PARKER CONSTITUTION CLUB OP NEW YORK CITY.
REPORT No. 2.
On the charges brought against President Roosevelt
for his conduct toward Colombia in November, 1903.

On November 2, 1903, the United States and the Republic of
Colombia were at peace with each other.
For many years their relations as to the Panama territory
had been regulated by a treaty made in 1846 between our Govern
ment and the Republic of New Granada. New Granada was then
an independent nation, whose territory included the State of
Panama extending from the chain of mountains which forms the
northwest limit of the Continent of South America, upwards, past
the Isthmus of Panama to the borders of Costa Rica. Some time
after this treaty was made, the State of Panama became, voluntarily,
a part of the Republic of Colombia. By tacit understanding, the
treaty, as President Roosevelt has expressed it, "ran with the
land ' ' ; that is to say, for better or for worse, all of its provisions
became binding upon Colombia on the one side and upon the
United States on the other, and each of those two countries
became, as against each other, possessed of the rights and bound
by the obligations which formerly existed between New Granada
and the United States. It is necessary to read the pertinent parts
of this treaty to have an intelligent understanding of the present
matter. It must also be borne in mind that Colombia is a recog
nized nation of the world, and as much a sovereign state as
is the United States. In territory, it is as large as Germany. Its
Panama Department was nearly five hundred miles in length, and
extended from the Pacific on the west, to the Carribean Sea on

ed36 100

the east. Colombia's population is over four millions, of which
about three hundred thousand lived in that Department.
These are the pertinent parts of the treaty :
" Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce.
The United States of North America and the Republic of
New Granada in South America, desiring to make lasting and
firm the friendship and good understanding which happily
exist between both nations and have resolved to fix in a manner
clear, distinct and positive, the rules which shall in future be
religiously observed between each other by means of a treaty,
or general convention of peace and friendship, commerce and
navigation. * * * ARTICLE FIRST.
There shall be a perfect, firm and inviolable peace and sincere
friendship between the United States of America and the Republic
of New Granada, in all the extent of their possessions and territories,
and between their citizens respectively, without distinction of
persons or places.
*******
ARTICLE THIRTY-FIFTH.
* * * q^g Government of New Granada guarantees to
the Government of the United States that the right of way or
transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communi
cation that now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be
open and free to the Government and citizens of the United States,
and for the transportation of any articles of produce, manufactures
or merchandize, or lawful commerce, belonging to the citizens of
the United States ; that no other tolls or charges shall be levied or
collected upon the citizens of the United States, or their said mer
chandize thus passing over any road or canal that may be made by
the Government of New Granada, or by the authority of the same,
than is under like circumstances levied upon and collected from
the Granadian citizens ; that any lawful produce, manufactures
or merchandize belonging to citizens of the United States,

thus passing from one sea to the other, in either direction, for the
purpose of exportation to any other foreign country, shall not be
liable to any import duties whatever ; or having paid such duties,
they shall be entitled to drawback upon their exportation ; nor
shall the citizens of the United States be liable to any duties,
tolls or charges of any kind to which native citizens are not sub
jected for thus passing the said Isthmus. And, in order to secure
to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advan
tages, and as an especial compensation for the said advantages and
for the favours they have acquired by the gth, jjth and 6th articles of
this treaty, the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously
to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of
the before-mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free transit
from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed
in any future time while this treaty exists ; and in consequence, the
United States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of
sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses
over the said territory.
Second. The present treaty shall remain in full force and
vigor for the term of twenty years, from the day of the exchange
of the ratifications ; * * *
Third. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if neither party
notifies to the other its intention of reforming any of, or all, the
articles of this treaty twelve months before the expiration of the
twenty years, stipulated above, the said treaty shall continue
binding on both parties, beyond the said twenty years, until
twelve months from the time that one of the parties notifies its
intention of proceeding to a reform.
Fourth. If any one or more of the citizens of either party
shall infringe any of the articles of this treaty, such citizen shall
be held personally responsible for the same, and the harmony and
good correspondence between the nations shall not be interrupted
thereby ; each party engaging in no way to protect the offender,
or sanction such violation.
Fifth. If, unfortunately, any of the articles contained in
this treaty should be violated or infringed in any way whatever,

