemy could and ought to have been recon-
noitered, and their strength ascertained, sufficiently to prevent the
commanding general from an attempt to take them by an infantry-
attack in front. The evidence before the commission shows that no
reeonnoissance had been made.
A naturally strong position, strengthened by three tiers of entrench
ments, each mounted with many long-range guns, supported by

55
infantry behind breastworks, under command of an experienced
general, a pesitipn apprpachable enly over an ppen field about a mile
and a half lpng, bprdering pn a river with an ppen low bank — such
a position is a Malakoff, a Mont-martre— if it has to.be taken at all, it
can be taken only a la Malakoff, or a la Mont-martre, that is, with
the spade — by a gradual approach in counter works, and with heavy
artillery ; attacked in front by infantry alone, it will, in ninety-nine
cases out of a hundred, prove a rock from which the attacking column
will recoil crippled and bleeding, to be annihilated in its retreat to the
river. Such is the position occupied by the Confederate army near
Fredericksburg, and because it is such, all the bravery of our gal
lant soldiers did not even enable us to learn from our own observa
tion, how strong an army the enemy had in and around this position
We think the attack, as directed by General Burnside, a great
mistake, and the escape of his army almost miraculous.
The idea to break this line of entrenchments by an infantry charge
in the hope of piercing it and then destroying the enemy, we consider
erroneous. •*
Napoleon Bonaparte based his tactics of breaking the centre of the
enemy's army — which he practised orfopen battle-fields only — upon
the superior discipline, and the more perfect movability of the French
army under his own command, which enabled him to whip the two
parts of the broken hostile army separately, because one half of them
would be, for a time, without a head, and the half that remained with
the general-in-chief would be numerically inferior to his own army
This principle is not applicable to a chain of entrenchments placed in
succeeding tiers ; here every entrenchment is a citadel in itself; in
case the enemy should carry one, each of the rest has its own com
mander, and has lost only a comrade. The striking similarity
between the rebel position at Fredericksburg and that at Cedar
Mountain (the former on a larger scale) ought to have taught General
Burnside the necessity of adopting a different plan. Had General
Banks, at Cedar Mountain, not been able to put his excellent artillery
in a position from which it did terrific execution upon the enemy's
batteries, his entire army would havev been destroyed.*
Not to attempt the building of a pontoon bridge in face of an enemy
before the opposite bank has heen cleared from the foe, is a rule as
old as military science itself. This rule General Burnside did not
* See pages 36 and 37, Part I.

56
remember until after he had lost half a day, and many men of the
most valuable troops in any army — most valuable, because they can
be replaced with great difficulty. To send the unarmed engineer out
upon the end of a bridge to be shot down by sharpshooters behind old
buildings, is not war. The engineer regiments, in particular the
Fifteenth New York Volunteers, have earned for themselves a glo
rious name ; they -had built the two bridges on the left Mng, and
enabled General . Franklin to cross about noon; while the Fiftieth
Regiment, engaged on the bridges on the right wing, had been unable
to accomplish anything; the Fifteenth were sent for — with a cheer
they set to work, and completed the bridge on the right — and so did
the work of both.
The manner in which General Burnside concluded to carry out a
certain plan of operations ; and when remonstrated with by one or
the other of his officers, becomes cenvinced that his plan was imprac
ticable er deficient, had te be changed cr altogether to be abandoned,
shows that he is not possessed of that circumspection, foresight, and
forethought indispen sible in the commander of a large army.
That notwithstanding these errors, oversights and mistakes, the
army crcssed the river, and ceuld, twp days later, return te the left
bank, is no evidence that these errors and mistakes were not com
mitted. General Franklin says : "For some unaccountable reason they (the
rebels) allowed us to cross, and did not open their batteries." We
can find but one plausible explanation why the enemy did npt ear
nestly ppppse the crcssing of our army on the 12th.
The war has lasted longer than the people at large had expected,
and the ery for a decisive battle had been heard ever since the battle
of Antietam. When General Lee found that Burnside actually com
menced to'move his army to the right bank of the Rappahannock, we
think he considered this his opportunity to satisfy the clamor for a
decisive battle, and concluded to let our entire army cross under a
faint ^resistance ; sufficient to make us more eager to follow up the
imaginary advantage ; to repulse our first attack as mildly as it could
be done ; thereby inducing us to' repeat it with all our forces ; thus
opening a space between our rear and the city for the purpose of
throwing cavalry and infantry masses, from his extreme right and
left, into our rear, while all his artillery opened on our front, and
while his long-range guns destroyed our bridges in the centre and on
our right. That, under such circumstances, Burnside's entire army

