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THE LIBRARY OF
BIBLICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

EDITED BY
REV. GEORGE R: CROOKS, D.D., LL.D.,
AND
BISHOP JOHN F. HURST, D.D., LL.D.

VOL. I. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE HOLY
SCRIPTURES. By Rev. Henry M. Harman, D.D. $4 00
II. BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS. By Rev. Milton S.
Terry, D.D., LL.D  3 00
III. THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA AND METH
ODOLOGY. By Rev. George R. Crooks, D.D.,
LL.D., and Bishop John F. Hurst, D.D., LL.D., . 3 50
IV. CHRISTIAN ARCHAEOLOGY. By Rev. Charles W.
Bennett, D.D. With an Introductory Notice by Dr.
Ferdinand Piper. Revised by Rev. Amos William
Patton, D.D., 
V. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. Vol. I. By Rev. John
Miley, D.D., LL.D.,  3 00
VI. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. Vol. II. By Rev. John
Miley, D.D., LL.D.,  3 00
" VII. HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN GHURCH. Vol. I.
By Bishop John F. Hurst, D.D., LL.D  5 00
" VIII. HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. Vol. II.
By Bishop John F. Hurst, D.D., LL.D  5 00
IX. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN
FAITH. By Rev. Charles W. Rishell, Ph.D., . 3 50

LIBRARY

OF

BIBLICAL AND THEOLOGICAL

LITERATURE.

EDITED BY
GEOEGE K. CKOOKS, D.D.,
AND
JOHN F. HUEST, D.D.

VOL. IX.-THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN
FAITH.

NEW YORK: EA TON &• MAINS.
CINCINNATI. ¦ CURTS &» JENNINGS.

PUBLISHERS' ANNOUNCEMENT.

The design of the Publishers and Editors of the Biblical and
Theological Ld3rary was declared, before either volume of
the series had appeared, to be the furnishing of ministers and
laymen with a series of works which should constitute a compen
dious apparatus for advanced study on the great fundamental
themes of Christian Theology. "While the doctrinal spirit of the
separate works was pledged to be in harmony with the accepted
standards of the Methodist Episcopal Church, it was promised that
the aim should be to make the entire Library acceptable to Chris
tians of all evangelical Churches. The following works have
already appeared :
Harman — Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scrip
tures. Terry — Biblical Heemeneutics.
Bennett — Christian Archaeology.
Miley — Systematic Theology. 2 vols.
Crooks and Hurst — Theological Encyclopedia and Meth
odology. Hurst — History of the Christian Church. 2 vols.
Eishell — Foundations of the Christian Faith.
A few other works will follow these, in order to complete the
circle of fundamental theological science as originally contem
plated by the Publishers and Editors.
The reception which has been accorded these works has been
so prompt, cordial, and sympathetic that the Publishers are led
to beHeve that the Christian public is satisfied that the pledges
made at the outset have been faithfully kept.
In every treatise in the future, as in those of the past, the
latest literature will be recognized and its results incorporated.
May we not hope that the same generous favor with which mem
bers of all evangelical denominations have regarded the undertak
ing from the beginning will be continued throughout the series?

THE

FOUNDATIONS

OF THE

CHRISTIAN FAITH.

BY

CHARLES W. RISHELL, A.M., Ph.D.
Professor of Historical Theology in Boston University
School of Theology.

NEW YORK : EATON & MAINS.
CINCINNATI : CURTS & JENNINGS.

Copyright by
EATON & MAINS,
J899.

Eaton & Mains Press,
ISO Fifth Avenue, New York.

PREFACE.

Intelligent adherents of the Christian faith agree that the grounds
upon which they accept the teachings of Jesus as fundamental are sat
isfactory. On the other hand unbelievers affirm that these basal ele
ments of Christian doctrine are untenable and therefore incapable of
sustaining the superstructure reared upon them. They deny that
God is, or at least that he is what Christians hold him to be ; and also
that he is related to man as Christianity represents. They further
deny that man is, either in his nature or his destiny, what the Chris
tian system assumes. Revelation they regard as delusion, and all the
rich record of supposed reUgious truth contained in the Bible as false,
and therefore unable to satisfy the normal human heart. They assume
that their opinions on the questions in dispute between themselves and
us are so well established as to admit of no further argument.
It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the foundations upon
which our faith rests, in order to discover whether we are the victims
of delusion, or they who reject teachings to us so sacred and true. We
owe this examination, not to ourselves alone, but also to the multitude
of those who implicitly follow our instructions in the firm belief that
we are not blind guides.
I have striven to keep in view the fundamentals, that is, those posi
tions which, if securely held, provide for the maintenance of the whole
Christian contention. By the fundamentals I do not mean what are
sometimes figuratively called the citadels of the faith. When all is
lost but the citadels these will scarcely be worth defending. It is be
lieved that the defense here conducted saves to Christianity its whole
domain by holding all the strategic frontier posts the capture of which
would result in the devastation of our entire territory.
My purpose has not been to give the complete hterature of Christian
evidences ; nor to mention all the best books on the subject ; nor all
even of those which I consulted in the preparation of this work. Yet
in the main my indebtedness to the work of others has been indi
cated, and I am not aware of having omitted the mention of any work
upon which I depended for information.
This opportunity is gladly seized for the expression of my profound
sense of obhgation to President Warren, of Boston University, who, at

x Preface.
various times, gave me valuable suggestions, especially with reference
to the books consulted on the general subject of religion, also to Wil
liam Marshall Warren, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Boston Uni
versity, and to the Rev. George Arthur Wilson, Ph.D., Instructor in
Philosophy in Syracuse University. The former went over a part of
those chapters which deal with the philosophic assault upon Chris
tianity ; the latter read the entire manuscript. To both I am indebted
for counsel, the results of which can but render my work at once
more complete and useful. My dependence upon the philosophy of
Professor Bowne will be apparent from the numerous references to his
writings. Throughout this entire work my aim has been to treat thoroughly,
yet clearly and helpfully, the questions at issue between faith and un
belief. In order to be perfectly just to our opponents I have stated
their views and arguments with considerable fullness and as much as
possible in their own language. This method enabled me to avoid
much abstract discussion and to give concrete instances of all the
principles in dispute. At the same time by pursuing this course I
have not been prevented from giving a systematic presentation of the
subjects under consideration, individually, and in their mutual rela
tions as parts of the general scheme. The scope of the work will also
be found rather more comprehensive than that attempted in most
works on the evidences of Christianity.
My hope is that my efforts to refute the arguments of our critics,
to confirm the faith of the wavering, and to lead unbelievers to a glad
acceptance of the benefits and duties of the Gospel of Christ, may
prove helpful in the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth.
Boston, Sept. 1, 1899. Charles W. Rishell.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.
PAGE.
I. Knowledge, Belief, Faith, and Unbelief  1
1. Knowledge. — Knowing and knowledge defined— Methods of ascertaining
reality — Revelation as a mode of ascertaining reality. 2. Belief.— Diffi
culty of distinguishing sharply between knowing and believing— Belief
defined — Both knowledge and beliefs received on authority — Authority less
dangerous to religious than to scientific knowledge and belief. 3. Faith. —
Distinction between belief and faith. 4. Unbelief.— Ambiguity In the terms
faith, belief, and unbelief.
II. Faith and Unbelief as Related to Religion  6
Intellectual character of religious faith — Distinction between unbelief
and rejection of Christianity — So-called emotional unbelief is in fact
emotional rejection of Christianity — "The will to believe" — Criticism of
Professor Clifford's position — Value of a practical decision in the absence
of conviction.
III. Idea and Method of Evidences. Definition and Discrimination of
Terms  12
1. Apology. — Aggressive character of apology. 2. Evidences.— Purpose of evi
dences different from apology. 3. Apologetics. — The science of apology.
IV. Limitations and Scope of the Subject  13
1. Not to defend any creed. 2. Includes facts essential to proof of a revela
tion. 3. Demonstration not required. 4. Must furnish rational basis of
belief. 5. Must prevent alienation from Christianity. 6. Must command
respect of thoughtful unbelievers. 7. Must aim to lead men to acceptance
of Christ as their Saviour.
V. Value of Christian Evidences  15
Effectiveness of arguments on the subject of religion — Their design — Evi
dences comprehensible by the majority — Seasons why they should be
provided. DIVISION I.
The Relations of Philosophy and Christianity.

Section L — Atheism.
CHAPTER I.
The Atheism of the Physical Senses  20
First argument of atheism — Philosophers and scientists who believed in the
existence of God — The search conducted by Inadequate means — False dis
tinction between the natural and the supernatural— Folly of the atheistic
argument from the regularity of nature. XI

xii Table of Contents.
chapter II. PAGE
The Materialistic Denial of the Soul  24
The second argument of atheism — Strecker's definition of materialism —
Buchner's evasion of the question of matter— Damaging admissions of
materialists — Views of Du Bois-Reymond. CHAPTER III.
The Dispute Between Du Bois-Retmond and Haeckbl  28
Supposed astronomical knowledge of the brain — No causal connection be
tween brain-movements and consciousness — Haeckel's reply to Du Bois-
Reymond — Haeckel's scornful language no argument.
CHAPTER IV.
Refutation op the Materialistic Pstchologt  33
Chasm between mental and material phenomena — Haeckel's identification of
thought and energy — Man as a conscious automaton — Uselessness of
thought in materialistic theory — Materialistic denial of freedom — Con
fusion of thought arising from materialism — Materialism destroys the
validity of thought— And also its significance.
CHAPTER V.
The Materialistic Denial of God  39
Difficulty of materialism with matter and motion — Supposition of matter
eternally in motion — Difficulty of Intelligence In the world — Human think
ing demands a God. CHAPTER VI.
The Alleged Imperfections op the World and Intelligence nf Crea
tion  45
Third argument of atheism— Presupposes a finished world — Argument from
analogy — Martineau's answer — Value of alleged useless provisions of
nature — Helmholtz on the human eye — Darwin on the sting of the bee —
Excessive fecundity of animals— Proved to be untrue— Lange's criticism of
the birth-law of species answered — The law of death defended — Atheistic
argument from imperfections popular but without force.

Section IL,— Agnosticism.
CHAPTER I.
The Agnosticism of Huxlet as a Practical System  53
Huxley's definition of the word — Slight difference between agnostic and
atheistic position — Agnosticism a method of investigation — Based on a
creed — Further characterization of agnosticism — Agnosticism not content
to remain in Ignorance — Results reached by agnostic method — Closely re
semble a creed negative of Christianity— Fallibility of the individual reason —
Agnostic principle unscientific. CHAPTER II.
Huxley's Deceptive Terminology  60
Huxley on faith and ratiocination— His denial of " pressure " in religion —
We act in common life without pressure of a mercenary kind — Suggestion
of a more accurate nomenclature — Agnosticism based on a false philos
ophy.

Table of Contents. xiii
chapter iii. PAGE
The Philosophic Basis of Huxleyan Agnosticism — The Philosophy of
Hume  64
Ideas and impressions distinguished — The representational theory — Inference
from cause and effect. CHAPTER IV.
Criticism of Hume's Agnostic Principles  68
Complexity of Hume's so-called impressions — The activity of the mind in con
nection with them — The mind's activity examined — Ideas not reducible to
Humian impressions — Origin of ideas — The mind's contribution to knowl
edge — Origin of the Idea of God according to Hume.
CHAPTER V.
Hume's Theory of Knowledge and of the Causal Relation  74
The representational theory no solution of the problem of knowledge —
Origin of the idea of causal relation— The idea of force not a deception —
Further answer to Hume's skepticism — Relation of the discussion to
doctrine of creation — Hume's doctrine of mental limitation refuted —
Conclusion. CHAPTER VI.
The Philosophy of Kant as a Basis for Agnosticism -  80
Knowledge as related to experience — Kant's three transcendental ideas —
Cannot be proved either real or unreal — Reaction from this extreme skepti
cism — Findings of the Critiques of Practical Reason and of the Judgment —
No philosophic basis for Huxleyan agnosticism.
CHAPTER VII.
The Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer as a Practical System  85
Primary purpose of Spencer's philosophy — Validity of religious belief — Inade
quacy of symbolic conceptions of religion — The existence of the absolute a
necessary assumption — Prevailing religious beliefs should not be too sud
denly changed — Spencer's divergence from Huxley.
CHAPTER VIII.
Spencer's Philosophy of the Unknowable  90
Unknowableness of the reality behind appearances— Spencer's confusion of
two distinct propositions — His faith sufficient for action — What is meant by
the established limits of our intelligence f
CHAPTER IX.
Spencer on the Divine Personality  94
Denial of God's personality— Argument for something higher than personality
in God— Why we attribute personality to God— What God may be besides
personal we do not know — No certainty that Spencer's idea of God is the
most definite possible — Spencer's recoil from the consequences of his argu
ment — His unreasonable demand — Universal skepticism.
Section HL. — Pantheism (Monism).
CHAPTER I.
Pantheism in its Older Forms  99
Pantheism of Averroes and Spinoza distinguished— Spinoza on the finite and
the infinite mind— Denial of personality to the infinite— Suspicious source of
this idea of God— Objections to pantheistic view— Confusion arising from
pantheistic theory.

xrv Table of Contents.
CHAPTER II. PAGE
Pantheism in the Form op Monism  104
In what sense monism is pantheistic — Prevalence of monism in Christian
thought— Reason for its rejection of dualism— Romanes's argument against
mind as a cause of motion in matter — One form of his argument examined—
Hoffding on change of direction in physical movement— The real difficulty
not stated by Romanes— His assertion of the impossibility of intervention
from without— Romanes turned against himself — Would intervention from
without destroy the order of nature ? — The answer depends upon the mean
ing of the term " order of nature." CHAPTER III.
The Idealistic-Monistic Psychology  112
Two classes of monists— HSffding's reasons for holding to monism in psychol
ogy—First reason— Second reason — Third reason — Dualism a better explana
tion than monism of the concomitant brain and mental activity — Heading's
illustration examined — Physiology opposes dualism.
CHAPTER IV.
The Materialistic-Monistic Psychology  116
Forel and Haeckel as materialistic monists — Atom and cell souls — Forel on con
sciousness and soul — The soul as a function of the brain — Forel' s description
of sensation and other mental phenomena — Criticism of the above account —
Relation of brain condition to mental activity.
CHAPTER V.
The Monistic Psychology op Haeckel  121
Haeckel not a philosopher — Hoffding the philosopher versus Haeckel the sci
entist — Further evidence of their disagreement — Monism fails to provide for
consciousness of personal unity — For freedom of the will — For freedom of
thought — And for immortality of the individual — Failure of monism to
escape dualism. CHAPTER VI.
Monistic Theology  126
Three chief characteristics of monistic theology — Monistic proof of God's ex
istence — The sole attribute of the God of monism — Feelings necessarily ex
cluded from monistic piety — The feelings it allows not distinctively religious
— Theological inconsistency of monism — Wider range of feelings in theistic
belief — Failure of monism in aesthetics. CHAPTER VII.
Monism as a Cosmological Theory  132
Double misunderstanding of Christianity by monists — Monistic cosmology —
The world a numerical unit — And involves also qualitative unity — Qualita
tive oneness admits of no grades — No distinction in kind between man and
animal — Our mental faculties our only means for construing the world —
Dualism regards the world as an aggregate— In the world of matter also
there is multiplicity, not unity— Qualitative diversity in the physical world.
CHAPTER VIII.
The Monistic Negation of God's Personality   140
Monism metaphysics, not science— Grounds for monistic denial of personality
of God— Defense of Christianity against Imputations of monists— Haeckel' s
objection to the doctrine of personality in God — His scientific dogmatism —
And profound ignorance of the teachings of Christianity.

XABLE OF CONTENTS. XV
CHAPTER IX. PAGE
Concluding Criticism of Monism  145
Real doctrine as to God and man in Christian teaching — Further statement of
the difference — Inconsistency of monism in attempting to define God — Also
its absurdity — Practical abandonment of monism by monists— Inadequacy
of the dualism of monism — Are this ether-spirit and the atom-soul the same
in kind f Section IV. — Deism.
CHAPTER I.
Deism Versus Religion  149
Deism, pantheism, and Christianity — Deism in modern thought — Evidence of
deistic tendency in apologetic literature — Effect is to destroy prayer— Equally
dangerous to the ethical side of religion — Frohschammer's doctrine of res
ignation — Steude's reply. CHAPTER II.
The Christian and Deistic Conceptions op God's Relation to the
World  154
Wallace on the exalted character of the deistic conception of God — Wallace's
assertions denied — His own admissions — Deism makes God content with
the world — And gives him nothing to do — Deism and evolution incapable of
being united in thought.

DIVISION II.
Scientists and Theologians in Conflict.

Section L — Scientific Agnosticism.
CHAPTER I.
Christianity and Scientific Research  158
Valuelessness of the argument from the opinion of scientific men — The re
lation of the clergy to scientific thought — Christians should not oppose or
fear scientific research — True attitude of the clergy toward science — Scien
tists' confession of their own faults — Language of Mr. Spencer.
CHAPTER II.
The Method op Acquiring Theological Knowledge  163
Haeckel's doctrine that all science is physical — The study of history refutes
his view — Diverse phenomena demand diverse methods of investigation —
Conflict between theology and scientists unnecessary — Diverse methods may
be equally valuable — Wrong methods sometimes employed by theologians-
Exactness of modern theological methods.
CHAPTER III.
Belief in Miracle is Evidence of a Wrong Method  168
Scientists who affect the role of philosophy — Andresen and Dahl cited—
Bowne on the subject of method — Unscientific procedure of some scientists.

xvi Table of Contents.
CHAPTER IV. PAGE
The Objects op Theological Knowledge  172
False assumptions of certain scientists — Monism and Christianity as supersti
tion — Assumptions of theologians and scientists — Dispute between theolo
gians and scientists as to ownership of facts — Faith employed both in sci
ence and theology — Parallel between scientific and theological practical
procedure — The parallel carried further — Strecker on scientific articles of
faith — Also Huxley and Haeckel. CHAPTER V.
Articles op Faith in Theology and Science  179
Haeckel's assertion against religious dogmas — First part of his argument for
belief in God — Second part — Biichner on articles of religious faith — Spencer
on limitations of scientific knowledge— Wagner and Rosanes— Articles of
faith justifiable in science and theology.
Section IL — Scientific and Theological Theories of the Relation of God to
Creation and Providence.
CHAPTER I.
God and Creation  185
Creation not a problem for science — Scientists do not generally deny the agen
cy of God in creation — Darwin's position — Why they have been understood
to deny the divine agency — Conclusions of natural philosophy not war
ranted by science — Can the teachings of modern science and of Genesis be
reconciled ? CHAPTER II.
The Science op the Bible  190
Are the scientific utterances of the Bible of fundamental importance » — The
essence of the Scripture account of creation to be found in its religious as
pect; — Haeckel's concession as to the science of Genesis — Horton on the
superiority of the Mosaic cosmogony — Necessity of observing the true lim
its of science — The evolutionary method of creation not unworthy — Distinc
tion between man and beast as noted in the Bible.
CHAPTER HI.
Necessity of Miracle to Religion  198
The assault of science directed against miracle — Disadvantages connected
with giving up belief in miraculous interventions — First disadvantage —
Second disadvantage. CHAPTER TV.
The Inadequacy of the Mechanical Theory  202
Mechanical theory inadequate to the explanation of phenomena known to sci
ence—Summary of the argument by Wallace.
CHAPTER V.
Breaks in the Progress op Material Development  206
President Schurman on the survival of the fittest— Evolutionists Ignore, minify,
or invent facts— Life a break in the continuity of development — Wallace's
theory of the nature of the intelligence which guided man's development
examined.

AAUi,*; vss CONTENTS. XVII
CHAPTER VI. PAGE
SCIENCE AND THE MIRACLES OP THE NEW TESTAMENT  212
The New Testament idea of a miracle— Do the New Testament writers regard
miracles as violations of the laws of nature ? — Errors arising from the at
tempt to define too exactly the relation of each miracle to natural law — Re
lation of our knowledge of nature to the fact of miracle — Alleged unknown
or higher laws according to which miracles might be performed.
CHAPTER VH.
Laws of Nature and Divine Intervention  219
Human analogies to divine interventions — Lack of uniformity in certain de
partments of nature— Relation of the doctrine of conservation of energy
to the possibility of miracle — Can an unembodied spirit affect matter ? —
Professor Bowne's criticism of realism.

division m.
Christianity and Modern Historical Science.

Section L — The Opposition to Miracles.
CHAPTER I.
Modern Exclusion of the Supernatural prom History  226
Denial of miracle by modern historians — The excessive credulity of many rela
tive to miracles — Chief difficulty relates to evidence — Hume's statement crit
icised — Testimony sufficient to establish the New Testament miracles might
be possible — And such testimony is furnished by Jesus Christ.
CHAPTER II.
The Alleged Thaumaturgic Element in the Miracles of Christ  231
Wellhausen, Renan, and Strauss — Renan's falsification of the record — The
proof that Jesus was not a thaumaturgist — Renan's theory makes Jesus dis
honest. CHAPTER III.
Renan's Attempted Degradation of the Miracles of Jesus  235
The delusion of Renan— Renan's unhistorical procedure— His degradation of
the character and of the works of Jesus— His estimate of the record by
Mark— Contrast between the miracles of the apocryphal and those of the
canonical gospels— Conclusion. CHAPTER IV.
Miracles as Unusual Events  34°
The unusual character of the miracles as a cause of doubt— Hume's misstate
ment of the law of evidence— Unusual and solitary events in the natural
world— Their significance for the claims of Jesus.
CHAPTER V.
Credulity as a Ground for the Rejection op Miracles  243
The tendency to the belief of the marvelous as an occasion of doubt— The love
of the marvelous checked by the love of truth— Hume's apparent concep
tion of the spirit of religion inapplicable even if true— The caution of the
writers of the gospels in accepting accounts of miracles.
2

xvm Table of Contents.
CHAPTER VI. PAGE
The Prevalence op Miracle Stories  249
Doubts arising from the alleged ignorance and barbarism of the nations
among whom miracles are said to have occurred — Because the miracle
stories of the New Testament were written by unschooled men they must
be received as true — Argument from the presence of miracle stories in all
religions— Christian miracles introduced a new order into the world— Argu
ment from the frequent violations of truth considered— And in particular its
application to testimony concerning religious miracles.
CHAPTER VII.
Christian and Skeptical Requisites to Faith in Miracles  254
Renan' s requisites for the belief of miracle— These requisites not as rigid as
those demanded by the Christian— Points which the Christian would add to
Renan's requirements. CHAPTER VIII.
Biblical and Nonbiblical Miracles  259
Limits as to the acceptance of miracles recorded in the New Testament — The
superior dignity of the New Testament miracles — Examples of nonscrip-
tural miracles— Superior motives of the New Testament miracles — Also their
superior attestation.
SecMon LL— The Criticism of the New Testament Records.
CHAPTER I.
Strauss's Mythical Theory op the Gospel Records  265
Many who still accept the theory — Strauss's rejection of the miraculous in
history considered — Why the miracles of Jesus were not more frequently
alluded to, in apostolic preaching and teaching — The mythical theory stated.
CHAPTER II.
Criticism of the Mythical Theory  270
The identification of Jesus as the Messiah unaccountable on the theory of
Strauss — Our knowledge of the character of Jesus largely dependent upon
the miracle stories — Further difficulties connected with the mythical theory.
CHAPTER III.
Trustworthiness of the Gospel Records  273
Harnack on the New Testament Records— Dates given by Jalicher and Weiss
—Harnack on the credibility of the gospels — Difference between the criticism
of the literary critic and that of the historian — Julicher on the trustworthi
ness of the synoptic gospels.

Section ILL — Christianity as a Factor in Human Progress.
The growth of Christianity in numbers — And in its influence upon public
opinion and private life — Why Christianity has not been more effective in
transforming the world — Effect of unbelief in checking the uplifting influ
ence of Christianity — History shows that Christianity has advanced science
and material progress  278

Table of Contents. xix
DIVISION IV.
The Struggle of Christianity with Antichristian Ethics.

Section I. — Proposed Substitutes for Christian Ethics.
CHAPTER I. PAGE
Atheistic Egoism  283
Strecker's statement of this ethics — Its practical eflect — Strecker not misun
derstood nor misrepresented — Relation of this view to the social organism
— This system compared with the teachings of Jesus.
CHAPTER II.
The German Ethical Culturists  287
Gizycki's statement of the ethics of ethical culture — Its principal fault the
denial of the value of an external authority — The impracticability of the
common weal as a means of determining what is right — The sole content
of the moral law not self-imposed. CHAPTER III.
The Ethics op Monism  291
Hoffding admits the profound historical significance of external authority —
But denies that it is the complete foundation of ethics— The monistic ethics
also based on external authority — But its authority is Inadequate — What
does Hoffding mean by relative authority ?
CHAPTER IV.
Criticism op Antichristian Ethical Systems  296
The fatalism of antichristian systems of ethics— Obliteration of the distinction
between good and evil — Carneri and other monists on truthfulness — Advan
tages of a fixed ideal standard — Morality a means, not a goal, in evolution
ary ethics — Inconsistent and inadequate motives of non-Christian systems
—Conclusion.

Section IL — Objections to Christian Ethics.
CHAPTER I.
Christian Ethics and External Authority  304
Nature of ethical authority in Christianity — The relations of love and faith in
the Christian system— Hoffding's misconceptions of Christianity — The ne
cessity of positive as distinguished from ethical requirements.
CHAPTER II.
The Ascertainability op God's Will  309
Gizycki on the difficulty of ascertaining the will of God— His difficulty imagi
nary — Is the knowledge of revealed morality dependent upon a previous
knowledge of the ethically good ?— Not knowledge merely, but also motives
needed.

xx Table of Contents.
CHAPTER HI. page
Originality op Christ's Law of Love— Rewards and Punishments  312
Testimony to the originality of Jesus— Love as taught by Christ and by
others— Nature of the love required by Christ^-His law not comprehended
by its critics— Rewards and punishments in Christian ethics.
CHAPTER IV.
Need of Divine Aid— Practicability of Christian Ethics  316
Divine aid needed in right living— Its benefits proved by history— Are the de
mands of Christ impracticable ?— Are they incomplete ?— Jesus's method
with intellectual honesty, slavery, and political economy.
CHAPTER V.
Incidental Objections to Christian Morals  322
Necessity for caution among Christian writers — Alleged immorality of the
Christian doctrine of atonement— Is forgiveness of sins dangerous ?— Prayer
— Providence — Nearness to God and nearness to men — Christianity and the
suffering classes.
DIVISION V.
Christianity and Opposing Religious Theories.
Importance of treating such systems as Theosophy, Christian Science, etc.

Section L — Proposed Substitutes for Christianity.
CHAPTER I.
Positivism, or the Religion op Humanity  328
Comte's misunderstanding of Christianity — Rigidity of Positive religion — Pos
itivism and the priestly class — The Supreme Being of Positivism — Positivism
an atheistic system — Superiority of Jesus, as an ideal, to the ideal of Posi
tivism. CHAPTER H.
Worship in Positivism  335
Comte's alleged three stages of theoretical conceptions — Absurdity of the Pos-
itivist object of worship — Positivism and prayer — The religion of deception
—Artificiality of Positivism. CHAPTER III.
Ethical Culture— Its Misrepresentations op Christianity  339
Relation of ethical culture to Christianity — Salter's first misrepresentation of
Christianity — His second misrepresentation — Third misrepresentation —
Fourth misrepresentation— Fifth misrepresentation.
CHAPTER IV.
Inadequacy of Ethical Culture to the Purposes op a Religion  346
Narrowness of application of ethical culture— Severity of the righteousness
inculcated by ethical culture — Attractiveness of righteousness — Lack of an
external standard of authority — Ethical culture offers no adequate check to
human selfishness.

Table of Contents. xxi
chapter v. PAGE
Theosophy — Exhibition of its Speculative Character  351
Relation of Theosophy to Christianity — Exoteric and esoteric doctrines — Plan
of theosophic salvation— Unpractical character of Theosophy— Citations
from the Epitome. CHAPTER VI.
Theosophy — Its Inferiority to Christianity  356
The doctrine of Karma and the Christian doctrine of retribution — Aim of The
osophy — Its demands upon our credulity— Its fatalism — The miracles of
Jesus and the alleged marvels of Theosophy compared.
CHAPTER VII.
Christian Science— Statement and Criticism  360
Scant use of the words and deeds of Jesus by Christian Scientists — The prom
inence it gives to bodily healing— Its false metaphysics— Citations from Mrs.
Eddy — Her anthropology — Her doctrine of evil — Her philosophy of the plan
of salvation. CHAPTER VIII.
Christian Science Contrasted with Christianity  367
First contrast between Christianity and Christian Science — Second contrast —
Third contrast — Fourth contrast — Inapplicability to life as a whole — Its neg
ative ethics.

Section IL — Objections to Christianity Drawn from Religious Considerations.
First theological objection — Second theological objection— First practical ob
jection — Second practical objection — Objection to the Christian doctrine of
sin  370
Review op Results to this Point  372
Great value of the indirect evidences — Necessity and nature of the positive evi
dences. DIVISION VI.
The Doctrines Concerning Man.

Section L — The Spiritual Nature of Man.
CHAPTER I.
Reasons for the Christian Belief  375
The meagerness of New Testament psychology— Obligations growing out of
our faith — The Christian doctrine alone explains the phenomena of the men
tal life — The universality of the belief in the soul.
CHAPTER II.
Validity op the Christian Idea of the Soul  -.  380
Tylor's theory of animism examined — Capacities of primitive men — Thought
must be the product of something immaterial— Consideration of Paulsen's
views — Nature of the soul no more indefinable than matter.

xxn Table of Contents.
CHAPTER III. PAGE
The Personality op Man and his Superiority to the Brutes.  384
The Christian position— Haeckel's denial of distinction between man and beast
criticised — Romanes on mind in man and beast — Sameness of origin com
patible with difference in kind — His error here vitiates his reasoning.
CHAPTER IV.
Man's Personal Superiority to the Brute — Romanes  389
Estimate placed on self-consciousness — Romanes's incorrect definition of self-
consciousness — Perceptual, receptual, and conceptual faculties — His sub
sidiary considerations— He makes the distinction while denying it.

Section IL — The Immortality of the Soul.
CHAPTER I.
Man's Capacity for Immortality  394
The question of conditional immortality left to polemics — The capability of
the soul for immortality — The soul-life independent of the brain — Weakness
of argument against immortality. CHAPTER n.
Grounds for the Belief in Human Immortality  399
Man's rank in creation as an argument for immortality — John Fiske on man
as the chief of God's creatures — Ascription of folly to the Creator — George
Eliot's impersonal immortality immortality only in name.
CHAPTER III.
Presumptions in Favor of Immortality  404
The argument from the insufficiency of time for man's development — The
same applied to the moral nature — The argument from the demands of jus
tice—The presumptions all in favor of immortality, and they are very pow
erful. Section HI.— The Origin of Human Sin.
CHAPTER I.
Examination of the non-Christian View  408
Man, not God, responsible for sin— John Fiske's statement of the evolutionary
origin of sin — The doctrine of the brute origin of man challenged — The
alleged great antiquity of man— Lack of existing remains to prove man's
brute origin. CHAPTER II.
The Fall of Man  413
The argument from analogy is against the brute origin of man— Facts show
ing the great improbability that man sprang from the brutes — The evidence
as to man's primitive condition — Man's present moral sentiments as proving
the fact of a fall.

Table of Contents. xxiii
division vn.
The Doctrines Concerning God.

Section L — The Existence of God.
CHAPTER I. PAGE
Necessity, Universality, and Persistence of the Belief  420
First reason for believing in the existence of God — Herbert Spencer quoted —
Second reason for the belief — Moral and intellectual superiority of those
who believe — The only valuable form of the ontological argument.
CHAPTER II.
The Argument prom Design  424
The source of the idea as augmenting the force of the ontological argument —
The argument from design stated — Romanes's argument against design
examined — At most his argument proves only a process by fixed laws.
CHAPTER III.
Inadequacy op the Process of Natural Selection  438
The fatal flaw in his reasoning concerning the eye — Natural selection works
destructively, not constructively— Four points to be considered — Impos
sibility of stating the doctrine of natural selection except in terms of tele
ology — Citation from Professor Bowne.
Section IL — The Personality of God.
CHAPTER I.
The Personality op God Ascertainable  433
Unity of God conceded — Trinity left to systematic theology — Our knowledge
of God partial — Treatment of the first obstacle to belief In God's personal
ity — Fallacy of Hamilton's reasoning pointed out — Spencer's criticism of
Hamilton's position. CHAPTER n.
False Assumptions of Denial  437
Mansel and the second obstacle — Mansel's erroneous definition of terms — The
third obstacle — The denial is based on a material conception of God —
Bearing of the doctrine of the Trinity on the question.
CHAPTER III.
Erroneous Conceptions of Personality — The Theories of Schopenhauer
and Von Hartmann  442
Mansel's denial of our right, in thought, to regard God as personal— Professor
Bowne on the objections to the personality of God — The positions of Schop
enhauer and Von Hartmann— Martineau's criticism— Intrinsic absurdity of
their views — Their denial of freedom. CHAPTER IV.
The Argument for Personality  447
Naturalness of the belief in the personality of God— Is the belief legitimate
also ? — Justifiability of our spontaneous thinking— Our personality carries
with it the personality of God — Our religious natures demand that God be
personal— So also our intellects— Parallel between creative and human in
telligence.

xxiv Table of Contents.
DIVISION Vffl.
Revelation.

Section L— The Nature and Fact of Supernatural Revelation.
CHAPTER I. PAGE
The Possibility op a Revelation  453
God not the only object of revelation — Revelation not given in propositions
alone — The allegation that God cannot reveal himself — Special revelation
to a single people — Doctrine of a purposed as distinguished from an inci
dental revelation. CHAPTER II.
Human Capacity and Need  457
Is man capable of receiving a revelation from God ? — Purpose of revelation —
Man's need of a divine revelation — Perplexity of the primitive man as to his
religious feeling and its gratification. CHAPTER HI.
Primitive Revelation  461
Improbability that God would leave man uninstructed — Probability in pro
portion to the necessity and possibility — The insignificance of the earth as
an objection to a purposed revelation — Why a further revelation was neces
sary. CHAPTER IV.
Natural Revelation  465
Revelatory significance of nature — Further reasons for the belief that man
needed a special revelation — Agreement of theologians as to the principal
teachings of the Bible — The perversity of nature and of history forbids that
it should reveal God. CHAPTER V.
The Biblical Revelation  469
The real purpose of the revelation contained in the Bible — The Bible the
record of a revelation progressively bestowed — Human misunderstandings
of revealed facts — At each stage of progress the revelation was in advance
of human attainment. CHAPTER VI.
Limitations and Effect op the Old Testament Revelation  473
The superior claims of the biblical revelation— Mill on the apparent partiality of
God for the Jews — The Jews well adapted to become the recipients of a reve
lation from God— Preparation of other nations for the reception of the
Gospel— Incompleteness of the revelation of the Old Testament— Its falli
bility asserted in the New Testament— To the Christian the truth of Christ
is the criterion— The Old Testament accomplished its purpose — Superiority,
in some respects, of the Old Testament.
Section n.—Christ the Chief Source of Revelation.
CHAPTER I.
The Doctrine op Inspiration  480
The men, not the writings, inspired— Summary of Bishop Butler's views as to
a priori estimates of inspiration— The obligation of caution— The infalibility
of the New Testament not essential to faith in the truth It contains— The
real advantages of inspiration.

Table of Consents. xxv
chapter II. PAGE
The Fact op Inspiration  486
First reason for believing that the writers of the New Testament were in
spired — The desirability of such inspiration — Some New Testament writers
claimed inspiration — Superiority of the New Testament to all other religious
literature. CHAPTER III.
The Claims of Christ— His Premundane Existence  490
His premundane existence claimed — John's gospel furnishes most of the
alleged utterances of Jesus regarding himself — The objection that preexist-
ence was attributed to all important objects — Examination of passages upon
which the doctrine of Christ's premundane existence depends.
CHAPTER IV.
Other Claims Made by Christ  495
The right to forgive sins — Jesus's unique power over the consciences of
men — His relation to the kingdom of God — His claim of equality, if not of
identity, with the Father.
Section ILL — The Validity of Christ's Claims.— The Evidence from
His Character.
CHAPTER I.
His Humility and Sinlessness  498
The humility and unselfishness of Jesus — Argumentative importance of
Christ's assertion of sinlessness — His conception of sinlessness — Agree
ment between the synoptists and John — The opinions of his friends.
CHAPTER II.
Alleged Sins of Jesus  502
First argument against his sinlessness considered— Examination of specific
sins charged by the Jews — Alleged record of sinful deeds and words in
vestigated. CHAPTER III.
Objections to the Doctrine of Sinlessness  509
Did Jesus deny moral goodness of himself ? — The objection that perfect
sinlessness is impossible to man — Relation of temptation to sin — The
allegation that he must have been imperfect in his childhood— Moral de
velopment does not necessarily imply previous sinfulness — Significance of
the fact.

Section IV. — The Miracles as Evidence of the Validity of
Christ's Claims.
CHAPTER I.
The Evidential Value of the Gospel Miracles  514
Are the miracles a burden to our faith ? — Reasons not discoverable for deny
ing the reports of Jesus's miracles — The attempt to explain the miracles
of Jesus without the supposition of special divine aid— Miracles involving
control over forces of nature.

xxvi Table* of Contents.
CHAPTER II. PAGE
Special Divine Aid in the Miracles of Jesus  518
The superiority of Jesus's miracles an argument for the divine aid in their
performance— Other considerations— The question of a sufficient occasion
for the divine intervention— Order of nature properly interfered with for
such results— Conclusion.
Section V.— The Resurrection of Jesus and the Validity of His
Claims.
CHAPTER I.
The Theory of apparent Death  523
Miracles wrought upon Jesus — Distinction between his resurrection and his
raisings from the dead— Rationalistic denial of the actual death of Jesus —
A second theory. CHAPTER II.
Untenability op the Theory op Apparent Death  527
Inherent improbabilities of the theory — Strauss's and Keim's criticisms — A
principal basis of the theory is mere assertion — No reason for questioning
the fact of his death — Jews and Romans combined to prevent mistake as to
his death. CHAPTER III.
The Vision Hypothesis — Strauss  531
Something took place to alter the feelings of the disciples — Strauss's earlier
theory — Theory of reflection and consequent vision — The theory criticised
— Its abandonment by Strauss. CHAPTER TV.
The Theory of Renan  535
Summary of Renan's hypotheses— Weakness of his position — Impossibility
that his suppositions should be real — His violation of the record — Renan's
theory fails to account for the faith of the early Christians.
CHAPTER V.
General Defects op the Vision Hypothesis  540
The dreams of Mohammed and the resurrection of Jesus as springs of reli
gious action— Examination of alleged parallels to the supposed visions of the
early disciples — Blindness of the theorists to the defects of their argumenta
tion — If an illusion it was one both of sight and hearing.
CHAPTER VI.
The Theory of a Divinely Wrought Vision  544
Keim's plausible statement — The theory preserves the supernatural — The ques
tion one of fact, not of faith— First difficulty — Second difficulty.
CHAPTER VII.
Paul and the Resurrection of Jesus — Other Considerations  548
Did Paul see Jesus as the primitive apostles saw him f — Significance of 1 Cor.
xv, 3-8— The argument from the empty grave— Keim's attempted reply.

Table of Contents. xxvii
chapter VIII. PAGE
Alleged Contradictions in the Records — Recapitulation  555
Universal belief of the early Church— Modern instances of discrepant reports
in which the main fact is not denied— The fact of the resurrection a necessity
to Christian faith — Recapitulation of the argument for a genuine divine
revelation. Section VL— The Superiority of the Christian Revelation.
CHAPTER I.
Christianity and Buddhism  559
First point of comparison— Second point— The main fact in Buddhism is
temporal evil — Buddhism seeks redemption from suffering ; Christianity
from sin — The Buddhist and Christian saint compared.
CHAPTER II.
Christianity and Mohammedanism  566
The idea of God in Mohammedanism and in Christianity — Mohammedanism
and polygamy — Mohammedan theory and practice of divorce — Total absti
nence from intoxicants — Practical results of the Christian system.

Section VO. — Christianity the Final Revelation.
CHAPTER I.
Its Satisfactory Conception of God and of Man  572
The exalted religious conceptions of Christianity prove it the final religion —
The needs of the human heart perfectly met by the Christian doctrine of
God. CHAPTER II.
The Threefold Satisfaction of the Conscience  577
The conscience demands a perfect moral standard — Release from the burden
ing sense of guilt — Pardon cannot be safely bestowed as the act of a sover
eign will — Christian system does not minify sin — The human condition of
pardon. CHAPTER III.
Christianity and the Problem of Temporal Evil  582
Its doctrine of a future life as affecting earthly happiness— Its emphasis on the
joys of the soul — All Christians incited to labor for the betterment of human
conditions on earth— Its doctrine of the future life as satisfying human
longings. CHAPTER IV.
Christianity and Human Progress  585
Material progress most advanced in Christian lands — Limits to the demands
upon religion — Christianity makes men successful in business — Encourages
the study of nature — Impels to the pursuit of education and culture— Its
spirit of freedom.

xxviii Table of Contents.
Section VuX— The Experimental Test.
CHAPTER I. PAGE
The Discoveries Reached by this Test  589
The facts of Christian experience capable of classification and examination—
To decline the experimental method with Christianity is to proceed unscien
tifically — Christianity capable of scientific verification — What God's will is—
And what is meant by willing to do it — The conditions of the experiment
within the reach of all — The first effect of the experiment is to convince us
that we are sinful— The second discovery is that by faith we are saved.
CHAPTER II.
Christian Experiences Divinely Wrought  595
The suggestion that all the foregoing is true, but naturally, not divinely wrought
— Four reasons for rejecting the suggestion just mentioned — Experiences
which increase the certainty gained by the earlier experiments — Improba
bility that so many intelligent persons should misread the source of their
experience. CHAPTER III.
The Experimental Test and the Future Life — Final Summary and Ap-
pbal to Unbelievers  600
The limitations of this method — The experimental method lends additional
support even to the doctrine of the future life — Summary of the entire result
of the study now concluded — Appeal to unbelievers to cease opposition
and to lend their aid.

INTRODUCTION.

As long as human hearts are sinful and human intellects liable to
deception the difficulties in the way of the universal acceptance of
Christianity arising from passive and active unbelief will continue.
It is the design of this work to remove, as far as possible, these
obstacles from the path of Christian progress. A study of them
must, therefore, first engage our attention. This can be best conducted
by a comparison of certain phases of faith and unbelief. We shall
endeavor, first of all, to differentiate a number of words which,
though in constant use, are frequently misemployed.
I. KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF, FAITH, AND UNBELIEF.
1. Knowledge.
In general, knowledge may be described as the sum of our cogni
tions. In knowledge each cognition must be of something real, and
the reality must be correctly conceived. Denned in terms Knowing and
knowledge
of the mental acts involved, knowing is the double mental defined.
process of determining what is real and forming correct conceptions of
the real. These two processes, however, while logically distinguished,
are so interwoven, in the act of knowing that they may be said to go
forward together, and mutually to aid each other. The process need
not be wholly performed by the possessor of knowledge, since others
may determine for us what is real ; but in order to know we must at
least correctly conceive the real. The result of the process is knowl
edge, which may be defined as the correct conception of that which
has been determined to be real.
Since we know only that which has been found real, it follows that
to ascertain what is real is the first important element in the process
of knowing. It is this which distinguishes knowledge from Methods o f
SLSCsrtniii-
surmise. But the ascertainment of the real may proceed ing reality.
by several different methods : (1) by intuition ; (2) by demonstration ;
(3) by revelation ; (4) by experience ; (5) by combinations of the pre
ceding methods. Intuition gives us self-evident truths; demonstra
tion furnishes us secondary truths ; revelation includes all communi
cated truth, of which a divine communication would be but a single

2 Introduction.
item ; experience is the result of voluntary or involuntary experiment,
and furnishes us with many of our primary cognitions ; while as an
illustration of the combinations possible we may mention the testing
by personal experiment of facts revealed to us by others, thereby
affording a double assurance of reality.
Each of these modes of putting the mind into possession of correct
concepts of reality has its own specific advantages in the various fields
of research. For example, intuition and demonstration are peculiarly
valuable in mathematics; experience (experiment) in the physical
sciences, psychology, and religion ; revelation in religion and history.
It is customary to think of revelation as an inferior mode of ascer
taining reality. But it should be remembered that none of the modes
Revelation as mentioned above can be employed without challenge.
ascertain- While we cannot demonstrate an axiom, we still put to
ing rea y. pgj^^ tesjg every proposition offered to us as self-evident.
We do not accept as demonstration everything that passes under that
name. We test alleged demonstrations even in mathematics, and
even then we confirm our faith by the fact that thousands of others
have tested them also, and that all agree to their soundness. Experi
ences, physical or mental, have to be examined with critical care to
avoid deception. No more can be said of revelation, the principal
caution in connection with which is that it be tested by those who are
skilled in the methods of preventing such deceptions as may arise in
its employment. We are just as well assured that the American
Revolution is a fact as we are that the sum of the angles of any tri
angle is equal to two right angles, though the one fact is given us
solely by revelation and the other by mathematical demonstration.
Indeed, much of our knowledge would at once disappear should we
lose all that has come to us by revelation. All the history of the re
moter past would be gone from every mind, as also most of what the
students in our schools and colleges and the masses of the people know
about science and other departments of learning. The question is
thus seen to concern not the value of revelation as a means of putting
us into possession of conceptions of reality, but the possibility and
actuality of divine revelation. This it is no part of our plan to discuss
here. Our only purpose at present is to show that revelation is a reli
able method of ascertaining reality. 2. Belief.
There is no well-defined line of demarcation between knowing and
believing. This is true whether we consider the use of the words, even

INTRODUCTION. 3
by careful writers,1 or the nature of that which the words are intended
to express. We often use the term belief to designate matters of
knowledge. The realm of that which we may indiscrimi- Difficulty of
nately describe as the known or as the believed is very ing sharply
he twe e n
large. For example, if one should ask, Do you know that knowing
r J and believ-
Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo ? we should unhesita- ing.
tingly answer, I do. On the other hand, were we asked, Do you believe
that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo? we might be surprised that
the questioner should imply a doubt, but we should feel no sense of
inadequacy in the reply, I do. Of almost all historical events the
same is true. But, further, if there is anything we know, it is the truths
stated in the propositions of geometry. Yet we do not hesitate to say
that we believe those truths. On the other hand, we often say we know
that which is, perhaps, strictly speaking, incapable of being known.
Do we know the factors composing the so-called Copernican theory to
be true, or do we believe them ?
In all matters of knowledge there is an element of belief also. The
revelations of the spectroscope as to the composition of the stars give
us knowledge. But we accept the data as knowledge on the basis of
faith in the uniformity of the action of the instrument and of the re
actions of the primary elements upon it. We do not trust even the
demonstrations of mathematics as such, but rather we believe in our
own powers of reasoning or in those of others, many or few. When
skepticism has questioned everything else it must at last trust the
powers of the human mind or land in denial of all knowledge.' Thus
underlying all our knowledge is belief in the power of the mind to
know. Still, there are some things of which it would be absurd to say that
we believe them, for they are matters of knowledge; and there are
others of which it would be equally absurd to say that we know them,
although we may have every reason to believe them. There are some
things which lie altogether without the range of human knowledge,
and others lie as certainly within that range. To put it in another
form, there are some things of which it is possible, and others of which
it is impossible to ascertam the reality. In general, all propositions
the validity of which cannot be established by intuition, demonstra
tion, experience, revelation, or by combinations of these, must be ac
cepted, if accepted at all, as beliefs, and not as knowledge; for in-
1 Professor James uses the term belief to signify " every degree of assurance, including
the highest possible certainty and conviction."— The Principles of Psychology, New York,
1890, vol. ii, p. 283.
aComp. Shoup's Mechanism and Personality, Boston, 1891, chap. 1.

4 Introduction.
stance, many of the hypotheses of science and many wholly justifi
able inferences from scientific data. Of course the degree of support
which such propositions have in their favor will vary in fact, and also
in the judgment of different minds. Some of the hypotheses of science
have much in their favor and but little against them, while others
account for many facts, but fail to account for many others. So also
the weight of testimony will be differently estimated by different
minds. For credibility and incredibihty are purely subjective con
cepts with reference to objects of thought. Things are credible or in
credible to minds only. When it is asserted that anything is incredi
ble the question at once suggests itself, To whom is it incredible?
There are but few minds capable of determining accurately the credi
bility of alleged facts, and it is only within the limits of their own
departments of learning that even the best thinkers can be trusted to
give a correct opinion. Even then their general philosophy may warp
their judgments as to what is credible. A skilled historian might be
supposed capable of giving an authoritative opinion as to the credi
bility of miracles. And such an opinion he could give if he confined
himself wholly to the realm of historical evidence. But if he allows
his Christian or non-Christian philosophy to affect his judgment, his
opinion as an historian might be at once invalidated.
Belief is affirmative opinion, more or less well supported with refer
ence to matters which lie beyond the possibility of true knowledge. It
Belief is exceedingly common. All the results of metaphysical
6 ne " and other speculation, most verdicts given in our courts of
law, and all expectations with reference to the future, whether of the
actions of man or the events of the natural world, are beliefs, in the
sense now described. In the same sense even the denial of the truth
of many of the doctrines of Christianity is but the expression of a
belief. For, so far as they lie outside the realm of ascertainable
reality, any assertion concerning them, whether positive or negative,
must, in the nature of the case, be based on belief.
The distinguishing feature of belief as compared with knowledge is
not that the former is received on authority — that is, on the word of
Both knowi- one who is supposed to know ; ' for many of our beliefs do
edge and rr ' J
beliefs re- not so arise, but are the results of our own reflection. On
ceived on
authority, the other hand, much of our knowledge is received on au
thority. If such were not the case, none but original investigators in
the realm of physical nature would have any scientific knowledge,
1 On the compatibility of authority with reason in religion, see Moberly's Reason and
Religion, London and New York, 1896, particularly pp. 1-87.

AJSiiiui^uCTION. O
and they would have only what they had acquired independently of
all others. Strictly it cannot be said that either knowledge or belief
is received on authority. Facts may be made known to the mind
which, if properly conceived, result in knowledge for the mind to
which they are made known. Our knowledge is based on authority
more frequently than our belief. For when anything is given us as
an opinion or belief the mind must not only properly conceive what
is intended to be expressed, but it must weigh its reasons for making
the opinion or belief its own.
Neither as to matters of knowledge or belief does the mind accept
the authority of another without at least a measure of reasoned con
fidence in the authority accepted. And men are either credulous or
incredulous with regard to that which is presented as fact ; but the
very nature of belief is such as to involve a measure of incredulity.
Were some fantastic opinion presented to us as fact by one whom we
recognized as authority, we should accept it as fact and think we had
knowledge ; but if it were presented to us by the same authority as a
matter of belief, we should, possibly, reject it. The truth is, there
fore, that so far as the action of the mind is concerned it is more
liable to deception when receiving supposed knowledge on authority
than when receiving items to be believed. For, while we are at lib
erty to reject a suggested belief, our loyalty to truth forbids our re
jection of the imparted fact.
Intelligence is no more shocked when a theological dogma is
received on authority than it would be were a deliverance of science
so received. If both are given out as facts by the same »uthoritv
person, or by persons recognized by the mind as of equal less daP"
authority, both will be received without regard to the thantoscE
diverse realms to which they belong. If both are given ence-
out as matters to be beheved the mind will accept them only after
having applied the proper tests. The danger in either case is that the
authority will give out for fact what is merely a matter of belief. But
this danger is slighter in religion than in science, since religion does
not generally dignify its facts as knowledge, but as beliefs ; while sci
ence says very little about its beliefs, but speaks much of its knowl
edge. Dogmatism is not confined to theology.1
lWe know of no more dogmatic utterances than those of Haeckel. This is true
whether we consider his disdainful language concerning articles of religious faith or his
unwarranted assertions concerning the results of scientific investigation. On page 44 of
his Monismus he says that we know that " the soul is a sum of plasma movements in the
ganglia cells," and on page 45, that we know " that man developed from pithecoid mam
mals late in the tertiary period." It is perhaps needless to say that neither he nor
anyone else knows anything of the kind. Even Huxley will not make such assertions,
3

6 Introduction.
3. Faith.
The words faith and belief are commonly employed interchange
ably. This practice is misleading and should be abandoned, since the
Distinction two words connote different, if not radically diverse, con-
beiieT and cepts. BeUef emphasizes the intellectual, faith the emo
tional elements of our nature, as brought into exercise
when an object is presented to us. We believe a proposition ; we
have faith in a person or in a plan or in a process, and the like. The
former is almost, if not quite, wholly intellectual; the latter, while
involving the intellect, takes the form of practical trust. Religious
belief is acceptance by the intellect of propositions connected with re
ligion. Religious faith is the heart's trust in the objects of worship
and in the methods offered by any religion for the accomplishment of
its proposed results. In the Christian system religious faith is often
termed saving faith. 4. Unbelief.
As here used, the word unbelief is not so much the negative of sav
ing faith as of belief. It may be defined as negative opinion, more or
Ambiguity less well supported, with reference to matters which he
n erms. Devon(j the possibility of absolute knowledge. Still, there
is an ambiguity both in the words faith and belief, and in the word
unbelief, which must be guarded against by every reader. In refer
ence to unbelief the ambiguity arises from the fact that we have no
one word which distinctly notes the contrast between saving faith
and the lack of it. Hence we are obliged to use the word unbelief for
the intellectual and also for the emotional condition which eventuates
in the rejection of Christ and Christianity.

n. faith and unbelief as related to religion.
When opponents of Christianity speak of religious faith as though
it were superstitious or purely emotional, and condemn it accordingly,
intellectual they forget or suppress the fact that unbelief has no bet-
ch&rflctipi*
of religious ter claim to an intellectual character than has faith.
Since the judgment is always at least so far involved in
every act of faith as to assent, faith is in the nature of the case intel-
though he evidently believes (not knows) them to be true. See his prefatory notes in
Haeckel's Freedom in Science and Teaching, London, 1879, p. 14 ff. Compare some
excellent remarks on this dogmatizing spirit of Haeckel, in Semper's Der HaeckeUsmus
in der Zoologie, Hamburg, 1876, pp. 28, 32 ft., 34.

Introduction. 7
lectual as well as emotional. The intellectual is one of its constant
and constitutive factors, though often unconsciously, and though the
contents of our creed may not, by everyone, be put into the form of
propositions which the intellect can grasp. Faith is, indeed, always
accompanied by emotion ; but that its basal element is intellectual is
clear, first, from the conditions under which it originates, and, second,
from the conditions in which alone it can continue to exist. It orig
inates under the influence of facts made evident to the intellect ; the
facts, namely, that we are dealt with honestly and benevolently by
those whom we learn to know, and uniformly by the natural order in
which we live. Did we as commonly meet with deception and self
ishness, from the cradle onward, as we do with constancy, honesty,
and love, we should have no faith ; but unbelief would be the rule be
tween man and man and between man and God.
Faith is not an instinct with which we are born. The child learns
but gradually that every movement of its mother is one of tender
ness. We do indeed inherit a capacity which has to do with our at
titude of trust or distrust in reference to those about us, but it is
because the preponderance of influence is in favor of faith that this
faculty takes the direction it does. So also the conditions of its con
tinuance are withdrawn the instant an intellectual doubt arises ; and
only when this is removed can faith reenter.
The traditional acceptance of Christianity at the hands of our par
ents or of other associates of our childhood life is no exception ; for it
is based on the intellectual acknowledgment of their good judgment
and veracity. In childhood this process is, of course, not clearly per
ceived, and it might be truthfully said that in all such cases religious
faith arises in a state of ignorance. The fact remains, nevertheless,
that it is the intellect, not the heart, that first accepts. Indeed, it is
psychologically impossible to exercise faith prior to or unaccompanied
by intellectual cognition. Faith in God includes assent to the propo
sition that God is.
Of unbelief it is equally true that its fundamental element is always
intellectual. But while faith always includes the accep- Distinction
tance of the Christian system, there is a clear distinction unbelief
between unbelief and the rejection of the Christian sys- tion of
tem. That these statements are true will appear from an ty.
examination of the following tabulated statement, which considers
chiefly the emotional side, and which is confined in form to the situ
ation in Christian lands. It would vary in form, though not in prin
ciple, for non-Christian countries.

8 Introduction.
A. Emotions which work for the acceptance of the Christian
system.
1. The interests which from childhood have been bound up with it
in our thought, amounting to an unconscious bias.
2. Party pride. (Church, parents, etc.)
3. The intelligent recognition, by means either of experience or of
testimony, of the value of Christianity.
4. The sense of the truth of the Christian system, for instance,
that it explains otherwise inexplicable problems.
B. Emotions which work for the rejection of the Christian system.
1. Prejudices instilled in childhood, unconscious bias.
2. Party pride. (Often not so much against Christianity as
against the Church — for instance, socialism.)
3. Intelligent recognition of the antagonism of Christianity to in
terests chosen as supreme — perhaps always sin in some form,
though often subtle.
4. The feeling connected with the conviction that the Christian sys
tem is false.
Under A, case 2 is not identical with faith, and is thus an apparent
exception to the statement that faith and the intellectual acceptance
of Christianity are always practically coincident. The case is given for
the sake of completeness, since it is conceivable that such an emotion
might aid in producing faith, for example, by preparing the way for
case 3. It is no exception for the reason that it supposes a relation to
a party, and not to the objects of faith themselves. Case 1 furnishes
instances of intellectual but comparatively unintelligent acceptance.
Under B, case 1 is intellectual, though relatively unintelligent, un
belief, while case 4 furnishes instances of undoubted intellectual and
intelligent unbelief. Where cases 2 and 3 are unattended by cases 1
or 4 they involve unbelief ; but the rejection they imply may coexist
with a suppressed, though more or less clearly conscious, conviction
of the truth of the Christian system.
The result confirms the statement that both faith and unbelief al
ways have an intellectual basis, and shows that they are always ac
companied by prompting or sustaining emotions. But it also shows
that while the rejection of the Christian system is sometimes based
on unbelief, it is in other instances, perhaps generally, the result of
emotion, and may be accompanied by real intellectual belief. It
shows, further, that the acceptance of the Christian system is always
intellectual, and that it is more often both intellectual and intelligent
than is rejection.

INTRODUCTION. 9
On the other hand, it shows that it is incorrect to speak of unbelief
as emotional, and that what we call emotional unbelief is in reality
not unbelief, but emotional rejection of the Christian system. These
conclusions explain our abhorrence of much of the infi- so- called
delity of every age, and enable us to comprehend its un- unbelief1 Is
reasoning and unfair character. Its turpitude consists tionai re
in the fact that it is not unbelief, but belief crushed in ^hr is ti
the interest of some emotion. They also furnish the clew to am y'
our respect for a certain class of rejecters of Christianity. There is
no moral dishonor in their attitude. Belief fails them just where it
must exist, if at all, namely, in the intellect. The necessity of break
ing away from the demands of the heart may sadden those who do
it, as in the case of Romanes, ' and even of the late Professor W. K.
Clifford.2 And as the emotional rejection of Christianity, where
real intellectual belief exists, is culpable and base, so would be an
attempt to force the conviction of the intellect in the interests of
emotional acceptance. Our hope for the honest skeptic is that he is
accessible to reason, while our despair for the willful or emotional
rejecter of Christianity lies in the fact that he cannot be reached
by argument. The moral excellence of an intelligent believer, or
the changes wrought in lives by conversion, or the testimony
of intelUgent Christians to their reUgious experiences, will always
command the respect of the inteUectual and inteUigent unbeliever,
and may lead him to reexamine the ground of his unbelief, or, as
scientific facts, even create a presumption in his mind in favor of
the Christian system. It is rarely the case in instances of emotional
rejection that the difficulty can be removed by positive evidences, for
these do not appeal to the emotions. Such cases need practical rather
than literary treatment. They are amenable to revulsions of feeling,
such as the appeal to the nobility of a mother's or a wife's Christian
character, the death of a loved friend, the scenes at a stirring relig
ious revival, and, occasionaUy, appeals to the conscience.3
The views just expressed as to the presence of an intellectual element
in all faith seem to conflict with those which prevail in many quar-
1 See his Thoughts on Religion, Chicago, 1895, p. 27 ; also his Candid Examination of
Theism (by " Physicus "), pp. 51, 130. Romanes began and ended his Ufe as a Christian
believer, though for a period he was an atheist.
3 President Noah Porter quotes Clifford as saying, " We have seen the spring sun shine
out of an empty heaven to light up a soulless earth ; we have felt with utter loneliness
that the Great Compaion is dead."— Science and Sentiment, with other papers, chiefly
philosophical, New York, 1882, p. 371.
3 For good suggestions of a practical kind see Theodor Christlieb's The Best Methods
of Counteracting Modern Infidelity, New York, 1874, pp. 18-27.

10 Introduction.
ters to-day. We hear much of the wish or the will to beUeve, and
there are those who do not hesitate to declare that faith is a function
" The will to of the will. ' This can never be the case when propositions
believe." ax& offered for our acceptance or rejection. Here the
judgment must decide, and to speak of volitional beUef would be ab
surd. It is true that our judgments are often warped by our charac
ter. But these same judgments appear in consciousness as the result
of a purely intellectual process. Did we in any given case recognize
the influence of our character upon a judgment we should at once
lose confidence in its validity.
There are other cases in which our choice between the affirmative
and the negative of a proposition is governed by our wish. We can
come to no conclusion. There is a degree of satisfaction in beUev-
ing one way or the other, and by an act of will we end aU further
reflection and decide for that which we desire should be true. This
is done by everybody in aU departments of Ufe. There is nothing
dishonest about it, -but to do it exhibits good, practical common sense.
It would be as legitimate in reUgion as elsewhere.
But there should be no misunderstanding as to what has taken place.
There is in reality no more belief than there was before. The wfll has
Criticism of no* performed the impossible task of coercing the inteUect.
Clifford's7 We Uave simply quit debating the question and determined
position. henceforth to assume that what we wish to be true is true.
The idea promulgated by Clifford ' and others, that we dare not, at
the peril of moral dishonor, choose sides in cases like those just men
tioned, but must wait until the mind is compeUed to accept one side
or the other, is absurd from every point of view. Let us suppose the
proposition in question. to be, There is a God. According to Clifford
we should have to withhold judgment until the argument for one side
or the other is convincing. The heart's preference can have no rights
until the mind reaches a conclusion. Now, this is to ignore the right
of any portion of our being except the intellect to have a word in de
ciding our destiny or happiness. If the inteUect leaves us in the dark,
we must remain without a guide, however miserable that may make
us. Such a course is, to say the least, high-handed outrage upon aU
the other elements of our being. But, further, in such a case as that
which we have supposed we may be doing both ourselves and others
1 See, for example, the delightful book of Professor James, on The WiU to Believe,
New York, 1897 ; also his Principles of Psychology, vol. ii, pp. 320 ff.
» Lectures and Essays, London, 1886, p. 339. Precisely opposite Is the position of
the school of Albrecht Ritschl in Germany. See Otto Ritschl's Ueber Werthurthelle,
Freiburg 1. B., and Leipzig, 1895, particularly p. 34 f.

Introduction. 11
a great wrong. The simple fact that we cannot settle a proposition
does not make it untrue. Yet by going only as far as our inteUects
guide us we act as though it were untrue. The practical.concerns of
Ufe do not admit of such handling. We may with perfect propriety
hold our judgment in reserve when no practical interests of our own
or others demand action ; but when a proposition contains in it the
obUgation of duty we cannot long wait for further Ught, but must act
one way or another.
Again, in the case of all unsettled reUgious propositions Clifford's
principle would involve action on the side of infidelity, though the
heart's sympathies might be on the side of reUgion. There are many
cases in which the judgment is unconvinced, when to act on the
negative of the proposition would be to act the part of the infidel.
On the other hand, to act on the affirmative would be to act the part
of the religionist. There is no more of hypocrisy in one than in the
other. It is impossible not to act, for in aU such cases we act by not
acting. Why should our wishes or our interests be sacrificed when
the judgment has nothing to say ? Our only true course under such
circumstances is to act in accordance with what we think wiU best
further our own and other men's welfare. The agnostic ought to be
governed by this principle, if he is an agnostic and not an atheist.
For, being an agnostic, he does not know whether there is a God or
not. All he knows is that he does not know. If he has any prefer
ences, he has a perfect right to indulge them, provided only that he
does not thereby do injury to his feUow-men. Why should, the ag
nostic act as though he were an atheist ? He repudiates atheism, but
persistently acts the atheist's part. It must be either that he does
simply follow his preferences, or else he is governed by the pernicious
principle that when the affirmative of a proposition is unproved we
must assume that the negative of it is true.
While it is justifiable, therefore, to give our wishes consideration
when our judgments are undetermined, it needs again to be pointed out
that the act is not one of faith, unless we use the term value of a
faith in the sense of a venture, which would be a misuse, cision in the
Nevertheless, it does not f oUow that those who, under such conviction.
circumstances, act on the supposition of the truth of Christianity wfll
not be as firm Christians as those who act on conviction. A practi
cal decision may, as easily as belief, lead to the consistent practice
of reUgion. The steadfastness of one who makes such a choice will
be in proportion to the strength of the inclinations which lead him to
choose, to the completeness with which those inclinations are subse-

12 Introduction.
sequently gratified, and to the sense of the importance of the interests
involved. Furthermore, by such action the conditions wiU be pro
duced by which intellectual conviction may be reached.
By willing to believe, then, can be meant only the determination to
give our inclinations and apparent interest, and our sense of obliga
tion to our fellow-men, the right to decide our conduct when our
judgments can reach no conclusion. In order to guard against run
ning into fanaticism, however, these incUnations and interests must
have been subjected to the criticism of reason. Only then may we
break the bands which have hitherto restrained us.
in. IDEA AND METHOD OF EVIDENCES. DEFINITION AND DISCRIMINATION
OF TERMS.
1. Christian Apology (from a-Kofaryia, a defense or a speech in de
fense) is the Uterary defense of the Christian reUgion against its op-
Aggressive ponents. It is either general or special, according as it
ClJ.ci'T^CLCr ot
apology. includes aU or but specific phases of unbeUef . In Uterary
defense it is sometimes necessary to overthrow assumptions on which
objections to the Christian system are based, and hence apology has
an aggressive as weU as a defensive aspect. Since, however, even in
its more aggressive forms, the object of apology is defense against
assault, it must adapt itself both to the character of the assailant and
to his method of attack. If the weapons and methods employed
against Christianity be those of philosophy, science, history, and
ethics, the apologist must meet the assailant with corresponding
weapons and methods. Any other form of defense would be ineffec
tual, because irrelevant. Apology, therefore, cannot choose its ground.
It must meet the assault where it is made and in the form in which it
is made.1 Hence there is an element of variabiUty in apology which
is unavoidable, and which is the sure mark of its Uving character.
On the other hand, the apologist need do no more than show that,
judged by facts which both parties to the contest accept, either from
conviction or for the sake of the argument, the difficulty in question
affords no substantial hindrance to the acceptance of Christianity;
and he may concede for argument's sake as much as he pleases, since
his duty is not to convince of the truth of Christianity, nor to eluci
date its tenets, but to repulse its assailants.
2. Christian Evidences, or the Evidences of Christianity, includes
apology as argument in rebuttal ; but its peculiar province Ues beyond
apology, whose function is merely to clear away objections, while
> " Die Apologie ist der Anwalt des Chrlstenthums vor verschledenen Instanzen '*
— Chr. A. Bugge, In Die Christliche Welt, 1897, No. 17, Col. 387.

Introduction. IS
evidences should aim to produce conviction. Apology prepares the
mind for belief ; evidences should induce beUef . Apology p .
is addressed chiefly to the intelligence or reason, and |Tflder1e1e|
deals only with the intellectual aspects of unbelief ; evi- fr°m aP0l~
dences should appeal to reason, emotion, and will, and deal
both with the inteUectual and the emotional causes of rejection of
Christianity. Apology says to its opponents, "Your contention is
untenable, or irrelevant ; " by evidences we show that the Christian
position is inteUectually and moraUy obligatory. Apology takes
form and method from the attacks made upon Christianity. Evi
dences wiU exhibit Christianity as superior to aU other systems,
actual or conceivable.
From these remarks it will be seen that evidences should, so far as
they are vaUd, have an abiding character. As a matter of fact, how
ever, evidences have suffered in the past, and probably wiU suffer in
the future, in the permanency of their value, by being falsely
reasoned, or else based upon false conceptions of science or of phi
losophy. For evidences, like apology, must undergo both formal and
material modifications in order to the proper employment of the
changing views of scientific and phflosophic fact, even though the
champion of Christianity may not be persuaded of the truth of the
new views.
3. Apologetics is a term for a treatise on apology. It includes with
apology proper the discussion of the nature of faith and unbeUef , the
consideration of methods, the history of apology and evidences, and
the Uke. It is the science of apology. In its ordinary use the term
is made to include the whole treatment of faith, unbelief, and rejec
tion of Christianity, as these stand related to the propagation of the
Gospel. rv. limitations and scope of the subject.
1. The apologist is under no obligation to defend or enforce the
articles of any particular creed, or any particular form of faith. This
would lead him into the domain of polemics. Nor is he bound to de
fend the acts of the visible Church.1
2. His duty is to defend and enforce the facts essential to the proof
of revelation. There may be room for difference of opinion as to
what these essentials are ; but when he has settled this question for
himself his only duty is in reference to them. All the rest may be
safely left to polemics for adjustment. But the apologist has no
right to abate anything of these essentials, once he has determined
'Comp. A. B. Bruce's Apologetics, New York, 1892, p. 503.

14 Introduction.
what they are, in order to make them more acceptable ; rather must
he strive to change the mental and emotional attitude of the objector.1
3. Demonstration is seldom, if ever, to be required.3 If a fair de
gree of probability in favor of a truth of Christianity is established,
it should, in most cases, satisfy aU demands. By such a degree of
probability we mean one which at least preponderates over the prob
abilities on the other side.
4. Evidences should satisfy the Christian demand for a consciously
rational foundation of beUef . It is designed, therefore, primarily, for
those who are already Christians, and who require that there should
be no controversy between their inner experience and their scientific
conceptions, or between their inteUigence and their wiU.
5. Evidences should counteract the influence of those arguments
against Christianity which tend to aUenate men from Christian faith
and life. For example, one who is an admirer of natural science, if
persuaded that Christianity is either intrinsicaUy or historicaUy in
imical to it, would be alienated from the faith by that beUef . So, too,
many of the ethical culturists are alienated from the faith by the feel
ing that Christianity, at any rate in its present form, lays too much
stress on devotion and dogma, and not enough on moraUty. Hence
it is the duty of the apologist to point out the fallacy of aU such
arguments. 6. Evidences should be so constructed as to command the respect, if
not to win the adherence, of sincere and scholarly unbeUevers. In
order to this it is necessary that the apologist should know his antag
onist's position, appreciate the weight of the arguments in its support,
and in aU references to the same be entirely fair and just. Further,
he must be thoroughly loyal to his own convictions, and prove by the
force of his reasoning, both against his opponent and in favor of his
own position, that he is worthy of inteUectual respect. He must be
able to give a reason for the faith that is in him. In addition to aU
this he must speak or write in the spirit of Christ. Lacking any of
these qualifications he is liable to stimulate prejudice against his
cause and against all in whose name he speaks. The fact that aU
men feel the need of religion should prompt the apologist to his best
endeavor.3 1 See Crooks and Hurst's Theological Encyclopaedia and Methodology, on the Basis of
Hagenbach, New York and Cincinnati, under The Task of Apologetics, and Steude's
Beitrage zur Apologetik, Gotha, 1884, p. 75.
» Bowne asserts that demonstration is no longer expected in any department of ob
jective knowledge.— Philosophy of Theism, New York, 1887, pp. 10, 30, and elsewhere.
8 That such is the case is clear from the many attempts of soientlflo men to pave the
way for a reconciliation between science as they conceive it and religion. For examples

Introduction. 15
7. Evidences should aim to lead men to a humble acceptance of
Christ as their Saviour. If the results were merely inteUectual, some
thing would be gained, but not all that the Christian apologist desires.
The conflict is not intended merely to end in belief, but also in saving
faith. V. VALUE OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.
That the evidences of Christianity, rightly conducted, are effectual
need scarcely be affirmed. The large number of works, designed to
set forth these evidences, which have been written and
the eagerness with which they are read by thoughtful ness ofVar-
people sufficiently evince their value. Men are convinced IS Subject
by argument on reUgious as on other subjects ; and they ° re lglou'
are persuaded to action here as elsewhere by the due presentation of
weighty considerations. True it is that the most valuable evidence
anyone can have of the existence of God is the power of God exerted
in the individual's own salvation ; and hence the evidences of Chris
tianity fafl of their purpose if they do not lead the reader of them to
submit himself to that power. It is necessary to repeat that the evi
dences are not addressed to the judgment alone. They are designed
to produce not merely opinions, but convictions. He who
* J * ' Their design.
has only the former may remain inactive; not so he
who is possessed of the latter. The evidences of Christianity must not
only be presented ; they must be weighed by him to whom they are
offered. If this cooperation is not accorded by the reader, he wiU, of
course, receive no benefit. If, on the other hand, he furnishes his
part, he must of necessity be led to the participation of the benefits of
the Gospel. If anyone refuses this cooperation, evidences cannot
be accused of uselessness because they do such a reader no good.
Nor can it be urged against the value of Christian evidences that
the vast majority of people neither understand nor need them.
There are few who do not at times raise the question why Evidences
they beUeve in the doctrines of Christianity, and, whether siwi'by'the
false or true, many are drawn away from the faith of the ma;lorl y-
Gospel by the arguments of our enemies. To all such the evidences
of Christianity may prove valuable.1 If some do not understand or
feel their force, it still remains true that vast numbers do both under
stand and need them. By all means we shaU thus save some.
Haeckel's Der Monisums als Band zwichen Religion und Wissenschaft, Bonn, 1892, and
Spencer in First Principles of a New System of Philosophy, second edition, New York,
1868, to say nothing of many lesser lights. Says Spencer: "Of all antagonisms of belief,
the oldest, the widest, the most profound, and the most important is that between Re
ligion and Science," p. 10.
1 Comp. G. F. Wright's The Logic of Christian Evidences, Andover, 1880, p. 4.

16 Introduction.
Furthermore, in a time when infideUty is exerting its utmost efforts
to overthrow Christianity sflence would be regarded by many as a
Reasons why sign of conscious insecurity against the assaults of the ad-
fa e* pSr o v i - versary, and as a virtual confession that it has no reasons to
offer why men should accept it. Here, again, it is neces
sary to remind the objector that Christianity does not exist simply
for its own sake, but for the benefits it can confer. And although it
be true that Christianity contains the truth, whether men are con
vinced of that fact or not, yet only as men recognize the truth that is
in Christianity do they place themselves under its sway. We may
not stand stiU and see thousands swept away from the influence of
the Gospel simply because we know that Christianity is true. We
must make other men see that it is true, and that its truth imposes
obligation.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.

DIVISION I.
THE RELATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY.

The manifold assault upon the Christian system is reducible to five
forms : the philosophical, the scientific, the historical, the ethical, and
the religious. In order to thoroughness it will be neces- Five forms of
<l 4 S !1 11 1 t
sary to hear aU the principal objections to Christianity against
brought from any of these five sources, to consider anity.
whether they are weU or iU founded, and, in the former case, whether
they are reaUy destructive of intelUgent faith. In those cases in
which objections are ill founded it wfll be necessary to inquire
whether the error arose from a misapprehension of Christianity or
from false assumptions ; in the latter event their falsity must be ex
hibited. This will give an aggressive tone to our defense in all such
instances. Further, in so far as other reUgions, actual or prospective,
are offered as competitors of Christianity, we shaU be obUged to con
sider the claims of these rivals for our regard.
The phnosophic assault is directed against a number of the essen
tials of Christianity, though chiefly against its doctrine of God. It
has taken four principal forms, which may be stated and briefly de
fined as f oUows : *
I. The Atheistic, which denies the existence of God ;
II. The Agnostic, which denies the knowableness of God ;
III. The Pantheistic, which denies the personaUty of God ;
IV. The Deistic, which denies the possible supernatural revelation
of God. SECTION I.-ATHEISM.
Atheism can be attributed with certainty to but comparatively few
thinkers.3 Some have, without sufficient reason, denied the possi-
1 See for fuller definitions Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories, third edition, Edinburgh and
London, 1885, Appendix, Note I.
' For a discussion of that atheism which springs from the ethical nature see J. S.
Blackie's The Natural History of Atheism, New York, 1878, chapters iii and vi.

18 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
bility of unqualified atheism, because it is so contrary to aU our
Atheism de- natural feelings and needs. But there is no reason to be-
flned' lieve that Feuerbach did not say what he meant when he
wrote, " There is no God ; it is clear as the sun and as evident as the
day that there is no God, and stiU more that there can be none." Its
adherents profess to find in the world no need for God, while they re
gard as inadequate the proofs of his existence offered by believers
(critical atheism),1 and the alleged communion of the soul with him
and his revelation of himself to man as priestly deception, ignorant
delusion, or gross superstition. The world, they tell us, affords no
evidence of inteUigent and beneficent design, but rather of chance, or
fate, and malignity. Atheism and materiaUsm go hand in hand, as
do atheism and pessimism. The soul, if an entity at all, is not im
mortal. Virtue and vice lose their eternal significance, since, because
everything is necessitated, there is no responsibility. Hence there
can be no atonement, no redemption, no future either of reward or
punishment. With some these negations are a firm belief (dogmatic
atheism) ; with others they take the form of settled doubt.' Some
atheists are bold and blasphemous; others are saddened by their
own conclusions.
Apology can do little with atheism in its form of an estabhshed con
viction, for in this form it is a prejudice, since it is evident that the
nonexistence of an invisible, spiritual being cannot be demonstrated.3
The most that could be done in this direction would be to make his
existence appear undemonstrable by a criticism of the proofs for his
existence. Any conclusion beyond this is based upon thinking so in
consequent as not to be amenable to the significance of facts in favor
of faith. One cannot reason with a prejudice.
In so far as atheism is mere doubt of the existence of God, however
profound and firm it may be, the atheist may be reached by argu
ments for the existence of God — at least to the extent of the admission
that there may be a God. He can at least be brought to the point
where he will confess that he has not sufficient data to warrant a
1 Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories, p. 4.
s This latter Is the attitude of B. Carneri. He says that the expert scientist is the last
one to say, " There can be no God." All he can say is, "I do not find him, either in the
creation or in the government of the world." Der Moderne Mensch, Vierte Auflage,
Bonn, 1895, p. 96 f .
s Dr. Friediich Dahl challenges any Investigator to prove that the world was not created
by an almighty God. Die Nothwendigkeit der Religion, Heidelberg, 1886, p. 107. See also
Chalmers's On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, as manifested In the adaptation
of external nature to the moral and Intellectual constitution of man, London, 1869,
p. 404 f. Of course the impossibility of proving that there is no God does not prove that
he Is.

The Relations of Philosophy and Christianity. 19
denial of God's existence. To one part of this achievement we now
address ourselves.1
There are really but three forms of the atheistic argument : 1. That
which declares that supersensuous beings cannot be found ; 2. That
which is based on a materialistic philosophy ; and 3. That which is
based on the evils and imperfections of the world.
1 The reader who wishes to follow up the entire argument consecutively may, after
reading what is here said in answer to atheism, turn to Division vu of this work.

20 Foundations of the Christian Faiths.

CHAPTER I.
THE ATHEISM OF THE PHYSICAL SENSES.
As an instance of the modern form of the first-named argument we
recaU the utterance of Carneri, already referred to: "I do not find
First argu- him [God], either in the creation or in the government of
atheism. the world." August Baur,' summing up this argument,
says that "neither in the use of the microscope nor the telescope, the
retort nor the dissecting knife, has any investigator ever discovered a
supersensuous being." The argument isweU adapted to deceive the
unwary. If aU the great investigators have failed to discover either
the soul or God, many would be inclined to say that there can be no
soul and no God.
It should be noted, first, that all that any investigator' can affirm is
that he personally has not found the soul nor God. He can speak
only for himself, and he can only declare what he individuaUy has
not found. The more thorough his training and the more extensive
his knowledge of the wonders of being, the less Ukely wiU he be to
declare that there is no soul or there is no God. Says Carneri," speak
ing of the one who is reaUy at home in matters of science, and to
whom it is therefore clear how little man knows in comparison with
aU that is about him, " He is the last one not to perceive how much of
which he does not even dream is possible in the universe, and to say,
' There can be no God.' " Should anyone, however learned, declare
that because he has not found supersensuous existences there is none
such, he would be going far beyond the warrant of facts in his own
possession. However firm he may be in the conviction that if there
were a God or a soul he would have come upon traces of them some
where in the course of his investigation, his testimony could not bal
ance that of those who declare that they have found both God and the
soul. We should note, therefore, secondly, the fact that large numbers of
men of the first rank have found what to them were unmistakable
traces of the supersensuous. Dutoit-Haller s names the following
1 In his Die Weltanschauung des Christenthums, 2te Auflage, Blaubeuren, 1896, p. 101.
a Der Moderne Mensch, p. 96.
s In Schopf ung und Entwlckelung nach Bibel und Naturwissenschaft, Basel, 1892, p. 4.

The Atheism of the Physical Senses. 21
modern philosophers and scientists who have not attempted to conceal
their religious convictions: Leibnitz, Descartes, Ampere, philosophers
Faraday, Fresnel, Brewster, De la Rive, Euler, Gauss, tfftsSCwho
Wurz, Chevreul, Biot, Justus von Liebig, Fehling, Morse, the^exis1"
Kepler, Copernicus, Newton, Herschel, Alexander von enceo °
Humboldt, Madler, Gruner, Elie de Beaumont, Fraas, Pfaff, Favre,
Linnaeus, Albrecht von HaUer, Griesbach, Oswald Heer, Ehrenberg,
Owen, Quatrefages, Isidore Geoffroy-St. Hilaire, Agassiz, Hyrtl, von
Beneden, Claude Bernard. This is a highly respectable array of
names, and the list could be considerably increased. Romanes, l for
example, was first led by his studies to the denial of God and soul,
but later investigations convinced him that he was mistaken.
We think it precarious to base an argument for religion in any of
its aspects on the authority of any name or number of names of schol
arly standing, nor do we offer this catalogue for any other purpose
than to offset the negative testimony of atheists who say they cannot
find God. They cannot, but others can. Madler, whose scientific
abiUty will not be questioned, says: "A true investigator of nature
cannot be a denier of God. Whoever looks as deeply into the work
shop of God as do we, and has so much occasion to admire his omnis
cience and eternal order, must bow his knees in humility before the
rulership [Walten] of the holy God.""
So far, then, the argument for the atheistic denial of God and the
soul from what the atheists profess not to have found is seen to be
valueless. But perhaps the reason why they have not The s e ar c h
* r J J conducted
found God is that they have not employed the right by inade-
Q U. Si t 6
means and searched in the right realm. If the soul and means.
God be what beUevers in them declare, they are immaterial, and
therefore cannot be apprehended by the senses. The microscope and
the telescope, the retort and the scalpel, are alike inadequate to their
discovery. Many of our materialistic phflosophers appear unable to
conceive of spirit except in terms or under the forms of matter. To
these minds the negation of the qualities of matter is the negation of
existence ; for they know and can conceive none but material exist
ence. This very fact, however, ought to show them that if there be
such a thing as spirit, the instruments and methods employed in its
investigation must be different from those needed in the investigation
of matter. That instrument, says the believer in spirit, is the human
1 See his Thoughts on Religion, and his Life and Letters, edited by his wife, London,
1896. 8 CHed by Dutoit-Haller, Schepfung und Entwickelung, p. 4.
4

22 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
mind itself in aU its varied functions ; and the method corresponds to
the instrument. Even the materialistic philosopher must, if he bases
his philosophy on the results of modern science,' be aware that there
are many facts which are discovered by reflection and not by ma
terial instruments. The ether lacks all the quahties of ordinary
matter, and is therefore not appreciable by the senses, and yet no
scientist questions its existence. For aught we know it may be
supersensuous. It certainly is extra-sensuous. Why, then, do we
affirm its existence ? Because it is needed to explain certain physical
phenomena. Without it the mind cannot rest. With it the mind
is satisfied. Yet there was a time when, the facts needing explana
tion being undiscovered, the mind felt no need of the hypothesis of
the ether. To those who have not made certain discoveries of fact
the hypothesis of a personal God may not be needful. But they
should surely not affirm that there is no such fact, and hence no need
of God.
Romanes strongly urges this point, and we feel sure that it is worthy
of much consideration, at least by way of cautioning those who are
too secure in their denial of God. Perhaps if Cameri were to look
at the world and man as some have looked at them, he would find
God, if not in creation, at least in the government of the world and in
human life. Strictly the scientist, as such, cannot speak as to God's
existence ; the philosopher can, if he takes a sufficiently wide range
of facts upon which to base a conclusion ; and on such a basis he will
at least refuse to deny the existence of the soul and God, or to act as
though they were not. The most he can do is to act like one who
cannot decide by reason, and hence must decide by preference.
One of the principal hindrances to the discovery of God in nature
has been, and still is, a false distinction between the natural and
False di s- tlie supernatural. It may be that it is too much to say
tween0Ithee tllat these two concepts are coextensive and identical.
an^thVsu! But Jt is undoubtedly false to assume, as most believers
pernatural. m Q.od d0) that God manifests himself only in the unu
sual. This assumption gives the atheist an undue advantage ; for in
accordance with it all that can be traced to physical causation is
removed from the sphere of supernatural causation. It is on this
ground alone that the assertion so often made can be substantiated,
that as scientific knowledge grows the idea of God's participation
in the affairs of the world becomes less probable. The assumption
is one which makes God a God of disorder only. It sliuts him out
of all that portion of the world which proceeds according to regular

The 'Atheism of the Physical Senses. 23
method and admits him only where there is apparently no reason
or inteUigence, and as one realm of nature after another is discov
ered to be under the reign of law the tendency is to exclude God alto
gether. But is it in reaUty a greater proof of inteUigence to do things
singly and out of connection with each other than to do them regu
larly and connectedly ? Certainly not ; on the contrary, the reverse
is true. So that we who beUeve in God ought to be strengthened in
that faith by the evident inteUigence displayed in the marvelous sys
tem of nature. There is more evidence of the supernatural in the
orderly world which science has revealed to us than there is in the
chaotic world known to those who do not see the wonderful connec
tions of things ; only that evidence is not brought to Ught by physical
instruments, but by reflection.
Thus, as men have searched for God with inadequate means, so
they have looked for him in the wrong place. In either case it is not
surprising that they have not found him ; but the foUy of Folly of the
the atheist is none the less evident. He does not so deal argument
with any other affair, especiaUy with those of a practical regularity
concern. In the mouth of the atheist the argument ° na ure-
against the existence of God from the regularity of nature must
mean that if there were irregularity, this would so far be an argu
ment in favor of his existence. If it is regularity which makes belief
in him impossible, then irregularity would make belief in him possi
ble. But since atheism is just the denial of the evidence for intelli
gence, it is clear that the atheist's argument is based on the assump
tion that irregularity and unintelligibility in results are marks of
intelUgence ; the more irregular and uninteUigible one's proceedings
are, the greater the evidence of design ; and if the world were whoUy a
chaos, so far as our thought is concerned, the evidence that a God of
infinite wisdom had made it would be overwhelming. Now, we say
that the atheist does not so reason in reference to other affairs.
Among men considerable eccentricities in conduct and social life are
marks of defective reason. In business it is not the man who does
everything in a disconnected and disorderly manner who is regarded
as possessing the highest intelligence. Yet, if the atheist argued from
this supposed condition of things as he argues concerning the world,
such would be his conclusion. Surely there is some great perversity
in the atheist's reasoning. Or is he simply trying to avoid anthropo
morphism in theology ? If so, he must he credited with the highest
degree of success.

24 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
THE MATERIALISTIC DENIAL OF THE SOUL.
We consider next that atheistic argument which is based on the
materiaUstic philosophy. In the preceding argument atheism said it
could not find God and the soul. In this it says that God and the soul
The second are not needed for the explanation of the phenomena
argument
of atheism, presented by man and the world. True it is that for the
more thoughtful and well-instructed classes materialism in its
coarser forms is a belated standpoint; though for large numbers
of readers it still ranks in some degree as the final word of
science and philosophy, and many years must pass before it will be
ended.1 Wilhelm Strecker, one of the most recent defenders of materialism,
who is vouched for by that prince of modern materiaUsts, Ludwig
Biichner, says:2 "That which distinguishes materiaUsm from every
other view of the world is that it traces aU being and aU events in the
world to matter and the forces inherent in matter, and denies the exist
ence and operation of any power outside of nature. AU events are,
strecker's according to materiaUsm, the necessary effects of definite
ofmateriai- causesi an^- this necessity exists, not only in our thinking,
ism. ku|; js founded m the things themselves. Even Ufe and
the phenomena of consciousness, materiaUsm regards as but phenom
ena of matter which appear under given conditions — which, however,
are not certainly known — and which will cease with the conditions
that attended them." "According to this view, aU events in the
world come to pass in accordance with eternally vaUd and inflexible
laws which cannot be abolished or changed by any arbitrary wiU,
but to whose might all wiU is subject." 3 This is intended to exclude
God from the world, and to assert that he is unnecessary. And
according to Strecker, not only is he unnecessary, but "as knowledge
becomes more diffused, faith (that is, religious faith) must disappear;
1 Comp. T. Menzi: Der Materialismus vor dem Richterstuhl der Wissenschaft, Zurich,
1898, p. 3.
* In Welt und Menschheit vom Standpunkt des Materialismus. Eine Darlegung der
Mateiialistischen Weltanschauung. Ncbst elner EinfUhrung von Professor Ludwig
Bttchner, Leipzig, 1892, p. 13.
s Ibid., p. xiv.

The Materialistic Denial of the Soul. 25
the deeper our insight into the laws of natural phenomena, the less
tenable will become faith in supernatural events." "
It is evident that materialism bases its claims to recognition on its
abiUty to explain more satisfactorily than any other system the world
and aU that is therein. The antithesis between the Christian and the
materialistic view is sharply drawn. The former declares God neces
sary ; the latter declares him unnecessary, and in so doing affirms the
sufficiency of matter and its inherent forces for the explanation of
all things. But let us see what the modern materialist means by mat
ter. Buchner says:2 "In connection with the word 'materiaUsm,'
everyone thinks only of matter, or has the mental image of matter
as crude, common, unintelligent, inert, mind-inimical stuff ; Bachner's
in connection with the word ' spiritualism ' only of the the ques ¦
whoUy indefinite conception of spirit, while in reality ter.
neither of the two has a separate existence, and matter, force, move
ment, form, life, and sensibiUty, which last in its highest and gradual
development or elevation becomes soul and spirit, form in fact only
a single indivisible unity. Therefore, we had best designate this view
' Monism ' (instead of materialism)." There is an evident desire to get
rid of the appropriate name for this philosophy. By this very defini
tion of matter Buchner abandons materiaUsm, pure and simple,
and faUs back upon elements which have hitherto been attributed
to soul and spirit. a He makes matter sentient, and claims that this
sensibility, when it has reached its highest development, becomes soul
and spirit, and yet claims that matter explains everything. With
monism, which is to be clearly distinguished from materialism, we
shall deal in due time." Here it is sufficient to point out that the ma
terialistic position is rejected unqualifiedly by monists, and that it is
not true, as Buchner says, with reference to the names materialism
and monism, that it makes no difference "what name you give the
child." Such monists as Haeckel and Forel refuse to be classed with
materialists.5 Haeckel goes so far as to speak of the inseparable con
nection between spirit and matter, or God and the world, and pro
poses the word substance in its stead, defining it as having the attri
butes hitherto bestowed upon both matter and spirit. Forel" speaks
1 In Welt und Menschheit vom Standpunkt des Materialismus, Strecker, p. 5.
a In Strecker's Welt und Menschheit, p. x.
3 So also Strecker attributes to matter the power to feel, think, and will. Welt und
Menschheit, p. 77.
4 It should be stated, however, that, owing to the striking similarity of monism to ma-
teriaism, amounting In some features to identity, the whole case against materialism can
not be made clear until monism has been considered.
6 Der Monismus als Band zwischen ReUgion und Wissenschaft, Bonn, 1892, pp. 10, 14.
« Gehirn und Seele, Bonn, 1894, p. 30 f.

26 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
in bitterest terms of those physicians who cherish materiaUstic views.
Romanes, during the monistic period of his history, thought theism not
inconsistent with monism.1 We may safely assert, therefore, that
even Buchner does not regard materialism as adequate to the explana
tion of all phenomena. It must become monism in order to satisfy
its own felt demands.
But we cannot content ourselves with this confession on the part of
Damaging leading materialists. Strecker is more consistently mate-
ofmma teS- rialistic than Buchner, and as an honest man is obUged to
" '' ' admit that in order to attain to a complete system mate
rialism is compelled to fiU out numerous gaps in the knowledge which
is possible to experience and experiment with certain articles of faith
which cannot be more exactly demonstrated, whose justification is
therefore contested by opponents of materialism, and which by no
means suffice for the difficulties that present themselves in the consid
eration of the world.3 The materialistic view of the world does not,
therefore, by any means rest in aU respects, as many overzealous ad
herents of the system sometimes declare, upon fixed facts, but must
give wide room for belief. Materialism believes in the objective va-
Udity of our conceptions of time and space ; it believes in atoms ; it con
fides in the unchangeable operation of the law of causaUty." We re
quest the reader who is disposed to think of Christianity as a system
in which belief plays a large part, and who accordingly thinks Ughtly
of it, to consider the confessions Strecker here makes. In order to a
complete system we must believe where we cannot know. The arti
cles of beUef proposed by science are inadequate. MateriaUsm does
not rest in aU cases upon ascertained facts, but upon beUef s, and inade
quate ones at that. Those who assert the contrary are overzealous ad
herents of materiaUsm. Time, space, atoms, and the law of causaUty
are all matters of belief, not of demonstration. That in spite of aU
this Strecker should remain a materialist simply indicates that he
knows of no better explanation than materiaUsm affords. But, them
selves being the judges, materialism does not satisfactorily explain
everything. This is aU we contend for here.
Nevertheless, sweeping as these admissions are, it wiU not do to
rest our case upon them, for they do not touch the real question at issue,
namely, whether materialism is a sufficient ground upon which to base
the denial of the soul and God. The tremendous importance of this
question will be seen at a glance. If the materialistic hypothesis does
1 Mind and Motion and Monism, New York, 1895, p. 116 f.
* Welt und Menschheit, p. 136 f. » Ibid., p. 14.

The Materialistic Denial of the Soul. 27
explain everything which we have hitherto attempted to explain on
the theory of the soul and God, then we have no room left for belief
in soul and God. But not even the importance of this question for
the Christian position should make us unwflling to face the truth,
and hence the materialistic argument should be patiently and honestly
studied. We are persuaded that no one is more capable of an unprejudiced
investigation of the materiaUst's views than one who truly believes in
the existence of God and the soul, with aU that such a belief implies of
moral obUgation. Yet, because some readers may doubt our ability to
pass an unbiased judgment on the facts, we propose to let others speak
for us who wiU at least not be accused of prejudice in our favor. For
tunately for our purpose we have a modern dispute among nonbe-
lievers in the soul which brings out the strength of both sides. It is
the dispute which arose in Germany in connection with a lecture on
" The Limits of our Knowledge of Nature," 1 by E. Du Bois-Rey
mond, late professor of physiology and director of the „,
^ ^ r J °J Views of Du
physiological laboratory at the University of Berlin. Du Bois/ Eey_
Bois-Reymond insisted in the lecture which attained such
celebrity that our knowledge of nature Ues between two Umits which
are forever fixed, namely, our inability, on the one side, to understand
matter and force, and, on the other, to deduce mental processes out of
material conditions.2 He says * that the investigator sees the mental
life influenced in a thousand instances by material conditions. He sees
the human mind grow simultaneously with the brain. In sleep and
dreams, in unconsciousness, in epilepsy, in cretinism, and in mikroceph-
aly, in fever, deUrium, inflammation of the brain, and in numberless
healthy or diseased states mental activity appears dependent upon the
permanent or temporary condition of the brain. Where the leap from
the anthropoid ape to man, indicated by the power of speech, is made
there is a corresponding difference in the size of the brain. And not
only the size, but the structure of the brain affects the mental life.
If all the atoms of which Caesar was composed in any instant of his
Ufe could be brought together as they were at that instant, Csesar
would be restored to us both in body and in mind. This artificial
Csesar would have in the first instant all the impressions, purposes,
and mental representations of the original Csesar at the instant
supposed. 1 See J. H. Gore's edition of Du Bois-Reymond's three scientific "Vortrage," published
by Ginn & Co., Boston, 1896, to which all our references are made.
» Vortrage, p. 65 f. * Ibid., pp. 66 ff.

28 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER III.
the dispute between du bois-reymond and haeckel.
This is so far a good statement of the materiaUstic position, which
insists that the mental life and the brain are inseparably connected.
But at this point Du Bois-Reymond stops and refuses to go further.
We condense his argument.1
He regards an astronomical knowledge of a material system as the
most perfect possible to us. Such a knowledge he defines as one
which comprehends aU parts of the system, their mutual and relative
positions and their movements. Its result would be that we could
reckon the positions and movements of the parts for any instant in
the past or future with the same certainty that we could the posi
tions and movements of the heavenly bodies were astronomical theo
ries perfect and our observations perfectly exact.
If we had an astronomical knowledge of a muscle, a gland, a plant,
Supposed an egg in contact with the spermatozoa, we should then
ical knowl- possess the most perfect knowledge of these material sys-
brafn. terns possible to us ; our demand for a causal explanation
of things would be so far satisfied as that we should desire nothing fur
ther than to comprehend the nature of matter and force themselves.
The contraction of the muscles, the secretions of the glands, the
growth and chemistry of the ceUs in plants, and the relation of
fructification to the development of the egg — aU these almost hope
lessly incomprehensible processes would be as comprehensible as the
movements of the planets. Let us suppose, on the other hand, that
we possessed such an astronomical knowledge of the brain of a man.
The result would be that, so far as the material processes were con
cerned, we should feel that our demand for a causal explanation was
satisfied, just as in the movements of the muscles or the secre
tions of the glands. All the involuntary operations of the nervous
system and their effects upon the movements of muscles, such as
breathing, would be sufficiently known. Even those material proc
esses of the brain which are uniformly attendant upon or attended
by mental processes would also be as perfectly transparent as the con-
1 Vortrage, pp. 58 ff.