it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two contracting parties
shall ordain or authorize any acts of reprisal, nor shall declare war
against the other on complaints of injuries or damages, until the
said party considering itself offended shall have laid before the other
a statement of such injuries or damages, verified by competent
proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same shall have
been denied, in violation of the laws and of international right."
The route over the Isthmus to which the treaty refers, has
come to consist of the railroad, now constructed, and the canal,
partly constructed, extending across from Colon, on the Carribean
side, to the City of Panama, on the Pacific side, a part of the
Department of Panama about equi-distant from its northerly
and southerly boundaries.
To summarize the treaty between the two countries : It is
primarily a treaty of ' ' peace and amity ' ' as well as of " naviga
tion and commerce," and the cardinal article of the treaty is to
establish " a perfect, firm and inviolable peace and sincere friend
ship' ' " in all the extent of their possessions and territories. ' ' The
railroad, the canal, and any other way of transit, from Colon to
the City of Panama are to be open to the United States on the
payment only of such tolls as citizens of Colombia pay, and without
import duties where the merchandise is simply passing through.
In order to secure these advantages, the United States has guaran
teed to Colombia that this free transit shall be preserved uninter
ruptedly and unembarrassed ; and has also guaranteed the sov
ereignty of Colombia over the territory. The treaty was and is
terminable by either the United States or Colombia on one year's
notice. Finally, — and most important — no acts of private citizens
of either country are to interrupt ' ' the harmony and good cor
respondence between the nations ; ' ' and neither party is to protect
the offender or ' ' sanction such violation. ' ' If either party shall
assert that the other has broken the treaty, it shall not be a cause
for war unless the claim shall be first reduced to writing, veri
fied by proofs, accompanied by a demand for justice and satis
faction, and be denied.
In this state of peace, and with such treaty relations between

the two countries, President Roosevelt on November 2, 1903,
caused the following order to be telegraphed to the commanders
of United States warships stationed on the Carribean side :
" Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption
" threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad.
' ' Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either
"government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or
" other points."
He likewise caused to be telegraphed to the commander of
the warship on the Pacific side :
" Proceed with all possible despatch to Panama. Tele
graph in cipher your departure. Maintain free and unin
terrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed
" force, occupy the line. Prevent landing of any armed
' force, either government or insurgent, with hostile intent, at
" any point within fifty miles of Panama. If doubtful as to
' ' the intent of any armed force, occupy Ancon Hill strongly
' ' with artillery. If the ' Wyoming ' would delay ' Concord '
or ' Marblehead,' her disposition must be left to your dis
cretion. Government fotce reported approaching the Isthmus
in vessels. Prevent their landing, if in your judgment
' ' landing would precipitate a conflict. ' '
The reasons which were later officially stated in behalf of the
administration for the presence of the war ships and for the send
ing of these telegrams are the following : At the time when they
were sent the Colombian Senate had rejected a proposed treaty
between the two countries under which it was to receive from us
ten million dollars for ceding to us the half -built canal and the
territory within a zone a few miles on either side of it. A pro
test against Colombia's course was thought likely on the part of
some of the inhabitants of Colon and of the City of Panama. It
was also thought likely that Colombia would send troops for the
purpose of suppressing this protest, and that the Colombian
government vessels bearing these troops might then be on their
way. In other words, President Roosevelt, according to his own
statement of the occurrence, directed our war vessels to prevent
soldiers of Colombia from landing on their own shores in order

to anticipate and prevent disorder when we were at peace with
that country and bound by a treaty so to continue.
To comment properly on this situation, we first refer to the
declaration of principles of this Club :
' ' It has always been the will of the American people,
obedient to the admonition of Washington in his Farewell
Address, that their public officers should hold sacred the
obligations of international law and international fair deal
ing, and should refrain from aggression upon other nations
and peoples, and from needless intermeddling in their
affairs. *******
' ' This venerable and beneficent policy President Roosevelt
' ' has undertaken to reverse, and in its place to set up a
' ' policy of autocratic force. He has shown that a President
" who has the will to usurp "legislative functions, to exalt
" the power of the Executive above the Constitution, and to
" commit our nation to violations of international justice,
' ' easily finds a way. ' '
The demonstration of President Roosevelt's policy and
tendencies is complete when we lay the terms of the treaty
alongside of the terms of his telegrams. He did not hold sacred
the obligations of international fair dealing. He did not refrain
from aggression upon Colombia. In issuing orders that Colombia
should not be allowed to land troops on her own territory he
acted arbitrarily and autocratically, his course also leading to
a lamentable violation of international justice and to a breach
of our national honor. If the orders had been carried out and
Colombia had resisted in the assertion of her sovereign rights,
this country would have been plunged into a war with Colombia
by President Roosevelt's individual act. There could not be a
clearer illustration of the dangers attending the occupancy of the
Presidential office by one having such a conception of its powers
and functions. Moreover, while his telegrams were not in form a declara
tion of war, they authorized acts of war, and thus became in
effect a usurpation of the power "to declare war," conferred
by the Constitution not upon the Executive but upon Congress