57
would have either been destroyed or captured, cannot very well be
doubted ; the evidence of Generals Burnside, Sumner, and Hooker
before the Investigating Committee proves that the first part of the
above programme was carried out to the letter, and how near General
Burnside came to carry out the second jiart designated to be per
formed by our army. The heavy rain and severe gale prevented the
rebel army noticingjhe withdrawal of our army to Falmouth until it
was accomplished, and presented to General Burnside the golden op
portunity to save the rest of his noble army from certain death.
When the news of the fearful slaughter at Fredericksburg became
known, the people with one voice said, this is the fault of the admin
istration at Washington — it is not Burnside's fault. General Burn
side thereupon had a letter to General Halleck, published, wherein he
exonerated everybody else from blame, and declared himself and
' alone responsible for the plan, for its executicn, and fpr its failure.
This letter, if genuine, dees mere credit tc the brave Burnside's neble
heart than te his head. How could he expect the army ever to have
confidence in him as a leader after he openly admits to have com
mitted so grave mistakes 1 It did not calm the excitement. Soldiers
are the severest and the best judges of their officers, here as well as
in every other country.
Thus, by the appointment of General Burnside to the chief com
mand, against his better judgment, the country has lost an excellent
commander of a corps, but has not fpund a fit General, anpfher evi
dence how true it is that a good soldier at the head of a division
makes a melancholy failure when placed beyond that.
The Senate Committee on the War thought proper to pro
ceed to Falmouth and there to investigate the matter. This ex
amination proves that General Burnside on the 9th of November, at
the request of General Halleck, sent his plan of operations on Fred
ericksburg to Washingtpn ; that on the 4th of November the Gene
ral-in-Chief, the Quartermaster-General ahd General Haupt visited'
him at his headquarters in Warrenton. There they discussed his
plan in all its details, and it was agreed that^General Burnside should
at once make all preliminary arrangements for the immediate execu
tion of the same, so that the moment it sheuld receive the approval of
the President, which General Halleck was Jo procure, the most speedy
execution thereof should at once take place. General Halleck, at the
headquarters of General Burnside, on the 12th of Nov., 7:10, P. it., ,
issued a telegraphic order to General Woodbury at Washington

58
to have the pontoon and bridge material transported to Aquia Creek.*
After his return to Washington the General-in-Chief saw the Presi
dent, who approved Burnside's plan. General Halleck hereupon
telegraphed to the latter to go ahead as he had proposed. General
Burnside concentrated his army and moved Sumner's division to Fal
mouth, where this officer had to come to a dead halt, because the pon
toons which he expected to find were non est. To the want of pon
toons, without which the Rappahannock could not be crossed, all the
general officers attribute the disastrous affair at Fredericksburg.
General Franklin says : I would like to impress as firmly upon the
Committee. as it is impressed upon my mind, that this whole disaster
has resulted from the delay in the arrival of the pontoon bridges.
Whoever is responsible for that delay is responsible for all the disas
ters that have followed. General Burnside testifies that he was under
the impression that General Halleck who gave the orders for the pon
toons to.be sent to Aquia Creek, would see to it that this order was
properly carried out; because otherwise he would have carried it out
himself. General Woodbury testifies that he received Halleck's or
der — that he found it impossible to start the pontoons .as early as was
expected, and then says — General Halleck's order to me on the 13th
made it apparent that the army was preparing to march on Fred
ericksburg. Fearing that the movement weuld be precipitate, I went
tp General Halleck's cffice and urged him te delay the mevement
some five days, in order that the necessary preparations might be
made to insure success. To this he replied that he would do nothing
to delay for an instant the advance of the army upon Richmond. I
rejoined that my suggestions were not intended to cause delay, h"ut
rather to prevent it. General Halleck admits that he went to War
renton, and there at length discussed General Burnside's plans ; that
he issued the order to General Woodbury tto send the pontoons ; that
he told Burnside to made all preliminary preparations to execute his
plans when approved; that he got the President's approval of Burn
side's plans, and that he telegraphed to the latter to go ahead as he
had proposed. That on his return to Washington he was called upon
by General Woodbury and notified of the impossibility to move the
* Warrenton, Nov. 12— 7 :'l0 P. M.
Brigadier General Woodbury, Engineer Brigade : —
Call upon the Chief Quartermaster, Colonel Rucker, to transport all
your pontoons and bridge materials to Aquia Creek. Colonel Belgor has
been ordered to charter and send me one hundred barges to Alexandria.
H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

59
pontoons as early as could be expected ; but as to the direct request
of Gen Woodbury to postpone the movement, and as to his reply
thereto his recollection is indistinct. The General-in-Chief of the
army tries to clear himself from the culpable neglect of duty with
which he is charged in the above testimony, hj saying — " that all the
troops in and around Washington were under command of General
McClellan ; that he issued his orders direct to the commanding officer
at Washington with one single exception; that the troops should be
moved from the command of Washington until I was notified by Gen_
McClellan or the commanding officer here (Washington.) Iwas told
that Burnside when he relieved McClellan stood in the same position."
We have before had occasion to see what, since September last,
was the official position of General McClellan in relation to General
Halleck ; to see that the latter had no control, or authority, or inter
ference whatever with the operations of General McClellan ; in fact,
to see that officially he did not know anything about them. This
relation between tbem was one of the principal causes of McClellan's
removal from command.
General Halleck by this part of the testimony wishes to show that
he considered he had as little right to interfere with the army under
General Burnside as when it was under General McClellan. O that
for Burnside's sake and the army this had been true ! That this was
not the case, that the official relation between the General-in-Chief
and General Burnside, at the head of the army of the Potomac, was
as different from that between General McClellan and General Hal
leck as black is different frcm white. This is clearly shewn by the
very presence ef General Halleck at Burnside's headquarters ; by his
asking Burnside te prepare a plan and to submit it to him ; by his
discussion'of Burnside's plan and by his taking it to the President for
approval. General McClellan did not trust the General-in-Chief with the
secret of his plan for the campaign, althcugh the fermer ever and
over again asked him to, let him know it; still less would he allow the
least part in the execution thereof to be directed by General Halleck.
When General Halleck communicated to General McClellan anything
about the intended operations of the army, he did it only as especially
instructed by the President, not as General Halleck. This self-con
tradiction prevents the General's acquittal on the plea that officially
he had nothing to do with the general supervision of the operation^ of
the army under General Burnside. ¦ „
To the question — " Was there or not any agreement or understand-