Dispute Between Du Bois-Reymond and Haeckel. 29
traction of the muscles. And it would be a great triumph if we could
definitely say that, in connection with a definite mental activity in
given ganglia ceUs and nerve filaments, a definite movement of given
atoms took place. For the present we do not even know whether only
the gray or whether also the white brain matter thinks, and whether
a given condition of the soul corresponds to a given position or move
ment of brain atoms, or brain molecules.1 As to the mental processes
themselves, it is plain that the astronomical knowledge of the brain
would leave them as incomprehensible as ever. It would reveal to us
nothing but matter in motion. By no arrangement or movement of
matter can a bridge be thrown across to the realm of consciousness.
Movement can do nothing but produce movement or transform itself
into potential energy. Potential energy can do nothing but produce
movement, maintain equiUbrum, or exercise a pressure or a pull. The
sum of energy remains the same. Mechanical causes produce me
chanical effects.' Thus the mental processes which go along with the
material processes of the brain lack, for our understanding, a suffi
cient cause. s They Ue outside of the law of cause, and hence cannot
be understood. *
Upon a superficial consideration it might appear that an exact
knowledge of the material processes in the brain would explain cer
tain mental processes and capacities, such as memory, the No causal
. connection
flow and the association of mental representations, the between
brain move-
results of practice, specific talents, and the like. But the ments and
... conscious-
least reflection will show that this is a deception. Only ness.
concerning certain conditions requisite to the mental Ufe, conditions
of about equal significance with those which are created by sense im
pressions, would such knowledge instruct us, not concerning the birth
of the mental life through these conditions. What thinkable causal
connection exists between certain movements of given atoms in my
brain and such facts of consciousness as that I feel pain, pleasure,
1 That for every condition of the soul or mind there is an exact and unvarying condi
tion of the brain is, however, the supposition of all materialists, and the basis of their
psychological theory. The supposition is founded upon the fact that so far as traced all
mental activities are accompanied by corresponding brain actions— all mental change by
change in the brain. See Clifford's Lectures and Essays, pp 244 ff. This subject is well
treated by Ladd's Philosophy of Mind, New York, 1895, pp. 237-282, 314-355.
8 Italics ours.
5 Strauss asks why there might not be conditions under which movements of atoms
should be transformed into sensibility if such movements are transformed into warmth.
Der alte und der neue Glaube, 7te Auflage, Bonn, 1874, p. 210. To this the answer is
plain. Warmth is a physical sensation produced by a peculiar kind of molecular motion.
The perception of that sensation may be accompanied by movements of brain atoms.
but it is itself not molecular movement, but mental representation.
* That is, from the standpoint of material science, which recognizes no existence and
no place for causality except matter.

30 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
warmth or cold ; that I taste something sweet, smeU the fragrance of
roses, hear the tones of an organ, see a red color, together with the
immediate certainty that I am which flows from such facts ? It is
thoroughly and forever inconceivable that it should not be indifferent
to a quantity of atoms of carbon, oxygen, or nitrogen how they Ue and
move, have lain or moved, or will lie and move. It is in no way to
be discovered how consciousness could arise out of their cooperation.
If their movements and position were not indifferent, then we should
have to think of them as did Leibnitz, as monads, each with its own
consciousness. But this would stiU not explain the fact of conscious
ness, nor would it aid our understanding of the single consciousness
of a human being.1 Hence it is fundamentally impossible to explain
why accordant tones give us pleasure and red-hot iron pain. A brain
which should for any reason be without consciousness would be no
mystery to one with the supposed knowledge. The dreamless sleeper
would be comprehensible, but he would become incomprehensible the
instant he began to dream.
From these utterances it is plain that Du Bois-Reymond does not
propose to substitute a spiritualistic for the materialistic explanation
of psychological phenomena. AU the more significant is it, therefore,
when he goes to so much trouble to demonstrate that the facts of con
sciousness, while they may be conditioned by changes in the brain,
are not caused by those changes. Others before him and after him
confessed that the phenomena of mind cannot now be explained by
matter alone, but he showed that we never shaU be able to explain
them so. It was this which brought down upon him the wrath of
some of his feUow-laborers.
The only serious argument against Du Bois-Reymond's position is
that offered by Haeckel.2 The former, it wfll be remembered, had
Haeckei'sre- considered as an absurdity the supposition that each atom
Bois-Rey" had its own individual soul. The latter repUes that " Ev
ery atom possesses an inherent sum of energy, and is in
this sense besouled (beseelt). Without the hypothesis of an atom-
soul the most common and universal phenomena of chemistry are
inexplicable. Pleasure and displeasure, desire and disinclination,
attraction and repulsion, must be common to all physical atoms ; for
the movements of the atoms which take place in the production or
dissolution of every chemical combination are only expUcable when
> If each brain atom had its own consciousness how could we account for the existence
cf a single harmonious consciousness of the entire brain ?
3In Die Perigenesis der Plastidule, Berlin, 1876, pp. 38, 39.

Dispute Between Du Bois-Keymond and Haeckel. 31
we attribute to them sensibility and will .... That the wiU of man and
of the higher animals appears free in contrast with the fixed will of the
atoms, results from a delusion elicited by the highly complex voli
tions of the former in comparison with the exceedingly simple voU-
tions of the latter."
To this Du Bois-Reymond retorts 1 that such a method of argumen
tation is a disdainful forsaking of the inductive method of treating
the question as to the conditions under which consciousness origi
nates. Well does he make this charge against Haeckel. For, so far as
this quotation from him goes, it in nowise adds to our information
concerning the origin of consciousness, but simply attributes mental
states to atoms. Indeed, Haeckel does not pretend to explain con
sciousness by the arrangement and movement of atoms — though he
censures Du Bois-Reymond for saying these cannot explain it 2 — but
simply postulates consciousness as an attribute of atoms.
Du Bois-Reymond further answers Haeckel by saying that the lat
ter sins against the first rule of philosophy : Entia non sunt creanda
sine necessitate. (Existences are not to be created without neces
sity) . For why should there be consciousness where mechanics explain
everything ? And if atoms are capable of receiving sensations, what
is the need of organs of sense ? And he calls attention to the fact
that Haeckel passes over the difficulty mentioned by Du Bois-Rey
mond : that the numberless atom-souls of the human brain cannot ex
plain the single harmonious consciousness of the human being. s
Other objectors to Du Bois-Reymond undertook to explain the influ
ence of one body upon another at a distance through empty space by
the supposition of a will inherent in the atoms, to which he replies
that this is indeed a wonderful will which is shared by two, and re
minds them that such a man as Newton gave up all hope of explain
ing the problem they would make clear.*
In a scornful passage Haeckel 6 speaks of the outworn notion that
the human consciousness is an insoluble problem, a transcendental
phenomenon in contrast to all other phenomena of nature. Haeckel's scornful
And he declares that it is on just this notion that men language
no argu-
base their belief in the specificaUy distinct quality of man ment.
and the doctrine of the immortaUty of the soul. He also intimates
that Du Bois-Reymond's lecture is distinguished for its rhetorical
grace rather than for its contents, and that the fair sex are Ukely to
be most partial to so " fair " a sermon. That all this offers no shadow
1 Vortrage, p. 83. a See Du Bois-Reymond, Vortrage, p. 84.
8 Vortrage, p. 83 f . * Ibid, p. 84 f . 6 Der Monismus als Band, p. 44.

32 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
of argument he probably feels, for he refers to his work on Freedom
in Science and Teaching for a defense of his views as against his ad
versary. But turning to that work we find 1 that his treatment of
the subject in hand furnishes no facts upon which to base a conclu
sion which could not be admitted by Du Bois-Reymond. Theories
and opinions there are which beg the whole question, to which he
would not consent. Between the two men, therefore, the dispute is
one of interpretation of facts; Haeckel interpreting them in accord
ance with his preconceived opinions and reaching the conclusion that
there is no such thing as mind, Du Bois-Reymond interpreting them
inductively and reaching the conclusion that all we know, and in the
nature of the case can know, of the brain must forever fail to explain
all the phenomena of mind. Haeckel goes beyond the warrant of the
facts; this Du Bois-Reymond refuses to do. The outcome of the
whole dispute can be summed up in a few words. Haeckel has failed
to show how material causes can produce nonmaterial effects, and he
has failed to show how the many supposedly conscious atoms of the
human brain can, combined, result in the individual consciousness
of the human mind.
In closing this part of the discussion we wish to caU attention to
the fact that it is by the unreserved appUcation of the principles of
materialism that these results have been reached. MateriaUsm, fol
lowed as far as it has ever been carried, has failed to explain the fun
damental facts of the human consciousness. Where Haeckel fails,
even with the aid of his atom-souls, it is useless for others to try.2
1 Chapter vii.
5 Clifford thinks it may some time be established that there is no mind without brain.
He does not pretend that such a conclusion is now established.— Lectures and Essays,
p. 269.

Refutation of the Materialistic Psychology. 33

CHAPTER TV.
refutation of the materialistic psychology.
The history just given of the dispute between Du Bois-Reymond
and Haeckel furnishes arguments sufficient to restrain any unpreju
diced mind from adopting the materiaUstic view of the mental life.
But our case against materialism is not complete. Many of Du Bois-
Reymond's utterances are so brief as to lose somewhat of their real
force except for those who are familiar with the points in dispute.
We emphasize therefore, first of all, the immense and impassable
chasm between thought and the phenomena of matter. "The state
of a man's brain and the actions which go along with it Chasm be-
tweenmen-
are things which every other man can perceive, observe, taiandma- tcri&l piiG-
measure, and tabulate ; but the state of a man's own con- nomena.
Sciousness is known to him only, and not to any other person. Things
which appear to us and which we can observe are caUed objects, or
phenomena. Facts in a man's consciousness are not objects or phe
nomena to any other man ; they are capable of being observed only
by him.1 We have no possible ground, therefore, for speaking of an
other man's consciousness as in any sense a part of the physical
world of objects or phenomena. It is a thing entirely separate from
it ; and aU the evidence that we have goes to show that the physical
world gets along entirely by itself." 2 There is no point at which
the distinction between mental and physical phenomena is more
marked than in connection with physical and mental pain. We are
perfectly able to distinguish them, and to trace the former to the
body, while the latter appears to have no relation to bodily condi
tions. Laughter may be caused either by tickling or by a ludicrous
idea ; but these causes differ totally from each other.
Because of this significant fact most investigators are disposed to
admit that, though brain processes and thought proc- Haeckel's
. identifica-
esses always appear together, there is no evidence that tion of
their relation is that of cause and effect. 3 Even Haeckel and energy.
is able to make the leap from brain processes as conditions of
1 Those who believe in mind reading object to this; but even for them it does not in
validate Professor Clifford's conclusion.
3 Clifford, Lectures and Essays, p. 260.
?So Tyndall: see British Association Report, 1868.

34 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
mental action to brain processes as causes of mental action only by
denying the distinction between thought and energy, and asserting
that the mysteries of matter and force are exactly identical with
those of consciousness.1 This he gives, of course, only as his opinion.
The opinions of the majority of those as able as himself are against
him. Aside from opinion, however, the identity of thought with
motion involves a contradiction ; for motion and space are the neces
sary concomitants of each other, but thought gets on without space.
To identify thought and energy leads to a similar difficulty, since it
violates the law of the conservation of energy. This law demands
that for every footpound of energy lost to one body there shaU be
stored an additional footpound in some other body. But if energy
be transformed into thought, energy is lost to the physical world,
since thought is not physical energy.2 Moreover, as Romanes points
out, we have no gauge for the quantity or the quaUty of thought pro
duced other than the effects of the thought. But a stupid fellow
might expend vast quantities of brain energy and yet produce no
valuable thought. It is an admitted fact that it is not all brain
energy, but energy of a brain of a certain quaUty which returns re
sults worth the effort. Hence there is no equivalency between the
physical causes and the psychical effects. In fact, there is no demon
strable connection between neurosis and psychosis but that of simul
taneity. This is practicaUy admitted by those who attribute mentality
to atoms. For if there can be mentaUty without brain, then why is a
brain necessary ? And if the movements of atoms in their infinitely
varied combinations are to be attributed to mentality, it must be a
much higher type of mentaUty than that of the human brain, for it
is very certain that this could never have produced a thought as infi
nitely varied and intricate as this world is. If it be replied that the
world is not the product of designing thought, then we are compeUed
to say that blind thought is superior to conscious thought. This is
not to be overcome by giving different names to different kinds of
human movements, as vegetative, reflex, etc., for none the less those
1 " The problem of the origin and nature of consciousness is only a special case of the
general problem of the connection of matter and force."— Freedom in Science and Teach
ing, p. 102. Clifford declares that if we accept the doctrine of evolution we must believe
that along with every motion of matter there is some fact which corresponds to the
mental fact in ourselves, since we cannot suppose that so enormous a jump from one
creature to another should have occurred at any point in the process of evolution as the
introduction of a fact entirely different and absolutely separate from the physical fact.
—Lectures and Essays, pp. 265, 266. He does not pretend, like Haeckel, that there is any.
thing In the action of the atoms themselves to indicate mentality even In the lowest de.
gree. a Comp. Romanes' Mind and Motion and Monism, p. C6.

Refutation of the Materialistic Psychology. 35
actions which are performed by atoms and even by plants afford us a
variety, deUcacy, and exactness unknown to the volitional acts of
man. Besides, this would leave human thought, which is teleological
and conscious, to be accounted for. So that materialism would fail
again in the realm of psychology.
Another insuperable difficulty in the way of the materialistic theory,
to which many have called attention, is that it makes of men con
scious automata.1 If it were not for consciousness, mate- Manasacon-
. scious au-
rialism could get on very well. But consciousness is the tomaton.
one great terror of materialistic thought, continuaUy heading it off,
whichever way it turns. Unconscious automata are perhaps conceiv
able, but conscious automata defy all our powers of conception. In
the first place, if aU the changes in the brain are determined by phys
ical causes, and if these changes in turn determine our thinking, our
mental states, then thought, which is not physical, can have no func
tion, since it cannot, by hypothesis, influence either the brain on the
one hand or further thought on the other. Thought is a product of
brain activity, but itself has nothing to do. This is a serious difficulty
from the standpoint of materiaUsm, which claims to be the special
champion of the doctrine of natural selection, according to which every
thing that is has some function to perform. Let the reader consider
what it means when it is declared that thought has never in any way
affected the welfare of the world nor modified human action in the
sUghtest degree, as it most surely has not if the contention of the
materiaUsts be true, that every condition of the brain is directly deter
mined by physical causes, and that thought is merely the product of
brain conditions. If this be true, and we could suppose no one ever to
have been conscious of any of his deeds, the world would be in exactly
the same state in which we find it to-day. A world of unconscious
actors would have done precisely the things which the world of con
scious actors has done, and would, therefore, have reached just the
state we have reached.
This supposition is an enormous tax upon our creduUty, since it
contradicts thought itseU. And it also emphasizes the uselessness of
consciousness, and thus contradicts one of the first princi- uselessness
pies of natural selection. If, in order to escape from this m materfai-
difficulty, we suppose thought to have a place in tho prog- ls 10 * e0ly*
ress of the world by regarding it as a mode of motion or a kind of
energy, then, since it is at least not physical energy, we have destroyed
1 Says Clifford, "We are more than automata, because we are conscious."— Lectures and
Essays, p. 263.

36 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
the doctrine of the conservation of energy. But this doctrine is the
principal barrier erected by materiaUsts against the theory that mind
may influence matter. There is no place left to which materialistic
thought may escape for safety.
We come next to consider the inadequacy of the materialistic theory
for the explanation of one of the greatest and most persistent facts of
Materialistic our self -consciousness, namely, our sense of freedom. We
denial of ,,,.,,- m. ,
freedom. have seen that Haeckel regards this as a delusion. Strecker
says that a materialism which undertakes to explain mental processes
by means of laws which are vaUd in the entire world cannot recognize
the freedom of the wfll ; a that the freedom of the wiU is a deception.
There is and can be no such thing. Not independent self-determina
tion, but iron necessity, rules aU the thoughts and actions of man, and
what has been regarded as free will is but a link in the chain of causes
which has existed from all eternity and wiU continue eternaUy ; in
which every member is the effect of what went before and will become
the cause of what foUows.2 " The man of honor and the malefactor
are made of the same material, and not free will, but the force of cir
cumstances, has made them what they are." 3 Such a view of the wfll
is the only consistent one for materialists to take.
We shaU not attempt to follow here aU the subterfuges to which
they resort in order to make it appear that their doctrine is not dan
gerous to morals. It is vain for them to point to those who have
denied freedom as among the most upright of men, for this is not a
fact in any instance where the denial has been consistent. Where it
is a fact it is to be accounted for on the ground that the denial has
been made for purely theoretical reasons, while in practice the deniers
have held themselves and others responsible. This is confessed by
Strecker.4 So that if this doctrine of materiaUstic determinism does
not affect men for evil, it is because of the force of the opinion that, in
spite of the theory, the persistent old notion is true that we are free,
and hence responsible. The only consistent view for materiaUsts to
take is the one held by some of their number, that repentance is both
needless and futile, since by hypothesis the act repented of was una
voidable, and since repentance can neither undo the deed nor affect
future conduct and destiny. No mental act can affect the brain, from
which alone all thought and action spring. B
If now we undertake to limit ourselves to the consistent material
istic conception, we find our mechanical brains, which work according
1 Welt und Menschheit, p. 83. a Ibid., p. 6 ff. » Ibid., p. 92. « Ibid., p. 90 f.
s As Lamettrie, see Lange's History of MateriaUsm, Boston, 1880, vol. ii, p. 85 f.

REFUTATION OF THE MATERIALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY. 37
to fixed and unchangeable physical laws, producing the strangest
series of contradictions. First, they have produced the delusion that
we are free and responsible, and made it so persistent a conviction that
it cannot be eradicated from our thinking. Second, they have pro
duced the opinion, in contradiction to that delusion, that we are not
free. Third, they make those who beUeve that aU actions are necessi
tated honor the benefactors of the race, praise virtue, condemn vice,
and pursue and punish the disturbers of our peace and of the social
order.1 And, fourth, they make us wear ourselves out trying to find
some way to reconcile aU these mental facts to this materiaUstic theory.
The charge we bring against materiaUsm, then, is that by denying
the freedom of our thinking and willing, and at the same time their
power to influence conduct, it fails to explain our sense Confusion of
of freedom and introduces confusion into aU our think- aristagfrom
• ni itprinl-
mg. When we remember that aU this results from an ism.
attempt to deduce everything in the realm of matter and of mind
from the application of the law of causality, and then recaU that this
law of causaUty is itself an article of faith, it does seem as though it
were better to adhere to the old faith which teaches us that we are
free. For it is, after aU, a question of which faith we shaU accept.
The preference should be given to the faith in freedom, since it is
native and spontaneous as weU as capable of giving consistency to our
thinking and conduct, while the faith of determinism is deduced from
an hypothesis and ends in moral disaster if consistently held, and in
confusion of thought and action if inconsistently held.2
This brings us to the final consideration which we shaU mention in
the argument against materiaUsm drawn from psychology. On mate
riaUstic principles, there is no trusting thought. We have Materialism
seen what dire confusion it introduces into the world of thevaUdity
ethics. No less confusion is there in the realm of abstract oftnougnt-
thinking, and that necessarily, if materialism be true. We cannot
control our thoughts. From simple perception to the highest forms
of mathematical reasoning, everything is predetermined by the pre
ceding physical conditions, upon which thought itself never reacts.
1 Welt und Menschheit, p. 90.
8 At this point we call attention to the evil practical effects of materiaUsm. The argu
ment is one we do not like, and we should not mention it but for the fact thatmaterialists
never grow weary of asserting the immense ethical superiority of their system to that of
Christianity. Suffice it to say that it is not Christian thinkers alone who affirm the evil
practical effects of materialism. See, for example, ForePsGehirn und Seele, p. 30; Paul
Cams' The Soul of Man, an investigation of the facts of Physiological and Experimental
Psychology, Chicago, 1891, p. 382; and Huxley's Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews,
New York, 1871, p. 127, and elsewhere.
5

38 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
No effort of ours can render our thinking more correct, for this is sim
ply one form of the delusion of free will. Now, however it may be
with the correctness of our sense impressions, whether they be true or
false, we can do nothing to correct them if we suspect them erroneous.
This suspicion itself is a result of precedent physical conditions, and if
our errors are to be corrected this result wfll be brought about by phys
ical conditions also. In fact, thinking is useless. If we try to think,
the effort springs from physical conditions ; if, knowing the useless
ness of the effort, we no longer try, our subsequent stupidity as weU
as the despair which led to it are all produced by this endless chain of
physical causes. Thus the conflict of thought is a conflict of physical
conditions. The man who sets himself up as a judge of another man's
thinking is simply foUowing a necessity of his physical nature. His
assurance that he is right and his opponent wrong is the result of the
same kind of causes.
If one grows skeptical in consequence, and says that on this princi
ple we cannot be sure of anything, even this is a product of physical
And also its conditions. Whichever way we "turn, we find no escape
sign cance. £rom ^ne jaws 0f physics. Thought has no significance.
The only consistent thing to do is to cease to think. We have no cri
terion except our own brain, which determines for each individual
what his thinking shaU be like, both as to substance and quaUty. If
we undertake, with Herbert Spencer, to introduce a saving element
into our thinking, not, indeed, for the present, but for the future, on
the theory that by natural selection those who think truly wfll sur
vive and those who think falsely wfll perish, we find ourselves con
fronted with the fact that, according to materiaUsm, right thinking
can only affect those who survive, but they and their offspring are
the ones who have already thought correctly. But even here right
thinking must mean right brain action, and, as Professor Bowne'
says, even this " would provide for valid thoughts only so far as they
are related to survival; whereas the bulk of our thoughts have no
bearing on survival. A mistake in our theory of double stars or in
solar physics would not be attended by any physical disaster. " " What
warrant, then, have we for trusting the report of thought on these
things ? " Thus it is that thought is reduced to chaos by the material
istic hypothesis which gives itself out for so superior a way of looking
at the facts of Ufe.
For all these reasons we must reject materialism and assert that it
is not a sufficient basis for the denial of the reality of the soul.
> Metaphysics, New York, 1882, p. 390; revised edition, 1898, p. 323.

The Materialistic Denial of God. 39

CHAPTER V.
THE MATERIALISTIC DENIAL OF GOD.
So far, then, atheism fails to satisfy the demands of thought. We
raise the question whether in its denial of God it can satisfy us any
better. In reaUty, we are entitled to deny atheism the right to expect
any further attention. It undertakes to prove that there is no super
sensuous existence. It has had a fair hearing and has completely
broken down in reference to the soul. What right have we to sup
pose that it can do any better with reference to its denial of God ?
Nevertheless, we shall not employ our advantage. If the materialistic
hypothesis can get on without God, let it prove its ability so to do.
Here again it is necessary to call attention to the inadequacy of the
materialistic view as confessed by its most pronounced advocates.
Strecker says that those who believe that matter never Difflcult„ ot
began to be must assume that motion is not as eternal as ™jt^ matte?
matter, but had a beginning. The question is, how mo- and motion-
tion was first imparted to matter. The supposition that motion arose
in the hitherto motionless matter as a result of a potential energy
which the latter possessed is untenable, since no explanation is thus
afforded. Without some external cause, however small, this poten
tial energy could not be transformed into kinetic. Idealism cannot
aid the materiaUst, since, contrary to the former, he holds that the
sensuous is the real world and admits no mysterious second world,
and confesses that our means of information are insufficient for a
clear and thorough understanding of the world. ¦ We must not won
der that so frank an avowal of the inadequacy of materiaUsm does
not turn its adherents away from it. They hold to the beUef that it is
not the inexpUcability of things on their hypothesis which causes the
trouble, but the limitations of the human understanding. Their faith
in the truth of their view is, therefore, without sufficient foundation.
In effect they say we cannot, by reason of the Umitations of the hu
man mind, demonstrate our theory ; but we maintain it nevertheless.
It is strange that Strecker does not recall his other confession, that
the articles of faith of materiaUsm, added to the knowledge we
possess of the world, are still not sufficient for its explanation.2
1 Welt und Menschheit, pp. 25-29. a Ibid, p. 14.

40 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
But as in the case of the materiaUstic psychology, so in reference
to the materialistic cosmogony, the confessed inadequacy of material
ism must not be the main reason for its rejection. The confession is
merely adapted to prevent those from taking such a step who have
not already given themselves up to it.
Supposition Materialism denies the need of any God to explain the
eternaiiyin existence of the universe in which we Uve, and asserts
111 that all that exists is matter with its forces. It is of
necessity assumed that matter has always existed, otherwise it must
have had a creator. Now, let us suppose that matter existed from
aU eternity in motion, or matter possessed of any and all the forces
necessary to the development of such a universe as ours, without a
mind to direct these forces. This is assuredly a most generous sup
position. Then the question arises, why we can reckon a period of
time in which, beginning with a rotating mass, the present universe
might have come to be. For, give as many billions of years as we
may to this process, no one pretends that it is eternal. What is the
reason this process is not further along ? The only answer that can
be given is again purely hypothetical, namely, that we do not know
but that our present universe is one of an eternal series which have
been coming into existence, and dissolving again into their original
elemental condition, and that this process will repeat itself eternaUy.
Now, when one is hard pressed in argument he can make any sup
position that wfll extricate him from immediate danger of annihila
tion, and this supposition is exactly of that sort. The idea' that
there will come in the course of ages such changes in physical condi
tions as will cause the heavenly bodies to coUide? thus generating such
heat as to reduce them to the original condition supposed in the nebular
hypothesis, has no foundation on which to rest, and would never have
been thought of but for the exigencies of the materiaUstic argument.
To support the hypothesis that there is nothing but matter and its
forces, such an hypothesis might be framed. But to support an hy
pothesis by an hypothesis which has no fact to support it, is certainly
a most unphilosophic and unscientific procedure, and has not been
much employed, be it said to their credit, even by materiaUsts them
selves. But if this heaping up of hypotheses must be disapproved, we
have on our hands the difficulty that matter, supposed to have had
eternally the potencies in operation necessary to the production of
such a world as ours, has produced it only in time.
But let us suppose the difficulties just mentioned to be not insoluble.
' Welt und Menschheit, p. 6.

The Materialistic Denial of God. 41
We should then have, instead of an inteUigent creator, eternal, un
created matter possessed of certain powers or capabilities as a result
of which a world is evolved, or a series of worlds. Now, we may ad
mit that, as we must posit something eternal, something without be
ginning, it is as conceivable that matter possessed of the assumed
potencies might be eternal as it is that an inteUigent creator is eternal.
Or, to put it in language more commensurate with the power of hu
man thought, we can as easily think of the former as existing prior to
everything else, or, as Herbert Spencer designates it,1 as self -existent,
as we can of God. If we must ask, Whence this matter ? we must
also ask, Whence this God?2 If anyone is inclined to doubt this,
let him reflect that it is because he has been accustomed to think of
God as the author of all things, himself being uncreated, and not be
cause of any inherent difficulty in the thought.3 When we come,
however, to apply the hypothesis of this supposed matter to the expla
nation of our present world, we find it inadequate. There Difficulty
is intelhgence in the world, and for this nonintelligent 2enceelin
matter cannot account. If it be said that intelhgence is world.
one of the quaUties of matter, the result is pantheism, with which we
shall deal later. But this pantheistic hypothesis is a yielding of the
'First Principles, p. 31.
3WissenschaftUche Vortrage uber relioglose Fragen, Zweite Sammlung, Frankfurt-am-
Main, 1878, p. 31.
3 We cannot agree with Professor Flint in complaining of the materialist for not prov
ing the eternity of matter. It is pertinent to question the arguments offered in its proof;
but the materialistic atheist has as good a right, though not as good reason, to assume
eternal matter as the theist has to assume an eternal God. His criticism of the argu
ment in favor of eternal matter is, we think, absolutely unanswerable. The argument in
question is that of the German materialist, L6wenthal, author of a widely read work en
titled System und Geschichte des Materialimus, Leipzig, 1862, and founder of a religious
community called " Cogitants ; " "a society which, on the one hand, makes thinking
and knowledge themselves the object of cultus, but, on the other hand, is based on the
cultivation of human dignity and human affection" (comp. Lange, History of Material
ism, vol. iii, p. 295), and is stated thus : " What has no end can have no beginning. What
cannot be destroyed can also not be created. Matter cannot be destroyed and conse
quently cannot be created ; it is without end, and therefore likewise without beginning— is
eternal." Thrown into syllogistic form we have two distinct arguments : first, "What
has no end can have no beginning ; matter has no end ; therefore it had no beginning."
The major premise is, to say the least, a pure assumption, in the nature of the case ut*
terly incapable of demonstration, and as a general proposition there is reason to believe
it false ; for instance, influences once set in motion as a result of mental action will prob
ably never end, yet we can mark their historical beginnings. But, aside from this, the
minor premise is also unproved. No one knows whether matter will have an end or not.
One's theory of the nature of matter must determine one's opinion on this question.
From these assumed premises it is proposed to demonstrate the eternity of matter.
The second argument runs : " What cannot be destroyed can also not be created ; matter
cannot be destroyed, therefore it was not created." What, we ask, has the indestructi
bility of a thing, once called into being, to do with the possibility of its creation? Again,
it is unproved that matter cannot be destroyed. Only as an hypothesis, therefore, is the
materialist justified in speaking of the eternity of matter. On the foregoing compare
Zollmann's Bibel und Natur in der Harmonie ihrer Offenbarung, GekrOnte Preisschrift,
Zweite Auflage, Hamburg, 1869, p. 52 ff.

42 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
doctrine of materialistic atheism, and is therefore fatal. Yet on no
other hypothesis can materiaUsm account for intelligence. Human
thought, to say nothing of animal intelligence, is the crushing weight
under which materialistic atheism, as an explanation of the world,
groans. But there is evidence that inteUigence was employed also in the
production of the nonintelUgent creation. However we may regard
the doctrine of design in nature, there can be no question that the
world does leave upon the human mind the impression of an adjust
ment for which it cannot account except on the hypothesis of an
intelligent somewhat in action. In order to get rid of this impression
we are obliged to think contrary to the laws of our own being. Our
only means of estimating possibiUties is ourselves. It is as human
beings that we are endeavoring to understand the world. Our whole
idea of causality, motive, and purpose springs from what we know
of ourselves. We are obliged by the Umitations of our own minds to
anthropomorphize everything which is not ourselves, whether it be
God or the world. We know full weU that in our own Uves results
are the outcome either of purpose or of what we are obUged to regard
as accident ; and that the inteUigent results — that is, those results
which are inteUigible to other beings like ourselves — are the outcome
of a more or less intelligent purpose. When we look at the world,
which is not the product of our own action, we are obliged to read
into it either purpose or accident. We have no other way of account
ing for things, whether within or without ourselves. And as we can
not account, on the ground of accident, for some results which we
know to be the work of man, so we cannot account, on the ground of
accident, for some things which we know to be not the work of man.
It is not so much particular results in nature which leave this im
pression as the whole scheme. When the world as a mechanism is
offered in explanation of things, we cannot, without dehumanizing
ourselves, refrain from the feeling that somehow inteUigence has to
do with the mechanism. The mechanical view of nature is as old as
scientific thought, to which, indeed, it has always been serviceable,
though only as united with dynamism. It appeals to us because
of its apparent simplicity. Matter, motion, and force, with space and
time as conditions,. are its only fundamental assumptions. All the
infinitely varied products of nature result from the interactions of
these elements. To be sure, certain laws of activity, as Newton's
laws of motion, are also assumed, but these follow as a matter of
course from the nature of the elements. When we consider, how-

J.HE MATERIALISTIC DENIAL OF GoD. 43
ever, that these general conceptions and laws are entirely inadequate
to the explanation of any single event in nature, and that for such an
explanation a particular assumption must be made for each particular
condition, "-he complexity of the theory becomes evident. For in
stance, why does water boil ? The fundamental assumptions furnish
the general conditions, but for the adequate answer we must supply
every specification that enters into the problem. Thus the mechani
cal theory leaves us just where we were before — it is itself as com
plex and as much in need of explanation as the facts it would explain.
It does not give us the faintest suggestion of an answer to the onto
logical question in which we are interested.
Atheism fails to satisfy our thinking as human beings. We must
posit a somewhat in which inteUigence plays a part. We must be
come either pantheists, or deists, or theists, even though Human think-
we say with the agnostic that we know nothing further of ing demands
this intelhgence than that it is. If anyone says that this
is to narrow the world down to our small way of thinking, we repeat
that we can judge of things only by what we know. If the world is
to be intelligible to us, it must be interpreted by means at our com
mand ; and all our philosophic and scientific thought is really an at
tempt to understand the world. Therefore it is supreme folly to cast
away the only criteria by which we can estimate what is about us. 1
If it be replied that judging the world in this way is to render our
knowledge of it insecure, since we may be totally wrong owing to our
acknowledged mental limitations, we answer that the only means we
have of knowing that we are limited in our power to know is the
application of our own judgment to that question. Should we carry
out the argument we are trying to answer, we might say that per
haps we are totally wrong in thinking our minds are limited.
As soon as we distrust our means and powers of knowing we re
duce all thinking to hopeless chaos. Hence, no argument can be
based on what we possibly do not know. All arguments must be
based on what we do know ; and we know that in the realm of hu
man activity we are compelled to attribute intelligence to many of its
results. Our criteria for judging nonhuman activities are the same
as those we apply to human. On this principle the conception of
eternal matter, possessed of any forces one may be pleased to bestow
upon it, cannot account to the human mind for the mechanism of the
1 Paulsen, though in the interest of idealistic pantheism, follows most other thinkers in
applying this method in the interpretation of the world. See his Einleitung in die Phi
losophic, Berlin, 1892, p. 242 ff.

44 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
world. We f uUy recognize that this argument does not prove intelli
gence in the conduct of the world. StiU, it does render such inteUi
gence probable, and it shows that the materiaUstic theory is not a suf
ficient basis for the denial of a God, and this is aU that we have
endeavored to demonstrate here.1
1 Romanes has some excellent remarks along this line. He takes up Herbert Spen
cer's doctrine of the persistence of force as rendering uniformity of law inevitable, and
shows that, even though it were admitted, It is nevertheless true that " the mere persist
ence of force, even if it were conceded to account for particular cases of physical se
quence, can give us no account of the ubiquitous and eternal direction of force in the
construction and maintenance of universal order." See Thoughts on Religion, p. 67 ff.

The Alleged Imperfections of the World. 45

CHAPTER VI.
the alleged imperfections of the world and intelligence
in creation.
We next take up the argument of atheism as drawn from the
suposed evfls and imperfections of the world. In fact, the evfls
to which we are subject, the reaUty of which we have
, . . . TWrd argu-
no disposition to underrate, do not militate against the ment of
atheism.
existence and intelhgence but against the goodness of
God, which is a Christian doctrine to be stated and defended when
the proper time arrives.1 It is not so with the alleged imperfections
of the world. They furnish an argument which the atheist may legiti
mately employ against the beUef in any God, since chance is more
likely to result in imperfection than is the act of creative inteUigence.
We point out here that this argument, however, presupposes a
finished world. From the point of view of those who hold to a sud
den creation the argument would be difficult to overcome Presupposes
if the facts of imperfection be substantiated. But if we a finished
.... world.
view the world as in process of evolution, as science, which
modern atheists affect so much to revere, teaches us to do, then we
should not expect perfection, but imperfection. A partiaUy devel
oped world must appear imperfect from the ideal standpoint. God
himself would so adjudge it. The only resource left for the atheist,
then, is to assert that God would have created the world outright and
perfect, and since the world has not so come into existence God has
had nothing to do with it ; that the only use we have for a God is to
create a perfect world. But no finite being can predict what infinite
wisdom would elect to do ; and atheists themselves do not pretend to
say that God would have done as we have supposed. Hence the ar
gument of atheism from the imperfection of the world is valueless.
But even on the supposition that the world is complete, the imper
fections which it is supposed to exhibit do not necessarily
rr Argument
prove that infinite inteUigence did not produce it. Where from anal-
there is so much that appears like intelUgent action as it
is admitted the world affords, the argument from analogy would re-
'See division Iv, section ii, chapter v; and division viii, section vii, chapter ii and
chapter iii.

46 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
quire us to suppose that what does not appear such is nevertheless
like all the rest. As the knowledge of nature increases, the realm
which seems to human judgment unmeaning becomes constantly nar
rower ; and this fact should lend force to the analogical argument just
mentioned. It should also make us cautious about calling anything
unmeaning or imperfect, since if our knowledge were more compre
hensive and exact our estimates might be reversed. And we caU at
tention once more to the fact that this supposition is not arbitrary,
but founded upon the history of man's acquaintance with the world.
So, then, although these aUeged imperfections might arouse in us a
suspicion that they evince chance rather than design, they cannot
possibly prove that it is so ; while in reaUty the preponderance of evi
dence is on the other side.
But we raise the question whether these alleged imperfections are
imperfections in fact. Martineau in his Study of ReUgion ¦ takes up
Martineau's this question and negatives it ki an exhaustive consider-
ation of the facts. He classifies them as (1) those caUed
useless and unmeaning, and (2) those regarded as positively hurtful.
Under the former he mentions faults found in the inorganic world,
such as the ice of the poles and the parching heat of the equatorial
regions ; the vast deserts and seas uninhabitable by man ; the desola
tion wrought by earthquakes, volcanoes, and hurricanes ; the absence
of atmosphere and water in the moon, one side of which alone is ever
turned toward the earth and whose periodic time gives us such
scanty glimpses of its face ; the great gap between Mars and Jupiter
with its insignificant asteroids ; the excessive heat of Mercury and
cold of Neptune ; the fifteen years of alternate night and day near
Saturn's poles ; the progressive cooUng, contraction, and resistance
which must reduce the whole to a dead mass; and the enormous
waste of space, unfilled by worlds, and of light, diluting itself through
vacancy. Turning to the organic kingdom he mentions organs, such
as the spleen and some glandular bodies, to which we can assign no
function ; the wings of the ostrich, the feet of the sloth, and the ant
lers of the deer, which but ill perform their function ; and organs
never developed in the animal that bears them, as the teeth of the
embryonic whale and bird ; the pretense of wings in numerous in
sects that never fly ; the muscle under the skin used by the horse for
throwing off flies, but which, though traceable in man, he has no
power to use, and the functionless mammae on the breast of most
mammalian males. 1 New York, 1888, vol. I, pp. 352-398.

The Alleged Imperfections of the World. 47
We cannot even condense here his reply to these criticisms of
creation ; but we cite one sentence which gives the clew to it. He
says: " Facts of this kind may fairly enough be caUed Value of al
leged use-
unmeaning, if no more is intended by the phrase than less provi-
si ons of
that we do not know their raison d'etre ; and useless, if, nature.
in order to try them, a purpose is assumed which they fail to serve.''
The fact is that whereas men call these things useless and unmeaning,
they ought only to say they appear to us unmeaning and useless.
Nor is this astonishing. We must judge according to our capacities
if we judge at all ; though perhaps modesty would suggest that we
refrain from judging concerning that of which we know so little.
We have absolutely no way of knowing what the effects would be
were things in nature different from what they are. Speculation on
that question is useless, even if nothing in nature is useless. Though
we should aUow that man's happiness only is to be consulted, still it
is evident that there is ^precious little, if anything, which is useless
and unmeaning even to our minds. We must consider that for
man's interest in nature variety is needful, and some of the things
above mentioned contribute to variety if to no other end. Man needs
beauty, and what is more beautiful than the waxing and the waning
moon? To this must be added that the moon is earth's timepiece
for some of man's larger periods of time. The vast spaces of the sky
develop a sense of awe ; and to this end even earthquakes, volcanoes,
and hurricanes contribute. Undeveloped organs give us hints of the
laws of development in the organic world. Deserts and oceans de
velop the energy and the spirit of enterprise in man, and have pre
vented the too wide dispersion of men over the face of the earth, to
say nothing of other uses. We do not say that these are the ends
which the things mentioned were intended to secure. We do say
that they serve these, with many other ends, and that it is folly
to assert that there is anything in the world which is useless and
unmeaning to man.
There is nothing that the atheist enjoys more than to charge believ
ers in God with anthropomorphism. This word is frequently hurled
at us also by those who profess to be unusuaUy objective in their
thinking. But in maintaining that there are meaningless products
in nature the theorist either assumes the strictly human standpoint
according to which all that does not in some way minister to man
is held to be without significance, or he presumes to judge the mean
ing of each particular product in its relation to the whole purpose of
the universe. If he is not anthropomorphic he must be omniscient.

48 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Under those provisions of nature which have been complained of as
positively hurtful Martineau discusses three classes. His treatment
is so exceUent that, though we cannot quote at length
on the hu- his splendid rhetoric, we condense his argument for the
1113.11 6V© benefit of the reader. The first class is that comprising
supposed faulty single organs of the animal economy. For example,
the human eye has been charged by Helmholtz and others with
serious imperfections, concerning some of which Helmholtz says:
"Now, it is not too much to say that if an optician wanted to seU me
an instrument which had all these defects, I should think myself
quite justified in blaming his carelessness in the strongest terms."1
In view of Helmholtz's high standing in the scientific world this
appears serious, though few of us are aware that the normal human
eye is so imperfect and none of us know it except by scientific study ;
so that for practical purposes the eye does its work in a satisfactory
manner. No criticism on the theoretical imperfections of the eye
can weigh against creative wisdom if, after all, it perfectly answers
its ends. And this Helmholtz himself admits. "The eye has every
possible defect that can be found in an optical instrument, and even
some which are peculiar to itseU. " 2 " AU these imperfections would be
exceedingly troublesome in an artificial camera obscura and in the
photographic picture it produced. But they are not so in the eye." '
After further discussion he adds the foUowing refutation of himself :
" The adaptation of the eye to its function is therefore most com
plete, and is seen in the very limits which are set to its defects. Here
the result which may be reached by innumerable generations work
ing under the Darwinian law of inheritance coincides with what the
wisest wisdom may have devised beforehand.'''' *
Another instance of alleged unskUUulness in nature is cited from
Darwin," as follows: "Can we consider the sting of the wasp or of
the bee as perfect, which, when used against many attack-
Darwin on ° •>
the sting of ing animals, cannot be withdrawn, owing to the backward
serratures, and so inevitably causes the death of the insect
by tearing out its viscera?" But Darwin himself suggests that this
is a case of a misapplied tool. Originally intended for cutting grooves
in wood, which purpose it answered weU, it is sometimes employed as
a bayonet. Hence it is the misuse, not the use, of the sting which is
1 Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, translated by E. Atkinson, with an introduc
tion by Professor Tyndall, 1873, vi ; and Recent Progress of the Theory of Vision, trans
lated by Dr. Pye Smith, p. 219.
« Popular Lectures, p. 227. s Ibid., p. 224. * Ibid., p. 228.
* Origin of Species, chapter vi, p. 202.

The Alleged Imperfections of the World. 49
fatal. Besides, if the bee or wasp confined the use of its sting to war
with its own kind it would receive no harm, as observation proves.
And we add to what Martineau has said the consideration that the
death of the insect in attacks upon men or domestic animals is really
to be regarded as a benign and wise provision, tending to teach it
better morals and to spare the human race from needless pain ; for
aU its attacks upon others than its own kind are unnatural and un
necessary. The second class of supposed hurtful phenomena has to do with the
law of birth which regulates the arrival of new beings ; whether (a)
of individuals, or (fi) of species.
(a) The fecundity of animals, for instance, especiaUy of the lowest
types, apparently amounts to a frightful excess. The herring's roe,
the duck which wfll lay nearly one hundred, and the goose Exccssiv©
which wfll lay about thirty eggs per year, are illustra- fecundity of animals.
tions. Even among quadrupeds the provision for succes
sors is profuse, the annual offspring of the rabbit, for example,
amounting to upward of thirty. Of aU these preparations for life
only a smaU proportion can fulfill its apparent end. In such dispro
portion between preparation for and realization of the ends of Ufe is
there any trace of wisdom ? In seeking an answer to this question
it is necessary first of all to consider that, unlike ourselves, nature has
no occasion for parsimony. Says Madame Dudevant : " Do we say
that the exuberance of shrubbery and fruit is an error of nature ?
Nature is prodigal because she is rich, not because she is foolish." •
But, again, though a grain of wheat, for example, may miss its own
intended end by finding its way into a loaf of bread, does it thereby
fail of at least one of its natural purposes ? Nearly every- pr0ved to
thing has an evident end in relation to something outside e un ue-
of itseU. We can say that anything misses its end, then, only in
case it misses every end it is adapted to subserve ; and Martineau
might have added that in nature there is at least the hint of the
Christian doctrine that nothing exists for itself alone, but that its
highest reason for existence is its serviceableness to its neighbors.
If its defeat, so far as itself is concerned, is better for its neighbors
than its own perseverance, has it then added nothing to the general
good? Is there then no sign of wisdom? "Whatever may be said,
from considerations of humanity, against the system of prey, . . .
it thus escapes the charge of breach of promise." Even the death of
so many human infants is no evidence of unwisdom, and the con-
1 Nouvelles Lettres d'un Voyageur, Paris, 1877, referred to by Martineau in loc.

50 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
trary opinion springs from an unwarranted expectation of long life.
An infant has its right of existence not alone in view of an adult state
that is to be, but also in view of what it is as an infant. If we con
sider our own instead of the infant's claim to its right to continued
life, we are in no better position to find fault with the wisdom which
provides for early deaths. For to no parent can the value of child
hood be estimated, even though the parent's farther expectation be
not realized.
(b) StiU sharper criticism is apphed to the birth-law of new species,
on the assumption that it is correctly defined in the Dar-
LicfsmofCthe winian hypothesis. Of the numerous "accidental" vari-
of1 spelefes ations which hving organs may spontaneously take myri-
answered. ^ ^^ ^ ^.^ ^ only thoge wm gtand which aid the
animal in holding its footing in the world. The copartners in these
happy changes find each other out and start the successful famines,
thus founding fresh species. In the process nature destroys infinitely
more of her own work than she preserves ; makes many failures for
one hit. " If," says Lange,1 " a man, in order to shoot a hare, fired off
milUons of gun barrels in aU random directions upon a great moor ; if,
in order to get into a shut room, he brought ten thousand keys at
haphazard and tried them aU ; if, in order to obtain a house, he built
a city, and abandoned the superfluous houses to wind and weather,"
no one would " suppose that in this procedure there lay a higher wis
dom, recondite reasons, and superior skill." In answer Martineau
premises that the shot hare, the fitted key, the occupied house, stand
for any new species which nature sets up, or a new organ that had
been wrought out. The random discharges, wrong keys, empty tum
ble-down houses, represent the aimless, fumbling, wasteful activity of
nature on her way to the new species, the disappearance, without
trace, of innumerable abortions from the world. But, allowing the
Darwinian hypothesis, where are the millions of failures from the
midst of which success has emerged ? Are the real steps of evo
lution that have now advanced to man, the intermediaries between
the ascidian and Shakespeare, to be regarded as missing shots ? That
can hardly be, since they are the very means that have conducted to
the end, and have not failed. Nor can we treat as failures those lines
of variation which have resulted in something else than the human
species. Unless everything is to be condemned as abortive which, in
leading to an ulterior nature, at present stops short of it though car
rying in it its own minor end, there is not the slightest resemblance
1 Gesohlchte des Materialismus, Zweltes Buch, 2ter Abschnit, p. 264.

The Alleged Imperfections of the World. 51
between the real process of the organic world and the senseless actions
with which Lange compares it.
The third class has to do with the law of death, which provides for
the dismissal, from the world, of superseded beings. While the struc
ture of sentient creatures might suggest intelligence, it is said that
a contemplation of the brevity of their existence indicates that nature
sets no value on her own work, and hence leaves no room for the
hypothesis of intelligence. But, says Martineau, whatever ends are
pursued in nature must be temporary ends, admitting of The law of
reahzation within a Umited term of existence, and the fended.
vanishing of that existence affords no evidence that its purpose
has broken short or failed. We can think of no better means of ren
ovation than by the substitution of new organisms for old. Even
the instinctive dread of death, if not checked by other facts, would
produce ruin. Such a fact is the beneficence of death. In the case of
human death also there is at least good reason to see inteUigence, to
say nothing of beneficence. There may be advantages in a longer
term of life, but the question is, How long should the term be ? Indi-
viduaUy we should never, probably, be willing to die, nor to have our
friends die, if our powers and theirs did not decay. Were the term
prolonged so as to give us the centuries of Methuselah there would be
no gain to man unless maturity were reached as early as with us ; in
which case the world would be soon filled, and with but a limited
number of families. If childhood, youth, manhood, and old age were
long in proportion to the entire life, the effect would simply be to make
progress slower. Under the former supposition society would exist
on the principle of immense clans, and the fathers would possess an
undue preponderance of influence as compared with youth. Under
the latter supposition children would be born late in the life of their
parents and far apart, so that to newcomers in the world the old
would be older, and companions few. Besides, if great minds, such
as that of Newton, continued among men for centuries, the general
knowledge would be increased, but a few minds would do aU the work,
thus discouraging effort with its consequent mental development.
And if it were still regarded advantageous to have our benefactors
live long, it must be remembered that the tyrants and wicked men
would have a similar lease of life.
These considerations relative to the supposed blemishes in nature
show that after all there is no adequate ground, for calling them blem
ishes. If there is no such ground then there is no reason to be drawn
from them which would warrant the denial of inteUigence in the

52 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
ordering of the world, as the atheist does. We have given a large
space to this entire third argument of atheism because it is the pop-
Atheistic ar- ular one; the people employ it or are staggered by it.
g u m e n t
from im- It now seems evident that, although there are some inex-
popular but plicable mysteries in the world, they are not sufficient
w 1 tho ut , , ¦,,.-, ¦ * r
force. to overthrow the preponderant evidences m favor of
inteUigence; so that the atheistic view has no basis here on which
to rest.
In our whole treatment of the subject of atheism we have endeav
ored to observe the Christian law of thinking no evil. We have
striven to attribute to thoughtful atheists an unaffected sincerity. We
ask them to give our remarks an equaUy fair consideration. Their
difficulties wfll not all be removed. But we think that enough has
been said to accomplish our purpose, namely, to show that, whether
there be any other and better way of accounting for the world, at
least the atheistic theory does not account for it.

-ri-tuNObiiuisM uu ij_u.vi.jiji jvs a Practical System. 53

SECTION II.-AGNOSTICISM.
CHAPTER I.
THE AGNOSTICISM OF HUXLEY AS A PRACTICAL SYSTEM.
Agnosticism is a word of recent origin, invented by Professor
Thomas H. Huxley, as an epithet by which to designate Huxley's
his intellectual attitude toward conclusions of atheism, oV^tVe1
theism, pantheism, materialism, idealism, and Christianity. word-
Most people had, in their own judgment, more or less successfully
solved the problem of existence by one means or another, while Pro
fessor Huxley felt sure that he had not solved it, and, moreover, was
pretty strongly convinced that the problem was insoluble ; that is,
that all the others were deceived in thinking they had solved it. In
this conviction he was conscious of having Hume and Kant on his
side. Yet he could find no term by which to designate this mental
attitude, until, in the reflection that the gnostics of Church history
professed to know so much about the very things of which he was
ignorant, he hit upon the term agnostic' This account of the origin
of the epithet agnostic, given by its inventor, relieves him of the
charge of attempting, by the adoption of the term, to shift the issue
in relation to the Church and Christianity,2 though the affirmation
connected with the charge that the term ' ' involves a mere evasion"
is, we think, in practice, true. So, then, agnosticism was not intended
to be a mere cowardly name for atheism, since it originally designated
an ignorance as to matters of fact which the atheist does not profess.
Nevertheless, the agnostic position is one that troubles the atheist
very little. He is quite content with those who, though gngnt differ-
they will not say they know or are certain that there is no twcen *a|-
God, take up the position that they do not know, or have Sthel s't'ic
no evidence sufficient to convince them, that there is a position.
God. For in fact this is exactly the position maintained by most
] Huxley's Essays upon Some Controverted Questions, New York, 1892, p. 27. The ety
mology of the word has been criticised and its needlessness pointed out by President
Schurman's Belief in God, New York, 1893, Lecture I.
2 This charge was made by Dr. Wace, Principal of King's College, London, in a paper
read at the Manchester Church Congress, 1888. See Christianity and Agnosticism, New
York, 1889, p. 6.
6

54 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
atheists, and there can be no doubt that, whether by intention or not,
agnosticism has greatly strengthened theoretical and practical athe
ism. That it has also served and wfll yet serve to moderate the excess
ive dogmatism of some theologians is one of the proofs that, as we have
our treasure in earthen vessels, we need those who, by their extremes
of denial, lead us to inquire whether we have not ventured to be wise
above that which is written. The genuine agnostic, in the sense indi
cated by Professor Huxley's history of the origin of the term, may
find fault when we assert, as knowledge, details concerning things un
seen, though he can find no fault if we assert them as beliefs, even
though he may not regard our beUefs weU founded with respect ta
those things.
But agnosticism, as denned by Huxley himself, is something more
than a conditon of ignorance. "Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed
but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous appUcation of
a single principle." ' " Positively the principle may be expressed : In
matters of the intellect foUow your reason as far as it will take you
without regard to any other consideration. And negatively : In mat
ters of the inteUect do not pretend that conclusions are certain which
are not demonstrated or demonstrable." If we rightly understand
Agnosticism this description of agnosticism it is a method of investiga-
of^nves°tf- tion in matters with which the inteUect concerns itself.
gation. It insists that when the inteUect is at work it shall employ
reason only, pushing aside any and all other considerations. The em
ployment of this method may lead us, as Professor Huxley says it led
him,2 " nowhere else but into the dark depths of a wild and tangled
forest ;" but this discovery should not deter us from foUowing our rea
son " as far as it wfll take us." We are concerned just now, not to
attempt a refutation, but a statement of agnosticism ; stiU, we cannot
refrain from declaring that, if in foUowing reason alone we are
led in our thinking nowhere but " into the dark depths of a wild and
tangled forest," we certainly have just cause to suspect, either that
we have misread the signboard and have been following some other
than the path of reason, or else that, after all, reason may be a good
path to follow, part but not all of the way, through the continent of
thought. This, not that we should shrink from foUowing reason into
those dark depths because they are unpleasant or frightful to us, but
because when we see that any road, be it reason or any other, takes
us nowhere, but constantly plunges us further into intellectual confu
sion, we should suspect the sufficiency of the road we have chosen.
1 Essays upou Some Controverted Questions, p. 281. > Ibid, p. 276.

Agnosticism of Huxley as a Practical System. 55
We must do this, unless we have deliberately decided that the uni
verse is unintelligible, and this the agnostic cannot know. If he has
the slightest suspicion that it is inteUigible, and discovers that reason,
followed alone, makes it wholly unintelligible, it would be an evi
dence of nothing but dogmatic stubbornness of the most antiagnos-
tic kind to be minded, as Professor Huxley says,1 "to go straight on
until I either come out on the other side of the wood or find there is
no other side to it, at least, none attainable by me."
This discussion has not been intended to afford any argument
against agnosticism as such, but merely to bring to hght this method
of foUowing to its last consequences the lead of reason alone, in mat
ters of inteUect, and not aUowing ourselves to be deterred by any
consequences of any kind whatever. And we have now reached a
point where it has become plain that if agnosticism, as Based 0n a
Huxley adheres to it, is not a creed, it is a method based creed-
on a creed whose principal article is the exclusive right of reason to
guide us in matters of inteUectual activity ; and that Professor Hux
ley holds fast to this creed with a grim determination not surpassed
by any theological dogmatist of any age.*
In order to exhibit further the Huxleyan agnosticism we turn to his
negative expression of the principle which underlies agnosticism as a
method. It might be pertinent to show that in following reason so
faithfully Professor Huxley has acted at least as though the wisdom of
such foUowing were demonstrated or demonstrable. But, whether
pertinent or impertinent, to call attention to the fact has the merit of
bringing us to see that in this negative expression of his principle he
has said nothing new nor to the point. For all will admit it as it stands,
but each will reserve the right to determine what has been demon
strated or is demonstrable. Professor Huxley regards the F u r t h e r
cbaraeteri-
sufficiency of reason as so demonstrable that he would fol- z at ion of
agn osti-
low it, which he did, his life long, though intellectually it cism.
led him through (and kept him in) the dark depths of a wild and tan
gled forest. The majority of us would consider that very result as
sufficient demonstration that reason, or at least Professor Huxley's
use of it, was not a sufficient guide in intellectual concerns.
But not only is there difficulty in determining when any proposition
is demonstrated or demonstrable ; it is to be observed also that it
touches only the regarding of conclusions as certain without demon-
1 Essays upon Some Controverted Questions, p. 277.
2 That Huxley continued to the end this adherence to the agnostic creed is made clear
by E. Clodd, in his Pioneers of Evolution, New York, 1897, pp. 201-266. Comp. also an
article on Professor Huxley's Creed, in the Quarterly Review, vol. clxxx, pp. 160 ff.

56 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
stration. If we regard them as probable, in other words, the princi
ple of agnosticism as here laid down does not affect them.
Again, this exposition of agnosticism as a method would not be
even relatively complete did we not call attention to the significance
of the word method itself. A method is a process for reaching results.
Professor Huxley has described agnosticism as a method for reaching
intellectual results ; that is, conclusions. He has made reason the
sole instrument employed in the process. That, hovever, is not the
point here. The point is that agnosticism, as interpreted by Huxley,
is not content to remain in a condition of ignorance concerning the
problems of existence, but has its own methods of investigating
those problems. In other words, it proposes, not to aUow atheists,
theists, pantheists, etc., to do all the work of investigation, but to
enter upon that work itself, in its own way. It is not content with
Agnosticism the role of a mere spectator ; much less to ignore the
to remain questions at issue. Hence we must expect it to reach con-
rance. elusions. From this point of view, even though we had
none of the conclusions of agnostics before us, we should be compeUed
to look at it with a profound degree of interest, if not of anxiety. For,
to change the figure, it enters the field with the assertion that aU of us
have failed to find the solution we have claimed, and, further, it has
an exclusive method by which such investigations should be con
ducted. Thus Christians are compelled to see in agnosticism, not a
state of mental ignorance relative to God and the soul, but, at least
in some respects, an antagonist.
In order that we may stiU more completely understand the nature
of Huxleyan agnosticism, we must take a further statement from the
great scientist. " Agnosticism," he says,1 "is not properly described
as a ' negative ' creed, nor indeed as a creed of any kind, except in
so far as it expresses absolute faith in the validity of a principle
which is as much ethical as inteUectual." This principle is the one
just discussed, as stated in its intellectual aspects. As to its ethical
aspects he says : " This principle may be stated in various ways, but
they all amount to this : that it is wrong for a man to say that he is
certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce
evidence which logically justifies that certainty." Further: "The ap-
Results plication of that principle results in the denial of or the
reached by ....
agnostic suspension of judgment concerning, a number of Dronosi-
method. ,. , . , r r
tions respecting which our contemporary ecclesiastical
' gnostics ' profess entire certainty." All this is intended as an ethical
1 Essays upon Some Controverted Questions, pp. 350,351.

LUItUO IILHOIU \JJ* XJ- UAiifJ 1

as a Practical System. 57

justification of the denial of, or the suspension of judgment concern
ing, a number of propositions connected with the Christian system.
As he does not limit the ecclesiastical gnostics by any other word
than contemporary, and as the controversy which occasioned his re
marks was with Protestant theologians, we may presume that he had
in mind Protestant doctrines or propositions. Perhaps he has gone
too far in attributing to these "gnostics" entire certainty. But,
whether this be the case or not, at least we see that agnosticism of
the Huxleyan type leads to the denial of these propositions — or at
least to suspension of judgment concerning them ; and not only as
an intellectual necessity, but also as an ethical.
The denial of a proposition certainly bears a strong resemblance to
what is ordinarily called a negative creed ; and the same closely re-
may be said, though in a lower degree, of suspension of creed 6neg^
judgment concerning it. Both of them are unqualifiedly chrisUani-
negative when compared with the assertions made by Jesus y'
Christ. In response to Christ's positive assertion the Huxleyan agnos
tic says, "Surely not," or at least, " Perhaps not." When Professor
Huxley appeals to his conscience, and declares that it forbids him to
do otherwise because he can produce no "evidence which logically
justifies " certainty, he plainly refuses all evidence whatever, and de
nies or suspends judgment simply because he has assigned these propo
sitions a purely intellectual significance and because he has followed
reason alone, "without regard to any other consideration." Thus
each agnostic judges all, or at any rate some, of the essentials of the
Christian system by the light of reason alone, putting aside all other
considerations such as the effects of Christianity on the individual
Christian life. And each makes reason coequal with his own individ
ual reason. He will not aUow the judgments of others any weight.
This would be to give up the agnostic principle as interpreted by
Huxley. If it is proper to speak of the pride of reason, surely it is
proper to do so here. For while we may trust reason implicitly, ab
stractly considered, it is very certain that experience teaches us that
reason as used in almost every concrete instance has led men more
or less astray.
We point out then here some of the fatal defects of agnosticism so far
as we have already studied it. It establishes the individual reason as
the sole guide in inteUectual concerns. It makes a virtue of standing
by the findings of the individual reason, regardless of what they are.
All this sounds exceedingly plausible. For who is not wflling to
praise the power of reason ? and who does not recognize the courage of

58 Foundations of the Christian .faith.
the man who wfll follow so infaUible a guide to any length, even to
the martyrdom of being led into the " dark depths of a wild and tan
gled forest to which there is no other side ? " The man who wfll do
that must be a truth-seeker indeed. But, alas ! the infaUibflity of the
Fallibility of individual reason is not demonstrated nor demonstrable,
uai reasom though its frequent falUbility is. So then the Huxleyan
agnostic is, to say the least, inconsistent when he accepts as so very
secure the guidance of reason. He is obliged to do as other mortals,
accepting some guide and trusting in its leadings to the end. Only
he is doubly credulous ; for he accepts the abstract thing caUed rea
son, and also his own appUcation of it, without regard to any other
consideration whatever.
Furthermore, this principle, so far from being "the fundamental
axiom of modern science," as Professor Huxley assures us it is,' vio
lates the principles of scientific investigation at every point. True
science does not follow reason even though it leads into the " dark
depths of a wild and tangled forest." When any principle, whatever
it be, fails to lead the investigator into clearer knowledge, he rejects
it. When, in the use of reason, men are led into intellectual dark
ness in any realm of thought, science teUs them that either they are
not using reason or they are making an inadequate or otherwise im-
Agnostic ProPer use °f it. Science advances on the principle of re-
u nVci en*- Jectmg a:nJ method which affords no clear and harmonious
tific. view of all known facts in a given realm ; and it will rea
son on all facts, refusing to declare alleged facts no facts because
apparently out of harmony with the reasoner's reason. Science em
ploys reason to account for the fact, not as a universal means by
which to determine whether alleged facts be real facts. In determin
ing facts reason is indeed employed ; but so is observation. We do
not need reason, in the sense in which Professor Huxley uses the term,
to determine whether we have a headache, or experience happiness,
or anticipate disaster. These are facts to be explained, and in the
process of explanation reason is employed ; but if it fail to explain
them we should call in some other aid, refusing to follow reason,
even though it confused our minds with reference to the facts.
Huxley is not alone in his appreciation of reason. In this all intel-
lectuaUy earnest thinkers would foUow him. But he forgets what
some others remember, namely, that reason is but a logical apparatus
for the attainment of insight. Granting that one employs his reason
correctly, the outcome may still be intellectual confusion, owing to
1 Essays upon Some Controverted Questions, p. 281.

Agnosticism of Huxley as a Practical System. 59
wrong or inadequate data and presuppositions. The fact that Huxley
remained to the end in the "wfld and tangled forest " indicates that
his data or his presuppositions, or both, should have been subjected
to a thoroughgoing criticism and revision. Had this been done he
would have found, as so many others have found, that to this tangled
forest there is "another side."

60 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
HUXLEY'S deceptive terminology.
The history of the word agnosticism which Professor Huxley gives
shows that it was coined for the purpose of expressing an attitude or
condition of mind with reference to the great problems of religion. We
have seen also that the principle which underlies the agnostic method
is, according to Huxley, that reason is a safe and the only proper
guide, no matter where it brings us ; and that the appUcation of the
principle ' ' results in the denial of, or the suspension of judgment
concerning, a number of propositions respecting which our contem
porary ecclesiastical ' gnostics' profess entire certainty."
Did agnosticism do nothing more than this last it would not be so
very dangerous. But it does not stop with the suspension of judg
ment concerning these propositions ; it acts as though they were not
true. "In the business of life," says Professor Huxley,1 " we constantly
take the most serious action upon evidence of an utterly insufficient
Huxley on character. But it is surely plain that faith is not entitled
ratiocfna- to dispense with ratiocination, because ratiocination can
not dispense with faith as a starting point; and that,
because we are often obhged by the pressure of events to act on very
bad evidence, it does not follow that it is proper to act on such evi
dence when the pressure is absent." Several things must be noted
in connection with these statements. First, they are made in order
to illustrate the use of faith in "the business of life," on the one hand,
and in religion on the other. Second, it is assumed that the evidence
upon which religious action depends is "very bad," " utterly insuffi
cient." Third, that while we act on such evidence in "the business
of Ufe," we need not act upon it in matters of reUgion, because, in the
former, pressure is brought to bear which requires action, whfle in
the latter there is no such pressure. Now, we shall pass over the as
sumption that the evidence for religious action is utterly insufficient.
This is not the place for the display of the evidence. We confine
ourselves to the third point noted. While, according to the agnostic
principle, in matters of intellect we must follow reason alone, no
1 Essays upon Some Controverted Questions, p. 280.

Huxley's Deceptive Terminology. 61
matter where it leads us, it appears that the considerations which
should govern us in the business of life are not applicable in religion,
because the pressure is present in the one and absent in the other.
These two agnostic principles completely destroy all religious belief
and all religious activity ; that is to say, according to Professor Hux
ley, they leave nothing of religion.
Now, we all admit that we act in many cases on very insufficient
evidence, because action is demanded. The evidence that one can
earn a Uvelihood in a given line of business may be very
inadequate, but if this is the only line open to him he is '.' pressure"
^ J r in religion.
obliged to follow it or go hungry. The pressure of need
is upon him. But we judge that Professor Huxley feels no pressure
of religious need, and that he attributes his own state to all others.
If not, he ought to have made it clear that all who feel such need
are as properly within limits when they act on the bad evidence
of reUgion as when they act on bad evidence in any other practical
concern. For religion is not merely, nor chiefly, a series of propo
sitions. Even the credal propositions we possess are all designed
to bear on the practical side of religion, though some of them
may be confessed to bear very remotely upon it. Religious action
grows out of the needs of the heart as truly as business action
springs from the needs of the body. The pressure does not arise
from the same source, but it is as great in one realm as in the other.
That it appears otherwise is owing to the fact that we have as the
basis of life a physical being to which we have given far more attention
than we have to our spiritual nature. But even if one were dis
posed to deny that the pressure is as great in reference to religion
as it is in reference to food, still it is false to assume that it is
whoUy absent in any considerable number of cases with reference to
the former.
We cannot help asking what is meant by evidence of an utterly
insufficient character. Insufficient for what ? For the estabhsh-
ment of a proposition? If that is what is meant, would we act in
Professor Huxley teU us that where pressure is absent £& without
we must not act? If it is irrational to act in the absence a^merce-
„ ., ' * i. nary kind.
of certainty except where there is a pressure of events,
even science itself will make slow progress. For science acts on
many a hypothesis the evidence for which is, at first, utterly insuffi
cient for its confirmation ; and it acts on it in the hope of finding the
confirmatory evidence, which hope is often realized. There is no
particular pressure in the mercenary nor in the physical sense of the

'62 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
word. There is a pressure which arises from the desire for knowl
edge, or perhaps from the benevolent desire to confer some benefit on
mankind. Such a pressure is on most of us for religious action.
There is in most of us a desire to know, in the sense of experiencing
for ourselves, the truth, for example, of the proposition that we can
be saved from the power which certain of our pecuUarly offensive
propensities exercise over us. Many a one has started on the search
for this knowledge scarcely believing that it was possible to attain it;
at least, the evidence he had was in nowise convincing. He acted in
order to test this particular religious hypothesis ; not, indeed, for the
sake of establishing merely an inteUectual proposition, but for the
sake of the benefit he would derive if the proposition were found
true. If Huxley's agnostic principles were to be adopted, not only
would scientific investigation lose one of its main methods for the
¦establishment of fact, but morality would be deprived of one of its
principal means of advancement.
Thus, in the course of our investigation, we have discovered that
agnosticism has completely changed its form. It quietly substitutes
Suggestion "I do not believe" for "I do not know," and yet calls
accurate itself agnosticism to distinguish itself from gnosticism.
nomencla- .
ture. What rights has agnosticism in the realm of belief ? But
it draws the practical conclusion from its "I do not beUeve," and
says, " I wfll not act." If it had remained agnosticism it might have
acted, in spite of its lack of knowledge. But its "I do not beUeve " is a
complete annihilation of all impulse to action. The difference be
tween agnosticism in this form and atheism is almost, if not whoUy,
in name. Let the adherents of this phase of, irreUgion caU them
selves, not agnostics, signifying their lack of knowledge, but apistics,
signifying their lack of beUef ; and let them caU their system, not
agnosticism, but apisticism. The mongrel character of the word is
no more marked in the one case than in the other, and the name we
propose has the merit of describing the fact. Translated into English,
for those who do not care to hide the real facts from the English
reader by the use of a Greek form, we should have for apistics, un
believers, and for apisticism, unbeUef . To designate his inaction the
agnostic might call himseU an aergist and his system of inaction
aergisticism. Agnosticism comes to us in the garb of modest reserve and intel
lectual honesty. As an inteUectual attitude or condition it presents
no alarming features. Every honest man, in his reflecting moments,
has felt the necessity of caution in statement, however he may have

Huxley's Deceptive Terminology. 63
transgressed in this respect under the influence of emotion. AU our
admiration and confidence disappear, however, when we discover
that it is a method and a creed, or at any rate a method based on a
creed, both of which are fundamentaUy antireligious, impracticable,
and unscientific. We now proceed, to show that it is based on
a false philosophy. That philosophy, so far as the Huxleyan form
of agnosticism is concerned, is weU stated by Professor Huxley as
foUows:1 "The results of the working out of the agnostic princi
ple will vary according to individual knowledge and capacity, and
according to the general condition of science. That which is unproved
to-day may be proved by the help of new discoveries to-morrow. The
only negative fixed points will be those negations which flow from
the demonstrable Umitation of our faculties."
It is the last of these sentences which contains the kernel of the
agnostic phflosophy. In the nature of the case we never can prove
by any discoveries what by reason of the limitations of Agnosticism
our faculties we could not know. In order to ascertain a af|i|e pn°
the limits of our knowledge, therefore, we must discover osop y'
what are the limitations of our faculties. The distinguishing feature
in the philosophies of Hume and Kant was just this attempt to dis
cover these limitations, and Professor Huxley professedly adheres to
their philosophic views. He says:2 "The reader . . . wfll now see
why my mind steadily gravitated toward the conclusions of Hume
and Kant." He quotes approvingly from Kant the following: "The
greatest and perhaps the sole use of all phflosophy of pure reason is,
after aU, merely negative, since it serves, not as an organon for the
enlargement (of knowledge), but as a discipline for its delimitation."
And again: "With Hume and Kant on my side I could not think
myself presumptuous in holding fast by that opinion," that is, the
opinion that the problem of existence was insoluble. a Hume and Kant
were not caUed agnostics ; but, since their philosophy with reference
to the limitations of our faculties is made the basis of the agnostic
system of practice, our next task must be to consider their phflosophy,
which, so far at least as Hume is concerned, it ought to be remarked,
is in such discredit among philosophers of to-day that it almost looks
as though Huxley had read philosophy until he came to something
bearing the impress of two strong names— something also exactly
suited to his agnostic purposes— and had then refused to go further.
» Essays upon Some Controverted Questions, p. 282. » Ibid., p. 275 f.
•Comp. his Hume, New York, 1879, pp. 55-58.

64 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER III.
THE PHILOSOPHIC BASIS OF HUXLEYAN AGNOSTICISM— THE PHILOSOPHY
OF HUME.
For our present purposes Hume's philosophy is sufficiently por
trayed in his Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. 1 His
somewhat ambiguous use of words makes it difficult to ascertain
exactly his meaning. Nevertheless, on the main points it is not easy
to misunderstand his positions. His philosophy is in fact a theory of
knowledge relating
(1) To the Methods of Its Acquisition, and (2) To Its Limits.
(1) The Methods of Acquiring Knowledge.
We mention three methods which Hume seems to distinguish :
A. Intuition and Demonstration. He says:2 " AU the objects of
human reason or inquiry may naturaUy be divided into two kinds ;
to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind
are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, and, in short,
every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstrably cer
tain." B. Sensations and Other Impressions. "Everyone will readily al
low that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of
the mind when a man feels the pain of excessive heat or the pleasure
of moderate warmth, and when he afterward recaUs to his memory
this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties
may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses, but they never
can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment.
The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with great
est vigor, is that they represent their object in so lively a man
ner that we could almost say we feel or see it." 8 " We may observe
a like distinction to run through aU the perceptions of the mind.
ideas and A man m a nt of anger is actuated in a very different
sioiisdis- manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If
tmguished. you tell m0 tnat any person is in lov6) j g^jjy understand
your meaning and form a just conception of his situation, but never
1 The Philosophical Works of David Hume, four vols., Boston, 1S54, vol. iv. Our ref
erences will be to the " Inquiry" as found in the volume just mentioned.
» Ibid., p. 30. » Ibid., p. 16.

Philosophic Bksis of Huxleyan Agnosticism. 65
can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of
the passion." " Here, therefore, we may divide all the perceptions of
the mind into two classes, or species, which are distinguished by their
different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively
are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. The other species
want a name. . . . Let us, therefore, use a little freedom and call
them impressions. ... By the term impression, then, I mean all our
more Uvely perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or
hate, or desire, or wfll." ¦ Thus sensations and impressions not only
furnish us knowledge, but by the action of memory and imagination
we have ideas or thoughts.
C. Inference from Cause and Effect. "By means of that relation
(of cause and effect) alone we can go beyond the evidence of our
memory and senses." "A man, finding a watch or any other ma
chine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been
men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the
same nature. And here it is constantly supposed that there is a con
nection between the present fact and that which is inferred from it.
Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be
entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice and rational
discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person;
why ? because these are the effects of the human make and fabric,
and closely connected with it. " 2
These, in brief, are the three methods by which we acquire knowl
edge. But we have given them place rather for the sake of complete
ness of outline and for purposes of definition than because they bear
upon the agnostic philosophy. The real point we now attempt to por
tray. (2) The Limits of Human Knowledge. These are determined in
three ways.
A. By Its Sources. Among these he ranks intuition and demon
stration,3 together with impressions as the source of ideas.4
B. By Its Means. It is here that the much-discussed Bepresenta-
tional theory of perception makes its appearance in Hume's system.
"It seems evident," he says," "that men are carried TheKe re_
by a natural instinct or prepossession to repose faith in sentationai
their senses. ... It seems also evident that, when men
follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always sup
pose the very images presented by the senses to be the external ob-
1 Hume, Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, p. 15 f.
2 Ibid., p. 31 f. 3Ibid., p. 188. i Ibid., pp. 183 ff. 6 Ibid., p. 172 ff.

66 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
jects, and never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing but
representations of the other. . . . But this universal and primary
opinion of aU men is soon destroyed by the slightest touch of philos
ophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind
but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets
through which these images are conveyed, without being able to pro
duce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object.
No man who reflects ever doubted that the existences which
we consider when we say this house, and that tree, are nothing but
perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of
other existences which remain uniform and independent." Note the
practical bearing of aU this. "By what argument can it be proved
that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects
entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be pos
sible), and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itseff,
or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from
some other cause still more unknown to us ? ... It is a question of
fact whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external
objects resembling them. How shaU this question be determined?
By experience, surely, as aU other questions of a like nature. But
here experience is, and must be, entirely silent. The mind has never
anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach
any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of
such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning."
The second of the two principal means of knowledge upon which
Hume depends for the proof of the limitations of our knowledge is
the inference from cause and effect, before mentioned as
Inference . .
from cause a method of knowing. It is, says Hume, in effect, a
and effect. method of knowing, but it is a method which iUustrates
how little we can go beyond the evidence of sense and memory. " If
we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that
evidence which assures us of matters of fact (that is, apparently, of
that which lies beyond the evidence of the senses and memory), we
must inquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect."
" The knowledge of this relation (cause and effect) is not, in any in
stance, attained by reasoning a priori; but arises entirely from expe
rience when we find that any particular objects are constantly con
joined with each other." 1 " Every effect is a distinct event from its
cause." "It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause ; and the
first invention or conception of it a priori must be entirely arbi-
1 Hume, Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, p. 32.

r hilosophic Basis of Huxleyan Agnosticism. 67'
trary." "In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any sin
gle event, or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of obser
vation and experience." " All inferences from experience, therefore,
are effects of custom, not of reasoning." "Having found in many
instances that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and
cold, have always been conjoined together : if flame or snow be pre
sented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect
heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does exist and wfll dis
cover itself upon nearer approach." As the conclusion of the whole
matter, he says that if we go into a Ubrary and take up any volume,
we should ask, " Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning
quantity or number ? No. Does it contain any experimental rea
soning concerning matter of fact and existence ? No. Commit it
then to the flames ; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illu
sion." 1
C. By Our Capacities. " They (the philosophically disposed) will.
never be tempted," says Hume,2 "to go beyond common life so long
as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they em
ploy, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we
cannot give a satisfactory reason why we believe, after a thousand
experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn, can we ever satisfy
ourselves concerning any determination which we may form with
regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature from, and.
to, eternity ? "
1 Hume, Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, p. 188. a Ibid., p. 184 f .

68 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER IV.
criticism of hume's agnostic principles.
After reading this outline of Hume's philosophy we shall be con
vinced that, though without the name, Hume was an agnostic. The
sources and means of knowledge and the limits of our capacities
combine to prevent our knowing anything but mathematical truth,
and, perhaps, somewhat of the ordinary course of nature. But even in
the practical concerns of life we are not sure that we know what to do.
We can at most believe that the future will be as the past. And we do
not wonder that Huxley says that he had Hume on his side in entertain
ing a pretty strong conviction that the problem of existence is insoluble. '
For our purposes it wfll not be necessary to consider this whole out
lined scheme, but only so much of it as relates to the determination
of the limits of our knowledge ; and of this we shall take into account
only a part. Nor can we give a fuU discussion of a truer theoiy of
knowledge than that of Hume. For such theory we must refer the
reader to works especially devoted to the subject.2 We shaU confine
ourselves to some hints that may suffice to show the inadequacy and
falsity of Hume's theory, which is all that is needed in the overthrow
of agnosticism.
Under the limits of knowledge as determined by its sources we shaU
examine his theory of impressions as the source of ideas. We are
not anxious to emphasize, what has often been pointed out, that the
distinction which Hume makes between impressions and ideas is su
perficial, artificial, and valueless. It is more to the purpose that his
definition of these terms is false, and the relation which he makes
them sustain to each other, at least in part, inverted.
Hume's notion seems to be (1) that an impression is itself a simple,
Complexity uncompounded thing, and (2) that the mind is the passive
of Hume's . . , . .
s o-c -,i 1 1 e d recipient ol it. JLet us examine a couple of the impressions
Impressions. . . . , . .
mentioned by him ; for example, that of loving. It is cer
tainly very complex, including the consciousness of seU, of the loved
1 Essays upon Some Controverted Questions, p. 276.
2 One of the best is Theory of Thought and Knowledge, by Borden P. Bowne, professor
of philosophy In Boston University, New York, issi7. Another excellent work is Philoso
phy of Knowledge, by George T. Ladd, professor of philosophy in Yale University, New
York, 1897.

uriticism of Hume's Agnostic Principles. 69
one, and of love itseU more or less clearly differentiated from friend
ship, indifference, and iU-will. And even these necessary elements of
consciousness in loving do not exist simple and alone. Self is in some
measure distinguished from aU that is not self, the object of my love
from others toward whom I feel no such affection, and love itself is in
part admiration and in part an indefinable attraction.
It is perfectly evident that in loving the impression is not uncom-
pounded. But it is far more important to note that the mind is not
passive. The activity of the mind is even more apparent The activity
,. ... ,, . . „ „ of the mind
in connection with the impression of suffering from excess- in connec-
ive heat. This impression is exceedingly complex, and in them.
connection with it the mind is of necessity active. The mind need not
emphasize but it must be conscious of the self ; it must conceive of
suffering; of these two as connected; of heat and of the degree of
heat. Each of these elements of the complex impression is itself com
plex to a degree, and the mind with incredible swiftness takes cogni
zance of each of the absolutely simple elements, compounds them into
higher units, and then compounds these units into the unit which
Hume calls the impression of suffering from excessive heat.
Itnow becomes necessary to define more exactly the activity of the
mind in connection with any impression, or, as the modern psycholo
gist would say, perception. A piece of hot metal is brought T^tiv?tind^
into contact with the tip of my finger. What is the proc- amined.
ess by which I become aware of the fact? First, there is the con
sciousness that I am being touched ; second, that I experience pain ;
third, I discern that the pain is of a definite kind ; and fourth, I locate
it in a definite portion of my body. These are not all the steps in the
process, but the other steps do not differ in kind. In each case the
mind does all that is done. This is true even in the simplest percep
tion of an object. For example, we say that we see a book on the
table. It is a psychological commonplace that all the eye receives
from the book is the beating of the ether waves upon the retina.
When the effects of these waves are carried to the brain, what have
we as a result ? Nothing but a form of motion in the physical ele
ments. We have as yet not even a sensation. The age-long efforts
of materialists have only served to emphasize the fact that in the
brain we have physical movements alone. AU beyond this is mental
activity, strictly so-called. Without stopping to be overnice in our
analysis, we point out that, instead of an indefinite series of move
ments, we have the one sensation. Each variety of physical movement
results in a specific sensation unrelated to aU others. Then foUows

10 Foundations of the Christian jjaith.
the relating activity, and the objectifying of the whole under the form
of space, and the application of the various other categories, such as
time, substance, causality. The fact that this process is in the main
automatic does not in the least invaUdate the conclusion that it is
strictly the product of mental activity as distinguished from the
physical. As soon as the nervous changes have taken place the mind begins
to operate. On the one side we have nervous change, on the other
mental activity. But the mind has not noted the nervous changes;
the mental process would be the same in a person who did not know
that he had nerves. How mental activity and nervous 'changes are
connected it is impossible to determine. Certain it is that the nervous
changes are not the impression (perception) nor any part of it, and
that impressions are not the ready-made things Hume thought them
to be. It must follow inevitably that the mind forms its own im
pressions, instead of their being formed for it and stamped upon it or
thrust into it. Figuratively we may speak of the mind as containing
thoughts, or as having impressions made upon it, as though it were a
piece of hoUow ware or a waxen tablet into which things called per
ceptions can be put or upon which they can be stamped ; but it is mis
leading to take these figures for facts. We do not know the whole
process by which we gain impressions, but we do know that they are
not injected into nor imposed upon the mind by external objects ; for
we have discovered by analysis how the mind constructs and defines
its own perceptions in response to the physical stimulus.
So when Hume tells us that all our ideas are feeble copies of impres
sions we are able to perceive more exactly the amount of truth there is
in what he says. If impressions are not altogether nor chiefly the re
sult of the power of external objects over us, but rather the product
of our own mental action under given conditions, then the copying of
impressions or perceptions for the purpose of obtaining ideas must
mean simply the mind's copying of its own activities, that is, remem
bering what it has done. '
The analysis of Hume's impressions further betrays the fact that
the mind is in possession of ideas which cannot be reduced to Humian
ideas not re- impressions, nor any compound, transposition, augmenta-
Humiau im- tion, or diminution of them. Such is the idea of seU. It
pi ess ons. jg nQ^ jn an^ sense a feeble copy of a lively impression
which preceded it. It is indeed difficult to get at the origin of the idea
1 The immense significance of this conclusion for the theistic argument need not be
pointed out here.

Criticism of Hume's Agnostic Principles. 71
of seK, but we know that it is not a copy of an impression. It is the
primary fact and presupposition of the mental life.1 At the earliest
dawn of knowledge it is there, however vague its form, as a part of
our mental outfit. Nor is it the result of the analysis (division, dimi
nution), nor of a compound, nor of an augmentation, nor of a transpo
sition of any impression or set of impressions. It is a fundamental
element in every impression. We have no impression of seU in the
same sense in which we have an impression of chill, or warmth,
or pressure, or sorrow, or joy. But prior to and entering into aU
Humian impressions is the idea of self ; for not only must there be a
seU in order to such an impression, but there must be the idea of self.
Without this the impression is impossible.2 So far, then, from aU
ideas being copies of impressions, every impression is in part a syn
thesis of ideas ; that is, some ideas at least are prior to impressions
and necessary to them.
We are not particular to answer aU the questions that might be
asked concerning the origin of ideas. From one aspect they all appear
innate, in the sense that they are potentially in the mind origin of
and are called into consciousness under the appropriate * eas'
stimulus. Especially is this true of certain ideas which, when formu
lated, are caUed axioms ; as, that a thing cannot both be and not be at
the same time. It is sufficient for our purposes to point out that even
on the confession of Huxley himseK there are ideas of relation which
are not given in sense experience,3 such as succession and coexistence.
These may, as Huxley says,4 require at least two impressions (simple
sensations) as a condition of their appearing in consciousness. But as
they are not furnished, but only brought to our attention by these
sensations, they must have been a part of our mental outfit, ready for
use when the purposes of knowledge demanded them.
It is not true, then, that the "creative power of the mind amounts
to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting,
or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. "
The mind is in possession of ideas or constructive principles which,
though they may appear in consciousness in connection with sense
1 Comp. J. F. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, second edition, Edinburgh and London,
1856, pp. 79-96.
2 For a discussion of the idea of self in its relation to thought, see Bowne, Theory of
Thought and Knowledge, pp. 21-29. Comp. Morell's An Historical and Critical View of
the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1862, pp.
51-55. Schurman holds to the three primary ideas of the self, the noiVself, or the
external world, and God.-Agnosticism and Religion, p. 104f. Comp. also, Ladd's Philos
ophy of Knowledge, pp. 193-227 ; Lotze, Microcosmus, translated by Hamilton and Jones.
New York, 1886, pp. 143-167 ; and Ferrier, as noted above.
3 See his Hume, p. 85. 4 Hume, p. 66 f.

72 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
experiences, are not copies of such experiences, but are, nevertheless,
the fundamental elements in aU impressions. In other words, the na-
The mind's ture of the mind is such that it furnishes aU that is most
ti0onnribtUo necessary in knowledge. If from this the conclusion
knowledge. were drawn that we have then no way of testing knowl
edge, and must be forever in doubt about its vaUdity, we reply that
for the mind itself, at least, there is valid knowledge, and as knowl
edge has no uses or interests apart from minds we need not trouble
ourselves about it any further. He who would undertake to go behind
the laws of thought must cease to think.
The vast significance of the question under discussion wfll be seen
in the statement of Hume that the "idea of God, as meaning an infi
nitely inteUigent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the
operations of our own minds, and augmenting, without Umit, these
qualities of goodness and wisdom. " • He gives this as an example of
an idea which is a copy of an impression. By the process of augmen
tation, however, the original has been clearly distorted beyond recog
nition. It is purely the work of the constructive activity of the mind
rather than of the memory. It is the creation of the mind, and that
without the checks employed in the definition of our sensations, and
hence has no claim to reality.2
It must be said that Hume's is not the true account of the origin
either of the idea of God, or of God as infinitely intelUgent, wise, and
Origin of the good. His view is not borne out by the later investiga-
according tions of those who have devoted their talents to the study
to Hume. of religions. s
We might rest our case against Hume on this point, with a reminder
to the reader that we have shown that ideas are not "copies of im
pressions," but that "impressions" involve ideation, and that as the
theory is false, aU applications of it to matters of religion are discred
ited. But we prefer to investigate this special appUcation briefly by
itself. According to the theory, the impression goodness, or the lively
perception of goodness in ourselves, is augmented until it is infinite,
and then attributed to God. So also of wisdom. But while aU men
have the idea of God, not aU are "impressed" with human goodness,
1 Inquiry, p. 18.
'Hume has had successors In his account of the origin of the idea of God, as he had
predecessors. An example of the latter Is Leibnitz, in Principes de la Nature et de la
Grace, § 9 ; and of the former, F. W . Newman, in A Defense of the Eclipse of Faith, by
Henry Rogers, Boston, 1854.
» Comp. Lectures on the Origin and Growth of the Conception of God as Illustrated by
Anthropology and History, by Count Goblet d'Alviella, second edition, London, Edin
burgh, and Oxford, 1897, especially Lectures ii and v.

Criticism of Hume's Agnostic Principles. 73
but rather with human depravity; not with human wisdom, but
rather with human ignorance and folly. That we do attribute a de
gree of goodness to certain individuals is true, but the idea of good
ness did not spring from seeing goodness in men. For if the idea were
not in the mind, we could not possibly recognize it when we saw it.
At least there must have been some innate capacity by which it could
be recognized in its true nature. The same is true of the infiniteness
of the goodness of God. Were the idea of infinity not in the mind,
it could not be joined with the idea of goodness and ascribed to any
being. So, too, the idea of God must exist before any infinite attri
butes can be ascribed to him. The idea of God with his attributes is
impressive, but man has no attributes impressive enough to suggest,
or to leave as a copy in the mind, the idea of God. Thus this example
breaks down upon analysis just as aU the rest of them did, and we are
doubly warranted in rejecting his account of the origin of the idea of
God as infinitely intelligent, wise, and good. The elements of truth in
his position wfll aU be dwelt upon in another connection.

74: Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER V.
HUME'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF THE CAUSAL RELATION
Under the limits of knowledge as determined by its means we take
up, first, Hume's representational theory. There is, however, the
less need for lengthy discussion here, since the result of the theory is
doubt, not alone of the things peculiar to religious thought, but also of
the things of sense. StiU, as it is a part of the phflosophical basis of
agnosticism, we cannot altogether pass it by. The theory supposes
rightly that it is not the external objects themselves which are present
in perception. It is wrong, however, in affirming that the images of
these external objects are admitted to the mind through inlets caUed
senses, and that these images are immediately perceived by the
mind. It is impossible to give any clear account of these images.
Confessedly they are neither material nor mental. Differing from
both matter and mind, it is difficult to see how matter could throw
them off, as the figure has it, or how mind could know them any
more than it can know immediately any other substance differmg
from itself — as, for instance, matter. So then we cannot help asking,
The repre- What is that which is neither mental nor material ? And
sentational . -, . , . . ,, , ., -, , . .
theory no we cannot desist from saying that the explanation does
the prob- not explain. The solution of the problem of knowledge
knowledge, gained in perception may seem hopeless. The representa
tional theory certainly does not solve it. The fact of knowledge no
one can seriously doubt. How it is possible and what it imphes we
leave to the metaphysicians to explain. 1 For all the practical con
cerns of life we must act on the theory that there is an external
world. Doubts raised by the representational theory are at most
speculative, and, as we have seen, the speculation is itself inconsistent
and unclear. Hence we must go on with what is needful for practical
life, entertaining no doubts arising from the representational theory.
We consider, second, the limits of knowledge as determined by in
ference from cause and effect. Hume is right in saying that the
1 The Immense reinforcement which the theistic argument receives from this deepest
of all philosophical investigations is one of the surprises revealed in the more thorough
going methods of post-Kantian studies. The present-day theory of knowledge Is theistic
In spite of the most searching adverse criticism. We must be theists or give up all
hope of explaining the problem of knowledge.

Hume's Theory of Knowledge. 75
knowledge of the relation of cause and effect is not in any instance
attained a priori. But when he says that it arises entirely from ex
perience he is in error. Even according to his own development of
the subject the knowledge of that relation does not arise out of ex
perience, for none emphasizes more than himself the fact that we
experience no causal relation. Indeed, the very end of his discussion
of the subject is to prove that we go beyond experience Origin of the
when we do more than assert the conjunction of what we ai re°ation!~
call the cause and the effect. That they are conjoined we know ; that
they are connected he says we do not know. Or, to put it another
way, we have, in experience, knowledge of the conjunction of things
in time and space, but not of any relation between them except that
of the conjunction described.
If, then, the external world does not furnish us any knowledge of
the causal relation, have we any other means of knowledge concern
ing it ? Hume answers in the negative. Is he right ? It wfll be ad
mitted by all that we have the idea of cause, and Hume has made it
clear enough that sense experience did not furnish us the idea. It
must, then, have been furnished by the mind itself. The analysis of
the idea shows that it is essentially an idea of force or power ; so that
we may admit with Hume that we perceive no power in the conjunc
tions we call causal, and yet we know we have the idea of power in
those conjunctions. That we do not attain the idea by a priori
reasoning, and that we do not attain it by sense experience, does not
destroy the fact that we have it. Nor would that fact be destroyed
if we should fail to show under what conditions the idea arises in the
mind. In any event the idea is there, and it does not come to us
apriori nor in sense experience.
But may it not be that the idea arises, as Hume teUs us, from
custom or habit ? Do we not have the idea of causal connection from
the observation of constant conjunction ? Hume says that we are led
by custom to expect heat or cold when we perceive flame or snow,
and the movement of one billiard ball when struck by another. This
is true, but the causal relation is not expressed alone in terms of
change or sequence, but also in terms of force or power. And there is
nothing in ten thousand effects to suggest power which is not equaUy
resident in a single effect. Custom would account only for our expec
tation of change upon the conjunction of two objects in given ways. a
1 On Hume's theory it is absurd to speak of impressions or of any form of influence, or
even of explanation, since all these imply the causal relation. On the difficulties con
nected with Hume's theory of causation and related conceptions, see Works of Thomas
Hill Green, vol. i, pp. 172 ff, London, 1885.

76 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
It remains, however, to be determined whether this idea of force is
not itself a deception. To raise this doubt is, indeed, to raise a doubt
The idea of about our profoundest convictions, and yet it is impossi-
decTption3, ble to prove that we are not deceived. But we hasten to
say that there is no reason to believe that we are deceived, and he
who raises the doubt as to the reality of force has upon him the
burden of proof. It is possible to raise a doubt of anything. It is
not possible always to give good reason for our doubt. This is
such a case. But while we cannot demonstrate the existence of
force, there is every reason to beUeve in its reality aside from the
mind's assertion of the fact, which is itself a reason for behev-
ing in it. Now, though we know so httle of the nature of force
as distinct from its effects, there are certain facts which compel
us to beUeve in its existence. Primary among these is our own con
sciousness of resistance and counter-resistance. The impression of
our being resisted by external objects is as lively as that of our being
affected in any other way by them. To say that there is nothing con
nected with an external object to occasion that impression is as absurd
as to say that there is nothing in a piece of heated metal to occasion
the impression of pain.
But there is something in the action we take in connection with the
two impressions that helps us to beUeve in the reality of force more
than in the reality of heat. When we have the impression of pain as
arising from heated metal we withdraw our fingers, or other parts
affected, and we might almost think we were deluded if no perma
nent injury were wrought. In the case of the impression of being
resisted, on the contrary, we are conscious of a counter-resistance, not
by the bodily organs, indeed, but by the mind. And this conscious
ness of mental resistance is accompanied by an impression of mus
cular exertion. Besides, our judgment and volition come to our aid
under such circumstances, the one suggesting a change in the position
of the body according to the laws of physics, the other stimulating us
to perseverance. We can time both the beginning and the end of the
resistance and counter-resistance. We are very sure that if there is
sufficient counter-resistance we need not yield when we are resisted.
There is something by which we resist. We have that something at
our command. Universal consent terms it power. Whatever it is
we can employ it in different degrees up to a certain limit, which is
not the same in all persons. When we see another person doing as
we do under like circumstances of stress we attribute to him both
volitional and muscular power. There is the same reason for doing

Hume's Theory of Knowledge. 77;
this that there is for supposing him to be constituted in other respects.;
like ourselves. AU other things being equal, we should attribute both
a voUtional and muscular power to animals. Of the muscular power -
we are sure. When we come to unintelligent objects there can be
no voUtional and no muscular power, but muscular power being but
one form of physical power we can attribute other kinds of physical
power to inanimate objects.
This is, probably, the account of the origin of the idea of power in
the material world. It is irresistible to the thinking mind. Besides,
we have tests which we can apply here. As we accomplish more
when we are conscious of the exertion of a greater degree of power, so
we expect those objects which give evidence of great physical power
to accomplish much, and we are never disappointed. That we can
not explain the whole process of physical causation does not affect .
the certainty that there is such a thing as force, whether in the realm
of practice or of thought. Only he who overlooks or ignores the facts
while he gives exclusive attention to certain unanswerable questions
can be skeptical here. My consciousness of volitional energy would
in nowise decrease in case those parts of my body which Further
have hitherto been under my control were removed from if u^m e *s
that control by paralysis or excision. I should simply s ePtlclsm-
lack the means of expression. That some parts of my body are under-
my control and others are not arises solely from the fact that some
are constructed to that end and that others are not. This, and no de
fect in the nature of supposed force, as Hume intimates to be the
case, ! is the explanation of our inability to move some of the organs
of the body.
Hume further strives to make it appear that our idea of power is
not connected with its conscious exercise by the wiU. He says that ,
if we were conscious of power in ourselves we should be fully ac
quainted with it, and so could explain why it would move some of our
organs and not others. But we have just seen that it is not in the
nature of the power that the failure lies, but in the construction of
the organ. Besides, it is not true that if we are conscious of the
power we must be fully acquainted with it and all its limits and capa
bilities. This, in the nature of the case, could not be known unless
we knew that we had tried our power on every possible object. Hence
we conclude that Hume has not succeeded in destroying the fact of
causality, and thus in establishing the atheistic, or at any rate, the>
agnostic denial of the necessity for a first cause.
1 Inquiry, vol. i, p. 75 f.

78 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
There is, however, one special application of his doctrine of infer-
enee from cause and effect which we must here notice. It is that
Relation of the cause can never be concluded to be greater than the
'"doc3: known effect demands; and that as the world is not infinite
ci^tion.0* the cause of it cannot be infinite, or at least cannot be
known to be. This is in reality the old idea that the world has im
pressed us as of a certain magnitude, and our idea of its cause must
be a copy of that impression Umited by the magnitude of the original.
Even if we suppose the argument vaUd from every other standpoint,
it is invalid from that of our knowledge of the limits of the world;
for we have no knowledge of any such limits, and to limit the cause
of the world because we suspect limits to the world would be a gross
violation of thought. The more the world is studied the more it ap
proaches to our idea of the infinite, whether in its extent, its variety,
or its power. The idea suggested by what we know of the world is
not that of a limited, but of an infinite cause, in point of wisdom,
power, and goodness. Correct reasoning from the nature of the effect
to the nature of the cause, in this case, leads to the postulate of a
cause great enough to be equal to aU we know and aU we can ever
learn as to the world. Were we to say that such a being is Umited
we should have to go outside the universe to define the limitation.
Only inexperienced investigators would pretend to Umit the cause to
what they know of the effect, for the experienced have discovered
that their conception of the world is constantly enlarging.
After this relatively brief discussion it wfll not be necessary to give
much space to the supposed Umits of our knowledge as determined
Hume's doc: by our capacities. That they are limited none can deny.
mental lim- But that they are as Umited as Hume asserts has, we
futed. ' think, been disproved ; and also that they are Umited in
the way described by Hume. It might be sufficient to caU atten
tion to the fact that the limitations of our faculties asserted by Hume
are discovered only by the use of the very faculties which, it is de
clared, cannot be trusted beyond the realm of practice and experience.
It is most clear that no one ever found either in practice or experi
ence the limitations supposed ; but they are deductions from facts dis
covered by practice and experience. As, then, in order to discover
the alleged fact of limitation, Hume has gone beyond the realm fixed
for our mental activity, what right have we to believe that the deduc
tion is not erroneous ? It is true that the direct appUcation of his
language, as cited above, is rather to philosophy than to religion, and
would completely destroy our belief in any external reaUty. Yet he

Hume's Theory of Knowledge. 79
evidently means to cut us off from any kind of religious thought
which rises above "common life" to causes and to our relations with
God. We are exhorted to reflect only on "common life" and to
avoid thought concerning the origin of worlds. The " more sublime
topics" are to be left "to the embellishment of poets and orators, or
to the arts of priests and pohticians." 1 " The imagination of man is
naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is remote and extraordi
nary, and running without control into the most distant parts of
space and time." ... "A correct judgment observes a contrary
method, and, avoiding aU distant and high inquiries, confines itself to
common life, and to such subjects as faU under daily practice and ex
perience."2 All this would be true if our faculties were turned only
earthward by their very nature and limited by their observations of
earthly things. But this, we have seen, is not the case. We cannot
here discuss the significance of conscience for something aside from
what he calls "common life ; " but in its appropriate place it will be
made clear that that which is highest in us looks away from earth,
however much one part of us may be of the earth, earthy.
This survey of Hume's philosophy has not only served, as we be
Ueve, to show its falsity, but also to exhibit the intimate connection
between it and Huxleyan agnosticism. Huxley has simply applied
Hume's fundamentaUy agnostic principles. Were they Conclusion
correct we must come to Huxley's conclusions. As they
have been proved incorrect we are released from the bonds which
would hold us down and in, and are permitted, not, indeed, to roam at
wiU, but to take a wider range than agnosticism allows. We are bound
to exercise caution in all our thinking and assertions of knowledge ;
but we are not indebted to the agnosticism of any age of the world
for the sense of that necessity.
» Inquiry, vol. i, p. 184. 2 Ibid., p. 184.