(U. S. Constitution, Article i, Sec. 8). In this aspect his con
duct was unconstitutional, not only in tendency but in fact.
For purposes of the present discussion and report, the fact that
Colombia was so powerless that it later refused to fight with us
has no bearing on the President's act. If the President had
given orders that no English troops should be allowed to land in
Jamaica, or that no French troops should be allowed to land in
French Guiana, his instructions would have been regarded by
those countries and by the entire civilized world as a declaration
of war. More than that, war would actually have resulted. The
argument that the telegram did not declare war can only be based
upon the proposition that his unlawful aggression was against a
nation too weak to resent it.
Apart from the constitutional aspect, the instructions of the
President were certainly a violation of the law of nations as well
as of every consideration of right and fairness. This was not
' ' peace and amity ' ' with Colombia. It was the precise ' ' violation' '
of the ' ' harmony and good correspondence between the nations ' '
which the treaty forbade. No complaint had been made by us.
None of the preliminaries required by the treaty in case of an
alleged violation had been observed by this country. It was the
act of a larger and stronger nation saying : ' Right or wrong ;
our pledge to the contrary notwithstanding ; you shall not be
permitted to preserve order or prevent a revolt on your own
territory. ' We had solemnly agreed to guarantee the sovereignty
of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama. President Roosevelt's
directions were that Colombia be forcibly ousted from sovereignty
over the Isthmus of Panama. We conclude that upon the face of
these telegrams President Roosevelt committed our country to a
breach of faith and of a solemn agreement.
War did not result from the instructions to the naval
commanders, and on account of a fact from which little comfort
can be derived. They were not received in time to stop the
Colombian ship. Commander Hubbard, the senior in command
of the United States' ships on the Atlantic side, acting in the
ordinary line of his duty, did not interfere with the landing

of the Colombian troops. On November 3d, the day following
these telegrams, he answered that before they had been received
400 Colombian troops had already been landed at Colon. A tele
gram also arrived from our Consul at Colon informing the State
Department that the government force on the Isthmus comprised
500 men, although their officers had promised to support a revolt,
and that at the City of Panama (on the Pacific side) there was the
Colombian gunboat " Bogota." Altogether there were at most
in this vicinity, affiliated one way or the other, a fighting force
of about 2,000 men. Their actions, according to President
Roosevelt's logic were to determine in a few days the rights of a
republic of an enormous area and comprehending some four
million souls.
On the afternoon of the 3d, after receiving these notifica
tions, the State Department telegraphed :
" Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department
" promptly and fully informed."
To that came a reply from our Consul at Panama :
' ' No uprising yet, reported will be in the night. Situation
" is critical."
Two hours later the Consul again telegraphed :
' ' Uprising occurred to-night, six. No bloodshed. Army and
' ' navy officers taken prisoners. Government will be organ-
' ' ized to-night, consisting three consuls also cabinet. Soldiers
' ' changed. Suppose same movement will be effected in Colon.
1 ' Order prevails so far. Situation serious. 400 soldiers landed
" Colon to-day."
' ' The uprising ' ' consisted of the arrest of two commanding
officers of the Colombian troops by some men at the City of
Panama who then proclaimed within the hour independence of
the Department. On the succeeding morning, November 4th, the Colombian
gunboat outside of Panama began to shell that city. The United
States Consul General ordered this to be stopped at once. On the
same morning Commander Hubbard on the Atlantic side, at the

request of our Consul, landed a force of marines, because he had
been notified that if the two Colombian officers who had been
seized at Panama the night before were not released, the Colom
bian officer in command at Colon would [open fire on the town.
Negotiations between Commander Hubbard and the Colombian
commander resulted in the sending of an emissary from Colon to
Panama to arrange about the release of the two officers. During
the next two days Hubbard, by refusing to permit transportation
of troops on the railway from one side of the Isthmus to the
other, and by judicious placing of his own batteries, prevented
any encounter between any forces. Meetings took place on
November 5th between those who claimed to have formed the
new Republic, and the Colombian officer who had landed with
his 400 men at Colon. The nature of this interview may be
surmised. The result was that he sailed away with his troops.
Thereupon a telegram was sent to the United States by three
persons calling themselves the ' ' Junta, ' ' announcing that the
Republic of Panama had been established, and the Administration
on the succeeding day, November 7th, telegraphed as follows to
Colombia :
' ' The people of Panama having, by an apparently unani-
" mous movement, dissolved their political connection with
" the Republic of Colombia, and resumed their independence,
' ' and having adopted a Government of their own, republican
" inform, with which the Government of the United States has
' ' entered into relations, the President of the United States, in
' ' accordance with the ties of friendship which have so long
" and so happily existed between the respective nations,
' ' most earnestly commends to the Governments of Colombia
' ' and of Panama the peaceful and equitable settlement of all
" questions at issue between them. He holds that he is
' ' bound, not merely by treaty obligations, but by the in-
' ' terests of civilization, to see that the peaceful traffic of the
' ' world across the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be
" disturbed by a constant succession of unnecessary and
" wasteful civil wars."
President Roosevelt, in his letter of acceptance of the presi
dential nomination, charges his critics with misstating the facts.