60
"ing between you and1 General Burnside that the pontoons andfariy
" stores necessary for him to cross the river and move toward Fred-
" ericksburg, should be furnished to him by the authorities here,
" (Washington,) without his looking after them himself V — General
Halleck answers, " Yes, sir. I told General Burnside that everything
" Was at his disposition. He must make his own requisitions and
" give his own orders ; that I would not interfere, except to assist in
" carrying his views out as much as I could ; whenever anything was
" reported to me as not being done that I would render all the assis-
" tance in my power."
Here then is from his own mouth his promise' to Burnside that he
wou|d assist in carrying out his views as much as he could, and when
anything was " reported as not being done (as was reported by Gen.
Woodbury) - that he would render all assistance in his power." All
this he promised in regard to orders given by General Burnside ; how
much more was he in duty bound to do the some in regard to the
order to General Woodbury, which he himself had issued.
General Halleck knew that General Burnside's view was to take
Fredericksburg by surprise if possible ; tbat therefore the time be
tween the arrival of the vanguard of his army in view of the city,
and between its actual occupation, should be as short as possible; he
must have known that . the appearance and the halt of Burnside's
army at Falmouth, would be the signal for the enemy to. put up his
defensive works. With this knowledge in his possession ; forwarne d
by General Woo.dbury of the dangers which an arrival at Falmouth
of the army, before the pontoons were there, was sure to involve ;
asked to netify General Burnside ef the imppssibility tp have the
pentpons at Falmouth at a time when Burnside, (ignorant of the
impediments) could reasonably expect their jurrval-^the General-in-
Chief of the army wantonly violates his different promise to General
Burnside, to " render him all the assistance in his power" — does not
even give him a, single notice of what officially and alone, in conse
quence ofthe order to General Woodbury haiiing been sent by Hal
leck, has been reported to him and not tp General Burnside. By this
criminal willful omission he allows the army of the Potomac to be led
to destruction, and thus becomes principally responsible for the lives
of the 12,000 brave slaughtered soldiers.
We will not pause to dissect the atrocious indescribable meanness
witl' which the General-in-Chief, after having deceived him with false
expectations, which he knowingly disappointed, attempts to cast th e
blame of the failure on General Burnside. As an officer in the army

61
of the United States, as the General-in-Chief of his army, General
Halleck as well as any other officer and soldier, is in duty bound to
giye immediate information tp the proper officers cf everything, be it
ever se trifling, that by any ppssibility can have a,ny bearing upon the
movements or operations of the army or any part thereof.
• So universal is this duty enforced in all armies, that if, for instance,
a single wagon of the pontoon train had, on the, march, broken down
near any pf the pickets cf our army, such an accident wpuld. have
been immediately reported, to the nearest officer, who would have
been iu duty bound to send this report to the place where the train
had started, (Washington.) as well as to the ppint pf its destination,
(General Burnside's Headquarters) ; er had a scputing party passed
' the broken wagpn they weuld have made a report tp the nearest
efficer. The impertance ef this rule fer the safety of an army is so
self-evident, that we merely allude te it. The General-in-Chief's
principal and first duty is a general superyisicn pf the executien of
the plans of the campaign ; to procure perfect concert of action between
all the distinct and separate corps and branches ef the army designed
tp ccpperate ; te urge the sIpw tp mpve mpre rapidly,, and te hpld back
thpse that meve tpp fast. Under this general duty ef the General-in-
Chief, General Halleck was bound te nptify General Burnside with
out a moment's delay, ef the impossibility to start the pontoons as early
as the latter had a right to expect it. That General Halleck himself
gave the order about the pontoons to General Woodbury direct,
— that he impressed General Burnside with the belief that he also
would see tp its execution, and thereby caused him not tp enquire any
mere abeut it— that by issuing the erder himself he had induced
General Wppdbury tp repert the impessibility " to start the pontoons
at oncef'to General Halleck and not te General Burnside, (as he weuld
have dpne, had the prder te him been issued by the latter) and— Hal
leck's premise to Burnside '¦ that he would render him all the assist
ance in his power " — all these circumstances aggravate the culpability
of the General-in-Chief.
The private soldier who falls asleep when on picket duty and
thereby omits to watch over the safety of the camp,, suffers death,
whether or no his neglect causes a surprise or capture of the camp ;
because of the bad example to the army and of the impossibility to
preserve proper discipline if such Steglect should be permitted, to pass
unpunished. The intentional omission of the General-in-Chief to nptify General
Burriside — when expressly requested to do. so by General Woodbury