80 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VI.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT AS A BASIS FOR AGNOSTICISM.
This, like the philosophy of Hume, is an attempt to define the. lim
its of knowledge, but it is much more elaborate and critical than
Hume's. The mere skeleton or bony structure of Kant's works
would occupy more space than we can here afford. We shall be
obliged to refer those who desire fuller information concerning it to
his published works in the original or in translation. We must con
tent ourselves with brief summaries of his arguments and conclu
sions and such points in their discussion as wfll serve to show the
source and nature of the fallacies they contain.
We need to consider his three principal works, the Critique of
Pure Eeason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Cri
tique of the Judgment. The first is a study of the powers and
processes of the mind in the acquisition of knowledge ; the last two a
study of those things which for practical reasons we may accept,
though we cannot know, as true. If we fail to take into account the
last two treatises we must of necessity misunderstand him. And we
wish to point out here that, so far as the agnosticism of Huxley is
true to its name, it is guilty of exactly this fault of considering only
the Critique of Pure Reason ; and so far as it transforms itseff into
apisticism it has no foundation in the Kantian system.
Kant holds that all our knowledge begins with experience; that
is, that " in respect to time," "no knowledge of ours is antecedent to
Knowledge experience, but begins with it." "But, though all our
to expert knowledge begins with experience, it by no means foUows
ence. that all arises out of experience." • Here Kant denies the
Humian theory of knowledge, and by no one has it been more suc
cessfully combated. But it will be distinctly noted that he does not
deny that our knowledge is limited by experience. On the contrary,
he holds that knowledge is so limited. This he discusses at length in
Part First of the Critique of Pure Reason. Summing up in section.
1 Critique of Fure Reason, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, London, 1869, p. 1. A
standard German edition of Kant's works is that edited by G. Hartensteiu. I. Kant's
silmmtliche Werke, In chronologischen Relhenfolge, 8 Bde. Leipzig, 1867-69. All our
references are to Melklejohn's translation.

Philosophy of Kant as a Basis for Agnosticism. 81
10 he says:1 "We have shown that we are in possession of pure
¦a priori intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when
in a judgment a priori we pass out beyond the given conception,
something which is not discoverable in that conception, but is cer
tainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the con
ception, and can be united synthetically with it. But the judgments
which these pure intuitions enable us to make never reach farther
than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for objects of possible
experience. " The last sentence is the one which proves that Kant limits
our knowledge as above stated. In further illustration of his position
we quote as foUows : 2 " Our knowledge springs from two main sources
in the mind ; the first of which is the faculty or power of receiving rep
resentations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of cog
nizing by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production
of conceptions) . Through the first an object is given to us ; through the
second it is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere deter
mination of the mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions consti
tute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither con
ceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them,
nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition." "We
apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for impres
sions, in so far as it is in some way affected ; and, on the other hand,
we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or
the spontaneity of cognition, under -standing. Our nature is so con
stituted that intuition with us can never be other than sensuous ;
that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects.
On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous in
tuition is the understanding. Neither of these faculties has any pref
erence over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object
would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would
be thought. Thoughts without content are void ; intuitions without
conceptions, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its
conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in intuition)
as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under con
ceptions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper func
tion. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot
think. In no other way than from the united operation of both can
knowledge arise."
It is clear from this that Kant thinks of knowledge in its twofold
aspect of matter and form. This embarrasses him continuaUy
1 Critique of Pure Reason, part i, p. 44. * Ibid., p. 45 f.

82 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
throughout the Critique of Pure Reason, and is the source of many
a faulty conclusion. The distinction is so far correct that the senses
do furnish the impressions while the mind, not merely the under
standing, supplies all the constructive or organizing principles.
The discussion of the sensibility and understanding is, however,
but a sort of introduction to the treatment of the Pure Reason,
which "contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and prin
ciples which it does not borrow either from the senses or the under
standing." ' Speaking of the nature of these conceptions he says:"
"The term conception of reason, or rational conception, itself indi
cates that it does not confine itself within the Umits of experience."
"The pure conceptions of reason at present under consideration are
transcendental ideas."" "AU transcendental ideas arrange them
selves in three classes, the first of which contains the absolute (uncon
ditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity
Kant's three of the series of the conditions of a phenomenon, the third
transcen- . .
dentaiideas. the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of
thought in general. The thinking subject is the object-matter of Psy
chology; the sum total of all phenomena (the world) is the object-
matter of Cosmology; and the thing which contains the highest con
dition of the possibihty of aU that is cogitable (the Being of aU be
ings) is the object-matter of aU Theology. Thus Pure Reason pre
sents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psy-
chologia rationalis), of a transcendental science of the world (cos-
mologia rationalis), and, finaUy, of a transcendental doctrine of
God (theologia transcendentalis) ." "They are . . . pure and genuine
products, or problems, of pure reason."4
In a very lengthy, elaborate, and profound discussion in the re
mainder of the Critique of Pure Reason he reaches the conclusion
that, while the reason cannot do otherwise than entertain these ideas
of the existence of the soul, the world, and God, yet all arguments in
favor of them as realities are sophistical. Thus, though these ideas
are present in the reason yet there is no way of proving that there is
any reaUty corresponding to them. According to this we have a
faculty for receiving impressions of objects in the physical world and
a faculty for transforming these impressions into thoughts, thus giv
ing us a knowledge of external objects, at least so far as phenomena
are concerned; but we have no faculty by which a nonphysical be
ing, as God, can make himself felt in the soul. It is true we have
1 Critique of Pure Reason, part i, p. 212
' Ibid., p. 219. » Ibid., p. 228. « Ibid., p. 233.

j. jcuu-uou-t-ni: OF 1\.ANT AS A BASIS FOR AGNOSTICISM. 83
the idea of God as we have the idea of marble, but the latter is the
product of sensibility and understanding, while the former is the
product of pure reason, and there is no way by which to cannot be
prove that it is anything but an idea. So of the soul, t^/reiiOT
and so of the world. However, as it is impossible to prove "ureal.
that these ideas correspond to external or objective reality, so it is
impossible to prove that they do not. The possibility of such sup
posed realities cannot be denied, since they are transcendental.
Knowledge is confined to the world of sensuous experience.
It would seem that such a system of thought is exactly suited to
that agnosticism which professes to be a condition of inevitable igno
rance concerning the problem of existence, arising from the natural
Umitations of our powers. And on the supposition that there is no
fatal flaw in Kant's system, as presented in the Critique of Pure
Reason, Huxleyan agnosticism, as just defined, is so strongly en
trenched that it can never be dislodged.
It is wholly unnecessary for our purpose to undertake to show that
this part of Kant's system does exhibit any such fatal flaw. In the
first place we do not seriously object to agnosticism as long as it con
fines itself to the realm of knowledge in the Kantian sense. For Kant
only that was knowledge, strictly so caUed, which either Reaction from
depended on the necessary laws of thought, and hence skepticism.
was demonstrative, or which the senses give in conjunction with the
forms of the understanding. Religious truth is neither demonstrative
nor sensuous knowledge. It is the knowledge of belief based on such
evidence as our nature, considered in. its entirety, furnishes. And
when any system includes in its sweep a denial of aU knowledge ex
cept of phenomena, and affirms that not only do we not know the
existence of the soul and God, but also of the world, the result is
to make men act on the principles of common sense and to disregard
phflosophy. And when philosophy, after it has done its worst, can
not affirm that there is neither soul, nor world, nor God, men of
practical sense will assume, along with the reality of the world, the
reality of the soul and of God ; especially as we have the express
permission of this mighty champion of agnosticism for such an
assumption. Besides, this philosophy strongly insists that these ideas are neces
sarily in every mind and come to consciousness on occasion ; that of
the soul and of God as truly as of the world. All that it says is that
we can neither prove nor disprove them because of the fact that the
mind has no powers by which it can reach them. The ideas are

81 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
there, and that is all we can say of them. They are aU there, and
it would be unfounded discrimination to act upon the reality of one
and the unreality of the others. Agnosticism as a scheme of action
belies its name, and proves that it is not agnosticism. But as a scheme
of action it has no support in the Critique of Pure Reason.
But to the Critique of Pure Reason Kant added the Critique of
the Practical Reason and the Critique of the Judgment. In the
latter works he found, not indeed a basis for knowledge, in the Kant
ian sense, of the three ideas of Pure Reason, but a necessity for belief
in them. With belief agnosticism has absolutely nothing to do. As
soon as it touches this realm it becomes apisticism. The man who
calls himself agnostic may also be an apistic ; but what we require
is that he shall not include both of these attitudes under one name
Findings of and then define his attitude merely according to its ety-
of Practical mology. If he wfll insist on being both an agnostic and
ofthe Judgd- an apistic let him make his definition of his attitudes
ment' such that everyone will understand that he neither knows
nor believes that there is a God, and then everyone wfll see at a
glance in what class to rank him.
Kant's philosophy as a whole, then, is unfitted to become the basis
of agnosticism with apistic annexes. There is nothing in it to prevent
our believing in the soul, the world and God ; but it affords us much
that must lead us to believe in them as realities. It bears hard on
certain systems of theology ; but it leaves room for Christ and the
apostles. When, therefore, Huxley bases his apisticism on Hume
and Kant he bases it upon an insecure foundation. For so far as
Hume afforded it a basis Kant has refuted him ; and Kant makes it
impossible to doubt the soul, the world, and God. Huxleyan agnos
ticism is harmless ; the attempt to make the term cover belief and
the activities appropriate thereto would be contemptible were it not
No p h i 1 o- for the probability that the so-called agnostics are blind
sophic basis °
for Huxley- to their own method of procedure. So that whfle we
an agnosti-
cism. condemn their methods we may possibly excuse or paUi-
ate them in view of their infatuation. Nevertheless we cannot resist
the feeling that those who set themselves up for oracles should not
allow themselves to be blinded. • But to proceed. Huxleyan agnosti
cism is, as we have seen, an impracticable system when applied to
the methods of scientific investigation ; and it has no secure basis in
the philosophy of Hume and Kant. So much our investigation of its
claims has clearly revealed.

The Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer. 85

CHAPTER VII.
THE AGNOSTICISM OF HERBERT SPENCER AS A PRACTICAL SYSTEM.
When we turn from Huxley to Spencer we discover that the latter,
like the former, professedly bases his system upon a philosophy which
had been in a large measure developed before him. While Huxley
depended upon Hume and Kant, Spencer starts from Sir William
Hamilton's Philosophy of the Unconditioned, and Henry Longueville
Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought.1 But, as Huxley takes only
so much of Hume and Kant as suits his purposes, so Spencer modifies
and extends the doctrines of Hamilton and Mansel.
Spencer's philosophy as embodied in Part I (The Unknowable) of
his First Principles of a New System of Phflosophy " is really an at
tempt to show on what basis a reconciliation may be primary pur-
brought about between religion and science. He regards cer't°ph?ios-
the conflict as one which has been in existence ever since op y'
" the recognition of the simplest uniformities in surrounding things
set a limit to the previously universal fetichism," and as being the
most important of all antagonisms of belief.3 His sense of the impor
tance of the conflict is at the same time his consciousness of the impor
tance of bringing it to an end. The method by which he seeks to effect
the reconciliation is to show that the ultimate ideas of religion and
science are identical, and may be summed up in the recognition of the
mystery behind all things. * ' 'If religion and science are to be reconciled, "
says Spencer, "the basis of reconcihation must be this deepest, widest,
and most certain of all facts : that the Power which the universe mani
fests to us is utterly inscrutable." It will be noted that we have here
the admission that there is a Power which the universe manifests to
us. So, then, we have gotten from a mystery which we cannot ex
plain to a Power to which this mystery is attributed. It is the high
merit of Religion that " from the beginning it has dimly discerned the
ultimate verity and has never ceased to insist upon it. " 6 ' After criti-
i The Bampton Lectures for 1858. Boston, 1860. In reality Jacobi had previously de
veloped the ideas emphasized by Hamilton and Mansel in this respect, asserting that
Kant labored under the error that it is not in the nature of the ideas, but in the nature of
our knowledge, that these ideas cannot be proved realities. See Schwegier on Jacobi,
in History of Philosophy.
* New York, 1868. s First Principles, p. 11. * Ibid., chaps. 2 and 3. 6 Ibid., p. 99.
8

86 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
cism has abolished aU its arguments and reduced it to silence there
has still remained with it the indestructible consciousness of a truth
Validity of re- which, however faulty the mode in which it had been ex-
ligious belief. pressedi was yet a truth beyond cavil." ' And this inde
structible consciousness of a truth in the mind's possession is to be
trusted. Speaking of the diverse forms of reUgious beUefs he says:3
" To suppose that these multiform conceptions should be one and aU
absolutely groundless discredits too profoundly that average human
intelligence from which aU our individual inteUigences are inherited."
Further, " To the presumption that a number of diverse beliefs of the
same class have some common foundation in fact must, in this case, be
added a further presumption derived from the omnipresence of the
beliefs. Religious ideas of one kind or another are almost, if not quite,
universal." "The implication is practically the same," even though
in some races these ideas arise only when "a certain phase of inteUi
gence is reached." Again,3 "A candid examination of the evidence
quite negatives the doctrine maintained by some, that creeds are
priestly inventions." Even the hypothesis that reUgious ideas are the
products of the religious sentiment admits that this sentiment is a
"constituent in man's nature,'' and this "cannot be denied by those
who prefer other hypotheses." 4 "And if the reUgious sentiment . . .
must be classed among human emotions we cannot rationaUy ignore
it. We are bound to ask its origin and function." "Any theory of
things which takes no account of this attribute must, then, be ex
tremely defective." We are " obUged to admit that it is as normal as
any other faculty," and that it " is in some way conducive to human
welfare." Furthermore, "Throughout aU future time, as now, the
human mind may occupy itself, not only with ascertained phenomena
and their relations, but also with that unascertained something which
phenomena and their relations imply. Hence if knowledge cannot
monopolize consciousness— if it must always continue possible for the
mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge— then there can
never cease to be a place for something of the nature of religion."6
Thus we have a defense both of a Power as existing, though inscru
table, and a religious sentiment in man which cUngs to the fact of such
a Power, with science on the side of religion here if nowhere else. Nor
is this wrung from Spencer's occasional utterances, but it is the very
thing for which he contends. So far, then, there is nothing in the
system to alarm the most timid soul.
We must next note, however, that, according to Spencer, theology
¦First Principles, p. 100. » Ibid., p. 13. 'Ibid., p. 14. * Ibid., p 15. » Ibid., pp. 16, 17.

The Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer. 87
has gone too far in asserting anything except the existence and in
scrutability of this Power. This is developed under the ideas of " sym-
boUc conceptions" and the "relativity of knowledge." inadequacy
The doctrine of symbolic conceptions is summed up as conceptions5
follows:' "When, instead of things whose attributes of religion.
can be tolerably well united in a single state of consciousness, we have
to deal with things whose attributes are too vast or numerous to be so
united, we must either drop in thought part of their attributes or else
not think of them (the things) at aU ; either form a more or less sym
bolic conception or no conception. We must predicate nothing of ob
jects too great or too multitudinous to be mentally represented, or we
must make our predications by the help of extremely inadequate rep
resentations of such objects — mere symbols of them."
As iUustrations of symbolic conceptions he gives, along with others,
the foUowing:'' "Should something be remarked of the class, say
farmers, . . . we neither enumerate in thought all the individuals
contained in the class nor believe that we could do so if required ; but
we are content with taking some few samples of it and remembering
that these could be indefinitely multiplied. Supposing the subject of
which something is predicated be EngUshmen, the answering state of
consciousness is a still more inadequate representation of the reaUty.
Yet more remote is the likeness of the thought to the thing if reference
be made to Europeans or to human beings." But the use of these
symbolic conceptions is liable to lead us into error. "We are led to
deal with our symbolic conceptions as though they were actual ones,
not only because we cannot clearly separate the two, but also because,
in the great majority of cases, the first serve our purposes nearly or
quite as well as the last- are simply the abbreviated signs we substi
tute for those more elaborate signs which are our equivalents for real
objects."3 "Thus we open the door to some which profess to stand
for known things but which reaUy stand for things that cannot be
known in any way." 4 With one swoop he includes ultimate religious
and ultimate scientific ideas in the illegitimate symboUc conceptions,
saying that they are not cognitions but mere symbols of the actual.6
He next proceeds to show by an analysis, both of the product and
the process of thought, that the reality existing behind all appearances
is and must ever be unknown ; thus aiming to establish the relativity
of thought, that is, the fact that thought can never reach the reaUty
behind phenomena. The reUgious significance of this doctrine is that
God, just because he is the First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute,
i First Principles, p. 27. a Ibid., p. 26 f. 'Ibid., p. 28. ? Ibid., p. 29. « Ibid., p. 68.

88 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
cannot be known. We need not elaborate this here because Mr. Spen
cer does not draw the conclusions which the argument seems to war
rant. He shows that the teachings of Hamilton and Mansel lead to
the impossibility of affirming the positive existence of anything be
yond phenomena, and then states that to his mind such a conclusion
involves a grave error. He says: "Observe . . . that every one of
the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demon
strated distinctly postulates the positive existence of something be
yond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute is, by
implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute." " Clearly, then, the
very demonstration that a definite consciousness of the Absolute is
impossible to us unavoidably presupposes an indefinite consciousness
of it." 1 Hence, when he comes to the final act of reconciliation, he
says that "though the Absolute cannot in any manner or degree be
The existence known, in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that
oftheAbso- ' D J
luteaneces- its positive existence is a necessary datum of conscious-
sary assump
tion, ness ; that so long as consciousness continues we cannot
for an instant rid it of this datum, and that thus the belief which this
datum constitutes has a higher warrant than any other whatever."2
Thus we discover that Spencerian agnosticism does not transform
itself into apisticism, but aUows us to beUeve what in the strict sense
we cannot know, and that this belief has a warrant so high that it is
preeminently respectable.
We turn now to the final element in the agnosticism of Spencer in
its practical aspects. As he does not draw the most radical conclu
sions relative to the existence of the inscrutable Power, so he is less
radical than we might anticipate concerning the use to be made of the
illegitimate symbolic conceptions of that Power. "The imperfections
of Religion, at first great but gradually diminishing, have been imper
fections only as measured by an absolute standard." "Speaking gen
erally, the religion current in each age and among each people has
been as near an approximation of the truth as it was then and there
possible for men to receive." The concrete forms "have, for the time
being, served to increase its impressiveness." Were these concrete
Prevailing re- conceptions taken from men, "and the attempt made to
iiefsUshouid Sive them comparatively abstract conceptions, the result
s Sa dlnYy would be to leave their minds with none at all, since the
changed. substituted ones could not be mentaUy represented." "At
the present time the refusal to abandon a relatively concrete notion
for a relatively abstract one implies the inabihty to frame the rela-
1 First Principles, p. 85 f. a Ibid., p. 98.

The Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer. 89
tively abstract one, and so proves that the change would be premature
and injurious." "Few, if any, are as yet fitted whoUy to dispense
with such conceptions as are current. The highest abstractions take
so great a mental power to realize with any vividness, and are so in
operative upon conduct unless they are vividly realized, that their
regulative effects must, for a long period to come, be appreciable in but
a smaU minority." "Those who relinquish the faith in which they
have been brought up for this most abstract faith in which Science
and ReUgion unite may not uncommonly fail to act up to their convic
tions." "We must, therefore, recognize the resistance to a change of
theological opinion as in a great measure salutary." " These various
beliefs are parts of the constituted order of things, and not accidental
but necessary parts. Seeing how one or other of them is everywhere
present, is of perennial growth, and when cut down redevelops in a
form but slightly modified, we cannot avoid the inference that they
are needful accompaniments of human life severaUy fitted to the soci
eties in which they are indigenous. From the highest point of view
we must recognize them as elements in that great evolution of which
the beginning and end are beyond our knowledge or conception — as
modes of manifestation of the Unknowable, and as having this for
their warrant." 1
Here again we see that if the principles of Spencer were lived up to
aU faiths would be tolerated ; each thinker would have a right, and
indeed be in duty bound to speak out his best thought, Spe??^r's„ &-
and no one should be censured for being conservative any fromHuxiey.
more than for being progressive. In other words, as distinguished
from Huxley, Spencer would have some regard to practical conse
quences. His theory would allow the matter to be determined by
force of the better argument, not by malicious thrusts at the opposi
tion from either side. Whatever his phflosophy may imply which he
does not hold, it is clear that as a practical system the outcome of his
teaching is that there should be perfect toleration ; since whatever one
believes, that belief is best for him, as it is the only one possible to
him. The dangerous elements are therefore in the phflosophy of
Spencer, not in his application of it.
1 The foregoing citations are from pp. 116-122 of the First Principles.

90 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VIII.
spencer's philosophy of the unknowable.
The agnosticism of Spencer differs from that of Huxley, not alone
in its practical consequences, but in that while the latter dweUs chiefly
on the limitations of our faculties the former emphasizes the trans-
scendent nature of the great Object of reUgious thought. Neverthe
less, the difference in this respect between the two systems is not im
portant, for they come to the same conclusion, namely, that it is im
possible for the human mind to know God. In both systems this con
clusion is reached by a study of the attempts of the mind to see behind
phenomena. And although in Part I of the First Principles Spencer
appears to present a new philosophy as taught by Hamilton and Man
sel and modified by himself, in Part II, it is evident that he is far more
a follower of Hume than would be at first supposed. Hence we may
confine ourselves to the philosophy of the Unknowable.
But it is not necessary to take up the whole of that phflosophy,
since our purpose is merely to show that such positions as are destruc
tive of Christianity in its practical operations are either untenable
or otherwise ineffectual. Indeed, were aU to draw the inferences
that Spencer draws and then live up to them in practice there would
be little need to attempt an answer to his philosophy. It is only be
cause there are those who hide behind the philosophy and do not
make Spencer's application of it, thus excusing their practical athe
ism, that we need discuss this phflosophy here.
The one burden of Spencer's phflosophy is, " that the reaUty exist-
Unknowabie- ing behind all appearances is, and must ever be, un-
Q6SS 01 L 11 ©
Reality be- known." 1 " AU possible conceptions have been, one by
ances. one, tried and found wanting ; and so the entire field of
speculation has been gradually exhausted without positive result."2
The same idea is found in many forms of statement throughout this
entire philosophy. All knowledge is relative; never reaching the
finality of things, but only the relations between tilings. This is
as true for the things with which science is conversant as for those
with which religion deals; and Spencer displays his fair-minded
ness by boldly showing up the unscientific character of science in pro-
1 First Principles, p. 69. a Ibid., p. 68 f .

Spencers Philosophy of the Unknowable. 91
f essing to know that about which nothing can be known. Neverthe
less, it is only with the religious aspects of this Unknowable that we
have to do.
There can be no doubt that many have so spoken of God in theo
logical treatises as to leave the impression of a knowledge of him far
more comprehensive than they possess ; and in so far they have been
forgetful of the silence of Jesus and the apostles on the very points in
which they have seemed so wise. And the documents from which we,
as Christians, draw our knowledge of God, are entirely clear in their
utterance on the question of his inscrutable nature. We did not need
a Hamilton, or a Mansel, or a Spencer to teach us this truth. Paul
exclaims : " O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowl
edge of God ! how unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past
finding out ! " 1 The nearest approach that Jesus ever made by direct
statement to a characterization of the nature of God was when he
said, " God is a Spirit," 2 though he tried to convey to the minds of
men much concerning the character of God, and his relation to the
world and to men.
It is not, therefore, antichristian in Mr. Spencer to affirm that we
know very little of God's nature, ontologically consid- Spen(.er>Seon-
ered; and especially when he declares that all human ^fnetprop"
thought is inadequate to such a discovery. Mr. Spencer's osltlons-
error appears to consist in the identification of two quite separate and
distinguishable propositions, the first of which is that we do not know aU
about God, and the second of which is that we do not know anything
about God. The first is undeniable, but the latter is not to be quietly
and without protest substituted for it. The first is a Christian doctrine,
the second is hardly different from atheism. Though we do not and
cannot know all about God, we may know something about him ; or if
it suit the agnostic mind any better, we may and must believe something
concerning him. Mr. Spencer believes in the existence of a something
which he so far defines as to call it a Power, the First Cause, absolute,
infinite, and capable of manifesting itself . s Of the certainty of these
things Mr. Spencer says : "Though the Absolute cannot in any man
ner or degree be known, hi the strict sense of knowing, yet we find
that its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness ; that
so long as consciousness continues we cannot for an instant rid it of
this datum ; and that thus the belief which this datum constitutes
has a higher warrant than any other whatever."4
1 Rom. xi, 33. 2 John iv, 24.
3 First Principles, pp. 38, 46, 87, 98, 99, 108, and throughout. 4 Ibid., p. 98.

92 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
This sounds marvelously like the utterances of theistic writers. For
example, Bowne says:1 "The infinite is the most certain factor in
objective knowledge." Whoever wiU take the pains to recaU the
fact, made clear in the Introduction to this work, that there is no
well-defined line of demarkation between knowledge and belief, since
all knowledge is dependent on beliefs, wiU not think it worth while to
dispute as to the antitheistic or the theistic form of statement. The
one emphasizes the high warrant of the belief, the other the certainty
of knowledge, in reference to the infinite. Both agree as to the cer
tainty. Mr. Spencer was probably not conscious of quibbling when
he insisted that we know nothing of the Absolute, and yet that we
must believe in the positive existence of the Absolute with aU the at-
His faith suffl- tributes, which as we have seen, he admits it to possess.
cient for ac
tion. And his agnosticism amounts to nothing, so far as the
confessed attributes of the Power are concerned. For men do not act
on knowledge alone, nor chiefly. And a beUef with so high a war
rant as Spencer affirms the beUef in the positive existence of the Abso
lute to have, a warrant "higher than any other belief whatever" — for
example, higher than that for our own existence or for the existence of
matter — is one on which men can and wfll act.
By what right, we ask, does Mr. Spencer Umit our belief in the Abso
lute to the list of attributes mentioned on the preceding page ? And be
it noted that it is belief that he is here talking about, not knowledge ;
yet a belief that has for it a higher warrant than any other beUef
whatever. The principal limit he sets to our beUef is in refer
ence to the personality of the inscrutable Power. Criticising the
statement of Mr. Mansel, that " it is our duty, then, to think of God as
personal," he says2 : " Duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny
personahty. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to
the established limits of our inteUigence, and not perversely to rebel
against them." Here he is protesting against Mr. Mansel's affirma
tion of duty. We wish, however, to waive the question of duty
with reference to this matter, except to agree with Mr. Spencer that
it is our duty to submit ourselves with all humility to the estabhshed
limits of our intelligence. The question as to what he means by the
^byfhe estai> established limits of our intelligence is, however, still an
ofSilr intern- open one- What does he mean »y intelligence? He
gence. certainly does not mean knowledge, for he repeatedly
declares that we must believe things which we cannot know, in the
strict sense of the word. But since knowledge and belief exhaust
' Metaphysics, p. 479. a First Principles, p. 108.

Spencer's Jf hilosophy of the Unknowable. 93
the possibilities of inteUigence he must mean by the established limits
of intelUgence the established Umits of belief.
There is also an ambiguity in the term " estabhshed limits," which
needs to be cleared up. In what sense are these limits established : by
the nature of things, or by Mr. Spencer's argument ? If by the na
ture of tilings it would certainly be our duty to submit with all humil
ity. But even then we could not refrain from constant effort to dis
cover whether the limits we suppose established in the nature of
things are the real limits ; and if we were convinced that they were
the real, there would still be the possibility that they are not both real
and final. So we ought in duty not to submit to the established limits
unless we know them to be both real and final. In those limits as es
tablished by the nature of things there is, then, at present, nothing to
submit to. If he means the limits established by his argument, then
he means to say that it is our duty to submit to his estimate of the
limits of belief. We suspect that only those will submit to his judg
ment, as such, who do not venture to think for themselves. All are
at liberty to submit to the limits of belief he thinks he has estabhshed
if they are convinced by his argument. To that number we do not
belong.

Qi Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER IX.
spencer on the divine personality.
What are the limits of beUef , then, with reference to the personal
ity of the inscrutable Power ? It is evident that Mr. Spencer has no
Denial of positive beUef in the personality of God, and that he be-
God's per- r
sonality. lieves that God is not personal. It seems," he says,1
" somewhat strange that men should suppose the highest worship to
lie in assimilating the object of worship to themselves. Not in assert
ing a transcendent difference, but in asserting a certain likeness, con
sists the element of their creed which they think essential." These
words refer entirely to the fact that personality is attributed to God,
and hence they can only mean that, whatever he beUeves, he does not
believe that God is personal, but that he is, in this respect, transcend-
ently different from men. So much in fact he says. " Is it not just
possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending inteUigence
and will as these transcend mechanical motion ? It is true that we
are totaUy unable to conceive any such higher mode of being. But
that is not a reason for questioning its existence ; it is rather the re
verse."2 This fairly commits him. to the belief that in denying per
sonality to God he does not necessarily assert of him something lower,
but rather something higher. He says in support of his position :
"Have we not seen how utterly incompetent our minds are to form
even an approach to a conception of that which underlies aU phenom
ena ? . . . Does it not follow that the Ultimate Cause cannot in any
respect be conceived by us because it is in every respect greater than
can be conceived ? " 3 Putting it aU together it means that there is
more reason for asserting of God something higher than personality
than there is for attributing personality to him.
Let us then test the arguments, first for something higher than per
sonality in God, and then for personality. The only argument Spen-
Argument for cer gives on his side is our inability to conceive of this
something ,
higher than higher mode of being. Our total inabflity to conceive
personal!- , . J
ty in God. any such higher mode of being "is not a reason for ques
tioning its existence ; it is rather the reverse." This is absolutely the
only scrap of support he offers for his belief. All the rest is directed
1 First Principles, p. 109. a Ibid. ' Ibid.

Spencer on the Divine Personality. 95
against belief in personaUty. We are asked, then, to believe in the
higher mode of being because we cannot conceive it. This is to
make inconceivability a test of reaUty.
Against assigning personality to God, or, as Mr. Spencer prefers,
the Unconditioned, the Ultimate Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, he
mentions that this attribute must be derived from our own natures,
and hence is not an elevation but a degradation. This, together with
the foregoing, sounds very much as though Mr. Spencer, besides all
the other attributes he assigns to the inscrutable Power, would assert
of it that it is higher than we, since he fears lest we may degrade it
by attributing to it inteUigence and wfll ; that is to say, personaUty,
which is an attribute of man. Here he is in agreement with theists,
especially Christian theists, who firmly beUeve that God is infinitely
more exalted than ourselves.
This is not the place to discuss the source from which we derive our
ideas of the personality of God. We are engaged now, not in testing
Christian theism, but in testing Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Un
knowable. Nevertheless, we suggest that it is just possible that we
do not derive those ideas from ourselves primarily, but from a reve
lation of himself which God made to men. This statement will be a
great grief to the deniers of the need or the possibility of revelation,
we know, but it will be no greater grief to them than it is to us to have
Mr. Spencer make inconceivability a test of reaUty.
But let us see briefly what it is in us men which has so persistently
caused us to attribute intelligence and will to God. If we, aside from
revelation, assert anything concerning God we must do it on the
ground of reasoning from the known to the unknown. This kind of
reasoning is adopted by all who reason. Now, we know in the
products of the human cause that intelligence and will are involved.
When we see any product of a nonhuman cause that looks like what
we would call intelUgence in the product of a human cause Wbyweattrib-
we inevitably attribute it to intelligence and will in the aiity?o God.
nonhuman cause. We may be wrong in so doing ; but to do this is
inevitable if we think. So that only those thinkers who deny evi
dence of intelligence in the world can escape from attributing in
telligence to the Ultimate Cause, and no cry of "Anthropomor
phism ! " wfll ever induce the human mind to shrink back from acting
according to its own laws.
But when we have done this we do not necessarily believe that this
intelUgence is only equal to ours, but, on the contrary, we think it in
finitely greater. The exaltation of God in our thought consists, in

96 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
part, in making that intelligence infinitely more perfect than our
own, as the products of his intelligence are infinitely more perfect than
What God our own. Nor when, by the necessities of our thought,
sufves,epei> we attribute personality to God, rather than, with Spen-
not know. ° cer, some alleged unknown thing higher than person
ality, do we mean to say that we have conceived of God as he is in all
respects. It is possible, though not probable, that God is not personal
in our conception of the word ; since our idea of personaUty may be
erroneous. Or it is possible that he is personal in our sense of the
term, and more than personal. When we foUow the example of
Spencer and begin to make conjectures there is no saying where we
shall end. But when we think according to the laws of our mind
and according to all the ordinary modes of thought we are obhged to
think of God as personal, and in no other way.
It may be said in reply that we should not construct any definite
idea of God at aU. A Spencerian agnostic cannot consistently make
such a demand. For Mr. Spencer, while leaving his idea of the in
scrutable Power very indefinite, has, as we have seen, given it at
least a small degree of definiteness. In discussing Mr. Spencer's de
mands that we should submit to the established limits of our inteUi
gence we saw that it is impossible for the human mind to be sure
that it has reached those limits. Hence, though we may be very cer-
No certainty tain that we shaU never fuUy comprehend the infinite, it
that Spen- J r . , .
cer's idea of foUows that we cannot be sure that Mr. Spencer's idea is
God is the
most den- as definite as it can be made. Thus there remains, not
nite possi
ble, only the right, but the duty to seek ever to know more
of the inscrutable Power, just as the scientist seeks ever to penetrate
more deeply into the mysteries of nature. No one is more ready
than Herbert Spencer to confess and even to emphasize the present
limits of scientific knowledge ; and yet he does not conclude that the
scientist should not try to add definiteness to the indefinite concep
tions of science. Why should he blame the theologian for striving
for the same end ? He admits frankly the errors of science in the
course of its history. We as frankly admit those of theology, espe
cially of natural theology. But because mistakes have been made in
the past we do not feel disposed to cease effort. And if the apostle of
the indefinite in religious thought finds some degree of definiteness
we champion the right of those who by proper methods seek to know
more of God than Mr. Spencer has told us. All we ask is that the
Spencerian agnostics shall not insist on fixing the limits of our intelU
gence this side of our utmost possibility, and that they shall be as

Spencer on the Divine Personality. 97
loyal in adhering to the estabhshed constitution of our minds as they
expect their opponents to be to the limits of intelligence when once
they are reaUy discovered.
And in fact, in this instance, as so often, Mr. Spencer recoils from
the logical consequences of his own argument, and says: "Very
likely there wfll ever remain a need to give shape to that spencer's re-
indefinite sense of an ultimate existence which forms consequen-C6s of (lis
the basis of our intelligence. We shaU always be under argument.
the necessity of contemplating it as some mode of being ; that is, of
representing it to ourselves in some form of thought, however vague.
And we shall not err in doing this so long as we treat every notion
we thus frame as merely a symbol, utterly without resemblance to
that for which it stands." Thus he gives up his case against those
who believe in giving definiteness to an indefinite idea. He thinks
this not only right now, but suspects that there will always remain
a need for doing so. This necessity, which will always be upon us,
arises, as we have pointed out, from the constitution of the human
mind and, indeed, from the entire spiritual nature. What that form
of thought or mode of being is which we shall always necessarily
frame he does not say. If our argument is correct it will always be
the personal mode of being which we shaU attribute to the inscru
table Power.
There is, however, one point in the statement of Mr. Spencer's con
cession to the Christian theists to which we must take exception.
He says that we shall not err in giving definite form to His unreason-
the indefinite " so long as we treat every notion we thus a e eman '
frame as merely a symbol, utterly without resemblance to that for
which it stands." We have no objection to regarding all our notions
merely as symbols. This is in fact what the Church has done from
the beginning. But we do object to the requirement that we shall
treat these symbols as utterly without resemblance to that for which
they stand. It is impossible for man, without self -stultification, to
treat the attribute of personality in God as utterly without resem
blance to the fact. If we represent the inscrutable Power as any
mode of being it must be the personal mode. To override this ne
cessity and say that it compels us to think of God as entirely differ
ent from what he is would be to turn all human thinking into hope
less chaos. For there is nothing about which we think deeply whose
correspondence to our thought we could not equally and with equal
positiveness deny. So far as there is any probability in the case it is
all on the side of the belief that when we attribute personaUty to God

98 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
we are so far correct, though it is not impossible that this does not
wholly describe him.
There is only one other form of agnosticism which needs to be no
ticed here, and that can be briefly dismissed. It is that rare kind
which assails aU knowledge. It exists in two forms : first, a nega
tive, which is not sure of anything ; and, second, a positive, which
Universal asserts that nothing can be known. The first simply de-
skepticism. nieg ^^ there is a basis for any conclusion, and consist
ently maintains a purely skeptical attitude. It arises from a defect of
wfll. Both forms contradict their fundamental principles ; for the
first knows at least something, namely, that there is no basis for any
conclusion, while the second knows that nothing can be known,
which is knowledge of the most comprehensive kind. l
After a reasonably full and a thoroughly impartial consideration of
agnosticism in aU its principal forms we are led to the conclusion that
it is fll founded and deceptive, and that, as far as it contradicts Chris
tian thought, it is entirely without claim upon us as thinking beings.
Much less should it be permitted to rob us of our faith in God as
knowable, at least to the extent of our practical needs.
1 It is interesting to note that Augustine handled universal skepticism with rare skill,
so early did Christianity attempt the defense of knowledge. See his De vera religlone,
39, 72. Comp. Windelband's History of Philosophy, translated by J. H. Tufts, New York
and London, 1895, pp. 277-279.

Pantheism in its Older Forms. 99*

SECTION HI-PANTHEISM (MONISM).
One of the most striking features of modern anti-Christian thought
is the prevalence therein of the pantheistic element. Atheism has
had a new lease of life in recent times, and the general tendency of
agnosticism has been to lend it aid and respectability. But there are
many anti-Christian thinkers who are not atheists, and pantheistic
who resent being classed with them. l Nevertheless, their m6™!"! r'n
idea of God is so vague as to be destructive of everything tnought-
valuable in Christianity. In this vagueness they strongly resemble
Mr. Spencer; and in fact agnosticism lends its assistance to anti-
Christian thought through Professor Huxley to atheism, on the one
hand, and, on the other, through Mr. Spencer to pantheism. Or per
haps it would be more correct to say that Mr. Spencer borrowed from
pantheism in the construction of his agnosticism, whfle Professor
Huxley borrowed more from atheism.

CHAPTER I.
PANTHEISM IN ITS OLDER FORMS.
It is our purpose to consider pantheism, as every other form of
anti-Christian phflosophy, chiefly in its more recent forms. But ' in
order to do this to advantage it wfll be necessary to look briefly at
pantheism as a general doctrine of God, the world, and man, without
reference to any special period of time. Broadly speaking, panthe
ism identifies God and the world. According to Averroes * the world
is an emanation sustained by an anima mundi, or world soul, as
which the Deity was conceived. Spinoza took the view that every
thing was God, who, or which, is a substance with two modes of man
ifestation, one being thought, the other extension. Both modes he
regarded as acts of Deity, thought being his subjective, extension his
1 We cheerfully acknowledge tho sturdy blows struck by pantheists in recent times at
materialism ; but we cannot escape the conviction that the dread of materialistic opinion
which they ascribe to others has been the principal influence holding them back from
carrying their arguments to the conclusion for a personal God. For illustrations sec
Paulsen's Einleitung in die Philosophie, pp. 242-248, and Forel, Gehirn, und Seele, pp. 6,
8, 31, 32.
2 Deberweg, History of Philosophy, translated by G. S. Morris, New York, 1874, pp.
406, 415-417.

100 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
objective act. The difference between Averroes and Spinoza might
Pantheism of be stated thus : The former regarded God as the aU ; the
.A. vcrrocs
and Spinoza latter regarded the all as God.1 Since in popular
ed. " thought God is regarded as spirit and the universe as
matter it might be supposed that to call God the aU would be to make
the all spiritual, while to caU the all God would be to make God ma
terial. But such a distinction would be erroneous. Only the gross
materialists think of matter in such a way as to assert that it ex
cludes spirit. Rather is the tendency toward a refusal to define mat
ter, thus making it possible to leave vague the answer to the question
whether God is material or spiritual. It is claimed that we know
nothing of the nature either of spirit or matter, and that, hence,
it is better to speak of one substance with the two attributes of
thought and extension.
With reference to the doctrine of God and the world the two forms
of pantheism just mentioned give us the only possibiUties, although
there are all shades of these forms represented in philosophy. But
we have yet to state the main points in the pantheistic psychology. It
is evident that to the pantheist the human soul can have no real indi
viduality. Whether we regard God as aU, or all as God, the human
soul, as a distinct entity, is blotted out of existence. Taking Aver
roes and Spinoza as the two great historical types of the genus pan
theist we find that the former regarded the individual mind as but a
manifestation of the impersonal mind — the anima mundi. Spinoza
expressed himseU in other language, but the essential idea was the
same. Morell 2 thus sums up Spinoza's views as to the relation of the
finite to the infinite soul: "The mind of man . . . must be essen-
Spinoza on tiaUy and substantially a portion of the divine thinking;
andetheninfi- regarded individually or phenomenally it must be a sitc-
nite mind. cession 0f different modes of the infinite thought:' " The
body is the object of the mind, the mind the idea of the body ; and
they are united to each other through life, not because there is any
direct connection between them, but because there is a fundamental
unity." Thus pantheism, by making God all, or all God, and our
' minds or spirits merely modes of the divine, destroys the hope of in
dividual immortaUty along with our real personality. Not only so.
Besides the denial of human personality and individual immortality
pantheism denies our freedom. We are but modes of the divine. To
'Comp. Farrar's Critical History of Free Thought, pp. 109, 415; Martineau, A Study of
Religion, vol. ii, pp. 159-166; Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, vol. ii, p. 56; Morell's
History of Modern Philosophy, pp. 124-128.
a History of Modern Philosophy, p. 128.

l'ANTHEISM IN ITS OLDER FORMS. 101
admit our freedom would be to admit that there is something besides
God. Because Spinoza thus took up aU things into the being of God, and
apparently made everything divine, Novalis described him as "the
God-intoxicated man," and Schleiermacher says of him that " the infi
nite was his Alpha and Omega," and that "he was full of religion and
holy spirit." 1 It is unnecessary to deny the purity of Spinoza's life
in order to prove the antichristian character of his doctrine. But
we are chiefly concerned here to show that, being antichristian, it is
at the same time false. We may admit without hesitation that pan
theism is not, in theory, atheism, and also that as a theory of the rela
tion of God to the world it is in some respects preferable to that held
by many uninstructed Christians — preferable as a system of thought
and also as to its practical results when carried to the logical conclu
sions. But viewed in its fundamental principles pantheism is hardly
more satisfactory to thought than materialism, and scarcely less dan
gerous to morals.
One of the chief difficulties connected with pantheism as a system
of thought is its necessary denial of personality to the infinite. His
only freedom is a freedom from external constraint. Denial of per-
J sonality to
And since pantheism denies anything external to the the infinite.
Deity he must be in this sense absolutely free. But freedom to choose
this rather than that is denied him. He is free only to unfold his
essential being, and this not freely, but according to his essential
nature. What he is he does ; but he does it because he is, not because
he will; because compeUed by an inner necessity, not as of free
choice. This denies to the Deity inteUigence in any sense of the word
known to us by our own experience or observation. The intelligence
known to us by the observation of ourselves is not bound, or at least
does not appear bound, by an inner necessity, though often hindered
in the execution of its designs by external obstacles. The God of
pantheism, contrary to this, is not hindered by anything external to
himself, for there is no such thing ; but he is, on the other hand, if
conscious at all, conscious of his inability to unfold in any way other
than he does. He is a helplecs God.
What, now, is the source of this notion of a necessitated infinite ?
It arises solely from the purpose to make aU being suspicious
consist in substance, and to make that substance one. thjVTdea of
These postulates are taken for fact in the very funda- ° '
mental definitions and propositions of Spinoza's system. Given cer-
1 Eeden iiber die ReUgion, 4te Auflage, 1831, p. 47 f.
y

102 Foundations of the Christian i^aith.
tain definitions, certain propositions necessarily follow. But take
these propositions, which are logicaUy connected with certain of
Spinoza's definitions, and see if there be any reason for holding them.
"There cannot be, and we cannot conceive, any other substance than
God. " " Whatever is is in God ; and nothing can be, nor be conceived,
without God." • These are mere assertions, based on nothing but the
definitions which involved them. If one defines everything as God
then, of course, we can conceive of nothing except as in God. But
there is no reason for saying that everything is God. That is, the
assertion is an hypothesis, not a fact. On the other hand, there is
the best of reason for attributing free inteUigence to the Deity.2 Here
we are engaged simply in testing pantheism, which involves certain
consequences so serious as to prevent its acceptance.
Thus, not only because it is unfounded, but because it is inconsistent
with established fact we reject it. But what are these consequences 1
How is it inconsistent with established fact ? First, very much in the
Objections to same way as was found to be the case with materialism.
view. el'L" The world, says pantheism, is but an unfolding of God
according to his inner necessity. There is, therefore, no purpose, but
only impulse. The world, or God, or both as one, is an automaton. We
are a part of that great machine, or rather we are modes of it. Our
thoughts, feelings and purposes, are also a part of it. The fundamental
conviction of our being is thus contradicted, and aU for the purpose of
maintaining that there is but one substance. Admit as fact the con
viction from which we cannot free ourselves in point either of feeling
or of practice, the conviction, namely, that we are free personal
agents, and the pantheistic doctrine that God is aU is at once swept
away. And what is the argument by which it is sought to destroy
that conviction ? Simply this, so far as pantheism is concerned, that
God is all, and therefore our freedom and personaUty are delusive
sentiments. The consciousness of our freedom and personaUty is in
destructible, and yet we are asked to annihilate that consciousness
i It has often been pointed out that the pantheism of Spinoza is, in essence, little more
than a logical fallacy— the fallacy of the universal. How did he come by his notion of a
universal substance? The facts from which he started are, on the one hand, the infi
nite manifold of nature, and on the other the individual minds that think. By a process
ot dropping characteristic features he advances along each line until he arrives at what
he considers the essential nature of each in the pure abstractions, thought (or conscious
ness) ana extension. The suggestion lies near at hand, Why have two substances?
Would it not be far better In the Interest of unity to posit one substance with two attri
butes ? Thus his pantheism is triumphant. But as soon as we ask for such a definition
of terms as will give them some intelligible content all the diversity and manifoldness of
the original reappear. Thought and extension are abstractions existing only In the
mind that thinks them. The actualities to be explained are things and thinkers.
¦' See infra.

Pantheism in its Older Forms. 103
in the interest of the theory that God is aU in such a sense as to make
us but modes of himself. That theory has no foundation in any fact
known to us. It is a theory, pure and simple. Why should we let it
destroy our firmest convictions ?
Further, pantheism as surely as materiaUsm, would, if carried out
to its logical results, destroy all thought. It begins with the contra
diction of the fundamental facts of consciousness. If we do not know
that we exist as personal and free agents we know nothing. For to
deny this is to deny the ego, in contradistinction from which alone
we know the non-ego. So that both the seU and the not-self are struck
down at a single blow. But if we are so grossly deceived in the pri
mary facts of consciousness, in those things which are most accessible
to thought, how can we trust our conclusions with reference to mat
ters more remote from us ?
And here we are talking as though we were at least free to think,
while by hypothesis we do not exist and we do not think, but God is
the existent thinker. But if God is the only existent thinker, and
each of us is but a mode of him and each one's thoughts but his
thoughts, then God thinks uninteUigently, erroneously, partially, as
weU as in some, correctly. And since it takes aU the Confusion aris-
thoughts of all of us, and more, to make up the sum total tneistic^eo-
of the thoughts of the infinite we have as a result the ry-
greatest conceivable intellectual muddle in God. Besides, with the
knowledge of the self and not-self gone there is nothing left to consti
tute God. This whole system, therefore, is destructive of all thought
and all knowledge. And, as Professor Bowne says, "Any theory
which shakes the mind's trust in itself is speculatively untenable ; and
for the reason that the theory can be established only by trusting our
faculties, while the moment it is established it undermines itself ; " that
is, by shaking the mind's trust in the very faculties by which the the
ory was established. It is not too much to say, therefore, that pan
theism is a system built out of nothing, upon nothing, by nothing.

104 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
PANTHEISM IN THE FORM OF MONISM.
But we do not wish to give further attention to pantheism in its
older forms, although so much seemed to be necessary to an under-
In what sense standing of the newer. The newest form of pantheism is
monism is a . . ., . .
pantheistic, known as monism. It is, however, only pantheism in so
far as it includes a doctrine of God. It may be, and often is practi
cally atheistic. Judged etymologicaUy monism is the doctrine which
proposes to explain all existence on the supposition of a single sub
stance. This substance might be regarded as spirit, thus annihilating
matter except as a phenomenon, or as an activity of spirit. In this
case it would be spirituaUstic monism. Or the one substance might
be regarded as gross matter, in which case we should have materialis
tic monism, with mind as mere phenomenon. In either case monism
would be primarily a doctrine as to substance rather than as to theol
ogy or psychology, though these would inevitably demand an expla
nation at its hands. But, as a matter of fact, monism, as it is known
at the present day, is professedly neither spirituaUstic nor materialis
tic. It is an attempt to account for the phenomena of both matter
and mind, and yet to avoid the dualism involved in those conceptions.
It makes this attempt by postulating a substance which is neither
matter as ordinarily conceived, nor spirit, but which has the attributes
of both, manifesting itself now under the form of extension, now under
the form of thought. According to monism the materialists, the spir
itualists, and the dualists are alike in error. '
To Science, which seeks to reduce everything to the most elementary
conditions, this doctrine has proved exceedingly attractive, and, except-
Prevaience of ing a few ultra materiaUsts, most scientists of to-day are
Christian monists. Not only so, but monism is exceedingly preva
lent in the thought of many Christian writers. For all
these reasons it is absolutely necessary for the apologist to examine
and weigh it with all care and fairness. As a further preUminary
statement it must be said that monism in the present day is scarcely
distinguishable from materialism, so material is the conception of this
1 On the various types of monists comp. Ziehen's Introduction to Physiological Psychol
ogy, translated by Van Liew and Beyer, second edition.London and New York, 1895, p. 300.

Pantheism in the Form of Monism. 105
supposed one substance, and also that it has formulated a doctrine of
psychology and theology.
Before going further it wfll be necessary to give the principal argu
ments by which monists support their contention. These of necessity
relate to the systems which monism rejects, namely, du- Reason for its
alism, spiritualism, and materialism. Dualism is rejected dualism.
on the ground that there is no way of explaining how spirit and mat
ter, which are so exceedingly diverse, can affect each other as, on the
supposition that both exist, it appears that they do. Of dualism there
are two forms ; the first emphasizing mind as the cause of motion, the
second mind as the effect of motion. Such is the distinction made by
Romanes,1 himself a monist, and it is probably the best possible put
ting of it, though we enter our caveat when, without further ado, he
identifies spiritualism with that form of dualism which makes mind
the cause of motion. The elements of the problem, then, are mind,
matter, motion.
We have already discussed the materialistic theory and need give it
no further attention here. But when, in the effort to sustain monism,
it is proposed to show that mind cannot be the cause of motion we are
obhged to examine the process of reasoning. The one argument which
Romanes employs is the supposition that motion in matter considered
as an effect of mind violates the scientific doctrine of conservation of
energy. We condense his argument. 2 He begins by ad- Romanes's
mitting that the view he combats has the advantage of agalnstmind
supposing causaUty to proceed from the mind, which is moatCiaoUnei°n
the source of our idea of causaUty, and not from that into mattei-
which that idea has been read by the mind. "Hence," he says, " it
is so far less difficult to imagine that mental changes are the cause of
bodily changes than vice versd; for upon this hypothesis we are start
ing at least from the substance of immediate knowledge and not from
the reflection of that knowledge in what we call the external world."
Nevertheless, this does not overcome his difficulty with the doctrine
of the conservation of energy. "If the mind of man is capable of
breaking in as an independent cause upon the otherwise uniform sys
tem of natural causation the only way in which it could do so would
be by either destroying or creating certain quanta of either matter or
energy. But to suppose the mind capable of doing any of these things
would be to suppose that the mind is a cause in some other sense than
a physical or a natural cause ; it would be to suppose that the mind is
1 Mind and Motion and Monism, pp. 47, 50. Romanes experienced many changes of
opinion, but finally died a theist and a Christian. a Ibid., pp. 50-54.

106 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
a supernatural cause, or, more plainly, that aU mental activity, so far
as it is an efficient cause of bodfly movement, is of the nature of a
miracle." This conclusion he designates as per se improbable. Its
impossibility he considers further on. In order to avoid confusion
let us pause here and examine the argument as far as it has been
carried. We begin with that part of his objection to mind as the cause of
motion in matter which says this would be to make the mind a cause
One form of jn some other sense than a physical or a natural cause ;
his argument r J '
examined. that is, it would make it a supernatural cause, and aU
movements of body by mind miraculous. In this objection, physical
and natural are taken to mean the same thing. A physical cause is a
natural cause and vice versd. The mind is neither to be designated
as physical nor natural, but as supernatural, and its power to affect
the movements of the body as miraculous. It appears, then, that the
force of the objection lies in the difficulty which the monist feels in
admitting the existence of anything besides the natural, that is, the
physical, or, in other words, the monist objects because he will not
consent to the supernatural, or, to use his alternative word, the super-
physical. He stumbles at the supernatural (superphysical) and at the
miraculous. This objection is of force, therefore, only when one has
reached the conclusion beforehand that the supernatural (superphysi
cal) and the miraculous are incredible. But, since the mind is regarded
as supernatural, if the supernatural is incredible the mind is incredi
ble ; that is, there is nothing corresponding to our ordinary ideas of
mind. This reductio ad absurdum is perhaps sufficient to show the
futility of the argument in question.
Let us try the former part of the argument, which asserts that if
the mind breaks in as an independent cause upon the otherwise uni
form system of natural (physical) causation it must be either by de
stroying or creating certain quanta of either matter or energy, or
both.1 Let us think of physical causes at work, the sum total of
matter and force being always the same though changing as to locality
and form. Now, is it true that the only ways in which an outside
cause could break into this kind of a system would be by destroying
or creating; that is, subtracting from or adding to the matter or the
energy of the system, or both ? It is not true. There is yet a third
possibility ; that is, that the external agent might merely manipulate
i The reader's attention Is called to the fact that our purpose here Is not to prove that
an independent cause can break into the system, but that, if it can, it can do so without
the consequences which Romanes says would follow.

Pantheism in the Form of Monism. 107
the matter, or force, or both, as they would not be manipulated were
they left to themselves. Hoffding in answer to this possibility says *
that a physical movement does not change its direction except by the
appUcation of a physical force of a given strength. But Hoffding on
this affirmation is just the point in dispute, and simply rection in
" physical
begs the question at issue. In fact, on a preceding page, movement.
he admits the possibility that a physical movement might have a
nonphysical cause.2
It is true that such.an external agent would have to exert energy
to change the direction of the energy of the system ; but it is not nec
essary to suppose that the energy of the system would be either in
creased or diminished by such interference from without. The doc
trine of conservation of energy demands that if one body in motion
be interfered with by another body the loss of energy in the first shall
become an increase of energy in the second. It has nothing to say as
to the effect of interference with body by spirit. Now, if a super-
physical mind could stop a rolling ball the energy of the ball could
not, according to the doctrine in question, be imparted to the mind,
for the doctrine demands that the energy shall remain within the sys
tem. Hence there would be no diminution in the sum of physical
force. On the other hand, the mind-energy could not be imparted to
the body, for the energy of the physical system cannot be augmented.
So that nothing would be added. On the supposition, then, which
Romanes himself makes, of the breaking in of an independent cause
upon the otherwise uniform system, no energy need be added or sub
tracted. The energy would simply be given a new direction.3
In truth, Romanes did not put the dualistic difficulty in its strong
est form. The real difficulty is as to how two supposed entities so
whoUy diverse in their attributes as mind and matter can T]le real diffl.
affect each other. How can a nonphysical force in any statJd'b'y
way influence a physical force? The two forces might Romanes.
be supposed to be so different as to be both at work at the same time
and place without interfering with each other. It does appear as
though it were not difficult to conceive of mind as influencing mind
or of matter as influencing matter;4 but how can mind influence
matter ? In fact, however, it is impossible for us to conceive how one
1 Psychologie in Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung. German by F. Bendixen.
Leipzig, 1887, p. 70. 2 Ibid., p. 38.
3 Comp. O. Kiilpe's Outlines of Psychology Based upon the Results of Experimental In
vestigation, translated from the German by E. B. Titchener, p. 4 ; London and New
York, 1895, and Ziehen's Introduction to Physiological Psychology, p. 305.
4 Even HSffding seems to have assumed the truth of this appearance, Psychologie,
p. 69 f.

108 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
particle of matter influences another particle of matter. It is agreed
among scientists that matter cannot influence matter across empty
space; and yet it is also agreed that no two atoms of matter touch
each other; that is, there is seeming contact, yet actual distance,
between them. It is one of the profoundest mysteries of science that
matter seems to influence or affect other matter. Why, then, should
we stagger at another mystery in the form of matter influenced by
mind ? In this respect at least duahsm is as explicable as monism.
Judged by the only standard known to us it is easier to think of
matter as moved by mind than of matter as moved by matter.
These considerations show that the assumption of matter moved by
mind does not carry with it the consequences which Romanes sup
poses, and that, if it did, still it would prove nothing to one not
already convinced of the incredibflity of the rniraculous and of the
existence of mind. They also show that the assumption is not,
as Romanes asserts, improbable per se.
But having attempted to show that the assumption in question is
improbable, he next proceeds with the attempt to show that it is vir
tually impossible. He supposes the case of a sportsman who shoots
His assertion and kills a bird The sportsman's vohtion is supposed to
sfbmtyoFm- have broken in upon the otherwise continuous stream of
f romewVt°h" physical causes by modifying the molecular movements
of the brain in a way to make the aim correct and the
gun to discharge at the right instant, by converting the gunpowder
into gas which propeUed the lead, which killed the bird. The first
change in the material world (the brain) was very sUght ; but owing
to the intricate nexus of physical causaUty throughout all nature, the
introduction of so slight a disturbance is found to exert an everlast
ing and ever-widening influence. The mechanical processes of the
bird's body — its animal heat, its power to condition other mechanical
changes in other lives, its power to propagate its kind, with all the
physical changes this must have carried with it — all these have come
to an end as a direct consequence of the man's volition thus suddenly
breaking in upon the otherwise uniform course of nature. " Now,"
says Romanes, "I say that, apart from some system of preestablished
harmony, it appears simply inconceivable that the order of nature
could be maintained at aU if it were thus liable to be interfered with
at any moment in any number of points." And he rightly says
that the only difference between the doctrine of preestablished
harmony and materialism as affecting freedom is that the former
provides for a spiritual force which governs aU things, and the lat~

Pantheism in the Form of Monism. 109-
ter a material. Hence he thinks we shall not accept preestabUshed
harmony. This is the argument that is designed to show the impossibility of
the assumption that mind can cause motion in matter. We wish first
of all to determine whether Romanes means to deny that the will is
free, and to assert that the wfll of the sportsman was a Romanes
part of the chain of physical cause and effect. That this againsthim^
is what he means is evident from the fact that he is argu- self •
ing against the possibility of an intervention by an independent cause.
In other words, he here maintains that the physical system is a closed
circle into which a mind from without could not break except at the
risk of introducing the utmost confusion into the system. Now, this
is identicaUy the position of materialism ; and vso monism is thus far
materiaUsm. But one of the strongest arguments against material
ism is just the consequences of this denial of the place of thought in
the system. And indeed it is an argument employed by Romanes
himseU. In the same work from which we have condensed this argu
ment he sums up the materialistic position thus : ' " Nowhere can we
(according to materiaUsm) suppose the physical process to be inter
rupted or diverted by the psychical process ; and therefore we must
conclude that thought and volition really play no part whatever in
determining action." Such a conclusion he declares to be opposed at
once to common sense and methodical reasoning ; and he shows the
truth of this judgment by a sound argument of some length. We
simply turn Romanes loose against himself. The sportsman's thought
and vohtion did or did not play some part in determining his action
in taking aim and pulling the trigger. If they did not, as Romanes
argues on pages 52 and 53, then materialism is right, and Romanes is
simply a materialist calling himself by the name of monist. If they
did, as Romanes argues on pages 70 ff., then the materialistic Romanes
is overcome in argument and fact by the spiritualistic Romanes ; not
by the monist Romanes, for the argument is that of spiritualism as
against materialism. So, then, Romanes has answered himself thus
far by showing the unsoundness of the position that thought and voli
tion do not affect action. Hence we conclude that, whether the order
of nature can or cannot be maintained if man's volition can interfere
with that order, man's volition does so interfere according to Romanes
himself. But is it true that the order of nature cannot be maintained under
such conditions ? What is meant by the order of nature ? Let us
1 Mind and Motion and Monism, pp. 70 ff.

110 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
answer the second question first. It may perhaps be safely assumed
that there is nothing involved in the order of nature except the forces
of nature. If they should cease to operate in their regular way the
order of nature would be overthrown. If gravitation, cohesion, and
Would inter- chemical affinities, for example, should prove inconstant
vention from m their operation there could be no order of nature such
strty the as we now have. But it does not interfere with the order
ordfir oi nn-
ture? 0f nature when the action of gravitation in one place is
counteracted by its more forceful application in another ; as when the
weight of the suspension bridge is thrown upon the towers. Nor does
it interfere with the order of nature when cohesion is called in to aid
in checking the local force of gravitation ; as in the cables which are
employed in the supposed bridge. As a whole the system of nature
is not interfered with. The forces of nature are simply manipulated.
It cannot even be said that the force of gravitation is suspended in
the span of the bridge. It acts just as before ; but other forces have
been caUed into exercise by which gravitation in the span does not
produce its ordinary effects.
But the order of nature is larger than this diminutive earth on
which we live, and as yet no human voUtion has been able to affect
this larger order. It goes on in a perfectly uniform way, uninfluenced
by human action.
We are beginning to reach the point where we can answer the ques
tion of the possibility of niaintaining the natural order if interfered
with by the human wfll. The human will cannot reach beyond the
earth and its atmosphere, hence the order of nature in that realm be
yond is in no danger from the mind of man. Nor can the human will
affect the fundamental order even upon the earth. It cannot make
nor unmake gravitation, nor any of the other forces of the natural
world. The most it can do is to change the direction of these forces.
And this it can do only by a law of compensation. If it checks gravi
tation in one place it must do it by increase of gravitation elsewhere.
Thus the order of nature is maintainable on the supposition that
human volition can interfere, for that interference is limited.
But, if by the order of nature is meant that which would be were
The answer man not on the earth, then it is plain that man has changed
on the meaiv the order. He does it every time he destroys or plants a
term " order tree, or cultivates a wild plant until it is fit for the flower
Of Tl 3.^111* A " garden, or dams a stream and turns a water course, or
builds a house, or weaves a web of cloth and makes a garment.
With the order of nature in this sense man's voUtion is constantly in-

Pantheism in the Form of Monism. Ill
terf ering ; sometimes for the better — that is for its greater beauty and
utility in the sight of man — and sometimes for the worse. Nay, more ;
even from beyond our earth and its atmosphere come additions to its
quantum of matter and force without any perceptible change in the
fundamental order. Numberless meteors fall into our atmosphere.
Those which reach the earth's surface and those which do not add
alike to the earth matter and force which did not originaUy belong to
it ; but the earth swings in its orbit and rotates upon its axis just as
before, and the action of none of the laws of nature is interrupted in
any serious way.1 We conclude, therefore, that the monistic argu
ment against dualism is altogether inconclusive. Our object has not
been to establish the fact of duaUsm, but to show that monism has
failed to prove its impossibility. So far as monists consistently object
to pure materiaUsm we accept their arguments and conclusions, which
indeed were not theirs before they were ours, but ours before they
were theirs. We also grant their right to claim that there is some
thing in the world besides spirit, though we reserve the right to say
in the proper place what we must hold that something to be. For the
further test of monism it will be better to take up the monistic psy
chology and theology, including, of course, its cosmology. In these we
must find its strength or weakness.
1 The above criticism of Romanes's views Is applicable to all statements similar to his ;
for example, that of A. Riehl, Introduction to the Theory of Science and Metaphysics,
1894, p. 231.

112 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER III.
THE IDEALISTIC-MONISTIC PSYCHOLOGY.
We are met at the very threshold of this branch of the subject by
the fact that there are two distinct tendencies in monistic circles, the
Two classes of first being represented by those who are inclined to ideal-
monists. igm> the secon(j by tnose wn0 incline toward materiaUsm.
In English, Romanes is a fair representative of the former, and Paul
Carus ¦ of the latter. Because the continental thinkers have studied
the subject more profoundly and originaUy we prefer to take them as
the standard monists, though their works are in a foreign language.
As the representative of the idealistic or spiritual monists we choose
Hoffding as he has presented his views in his "Psychology," already
several times referred to. But we must guard against thinking of
Hoffding as a confessed idealist. He says that he does not enter on
the question whether it is spirit or matter which lies at the foundation
of being.2 "As to the inner relationship of spirit and matter we teach
nothing ; we assume that one substance (Wesen) works in both. What
kind of a substance (Wesen) is this ? Why does it reveal itsefl in a
twofold form? Why is not a single one sufficient ? These are ques
tions which lie beyond the realm of our knowledge. Spirit and matter
appear to us as an irreducible twofoldness, just as do subject and ob
ject. We remove the question farther back, therefore. And this is
not only justifiable, but even necessary, since it is plain that in reality
it lies deeper than is generally believed." s
Why, then, does he insist on thinking that one substance works
both in spirit and matter ? He gives us several reasons. * (1) Because,
Hi"asons gfoSr according to the doctrine of the conservation of energy,
mmiYsm in We cannot beUeve the dual theory of interaction between
psychology, spirit and matter. Let us consider this. According to
Hoffding himself the doctrine in question is one purely of physics."
Ho makes this declaration the basis of an argument against any causal
relation between spirit and matter. But, in reality, when he limits it
to physios ho limits it to the brain, so far as psychology is concerned,
1 See in his The Soul of Man, an Investigation of the Facts of Physiological and Exper
imental Psychology, the section on " The Reaction against Materialism," pp. 380-388.
a Psychologic, p. 84. s Ibid., p. 83 f. * Ibid., p. 80. 'Ibid., p. 69.

1HE JLDEALISTIC-XV10NISTIC PSYCHOLOGY. 113
and thus the doctrine says nothing about the possibflity of an influence
from without the system. We think this is made clear
in a preceding discussion.1 (2) Because of a series of par
allels between the activity of consciousness and the functions of the
nervous system.2 He thinks it would be a wonderful accident if these
parallels existed without any fundamental innerconnec-
* Second reason.
tion. But it would be easy to account for these parallels
without the theory of accident on the hypothesis that mind and brain
mutually influence each other. And, as we have seen, there is noth
ing to hinder us from holding this theory, since its only support is the
doctrine of the conservation of energy, which we have proved to be
no support. (3) Not only the parallelisms between the activity of
consciousness and that of brain but the equivalency be- m, . .
^ J Third reason.
tween them he holds to be a proof of the inner connec
tion, or, in other words, of the theory that it is one and the same sub
stance giving a twofold expression to itseU. But in fact there is no
such equivalence. This Romanes has clearly demonstrated,3 though,
as he supposed, in the interest of monism. Hoffding seems to have
confused the fact that there is a proportion between brain develop
ment and the degree or grade of consciousness with the thought of a
proportion of brain activity and activity of consciousness.4
Hoffding also discusses the question whether there are not some
mental processes which are not in any way connected with brain
action, and comes to the conclusion that there are no such mental proc
esses. We are not particular as to the settlement of this question, since
if we may suppose all mental processes connected with brain action the
question is not thereby answered as to which is cause and which is
effect. And in no case is it necessary, with monism, to deny caus
aUty in the relation, and to make both effects. For, as we have repeat
edly pointed out, dualism as well accounts for the facts Dualism abet-
as does monism. And perhaps this is as good a place as tion than
... monism of
we shall find to show that dualism is a better explanation concomitant
of the twofold activity than is monism. This will un- mental ac-
J , , tivity.
questionably appear to be the case when once we have
conquered the inveterate prejudice against the idea of interaction be
tween mind and body. For, as Hoffding says,B with all frankness,
monism is not a complete solution of the problem of the relation be
tween soul and body, and this supposed inner connection is inexplica-
' See pp. 106,107, above.
» These parallels may be found in his Psychologie, pp. 62-65.
•Mind and Motion and Monism, p. 68 f.
4 Psychologie, pp. 75 and 80 compared. 6 Ibid., pp. 83, 84.

114 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
ble, lying beyond the limits of our knowledge. Now, we do not
pretend that dualism is a complete explanation of the relation of soul
and body. That there can be any effective relation whatever between
the two is a mystery— a part of the broader mystery of effective rela
tion between things in general. But dualism explains what monism
fails to explain, while it can explain everything that monism can
explain. We can best make this clear by reference to an expression em
ployed by Hoffding. He says that the thoughts, feelings, and pur
poses of which we are conscious in inner experience have their
Heff ding's counterpart in the physical world in certain processes
examined!1 of the brain. " It is as though one and the same content
were expressed in two languages."1 Now, we ask, is it likely that
two languages would be needed to express the same content or fact ?
Is it not more Ukely that the two languages give expression to two
distinct facts f Besides, the monistic theory supposes that it is one
and the same substance which speaks these two languages. It is,
indeed, not unusual for one person to speak two languages ; but it is
an unheard-of thing for the same person to have two native lan
guages. Yet here is a supposed substance which expresses the same
fact in two languages both of which are native to it. We affirm, that
it is much more natural to suppose that there are two entities cor
responding to these two languages. Particularly is it more natural
since, according to Hoffding himself, these languages have nothing
in common. They differ, not as two different human languages
differ, but as the languages of two beings might be supposed to differ
whose attributes are mutuaUy exclusive of each other. Hoffding's
figure of speech is misleading in that it attempts to minify the actual
difference. This difference is not simply such as exists between
two languages, but rather such as obtains between the letters in
the words of a printed page (so much color, form, etc.), and the
thought conveyed by them to the reader. The one is material, the
other mental.2
But recurring once more to his figure we say again that such differ
ences of language point to the thought of different entities which
employ them. We fully recognize that it is figurative language
which Hoffding uses, but we have kept to the thought which his
1 Psychologie, p. 81. On Hoffding's theory comp. the excellent discussion in Ladd's
Philosophy of Mind, pp. 319-355.
* The same remarks apply to the illustrations of the convexity and concavity of the
same arc of a circle, and of the solar system as Copemlcan and Ptolemaic when viewed
respectively from the sun and the earth. See Fechner's Elemeute der Psychophysik, Leip
zig, 1889. Erster Theil, p. 2 ff.

The Idealistic-Monistic Psychology. 115
figure sought to express, and have shown thereby the improbabflity
of monism and the probability of dualism.
There is but one more point made by Hoffding which need be here
noticed. He thinks that physiology will never admit that the physi
ological processes in the brain suffer any interruption at Physiology op-
the hands of psychological processes. For, aside from fimfs
the doctrine of the conservation of energy, physiology must regard
the nervous reactions as proceeding in an articulated circle of a
self-dependent character. The fundamental thought of physiological
science is the complete inner connection of the organic life. There
is no place in the process where physiology can find any trace
of cessation.1 As an argument this amounts to absolutely nothing,
as Hoffding would doubtless confess. It does nothing but record
the fact that the science of physiology is bent upon maintaining its
position. And from the standpoint of physiology alone we certainly
have no fault to find with either the theory or the purpose. It is only
when certain physiologists assert that there is nothing in man but
physiological processes that we object. One may, from the physi
ological standpoint, insist that there is no interruption of physical
processes in the human brain without denying, from a wider stand
point, that for other than physiological results there may be some
sort of cooperation between brain and mind. For according to mon
ism itself there is mind as truly as there is matter, both of which,
however, monism regards as abstractions.2 The use of the fact that
physiology cannot allow any external science to dictate its limits is,
then, merely to warn us off and prevent our trespassing ; or at most
it serves to tell us that, right or wrong, some physiologists are deter
mined to deny interaction between mind and brain.
1 Psychologie, p. 71 f. 2 Carus, The Soul of Man, pp. 23 f. 383.

116 Foundations of the Christian jaith.

CHAPTER IV.
THE MATERIALISTIC-MONISTIC PSYCHOLOGY.
We turn our attention next to that class of monists who lean to
ward materiaUsm, and we take for the representatives of this class
Forel and August Forel, professor in the University of Zurich, and
materialistic Emst Haeckel, professor in the University of Jena.
monists Forel has defined and defended the monistic position
with great ingenuity, in a small work of recent date, ' and Haeckel
has published what he calls his confession of faith,2 in which he sounds
the high praises of monism as a bond of unity between reUgion and
science. It is a striking illustration of the fact that our daily occupa
tions predispose our tendencies, to find Hoffding, the philosopher,
tending toward idealism, and Forel and Haeckel, the men of natural
science, tending toward materiaUsm, yet all professing to deal with
the same data and to represent the same system. Both parties have
a right on the field, since monism professes to be a philosophical con
ception which is the outcome and result of science in its maturest
shape.3 Of course aU monists repudiate materiaUsm in its baldest
form — Carus, Forel, Haeckel, and all the rest — and we do not question
their honesty. That they work into the hands of a purely material
istic view of the soul is nevertheless true.
We shall attempt to state in brief the principal doctrines of the
more materialistic monistic psychology.
According to Forel, brain and soul are one ; ' each phenomenon of
soul has its material aspect, and each material phenomenon has its
psychical, though in the main more elementary, aspect ; there is no
brain without soul, and no complex soul, analogous to our own, with
out brain ; psychology and brain physiology are but two different
ways of looking at the same thing.
Consequently, according to both Forel and Haeckel, the investiga
tion of the phenomena of soul belongs within the domain of the de
scriptive, experimental sciences of nature ; the soul must be studied,
1 Gehirn und Seele, Bonn, 1894.
2 Der Monismus als Band zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft. Glaubensbekenntniss
eines Naturforschers. Bonn, 1892.
3 Carus, Monism, Its Scope and Import, Chicago, 1891-92, p. 6.
4 Gehirn und Seele, pp. 13, 14, 18, 27.

1HE IVIATERIALISTIC-IVLONISTIC PSYCHOLOGY. 117
not as an immaterial thing, but in the organ of the soul, the brain,
since scientific psychology is a part of physiology.' It should be
noted here that by the brain as the organ of the soul these men do not
mean an instrument which the soul employs for its purposes, but that
which produces the soul.
Again, they teach that the human being is not the only existence
which has a soul, but that there is a soul in everything — in each atom,
in each living cell of plant and animal, in the lowest, the Atom and cell
highest and the intermediate forms of life.2 But they sous'
claim that the higher forms of soul life are connected only with brain.
In fact, Forel warns vigorously against what he calls humanizing the
ideas ceU-soul and atom-soul, which he postulates on logical grounds,
but which have not the slightest resemblance to the human soul.3
For, as he says in the same connection, we have difficult and but
partial access to the souls even of the higher mammalia ; the souls of
insects we can construe but hypotheticaUy and fragmentarily ; while
every soul becomes more and more difficult of access and investiga
tion as it recedes in the scale of life.
As to consciousness in relation to the soul, Forel is unclear as possi
ble. He says that the essence of the idea of soul lies in the idea of
consciousness, which he defines as the faculty of inner vision, and of
reflecting external objects in this inner vision.4 Yet he Forel on con-
. sciousness
says that it would be impossible to prove that any activity and soul.
in the world is unconscious, and seems to identify consciousness with
attention.6 On page 13 he says that human consciousness, soul, the
content of consciousness, activity of the brain and brain matter, are
but forms in which one and the same thing appears, and not separa
ble from each other though logicaUy distinguishable by our faculty
of abstraction.
Haeckel is rather more clear. He says 8 that the soul is a function
of the brain, and that what we caU human soul is but the sum of our
sensibilities, volitions, and thoughts, the sum of thephysi- The soul as a
' function of
ological functions whose elementary organs the micro- the brain.
scopic ganglia cells of our brain constitute. And he confesses that we
> Gehirn und Seele, p. 14, 18, 19; Der Monismus, p. 21 f. On the other hand Professor
Scripture, who is an ardent advocate of the experimental method in psychology, ad
mits the right of the introspectionists to attempt the maintenance of a true science ot
mind apart from physiology, and says that no physiological experiments or methods can
ever reveal a mental act. The New Psychology, London and New York, 1897, p. 14.
a Ibid., p. 26 f. ; Der Monisms als Band, p. 21.
8 Ibid., p. 27. 4 Ibid., p. 11. 5 Ibid., p. 12.
8 Der Monisms, p. 21 f. His use of the word function is similar to that which Professor
James distinguishes as productive function. Human Immortality, Boston and New
York, 1898, p. 13.
10

118 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
can definitely prove the existence of consciousness only in the highest
animals. In a note on page 44 he asserts that the soul is a sum of
plasma-movements in the ganglia ceUs. Thus the soul is, from one
aspect, the sum of sensibihty, volition, thought ; and from another,.
movement in matter organized in a certain way.
Now, in accordance with the theory that brain and soul are one,
Forel attempts to explain sensation and other mental phenomena
physiologically. He first- explains that the peculiar property of the
Forei's de- nervous system is the power to convey an excitation
sensation swiftly by a sort of wavelike movement.1 For the sake
mental phe- o£ brevity we shall caU the wavehke movement wave.
nomena. Explaining sensation he says 2 that it occurs in the cere
brum plainly at the point of arrival of the wave which started from
that portion of the periphery of the nervous system which was the
subject of the excitation. Here it meets with other coordinated waves
and wakens countless other associated waves which, in an infinitesi-
mally weakened form, or as one might say in a state of slumber, con
tinue to swing on as a sort of memory of their original vigor, or which
stand ready in some other mysterious way to be aroused. These
traces of memory exist together in the most multitudinous though
orderly and harmonious union, or in so-caUed association. The wave
which wakes these slumbering or weakly swinging waves, these mem
ories of former sensations, strengthens and changes in part the whole
associated complex. The result of this is to affect other series of
complexes, partly checking them, partly strengthening them. Some
of these strengthening waves result in impulses of the wfll and pro
duce movements.
Having given us this powerful effort he admits that though we must
approximately represent the process of thought as just given we must
not forget that there are many other forms of waves which are whoUy
unclear; for example, how the brainwaves which result in emotion are
conditioned ; also that there are processes which are accompanied by
an effort which we caU attention.
This, then, is the monistic account of sensation, accompanied by
the confession that it is but approximate, and that the profounder
contents of consciousness are not explicable. Now we call attention
to the fact that this is not a description of the process of thought at
Cthec above1 a11, but only of certain movements in the brain which
account. have been arbitrarily identified with thought. The
monist takes such a material view of things that he cannot see that
1 Gehlrn und Seele, p. 15. a n,^ p. 19.

The Materialistic-Monistic Psychology. 119
the brain movements are one thing and the thought another. Forel
could have learned from Hoffding that it is purely a figure when
memory is attributed to any phenomenon of the physical world.1
And it is a purely hypothetical account even of the connection of
these hypothetical waves. It is pure assumption that waves which
reached the brain went to sleep there but continued to exist, ready to
wake up when called upon. The figure of speech has, so far as we
know, nothing to correspond to it. It is another pure assumption that
these original waves continue to be waves though in a weaker meas
ure. And it is a pure assumption that new waves have the power to
strengthen weakened waves. So that even from the physiological
standpoint we have learned nothing to the purpose. Yet we are told
that we must not any longer study the mind in its own phenomena,
but in the phenomena of brain movement. Then, too, why make
this demand and at the same time admit its impossibility ? — as we
see that Forel has done in the confession noted above.
Another thing that Forel insists upon as proving the physiological
character of thought is the relation of brain conditions to mental
activity. He declares2 that the study of the brain and of mental dis
eases shows that when the cerebrum is injured the result is at once
seen in psychical changes, though he admits that not every such in
jury results in serious mental impairment.
The point as to how much injury the brain can suffer without loss
of mental power is not altogether settled. Carus gives ' a number
of instances of injured brains which resulted in loss of Eeiation of
i ... ,-, £ , . . brain condi-
bodfly movement in various members, but m all oi wnicn tion to men-
-. j, ,1 • , tal activity.
the mental power remained intact. One ot the instances
was that of a general whose mental activity and professional judg
ment were left unimpaired, but who wearied easily when engaged in
intellectual pursuits. Carus says that if one hemisphere of the brain
remains sound the loss of sensory and other centers in the other hemi
sphere wfll be marked only by tiring more easily than when both hemi
spheres are intact. But, if the theory of monism as given by Forel
be true, loss of brain matter in considerable quantities ought to result
in loss of mental activity in variety and intensity. That instead of
this the result, in cases like those mentioned by Carus, is quicker
weariness in inteUectual labor, shows that the inteUectual worker,
the mind, is in possession of an instrument which, by reason of its
injuries, cannot serve as long as it once did without fatigue. The in
teUect must give the relatively small amount of brain more work to
i Psychologie, p. 59. 2 Gehirn und Seele, p. 18. s The Soul of Man, p. 172 f.

120 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
do. The inteUect remains the same; but the servant is weakened.
Besides, Forel quietly assumes the facts to prove his theory, whereas,
they are as capable of explanation on duaUstic as on monistic grounds.
Let us suppose that aU he says is true ; still the question would be, Is
the alleged difference in mental power real or only apparent ? Does
the injury to the brain really decrease mental power, or does it only
decrease the facility with which the inteUect expresses itseU ? Forel
assumes the former, and then draws the conclusion that brain action
and mental action are practicaUy identical. This is a circle in reason
ing as perfect in its kind as the famous circle of Giotto. In fact, brain
injury does limit bodily movement in some cases ; but that does not
prove that there is any loss of wfll power. The disturbance in the
physiological functions is admitted, but not the disturbance in mental
functions. As we have seen, the fact of weariness indicates that the
power of the mind remains the same, but that the power to express
itself is reduced.1
1 The doctrine we have here maintained is that of Professor James, published since the
above was written, called by him the permissive or transmissive function ofthe brain, as
distinguished from the productive function, which he rejects. Human Immortality, p. 15.

XJtUJJ J.Y10N1STIC rSYCHOLOGY OF HAECKEL. 121

CHAPTER V.
THE MONISTIC PSYCHOLOGY OF HAECKEL.
It is time to turn our attention to Haeckel. His wide reputation,
arising in part from his real services to science in some of its depart
ments and in part from the natural vigor of his mind, which leads him
to give forcible expression to whatever position he holds, lends to
his above-mentioned work an importance far beyond its ability. As
a compendium of assumptions and assertions in the interest of monism
it probably has no equal. But as Haeckel is a scientist, and scientists
are popularly supposed to be very exact in statement and rigid in their
demands for proof before they wfll accept anything as fact, his words
will carry immense weight with a certain class of readers. We desire
to call attention, then, to the fact that, whatever may be Haeckel's
merits when dealing with biological phenomena, the philo- Haeckel not a
sophical interpretation of these phenomena is more likely p osop ei"
to be conducted properly by one whose life is devoted to philosophy
than by one whose field of research has been the material realm. On
this point David Friedrich Strauss, whom Haeckel calls the greatest
theologian of our century,1 is correct when he says:2 "Phflosophy
alone, considered as metaphysics, is able to furnish the ideas of energy
and matter, substance and phenomena, cause and effect, those finest
instruments with which the student of nature hourly operates; it
alone can teach us how to- apply them with logical correctness. The
scientist can receive from the hand of philosophy alone the Ariadne
clew to the labyrinth of the daily increasing mass of observed facts ;
and phflosophy alone can furnish the scientist with the only possible
information in the regions which contain the questions of beginning
and end, Umitation or Umitlessness, purpose or accident, in the
world." Had Haeckel heeded this suggestion his attempt to construe the
world from a philosophical point of view would have been, to say the
least, more modest. Let the reader, therefore, not be prejudiced in
favor of Haeckel's philosophy ; for Haeckel is not a philosopher but a
scientist. Let Haeckel furnish the facts, and let phflosophers inter-
> Der Monismus, p. 23.
a Der alte und der neue Glaube, Siebente Auflage, p. 215.

122 Foundations of the Christian j^aith.
pret them. As we have already said, Hoffding, the philosopher, in
terprets these facts quite differently from Forel and Haeckel, the sci
entists. We have given Haeckel's description of the soul. We now give
Hoffding, the Hoffding's estimate of Haeckel's view.1 "One some-
S^Hafei, times meets, in the utterances of physiologists who have
the scientist: gome philosophical education, the statement that the ac
tivity of consciousness is a function of the brain. It appears, how
ever, as though the strictly physiological use of the expression ' func
tion ' must contradict such a statement. That, for example, contrac
tion is the function of muscle, says nothing but that it (contraction) is
a given form and condition of muscle in movement. . . . Muscle in
function is as material as muscle in rest, and what does not possess the
attributes of matter cannot be the form of activity of anything mate
rial. The idea of function, in the physiological sense, points as truly
as the idea of matter or product to something which meets us in the
form of space as an object of perception. Thoughts and feelings can
not be represented as objects in space or as movements. We learn
them (thoughts and feelings), not by external perception, but by the
sensibility of the self and by self -consciousness. ... By many round
about ways it is finaUy discovered that certain phenomena of con
sciousness are connected with the functions of certain definite parts of
the brain. And there is no doubt that the highest activities of con
sciousness have their corresponding brain functions. . . . But the ac
tion of consciousness and the functions of the brain we constantly
learn to know by means of different experimental sources. Material
ism overreaches itself by obliterating this essential distinction. By
giving to brain the power of consciousness (that is, by making con
sciousness a function of brain), or perhaps even making the brain the
subject of the manifestation of consciousness, the materialist returns
to the mythological-fantastic standpoint." These words were written
to oppose materialism. But in this respect there is no difference be
tween materialism and Haeckel's monism. Both make the soul a func
tion of brain.
That Hoffding and Haeckel, the philosopher and scientist, disagree
Further evi- *s further evident from additional remarks by the former,
theirCdis°a- which we here quote and compare with remarks of the
greemen . ]atter. Says Hoffding," commenting on the preceding
quotation from his Psychologie : "We have in mind here more es
pecially empirical or phenomenological materialism, that is, that view
' Psychologie, p. 75 f. a Ibid., pp. 76 ff.

J- JUIj JYIUWIOJJU XD

TOHGLOGY OF HAECKEL. 123

which makes it a result of experimental science that the phenomena of
consciousness are forms or effects of material phenomena, so that all
reality may be reduced to motion in space." We pause in the quota
tion to show that this is just what Haeckel does. He says : a " The
neurological problem of consciousness (note that he assumes that con
sciousness is a neurological problem) is only a special one contained in
the all-comprehensive cosmological problem, the problem of substance.
If we had an understanding of the nature of matter and force we
should also understand how the substance which forms their basis
could, under given conditions, feel, desire, and think." And on page
44 of the same work he says : " The facts of consciousness and its rela
tion to the brain are not less and not more puzzling than the facts of
seeing, hearing, gravitation, and the connection of matter and force."
As quoted before, Haeckel declares that the soul is a sum of plasma-
movements in the gangha ceUs. Here he plainly speaks, not merely of
equal degrees of mystery ; on the contrary, he identifies the mysteries
of consciousness and the mysteries in the physical world. Now hear
what Hoffding has to say concerning the view in question : "Even
if he (the empirical materialist) were right in all his assertions,
Still he constantly overlooks something which raises a new and, to
him, an alarming problem — the fact, namely, that motion in space
is known to us only as an object of our consciousness. From the
Standpoint of the theory of knowledge, therefore, such ideas as con
sciousness, representation, and perception lie deeper than the ideas of
matter and motion. . . . What we have here tried to do is, how
ever, not to point out the inconsequence, from the standpoint of the
theory of knowledge, which (empirical) materialism is guilty of by the
demand that consciousness shall recognize as the absolutely original
and only real that which is given only as an object of consciousness,
and which can only be represented and known by the activity of con
sciousness itself. Our object here, on the other hand, is only to de
termine what view the given compels us to take ; and the result of our
criticism of materiaUsm is that it sins against the very ideas we gain
from experience."
We must now briefly note several other points which may be dis
missed the more promptly because they have already been considered
in other connections. For example, Haeckel's description Monism fans
of the soul as a sum of mental states or of physical move- for conscious-
HcSS OI ^JtrA-
ments makes no provision for our consciousness of per- sonal unity.
sonal unity. It denies the existence of a unitary soul, and so fails to
i Der Monismus, p. 23.

124 Foundations of the Christian ±'aith.
explain how we have a sense of unity or can be aware of a multiphc-
ity. This is possible only to an individual. For example, it would be
logicaUy possible to an atom-soul but not to a complex brain-soul.
Again, monism denies the freedom of the wfll. Says Hoffding,1
"Psychology, like every other science, must be deterministic, that is,
For freedom of it must proceed on the supposition that the law of causal-
the will. ity deludes tne action of the wfll just as it is assumed
that it includes other phenomena of consciousness and material
nature." Such, indeed, is the doctrine of all monists. It is true they
do in some cases speak of the freedom of the wfll, but by that they
mean freedom to do what one wills, not to wfll freely, even within-
narrow limits. And some of them, Uke the materiaUsts, claim that
the doctrine of freedom in its usual form is incompatible with the
preaching of morahty. But in fact if our choices are necessitated, in
any true sense of the word, then we aU labor under a tremendous
delusion. But the quotation we have just given from Hoffding contains an al
lusion to a third point which we cannot leave unnoticed. It is the
For freedom of expression about each and every phenomenon of con-
oug ' sciousness as included along with material nature under
the law of causality. This is the old materiaUstic doctrine which de
nies freedom even to our thought. And here, as there, it cannot be
allowed without destroying the vaUdity of aU thought. For if one
thought is necessitated, every thought is also. Hence when we think
differently from others their thoughts and ours have equal value for
truth, that is, reaUy no thought can be said to be either true or false.
Again, monism, as truly as materiaUsm, finds no place for individ
ual immortality. Carus" discusses at length the question, Is death a
a n d f o r i m- finaUty ? and gives it a negative answer. He even speaks
ttier fnaivid- of the immortaUty of the soul. v But the careful reader
wfll see that it is not the irnmortahty of the individual,
but of the father and mother, who though they die, Uve on in their
children. It is remarkable that he did not recall those numerous
human beings who are destined to live ceUbate lives, and those other
numerous husbands and wives who have no "life after death in the
coming generations," because nature affords them no offspring;3 or
whose progeny become extinct. Had he reflected on these facts he
i Psychologie, p. 439. a The Soul of Man, pp. 398 ff .
a There seems something almost dishonest in his language about the immortality of the
soul on p. 407 f, when we see in his discussion of the Psychological Problem and Religion
(pp. 429 ff.) bow vigorously he denies any true immortality. But we prefer the more char
itable view that he is deceived by his preconceived theory.

xujts, jnuiUSTIU JTSYCHOLOGY OF HAECKEL. 125
would not have been betrayed into ascribing immortaUty to man in
the sense in which he uses the word. In due time we shall see how
unscientific is the denial of immortaUty.1 Here we can only use the
denial to point out how many conclusions materiaUsm and monism
have in common.
Monists are loud in their professed renunciation of materialism.
And no doubt they are honest. But it is strange they do not see that
their path is the same in aU essential respects as that of their declared
foe, and that at the end of the journey they therefore reach the same
goal. And finaUy, monism does not do away with the fact that there
is a dualism between mentality and matter. It only Fa,iure of
changes the relation they sustain to each other. Seapeduai-
Thought and extension have the same mutuaUy exclu- lsm-
sive character as in dualism, only these mutually exclusive some
things are regarded as two ways of looking at one self-consistent sub
stance. We have seen that it is more natural to suppose that two
such wholly unlike phenomena are the aspects of two wholly differ
ent substances. As between dualism and monism in psychology, the
former has taken up the more tenable position.2
1 See division vi, section ii, chaps. 1-3. 2 See Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, chap. x.

126 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VI.
monistic theology.
Monism, judged by its etymology, distinguishes itself as a stand
ing protest against dualism. Nevertheless, it is much given to theol
ogy, and its adherents do not distinguish it theologicaUy from pan
theism, but apply that name to its conception of God and his relation
to the world.
The first peculiarity of monistic theology is its proof of the exist
ence of God, which is not moral but cosmological. In this connec
tion it is to be noted that monism is very sure of the existence of God,
• although its only use for him (or should we say " it ? ") is as the up
holder of the world, and the like.
Another striking feature of monistic theology is its negative char
acter. Particularly does the monist negate certain attributes which
Christianity has cherished as most precious, especiaUy personaUty.
Three chief A third characteristic of monistic theology is its vague-
tics of mon- ness. This is necessarily the case, since to the monist
istic theol- ...
ogy. it is impossible to liken God to anything in heaven
above, nor in the earth beneath, nor in the waters under the earth.
Theism strives to make God in some degree comprehensible to
thought, though it recognizes the impossibility of giving more than a
few practical hints in this direction. Pantheism, or monism, pur
posely avoids all descriptions of God which can be grasped by the
logical understanding.
Let us take up these points in the order of their statement. We
find Forel defining God as that which makes out or constitutes the
unsearchable, metaphysical Omnipotence,1 and he declares that while
we cannot understand this infinite power we have no right to deny its
existence, which is proved by the phenomena of the universe.2 Ben-
Mon i stic Jamin Vetter says: "With the progress of the knowl
es0 exisiv edS© of the causal connection of nature arose . . . ever
clearer the suspicion, and at length the certainty, that
there is one unchangeable Somewhat (Wesen) which is far above all
human limitations, the source and preserver of aU finite things.'"
1 Gehirn und Seele, p. 6. a pjid. p 31
0 Die moderne Weltanschauung und der Meusch, Zweite Auflage, Jena, 1896, p. 145 f.

-i-ViONISTIO XHEOLOGY. 127
When we turn to Strauss we find no attempt to prove the existence of
God. He identifies God and the universe. We feel ourselves depend
ent, and it matters not whether we say we are dependent on God or
on the universe. • Haeckel, who has taken the trouble to give us a
so-caUed " Confession of Faith of a Natural Scientist," also gives no
proof. Why should he ? The universe and God are simply names
for one and the same thing. There is as much evidence for the exist
ence of one as for the other. Of course there remains the question
as to the right to identify God and the world ; but that is the presup
position of monism, so far as it is a theology. Nevertheless, it is plain
that even in Strauss and Haeckel we have the proof of the existence
of God in the existence of the world, so that they fall into Une in this
respect with other monists.
Now, what are the consequences for rehgion of this doctrine that
God is, or is known only as the source and upholder of the world ?
This question receives the suggestion of an answer in the considera
tion that the one idea in connection with the God of the monists is
Power. This is his sole attribute. In the New Testament we are
taught that God is Love. In the scriptures of the monists God is de
clared to be Power. It is true that Strauss, the great The sole at-
prophet of monism, rebukes Schopenhauer for hitting the the™God of
monistic conception of God in the face ; and says that momsm-
such conduct affects the religious feeling of the monist as blasphemy,
and that the monist demands for his Universe-God the same rev
erence demanded by the pious soul of the old style for his God.2 But
even he would not venture to assert that the God of the monists
should be loved, or that we should feel grateful to the universe. He
demands only that such feelings as he possesses should not be
wounded by unbelievers, and he does not like to think that anyone
should annihilate his feeling of dependence which is, to him, the sub
stance of the reUgious feeling. "
We call attention to the fact that certain of the most important of
the religious feelings have no place in the attitude of the monist to
his God. Love is out of the question ; for we never love Feelings nec
essarily ex-
the merely powerful. Some of the forms in which this eluded from
,. , , j i, monistic pl-
power manifests itself we may love, but not the power ety.
itself. The same is true of the feeling of gratitude. There is nothing
to be grateful to. We may indeed congratulate ourselves when we
are situated according to our own wishes, but gratitude is a feeling
toward a person, and is clearly distinguishable from self-compla-
1 Der alte und der neue Glaube, p. 142. 3 Ibid., p. 147. 3 Idem.

128 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
cency. So, too, communion with this God is impossible. We may
meditate all we will in the presence of nature. It may, in a poetical
sense of the word, speak to us, or commune with us. But of com
munion such as we have with a person there can be none. Again,
toward this power it is impossible to feel any sense of duty, though
such a sense may be experienced toward some of its manifestations.
Thus while love, gratitude, and duty would not be absent between
man and man, their manifestation would be social rather than reU
gious ; that is, limited to our relations with our feUow-men. Strauss
speaks indeed of reverence (Pietat) toward this monistic deity. But
this, too, is a feeling impossible of entertainment in reference to a
mere power. One can reverence a person only, and that because rev
erence is a sentiment elicited by character, which we can attribute
only to a person.
When we turn to those feelings which we could experience in our
relations to this mighty power which the monist calls God we find
that not one of them is, strictly speaking, distinctively reUgious,
The feelings though aU of them attend upon religious feeling to a
distinctively greater or less extent. We mention, first, admiration ;
religious. jor we can jyjjjjjpg p0weri and especiaUy when it assumes
forms of expression harmless to our interests and adapted to awaken
our aesthetic emotions. Closely akin to this is wonder; a feeling
which we may experience toward any power which is to us mysteri
ous because of its evident reserve of what we conceive to be its vast
or unknown possibilities. This emotion may be heightened to awe
when the sense of the vastness of the power becomes overwhelming,
or to sublimity when it is mixed with admiration rather than fear.
This awe-inspiring power may also elicit fear and terror, which it
often does in timid souls, or when it appears inimical to some or aU
of our present interests. Any of these sentiments— admiration, won
der, awe, sublimity, fear, terror— might lead to adoration, which is a
religious state and a reUgious act, if the object of adoration were per
sonal. When it is impersonal the thoughtful man wfll refrain, be
cause he would not commit the folly of adoring that which has no
intelUgence to perceive his emotion. We may be incited to hope,
also, by the contemplation of power, and it is possible even to exer
cise faith in power. But the hope and faith here mentioned are not
the religious sentiments known by those names, and are as possible
to the atheist, whom the monist condemns, as to the monist himseU.
In fact, the vociferations of monism are well adapted to deceive
only the unobservant, among whom we are obliged to place all mon-

JMonistio Theology. 129
ist theologians. Forel, for example, repels the charge of atheism
placed against monism. He says : ' "We often meet with the saying,
Pantheism is the same as Atheism. A hundred times, Theological
No ! " But we chaUenge the monist to show us one single encyof mon-
sentiment which his God can eUcit which is not equaUy lsm"
called for by what the atheist calls power. In fact, the atheist and the
monist hold exactly the same notion of the power that is in the
world. The monist simply becomes inconsistent by naming this
power God. The monist says, "A spirit in everything ; " or " God in
everything." But it is only as he unconsciously or surreptitiously in
troduces the theistic idea, which denies that God and the world are
identical, that he gains anything over the atheist, who says merely
that there is power in everything. Let the monist rid himself of
every vestige of theism and the difference between himself and the
atheist wfll be one of nomenclature only. Admiration, wonder, awe,
sublimity, fear, and terror are felt by the atheist in his contemplation
of the world — the universe. The monist makes it a matter of indif
ference whether we say God or universe ; if he makes any distinction
rather preferring the latter to the former word.2
We do not make this point against the monist theology in order to
arouse prejudice, but to call attention to the unclear thinking of mon
ism. If they take their doctrine earnestly there is nothing which
monists can feel toward their universe-god that the atheist cannot
feel toward the universe. As soon as they rise above this atheistic
condition of the feelings it is evident that there is something in their
thought that is other than the universe ; or, in other words, that they
have forsaken the monistic standpoint.
But, it may be asked, can it not also be truthfully said of theism
that it knows no emotions except those which atheists and aU men
have in common ? We answer that such a proposition would be false.
Neither monist nor atheist experiences any sense of love, gratitude,
or duty toward the All, because these are sentiments which exist be
tween persons, and the AU is impersonal. But the theist can love his
personal God, feel grateful to him, and recognize the relation of obli
gation. So, too, the theist, unlike the monist and atheist, can rever
ence the personal God. And, furthermore, as we have seen, com
munion in the true sense of the word is possible only on wider range
...,,,. of feelings in
the theistic hypothesis. It may be said that the person- theistic be-
ality of God is a fiction, and hence aU this sentiment is
sentimentality. But that is not the question here. The point is not
i Gehirn und Seele, p. 30. ' Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, p. 144.