IO

There is not a single fact above set forth which is not supported
by the records and admitted by the Administration.
In forming our conclusions upon this further situation, as
developed by the telegram to Colombia of November 7th, there
is another significant fact stated by President Roosevelt in his
message to Congress, namely, that there had been over fifty
actual outbreaks on the Isthmus in the last fifty years. We
had effectively policed the Isthmus during this period, and gone
no further. In the present instance, whether it be due to the
presence of our war ships in advance, or whatever cause, there
was not even a real outbreak. But the present situation did
differ from any preceding affair of the kind in that Colombia
had just rejected the treaty under which we proposed to build
the canal at Panama rather than in Nicaragua. The Administra
tion had already notified Colombia that its refusal to accept the
treaty would be regarded as an unfriendly act. When, never
theless, it persisted, our four days' peaceful policing of the canal
did not end the incident, as on previous occasions, but resulted
in the notification to Colombia that its Department of Panama
was a nation. To seek to justify the action of the Administration
on the ground that we sympathized with the oppression and
tyranny put upon the people of Panama by the Colombian
Government is a pure afterthought. The cause of President
Roosevelt's action lay in the attitude of Colombia towards the
proposed treaty and in nothing else.
Speaking first of the matter in its strictly constitutional as
pect, it is provided by Article II., Section 3, that the President
' ' shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers. ' ' Under
this clause of the Constitution it is undisputed that the President has
the power to recognize a government which de facto rules an existing
nation without regard to its dejure right to rule. We dispute the
proposition that he has the constitutional power to recognize a
seceding territorial part of another nation as a new and inde
pendent nation — certainly until its de facto independence has been
practically established.

On other than constitutional grounds the observations made
in an earlier part of this report concerning the orders of the
President of November 2d are again applicable. The message to
Colombia has a further regrettable element. It was the act of
a President of a great nation informing another nation of a situa
tion not in accordance with the true state of facts. There was
no ' ' unanimous movement ' ' by any ' ' people. ' ' No ' ' people ' '
had adopted any government, and the powers which the so-called
' ' Junta ' ' had arrogated to itself was in no sense a government
republican in form. We need not comment upon the sarcastic
and bitter allusion to ' ' ties of friendship. ' '
The conclusion is irresistible that President Roosevelt seized
upon an excuse which was only a shadow, and that the Depart
ment of Panama was wrested from the Colombian Republic.
Moreover, it cannot be ignored that this country at once pro
ceeded to enter into a treaty with Panama, as an independent
nation, whereby it obtained the possession, control and virtual
sovereignty of a portion of the territory which had been so wrested
from the dominion of Colombia.
It is manifest that Colombia was deprived of that portion of
her territory consisting of the Department of Panama by the atti
tude, interference and power of the United States. Whatever the
advantages of the construction of the canal, or the wrongs of the
Panamans, they do not justify conduct on the part of this country
which had that deprivation as a result. We have no traditions
which favor the spoliation of weaker countries. Far better would
it have been openly to notify Colombia that if it persisted in its
refusal to ratify the proposed treaty this country would feel com
pelled, in the interests of the commercial world, to build the canal
and protect it by force. It would have been within the poiver of
Congress to adopt such a policy, and perhaps it might justify
itself before the world by the necessities of civilization, and by
the deliberation, fairness and publicity of the proceedings. Such
a course would at any rate have relieved us from the odium of hav
ing accomplished the same result by means not only tortuous, but
savoring of cunning and intrigue. As it is, President Roosevelt,

12
by unconstitutional and arbitrary conduct on his part, com
mitted the nation to a policy and to transactions offensive to the
law of nations, and to those high standards of international honor
and morality which this country has always observed. That
conduct on his part we can only condemn.
PARKER CONSTITUTION CLUB OF NEW YORK CITY,
By Wheeler H. Peckham,
John G. Carlisle,
WlLWAM B. HORNBLOWER,
John G. Milburn,
Adrian H. Joline,
William Church Osborn,
Howard Taylor,
Committee on Reports.

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