62
— of the unavoidable delay in the start of the pontoons, uppn which
the operations of Burnside's army were based, constitutes a crime by
far greater than many of those, under the articles of war punished
with death. It caused the wholesale slaughter of 10,000 Union
soldiers. The discipline of the army, which constitutes its efficiency ; the
safety of the country ; justice to the 10,000 slain on the bank of the
Rappahannock ; justice to their parents, their widows, their orphans ;
justice to those who may yet be called to fight their cpuntry's battles ;
justice te all demand that the Cemmander-in-Chief prder Major-General
H. W. Halleck te be tried befpre a court-martial on the charge of
" wilful neglect of duty which he was requested to fulfill — such neglect
having caused the loss of 10,000 men, aud the disastrous defeat of our
army at Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862.
On the 1st day of January, 1863, President Lincoln issued, in ac
cordance with his proclamation of September 22, 1862, his so-called
Emancipation Proclamatipn. Washington, January 1.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, en the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and Bixty-two, a proclamation was
issued. Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by
virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the
authority and government ofthe United States, and as a fit and necessary
war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of Janu
ary, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three,
and in accordance with my purposes so to do, publicly proclaimed for the
full period of one hundred days, from the day first above-mentioned, order,
designate, as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof
respectively are this dayjjin rebellion against the United States, to wit :
Arkansas. Louisiana — (Except the parishes of St. Bernard, Placqueroines, Jeffer-
son, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre
Bonne, Lourche, Ste. Maria, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city
of New Orleans.)
Mississippi,Alabama,Florida, Georgia,
South Carolina,
North Carolina, and
VraoiNiA — [Except the forty-eight counties] designated as West Vir-

63
ginia, and also the counties of Berkley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth
City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk
and Portsmouth, and which excepted parts are for the present left pre
cisely as if this proclamation were not issued.)
And, by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order
and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States
and parts of States are, and henceforward shall be, FREE. And that the
executive government of the United States, including the military and
naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said
persons. /
And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain
from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence, and I recommend to
them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable

* * * # - * # *
Done at the city of Washington this first day of January, in
, u ^ the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-

three, and of the Independence of the United States of
^~^~^ America the eighty-seventh. Abraham Lincoln.
By the President,
Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.
The President issues the above order by virtue of the power vested
in him as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United
States ; that is in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. (This order
is countersigned by the Secretary of State, not by the Secretary of
War.) In this capacity Mr. Lincoln is undoubtedly subject to the
rules and usages applicable to the orders and actions of the Com
manders-in-Chief of other armies, and he places himself on a par with
them. No orders of a commander have effect beyond the territory in
actual possession of the armies under his command ; nor beyond the
time of such actual occupation.
The orders of a commander become effective only as far as he
possesses the 'power at any moment to enforce them. The Com
mander-in-Chief of the army of the United States surrounds the
territory wherein his war order sets forever free all the slaves, with a
circle of* slave States distinctly exempt from the operation thereof,
and se makes it impossible for himself to -enforce his order. The
right to take private property from the inhabitants of the enemy's
country is not recognized by the rules of civilized warfare.
When Napoleon Bonaparte had entered Russia Prince Poniatowski,
an eminent Polish nobleman, is said to have suggested to him, how
"deadly a blow he could strike against Russia by issuing a decree
liberating all the serfs. The emperor replied : " France would curse

64
me were I to do it, because I would thereby give the Russians the
right to rob every Frenchman of his private property, should they
ever enter France; and, my friend, do not forget that I cpuld not
.liberate the Poles till I occupied Poland, and therefore I cannot
liberate the serfs, even were I inclined to do so, till I have occupied
Russia." Napolepn's ppinion in matters like this is entitled to
respect. The tendencies of the civilized world during the last two centuries
have been te reduce as much as pcssible the se-called war power,
upen which alone Mr. Lincoln bases his right to issue the proclama
tion ; to reduce it in the interest of civilization and humanity. The
excesses of the French in Algiers, and those ef the English in India
and in China, have called fcrth a cry cf horror and indignatipn
throughput Christendom ; they were cemmitted against fereign and
half-barbarian unchristian natipns'. Hpw insignificant weuld these
excesses appear cempared with the herrprs pf a servile insurrectipn pf
3,000,000 Africans against pur own erring brothers, -with whom we
are connected by thousands of family ties, and with whom we hope,
one of these days, again to live in peace and harmony as one nation.
The Commander-in-Chief apprehends such an insurrection, because he
distinctly enjoins the slaves to abstain from it.
Whether this unholy war be continued for years to come, or
whether the battle, Dec. 13, at Fredericksburg has been the last great
battle; to the military world, the periodirom August 1861 to January
1863, will forever form a subject of intense interest^ of the most scru
pulous investigation and professional speculation ; on account of the
rapidity with which the Union army of about 450,000* men was put
in' the field ; . on account of the magnificent armament of every branch
of this vast army, unequaled in any other country ; on account of the
— in so short a time — unheard-of expenditure of about $1,260,000,000,
and the army not paid — one of the most demoralizing neglects to any
army ; in consideration of the fact that in General McClellan the
nation has found a general whose genius and skill as a strategist and
as a tactician, by competent judges of all nations is admitted to be
unsurpassed by the most famous qaptains of any age, while.an Gen
erals F. J. Porter, Franklin, Sumner, Hooker, Heintzelman, Burnside,
Rosecrans, Keys, Stoneman, Banks, Hancock, Sigel, and many others,
* We believe the future will show that the above number has, at no time
during the war, been exceeded by all our armies actually under arms ; all
the Reports of the Secretary of War to the contrary notwithstanding.