130 FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.
the justifiabiUty of these feelmgs, but the possibility of them in the
one case and the impossibility of them in the other. So, too, of the
other class of feelings which the AU induces in every heart, such as
admiration and the like. They become religious only when they are
joined with the idea of God as distinct from, not as wholly identical
with, the world. Unless we are willing to admit that the social feel
ings of love, and the like, are religious when experienced toward men,
and hence that a God is unnecessary to religion, and that an aesthetic
feeling, such as admiration, is religious in every instance of its exer
cise without reference to the cause which produces it, we shaU have
to confess that theism knows religious feelings unknown to other
forms of faith. Besides, hope and faith in a system such as the uni
verse are very different feelings from hope and faith in a person. We
cannot, therefore, accept the results of the monistic theology as a sub
stitute for the theistic.
For the purposes of a religion which shaU satisfy aU the needs of
the human heart monism is a failure. It leaves us love, but with no
object such as the heart demands. It robs us of the "Great Compan
ion " as truly as atheism. It limits faith and hope to man or to the
mechanical universe. For the purposes of aesthetics, so far as it can
be separated from the other elements of our nature, monism wfll an
swer. But even in this respect it would prove a failure, since the
aesthetic feelings, while distinguishable, blend with aU our other feel
ings, and would suffer numbness as a result of the deadening of the
religious emotions. As a matter of fact aU high art has been the
product of theism or polytheism. There is no single instance of the
F5i!lLrJ! °„£ antireligious contemplation of nature which has resulted
JlHMl 1SII1 in
aesthetics, in the permanent artistic satisfaction of the mind. Nor
has pantheism, consistently held, which it but seldom is, ever pro
duced a poet, orator, musician, painter, or sculptor of note. Haeckel,
with his usual wealth of assertion and poverty of proof, declares that
Strauss has proved that monism does not destroy poetry nor fail to
satisfy the emotional needs of man.1 But Strauss has neither done
nor attempted any such thing. He has simply shown that the monist
must turn from religion, as ordinarily conceived, to the great masters
of poetry and art." Here Haeckel fails to distinguish things which
are different, as he so often does. Of this failure we have another in
stance in the same connection. He affirms that every increase in our
knowledge of nature's secrets warms the feelings, nourishes the fancy,
' Der Monismus, p. 34.
» See his development of this subject In Der alte und der neue Glaube, pp. 303-376.

Monistic Theology. 131-
and enlarges our sense of beauty. Of this he mentions Goethe as an
example. Who denies this? Assuredly not the theist. What we
deny is that the increase in knowledge above mentioned would have
produced the alleged results in Goethe, with aU his genius, had he
been a consistent pantheist. That one needs to be an orthodox Chris
tian to be a poet is not asserted ; although we do assert that the more
truly Christian the poet is, in the primitive and essential sense, the
richer and warmer his fancy and feeling wfll be. The history of lit
erature proves this assertion, Goethe not excepted. As a sustainer,
therefore, of either religious or aesthetic emotions, monism is a fail
ure ; and without the emotions reUgion and art would disappear. We
are compeUed, as a consequence, to reject the monistic religion.

132 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VH.
MONISM AS A COSMOLOGICAL THEORY.
We note, as the second characteristic of monistic theology, its nega
tive character. It consists chiefly in a negation of Christianity, espe
ciaUy of the personality of God. Here it takes common ground with
Spencerian agnosticism, though generaUy for less philosophical rea
sons. In respect of its denial of personality monism rests in part upon
a double misunderstanding of the Christian doctrine. In the first
place the monists appear, generally, to think that Christianity regards
God's relation to the world as an external one, and when they re
ject a personal God who intervenes in the affairs of the world, a deus
ex machina, they appear to think they are rejecting the Christian
doctrine of the relation of God to the world. That many Christians
have inconsistently held that doctrine is unfortunately true. But that
it is the Christian doctrine is not true. Rather is it the deistic idea
with the addition of what deists deny, namely, intervention in the
world's affairs. In the second place, monists appear to think that, be
cause Christianity asserts personaUty therefore it must deny or for
get his immanence, or his omnipresence. ¦ Given the Christian idea
Double mis- of God, as a personal being present in aU the phenomena
understan d-
ing of Chris- of the world, yet as not identical with the world, the
tianity by
monists. monists might save themselves much needless trouble.
They need not try (1) to prove to Christians that God is not external to
the world in a spatial sense, for that Christians do not deny. He is
not, in the Christian view, external to the world in any sense except
that he is not the world. If anyone can think of no kind of exter
nality except spatial externaUty it is doubtful whether anything can
be done for him unless we could somehow impart a Uttle mental abil
ity to him. StiU, we shaU try ; and we try by stating that neither our
thoughts nor our spirits are spatially external to our bodies, yet they
are external in the sense that they are not our bodies. Nor need
monists try (2) to prove to Christians that God is in everything, that
1 See Forel s Gehirn und Seele, pp. 22, 80 ; Strauss's Der alte und derneue Glaube, p. 109.
Spencer falls also to take any account of the real Christian position in what he evidently
regards as an exhaustive classification of the various doctrines of the relation of God to
the world. See First Principles, pp. 30 ff.

Monism as a Oosmological Theory. 133
he is everywhere present, that he is in all and through ah. But in as
serting his omnipresence Christians do not assert that he is all in the
sense that there is no other being except him. The two points of dif
ference, then, between monists and theists in their doctrine of God
and his relation to the world are, first, whether God and the world
are one and the same, so that whether we take God or the world mat
ters not ; and, second, whether God is personal or impersonal.
The first of these questions we have discussed from the standpoint
of reUgion. We must now consider it as a question of cosmological
fact. In order that we may have a basis of operation let us take up a
definition of monism. Carus says:1 "Monism (that is, Monistlc Cos-
the word monism) means that the whole of reality, that mol°sy-
is, everything that is, constitutes one inseparable and indivisible en
tirety. Monism accordingly is a unitary conception of the world."
"The AU being one interconnected whole, everything in it, every fea
ture of it, every relation among its parts, has sense and meaning and
reality only if considered with reference to the rest of the world and
to the whole itself. In this sense we say that monism is a view of the
world as a unity."
We have here two somewhat diverse aspects of monism. The first
relates to the asserted fact that " everything that is constitutes one in
separable and indivisible entirety," and the second is this fact as con
ceived by the mind with all its implications. StiU, the essential thing
is the assertion that the world is a unity ; the word world meaning
everything that is — the whole of reality. The language of the defini
tion leaves the impression that the unity spoken of is numerical. It is
a "whole," an "inseparable and indivisible entirety." Nevertheless,
this "whole," this "entirety," has "parts" which are so intercon
nected as to make one whole and which also have their relations with
one another. The inseparability and indivisibility of this entirety
cannot, however, we suppose, exist for thought, since the parts are
thought of separately by monists, as by others. But these parts, when
thought of as such, are not "things in themselves," "ab- The world a
D ' numerical
solute existences," but abstractions. They have their unit.
"sense," "meaning, and reaUty only if considered with reference to
the rest of the world and to the whole itself." Hence the inseparabil
ity and indivisibility, which are not impossible for our abstract think
ing, must pertain to the existing whole. Thus we have reached a
numerical unit. There is but one existence, and that is the world.
We think of it as having parts, but these parts are not realities, they
i Monism : Its Scope and Import, p. 7.

134 Foundations of the Christian .faith.
are simply abstractions of the mind to enable us to think the more
easily. Now, this numerical unity involves also a qualitative unity. That
And involves cannot be a numerical unit which has within it differ-
tativequn!ty" ences in kind. A duality or a pluraUty of different kinds
of things, did they exist in combination, would be an aggregation, not
a numerical unit. This doctrine of quahtative unity is much insisted
upon by monists when speaking of the relation between a supposed
soul and a supposed body. It is made very clear that when we see
phenomena of extension we merely think of a body, and when we see
phenomena of thought we merely think of mind ; but we are taught
that in fact there is but one kind of substance, and this substance has
the quality of impressing us as possessing the wholly diverse attributes
of extension and thought. Says Forel : ' " Our human brain-soul is
not at all to be considered as something different from the world-all,
but as a partial phenomenon of it. It is in our (monistic) sense divine,
but not in and of itself higher than the other phenomena of the world."
Here we see that the denial of the difference in kind includes the dif
ference of higher and lower kinds. The qualitative oneness admits of
Qualitative n0 grades. Gravitation and cohesion are as exalted as
mHsfof no love- Haeckel even says this in so many words. "As
grades. an essential, fundamental ingredient in this pure monism
we may, in a certain sense, consider the supposition of ' besouled (be-
seelte) atoms ' — an early idea to which Empedocles gave expression
more than two thousand years ago in his doctrine of the hate and love
of the elements. Our present-day physics and chemistry have uni
versally accepted the atomic theory first proposed by Democritus, in
asmuch as they regard all bodies as composed of atoms, and trace all
changes to the movements of these discrete particles. All these
changes, alike in organic and inorganic nature, appear to us in reality
comprehensible only when we represent the atoms to ourselves, not
as dead masses, but as living particles, invested with the power of at
traction and repulsion. Like and dislike, love and hate, are but other
expressions for this power of attraction and repulsion." 2
We do not regard Haeckel as capable of saying, except by happy
chance, exactly what he means when outside of the realm of science.
But, if we are to judge from what he says, he does not mean that
attraction and repulsion are to atoms what love and hate are to con
scious being, but that attraction, physically and chemicaUy considered,
is love, and love is but physical and chemical attraction. If he does
1 G ehirn und Seele, p. 14. » Der Monlsmus, p. 14.

MONISM AS A COSMOLOGICAL THEORY. 135
not mean what he says, we do not know what he does mean ; and since
he is trying to make us see that atoms are never dead, but always Uv-
ing, we see no way out but to take him as meaning just what he says.
Psychologically, then, monism teaches that there is no difference in
grade, between what we call soul and what we call matter ; and also
that the forces of nature are identical in kind with the moral forces
which unite mankind. Strange as all this seems it is perfectly con
sistent with the doctrine that everything that is constitutes one insep
arable and indivisible whole ; and, in fact, from this latter position
no other conclusion could be logically deduced. We have seen that
Strauss makes no distinction between the ideas God and universe.
So that the denial of the distinction in kind in relation to psychology,
theology, and cosmology is complete.
Anthropologically also the distinction in kind is obhterated. Says
Haeckel:' "The first beginnings of those higher brain functions
which we designate as reason and consciousness, religion, and morality,
are undeniably present in the most highly developed domestic animals,
especially dogs, horses and elephants ; they differ only in grade, not
in quality, from the corresponding soul-activities of the lowest races
of men. Had apes, particularly the anthropoids, been, No distincti0I1
like dogs, domesticated for thousands of years, the ap- tween dman
proach to the soul-activities of man would undoubtedly and ammal-
have been still more striking. The apparently deep gulf which sepa
rates man from the most highly developed mammals has for its par
ticular ground the fact that man unites in himself several prominent
qualities which appear in the other animals only one by one, namely,
1, the higher differentiation of the larynx (speech) ; 2, of the brain
(soul) ; and, 3, of the extremities ; 4, finally, the upright position in
walking. Solely the fortunate combination of a higher grade of de
velopment of these important animal organs and functions lifts the
majority of men so high above all animals." So that there is no
qualitative difference between animals and men. Fdrel sums up the
monistic position as follows:2 " The knowledge thus gained compels
us to the supposition of a truly divine monistic world-potentiality
(Weltpotenz) which hides itself behind our abstract artificial con
cepts, and this world-potentiality must be at once consciousness, mat
ter, and force, and that which brings forth the progressive evolution
of the world and especially of inorganic and organic nature on our
earth. This world-potentiality evidently possesses the possibility of a
plastic expansion necessary to the infinite, evolutionary diversity in
1 Der Monismus, p. 38. " Gehirn und Seele, p. 13.

136 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
the details of its phenomena, together with the cyclic repetition of
the individual series of phenomena ruled by harmonious laws, aU of
which we with our weak brain power, in our partial human conscious
ness, but relatively and partiaUy divine or cognize, and then construe
in our own way."
We pause to take our bearings. The reference to the weakness of
the human brain power is very impressive. Who that has ever
thought but has all too painfuUy felt its truth? And when first re
minded of it we incline to say that, after all, our dualistic or pluralis
tic explanations of things are probably wrong. Recovering our
selves, however, we remember that monists as a class are probably
as brain weak as dualists ; and that though the human brain is weak
it has undertaken the task of construing the world according to its
Our mental phenomena, and it, or, as we should prefer to say, the
only 'means mind, is the only power we have with which to perform
for constru- tnat task. We should certainly feel commiseration for
world. the man who claimed that he had solved aU problems.
But it is plain that we cannot rest until we have reached a solution
which is at least relatively satisfactory. If there be several such
solutions each must choose that which to his own judgment best an
swers aU questions. Now, the dualist says it is more Ukely that there
are two entities corresponding to the two phenomena of thought and
extension than that these wholly incommensurable attributes should
inhere in one entity. And this we must argue because aU analogy is
on our side. For diverse chemical reactions we seek diverse chemi
cal elements. It would be impossible to make the physician beheve
that a poison is at the same time not a poison, however innocent or
even helpful it might be when adininistered under certain conditions.
The duaUst furthermore maintains that the supposed difficulty of in
teraction between mind and matter is no whit greater than that of
interaction between material units. Yet all admit interaction in the
latter case, inexpUcable though it be. So, then, the duaUst thinks his
interpretation more satisfactory than that of the monist, while he
frankly admits that both dualist and monist may be, though he sees
no reason to think that the former, is wrong ; and thus far he cannot
admit the qualitative and quantitative unity of the AU or the sum
total. Within this higher realm of mind (and the duaUst insists that mind
is higher than matter) there is, if we may judge from aU we know of
it, a multitude of individuals. I cannot get rid of the feeling that I
have an independent personality, nor can I believe that the idea of

Monism as a Cosmologioal Theory. 137
self is a mere abstraction with no reaUty to correspond to it ; though
I am perfectly wflling to concede, as the monist demands, that my self
has significance only when viewed in its relation to the whole. The
whole, however, as the dualist conceives it, is not a nu- Dualism re-
merical unit but an aggregate. If I am a person, in the world Sas' an
sense in which it seems to me I am a person, then it is aggre8ate-
very sure that the whole is not a numerical unit, unless I have erred
in attributing personality to others. Now, if I give up the idea of my
personality I must have a better reason than the mere desire to re
duce all things to unity in the numerical sense. I cannot avoid the
conviction of personaUty, but I can avoid the conviction of numerical
unity in the universe. I yield the less fundamental to the more fun
damental conviction. Just here is one of the chief weaknesses of
monism. It holds to the doctrine of numerical unity, but it cannot
act on the supposition of its truth. To hold a doctrine as scientific
which must be contradicted in practice is absurd. The theory and
practice of chemistry and physics must be harmonious. We cannot
hold the Newtonian doctrine of gravitation and act as though it were
false. We practice what we preach in these respects. But monism
holds a doctrine of individuality which it forbids us to put into
practice. But within the lower realm, the realm of what we all caU matter,
we find what we are bound to treat as a multiphcity instead of a
unity. Take, for example, the atoms. The very scientists who so
vigorously assert the unity of the universe, numerically and qualita
tively, are those who insist on the atomic theory of the composition
of matter. Carus consistently regards the atoms and molecules as
abstractions also.1 And for a view of the world, an opinion of the
nature of things, it may be proper to call them abstractions ; since
a view of the world held by the mind need not correspond to
the facts. The monist view of the world, which considers atoms
and molecules as abstractions, certainly does not cor- in the world
' of matte r
respond to the facts unless we are now to be taught that also there is
r multiplicity,
molecules as weU as atoms are fictions. For the chemist not unity.
has hitherto been unable to get on without his molecules, and to him
they are not abstractions, but substantial realities, whatever they may
be for thought. If we may say that atoms and molecules are abstrac
tions we may say also that matter is an abstraction ; and that all
chemical reactions and processes of the physical world are abstrac
tions. If they are not abstractions they are realities ; and, in practi-
1 Monism : Its Scope and Import, p. 7.

138 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
cal life, we are obliged to treat them as such. This is true even of the
monists, whose philosophical creed must be abandoned for the pur
poses of science and art. But if each molecule is a reality we have a
multiplicity, and not a numerical unity, in our world. Each molecule
might be of the same quaUty as every other, but it would not be
every other molecule. Again, the numerical unity of the physical
world breaks down when we consider that the universe is made up of
a number of solar systems. Our own solar system has a sort of
identity for itself which it preserves side by side with other solar
systems within the one great whole.
But, more important still, within the physical world there is every
evidence of qualitative diversity instead of unity. Things are not all
Qualitative di- alike. We leave out of the count here the apparent
the physical difference between the organic and the inorganic and the
A  living and the dead. The chemical elements, so called,
have their individual characteristics, no two of them being alike.
The theory that there is one kind of substance out of which aU these
elements are constructed has almost no scientific evidence in its sup
port, and, even if speculatively tenable, cannot be appUed in practice.
For even should we suppose that there is one simple matter of which
the so-called elements are constituted still it would be true that this
simple matter exists in different states, which is essentially the same
thing as different kinds of matter, by which we mean matter with
different kinds of properties. There might be homogeneity in matter
considered as having no properties, if such a thing were thinkable,
but as soon as we think of matter with properties we find diversity,
or heterogeneity. And should we at length reduce the properties of
matter to a minimum there would have to be at least two in order
that the law of cause and effect might operate. For perfectly homo
geneous matter in one perfectly homogeneous state could not result
in anything different from itseU.1 So that qualitative unity is, in
human thought, an impossibflity. It never could satisfy our need of
causal explanation. But, as a matter of fact, the progress of science
is not, except speculatively, in the direction of belief in the homoge
neity of matter, but rather favors its heterogeneity. For the number
of chemical elements which are irreducible by any means known to
chemical science is constantly increasing.
Modern scientific thought, with its atoms and molecules in a real
space, is monistic only in name. The quantitative and qualitative dif-
1 Compare Spencer, especially his assertion that one cause produces many effects.
Illustrations of Universal Progress, New Vork, 1866, p. 32.

Monism as a Cosmolqgical Theory. 139
ferences among things must be explained, and as long as they are
referred for explanation to an impersonal power their own complexity
must be carried back into their source. Thus the unitary ground
breaks up into a plurality as manifold as its products.1
On the other hand, the dualistic position must be transcended, and
hence we are aU monists in some fashion. But the true monist re
fuses to assert unity where none is possible. He can affirm no proper
unity of spatial objects since they are indefinitely divisible, and con
sist of aggregates of parts. Nor can he think of a unitary cause of a
variety of products, except as the entire cause is active in each. These
axioms of a true monism are violated by all so-called monists who
view the fundamental reaUty as impersonal. With both these ax
ioms Haeckel plays havoc, and as a result his unity is one of words.
The actual manifoldness has not been in the least reduced. Only as
we advance to the conception of a personal intelligence who remains
seU-identical whfle thinking and wflling into existence the manifold,
can the notion of the manifold be combined with that of unity.
1 For further evidence of the dualism of monism see p. 147 f ., infra.

140 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VIII.
THE MONISTIC NEGATION OF GOD'S PERSONALITY.
The estabhshed facts of science point, then, to heterogeneity in
matter as psychology points to a multitude of personalities. Neither
in the one nor in the other realm do we find the numerical unity
which monism teaches. We are perfectly wflling to foUow all facts
where they lead us, but we are not willing to have the scientist turn
metaphysician, and then claim dominion over us for his speculations
Monism meta- as weU as for his facts. The course of our study must.
science.' have revealed to the reader the fact that monism is far
more metaphysics than science. Disclaiming, in the name of science,
any knowledge of the reality behind phenomena it surreptitiously
posits, in that reality, absolute unity. This is a metaphysical theory ;
and we have seen that it has less to support it than the metaphysical
theory of duaUty as between mind and matter, and of multiplicity
within both the realm of mind and the realm of matter. Should it be
said that nevertheless we cannot escape the conviction of the unity
of nature, we reply that we do not deny it in any other than in the
monistic sense. Of a metaphysical unity in which aU distinctions of
quality and number lose their reaUty and must be regarded as mere
abstractions we know nothing.
We repeat, the unity known to dualism is one which is the result of
scientific investigation, not of metaphysical speculation. It begins
with the simplest forms of matter and extends to the bounds of the
universe. Each human body is a unit in the sense that its members
cooperate with each other. Each human being is a unit in the sense
that mind and body cooperate. Each planet is a unit in the sense
that it has its individual orbit and plane of revolution ; and the planet
and aU its parts and inhabitants are a unit, not only for thought, but
in that they dweU together in harmony. In the same sense the
human race is a unit, and all the planets, with the central sun, con
stitute a unit ; and aU the systems united are a unit. There are many
units in one unit. But the one unit is a composite thing, not a thing
whose parts exist only as abstractions of the mind.1 This scientific
> Paulsen, though an idealist pantheist, seems to favor this idea of a composite unity..
Einleitung in die Phllosophle, p. 245 f.

Monistic Negation of God's Personality. 141
unity need not deny the scientific theory of the origin of the world,
of life, of the diversity between plant and animal, between animal
and man, nor yet, to put the same idea in another form, the develop
ment of aU the highest forms of Ufe out of the simplest. When dual
ists deny evolution they are not, if they understand themselves,
moved by the desire to support duahsm as against science; for
science, as such, has nothing to say about dualism or monism. As
soon as these questions enter the field of discussion science becomes
silent, though scientists, essaying the role of metaphysicians, may be
very voluble.
The conclusion is that monism, as a cosmological theory, is a fail
ure, whether considered from the standpoint of science or of meta
physics ; and hence its negation of the Christian cosmology has no
force. But this peculiarity of monistic theology which consists in the
negation of the Christian position is even more striking in its denial
of the personaUty of God. It behooves us, therefore, to Grounds for
, , ., . .... ... monistic de-
see on what grounds monism denies his personality, mai of per-
Monism is anxious to have a God, but it is also anxious God. ' y
to make it clear that he is not a God fitted out with human at
tributes and weaknesses, nor one who is " exteriorized " or re
garded as personal. It opposes aU compulsory worship accorded to
such outworn, untenable, puerile, and legendary dogmatic repre
sentations, as well as all supposed interventions of God in nature.1
We Christians are often reproached for worshiping an absentee God.
We suspect that an absentee God, if weU employed, would be prefer
able to a present God of the do-nothing kind held by monism.
But we beg the pardon of the reader for this descent to the plane of
argumentation employed by our opponents. We rise again to the
Christian level. The God of the Christian is neither an absentee nor
a do-nothing; but one who is ever present and ever engaged in a
manner which must be considered worthy by all who do not regard
inaction as the proof of perfection. We call attention to the fact that
the God of the Christian is not "exteriorized," nor fitted out with
human weaknesses, and that such human attributes as we regard
him as possessing are those which man has in common with God,
rather than those which God has in common with man. They are
attributes without which we could not think of him as God. They
are attributes worthy of a God ; attributes which must forever make
men attractive who think of themselves as men rather than as highly
developed animals. They are such attributes as goodness, love,
i Forel, Gehirn und Seele, p. 30.

142 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
purity, strength, wisdom, inteUigence, truth, faithfulness. These are
not human weaknesses, but constituents of whatever Godlike charac-
D e f e n s e of ter men possess. That Christians have sometimes made
ity r against of God a man somewhat magnified, a being with hu-
o?monists.S man weaknesses, we do not deny, but confess with
shame ; but we do deny that it is Christian to do so, and we shaU
attempt in the proper place to portray the true Christian concep
tion of God. As to compulsory worship, that too is unchristian;
and the same may be said of so-caUed Christian dogma in the
sense objected to by monists. Compulsory belief is no more Chris
tian than compulsory worship, and from the Christian point of view
neither is acceptable to God. So also it is unchristian to dogmatize
in the sense of intolerant exclusion of aU from the kingdom of God
who do not accept our definitions of Christian truth. But dogmatic
representations, in the sense of efforts to state in aU humility of spirit
some of the great truths of religion, are not unchristian, nor are they
unscientific, nor objectionable to men of a true scientific temper. As
to the alleged outworn, untenable, puerile, or legendary character of
Christianity, we deny that it has in it, when correctly understood,
anything of the kind. That it appears to some to be of the char
acter described is not due to the facts, but to a misapprehension of
the facts.
Haeckel, with his usual brutal forcefulness and disregard of the
facts, gives us in his "Confession of Faith," so called, his religious
reason for opposing the personaUty of God. He says:1 "AU the
multifarious forms of religious faith which ascribe to the personal
God purely human attributes can be grouped under the one con-
Haeckei's ob- cept of Homotheism or Anthropomorphism. However
doctrine of diverse these anthropomorphic representations may be
pci son a!-
ity in God. in the dualistic and pluraUstic reUgions, there remains
common to aU of them the unworthy conception that God is like
man and is organized according to the same type. In the realm
of poetry such personifications are to be both admired and per
mitted. In the domain of science they are thoroughly inadmissi
ble ; they are doubly reprehensible since we know that not until the
Tertiary period was man developed, and then out of the pithecoid
mammals. Every religious dogma which represents God as a spirit
in human form degrades God to a ' Gaseous vertebrate ' (Gasfbrmigen
Wirbelthier) ."
The whole burden of this objection to personality in God Ues in the
1 Der Monlsmus, p. 45 f.

JM.0NISTIC INEGATION OF (jOD's PERSONALITY. 143
i
fact that personaUty makes God like man. In answer there are sev
eral things to be said. First, we call attention to the dogmatism of
Haeckel on the date and method of the origin of man. Nobody knows
that man was developed in the latter part of the Tertiary period out
of the pithecoid mammals. It is the most arrant dogmatism to make
such an assertion. If Haeckel has not lost all power to H-
distinguish between belief and knowledge he must know dogmatism.
that, so far from our knowing what he says, the evidence for a scien
tific belief in the aUeged fact is by no means complete. PersonaUy
we do not care which way the dispute terminates. But a scientist
ought not to speak as he has spoken on this subject. In this connec
tion we wish to mention a related point. Evolutionists never tire of
teUing us that, in the language of Darwin, man born of the animals is
nobler than man born of the dust. But if the argument of Haeckel is
not to be robbed of much of its force we must suppose that in his
deepest soul he beUeves the pithecoid origin of man to be ignoble ; for
he seems to say that in attributing human attributes to God, in mak
ing him like man, we are in reality reducing him to the level of the
brutes. It is by reminding us of our animal origin that he emphasizes
the "unworthiness " of that conception of God which makes him Uke
man. Closely interwoven with this is his idea of spirit as gaseous.
It matters not that theologians have sometimes spoken of the soul
as though it were material. Christianity teaches that the soul is
spiritual, not material, and that God also is a spirit, and not material.
Haeckel ought to take pains to learn what Christianity is, not merely
what some people have thought it to be.
Of the same kind is his representation of anthropomorphism as
making God similar in organism to man (gleichartig— homotyp organ-
iziert). Christianity does not think of God as organized at all. Can
it be possible that Haeckel has taken his idea of God as organized Uke
man from the nursery ? Or did he receive it from classic art ? These
are the only sources whence he could have gotten , the notion.
That we have not misunderstood his meaning is evident And profound
ignorance of
from the fact that his language is plain, and from the *f cnristiali-
fact that others have expressed the same idea in stiU ity-
more unequivocal terms. Nordheim, who is a firm Haeckelian in
the doctrine of evolution and in respect of his rejection of the per
sonaUty of God, says : "The God of the First Book of Moses (Genesis)
is an old man with a long beard."1 It is a remarkable thing that a
1 Die Erfullung des Christenthums auf ;Gundlage der Entwickelungslehre, Berlin, 1894,
p. 309.

144 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
man who undertook to write a book designed to bring about har
mony between Christianity and scientists (there never was and never
will be any conflict between Christianity and science) should so
grossly misunderstand the God of the Bible. The God of Genesis an
old man with a long beard ! The God of Christianity organized like
man I Very evident is it that men who have gotten their idea of the
God of the Christians from the days of the nursery, and who have
so neglected Christian teaching from that time on to mature age that
they have never corrected the conceptions of those childhood days,
are not fit to judge of the dignity of the human attributes alleged to
be bestowed by Christians on their God.

CONCLUDING CRITICISM OF MONISM. 145

CHAPTER IX.
CONCLUDING CRITICISM OF MONISM.
But, furthermore, Christians do not bestow human attributes upon
God. Rather do they bestow divine attributes upon man. They do
not anthropomorphize God, but theomorphize man. For Christianity
does not teach that God is like man, but that man is like God ; it de
nies that men make God and affirms that God makes men, and that
he makes them in his own image. In fact, monism teaches the same
thing, only its idea both of God and man is different from that of
Christianity. Which is the more worthy idea is a question for each
to decide for himself ; and here it is a question, not of the truth of the
idea, but merely of its worthiness, raised by the monists themselves.
But while Christianity teaches that man is hke God it Real doctrine
does not, like monism, teach that man is God, or that and man in
man is as like him as the part is Uke the whole. Chris- 'teaching.
tianity teaches that man differs from God both in degree and quality.
With reference to the difference of degree, Christianity asserts that
it is infinite. Such a difference in degree amounts to a difference
in kind— the infinite and the finite are two diverse kinds of being.
But the difference in quality is not noted in the difference of degree.
Love, truth, intelligence, these are of the same quality whatever
their degree. In this respect there is no difference in quaUty be
tween man and God. This difference shows itself only where man is
characterized by qualities altogether wanting in God. For example,
man has bodfly parts, God has none ; he is not an old man with a long
beard. Here is one difference of quality. Another is seen in the presence
in man of moral elements which Christianity denies to God, as hate,
maUce, and the like. StiU another pertains to intelli- Further state-
ment of tne
gence, wisdom, power, and their contraries. Man is both difference.
intelligent and ignorant, both wise and unwise, both strong and
weak. God is neither ignorant, nor unwise, nor weak. What
objection can there be to thinking of God and man as alike when
their likeness consists in that which is absolutely noble, and when
God is not thought of as having human qualities but man is thought
of as having godlike qualities? Does this degrade God? Let

146 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
us compare such a conception of God with the conception held by
monists. Which is the nobler God : the intelligent or the nonintelU
gent, the loving or the nonloving, the righteous or the nonrighteous
(that is, the indifferent to righteousness), the favorer of moraUty in
men or the one who regards good and bad in morals as alike good, the
God who knows what he is about or the one who does not ? In fact,
it is monism which holds to a degrading conception of God; for it
teaches us that God is the producer of all things — truth and error,
moral goodness and moral evil included.
This leads us to the third characteristic of monistic theology,
namely, its vagueness. This has been made apparent by the preced
ing discussion. It may be that it is difficult to make clear an idea of
God which has nothing to correspond to it in the entire range of our
knowledge. What we really find fault with the monists for under
this head is that they attempt to define their idea, since, according to
Forel, he cannot be represented.1 Why, then, do they try to repre
sent him ? Why do they not take up a consistently agnostic position ?
inconsistency We have seen that Strauss identifies God and the uni-
ofmonismin . ,. ,,-,¦,.¦„.. , .
attempting verse. According to Forel, all original potencies (Urpo-
God. tenzen) of organized life, including the potentiality of the
soul, are contained in inorganic nature. This amounts to a universal,
potential besouling of the world-all, which leads us back to our
monistic conception of God."2 Again, "We reverence in deepest
humihty the eternal, unfathomable almightiness of the omnipresent
God which reveals itself in every atom of the world, the God who
is at once the cause of the to us unknown world-aU and the world-all
itself." s If this means anything it means that, since God is both the
cause of the world-all and the world-aU itseU, God must be the cause
of himself.
This vagueness does not arise alone from the difficulty of defining
the monistic God, but from the nature of that God. A God who is
the cause of himself is of necessity vague to aU who mean anything
by the law of causality. For it is evident that if God is the cause of
Also its ab- himself he must have existed before himseff, since the
cause is always prior to the effect. But if such a thing is
absurd, why hold to it ? Christianity also beUeves that God reveals
himself in every atom of the world, though it does not believe that the
atoms have souls. It also believes that God is the cause of the world-
all, but not that he is the world-all. There either is or there is not a
distinction between God and the world. If he is the world there is no
1 Gehirn und Seele, p. 6. « Ibid., p. 26. 3 n,;,}., p, 30 1.

Concluding Criticism of Monism. 147
distinction. If he is the cause of the world there is a distinction.
But apparently monism holds both that there is and that there is not
a distinction between God and the world, using the words in the same
sense in both cases. This may not be contradictory, but it is so vague
as to make it impossible of acceptance by one who demands of himself
clear thought.
But in fact monists themselves give up the monistic idea when they
come to practical life ; and with the presentation of the proof of this
statement we shall close our discussion of pantheism or Practical
monism. In a note in Haeckel's "Confession of Faith" mentofmon-
he discourses on the world-substance as follows:' "The ists.
relation of the two primitive constituents of the Cosmos, Ether, and
Mass, may possibly be made in some measure provisionally clear
(anschaulich) in the foUowing comparison (according to one of the
many hypotheses) :
WORLD (SUBSTANCE  COSMOS)  NATURE AS KNOWN TO MAN.
World-ether (Spirit), movable or active sub- World-mass (Body), inert or passive sub
stance — Possibility of Vibration. stance — Possibility of Stability.
Principal functions : Electricity, Mag- Principal functions : Gravity, Inertia,
netism, Light, Warmth. Chemical Affinity.
Structure: dynamic ; continuous, elastic Structure: atomistic; discontinuous,
substance, not composed of atoms. inelastic substance, composed of atoms.
Theosophically considered : ' Creative Theosophically considered : ' Created
God ' (constantly in motion). World ' (formed in rest)."
It will be seen at a glance that here is no qualitative, and hence no
quantitative or numerical unity. But, more than this, the above
scheme provides for a creation and a creator, a body and a spirit.
The difference between it and the Christian scheme is that the mon
istic idea of God as spirit and creator is identical with the world-ether,
whfle Christianity makes God intelligent and personal. It is difficult
to see how that homogeneous thing known to science as the ether
could affect mass (matter) in the way supposed unless that thing
which no sense ever perceived, and which exists only as a inadequacy of
means of helping our inert, passive matter, is also intelli- of monism.
gent. In any event there is duaUty instead of unity, and the dual
ism of monism is not as adequate to the explanation of the facts as
the dualism of Christianity. When we make an hypothesis simply
for the explanation of results it ought to be made adequate to their
1 Der Monismus, p. 42.

148 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
production. It is impossible to see that the hypothesis of the ether
without intelligence is adequate.
Another element of vagueness arises from the fact that whfle he
makes the ether equal to spirit — that is, identical with spirit — he has
also given to every atom a soul. We could wish to know whether
this spirit is of the same kind with the soul which is in the atom, and
Are this ether- whether it is also the same kind of a somewhat that we
tSer atonv duahsts call spirit. As his atom-soul and his brain-soul
s anie1!1!! differ so essentially from the soul of duahsm we sus-
kind? peet that the spirit he here speaks of differs from the
spirit posited by dualists. If so we are left entirely in the dark with
reference to the nature of this spirit. It may be very clear to Haeckel,
but the teacher of a new reUgion ought to be considerate of the mental
unpreparedness of those to whom he addresses himself. We have a
suspicion that the reason why he gave us no clearer conception of all
this is that it is lacking in himself ; that, as is so often the case with
him, he dogmatizes on the subject without taking the trouble to think
it through.
Monistic theology, as monistic psychology, is a dismal failure.

JJEISM versus Eeligion. 149

SECTION IY.-DEISM.
CHAPTER I.
DEISM VERSUS RELIGION.
In some of its aspects deism is the very antipodes of pantheism.
According to the latter God and the world are identical ; according
to the former they exist apart, very much as a machine exists apart
from the man who made it. Deism makes God a necessity to the
beginning but not to the continuance and progress of the world. It
thinks of God as the Creator, but only indirectly as the Preserver of
creation; as having, at the creation, bestowed upon the Deism, pan-
theism, and
world such forces and laws that the world's history is Christianity.
their natural and necessary result. God did his work once for aU.
Thenceforth he left it to itself. In some respects this system is not
mimical to Christianity. It, in common with Christianity, regards
God as one and personal, as well as Creator. But it is evident that in
the relation which it gives God to the world lies hidden a vast realm
in which it must antagonize Christianity. If God be excluded by his
own act, or in any other way, from participation in the affairs of the
world, then providence, prayer, revelation, sin, and redemption, in
any Christian sense of these terms, fall away.
The majority of readers will think of deism as a standpoint de
fended and overcome chiefly in the preceding century. But deistic
thought pervades much of the scientific literature of our day, and
especiaUy do many theologians who attempt a reconciliation between
science and Christianity rest satisfied with deistic conceptions of the
relation of God to the world. For example, Andresen 1 says that for
men to deny the intervention of God as cause would be the same as
to assert that our sense of causaUty could be perfectly satisfied with
out including in it the infinite. But whfle this appears, as it is in
tended, as an argument for the doctrine that God inter- Deism in mod-
venes in the affairs of the world it does in fact faU short ern oug
of that. For deism admits the need of God as first cause, and that is
1 Die Entwickelung der Menschen im Lichte christlieh-rationaler Weltanschauung,
Hamburg, 1892, p. 43. Compare the criticism of Andresen on this point by Steude, in his
Christenthum und Naturwissenschaft, Giitersloh, 1895.
12

150 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
reaUy all that Andresen here proves. But that his standpoint is un
consciously that of deism is stfll more plain from the fact that he
says:1 " For practical purposes it is indifferent to us just when God
exerted a causal influence." If this declaration be true then deism is
as satisfactory for practical purposes as theism. This Andresen by
no means holds to be the case ; but nevertheless much of his argu
ment is valid rather against atheism than against deism.
Many of the deistic positions can be better dealt with under other
heads than deism. But so far as deism has a place in modern
thought it wiU be necessary to treat it here. And we begin by show
ing that the deistic theory is incapable of satisfying om- religious
needs. To him who denies the validity of the religious nature in
man this argument wfll have but little weight. But the majority,
even of scientific men, are not of the class just mentioned ; and to
their thought any doctrine of God which fails to meet the demands
of the reUgious nature would have to be replaced by one which an
swered that purpose better.
One of the most striking evidences of a deistic tendency in modern
apologetic literature is that the place of miracle is denied either as
Evidence of possible or as actual. Schweizer affirms that in the in-
deistic tend-
ency m terest of religion itself it is necessary to deny every
apologetic ° J J J
literature. supernatural intervention.2 Wagner in his excellent
Uttle work entitled Christen glaube im Bunde mit der Naturwissen-
schaft (Christian Faith in League with Natural Science) 3, touches
the subject of miracles very gently, and throws doubt upon them
in a most amazing manner. The whole trend of these, and scores
of similar writings, is to minify or banish the miraculous from
Christian faith and to reduce it to the acceptance of the purely me
chanical view of the world, in which God has no part ; at least none
by which he can alleviate our misfortunes or commune with our
souls. The drift of all such thought is to place the world, at its very
beginning, at a distance from God, and to bring him near to it only
in the human spirit through the power of the idea of God.4 Now, all
this directly contradicts the teaching of Jesus, and robs us of what
we need in our relation to God. Of what use is it that God is per
sonal if when we call on him he is unable to answer us? Even
though we do not need miracles to convince us of the presence of a
1 Die Entwickelung der Menschen, p. 48.
a Die Zukunft der Religion, Leipzig, 1878, p. 25.
" Braunschweig, 1891. See, for example, pp. 17 f.. 48 f.
« Comp. Frohschammer's Das Chrlstenthum und die moderne Wissenschaft, Vienna,.
1868, p. 307.

Deism versus Eeligion. 151
divine power in the world, stiU, for answer to prayer, God must have
access to the working forces of nature and abflity to direct them as he
wfll. The child of God does not go in prayer to one whom he thinks
unable to do for him everything needful at the moment. Efleetistod
Were that the prevaihng conception of God prayer stroy prayer.
would be no longer offered. For whatever the reflex benefits of
prayer may be, and they are doubtless very great, if they were be
heved to be the only benefits possible men would cease to pray. It is
unreasonable to pray to a God who is unable, but it is reasonable to
pray to a God who, though able, may often decUne to answer.
Hence, to a prayerful life, the belief in God's access to and power over
the forces of nature is a necessity ; and all schemes which rob him of
these are not only deistic but destructive of religion in any true
sense of the word.
Thus deism, even when the attempt is made to couple it with
^Christian elements, is ruinous to the devotional life. But it is equally
dangerous to the ethical side of religion. One of the most recent at
tempts, by an anonymous author, to reconcile the Chris- Equally dan-
tian faith and natural science asserts 1 that the perfection the ethical
sid6 of rfili-
of God consists in the fact (?) that all his later counsels gion.
(volitions) are the necessary consequences of his first volition, all
his later operations the inevitable results of his original creative
wfll. This makes prayer answerable by provision having been
made both for the prayer and the answer to prayer in the origi
nal outfit of the world. The offerer of the prayer did not freely
choose to pray, though he thought himself free in that act. He
prayed because the time had come and the circumstances conspired
which God had foreordained from the beginning of the world. And
as he had planned for the prayer, which was inevitably offered in
just the way and just the spirit prearranged, so the answer had been
planned; or, if the petition was denied, this was planned also. In
other words, God has deliberately planned to deceive us into thinking
we are praying and that he can answer, and into the belief that when
he answers it is because we pray, and when he dechnes our petitions
it is because his wisdom discerns in it that which our minds fail to
grasp. Were this generally believed prayer would cease, and so
would respect for the moral character of God be at an end.
But, more than this, aU real moral endeavor would be impossible.
The doctrine in question is even more fatal to the ethical life than the
materialistic theory. For it makes God himself a deceiver, as well
1 Der christliche Glaube und die Naturnotwendigkeit aller Dinge, Berlin, 1891, p. 27.

152 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
as the author of aU our sin. That we are not drawing, from the doc
trine of the book, conclusions not accepted by the author himself is
evident from its utterances relative to the freedom of the wfll.
"From the impossibflity of our being conscious of the natural laws
which operate upon us arises for us the capacity of free choice."
"The freedom of the wfll consists in the unconsciousness of its lack of
freedom." " We ourselves make the laws which manifest themselves
in our lives, since we make our decisions by free choice on the basis
of causes which do not appear in our consciousness." ¦ That is, we
are free because we do not know that we are not free. This is word-
juggling and thought-juggling combined. The upshot of it is that we
think we are free, but we are not ; and even our deceptive conscious
ness of freedom is the result of the original creative act of God. So
we are deceived and God is the deceiver. If this idea, consistently
acted upon in everyday life, would not result in a cessation of all
moral endeavor then no idea could possibly affect conduct.
But we are taught by these modern deists that our relations to God
are not ideal when we seek to have him. interfere in his works on our
behalf. Frohschammer * teaches us that the true natural providence
of God consists in the fact that God has given us the physical and
mental power to know and to control the forces of nature for our own
good ; and that when this power is not adequate man should bow in
Frohscham- resignation to God's wfll as manifested in what is, and
trfneSofCres- not caU upon him to change miraculously his orderly
igna ion. purposes according to our desire. For not in the wish to
have God adapt himself to us, but in humble acquiescence in God's
wfll and the unchangeable course of his creation does real religious
sentiment display itself. And Frohschammer further says that Jesus
in the garden of Gethsemane performed the most truly and perfectly
religious act which the history of man offers, displaying the true na
ture of the religious faith and life by submitting himself, in spite of
his deep sorrow, to the divine counsel and the natural course of
events, without claiming the miraculous protection of God.
To this Steude replies s that, while the act of Jesus was an humble
acquiescence in the divine will, it was not acquiescence
Steude's reply. . ^
in the natural course of events ; least of all was it resigna
tion as a result of the conviction that the divine power does not affect
1 Der Christliche Glaube und die Naturnotwendigkelt aller Dinge, pp. 38, 39, 43. Comp.
Steude's Christenthum und Naturwlssenschaft, p. 68 ff.
2 Das Christenthum und die moderne Naturwlssenschaft, p. 295. Comp. Steude, as
above, p. 57 f.
8 Christenthum und Naturwlssenchaf t, p. 67 f .

Deism versus Religion. 153
directly, but only indirectly, the welfare of man. For had this been
his conviction the prayer that the cup might pass from him would be
inexplicable. Accordingly the words " If it be possible, " and ' ' Thy wfll
be done," do not relate to the natural unchangeable course of things
ordained by God, but solely to the question whether his suffering and
death were founded in the saving counsels of the Father. As Steude
weU says, humility can be a truly ethical and religious act only when
it is achieved and practiced in the face of the conviction that God
could guide us otherwise, and that he could, if he would, miracu
lously help and save us. On the contrary conviction resignation is a
necessity, to refuse to submit foolishness, humflity a mere matter of
the understanding — the result of mental reflection and not a religious
act. In none of these ways, then, does modern deism satisfy the con
ditions of true piety.

154 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
THE CHRISTIAN AND DEISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF GOD'S RELATION TO THE
WORLD.
It is sometimes claimed that the relation of God and world as con
ceived by this modern deism is more exalted than that which is
supposed by Christianity. Says Wallace, the colaborer of Darwin in
establishing the theory of natural selection : ' "I beUeve that the uni
verse is so constituted as to be self -regulating. ... As a matter of
feeling and religion, I hold this to be a far higher conception of the
Creator and the universe than that which may be called ' the con
tinual interference ' hypothesis. " " The world is so constituted that by
the action of general laws there is produced the greatest possible
variety of surface and of climate ; and, by the action of laws equaUy gen
eral, the greatest possible variety of organisms has been produced,
adapted to the varied conditions of every part of the earth. The object
or would probably himself admit that the varied surface of the earth
Wallace on *s *ne result of general laws acting and reacting during
character of countless ageS) and that the Creator does not appear to
conception guide and control the action of these laws— here deter-
of God. mining the height of a mountain, there altering the chan

nel of a river. ... If , then, a ' contriving mind ' is not necessary at
every step of the process of change eternaUy going on in the inorganic
world, why are we required to beUeve in the continued action of such
a mind in the region of organic nature ? . . . Why should we suppose
the machine too compUcated to have been designed by the Creator
so complete that it would necessarily work out harmonious results?
The theory of ' continual interference ' is a limitation of the Creator's
power. It assumes that he could not work by pure law in the organic
as he has done in the inorganic world ; it assumes that he could not
foresee the consequences of the laws of matter and mind combined.
... If we could not conceive the world of nature to be self-adjusting,
and capable of endless development, it would even then be an un
worthy idea of a Creator to impute the capacity of our minds to him;
but, when many human minds can conceive, and even trace out in de-
1 Natural Selection and Tropical Nature; Essays ou Descriptive and Theoretical
Biology, London and New York, 1891, pp. 144, 151, 152.

CONCEPTIONS OF VjtOD'S ItELATION TO THE WoRLD. 155
tail, some of the adaptations in nature as the necessary results of
unvarying law, it seems strange that, in the interests of religion, any
one should seek to prove that the system of nature, instead of being
above, is far below our highest conceptions of it."
Did we ascribe to God our human incapacity it would indeed be a
degradation of our conception of him. But we deny that the theory
of constant intervention limits the power of the Creator, and that it
involves the doctrine that he could not have controlled the world by
natural law without his intervention, or that he had not the ability to
foresee the results which would be worked out by the complex laws
of matter and spirit. We do not assert, as WaUace in- Wallace's as-
scrtions dG-
timates, that such a machine as this world, on the sup- nied.
position that it is capable of guiding itself, is so complicated that
God could not have produced it. The assertion that God is limited is
made by those who deny the possibflity of his intervention. Theists
do not say, in this connection, what God could or could not have done.
True to their scientific instinct, they ask simply what the facts indi
cate that he does do. They leave it to scientists, so called, to specu
late as to what God can and cannot do. Did deists never raise that
question, theists would never discuss it; but when they deny the
possibility or actuaUty of divine control of this world and interven
tion in its affairs we submit the facts in proof of the contrary.
Indeed, Wallace himself admits that, with reference to man, there
is a class of phenomena which indicates "that a superior intelligence
has guided the development of man in a definite direction and for a
special purpose, just as man guides the development of many animal
and vegetable forms." 1 True, he wfll not admit that this superior in
teUigence is the one Supreme Intelligence whose wfll or power he con
ceives to have given origin to universal forces and laws. But he dis
tinctly admits throughout his entire section on The His own j^.
Limits of Natural Selection as Applied to Man, covering misslons-
twenty-eight pages, that these natural forces and laws are not suffi
cient to account for all the facts of man's physical and moral being.
Whether there is any reason for supposing that some inteUigence
higher than man and lower than God, as Wallace supposes, rather
than God himself, " guided thedevelopment of man in a definite direc
tion and for a special purpose," we shall not discuss further than to
say that the only apparent reason for such an hypothesis is to get the
advantage of a needed higher intelligence without admitting that God
had anything to do with the world except to start it on its way.
i Natural Selection and Tropical Nature, p. 204.

156 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
The question is before us in the form of the more worthy concep
tion of the relation of God to the world. We assert that the theistic
conception is far more worthy than the deistic. If the fact be once
admitted that God created the world aU that nonsense about his abso
luteness and incommunicableness, in the transcendent meaning of
those terms, is at once done away with. By the hypothesis God can
be God and yet be interested in something. So far, then, theists and
deists would seem to agree. But once this fact is conceded, that God
was interested enough in the world to create it, we can in no way ac
count for his immediate loss of interest in it. Such a change in his
mind is exactly what we find in the frailest of human beings, but not
in the strongest. Yet to attribute it to God is supposed not to be de-
Deism makes grading, while to affirm that his interest in his creation
w ith°nthne is perpetual is declared to be degrading. Perhaps, how-
worid. ever, it may be said that the modern deist does not deny
that God is interested in his creation, but merely that he in any way
touches it or affects it. He made it to suit him at first, and that is all
there was to do. If there were only unintelligent beings on earth ;
if it were a mere question of inorganic existence, or even of plant and
animal life, this would not be so bad. But, according to deism, God
made the world to suit him and it continues to suit him, man included.
An exalted idea of God, surely, that man is and has been as God wants
him to be ! Can it be that God is satisfied either with our sorrows or
our sins ? That all this is just as he would have had it ? If so he is
neither as moral nor as merciful as man.
But not only must consistent deism attribute to God this self-com
placent observation of human sin and misery, but idleness as weU.
He is a mere spectator, with nothing to do. Surely, if it be a question
of worthiness in the eyes of man, this is a much lower conception of
God than that given us by Jesus Christ in those memorable and preg
nant words, "My Father worketh hitherto." Idleness, and indiffer
ence to the pains and sins of his creatures, are not exactly exalted
qualities to attribute to God. But maybe the deist means to say that
God is idle, not because he would not be active, but because he cannot,
in the nature of the case, do anything for the world. Now, we ask,
And gives him why can he not do anything for the world ? Did he make
do. it so that he could not? If so, then we must suppose
either that it exactly suited him or else that he would make it other
wise if he had it to do over again. The latter supposition is the re
pentant God of Genesis, and the early books of the Bible, which has
caused so much horror to scientists, but which in this case they have

CONCEPTIONS OF liOD'S KELATION TO THE WORLD. 157
found to be exactly their God. Christians do not believe in a God
that has any need to repent of any of his acts ; though they believe
that there were those who had such a conception of God, of whom we
have a record in Genesis and elsewhere. But maybe he did not in-
tentionaUy make it so that he could not interfere with it. Perhaps it
slipped out of his grasp and he could not help himself. Any of these
suppositions of the relation of God and the world are possible under
deism, and one of them must be true. Whichever one is true it is a
degrading idea of God.
We can here give to the intrinsic merits or demerits of the deistic
notion of the relation of God to the world but little space. But it is
worth while to point out that any theory which fairly and honestly
admits God as Creator cannot deny his continuous agency and at the
same time assert the evolutionary theory of the world. If evolution
is God's method of creating he is still at work. Theistic Deism and
evolution is possible, but deistic evolution is a contradic- c a°p abTe'of
tion in terms. Again, it is all a mere supposition that in thought!
God created the world and endowed it with forces which will of
necessity work out his wfll. It is impossible for us to say that God
put forth energy in the beginning and then ceased. It is, to say the
least, as probable that gravitation is a divine force constantly exerted
on matter in a certain way as that it is a divine force deposited in
matter once for all. In the former case the law or method of proce
dure is as divine as the force ; and, whfle we might continue to speak
of the laws of nature, we should be persuaded that in reality these
are laws of God. We see, further, that the main reason why certain
scientists desire to rid themselves of the idea of an immanent God is
that they fear the effects of divine intervention upon science. This
point we must postpone for discussion until later. But when the
proper place has been reached ' we shall show that the interventions
alleged by Christianity are not dangerous to science.1 Meantime it is
a matter of life and death to religion whether God is able to intervene
or not. 1 See division il, section ii, chap. 6.

158 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

division n.
SCIENTISTS AND THEOLOGIANS DM CONFLICT.

SECTION I.-SCIENTIFIC AGNOSTICISM.
CHAPTER I.
CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.
The struggle which Christianity has had with phflosophy has been in
good measure carried on with those, who in some degree profess to be
its friends, engaged in giving philosophic expression to its prof ounder
basal tenets. The beginnings of modern science also were made by
open adherents of Christianity ; and although in the recent past many
great scientific names have arrayed themselves in antagonism to some
or all of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith, from the
beginning until now some of the greatest of scientists have been
Christians. We do not place any reliance, by way of argument as to
Vaiueiessness the merits of the question, on the attitude of scientists
merit6 "om toward Christianity. Unless it were demonstrated that
of6 scientific scientific thought is more exact than other thought, and
men- scientific men more free from bias than other men of
trained minds, the opinions of scientists as to the truth of the Christian
system could be of no special value. But these things are not demon
strated, though by the history of science the contradictory of them
is.1 But, while it is not true either that scientific testimony to the
Christian faith has any special value or that the majority of great
scientists have been opposed to Christianity, the tactics of some
enemies of the cause we represent compel us to call attention to
the facts.
That there is, among clergymen especially, a profound fear of the
results of modern science there can be no doubt ; nor is this fear cen
surable, notwithstanding it is really groundless. There are some men
of science who are at the same time bitter antagonists of the Church,
if not of Christianity. They seem to take delight in setting forth the
alleged facts of science in such a way as completely to destroy reU-
1 See a brief editorial In the Methodist Review, July- August, 1897, pp. 622-624.

Christianity and Scientific Research. 159
gious beUef . In so doing they conduct themselves in a manner very
unbecoming those who profess to be humble and earnest searchers
after the truth, and they have no right, under such circumstances, to
the reputation for exactness and impartiality which the designation
"scientist" usuaUy bestows. Nevertheless, but few are Tne reiation
thoughtful enough to distinguish between the scientist and {j* Gentile
the partisan, and to the popular mind even the rankest bought.
falsehood, if uttered in the name of science, passes of necessity for
truth.1 When the clergy see large portions of the community turning
away from the faith given us by Jesus Christ, as a result of the teach
ings of men who train professedly under the banner of science, they
naturally take alarm, especially as they are thoroughly convinced of
the value and necessity of Christianity to the needs of mankind. The
spectacle they witness is like that of a man who throws a rope to a
drowning man and sees it rejected as a means of salvation.
Now, while this is right and commendable, it is absolutely necessary
that the clergy should know that, wherever there is a conflict between
science and theology, either the science is erroneous or the theology —
or both. However protracted the dispute between scientists and the
ologians may yet be, between true science and true theology there can
be no conflict. It is therefore very much out of place for a Christian
to oppose or fear scientific investigation, for it is the principle of
Christianity to encourage freedom of thought. In fact, Christianity
not only leads men to seek the exact truth but prompts them to ad
here to it through all persecutions. Besides, the God of Christianity
is the Creator of all things, and true science can, at Christians
° ' should not
the worst, but correct our ideas concerning his methods oppose or
' ° fear scientific
in creation. The thing to be feared, then, is false science research.
and false theology. Nor should we, because an alleged scientific
fact contradicts our theological belief , immediately conclude that
it can be no real fact, but must be merely an imagined one. The
trouble may be with our form of theological belief. This has happened
many times in the course of Church history ; some of the darkest
pages in the history of Christendom are those which record persecu
tion of men for holding scientific opinions contradictory of alleged
Christian doctrine.2 The case of Galileo is generally cited, but there
1 Comp. Christenglaube im Bunde mit der Naturwlssenschaft, p. 37.
8 For the long and painful history, considerably exaggerated, however, see White's His
tory of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, in two volumes, New
York, 1896. Minify his statements as we may and must, there is still overwhelming evi
dence of the folly of ecclesiastics in their dealing with scientists. See also Zockler's
Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen Theologie und Naturwlssenschaft, Giitersloh, 1887,
and Bowne's The Christian Revelation, Cincinnati and New York, 1898, p. 95.

160 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
are others equaUy striking. Luther opposed the now universally
accepted Copernican theory ; and in this he was supported by his co-
laborer Melanchthon, by Calvin, and by divines in the English Church. '
When the theory of evolution was first announced by Darwin and his
colaborers it was almost universally held by the clergy to be subver
sive of the fundamentals of the Christian faith. It is, perhaps, needless
to say that few well-informed theologians of to-day so regard evolution.
These and similar experiences should teach us, not indeed to accept,
as established, every scientific statement, but on the other hand not at
once to reject it simply because it seems inimical to some dogma we
cherish. It may be that the opposition of the two is apparent rather
than real, or it may be that we have surrounded the dogma with
accretions not essential to its full value and that the alleged scientific
fact is opposed only to them. For a practical reason also we should
not be in haste to condemn as unchristian, and therefore false, a sup
posed scientific fact. When evolution was publicly declared to be
destructive of Christian faith those who felt that evolution was true
naturally turned their backs on Christianity, on the word of its official
representatives. Besides, it is humiliating to have to retract our hasty
condemnations, and tends to decrease the confidence of the thought
ful public in our judgment ; and those who are our unrelenting antag
onists point to the victories which science has won in its warfare
with Christianity, thus strengthening the hold of science as exact
True attitude truth on the minds of the masses and weakening ours
towaerdles!£ h7 evelT battle we lose. The true attitude of the clergy to
ence- science is one of friendliness. That attitude has never done
us any harm ; antagonism has. But our friendliness should also be
intelligently discriminating, not unduly credulous. Above all, when
anything in science appears to contradict important doctrines of our
faith, we should remind ourselves and others that in the past no truth
of science has failed of adjustment to the truths of Christianity; and
that as it has been in the past so it wfll be in the future.
Perhaps it is more appropriate for us to acknowledge with all frank
ness the faults of theologians in the conflict they have waged with
scientists than it would be for us to point out the corresponding errors
among scientists. But it will at least not be out of place for us to
quote what scientific men themselves have said on this point. Forel,
after administering a stern rebuke to theology, turns also upon
science, and says : 3 " Proud of her results, science has often forsaken
1 White, History of the Warfare of Science with Theology vol 1 pn i>6 ff
2 Gehirn und Seele, p. 9.

Christianity and Scientific Eesearch. . 161
the modest path of true philosophy. She has often forgotten that
her alleged laws are not fundamental laws. . . . She has set herself
in the place of God, and worshiped materialistic idols „ ,
c , •¦ , s , . , Scientists'
(matter, force, atoms, natural laws) which are no more confession
,,,.,,.., of their own
tenable than the religious dogmas which she has com- fauIts-
passionately ridiculed." But a greater by far than Forel has spoken
to the same effect. " Science, however, like' religion, has but very
incompletely fulfiUed its office. As religion has faUen short of its
function in so far as it has been irreligious, so has science fallen short
of its function in so far as it has been unscientific. ... In its earlier
stages science, whfle it began to teach the constant relations of phe
nomena, and so discredited the belief in separate personalities as the
causes of them, itself substituted the belief in causal agencies which, if
not personal, were yet concrete. When certain facts were said to
show ' Nature's abhorrence of a vacuum,' when the properties of
gold were explained as due to some entity caUed ' aureity,' and when
the phenomena of life were attributed to a ' vital principle ' there was
set up a mode of interpreting the facts which, while antagonistic to
the religious mode, because assigning other agencies, was also un
scientific, because it professed to know that about which nothing was
known. Having abandoned these metaphysical agencies — having
seen that they were not independent existences but merely special
combinations of general causes — science has more recently ascribed
extensive groups of phenomena to electricity, chemical language of
affinity, and other like general powers. But in speaking Mr- sPencer'
of these as ultimate and independent entities science has preserved
substantially the same attitude as before. Accounting thus for all
phenomena, those of life and thought included, it has not only main
tained its seeming antagonism to religion by alleging agencies of a
radically unlike kind, but in so far as it has tacitly assumed a knowl
edge of these agencies it has continued unscientific. ... In each
phase of its progress science has thus stopped short with superficial
solutions— has unscientifically neglected to ask what was the nature
of the agents it so familiarly invoked. . . . And this, which has all
along been the unscientific characteristic of science, has aU along been
a part cause of its conflict with religion. " ' ' Each (science and religion)
has been obliged gradually to relinquish that territory which it wrongly
claimed, whfle it gained from the other that to which it had a right.
... A permanent peace will be reached when science becomes fully
convinced that its explanations are proximate and relative." '
1 Spencer, First Principles, pp. 104-107.

162 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
The high position of Mr. Spencer in the world of science makes
these words doubly weighty. And it is to be wished that men who
affect a standing among scientists would always be mindful of them.
That the religious impulse and the impulse to search creation through
and through, both of them ineradicable, should lead to conflict between
the special representatives of the two is due solely to the obstinacy
which springs from human pride of opinion. To the Christian it is
perfectly evident that there should not be conflict but cooperation.
Let us as Christians be so well informed that we can distinguish what
is established from what is mere hypothesis, so loyal to truth that we
shall welcome it from whatever source it comes, and so completely
master of the situation that we can prove, to all honest inquirers
whom we meet, the truth of Christianity side by side with all truth of
science ; while we are so magnanimous that whenever we hear our
scientific brethren telling us that our statement of dogma is wrong,
from their point of view, we shaU give their words a fair and impartial
consideration. Science does not, like philosophy, set up systems of thought in
rivalry of Christianity. Its most determined antagonism is rather
incidental than purposed or systematic. This fact will make nec
essary a departure from the method of procedure employed in dis
cussing the relations between phflosophy and Christianity. We shall
not have to do with scientific systems which we must attempt to over
throw, but with objections which science brings against Christianity.
The conflict thus engendered may be considered under three general
heads, which bear upon the methods and objects of theological knowl
edge and upon theological theories of the relation of God to creation
and providence.

Method of Acquiring Theological Knowledge. 163^

CHAPTER II.
THE METHOD OF ACQUIRING THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE.
Before we can estimate correctly the weight of the objections
which scientists make to the methods by which theologians profess
to acquire theological knowledge a basis of comparison between the
methods of science and of theology must be sought. Such a basis is
to be found in the respective natures of the two departments of learn
ing. At the very outset we are met with questions as to what we
mean by science, what it includes, and whether there is anything to
which the methods of science are not applicable. Haeckel denies that
there is any distinction between the scientific study of matter and the
scientific study of mind. ! This is a consistent conclusion from his
form of monistic faith, and means much more than at first sight
appears. For it will be remembered that he regards the problems of
life and mind as simply a special form of the problem of matter and
force ; hence the true method of studying mind is to study matter and
force. So his monism leads him, of course, to identify the Haeckel's doc-
study of theology with the study of substance. In reality scfe n c e' Is
his idea of science is, then, the investigation of matter and Physical-
force. But he thereby excludes, as having no place in the realm of
investigation, every form of psychology except the physiological,
and every form of theology except the monistic. In other words,
psychology and theology in the Christian sense are ruled out.
But this doctrine that there is but one science, that which has to do
with matter and force, is a most narrow and partial view of things.
Before we take up that point, however, we wish to point out that ac
cording to Haeckel himself monism is not demonstrable, but an a? tide
of faith.2 However probable monism might appear, therefore, to
any mind, it would be unsafe to assume the truth of the doctrine
under discussion. But what shall we say of history ? Is it, too, to be
regarded as the study of matter and force ? There are The stll(Jy of
indeed those who hold to a philosophy of history which tntSJ his
would favor that conclusion. But nobody studies history ™w"
by studying matter and force exclusively. For purposes of history
1 Der Monismus, p. 10.
' Ibid., pp. 9, 37. See also Romanes's Mind and Motion, and Monism, p. 118.

164 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
psychology must be studied in the light of free wfll and the reaUty of
the soul. And in fact, so far as monism is a theology, this too must
be considered as philosophy rather than science.
We may, then, dismiss Haeckel's denial of the distinction between
sciences. There is at least a science of mind, as seen in psychology
and history, as weU as a science of matter and force. The latter is
generally known as science, or natural science, including its various
branches of physics, chemistry, biology, and the rest, while the other
sciences are known by their specific names. But this does not prove
that they are not sciences ; and in this' way it is seen that theology in
the Christian sense may be as truly a science as any other branch of
learning, though it is generally designated by its specific name. Any
sober definition of natural science wfll agree with Du Bois-Reymond,
Alexander von Humboldt, Kant, Lotze, Fechner, Liebmann, and oth
ers, in limiting it to the physical world,1 thus leaving room for the
sciences of psychology, history, and theology. Even on the suppo
sition of the truth of monism the last three sciences have to do with
Diverse phe- one c^ass °^ attributes, or phenomena, of the one substance
maud3, aT an<* natural science with another. The subject-matter,
odsof inves- then, of natural science and of theology differs, and the
tigation. former should, as a consequence, not find fault with the
methods by which the latter arrives at conclusions. Natural sci
ence deals with the changes which take place in the physical world;"
theology deals primarily with God and the human soul.
If this were the whole account of the matter there could be no con
flict ; but whfle science looks at the world from one standpoint theol
ogy is obliged to look at it from another. Theology does not meddle
with science when it declares that God is, and that he made and up
holds the world ; nor even when it declares that he intervenes in its
affairs. For theology must attempt to define, though it may not be
able to explain, the relation of God to the world. All theology, mon
istic as well as dualistic, does this. Science, however, does meddle
with theology whenever it undertakes to say that there is no God, or,
Conflict be- admitting his existence, attempts to define his relation to
tweeu the-
ology an d the world. That is a task which lies entirely outside the
scientists un~
necessary. sphere of science. Now, it is evident that there are two
ways of viewing the world : the scientific, which knows, and in the
nature of the case can know, nothing about God's relation to creation,
and the religious, which asserts such a relation. And it is perfectly
1 Comp. Steude's Christenthum und Naturwlssenschaft, pp. 89 ff.
* Du Bois-Reymond, Vortrage, p. 35 f.

i-VJ.Ji.inuu UK' ACQUIRING J.HE0L0GICAL KNOWLEDGE. 165
evident, also, that while, as Romanes says,1 " A reUgious explanation
of any natural phenomenon is, from the scientific point of view, no
explanation at all," it is equally true that a scientific explanation of
any natural phenomenon is, from the religious point of view, no ex
planation at all. Yet if both of these views are kept unmixed with
anything belonging to the other it is impossible there should be any
conflict.2 In so far, then, as science and theology occupy diverse realms, or
look at the same objects from a different point of view, it is natural
to expect that their methods of attaining certainty should differ also.
It by no means follows that, because the methods employed by science
in the investigation of matter and force afford certainty, these same
methods must be pursued in realms apart from matter, and that
otherwise certainty cannot be attained. The existence of an invisible
spiritual entity cannot be demonstrated by the methods of physical
science ; but that does not say there is no method by which such enti
ties can be demonstrated. To him who refuses the use of DiVerse meth-
methods and powers of observation other than those of °quaiiayvld-
the physical sciences there must always be doubt con- uaWe-
cerning the existence of anything other than the physical world ; just
as men who fail to utilize the faculties and methods necessary to be
employed in the study of nature cannot discern what the trained stu
dent of nature discerns. But as the scientist in the use of the appro
priate methods and faculties becomes ever more certain of his ground,
so does the Christian theologian.3 The divergence between the two
realms renders it unbecoming in either to dispute the findings of the
other. If either encroach upon the domains of the other there is likely
to be a conflict, but it wfll not be between scientists and theologians,
as such, but between those who, for the time, pose for what they
are not. In this respect both scientists and theologians have been
guilty. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the methods of theolog
ical investigation are wholly diverse from those of natural science.
There is, indeed, in this respect, much in the history of theology of
which we have reason to be ashamed. Other dogmas have been de
duced from accepted dogmas and contended for as though they were
as sure as revelation. Such instances are to be found frequently in
the records of both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant Churches,
1 Thoughts on Religion, p. 40.
s Spencer has an excellent paragraph which should be heeded both by scientists and
theologians.— First Principles, p. 21.
3 Comp. W. Schmidt's Christliche Dogmatik, Bonn, 1895. Erster Theil, p. 31.
13

166 Foundations of the Christian jaith.
though the cases are less numerous in the latter than in the former.
Wrong meth- An iUustration within Romanism is the doctrine of the
ods some- . „. ,, ,.,.. . _, .,, .
times em- immaculate conception of the virgin Mary: withm the
ployed by
theologians. Protestant Church we mention the doctrine of the ultra-
Lutheran Flacius, that sin is the very essence of fallen human nature.1
Another false method of attaining certainty in theology is that of ac
cepting as true the definitions of doctrine promulgated by Church
councils, whether they appear true or not, on the basis of the general
doctrine that the council cannot err. This, of course, does not prevail
in Protestantism, though there is sometimes a submission to authority
even there, in the absence of personal conviction, which is quite simi
lar to Roman Catholic procedure. Still another false method has been
that of insistence upon a given interpretation of the Christian Scrip
tures as the only true one. This was done when there had been no at
tempt at securing a correct text and without any appeal to the facts
of observation, even in cases when these were easily accessible.
These are a few of the false methods which theology has employed
in securing its conclusions. Many pages might be filled with descrip
tions of similarly careless processes. And we do not wonder that sci
entists who were conscientious in scrutinizing every phenomenon of
nature felt that in comparison theologians were exceedingly credulous.
Nor can we plead that scientists were as dereUct in this regard as the
ologians ; for theology is far older than modern science, which did not
hesitate to reject the science of earher days, while, until very recent
times, theology has failed to make similar progress. The only excuses
that theologians can offer, and within certain limits they are valid,
are that the sacred character of their faith, so different from purely
scientific beliefs, led them to extreme conservatism, and that it is dan
gerous to break hastily away from doctrines so intimately interwoven
with the ethical life of the people.
But we repeat that to-day theology is very rapidly becoming mod
ernized in its methods, and that its best representatives proceed with
as much critical care and breadth of learning as scientists employ.
When one considers that theologians are expected to be not only schol
ars, but conservators of the moral vigor of the people also, it cannot
be denied that progress is fully as swift as ought to be expected. Those
who criticise our methods to-day are probably not aware of the variety
of tests to which all theological conclusions are subjected by the most
1 Comp. A History of Christian Doctrine, by H. C. Sheldon, Professor in Boston Uni
versity, New York, 1886, vol. il, pp. 57, 120. Also M611er's Lehrbuch der Kirchen-
schichte, Freiburg 1. B., and Leipzig, 1894, vol. iii, p. 257 f, and Gieseler's A Text-book of
Church History, Translated by H. B. Smith, New York, 1862, vol. iv, p. 455.

Method of Acquiring Theological Knowledge. 167
thoughtful students before being announced to the world. In the
study of the Bible the greatest learning is applied in the effort to se
cure the nearest approach to the true and original text. The most
diligent research is made into the date, authorship, motives, or objects
of the books of the Bible. The history of the canon is made the object
of investigation of the most painstaking kind. AU the results of these
studies are applied in the interpretation of the Scripture, with a
knowledge of the sacred and cognate languages, of the history con
temporary with the times of the writers, of the manners and customs
of ancient peoples, and, in short, of everything which can Exactness of
throw light on the meaning of the written word. Biblical "fog? cai
theology employs the results of this critical interpretative methods-
care to discover the peculiar contents of each book, or of a group of
books by the same author, and of the Old as distinguished from, and
then as combined with, the New Testament. Notice is taken of the
upward progress of the contents of revelation, the nature of which, as
well as of inspiration, is discriminatingly studied, not in the light of
dogma, but of the Bible itself. Not all have the same skiU in the ap
plication of these methods to Bible study, and no theologian perfectly
applies them ; but the ideal is ever before us, and perhaps we succeed
as weU in our department as any other class of investigators does in
theirs. Nor do theologians confine their researches to the Bible.
After they have discovered the real significance of the history and the
doctrine of their own sacred books they study, for purposes of com
parison, the sacred books of other religions. And it can be truthfully
said that the teachings of other religions are estimated with judicial
temper side by side with those of Christianity. Furthermore, the
Scripture portrayals of human nature are compared with the phenom
ena of individual psychology and with history, that storehouse of
facts relative to the psychology of the human race. Christian ex
perience is studied with scientific care— its states compared with those
found apart from loyal devotion to Christ in the same individual at
successive periods of time, every safeguard being employed to make
sure that the experiences described are real, so that the results may
be properly estimated.

168 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER III.
BELIEF IN MIRACLE AS EVIDENCE OF A WRONG METHOD.
Some scientists find fault with the methods of theology because of
its conclusions. They tell us that as long as we believe in the possi
bility or actuaUty of divine intervention in the affairs of the world
our methods must be wrong. Such scientists need to be reminded
that only as they cease to be scientists can they affirm or deny any
thing concerning divine intervention. If science is rightly denned as
Scientists the study of changes wrought in the material world by
the° rate eof material forces, then, of course, science can see no divine
philosophy, intervention. And in this sense of the word no one
can deny the legitimacy of science. But when scientists undertake
to say that there is nothing which effects changes but material
forces they at once become unscientific. This is a matter which lies
rather in the realm of philosophy or theology than of science. 1 And
when they speak as philosophers or theologians scientists must ex
pect to find philosophers and theologians asserting their rights by
the methods of philosophy and theology. Unless one is ready to
deny the existence of God and his creation of the world it is impossi
ble to say that God does not intervene at every moment. As Andre
sen says,2 there is no characteristic, essential difference between law
and intervention, but the difference Ues in the point of time in which
God acts. Since we do not know the laws of God in aU the minutiae
of their deep-lying operations we cannot teU whether the cause of an
event lies far back in the past or in the immediate past. The former
we call causality, the latter intervention. Both are, by hypothesis,
God's acts. All the scientist need ask is that, if God intervenes, he
shall not contradict his own laws. Says Dahl : 3 " The investigator of
nature as such dare not acknowledge miracle. He cannot rest satis
fied, when he fails to find the natural cause of an event, with the
thought that a miracle has taken place. He must, in fact, strive to
wholly eliminate miracle. . . . But it would be an extremely ven-
1 On the relations of philosophy to science see Wundt's Ueberdle Aufgabe der Philoso-
phie in der Gegenwart, Leipzig, 1874, p. 9 ; also Kaftan's Das Christenthum und die Phi
losophic, Leipzig, 1896, p. 8.
a Die Entwlekelung der Menschen, p. 47.
3 Die Nothwendigkeit der Religion, p. 106 f.

Belief in Miracle as Evidence of Wrong Method. 169
turesome conclusion to draw, from the universal activity of natural
law, that no miracle whatever can take place. What scientist can
prove that the world is not created by an Almighty God ? And if it
is created the creator can intervene in the regular course of his own
creation. . . . But not only are miracles possible, we cannot even
know that miracles do not occur daily in our presence. When we
see any event we rightly seek to trace it to its causes. We seek and
find an explanation. Often we hit the right one ; and often we find
later that we are deceived, and that the causes were other than we at
first supposed. ... It often occurs that we cannot find the causes
even by the most diligent search. We assume in such cases, and
with perfect right, that this is owing to our imperfect knowledge of
natural law. But who will assure us with certainty that it was not a
miracle ? I think that what has been said will suffice to show that
the assertion, 'There are and there can be no miracles,' is as hazard
ous as that hundreds of miracles occur daily in our immediate
presence." Though this is the reasoning of a scientist we do not regard it as
altogether satisfactory, for analogy would teach us to suppose that,
as most events can be traced to natural causes, aU of them could
be did we know nature with sufficient intimacy. StiU, so much
remains true that we cannot positively and with absolute assurance
of certainty deny either the possibility or actuality of miracles.
Hence, if the theologian, after careful sifting of the evidence, still
thinks that miracles have occurred, the scientist ought not to find
fault with his methods on the mere ground of a supposed erroneous
conclusion. The only way to attack the methods in that case would
be to show that they were based on some faUacy in argument or
investigation. The whole difficulty here seems to lie in the fact that
the scientist forgets the widely diverse but not mutuaUy destructive
character of the scientific and the religious explanation of an event.
The truth probably is that neither explanation is complete, but that
both combined give all the facts.1
This question of the validity of theological method is of such funda
mental importance that we venture to add a quotation from Pro
fessor Bowne's Metaphysics,3 which, though written from the stand
point of philosophy, is with sUght modification capable of being
applied to the subject in hand. "What, then, is our method? It
is plain that every philosophical inquiry assumes a certain trust of
1 Comp. Paulsen's Einleitung in die Philosphie, pp. 244, 247.
2 Metaphysics, pp. 18 ff ., revised edition, pp. 5, 6.

170 Foundations of the Christian j?aith.
reason in itself. This is a universal fact of mind, and hence a fact
Professor of the system of which we form a part. This self-con-
^ owne quo fidence of reason is not to be groundlessly distrusted,
both because such distrust would be irrational and because it would
forestall all investigation. In discussing our theory of things we pro
pose, therefore, to take everything as it seems to be, and to make only
such changes as are necessary to bring our views into harmony with
themselves. . . . Such a method does no violence to the natural
sense of probability, which can never be needlessly violated with im
punity. Such a method, too, allows reason its full rights. It is an
act of faith, not of skepticism ; for it makes no changes unless reason
calls for them. If we distinguish between appearance and reaUty
it is because reason can be harmonized with itseU in no other
way. . . . Our only assumption is a provisional trust in reason ; but
we by no means assume that inquiry wfll leave our general views
unchanged. Nor is our problem any more speculative than are the
theoretical problems of physical science, while the method is the same
in both cases. Physics, going out from phenomena, asks how we must
conceive of the unseen agent, or agents, which produced them. Ac
cordingly it posits atoms, ethers, etc., of various kinds and powers.
Indeed, theoretical physics is metaphysics, as far as it goes. And the
physicist carries himself beyond the phenomena by the sole force
of reason. He has no other criterion of truth in this unseen realm
than the mind itself. He enters it only by thought, and thought is
the only warrant for its existence. We go to work in the same
way and appeal to the same standard. We use, therefore, no new
method and appeal to no occult authority. . . . Neither science nor
philosophy denies anything which the senses give, though both find
reason for denying that the senses give as much as uncritical thought
assumes. Both make the data of senses their starting point, and on
them build up a rational system. But this system is never a matter
of the senses, but an inference from their data. Both physics and
metaphysics carry us at once into a world of realities whose existence
can be assured only by thought. The conclusions of physics concern
ing the true nature of things are most startUng, and at first sight
seem to outrage aU reason. These theories, which seem so monstrous
when tested by the senses, are not to be tested by the senses, but solely
by reason. They deny nothing which the senses can give, but are
inferred from the data of the senses. Our trust in them, therefore,
depends only upon our trust in reason itself, and on the cogency
with which they are inferred from the data. . . . The visible heavens

J5ELIEF IN 1V1IRACLE AS iiVIDENCE OF WRONG METHOD. 171
are the heavens as they appear to the eye ; the astronomical heavens
are the heavens as they appear to the reason. . . . As it is no objec
tion to physics and astronomy that the atoms and the ether cannot
be seen, or that the heavens seem to contradict Copernicus, so it is
no objection to phflosophy that its theories cannot be verified by
the senses. They are never matters of eyesight, but of insight."
The only additional remark needful is that we do not admit the
universal, nor even the general, use of the strictly scientific method
by scientists. As we have before pointed out, scientists often claim
for their speculations the protection of their own scientific reputa
tions. It is unscientific to attempt to make the facts bend to a the
ory, as some try to do with facts refractory to theories of science.
It is equally unscientific to ignore these refractory facts TT . ....
u n S C 1 6 H X 1 1 1 c
and yet claim certainty for the theory. Such facts can, procedure
^ *" 'of some sci-
at most, be left on one side until further investigations entists.
can be made ; and should they exist in any considerable number they
must inevitably suggest that the theory needs emendation, if it is not
wholly false. Still more objectionable is it to assume that matters
otherwise inaccessible may be determined by a theory, as, for ex
ample, the existence of an extinct race through which man passed
on his way from the pithecoid to his present state. Science stops
where the facts of observation stop. Its only business is to interpret
these facts into theories consistent with them. Anything further is
not science, but speculation, often of the most dogmatic kind. Sober-
minded scientists protest against such procedures on the part of their
more venturesome brethren.1 But as long as scientists dogmatize
and still set themselves up as examples of propriety in method they
should not complain of speculative and dogmatic theologians who
foUow in their footsteps.
1 Comp., for example, Semper's Der Haeckelismus in der Zoologie, pp. 25-33, and the
notes on pp. 34-36, in which Semper quotes also a protest from His.

172 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER IV.
the objects of theological knowledge.
The criticism of scientists against theology in this respect is inti
mately connected with that just discussed. As the methods of the
ology are declared to be inadequate, so the objects of theological
knowledge are affirmed to be uncertain, and belief in them is
branded as superstition. The underlying assumption in such criti
cism is that there is nothing but matter and material force. The f oUy
of such an assumption is evident upon a moment's reflection; for,
even though it were true, scientific research cannot for a moment
claim to have established its truth. It is unfortunate that so many
scientists should be so proud of their achievements as to forget at
False assump- times the apparently inexhaustible stores of surprises held
tain scien- °y the world with which to reward human research. The
scientist, so far from thinking for a single instant that he
has exhausted the knowledge of nature, ought to be surprised at noth
ing that may appear. That student of nature who was most skilled
in the secrets of the world two centuries ago might just as well have
supposed he had exhausted all knowledge of reaUty ; yet what mar
velous discoveries have been made since then. In fact, the dreams of
alchemy, ridiculed some time since by science, bid fair to be realized in
a time when diamonds can be produced by artificial means. And while
it is not to be expected that scientific research into the nature of
matter wfll ever bring to light the existence of God, yet the modesty
proper to science forbids it to say there is no God.
But some of those scientists who assert the existence of God talk
about the superstitions of Christian theology. The monist wfll posit a
soul in every atom and in every living cell, and in the world-all, and
he will ' ' bow in deepest humility " to this world soul ; yet he will point
the finger of scorn at the Christian, whose belief makes not half so
great a draught on credulity. True, the monist says that by soul he
means a function of matter, and not an independent reality; and this
he thinks guards him against the accusation of superstition. But, as
we have seen, the firmest monists do not claim that their behef is
more than belief. We ask, therefore, which is the more superstitious
act, to " bow in deepest humility " before what we know— or at least

1'he Objects of Theological Knowledge. 173
believe — to be a mere unintelligent function, or to bow before what is
believed to be an inteUigent being? But perhaps it will Monism and
be said that the superstition consists just in this very [ty raV super-
belief of such an intelligent being. Let us remind the stltlon-
monist again that his belief is but a belief, even though he may claim
that it is a more rational belief than belief in a personal God. At the
most it is belief against belief. We insist that it is more superstitious
to feel reverence toward an unintelligent thing than toward a personal
being. Did the monist openly declare himself a materialist he could
be excused from the accusation of superstition ; but the religious mon
ist is as superstitious as the Hottentot who worships a fetich. It ill
becomes any class of scientists, therefore, to raise the cry of supersti
tion against Christians.
Aside from this ad hominem argument in justification of Christian
beliefs we wish to caU attention to a fact often overlooked by both
scientists and theologians. It is that, as far as the objects of his sup
posed knowledge are concerned, the theologian is in no worse case
than the scientist. The former assumes the existence of spirit, the.
latter of matter ; both with good reason. Men of about equal mental
caliber and reflective power have assumed or denied one or the other.
The scientist ignores the doubt and proceeds with his investigations as
though matter were an unquestioned reality. ShaU he blame the theo
logian for proceeding in a similar manner? Both act on Assiimptions
the discoverable laws, one of matter, the other of spirit, fyttvs°&£&
and each in his own realm gets invariable results under sclentlsts-
like conditions. Both are equally sure that back of the phenomena
there is entity. Yet the scientist cannot explain the ultimate nature
of matter nor the theologian of spirit. Both find limits to their in
sight and knowledge, and so far as we can see they are alike in bad
case— 0r, if it be preferred, each has advantages and disadvantages
about equal to the other.
This point demands further amplification. The situation is often so
represented as to leave the impression that science is a system of facts
while theology is a system of speculations.1 We think no candid theo
logian who knows the facts can deny that theology has speculated un
necessarily. But, just so, no candid and well-informed scientist can
deny that many of the conclusions of science are the result of specula
tion. Perhaps theology, which, like philosophy, deals much with the
unseen, should be excused even if it speculates unduly ; for scientists,
though it is not their proper function, cannot resist the temptation to
1 So Buckle, History of Civilization in England, New York, 1864, vol. ii, pp. 453, 458 ff.

174 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
speculate the instant they come to the boundaries of the sensuously
perceptible. But if both science and theology speculate both also
have their facts. Sometimes there is a dispute between theologians
and scientists as to the ownership of these facts. Many things in na
ture are available for use as indicative of a guiding inteUigence. The
theologian does not hesitate to employ them. On the other hand the
Dispute be- scientist often claims the whole realm of being and event,
ioVg1anstaend in, the physical world and in history, for his own. If
?oeowuer- some scientists had their way they would exclude aU in-
ship of facts. vestigators who do not follow with them. But even
though the theologian may admit the right of the scientist to attempt
the explanation of such facts as the religious sentiment, conscience,
the universal belief in God, the existence of sacred books, especially of
the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, Jesus Christ and the religion he
founded, and Christian experience, he still insists that these are his
own facts and that it is his peculiar duty to explain them. And he
not only holds that he can explain them more reasonably than can the
scientist, but also that where science fails of an explanation of the
facts of the natural world theology can lend it some useful hints. It
is to be hoped that the time will come when speculation shaU be re
duced to a minimum both in theology and science, but it is very sure
that at present both have facts and both speculate on them.
Closely related to this is another fact. It is often assumed that
science is sure of its objects while religion has to take its objects on
faith. This may mean several things. So far as it means that science
is sure of matter and religion not sure of spirit, it is a false assumption,
for both have a degree of certainty concerning them. Perhaps what
is really meant is that the propositions of science are demonstrated,
Faith em- while those of theology are merely assumed. If this defi-
in science nite form of putting the supposed advantage of science
oiogy. over theology be taken up for discussion it must be
met with an unequivocal denial. That Christians believe in many
things they cannot demonstrate is freely admitted; but that these
beliefs are mere assumptions is very seldom true, even of the most
recondite dogmas. That they appear so to some people only proves
that those people have not studied with unprejudiced minds the
arguments by which dogmas are upheld, or else that they lack the
power to appreciate a certain class of facts. Christian dogmas always
have some foundation in fact, though in the history of theology many
such dogmas have been very poorly supported. As theology progresses
the inadequately supported doctrines are given up. But precisely the

The Objects of Theological Knowledge. 175
same thing is going on, and has gone on, in the history of scientific
progress ; scarcely more nor less so than in theology. So that here,
too, theology appears to as good advantage as science.
Why, then, it may be asked, is the impression so general that faith
occupies so much the larger place in religion than in science ? We
answer, it is the result of nomenclature rather than of fact. Religion
speaks of faith, science of knowledge. But science has no more
knowledge than religion. In other words, science is a system of faith
in every sense in which religion is such. This may appear to be a
radical statement, but we assure the reader that it is made in all
calmness and that it is capable of abundant illustration. In order that
the truth of what we have just asserted may appear let us compare
science and religion in their two aspects of practice and theory.
Beginning with Christian faith, in the sense of trust in a personal
God, or in the efficacy of certain practices, we find that science, in
its appUcations t» practical Ufe, offers an almost perfect paraUel.
Faith in God as a person of the kind described in the New Testament
is always followed by certain definite results affecting parallel be-
the happiness of the human mind, the soul's attitude tm^andthe-
toward questions of conscience, and the corresponding practical
conduct. Careful observation has revealed the fact that procedure.
just in proportion as faith in God as revealed by Jesus Christ is un
mixed with uncertainty— clear in its comprehension of his nature and
firm in its reliance upon him— are the above results weU marked. In
other words, faith in this sense, of confidence in a person, always pro
duces the desired results, and they cannot be attained when this faith
is lacking. This would be admitted even by atheists, though they
would affirm that the results of the atheistic faith are as good, or bet
ter, though not identical. Now, the same thing is true with reference
to the practices of Christianity. The one who performs them expe
riences certain well-defined consequences which those do not expe
rience who neglect them. Such practices are the studious and devout
reading of the Bible, prayer, association for religious purposes with
earnest Christians, and the like. These, if performed in the spirit of
Christianity— that is, according to the known laws of Christian pro
cedure—never fail of their effects. The conscience is enUghtened, the
purpose to live unselfishly and helpfuUy is strengthened, and the
whole deportment becomes distinguished by a rare combination of
cheerfulness, patience, loving-kindness, and moral strength.
There may be those who wiU underrate these results as compared
with practical science, but no one can deny that for practical purposes

176 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
the scientist must proceed in the same way as the Christian. He
must trust the powers of nature and their regularity ; he must use the
appointed means for accomplishing the desired ends. If he does aU
this he gets the results he seeks ; if he fails to do so the results are not
obtained. It may be said that the analogy fails because in trusting
The parallel in God we take his existence on assumption merely,
the"6 """ while in trusting the powers of nature, and their regular
action, we act on what we know. But this is a faUacy. We know
the powers of nature by their results, and in no other way. And we
beUeve in their regular action because they have never disappointed
us. Precisely so is it with the Christian's faith in God. Perhaps,
however, some one may say that all the results of Christian faith can
be explained without the supposition of a God. But this is, at least,
undemonstrable ; while the natural scientist, unless he be an atheist,
would not assert it. In its proper place we shaU show that it would
be as unscientific to deny that these are results of the divine aid as to
assert that events in the physical world are not controUed or affected
by the action of physical forces.1
But the paraUel does not end here. In the matter of the acceptance
of propositions which are unproved, or perhaps incapable of proof,
science as much goes on faith as does theology. The popular under
standing of the situation is the contrary of this ; but aU capable scien
tists know that it is true, and do not hesitate, on occasion, to ac
knowledge it. We have had previous occasion to refer to one of the
most recent representatives of a purely scientific view of the world, so
purely scientific as to be atheistic ; one who denies, in other words,
the validity of the religious view altogether. But hi order not to
Strecker on break the connection we cite the passage in full: "In
t l'ciVs0 olf order to attain a complete system of opinions materiaUsm
1 also finds itself compeUed to fiU out the numerous gaps
in the knowledge gained by internal and external experience with
articles of faith (Glaubenssatze) which it cannot establish, which
therefore wfll be contested by our opponents, and which by no means
answer the purpose of explaining the difficulties and problems which
present themselves to us in considering the world. . . . The ma
terialistic view, then, does not at all rest, as its overzealous adherents
sometimes assert, in all respects on the basis of established fact, but
must, like all positive views of the world, give faith a large place.
Materialism believes in the objective validity of time and space; it
believes in atoms ; it relies upon the unchangeable operation of the
1 See division viii, section viii, chap. 2.

The Objects of Theological Knowledge. 177
law of causation. MateriaUsm starts from the knowledge gained by
experience ; its point of view is the law of causation as deduced from
experience; and with the validity of this law it stands or faUs." 1
Before going further it should be noticed that a purely scientific
view of the world must " give faith a large place," since it does not
always rest on the basis of established facts. But Strecker is by no
means the only nor the best known representative of an exclusively
scientific view who confesses the place of faith in science. Huxley
declares that the great act of faith which every man must perform
is to believe that the powers of nature wiU continue to operate in the
future as they have operated in the past.2 And Haeckel Also Huxley
,,,.,,,„ ' and Haeck-
the self-appomted prophet of the exclusively scientific el-
view of the world, in the already oft-quoted because for our purpose
important work, says : b " The gaps which the empirical investigation
of nature must leave open in the temple of science we can fill up with
hypotheses, with more or less probable suppositions. These we can
not at present positively prove, although we may be allowed to em
ploy them in the explanation of phenomena so far as they do not con
tradict a reasoned * knowledge of nature. Such reasoned hypotheses
are scientific articles of faith. ... A reasoned hypothesis of fun
damental significance is, for example, faith in the unity of matter
(the composition of the elements out of original atoms), faith in the
origin of the first life from nonUving substance (Urzeugung),6 faith
in the unity, in principle, of all natural phenomena." On the same
page he says that he regards this last article, faith in the unity in
principle and in the genetic connection of organic and inorganic
nature, as one of the fundamental doctrines of monism. That is, one
of the fundamental articles of monism is not a proved fact but an
hypothesis, an article of faith. Again, on pages 39 ff. of the same
work, he says : "The law of conservation of substance belongs also,
taken strictly, to the articles of faith of natural science." Yet he
immediately sets it up as section 1 of the monistic religion. He then
proceeds to say that the present day physicists universaUy, and with
1 Strecker, Welt und Menschheit, p. 13 f.
3 " It is quite true that the ground of every one of our actions, and the validity of all
our reasonings, rests upon the great act of faith which leads us to take the experience
of the past as a safe guide in our dealings with the present and future."— Essays Upon
Some Controverted Questions, p. 280.
3 Der Monismus, p. 37.
4 Perhaps some would prefer to translate "reasonable " (vernunftige).
1 The word Urzeugung is difficult to render in English so as to convey the exact Idea of
Haeckel. We append a translation of a part of the definition given in Brockhaus'
Konversations Lexikon: "Urzeugung or Abiogenesis, the origin without parents, of
organic beings from inorganic matter (Stoff)."

178 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
right, regard the law of the conservation of energy as the indestructi
ble basis of their scientific knowledge of nature, just as chemists hold
to the doctrine of the conservation of matter ; but that skeptical
phflosophers could raise serious difficulties with these individual laws
just as they can with the union of the two in his law of the conserva
tion of substance. Perhaps we shall not need further evidence, drawn
from the statements of scientists themselves, that science does, in
deed, give large space to faith. Yet we add the testimony of Buchner
in his Introduction to Strecker's work as above mentioned. He says : l
"He (Strecker) emphasizes with perfect justice the undoubted right
of the searcher after truth to bridge over the gaps in our knowledge,
which perhaps science can never fill, with hypotheses or articles of
faith." We think none the less of science because it is obliged to beUeve
where it cannot see ; and it is a great wrong to scientists to censure
them for making any hypothesis necessary for the explanation of
the phenomena of matter and force. But it is an equaUy great
wrong to theologians to condemn them for making hypotheses suita
ble to the explanation of the facts of the religious life, or to demand
that theology should abdicate in favor of physical science.2
1 Welt und Menschheit, p. x.
aComp. G. F. Wright, The Logic of Christian Evidences, Andover, 1880, pp. 7-U.

-articles of Faith in Theology and Science. 179

CHAPTER V.
ARTICLES OF FAITH IN THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE.
Perhaps it wiU occur to some one to say that while both science
and theology have their articles of faith the former are well founded,
the latter fll founded. Haeckel makes this assertion in its strongest
possible form, affirming that Church creeds or religious dogmas are
either pure fictions (without any empirical proof) or un- Haeckel's
reasonable (contrary to the law of causation).1 He gives against 're"
no examples and makes no exceptions. That is, these mas. g"
creeds are without any facts in their support or, worse than that,
contrary to the law of causation. We sincerely regret that he did
not give us at least one example of each kind. However, he gives us a
hint of what he means in a remark on the same page. " Since both the
simple processes of inorganic nature and the more complex phenomena,
of organic Ufe are traceable to the same forces of nature ; and since,
further, these (the forces of nature) have their common ground in a
single primitive principle which fills the universal infinite space of the
world, we may consider this last (this primitive principle— the ether)
as the all-comprehending Deity and thereon base the proposition that
'faith in God is capable of being united with natural science.' "
We have here at least a specimen of what he regards as a scientific
article of faith, one which has facts to support it and which does not
contradict the law of causality. On the other hand we must suppose,
since he rejects the Christian doctrine of God, that he regards it as
having no facts in its support or as being contrary to the law of caus
ation, or both. As this is not the place to display the facts which the
Christian system has to offer in support of its faith in God we refer the
reader to the appropriate portions of this volume that he may judge
for himself whether it has no facts, and is therefore purely fictitious,
and whether it contradicts the law of causation. Here we inquire
what facts Haeckel's doctrine of God has for its support. It is evident
that he has given, though briefly, his argument for belief in God, and
that he has identified for us his deity (the ether).2 The first part of his
1 Der Monismus, p. 37.
3 See also the scheme we have cited from him on p. 147, above, where he attributes crea
tion to the ether.