65
i, m '.no "litiii'vr •) .'ixi.'n! riijmo'i *li •¦-' w-.o. i >+'*iq (^ ¦ j hi ,iiohm«,' »,l:<
we,, possess in^ell^geijtt, ^opnpetent^ an.d ))tffl&, <so$S$tim4,ftt&w£ corps
d'armee ;* on account of the undisputed bravery, i endHff*»QeR> and
superior,, fighting ,qqalj,tiesi ^ne^hy, displayed- hybomi.arrt^J on
account of ithe little, effect, as y^jjjproducie^rttponejlihl^ajaoyj'jhy'jikhe
cprrupting, influence^ tejwjihih^ in-.^m^
has been subjected, and.pnjaccouni of tfee. aVjsg^cftiaSanyfjlasiragnad-
yantage, really, gained^hyijSp, large and i,g^^i^iKar an qajhy-jino so
marjy. hard-fought battles?,,, :; /j oJ -¦ siSAl sio'i .a-.jiD jiu!"-- -t'^
tlJ ^n justice .tp the loyal piri^njs^^rs.ojfe^ei^olsb^fliaii |risti«e61to
tljeir .military ialent and. applicatipn--rtif justice tortheirLhe^oic-ibearaqg
and endurance — wp present to, the . military world tftft-folliawiHgahrief
record of the, | Union, !Ar.,my wilhgir performances m i¥irgainiauand
Maryland. ; nhvl-i-iv -.v;n »wj-/ joiiJ >idi W? --tbiW''1 "uhiupii •
, Mr. Lincpki, thajGoimjii^r^^r^n-cMff^^the Army and Navyyiwhen
the, pre sent war ccmmejicefb, j Sfitertajoedi ,- (ihe. etaroneriUs idea tlsdatothe
rebellion cenld he supprelsaeidiiteithiatninety days by a pdssemam-
tatus<; he called iout ?5iO0OOv(Jlu»teiers for ninety day's ; overruled
General Scott's, milit88ryiadj%ie^u«n^ijsent!ithoSe "ninety fllayB'^ iften,
unorganized, intpi wh»tr,Wj»s,;expectedfto be a spectacle -militaire fer
the members of COngresji and-fteiirAiends,ibut what shaped itself
into Ifoe disgraceful rout— tBull< Run the; iFSrsttf jij // b^ . .ilf. ol ¦>!
[,.| General McClellani was then placed- in theicomniahA>jyeslgn:ed'>'toy
General Scott. . In th e> capital, surWKduided by1 the • enemy's 'febeee, (he
prgainztidja new army, as it was heat '. pessible under existing ciwtrim-
staft-QfiSi He prepared apian for a campaign,, contemplalfingi the' cap-
turs;pf Richntond anditheoSuippr'issiotiiirf'^hfe' rebellion;- apian fthblt,
as prpyjed, ,by pffitiital documents Mtely>eomHdoiliighto'¥eforfe rtheB.feou'rt-
mai;laaj& abpye refeitDeditq, wfcsr npt only jpterfectl in it&.&tirateguiai con
ception, shut, if pver equalled, was, certainly unsurpassed iin .detailed
— — :- "1 U. i, 'lb'! . M.
* Among the few gratifying reflections called forth by this war,, is thejhigh
standard 6f jJrof&sr6hal efficiency1 uiriVersaily possessed by the officers gradu
ated front the Military I Academy at! West, Point; whether they haVekceritittu-

riomniissions atthe outbreak of \W pre'sght War. No military academy' <
endow the students with genius, nor turn out commanders-in-chieif|ngefflei?ais
able judiciously to fominan^
once In a century : dux" the Iact that almost all our present most able generals
were majors or' captains1 Uwo years' ttgo'j the' exfemplaYy''ma™efl1rI*Wiich
large funds passing, ^hrjough their, hands are always properly ^ccebntedjjpr
witho'utanyloss to the country, place West Point, as # military, educational
institute,' at a par, if not alMd of^Mniila* institutions iuariy other country.
.Theiei ars, exceptions, to ta<sure-^-th!at otitiwn&WHiillekmfoTAkaVWtW&gw
all— but they are few and far between., <m\\f)-)iL nio fov «i W.i' nm-wq
5

66
elaboration, in completeness, in its comprehensive ramifications, in its
far-reaching anficipatiefa! bf eveTits^as 'well as in 'the^eiesWa'ry prepjar-
atipnstomeetthem.fi"1 r.'.ii/qaihiixj >>A< to jmuoo-.u no '--,jW.v>s>
10 This plan the1 general intended "to keep secret till after the"' com
mencement of its practical' 'execution ; its success 'could be interfered
with lay the result ' of battles only:r'! In ' conformity vrith' his plan, the
army tof^the West had commenced operations1 iri the fikfd; 'haa b&en
successful in every' 'omje of 'their numerous' 'engagbrSents!'fre nr'Somer-
set, Bpwling Green, Fort Henry, to Columbus ; wh'eA' fa' ' few days be
fore the armyof the Potomac Was to commence the "execution of the
part assigned to them,; the President, Commander-in-Chief, onMally
ordered General McClellan'tb 'Communicate 'fo Wm his1 plah.J 'The
general had to obey orders. The ' Cpmm«nder-m-Chi'ef assured his
enquiring friends that this time success was certain ; he peeved ihe
correctness pf his views by explaining the plan : Vfew' hours 'later the
iGantfederate General Jphnson; at ' Maiiassas,' 'knew the plan • ' • he at
once retreated -with his armyto Richmond.'" The frieh&s'Of the'Gom-
-mander-in-Chief thereuppn censureid 'General McClellan for having
aHowedfilihe'escape of Johnson '«> army ;frem''MslniaSSas.^ ''^ !!'-'1 >w9i '
oil The""President, Commauder-in-Chief,- reiieVeld General MeClellan
;»s General-in-Chief nof the army, arid assigned this position '"de fac
to " to Mr. Edwin M: Stanton, Lawyer - and ! Secretary of War,
General McClellan" embarked) hisiarm^ for the peninsula; ; on' his
Arrival there: he found that 45,000 -men under General McD,pwell, by
order of '¦< the. Coifimander-in -Chief, had not been permitted to em
bark, and. had been placed at the disposal iof Mr. Edwin -M. SfamtOn ;
that bis most perfect disposition of the' forces under Generals' Bank's,
Wadsworth, Abercrombie' ;and 'others; between- the Rappahannock,
¦the Shenandoah, and the Potomac, and especially' in froht of Wash-
i ingtoh, had all been countermanded by the Commander-in'ChieiPtand
Mr. Edwin M. Stanton.
^bjTli6 betrayal of McClellan's plaii.fpr the campaign, to, the, enemy
enabled the latter to concentrate' his forces' in positions herettofore
undefended/This ahd the numerical deduction of .45,06d'meii!from
hijs^army, considerably delayed the, j advance of the army on the
ipeuinsula.'ii-jA;i|. .ribii..i(ii!-"T dm iiml i ' .lining i\ ii n .jjjj.. iifj v/obno
Thfe Commander-in-Chief's friends censured McClellan's slowness.
,1 When the army, of the- Potomac was within a few miles of Rich
mond, General McClellan asked now to have restored to hint the
4550,00 ^meri withheld frpm his army1,;, they then stood withyj,,fpur
4^ys: march pf his present lines ;ahe Commander-in-Chistf did not
permit them to rejpin McClellan's army.' "" » ¦* ' '. '"¦' -

67

/.¦-j . ii ,; ri , i k u' 'T-'U1* "'¦' ¦¦-¦'' -1!'l ,' -i-'Ui:i nft vvf">inlo i
The Confederate army at Richmond} largely .reinforced, from all,
parts of .the .Confederate States, hereupon, attacked the armv ot tae
tL.'IJ-aiiiM 4';vTr-«1<3in.-tY.-.-' v \ '• •¦., ff Va. ¦¦¦¦¦¦¦>w .,i,[ns.> >>''£ at'7^'
rotomac with the intention of destroying it by superiority, at num-,
. -a »(H I- '¦:¦¦>,'. •:¦¦ i-'h.'-),: . , ... ,..". <i Jm-i/lwf BW 1 *IJ .,.-m>
bers and by advantage of position. By . most sublime strategv.
Uivk; Tin: J -,u ,.iu. Pur „ • *].:. . ..;::t-7'< runs S'WiTslV 1:''" ''VT-
executed in the most. perfect manner— by the he'0?? bravery at ta^
officers and men, McClellan snatched from their combined^efFqrts the .
victory, which the Confederate generals considered . certain ; fifir
secured the admirable position at' Harrison's' Landinir, and sent the ,
reljel army that ventured to attack Malvern ¦ It,ill , badly whipped ^to^
Richmond.' . .' ' . , • ti [„
.[¦ml > K, Ij  ) .,iit ni :l' ¦:'¦ '¦>'! I" ?'tf" lHi.>,t)(r,
A dozen battJ.es. ,the army of the Potomac had fough^on the(penjKUr
sula without Jiaving. received any reinforcements^ McClellan now
asked for 35,000 men to replace the losses in battle ami for the pur- ,
* > ' i ,\ : !¦ I, ff- !'.r. '¦,'•, 111 ([Oil: Ot 'iiSf'i; -iJ
pose of taking Richmond; he points out where, there, are such [that
can ,be spared ; lie explains the, importance of taking Richmond, now,
V '*'' trl •'"•• f-'^i?''^ /t}-^"^V ,'t.v' i6t>'Wtt'>T :usf".
and from Harrison s .Landing, and he foretells the consequences ol a
. . , . -6- mi ol.!; •!" ¦ ¦ ¦¦ ¦ "* -a: ¦ **>-i ¦" ,vnsi'.
neglect to do it. . ,. ,,,,
In the face of all this, General H. W. Halleck, just appointed
_. n: '¦> ¦ >; .-., . ,. ,(r. - ! ., ! u,i/ ¦ ij-i ¦ ¦ • I ,, i i_v ,ii,' «¦'. i I - u '.'I'
General-m-Chief, .peremptorily orders General McClellan to remove
his entire army from Har.nson s Landing to Aquia Creek, a place
from which the ostensibIe,ebiect.ei this movement can hardly be ac-
'."¦, .'11, Jill ¦: lU.rlT ITJ-Ji :¦"'.• -1/ .to .< '. ,¦-,::, -l.'Ji ¦: ".'Us, VjftHlnf,--..'
comphshed. r .
The President Commander's friends bitterly complain that: by
McClellan's fault, and slowUess, the campaign en tlje peninsula had
net, given Richmcnd tp Mr. Lincolnj and that the' expected results
, w;>TT'jJ 1 1 , ' ;l ; i. v - ' i. Icuiir-.i . i ..; t , f ¦_ . ,'l .'¦, "'I ' ,j 0''
have not been a.chieved. Arriving at Aquia Creek, the army. of the
Potomac, m separate corps is, by the Cpmmander-m-Chief, detailed
to the command of General Pope, and McClellan finds hiniselr stripped
of command. (.,, , .... „„