180 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
argument is that both the simpler processes of inorganic nature and
First part of tne more complex phenomena of organic life are tracea-
ment foA"- ^le tothe same forces of nature. But, as we have seen,1
lief in God. y^g ^ according to his own declaration, an article of
faith and not an established fact. Should it be replied that though it
be an article of faith it is itself supported by fact, we answer that the
majority of scientists do not think so.3 Anyone who wfll take the
pains to read what scientists have to say with regard to the origin of
life will discover that it is really a piece of arrant dogmatism to assert
that the processes of inorganic nature and the phenomena of organic
life, in which Haeckel includes mental processes, are traceable to the
same forces of nature. So, then, the first part of his argument for his
deity is an unproved hypothesis, and not an established fact.
The next factor in his proof is that the forces of nature have their
common ground in a single (unitary) principle (the ether)
par . wnjcn g2is fljg universal infinite space. But is this an
estabhshed fact ? By no means. The very existence of the ether is an
hypothesis ; rendered necessary, as scientists think indeed, by the de
mand of facts for explanation, but still an hypothesis; and an hypothesis
which has undergone considerable modification in reaching its present
form. It is admitted on all hands that the ether is not perceptible by
the senses. It is as truly without parts as the God of the Christian is
affirmed to be. It is immaterial. It is the condition of all things visi
ble and tangible. In fact, it seems to have about the same duties
which Christians assign to God, so far as the material world is con
cerned. It is declared to be the God of the monist (see above). The
only difference between this ether and the God of the Christians is
that the latter, with his intelligence, is better fitted for his task than
this supposed ether could be. God is not matter, and he cannot be
known to the senses ; ether is not matter, and it cannot be known to
the senses. Both are held, so far as the facts of observation demand
explanation, as hypotheses ; and yet Haeckel would attempt to say
that the scientific articles of faith have facts in their support, while
the creeds have none. As an hypothesis by which to account for all
the facts God is incomparably superior to the ether.
But to this Haeckel would reply, probably, that the doctrine of God
is unreasonable in that it contradicts the law of causation. Let us
1 Page 177 above.
i Comp. Willkomm's Ueber die Grenzen des Pflanzen-und Thierreiches und den Urs-
prung dos organischen Lehens auf der Erde, Prague, 1888, pp. 24-31 ; Philipp's Ueber Urs-
prung und Lebenserscheinuugen der tierischen Organismen, Leipzig, 1887,p. 19 f ; Du
Bois-Reymond's Vortriige, pp. 55 ff. ; 88 and 89 ff .

 „ _„„„ „, ^heologyand Science. 181
look at this. We shall make no objection to the fact that science
knows no cause which is not an effect, and none which does not lie
within the realm of matter and force. But how does the doctrine of
God as held by Christians contradict the law of causation ? Evidently
by supposing that somehow he affects the matter and force already
in the world. But does this ether not do exactly the same thing ?
Haeckel ascribes to the ether the impartation of motion to matter, and
makes it the condition by which atoms can affect each other at a dis
tance. ' This is dualism, pure and simple, since the ether is not mat
ter, but distinct from it, and yet affects it. Hence it is difficult to see
how the Christian doctrine of God is less weU supported by facts or
more unreasonable than this "scientific" doctrine.3
Buchner, too, tries to make it appear that the articles of faith of
religion and philosophy rest on unproved suppositions and assertions
which contradict grossly the facts of science and the rules of logic,
while those of science rest on the unimpeachable basis of Btichner on
an order of all being which is founded on law and cannot "'[* 0 u°g
be changed, a basis brought to light by science itself.3 faith-
Not much time may be spent on this. There is not a single doctrine
of the Christian religion (though the same cannot be said of some doc
trines of professed Christians) which contradicts any established fact
of science or which violates any rule of logical thought. These doc
trines do not rest on unproved assumptions, nor on assertion. They
are, without exception, so far as they are fundamental to Christianity,
based on well-established facts ; that is, they are necessary to the ex
planation of the facts, and the attempt to explain these facts in any
other way does violence to them. If we examine the confessed articles
of faith mentioned by Strecker and sanctioned by Buchner we shaU
discover that the whole system of science rests, according to them, on
faith in the law of causation. This law, though deduced from expe
rience, contains in it no assurance that it is universal or unchangeable.
This assurance is read into the law by our own judgment. It is a mere
matter of opinion, or belief. Hence Strecker truly says that the
materialistic, which is given out as the strictly scientific view, trusts
in, relies upon, the unchangeable operation of the law of causation.
1 Der Monismus, p. 41.
3 Iu fact the hypothesis of the ether is a kind of scientific confession of ignorance. En
tirely justified to science by its usefulness, it becomes utterly absurd when required to
explain the dynamic origin of things or when set up as the creative deity. What possi
ble notion can be formed of a unity without parts that yet fills all space, an impondera
ble, immaterial somewhat that is not spirit, a cause of order and system together with
all the phenomena of organic and conscious life, yet devoid of intelligence?
1 In his EinfUhrung to Strecker's Welt und Menschheit, p. xi.
14

182 Foundations of the Christian ±aith.
When we believe that this law is universal and unchangeable we do
so with good reason. But it is, none the less, belief, not established
fact. And the beliefs essential to Christianity are based on equaUy
good grounds, although many scientists, especiaUy atheistic and mon
istic scientists, seem not to be aware of it.
But, again, it is affirmed that Christians talk with assurance con
cerning things which in the nature of the case lie beyond the range of
actual knowledge. Now, we frankly admit that we are convinced
of many things which, in the strictest sense of the word, we cannot
know. We talk familiarly of things unseen and intangible. Here,
too, we must postpone the justification of this mode of procedure ; but
by turning to the proper place in this volume the reader may see that
we do not beheve without the best of reasons. In this part of our work
we can only point out that we do just what science does in its sphere,
and that if it is aUowable in matters of science it surely cannot be con-
demnable by scientists in the sphere of reUgion.
That science does talk familiarly of things concerning which it can
give no consistent account is acknowledged by aU who understand the
situation. Herbert Spencer devotes twenty pages of his First Princi
ples to an exhibition of the Umitations of scientific knowledge. 1 Among
the things which science cannot do or does not at aU understand are, ac
cording to Spencer — Space and Time, the Nature of Matter, of Motion,
of its Transference, of Force, and how it acts, of Consciousness, of
Mind, of Self. Du Bois-Reymond gives us seven Weltrathsel (prob
lems or puzzles found in the world), the first of which is the nature
Spencer on °£ matter and force, the second the origin of motion, the
oTscfentiflc third the origin of life, the fourth the apparently purposed
knowledge. and teleological order of nature, the fifth the origin of
sense-perception, or consciousness, the sixth reasoned thought and the
origin of language, and the seventh the freedom of the wfll. Several
of these he regards as not only unsolved but insoluble.3 Even the all-
wise Haeckel admits that there is one limit to his knowledge (Jesus ad
mitted as much concerning himself), namely, the nature of matter
and force, and says that if we knew this we should know aU about
the world, including life and consciousness.'
Wagner, in his Christenglaube im Bunde mit der Naturwissen-
schaft, to which we have made frequent reference, gives eighteen
pages to the emphasis of the limits of scientific knowledge of na
ture.* Considering the fact that he is fully committed to the mod-
1 Comprising the whole of his chap. 3, on Ultimate Scientific Ideas.
3 Vortrage, pp. 73-112. »DerMonismus,p. 44. * Ibid., pp. 23-41.

Articles of ITaith in Theology and Science. 183
era scientific theories of the world, his concessions are the more strik
ing. He says : " Nevertheless, we dare not overlook the fact that all
our natural laws are founded on hypotheses which we wagner and
make concerning the effective forces of nature. Kepler in Kosanes.
deducing his planetary laws from the results of many observations
came upon certain ideas which when applied to our planetary system
led at once to correct conclusions, which harmonized with observation.
These laws, however, find their mathematical foundation in the cele
brated Newtonian law of gravitation, which, indeed, is called a law, but
which, nevertheless, is only an hypothesis, concerning which Rosanes
says,1 ' If for the explanation of the motion of the cosmical masses we
could discover a simple hypothesis which varied but infinitesimally
from that of Newton, we could have no means of discovering which
was the correct one.' That is, we could very well think of two diverse
fundamental causes for the actual masses and distances and their
changes of place, which, nevertheless, if applied to other given masses
and distances could lead to quite different movements. Which of the
two is right could not be decided ; within the actual limits in which
they were to be apphed either one would suffice. Thus all hypotheses
and the laws of nature deduced from them are valid and applicable
only within certain limits. . . . Whether we have in fact hit the exact
truth with our hypothesis is and will remain whoUy uncertain. ... It
cannot be denied that from the heaven (of knowledge) into which we
were transported by the modern scientific view of the world, we are,
so to speak, in turn torn away. ... On every side the insight into the
real causes of that which appears and disappears is denied us ; the
world now, as before, is inexplicable." " One can, if he wfll, deceive
himself into the belief that aU hypotheses which lead us to natural
laws, so far as we can judge, correspond to experience and are absolutely
correct, or in other words are no longer hypotheses, but certainties, in
which case one would indeed proceed very unscientificaUy."
These confessions could be multiplied indefinitely. We take no
pleasure in them. We think none the less of what science has done
because she has found her limits. But when scientists, or those who
would be scientists, accuse us of talking familiarly of those things
-concerning which, in the ultimate analysis, we know nothing, we feel
justified in saying that, while it is all true, we are in no worse case
than others. No one feels more painfully than the thoughtful theo
logian his lack of knowledge in the strict sense of the word. But we
1 Eosanes, Ueber die neuesten Untersuchungen in betreff unserer Anschauungen vom
Raume, Breslau, 1871.

184: Foundations of the Christian Faith.
are aU justified in the practice of taking some things for fact in order
to have a working theory ; and we need not say at the end of every
Articles of sentence that we do not know the facts, but only as-
faith justM- ., T , • A. . , ,. ,
able in sci- sume them. In other words, scientists who take up
ence and
theology. an agnostic position relative to religion should not forget
that theologians would be equaUy justifiable in toking an agnostic po
sition relative to science.
Scientific agnosticism consists essentially in the assertion that the
methods by which we acquire theological knowledge are inadequate
and that the objects of theological knowledge are of very uncertain
reality. If we have succeeded in defending Christianity against these
two very serious imputations we have succeeded in refuting scientific
as distinguished from philosophical agnosticism.1
' On scientific agnosticism see further, Schurman's Agnosticism and Religion, New
York, 1896, Part I.

vjod and Ureation. 185

SECTION II.-SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE
RELATION OF COD TO CREATION AND PROVIDENCE.
CHAPTER I.
GOD AND CREATION.
We have had occasion several times to caU attention to the fact
that the existence of God as Creator cannot, in the nature of the
case, be disproved. In fact, science as such has nothing to do with
creation. This is apparent from the definitions of science which are
given by the best authorities. As Professor Bowne says: "He (the
scientist) views nature as given, and seeks to find the order of its
changes and the interaction of its parts." • Creation is reaUy a phflo
sophical or theological problem ; and it is not even true that science
seeks to discover the method of creation, though in pursuing its pur
pose it may shed some Ught on that interesting subject, creation not a
How matter came into existence, what were its original science.
attributes and how it came by them are questions with which sci
ence as such need not concern itself. Concerning the origin of
atoms Haeckel says: "This event, if it ever took place, is wholly
beyond the range of human knowledge, and can, therefore, never be
an object of scientific research." Philipp says: "In what manner
the dead fundamental substance originated we can no more con
jecture than we can guess the history of the origin of the ele
ments of granite." And Virchow teUs us: "I have expressly
declared that natural science is not able to solve the problem of
creation."2 Science can neither affirm nor deny creation by God ; but it is at
liberty and it is its duty to ignore that whole matter. If any scientist
sees fit to dabble in such questions we make no objection ; but we do
object when he does it in the name of science. Nevertheless, scientists
have busied themselves with the problem of creation— the Whence,
the Why, the How, and the Whither. Hence it becomes the duty of
the apologist to consider what they say. And first we wish to point
out that scientists have not by any means unanimously, nor even
1 Metaphysics, p. 102.
"These citations are from Steude, Christenthum und Naturwlssenschaft, p. 134.

186 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
generally, denied creation by God; while many have asserted it.
All monists assert it, though some of them in a very vague and unsat-
Scientists do isfactory way. AU deists assert it, though they deny
ally deny the any further relation of God to the world. No agnostic
God increaf denies it ; for he professedly knows nothing about it.
tion. Only atheists are left to deny it ; and they are relatively
few in number, while of them many will go no farther than to say
they see no reason for believing it. Among scientific men of the first
order who have more or less clearly expressed themselves in favor of
the idea of God as creator is WaUace, who by the very fact that he
argues the more exalted character of creation as an original act of
God betrays his belief. And he distinctly says: " Only in reference
to the origin of universal forces and laws have I spoken of the will
or power of one Supreme InteUigence."1 Further, he takes the posi
tion that all force is wiU force, and that as matter is force the whole
universe probably is "the will of higher intelligence or of one
Supreme Intelligence."2 In a general way these utterances commit
WaUace to some form of the doctrine of creation by God, though he
insists that it is through law, with notable exceptions.
Darwin, too, although he professed to become more and more an
agnostic as he advanced in years, leaves us in no doubt that he held
to the existence of God and creation by him. "The question . . .
Darwin's posi- whether there exists a Creator and Ruler of the uni-
11 on- verse . . . has been answered in the affirmative by
some of the highest inteUects that have ever existed."3 "The birth
of the species and of the individual are equally parts of that grand
sequence of events which our minds refuse to accept as the result of
blind chance." 4 " I see no good reason why the views given in this
volume should shock the religious feeUng of anyone. ... A cele
brated author and divine has written to me that he has graduaUy
learnt to see that it is just as noble a conception of Deity to believe
that he created a few original forms, capable of self -development into
other and needful forms, as to believe that he required a fresh act of
creation to supply the voids caused by his laws." B On page 428 of the
same work he speaks of " what we know of the laws impressed upon
matter by the Creator." On page 429, at the very close of the volume,
he says : " There is grandeur in this view of life with its several
powers having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few
1 Natural Selection and Tropical Nature, p. 205. a Ibid., pp. 210-212.
» The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, new edition, Revised and
Augmented, New York, 1895, p. 94. ¦'Ibid., p. 613.
» The Origin of Species, By Means of Natural Selection, London, 1872, page 421.

God and Creation. 187
forms, or into one ; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on
according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been and are
being evolved." Comparatively late in Ufe he wrote: "In my most
extreme fluctuations I have never been an atheist in the sense of deny
ing the existence of a God ;" • on the contrary, he thought of himself
as an agnostic. In 1876 he wrote of the "impossibility of conceiv
ing this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his
capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of
blind chance or necessity." 3 In 1881 he wrote of "my inward convic
tion . . . that the universe is not the result of chance." 3 It is easy
to see that there is a growing indeflniteness in his references to God
as Creator ; yet we think that from first to the last they show a be
lief that the world is not a chance product but the result of the act or
acts of an inteUigent God.4
These names are sufficient, though scores of scientific men of
highest rank could be added to the Ust. That to some students of
science the facts have appeared otherwise is not strange. For it is
easy to mistake an argument against design, for example, for an
argument against creation by the Deity ; or a refutation of the ordi
nary arguments for the existence of God for a denial of his existence.
Darwin could not accept the proofs of God's existence as conclusive ;
yet he could not escape the conviction that this universe is not the
result of chance. This can mean only that it is the product of inteUi
gence; and its immensity and its wonderful character must have
suggested, though it did not, to his mind, prove, that why they
God created it. Another fact which has seemed to many understood
to indicate that scientists deny creation to God is that \£e ddfVnie
with almost perfect unanimity they deny the creation in asency-
the manner described in Genesis. As long as the account of creation
there given was held to be literal and exact history scientists denied
creation. They refused to go to the Bible for an account of how this
world came into being when the world itseU was before them and
open to their study. And particularly were they unwiUing to accept
the Bible account, since it seemed to them to contradict the records of
the world itself. So to those who identified creation with the account
of creation given in Genesis it appeared to be denied by scientists.
1 The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, edited by his son, Francis Darwin, in three
volumes : London, 1887, vol. i, p. 304.
2 Ibid., p. 312. 3 Ibid., p. 316.
'See the article by Professor B. B. Warfield, on Charles Darwin's Religious Life, in the
Presbyterian Review, vol. Ix, pp. 569 ff.

188 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
But whfle scientists have not generaUy denied creation by the Deity
some have gone so far as this, and especiaUy have some done so who
have been rather natural philosophers than natural scientists. Per
haps we should not too severely censure those scientists who attempt
phflosophy ; for, as Romanes points out, science cannot account for any
of its ultimate facts, nor even attempt to do so, without entering the
domain of phflosophy. • Nevertheless, we again protest against the
attempt to pass off this natural phflosophy for natural science. And
we point out that many of the conclusions of the natural phflosophy
are unwarranted by science. Says Wagner :' "The more recent in
vestigations prove most clearly that man was a product of the latest
Conclusions Slaciai period in Europe, and this fact suffices both for
of natural natural philosophy and for those who in our day are
philosphy * r j •>
ra°nteWdaby trame(* m natural science to teach that the Scripture
science. account of creation is not to be held as historically cor
rect. But whfle the men of science content themselves with this fact
the natural philosopher at once rejects any and every divine in
fluence in the development of the organic world and sets up his
atheistic view instead. The progress of chemistry makes it proper to
speak of those infinitesimal, indivisible portions of matter, the atoms,
of which bodies are composed, which when united in groups form
molecules, and which are separated from one another by certain dis
tances. By the supposition of attractive and repulsive forces the
various changes which bodies can undergo are explained. This
hypothesis has much in its favor, although it leaves much wholly
unexplained. But to the natural philosopher the existence and opera
tion of these atoms, out of which according to fixed laws the world
forms and modifies itself, suffice to render unnecessary the creative
energy of God." That the facts in the cases cited by Wagner do not
support, nor even suggest, the conclusions drawn by natural philoso
phy is evident at a glance. Others have tried to do away with the
creative agency of an inteUigent being by positing a soul in each
atom, as Haeckel does. The unsatisfactory character of this monistic
doctrine has been sufficiently pointed out. We only remind the
reader here that it cannot account for the unity of our con
sciousness nor for our consciousness of personal unity, and that as
long as we feel ourselves to be personal no doctrine of God which
diffuses him through the whole universe can hold its place in our
thought. 1 Thoughts on Religion, p. 43.
» Chrlstenglaube im Bunde mit der Naturwlssenschaft, p. 2 f.

LrOD AND CREATION. 189
But the question of the relation between the theories and discoveries
of modern science and the biblical account of creation recurs.1 That
there is a conflict here is undeniable ; and the dogmatic theologian is
bound to take his choice between an attempt to disprove the findings
of science and the establishment of the historical verity of the Scrip
ture account of creation on the one side, and on the other the admis-'
sion that Genesis is not an exact statement of scientific facts. For all
efforts at harmonization have fafled, since they either deny what
science affirms or do violence to Genesis itseU.2 It is a significant fact
that few scientists of first rank who believe in creation and also in
the Bible have thought such a harmony possible. However, because
we are not dogmaticians but apologists, the alternative mentioned
does not present itself to us for decision in this connection. For in
this place we are discussing the question whether God created the
world, not how he created it. So that we need neither insist that
the Bible account of creation is correct nor affirm that it is wrong.
If anyone takes the latter position aU that can be de- Can tne teach.
manded of Christian evidences is to show that faith in the j".|s science"
revelation given in Jesus Christ is not thereby destroyed, si^berecon-
It is bad pohcy for the defender of the faith to support the ciIed?
correctness of Bible science : for our defenses fail to convince scientific
men, and react unfavorably upon their estimate of our ability to see the
truth in those matters in which they would not naturally set up their
opinions against ours. So that we have no reward for our effort, and
have made access to the hearts of scientists more difficult than ever.
Men may say as much as they please, that the unreadiness of scientists
to accept the science of the Bible results from a wicked heart of unbelief.
Scientists repel the imputation, and are alienated from Christianity
thereby. Hence, unless the science of the Bible be essential to salva
tion, we ask whether it is not wiser for those who accept it on faith
to allow those who cannot believe as they do to believe as their
judgments dictate. That is a right precious to Protestants, at least,
and we should not forbid it to others. The important point is to win
men to living faith in Jesus Christ and to activity in his service. If
the teachings of the Bible relative to science stand in anyone's way
let us not strive to hinder his attempt to destroy the barrier.
1 An excellent discussion of the contents of the first three chapters of Genesis may be
found in Professor Samuel Harris's God the Creator and Lord of All, New York, 1896,
vol. i, pp.466ff.
3 For conclusive proof of this statment see Steude, » firm believer in God as Creator,
Christenthum und Naturwlssenschaft, pp. 19 ff. Comp. also two articles by President
Morton in the Bibliotheca Sacra, 1897, pp. 264-292, and 436-468.

190 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
THE SCIENCE OF THE BIBLE.
There are several facts which suggest that the utterances of the
Bible on scientific questions, whether absolutely true or not, cannot be
Are the scien- 0]E fundamental importance. First, it is an unquestioned
ances of the fact that the Bible was not given us to teach science, but
difme0"™! to show us God's relation to man. The science of the
importance? gjDie) therefore, is of secondary importance; it is inci
dental. Again, had the inspiring Spirit regarded it as essential we
can but beUeve that the language employed would have been so un
equivocally scientific, instead of popular, that there could be no ques
tion of its inspiration. Instead of this we have a purely popular set
ting forth of the facts relative to the universe. There is nothing in
the language employed to indicate that there was in the mind of the
writer any other than the popular view. When we say that he knew
the scientific facts but put them in popular form we can only do so
because we believe in the equal inspiration of all parts of the Bible.
This brings us face to face with the question whether we must enter
tain such a belief in inspiration. This question we shaU not discuss at
length. But we recommend anyone who is in doubt to read what is said
on that subject in Dr. Henry M. Harman's Introduction to the Study
of the Holy Scriptures. ' We quote a few sentences : ' ' But it (the theory
of verbal inspiration in every part of the sacred Scriptures) is very in
convenient to the biblical interpreter, apart from its being in many
cases useless, for it compels him to reconcile every discrepancy, how
ever trifling, and to vindicate the grammatical accuracy of every
word and sentence in the sacred canon, which, in not a few instances,
is a difficult task and rarely satisfies the candid reader." The doc
trine is even more fatal in the field of Christian evidences ; for it
leads us to attempt a harmony where none is really possible, and thus
to an unconsciously dishonest interpretation of the Bible or to un
called-for denials of the truth of scientific conclusions. It is better to
give our strength to the overthrow of those positions which are really
dangerous to faith in Jesus Christ,2 and to the defense of those
1 Fourth edition, New York, 1884, chap. 1, pp. 23-28.
a Comp. Professor E. Caird's The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte, Glasgow,
1885, p. 185.

'1'he Science of the Bible. 191
Christian truths the acceptance of which leads consistent men and
women straight to his service.
A third point is that nobody now holds to the UteraUty of the Gene
sis record of creation in aU its parts. The days, with their mornings
and evenings, are universally regarded to-day as periods by those
who strive to reconcile Genesis with science. That this method of
harmonization also is a failure is clear from the fact that, however
long these day -periods may be, they represent, in the Bible, periods
in which definite portions of the creation were brought to completion,
whereas the periods known to science have no such definite contents,
but overlap each other. Our purpose here is, not to show that no rec
onciliation is possible, but to exhibit the fact that we need not insist
on the scientific accuracy of the Biblical account of creation. StiU,
we think it unwise so much as even to attempt a reconciliation be
tween Genesis and science at present. For, in the first place, such a
reconciliation implies that we have an absolutely correct interpreta
tion of the Scripture record ; ' and, second, that we have the final
word of science as to the method of creation. Had we not better wait
with our harmony until science has finished its work ? Most of our
difficulties with science have arisen from the fact that we have ad
justed our doctrine to scientific teaching, and then, when the latter
changed, we were not willing to readjust. Let us as much as pos
sible quit such adjustments until scientists can pledge us that
they have the final truth in their various departments. Until
then, strong in the faith, let us not be anxious about the harmony
or disharmony of our doctrine with the teachings of science, but
let us be anxious to learn the truth. All this desire for harmony with
science implies a relatively feeble faith in the religion we profess.
If the essential point in the scriptural account of the creation is not
its scientific utterances that point must be sought in its reUgious as
pect. This is without doubt the favorable position for
Christianity. Many of the most thoroughly orthodox of the Scrip-
theologians of the present day so fuUy beUeve this that of creati°n
they not only deny that Christianity can experience any in its reii-
harm from the admission of the nonhistorical character of
the Scripture record of creation, but strongly insist that this should be
openly and everywhere taught. Steude, one of the editors of Der Beweis
des Glaubens, a standard orthodox periodical of Germany, says : *
1 Comp. Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences, New York, 1869, vol. 1, p. 403.
2 Christenthum und Naturwissenschaft, p. 45 f. Steude is admitted by theologians of
all schools in Germany to be strictly orthodox.

192 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
"I hold it as one of the duties of apologists who are caUed to the task
of establishing peace between natural science and Christianity, and of
restoring peace to the hearts of many educated Christians of our day,
to declare over and over again, openly and emphaticaUy, that the
Biblical account of creation is not an historical but a reUgious record,
and its scientific aspects, neither in the Old nor in the New Testament,
to be looked upon as binding, or as a dogma of the evangelical Church.
And so also I hold it for the duty of the teachers of evangeUcal re
Ugion in treating the BibUcal account of creation to bring out and
emphasize only the religious truths of Gen. i and ii, and to make
known to the more mature pupils the reasons why the Bible story of
creation can be granted no historical worth or doctrinal significance
on their natural-historical side. For only when this is universaUy
done can the collisions between science and Christianity and between
the modern view of the world and Christian faith graduaUy cease."
We confess that such an utterance as this appears to us extreme-
For, even according to so radical an opponent of revelation as Haeckel,
there is very important truth in the Mosaic account of creation. He
says : 1 " Two great and fundamental ideas, common also to the non-
Haeckel's miraculous theory of development, meet us in this Mosaic
concession
as to the sci- hypothesis of creation with surprising clearness and sim-
ence of Gen- .... . , . . . . . . . _. ... , , ,
esis. plicity — the idea of separation or differentiation and the
idea of progressive development or perfecting." In view of this con
cession it is no wonder that we find Biot saying : " Either Moses had
a more profound instruction in science than that afforded by our
century or he was inspired."2 Dutoit-HaUer argues that aU the
events in the physical world which took place prior to the appear
ance of man must have been revealed if they are found in the Mosaic
record to be in accord with the discoveries of natural science.3 This
is a vaUd argument unless we are willing to admit that Moses hit on
the unquestionably scientific features of his account by accident, or
else that the science of his day approached remarkably close to that
of ours. In fact, Haeckel denies inspiration to Moses's record of crea
tion only on the ground that along with the great truths, which he ad
mits the account contains, it also records some fundamental errors.*
So, then, we cannot agree that we should teach that the account of
creation in Genesis has no historical worth. But, though the lofty
• The History of Creation, from the German of Ernst Haeckel, the translation revised
by E. Ray Lankaster. In two volumes. New York, 1876, vol. 1, p. 38.
3 Cited from his Tralte elementalre d'astronomie physique by Dutoit-HaUer, in Schop-
fung unci Entwicltelung nach Bibel und Naturwlssenschaft, p. 6.
8 SchUpfung und Entwlckelung, p. 6. * The History of Creation, vol. i, p. 39.

J. HE SCIENCE OF THE BlBLE. 193
scientific conceptions admittedly belonging to that account indicate
inspiration, yet the fact that these are not uniform and complete, but
partial in their extent, suggests that the inspiration which Moses had
for rehgious purposes aided, though it did not render him infaUible,
in the scientific conception also.
This inspiration for the purpose of a religious revelation is made
very clear when we note the differences between the Mosaic account of
creation and the cosmogonies of other ancient people. Comparing the
Hebraic and Chaldean cosmogonies Horton says that, while the resem
blances are striking and interesting, the differences are far more signifi
cant. In the Chaldean account "the gods did not create the world,
but rather the world created them. The distinctive note of Gen. i, on
the other hand, is that ' in the beginning ' there was God, and he
created the whole universe." "The further the comparison with
other rehgious systems is carried the more convincing Horton pn the
is the conclusion that the whole tenor of this first chapter of Pt h^°Mo^
of Genesis is unique. God is at the beginning. He has mogony.C°s"
no equal, no rival." " The whole creation proceeds from his will
and the word of his mouth." " This clear and firm conception of God
as the creator, and of man as the image of his creator,1 is in itseU
sufficiently wonderful, and can leave no doubt on the mind of the stu
dent of Comparative Mythology that in this point Ues the essential
revelation of this chapter. If the chapter had been composed for the
first time to-day — in the schools of Darwin or Haeckel, for example-
it would be a revelation ; it would be, not a scientific statement, but
the assertion of two consummate truths which science is not able to
discover. ... If these truths are not revealed they cannot be known,
and yet when they are revealed they become the key to all the science
of God, or theology, or to all the science of man, or anthropology." 2
The insistence on the religious character of the revelation in Genesis
relieves us of the necessity of adjusting our theology to the changes
in scientific views. Whether they remain the same or whether they
alter, we have in Genesis, which arose in the midst of surrounding
rehgious error, truth which the ages need and have never been able to
shake. " No scientific investigation of nature can cause us to weaken
in the faith in God as the Almighty Creator of heaven and earth." s If
we confine our use of Genesis to its reUgious value we cannot come
1 Notice that even in this very early revelation human attributes are not ascribed to
God, but divine likeness to man. God is not made in the image of man, but man in the
Image of God.
' Horton, Revelation and the Bible, New York, 1892, pp. 31-37.
s Riehm, Christenthum und Naturwlssenschaft, Leipzig, 1896, p. 27.

194 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
into conflict with science, and we use it as it must have been originaUy
designed, namely, as a revelation of religious truth. Should it be said
in reply that the teachings of science are in danger of overturning
faith in this religious truth, we answer that such a fear is groundless.
This is evident, first, from the fact that these religious truths are en
tirely out of the reach of science ; and, second, from experience of the
past relations of science and theology. We have mentioned the fear
which Christians felt of the Copernican theory, now universaUy held
by Christians without the slightest detriment to their faith. It is not
generally known, though it is a fact, that Newton's laws of gravita
tion were also feared and opposed as unsettling to faith. Even Leib
nitz regarded the doctrine of gravitation as destructive of revealed re
ligion.1 These, with numbers of similar experiences, ought to teach
us that religion is not bound up with any method of creation which
men have gathered from the Bible or read into the Bible, nor with any
question of natural science, but stands on a foundation of its own;
and that it is in no danger of being banished from the world.
Such considerations as those which have been presented must, if
allowed their due weight, lead the Christian apologist to leave each
individual to his own belief in matters of science, and to spend his
strength in showing that none of the really established scientific
hypotheses can destroy the effect of the argument for Christian be
lief. But in making this concession the true limits of science must be
ever kept in mind ; for much is set forth for scientific fact which in
Necessity of reality is nothing but assumption ; and much also is caUed
observing .
the true lim- science which really belongs m the realm of phflosophy.
ence. ' And, while no established fact can undermine faith in
Jesus Christ as the Son of God and Saviour of the world, there
are many speculations both in science and philosophy which, if con
sistently held, must make such faith impossible. But it needs to
be remembered that even if the evolutionary idea of creation came to
prevail in the minds of men it would not of necessity destroy faith in
Christ ; for many of the truest Christians of the last thirty years have
been firm believers in the evolutionary theories ; and their numbers
are increasing. This is true even of the evolutionary theory of the
origin of man,2 the arguments for which, though not compulsory,
are yet so strong that few thoughtful and weU-inf ormed men of to-day
can be found who will venture to assert that it is false. And when we
1 Comp. Darwin's Origin of Species, p. 422, and White's History of the Warfare of Science
with Theology, vol. I, p. 15 f.
a Comp. Tayler Lewis's The Six Days of Creation. KoboD«'ctadv. 1855. p. 246 f.

AMIS SCIENCE OF THE BlBLE. 195
look afresh into the Biblical record of creation we find that God formed
man out of the dust of the ground, but the steps of the process are no
where described. In the days when science accepted the idea of the
immediate creation of species by a divine fiat theologians read that
notion into the words of Genesis. Now that science has changed its
mind is it necessary for us to defend the old science which is not in
the Bible at all ?
It may be said that it is unworthy of man to believe that he was de
veloped from the lower orders of animal life through a being which
was partly ape and partly man. We answer that if God did it in that
way it is not an unworthy way of doing it. The real question, in other
words, is not one of the dignity of the method, which it is The evolution-
difficult for man to settle, but one of fact. We certainly of creation
have no wish to persuade anyone that man was developed thy.
in the manner supposed by evolutionists ; but we also do not wish any
one who is convinced of it already to feel that he must therefore reject
Jesus Christ. No one who reads Gen. i can fail to note that from
the grass, herbs, and fruit trees, through the water animals, fowls of
the air, and beasts of the earth, to man, there is an ascending scale.
And it is also clear that as God formed man out of the dust (that is,
the elements) of the earth, or soil, so he is represented as forming the
beasts of the field out of the same.1 The material employed was the
same as that which goes to constitute our earth ; and it was the same,
according to Genesis, both in man and beast. This science finds to be
a fact of observation, and so far the story of Genesis and the discov
eries of science agree. When the Bible gives us no word as to the
method employed, and science thinks the method was by evolution,
why should we try to make it appear that science is wrong ? Genesis
does not, as Willkomm asserts,2 teach that all the animals and plants
of our earth were created by the word of God complete, as PaUas
Athene sprang ready accoutered from the head of Zeus. The language
of Genesis is, "And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, . . .
Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath
life, . . . Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind,
cattle, creeping thing, and beast of the earth." However nearly or
remotely this may correspond to the scientific conception of the proc
ess of creation, it certainly is just as possible to think of it from the
standpoint of evolution as of sudden creation ; for no description is
given us of the method. The language simply ascribes creation to God
without telling us anything of his mode of procedure. Why should
1 Gen. ii, 19. 2 Ueber die Grenzen des Pflanzen-und Thierreiches, p. 24.

196 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
theologians read into Genesis a method of creation contrary to that
assumed by science ? At the behest of science we once read the sud
den creation theory into the Scripture record ; now that science has
changed we need not read the new theory in ; but we also need not de
clare that science and Genesis conflict.1 The conflict is not between
science and Genesis on the question of evolution, but between science
as it was and science as it is.
The evolutionary method may not be demonstrated, but it must
not be overlooked that no other method is demonstrated. Whether
by immediate creation or by evolution, man's body is formed of the
physical elements of our earth. Then, too, it is a question whether
we are consistent in thinking slightingly of any being God has made.
No one denies the superiority of man's physical organism, however
many points of resemblance may be found between it and the organ
isms in lower animal life. These resemblances are facts no less than
the differences. Need we find fault with our Creator, or jealously
contemn his other creatures, because the differences of bodily organ
ism between them and us are not greater ?
But if the writer of Gen. ii tells us that man and beast have the
same physical origin he also notes a difference which science does not
Distinction Pretend to deny. To the statement that the Lord God
mVn" and t°rmed man of the dust of the ground he adds that he
no6tedSin the " breathed into his nostrils the breath of life."2 How-
Bible. ever we may interpret these words they note a some
what which God gave to man which it is not said he gave to the ani
mals. The whole account in Gen. i and U shows that the author
or editor thought God had given man the place of dignity. Of man
only is it said that God created him in his own image. And that
image is not physical, for God is a spirit. Man is not, then, robbed of
his divine image by being regarded as physically the lineal descend
ant of lower forms of animal life. Nor can the breathing into man's
nostrils the breath of life be taken literaUy. For in that case we
should have to think of God as having physical breathing apparatus
similar to ours, and the breath of life would mean the ordinary breath
necessary to life. But this the lower animals have also. Hence the
words " breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man became
a living soul," cannot imply that prior to that he was dead matter, nor
a living, though not breathing, organism. It must mean that he, like
the beasts of the field which God also formed of the dust of the
j?round, was alive and breathing, but that God gave him an addi-
1 Lewis, The Six Days of Creation, chaps. 16 and 24. " Gen. 11, 7.

J. HE SCIENCE OF THE BlBLE. 197
tional something. The words probably signify the same as making
man in his (God's) image. AU this indicates that there is not so much
difference between the accounts of man's creation, as given in Genesis
and by scientists, as has been sometimes supposed. And it suggests
that we should at least not try to make those differences greater than
they are. In a general way the Bible doctrine of the origin of man
does not differ from that held by evolutionary science. The fact for
us to hold fast is that God created man, by whatever method, and
that he created him in his own image.1
1 A. Berthoud, a strict conservative of Geneva, asserts the purely religious purpose of
the Bible. Apologie du Christianisme, Lausanne, 1898, p. 275 f.
15

198 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER III.
NECESSITY OF MIRACLE TO RELIGION.
Providence, in the Christian sense of the word, involves the con
stant divine superintendence of man and the at least occasional inter
vention of God in man's behalf. The doctrine also includes answer to
prayer. The classic expression of the doctrine of providence is con
tained in the words of Jesus: "Are not two sparrows sold for a
farthing ? and one of them shall not faU on the ground without your
Father. But the very hairs of your head are aU numbered. Fear ye
not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows." 1 Of the
many utterances of Jesus relative to answer to prayer we quote but
one : " Ask, and it shaU be given you ; seek, and ye shaU find ; knock,
and it shall be opened unto you. ... If ye then, being evil, know
how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your
Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him ? " 2
The assault of science, however, is not directed so much against provi
dence and answer to prayer as against miracle ; for scientists rightly
feel that if miracle is admitted providence and answer to prayer
The assault follow. Hence many scientists, some of them professed
directed Christians, demand that faith in miracles shaU cease.
acie. Buchner, in the name of materiaUsm, describes the true
order of the world as one which rests on the necessary and perpet
ual operation of natural causes, excluding aU voUtion (or caprice —
Willkur) and acts of violence in the phenomena of nature.3 And
Strecker* rejects every explanation which admits chance or voU
tion (caprice) in the formation of the world and which does not
insist on the exclusive action of physical causation. EKeld says : '
"The unfortunate antagonism between the reUgious and the scientific
standpoint . . . will continue as long as theology . . . insists on the
faith in miracles." Says Haeckel : "Not to that theology does the fu
ture belong which conducts a fruitless warfare against . . . evolution
but to that which masters, recognizes, and employs it." e
1 Matt, x, 29-31. » Matt, vii, 7, 11.
8 Einf aiming to Strecker's Welt und Menschheit, p. viii. 4 Ibid., p. 27.
8 Die Religion und der Darwinismus, Leipzig, 1882, p. 3.
•Die heutlge Entwlckelungslehre im Verhttltnlss zur Gesammtwissenschaft, Stutt
gart, 1877, p. 19 f .

Necessity of Miracle to Keligion. 199
These references may suffice to reveal the fact that what science
demands of Christianity in order to the restoration of peace is the
yielding of the faith in the miraculous. In view of this some theo
logians have ceased to emphasize the miraculous in the Christian
religion, and have practically come to agree with Elfeld's implication
in saying that "the world-order is the greatest and most imposing of
all wonders."1 This is evident in such expressions as that of Her
mann Schultz, that life is, in its final analysis, a riddle and a wonder
(or miracle— Wunder).2 Still more clearly does this tendency appear
in Lipsius.3 " That many events and phenomena in the world cannot
be sufficiently explained by laws valid for a definite circle of phe
nomena does not prove that these laws are suspended by a ' higher
order' of procedure." "Everything which, from the teleological
standpoint, offers itseU as a proof of divine guidance and provi
dence is a miracle in the reUgious sense, and as such, indeed, never
empirically cognizable."
It would be fortunate in some respects if we could accept this idea
of a miracle which has a significance for religion but which natural
science cannot deny because it cannot discover it. But
this is not the Christian doctrine of miracles, as the tages con-
, ., , nected with
miracles attributed to Jesus and the apostles plainly giving up be-
lief in nnrac-
show. Besides, whfle we should gain, in that the dis- uious inter
ventions.
pute with scientists on the subject would cease, there
would be several disadvantages connected with this modified view.
For let us suppose that we could get on if we gave up the miracles
of the New Testament, and admitted that miracles are not necessary
to attest a divine revelatory authority, stiU Christian faith cannot get
on without belief in miraculous interventions. This is not because
we can see no evidence of God's connection with the world except in
some unusual events ; for his handiwork is apparent every- where.
But we need belief in present-day interventions for at least two very
important reasons. First, any doctrine of providence which makes us
a part of a chain of cause and effect from which we cannot be extri
cated, and from the sins and sorrows of which God cannot redeem us by
his intervention, leads to aU the consequences of fatalism. First disad-
It represents God as having made the world so that we are van age'
sinners by no fault of our own and yet as having given us consciences
to torment us for our sins. This is an injustice which must caU forth
'Die Religion und der Darwinismus, p. 2.
2 Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik, Gattingen, 1894, p. 29.
3Lehrbuch der Evangelisch-Protestantischen Dogmatik, Dritte bedeutend umgear-
beitete Auflage, Braunschweig, 1893, pp. 324 ff.

200 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
the resentment of aU who do not fear his further wrath. It would be
impossible to love such a God. The same remarks would apply to our
sorrows. Should it be repUed that we are in just as bad case with a God who
can help but wfll not, we answer that in aU cases of sin God does help,
and that if all ceased from sin there would be very Uttle sorrow, and
the sorrow which remained would wear a new and less oppressive as
pect. Further, that while God does not, in some instances, release us
from sorrow, he does in others, and a moment's reflection wfll show any
thoughtful person that if he is a father he may want us to bear some
trials in order to bring out our greatest perfection of character. So
that whfle we may sometimes murmur because we are caUed upon to
pass through sorrow we may be sustained, under the Christian doc
trine, by the sense of the combined wisdom and love of God, who
knows what is best and loves us so much that he wfll not aflow any
thing to effect our real harm which we do not, by our own fault, bring
upon ourselves. Such a God we can love ; and a God so related to us
we must love, unless our hearts are ingrate. On the other hand, let it
be known that God has so made us and the world that he cannot help
us and we cannot help ourselves, and we will not only be unable to love
him but it would benumb all our better feelings and lead to inaction.
Why strive, if with aU our striving we accomplish nothing ? If we
are, through and through, automata, there is no ideal Ufe for us.
What the whole mechanism provides for that part of itself which we
are, we shaU become ; no more, no less. Thus we lose the sense of di
vine companionship and the incentive to high endeavor. Any doc
trine of providence, then, which is not to crush within us the most
precious possession of life must aUow for interventions whenever God
will. Second, any doctrine which makes answer to prayer impossible will
sooner or later sflence prayer. That the privilege of prayer has been
Second disad- misunderstood, and employed in the hope of securing aU
vantage. manner of benefits which men ought to secure with
out special interventions, is true. But this does not invaUdate the
proper use of prayer nor the certainty of its answer. And while it
is a fact that the older and the wiser we grow the less extensive is the
range of those things in which we expect a divine intervention, yet is
it also a fact that graduaUy we come to the assurance that God does
answer, by direct agency, some of our petitions for earthly as well as
for spiritual good. And those who think that God cares for our souls,
but not for our bodies, forget that God created us with bodily as weU

1NECES8ITY OF MIRACLE TO KeLIGION. 201
as spiritual needs, and consequently that his providence must extend
over the one as over the other. For the sake of true reUgion, there
fore, we need answer to prayer. But if God cannot answer we must
cease to pray ; for under such circumstances prayer would be mockery
and self-delusion.
This is true even of the so-caUed reflex influence of prayer, the value
of which can scarcely be estimated. If it were beUeved that it is the
only value which prayer has we should no longer pray. We secure
the reflex influence of prayer only when the possibflity that God can
intervene is left open. Without behef in providence and answer to
prayer in the Christian sense there might be some kind of reUgion, but
there could be no Christian reUgion. Hence Christianity feels that
here is the very heart of the conflict between itseU and that science
which is antichristian. We must therefore with aU care examine the
affirmations of those scientists who deny the miraculous in the world's
history. In substance they make three points : A There is no need
of miracles. B. Miracles make science impossible. C. Miracles are
impossible.

202 Foundations of the Christian .paith.

CHAPTER IV.
THE INADEQUACY OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY.
The scientists referred to claim that the mechanical theory of the
world is sufficient for the explanation of all phenomena, and that
hence the intervention of a spiritual being is uncaUed for. In discuss
ing materialism and pantheism or monism we saw the inadequacy of
the mechanical theory so far as psychology and theology were con
cerned. But there are also many facts, which Ue directly within the
realm of science, which the mechanical theory whoUy fails to account
for. It is generally agreed that, while the immediate causes of proc
esses in the bodies of living plants and animals, when we can see
them at all, are the same as those which we find operative everywhere,
it is by no means possible to point out the bond that unites the quah
ties of matter known to us and all the phenomena of life, as, for ex
ample, growth and heredity.1 Now, one such confession shows as
Mechanical we^ as one hundred that the mechanical theory is not
e'tfua t eato sufficient for the explanation of phenomena known to sci-
tfon6 o^phi^ ence. And whfle such a fact does not prove the necessity
known" of the intervention of a spiritual being it certainly does
science. strongly suggest it ; for to the human mind the power of
wfll to help out the forces of physical nature is known. That without
such help it is impossible to explain the phenomena of man's nature is
argued by A. R. Wallace in his section on the Limits of Natural Selec
tion as Applied to Man.2 It is true that he seems to think that the
superior inteUigence which guided in the development of man is not
the " one Supreme Intelligence," whose will or power gave origin to
the universal laws and forces of nature, but some being or beings in
termediate between God and man. But still he holds that natural
selection is not sufficient for certain facts which he sums up as follows :
"Briefly to resume my argument, I have shown that the brain of
the lowest savages, and, as far as we yet know, of the prehistoric
races, is little inferior in size to that of the highest types of man,
and immensely superior to that of the higher animals ; while it is uni-
1 Comp. Strecker's Welt und Menschheit, p. 130. For a full discussion of the diffl-
. enltles in the way of the mechanical theory, see Steude's Christenthum und Naturwis-
iSenschaft, pp. 134 ff.
' Natural Selection and Tropical Nature, pp. 186-214.

The Inadequacy of the Mechanical Theory. 203
versaUy admitted that quantity of brain is one of the most important,
and probably the most essential, of the elements which determine
mental power. Yet the mental requirements of savages, Summary o£
and the faculties actuaUy exercised by them, are very mVnf'Vy
little above those of animals. The higher feelings of pure Wallace.
morality and refined emotion, and the powers of abstract reasoning
and ideal conception, are useless to them, are rarely if ever manifested,
and have no important relations to their habits, wants, desires, or
well-being. They possess a mental organ beyond their needs. Nat
ural selection could only have endowed savage man with a brain a
few degrees superior to that of an ape, whereas he actually possesses
one very little inferior to that of a philosopher.
"The soft, naked, sensitive skin of man, entirely free from that
hairy covering which is so universal among other mammalia, cannot
be explained on the theory of natural selection. The habits of savages
show that they feel the want of this covering, which is most com
pletely absent in man exactly where it is thickest in other animals.
We have no reason whatever to beUeve that it would have been hurt
ful, or even useless, to primitive man ; and, under these circumstances,
its complete abolition, shown by its never reverting in mixed breeds,
is a demonstration of the agency of some other power than the law of
the survival of the fittest in the development of man from the lower
animals. " Other characters show difficulties of a similar kind, though not,
perhaps, in an equal degree. The structure of the human foot and
hand seem unnecessarily perfect for the needs of savage man, in whom
they are as completely and as humanly developed as in the highest
races. The structure of the human larynx, giving the power of
speech and of producing musical sounds, and especially its extreme
development in the female sex, are shown to be beyond the needs of
savages, and, from their known habits, impossible to have been ac
quired either by sexual selection or by survival of the fittest.
"The mind of man offers arguments in the same direction hardly
less strong than those derived from his bodily structure. A number
of his mental faculties have no relation to his fellow-men or to his ma
terial progress. The power of conceiving eternity and infinity, and
aU those purely abstract notions of form, number, and harmony which
play so large a part in the life of civilized races, are entirely outside
of the world of thought of the savage, and have no influence on his
individual existence or on that of his tribe. They could not there
fore, have been developed by any preservation of useful forms of

204 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
thought, yet we find occasional traces of them amidst a low civiliza
tion, and at a time when they could have had no practical effect on
the success of the individual, the family, or the race; and the de
velopment of a moral sense or conscience by similar means is equaUy
inconceivable. " But, on the other hand, we find that every one of these character
istics is necessary for the fuU development of human nature. The
rapid progress of civilization under favorable conditions would not be
possible were not the organ of the mind of man prepared in advance,
fully developed as regards size, structure, and proportions, and only
needing a few generations of use and habit to coordinate its complex
functions. The naked and sensitive skin, by necessitating clothing
and houses, would lead to the more rapid development of man's in
ventive and constructive faculties, and, by leading to a more refined
feeling of personal modesty, may have influenced to a considerable
extent his moral nature. The erect form of man, by freeing the
hands from aU locomotive uses, has been necessary for his inteUectual
advancement, and the extreme perfection of his hands has alone ren
dered possible that exceUence in the arts of civilization which raises
him so far above the savage, and is perhaps but the forerunner of a
higher intellectual advancement. The perfection of his vocal organs
has first led to the formation of articulate speech and then to the de
velopment of those exquisitely toned sounds which are only appre
ciated by the higher races, and which are probably destined for more
elevated uses and more refined enjoyment in a higher condition than
we have yet attained to. So those faculties which enable us to tran
scend time and space and to realize the wonderful conceptions of math
ematics and philosophy, or which give us an intense yearning for
abstract truth (all of which were occasionaUy manifested at such an
early period of human history as to be far in advance of any of the
few practical appUcations which have since grown out of them), are
evidently essential to the perfect development of man as a spiritual
being, but are utterly inconceivable as having been produced through
the action of a law which looks only, and can look only, to the imme
diate material welfare of the individual or the race.
"The inference I would draw from this class of phenomena is that a
superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite
direction and for a special purpose, just as man guides the develop
ment of many animal and vegetable forms. The laws of evolution
alone would, perhaps, never have produced a grain so weU adapted to
man's use as wheat and maize, such fruits as the seedless banana and

The Inadequacy of the Mechanical Theory. 205
breadfruit, or such animals as the Guernsey milch cow or the Lon
don dray horse. Yet these so closely resemble the unaided produc
tions of nature that we may well imagine a being who had mastered
the laws of development of organic forms through past ages refusing
to beUeve that any new power had been concerned in their production,
and scornfully rejecting the theory (as my theory will be rejected by
many who agree with me on other points) that in these few cases a
controlling inteUigence had directed the action of the laws of variation,
multiplication, and survival, for his own purposes. We know, how
ever, that this has been done, and we must therefore admit the pos
sibility that, if we are not the highest intelligences in the universe,
some higher intelUgence may have directed the process by which the
human race was developed, by means of more subtle agencies than we
are acquainted with. At the same time I must confess that this theory
has the disadvantage of requiring the interference of some distinct in
dividual intelUgence to aid in the production of what we can hardly
avoid considering as the ultimate aim and outcome of all organized
existence — inteUectual, ever-advancing, spiritual man. It therefore
implies that the great laws which govern the material universe were
insufficient for his production, unless we consider (as we may fairly
do) that the controlling action of such higher inteUigences is a
necessary part of those laws, just as the action of all surrounding or
ganisms is one of the agencies in organic development. But even if
my particular view should not be the true one the difficulties I have
put forward remain, and, I think, prove that some more general and
fundamental law underhes that of natural selection."

206 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER V.
BREAKS IN THE PROGRESS OF MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT.
Such an argument as that just quoted from WaUace is in pleasing
contrast, in respect both of frankness and abflity, with the statement
of Haeckel that the superiority of man to the animals is founded
solely in the fortunate combination of the higher development of the
larynx, of the brain, and of the extremities; and in his erect posture.1
Wallace regards these also as important to man, but he is not deceived
by this fact, nor would he aUow others to be deceived into thinking
that the cause of these advantages is thereby explained. Everybody
knows that the advantages mentioned are so great as to practicaUy
elevate man from the animal into a higher order of being. The ques
tion, however, still remains, How did man come by these advantages ?
Wallace has shown that by the law of selection, natural or sexual,
these peculiarities of man find no explanation. That law worked up
to a certain point, then came intervention ; when the intervening in
teUigence, working by means unknown to us, had accomplished the
differentiation of man from the lower animals, or from the animal
next below him, then the law of natural selection began to apply
again ; or at least we can see how by its appUcation man might de
velop indefinitely. As Schurman says : 2 " Assuming, therefore, Dar
winism to be true, I trust I may be permitted to observe that the
President 0I"igm 0I species remains almost as much a mystery as
the "survival ever- ¦ • • Organisms differentiating themselves continu-
of the fittest. ous]y along particular lines for indefinite periods of time
must, under the law of the survival of the fittest, infallibly give rise
to new species. But pray observe that the survival of the fittest does
not account for the arrival of the fittest. That self -evolving organism,
on which the entire issue is dependent, is a miracle which no naturalist
has as yet transmuted into science. . . . The question then arises by
what agency those variations are originated, shaped, and continued so
that they are capable of producing those specific forms which, under
the sifting of natural selection, actually emerge. Darwin himself was
not insensible to the heavy weight of this unexplained mystery. In a
letter" to Huxley, written November 25, 1859, he expressed his per-
1 Generelle Morphologle, 1866, vol. U, p. 430. « Agnosticism and Religion, p. 17 f.

Breaks in the Progress of Material Development. 207
plexity concisely and aptly, though somewhat profanely, in the fol
lowing query : ' What the devil determines each particular variation ?
What makes a tuft of feathers come on a cock's head, or moss on a
moss rose ? ' "
It is impossible for anyone to be insensible to the simplicity and
beauty of the principle of a gradual differentiation of form and func
tion and an equaUy gradual progress from homogeneity toward com
plexity, and thus from the lower to the higher, assumed by science.
We can understand that, once this theory has taken possession of the
imagination, it is regarded as a rude disturbance of a dehghtful men
tal state to suppose that anything can interrupt the steady on-going,
even though that something be the power of God. And it is natural
that scientists upon whom this idea has seized should prefer to think
of God as having made the world capable of this infinite and steady
progress. The difficulty is that the theory is demonstrably not in ac
cord with the fact. In order to make the theory fit the facts it be
comes necessary to ignore some facts and to invent others. For ex
ample, Mr. Wallace, in an argument for Creation by Law, says : 1 " Now,
this great mass of facts, of which a mere sketch has here been given,
are fully accounted for by the ' Law of Variation ' as laid down at the
commencement of this paper. Universal variabihty — smaU in amount,
but in every direction, ever fluctuating about a mean condition until
made to advance in a given direction by selection, natural or artificial —
is the simple basis for the indefinite modification of the forms of hfe."
Here Wallace overlooks the all-important fact that the variations
employed by selection to give a definite direction to the forms of life
are not accounted for. Well might Darwin ask what determines the
particular variation. What WaUace caUs the simple Evolutionists
basis for the indefinite modification of the forms of life is f|°orl'nvent
just this tremendous fact of unaccountable variation, ac s"
which seems subject to no law but the law of chance. Not only is the
fact ignored ; it is first minified. Take away variability and intro
duce the reign of universal law, and things would wear a different as
pect in this world. So also other alleged facts have to be invented.
For example, Haeckel claims that the species of ape to which man is
traceable lived in the middle Tertiary period, and disappeared long
ago. Out of this species was evolved the man-ape, or anthropoid, and
out of them the ape-man, or the speechless man, the progenitor of true
or speaking man.2 These two missing links, together with the species
' Natural Selection and Tropical Nature, p. 158.
* Elfeld, Die Religion und der Darwinismus, p. 89.

208 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
of apes out of which they were evolved, are supposed to have existed
on a hypothetical continent between Madagascar and the Island of
Sunda. This continent, to which Haeckel has even given a name,
Lemuria, sank into the sea and carried with it aU these supposed men-
apes and ape-men, so that we need hope for no discovery of them
until the sea 3hall give up her dead, when progenitor and progeny
shall have the joy of a happy reunion.
Now, personally, we have not the slightest objection to being de
veloped from or through apes, since it is universaUy agreed that we
are not now apes, but men. But we do object to having speculations
palmed off upon us as facts. Why should the fact that the missing
links have not been discovered be ignored to such an extent as to
make possible the invention of supposed facts to take the place of
missing real ones ? Why substitute guesses for realities ? It is simply
done in order that the beautiful imagination of an uninterrupted prog
ress through the smallest possible variations, extended over an un
limited period of time, may make unnecessary the reasonable hy
pothesis of divine guidance and interest in the world. When we
wake up to the real facts we are forced to believe that God never
ceased his work upon creation, and that he is engaged upon it still.
We agree with WaUace, that "a superior inteUigence has guided the
development of man in a definite direction, and for a special purpose ; "
which we interpret by the words : " So God created man in his own
image, in the image of God created he him ; male and female created
he them."
No better iUustration of a break in the continuity of progress in
nature can be found than the phenomenon of Ufe, the attempt to ex
plain which has called forth such strenuous efforts among scientists.
Nor have these efforts been altogether unrewarded. They have ehc
ited many most interesting facts concerning the nature of Ufe ; and
Life a break in have by so much tended to minimize its mystery. And
ity* of°devei- ** *s w^tn no sense of triumph over the defeat of a rival
opment. theory that we caU attention to the fact that, not
withstanding all that has been discovered concerning life, the
secret of its origin is stfll wrapped in impenetrable mystery. But,
since scientists sometimes speak with such unbounded contempt
of those who insist that there are breaks in nature, it may not be
amiss to cite a few utterances from those who have a recognized
high standing in the scientific world to show that theologians are not
alone in claiming that a creator is needed to account for the phe
nomena of life.

Breaks in the Progress of Material Development. 209
Says Johannes Hanstein,1 speaking of the effort to discover the
origin of life: "If the goal can ever be reached by human power it
now lies heavily veiled in the incalculable distance." Count Saporta
says : " " Instead of attempting, with certain natural philosophers, to
find in the operation of purely mechanical forces the key to the secret,
we rather confess our complete ignorance as to the origin of organic
life." Lorenz Fischer goes stfll further : 3 "If organic life is the result
of a special law of nature it can have its ground in the last analysis
only in the absolute, the original source of aU finite, conditioned exist
ence, as of all natural laws ; for no finite being can give to a thing
what it did not from the beginning possess. This conclusion may be
caUed mysticism, or God knows what else, but it does not change the
facts, and no one can with right dispute the logical sequence from
which it proceeds. Without the supposition of an absolute, creative
being the final cause of life cannot be explained. . . . This postulate
is demanded by logical thought and is contradicted by no fact of obser
vation or natural science. " These citations are from Wfllkomm's work,
already referred to, as we have not access to the originals. Wfllkomm
himself says:4 "Every investigator who is not blinded by human
pride must reach the conviction that life is of divine origin." And he
declares that to deny his conviction of divine intervention, reached
entirely apart from revelation, would be cowardly and unworthy of a
man. Du Bois-Reymond admits " that the introduction of life may
have been the result of a supernatural act, though he emphatically
declares that it might result from a supernaturally imparted motion,
and that but one such act could in any event be needed.
Such men and such confessions are not to be laughed down, espe
ciaUy when it is universally admitted that the origin of life is not ex
plained. 6 Life is in itseU so great a variation from the ordinary course
of events that we must regard it as a break in the continuity of the
world order. The simplest form of life has the powers of assimilation
of food, growth, and reproduction : and though life may be defined as
the result of matter in motion under certain definite conditions, yet is
this power not explained. For the question arises, How did these
definite conditions come to exist ? If they arose in the natural course
1 Das Protoplasma als TrKger der pflanzliehen und thierischen Lebensvorrichten, 2.
Auflage, Heidelberg, 1887, p. 312.
3 Die Pflanzenwelt vor dem Erscheinen des Menschen. Aus dem Franzosischen fiber-
setzt von C. Vogt, Braunschweig, 1881.
3 Ueber das Prinzip der Organization und die Pflanzenseele, Mayence, 1883.
* Ueber die Grenzen des Pflanzen-und Thierrelches, p. 31. 6 Vortrage, p. 88.
8 Herbert Spencer has recently said that " in its ultimate nature Life is incomprehensi-
ble."-Nature, Oct. 20, 1898, p. 593.

210 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
of progress how is it that not aU matter is Uving and possessed of the
power to maintain and propagate life ? If the supposed definite con
ditions were afforded at a distinct period in the cooling of our earth
then all the matter on the earth's surface ought to be alive. Then our
problem would be to account for dead matter. If it be said that but a
portion of the material of the earth was in condition at any given
period, still we must suppose other portions to have reached those con
ditions later. If they did not, why did they not 1 Turn it whichever
way we will, life is a variation from other phenomena so great as to
demand a guiding intelligence which afforded the conditions of the
variation at the proper time and place. l
It might be legitimate to show that consciousness is a still greater
break of continuity ; but we think few readers wfll be inclined to
question this fact, so we forbear.
These considerations wfll suffice to show that there is need for some
thing besides the forces of nature, and that it is exceedingly probable
that that something must be an intelUgent being. If there be any
being capable of intervening God surely is capable ; for we can scarcely
think of God as trusting so important a piece of his creation to any sub
ordinate. Wallace's argument that the " grand law of continuity, the
last outcome of modern science, which seems absolute throughout the
realms of matter, force, and mind, so far as we can explore them, can
not surely fail to be true beyond the narrow sphere of our vision, and
leave an infinite chasm between man and the Great Mind of the uni
verse,"2 is a good scientific argument in favor of the existence of
what Christianity has maintained, namely, that there are "angels
and archangels, spirits, and demons," but it does not lend any proba
bility to the doctrine that these beings, intermediate between man and
God, were the ones who ' ' guided the development of man in a definite
direction, and for a special purpose."
Why should Wallace attribute that guidance to them rather than
to him ? Who guided their development ? Presumably each higher
guided the development of the one just below. At last we shall
come in that way to one whose development was guided by God him
self. Was it the purpose of God that the one next below him should
1 Comp. H. W. Conn's The Living World, New York and London, 1891, pp. 46-51. Profes
sor F. R. Japp, of Aberdeen, said at the session of the British Association for the Advance
ment of Science held at Bristol, England, In September, 1898, " I see no escape from the
conclusion that, at the moment when life first arose, a directive force came into play-a
force of precisely the same character as that whieh enables the Intelligent operator, by
the exercise of his will, to select one crystallized enantiomorph and reject its asymmetric
opposite. "-Nature, September 8, 1898, p. 459, col. 1.
2 Natural Selection and Tropical Nature, p. 205, u.

Breaks in the Progress of Material Development. 211
guide in the development of the being or order next lower, and so on
down to the lowest ? If it were his purpose then why not attribute
the work to him ? Is it beneath his dignity ? Surely it w „ , , „ „ „ , „
W di 1 1 a O c o
is not less dignified to work than to plan work, except on {fte^ture oi
the presuppositions and distinctions of mortals. And if * £nece ™5f^
God designed man and gave this supposed intelhgence, aevilorjment
intermediate between God and man, power and authority exammed.
to guide in his development, we still have divine interference, though
intermediate rather than immediate. If God designed man we may
as well add to that concession the truth revealed in Genesis which
says that God made man (whether immediately or intermediately) in
his own image. So that any clear understanding of WaUace's theory
leads directly to divine interference in the affairs of the world as well
as to denial of the sufficiency of the world mechanism. If, with our
limited knowledge of the facts of nature, we can find so many things
inexplicable on mechanical principles, and if the world grows more
mysterious the more profoundly we strive to penetrate into its secrets,
how can anyone deny that divine interference is necessary ? Nor are
we driven by this thought to the conclusion that God must interfere
because he could not make a machine capable of doing his will ; but
rather are we led to feel that God would not exclude himself from his
world, since man was to need his presence for purposes of communion,
dependence, and the like.

212 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VI.
SCIENCE AND THE MIRACLES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.
We turn to the assertion that miraculous interventions make science
impossible. Says Elf eld : • "In fact, we could hardly speak of science
if, instead of law, volition of a kind which cannot be prognosticated
ruled ; if in the restless change of phenomena nothing fixed and abid
ing existed to which the human mind could hold. Not fleeting phe
nomena, but the laws which lie at their base form the object of
scientific research. Were we to suppose that these laws were subject
to change, or even to exceptions, we should thereby remove the foun
dation from under the feet of science." This utterance fairly repre
sents the general opinion of a certain class of scientists. The first
thing to be said about it is that if the supposition of the intervention
of a superior being in the phenomena of the universe makes science
impossible, the denial of such a possibility makes reUgion impossible.
The question would then arise, Which shah give way? The only
proper answer to this question must result from a discussion of both
science and religion on their merits. After such a discussion were
ended opinion would remain divided, just as it is to-day. Another
point to which attention needs to be caUed is that the interventions
supposed by Christianity are not of the capricious kind indicated in
Elfeld's language. But especiaUy is it necessary to state that the
miracles of Christianity do not make science impossible, for the reason
that they are not, as is often assumed, contrary to natural law, though
they are variations from its ordinary operations. They do not require
us to deny the exactness and uniformity of the operation of any force
in the physical world, though they do require that these forces be
manipulated by a Being who understands them far better than do we.
In order that these assertions may be confirmed it wfll be necessary
to examine the idea of miracle which the Scripture writers had. How
did they conceive of miracle in its relation to natural law ? We shall
The New Tes- confine ourselves to the New Testament, since its idea of
tament Idea .
of a miracle, miracle is the same as that of the Old. And one of the
first things to be noticed is that in the New Testament the idea of
miracle applies only to events in the physical world. For example,
1 Die Religion und der Darwlnlsmus, p. 1 f.

Science and the Miracles of the New Testament. 213
the conversion of a soul is nowhere classed as a miracle. In other
words, not all divine interventions in human affairs are thought of by
the Scripture writers as miracles. Again, it is certain that these
writers did not think of miracles as merely natural, though surprising
events, adapted to excite astonishment because of their extraordinary
character ; they did not think of these miracles as mere tricks or as
results brought about by the superior knowledge possessed by Jesus
as to methods of doing things. There was a dignity in the deeds he
performed which forbids the former supposition, and the latter is
ruled out by the fact that his miracles were the expression of love,
power, and authority rather than of knowledge, though knowledge
was necessary to them. Furthermore, these miracles were regarded
as contrary to the ordinary course of events. Had the forces of
nature acted in their usual way the sick would not suddenly have be
come well, the blind able to see, the deaf to hear, the paralytic to rise
up and walk.
Again, these miracles were not regarded as the result (at least not
in aU cases) of the power of one mind over another mind, and thus
mediately over another's body. The healings at a distance, as of the
servant of the centurion of Capernaum, and such miracles as the
stilling of the storm and the cursing of the barren fig tree, in which
instances the subject of the miraculous energy had no mind through
which to work, clearly show this. Rather are these last-mentioned
instances certain evidence that the New Testament writers attributed
to Jesus a direct power over the forces of nature. " What manner of
man is this, that even the winds and the sea obey him! " was the nat
ural expression of their thought. The essence of their conception of
miracle in relation to natural law may be summed up by saying that
it exhibited a power or an authority to perform deeds which would
not have occurred in the ordinary course of nature, but which that
course would have prevented.
In this sense of the word miracles are interruptions, or even viola
tions, of the laws of nature. But this is not the significance attached
to the term "law of nature" when objection is made to Do tne New
its interruption or violation. Scientists know that the writers re-
ordinary course of nature is not the universal course, f^ asmvk>
The ordinary course of nature gives every human t£e '^ws of
being a certain number of organs in a reasonably pro- nature?
portionate state of development ; but sometimes nature produces a
monstrosity. Scientists would not say that in such cases the laws of
nature were interrupted or violated. By a law is not meant, then, a
16

214 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
perfectly uniform production of results, but the uniform or constant
operation of forces. It is a law of nature that on this earth the attrac
tion of gravitation always draws bodies toward the center of the earth.
It would be a violation or an interruption of that law if the attrac
tion of gravitation should occasionaUy draw bodies away from the
center of the earth, or should cease to draw them in the direction
it does.
Now, we assert that, whfle the Scripture writers regarded Jesus as
having power over the forces of nature, they did not think of it as a
power to unmake gravitation or cohesion, or the like. Menegoz ' and
others claim that the IsraeUtes knew how to distinguish between that
which corresponded to the laws of nature and that which did not, and
that the difference between them and us, in this respect, is simply one
of degree. Now, in the sense in which the scientist objects to the in
terruption or violation of the laws of nature, there is no reason to be
lieve that they knew anything of such laws in any scientific way.
They knew that medical treatment might heal the sick, but they
could only see divine authority in anyone who could heal without
medicine. They knew that one who attempted to walk on the water
would, ordinarily, sink. But they knew nothing of the distinction be
tween denser and rarer, buoyant or nonbuoyant substances, nor of
the nature of gravitation. Hence, to attribute to these writers a pur
pose to say that Jesus walked on the water, thereby undoing all these
distinctions and laws, is erroneous. The miracles were indeed more
than wonders ; but there is no reason to beUeve that they were re
garded as the results of a suspension or violation of the forces, but
only as a suspension of the ordinary effects of the forces, of nature.
Even, this is perhaps going too far ; for it is doubtful whether these
writers had any conception corresponding to our idea of a natural
force. But it may be said that, even though they did not have such a con
ception of the miracles of Jesus, we who have had the advantages of
modern education must think of them as having occurred, if they oc
curred at aU, in connection with the overturning of those natural
forces. If Jesus walked on the water gravitation must be supposed to
have ceased to act except so far as it was necessary to hold him to the
surface. Now, we need not, and indeed we should not attempt to
define altogether the relation of miracle to natural law. AU such
attempts lead to unnecessary discriminations as to the probable reality
of certain miracles, or otherwise load down the faith in miracles with
• La notion biblique du miracle, Paris, 1894, pp. 8 ft.

Science and the Miracles of the New Testament. 215
burdens too heavy to be borne. For example, Beyschlag ' makes the
attempt, and as a consequence accepts the historicity of the three rais
ings from the dead recorded in the gospels and rejects Errors arising
the miraculous character of the feeding of the multitudes tempt to de-
in the wilderness. In the former he thinks he can see actiy the
how Jesus might have raised the dead if they had not each mira-
been so long dead as to have lost every spark of life, uraiiaw.
But he cannot see how Jesus could have created bread ready baked or
fish ready cured ; so he thinks it was not the five loaves and two fishes,
but these together with what others in the company furnished, which
sufficed to feed so great a multitude. Once we rid ourselves of the
feeling that we need explain how a miracle was wrought, and judge
of the reliability of a miracle story, not by the criterion of its supposed
possibflity or impossibility, but by the historical evidence which it can
offer, we shall be on the right road. It may be legitimate to reflect on
the manner in which a given miracle was wrought, but it is not legit
imate to explain a miracle away simply because we can think of no
way in which it could have been wrought, nor even because it con
tradicts the ordinary course of nature ; for aU miracles, as weU as aU
human interventions, do that.
But whfle it is true, as Row says,2 that "we know nothing re
specting the modus operandi by which God works a miracle," yet we
do know that none of the miracles recorded in the New Testament is
there represented as being in violation of natural law, and that it is
not necessary for us to assume such violations. There is no reason to
suppose that when Jesus walked on the water the law of gravitation
was suspended. It continued to operate, but some other law, we know
not what, counteracted its ordinary effects. To this it may be ob
jected that with the increase of the knowledge of nature Beiation of
we might some time reach the point where the miracles of |$gre *J0W£
Christ could aU be explained on scientific grounds, and £™ $^£
then we should have to cease calUng them miracles. This aole-
objection to the theory of miracles here maintained is based on the
notion that, if the miracles be according to natural law to us unknown,
they are not miracles at all. But this is to assume the very point
under consideration. Besides, we are so far from such knowledge
even now that if we suppose Christ to have had it we must in any
event regard him, with Nicodemus, as a "Teacher sent from God."
> Leben Jesu, Erster, untersuchender Theil, Drltte Auflage, Halle a. S„ JB93, pp.
296-331. » Manual of Christian Evidences, seventh edition, New York, p. 7.

216 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
So that for some of the purposes of the historical miracles we should
have, even so, aU that we want. But it must also be said that there
is no likelihood of our ever attaining to a perfect knowledge of the laws
of nature. There is now a recognized transcendent realm which we
do not understand, and which most scientists think we can never
understand ; and this realm is more likely with the progress of in
vestigation to enlarge in our conception than to diminish.
However, were we to suppose that some time our knowledge of na
ture would be so comprehensive that the laws of the universe shaU aU
be known to us, stfll the miracles according to law would not lose
their miraculous character. For it is one thing to know the laws of
nature and another to manipulate them. These laws are in a meas
ure external to us, while with God they are native. They are expres
sions of himself. So that even if we had equal knowledge he would
have greater access, and hence could do by means of these laws what
we could not do. There is another difference between God's relation
to the laws of nature and ours : his knowledge is before, ours is after
the fact. But if under such circumstances we can combine nature's
forces in a manner different from nature's ordinary course, and
thus produce artificial as distinguished from natural effects, how much
more can God, who determined what these forces should be. For ex
ample, we have reason to beUeve that the law of the refraction of
light could be so manipulated, by a being who had perfect access to
the powers of nature, as to produce the lengthening of the day in the
case of Joshua and the return of the shadow on the dial in the case of
Hezekiah. But, whether or not any other being has such access or
ever used it, we know that we have no such access to powers of na
ture which we nevertheless know to exist.
Sometimes the emphasis is laid upon the existence of unknown or
Alleged un- higher laws by which the miracles were performed.
higher niaws There may or may not be such laws, and they may or
toCwhiclh: may not De employed in the performance of miracles.
might 'be But when the emphasis is placed here we are in danger
per ormed. of iosulg the miracmous m answer to prayer by the
fact that so far as they are unknown they may at any time be
come known ; for they may lie inside the realm which is not tran
scendent. Because they are unknown we know nothing about them
and can make any supposition we please, but can gain nothing
with those who are unwilling to take our suppositions for facts. As
to the supposed higher laws, it is difficult for us to conceive of
them. Are there two sets of laws by which this world could be

Science and the Miracles of the New Testament. 217
governed? That the course of nature might have been different
from what we find it had the forces of nature been differently com
bined we can easily conceive. But that God has imposed certain
forces upon the world different from, and lower than, those which he
sometimes employs simply means that he sometimes acts according
to one notion and sometimes according to another. If the laws of na
ture are the expression of his will then the idea of a higher law, ex
pressive of another and higher will, is a dangerous supposition. For
we should then have to ask why this supposed higher law was not
made the law of our world for constant instead of occasional use. Be
sides, the supposition of a higher law by which miracles are wrought
takes it for granted that miracles are suspensions of the laws of na
ture. Hence it is better to think of miracles as performed by the
employment of the laws of nature regardless of whether they are
known or higher. The laws of nature must be accredited with suffi
cient capabihty of combination to produce aU effects needful for any
event which this world could possibly demand. We should say, there
fore, not that miracles are performed by the use of unknown or higher
laws, but by the unknown or higher use of laws imposed by God
upon the world at creation. This would be analogous to what we our
selves do when we combine the laws of nature so as to produce effects
which nature, left to herself, would not produce. The main point, how
ever, is that we must suppose God to have an access to and control
over nature which we do not possess, as we have an access to and con
trol over ourselves which others do not possess over us.
Thus, without any violation of the laws of nature, we can see how
God might perform works out of the ordinary course of events, such
as men can never perform, and which are in the truest sense of the
words divine works, or miracles. No miracle recorded in the New
Testament demands for its explanation, so far as human eyes can see,
any other forces than those found in nature, though these forces must
have been employed or combined in an unusual way if they wrought
the effects described. We cannot, indeed, divine the kind of combi
nation of forces which should so change the ordinary course of nature
as to produce bread already baked, or fish already cured, as must
have been the case in the feeding of the multitude ; and hence there
is a tendency on the part of many beUevers to pass lightly over such
miracles as being most difficult to explain on natural principles ; while
unbelievers emphasize them for the same reason. Both are wrong.
While all miracles are explicable on natural principles none of them
are explicable without the supposition of God to employ the natural

218 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
forces. The miraculous does not consist in the conformity or non
conformity to the usual natural order, but in the fact that, though in
accordance with law, none but God could do it. Hence, unless we
could prove that by no possible combination of the powers of nature
could bread already baked or fish already cured be produced, we can
not deny the possibility of such a miracle. Manifestly such a proof is
not forthcoming. The conclusion of the whole discussion is that there
is nothing in the New Testament idea of miracles to render science
impossible.1 1 Professor Baden Powell labors under the common delusion that miracle is at variance
with natural law. See Essays and Reviews, Edited by F. H. Hedge, Boston, 1861, p. 123.

Laws of Nature and Divine Intervention:. 219

CHAPTER VII.
LAWS OF NATURE AND DIVINE INTERVENTION.
The immediately preceding considerations were not intended to
exhibit the possibflity of miracles, but to show that if they are possible
at aU they are possible without the violation or suspension of natural
law. But, says the class of scientists now in our thought, such manip
ulations of the forces of nature by a Superior Being are impossible.
To this we answer that men, at least, have a power, within certain
limits, of manipulating these forces, and that this power increases with
the growth of our knowledge of nature.
For some readers it may be useful to mention a few particulars in
which man has exercised this power of manipulation, or intervention
in the ordinary course of events. Chemistry is one of the sciences
which are constantly concerned in such interventions. Nature's own
combinations are dissolved, and the primary elements thus secured are
sometimes preserved separate, sometimes employed in new combina
tions unknown to nature, but useful in assisting nature in counteract
ing some of her more baneful evils, or in the arts. Furthermore, man
has such access to the laws of nature that he can control, within cer
tain limits, the products of the vegetable and the animal world. Vege
table foods, cereals, fruits, and flowers of a kind which Human anaio-
unaided nature never would have produced are con- f \^se \^l
stantly on our tables, or in our fields and gardens, as the ventl0ns-
result of man's manipulation of natural law. Bacon said that if men
would control nature they must obey her. And just in proportion as
men know and obey her laws does she cease to be terrible and become
helpful, lending herself pliantly to man's invention. Our domestic
animals are a constant reminder of the power of man to do with
natural forces what nature herself would never do. The same is true
of every labor-saving implement and every machine or construction
by which our way is made more easy or pleasant through this world.
The steady Ught from the electric lamp, the steam which propels our
railway trains, our systems of trolley cars, our telephones, our pho
tography, and ten thousand other inventions, aU show that man does
what nature would not do. Sometimes our interferences with the
regular course of nature are helpful, as when soil otherwise barren is

220 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
irrigated or enriched and made productive. Sometimes, as when by
denuding our mountains or forest lands of their timber, we bring on,
now droughts, now disastrous floods, these human interventions are
harmful. But the facility with which nature can be diverted from
her natural courses to man's wish is so remarkable as to suggest that
God purposely left open the possibility of intervention.
That it is left open is very sure, not only from what we see in the
way of artificial products, but from the fact that the reign of the law
itself, in the sense of regularity of order, does not seem to be universal.
Some things appear to be left to chance, not in the sense that they are
uncaused, but in the sense that they are not predetermined by the na
ture of things or by the divine will in creation. The same laws and
forces appear to rule in all the heavenly bodies throughout the uni
verse ; from which we infer the unitary original cause of aU things.
But, while the same law and the same course of nature appear wherever
there is law or order, there appear to be realms where, while chaos is
not present, there is no prognosticable order which nature will f oUow.
Man has five fingers on each hand ; the number is definite, not con
tingent ; but trees have branches in the greatest diversity of number
and location. l Where the branches are placed and what form they
assume are the result of the operation of many causes, but the variety
of form, number, and position, in comparison with the regularity of
the limbs of a human being, shows that the tree foUows no law (order)
of development as minute as that which produces man. That is, there
may enter into the production of a tree a greater variety of combina
tions of causes than may be concerned in the production of a man.
But that in the production even of men a variety of causes may
combine is evident from the fact that not aU men are alike, probably
no two are alike. Were the combinations.of causes in the production
of men always the same, or, in other words, did law in the sense of
exact uniformity reign everywhere, there could be no variety in human
Lack of uni- appearance or in human minds. There is a certain irreg-
certain de- ularity as weU as regularity in the combination of causes,
partmentsof . ,. . , .,.,..„,
nature. and. this leaves open the possibility of human determina
tion of what those combinations of causes shall be. Enough of them
are beyond our reach to prevent us from completely destroying creation;
but enough of them are within our reach to make possible their employ
ment in its modification. God's providence is not such as to exclude but
such as to include man's participation in it. Hence it is that God in his
1 Andresen, Die Entwickelung der Menschen, p. 11. The following discussion was sug
gested by Andresen's section on Gesetze und Zufall.

Laws of JNature and Divine Intervention. 221
providence cannot always be held responsible for results. He has taken
man into partnership with himself in the management of this world's
affairs, and while God doeth all things weU man often fails. But this
very fact, that man is a colaborer with God in the care of the world,
makes it probable that God would have to interfere sometimes to undo
the mischief wrought by us. And having left the world open to man's
interference it is surely not closed to his own. There is law or prede
termined method in every realm in the universe, but law in the sense
of predetermined method does not prevail in aU events which take
place in every realm. Were it otherwise man could not change the
course of nature in any particular. The only way to escape from this
conclusion is to suppose that human thought has absolutely no influ
ence in what occurs about us, but that we are a part of a great machine
which makes us do as we do and think as we think, a part of the gen
eral result being that we seem to affect nature when in reaUty we do
not; or, in other words, the whole result of this great machine of
which we are a part includes our gross illusion of freedom and of influ
ence on the world about us. None but the rankest of materialists
would assert such a thing.
Perhaps some one will say that man can do these things because he
has a body by which he is brought into connection with the physical
world, but that God, who is a spirit, has no such power over nature
just because he is without body or parts. 1 This thought may be based
on the doctrine of the conservation of energy, or on the idea that,
while body can influence body, spirit cannot. In principle all this has
already been traversed ; but as the matter presents itself here under
new aspects we take it up for consideration once more.
We call attention again to the fact that the doctrine of the conser
vation of energy has not been demonstrated universal. Natural selec
tion has its limits, and it is just possible that the law of conservation
of energy has its limits. We do not know anything about that. But
when that doctrine is urged as a proof that God cannot intervene in
the affairs of his own creation we must demand that the universality
of the law in question be proved. If this cannot be done
within the physical realm, where it belongs, how can it doctrine of
be proved to be true as between matter and spirit ? There vation of en-
is far more probabiUty that we are deceived in thinking possibility of
TV} 1VQ plf1
that the law of conservation of energy hinders the mind
from influencing the body than in supposing that all the cases of such
apparent influence are real. That appearances favor the opinion
1 Comp. Paulsen's Einleitung in die Philosophie, p. 184 ff.

222 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
that mind can influence matter no one questions ; for however refined
may be the substance of which our brains and nervous systems are
composed that substance has all the attributes of matter. So that if
our minds do influence our brains, and through them and the motor
nerves the muscles of our bodies, then the law of conservation of energy
does not hinder spiritual influences upon the material world. Now, the
law of conservation of energy, if so construed as to exclude the influ
ence of thought and volition, leads straight to the denial of mind, and
thus to materialism. And in fact it is as easy to think that we have
no spiritual nature as to think that, having such a nature, it can in no
wise affect our conduct. But, if the conservation of energy is to be
regarded as law for all being, then we ought in all consistency to admit
that there is nothing in the universe but matter.
We have seen that that form of monism which tends toward mate
rialism does not aid us, for while it makes a great boast of finding
spirit in everything it gives spirit nothing to do. In fact, monism
must, if consistent, deny any function both to what we caU matter and
to what we call spirit ; it must even deny the reaUty of both. They
are phenomena of a something lying back of both matter and spirit.
Thus, in consistent monism, we have phenomena caUed material and
phenomena called mental, but no matter and no mind. These phe
nomena, of both classes, are effects, not causes ; hence monism makes
it impossible for mind to influence matter, and denies the existence of
mind just as does materiaUsm. Both monism and materiaUsm make
the explanation of the apparent action of mind upon matter impossi
ble. There is absolutely no good reason for denying the reaUty of
mind and matter. The desire to reduce all reality to the simplest pos
sible form is no excuse for such nihilism. If there is any reason to
suppose that phenomena have any reaUty behind them, then there is
reason to hold that two classes of phenomena so whoUy diverse as
the material and mental have two correspondingly diverse kinds of
reality behind them. All the knowledge we have of metaphysical
reality is deduction from phenomena. Of matter per se we know
nothing, and of mind per se the same may be said. But the more
energy is studied the more it seems as though it were primarily voli
tional. And it is impossible to say, in view of these facts, that, as
the result of the law of conservation of energy, mind cannot influ
ence matter.
If we turn to the other idea, that though we must admit that man's
mind can and does influence his brain, and thus mediately even dead
matter, God, because he is without body or parts, cannot influence

Laws of .Nature and Divine Intervention. 223
matter, we find the argument in favor of it equally inconclusive. If
spirit in the form of the human mind can influence matter Can an unem.
(brain) the principle that mind and matter are not inac- affect1 Smatr
cessible to each other is established, and spirit in the form ter ?
of God can influence matter also. We may admit that the universe
is not to God what our bodies are to our minds ; but the Christian and
philosophic doctrine of the immanence of God makes the possible use
or manipulation of the world by God analogous to our use or manipu
lation of our bodies. We cannot tell how matter is able to act upon
matter nor how mind is able to act upon matter, whether in man or
beyond him. The mystery of interaction between being and being is
unsolved. It is no greater when supposed to exist between God and
the material world than when supposed to exist between the human
mind and the human body. The fineness of the quality of the matter
of the brain does not help us in the case of man, for, fine as it is, the
brain is matter still. We see that somehow mind and brain in man
interact; but the "how" we cannot comprehend. Until we know
more of the relation of God to the world than we do now we cannot
say that there is not something in the world which corresponds to the
brain in man. Perhaps it is the ether. This is a guess ; but here aU
is guesswork. The one thing which remains sure to all but rank mate
riaUsts is that somehow mind and matter can influence each other.
The intervention of spirit in the physical world is a fact the denial of
which introduces the direst confusion into our thinking. If the his
torical evidence in favor of such interventions is as good as that in
favor of other alleged facts there is as much reason for belief in the
one case as in the other. Whether the historical evidence is of such a
character we shaU see.

Throughout our discussion of the closely related antichristian phil
osophical and scientific positions we have made one great concession
to our opponents, for the sake of argument, namely, that the theory
of realism is true. Before we leave this branch of our study we think
it proper to say that the concession made for the sake of argument
does not represent our real opinion. Because of its appropriateness
as a conclusion of the discussion which has been carried on at such
length, and because it weU sums up our own views, we quote from
Bowne's Metaphysics the foUowing forceful words:1 "AUowing the
world to be in itself a fact of some kind, two views are possible con-
1 Metaphysics, pp. 459 ff. See also his Theory of Thoughtand Knowledge, part ii, chap. 3.

224 FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.
cerning its nature. The realist's position is this : The system of the
world is a complex of substantial things which are endowed with vari-
Prof. Bowne's ous forces, and which are the real and constant factor in
criticism of „ , , ,, . , , „
realism. the changes of phenomena. As such they exist apart from
any thought, and when we perceive them we add nothing, but recog
nize what they are. This is the view of common sense, and, if analy
sis detected no difficulties and inconsistencies in it, it must be allowed
to stand. The idealist, on the other hand, thinks as follows : We think
under the law of substance and attribute, or of thing and quality.
Both thought and language are impossible without nouns as the inde
pendent base of the sentence. Accordingly, we tend to give a sub
stantive form to every object of thought. So we speak of gravitation,
electricity, magnetism, etc., as agents or things ; and it is not until we
reflect that we perceive that they are forms of agency only. Indeed,
every constant phenomenon tends to be viewed as a thing. Now, the
world owes its substantial existence entirely to this tendency. This
substantive character is merely the form under which certain objec
tive activities of the infinite appear to us. The idealist, then, proposes
to replace the nouns of realism by certain constant forms of activity
on the part of the infinite. Change in things he views as a change in
these forms. Progress he views as a higher form of this activity.
There are no fixed points of being in the material world ; but every
where there are law and order. The continuity of the system ex
presses simply the constancy of the divine action. The uniformity of
the system expresses the steadiness of the divine purpose. In short,
the world, considered in itself, is an order of divine energizing, which,
when viewed under the forms of space and time, of causaUty and sub
stance, appears as a world of things. In distinction from subjective
idealism this view may be called objective idealism. The former does
not allow the world to be an objective fact, but only a series of presen
tations in us ; the latter allows it to be an objective fact, but holds
that it cannot exist as it appears apart from mind.
" The realistic view is, of course, more harmonious with spontane
ous thought than the idealistic view, but it properly has no advantage,
except for the imagination. It is more easily pictured than idealism,
but both views are equally compatible with phenomena and with objec
tive science. We have seen that even subjective idealism is compat
ible with science, so far as the latter deals with phenomena and eschews
metaphysics, while objective idealism allows all the facts even of
scientific metaphysics to stand, and seeks only to go deeper. It allows
the atom and its laws, and suggests only that the atom, though the

Laws of Nature and Divine Intervention. 225
basis of physical science, may itself be phenomenal of some basal fact.
Thus all the principles of physical science remain undisturbed,
although they may be referred to something behind them and which
is the reaUty in them. But, even if the principles of objective science
were disturbed, it would not allow that idealism is false, for there is
no warrant for making the possibility of physics the final test of
truth. The imagination will find more assurance of the uniformity of
nature in the hard reality of the physical elements than in the purpose
and nature of the infinite ; but, in any case, this is a fancy. We have
seen that the finite, of whatever kind, comes into existence, and
remains there, only because of the demands of the system. This is as
true of the material elements as of anything else. Hence, we have no
ontological assurance of the uniformity of nature in any respect. For
aU that we know the most unimaginable revolution may take place
at any moment and in the most unimaginable way. For knowledge
on this point we must have either a revelation from the infinite or a
perfect intuition of its nature and tendency. Hence the uniformity of
nature can never have any foundation better than the constancy of
the purpose and nature of the infinite."

226 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

division ni.
CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN HISTORICAL SCIENCE.

Although so much space has been given to the conflict of Chris
tianity with phflosophy and science it would be a great mistake to
assume that the weapons of warfare employed by the enemies of our
faith are exclusively or even chiefly drawn from the sources already
considered. In history, as understood in modern times, we have a
science as exacting in its demands for proof as the science of physical
nature. This science is rising into favor, and soon this country wfll
have its criticaUy trained historians in large numbers who will be im
bued with the new ideas and who wfll, at least in some cases, prob
ably take sides against us. The apologist needs to know, therefore,
the principles of historical science and to be able to estimate their
truth or error and to employ or combat them. In a work like this,
however, these principles must be tested in connection with concrete
instances or phases of their use in opposition to the Christian system.
Of these there are three, relating, first, to the miracles ; second, to the
biblical record ; and, third, to Christianity as a civilizing force.
SECTION I.-THE OPPOSITION TO MIRACLES.
CHAPTER I.
MODERN EXCLUSION OF THE SUPERNATURAL FROM HISTORY.
Our examination of the arguments against miracle drawn from
phflosophy and natural science have led us to the conclusion that they
are absolutely without force. There is nothing revealed by phfloso
phy with reference to the relation of God to the world which forbids
miracles, and there is nothing revealed by natural science relative to
the laws of nature which casts doubt upon the possibflity of miracles.
Hence, when the fact of miracle is asserted, the historian cannot
Denial of mir- aUow any prejudices of phflosophy or natural science to
em rXstori- binder his belief ; it becomes to him solely a question of
evidence. And this is the exact position of at least some
who assume to be scientific historians. Hume, ' for example, admits the
1 Philosophical Works, vol. Iv, p. 146 f.

Exclusion of the Supernatural from History. 227
possibflity of miracle, though he denies that anymiracles have ever been
proved to be facts. Ernest Renan does the same, even more explicitly.
He says:* "We do not say 'Miracle is impossible;' we say, 'There
has been hitherto no miracle proved.' " After carefully discussing the
conditions under which we could beUeve that a miracle has been per
formed he declares that these conditions have never been fulfiUed,
and adds,3 " Tfll we have new Ught we shaU maintain, therefore, this
principle of historical criticism, "that a supernatural revelation cannot
be accepted as such." David Friedrich Strauss says:3 "Indeed, no
just notion of the true nature of history is possible without a percep
tion of the inviolabiUty of the chain of finite causes and of the impos
sibility of miracles." Strauss has here very succinctly put the reason
why the historian feels himself bound to reject aU miraculous events ;
it is because of his belief in the inviolabiUty of the chain of finite
causes. As some scientists refuse to beUeve in the intervention of
God in the physical world, but insist that nature, by slow degrees and
in the course of long-extended periods, evolves all that is ; so in human
history some historians fail to see anything but the development of
man as he is bound up with physical nature, which sometimes hinders
and sometimes helps him. The existence of God is not necessarily
denied, but there is nothing for him to do, and he does nothing. Here
it is sufficient to point out the atheistic character of all such historical
interpretation. The extreme unwiflingness to believe any miraculous
event arises in a considerable measure from this atheistic philosophy
of history.
Nevertheless, those who demand such stringent proof of the occur
rence of miracles must not be too severely condemned. They may be
atheistic, but they furnish a wholesome check to the unbounded cre-
duUty and superstition which many professed Christians seem to regard
as an essential part of their faith ; who, because they are persuaded
that God can work miracles, are ready to beUeve almost any miracle
story related to them. It is one thing to believe that God can give
men miraculous aid, and that he has done so at times ; it is another to
beUeve that he does so on aU occasions. It ought to be a part of the
duty of aU Christians to rescue the miracles of the New Testament
from the disgraceful associations in which credulous or designing men
have placed them. And perhaps Hume was sincere when he said that
his method of reasoning might possibly serve to confound the danger-
1 The Life of Jesus, translated from the Original French by C E. Wilbour. New
York, 1886, p. 44. » Ibid., p. 45.
» The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, translated from the Fourth German Edition
by Marian Evans, New York, 1860, vol. i, p. 55.

228 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
ous friends or disguised enemies of the Christian religion." l For that
there is an element of superstition in most men is evident ; and when-
The excessive ever this is given over to a credulous mind one miracle
credulity of
many reia- becomes as probable as another, and the miracles of the
tive to mir- ...
acies. New Testament lose all dignity and value m the eyes of
thinking men. Hence it becomes us to put a reasonable restraint upon
our tendency to accept alleged miraculous events as realities, rejecting
such as appear ill founded and accepting only such as have good evi
dence in their favor. The same considerations should prompt us to
hear all the difficulties which experts in historical evidence offer
against miracles, and to weigh them with candor and impartiaUty of
mind. And in giving them this careful consideration it wfll be weU
to take up here the more general difficulties which students of history
feel, reserving for later treatment the specific difficulties connected
with the miracles of the New Testament. We have tried to distin
guish these general difficulties and shaU attempt to treat each sepa
rately. The first and chief difficulty consists in the aUeged insufficiency
of any evidence to establish the fact of a miracle. This is summed up
by Hume" as foUows : "No testimony is sufficient to establish a
miracle unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood
would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to estab
lish." It is natural to inquire why such rigorous proof is demanded.
Chief difficulty The answer to this query is found also in Hume in
relates to evi- .,-,..
dence.Hume's the following words : 3 A miracle is a violation of
statement
criticised. the laws of nature ; and, as a firm and unalterable ex
perience has estabhshed these laws, the proof against a miracle, from
the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from expe
rience can possibly be imagined." We confess ourselves at a loss to
know just what kind of an experience a firm experience is, though
perhaps an experience weU established as to its reaUty is meant. We
cannot but feel, also, that the word unalterable is faulty in this
connection, for though the experience is one which has continued
during a considerable length of time it is certainly a presumption to
say that it will continue forever. It is, in fact, a begging of the ques
tion, for whether the experience of uniformity is unalterable is just
the point at issue. Besides, no experience, however uniform, can es
tablish a law of nature, except in the sense of that very uniformity
itself. What we experience, in other words, is uniformity, and this
experience is one of which we have no doubt (or, as Hume would say,
• Philosophical Works, vol. iv, p. 149. » Ibid., p. 131. s ibid,, p- m

Exclusion of the Supernatural from History. 229
it is firm), and, while we cannot say that it is unalterable, we can say
that, so far as it has reached, it is unaltered — it has been invariable.
Fire always burns ; ice melts when the thermometer registers a given
degree of warmth ; lead sinks and cork floats in water. We should
need good evidence to assure us that fire ceased to consume fuel with
which it came in contact, ice to melt at a surrounding temperature of
thirty-three degrees Fahrenheit maintained for a considerable length
of time, and the like. And even if we were sure that any of these
things had occurred we should require proof that there was not
some natural explanation — that is, that something in the ordinary
processes of nature, or introduced into them by man, did not bring it
about. For example, we might admit that the wood and the fire
came into contact for a sufficient length of time to produce combus
tion under ordinary circumstances, but we should be quite certain
that, either by excessive moisture or hardness, or by chemical treat
ment, the wood had been rendered incombustible.
So much the uniformity of experience in these things would require.
Did we think otherwise aU action would be rendered uncertain.
The farmer could have no expectation of a crop, or of any particular
kind of a crop, as the result of the planting of the seed and of aU his
husbandry ; the engineer could not trust his steam, nor the navigator
the resistance of the water which is necessary for the proper effect of
the wheel in propelling the ship, if our experiences in these respects
were not uniform. But do not all these illustrations and as many
more as we might add show that what we have faith in is this uni
formity of nature when left to itself ? In this respect the argument
from experience is indeed as strong as can possibly be imagined, not
withstanding the fact that we have not experienced all the methods
of nature. We can scarcely think of evidence strong enough to con
vince us that at any time or place, of its own accord, and as a result
of an inherent possibflity of its seU-suspension, gravitation ceased to
act in its usual way. But if the witness said that what he saw or was
assured of was not the suspension of the law of gravitation by its own
failure to act, but the balancing of some other force against gravita
tion so that it did not produce its usual effect, we should at once be
lieve that it was entirely possible, and, if he were discerning and
truthful, entirely probable. Uniform experience leads us to beUeve
against aU testimony that the forces of nature, if left to themselves,
never change their effects ; but a reasonably wide experience has also
led men to believe that there are ways by which any of the forces of
nature can be balanced or neutralized in their effects by other forces.

Foundations of the Christian Faith.
This last belief grows stronger as men become more thoroughly ac
quainted with nature, and it has practicaUy led mankind to the feel
ing that there is no predicting what men can or cannot do in the
manipulation of the forces of the world. Laws of nature certainly do
not change themselves ; this it may be said that experience teaches
us. And it may be that God has never changed them ; so we beUeve.
But the proof from experience goes no further. As we have seen, it is
not according to the New Testament to say that a miracle is a violation
of the laws of nature. For such a miracle no proof yet given could
suffice. But for miracles which are wrought by the combination in
new ways of nature's laws or forces good testimony would suffice.
We have come to expect such interventions on the part of man. Tes-
Testimony suf- timony might lead us to believe that God had manipu-
tabiish10 the" lated the forces of the world, or, in other words, miracu-
me™tTmir£ lously intervened in away forever impossible to man.
posSsibifhtbe Says Hume : ' "It is a miracle that a dead man should
come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or
country." Very true; it would be impossible to beUeve that one
who came to life was ever dead. But it is quite another thing to
believe that God could not bring a dead man to Ufe. That we cannot
believe ; otherwise we should say that miracles are impossible. The
point is, Can any testimony show that he ever did bring a dead man
to life ? We assert that such evidence is possible and that it exists,
and that only an atheistic construction of history can deny it. Jesus
And such tes- Christ is the standing proof that God has interfered in the
furnished by affairs of this world." This is felt by the deniers of mira-
jesusChrist. ^ g^ nence t^gy strive to explain the miracles he per
formed as ordinary events, or the accounts of them as misunderstand
ings, misrepresentations, or the like, or else they attempt to make
Christ out a deceiver or deceived. The difficulty with the former
method is that Jesus undoubtedly thought that he was working
miracles. Hence the latter method only is left open. Let us examine
it in at least some of its aspects.
1 Philosophical Works, vol. Iv, p. 130.
2 The reader who will attentively consider what we adduce in reference to Jesus as the
chief witness to the fact of miracle will see that the difficulties of Professor Baden Powell
are overcome. See Essays and Reviews, edited by F. H. Hedge, Boston, 1861, pp. 119-122.
Similarly our argument meets the fact of which some have made so much, namely, that
the Bible gives us to understand that miracles have been wrought in the interest of false
hood. Comp. Supernatural Religion: An Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation,
in three volumes, complete edition, London, 1879, vol. i, pp. 11-13. It is not a question
what Satanic agency can accomplish, but of whether Jesus is to be credited when he
claims to work miracles by divine agency.