Ge?,ffal
the dem(
Self-isreservafijon now hecomes law supreme with the President
Commander: whether (or no, his friends and his advisers are a unit
r ,->.( tbii-n ii.''i_jji-X ' •• Aiv^' \, -V •- , j >i ¦¦ ,.,«, o.,i\ , v.,\u, ,,v,v ,-j
on that ppint He himself is cpnvmced tfiat General McClellan albne.
ov Ti'*,! Spp :>\r lltiWL-l.r »,l'j naJilJi.T^.* ffipi'i-'tv -* '«!' 'W,. V ¦iTEi,
can preserve.him and bis friends. . He reinstates the general in his
, . -.'.f.l '•" *l!rrfT Oi, •-•'Wdf t,."l)!K--^ vr..,r,=,->Y ,., - V,U,| ;;„.,, n.ilHl.j,;, ¦-/', ' -!,o.f V
high command, who accepts onlyon a conditipn npt tp be1 interfered
with rbyr anybody. The President Cemmander agrees to this aha"'
f K«?H ¦Jif-^J:!ti .I'-imiH lif BOH K'llMi III .IlUidsiTd ft! ,1|«< ,o?l
promises t9 sfack to rit. y , ,.'/-'„.. ,- •
Intwo weeks McClellan.' fights the battles of Sbuth Mptinfain''ahd,
i^ J;'.- y-'.'^ir,/ ' .n'4fr, 7TT*ft fr .-"t !;,i. ^ - ¦ ,; ;.r- r. iQ,|J / r'? -~~^ t ,
of Antietam, drives General Lee out of Maryland back across tne