Thaumaturgic Element in the Miracles of Christ. 231

CHAPTER II.
THE ALLEGED THAUMATURGIC ELEMENT IN THE MIRACLES OF CHRIST.
Several deniers of real miracle affirm the thaumaturgic element
in the reported miracles of Christ. Says Wellhausen : " "If Jesus per
formed signs and wonders it is plain from his own utterances that he
laid no stress upon them. In the first three gospels he appears as a
thaumaturgist, though it is not his purpose to be such." Essentially
the same view of at least some of the works of Jesus is taken by Renan,
only he regards Jesus as consciously a thaumaturgist, though perhaps
contrary to his own will." He speaks of the miracles of healing which
Jesus "thought he performed,"3 and says: "Many circumstances,
moreover, seem to indicate that Jesus was a thaumatur- Wellhausen, Renan, and
gist only at a late period and against his wfll." 4 Strauss Strauss.
also seems to think that Jesus was under a sort of necessity of meet
ing the expectations of the people concerning the miraculous works of
the Messiah, as which he had given himseU out,' though he regards
the miracle stories as mythical rather than as accounts of the deeds of
a wonder-worker. That thaumaturgy, in the sense of mere wonder-working, is attrib
uted to him by Renan and others, is evident from all they say about
it. This is implied by Wellhausen when he asserts that Jesus surely
did not wish to appear as a thaumaturgist, and by Renan throughout
his entire discussion of the subject. We have in aU this two things :
First, that Jesus did not wish to work wonders, but was forced to do
so by circumstances, partly of his own creation; second, that his
miracles were in reality nothing but wonders. Says Renan -." " As to
miracles, they were considered, at that time, the indispensable mark
of the divine and the sign of the prophetic calling. The legends of
Elijah and Elisha were f uU of them. It was the received opinion that
the Messiah would perform many. . . . Jesus had therefore to choose
between these two alternatives, either to renounce his mission, or to
become a wonder-worker." " It is impossible . . . to distinguish the
miracles which have been attributed to Jesus by popular opinion from
1 Israelitische und Jttdische Geschichte, Zweite Ausgabe, Berlin, 1895, p. 351.
8 The Life of Jesus, pp. 231, 235, 236. 3 Ibid., p. 232. < Ibid., p. 235.
B The Life of Jesus, vol. il, p. 452. 8 The Life of Jesus, p. 230.

232 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
those in which he consented to take an active part." 1 " Oftentimes he
performed his miracles, not until after solicitation, with a manifest dis
inclination, and while reproaching those who asked them for the gross-
ness of their understanding. A singularity, apparently inexpUcable,
is the care he takes to do his miracles privately, and the injunction
which he gives to those whom he heals to tell it to no man." 3 " One
would say, at times, that the part of a thaumaturgist is disagreeable
to him. . . . We are, then, permitted to believe that his reputation as
a miracle-worker was imposed upon him, that he did not resist it very
much, but that he did nothing to aid it, and that at aU events he felt
the emptiness of pubhc opinion in this regard." 3
These are remarkable statements for one to make who insists on
strict adherence to the principles of historical criticism ; for in mak
ing them the main principle he has foUowed is the unscientific one of
falsifying the record. This he has done in several very important
particulars. First, in all that he says or impUes with reference to the
disinclination of Christ to perform miracles. Every passage he cites
in favor of that idea has to be misinterpreted in order to make it sig
nify any such disinclination.4 The first two passages show no disin-
Renan's falsi- clination, but note a positive refusal to give a sign. Had
record. they come to him with one in affliction he would have ex
erted his power ; but when all they wanted was a sign, to gratify their
curiosity or to help them in their pretended desire to beUeve on him.
he felt no disinclination ; he simply refused. The fourth rebukes the
hearers for thinking that he could not or would not provide food mi
raculously if it were needful. The third, fifth, and sixth rebuke his
disciples for the want of faith which hindered them from performing
a miracle requested of them. There is a considerable array of pas
sages, but they refer to but three facts, and none of them supports in
the slightest degree the aUeged disinclination to work miracles.
True it is that he oftentimes did not perform his miracles until after
solicitation ; but it is a perversion to make this fact prove an unwill
ingness to perform miracles. Renan has conveniently forgotten the
fact that Jesus sometimes sought opportunities to perform his miracu
lous works, and that he performed them when the influential portion
of the witnesses found serious fault with him for his acts. Had he
been disinclined to work miracles there were many he need not have
performed; but as he would not aUow the hypocritical scribes and
1 The Life of Jesus, p. 232. • Ibid., p. 235. » Ibid., p. 236.
4 The passages are Matt, xii, 39; xvl,4; xvii, 16; Mark viii, 17, seq. ; ix,18; Luke Ix, 41.
See the Life of Jesus, p. 235.

Thaumaturgic Element in the Miracles of Christ. 233
Pharisees to reduce him to a thaumaturgist, who worked wonders
simply to gratify the whims of men and to increase his power over
them, so he would not allow them to deter him from performing mir
acles of mercy when opportunity offered, even though they had time-
honored custom on their side.
Second, he has falsified the record in speaking of Jesus as a thau
maturgist. He evidently feels this, for he tries to smooth it over by
saying that "A mere sorcerer, after the manner of Simon the ma
gician, could not have brought about a moral revolution like that
which Jesus accomplished. If the miracle-worker had effaced in
Jesus the moral and reUgious reformer there would have sprung from
him a school of magic, and not Christianity." Also by saying,
" Almost down to our day the men who have done most for the good
of their kind (the exceUent Vincent de Paul himseUI) have been,
whether they wished it or not, thaumaturgists." These are amazing
assertions. The last one of them is absolutely false, even in the re
ligious world. As to the first one, it implies that there was a com
plete divorce between the thaumaturgic element in the The proof that
Ufe of Jesus — the unwelcome element, tolerated from ne- notSa Sthau-
cessity, imposed upon him— and the moral and religious matul'Sist-
reform element, which was that of his own choice. Now, the record
can be accounted for only on the supposition that those who wrote it
saw in these miracles a part of his moral and religious work. They
saw in it no trace of thaumaturgy, sorcery, magic. Had there been
any thought of that we should have had as a result of his life both
Christianity and a school of magic. These two tendencies would have
gone out from him inevitably ; for evidently the works he did made
as profound an impression as his words upon those who knew him.
But, on the contrary, we have one Jesus, revealed to us in his words
and works, harmonious with himself, and producing Christianity
only and not a school of magic also.
There were thaumaturgists in those days, and they had their
followers who were thaumaturgists. That Jesus did not become the
founder of a school of thaumaturgy shows that he made upon those
who saw his works an impression different from that of the sorcerers
of his day. In the gospel of John ¦ we have Jesus reported as saying,
"If I had not done among them the works which none other man
did, they had not had sin." If our critics will aUow that Jesus
uttered these words they will have to admit that he did not think of
his works as on a level with those of the thaumaturgists of the time.
1 Chap, xv, 24.

234 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
If they refuse the words to Christ, still they must admit that they
express the opinion of the Christians of the first century. Hence it is
evident that to call Jesus a thaumaturgist is to do violence to the
records. But, further, Jesus is reported as claiming that his miracles
are not magic, but the result of his union with the Father. The
power to heal the sick was also the power to forgive sins.1 The
result of his works was that men glorified God. Jesus rebuked the
cities wherein most of his mighty works were done because they
repented not.3 Had Jesus been an unwilling worker of miracles,
or a thaumaturgist, aU such language would have been impossible.
Plainly we are obliged by the record to think of Jesus as having
wrought his works as the natural result of what he was and of his
mission to men ; as the sent of the Father.
Third, he falsifies the records in making Jesus enter upon his career
as a "wonder-worker" in order to maintain his standing as the
Messiah in the eyes of the public. This is to ascribe to Jesus a taint
of dishonesty wholly foreign to his character as portrayed in the
Renan's the- gospels and epistles of the New Testament. Further, it
jeysusadfs- ascribes to him a lack of faith in his mission; for if he
had been clear as to his divine commission for the work
he had undertaken to do he must have been inwardly sure that,
whatever fate befell him, he must succeed without the adventitious
aid of works adapted to meet the expectations of the people concern
ing the Messiah. Again, had this been his motive he would never
have crossed the wishes of the ruling classes by refusing signs when
asked for, or by heaUng at times and under circumstances displeasing
to them. Besides, throughout the records the impression is left that
Jesus wrought his miracles, not because of the reputation they would
give him, but for the benefit they would confer upon the subjects and
witnesses of them. They were designed to bring healing to the bodies
and repentance into the hearts of men. Had his motive been to
make the general public accept his Messianic claims he would never
have forbidden one who had been healed to publish it abroad. The
records teach us that he went about doing good ; that he was moved
with compassion ; not that he was seeking to estabUsh a Messianic
claim by catering to public expectation. He did expect men to believe
on him for his works' sake ; but that is a very different thing from
doing them in order to produce belief. He wrought his miracles be
cause they were within his power, and because they were part of his
mission ; not in order to attest his mission.
i Mark II, 1-12. » Matt, xl, 20 and reft.

Attempted Degradation of the Miracles of Jesus. 235

CHAPTER III.
renan's attempted degradation of the miracles OF JESUS.
Renan has sacrificed the character of Jesus to a desire to rid
Christianity of the miraculous element. He appears to have labored
under the monstrous delusion that if he could make Christ appear
as an unwilling thaumaturgist, not as a sincere believer in his pos
session of divine power, he could the better recommend The delusion
him to the educated classes of to-day. This presupposes of Kenan-
that the educated classes would have more respect for one who knew
miracles to be impossible, but who wrought works by the methods
known to magic, than they would for one who honestly but igno
rantly believed in the possibflity of miracles. It is very difficult to
make out what Renan was trying to accompUsh, but his perpetual
effort to make it appear that Jesus performed his wonders only
because he could not do otherwise leaves the impression that the
great French romancer wished to screen our Lord from the scorn
of the modern world. At any rate he has made him out a de
ceiver, though for a noble purpose, weakly yielding to the force of
circuinstances. When the strict demands of Jesus for frankness in speech and con
duct are considered Renan's view of the motives of Jesus becomes
incredible unless we are wflling to think of the professed Messiah as
wicked to the heart's core. In the gospels Jesus is represented as
condemning any acts of reUgion or mercy performed for the purpose
of raising their performers in the estimation of men. AU acts done
for such purposes he regarded as essentiaUy hypocritical. Yet Renan
does not hesitate to represent this same Jesus as performing his
wonders to elevate himself in the eyes of his contemporaries. In the
gospels Jesus is represented as recommending the doing of aU good
deeds with sole reference to the all-seeing eye of God, whom men
were to trust for the reward. In the work of Renan he is affirmed to
have taken his reputation into his own hands, thus violating the
principle he taught to others. In order to make Jesus out thus doubly
hypocritical Renan has had to warp the plain meaning of many
individual passages, and generally to falsify the record. Yet he has
done all this under the pretense of strict adherence to the principle of

236' Foundations of the Christian Faith.
historical criticism— which demands, he teUs us, the rejection of aU
Renan's un- supernatural relations — and in the performance of his
nistoriC3rl m _ ,
procedure, duty as an historian, which he asserts to be to in
terpret" every supernatural relation and to seek "what portion of
truth and what portion of error it may contain." '
Had Renan given out his theory of the miracles of Jesus as purely
theory it could be treated with less severity. But foisting it upon
the pubUc as he did in the name of historical science it cannot be too
severely condemned. It is indeed the business of the historian to
seek what portion of truth and what portion of error any relation,
whether supernatural or not, may contain. And he has no right to
give out as fact anything not fairly deducible from the records to
which he has access. Renan has not contented himself with this.
simple business of the historian; he has gone beyond, and by mis
interpretations of words and deeds of Jesus has read into the records
what is not there — in order to read out again as historical fact what
he had read in. It is one of the most shameful proceedings known to
historical criticism. As an historian he was not obhged to furnish
a theory for the explanation of the miracle ; he would have fulfilled
aU the historian's duties had he declared it impossible for him to
accept the miracles and asserted his inabflity to find any adequate
explanation of the facts connected with the record of them. Any
thing beyond that was a violation, not a fulfillment, of the duties of
the historian.
But Renan was not content to degrade the character of Christ, he
degraded his work also. He says :' " The four narratives of the Ufe
His degrada- or Jesus are unanimous in vaunting his miracles. One
character of them, Mark, the interpreter of the apostle Peter,
wor k s 'of insists so strongly upon this point that, if the character
of Christ were traced exclusively according to his gospel,
he would be represented as an exorcist in possession of charms of
rare efficacy ; as a very powerful sorcerer who inspires terror, and of
whom men are glad to be rid." * An examination of the references to
Mark as given in Renan's note shows that six different matters are
there mentioned : 1. The stilling of the storm, with the fear of the
disciples ; 2. The casting out of the legion of devils, which were per
mitted to enter a herd of swine and lead them to their destruction,
' The Life of Jesus, p. 45. " Ibid., p. 237.
a We copy his entire note to this remarkable statement: " Mark iv, 40; v, 15, 17, S3, 36;
vl, 50 ; X, 32. Comp. Matt, vlll, 27, 34 ; ix, 8 ; xiv, 27 ; xvii, 6-7 ; xxviii, 5, 10 ; Luke iv, 36 ; V, 17 j
vlll, 25, 35, 37 ; lx, 34. The Apocryphal Gospel, called that of Thomas the Israelite, carries
this character to the most shocking absurdity. Comp. the Miracles of Infancy, in Thilo,
Cod. Apocr., N. Y., p. ex, note,"

Attempted Degradation of the Miracles of Jesus. 237
with the earnest desire of the Gadarenes to get rid of Jesus; 3. The
healing of the woman with an issue of blood, who feared, trembled,
and told Jesus all; 4. The raising from the dead of the ruler's
daughter; 5. The walk upon the sea, and the fear of the disciples
before they knew him ; and, 6. The last journey to Jerusalem, Jesus
going before— the disciples being afraid. These are the passages
which are to prove that the Gospel of Mark represents Christ (1) as
an "exorcist" in possession of rare "charms;" (2) as a powerful
"sorcerer who inspires terror, and of whom men are glad to be rid."
Pray, where does Mark say anything about "exorcism" or
"charms" or "sorcery?" Only one who had determined that
there is no such thing as historically attested miracle, and who felt it
his duty as an historian to read into a record what it did not contain,
could write as Renan has written on this matter. Mark does not hint
at exorcism, or charms, or sorcery, but wherever he His estimate
assigns or hints at any cause for the works which Jesus of the record
bv Murk
performed he leaves us in no doubt that they were
wrought by the power of God in Christ. Nor is there anything in
Mark to leave the impression that Jesus inspired terror. The only
possible hint which these passages give of such a thing is that con
tained in 1, 3, and 6, as noted above. After Jesus had stilled the
storm Mark tells us that the disciples " feared exceedingly," and said
one to another, " What manner of man is this ? " It is not a necessary
interpretation of this passage to make them afraid of Jesus, who had
the power to still the storm. It may refer to the fear they had had of
the storm. The natural supposition is that the new exhibition of his
power would excite wonder, as Matthew teUs us ; 1 but their expecta
tion that he could rescue them from their impending danger would
seem to forbid fear of him after he had, by any method, done what
they desired. But, even if we suppose that this unexpected mani
festation of power over nature aroused fear in them, still it would not
justify the assertion that, according to Mark, Jesus inspires terror.
Nor would so general a statement be warranted if we took the third
and sixth cases along with the first ; though it is plain that we dare
not do this, because the woman who was healed is not represented as
fearing him as a sorcerer but as being naturally timid, since she could
bring herself to do no more than surreptitiously touch the hem of his
garment; and the disciples who were following Jesus to Jerusalem
were not afraid of him, but of the consequences which would attend
Upon their arrival in the city. 1 Matt, viii, 27.

238 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Any fear felt in the presence of Jesus was not inspired by him, but
by their superstition or by their consciousness of guilt or sinfulness in
the presence of one so evidently holy as Mark represents Jesus to be.
Furthermore, the passages he cites from Mark do not represent Jesus
as one of whom men were glad to be rid. The Gadarenes alone have
the distinction of praying Jesus to leave their coasts. So far from
his inspiring terror and a desire to be rid of him men sought him,
according to Mark, on numerous occasions. They knew the benefi
cence of his works. These did not make the impression of being the
deeds of a designing exorcist or sorcerer who used charms to ac
complish his purpose. Mark does not portray Christ as the unlovely
being Renan imagines.
The references he adds from Matthew and Luke do not aid
Renan's cause, as an examination of them would show. And when
the romancer attempts to make the gospel narratives but a less
glaring portraiture of works of magic than the gospel of Thomas and
the gospel of the Infancy he shows himseU so incapable of dis
tinguishing things which are different that we lose aU faith in his
historical temper; in spite of his professed historical superiority to
those who believe Christ's works were miracles and not the deeds of
an exorcist or sorcerer, wrought in the consciousness that he was com-
Contrastbe- mitting a fraud, but feeling compelled to do them in
miracles t]ft order to appear as the promised Messiah. In the gospels
j^hai^nd of Thomas and of the infancy of our Saviour the child
cha0noni cat Jesus is represented as capricious, willful, and revengeful.
gospels. Boys and men are struc]j. dead at kig word Now he does
good and kind deeds, now hurtful and maUcious. Most of his
wonders have no moral quaUty whatever, but are performed merely
to show what he can do. He makes birds of clay with other boys,
but at his command his birds fly. He transforms boys into kids and
then back again into boys. An expectant bridegroom had been
changed into a mule by witchcraft ; Jesus restored him to manhood.
These apocryphal gospels give Jesus no dignity of character, but
only superiority of power ; they offer us no teachings, but are made
up of acconnts of prodigies performed by Jesus. There is good
reason why Joseph's neighbors should ask to have Jesus removed
from their midst; for according to these apocryphal coUections of
wonders he betrays only a purpose to have his own way, not a pur
pose to use his power for the good of others. In these gospels it is
presupposed that the power to metamorphose one species into another
is as important as the power to raise the dead ; for the standpoint is

ATTEMPTED DEGRADATION OF THE MlRACLES OF JeSCS. 239
whoUy that of the wonder-worker. In the canonical gospels the power
of Jesus is subordinated to the utilities of Ufe and to the spirit of a
boundless love. The apocryphal gospels referred to by Renan are brief,
each containing little more matter than a couple of the longer chap
ters of the canonical gospels, yet they record, on the one side, several
people struck dead by the boy Jesus because they had in some way
offended him, of which the canonical gospels give no example, and,
on the other side, more raisings from the dead than are recorded
in the gospels of the New Testament. In spite of aU these marvelous
differences Renan has the effrontery to say to an intelligent pubUc
that Mark represents Jesus as "an exorcist in possession of charms
of rare efficacy, as a very powerful sorcerer who inspires terror, and
of whom men are glad to be rid;" and to add that the gospel of
Thomas carries this characteristic of Mark's gospel to the most
shocking absurdity.1
The attempt, then, to cast odium upon the excellence either of the
character of Christ or of his miracles fails. The documents from
which alone a knowledge of the Saviour can be drawn do not repre
sent him as a thaumaturgist, exorcist, sorcerer, magician, but as one
who in a spirit of gentleness and seU-abnegation went about the world
preaching and exemplifying righteousness, forgiveness, helpfulness,
and love ; as one whose works were wrought by a divine power resi
dent in him — works not designed to display his power, for then the
wonders of the gospels of Thomas and of the Infancy would have
answered as well as any others, but works exhibitive of a compassion
and love which could have sprung only from a nature truly divine.
So we come back to the assertion in support of which aU this exami
nation of the aUeged thaumaturgic character of the works of Jesus
has been conducted — the assertion that there can be testimony suffi
cient to substantiate such miracles as those recorded in the New Tes
tament, and that the testimony of Jesus does substan- „
Conclusion.
tiate them. We cannot think of Jesus as mistaken when
he thought he performed miracles by the power of God. If it be estab
lished that he thought so it is sufficient evidence to all who are cap
able of weighing evidence. When any one confesses, as do Hume
and Renan, that miracles may be possible, the testimony of Jesus that
he has wrought them is ample.
1 The gospel of Thomas in its two Greek forms, and in its Latin form, and The Arabic
gospel of the Infancy of the Saviour, may be found in Apocryphal Gospels and Acts ;
Translated by Alexander Walker, Esq., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1873.

240 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER IV.
MIRACLES AS UNUSUAL EVENTS.
The second difficulty which students of history feel in connection
with the credibiUty of miracles arises from their unusual character. It
is a common thing to see human beings die or to sink in water ; but
The unusual none of us has ever seen a dead man brought to life, nor
oil fLTAPtP V Of
the miracles witnessed the spectacle of one walking upon water as
as a cause of
doubt. upon solid ground. Hence, when such unusual incidents
are reported, it is natural for us to question whether there may not be
some misunderstanding or, perhaps, intentional misrepresentation.
Says Hume:' "Suppose, for instance, that the fact which the testi
mony endeavors to establish partakes of the extraordinary and the
marvelous ; in that case the evidence resulting from the testimony ad
mits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more
or less unusual." It is but an echo of this when Renan says : " " It is
not therefore in the name of this or that philosophy, but in the name
of constant experience that we banish miracle from history." Now,
there can be no doubt but that we do demand better testimony for the
establishment of an hitherto unheard-of event than we do for the
usual events of life. We are more careful about the evidence that a
man has survived an absolute fast of forty days than that he has sur
vived a fast of two days. If to this unusual character of the event it
is added that it was miraculously wrought we want stfll better testi
mony just because the miraculous is the unusual. If in every com
munity there were men who performed frequent undeniable miracles
we should soon come to regard them as the usual, and our care in
sifting the evidence would somewhat relax.
Nevertheless, the law of evidence is not correctly stated by Hume
Hume's mis- when he says that it admits of a diminution in propor-
the law of tion as the alleged fact is unusual. Rather is it the true
law of evidence that the more unusual the aUeged fact
the better the testimony must be to produce conviction. An alto
gether unusual occurrence may be sufficiently attested by the high
character of the -witness for sanity, discrimination, and probity.
Hume quotes the saying, " I should not beUeve such a story were it
1 Philosophical Works, vol. Iv, p. 128. » The Life of Jesus, p. 44.

Miracles as Unusual Events. 241
told me by Cato " — and some stories there are which we could not
believe, no matter who told them ; but it must be remembered that
such are the stories that truthful and discriminating men do not teU.
So that, in fact, if we have reason to trust the intelligence and mo
rality of a witness we are ready to give credence to his assertions as
soon as we are sure he means his words to be taken in their ordinary
sense.1 Jesus's testimony to the divine source of his power and the di
vine purpose of his mission is sufficient to settle those facts for all who
are capable of appreciating the absolute inteUectual and moral integ
rity of the Son of man. Had he come representing himself as from
God, as doing God's work, and yet as violating the lawg which God
reveals as his wfll, Jesus would thereby have proved himseU either in
capable of true discernment or else guilty of deception. But nowhere
does he represent his works as being such violations. What he claims
is a power to bring about results which nature does not produce with
out interference, and that this power is the power of God in him for
the fffifiUment of a peculiar mission to men. He affirms himseU to
have a unique character, a unique mission, and a unique relation to
God. As such it is not incredible that he performed unique deeds.
Not only are there some beings on whose testimony we feel compeUed
to accept as facts alleged occurrences of the most unusual character,
but it is in evidence, and accepted by us all, that there have been
events which occurred but once. It is the generaUy accepted opinion
of scientists that there was a time when life first appeared ^^H a°d
on the earth. We have no difficulty now in believing «nvee°attsu^
that dead matter can be turned into Uving matter. Liv- world.
ing matter possesses the power to work such a transformation upon
the dead matter which surrounds it. But there was somewhere a first
Uving matter. It must have come into existence under conditions en
tirely unknown to us at the present time. No one doubts that it is so ;
yet it is in the most forceful sense of the word an unusual event, never
having occurred, so far as we know, but once. At the time of its oc
currence there was nothing analogous to it, nor ever had been. In
reality there is nothing analogous to it now. But the testimony of our
own senses is that there is life in matter, and we are sure it must have
had a beginning under conditions different from the origin of life at
the present time. So also there was a first appearance of inteUigence
in connection with a brain ; and so there was a time when every spe-
1 For a time it was difficult for men to believe the stories related by Marco Polo ; and
there are many whom it is still difficult to convince of the truthfulness of those who de
scribe for us, as professed eyewitnesses, the "rope trick "or the "mango trick" of
Hindu jugglery.

242 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
cies of plant and animal which now is was not. To-day human beings
are propagated only by human beings ; but there was a time when one
human being, or more than one, came into existence independent of
any human ancestry. ' No one denies this, and yet men wfll say that
everything is incredible in proportion as it is unusual.
Nothing could be more unusual than the things just named, and noth
ing could be more wonderful ; yet we beUeve them without difficulty
—on the testimony of scientists in whom we can discover no motive
for deception and no sign of inabiUty to ascertain the facts, or we be
lieve them because they seem to us incapable of any other explana
tion. We do not admit that with reference to these stupendous facts
Their signifl- there must be some misunderstanding or misrepresenta
tion aims tion- But wnen Jesus claims power to restore the dead
of Jesus. to lif e unbelievers refuse credence on the ground that the
event is one which we do not see in everyday life. In reaUty we
know nothing about either death or Ufe. Did we understand them
we might see that it is perfectly easy to one with access to the powers
of nature to bring back Ufe to the dead at wfll. In fact, then, the
question is not chiefly as to the unusual character of the events, but
as to the character of the evidence in their support. And there is en
tire possibflity of evidence to sustain the truth of events which we
never saw performed, and which no man ever saw, and which never
occurred but once in the history of the world.
To this it may be repUed that the events referred to are natural,
while the miracles profess to be supernatural. Who can be sure that
the first life, consciousness, and human being were the products of
purely (so-caUed) natural forces ? The assertion that they are such
rests upon no evidence whatever. Besides, who can distinguish either
the usual or the unusual processes of nature from the supernatural ?
What is natural, and what supernatural ? No one can answer these
questions. Only materialism is under any logical necessity of deny
ing the creative power and agency of God. So that it is a mere as
sumption that the unique events in the history of creation were the
results solely of forces resident and operative in matter ; and, in any
event, so far as history is concerned, they forbid us to deny the re
ality of the unusual, however unlike the usual it may be.
> The argument Is essentially as given by Schmid, Die Darwin'schen Theorlen und ihre
Stellung zur Philosophie, Religion und Moral, Barmen, 1876, p. 316 f.

Credulity as a Ground for Rejection of Miracles. 243

CHAPTER V.
CREDULITY AS A GROUND FOR THE REJECTION OF MIRACLES.
A third difficulty which those who are accustomed to the careful
sifting of human testimony feel in the acceptance of any record of
aUeged miracle is the tendency of mankind to believe in the mar
velous. This difficulty has been strongly stated by Hume, and more
recent writers have simply adopted his ideas. He says : ' The tendeney
" The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from mira- |g the far
cies, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tend- JjjJgK ff
ency toward the beUef of those events from which it is douM-
derived. . . . But if the spirit of religion join itseU to the love
of wonder there is an end of common sense ; and human testimony,
in these circumstances, loses aU pretensions to authority. A re
ligionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no
reality ; he may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in
it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so
holy a cause; or, even where this delusion has not place, vanity,
excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully
than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances ; and self-
interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly
have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence; what judg
ment they have they renounce by principle, in these sublime and
mysterious subjects ; or, if they were ever so willing to employ it,
passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its opera
tions. Their creduUty increases his impudence ; and his impudence
overpowers their credulity." To this Renan adds practicaUy nothing.
He puts the case in brief thus :2 "It is, in most cases, the people them
selves who, from the undeniable need which they feel of Seeing in
great events and great men something divine, create the marvelous
legends afterward." What Strauss has to say" on this subject also
adds nothing. By the time we are through with Hume we shaU be
through with Strauss and Renan.
It wfll be readily admitted that men do enjoy hearing and tell
ing marvelous tales; and perhaps mankind takes some pleasure in
1 Philosophical Works, vol. iv, p. 133 ff.
2 The Life of Jesus, p. 45. » The Life of Jesus, vol. i, p. 55.

244 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
beUeving that some of the tales are true. But that the deUght
men feel in such stories leads to the invention of them, contrary to
The love oi known facts, is opposed to the innate love of truth.
ous checked Much as we enjoy the marvelous we enjoy the truth
oYtruth.10ve more. And this is true of aU grades of men. In fact,
the very first condition requisite to obtaining pleasure in any pro
found degree from accounts of marvels is the beUef in their truth.
Men do not invent false marvels for the sake of the pleasure
they get out of marvels; for it is only as they appear credible
that they afford this pleasure. This may argue a very un
critical stage of intellectual development, but it does not make
men wholesale self -deceivers for the pleasure they derive from decep
tion. Men who invent prodigies do it, not for their own pleasure in
believing them, but for the satisfaction they secure in the very exer
cise of their inventive genius, or for the sake of gratifying the pas
sion of surprise and wonder in others, or for the purpose of securing
power over those who accept them as truth.
But, according to Hume, if the spirit of religion join itself to the
love of wonder there is an end of common sense and of the value
of human testimony, and we might add, if Hume is correct, of
common honesty. Four attributes appear to have inhered in
Hume's conception of the spirit of religion : first, an enthusiasm
which blinds its victim to actual fact; second, a strong
H u m e's a p-
parent con- mclination to the perpetration of pious fraud ; third, an
ception of . •*.*,¦, ¦-. ¦•
the spirit of overpowering vanity ; fourth, a tremendously forcible
religion in
applicable sense of seff-interest. It would be futile to deny that
even if true. aU these attributes have attended some manifestations of
religion, and even some professed manifestations of Christianity. To
them we owe in a large measure the ill repute of reUgion with a
certain class of men. We may also admit that these attributes of hu
man nature account in a large degree for the vast bulk, though not for
all, of the miracle stories connected with religions. Further, we aUow
that these attributes — enthusiasm, fraud, vanity, and self-interest —
may form an essential part of some religions. But we deny that they
are consistent with Christianity, which, in its records as in its
Founder, betrays none of them. Hume was assaulting miracles in
general, but it is not our purpose to defend them in general. We
have to do here almost exclusively with the miracles of Christ.
Aside from what the apostles and early disciples believed, Jesus
professed to believe that he wrought miracles. Will Hume say
that Jesus imagined what had no reality; that he perpetrated

Credulity as a Ground for Rejection of Miracles. 245
pious frauds for the estabUshment of the kingdom of heaven ; that
vanity induced him to profess a power he did not possess ; or that
seU-interest acted so powerfuUy on him as to make him deceive
himself or others? We think not. If Hume was not himseU a
hypocrite he must have been a beUever in the miracles of Jesus,
for he compares the human evidence for the miracles of the Abbe
Paris with the evidence for those "of our Saviour," saying: "As
if the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with
that of God himseU, who conducted the pen of the inspired
writers."1 The question therefore is as to the character of the Person who pro
fessed to work the most of the miracles of the New Testament. Who
ever else may have been deceived or a deceiver it must be admitted
that Jesus was neither. Were we to assert that Jesus was either
one or the other we should do so in spite of the records from which
we draw aU our knowledge of him. In other words, our concep
tion of Jesus would be the product of our prejudices, and not of
a study of the records ; which, if they give us any portraiture of him
at all, give us that of a clear- visioned, honest, humble, self-sacrificing,
rather than of a fanatical, dishonest, vain, and seU-seeking man. So
then, whether or not Hume intended the words we have quoted from
him to apply to the miracles of the New Testament, they can only
apply if we regard Jesus as the degraded being that Hume has in mind '
when he describes one in whom the spirit of religion is joined to that
of wonder. Such a being Jesus was not.
But the latter part of his argument touches not so much the pro
fessed relator of miracles as those who accept them on his word.
When Jesus professed to work miracles did his disciples have suffi
cient judgment to canvass his evidence ? In answering this query it
wfll not be necessary to enter upon the question of the authorship of
the canonical gospels. It is generally agreed that these gospels were
put into their present form during the first century of our era ; and
that the synoptics were substantiaUy in the form in which we have
them soon after the destruction of Jerusalem. So that they correspond
to conditions existing in the first three quarters of the first Christian
century. Now, we find in the gospels evidence of an unwillingness
to believe in miracle which shows that the early disciples exercised
what judgment they had, and had neither renounced on principle the
1 Philosophical Works, vol. iv, p. 142. See also pp. 149, 150, where he seems to teach
that, though the miracles of the New Testament are not capable of establishment by
human reason, they are to be accepted on faith.
18

246 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
use of judgment in these matters nor, as a result of passion or a
heated imagination, lost the power to . employ it. It cannot be said
of the early disciples that their creduUty increased the "impudence"
of Jesus, or that his "impudence " overpowered their creduUty. This
language of Hume does not apply in the case of Jesus and his disci
ples. Even if the writers of the gospels were credulous
Tthecawr?ters they describe the witnesses of the resurrection of Jesus
peith1nBac- as being incredulous, at least in a reasonable degree,
co'unts^f though not so incredulous as to disbelieve when they
miracles. ^^ ^.^ ^^ Qwn eyeg They did not ttlinki indeeol,
that all miracles imply creduUty or imposture, but neither did
they feel themselves bound to beUeve aU that was told them. In
Matthew and Mark we have the record of the testimony upon which
the women beheved in the resurrection, and there is no evidence of
incredulity in their cases but rather of creduUty. We have no hint
in those gospels of the testimony upon which the apostles beheved l
unless we find it in Matt, xxvui, 17, where it is said of the disciples
that when they saw him they worshiped him. However, in the same
verse, we are told that "some doubted."
It was not easy to convince some of the eleven that there was no
deception being practiced upon them. In Luke,5 however, we have
some account of the steps which led them to beUeve that Jesus was
really risen. In the first place, it is to be noted that the testimony of
the women seemed to the apostles as idle tales, and they beUeved
them not (verse 11). Perhaps they would have been more ready to
believe what the women said had these not professed to have seen the
vision of angels who said that Jesus was aUve (verse 23). Angel
visions were too insusceptible of verification for ready acceptance.
The apostles therefore discounted their whole story. Still they went
to the sepulchre and saw the vision of angels for themselves (verse
24), or at any rate found the tomb empty ; but, failing to see the risen
Lord, they declined to accept the story of his resurrection. FinaUy
he appeared to Simon (Peter) and upon this testimony they believed
(verse 34). The two on the way to Emmaus beUeved only when they
saw him for themselves. But that the doubts of the eleven were still
somewhat active is evident from the story found in verses 36-41.
For when he appeared in the midst of them they thought it must be
a spirit instead of flesh and bones. They were far more ready to be
lieve that a spirit could be rendered visible than that the dead body
1 Comp. Matt, xxviii with Mark xvi. The reader will remember that verses 9-20 of
the last chapter of Mark are regarded by critics as a late addition. ' Chap. xxiv.

Credulity as a Ground for Rejection of Miracles. 247
of Jesus should be revivified and stand before them. In fact, Luke
gives us abundant reason to believe that in spite of some remaining
superstitions these disciples were not ready to give up their right to
judge for themselves even in the apparent presence of their Master
and Lord. The twentieth chapter of John gives us equal reasons for
supposing that the apostles were slow to beUeve. They were not to
be deceived by the apparition of anyone bearing the closest resem
blance to Jesus, in face, form, voice, or manner. There was but one
absolutely sure way to identify Jesus ; that was by the prints of the
nails and of the spear. Not Thomas alone, but aU the apostles de
manded this proof; for it was granted to aU. Paul,1 writing in the
fifties, spoke of the many infalUble proofs of our Lord's resurrection,
mentioned in Acts i, 3.
Now, we may be met by the suggestion that the proofs mentioned
in the records are no proofs ; but we must answer that if they were
not there is no proof of anything. And it is not the question here
whether the resurrection of our Lord is proved, but whether the early
disciples knew how to test the reaUty of a phenomenon and whether
they applied the tests. If we may judge from the record they were
quite as careful as a man of science would be to-day. Such a trained
observer could demand nothing more than was demanded by these
simple disciples, and no criticism of the record can destroy the fact
that such precautions were taken against deception. For even if the wit
nesses of the resurrection of the Lord be supposed to have had nothing
to do with the matters related in the gospels, stiU those gospels prove
that in the early part of the first Christian century those who had to
do with the propagation of the Christian faith knew what evidence
was demanded for the establishment of the resurrection ; they furnish
the proof that the early Christians had the judgment necessary to can
vass the evidence for a miracle, and, if the record can be trusted, they
did not renounce but employed their judgment in testing the reality
of miracle.
We are at liberty to infer also that they were duly cautious in ref
erence to other miracles than that of the resurrection, nor are we
altogether without documentary evidence in support of that inference.
Acts i, 3, speaks of "many infaUible proofs " of the resurrection; and
Acts iii, 10, declares that the people recognized the lame man, as, ac
cording to iv, 14, did also the religious authorities, whfle iv, 16, makes
them declare that they cannot deny the miracle. Furthermore, these
discipl es were questioned as to the power by which they had wrought the
1 1 Cor. xv, 5-8.

248 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
miracle (iv, 7), as though they feared some sorcerer's trick. Verse
13 shows, whatever else it may mean, that the Jews saw in them no
sign of wide reading, whether in books on magic or any other. Then
we see evidence of caution against deception from those who pretended
to be moved by the Spirit of God, in the words: " BeUeve not every
spirit, but try the spirits, whether they are of God." 1 True, the test
proposed is a doctrinal one ; but the doctrine was one of which they
had assured themselves by actual experience. ' Whatever may be the
date and authorship of 2 Peter, that document is early enough to
fairly represent the earUest period of Christianity, and in i, 16, the
author denies having foUowed ' ' cunningly devised fables. " The early
disciples constantly referred to their utterances as matters of which
they were eyewitnesses.3 And there was no motive of self-interest, for
they lost aU earthly good in adhering to Christ. Hence we must con
clude that, though there have been deceivers who have palmed off
-tricks for miracles, Jesus was not such ; and that, though there have
been men ready to beUeve any tale of marvel, the early Christians
were not such. They apparently received miracle only on the best of
evidence. ¦Uohnlv, 1. * Ibid., 1, 1-3. • See, for example, Acts iv, 20.

The Prevalence of Miracle Stories. 249

CHAPTER VI.
THE PREVALENCE OF MIRACLE STORIES.
Still another difficulty is put by Hume in its strongest form. ' "It
forms a strong presumption against aU supernatural and miraculous
relations that are observed chiefly to abound among ig- Doubts arising
norant and barbarous nations; or, if a civilized people leged ign<>
has ever given admission to any of them, that people wfll barbaiismof
be found to have received them from ignorant and bar- among whom
barous ancestors who transmitted them with that invio- sa'ui "to have
lable sanction and authority which always attend received occurie •
opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations we are
apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world, where the
whole frame of nature is disjointed and every element performs its
operations in a different manner from what it does at present. Bat
tles, revolutions, pestilence, famine, and death are never the effect of
those natural causes which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles,
judgments quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled
with them."
In none of their aspects or parts do these words describe the mira
cles of the New Testament, taken as a whole. They did not arise in
an ignorant and barbarous nation ; nor did the civilized nation in
which they appeared receive them from ignorant and barbarous
ancestors. In reading the New Testament everything goes on as we
see it go on, except when, occasionally, Jesus or one of his disciples is
represented as interfering for the time. There are early histories of
nations which leave the impression described by Hume, but the New
Testament is not among them, though we admit, of course, that to
the denier of miracle it would appear to correspond in some degree to
Hume's description.
But it may be said that, though the New Testament miracles did
not originate in an ignorant and barbarous nation, they arose among
the more ignorant classes of the Jews. This must be acknowledged to be
the fact. There were not many noble, or wise, or learned even among
the later generations of the early disciples. The primitive apostles
were men of much natural vigor of mind, at least in some instances,
1 Philosophical Works, vol. iv, p. 135.

250 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
though they certainly did lack the training of the schools. But as
these miracle stories were circulated, if not penned, by the unschooled
Because the apostles the phenomena they present cannot be accounted
ries of the for on any other supposition than that of their truth.
ment were From such untutored men we should not expect such
unschooled y miracle stories as these. Any one who will take the
must be re^ pains to compare these miracle stories with those of the
(M ' 1 V 1 M J MS
true. apocryphal gospels wfll see at a glance how superior in
point of sobriety are those of the New Testament. The apocryphal
gospels give us legendary miracles without doubt ; if the miracles
of the New Testament are legendary, also, why are they so different ?
Hume's description of early miracles, quoted above, exactly fits the
apocryphal gospels, why not the accounts of the New Testament also ?
We affirm that it is a psychological impossibility for the uneducated
early Christians to have given birth to such miracle stories as those of
the New Testament had they not witnessed the events there described.
No one man, however gifted, nor any four, could have produced them
in aU their simplicity and self -consistency. And to suppose that they
grew up as myths or legends grow, and yet took the form they actu-
aUy wear, is to suppose that in that place and age and instance human
minds operated in a manner different from anywhere else. If edu
cated, talented men wrote those accounts then they believed them or
were hypocrites. If they beUeved them then we must not say they
were not first properly tested, and in any case the odium of having origi
nated among ignorant people is removed by the supposition. If igno
rant men first related or afterward penned them then we are sure they
must have occurred as described ; and if as described it matters not
that they were given out by ignorant men.
But again Hume's irremediable skepticism rises from defeat to base
an objection to miracles on the ground that they are found in aU re-
Argument hgions. He says : ' " But, should this miracle be ascribed
from the . ....
presence of to any new system of religion, men, in all ages, have been
miracle sto- „ . , , . , . , ™o '
ries in all re- so imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind that this
hgions. very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and
sufficient with all men of sense not only to make them reject the fact,
but even reject it without further examination. " There is more of the
same kind on the same page, and we must consider it, but now we
comment on the above quotation. It teaches that the very fact that a
miracle is connected with religion renders it impossible of belief, or
even of consideration, by men of sense; such a circumstance is "full
1 Philosophical Works, vol. Iv, p. 148,

The Prevalence of Miracle Stories. 251
proof of a cheat." When we consider how much credulity, and perhaps
fraud, has been practiced in the name of religion by deluded or design
ing men we can scarcely censure Hume's evident heat ; for the words
quoted are those of passion, not of calm judgment. But just because
they are the expression of indignation, however righteous, we must
discount them. It is not a true principle that in a great stack of
sheaves of wheat we must expect no grain because we find the bulk
of straw and chaff so largely preponderant. It may be that anyone
who wiU thrash out and properly sift this great mass of religious mir
acle will find some valuable truth. Many men of sense have taken
this trouble and have found it so ; and it is not a mark of good sense
to reject all religious miracles because they are so often unfounded.
But he proceeds : ' ' Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed
be in this case almighty it does not, on that account, become a whit
more probable, since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or
actions of such a Being otherwise than from the experience which we
have of his productions in the usual course of nature." Here we have
a dogmatic denial of the possibflity of miraculous revelation in order
to support the improbability of any other form of miracle. Hume
asserts what thousands as able as himself deny. We cannot here take
up the proofs in favor of a supernatural or miraculous revelation, but
Hume and his followers would be largely outvoted on this question in
an assemblage of his inteUectual peers in any recent Christian age.
Besides, any sufficient proof that God is the author of the usual course
of nature is also sufficient proof that he is the author of those unusual
events in nature to which reference was made on page 241 and follow
ing. So that we must gather our ideas of God from his unusual as
well as his usual productions ; and the fact that any of his works are
unusual opens the way for belief in other properly attested cases of his
unusual action. To this it may be replied that the introduction of life
on the earth was accomplished once for all, and that thereafter life
was left to develop without his interference. Now, for the sake of the
argument, we may admit this. But we also affirm that, so far as the
Christian miracles are concerned, they too introduced a CMstian^mir-
new order in the world as truly as did the introduction of duced a new
life. Christian miracles are chiefly ascribed to Jesus and the world.
the disciples of his time. As science claims that life was introduced
but once upon the earth, so miracles have their place at the beginning
of Christianity. With that beginning the new spiritual Ufe was intro
duced into the history of man, and miracles have not been necessary.
The miracles recorded in the Old and New Testaments, confined as they

252 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
are almost exclusively to turning points in the reUgious history of
man, furnish a striking paraUel to God's usual way of doing unusual
things in nature as revealed by scientific research. So that we have
here no argument against the Christian miracles, but rather one in
their favor.
Further, he says: "This [that is, God's production in the usual
course of nature] still reduces us to past observation, and obUges us to
compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of
men with those violations of the laws of nature by miracles, in order
to judge which of them is most Ukely and probable." We remark
again that the New Testament miracles do not represent themselves
as violations of the laws of nature, but as variations from the usual
Argument course of nature. But suppose they were represented as
quent'vioit violations of natural laws ; Hume assumes that as such
truth Sc on- violations are less numerous than violations of truth we
sidered. must refuse to beUeve aU records of miracle. This would
be the case only were the motives for violations of natural law as
numerous as the motives for lying. It is a strange argument, indeed,
that because violations of natural law are few and violations of truth
numerous we must not accept any instances of the former. This
could be of any force only if the number of the former were reduced
to zero ; but in that case there would be no basis of comparison. If he
means to say that there are no miracles, but there are many cases of
falsehood, he simply begs the question at issue. If he aUows that
there are any miracles then he aUows the point in dispute, and it is
siUy to argue that we cannot beUeve them on human testimony. Our
business in that case becomes one of sifting the evidence for any
aUeged miracle.
FinaUy, he says: "As the violations of truth are more common in
the testimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning
And m nartic- an^ 0*ker natter of fact, this must diminish very much
uiar its ap- the authority of the former testimony, and make us form
testimony a general resolution never to lend any attention to it,
concerning _ J
religious with whatever specious pretense it may be covered."
Hume seems very sure that the probability of falsehood in
human testimony is much greater than the probability of miracle.
And we do not question the fact, which assuredly does diminish the au
thority of testimony for miracle. What we contend for is that there is
testimony which cannot be impeached that miracles were wrought
by Jesus Christ ; and Jesus is himself the chief witness upon whom
we rely. The only way to escape this is to deny that Jesus ever pro-

The Prevalence of Miracle Stories. 253
fessed to work any miracles, and to make the early Christians or the
writers of the New Testament, or both, attribute to him the miracles
which he never thought of. This we shall consider in due time. * But
if it be aUowed that Jesus professed to work miracles, then we have
testimony for miracle which would convince any impartial jury any
where. Only the man who is determined to rid the world of the mi
raculous at all hazards can disaUow the testimony of Jesus ; and to
form a general resolution never to lend any attention to miracle sto
ries is not to act the part of an historian, but to neglect one of his
greatest duties.
It will not be necessary to discuss the statement of Hume that the
miracles of different religions contradict each other.3 He appeared to
see for himseU that the argument drawn from the alleged fact was
"oversubtle and refined," though he tries to bolster it up by a com
parison with the reasoning of a judge on the testimony of an equal
number of opposing witnesses. A judge does not measure witnesses
by the cord, but by their character, inteUigence, and opportunity for
knowing the facts. If aU religions presented the same quaUty of tes
timony for their miracles there would be something in his compari
son, but such is not the case. Nor need we more than refer to the
argument mentioned by Hume, that it is extremely difficult to ascer
tain the truth or falsehood of the commonest matters. No one would
be disposed to question his statement ; but the difficulty with it as an
argument against miracles is that it proves too much. For it really
means that, as we cannot detect the truth or falsehood of the com
monest report, we cannot detect the truth or falsehood of a reported
miracle. This lands us in universal skepticism in history— as Hume's
other reasoning leads to universal skepticism in philosophy. If truth
and falsehood cannot be distinguished we are at Uberty to believe
what we please. We admit the difficulty, but deny the impossibility
of ascertaining the facts, in large numbers of cases, whether of com
mon matters or of miracle.
i See division ill, section ii, chap. i. a Philosophical Works, vol. iv, p. 138.

254 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VII.
CHRISTIAN AND SKEPTICAL REQUISITES TO FAITH IN MIRACLES.
Throughout the above consideration of the difficulties which pro
fessed scientific historians find in the way of miracle as historical
fact the purpose has not been so much to demonstrate the reaUty of
the miracles of the New Testament as to overthrow the arguments
against them presumably derived from the laws of historical evi
dence. In pursuance of our purpose we take up for special consider
ation the question whether the demands in the way of evidence for
the reaUty of miracle made by some modern historians are such as
commend themselves to impartial thought. Perhaps no one has fixed
Renan's req- more rigid conditions than Renan for the acceptance of
the belief of the claims of a "thaumaturgist." We quote him at
'i!l'"i' length.1 "Let a thaumaturgist present himseU to-mor
row with testimony sufficiently important to merit our attention ; let
him announce that he is able, I will suppose, to raise the dead ; what
would be done ? A commission composed of physiologists, physicians,
chemists, persons experienced in historical criticism, would be ap
pointed. This commission would choose the corpse, make certain
that death was real, designate the hall in which the experiment should
be made, and regulate the whole system of precautions necessary to
leave no room for doubt. If, under such conditions, the resurrection
should be performed a probability almost equal to certainty would be
attained. However, as an experiment ought always be capable of be
ing repeated, as one ought to be capable of doing again what one has
once done, and as in the matter of miracles there can be no question
of easy or difficult, the thaumaturgist would be invited to reproduce his
marvelous act under other circumstances, upon other bodies, in an
other medium. If the miracle succeeds each time two things would
be proven : first, that supernatural acts do come to pass in the world ;
second, that the power to perform them belongs or is delegated to cer
tain persons. But who does not see that no miracle was ever per
formed under such conditions ; that always hitherto the thaumatur
gist has chosen the subject of the experiment, chosen the means,
chosen the public 1 " 1 The Life of Jesus, p. 44 f.

Requisites to Faith in Miracles. 255
These, then, are the conditions declared requisite and adequate for
the proof ' ' that supernatural acts do come to pass in the world, and that
the power to perform them belongs or is delegated to cer- These requi
sites not as
tain persons." It is necessary to note that in the quota- rigid as
...,.,,.,, „ , those de-
tion miracle is used, not m the sense of a mere wonder, manded by
the Chris-
something unaccountable, but of a supernatural act. Now, Man.
we have to assert in contradiction to the above that aU the safeguards
mentioned by Renan would not suffice to prove to one of us noncriti-
cal believers in miracle that the raisings from the dead were super
natural acts. If the one who professed to be able to raise the dead
should succeed in every instance chosen by the supposed commission
until those who composed it were perfectly sure they could not baffle
him, all that would be proved is that the person possessed the power
he claimed, namely, the power to raise the dead. There would be no
proof that the power was supernatural. The power could not be de
nied, but the nature of the power, its source, whether resident in man
or supernaturally delegated to man, would be left undetermined. For
the determination of this question a new set of experiments would be
required. Furthermore, if, in addition to the one person supposed
who had proved himseU able to raise to life any dead body brought
to him, there should appear another possessing the same power the
effect would be not to suggest recourse to a supernatural endowment,
but to a natural one. The oftener one raised the dead, and the more
there were who proved themselves possessed of that power, the more
inclined would that "commission composed of physiologists, physi
cians, chemists, persons experienced in historical criticism" be to
doubt the supernatural character of the power and to regard it as an
unusual natural endowment, for which the said commission would
immediately proceed to search. In other words, the frequency of the
occurrence, so far from proving the supernatural origin of the power
by which it was performed, would tend to make men regard it as
natural. It is indeed strange that a historian so professedly critical
as Renan should have overlooked these two very essential facts : first,
that there would be nothing in a raising from the dead to prove that
the act was the result of a supernatural power ; and, second, that the
frequency of its repetition would be sure to argue the other way.
But it may be asked, If the supernatural character of the act could
not be proved by the method which Renan proposes what can prove
it ? Several things would be needful in addition to what Renan de
mands. First, the " thaumaturgist "' would have to claim that he did
his acts by divine power ; second, he would have to prove himself

256 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
honest in aU his representations in matters which could be tested ;
third, he would have to be possessed of a oUscrijninating mind ;
Points which fourth, he would have to prove by an unselfish hfe that
theChristian ,.•,¦,.
would add to he was not actuated in his representations by any desire
Renan's re-.,. ,
quirements. of self -aggrandizement. So much must be demanded of
the man who performed the acts or no sufficiently cautious commis
sion would feel any assurance that his power was more than an un
usual natural power. But this is not all. The commission itseU
would have to be composed of men who beUeve in, or at least do not
deny, the existence of an order which, as compared with the natural,
is supernatural. Should they, a priori, deny the supernatural, no acts
one could perform would have the effect of proving that the performer
wrought by supernatural means. Further, this commission would
have to be composed of men who believe that an honest, discrimina
ting, unselfish, and beneficent man, claiming supernatural power as
the means by which he performs his works, knows whereof he speaks,
and speaks the truth. Did they believe beforehand, as Renan does,
that a supernatural relation "always implies credulity or impos
ture " ¦ nothing one could do or say would prove to them " that super
natural acts do come to pass in the world."
But when aU the conditions we have added are fulfilled we have
essentially the conditions which existed between Jesus Christ and his
early disciples. True it is the disciples were not a commission com
posed of " physiologists, physicians, chemists, persons experienced in
historical criticism," but they were men who were not inclined to be
imposed upon; and if we may judge of the discrimination of "per
sons experienced in historical criticism " by the inadequacy of Renan's
requirements by way of proof they had more of the true historical req
uisites for membership in such a commission than those proposed by
Renan. We suggest that the next who attempts to cast doubt on the mira
cles of Jesus should reverse all that has hitherto been held by skeptics
concerning the ability of the early Christians to determine the char
acter and value of historical evidence, and, instead of denying this
ability, assert it. A strong case could be made out for all those who
believe that violations of truth are particularly common in testimony
concerning religious miracles, including Christian testimony. It could
be made to appear that these early disciples had reduced the produc
tion of miracle stories to a science and an art. They knew they dare
not have too many miracles of one kind, or else men would suspect
1 The Life of Jesus, p. 45.

Requisites to Faith in Miracles. 257
that there was a natural law governing them, hence they restrained
themselves and gave us but three raisings from the dead. So, also,
they knew that he who would prove his supernatural power by mira
cles must claim that he wrought them by such power ; hence they
made Christ claim this. They knew, also, that a man making such a
claim must be worthy of confidence ; hence they painted him as pos
sessing all negative and positive virtues, and also a remarkably clear
and discrhninating mind. The men who understood the laws of his
torical evidence so perfectly — so much more perfectly than our pro
fessed historical critics of the nineteenth century— were not simple
tons ; they were deliberate, crafty, far-seeing deceivers, who because
they were so cunning left no trace of their cunning. It is true that
such a handling of the testimony of the gospels would, if universally
appUed, destroy all faith in humanity and make history writing im
possible ; but who cares what else be overthrown if we can only over
throw miracles !
Indeed, Renan and his commission are but the modern representa
tives of the carping Jews who came to Jesus demanding the kind of
a sign which they claimed would convince them, and to whom Jesus
replied that no sign should be given them. WeU did he know that
since the miracles he had already wrought had failed to convince
them that his claims of power from heaven were weU founded, no
miracle he could work would succeed in convincing them. Besides,
Jesus had his own plans, and he could not allow aU the cavilers
who came to him to interrupt him in their execution. Upon but one
occasion 1 is Jesus represented as working a miracle for the purpose
of proving his possession of supernatural power, and that he is re
ported to have had that motive is the most suspicious fact about the
incident. He performed miracles as acts of mercy, not that people
might believe in him ; though he thought that if they would believe
for no other reason they should at least beUeve him for the very
work's sake.2
Furthermore, Renan's critical and historical ability suffers when we
take into consideration the statements he makes in the last sentence
of the quotation under discussion. There are numerous cases on
record of wonders of many kinds in which the " commission " prac
tically selected "the subject, the means, and the public." If Renan
was not acquainted with them he should not have written as he did.
Indeed, the cases in question are so remarkable that were it not for
the criteria we have added to those proposed by Renan we should be
1 Matt, ix, 6, and ref. » John xiv, 11.

258 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
obliged to beUeve that the miracles of Jesus were Uttle more super
natural than the wonders of the Indian jugglers, who do not claim the
supernatural in their performances and whose character would not
lend them credence if they did.1
1 The Rev. E. Cobham Brewer, LL.D., gives accounts of wonders of human hibernation
and simulated death which many think supported by unimpeachable testimony, and
which, but for the claim of the supernatural made by Jesus, might lead us to class his
raisings from the dead and his own resurrection alongside of them  Dictionary of Mira
cles, Philadelphia, 1884, p. 88. Comp. also an article on " The Wonders of Hindu Magic,"
by Henrich Heinsoldt, Ph.D., in the Arena, December, 1893, pp. 46-60. Bishop J. M.
Thoburn, however, declares his inability to find good evidence for the hibernations men
tioned. See his India and Malaysia: Cincinnati and New York, 1892, pp. 135 ff.

Biblical and Nonbiblical Miracles. 259

CHAPTER VIH.
BIBLICAL AND N0NBD3LICAL MIRACLES.
This suggests another difficulty which many students of history
feel when brought face to face with the miracles of the New Testa
ment. Why, it is asked, should we accept the miracles of the New
Testament and reject those of non-Christian origin ? Are we not guilty
of historical partiality if we do so ? That is, if we do so, is it not be
cause we are limited by our own religious community ? So Strauss
argues ; 1 and he reminds us that the Mohammedan is guilty of the
same partiality in judging of the contents of the Koran. The question
of the credibility of the Gospel history so closely interwoven with the
beUef in miracles we shah take up in due time.2 Here we hold our
selves firmly to a comparison of the miracles of the New Testament
with those outside of it. Such a comparison wfll be altogether favor
able to the claims of the New Testament miracles — so thoroughly as to
reUeve any historian from the charge of partisanship should he admit
the reality of them while denying the credibility of all others. We
desire to caU attention to the fact, however, that Christian evidences
do not demand of us the assertion that all the miracle stories in the
New Testament are authentic ; nor that no real miracles were ever
performed except such as are recorded in the New Testament. As we
are practically sure that some verses of the New Testa- Limit3 M t0
ment found their way into the text subsequently to the <*« e ^C£D£
composition of the documents,3 so we cannot say that no eaIeinecthe
miracle is reported which never took place. Indeed, such New Testa-
a case is pointed out. It is John v, 4, the omission of
which in the Revised Version, in accordance with the approved princi
ples of textual criticism, destroys the miraculous elements of the story
as far as the pool is concerned. Whether, in the transmission of the
text of the New Testament by written copies, or by other means, miracle
stories may be given in the gospels which have no foundation in fact
we need not here inquire, since it is clear that the great mass of the
1 The Life of Jesus, vol. I, pp. 47 ff. It will be noted, however, that Strauss so far ad
mits a distinction between the Biblical and the extrabiblical records of miracle as to fur
nish a possibility for the truth of the former which does not exist for the latter.
1 Division Hi, section ii, chap. 3.
• For example, Mark xvi, 9-20 ; John viii, 1-11.

260 FODNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.
Gospel miracles were a constituent part of the testimony concerning
the deeds of Jesus by those who knew him best. So also the Chris
tian accepts the miraculous in the Old Testament and has no a priori
inclination to deny the possibflity that God granted miraculous power
to Christians in later times, or even to non-Jewish and non-Christian
religionists. The apostle Paul believed that God had not left himseU
without a witness in any nation,1 and it may be that some of the wit
nesses he referred to wrought true miracles.
What is here contended for, then, is that the BibUcal miracles, par
ticularly those of the New Testament, are as a whole more worthy of
credence than aU other miracle stories whatever ; and so much more
worthy of credence as to place them, for historical purposes, in a cat
egory by themselves.
We make the comparison first on the basis of their dignity. Any
one who wfll take the pains to compare will at once discover that,
The superior taken as a whole, any group of non-Christian miracles
the New contains large numbers which are grotesque or otherwise
miracles. undignified, while almost nothing — perhaps a sound
judgment would aver that absolutely nothing — of this kind appears in
the New Testament. In the work by Brewer, mentioned above, any
one who desires can find the materials for such a comparison ready at
his command. However, we prefer to take cases which have been
cited to show that ecclesiastical and other miracles are no less well es
tablished than those of the New Testament. Matthew Arnold com
pares two miracles of the Acts with two from ecclesiastical sources,
and declares concerning them that it is impossible to find any criterion
by which one of the incidents may establish its claim to a sohdity
which we refuse to the others.2 He compares the promartyr, Stephen,
looking up into heaven, seeing the glory of God and Jesus standing
on the right hand of God,8 with the record that Babylas and Myg-
done, Christian servants of a Roman governor, saw St. Fructuosus,
the martyr, and his deacon, Eulogius, carried up on high with crowns
on their heads.
Now, aside from any question of the antecedent probability of such
visions derived from the character of those who were said to have
seen them or from the degree of evidence in support of the aUeged vis
ions, it is surely evident that the story of Stephen, merely as a story,
has in it elements of dignity and subUmity not found in the other.
The Biblical story would afford a far finer subject for poetical, musical,
or pictorial treatment than the ecclesiastical. This would at once be
1 Acts xiv, 16, 17. a Literature and Dogma, Boston, 1874, p. 126. a Acts vii, 55, 56.

Biblical and Nonbiblioal Miracles. 261
admitted by one who beUeved both accounts to be true. Again, Arnold
compares St. Paul, who on the way to Damascus hears the voice of
Jesus saying, "Saul, Saul, why persecutestthoume?" with St. Thomas
Aquinas, who, whfle praying, heard a voice from the crucifix saying,
"Thou hast written well of me, Thomas ; what recompense dost thou
desire?" It really seems incredible that Arnold should have fafled to
see any difference in kind here. The scene on the Damascus road x
represents Saul as having heard the voice from Jesus out of heaven,
whfle that in the monastery of St. Dominic at Naples makes the voice
come from the crucifix. The superiority of the former conception is
evident. But in making the comparison Arnold failed to state a fact
essential to the proper estimate of the two alleged occurrences : while
the voice that spoke to Saul of Tarsus made him the unwearying dis
ciple of Christ and apostle to the Gentiles, the voice from the crucifix
served to lend favor to the side of Thomas and the Dominicans as
against Duns Scotus and the Franciscans in their heated and unedfly-
ing dispute concerning the questions at issue between the Nominalists
and Reahsts."
No one would pretend to say that mere superiority in dignity wfll
demonstrate the supernatural reaUty of the Biblical accounts, and in
the cases discussed above the difference in this respect, whfle great, is
not immense. In fact, it is not by the careful selection of instances
favorable to the one side or the other that the question of superior
dignity can be determined. It is only when we read rapidly first
through the gospels and then rapidly through any other professed his
tory or biography containing miracle stories that we note the vast in
feriority of the latter. Then it wfll be seen, when the whole effect is
felt, that the Christian miracles are as superior in dignity to any other
miracle collection as Greek art is superior to Egyptian. The best of
the nonbiblical can scarcely match the poorest of the Biblical accounts ;
and below the best the stories range down to the absolutely coarse and
trivial, which indeed constitute the bulk of the nonscriptural coUec-
tion. We give a few examples. Six or eight workmen were unable
to lift a stone prepared for a place in a Benedictine monastery. St.
Benedict saw that it was the devil who made it so heavy, Exampies of
and making on the stone the sign of the cross he was able tu?a\s liiiral
alone to lift it with ease to its place. 3 St. Patrick floated cles-
to Ireland on an altar stone.* Whfle St. Francis Hieronimus (A. D.
• Acts ix, 1-9, reff.
2 See Brewer's Dictionary of Miracles, p. 499. For the story of St. Fructuosus, ibid, p. 7.
0 Brewer, Dictionary of Miracles, p. 160. 4 Ibid., p. 164.
19

262 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
1643-1716) was preaching one day a gentleman was being driven by in
his carriage. The preacher, holding out a crucifix, cried aloud, "0
holy Jesus, if these infidels have no respect for thee, let their horses
teach them better." As he spoke the horses feU on their knees and
continued so until the sermon was over. ' St. Bernardin (1380-1444),
St. Francis of Paula (1416-1507), St. Isidore's wife, and St. Raymund of
Pennaf ord, all sailed over considerable stretches of water on their cloaks,
the second having on board also his six disciples, the latter sailing one
hundred and sixty miles.2 St Vincent Ferrier received a sUp of paper
from heaven while he was preaching, dropped by a dying man to whom
he had some time before given absolution ; and the same saint received
a letter from the Holy Trinity.3 St. Eligius was shoeing a horse which
would not stand still. He took off the animal's leg, shod the foot, and
restored the limb, the horse being none the worse for the procedure.*
A man in anger cut off his wfle's long hair which had been her pride.
The Saviour told St. Antony of Padua about it. He gathered aU the
brothers of the convent together, and after they had prayed her hair
was instantly restored.8 Saints Angadrema, Enimia, and Isberga,
having vowed their chastity to Christ, did not wish to marry, and yet
did not wish to disobey their parents, who desired them to marry. In
answer to prayer they became leprous, and so escaped the sin of mat
rimony. The last named recovered her beauty by eating an eel picked
out of a dead body thrown into a ditch, after which she entered a con
vent." The three wise men, kings of different countries, were named
Melchior, Balthazar, and Gaspar. AU were buried at death in the
same vault. When Balthazar was buried the body of Melchior moved
away to give the place of honor to the newcomer. When Gaspar was
buried the first two moved respectively to the right and left to make
room in the middle for the last of the three. Two dead bishops per
formed a similar act of politeness out of respect for St. John the Alms-
giver.7 Jesus is declared to have sent St. Agnes of Pulciano a rose in
mid-winter." In an image representing the Virgin and Child, the
Child Jesus is declared to have left the arms of the Virgin to associate
with some boys ; and an image of the Virgin Mary, as a token of her
favor, to have taken an apple offered it by a boy on his way from
school." These examples of ecclesiastical miracles of a trivial kind are taken
at random from Brewer's coUection. It would be easy to multiply
1 Brewer, Dictionary of Miracles, p. 177. » Ibid., p. 64 f. *Ibid p 436
« Ibid., p. 228. » Ibid., p. 228. «Ibid.,pp. 388-390.
'Ibid., p. 439. 'Ibid., p. 448. • Ibid. p. 497.

±5iblical and JMonbiblioal Miracles. 263
their number many times. BUnd must be he who does not discover
how almost infinitely below the dignity of the New Testament mira
cles they fall. And the cases we have cited, together with others
more dignified, illustrate another point in which comparison should be
made between them and the miracles of the gospels, namely, the mo
tives which prompted the works. There is hardly a mir- Superior mo-
r r , tives of the
acle of Jesus which did not have for its immediate end New Testa
ment mira-
the relief of human suffering in some of its forms, or the cies.
illustration of some important spiritual truth. He walked on the
water, not because he wished to show himself independent of boat
men,1 but because he would comfort his disciples in the storm which
endangered them. It is a beautiful acted parable. After cursing and
withering the fig tree he made his deed an object lesson on the power
of faith. We mention these miracles because they fairly represent
that class of his works which are most open to criticism as lacking in
adequate motive. But let anyone study the motives here side by side
with the motives in the nonbiblical miracles and he will see that" in
the former they are as much higher than in the latter as the dignity
of the former exceeds that of the latter. But not only so ; the eccle
siastical miracles are evident imitations of the Biblical ; so that whether
we consider them from the standpoint of dignity, adequacy of motive,
or originaUty, the advantage in favor of the New Testament is im
mense. To this we add what is most important of aU, namely, that the
Biblical miracles, especiaUy those of the New Testament, are well,
while aU others are ill attested. As we have before pointed Also their su-
out, the fact that Jesus professed to work miracles is the tation.
best evidence in their favor. The fuU force of this cannot be felt until
we have portrayed the Christ of the gospels. But we remind the
reader of the failure of Renan's attempt to detract from the power of
Jesus's testimony, and of the fact that all other attempts in the same
direction have equally fafled. Nowhere in human history has there
appeared a man so manifestly superior to all who have preceded and
foUowed him, in point of honesty, insight, and beneficence. His testi
mony to a supernatural power by which he did his works is as strong
as it is possible to make testimony for any fact whatever. Any ordi
nary human testimony dwindles into insignificance in comparison
with it, whatever may be the point in dispute. The man who can
deny that Jesus wrought miracles, in the face of Jesus's own prof ession
that he did work them, thereby proves himself incapable of appreciat-
1 As in the case of some of those who sailed on their cloaks.

264 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
ing the character of Jesus. But even if one were disposed to dissent
from that proposition he could not dissent from this one, that mira
cles attested by Jesus Christ are better attested than by any other per
son whatsoever. So, then, there is a criterion by which we may as
cribe to the miracles of the gospels a warrant not possessed by any
others. It is the fourfold warrant of higher dignity, higher motiva
tion, higher originaUty, and higher attestation. And these criteria
exist in a degree so eminent that none but a determined denier of the
miraculous, in spite of any testimony whatever, can hold out against
them.

Strauss's Mythical Theory of the Gospel Records. 265

SECTION H.-THE CRITICISM OF THE NEW TESTAMENT RECORDS.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the gospel
records were at least so far trustworthy that when they represent
Jesus as professing to work miracles we may accept such repre
sentation as fact. We must therefore first defend the trust
worthiness of the gospels to this extent, and foUowing our chosen
mode we take the question up in connection with a specific attempt
to cast doubt on the miracles as an historical fact in the life of
Jesus. CHAPTER I.
strauss's mythical theory of the gospel records.
It may appear to some unnecessary to overthrow this theory, which
among theologians of aU schools has so Uttle standing in the present
day. But those who are reaUy acquainted with the facts know that
some of the most scholarly unbeUef of the present Many who still
generation builds upon Strauss. Haeckel and Huxley theory.
take their views of the New Testament almost directly from Strauss.
As recently as 1894 a book, by one who professes to have struggled
through scientific doubts into faith, claims to find in the doctrine of
evolution the fulfillment of Christianity.1 The Christianity of the
book is that of Strauss. And Strauss himseU, though he pubhshed
his first Life of Jesus in 1835, maintained the mythical character of
the gospels in his Old and New Faith, pubUshed in the seventh
edition as late as 1874. Many other facts might be given, but these
wfll suffice to show us that we are not yet done with Strauss.3
The first fact to be noted is that Strauss rejects the possibiUty of
the supernatural. "Our modern world . . . after many centuries
of tedious research, has attained a conviction that aU things are
linked together by a chain of causes and effects which suffers no in
terruption." "This conviction is so much a habit of thought with
the modern world that, in actual life, the belief in a supernatural
1 Die Erfullung des Chrlstenthums auf Grundlage der Entwickelungslehre.— Von P.
Nordheim, Berlin, 1894.
* For example, Strecker says : " The Christian religion has for its founder Christ, per
haps a purely mythical personage.— Welt und Menschheit, p. 136. Strecker's book was
published in 1892.

266 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
manUestation and immediate divine agency is at once attributed to
ignorance or imposture." ' These words were a more correct state-
Strauss's re- ment of educated opinion some years ago than they are at
the° miracu- present. Says Harnack: " Much which was at one time
toiVncon- hastily rejected has been confirmed by more thorough
investigation and more comprehensive experience. For
example, who, to-day, would dare deal with the miraculous healings
of the gospel history as earlier scholars did ? "' But the words of
Strauss never did state the facts. For there were always men
abundantly capable of judging who did not regard beUef in super
natural mamf estations as a sign of ignorance or imposture. We have
ever with us an arrogant few who consider any variation from their
opinions a token of ignorance. The discussion thus far has rendered
obvious the fact that there is nothing to hinder the occurrence of
supernatural events ; hence the assumption that they are impossible
is a gross violation of propriety on the part of an historian. Whether
or not they occur is a simple question of evidence.
In fact, Strauss seems to have seen this, and also that if Jesus pro
fessed to work miracles we must admit the reaUty of them, and so
spent his strength hi attempting to prove that Jesus did not profess to
work them. Before we proceed to show this, however, it is needful
to consider the presuppositions of Strauss a Uttle more nearly.
"Alone with the interaction of finite forces does history have to do.
Its first law is that of causaUty, in consequence of which the cause of
every effect we see is looked upon as involved inextricably with other
forces of nature. The intervention in this complex of a foreign
supernatural cause would break the causal connection and make
history impossible." a This is the atheistic view of history, which we
have so often met before, and we have seen that it is entirely false.
In fact, the real conflict here, as everywhere, is whether we shall
accept a Christian or a non-Christian view of the world. All who
have foUowed these pages with care from the beginning will, we
think, be convinced that we cannot accept any non-Christian view yet
proposed. All history -writing proceeds upon the basis of certain pre
suppositions. Strauss has chosen the atheistic, or at least those which
come to the same thing as far as history is concerned. Hence he
rejects miracle, and must find some way by which to get rid of the
testimony of Jesus in its favor.
1 The Life of Jesus, vol. I, p. 59.
a Das Christenthum und die Geschlchte, Leipzig, 1895, p. 18.
¦ Leben Jesu fur das deutsche Volk, s. 4, 5, cited by Beyschlag, Leben Jesu, vol. 1,
p. 20 f.

Strauss's Mythical Theory of the Gospel Records. 267
It is to be noted, however, that Strauss will not say positively that
Jesus wrought no miracles. "It is possible that Jesus may have
wrought numerous miracles." "That Jesus censures the seeking for
miracles (John iv, 48) and refuses to comply with any one of the
demands for a sign does not in itseU prove that he might not have
voluntarily worked miracles in other cases when they appeared to him
to be more seasonable." ' Nevertheless, after discussing the question,
he reaches the conclusion "Jesus would appear to have here repudi
ated the working of miracle in general,"2 and adds: "This is not
very consistent with the numerous narratives of miracles in the
gospels, but it accords fuUy with the fact that in the preaching and
epistles of the apostles, a couple of general notices excepted (Acts U,
22 ; x, 38 ff.), the miracles of Jesus appear to be unknown, and every
thing is built on his resurrection." His entire treatment of the
miracles attributed to Jesus consists in an attempt to show that the
records of miracle have practically no foundation in fact, but that
they are the result of the tendency to myth found in the thinking of
aU nations.
Although the main purpose in quoting the above was to show that
Strauss means to deny a profession of miracle-working to Jesus, we
must look at it from another point of view also. Why did the
apostles not make more of the miracles of Jesus U he whythemira-
wrought so many? Perhaps no one will ever be able Sei0eJnot
to give a sure answer to that question. But their ™u°enttyrai-
comparative sflence does not prove that the miracles Apostolic
were unknown to them. At most it proves that they andateach?
were not regarded as essential in the propagation of ing'
Gospel truths. And this is exactly the position of Jesus. He un
doubtedly wished men to believe on him for what he was rather than
for what he could do for them, or for the wonders he could perform in
their presence. It would have been easy to have degraded the Gospel
to a mere message of healing for bodily flls, or worse yet to a display
of power to work wonders. The miracles of Jesus were so wrought
as to leave the impression upon the disciples that he was greater than
his miracles, and that to possess him was more than any temporal
benefit he could bestow on them. And yet, whfle they did not
emphasize the miracles of Jesus in their preaching, they believed in
the reaUty of the miracle of his resurrection and preached it every
where. Besides, they professed to work miracles, and this they
would surely not have done had they not known that their Master
1 The Life of Jesus, vol. ii, p. 453. s Ibid.

268 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
performed them. So that we may, nay, we must, assume that the
apostles knew of the miracles of Jesus.
How then does Strauss account for the miracle stories in the gos
pels U Jesus did not profess to have wrought them ? It is to be noted
here that he professedly rejects aU methods of accounting for them
which attribute fraud to Jesus or the writers of the gospels. The
myth grew ; it was not invented. In so far we must accord to Strauss
a more profound insight into the character of Jesus and the apostles
and early disciples than many of his predecessors and successors.1
A few citations wfll tell the story of his actual mode of procedure.
"The expectation of a Messiah had grown up among the Israelitish
people long before the time of Jesus, and just then had ripened to
full maturity. And from its beginning this expectation was not
indefinite, but determined, and characterized by many important
The mythical particulars. Moses was said to have promised his people
theory stated. a pr0phet iike ^to himself (Deut. xviii, 15), and this
passage was in the time of Jesus applied to the Messiah (Acts Ui, 22 ;
vii, 37). " "In the old national legends the prophets were made illus
trious by the most wonderful actions and destiny. How could less be
expected of the Messiah ? Was it not necessary beforehand that his
Ufe should be adorned with that which was most glorious and impor
tant in the Uves of the prophets ? Must not the popular expectation
give him a share in the bright portion of their history, as subse
quently the sufferings of himseU and his disciples were attributed by
Jesus, when he appeared as the Messiah, to a participation in the
dark side of the fate of the prophets (Matt, xxiii, 29 ff. ; Luke xiii,
33 ff. ; comp. Matt, v, 12)?" "In general the whole Messianic
era was expected to be full of signs and wonders. The eyes of tha
blind should be open, the ears of the deaf should unclose, the
lame should leap, and the tongue of the dumb praise God (Isa xxxv,
5 f. ; xiii, 7 ; comp. xxxii, 3, 4). These merely figurative expressions
soon came to be understood UteraUy (Matt, xi, 5 ; Luke vii, 21 ff.),
and thus the idea of the Messiah was continuaUy fined up with new
details, even before the appearance of Jesus." "In no case could it
be easier for the person who first added any new feature to the de
scription of Jesus to beUeve, himself, its genuineness, since his argu
ment would be: Such and such things must have happened to the
Messiah ; Jesus was the Messiah ; therefore such and such things hap
pened to him.'" "Not only was it predetennined in the popular
• However, he does not entirely deny conscious Intention of fiction. See Life of Jesus,
VOL 1, p. 67. « The Life of Jesus, vol. 1, pp. 65-67.

Strauss's Mythical Theory of the Gospel Records. 269
expectation that the Messiah should work miracles in general, the
particular kinds of miracles which he was to perform were fixed also
in accordance with Old Testament types and declarations. Moses
dispensed meat and drink to the people in a supernatural manner
(Exod. xvi, 17); the same was expected, as the rabbins expUcitly say,
from the Messiah. At the prayer of Elisha eyes were in one case
closed, in another opened supernaturaUy (2 Kings vi); the Messiah
also was to open the eyes of the blind. By this prophet and his
master even the dead had been raised (1 Kings xvn ; 2 Kings iv) ;
hence to the Messiah also power over death could not be wanting." 1
"A frequently raised objection remains, for the refutation of which
the remarks above made upon the date and the origin of many of the
Gospel myths are mainly important, the objection, namely, that the
space of about thirty years, from the death of Jesus to the destruc
tion of Jerusalem, during which the greater part of the narratives
must have been formed — or even the interval extending to the begin
ning of the second century, the most distant period which can be
aUowed for the origin of even the latest of these Gospel narratives
and for the written composition of our gospels — is much too short to
admit of the rise of so rich a coUection of myths. But, as we have
shown, the greater part of these myths did not arise during that
period, for their first foundation was laid in the legends of the Old
Testament, before and after the Babylonish exile ; and the transfer
ence of these legends, with suitable modifications, to the expected
Messiah was made in the course of the centuries which elapsed be
tween that exile and the time of Jesus. So for the period between
the formation of the first Christian community and the writing of
the gospels there remains to be effected only the transference of Mes
sianic legends, almost ready formed, to Jesus, with some alterations
to adapt them to Christian opinion and to the individual character
and circumstances of Jesus, only a very smaU proportion of the
myths having to be formed entirely new."
1 The Life of Jesus, vol. ii, pp. 451, 452.

270 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
CRITICISM OF THE MYTHICAL THEORY.
The quotations we have made give the substance of the mythical
theory and of the arguments in its support. Since miracles cannot be
accepted, and it is evident that the early Christians beUeved that Jesus
wrought them, there must be some explanation of the origin of the
miracle stories ; and Strauss offers us the mythical theory. Let us
examine it.
In the first place we admit that the Jews in the time of Christ did
expect the Messiah to do essentiaUy the works which Jesus did, and
that their expectations were based for the most part on the so-caUed
types and prophecies of the Old Testament. Of course Strauss rejects
prophecy, as belonging to the supernatural; hence he could not
make Christ the fulfillment of prophecy. But we who do beUeve in
prophecy have just as good a right to take that view of it as Strauss
has to take the other ; for he and we agree that Jesus corresponded
closely to the Old Testament conception of the Messiah. So that here
again the question reduces itseU primarily to that of whether there is
miracle in the form of prophecy. Was Jesus the f ulfiUer of prophecy,
«... -j ..¦« or was he the creature of those who, knowing what the
The identiflca- °
as°IttoJMSe£ Messiah was to be, somehow strove to make the Unpres
entable on s*on **ia* Jesus corresponded to the Messiah? If the
steahes°ry°f f°rmeri ^ is simple enough ; the Gospel narrators re
corded what they saw and heard. If the latter, why
should they have selected Jesus ? Did he reaUy perform in their pres
ence some of the works of the Messiah ? If so, then Jesus did after aU
claim to work miracles, and we have it admitted that this testimony to
miracle exists. That is the point we have been contending for. If he
did not perform miracles such as they expected of the Messiah his dis
ciples must have known that fact. In that case we have absolutely no
way of explaining how they came to regard him as the Messiah. Ac
cording to Strauss himself the expectation that the Messiah would work
certain well-defined kinds of miracles was common. If Jesus did not
perform them he could not have been accepted as the Messiah. If he
did perform them then the mythical theory is unnecessary to the ex
planation of the origin of the miracle stories.

Criticism of the Mythical Theory. 271
Strauss himseU sees this dilemma and tries to escape it by talking
about the "overwhelming impression which was made upon those
around him by the personal character and discourse of Jesus." Yes,
Jesus did make an overwhelming impression upon those around him,
and he did it by his character and discourse. But his 0ur kn owl-
character and discourse are so interwoven with the mir- character' of
acles that U we take away the latter we have but a very p/^epeifd-
inadequate method of discovering what his character was. the* mUracie
And after aU, whatever impression he made, were the stories-
disciples such idiots as to be deceived into accepting as the Messiah
and suffering in the cause of one who had failed to exhibit the signs
which, according to Strauss himself, the Messiah must show ? How
ever low down in the scale of intelUgence they may have been the early
Christians had not reached that depth. And in fact it takes some
thought to transfer from the expected Messiah to any given individual
the Messianic signs with the modifications requisite to adapt them to
the individual chosen for that purpose. As they thought how these
signs fitted the character and circumstances of Jesus they must have
at least raised the question whether Jesus had, after aU, done the
works the Messiah was to do. If he did not, they must have pro
ceeded violently, and in contradiction to the known facts, to attribute
miracles to Jesus. So that on that hypothesis we get back to the
theory that the early Christians perpetrated a known fraud by pro
claiming Christ to be what they knew he was not. Thus the more
completely the expectation of the people corresponded to what the
early Christians asserted of Jesus the more sure we are either that
Jesus did perform the miracles expected, or else that the reporters or
their informants were willful deceivers. Strauss does not think that
conscious fiction played any very important part in the reports of the
doings of Christ. But it Jesus did perform the miracles ascribed to
him he was what he is declared to have been, and his testimony to
the reality of miracles is valid and incontestable.
These considerations render unnecessary any other investigations of
the mythical theory of Strauss. StiU, it may not be amiss to point
out some defects not noticed above. First, how is it that, Further diffl-
with the expectations of the Jews so definitely fixed con- nected with
cerning the works the Messiah was to perform, Jesus is theory.
reported as having varied so much from the model ? For example,
Moses gave the Israelites bread from heaven and Jesus multipUed the
loaves and fishes. Anyone who wfll compare the two accounts wiU
see that they differ in every particular. Again, Elisha raised the

272 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
dead and so did Jesus ; but in how different a manner 1 How are we to
account for these variations from the type, and for the form they
actually took ? The result of conscious fiction they were not, or else
the mythical theory was wrought out in vain. But for acts so whoUy
different from the expected type to develop in the minds of the
masses, and become current without contradictions in so short a time,
is psychologicaUy impossible. The stories as to the feeding of the
thousands, for example, i£ developed as myths in the popular mind
would have been distinguished, not by the minor difficulties now ap
parent, but by their more or less near approach to the type of the
Mosaic manna. Second, it is impossible for us to suppose that so en-
Ughtened a theory of religion and ethics could have sprung from the
myth-making followers of Jesus. They were Jews ; why did they not
make Jesus the Messiah of the Jews instead of the principal object
of their reUgion ? " All these things can be accounted for only on the
supposition that the records contain, in the main, what the eyewit
nesses among the early Christians related concerning the words and
deeds and character of Jesus. But, third, the theory of Strauss does
not at aU account for the subsequent history of Christianity. Can it
be possible that a myth would inspire such tremendous enthusiasm of
a moral and reUgious kind ? How did it happen that this myth hit
upon such profound psychological truths that, for aU ages, action ac
cording to them can suffice to transform character, sustain the great
est self-sacrifice, and uplift aU civilization ? Men do not gather grapes
of thorns, nor figs of thistles."
1 This Strauss admits him to have been.— Der alte und der neue Glaube, p. 48.
5 For an excellent criticism of the mythical theory see Nast's The Gospel Records:
Their Genuineness, Authenticity, Historic Verity, and Inspiration, Cincinnati and New
York, 1866, pp. 179-196.

Trustworthiness of the Gospel Records. 273

CHAPTER III.
TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE GOSPEL RECORDS.
While the mythical theory is thus seen to be untenable there are
other difficulties in the way of the acceptance of the Gospel records.
The first of these has to do with the date of their composition. In the
seventh edition of his Old and New Faith, published in 1873, Strauss
used these words : "Among those who can be reckoned as scientific
no theologian can be found who holds any of our four gospels as the
work of the author to whom it is attributed, nor of any apostle or
companion of an apostle. The first three, together with the Acts of
the Apostles, are held to be tendency compilations of the beginning
of the second century, whfle the fourth, since the epoch-making in
vestigations of Baur, is regarded as a dogmatic composition of the
middle of the second century after Christ." 1 These words did not
correspond to the facts at the time they were written, much less do
they now ; for during the last twenty-five years theological thought
has, with respect to the authorship and date of the New Testament
documents, undergone an enormous revolution. As to the authorship
of the gospels in their present form, it is now admitted that whether
they were written by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John is an unim
portant question ; for New Testament criticism has pretty weU estab
lished the doctrine that our present synoptic gospels are based on
earlier sources ; so that the authors, U not eyewitnesses, wrote from
the testimony of eyewitnesses. The situation at the present day is,
therefore, weU summed up by Professor Harnack in these words:
" There is, in the whole New Testament, probably but one document
(2 Pet.) which, in the strictest sense of the word, can be designated as
pseudonymous." * As to the date of the gospels, Harnack gives for
Mark, 65-70 A. D. ; Matthew, 70-75; Luke and Acts, 78-93; John,
80-110. s If we take the earliest of these dates in each case, and Har
nack regards them as entirely possible, our latest gospel was written
by the year 80 A. D. If we take the latest dates our latest gospel is
forty years earher than Strauss held it to be twenty-five years ago.
1 Der alte und derneue Glaube, p. 41.
2 Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius, Erster Band, Leipzig,
1897, p. viii.
3 Ibid., p. 718 f.

274 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Harnack even ventures to predict several things with reference
to future theological opinion on these points. He says: "In the
Harnack on criticism of the sources of the earhest Christianity we are,
Tes8tament.W without question, in the midst of a movement backward
records. ^Q tradition." "A time will come, and it is already ap
proaching, in which Uttle interest wfll be felt in the solution of the
hterary and historical problems in the domain of primitive Christian
ity, because that which is to be discovered will have attained gen
eral recognition — namely, the essential correctness of tradition with a
few significant exceptions. It will be recognized that in part even
before the destruction of Jerusalem, in part by the time of Trajan,
all fundamental forms of the Christian tradition, doctrine, preaching,
and even of church order — with the exception of the New Testament
as a collection — Uad become essentiaUy complete, and that it is neces
sary to conceive of them within these limits." 1
Turning from Harnack to other authorities we find JuUcher giving
the date of Mark as not earlier than 70, of Matthew not earUer than
80, of Luke not earUer than 80. 2 On the whole he is inclined to dates
later than those of Harnack, though it is plain that he does not agree
Dates given with Strauss as quoted above. Weiss 3 gives the date for
by Jiilicher
and Weiss. Mark at the end of the sixth decade of the first century,
Matthew soon after the destruction of Jerusalem, Luke not later than
80 A. D. These earlier dates ¦ are in close correspondence with those
given by Harnack. Zahn, a strict conservative, thinks that Matthew
wrote his gospel in Aramaic in 62. Mark he places at 64, Luke at 75,
our present Greek Matthew at 85, and John at 80-90. *
GeneraUy speaking, then, it is now agreed among the critics that
the gospels were composed during the latter half, or, more exactly,
the last third, of the first century. But it is also conceded that, if not
written by those whose names they bear, they are based upon tradi-
Hamack on tions and writings of eyewitnesses.6 It is not our pur-
it yCofdthe Pose nere to S° afresh into these questions of date, au-
gospeis. thorship, and credibility, but to give the consensus of
present-day opinion among those who have bestowed the most care
and study upon these subjects. With regard, then, to the credibility
Harnack again may be held to state well the present situation. He
1 Die Chronologle der altchrlstllchen Lltteratur, p. x f.
2 Elnleltuug in das Neue Testament, Freiburg, 1. B. und Leipzig 1S94, pp. 192, 199, 206.
a Lehrbuch der Einleltung in das Neue Testament, Zweite verbesserte Auflage, 1889,
pp. 518 f„ 537, 655.
' Theodor Zahn's Einleltung in das Neuo Testament, Leipzig, 1899. Zweiter Band, pp,
642, 043.
6 Comp. Jillicher's Eluleltimg, p. 232.

Trustworthiness of the Gospel Records. 275
says: ' "There was a time — the great public stiU Uves in it — in which
it was supposed necessary to regard the oldest Christian literature, in
cluding the New Testament, as a mesh of deceptions and forgeries.
That time is past. It was an episode in which science learned much
and after which science must forget much. . . . The oldest Uterature
of the Church is, in the principal points and in the most of the partic
ulars, viewed from the standpoint of Uterature and history, truthful
and credible." " The number of documents which, Uke the Pastoral
Letters, were interpolated in the second century, is very smaU, and a
portion of the interpolations is as harmless as the interpolations in our
song books and catechisms."
If there is an expert judge in matters of historical research, particu
larly in the department of early Christian literature, Harnack is one.
He is a Uterary critic, as aU historians must be, but he is more than a
critic. The historian must ask himself, when his work of criticism is
completed, whether what is left is sufficient to account for the effects
which foUowed the movement whose records he has been picking to
pieces. If not, then he has a tolerably sure proof of the fact that his
criticism has been conducted on erroneous principles, and that his
conclusions are incorrect. For example, there must be so much left
of the real history of Jesus and the disciples after criticism has done
its worst with reference to the Gospel records as wfll suffice to ex
plain or account for the tremendous results which followed. Hence
the mere Uterary critic may give full rein to his critical spirit, whfle
the historian must view the events professedly described in the docu
ments as part of a chain of historical cause and effect.
This fact in a large measure explains the divergences between crit
ics. Those who have reference to a historical purpose are obhged to
be less destructive than those who keep in mind merely the work of
criticism, or perhaps, in addition, a dogmatic purpose. Strauss was
principally a critic, although at first he had in mind a dogmatic recon
struction of the life of Jesus. And though he wrote two so-called
lives of Jesus he never was, in any sense of the word, an historian.
Later his critical spirit, divorced from the historical, led him to deny
that the gospels give us any clear and consistent portrait of Jesus,
and that hence they do not present him as having any positive value
for the reUgious life, but only as a problem."
There are not wanting to-day men who, lacking the historical but
controlled by the critical spirit, affirm that no true portrait of Jesus
1 Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur, p. viii,
» Der alte und der neue Glaube, pp. 76-79.

276 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
can be obtained from the gospels. * To their minds it is worse than
useless to attempt a Ufe of Jesus. Nevertheless they beUeve in him,
Difference be- and affirm that for a personal faith in him aU that is
criticism of needed is the Christ of dogma. This may be ; but the
critic ami historian, who has to consider Jesus as the starting point
historian. of a religious movement such as the world never witnessed
elsewhere, must find in him the adequate cause. And since that move
ment was weU under way before there was any generaUy accepted
dogmatic conception of him the records must one way and another
be made to yield the features necessary to constitute him a cause. So
that the historian must somewhere put a stop to criticism. Criticism
finds its end in itseU. History looks at criticism merely as a means.
Therefore we find such men as Harnack condemning unbridled criti
cism. Harnack has some respect for the method of Baur, who saw in
the writings of the New Testament one uniform principle— that of the
supposed strife between the Jewish and the heathen Christians — but
he cannot endure the mere critic. He says : * " The presuppositions of
the school of Baur are now, one may almost say, universally given
up ; but there remains in the criticism of the early Christian writings
an undefined mistrust, a method of procedure such as we see employed
by an ill-natured states attorney, or at any rate the method of a
would-be master (kleinm eisterUche methode), which observes chiefly
aU manner of particulars and seeks to construct from them the
clear and decisive elements. Instead of a tendency in the principle,
the attempt is made to detect aU sorts of tendencies and to prove
large numbers of interpolations; or the critic is governed by a
skepticism which places the probable and the improbable on the same
level." Anyone who is f amfliar with the methods of the average New Testa
ment critic must see at a glance that Harnack has here described them
exactly. He does not even except Holtzmann ; and we must add to his
name those of Weiss, Weizsacker, and about all the rest, although
there is a difference in the degree of their assumed infaUibflity. Har
nack gives JflUcher a better name than Holtzmann, and deservedly,
though JiUicher leaves also the impression that he thinks he can
"hear the very grass grow."
It wiU be interesting and profitable to hear what JiUicher, in spite
of aU he finds of inadequacy and contradiction in the New Testament,
1 For example, Martin Kilhler. See his Der sogenannte historlsche Jesus und der
geschichtllche, biblische Chrlstus, Leipzig, 1896.
' Die Chronologic der altchrlstlichen Litteratur, p. Ix.

Trustworthiness of the Gospel Records. 277
has to say with reference to the trustworthiness of the synoptic gos
pels. "As the synoptics make Jesus speak, as they make him arouse
the masses out of their slumber, and comfort them and _ , . ,_
' Julicher on
subject themselves to him in love, unfold to the disciples tne }J,U st-
0 r worthiness
the deepest thoughts of the message of the kingdom of of tp Qyo-
heaven, fiercely struggle with his enemies among the Pels-
Pharisees or Sadducees, and overcome them, so must he have spoken U
we are to comprehend the power of his brief activity to transform the
world." " It is indifferent how many of the miracle stories are given
up, whether he opened the eyes of one or of three who were blind, in
how many cases and under what circumstances he conducted his victo
rious struggle, not only with sin, but with the misery, sickness, distress,
and death which are bound up with it ; the principal point which is to
be illustrated by means of the more or less embellished stories, namely,
that he acted as one who had power, that he wrought miracles in the
manner described in Mark i, 32 ff., can be contradicted only by a pov
erty-stricken rationaUsm. . . . Stories such as that of the talitha cumi
(Mark v, 41) were not invented, and the idealizing fantasy of no be-
Uever whatever produced the Messiah who in the night, in prayer, in
the garden of Gethsemane, with heart depressed almost to the point
of death, received power to withstand a fearful death in spite of the
dullness of his disciples and the degraded character of his enemies."
" And U the whole portrait of Jesus which we have in the synoptists
unfolds the entire charm which belongs to reality this is not the result
of the Uterary skill of the evangeUsts (rather is it the result of their
lack of it), nor of the purely imaginative, poetical-creative energy of
their source of information, but of the fact that, modestly keeping
themselves in the background, they portray Jesus as they found him
in the congregation of the believers, and that in turn this source of in
formation corresponded weU to the original. As the highest art, so
also has the simplest faith ... a marvelously fine sense of that which
is pecuUar to its hero." *
If to aU this we add the judgment of such men as Hase, Weiss,
Beyschlag, Keim, and Edersheim, who, though they do not agree in
all the particulars, yet assert, and by their biographies of Jesus illus
trate, the essential adequacy of our Gospel records as sources of a rea
sonably full portrait of the Ufe and character of Jesus, we shaU see
that the trustworthiness of our canonical gospels is reckoned high by
the best critical historians of our day.
1 Einleltung, pp. 230-232. Comp. also the weighty words of Harnack in Das Christen
thum und die Geschichte, pp. 15-19.
20

278 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION III.-CHRISTIANITY AS A FACTOR IN HUMAN PROGRESS.
This is a subject which we cannot, for lack of space, treat with the
fullness it deserves. However, as the science of history has to do with
it, it cannot be passed over in this' connection. Not infrequently do
we read that unbelievers have announced as decaying the power of
Christianity to lead the active forces of the world. It is asserted that
The growth of science and practical interests now absorb the attention
Christianity . . ....
in numbers, of men, to the exclusion of the rehgious point of view,
and that they are also the prime forces which control in human affairs.
That there is in many quarters an alarming estrangement from the
Church is undeniable by the careful observer. And it is f oUy to deny
that this state of things is in a good measure due to a mistaken pohcy
on the part of the Church, which has been the professed representa
tive of the Christian reUgion. StiU, U anyone labors under the impres
sion that as a whole the Church is losing its grip upon society he needs
but study the statistics to see that never did it make such rapid strides
numerically as it has been making during the century just coming to
a close. In the year 1500 A. D. there were, approximately, one hundred
millions of professed Christians in the world. In two centuries the num
ber was increased by fifty-five millions ; whfle in the one century from
1700 to 1800 the gain was forty-five millions — nearly as much as in the
two centuries preceding. From 1800 to 1880 the Christian population of
the earth increased 210,900,000, and from 1880 to 1890 the gain was
82,865,000 ; making a total Christian population in 1890 of 492,865,000—
a gain in ninety years of 292, 865, 000.1 At this rate the Church is not
likely to disappear from the face of the earth in the immediate future.
But aside from the growth of church membership, and in spite of
the unideal lives of Christians, the influence of Christianity was never
And in its in- so prevalent in the ethical Ufe of the world as it is to-
nuence upon
public opin- day. There are some facts which have become so ap
ion and pri-
vate life. parent that they may be regarded as commonplaces ; for
example, that there is no labor question in countries not influenced by
Christianity, for the reason that only Christianity can inspire in the
masses the desire for better conditions. That on the one side the
masses take a too material view of the improved conditions to which
1 See Dorchester's Problem of Religious Progress, revised edition, New York, 1895.

Christianity as a Factor in Human Progress. 279
they aspire, and that, on the other side, too few are willing to grant
justice, not to say love, to the classes which have been so long op
pressed is no fault of Christianity. So far as it does not spring from
the impossibility of immediately changing the status quo it arises from
the anti-christian selfishness and materiaUsm which Christ has done
so much already to banish — a work which the enemies of Christianity
have in aU ages hindered from rapid completion. Another common
place is that U these great wrongs under which the world groans are
ever to be righted it must be by the banishment of selfishness and sin
and by the introduction of the law of love — both of which are essen
tial elements of the Christian scheme. The laboring classes every
where recognize this, and however they may hiss at the mention of the
Church they wfll applaud the name of Christ, and, whether they are
right or wrong in their estimate of the facts, they hate the Church
just in proportion as they think it does not represent the spirit of
Christ. It can never be said that Christianity is no longer able to lead
the world's progress while the highest conceptions of progress are all
found, germinaUy or expUcitly, in the teachings of the Nazarene.
It is very easy to find fault with the Church and with Christianity
considered simply in its historical manifestations. On .the other hand,
it is difficult to show that Christianity is in anywise to blame for the
perversions of it which have been such a scandal to all right-minded
persons. In judging of these perversions, however, we must always
remember that the critics of Christianity compare the great wrongs
of Christian history with the teachings of Christ as the standard.
Remove from history every trace of Christian principle, and let the
same men judge of the same deeds by the non-Christian standard,
and they would not appear to the critic so grossly wrong. This is an
evidence that the standard of right has very greatly changed under
the influence of Christianity. We shaU take up the relation of Chris
tianity to ethical Ufe a few pages further along in a more thorough
manner. Here it is sufficient to point out and to emphasize the fact,
admitted even by enemies of our faith, that it is not the teachings of
Christ that are at fault, but the use or abuse of them by professed
foUowers of Jesus. And it ought also to be said that it is not alone
a hypocritical difficulty with which we have here to deal. Relatively,
very few professed Christians have been, or are, hypocrites, at least
fundamentally. Only occasionaUy does one meet a human being so
depraved that he pretends to be a foUower of Christ when he knows
he is not, though it must be confessed that large numbers fall short of
the strict conscientiousness required by the gospels.

280 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Many there are, however, who do not so much profess to be foUow
ers of Jesus as desirous, though aU too weakly desirous, of Uving ac
cording to the teachings of Christ. Their inward propensities to evfl,
Why Chris- or their outward temptations, are too strong in compari-
tianity has ... . , , m, -,
not been son with their purpose to do right. They do wrong, and
more effect- , , , ,
ivein trans- they know it; yet, not because they would be hypo-
worid. crites, but because they will not cut themselves off from
the good influences of the Church, they remain members of it, to its
disgrace, feeling that in the Church there is some hope of improve
ment, whfle out of it there is none. The Church, on the other hand,
hesitates to discipline to the last extreme of excommunication (the
word is not used with its Roman Catholic implications), thinking of
itself rather as a family which must strive as long as possible for the
betterment of all its adherents.
Another reason why Christianity has not been more effective is that
it has not been understood, and hence not appUed in aU its purity and
strength to Ufe. This is scarcely astonishing when one considers the
exalted nature of the teaching of Jesus and the inteUectual and moral
dullness of men. The Gospel of Jesus Christ of necessity came to
men who were fll prepared for its comprehension. Its point of view
was whoUy different from their own. When, for one reason or
another, they became Christians by choice, it was impossible that
they should comprehend aU the significance of what they had done.
Like any other new scheme of thought and conduct, it could at first
impress itself but partiaUy upon men. Finally such a mass of heathen
phflosophy came in this way to be mingled in the thinking of those
who sincerely desired to be true representatives of Christ that the
Christian elements were not by any means the decisive ones. Chris
tianity was looked upon too much from the standpoint of doctrine,
and the doctrines were defined with reference to prevailing heresy,
and then the stress of necessity held the thought of the Church to
this point of view for centuries. Heathen elements also entered into
the Ufe of the Church, and Christianity was by so much overlaid with
error. All this is a direct result of the failure to apprehend, in its
full extent and richness, the real Gospel. As the ages went by Chris
tianity was so grossly misunderstood that it was believed men could
be converted by the sword, and it was held to be a mercy to employ
this method when peaceful means failed. In all these aspects it is a sad
history, but they are not the only aspects, and, besides, during all this
time the world was becoming at least nominally Christian and was
receiving some of the blessings of the Gospel, while the way was

Christianity as a Factor in Human Progress. 281
also being prepared for a better understanding and application of its
real nature.
Here it becomes necessary to mention another serious obstacle to
the spread of the blessings of the Christianity of Christ. We refer to
the opposition it has met from unbeUevers. This took two forms
almost from the very beginning, and they have contin- Effect of unbe-
ued without interruption down to the present day. The ing/the upl
first is that in which would-be teachers of the Gospel nueiufe of
were at heart unbelievers, though they knew it not. ls 'am y'
They were constantly striving to put the new wine into old vessels ;
to crowd the divine manifestation of the new religion into the narrow
forms of human thought. Fearful of anything which lay outside of
or which extended beyond the philosophy or science of the day they
have as much as possible denied the supernatural, and kept up such a
storm against the superstitions of those who believe in miracle as to
guide large numbers into a course which leads directly away from
the power of God unto salvation.
The other form is represented by the conscious unbeUevers of aU
grades. They have always rejected the claims of Christianity, often,
whether intentionaUy or not, misrepresented it, everywhere ridiculed
it, and done their best to prevent its doing its divinely appointed
work. When they have succeeded in some measure they have
pointed to the faflure of Christianity to do the very work they have
endeavored to the utmost to prevent. Those who have done this
have not always, nor indeed generaUy, been the foremost in their
communities in respect of inteUect or good morals ; but by an almost
diabolical diUgence in promulgating their objections to Christianity,
by selecting the worst types of church members or of acts done in the
name of the Gospel, and by appealing to the natural desire of a
wicked heart to find release from the stern demands of the moral
law, they have, not indeed won large numbers of youth to their
views, but alienated them from the influence of genuine Christianity
as completely as though they lived in a heathen land. Then they
have turned about and declared that none but women and children
cared for the Gospel.
And aU these considerations have to do with the faults which his
tory reveals in the relation of the Church toward science and material
progress. In so far as the Church has ever been inimical to them it
has been owing either to an exaggeration of their importance by
those who specially favored them, or to a one-sided conception of the
Gospel itseU. But, taking the history of Christianity as a whole, it

282 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
has not been unfavorable to science nor to material development.
On the contrary, wherever Christianity has gone these have at once
sprung up in her path. In spite of those who, whether within or
without the Church, have misrepresented the truth of Christ, his
religion favors freedom of investigation and teaching, though it also
favors such use and only such use of freedom as wfll not result in
History shows destroying the roots of aU virtue, without which science
tianity has could not flourish and material wealth and comfort
science and would be a curse. Hence the Church has rightly asked
progress. the scientists, from whom it has received aU of science
which it has embodied in its creeds, to give good reasons for a change,
and to prove the new views before they are generaUy promulgated.
She has refused to overturn at the behest of the science of one age
what the science of a preceding age demanded she should beUeve;
and especiaUy has she been jealous of the encroachments of any
so-called science which comes professing to overthrow Christianity
itseU. This is the real truth of the relation between the Church and scien
tific progress, although there have been times and individuals that
have unnecessarily placed obstacles in the path of research. For
such folly the cause we love suffers even now ; for our enemies make
the most of it. But, we repeat, taken as a whole, the Church has,
even in its Roman Catholic form, been favorable to the progress of
science and to the rational enjoyment of wealth and refined civiliza
tion. And as for the Christianity of Christ there is absolutely noth
ing in it to interfere with them. Impartial history wfll discriminate
between Christianity and the perversions of it which have passed for
genuine under its name ; it wfll point out the blamelessness of true
Christianity and its adaptability to aU true progress ; it will discern
the faults of the Church, but it will not overlook its immense services
to the world. At the hands of impartial history Christianity wfll
receive nothing but praise ; and it wfll not be censured for the faflure
of men to submit to its high demands, to understand and properly
apply it, nor for the hindrances placed in its way by unbeUevers.

Atheistic Egoism. 283

DIVISION IV.
THE STRUGGLE OF CHRISTIANITY OTTH ANTICHEISTIAN
ETHICS.

Under this head it will be necessary to consider : 1. Proposed Sub
stitutes for Christian Ethics ; 2. Fundamental Objections to Christian
Ethics ; 3. Incidental Objections. However, it must not be expected
that non-Christian ethics shaU be treated systematicaUy. All that is
here proposed is a consideration of the more important of those ethi
cal systems which are opposed, and only in so far as they are opposed,
to Christianity.
SECTION I.-PROPOSED SUBSTITUTES FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
ATHEISTIC EGOISM.
This is the extreme form of the atheistic ethic. It is represented
most brutally by Max Stirner,1 who, not content with Feuerbach's a
representation of the idea of God as an illusion, condemned even the
somewhat altruistic elements of Feuerbach's theory.3 But as few
atheistic ethicists are wholly in sympathy with the extreme position
of Stirner we shaU choose as the representative of atheistic egoism
Wflhelm Strecker,* who has the express sanction of such a man as
Buchner and whose work, published as late as 1892, may therefore
be regarded as belonging to the present day. Strecker recognizes the
existence of a moral law, unwritten, but nevertheless known to us,
and asks how we come to this knowledge, what is the content of the
law, whence it came, who gave it, in what the good consists, and why
we should do the good. In answer he says this is not inborn, since it
1 Pseudonym for Caspar Schmidt. See his Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, Leipzig, 1845.
> See his Wesen des Christenthums, Leipzig, 1841.
8 Comp. Nippold's Handbuch. der neuesten Kirchengeschichte, Dritte umgearbeitete
Auflage, Dritter Band, Erste Abtheilung, Berlin, 1890, p. 195.
* Welt und Menschheit, already frequently referred to. Our references to his work in
this connection will, unless otherwise stated, be found on pages 95-112. One is forcibly
reminded, by the conclusions of the writers referred to, of Weygoldt's prophecy as to
the outcome of religlonless ethics. See his Darwlnismus, Religion, Sittlichkeit, Leiden,
1878, pp. 137-153.

284 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
is so diverse in different ages and races. Whoever does not beUeve
in the existence of God cannot beUeve that he gave any determi
nation to our lives. The final purpose of aU our conduct is happi
ness, which consists in the effects of certain definite agreeable feelings
Strecker's and in the absence of others which are disagreeable.
statement of . „ , , . ,, , . , , „
this ethics. The securing of agreeable and the banishment ot pain
ful feelings is the purpose of our impulses and passions, in whose
perfect satisfaction our happiness consists. It often occurs that the
attainment of a pleasurable emotion or the prevention of a painful
one is possible only by denying ourselves of some other pleasure.
These are the cases in which the moral law comes into play. When
there is no conflict of pleasurable feelings then gratification is eth-
icaUy indifferent. The ethicaUy good may be designated as those
sentiments and actions which, a choice being possible between several
feelings, are directed toward that pleasure which in our judgment is
most permanent. It is the appUcation of the precepts of prudence
and wisdom in the securing of the highest and most enduring pleas
ures where several pleasures are possible. The purpose of all our
efforts or sufferings for the common good is always our own happi
ness. This rightly, since the community has its only justification in
what it can do for the individual more than he could do for himseU
were he in a condition of segregation. Many acts of friendship are
performed chiefly in the expectation that we shaU receive an ade
quate return from those whom we serve. In other cases we perform
such services, not for a like service in return, but because of the recog
nition, gratitude, love, respect, or reverence the beneficiaries wfll
show us. In noble souls even this is not needful, since they are satis
fied with self -approval. In stfll other cases we act because we have a
passionate inclination toward it which can be gratified only by action.
Virtue is the disposition to perform ethicaUy good acts and pre
supposes strength of wiU to choose the higher and permanent rather
than the lower and temporary pleasures. The estimate in which we
hold a virtuous action is not dependent on the freedom of the wfll ; for
we admire and honor strength of wfll in matters of ethics no more
than we do beauty of form, skill, or talents, which are in no way
dependent upon the wfll. We revere artists, inventors, and poets
without reference to their ethical qualities.
This, then, is one of the forms, and a principal one, which atheis
tic ethics takes. It is a not very refined selfishness. SeU is first of aU
to be considered. One is virtuous in proportion as he acquires a strong
and steadfast purpose, not to do right, but to secure bis highest and

Atheistic Egoism. 285
most lasting satisfaction at the expense of his lower and more tem
porary gratification. And this ethics expressly reserves the right of
each one to be his own judge of what pleasures will afford Its practical
him the highest and most enduring satisfaction. ' ' LUe is e"ect
short," says one, " and there is no future. Sensual pleasures afford
me a deUght which is at least more intense than any others which I,
with my tastes, can possibly reach in so brief a period. And as virtue
consists in choosing those pleasures which in my judgment are high
est and most enduring I wfll be virtuous by choosing sensuality."
"LUe is short," says another, "and there is no future; but I desire
and can secure the respect of the community in which I hve, and I
can secure this only on condition that I restrain certain of my pas
sions and devote myself to the welfare of others. I can get most hap
piness in this way, and so in this way I will be' virtuous."
Now, according to the doctrine of atheistic egoism both are equaUy
virtuous, for both have the strength of will to do that which is most
pleasing to the actor. This is not taking unfair ad van- Strecker not
tage of Strecker's words; it is taking them exactly at stood ner
1)1 i S I' ('¦ TJiTG-
what they expUcitly say. Not even the conscience is sented.
made a test of virtue in this system ; for it distinctly emphasizes the
fact that what one man's conscience forbids another's allows. If one's
conscience does not hinder his happiness in a given course it is per
fectly virtuous to practice it, no matter what it is. We need not mind
what others wish; for "a moral law which required us, regardless of
our own good, to care always for the good of others would be per
verted and senseless.'' If our own good is not advanced by society's
demands upon us we are under no obligation to meet those demands.
Such an attempt would be ' ' perverted " and ' ' senseless ! " And as I am
to be the judge of what pleasures are most valuable to me, and need
give up no pleasures for the good of others unless I think I Relation of
shaU get a higher pleasure by so doing, I must be the thefsdciaior*
judge as to whether I shaU aUow society to control me or ganlsm-
not. Any laws which would forbid my choosing what I regard as my
own highest satisfaction would be laws which, in the nature of the
case, would forbid my being virtuous, since virtue consists in the
strength of will necessary to do what most gratifies myself. It is,
perhaps, needless to say that, with such a definition of virtue and the
ethicaUy good, society would soon become an impossibility. Indeed,
one can hardly believe that Strecker means what he says. Yet it is
there in unequivocal language ; and it is, apparently, written in cold
blood. Very certain it is that he regards himself as occupying a

286 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
scientific as compared with the alleged nonscientific Christian stand
point. Egoism is bad enough when the actor is required to beUeve that an
other (as, say, God, or the general consensus of opinion) sets the
standard of what wfll secure him the greatest happiness. But when
virtue — the ethically good — is made to consist in the strong determi
nation to live in such a way that the individual so Uving shaU obtain
his highest happiness, and then the individual is aUowed to be his own
judge of how he can secure the highest happiness, the case is doubly
serious. All our ordinary ideas of virtue are subverted by such a
theory. AU actions are made equaUy virtuous if they only tend, in
the judgment of their performers, to secure their highest happiness.
Is it replied, That is not what Strecker meant ? Then we ask in re
turn, What did he mean ? The same thought runs through the entire
section comprised in the eighteen pages in which he treats this sub
ject. It recurs and recurs again. No one has a right to say he
meant something different from what he expUcitly said. We have no
right to take a single passage out of its connections — or for that matter
in its connections, especiaUy U elsewhere the author in question modi
fies the thought by other utterances— and make it stand for an author's
whole thought. But we have not done this. We have taken his
whole section devoted to this subject and it teaches the doctrine
stated in our analysis of it. Our only resource is to accept so lengthy
and explicit a discussion as representing his own thoughts ; and we
are at liberty therefore to refute it by showing consequences of the
doctrine which he either did not foresee, or which, U he foresaw them,
did not shake his faith in his position.
There is this further remark to be made. Since this atheistic egois
tic system professes to be much superior to the Christian system,
TcompTreed wbich Strecker severely criticises, we feel that it is only
reaching"! fair for the reader to examine Strecker's teachings for
Jesus. himself, or, U that is impossible, to read our analysis of
them, often UteraUy translated from his pages, and compare them
with such utterances of Jesus as are found in Luke vi, 34, 35, and Matt.
vi, 1-3, where we are exhorted to do our acts of benevolence benevo
lently, and not with reference to what we can get out of them, though
we are assured that acts so done are certain of their reward.

The German Ethical Culturists. 287

CHAPTER II.
THE GERMAN ETHICAL CULTURISTS.
The so-called Ethical Culture movement had its origin in America,
where it has some strong books to show as the products of its thinkers.
We wish to use these, however, in another connection, and hence we
confine ourselves here to the Germans. These are not, indeed, all of
one pattern, but we choose as their spokesman the late (Berlin) Pro
fessor Georg von Gizycki. We give an analysis of his ethics. '
We call those things good which tend to produce an agreeable, or
to do away with a disagreeable, condition of consciousness. We call
those things bad, on the other hand, which tend toward the opposite
result. Hence we do not look to things, but to the spirit, Gizycki's
when we wish to know whether anything is good or bad ; the ethics of
and to different spirits the same things may be moraUy ture.
different." But things produce, in some cases, both pleasure and
pain, in which case the surplus determines the good or the bad char
acter of the thing. If there is more pleasure than pain the thing is
good, and the greater the excess of pleasure over pain the better it is.
If, on the contrary, the pain exceeds the pleasure, it is bad, and that
in proportion as the pain is greater than the pleasure.3 It is of great
importance to remember that the ideas "good for the individual"
and " good for the community " are not always identical. When we
govern our conduct by the purpose to serve to the best of our ability
the welfare of humanity we are moraUy satisfied with ourselves ; we
have a good conscience. The good man wiU give up for the common
weUare every form of personal happiness except that of satisfying his
own conscience.'1 But there is a distinction between good and bad
outside of our consciences ; the highest standard of ethical conduct is
the general weUare. All the virtues tend toward the production of
happiness and the prevention of misery. All the vices have a tend
ency precisely the reverse.6 But why should we act for the common
weal ? Because such action is right and reasonable, demanded both
by conscience and reason. In proportion as a man is weU disposed is
1 As found in his Moralphilosophie gemeinverstandlich dargestellt, Leipzig, 1888.
2 Ibid., p. 11 f. Comp. also p. 17.
3 Ibid., p. 15 f. 4 Ibid., pp. 17-19. 6 Ibid., p. 21 f.

288 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
he moved by the purpose to do that which is right and good. There
are fewer morally blind or deaf than phy sicaUy. * What distinguishes
the moral from the nonmoral man is that in the former the idea of
duty, of the right and good, awakens strong feelings of pain or
pleasure, according as he thinks of doing wrong or right, whfle in the
latter that idea awakens no such feelings, or but very weak ones.2
While the ethical rule or form is found in the common weal, the
ethical purpose is not to advance this weal but to do that which is
right, the right being determined by the tendency to advance the
common weal. If it were not so our consciences would condemn us
when we fail in our best endeavors for our fellow-men. s
The feeling of obligation arises not from any authority external to
ourselves. No command which does not appeal to our sense of duty-
is morally binding.4 In the earliest state of man, as in the childhood
of each individual, we find no distinction made between that which is
commanded and that which is right, on the one side, nor between
that which is forbidden and that which is wrong, on the other ; obedi
ence was regarded as virtue, disobedience as vice. Man begins to be
a moral being when he begins to judge of the ethical quality of that
which is required or forbidden, and to act, not only from fear of
punishment, but from the consciousness of the lightness or wrongness
of the deed.1 Obligation, command, duty, law, express something
which is not left to our personal inclination for decision. This is true
for the autonymic as well as for the heteronymic significance of the
words ; but in the former case it is our own moral feeling which
obliges us ; in the latter the wfll of another. The moral penalty
is not any bodfly pain, but the condemnation of our own conscience.6
Duties are requirements which have some kind of a penal sanction,
but the real sanction of moral duty is self -censure, seU-condemna-
tion.7 The moral law is not a law which another lays upon us. It is
the distinctive feature of the moral law that it is seU-imposed. The
voice of conscience is man's highest authority and judge concerning
good. and bad. There is no appeal to a higher court. One can only
appeal from the badly instructed to the better instructed conscience.8
The vast superiority of this system over that of the atheistic ego
ists is evident. Atheistic it is indeed, and it is in some measure true
that pleasure is the criterion of conduct ; but it is not chiefly the
pleasure of the actor, but that of those he affects by his actions. It is
1 Moralphllosophle gemeinverstiindllch dargestellt, p. 27 f. a Ibid., p. 96.
• Ibid., pp. 112-121. « Ibid., p. 122. » Ibid., p, 141 f.
•Ibid., p. 143 f. ' Ibid., p. 148. » Ibid., p. 150 f.

The German Ethical Culturists. 289
an altruistic, not an egoistic system ; and yet it is not altruistic in the
objectionably exclusive sense, for it makes the great end of moral
action right doing, though the criterion of right doing is the general
weUare. We have not mentioned his views as to free will, nor shall we dis
cuss them, since to do so would lead us too far. Suffice it to say that
he suffers aU the iUs which arise in ethics from the assertion that our
acts are such as, under the circumstances, could not have been other
wise ; though he sets this doctrine in as reasonable a light as possible.
The principal fault we find with his ethics is in reference to what it
denies rather than to what it asserts ; and its chief denial is the
necessity and value of an ethical authority external to our con
sciences.1 It is not true that our actions are moral only It . .
when we begin to reflect on their moral quality and not ^"f4 lHe^'
upon the fact of a command. True it might be U moral vaJue 0,£ an
action were differently defined. But, when the common thority.
welfare is made the criterion of the good or bad character of an act,
to deny moral quaUty where this criterion is not appUed is erroneous.
As Gizycki tells us, our consciences demand that we shaU do right.
This is in fact the sole function of conscience, properly speaking.
For the deterniination of what is right we are suppUed with the gen
eral faculty of judgment, which becomes specificaUy moral judgment
when it estimates the ethical quality of any act, past or prospective,
performed by ourselves or another. In the performance of its func
tion of monitor the conscience is always satisfied in proportion to
the profoundness of the conviction of the moral judgment. In other
words, conscience sanctions us when we act according to our moral
judgment, and disapproves us when we act contrary to it.
One of the factors by which the judgment determines its decision
is the common weal. But it is not the exclusive factor nor even the
chief, in such an estimate. The vast majority of man- The impracti.
kind are incapable of estimating the common weal. What the common
they can and do estimate is the effect of their acts on the JJJeans of de^
happiness of the few or the one with whom they are in w'h'at1" "i!
immediate association. Should most men stop to ask rlght
themselves whether their conduct was in the interest of the common
good they would find the question so difficult of satisfactory answer,
in numberless cases, that they would not act at all. In fact, such a
definition of morality would, if the attempt were made to apply it
1 On the compatibility of Autonomy and Theonomy, see G. H. Graue, Die selbstandigo
Stellung der Sittlichkeit zur Religion, Braunschweig, 1892, p. 156 f.

290 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
universally, aU but paralyze human activity. ChUdren, and indeed
practicaUy all adults also, must have some simpler criterion of judg
ment. Custom is a valuable guide for the well disposed, since it is the
expression of the best thought of the general pubUc on questions of
morals. Another such guide is parental authority, or the authority
of our teachers, legislators, and civil officers. It is true that we dare
not submit ourselves without question to their dictation tf we wish to
maintain ourselves in our God-given capacity of moral agents, but,
on the other hand, the individual dare not defy either custom or ex
ternal authority unless he wishes to render the pubUc unhappy— thus
violating one of the strongest instincts of a good heart. It is moral to
do that which we believe to be right, whatever may have been the
factors which determined that belief. And he must be seU-conceited
indeed who never gives up his own judgment as to the right, nor
adopts that of any external authority whatever.
And this suggests another defect in Gizycki's view. He claims that
it is just the distinction of the moral law that it is seU-imposed. But
is it so ? What is obedience to the moral law ? It is nothing more or
The sole con- less than the doing of that which is right and the avoid-
tent of the „ , , . 7 . ™, ^ ¦ . , .
moral law ance of that which is wrong. What is right or wrong,
not self-im- .
posed. and why it is right or wrong, are questions which the moral
law does not answer. The moral law does not consist of a given num
ber of precepts for the guidance of conduct, whether seU-imposed or
otherwise, but of just one precept : Do right. Now, whence does this
precept come? To say that man imposes it upon himseU, unless by
man is meant mankind, is evidently erroneous ; for each individual
finds this precept within his own breast long before he could have
made it the one imperative demand of his Ufe. Many a man has tried
to rid himself of it, though in vain. It adheres to each of us as long
as consciousness lasts. Our opinions of specific acts may change ; but,
whatever our judgments of right may be or become, conscience insists
ever and always on the same thing : Do right. Whether it is the
voice of God within us, or whether conscience be the product of the
forces of nature, only those who deny the existence and the creative
power of God can deny that conscience is of God.1
So, then, neither as to our moral judgments nor as to our conscience
are we independent of external authority. We do not care to foUow
this atheistic altruism further here. Certain aspects of it wfll come
before us again for fuller consideration.
1 On the relation between the moral law and religious faith, see Traub's Die Sittliche
Weltordnung, Freiburg 1, B., 1892, pp. 66-93.

The Ethics of Monism. 291

CHAPTER III.

THE ETHICS OF MONISM.

The high claims of monism in reference to ethics would warrant us
in anticipating here something almost, U not quite, unobjectionable.
In order to give the monists every advantage we pass by the left wing
entirely and choose Hoffding as representative-in-chief of the monistic
ethics.1 It is necessary here, however, to repeat the fact that mon
ists refuse to be classed theoreticaUy with atheists. Whether their
ethics are atheistic remains to be seen from the analysis and discus
sion which follow.
The distinctive feature of monistic ethics as given by Hoffding is
found in his discussion of authority in relation to conduct. First of
all he emphasizes the profound significance historicaUy Harming ad-
of external authority in the development of the human f o'und 111s-
race. Entirely without authority would be only such as, nificance of
according to the ancient myths, grew up out of the earth, thority.
The authority of the family is the most primitive. Following this the
authority of civil society. The king, the nobility, and the clergy
(priesthood), by means of their physical and mental authority have
made human development possible in rude and wild periods. In the
confidence and gratitude which the protecting powers awaken is found
the germ of the ethical character of authority. As soon as man arrived
at the beginnings of associated Ufe he began to feel that he was related,
not only to the ruling authorities in the family, tribe, or state, but also
to a higher authority which transcends and furnishes the supports for
those human societies; namely, the religious authority. Here, for
the first, authority can become absolute. A trace of the moral rela
tion is found even in fetichism, as for example, in the case of the
Negro, who covers his fetich when he is about to perform some act of
which he is ashamed. At first only the evil powers are worshiped ;
the good powers need no attention, since it is their nature to be good.
This, however, is not an ethical idea, but purely selfish. A higher
step is reached when the good powers also are worshiped with grat
itude. There was a time when it was thought necessary by ethi-
cists to declaim perpetually against authority. Now about aUof them
1 In his Grundlage der humanen Ethik, Aus dem DSnlschen, Bonn, 1880.

292 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
recognize its great historical mission for the past, present, and future,
and there is a tendency to regard its enforcement as a proof of its fun
damental position in ethics.
But while the importance of authority is thus recognized he raises
the question whether the ideas of law and of authority are necessarily
bound up together. If I submit myself to the law because it is the ex
pression of the will of the authority my motive does not spring from
the idea of the law and its contents but from the relation which I sus
tain to the author of the law, whether that relation be one of fear,
loyalty, or reverence. I attain to the recognition of the law itself only
But denies that in a roundabout way. Had another given it I might not
piete f oundiv have obeyed it ; had my authority given me an entirely
ion o e ics. con^Ta;ry. comman(i I would have obeyed it. The great
significance of authority must be recognized ; but it must be denied
that the principle of authority is the complete foundation of ethics. It
is the educating force in the history of man ; but it is the true purpose
of the educator to make the pupil independent of his preceptor. Only
that authority is ethically justifiable which recognizes its own relativ
ity. Such an authority is that which represents the tradition which
one generation passes on to another as its necessary support until it
can stand on its own feet. Fear and seU-interest are banished by the
consideration that what is to be realized is not human wishes and feel
ings, but a definite, fixed order of things in which man forms a van
ishing quantity. As long as the feeling stfll continues in man that he
is but a member of a great whole, out of which he has sprung and upon
which he is dependent, ethics and reUgion wfll, under various forms,
make their influence felt. We stand in the presence of a fact which
has its ground in the condition and in the nature of man, and which
does not stand or faU with the commandments of an external power.
The system of ethics whose principles we have now set forth is as
much in advance of the system of the ethical culturists as theirs is in
advance of the atheistic egoist. So far as the form is concerned mon
istic ethics, as portrayed by Hoffding, strikes about the true propor
tion of altruism and egoism. Furthermore, it is an ethics which may
be designated as for the race and of the race, rather than for the indi
vidual and of the individual. The individual has ever to think of
himself as a part of a solidaric unit. The high significance of exter
nal authority also receives at least some recognition. But it is in the
limitations which monistic ethics places upon this external authority
that we find its chief source of weakness. In order to avoid repetition
we refer the reader to the defense of the Christian view of ethics and

The Ethics of Monism. 293
ethical authority for that part of this discussion which relates to the
idea that law and authority are not necessarily bound up together.
For the present we content ourselves with pointing out the fact that
the monistic ethics is also based on external authority, and that that
authority is inadequate.
That monistic ethics is based on authority is evident from the ex
plicit utterances of its best representative, Hoffding. He says : " Law
presupposes an authority to which man submits."1 "Only The monistic
6 tlllCS 3i 1 S 0
those authorities are ethicaUy justifiable which recognize based on ex-
t < ' T 11 i 1 I M LI-
their relative significance." a He speaks of the individual thority.
as a member of his race, as finding himself " caUed" to perform his
duties ; of his consciousness of being a colaborer in the great task of
advancing the progress of human society ; of this consciousness of be
ing one with the feeling of obligation, with the cognition of a higher
law. 3 But not only is monistic ethics based on authority, it is based
on external authority. The individual finds himself "called;" by
whom? Not by himseU, as the ethical altruists would affirm, but by
the race of which he is a part. To one who sees himself a part of a
world-order that order would not appear as physical, but as ethical.
"In our deep sense of dependence upon nature we feel gratitude and
reverence in the presence of that great connection of things which has
secured for us the ripened fruit of the mental life." 4 In aU this it is
plain that the attempt is to sanction our sense of obligation, our call
to action, by the order of nature as a whole. These things do not
arise from ourselves, but from that which is all about us. As Hoff
ding says, "Ethics and religion exist in close and exact union." 6 This
is the Darwinian ethics based upon the pantheistic philosophy. And
the pantheists or monists affirm emphatically the necessity of a world-
view, and hence of religion, as the basis of ethics.6 So, then, monism
and Christianity agree in giving to ethics a basis of external authority.
Now, the authority posited by monism is inadequate ; first of all,
because it is too general and vague. Its function is to give the indi
vidual the law of his Ufe. But when an inteUigent being But its au-
thority is in-
submits himseU to an authority the first thing he demands adequate.
of it, i£ the submission is to have any ethical value, is that it shall be
intelligent. But the God of monism — the all — has neither personality
nor inteUigence. There may be cosmic emotion, but design is denied.
The lawgiver has no purpose. The world-order may be ethical, but it
is altogether uncertain whether it is so. Remove every trace of a
1 Grundlage der humanen Ethik, p. 47. * Ibid., p. 55. s Ibid., p. 56.
4 Ibid., p. 60 f. » Ibid., p. 61. • Haeckel, Der Monismus, p. 45.
21

294 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
personal God, which the monist seldom does in his thinking, though
he does so by profession, and it is doubtful whether anyone would see
in the world the slightest trace of ethical requirement. For U there is
no personal God there is no sin ; what we theists call sin is a part of
the manifestation of the all. Hence aU the misery which the theists
attribute to sin the monist is logicaUy compeUed, even as the materi
alist, to attribute to the world-order. We may feel ourselves a part
of a whole as much as we wfll ; if that whole of which we are a part
affords us so much suffering, while at the same time we are a mere
vanishing quantity, we can but regard ourselves as an unwelcome
part. We could, under such circumstances, feel grateful only in the
sentimental significance of the word, and our gratitude would be
mixed with resentment that our lot is so sorrowful here and is without
hope for the future. In other words, monistic ethics fails to give us a
clear view either of the inteUigence or the moraUty of the present
order of things. Without such a view the authority of the order is a
totally inadequate basis for the ethics of a being who is inteUigent and
would like to be moral U the untoward order of which he is a part did
not hinder him. The tendency of an authority less inteUigent and
moral than man himseU is to discourage aspiration. We should nec
essarily feel ourselves dependent upon a power, not ourselves, which
makes, not for righteousness, but unrighteousness ; or at any rate which
demands of us a course of conduct for which it sets no example.
But another defect of monistic as of Darwinian ethics consists in the
very point which Hoffding exalts as a virtue, namely, its relativity.
The world-order is a relative authority, therefore it is entitled to be
called ethical. If it were absolute it would lose this title. What does
he here mean by relative and absolute authority ? A careful study
leads us to the conclusion that by relative authority he means one
which wfll cease to command when it has done its work and which
w h at does does not claim ideality for its requirements. Accordingly,
mean by ret on the one side, the time may come when man wfll be a
ative au
thority? law unto himseU ; and, on the other, man is now under a
law which is but partially perfect. Now, it might at first seem as
though the former part of this idea of relative authority is just what
we may expect to occur in connection with the Christian authority,
which ceases to command those who are in Christ and in proportion
as they are in Christ. And as for the second part, it seems to corre
spond with the idea of a progressive revelation in the Christian Scrip
tures. The first point we dismiss; but we call attention to the error
in the supposed correspondence between the unideal requirements of

The Ethics of Monism. 295
monism and the unideal requirements of the earlier Christian Scrip
tures. The unideal requirements of monism result from an imperfect
state of human development. The forces at work upon man's moral
progress Ue in the nature of things ; and they are forces, not ideals.
At every moment each individual has done the best he could. He is
a product, not a creator. There is no goal before him ; at every in
stant he is at the goal. If this seems to anyone to be an incorrect
representation of monism we beg of such a one to eliminate from
monism all theistic elements and then judge afresh of what we have
said. The unideal character of the Old Testament gave the individual
a definite goal which was beyond him. He was caUed on to strive.
He was not taught that his wfll and his action were bound by forces
without him— that he had always done the best he could. If the Old
Testament requirements were not the highest God would some time
expect of men, they were at least far in advance of what man had at
tained. He was not merely pushing man from behind, he was calling
him from before. This difference between the monistic and the Chris
tian ethics shows the inadequacy of the authority posited by the
former. It is an authority which fails to utilize the best which is in
man for his own advancement in the ethical Ufe. Monists will, of
course, deny that they have no ideals, but, we repeat, whenever they
aUow any ethical ideals they abandon their own chosen position,
namely, that the world-order is the authority in ethics. What the
world-order is now is the only standard, but it is evident that the
world is up to that standard or else the world-order would not be what
it is. And, looked at from the purely monistic standpoint, those indi
viduals who seem to be morally in advance of others cannot be taken
as models ; for there is no fixed standard by which to judge whether
their seeming superiority is more than seeming. Only that ethics
which allows an absolute standard can legitimately make any use of
ideals.

296 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER IV.
criticism of antichristian ethical systems.
To the above brief consideration of various systems of ethics op
posed to Christianity it is needful to add some remarks of a more gen
eral kind. Our purpose here is to point out certain dangerous features
which are common to aU antichristian ethical systems ; features in
herent in those systems, though not always openly avowed, and some
times denied.
The first of these characteristics is their fataUsm. However this
may be denied or explained away the fact remains that U we cannot,
The fatalism m any given act, do otherwise than we do our acts are
tfan Systems necessitated. No matter though I may do differently
of ethics. under Uke external circumstances in the future, because
of the smitings of the conscience, what I do at any given time is the
only thing I can do at that time. While we have nothing but con
demnation to express toward Strecker's ethical system, yet we must
once more credit him with a logical consistency and a courage of con
viction worthy those who shrink from his conclusions. He says : l
"The man of honor and the criminal are made of the same stuff ; and
it is not free wfll, but the force of circumstances which has made them
what they are. . . . EspeciaUy is it opportunity and temptation to
given acts which determine the character and destiny of men." It is
difficult to see, under such circumstances, why anyone should feel re
morse. Indeed, Strecker * and Gizycki 3 leave no place for retribution,
and make the only object of remorse, censure, or penalty the introduc
tion of a subjective element into the mind of the criminal or wrong
doer which will become a motive for resistance in future temptations,
or at most a protection of society against the deeds of the breaker of
the law." Now, as to remorse, it must be said that this is a state
which springs up in the individual often without a word of censure
from without ; and when there is no remorse for an evfl deed we look
upon the remorseless as particularly hardened. In fact, he is no more
1 Welt und Menschheit, p. 92 f. « ibid., p. 91.
8 Moralphilosophie. Slebenter Abschnltt.
4 Comp. Martineau's able criticism of Darwin's theory of remorse, in Types of Ethical
Theory, second edition, Oxford and New York, 1886, vol. 11, pp.419 ff.

Criticism of Antichristian Ethical Systems. 297
to be blamed for his remorselessness than for his deed if he is alto
gether the product of forces over which he has no control. Only in
case he is a free agent can we censure him for anything. •
The second characteristic is the almost complete obliteration of the
distinction between good and bad in actions. Logically and intrinsi
cally there can be no distinction at all. Here it is in the Obliteration of
the distinc-
writings of the monists, who professedly bufld so much tion between
good and
better than the atheists, that we find the most exphcit evil.
utterances on the relativity of the ideas "good" and "bad." Says
Forel:" "The concepts 'good' and 'bad' are entirely secondary and
relative to man ; they have no existence in and for themselves, but
only as relative antitheses. ... In fact, in itself there is nothing good
and nothing bad in the world, and when we assume these we do it
only because behind all these remain our human interests and rela
tive concepts, or we must confess that we simply do not know the
purpose and nature of the things in question. " Hoffding says : 3 " Hu
man ethics, for which the Golden Age, Paradise, is not a lost good,
but a goal which, as far as it is possible under human conditions,
is to be attained by the efforts of our race, cannot look upon sin
or moral evil as anything absolute. It knows a ' not yet,' but no 'no
longer.' " By this he simply means that man is not fallen, and hence
we cannot speak of him as " no longer " what he was, but as ' ' not yet "
having reached his highest moral possibilities. Now, we believe that
man has not reached those possibilities, and also that he had not be
fore the f aU. But positive or absolute wrong must be asserted by aU
who wfll assert any wrong whatever of a moral kind. The opposite
doctrine springs from making right and wrong to consist wholly in
their bearing on human happiness. As a matter of fact the right
tends to make men happy by Uf ting them above the iUs of life and by
providing them the joy of realized moral, inteUectual, social, and re
ligious ideals ; but things are not right merely because they contribute
to the happiness of man.4
This leads us to the position of the Ethical Culturists as represented
by Gizycki. He frankly says : s " If we would know what is good and
what is bad we must look at last not to the things (acts, etc.) them
selves, but to the mind ; and, according as the mind is, the same
1 Benjamin Vetter admits this. Die moderne Weltanschauung und der Mensch, p. 107.
a Gehirn und Seele, p. 7. Comp. also Vetter, as above, p. 107.
* Grundlage der humanen Ethik, p. 104 f . He uses the word " human " to distinguish
his system from theological ethics.
4 Comp. Balfour's The Foundations of Belief, New York, 1895, p. 16 f.
11 Moralphilosophie, p. 12.

298 FODNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.
things may be good or bad." That is, any act, as say, lying, is in and
of itseU neither wrong nor right, neither good nor bad, but is good or
bad according as the act bears upon the welfare of the world of hu
manity. There might arise, according to such a doctrine, circum
stances in which lying would appear to anyone not only excusable,
but which would make it appear wrong not to Ue. This is the inevi
table consequence of the doctrine that there is no absolute standard
with regard to human actions, but that each act is to be estimated by
itself, and by each individual according to his own mental constitu
tion and best judgment as to the effect upon human welfare of doing
or omitting it. Here again Strecker does not hesitate to deduce and
defend the logical consequences of the hedonistic ethics. Hear him :
"So much at least is plain, that the content of the moral law is not
continuaUy and everywhere the same, . . . that even people of equal
education differ as to what is good and bad, useful or injurious, right
and wrong. . . . We ought to regard the property rights of others ;
but does the poor mother do wrong when she steals bread to keep her
child from starvation ? We ought not to Ue. . . . Dare this command
not be violated in the interest of a higher purpose ? ... Is the Ue
under no external pressure allowable or justifiable ? . . . Can a phy
sician always avoid falsehood when he wishes to comfort a patient,
awaken his hope, etc ? ... In the frequent cases in which the tra
ditional moral precepts come into conflict with each other no other
guide remains to us than our own feelings and opinions. . . . The
moral law is different for each different man." '
Now, the ruin which such a doctrine would work in the moral world
must be evident to aU who have not blinded their own moral vision by
antichristian prejudice. If there are as many different ways of treating
truth as there are circumstances in life, then truth is a mere tool, and
truthfulness a mere name. But let us suppose that there might be ex
treme circumstances when falsehood would be more useful than truth,
still this ought to be considered as an evil, not as being equaUy vir
tuous with truthfulness ; as an unavoidable compromise arising from
the perversity of human hearts, not as admissible by the moral law ;
as the choosing of the lesser evfl, not as warranted by righteousness.
The right to perpetrate falsehood is evidently very precious to mo-
C ar n eri and nistic ethicists, for they aU appear to defend it. Carneri,
istsoii truth- m urging truthfulness as the beginning and end of aU
fulness. ethics, says : " " The point is not that one shall never speak
an untruth, but if one tells an untruth it should be such a case as
1 Welt und Menschheit, pp. 109-111. ' Der moderne Mensch, p. 108.

Criticism of Antichristian Ethical Systems. 299
would be justified by every high-minded man. His conduct must be
such that all the world will see that truth is sacred to him. ... If he
is sometimes compelled to dissimulate nothing can compel him to play
the hypocrite." Surely that is a strange conception of the sacredness
of truth which could tolerate falsehood. But it is to be remembered
that according to monist ethics everything is done for the common
good, presumably even lying. On this ground it wfll be difficult to
convict the Jesuits of immoraUty when in the interests of the Church,
which is to them the source of all good, they practice mental reserva
tions. But Vetter also, whose monistic orthodoxy is vouched for by
Haeckel himseU, seems to think that absolute truthfulness is whoUy
impracticable. He teUs us once more the story of the young man
who made a wager that he would utter no falsehood for a whole day,
and who won, though at night he had lost his betrothed, his means of
earning a Uvelihood, his best friends, and the inheritance his uncle had
expected to leave him.1 The fact is that any system of ethics which
makes the standard of conduct dependent upon the individual's esti
mate of the effect of his deeds upon the happiness of men must faU a
prey to all the evil consequences of this defense of falsehood, which
would render society impossible and degrade the individual, and pre
vent his development of his godlike personality.
This whole system of ethics based upon the doctrine of evolution is,
or U made the principle of conduct by the individual would be, dan
gerous in the extreme to good morals. Its natural effects are hindered
only by the Christian training of its adherents. Says Vetter : "In
brief that appears here as fact which we before mentioned hypothet-
icaUy as the consequence of the process by which man has been de
veloped, that every period and every smaller or larger human society
has recognized that as good or bad which by its whole tendency was
useful or hurtful to the common weal." And in speaking of the fact
that Christianity holds up a flxed ideal standard he un- Advantages of
dertakes to say that evolutionary ethics offers something standard.
better in that it has no stable norm. "The various spheres in Ufe to
which the individual man belongs — family and business caUing, com
munity and state, society and humanity — embody in themselves the
ethical views of very different stages of development. " 2 Except to one
who is convinced that the doctrine of evolution overthrows Christian
ity and is better than that which it overthrows, it would be difficult
to make plain the superiority of an ever-changing standard over one
that is flxed, provided that the latter were the highest conceivable.
i Die moderne Weltanschanung und der Mensch, pi 111. * Ibid., p. 112.

300 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
The changing standard makes men contented with themselves ; the
fixed, perfect standard spurs or allures men to endeavor. Besides,
there is of necessity confusion as to what is right and wrong as long
as there is no rule by which each can judge his conduct.
Another difficulty with the evolutionary ethics, whether egoistic or
altruistic, atheistic or monistic, is that it degrades morahty to a means
instead of setting it up as the goal. The end is human happiness, the
Morality a means right conduct. When conduct is just what it
goal, in evo- ought to be aU men wfll be perfectly happy.1 In this
ethics. natural and theological ethics agree. But with the for
mer conduct and happiness are related as means and end, whfle in the
latter the end is ethical conditions subjective and objective, and hap
piness is the result. Christianity does not despise but prizes human
happiness, and is perfectly sure that there can be no happiness of a
true and lasting kind where ethical conditions are not perfect and uni
versal. It taught this eighteen hundred years before our modern
apostles of evolutionary ethics were born. But much as it prizes hu
man happiness it regards moral perfection as infinitely superior. In
present conditions our best endeavors often fail to bring our fellow-
men the happiness we desire, and not infrequently the only happiness
the good man secures as the result of aU his labors is that which
springs from an approving conscience. This is, indeed, a sufficient
reward, but it is not that, or at least not aU of that, which evolution
ary ethicists set for the goal. Hence there must be disappointment
and perhaps discouragement. With human perfection rather than
human happiness as the end of all our moral endeavor we are always
sure that no effort fails to accomplish its due proportion of the great
task before us. We may have secured no better external conditions
for ourselves or others, owing to the neutralizing effects of the conduct
of evfl men, but we have, for ourselves at least, approached our goal
by every restraint of evfl passion and by every unselfish performance
of duty ; while at the same time we have done as much for the ad
vancement of human happiness as though we had aimed directly at
that, since all agree that happiness depends upon good morals.
Another and most serious difficulty with aU non-Christian systems
Inconsistent or ethics is that they are partly inconsistent and partly
q u ate" mo- inadequate in their proffer of motives for moral progress.
Christian In aU good logic nontheistic evolution ought to disre
gard motives altogether. Things, like Topsy in Uncle
Tom's Cabin, have no bringing up, they just grow up. They are pushed
1 Spencer, Data of Ethics, New York, 1883, chap. 8, and especially pp. 134, 137, 138.

Criticism of Antichristian Ethical Systems. 301
from behind ; never attracted from before. The morals of the world
have grown up as unconsciously to men as they did to our animal an
cestors, or as the weeds grow up in the fields ; they grow because it
is in the nature of things that they should. Nevertheless, however
inconsistently, all moralists speak of motives.
But further inconsistency is manifested in that adherents of natural
ethics condemn Christianity for sanctioning good morals by rewards
and by threatening evildoers with penalty. Yet, what else is this
hedonistic basis of ethics but a system of rewards and punishments ?
Christianity caUs men to righteousness for its own sake, and promises
happiness in addition. Egoistic natural ethics bluntly tells us that
the reward is what it is after, the strong intimation being that if hap
piness depended upon bad morals its adherents would be bad. But
even in systems nobler than the egoistic the chief thing is the reward
or the penalty. Right is to be performed, not because it is right,
but because it tends to make men happy — to further the common
weal. In this Gizycki J is an exception as far as his declaration goes ;
but consistently he cannot demand that men shall do right because it
is right and at the same time emphasize the reward of happiness as he
does, particularly when he condemns Christianity for the same
course.1 But, worse than this, the motives possible in naturalistic ethics are
inadequate, chiefly because of the anthropology with which they are
connected. Many of these ethicists are apparently fuUy persuaded
that man is simply a higher animal, with a morality which differs
only in degree from that of the lower animals from which he sprang.
This is so firm a conviction with some that they even deny any moral
sense in man. Carneri says : " Man is, through and through, a vicious
animal (von Haus aus ein bosartiges Thier) in whom resides no moral
sense."3 In the same connection he goes on to show that any
demands upon man which conflict with his nature (as a vicious
animal without a moral sense, we suppose) can never be realized.
This is a most depressing view to take of man. In comparison with
it the most depraved form of the doctrine of total depravity was ele
vated and inspiring. Not many, however, would go so far as the doc
trine stated by Carneri suggests. Yet the mildest form of this modern
anthropology would crush hope were it to become prevalent. " The
time is past," says Hoffding, "in which one can console himself with
1 See his section on Das Bewusstsein recht zu thun als der sittliche Endzweck, Moral-
philosophie, pp. 112 ff.
' Moralphilosophie, p. 338, where, however, he misrepresents Christianity.
> Der moderne Mensch, p. 22.

302 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
the supposition that man is the center of the world's Ufe and that
everything exists for his sake. The more thought penetrates into the
secrets of nature and learns her laws, the more man by the aid of this
knowledge can employ the powers of nature for his own benefit, the
more does he at the same time perceive that human Ufe is but a van
ishing element in proportion to the great whole." J Hoffding thinks
this doctrine tends to deprive men of an egoistic view of life, and even
to attract attention away from man and his wishes and to make him
submit cheerfully to what nature offers him and to devote himseU to
the reaUzation of nature's purposes. But as a matter of fact there is
nothing in such a view of man to produce the results he expects, but
everything to bring about the contrary. If nature's purposes were
those of an intelligent being man might be willing to sacrifice himseU
in their interest ; but when the fixed order is unintelUgent and unfeel
ing, and when tha,t order has brought man into the world only to
mock him for his insignificance, there is nothing to arouse either grat
itude or hope in the human breast, and without these there would be
Uttle activity or devotion.
Let it be generaUy understood that man is very insignificant in point
of importance, and that he does not even have so much consideration
bestowed upon him as to give him more than a span of days, and the
effect must inevitably be pessimistic gloom. Men will not submit
themselves cheerfully to such a natural order. If they submit at aU
it will be despairingly. They may assist each other under such cir
cumstances, but it wfll be not as sharers of a larger hope, but as part
ners in a common distress.3
It is evident that, whatever we may think of the metaphysical
¦questions supposed to be settled by monism, the system has as yet,
so far as its chief living representatives are concerned, not dis
engaged itseU from the toils of the materiaUstic ethics. What is
needed is freedom from the depressing influence of the evolution
ary idea of the basis of moral action, according to which that
action is right which is approved by the community; which there-
„ , , fore affords no higher standard by which to measure our
Conclusion. J
conduct and no ideal toward which we should strive.
The supposed fact that the processes of evolution will some time bring
in the perfect morality for the race may be unquestionable ; but the
difficulty with it is that we shall have no way of knowing when we
1 Grundlage der humanen Ethik, p. 60.
3 Comp. Bowne's The Principles of Ethics, New York„1892, pp. 194 ff. j and Balfour's The
Foundations of Belief, pp. 26 ff.

Criticism of Antichristian Ethical Systems. 303
have attained. By almost whoUy ignoring the fact that effort can
change our individual conduct from bad to good naturaUstic ethics
loses tha immense advantage which accrues to morals from earnest
endeavor. Ancestry and environment are not, whatever non-Chris
tian moralists may say to the contrary, the determining elements in
the morals of the individual, and need not be, therefore, in the morals
of the race. It is entirely possible to hasten the reign of righteous
ness. But U men are to strive for this goal they must not be taught
that they amount to nothing here and that there is no hereafter.
Every system of non-Christian ethics renders high morality logicaUy
impossible by ignoring the value of the ideal, and by robbing human
nature of its lofty significance. Only in the light of the Christian
doctrines of God and of the divine image and immortaUty in man can
we find any sufficient reason why the individual should be just, or
honest, or benevolent. Under the influence of the great truths of
Christianity human lUe becomes incalculably sacred, every moral in
stinct finds its fuU justification, and the inspiration to high endeavor
is supplied ; whfle at the same time, in the Christian law of love
the rule is supplied for the correct appUcation of our moral judg
ments.1 1 Comp. Bowne's The Principles of Ethics, pp. 160 ff.

304 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION II.-OBJECTIONS TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
christian ethics and external authority.
Before going further it ought to be said that in almost every
instance of objection to Christian ethics the objector has taken
either a shaUow or an erroneous view of the Christian idea. This
arises generaUy from the habit of taking the words of some supposed
representative of the ethical views of Christianity as those of a real
representative. The Christian reUgion, which includes Christian
ethics, is portrayed authoritatively in the New Testament, particu
larly in the four gospels, and U anyone wfll give to those records of
the teachings of Jesus an unbiased and careful study he wfll see that
most of his objections both to the Christian reUgion and to Christian
ethics (if we may distinguish between them) are baseless. The ob
jections not thus removed are a fair subject of debate between our
selves and our opponents.
There are four fundamental objections which non-Christian ethicists
lodge against Christian ethics. First, that it is based on external au
thority. Here again we must turn to Hoffding for the strongest putting
of the opposition. He even goes so far as to say that the one who acts
because a higher authority commands him to act would obey a reverse
command if the same authority ordered it. • He seems to think that
the principle of external authority in matters of conduct robs him who
submits to the authority of all right to exercise judgment for himself.
This is not true of Christian submission, which is purely voluntary
with him who submits ; that is, all ought to subject themselves to the
authority of God, but those who do so do it voluntarily. Hence a
degree of intelligence is presupposed, and this inteUigence leads men
to feel that submission to the will of God as revealed in Jesus Christ
is certain to secure the best results for all mankind. As it is a volun
tary relation it presupposes reflection on Christian requirement after
as before submission. Should one conscientiously think that the law
of Christ is not the best law there is nothing to hinder his severing the
relation voluntarily entered into ; although he who remains outside
1 Grumilage der humanen Ethlk, p. 48.

Christian Ethics and External Authority. 305
of or departs from this relation takes upon himseU aU the natural
consequences to himseU and others.
Now, the law of Christ is not a set of specific rules, but rather a
principle. Christ was the end of the law for righteousness to aU
that believe in him ; that is, its compulsory force is not felt by the
genuine Christian. The true disciple has never found in the precepts
which Jesus indorsed any ill to mankind, but benefit only. His ex
perience in this regard leads him to think that whenever a question of
conduct is involved he need only determine as nearly as possible
what Jesus would have done under like circumstances and his per
plexity will end. He believes Jesus sinless within and nature of
without, and as he loves Jesus he loves and longs for sin- thorny BIn
lessness. It is his greatest grief that he faUs short. He Cnristtanlty-
believes that Jesus revealed the character of God as perfectly holy ;
and he desires nothing so much as to become ethicaUy Uke God. In
other words, ethical authority in Christianity is not lodged in God as
ruler but in God as an ethical standard. There are authorities on
etiquette. They do not command, but they tell us what is proper.
We do as we please about foUowing their notions. If they represent
social custom correctly we gain or lose in social standing by regarding
or disregarding them ; but in no case do we think of obedience in the
abject sense of the word. So God, who has a right to command, does
not put the Christian into the relation of an abject subordinate obey
ing commands, but the Christian adopts God as revealed in Christ as
his ethical standard or authority. To him what God is and wills is
right in the same sense in which that is socially proper to the man of
the world which the Four Hundred are and do in social relations.
Perhaps no one will misunderstand the comparison, which is only
designed to define the words authority, obedience, and the Uke. The
Christian does not regard ethics as on the same plane with conven
tional etiquette ; and while our etiquette of this conventional sort may
change with the caprice of the Four Hundred our Christian standard
of authority is unchangeable. We may come to understand it bet
ter, but it is as unchangeable as God. So that the Christian would
not obey a reverse command, for he would know it came not from
God. But Hoffding goes further. The principal command of Christianity
is declared to be love ; but upon closer consideration he finds that we
are not to love man for his own sake but for God's sake. Love is not
the cardinal Christian virtue, but obedience— submission to God's
wfll. Obedience is the fundamental relation to an authority. In

306 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Christianity love is subordinated to obedience, for it knows no love not
founded on belief in supernatural authority. Christianity knows no
distinction of race or social condition, but it estabUshes a more vital
antithesis, that between behevers and unbeUevers, saved and un
saved Love and faith thus work against each other.1 It is most
astounding to find a man of Hoffding's thoughtfulness taking such a
view of Christianity, and asserting that the law of love is realized
only as a result of the modern principle of tolerance and that Spinoza
was the first to show that love is greater than faith. Did he never
The relations read the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, where
f°iithvinathe Paul expressly places love at the summit, distinctly
system.4 ia" saying that love is greater than faith? Jesus made much
of faith, but he said that the great commandment is love; and his
new commandment was to love one another as he had loved them. It
requires a charitable spirit to save us from saying that Hoffding was
hard pushed when he had to resort to such a position. As to the
modern principle of tolerance, Jesus taught it in its most perfect
aspects. ' Modern principle indeed ! How fond men are of taking the
things that Jesus taught and pretending they discovered them ! As to
the antithesis between believers and unbeUevers, saved and unsaved,
it exists only as a sad fact for Christians, not as a principle of social
exclusion, as in the case of the distinction between nations and
classes. And if it did it would be unchristian ; for Jesus was the
friend of sinners, and his followers are only Christians so far as they
are like him. This may be hard on some Christians, but it sets Chris
tianity right. Love and faith do not conflict in Cihristianity, then ;
but faith works by love.3
So also all that Hoffding says about obedience as the cardinal virtue
in Christianity is baseless. He does not pretend to find his conclu
sions in the Christian Scriptures ; they are his own inferences from the
nature of authority. But, as we have seen, he wrongly conceives the
nature of authority in Christianity, and hence also the nature of the obe-
Hoffding's dience to be rendered. In like manner does he misrepre-
misconcep- tions of sent Christianity when he says that Christians are not
Christian-ity. to love man for his own sake but for God's sake. It is a
fact that we are taught to love man for God's sake ; and it is one
of the glories of our religion that we are thus taught. Man does not
always appear lovable to man, but we are taught that when men ap
pear to us unlovable we must still love them because God, our God,
loves them ; and that when our hearts are right, we can love unlovable
1 Grundlage der humanen Ethik, p. 48 f . » Matt, v, 43, 44 ; Luke ix, 52-66. s Gal. V, 6.

Christian Ethics and External Authority. 307
men. Until we can love them with our hearts we must love them in
deed because God loves them. If we cannot love them for their own
sake we must love them for his sake, and our love to him is tested by
our love to man. • And this shows us that Christianity requires us to
love man for his own sake. Besides, the whole Christian system pro
ceeds on the theory that God loved man for man's sake. The Christian
is expected to be not conformed to this world but to take God's point
of view, and so to love man as God loved man. If there is any one
thing well grounded in the entire Christian system it is that as Chris
tians we are to love man for his own sake. Should any of us ever
think in a pessimistic mood and moment that man is unworthy of
love we are immediately taught the contrary by the recoUection
that Christ loved us and gave himself for us. In fact, the Chris
tian is related both to God and man, to one as vitally as to the other,
and the first duty to both is love. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God and thou shalt love thy neighbor," the neighbor being anyone
who needs our help.2 FormaUy, however, the Christian is in the
relation to God of a voluntary subject in the sense explained above ;
while his formal relation to man is that of helpfulness. Unless, then,
Hoffding understands Christianity better than its Founder did, love
is the cardinal Christian virtue.
There, is, however, another phase of this matter which ought to be
attended to here. While the Christian, because he is a Christian,
looks upon God, not as a ruler, but as a father,3 and does the Father's
will, not from compulsion, but because he loves the same things the
Father loves, yet God is an ethical authority in the sense in which
Hoffding uses the word, though only for non-Christians, or for those
who are striving to attain but have not yet attained the mind which
was in Christ. Anyone who knows the human heart knows that it
needs external restraints. Hoffding himself emphasizes the educative
power and function of external authority, whfle affirming that the
authority ceases to be such when the subject of it becomes able to dis
pense with it. Now, this is exactly what happens to one who is striv
ing to be like the Christ in spirit and conduct. When he does not
feel a disposition to do the right he does it because he is commanded.
After the disposition is produced he does the thing commanded be
cause he loves it, and not because it is commanded. Here again Hoff
ding learned from Christ and ran off proclaiming the discovery as his
own. But we must guard against being misunderstood. There is and
1 1 John iv, 20. 2 Luke x, 29-37. s Gal. iv, 6.

308 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
must be external authority in matters of civil society and ethics unless
each individual is to be a law unto himself. This necessity arises
The necessity from the perversion of the human heart — which aU ac-
asPdist\ne- . knowledge, however they may explain the fact. It fol-
fronl ethical lows that it is the duty of good men to submit themselves
ments.ire" to regulations and restraints and to the performance of
acts which they would not need were they the only people in the
world, and which would not exist but for the presence in society of
evfl men. In other words, in civil society there are positive as dis
tinguished from ethical commandments, and it is the ethical duty of
every man to submit to them just because they are imposed by exter
nal authority, without which society cannot exist. In the same way
there may be positive duties connected with our relation to God-
duties imposed by the Supreme Ruler in consequence of the unideal
state of the vast majority. If there be such commands it is duty to
observe them, not because they are founded in our conception of right,
but because wisdom has dictated them. That we do not see the rea
son for these commands does not release us from the obligation to
keep them. He who does keep them performs an ethical act, for he
is doing the right in submitting himseU to a revealed will of one who
has a right to speak. Only one who denies a personal God and his
rulership and revelation can deny the ethical character of such sub
mission. It is not true that in Christianity unconditional authority
continually thrusts itseU between the actor and what he would do,
and that the God of the Christian is jealous lest we should act for
some other reason than because he has commanded it ; • though it is
true that the Christian's God expects that what he is and wills shaU
be the standard for aU men, whether their horizon is wide enough to
comprehend his reasons or not.
1 Comp. Hoffding's Grundlage der humanen Ethlk, p. 48.

The Asoertainability of God's Will. 309

CHAPTER II.
THE ASCERTAINABILITY OF GOD'S WILL.
But it is declared that there is no way of ascertaining what the wfll
of God is. Here we shaU have to follow the sinuosities of Gizycki's
reasoning in order to trace out the faUacy involved in the objection
stated. He first points out that it is generaUy conceded by scholars
since the time of Hume and Kant that the existence of a personal God
cannot be demonstrated.1 In this he errs, except as the deniers of God
are accustomed to arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to be
termed scientific. But Gizycki conveniently forgot to state that Kant
declares that though it cannot be proved it must be beUeved, and hence
acted upon. However, he supposes for the sake of argument that
there is a personal God and that his wfll is the foundation of morals :
now he asks, How are we to determine what his wfll is ? There are
two ways — the study of external nature and supernatural revelation.
He argues that, to say nothing of the doubts on the part Gizycki on the
difficulty of
of many believers in God to-day as to the possibflity of a ascertain
ing the will
supernatural revelation, it is stfll a question which of the of God.
professed revelations contains God's wfll." If we take any one of
these as a starting point we do not get a universally valid morahty,
but one which is adapted to the adherents of the religion which fur
nished the revelation.
In discussing this point we shaU have to refer the reader to the lat
ter part of this book for a full consideration of the possibility of a
supernatural revelation, and for the proof that the final revelation is
furnished us in Jesus Christ. At present we call attention to the fact
that Christian morality is adapted to aU men, and that it is, strictly
speaking, capable of being applied among aU nations. It is a univer
sal moraUty, as weU suited to the orient in which it originated as to
the Occident where it has won its chief victories. But at length
Gizycki grants us the superiority of Christian morals, shirking the
real consequences of the concession by asking whether we shaU fol
low the moraUty of Romanism, of the Greek Church, of the Luther
ans, or Reformed, or, in general, which. Gizycki ought to know that
as we go to Kant for the Kantian philosophy in its pure form so we go
1 Moralphilosophie, p. 330. a iwd., p. 335.
22

310 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
to Christ for the pure form of Christian ethics. In the New Testa
ment, contrary to the assertion of Gizycki,1 we have an original and
His difficulty complete as weU as thoroughly seU-consistent and easily
imaginary, comprehensible moral system. That some differences of
opinion exist among theologians as to the genuineness of certain pas
sages, or even certain books, of the New Testament does not, as Giz
ycki pretends,2 make morality dependent upon textual criticism ; for
everything essential to the system of Christian moraUty is unequivo
cally taught in many unquestioned passages and books of the New
Testament. Again, it is asserted that tf we knew the revelation to be from God
we should have no method of determining that the revealed ethics
was good unless we had a previous knowledge of good ; and U we had
the knowledge of good by which to test a revelation we should not
need the revelation.3 But it is not true that we could not test the ex
cellence of revealed ethics unless we had a previous and adequate
knowledge of the ethicaUy good. Briefly, what we have revealed in
the New Testament ethics is the law of love. The originaUty of that
law as given by Christ we shall discuss in the next chapter. For the
present assuming it to be original, we affirm that it might be per
ceived to be good by those who had previously no approach to a cor
rect conception either of the good or of love as a law. The conscience,
which, however we may explain its origin, prompts every man to do
right, by its own action gives each of us to understand that there is a
right and a wrong, a good and a bad. This much may be said to be
revealed by conscience. But a moral standard, as, for example, the
general welfare, by which men may test their actions is the possession
of very few, most of us acting according to our instincts rather than
understandings. Yet there are few so low down in the scale of intel
ligence as to be unable to see at a glance the value of any standard
which might be at all adequate to the measurement of character and
is the knowl- conduct. The ppwer to perceive this value is not so
veaied' im> much conditioned by a previous knowledge of ethics as
pVnd'en8! it is by a mental capacity. Were it not for our posses-
vious knowl- si°n 0^ sucn a power as this, by which we discern almost
etfTicaffy intuitively the value of any new scheme or device pre-
g0° ? sented to our thought, we could make no progress, or at
most but very slow progress, in knowledge or insight. Some knowledge
we must have to test the value of revealed ethics, but not the knowl
edge revealed. Progress in ethical knowledge does not differ in this
> Moralphllosophle, p. 336. • Ibid., p. 337. • Comp. ibid., p. 331 f.

The Ascertainability of God's Will. 311
regard from progress in other knowledge imparted by instruction.
The wise teacher prepares the way for the impartation of a great
truth, but he does not expect a previous knowledge of that truth in
order that it may be understood when imparted. For this purpose a
far lower degree of knowledge is adequate.
In particular, Gizycki tries to destroy the value of the command
ment, "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," by saying, along
with other things of less moment, that it reduces to the standard of
religionless ethics, namely, the weUare of humanity.1 Now, let us
suppose that, as he says, we need no revelation to teach us to seek the
welfare of mankind, or, in other words, to love our neighbors as our
selves; what we are after in morals is not merely knowl- Not mereiy
edge, but also motives and impulses to action. We think but°aisodmo^
the attentive and unprejudiced reader has discovered ere tives neeaed-
this that there is nothing in religionless ethics to impel men to seek
the general weUare. Even U, as some suppose, our earliest instincts
are altruistic, contact with Ufe soon develops in most men an over
powering egoism, as aU history illustrates. The majority of man
kind, sad to say, are Uke Ishmael, with their hands against every
man, and every man's hand against them." Considerations of self
may lead men who have no love for each other to combine rather than
compete ; but this merely mitigates the strife somewhat, and does not
overcome the egoism so powerfully active in human hearts. For this
purpose there must be something which is of a higher order than the
world affords. There must be not only a divine revelation to our
minds and hearts, but also a divine transformation of our natures.
Conscience must somehow be afforded the cooperation, not alone
of the moral judgment, but also of the social feelings. We must be
born again before we can reach our best in this regard, and in pro
portion as the new nature is complete wfll we be able to execute what
our judgments dictate.
1 Moralphilosophle, p. 337. J Gen. xvi, 12.

312 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER IH.
ORIGINALITY OF CHRIST'S LAW OF LOVE— REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.
But it is erroneous to suppose that we need no revelation to teach
us to love our neighbors as ourselves. It is frequently asserted that
the law of love was taught by the Buddha, by Confucius, by the
Stoics, and others, prior to or independent of Christ.1 The effort to
dispute the originaUty of Jesus is, however, a failure. That he did
not bring into the world an ethics or a reUgion for which no prepara
tion had been made by previous revelations and providential lead
ings is not denied but asserted in the New Testament. It is one of the
evidences of the wisdom of the Nazarene Carpenter that he did not
come to destroy but to fulfiU. But that he brought something new is
only questioned by intense partisans ; and even some of them are fair-
Testimony to minded enough to acknowledge his superiority to aU who
naiity'^of went before, or who have foUowed after. Says WeU-
jesus. hausen:3 "Jewish scholars. . . . would have us beUeve
that all he (Jesus) said is found in the Talmud. Yes, aU and much
more, nteov i/uov travrSc. The originaUty of Jesus consists in the fact
that out of the chaotic desert (of thought) he recognized and with
greatest possible emphasis brought to our attention the True and the
Eternal." Even more definitely does Vetter admit the originaUty of
Jesus. Speaking of the growth of the conception of duty to our fel
low-men he says that "the idea of the universal brotherhood and equal
rights of aU men was first comprehended by Christ in all its inner
truth and fuU depth," and that this idea was made the banner which
his first followers carried with aU the enthusiasm of a new view of
the world.8
These concessions, great as they are, do not comprehend the whole
truth of the matter. In the writings or sayings of all others the ap
proaches to the love which Jesus inculcated as the substance and
standard of conduct the doctrine of love was but occasional, not fun
damental—not the one essential ingredient in ethics. In fact, it was
negatively rather than positively put. It was not " love as you would
1 So Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, p. 85 f., and generally among antichris
tian ethicists.
a Israelitlsche und jtldische Geschlchte, 2te Ausgabe, Berlin, 1895, p. 351.
8 Die moderue Weltanschauung und der Mensch, p. 112.

Originality of Christ's Law of Love. 313
be loved," but " do nothing you would not have others do to you." It
was a considerable advance to have the positive side put, Love as taught
"Do unto others as you would that they should do unto aVdby
you." The negative would prevent much injustice and otDers-
unkindness, but the positive would produce much justice and kind
ness. Nevertheless, Jesus did not state his moral code in the Golden
Rule. When he summed up the great commandments of the law
which he came to fulfill he gave the words, "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyseU." How, now, does this " love thy neighbor as thyself" differ from the
standard of the general weUare, or the welfare of mankind ? If it
stood by itseU it would still differ from the Golden Rule in that it
requires love rather than action; but at the same time a love
which is sure to lead to action. Self-love is not selfishness, for the
selfish man does not love himself. True seU-love is thoughtful for our
own good, and active in the effort to secure it. It is expected, there
fore, of the one who loves his neighbor as himself that he love man
kind thoughtfully, not sentimentally nor passionately alone, and that
he be active in his endeavors to secure the good of mankind. One
might seek the general welfare as a mere matter of duty while lack
ing any genuine love for mankind.1 Not such can be the attitude to
ward men of one who would fulfill the command of Christ. Such an
one must cultivate a spirit of love as a feeling toward all men. This
is evident from the "new commandment" which Jesus Nature of. the
gave to his disciples, " As I have loved you, that ye also by Christ.
love one another."" His love to them was to be the model of their
love to one another, and his love was one of feeling leading to seU-de-
nying and beneficent action. This does not leave each one to judge
for himseU as to the degree of love or activity he is to mamf est toward
his neighbor. His love for himself is to be tested by the love of Christ
for him before he makes it a standard of his love to others. Under
the rule or norm set by Christ it is not merely demanded that we seek
to ameliorate sorrowful conditions, whether physical or mental, nor
even that we strive for the physical, intellectual, and social perfection
of human conditions. AU this is included ; but he who loves God with
aU his heart and his neighbor as himseU must strive to induce his
neighbor to love God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself.
He must not only seek the welfare of mankind, but strive to enlist
others in the endeavor to bring in the golden age ; and he must do it
1 1 Cor. xiii, 3. * John xiii, 34.

314 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
by making men love the good, the righteous, the holy, the loving God.
The law of Jesus, in other words, recognizes the fact that the general
welfare cannot be secured while men love only earthly things ; and it
recognizes that the human heart demands for the object of its truest
and highest love a person possessed of aU lovely attributes ; and that
true and intense love to such a being, or to one supposed to be such,
has the effect of making the heart warm toward all who are loved by
him. In the light of all these things it is absurd to say that others had
taught the law of love before or independent of Christ.' So far as
This law not tney "taught" at aU they taught a law of love, but not
ed by itecrit- the law of love. This was first inculcated by Jesus of
lcs- Nazareth. And so far in advance of the world was he
that, though many have gotten the idea that love is the true law of
the ethical Ufe, our boastful scientists who claim that they needed not
Jesus to teach them show by all they say of the Master's words that
they are incapable of comprehending them. If they would know the
truth they must sit at Jesus's feet. If they will not learn of him they
will of necessity remain where they now are, in darkness ! The first
to teach the ethics of Jesus was Jesus himseU, and those who will
not come to him cannot have the light of lUe. Meantime they not only
fail to secure for themselves all the blessings of the truth, but by fol
lowing the paths which their own pride marks out they confuse
others and hinder the light from dawning upon them also.
The second objection of a fundamental kind lodged against Chris
tian ethics is that it is sanctioned by a system of rewards and pun
ishments, and therefore that Christian moraUty is merely a .kind of
selfishness.3 Gizycki gives us page after page to portray the essen
tially selfish character of aU ethics having for its motives rewards and
punishments. So far as Christianity is concerned he could have
spared himself aU such slanderous pains ; for all professed Christians
who have gotten their doctrines from Christ, the one source of our
Rewards and feith, entirely reject the motive of selfishness ; but they
m DChr?st?an a^so assel"t that Jesus did not make rewards and punish-
ethics. ments the motives for good conduct. Salter, who is one
of the chief representatives of the ethical culture movement in this
country, as Gizycki was in Germany during his Ufe, nobly defends
Christ against the blasphemous charge of proposing a mercenary
1 Comp. Mark Hopkins's The Law of Love and Love as Law ; or Christian Ethics, re
vised edition, New York, 1881, p. 76.
' Comp. the remarks of A. S. Farrar, Critical History of Free Thought, p. 180 f.

Originality of Christ's Law of Love. 315
ground for moraUty.1 It is one thing to warn men that evil conduct
and wickedness of heart wfll certainly lead them to sorrow and
anguish, and it is another to make that fact the reason why they
should avoid wickedness. Jesus did not, Uke some of our modern
ethicists, shut himseU up in his study to prepare lectures on sys
tematic ethics which he might afterward deliver to applauding multi
tudes. He knew that there is an absolute right which can be summed
up in the one idea of love to God and man; that our consciences
prompt us to do the right ; that the law in our own hearts teUs us to
do the right, without regard to the consequences for our present or
future happiness. But he had what many of our modern ethicists
seem to lack, namely, good practical sense, and this led him to offer
to men who needed, as the vast majority do, lower motives as aids
until the higher motives became strong enough to make the lower un
necessary. Besides, whfle Jesus was an altruist, he did not carry his
altruism to a dangerous extreme.3 Hence he had a place for seU as
weU as for others in his ethical system. Neighbor and self are on an
equal footing ; and as one should try to shield his neighbor from a
course of conduct which must lead to disaster, so he has a right to
stimulate himseU to good deeds and divert himself from evfl conduct
by similar considerations. It is not selfishness which prompts us so
to do ; it is good common sense. Somehow misery and vice are con
nected, and virtue and a reasonable degree and kind of happiness in
separable in this world. Many do not know this until they have
learned it by experience — then it is often too late. It is merctful to
declare the facts before the thoughtless or the uninstructed faU into
evfl ways. It is diabolical to demand that the truth shall be withheld
from them. It is hypocritical in one who would not demand this to
accuse Jesus of grounding his moraUty in selfishness because he
warned the wicked of the consequences of their sins. It is dastardly
to accuse Christian moraUty of selfishness unless Jesus taught it, no
matter who else teaches it.
1 Ethical Religion, Boston, 1889, pp. 179-182.
* Professor George Harris says: "The altruism which reduces itself to zero is an act
without an actor. It is something out of nothing. It is a verb without a noun. It is a
nonentity exercising power. . . . Unless one does make the most of himself he is incom
petent for good to others."— Moral Evolution, Boston and New York, 1896, p. 153 f.

316 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER IV.
NEED OF DIVINE AID— PRACTICABILITY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
The third fundamental objection is that we have no need of God's
help to lead good Uves. To say that we are incapable of leading good
Uves without divine aid Mr. Stanton Coit regards as " blasphemy
against our moral nature." He thinks the abflity to do right as much
a part of our being as our power to think, to see, and to eat. To deny
Divine ai d this would be the same as to deny that a child can add or
riihtd]ivin£ subtract without God's help. * The question of blasphemy
we shall not discuss. The real question is whether divine aid is help
ful. If it is it is needed. But is it a fact that the power to think, to
see, and to eat is a part of our being? To deny to man such powers
apparently seems to Mr. Stanton Coit impossible ; and if we do not
define the quaUty of the thinking, the correctness of the seeing, or
the wisdom of the eating, it must be admitted man does possess the
powers mentioned. But i£ the abflity to perform those functions as
they ought to be performed is asserted of the untrained infant or
young child, or even of many adults, we must be aUowed to note an
exception. If Mr. Coit means that in the same blundering manner
in which the average uninstructed individual thinks, sees, and eats,
or adds or subtracts, men can do right, we agree. But tf he means
that men possess within themselves the power to discover the law of
righteousness and love, and to execute it, we deny the assertion.
Man's inability to discover that law was discussed above ; here we
have to do chiefly with the question of abflity to execute it.
That man possesses no such power has been confessed by such vast
multitudes that the pretense of its possession by anyone is necessarily
regarded either as evidence of seU-conceit or else of an inadequate
conception of what righteousness and love mean. The individual who
really comprehends the demands of righteousness and love enters into
the conflict with the temptations of Ufe with modest fear instead of
boastful courage. He can but measure himseU at his best as probably
unequal to the powers which shall be matched against him. He looks
within and finds that even his impulses do not aU tend in the right
1 Quoted by Gizycki, Moralphllosophie, p. 386, from Colt's Ethical Culture as a Re
ligion for the People, a work of which we can find no trace except in Gizycki.

Need of Divine Aid. 317
direction. His struggle with himself is not yet complete, and he has
to defend himseU against foes within and foes without. Whether we
trace these evfl impulses to our alleged animal origin or to the Bible
doctrine of the faU of our innocent first parents, only a superficial
observer of seU and humanity at large can deny their existence and
power. And just because the demands of the moral law are so com
prehensive and exalted it is impossible for us to say that we have
reached the point where all our impulses join with the ideal require
ments of righteousness. Any moment may afford us a revelation of
duty to which we have hitherto been blind, and in the performance of
which our impulses refuse to cooperate. Such has often been the case
with conscientious seekers after ethical light, and, in view of all this,
it is foolhardy to say that the abflity to do right is an inborn power.
It is evident, then, that men need aid in the living of right lives,
and that mankind in its present state cannot provide it. Unless one
denies the existence of God, or his power and readiness to extend to
us the assistance we need, it is almost criminal to teach men that they
can do for themselves everything they need in the ethical life. It is
not claimed for Christians that they hve ideal lives. This is not be
cause the aid available is insufficient, but because perfect appropria
tion of that aid, for various reasons, fails. But the his- its benefits
' proved by
tory of the Church in aU those periods and localities in history.
which it has remained truest to the original character of Christianity
proves that the motives and forces imparted to one who becomes a
genuine Christian enable him to live on a higher moral level than
was possible to him in his pre-Christian condition. With divine as
sistance better ethical results are possible than without it. He who
has a real enthusiasm for right living, such as the ethical culturists
profess, ought not to block the way of success by deceiving men into
the false notion that they are of themselves sufficient for all the de
mands which the moral law makes upon them.
The fourth fundamental objection urged against Christian morals is
that it is impracticable. Strecker may be aUowed to speak for aU
who are of his opinion. He says : l "In fact, many Christian require
ments are incapable of f fulfillment because they are in con- Are thede-
flict with the peculiarities of human nature, our social econ- c h "i s t im-
omy (Wirtschaftsordnung), or our civilization. One can prac
abstain from violence against an enemy ; it is magnanimous to forgive
him ; but to love him whfle he does us injury, to bless him while he
curses us, is a demand on our disposition which, for natural reasons,
1 Welt und Menschheit, p. 150.

318 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
we cannot meet." At this point it may be weU to pause and caU
attention to the fact that Christianity does not expect any man to
love his enemies unless he first obtain the capacity for such love as a
result of a complete renewal of his nature. In this sense of the word
it is true that Christian moraUty conflicts with the peculiarities of
human nature. But Christianity teaches that those peculiarities are
not what they ought to be, and that man should be transformed in
such a way as to bring his inner nature into harmony with Christian
requirement ; and then it wfll be no longer true that Christian morals
make demands upon our dispositions which for natural reasons we
cannot meet. Anyone who has even the sUghtest acquaintance with
the history of the Christian Church knows that its pages afford us
numberless examples of those who, though possessed of the greatest
energy, have not only forgiven but have also loved their enemies.
That many professed Christians do not so Uve is nothing to the pur
pose. We hesitate to discriminate among the many worthy of men
tion ; but it wfll not, perhaps, be out of place to aUude to one honored
name — that of John Wesley.
Strecker proceeds:' " To deprive ourselves of our possessions and
goods and distribute the proceeds among the poor is a requirement
which cannot justly be made upon anyone, and which if foUowed, ex
cept with the addition of other conditions, would produce no benefits
equal to the greatness of the sacrifice. " In reply to this it should be said
that Christianity does not demand that we impoverish ourselves
and give the poor our wealth. Christ's command to the young man of
the gospel 3 was for him alone ; and a very Uttle study of his case as a
whole suffices to make the reason evident to any inquirer. That not
even the community of goods among the early Christians was required
iS'manifest.' Christ was too wise to demand poverty as a feature of
common Ufe. Well did he know that incriminate giving to the
poor is a curse rather than a blessing, and he never recommended it.
The apostle Paul, who lived much in the spirit of Jesus, said that if
anyone would not work neither should he eat.4 This provision un
doubtedly corresponded to the teachings of Jesus. Men must have an
earthly calling, and they must pursue it with aU possible vigor. The
voluntary poverty of the Christians of the Middle Ages was not in aU
cases Christian, though in the interests of what they erroneously re
garded Christian progress. There is absolutely nothing in the teach
ings of Jesus taken as a whole to interfere with the accumulation
of wealth. That extreme altruism which would make everyone as
'Welt und Menschheit, p. 150. » Matt, xix, 21. "Actsv,4. « 2 Thess. lit, 10.

Need of Divine Aid. 319
responsible for all others as he is for himseU would result in the direst
confusion and degeneration. It is no part of the teaching of Jesus, but
of a mawkish sentimentality. The spirit of Jesus, as the spirit of com
mon sense, requires that we make every individual responsible for his
own weUare. Jesus simply introduces so much of altruistic feeling
as serves to hinder our selfish passions from acquiring a preponder
ance of influence in our lives, and to bind men together in love. The
whole effect of the teachings of Jesus would be to place each individ
ual in that position in which he could best develop his own personal
ity and thus reach his highest possible enjoyment. These considera
tions completely, though briefly, show how unfounded are the criti
cisms of Buckle, Strauss, and others to the effect that Christianity is
opposed to material progress. ¦
In very much the same strain the attempt has been made to show
that the ethical requirements of Christianity are not complete. Says
Strecker:3 "Many commands of the moral law, such as diligence,
economy, promptness, perseverance, are not contained in Are they in-
the Christian ethics." Commenting on this statement comp e ?
Steude calls attention to the fact that all four of these virtues are com
prised in the one idea of faithfulness, which is inculcated in such pas
sages as Matt, xxiv, 45 f. ; xxv, 14 ff. ; Luke xvi, 10-12. 3 Were it true
that Jesus had never inculcated any of these virtues it would still be
false to say that they are no part of Christian moraUty ; for Jesus
taught the essentials of a Christian character, not so much by com
mandments, of which he gave very few, as by his own example. He
is our ideal. To foUow him, to be his disciple, is to do as he would do
were he surrounded by our circumstances. That he was dihgent,
prompt, economical, and persevering is unquestionable. But as a mat
ter of fact he did teach directly aU the virtues which Strecker says
Christian ethics lack. Diligence in one's own affairs is directly com
mended in the Parables of the Lost Sheep and Piece of Silver,4 and
diligence in the discharge of our duties to others is commended and
the absence of it condemned in the Parable of the Ten Talents.6
Promptness is one phase of diligence ; so that one cannot be diligent
who is not prompt. As to economy, it is directly required in connec
tion with the miraculous feeding of the multitude.6 That Jesus gave
this command is evident from the statements of Matt, (xiv, 20) ; Mark
(vi, 43) ; and Luke (ix, 17). Perseverance is commended in such pas-
1 See Buckle's History of Civilization, vol. ii, pp. 268, 287 ; and Strauss's Der alte und der
neue Glaube. p. 63 f. * Welt und Menschheit, p. 133.
5 See his article on Die monistische Etbik, in Beweis des Glaubens, Sept. 1895, p. 349.
4 Luke xv, 3-9. 6 Matt, xxv, 14 ff. " John vi, 12.

320 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
sages as Matt, x, 22; xxiv, 13; Mark xfli, 13. That these passages
have a specific appUcation in nowise interferes with the conclusion we
have drawn from them ; for the very idea of endurance or persever
ance, in Christianity, is that we shall perform the duty devolving
upon us whatever may be our fate, and every duty is to the Christian
a Christian duty. Blinded by passion, such accusations, as that of
Strecker are made in willing ignorance of facts to the contrary. Did
infidels devote a tithe of the time and energy to the actual and impar
tial study of Christianity in its original sources which they expend in
ignorantly criticising it they would be astonished at the perfection of
the system which they reject.
It has also been said that Jesus had no word to say in favor of in
teUectual honesty.1 Here again it may be said that Jesus set the ex
ample of searching for the truth and of adhering to his convictions
wherever they led him. He taught honor, honesty, and love of truth
and right in aU things. These requirements are fundamental in his
ethics. To say that he did not teach inteUectual honesty in particular
is to trifle with the precepts of Jesus. Again, Jesus is complained of
Jesus's method because he did not expressly condemn slavery.' But it
tea? honesty" was not ms PurP<>se to effect a mere external revolution.
poTiTl cal ^s method was to inspire men's hearts with the princi-
economy. pje 0f righteousness and love and to trust to these to ac-
compUsh, more rapidly and thoroughly than by direct command, aU
reforms needful for the ameUoration of human conditions. This is in
perfect accord with his doctrine that conduct springs from the heart.3
But by his doctrine of the equality of aU men before God and of uni
versal brotherhood he also made impossible, not only slavery, but aU
oppression in every thoroughly Christianized land. Were infidels as
anxious to secure the freedom of all men from the wrongs that oppress
mankind as they are to overthrow Christianity they would completely
change their attitude and strive to make all men Christians in fact as
well as in name. It is to their opposition that the prevalence of these
wrongs in nominaUy Christian lands is largely due.
Again, Salter asserts that Jesus did not meet our demands for a
higher conception of poUtics and poUtical ethics ; that he gave us no
adequate industrial ethics, and that he solved the social problem only
by referring the poor to Providence.* In reply to this it must be said
that the ethics of Jesus can be, and by Christians should be, appUed
» Comp. Steude's Bewels des Glaubens, Sept., 1895, p. 350, and Salter's, Ethical Reli
gion, pp. 202-206. » Salter, Ethical Religion, cited by Steude, as above.
3 Matt. xv. 19. ' Ethical Religion, pp. 206-226.

Need of Divine Aid. 321
alike to pubUc and private Ufe ; that the form of government is a
matter of choice under Christianity, and that it is a slander to say that
Jesus did nothing for the solution of social problems except to incul
cate trust in Providence in the hearts of the poor. Jesus gave us the
doctrine of universal mutual love, the only solution of all the prob
lems pertairting to the relations which human beings can sustain to
each other.
These are examples of the aUeged excesses and defects of Christian
morals. They appear on examination to be purely fictitious. A few
other illustrations might be given, but they are needless. AU that
have been or could be mentioned serve but to betray the diminutive
spirit, the ignorance or the malice of their originators. To any fair
and impartial mind, capable of forming a judgment on the complex
and enormous mass of facts found in the ethical teachings of Jesus,
the fact is clear that neither by way of excess nor of defect can any
fault be found with Christian moraUty.

322 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER V.
INCIDENTAL OBJECTIONS TO CHRISTIAN MORALS.
Besides those objections to Christian ethics which, if valid, would
destroy the very foundations of Christianity, there are others which
we have designated as incidental. The distinction thus made between
fundamental and incidental objections does not, however, destroy the
fact that both classes are fatal U capable of being substantiated.
It is difficult to escape the impression in reading the writings of
those who criticise Christianity that the fault-finders have some pur
pose to serve. Most certain it is that in every case they either mis
represent the facts of the New Testament, or draw their information
concerning Christian teaching from other than New Testament
sources, or claim as the result of Christian teachings consequences
which experience has proved not to follow in actual practice. With
out attempting to explain why our opponents should so pervert the
facts, we call attention to the perversion in the hope that aU readers
may henceforth take with due aUowance any criticisms either of
Christian faith or practice. But we cannot refrain from expressing
the wish that hereafter our Christian writers may be more cautious.
UnbeUevers are not altogether to blame for misunderstanding the
genius of Christianity when they find in powerful leaders of the
Church the very representations they criticise. And there is scarcely
a fault which has been charged against Christianity which is not
declared by some celebrity in the Church to be an essential of Chris
tianity. There has been altogether too much effort to make Chris-
Necessity tianity square with our philosophy, and not enough to
amongChr?£ Place ourselves in a position where, with a fuU knowl-
tian writers. edge of the eternal truths which Jesus inculcated, we
can calmly wait until the world's philosphy comes into accord with
the teachings of Christ. Too often the subordinate has been pro
claimed as the essential in our faith and practice ; the letter has been
insisted upon without regard to the spirit, sometimes in contradiction
to it ; the particular and local has been applied as though it were the
universal. Thus it has happened that Christianity has been more
thoroughly misrepresented by our friends than by our enemies. In
so far, therefore, we hafl every criticism offered by our foes, in the

Incidental Objections to Christian Morals. 323
hope that we may learn to be true Christians thereby. Our defense
must consist largely in clearing away the misrepresentations of
friends and foes and in the attempt to state the facts as they are.
That we shaU wholly escape from error we can scarcely hope.
There are two classes of incidental objections, those against doc
trines, and those against the aUeged influence of certain doctrines on
human conduct. Of those against doctrines as such we need mention
but one example — the doctrine of vicarious suffering. It is declared
immoral to let Christ, the innocent, suffer for man, the guilty sinner.1
The assertion is often made that everyone must suffer, and thus
atone, for his own sins. In answer it should be said that, Alleged im-
while this would vindicate the justice of God, it would S^Cbris-
speak but poorly for his mercy. But in fact the objection tr1ned°af
is based on a misunderstanding. Vicarious suffering is atonement.
not to be understood as a complete and unconditional release of the
sinner from suffering for his sin. Nor was it designed chiefly, U at all,
to placate God. Taking the teachings of the New Testament as a
whole we are obliged to regard the vicarious sufferings of Christ as a
method by which God can maintain the divine standard of justice on
the one hand, and of mercy on the other, whfle offering the most
exalted and powerful motive to man for holy Uving. To this scrip
tural form of the doctrine the above objection does not apply.
Of the second class of objections we give several examples.3
(1) It is affirmed that the preaching of forgiveness of sins, whether
with or without the blood of Christ, weakens moral endeavor. There
can be no doubt that the Romanist doctrine of indulgences does natu
rally tend in the direction indicated by the objection. The same may
be said also of the doctrine of the so-caUed liberal theologians, that
the divine forgiveness has its sufficient ground in the possession of
the power to forgive. The true Protestant doctrine i£ disconnected
from other doctrines which in the Scripture accompany it is equaUy
dangerous. Forgiveness can be safely preached only, as it is pro
claimed in the New Testament, where the beUever is assumed to hate
sin even more than he dreads its consequences and to love all right-
eousnesss as revealed in the perfect Son of God, the Son is forgiveness
of sins dan-
of man. Under proper limitations the preaching of for- gerous ?
giveness is essential to high moraUty. If God never forgave sin, but
ever required exact penalty, it would produce defiance of him in
1 Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, p. 29. The objection Is very ancient.
' For many suggestions under this head we are indebted to an article by Wllhelm
Kambli in Die christllche Welt (No. 1, January, 1897), on Religion und Moral.

324 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
many, while the outward righteousness of those who strove to lead
virtuous lives would be always the result of fear, not of the free
choice of the individual. Pardon granted under proper conditions
is more likely than penalty to produce love of the virtue recom
mended by the pardoner. Only under a system of pardon can grati
tude exercise any influence. Virtuous conduct is thus made not
only more sure, it is also founded in free choice, whence alone virtue
can spring. So the inner Ufe is made richer and purer, and the out
ward Ufe more conformable to the moral law, by pardon than by pen
alty. Penalty is a last resort, to be employed, not for vengeance, but
as a means of moral improvement either of the one punished or of
those who fear his fate ; and it is never to be applied when an appeal
to higher motives can be made effective. Besides, only as the be
liever in God recognizes that he has the divine favor can he take
courage and cherish hope, without which there will be no endeavor
for holy living. An unforgiving God would set a bad example and
paralyze moral effort in aU who had in them the consciousness of
guilt. (2) Prayer also, though in another way, is declared to weaken our
moral energies. This objection to a Christian doctrine and prac
tice is based on the idea that prayer is intended chiefly to afford
us a means of escape from unpleasant duties or burdens which we
ought to bear cheerfully in the interests of human wel-
' fare. Any prayer which has such a purpose is un
christian, and worthy of all condemnation. But Christian prayer, so
far as it leads to a sense of the forgiveness of sin in accordance with
the teachings of the Gospel, is, as we have seen, no hindrance, but a
help to moral effort. Christian prayer, in so far as it affords us
relief from sorrows of lUe which, U borne, would benefit no one but
might crush us, can do no harm to our moral nature. Furthermore,
as far as prayer aids us in the performance of duty, whether agree
able or disagreeable, and makes us more strong and courageous to
bear the burdens and inevitable sorrows of Ufe, its moral effect is
positively beneficial.
(3) The doctrine of divine providence1 has been charged with rob
bing its adherents of the virtue of foresight. If God is caring for
men why should they care for themselves ? There may be a few who
so understood this doctrine, though the writer, in a tolerably wide
1 On the doctrine of destiny or providence as Immoral, see Clifford's Lectures and
Essays, p. 265. His "destiny" or "providence," however, is remote from the Christian
•conception.

Incidental Objections to Christian Morals. 325
experience, never met one. The great majority surely hold the true
Christian view, that the very condition of benefiting by divine provi
dence is effort on their own part. "To him that hath shaU be given "
is not spoken to discourage the needy but to stir them to action.
Furthermore, the doctrine of providence encourages us, in periods of
apparently unavailing endeavor, to expect that, if we contmue in
welldoing, out of all our disappointment will emerge a higher good,
whether temporal or spiritual, than that for which we providence
have been striving. Thereby we are prompted to labor
on even when there appears no natural hope of success. Foresight is
therefore not destroyed by beUef in the providence of God, whose laws
must be known that they may be employed. The foresight our
opponents have in mind, divorced from trust in man and God, results
in selfishness and would lead every man to care for himself alone.
Such foresight is not wanted in this world. We do need the foresight
which is tempered with Christian faith.
(4) The declaration is made that the nearer one is to God the
farther away he is from his fellow-men. It is not to be denied that
nearness to God has been sought too often at the expense of flight
from the world and the consequent neglect of duty to man. But
wherever this has occurred it has been in contradiction Nearness to
of Christianity, which teaches by precept and example nearness "to
that the true love of God is always attended by love to men"
our fellow-men and is the prime condition of its highest exhibition.
No doubt, also, there are those who, because of their supposed relation
ship to God, are lifted up with pride ; but they are in so far unchris
tian. To reject Christianity, however, on account of these unworthy
professors of it would be no more justifiable than to select the worst
specimens in any department of art, and then condemn all art on
account of them.
(5) It is objected that Christianity points the poor and suffering
to heaven instead of giving them relief here and now. There is,
doubtless, too little practical brotherly love manifested by Christians,
and it may be that many have been so absorbed by the thought of
heaven that they have not given due importance to the earthly Ufe ;
but the facts show that Christianity has introduced the idea of
practical helpfulness into the world as a principle of all Christianity
conduct, and has fortified it with sufficient motives and suffering
impulses; and that whatever aspirations the masses classes.
cherish after better material or inteUectual conditions are the attend
ants of Christianity in proportion as it is in any country true to the
23,

326 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
principles of Christ.1 On the other hand, take away the doctrine of
future reward and punishment and this world must appear as the
scene of the grossest injustice and inequaUty, as a hopeless chaos of
social disorder. Nothing but the doctrine that this world is only a
part of each man's Ufe, and that each shaU continue to Uve beyond
death a lUe indissolubly connected with that which now is, can ever
give a moment's rest to the man whose conscience demands the con
junction of happiness with holiness, of misery with sin. Deprive the
unfortunate, whose sorrows no earthly ministry, however gentle and
helpful, can greatly mitigate, of the expectation of a Ufe free from the
sad temporal conditions which afflict them here, and their woes would
be intensified — robbed of hope and of the prospect of enjoyment instead
of pain hereafter. The Christian doctrine of the future has not hindered
Christianity from being, Uke its divine Founder, the minister of good to
the temporal as weU as the spiritual needs of men, and it has furnished
the key for the solution of some of Uf e's greatest mysteries and saved
the sorrowing from despair.
1 For full discussion of details see Gesta Christi ; or, A History of Humane Progress
under Christianity, by Charles Loring Brace, second edition, New York, 1883 ; and The
Divine Origin of Christianity Indicated by its Historical Effects, by Richard S. Storrs,
D.D., LL.D., New York, 1884.

Christianity and Opposing Religious Theories. 327

DIVISION V.
CHRISTIANITY AND OPPOSING RELIGIOUS THEORIES.

To some it may seem that the great non-Christian reUgions should
be treated in this work ; but while a comparison of them in some of
their aspects with Christianity is necessary, and wfll be afforded in its
proper place, it is not needful to refute them here. As a matter of fact
those who wfll employ this book are in no danger of accepting any of
the religions referred to, instead of Christianity ; nor is any of them,
not even Buddhism, seriously offered as a substitute for Chris
tianity. The same cannot be said of the four proposed substitutes
here treated.1
There may be those who wfll think that by introducing into this
work a discussion of such systems as Theosophy and Christian
Science its whole tone is lowered. We sympathize with aU such
readers as far as sentiment is concerned. But we beUeve importance
that aU who have had to deal practically with these such sys-
vagaries will welcome the discussion offered. Such wfll Theosophy,
realize their subtleness and the difficulty of refuting science, etc.
their positions. Besides, these systems are seriously offered as rivals
of Christianity for the adherence of mankind ; and they are accepted
by considerable numbers who should be Christians, and in a few in
stances by men and women of noble character and brilliant intellect.
In each case these proposed substitutes emphasize something highly
prized by multitudes. Since they are, in some circles, supplanting
Christianity, or making the propagation of Christianity in its pure
form difficult, there is reason to believe they have an attractive power
dangerous, not indeed to Christianity, but to many who ought to be
enjoying the more comprehensive benefits and engaged in the more
varied and important duties of our faith. If Christianity is to be
demonstrated superior to everything else offered for the reUgious
acceptance of men, these false or imperfect systems must be refuted.
1 It is not proposed to treat all, but only the principal, of those proposed substitutes
which have taken some hold on the thoughtful among English-speaking peoples. Steude
gives a somewhat exhaustive discussion of substitutes in Evangelische Apologetlk,
Gotha, 1892, pp. 451-487.