6ft

Potomac, arid finishes the campaign in Maryland. He now asks for
shoes, clothing; and btjbei^hecessaries, for the want pf which" tjhe, army
suffers' and cannot move/; all his most'nrgent requests ,'don't bring the
shoes.' The 'Cpmmander-ih-C,hief s Jrieiids circulate rumors' thai; there
exists no want pf shoe? and clpthing in the arrrfy and" then fin^' fault'
with McClellan, that he , complainsVof an imaginary want, and 'the
Secretary or" War' enters ' into an elaDorate .correspondence with ' the
n'>ii Li'» ' 1-it'. '>/> >' ',"'- <i. •:•'!• ^ o?j.: - .'¦¦/, ',¦, >>;' rfaiit ;/ , / v - j i :i
li-eneral-in-Uniel for the, purpose or proving that Jnere exists no want
• 41. •" Ollll.t'li'lijlll.,' K,,i ,'VIJ' f •<>"• '-' .1 "••' ,'W ''-fi'il !:r; , " 1,,,; -,,
in the army ; they both signally fail „m their object, but, they prove
their hbst'uity against McClellan', tW neglect" ef the War' Department,
and. the want of rectitude ,in the General-in-Chief.
ThePresiden^ Commander's friends now censure McClellan severe
ly, because he permits tjie army to lay still and "allows the Cbnleder-
. -i:.:i .'(it ii.' Pi; ,, -..n' i ','v '''4tV,''i'' " ¦">¦" '!'i' ¦ :' -ii.! fi-i:! ¦
ate army to stop in the Shenandoah Valley. , .
In the" meantime McClellan is maturing his plan foi; the new cam
paign.' Remembering the betrayal! in IWtarch last of his plans; to ihe
vi -^ r'nic ," in. t '.' -"-•¦,,,;" _, j),-,,; ;"L r.- ! , . ¦* .,,,-; -, ,,
enemy, he refuses to communicate lt.to anybpdy.
The. President Commander, .thereupon in. the latter, part of October,
forced' General McCjeii'ah to cross the Upper Potomac, and to com
mence tlie execution of a miserable, strategy, .not his own. A few
days later,' when the entire army is face to , face .with the, enemy, the
¦p -'•>«,-. <i vu' ml niiv ii 'iir.'i','-,!. . i ""¦Jr-1~1 ir1' ''-/¦ ' ' ' '"I' u><u\f n".
President V ommander again removes McClellan from cominand, , as
signing it, to Major-General Burnside, but pot assigning .any reason
for the removal! ' A few hours after trie receipt af1 this order McChJl^an
transfers Bis command^, tells his arm'y to "stand' by Burnside" as ypu'
stood 'by. ine, kind departs. ",The ^ 'Plresident 'Commander's, ''friends '
., 'nil to. ,v-T-.r..>,-( > .... fi ;¦;. ¦> ,, :.-:iJi,i+i Iv-.,,! , .- ¦ ¦;,-,, -<.,
thereupon " rejojce— they congratulate jhe. President, themselves and.
the! nation on the appointment of, General Burnside as 'Ills successor,
V "'"U'W: ^ri>,-ifr"' ffv 'V Vl- 'i.'.Tji,;. ,.", . j:iav"l to *¦ '-.,."Tlr,', -¦¦')'-
because they know him to be the man in whom the army reposes the
greatest^ confidence, and who will they are sure, take.Richmphd, befpre
the trst day pf January next. Burnside Himself declares oyer and..
ovet' again that he is not cpmp^ienV to lead sn large ap arjnW'tipa?*'
McClellan, -whem he knpws'as he knows hira'seli", is' the best map 'to"
command, tecause %e lmitfiev soundest head and the clearest military
miii ,¦., :-'.i\ y-i-i -ivlifc ¦-:•¦! .Va ,' ,:]-ia.ar U aiu -jjii '.'(', -,,*, -Lu, *¦ fi,, ,-. .,Si *
perception of any man %n the "United States. But .Burnside is a
-uriMp u: j^ji. ,.>(£, la: ,'iuu jcjit li-wuiyr ¦•• -jTTs v ,il »„i,ii jijf,
soldier, .and the President Commander's friends are not, "thereiore
.tfuraside's opinion can haverno weight against theirs in military mat-
u-il'ife,, r,il{it ,¦ ,, , p,(ir.,nvi .-. P.. .-<,9, :,¦<:¦,¦¦!; n'l U V m<Wi J ¦¦ ,:
ters. ' J
Bits an.-; .ii s^ihjc 3',v:o±i.:i: ,-, 1,'-^-'^! <uJT ,-,,uffv.Tt -v-L i; •-'•,,
People in Lngland, in ± ranee and m Russia, who nave had a
Cr<g^ irall. twp. Napqleon* and, Striletzers ^re ^astonisfedV 8¥hey1'i
wpnje>th^kcp^

69
ed to him, surrounded by his friends, obeyed the order of the Presi
dent, instead of marching to Washington and deposing him and his
advisers. These people do not know the patriot McClellan.
General McClellan when in Washington planned and worked for
his country's cause ; when in the field he fought for that cause ; when
^misrepresented and slandered, when degraded, he suffered for that
cause. Whether in the tented field, or in the Cabinet, McClellan
never lost sight of his country's cause; neither the President nor a
General-in-Chief, nor all the members of the pabinet could for an in
stant obstruct from his clear view, his country's cause. He conquered
self and kept silent for Mb country's cause ; but the most powerful
orator's brilliant eloquence could not have better ¦ enlightened the
people about our country's cause and its miBmanagers, than George B.
McClellan has done by his dignified silence.
May no inferior man ever have presented tp him the same tempting
opportunity and take advantage thereof.
General Burnside intending to cross the Rappanannock at Fred
ericksburg, communicated his plan to General Halleck, and relied for
the execution in Washington of a simple order, upon that gentleman's
promised assistance. Herein he was deceived, and the consequence is
the loss of 10,000 men, December 13, at Fredericksburg, which so
paralyzed the army of the Potomac that in five weeks it has not
stirred. Thereupon tbe President Commander issues an order to the army
wherein he declares, that the attack on Fredericksburg was no error,
and the*repulse only an accident. On examination the Commanders
of the three grand divisions of the army of the Potomac declare that
the attack was an error, and the successful retreat, a military accident
to the enemy.
The President Commander's friends thereupon say Burnside never
theless is the best cemmander ; it is only the fault of the enemy that
they did not get whipped. Burnside tenders his resignation : it is not
accepted. The President Commander's friends are confident that the
Emancipation Proclamation will conquer the rebellion.
Meanwhile we find at the close of the campaign in Virginia and
Maryland of 1862, the strong outworks of Richmond transferred to
the right bank of .the Rappahannock.
January 18th, 1863. V- F. A. P.

YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

3 9002 08561 1870