328 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Such a task, U undertaken, must be performed, however briefly, with
conscientious thoroughness and fairness. It will not answer the pur
pose to engage in denunciation. Here, as elsewhere, the law of love
must be obeyed. And it must always be remembered that however
inadequate, or even foolish, these professed reUgions appear to those
who reject them, to their adherents they are sacred and dear. While
dealing with them in the most uncompromising spirit, therefore,
everything must be avoided which savors of contempt or scorn.
Should any reader feel that too much space is given to the form of
faith to be refuted, his judgment wfll condemn his feehngs the
moment he reflects that in order to refute any system it is necessary
to exhibit it to the mind of the person to whom the argument is ad
dressed. We recognize indeed that these proposed substitutes for
Christianity are not all of equal dignity. We have classed them
together, not because we oppose them aU for the same reasons, nor to
indicate that they are alike worthy of regard or want of regard ; but
because, however they may differ in other aspects, they are aU claim
ants for the adherence of those whom Christianity has hitherto won or
is seeking to win.
SECTION 1.-PR0P0SED SUBSTITUTES FOR CHRISTIANITY.
CHAPTER I.
POSITIVISM, or the religion of humanity.
This strange mixture of the grotesque and the valuable is the
product of a mind whose thoughts have attracted wide attention and
won many adherents, particularly in the realm of philosophy, beyond
which most Positivists refuse to foUow their leader, M. Auguste Comte
(born 1798, died 1857). His seU-conceit was equal to the greatness of
his intellect. He regarded himself as the modern representative of
Aristotle in the sphere of philosophy, and of St. Paul in the influence
he was to exert on the future of reUgion.1 Although it is true that
"the Positivism which he taught, taken as a whole, is at once a phi
losophy, a polity, and a religion,"3 it must be considered here chiefly
as a religion, with only so much reference to the philosophy with
which it is interwoven and to the science which it absorbs into itseU
as is necessary to its proper understanding.
1 See the Catechism of Positive Religion, translated from the French of Auguste Comte
by Richard Congreve, London, 1858, p. 19. His religious system may also be found in his
SystSme de Politique Positive, but as the general reader will find the Catechism more
easily accessible, all our citations are from that work.
' Flint, Antlthelstic Theories, p. 178.

Positivism, or the Religion of Humanity. 329
In all Comte's criticisms of Christianity, it must be remembered,
he is filled with a profound disUke of Protestantism,1 while Chris
tianity and Roman Catholicism are regarded by him as identical.
Thus, like all who reject Christianity, he first misunder- Comte.s mig.
stands it. An illustration of the manner in which he per- f^got Chris-
verts it is found in his assertion that it "so Uttle under- tianity.
stands the dignity of labor as to refer its origin to a divine curse." "
This can refer but to one passage, namely, Gen. Ui, 17-19, which
makes, not labor, but the unproductive nature of the soil the curse
pronounced on account of sin. Before the "fall "and the "curse"
"the Lord God took Adam and put him into the garden of Eden,
to dress it and to keep it." Whfle his objections to Christianity are
based upon misunderstandings of it, his suggestions which have any
real value for ethics are aU the product of the spirit of the system
which he rejects. For example, he says : " A thorough sifting of this
important question would perhaps show that a fourth of the popula
tion in western Europe would be wise to abstain from having chil
dren, and that such a function should be exercised only by those who
are properly qualified," 3 that is, by those whose health is such as to
afford a reasonable warrant that their offspring shaU not be diseased.
This is a view which springs directly from Christian principle, which
would go further and demand also that persons disposed to crime or
vice should abstain from having children. * On the other hand, aU
the faults of his system, whether in the sphere of ethics or of devo
tional life, are the direct result of his conceit that he is wiser than
Christ and the apostles trained by him. This wfll appear in aU the
further portrayal of his proposed reUgion.
One of the most strikingly distinctive features of Positivism as com
pared with Christianity is that its founder, unlike Christ, left almost
nothing to be worked out by his followers. He gave the world a com
plete reUgion. It is not designed to be adaptable to varying civiliza
tions, but it presupposes that when it shall have completely taken
possession of the world aU civilizations wfll be alike. This tendency
to bind the inteUect and judgment by externaUy im- Rigidity of
posed provisions Comte carried with him from Roman ligion.
Catholicism into Positivism, both of which, so far, vary from the spirit
of Christ, which was not to give us rules and regulations, but to se
cure a disposition of the mind by the free choice of the wfll, and to
i Catechism, p. 414. " Ibid., p. 10. » Ibid., p. 321.
4 So his altruism, which he claims as a feature that distinguishes Positivism from Chris
tianity, is defined on p. 54 of the Catechism quite in the spirit of Christianity.

330 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
trust that disposition to perform its office in the individual and the
community. In fact, Comte's system is one of external authority and
of caste, as his whole doctrine of the hierarchy shows.1 About the
only feature which is to be left to the future for determination is the
shape which the edifices shall assume which Positivism shall here
after employ for purposes of pubUc worship. Provisionally he pro
poses that the old churches shaU be utilized, " in proportion as they
fall into disuse." ' StiU, two things are settled : their situation, which
"must be in the center of the tombs of the elect,'' and their direc
tion — " in aU parts of the earth the temples of humanity must turn
toward the general metropolis," which " for a long time, as the result
of past history, must be Paris. In this manner Positivism turns to
account the idea of which we find the rudiment in the Kebla of Islam-
ism. We institute, as the Mahometans did, a common attitude for
all true beUevers, and so bring into fuller Ught the touching soU-
darity of our free worship." We simply ask, Is that worship free
which must concern itseU about attitudes as though they were es
sential ?
Positivism also makes large provision for the clergy, or priestly
class.3 One of the axioms of the reUgion of humanity is that "no
society can exist and be developed without a priesthood in some form
Positivism and or other."4 In Positivism the clergy requires three suc-
the priestly . «=>.< i
class. cessive orders : the aspirants, admitted at twenty-eight ;
the vicars, or substitutes, at thirty-five ; and the priests proper, at
forty -two. The first class have a real spiritual calling, but do not as
yet belong to the spiritual power and exercise none of its functions.
The vicars are irrevocably members of the priestly body, though lim
ited to the functions of teaching and preaching. They must renounce
aU property and be married. The priests proper are taken from the
number of the vicars, and have full powers of advising, consecrating,
and regulating, which are the social characteristics of the Positive
clergy. The supreme power is vested in the High Priest of Humanity,
whose natural residence will be Paris, as the metropolis of the regen
erated West. He is the sole governor of the Positive clergy. He or
dains its members, changes their residence, revokes their cornmis-
1 Catechism, pp. 341 ff . The priesthood, however, are to have no power to crush opinions
contrary to their own, pp. 340 ff,
¦ Catechism, p. 140. His simplicity is both ludicrous and pitiable.
8 The male sex represents physioal laws, the female sex moral laws, and the priesthood
intellectual laws. The priesthood shares the life of both male and female— Catechism,
p. 162. One is irresistibly reminded of the celebrated division of the human race into
men, women, and clergymen. « Catechism, p. 279.

Positivism, or the Religion of Humanity. 331
sion, aU on his own moral responsibflity. To assist him in the dis
charge of his functions the supreme head of Western Positivism
is to have the aid of four national superiors, who, under his
direction, guide their four respective churches — the Italian, the
Spanish, the English, and the German. The high priest is the
national superior for France, though he need not be a Frenchman.
The regular mode of replacing him is by a successor whom he is to
name himseU, but with the assent of aU four national superiors.
Should they be divided in opinion, then the nomination must meet
the wishes of the senior priests of the two thousand presbyteries (that
are to be). The aspirant has a salary of $600, the vicar of $1,000, the
priest proper of $2,400, the high priest of $12,000, and each national
superior of $6,000. * Besides, the priest and high priest are to have an
aUowance for certain expenses connected with their duties.''' These
salaries are to be paid out of the pubUc treasury as soon as the faith
is universally adopted.3 Most candidates for the ministry would be
¦wflling to renounce aU property for the prospect of such salaries. Our
only additional remark is that this whole clerical scheme has a most
striking resemblance to that of Romanism.
Not until we come to the Positivist worship do we reach the real
pecuUarities of the system. The purpose of the worship is distin
guished from that of the worshipers of God as being self -betterment
for the better service of humanity, while that of the worshipers of
God consists in adoring him with vain compliments. * This false and
maUcious fling at Christian worship we pass by. The object of wor
ship is not God, whose existence is either denied or ignored, but
Humanity, which is the Great or Supreme Being. The symbol of
this being, in statuary or in painting, is a woman of the age of thirty,
with her son in her arms." But it would be an error to suppose that
aU human beings, or human beings only, compose this The^ supreme
Great Being; it includes "those only who are reaUy ca- Positivism.
pable of assimilation, in virtue of a real cooperation on their part in
furthering the common good."6 There are some "mere digesting
machines," who "are no real part of Humanity. You may reject
them, and to make up for the loss associate with the new Supreme
Being all the animals who lend a noble aid." "To form a right esti
mate of this indispensable complement of human existence let us
1 These are as close figures as can well be given. They reckon the English pound
sterling at five dollars in United States money.
» Catechism, pp. 302-305. s Ibid., p. 301. ' «Ibid., p. 87.
» Ibid., p. 142. ' Ibid., p. 74.

332 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
imagine ourselves without it. We should then be led without hesi
tation to look on many horses, dogs, oxen, etc., as more estimable
than certain men." '
But not chiefly is it Uving human beings who constitute this divin
ity. "In the composition of our Great Being the dead occupy the
first place, then those who are yet to be born." 3 Nor is it aU the dead
who compose this Great Being. "Our divinity only incorporates into
herseU the dead who are really meritorious." Nor is it composed of
the meritorious dead as they ready were in Ufe. " The ideal must be
an ameUoration of the real, or it is inadequate for its moral purpose."
We have a "tendency to forget the defects of the dead, whilst we only
recall their good quaUties." The divinity "puts away from each one
(of the meritorious dead) the imperf ections which in aU cases dimmed
their objective life." ' This divinity, composed chiefly of dead and
unborn men, horses, dogs, oxen, etc. ( " animals who lend a noble
aid" — who are to be looked upon "without hesitation " "as more es
timable than certain men " ), is a purely subjective one. There are
two forms of existence. "The first involves the presence of the
body and may be termed objective, to mark more clearly its con
trast with the second. The second leaves each one to exist only
in the heart and inteUect of others, and deserves the name of sub
jective."4 "In the past we see such a Ufe . . . prevail during forty
centuries. . . . During this long probation the minds of men habit
ually recognized the sway of purely imaginary beings — we see them
to be imaginary, their worshipers beUeved in their real and distinct
existence."6 "The only essential difference between subjectivity
in its later and in its primitive shape is this. In its later shape
we must be fully conscious of it. . . . Our predecessors, on the con
trary, vainly endeavored to see without them what had no existence
but within."1'
This last citation demonstrates that Positivism is a strictly atheistic
system, notwithstanding it dilates upon the worship of the Supreme
Being. It wfll be unnecessary to spend much time on this astonish-
Positivism an ing effort to create a divinity. It demands of those who
atheistic sys- J
tem. create the substitute divinity (and each must in the na
ture of the case create it for himself) that they shaU perpetrate upon
themselves the conscious fraud of treating as real that which they
know to "exist only in the heart and inteUect of others." AU others
than Positivists, U they worshiped at aU, worshiped imaginary be-
1 Catechism, pp. 75, 76. » Ibid., p. 89. » Ibid., p. 103.
' Ibid., p. 77. • ibid., p. 91. « ibid., p. 92 f.

Positivism, or the Religion of Humanity. 333
ings whom they supposed to be real. The Positivists are to worship
that which they know to be unreal as though it was real. If the
former were fools the latter are asked to become knaves; for "the
only essential difference " between the two is that in Positivism the
worshiper is "fully conscious" of the deception, not practiced upon
him, but practiced by himself upon himseU.
Besides, they deliberately "ameUorate" these "meritorious dead,"
changing them into what they were not. If "amelioration" be
aUowable it is difficult to see why the " mere digesting machines"
caUed men might not be included in the divinity, since they would
only need a Uttle more " ameUoration " to fit them for incorporation
into the divinity. In both respects, therefore, does Positivism prac
tice conscious seU-deception ; first, by thinking of the dead as though
they have a real existence, whereas they exist only in the hearts and
inteUects of others, and, second, by thinking of them as having been
moraUy what they were not. And without this seU-deception, at
least as far as the element of "amelioration" is concerned, the divinity
is "inadequate" for its moral purpose." *
It is difficult to see why, as far as our own betterment is concerned,
we might not as weU omit the dead, the Uving, or the unborn, whether
of men, horses, dogs, or oxen, from our ideal. It is, after all, but an
ideal which Positivism requires each to worship — an ideal in each in
stance of the individual's own creation. If by the worship of the
ideal we improve ourselves in mind and heart it is better that the
ideal should have no taint of moral fault. In this respect Chris
tianity offers us in Jesus Christ a far higher ideal than any mind can
create for itself. And as the mind has to choose its own ideal it could
choose Christ as well as any other. For, even though his superiority of
J6SUS, 3>S sin
metaphysical divinity might be supposed to unfit him for {J}jjjJ|- top*}£
use as an example, it is a plain fact that the man Christ itivism.
Jesus is a true example. But why talk of the worship of an ideal? To use
such language is to pervert it from its own common significance. Hu
manity, including those horses, dogs, oxen, etc., which are more esti
mable than certain men, is a generalization having no concrete reaUty.
It cannot be worshiped without intellectual self -stultification. When
Comte speaks of our worship of mother, wUe, daughter, husband, or
son,3 he speaks of that which is at least possible in thought; but his
humanity has no existence in the sense in which these exist. Not
only is it nonsense to talk about worshiping this abstract generaliza-
1 Catechism, p. 103. Comp. Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories, p. 202 f.
a Catechism, pp. 120-122.

334 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
tion, it is useless to do it. The purpose of the worship of mother, wife,
daughter, is to develop within us respectively veneration, attachment,
and kindness.1 But unless worship be the only mode of attaining
these quahties worship is useless. That they can be attained without
worshiping mother, wfle, and daughter is proved by actual experience
in numberless cases. i Catechism, p. 121.

Worship in Positivism. 335

CHAPTER II.
worship in positivism.
Why not worship the Christian's God ? In him are aU perfections.
The only reason that can be given is that Comte and Positivists do not
believe there is a God. Comte's principal precursor in phflosophy
was Hume. l This made him an agnostic, U not an atheist. It led him
to believe that causes never can be known, and the search after them,
whether as final or efficient, is futile. The only thing we can know is
laws ; unvarying relations of succession and resemblance ; the how,
not the why, of things.3 Put in his favorite form: "Every theoretical
conception passes necessarily through three successive stages. The
first is the theological, or fictitious. The second, metaphysical, or
abstract. The third, positive, or real. The first is always Comte's ai-
' r * leged three
provisional. The second, simply transitional. The third stages of
theoretical
alone is definitive. . . . There is, at bottom, no other cuf- conceptions.
ference between ' the first and second,' in point of theory than this :
that the deities recognized by the first are reduced by the second to
mere entities, or abstractions. . . . Metaphysics . . . have no other
effect in the original evolution, whether of the individual or of so
ciety, but to facilitate the gradual passage from theology to Positiv
ism." 3 This makes beUef in God an out- worn phase in human devel
opment. TheoreticaUy, therefore, this is his reason for rejecting the
worship of God. But, according to his own statement, the chief
distinction between those who worshiped God, or still worship him,
and Positivists is not the reaUty of the objects worshiped, for in
both cases he regards them as mere conceptions of the mind, but
that the former beUeved in the real existence of the imaginary be
ing they worshiped while Comtists worship a being they know to be
imaginary.* We shall not attempt what has been so often and so successfuUy
accomplished, namely, a refutation of the peculiar notion of the his-
1 Catechism, p. 7.
' Ibid., p. 57. Flint answers Comte briefly, but effectually, in these words: "All the
reasonings of the Positivists against causes resolve themselves at last into the single ar
gument—we cannot see causality, and therefore we cannot know causes "— Anti-Theistie
Theories, p. 195.
8 Catechism, pp. 169 ff . * Ibid., pp. 92 ff .

336 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
tory of thought mentioned above.' It has no real place here. We
insist, as above, that for the purposes of betterment, even with a view
to better service of humanity, an ideal entirely disconnected with
Absurdity of dead or unborn men, horses, dogs, oxen, etc., is as good
is* object'S as the ideal drawn from them, and better, in that we need
worship. not practice upon ourselves any seU-deception in connec
tion with its worship. And we also insist that U an ideal is to be wor
shiped it is better to worship the ideal we have in Jesus Christ, since
it is nobler than any other. If the purpose of the worship of humanity
is to induce us to Uve for others, then not the dead, or the unborn,
but the Uving should be the humanity worshiped. But it is not nec
essary to worship human beings in order to live for them. Positivists
have exhibited no preeminence over Christians, even under like cir
cumstances, in the matter of Uving for others. And if we take the
hard conditions through which Christians have passed in the ages
now gone by, in their endeavors to serve their f eUow-men, it must be
said that Positivists will never have an opportunity to prove whether
they would have done as much or as weU. Christianity has fought
down opposition to the spirit of good wfll until, theoretically, at least,
that spirit is everywhere encouraged. The conclusion is that Positiv
ism is not only ridiculous In proportion as it varies from Christianity,
but in aU that is valuable it borrows from the system it rejects.
Besides the object we must consider the content of worship in Posi
tivism. We pass by its elaborate division of the Positivist year, and
take up the vital matter of prayer, the importance of which Positivism
emphasizes. It is to be performed in a kneeling posture,3 and — whfle
Positivism *ke Prayers are to be read — they must be composed by the
and prayer, person offering them.3 The Positivist prays, not for the
purpose of receiving anything from the object of his worship, but in
order to give expression to his best affections.* "He may also ask,
but he asks only for a noble progress, which he insures almost by the
very asking. The fervent wish to become more tender, more rever
ential, more courageous even, is itseU in some degree a realization of
the desired improvement. . . . This holy influence of prayer may
extend to the intellect, were it only by urging us to new efforts to
improve our thought." "
1 We refer the reader to Flint, Philosophy of History in Europe, vol. 1: Philosophy of
History in France and Germany, New York, 1875. See also Flint's Antl-Theistic Theories,
pp. 190 ff., and comp. Edward Caird's The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte, Glas
gow, 1885, especially chaps. It and ill. Herbert Spencer also opposes Comte's view, not
on this point alone, but on many other points. See his letter in the New Englander for
January, 1864.
2 Catechism, p. 121. " Ibid., p. 110. ' Ibid., p. 105 f. 'Ibid., p. 106.

Worship in Positivism. 337
Here it is plain that the value of prayer is confined to the reflex in
fluence it exerts upon us. This is consistent ; for U the divinity has a
purely subjective existence it cannot aid us from without. Such an
idea of answer to prayer is the only one possible to the reUgion of
humanity. But why call it prayer ? ; Why not call it what it really
is, namely, the expression to ourselves of our desire for improvement?
Dead or unborn men, horses, dogs, oxen, etc., cannot help us to improve
ourselves ; why make any pretense of securing their aid ? They can
not hear our oral nor discern the contents of our mental effusions ;
why address them to them? We affirm that it is irrational to proceed
as the Positivists would have us do. The only explanation that can be
given of this strange reUgion of deception is that it is intended mainly
for women and proletaries, who, in the opinion of Comte, Tne reugi0I1
could be hoodwinked with ease.3 His Catechism is a "deception.
series of conversations between an imaginary woman and an imaginary
priest. The woman appears to see many difficulties in the way of the
new faith ; but the priest's answers invariably clear them up. Only with
such could a man Uke Comte have expected his new religion to find
acceptance. Women of discerning minds wfll not be so easily deceived.
The limited space which can be given in a work like this to a system
with so little merit forbids elaborate treatment. However, the essential
features of Positivism, its Great Being and prayer, have been suffici
ently exposed. It is not pertinent here to enter upon the Positivist
philosophy which professes to underlie the Positivist religion. It is
really nothing but agnosticism in a form quite similar to that of Hume
and Spencer. But there is one more characteristic of Positivism as a
religion to which attention ought to be called. Whoever has read even
this brief treatment of the subject must be impressed -with the artifi
ciality of Comte's system. It is not a growth, nor did it flow out of
his inmost heart Uke the utterances of a prophet. It is a Artificiality of
manufactured article, bearing all the marks of device. Posltivism.
It was thought out in the study, not wrought out in the conflict of
daily Ufe. The only exceptions to these statements are the elements
which embody Christian practice or which are imitations of such prac
tice or teaching. 8 Besides an artificial divinity, and prayer as an arti-
1 Flint calls attention, also, to Comte's perversion of the word " religion."— Anti-Theistic
Theories, p. 198 f.
' Catechism, pp. 31, 33, where he gives his reasons for addressing his reUgion mostly to
women. Seep. 114, where we get one of the many hints he gives us of his estimate of the
mental weaknesses of women.
3 For example, the offering of the last prayer when in bed, continuing until we fall asleep
(p. 124), and the suggestion that the two hours devoted daily to personal improvement by
prayer are less than the time usually absorbed by the reading of books of no value, or by
useless or even pernicious amusements.

338 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
fice, there are several other features worthy of note. " The morning
prayer should be, in general, twice as long as the evening. That at
midday should be haU as long." "We usuaUy divide the morning
prayer mto three parts of equal length." ' The nine so-caUed social
sacraments are, presentation, initiation, admission, destination, mar
riage, maturity, retirement, transformation, and incorporation.3 Their
significance cannot be explained here. Some of them are useful
enough, particularly those which are adapted from Christianity. The
point to be now illustrated is the artificial periods of time between
them. Between the first and second there are fourteen years. Seven
years later he receives the third sacrament, which admits him to the
service of humanity, whereas he had been previously a mere receiver
from humanity. It is a remarkable idea that one cannot serve,
though he can be served by, humanity for the first twenty-one years
of his Ufe. One would think that a youth of eighteen to twenty-one
might "render as noble an aid " as a "horse, a dog, or an ox."
Seven years must now pass; he must be twenty-eight before he
can be allowed to choose his career— the sacrament of destination.
Further development of this point is unnecessary. We mention but
one more instance : the clerical aspirants must be twenty-eight, the
vicars, thirty-five, and the priests proper forty-two years of age before
they can be admitted. All this insistence on definite times, ages, and
durations marks the artificiality of the system. It leaves nothing to
spontaneity. It overlooks the enormous difference in the rapidity of
natural development in different individuals and races. This in itseU
is sufficiently serious from a practical point of view, but it is men
tioned here solely for the purpose of illustrating the artificial character
which pervades the whole of the Positivist reUgion. A reUgion which
grows up as the natural product of the desire to meet specific human
needs may not be so systematic, and it may not be perfect in all its
theories ; but it has in it the breath of life. He who is not content to
let a reUgion grow, but would plan it beforehand, must needs be very
wise. Even God did not presume to mark out so definitely as Comte
the details of human Ufe. He left something to man's discretion and
decision, contenting himself with the revelation of the great funda
mental principles of conduct. The consequence is that the Christian
religion exhibits no marks of artificiality, though it gives evidence of
a superhuman wisdom. Comte's artificial reUgion, on the other
hand, except where it borrows from Christianity, evinces human
folly. > Catechism, p. 125. » Ibid., p. 128.

Ethical Culture. 339

CHAPTER III.
ETHICAL CULTURE— ITS MISREPRESENTATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY.
Not aU the members and adherents of the so-called societies for
Ethical Culture would attempt to substitute it for Christianity ; nor
would aU of them even go so far as to substitute the societies for
the Church. Nevertheless, the majority, U we may judge from the
Uterature produced by them, would do both. The Union of the
Societies for Ethical Culture aims "to elevate the moral Ufe of its
members and that of the community ; and it cordially welcomes to its
fellowship aU persons who sympathize with this aim, whatever may
be their theological or philosophical opinions."1 The aim of the
Union, therefore, is not to displace Christianity, though it does not
allow it any rank superior to that granted to atheism. Atheists,
materialists, and Christians aU meet on a common level, sinking their
differences in the one purpose, "to elevate the moral Ufe." This
very breadth, therefore, is destructive of the claim that Christianity
furnishes the only firm basis for a true moraUty. Under the specious
pretense of breadth it invites Christians to strip off their dearest tenets
and help atheists to demonstrate the possibility of high morality
without reUgion. But, whfle the Union displaces Christianity only
by indirection, there are those in the ranks of the Ethical Cultur-
ists, and they are the leaders in the ranks, who openly propose
to substitute Ethical Culture for Christianity. The princi- Kelation of
pal work of William Mackintire Salter is entitled taretoCb°ri£
Ethical Religion, and aU the suspicions aroused by the Hamty-
title are confirmed by the contents of the book. Even the minimum
of Christian doctrine which, according to Salter, the Unitarians hold is
too much," and hence Unitarianism cannot satisfy him. He can be
"satisfied" only when "no confession, Christian or other," limits the
freedom of the colaborers for the elevation of the moral Ufe. Mr.
Stanton Coit, another leader among the Ethical Culturists, has
written a work under the title, Ethical Culture as a Religion for
the People,3 to fllustrate the supremacy of ethics and the needlessness
of any religious faith.
1 Salter, Ethical Religion, p. 320, n. « Ibid., p. 266.
3 London, 1887. The date and title, as well as the contents, are given by Gizycki.

34:0 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
As the standard work on Ethical Culture we choose here Salter's
Ethical Religion. It is true that he disclaims any purpose, as his
colaborers would deny his right, to speak for others than himseU.
Still, he represents very fairly the main principles of the movement,
of which he is so ardent a champion, both in this country and in
Europe. Besides, there is no mistaking what he means. His lan
guage is unequivocal and his utterances are, in the main, seU-
consistent. This cannot be said of some other leaders of the Ethical
Culture movement in this country. Salter makes the impression of
being perfectly honest as well as unhesitating. In many respects, by
his solemn earnestness and zeal for righteousness, he reminds the
reader of the best of Hebrew prophets. For all these and for many other
reasons we have taken him as the strongest and most representative
man in the Ethical Culture movement in America, and we shaU dis
cuss that movement chiefly in the Ught of his utterances. ¦ It is, how
ever, not proposed to condemn the Societies for Ethical Culture for
what they are, but to defend Christianity against their assaults and
to point out the inadequacy of the movement as a substitute for the
religion of Jesus.
We consider first the faults Salter finds with Christianity as
compared with Ethical Culture. A chief complaint is that Chris
tianity holds that love and justice are actually ruling in the world ;
Salter's first tnat ** satf8> Th0 ideal does rule, whfle the new reUgion
SentottXoi wi11 say> Let it rule.' But Christianity, as one of the old
Christianity. religions which Salter rejects, does not say that love and
justice— the ideal— do rule. Some theologians have seemed to teach
this, but the vast majority of Christian beUevers hold the contrary.
The only teaching in the New Testament, which alone is the source
from which Christian doctrine can be discovered, approaching the
idea that the ideal does actuaUy rule in the world, is the doctrine of
God's providence over his people. We are taught that "aU things
work together for good to them that love God ;"s but the very state
ment impUes that there are evfls in the world, which, however, U we
cooperate, God can so overrule that they shaU not harm us but be
compelled to contribute to our good. The teaching is not that condi
tions are ideal, but that in spite of unideal conditions God's children
shall experience no real harm. In spite of all the evfl in the world God
• Besides the works already mentioned the reader should consult Felix Adler's Creed
and Deed, Now York, 1877 ; also an article by Adler on Modern Skepticism and Ethi
cal Culture, In the Forum, October. 1893, and another by J. Smith, Ethical Substitutes
for Christianity, in the British and Foreign Evangelical Review, vol. xxxi, p. 439.
» Ethical Religion, pp. 12, 13. » Rom. viii, 28.

Ethical Culture. 341
is at work upon human hearts striving to hinder its consequences.
Just because the standpoint of Christianity is so thoroughly ethical
it is possible to teach with truth that the man who loves God, the
Good, wfll be able to make the very existence of evfl itseU a means
of good; that is, of moral progress. The "old religion," Christianity,
has never said that the ideal rules, but that sin and misery are in a
world which ought to be, and might be, the scene of righteousness,
love, and happiness.
On the other hand, this "old religion " has been saying for eighteen
hundred years what the advocates of the "new" impudently claim
as their exclusive virtue: "Let the ideal, let love and justice rule."
Anyone who wfll honestly compare those portions of the world where
Christianity prevails, even in its most corrupt form, with the moral
conditions which existed among the same peoples prior to the intro
duction of Christianity can but come to the conclusion that just in
proportion as a nation is Christian is it enlightened and moral — does
the ideal, love and justice rule. Were men Uke Salter to cease
misrepresenting and maligning Christianity, and to turn their en
ergies to making it triumphant, it would not be long until the
ideal would rule in a very complete degree. The Ethical Culturists
are no doubt honest, but it is amazing that they should, like the
enemies of morality, assault the only system which has in it the
potency of human ethical improvement, giving aid and comfort to
those who in their secret hearts want aU the safeguards of moraUty
destroyed. Another serious fault is thus stated by Salter:' "And here is the
ignoble side to theology; for not only is the personal Deity of the
ology fllusory, but by gathering the divine qualities into a form out
side of man it allows us to forget that they are quahties for man, and
religion becomes the worship of something already ex- His second
isting instead of the sense of a burden and a task. We tation.
are to become divine ; we are to make this world a scene of justice.
All that men have gathered into the form of God is but the image of
our possible selves." Whether "the personal Deity of theology" is
illusory is not here in debate. But if there be a being in whom aU
divine qualities concur why should we be forbidden to worship him ?
It is universally conceded that men tend to become like the gods they
worship. Salter seems to object to our becoming righteous by means
of worship.
Again, it is not true that "all that men have gathered into the
1 Ethical Religion, p. 12.
24

34:2 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
form of a God is but the image of our possible selves ;" for they have
attributed to God omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, none of
which is possible to man. Salter, Uke most opponents of Christianity,
lacks in power of discrimination. This is why they fail to see the
superiority of Christianity. He has failed to discriminate here. What
he probably means to say is that aU moral quaUties which men have
attributed to God are possible in ourselves— the moral character of
God is our possible moral character. Now, these divine qualities of
love, mercy, justice, are not gathered by Christian theology into a
form outside of man, at least not there alone, but in the man Christ
Jesus. And so far from allowing us to forget that these divine quaU
ties are qualities for men any Christian theology which deserves the
name makes Jesus our example and demands that we shaU strive to
become ethically Uke God.1 In this sense of the word Christianity
has from the beginning taught that " we are to become divine ; '' that
"we are to make this world a scene of justice," and of many good
things besides justice. Strange infatuation with seU is that which
can make a man take the plainest truths of Christianity and arrogate
to himself the credit of having just discovered them without any aid
from the system he condemns.
But, again, Salter says:3 "The old religions (of course including
Christianity) leave us on our knees in rapt contemplation and wor
ship : the new wfll summon us to stand erect, and to beUeve that aU
men have worshiped, aU that they have dreamed of, aU that has seemed
so far above them and beyond them, men and women in the future are
to become and to realize." Can it be that Salter ready beUeves that
Third misrep- Christianity does not summon man to stand erect, and to
resentation. Dei jeye all that he here declares as to the ethical possibil
ities in mankind ? With aU purpose to be kind and charitable in
judgment we cannot acquit the man who can write such a passage of
being either too ignorant to be set up as a teacher of others, or else
too prejudiced to admit the good he knows to exist in a system he
opposes. Yet not for the sake of condemning Salter, who has doubt
less labored honestly, but for the sake of saving men from yielding to
his delusion do we point out the absolute unfairness and injustice of
what he says and implies. It is surely most unfair to Christendom
to represent it as on its knees, in rapt contemplation and worship,
while those who oppose the wrongs that are in the world and encour
age men to upright living are those who reject Christianity. The
Christian religion is indeed "the worship of something already ex-
1 1 Pet. 11, 21-23 ; Matt, v, 43^8. • Ethical Religion, p. 13.

Ethical Culture. 343
isting," but it is not that "instead of the sense of a burden and a
task," rather is it worship and the sense of a burden and a task. To
say or to imply that Christianity is chiefly worship, whfle neglectful
of morals, is to utter a base and baseless slander. Many so-caUed
Christians may have given themselves chiefly to the devotional side
of Christianity ; but they have done so, U at aU, in spite of the ethical
teachings of the New Testament, which constitute the bulk of the
New Testament writings.
Another complaint of Salter against reUgion in general is that it
makes sacred aU that it commands,1 and that it has often prompted
men to do things that are not right while probably they never once
asked themselves any other question than, Will it please my God?
and that, U anyone asks himseU what he ought to do, aside from the
fear or favor of God, he probably never does altogether wrong.3
Among the iUustrations he gives of men who under the influence of
reUgion did things which were wrong he mentions Paul, who, before
his conversion, verily thought he ought to do many Fourth mis-
representa-
things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth. Here tion.
is a case in which a reUgionist asked himseU what he ought to do,
and yet, according to Salter, did wrong.
Now, what do our opposers expect ? That we shall be omniscient,
because we are reUgious? Shall other men be excused for falling
into error when they follow their moral judgments and reUgionists
be condemned under the same circumstances ? That men professing to
be followers of Christ have persecuted and done many other wicked
things, under the impression that it was right to do so, is too true.
But, so far from this having arisen from a purpose to do the will of
Jesus, it arose from a neglect of such a purpose in the interests of the
current view of right. The savagery and bigotry of the non-Chris
tian world had entered into Christendom with the mere outward
form of Christianity. Instead of asking themselves, What would
Jesus do under our circumstances? men nominally Christians, yet
but Uttle CJlmstianized, followed the conception of right they had
brought with them into the Christian fold. No man who has respect
to the "fear or favor" of the Christian's God, and capable of forming
a correct conception of the spirit and content of Christian moraUty,
wfll ever do wrong while thinking he is doing right. But U, as so
many professed Christians do, he asks himself, irrespective of the
1 Jesus guarded against this danger by requiring men to judge of all acts by other
criteria than those of custom or commandment. See, for instance, his words relative to
" corban," Mark vii, 7-13.
a Ethical Religion, pp. 89-93.

344 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
fear or favor of God or man, "What ought I to do?" he will be
in danger of going astray. ReUgion does mean, as Salter says, to
most persons, the securing of the favor of God. But what sort of a
Christian would he be who could expect to get the favor of the Chris
tian's God by doing the very things he has forbidden? It is the
neglect of the will of God as revealed in Christ, not the effort to
follow it, which leads men astray whfle they ask themselves, irre
spective of the fear or favor of God, what they ought to do.
We cannot resist calUng attention to one peculiar fact. Anyone
who wfll read Salter's words on pages 89-93 wfll be impressed with
the vigor which he unconsciously admits religion to have lent to its
devotees. And this effect of reUgion is exactly what inteUigent
Christians insist upon. Salter would rob us of this mighty motive
to morality. The truth is that reUgion in the heart — the Christian
religion — is the most powerful and steady impulse to the foUowing of
conscience which can be conceived. But whfle the Christian reUgion
gives us such an impulse it also furnishes us with the principles
which in due course of time wfll educate the moral judgment of man
kind to a perfect standard. Of both of these tremendous advantages
which Christian has over non-Christian moraUty Ethical Culturists
of the Salter type would deprive the world. Yet they pose as re
formers !
We mention one more fault which Ethical Culturists lodge rather
against the Church and the clergy than against Christianity. Says
Salter : 1 " Even the Churches, which should inspire us with an ideal
view of Ufe, talk of mere morality." "We often hear, and, I am
sorry to say, from religious teachers particularly, slighting and con
temptuous words about morality." The second quotation probably is
Fifth misrepre- to be interpreted in the light of the first. Those who
sentation. gpeak of " mere morality » gj.e they who utter « glightjng
and contemptuous words about moraUty." No one can object to the
term " mere morality " who does not believe that morality is either
the highest thing in the universe or else the all of the universe. If
there is anything higher or other than morality then it is entirely pos
sible to speak of "mere morality" without any thought of sUght or
contempt. Morality is a human quality, and it is transcended in dig
nity as divine righteousness transcends human. If anyone denies the
existence of God there could, of course, in his judgment, be nothing
higher than human morality. Of aU human things moraUty is high-
1 Ethical Religion, p. 22 and p. 56. Felix Adler makes a similar complaint in The Forum,
Oct., 1893, p. 381.

Ethical Culture. 345
est. In a godless system of thought the term " mere moraUty "
would be one of disparagement. Not so in a system which acknowl
edges God." Besides, Salter should know, and if he dealt with men at
as close range as preachers do he would know, that what the major
ity of men caU moraUty is the abstinence from doing wrong. In com
parison with the demands of Christianity this is to be termed " mere
morality." Again, it is a fact that many, so far from being humbled
by their deviations even from their relatively low conceptions of
righteousness, are filled with pride and self-satisfaction because they
are no worse. Theirs is "mere moraUty" to be condemned. UntU
they are like God, the Good, who is far higher than morality in their
meaning of the word, they are in danger. Salter's is a war of words.
If he would take the pains to see what Christian teachers have in mind
when they speak what he caUs "sUghting and contemptuous words
about morality " he would see that these words never apply to what
he means by moraUty and what Christians caU the ethical side of
reUgion.

346 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER IV.
INADEQUACY OF ETHICAL CULTURE TO THE PURPOSES OF A REUGION.
We now turn our attention to a criticism of Ethical Culture itseU
in which it will be revealed that as human moraUty is not the high
est thing in the universe so it is not the only thing needful to hu
manity. (1) Ethical Culture is too narrow a scheme to meet all, or even most,
of the demands of human lUe. It offers us a gospel of righteousness.
In this there is nothing original. The Hebrews had the same concep
tion of lUe long ago, and the New Testament is largely made up of it.
Both the Old and the New Testament recognize that sin is the prin
cipal source of human sorrow, and also the principal enemy to the
proper development of human character. Christianity has for its
chief aim the destruction of the sinful disposition, the development of
righteous character, and the practice of right conduct ; yet, important
as it is, righteousness is not the only need of human Ufe. LUe is being,
Narrowness of aa weu" aiS conduct. We are, before we can be related to
ofPPe1tnicai others, in right or wrong behavior. Christianity says,
culture. Be) tliat you may ,j0 Ethical Culture simply says, Do.
Thus has Christianity everything that Ethical Culture claims, and it
had it before Ethical Culture had it ; and it has far more than Ethical
Culture has.
There are times when the heart needs the ministry of comfort rather
than of exhortation. Ethical Culture has no adequate word for those
who long for immortaUty and reunion with the loved and loving dead ;
no consolation for those who are the victims of disease or other pain ;
no promise that in a world to come there shaU prevail a better state
than this because no sin shall enter there, because it wfll be made up
of those who have triumphed over sin here. The heart has need of
fellowship, of the sense of awe and reverence, and of a thousand things
which Ethical Culture with its sole emphasis upon righteousness can
not afford. Ethical Culture is perhaps sufficient for those who have
plenty of friends and but few sorrows ; but hope must be kept aUve at
times when the heart is so filled with a sense of disappointment that
its pessimism allows no room for thoughts of duty.
It may be said that U all were righteous there would be no such

Inadequacy of Ethical Culture. 347
moments. We shall not undertake to dispute the proposition. But
the Ethical Culturist has lived so long in the thought of what ought to
be that he has forgotten what is. The vast majority are unrighteous ;
and no system is adequate which whUe it stimulates to righteousness
does not at the same time provide for the amelioration of the sad con
sequences of sin. For example, here is an unhappy violator of the
laws of righteousness. His conscience smites him, and he is wretched
on account of his sins. The sense of the evfl past overwhelms him.
He has lost his self-respect. Ethical Culture would exhort him to sin
no more. But he needs something beyond that. He must hear the
Great Supporter of the moral law say, Thy sins are forgiven thee.
Not, as is grossly understood by many, that he may be relieved of the
fear of punishment, for this is but a smaU ingredient in his cup of
misery ; but that he may feel that he has a friend who, though so high
and holy, will still not desert him.
(2) The righteousness which Ethical Culture advocates is, compared
with that of Christianity, not more exalted, but hard and severe.
Could it be practiced in complete isolation from Christian influences
it would result in the production of a civilization almost if not wholly
devoid of the gentleness and sweetness of genuine Christianity.
The reason of this is that Ethical Culture emphasizes righteousness,
the outward expression, the result, and places the cause too exclu
sively in the will and conscience; whereas Christianity expects
righteousness to flow, not only from the operation of the severity of the
wfll and conscience, but also from the spirit of love. negss incui-
Christianity recognizes that righteousness in conduct ethical cu£
may spring from a sole sense of obligation, and it teaches Ule-
that though we bestow all our goods to feed the poor and have not
charity it profiteth nothing.1 In other words, Christianity empha
sizes love as the source of all righteousness, and at the same time as
its most important element.
(3) This leads up to another defect of Ethical Culture as a substi
tute for Christianity. It claims that righteousness is so attractive
that it needs no other support than itself ; U it be Uf ted Attractiveness
up it will draw aU men unto it. True it is that when ness.
properly presented it is attractive. But it is impossible to present
it in its most attractive form in any words or phrases which human
thought can devise or human tongues can utter. Righteousness is most
attractive when presented in a concrete form ; and hence it is that the
righteousness of Jesus is best adapted to attract men to righteousness.
1 1 Cor., xiii, 3.

348 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
(4) Again, Ethical Culture is defective in having no authoritative
external standard of righteousness. Says Salter : ' "There is an ideal
aim for every child of man. It is not in anything outside of ourselves;
it is not to please some supernatural being in the skies ; it is not to
follow some far away historical figure in the past. It is closer to us
than this ; it is in our own heart, it is given to us in our very nature as
moral beings." We shall not pause to point out the confusion in the
use of terms which makes the passage just quoted unclear. What is
probably meant is that the ideal of righteousness is given to every
child of man by virtue of his nature as a moral being ; not only is it
natural to us to feel promptings to do the right, but the ideal of right
need not be sought outside of ourselves. If this were true there could
never be any need of instruction as to what is wrong or what is duty.
The ideal would be the same in infancy as in manhood, and in all
alike. The facts are aU contrary to this. There is, indeed, a powerful
impulse in each to do the right, but the ideal of right is chiefly a mat
ter of education.
It is the defect of naturaUstic systems of ethics that they make this
ideal standard dependent upon the concensus of pubUc opinion or upon
Lack of an ex- the subjective condition of each individual. Christianity
ard of au- gives us a fixed standard outside of ourselves. That
"" 'l* standard is Jesus Christ, presumably the "far away his
torical figure in the past," who is not needed, according to Salter,
because the ideal is closer to us, even in our hearts; a part of our
very nature as moral beings. Has Salter never met anyone who had
low ideals? Does every man, or any man, have in his heart such an
ideal as Jesus Christ except by having it suggested to him from out
side himself ? In fact, all men are foUowing a moral ideal which is
more the result of revelation either by men or God than of any innate
sense of correct ethics. It is notorious that most of what we do,
whether good, bad, or indifferent, is the result of voluntary or invol
untary imitation. Everyone who is not fiUed with seU-conceit needs
some noble example after which he may, though not slavishly, pat
tern. The highest actual and the highest conceivable example is just
this alleged unnecessary "far away figure in the past."
That we have not misunderstood Salter is evident from many pas
sages which might be cited. We give but one : " I beUeve a man can
be as vigilant over himself as ever God or angel could be. I beUeve he
may be as impartial toward himself, as high in Ins demands, and as
sure in his condemnations."3 Here he either denies omniscience to
' Ethical Religion, p. 57. a lDld<> p. 1T8.

Inadequacy of Ethical Culture. 349
God or attributes it to man, or makes it of no value in determining
questions of right and duty. He may have such wisdom that not even
an all- wise God could be wiser ; but no one else has. And those of us
who feel our profound lack of wisdom in the compUcated questions of
human duty are glad to avaU ourselves of the example of that glo
rious, though ' ' far away figure in the past, " Jesus Christ. Often have
men who did not know what to do asked themselves, What would
Jesus do were he in my place ? and after careful restudy of his blame
less and perfect teachings and life they have found great light.
(5) Ethical Culture does not offer any adequate check to the selfish
ness which dominates most human hearts. If this deep-seated evil is
to be overcome it must be by the awakening of some Ethical Cui-
affection strong enough to counteract it. In some good no adequate
degree and in some instances, patriotism, and conjugal human* seif°
and parental, as weU as fiUal, affection tend to produce the isnness-
desired result. The love of righteousness is impossible while this pro
found selfishness continues to exist. Righteousness has no attrac
tions for the selfish soul, which is blinded by its selfishness to the
beauty of benevolence. Righteousness preached, therefore, is not the
antidote to selfishness ; but love incarnate may awaken gratitude,
and through love to the benefactor love for his righteousness may be
educed. Very certain it is that the enthusiasm for himseU which the
person of Jesus has stirred in untold millions of hearts has done more
to lead men to forget seU than all other causes combined.
It may be said that men ought to love righteousness for its own
sake, and not because it is a quality of one who is loved. Such a de
mand will, however, be made only by one who knows nothing, or for
the time forgets what he knows, of human nature. Many things
ought to be which are not, and the question is how to make things
as they ought to be. Roundabout methods must often be employed
by practical men. The selfish man is self -centered ; to ask him to be
righteous is to ask him to act contrary to his strongest f eelings and to
be what he is not. By force of wfll he could perform benevolent acts,
but he cannot by any volition reach and correct the selfishness of his
heart. But if, by any profound emotion, the center of gravity of his
feelings can be changed there is hope that selfishness may be ban
ished. Even his very sense of self-interest may be employed to
destroy his undue love of self. Fear of the consequences of self -grati
fication, or love of some good which may be made to appear greater
than that which one has been pursuing, may change the center of
gravity of the emotions and thus prepare the way for love of right-

350 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
eousness. Many means have been found efficient, but the only one
which has never failed is the love of Jesus. Just in proportion as men
love him do they forget seK and love righteousness. Ethical Culture
ignores the fact that " out of the heart are the issues of Ufe." It seeks
to get conduct chiefly from the action of will, which, compared with
the affections, is powerless. Jesus taught us the true philosophy.
Neither in its criticisms of Christianity nor in its own nature is
Ethical Culture found worthy of becoming a substitute for the reUgion
of Christ.

Theosophy — Its Speculative Character. 351

CHAPTER V.
THEOSOPHY— EXHIBITION OF ITS SPECULATIVE CHARACTER.
Theosophy, says a recognized leader in the theosophical move
ment, "is wisdom about God for those who believe that he is aU
things and in all, and wisdom about nature for the man who accepts
the statement of the Christian Bible that God cannot be measured
or discovered, and that darkness is around his pavilion. Although
it contains by derivation the name of God, and thus may seem at first
to embrace religion alone, it does not neglect science, for it is the
science of sciences, and therefore has been caUed the wisdom religion."
"By embracing both the scientific and the religious, Theosophy is a
scientific religion and a religious science." •
In so far as it is scientific we shaU have to let science look after it ;
we have to do here only with its religious aspects.
If we were to judge from some of the utterances of the advocates of
Theosophy we should be compelled to suppose that they feel no sense
of difference between Christianity and their doctrine or Relation of
system.3 Indeed, so irenic are some of their expressions to^cMsfran^
that one almost wonders what it is that makes Christian- lty-
ity unsuitable for their purposes and Theosophy a necessity to them.
Further reading, however, reveals the fact that to the mind of the
average Theosophist original Christianity was quite theosophic, and
that the Christianity of to-day is really therefore not Christianity at
all. Though the Theosophist does not regard it as an assault upon
original Christianity to say that it was theosophic, yet the Christian
feels almost compeUed to defend his Master's religion against the im
putation. We gladly recognize the value to Theosophists of aU the
Christian truth they possess, but we must demur when Mr. Fullerton a
makes Jesus assert or imply one of the essentials of Theosophy,
namely, that ' ' man can only exhaust Ufe of its lessons by undergoing
lUe in every form ; " that is, makes Jesus teach the theosophic doc
trine of reincarnation ; or when Mr. Budd * identifies the method of
1 The Ocean of Theosophy, by W. Q. Judge, third edition, New York, 1896, p. 1. The
Supreme Court of Massachusetts has decided (1898) that Theosophy is neither religious
nor educational.
2 For instance, the paper by Alexander Fullerton, in Things Common to Christianity and
Theosophy, New York, 1894. ' Ibid., p. 10. * Ibid., p. 14.

352 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
teaching employed by Jesus and St. Paul with that of Theosophy in
its distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine and between the
masses and the select few.
The passages from Jesus and Paul upon which such an identification
must be based can only be so interpreted by one who fails to appre
hend their true significance. The distinction which Christ made was
not between the select few and the masses, but between those who
Exoteric and left all and followed him and those who were indifferent
6sot6ricdoctrines. or opposed to him.1 Paul's language about speaking
' ' wisdom among them that are perfect " 3 lends itself much more easily
to the interpretation of Mr. Budd. But with him it was not a funda
mental distinction, as with the Theosophists, but one founded in a
mere pedagogical necessity. Both Jesus and Paul found it necessary
to bide their time for the propagation of their doctrines ; but both felt
that the very men who to-day were unable to comprehend them might
be able to-morrow. The point with them was not that some men could
understand by reason of a greater " depth of intellect "or " clearer in
tuition"3 than others possessed, but that what truth had already
been imparted must first be assimilated before it would be wise to give
more. They did not trace this necessity to a faflure in some supposed
past incarnations by which they lacked the "purity of life" and the
" lofty ideals and aspirations " required in order to be "able to per
ceive and grasp the sublimest spiritual truths concerning nature and
man." * The truth they taught was not such as to require either high
inteUect or purity for its apprehension. It was a truth which the low
liest could grasp, and which appealed to the sinner in his sins. It did
not require him to be good in order to receive the blessings of the Gos
pel ; the blessings of the Gospel were designed to make him good. But
the moral and spiritual forces reUed on by Theosophists cannot work
except when conditions are favorable. "It would be subversive of the
ends they have in view were they (the elder brothers) to make them
selves public in the present civilization, which is based almost wholly
on money, fame, glory, and personality." " Jesus came to those who
were sick. The elder brothers wfll come only to those who are whole.
Here is one of the fatal defects of Theosophy, as judged by its chief
expounders. It does not save the sinner as such ; it can do its best
Plan of tbeo- only for him who, by repeated reincarnations and struggle
iSOplW* '<! I Sill- t
vation. contmued through long ages, has lUted himself into a
state of purity. And its highest representatives are those who stand
' Matt, vii, 6; xix, 29. a 1 Cor. II, 6.
3 Things Common, p. 14. « Ibid. » Judge, Ocean, p. 4.

Theosophy — Its Speculative Character. 353
among the great ones of the earth. Says a chief among the Theoso
phists,1 speaking of the occasional appearance of the Mahatmas, " In
those periods when they do come out some of their number are rulers
of men, some teachers, a few great phflosophers, while others remain
still unknown except to the most advanced of the body." It has
always been the glory of Christian sainthood that its members were
found among the high and lowly, and that they could let their light
shine elsewhere than merely among "the most advanced of the body."
This aristocratic element in Theosophy is itseU sufficient to condemn
it. True ' ' brotherhood " cannot exist where an essential of the system
is a distinction based on the stage of progress men have made in the
vast cycles of evolution demanded by Theosophy. The developed Chris
tian is just the one who can best help his lowly brother, and he feels
himself in nowise separated by any superior attainments from him
who is struggling with sin. Theosophy is guilty of perpetuating a
caste based both upon differences of intellect and of spiritual advance
ment. Another serious fault in Theosophy is its unpractical character as
evinced by the expositions we have of it from the pens of those who
are supposed to speak with knowledge concerning it. An Epitome of
Theosophy, published by the Theosophical Publishing Company, gives
the following as the aims of the Theosophical Society in unpractical
America: "The principal object of the society" is "the °f Theoso-
formation of a nucleus of universal brotherhood without phy-
any distinctions whatever ; its subsidiary objects being, (a) the study
of ancient and modern religions, philosophies, and sciences, and the
demonstration of the importance of such study ; and (b) the investi
gation of the unexplained laws of nature and the psychical powers
latent in man." In this statement of aims much is included of prac
tical value, and one would suppose that the society must perforce be
practical and beneficent in its results. But when we turn to the Epit
ome to see what Theosophy is we discover that but little attention
is given to practical problems, or at least but Uttle in any such way as
to aid in their practical solution.
Says the Epitome, "Some of its fundamental propositions are :
" (1) That the spirit in man is the only real and permanent part of
his being, the rest of his nature being variously compounded ; and de
cay being incident to all composite things, everything in Citations from
1116 Ji p 1 i -
man but his spirit is impermanent. Further, that the ome.
universe being one, and not diverse, and everything within it being
1 Judge, Ocean, p. 3.

354 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
connected with the whole and with every other, of which upon the
upper plane above referred to there is a perfect knowledge, no act or
thought occurs without each portion of the great whole perceiving
and noting it. Hence aU are inseparably bound together by the tie of
brotherhood. " (2) That below the spirit and above the intellect is a plane of con
sciousness in which experiences are noted, commonly caUed man's
' spiritual nature ;' this is as susceptible of culture as bis body or his
inteUect. " (3) That this spiritual culture is only attainable as the grosser in
terests, passions, and demands of the flesh are subordinated to the in
terests, aspirations, and needs of the higher nature, and that this is a
matter of both system and estabhshed law.
"(4) That men thus systematicaUy trained attain to clear insight
into the immaterial, spiritual world, then* interior faculties appre
hending truth as imniediately and readily as physical faculties grasp
the things of sense, or mental faculties those of reason ; hence that
their testimony to such truth is as trustworthy as is that of scientists
or philosophers to truth in their respective fields.
" (5) That in the course of this spiritual training such men acquire
perception of and control over various forces in nature unknown to
others, and thus are able to perform works usuaUy caUed ' miracu
lous,' though really but the result of larger knowledge of natural law.
" (6) That their testimony as to supersensuous truth, verified by
their possession of such powers, chaUenges candid examination from
every religious mind."
Turning now to the system expounded by these sages we find as its
main points :
" (1) An account of cosmogony, the past and future of this earth
and other planets, the evolution of lUe through mineral, vegetable,
animal, and human forms.
' ' (2) That the affairs of this world and its people are subject to cychc
laws, and that during any one cycle the rate or quality of progress
appertaining to a different cycle is not possible.
" (3) The existence of a universaUy diffused and highly ethereal
medium, called the ' astral light ' or ' akasa,' which is the repository
of all past, present, and future events, and which records the effects
of spiritual causes and of aU acts and thoughts from the direction of
either spirit or matter. It may be caUed the book of the recording
angel. " (4) The origin, history, development, and destiny of mankind."

Theosophy — Its Speculative Character. 355
" Upon the subject of man it teaches :
" (1) That each spirit is a manUestation of the one Spirit, and thus
a part of aU. It passes through a series of experiences in incarnation,
and is destined to ultimate reunion with the divine.
" (2) That this incarnation is not single but repeated, each individ-
uaUty becoming reembodied during numerous existences in succes
sive races and planets, and accumulating the experiences of each
incarnation toward its perfection.
" (3) That between adjacent incarnations, after grosser elements are
first purged away, comes a period of comparative rest and refresh
ment, the spirit being therein prepared for its next advent into ma
terial hfe.
" (4) That the nature of each incarnation depends upon the merit
and demerit of the previous lUe or lives, upon the way in whieh the
man has lived and thought ; and that this law is inflexible and whoUy
just. " (5) That ' Karma,' a term signUying two things— the law of ethical
causation (Whatsoever a man soweth that shaU he also reap), and the
balance or excess of merit or demerit in any individual — determines
also the main experiences of joy and sorrow in each incarnation ; so
that what men cad 'luck' is in reality 'desert,' desert acquired in
past existence.
" (6) That the process of evolution up to reunion with the divine
contemplates successive elevations from rank to rank of power and
usefulness, the most exalted beings still in the flesh being known as
Sages, Rishees, Brothers, Masters, their great function being the pres
ervation at all times, and, when cycUc laws permit, the extension, of
spiritual knowledge and influence among humanity.
" (7) That when union with the divine is effected all the events
and experiences of each incarnation are known."

356 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VI.
THEOSOPHY — ITS INFERIORITY TO CHRISTIANITY.
No unprejudiced person can read this Epitome without observing
how very largely it is composed of matters ordinarily called speculative
rather than practical ; that is, of matters which, even U true, could only
minister to our intellectual curiosity, not aid us in better Uving these
lives of ours. Another illustration may be found in almost the entire
extent of Judge's Ocean, a sample of which we give herewith. " They
(the ' elder brothers ' ) have mastered the mysteries of sound and color
through which alone the elemental beings behind the veil of matter
can be communicated with, and thus can tell why the rain falls and
what it falls for, whether the earth is hollow or not, what makes the
wind to blow and light to shine, and, greater feat than aU — one which
implies a knowledge of the very foundations of nature — they know
what the ultimate divisions of time are and what are the meaning and
the times of the cycles."
The doctrine of " Karma" seems to have a certain ethical value for
the seU-centered soul; though not greater than is found in Chris
tianity. In fact, in order to explain its most important aspects the
writer of the Epitome felt obUged to quote an utterance of Paul which
teaches what the Theosophist also believes. But the doctrine loses its
The doctrine value, as compared with the Christian doctrine of retri-
a n d at h e bution, by the fact that our sufferings in this lUe are con-
doctrine' 'of nected with our desert in a lUe lived hitherto— a Ufe of
retribution. wj1jci1 we have no consciousness, and of whose ill or good
desert we know nothing except by our sufferings or pleasures here
and now. Christianity also teaches, not only retribution in this Ufe,
for deeds done here, but more surely in a lUe to come. But it teaches
that that life will be a conscious continuance of this. Under Theoso
phy there is always a doubt of the connection between conduct and
happiness, in Christianity none.
But the program for the perfection of the spirit given in Theosophy,
"each individuality becoming reembodied during numerous exist
ences in successive races and planets," is such as to dishearten men.
Men would need to think very ill of Christianity, or else have a very
firm faith in the "knowledge acquired by the sages of the past," to

Theosophy — Its Inferiority to Christianity. 357
commit themselves to such a theory. In comparison with it how
simple the Christian way of salvation !
But how are we to secure confidence in these teachers ? At first we
have absolutely their word only. They have nothing to show us by
way of confirmation. True, they claim Moses, Jesus, and others as
among these teachers.1 But all we know of them is drawn from
sources which are nontheosophic, and our only reason for believing
that they were Theosophists is that Theosophists tell us they were.
Theosophy cannot point to any of its triumphs and say, " Behold
what I have done for these." For it is not by Theosophy that Theoso
phy claims to benefit men. It does not claim to be a force for the
elevation of men, but a description of forces and facts. It is a guide,
not an influence. It is a wisdom — the wisdom — reUgion. Its very
motto is, "There is no religion higher than truth." It aims to dis
cover and point out the truth ; not to exert a regenerat- Aim of Ti!eos.
ing power. This Ues in the things which it portrays. ophy"
The process of spiritual development "is entirely within the indi
vidual himself ; the motive, the effort, the result being distinctly per
sonal," and it can only be that one shall become an adept in the course
of long ages. The good and great of the past may be claimed by The
osophy, but, we repeat, we have only the Theosophist's word for it. a
Other systems also claim them. Whom shaU we believe ? Only in
the course of long ages can I ascertam by my own experience whether
the esoteric doctrines are true. Christianity does indeed also offer the
test of experience ; but it does not make that test last through long

So it is with regard to the theories they give us concerning life and
nature. We must take them whoUy upon the word of others, and
can test them for ourselves only after many successive incarnations.
This is faith carried to a boundless extreme. A few sentences illus
trative of the tax on our credulity demanded by Theosophy are here
given from Judge's Ocean : "The elder brothers of humanity are men
who were perfected in former periods of evolution. These periods of
manifestation are unknown to modern evolutionists so far as their num
ber is concerned, though long ago understood by not only the older
Hindus but also by those great minds and men who instituted and
1 Judge, Ocean, pp. 8, 10.
8 Among those whom Judge mentions in the first chapter of his Ocean as Mahatmas
are Apollonius of Tyana, Abraham, Moses, Solomon, Noah, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus,
Jacob Boehme, Paracelsus, Mesmer, and Madame Blavatsky. " The Theosophist says
that all these great names represent members of the one single brotherhood, who all
have a single doctrine," p. 10.
25

358 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
carried on the first pure and undebased form of the Mysteries of
its demands Greece. The periods, when out of the great unknown
credulity. there come forth the visible universes, are eternal in
their coming and going, alternating with equal periods of silence and
rest again in the unknown." " I repeat, then, that though the true
doctrine disappears for a time from among men it is bound to reap
pear, because, first, it is impacted in the imperishable center of man's
nature; and, secondly, the lodge forever preserves it, not only in
actual objective records, but also in the intelUgent and fully seU-con-
scious men, who, having successfully overpassed the many periods of
evolution which preceded the one we are now involved in, cannot lose
the precious possessions they have acquired."
The Christian Helper is ever nigh; but the "elder brothers who
continually watch over the progress of the less progressed " J can only
extend "spiritual knowledge and influence among humanity" "when
cyclic laws permit." 3 "The cycles must run their rounds. Periods of
mental and moral light and darkness succeed each other as day does
night. The major and minor yugas must be accomplished according
to the established order of things. And we, borne along the mighty
tide, can only modify and direct some of its minor currents. " '
There seems, then, to be a kind of fatality which binds both the
Mahatmas and the ordinary man; so that if one wished to gain
knowledge he could not unless the cyclic laws favored
Its fatalism. . . .
it. But this necessitarianism is found elsewhere. The
Epitome says: "The universe being one and not diverse, and
everything within it being connected with the whole and with every
other ... no act or thought occurs without each portion of the great
whole perceiving and noting it. Hence all are inseparably bound
together by the tie of brotherhood." We do not wish to go into the
argument against Theospophy which might be forcibly drawn from
its many self-contradictions, but we cannot refrain from calling
attention here to the fact that all are, now, not are to be, "inseparably
bound together by the tie of brotherhood." If this be the case, in the
very nature of things, why the Theosophical Society with its purpose
to form "a nucleus of universal brotherhood?" But it is not to
emphasize the fact that it is now represented as a thing to be by the
effort of the Theosophical Society and then as already existing in the
nature of things, but solely to emphasize the fact that a brotherhood
1 Ocean, p. 3.
2 Epitome, p. 1, and Ocean p. 3. See Cyclic Laws in Epitome, p. 1.
• Ocean, p. 5 f. >

Theosophy — Its Inferiority %o Christianity. 359
founded upon the nature of things lacks exactly the element of
brotherliness. The element of voluntary good wiU found in the
Christian idea of brotherhood is altogether lacking.
We close the discussion of Theosophy as a substitute for Christian
ity by giving the reader some idea of the marvels which Theosophists
claim their initiates can perform. To anyone who has the least
acquaintance with the miracles of Jesus the superiority Tne miraeies
of the latter will be immediately apparent; and this theJe|iieged
superiority is a symbol of the superiority of Christianity xheosoSphy
to Theosophy. We quote from Judge , J "If an initiate comPare(1-
can make a sohd object move without contact it is because he under
stands the two laws of attraction and repulsion of which "gravita
tion ' is but the name for one ; U he is able to precipitate out of the
viewless air the carbon which we know is in it, forming the carbon
into sentences upon the paper, it is through his knowledge of the
occult higher chemistry, and the use of a trained and powerful image-
making faculty which every man possesses ; if he reads your thoughts
with ease, that results from the use of the inner and only real powers
of sight, which require no retina to see the fine-pictured web which
the vibrating brain of man weaves about him."
1 Ocean, p. 12.

360 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER "VTI.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE — STATEMENT AND CRITICISM.
Were we to accept the reiterated professions, no doubt sincerely
made, of the adherents of Christian Science, we should not class this
movement as a proposed substitute for Christianity. Christian Scien
tists claim to be in fact the true foUowers of Jesus Christ, and by
impUcation aU but themselves are mistaken in regarding themselves
as true Christians.1 Christian Science may be described as an at
tempt to apply the most extreme form of subjective metaphysical
ideaUsm to the practical departments of health and soteriology. At
first sight it might appear therefore that there need be no rivalry
between it and Christianity. When it is considered that it attempts
to make Christ sponsor for both the metaphysical doctrines upon
which it proceeds and for its appUcation of those doctrines, and that
in applying this metaphysics it proposes to speak with authority both
concerning some of the presuppositions and some of the plainest
doctrines of Christianity, it will be seen that the apologist must at
least study it with careful scrutiny. The writer is convinced that
Christian Science is subversive of the Christianity of Jesus.
One of the first points which must attract the student's attention is
the fact that so scant use is made of the teachings and deeds of Jesus.
The discoverer of this faith and practice" may be conscious of placing
Scant use of Jesus at the center of her doctrine ; but she fails to leave
and d£e°drsdof that impression upon the reader of her works. What she
Christian teaches and what she has done is far more prominent
there than what Jesus teaches and what he has done.
The references to the teachings and deeds of Jesus are not only
meager, but they appear to be employed as a prop to what she says.
The impression is not left that we are attending to an exposition of
the life of Jesus, that he is the Spring whence all the teachings of
Christian Science flow. The metaphysical doctrines of subjective
1 It should be remembered that Christian history is thickly strewn with the records of
parties evidently unchristian which have claimed the Christian name.
' We refer of course to Mrs. Mary Baker G. Eddy. We have taken our references
mostly from her cheaper and more accessible writings. Her principal work, Science and
Health with Key to the Scriptures, offers nothing essential to the system, not here
given.

Christian Science — Statement and Criticism. 361
idealism seem to be fundamental ; from them arise aU of the practi
cal applications. It is not made clear that this philosophy was the
philosophy of Jesus, though the assertion is frequent enough.1 Be
sides aU this there would appear to be a misunderstanding in the
mind of the founder of Christian Science as to the exact content of
the teachings of Jesus. Her mind is so filled with the one thought
of the truth of subjective idealism that the utterances of the Scripture
aU interpret themselves in the Ught of that philosophy. It is in this
spirit that she interprets the saying of Jesus, " Take no thought what
ye shaU eat," 3 to mean that mortals need not concern themselves
with the chemistry of food ; in other words, that this saying of Jesus
supports the thesis that the diet of the invaUd no more than medicine
affects the question of his recovery. We think these few statements
are sufficient to warrant one in suspecting the Christian source of the
new doctrine.
But, further, notwithstanding the earnest declaration that Christian
Science is not designed chiefly for the healing of bodily disease,8 but
that its emphatic purpose is the healing of sin, still the Tne promi-
prominence given by Christian Scientists to bodily gives to6bod-
healing, taken together with the fact that somehow dy healing.
human beings seem to dread sickness more than they do sin, is Uable
to leave the impression that the adherents of the new system think
the rehef of the former the chief business of Christianity. This may
not be a fundamental defect, but one rather of the form in which
the doctrine is presented. But it is a notable fact that Jesus so taught
that whfle he healed vast numbers of their bodily ailments he left the
impression of an ethical and reUgious teacher rather than of a healer
of disease. According to Christian Science both sickness and sin are
illusions ; but the Christian Scientists would hardly deny that sin is the
more hurtful of the two. A system which professes to represent
Christianity should see to it that in the minds of its adherents that
thought is uppermost to which Jesus gave the principal emphasis.
We come next to consider the metaphysical system with which
Christian Science is connected; or, rather, the application which
Christian Science makes of it. We point out first of its false meta-
aU that the founder of Christian Science is not a skflled Physics-
metaphysician nor a skflled scientist in the ordinary acceptation
of those terms. Yet she speaks on these subjects as one having
1 For example, in No and Yes, p. 30.
* Rudimentary Divine Science, p. 23 f. On Mrs. Eddy's exegesis see J. H. Bates's Chris
tian Science and its Problems, New York and Cincinnati, 1898, pp. 76-87.
' Rudimentary Divine Science, p. 9.

362 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
authority. She quotes from an astronomer in 1891 the commonplace
that "color is in us," not "in the rose." ' The statement is not ac
cepted almost universaUy by physicists, as her authority makes her
beUeve. It is held by scientists that color is something which we at
tribute to the rose, but not that the color is in us. She says :3 " The
evidence that the earth is motionless, and the sun revolves around
our planet, is as sensible and real as the evidence for disease; but
science (that is, we suppose, Christian Science, certainly not science in
the ordinary use of that word) determines the evidence in both cases
to be unreal. To material sense it is plain also that the error of
the revolution of the sun is more apparent than the adverse, but
true, science of the steUar universe. Copernicus has shown that
what appears real, to material sense and feeling, is absolutely un
real. Astronomy, optics, acoustics, and hydraulics are aU at war
with the testimony, of the physical senses. This fact intimates
that the laws of science are mental; and Christian Science demon
strates this."
Now, idealist metaphysicians do not aUow that the physical senses
give any testimony whatever. Their theory is that certain im
pressions are produced upon the nervous organism and that the mind
within construes these impressions. The ideaUst metaphysics can as
weU account for the theory that the sun revolves around the earth as
for the other, that the earth revolves around the sun and upon its
own axis. In both cases the impressions upon the nervous organism
are the same. The difference is in the construction which the mind
puts upon the impressions ; not in any supposed "testimony of the
physical senses;" any "sensible" evidence as opposed to the mental
perception. It is an ungracious task, and one which we reluctantly perform, to
point out these glaring defects of metaphysical skill. We should not
have done it but for the fact that the founder of Christian Science
makes such large use of her metaphysical theory throughout her
system of teaching. We now point out the necessity of scrutiniz
ing her teachings on aU these subjects, lest her readers be misled
by her confidence in her metaphysical reasonings and aver
ments. We simply say, Beware. For the rest we shall foUow the
metaphysics of the system no further, but only the appUcation of it. 5
1 Rudimentary Divine Science, p. 16. » No and Yes, p. 14 f.
8 The entire metaphysical system is assailable even from the standpoint of its own sub
jective idealism. For example, its infinite is so thoroughly comprehensible by man that
it can assert that besides Its Infinite there can be nothing else. See Answers to Questions
in Christian Science, by Edward A. Kimball, p. 6.

Christian Science — Statement and Criticism. 363
According to Christian Science God is all, and there is nothing and
nobody in the universe but God. This is reiterated in so many differ
ent ways and with such frequency that it cannot be misunderstood.
" God must be found AU instead of a part of being." ' "God is AU-
in-all." 3 " Mortals do not understand the AU ; hence their inference
of some other existence besides God and his true like- citations from
ness— of something unlike him." s The same idea comes Mrs- Eddy-
out even more fully in the doctrine concerning mind, man, matter,
disease, error, evil, and sin. Of mind we read, "God is mind, and
there is no other mind." 4 Of man it is said, "he is neither matter,
nor a mode of mortal mind, for he is spiritual and eternal, an im
mortal mode of the divine Mind."6 "All real being represents God,
and is in him." Of matter the teaching is this : ' "All is mind. Ac
cording to the Scriptures and Christian Science aU is God, and there
is naught beside him." "The five material senses testUy to the ex
istence of matter. The spiritual senses afford no such evidence, but
deny the testimony of the material senses." "If, as the Scriptures
declare, God is All-in-all, then aU must be mind, since God is Mind."
Concerning disease we are taught,7 "Disease is a thing of thought
mamfested on the body." " The beUef that matter can master mind,
and make you ill Scientifically, is an error which truth must de
stroy."8 " What seem to be disease, vice, and mortality are illusions
of the physical senses." " " Disease is more than imagination ; it is a
human error, a constituent part of what comprise the whole of mortal
existence, namely, material sensation and mental delusion. But an
erring sense of existence, or the error of belief, named disease, never
made sickness a stubborn reality."10 Concerning error we have
this:11 "In erring mortal thought the reality of truth has an anti-
pode — the reaUty of error ; and disease is one of the severe realities of
this error. God has no opposite in Science. To truth there is no
error. As truth alone is real, then it foUows that to declare error real
would be to make it truth."
We deem it unnecessary to cite further utterances in proof of the
statement with which the preceding paragraph begins. With refer
ence to man only is any attempt made to mitigate this conclusion.
This is done by adding to the already quoted declarations concerning
man, the statement that " Man is not absorbed in Deity ; for he is for
ever individual." " Of course man is not absorbed in the Deity U he
i No and Yes, p. 21. * Ibid., pp. 24, 32. » Ibid., p. 25.
* Rudimentary Divine Science, p. 11. s No and Yes, pp. 34, 35.
6 Rudimentary Divine Science, p. 12. 'Ibid., p. 20. "Ibid., p. 21.
' Ibid., p. 22. 10 No and Yes, p. 12. » Ibid., p. 13. » Ibid., p., 34.

364 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
is " an immortal mode " of the Deity ; that is, the divine Mind. WeU
may the founder of Christian Science add, "but what this individu-
Her anthro- ^7 ^ remains to be learned." In fact, it is inconceiv-
poiogy. abie that a mode of the Deity should be an individual dis
tinct from the Deity. If as an individual he is not distinct from the
Deity he must be a part of the Deity, or the Deity himself in one of
his mamf estations.
Notwithstanding aU this the founder of Christian Science denies
that her system is pantheistic, asserting that pantheism is the beUef
that spirit, or soul, exists in matter,1 or, as she states it elsewhere,
"Mind in matter is pantheism." a In this sense of the word panthe
ism Christian Science does indeed refute it, as its founder claims.
" Christian Science shows that matter and mortal mind have neither
origin nor existence in the eternal Mind."3 We leave it to our philo
sophically trained readers to judge whether she has correctly defined
pantheism, and whether or not she can successfully claim immunity
from the charge of being a pantheist if judged by her metaphysics
instead of by her asseverations. To the present writer it is clear that
if her system is not pantheistic there is no system which can be
properly so named.
We pass on to the Christian Science doctrine of evfl. It is difficult
to treat this subject apart from sin, since the system appears to make
no clear distinction between them. We give the more important
Her doctrine utterances on the subjects in question. "If God knows
of evil. evil, even as a false claim, this knowledge would mani
fest evfl in him and proceeding from him. Christian Science shows
that matter, evfl, sin, sickness, and death are but negations of spirit,
truth, and Ufe, which are positives that cannot be gainsaid."* "My
system of metaphysics . . . rests on God as One and All, and denies
the actual existence of both matter and evil."5 " There was never a
moment in which evfl was real. This great fact concerning aU error
brings with it another and more glorious truth, that good is supreme.
As there is none beside him, and he is aU good, there can be no
evil.'"' " AU real being represents God, and is in him. In this Science
of being man can no more relax or collapse from perfection than his
divine Principle, or Father, can fall out of himself into something
below infinitude.'" "Good is great and real. Hence its opposite,
named evfl, must be small and unreal."8 " Hence there is no sin, for
God's kingdom is everywhere and supreme, and it foUows that the
1 No and Yes, p. 38. ' Rudimentary Divine Science, p. 13. ' No and Yes, p. 24.
* Ibid., p. 24 f. »Ibld„ p. 33. • Ibid., p. 33 f. ' Ibid., p. 35. 'Ibid., p. 42.

Christian Science — Statement and Criticism. 365
human kingdom is nowhere, and must be unreal."1 " The real Christ
was unconscious of matter, of sin, disease, and death, and was con
scious only of God, of good, of eternal Ufe, and harmony."3 "Ac
cording to the evidence of the so-called physical senses, man is ma
terial, fallen, sick, depraved," mortal. Science and spiritual sense
contradict this."
We recognize the difficulty under which Christian Science labors in
the attempt to make clear its tenets and yet escape the danger of mis
apprehension. Any metaphysical doctrine suffers from the inade
quacy of language to convey its thought, as weU as from the stupidity
of the reader. Much more is this the case when, as in Christian
Science, there is mixed with the metaphysical a prominent mystical
element. Mysticism, however true and valid, is difficult to put into
categorical statements. But we think there can be no misunderstand
ing of the significance of the foregoing quotations relative to evfl
and sin. To show that we apprehend the real meaning which lies
underneath the citations we have made we append others setting forth
what we may cad the philosophy of the plan of salvation according to
Christian Science. We have endeavored to arrange the citations as
much as possible in logical order.
"The law of Ufe and truth is the law of Christ, destroying aU
sense of sin and death. It does more than forgive the false sense
named sin, for it pursues and punishes it and wiU not let sin go until
it is destroyed — until nothing is left to be forgiven, to suffer, or to be
punished. Forgiven thus, sickness and sin have no re- Her pbnoso-
lapse. God's law reaches and destroys evil by virtue of j^ ^ **£
the Allness of God."4 " God must be found AU instead of vation-
a part of being, and man the reflection of his power and goodness.
This Science rebukes sin with its own nothingness, and thus destroys
sin quickly and utterly. It makes disease unreal, and thus heals it."5
" Sympathy with sin, sorrow, and sickness would dethrone God as
truth, for truth has no sympathy for error. In Science, the cure of
the sick demonstrates this grand verity of Christian Science, that
you cannot eradicate disease if you admit that God sends or sees it.'"1
"As there is none beside him, and he is all Good, there can be no
evil. Simply uttering this great thought is not enough ! We must
Uve it, until God becomes the All and Only of our being.'" " Had he
(Jesus) been as conscious of these evfls as he was of God, wherein
there is no consciousness of human error, Jesus could not have
1 No and Yes, p. 45. * Rudimentary Divine Science, p. 16. a Italics ours.
* No and Yes, p. 39. « Ibid., p. 21. « Ibid., p. 40. ' Ibid., p. 34.

366 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
resisted them."1 "In him we live, move, and have our being;"
consequently it is impossible for the true man — who is a spiritual
and individual being, created in the Eternal Science of Being — to be
conscious of aught but good." " If mortals could grasp these two
words, all and nothing, this mystery of a God who has no knowledge
of sin would disappear, and the eternal, infinite harmony would be
fathomed."' According to this scheme, since God is AU and God is Good, there
can be no sin. To think that there is sin is to depart from the truth,
and so to leave ourselves a prey to error. On the other hand, to rec
ognize in deed and in truth that God is AU is to recognize that there is
no sin ; but not only so, it is to be so fiUed with a sense of God that there
is no room for the thought of sin. When there is no thought of sin
there is no thought of sinning ; hence no sense of guilt, for when God
fills all the thought there can be no sense of having sinned. Thus sin,
which never did have any reaUty, is annihilated — cast out even from
human thought.
1 No and Yes, p. 46. « Ibid., p. 26.

Christian Science Contrasted with Christianity. 367

CHAPTER VIII.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE CONTRASTED WITH CHRISTIANITY.
Our first duty must be to point out the divergence of this teaching
from that of Jesus. This may be seen, first of aU, in the very forms
which the two systems assume ; that of Jesus being sim- First contrast
pie, practical, easUy understood, at least as far as is nee- Christianity
essary to salvation, and easily appUed ; that of Christian tianscience"
Science being, on the contrary, a subtle metaphysical disquisition
mixed with misty mysticism, difficult to understand and impossible
of appUcation to real Ufe, as we shaU show later on.
But, further, it differs from the teaching of Jesus by being less com
prehensive. It msists on a certain consciousness of God— and so far
it is Christian ; but this God-consciousness is with reference to his
being All. It is quantitative, while the teaching of Christ and the
apostles was adapted to lead men to be fiUed with a God-consciousness
with reference chiefly to his character. Anyone who will compare the
writings of the founder of Christian Science with the New Testament
will be convinced of this difference. In Christianity the AUness of
God is secondary, in Christian Science his character is secondary. The
pantheism of the New Testament is figurative ; iii Christian Science it
is taken literally.
Again, it differs from Christianity in its doctrines. In Christianity
there is no question that God is regarded as a person ; in Christian
Science his personality is denied in effect, U not in word. * But it is
particularly with reference to sin that the difference be- secono: con-
tween Christian Science and the New Testament comes trast
out most strikingly. In the former it is regarded as unreal, in the
latter it is treated as a terrible reality ; and men are exhorted and en
treated to forsake it, to repent of it, to seek forgiveness for it, and
strength of grace to overcome it. In the New Testament men are not
exhorted to beUeve there can be no sin, but, acknowledging its reality,
without any metaphysical subtleties, to be filled with the love of God
to the exclusion of sin. In Christian Science it is thought which
saves, in Christianity it is love. This leads to the mention of another
divergence. In Christian Science we hear nothing of faith, in the
1 See No and Yes, pp. 28 ff., and Rudimentary Divine Science, pp. 7-9.

368 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
New Testament much. Christian Science does, however, insist on
acceptance of a supposed fact. In other words, in Christian Science
saving faith may be said to be inteUectual, and to relate to fact. In
Christianity the stress is laid on faith in a person.
Another very marked difference is in the source of the saving en
ergy. In Christian Science it is whoUy in the human being. We must
think of God in a certain way. In the New Testament it is the Deity
which worketh in us. It might almost be said that in Chris-
Third contrast. tian Science one saves himseU, while in Christianity God
saves us. This wfll be further seen when we reflect that in Christian
Science there is no place for the Holy Spirit. The Trinity is rejected
as an absurdity, and the office and work of the Holy Spirit receive no
mention. The divine agency in our salvation receives no empha
sis. Jesus suffered that he might show " that the way out of the flesh,
out of the delusion of aU human error, must be through the baptism
of suffering, leading up to health, harmony, and heaven." * In other
words, he suffered to illustrate a truth, not to effect our salvation.
His death was simply a part of his example.
Christian Science leaves no room for the conscience, except in the
most incidental way. Repentance is supplanted by the thought of
the AUness of God. Christ and the apostles said, " Repent." Chris-
Fourth con- tian Science says, ' ' BeUeve that God is AU. " To the man
trast- who has been false to a sacred trust, betrayed the inno
cent, committed numberless crimes, there is no thunder from Sinai,
but only the assertion that sin is unreal; God only is, and God is
Good. The sinner finds peace, not in the fact of conscious pardon
from God, but in the thought that — no matter what he has done — God
only is. We do not say that coupled with the conditions required in
Christian Science this is dangerous, but we do say that it is different
from the teaching of the New Testament.
Such a system as this could not possibly be appUed generaUy to Ufe.
It may do for a certain class of people, but its application in matters
inappiicabii- of state would result in anarchy. Civil law must act as
as a whole, though there is something real besides God ; so must the
parent in training his children ; so must the teacher in the conduct of
his school. Besides, if it is true that there is nothing but God, hence
no sin, no evil, no disease, then it is equaUy true that hunger and cold
are unreal ; the demands of our bodies and of our minds, the most ex
alted and the most debased, are aU unreal. We are deceived in think
ing we suffer for anything. But by the time we have so completely
> No and Yes, p. 43.

Christian Science Contrasted with Christianity. 369
subverted aU that our dafly experience teaches us and enforces we
shaU land in universal skepticism.
We might spend much time and space in pointing out other
equaUy damaging features ; but we shaU content ourselves with the
brief mention of but one more. It is that its ethics, U it can be said
to have any, is negative. It saves from sin by the recognition of the
supposed fact that there is no reaUty in sin ; but we its negative
need something more for moral progress than salva- et ics-
tion from sin. We need a moral ideal of a positive kind. It may be
said that God, the Good, is this ideal. But we have seen that, in
fact, the qualitative conception of God retreats behind the quantitative
in Christian Science. Jesus taught, not the AUness of the Father, but
the love of the Father ; and the brotherhood of man foUows, the re
lation of the brothers being that of love and helpfulness. But even U
there were nothing in the fundamental teachings forbidding the for
mation of a brotherhood, U the sect were not held together by a theory
rather than by a loving interest in one another, stfll, as a matter of
fact, the constructive, the social side of ethics is not so presented — in
such unmistakable features— as to make much impression.
We refrain from any expression of opinion as to the real occasion or
cause of the reported healings of the body. ' If any or many have
been reUeved of disease, and restored whole to their families and to
the world by Christian Science, we rejoice. But we must protest
against the inference which Christian Scientists draw from this fact,
namely, that they have a divine truth which is the source of their
power. There have been so many mind-healers who never heard of
Christian Science, who have nevertheless been successful in large
numbers of cases, that we cannot say one is divine while the others
are not.

The four proposed substitutes for the Christian religion now dis
cussed have been found utterly incapable of filling the place they would
occupy. Above aU human wisdom stands the divine truth and the
divine plan offered by Jesus Christ. This we shaU show in detail in
due time. Here our principal aim has been to produce the evidences
of the inadequacy of the systems which would dethrone the Son of
man who was the Son of God.
1 On this subject see Dr. J. M. Buckley's vivacious and able treatment in his Faith
Healing, Christian Science. and Kindred Phenomena, New York, 1892, pp. 239-291.

370 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION II.-OBJECTIONS TO CHRISTIANITY DRAWN FROM RE
LIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS.
These are of two kinds, the theological and the practical. They
relate, 1. To miracles, and, 2. To the relation of the soul to God.
1. The first of the theological objections to miracles may be stated
as foUows: " Pantheism and theism unite in declaring that since God
made the world it must have been made according to his wfll.1 Hence
First theoiogi- miracles are acts contrary to God's own nature as ex-
tion. pressed in the world he made." In answer it should be
stated again that miracles are not acts contrary to the laws of nature,
but events which, though brought about by the employment of these
laws, are the result of an unusual use of them. God is a God of
order as weU as of power,3 and the scriptural miracles are not the
products of capricious interferences on the part of God with his own
world, simply in the exercise of his omnipotence, but of wise devia
tions from the ordinary course of his providence in the interest of
special ends.
2. This brings us to the second theological objection, which is, that
Second theo- God did not make nature so helpless, nor bestow upon it
logical ob-
jection. such unfruitful laws and regulations as to make his inter
vention necessary to the accomplishment of his purposes.'
This is a deistic difficulty, though it concedes the Christian doctrine
that God's creation was very good. But aside from the scriptural
doctrine of the intervention of evfl spirits in human affairs, by which
the course of human history must have been seriously modified, we
have the unquestionable fact of human sin, which has not only
wrought spiritual misery, but also confusion in the physical world.
Had all spiritual beings been true to God miracles might not have
been necessary;4 but the natural order of the world has been dis
turbed by sin, and hence divine interventions are no reflection on
God's creation, but rather a proof of his goodness, unless we are
ready to assert that he ought not to have created spiritual beings.
The first of the practical objections of a religious kind is also
directed against miracles. It is that offered by Paul Sabatier in his
¦Rewels des Glaubens, July, 1894, p. 270; Farrar, Critical History of Free Thought,
pp. 109, 111, 114.
• Beweis des Glaubens, July, 1894, p. 271. » Ibid., p. 270. « Ibid., pp. 272 ff.

Objections to Christianity. 371
LUe of Francis of Assisi.1 He says : " The equality of all men before
God is a teaching of the reUgious conscience; but mira- First practical
cle, this good-natured pastime of God, places him on a ODiectlon-
level with the capricious tyrants of earth. ... If God reaUy did
interpose in so capricious a manner in the destinies of men they
could not do otherwise than strive to become his favorites, in the
hope of receiving aU benefits from the favor of the ruler." In answer
it must be pointed out that Sabatier is arguing against the ecclesias
tical as weU as the scriptural miracles. There is indeed no reason to
believe that God supernaturally intervenes to produce stigmata,3 and
similar phenomena ; nor that his interventions are at all times equally
striking. God is represented in the Bible as working miracles chiefly
at particular epochs in the world's history. Furthermore, Sabatier
thinks of these miracles as violations of the laws of nature. This is
an incorrect view. He also thinks of the miracles as evidences of
a capricious weakness in favor of some whfle God allows others to
receive only the benefits of the regular operation of the natural laws.
The correct doctrine is that they are the expression of a love which is
universal in its scope, but which, under aU ordinary circumstances,
he charges his people to convey to the world. Without the miracles
men would never have been stirred to such acts of mercy as Christian
ity exhibits. Yet i£ miracles were constant there would be no room for
man's activity. So that in a very important sense the New Testament
miracles were wrought for the benefit of aU mankind, and not alone
for the individuals on whom they were wrought.
The second of the practical objections of a reUgious kind against
Christianity is that Christ stands in the way of the soul's communion
with God ; that Christianity teaches that we must come second practi-
to God by him, whereas nothing and nobody ought to be tion.
aUowed to intervene between God and the soul.3 This objection
ignores the other Christian doctrine, that he that communes with
Jesus communes with God. Jesus said, " He that hath seen me hath
seen the Father." He is so perfect a revelation of God that we cannot
think of God except as we think of Christ. And, so far from his
being a bar to our access to God, there is no class of reUgionists who
profess such intimate and friendly relations with God as do Chris-
1 Page 256 f. of the German edition.
'The stigmata are probably produced by the constant dwelling in thought on the
wounds of Christ. They need no second party to aid, whether divine or human, as
the genuine miracles do.
8 Harnack mentions and refutes this difficulty  Das Christenthum und die Geschichte,
p. 10.

372 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
tians. In practice Christ's mediation has precisely the opposite
effect from what objectors affirm.
A further religious objection to Christianity,1 having both a theo
logical and a practical aspect, is that against sin, with its inheritance
and its Satanic source. It is said that if men are born in sin they
Objections to ought not to be blamed. So they are not ; but they are
hJ? f ?I?f tt^3 blamed for the more or less permanent choice of the evfl
(IOC 11 111 C OI
sin. which they find in themselves and about them. It is
said that God must have made the devil. Not so. He made Adam,
but not fallen Adam. It is no more impossible to conceive of a fallen
angel than a fallen man. Then it is said that God should have kept
the devil away from innocent man. But man was, in point of possi
bility, the highest of God's creatures. To wrestle successfuUy with
Satan is not impossible to man. Those who succeed against him are
the nobler for the conflict. No man need be overcome by him. With
out temptation, that is, the trial of their wills, men cannot come to
their best in morals. The particular form and source of temptation is
indifferent.

REVIEW OF RESULTS TO THIS POINT.
The purpose of the preceding discussion was to show, first, that all
antichristian positions, directly or indirectly offered as substitutes
Greatvalue of for Christianity, are untenable ; and, second, that the
evidences, objections urged by unbelievers against Christianity are
either not weU founded or else do not touch the vital elements of the
Christian system. The effect of what has been said in the first part
of this work will, it is hoped, be to prepare the mind of the reader for
the full weight of the argument to foUow.
But this is not the only, and perhaps not the most important, effect
of the foregoing consideration of antichristian positions and argu
ments. We have weighed the principal objections and theories de
vised by men in antagonism to the Christian system, and found them
wanting. This leaves Christianity in possession of the field, and cre
ates a strong presumption in its favor. If all other forms of faith
offered as substitutes are false Christianity must be true, unless reU
gion is to be rejected. In fact, none but an atheist could propose that
we should crush out the religious element in our nature, and but a
minute fraction of unbelievers are atheists. While it is thus practi
cally acknowledged on all sides that we must and ought to have some
1 Discussed In Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, pp. 20-24.

Review of Results to this Point. 373
reUgion, and all the proposed substitutes are found inadequate, the
Christian religion alone is left for the acceptance of the inteUigent por
tion of mankind ; on the principle of exclusion it must be accepted.
Should it be replied that one cannot at will become an adherent of
Christianity it must be said in return that, in view of all the preced
ing considerations, men should at least make diligent search for the
truth of the Christian system. With the presumption so strongly in
its favor all who reject it should remind themselves that if they do
not see its truth the fault is probably with themselves, and that U
they will use the appropriate means and follow the right method they
will discover its truth. Thus in an indirect way we have been pre
senting the argument for Christianity from the beginning. The bur
den of proof has been thrown upon the rejecters of Christianity, and
they have been shown unable to bear it. This is a particularly favor
able result, inasmuch as it enables Christianity to maintain its position
of supremacy. It occupied the spiritual territory ; there were those
who undertook to dislodge it ; they have made their assault and have
been repelled. Christianity comes forth from the conflict "clear as
the sun, fair as the moon, and terrible" to its assailants "as an army
with banners."
In truth, Christianity need do nothing more than defend itseU
against assault, at least in Christian lands. Stfll, since its existence
is not that which it holds dearest, it offers reasons for its right to be.
It seeks to diffuse its blessings everywhere ; but for this its existence
would have no value. Hence it is not enough to prove itself superior
to all others. It must show itself the possessor or purveyor of benefits
without which man cannot come to his best ; as truth of the most valu
able kind.
This makes the positive evidences of Christianity a necessity. Never
theless, there is danger of misunderstanding at this point. Christian
Evidences does not propose a demonstration in the strict sense. Its
proofs are not in all cases compulsory of belief. Rather Necessity and
does it offer the reasons why adherents of Christianity the* positive
choose to beUeve its tenets in preference to others. These evidences'
reasons it seeks to present in such a way as to render the truth of the
essentials of Christianity so highly probable to the inquiring mind as
to lead to the desired practical acceptance of its benefits and duties.
In other words, the evidences of Christianity are not designed merely
to exhibit truth, but chiefly and primarfly to secure to as many as
possible the blessings of the Gospel and to induce all men to cooperate
in the great work for which Christianity exists. This practical phase
26

374 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
of the task set for Christian Evidences should never be lost sight of.
The matter at issue is not chiefly as to which side has the stronger ar
gument, although in this respect Christianity has nothing to fear; the
real issue is whether men shaU deprive themselves of the benefits of
the Gospel and mankind of their aid in diffusing these benefits among
others. Hence our contest is not one of dialectics ; our purpose is
not to outwit our opponents and put them to inteUectual shame. In
such a result Christianity has no interest. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that the argument is to be conducted without energy. Our
reasons for beUeving as we do must be presented with vigor and
strength in the hope that converts and colaborers may be won
thereby.

Reasons for the Christian Belief. 375

DIVISION VI.
THE DOCTRINES CONCERNING MAN.

It is not our purpose to consider aU the doctrines of Christian an
thropology ; we shall confine our attention to those which, U main
tained, furnish aU that is essential to the satisfaction of our religious
natures. In this respect dogmatics is much broader than evidences.
The former must furnish a complete system of theological thought ;
the latter has done all that is required of it when the fundamental
facts have been vindicated.
Before proceeding to the statement and defense of the anthropolog
ical doctrines of Christianity it may be well to explain why these
rather than the doctrine of God are first taken up for consideration.
Tne question of order reduces itself to one. of convenience ; Tne order 0{
and since the principal reason, aside from revelation, for procedure.
beheving in the personality of God is drawn from the nature of man
it is evidently better to deal first with the anthropology and afterward
with the theology of the subject. Besides, it is plain that, apart from
revelation, we know far more about ourselves than we do about God.
It is preferable to begin with that portion of our subject knowledge of
which is most accessible.
There are but four doctrines concerning man which need defensive
statement here :
I. That man has a spiritual nature.
II. That the spiritual nature in man is personal.
III. That the spirit of man is immortal.
TV. That the spirit of man is sinful.
SECTION I.-THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF MAN.
CHAPTER I.
REASONS FOR THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF.
The caption given to this section is exceedingly general and vague.
Too great definiteness is purposely avoided, first of all, because every
specific statement would demand proof, the furnishing of which would
detract from the simplicity of the argument, and thus from the force

376 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
of the impression. Many psychological questions of profound interest
have no value for the essentials of Christianity. In a treatise on psy
chology they would aU demand discussion ; here we need not commit
ourselves to any specific theory. But there is another reason for so
general a form of statement. It is that the New Testa-
.1 il t* HQ6£L£6r~ ©
nessof New ment gives us but a meager delineation of the human
psychology. govu i Much that has been stoutly defended as Christian in
reference to the soul, as, for example, its substantiaUty, is purely
speculative, and in no sense a part of Christianity as given us in the
New Testament records of Christ and the apostles.
Attention should be called in this connection to the further fact that
the New Testament attempts no defense of the reaUty of man's spirit
ual nature. Indeed, that reality is not even asserted ; rather is it as
sumed. It may be caUed the first great Christian postulate, not be
cause Christianity admits or suggests anything hypothetical about
the existence of the soul, but because it regards the beUef in the soul's
reality to be so secure a part of our mental possession that the truth
of the beUef may be left without assertion or proof. The Christianity
of to-day is equaUy well warranted in such a course. We hold our
selves under no intellectual obligation to furnish argument for a fact
which has always been and is now so generally beUeved. The logical
obligation, the burden of proof, is with those who deny the almost
universal belief.
Still, where there is no obUgation arising from the conflict of
thought, there is one growing out of our Christian faith. However
unreasonable or wicked men may be the Christian is not released from
the duty of striving to bring them to the Ught and the right. Much
Obligations as the denial of the spiritual nature in man may outrage
of our faith, the dictates of reason it becomes our duty to set forth
the ground upon which we base our beUef .
Before we proceed to state the reasons for our faith two addi
tional remarks must be made. First we decUne to consider the
presentation of these arguments in the light of a conflict of wit be
tween the believer and the unbeliever. We are in possession of the
field, and have no fear but that through the good sense of the majority
of mankind we shall continue to hold it. Our opponents rage in vain.
Blinded by passion or pride they do not understand how impotent
they are. But by their rejection of what we have ventured to call
the first great Christian postulate they not only deprive themselves of
1 Comp. Julius Kostlin's Der Ghiubc uud seine Bedeutung fur Erkentnnlss, Leben und
Kirche, Berlin, 1895, p. 18.

Reasons for the Christian Belief. 377
the benefits Christianity could confer upon them, but they hinder
the ethical development of mankind, which it is one of the chief
purposes of Christianity to advance. We covet their aid in this
work. Hence, U the statement of our grounds for beUef will save
anyone from joining the ranks of our enemies, or confirm the waver
ing faith of any behever, or perchance win some of the enemy to our
side and secure their cooperation, it is not only duty but pleasure to
make such a statement.
The second remark is that our reasons for belief are to be taken as
such ; not as demonstrations of fact. We are considering a question
of beUef, not knowledge, in the strict sense of that word. But here
again we must guard against the reiterated assertions of knowledge
on the part of scientists. Those scientists who deny the existence of
a reality known to Christianity as a soul deny it on the basis of
belief, not of knowledge. Whatever scientists may know they do
not know that there is nothing in the universe but matter and
physical force. With regard to the existence of the soul the scientist
is in no better position to judge than any other educated and thought
ful man ; and as a matter of fact it is only a smaU portion of the whole
number of scientific men of recent times who have made this denial.
We repeat, that the question is not one of demonstration on either side,
but of their reasons for belief against our reasons for beUef . What, then,
are our reasons for belief 1
1. We beUeve in the existence of a soul in man for the reason, first
of aU, that aU attempts to explain the phenomena of the mental Ufe
on any other hypothesis have utterly fafled. We cannot even re
capitulate here the discussion which exhibited the inability of material
ism and monism to meet the demands of a theory of mental phenomena.
If that discussion is not fresh in the reader's mind we re- The christian
quest him to refer back to the sections on those two sub- alone ex-
1 j I £L 1 II S til 6
jects. It can be truthfuUy said that the failure of the phenomena
effort to account for human consciousness on any other tai life.
theory than that of the existence of a soul is in this particular an
almost complete vindication of our faith. Everything that human
ingenuity could devise has been tried, and all in vain. The efforts put
forth have been not only varied but strenuous. No skfll in argument
was spared of which our opponents were capable, and which was
necessary to render their positions plausible. Every weapon of de
fense has been employed under stress of the feeling that, as between
the Christjan and antichristian theories, the struggle was one of Ufe
and death. Yet in spite of all this the positions of the opposition have

378 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
been confessed, in some cases by their propounders, to be inadequate,
and our discussion showed them not only inadequate but untenable,
and even absurd.
Haeckel, while pronouncing in favor of the monistic view, admits
that the truth lies between it and dualism. ' As between monism and
duaUsm in psychology we think our discussion made it evident that
the advantage is with the latter." Unless we are to turn away, there
fore, from the side which has the better argument we shaU be obliged
to adhere to the Christian contention that man has a spiritual nature.
Even U we were disposed to reject the Christian view we could not;
for when everything else fails we can depend only upon it. Should
anyone reply to this that we might reject both the antichristian and the
Christian view we point out that this would be to deal the deathblow
to thought. Where the alternatives appear exhaustive, as in this
case, and as Haeckel admits they are, we are obhged to adopt the one
that remains, unless we wish to empty our minds of all their contents.
But, aside from this, it is unreasonable to reject the only view that is
left simply because we do not like it. Only on the supposition that
the Christian view failed as ignominiously as all other views could
one who is convinced of the untenableness and inadequacy of ma
teriaUsm and monism be justified even in considering its abandon
ment together with the others. How thoroughly the Christian view
accomplishes what the others fail to do for us we shaU see in due time.
Here we wish to add a second reason for beUeving the Christian view,
which is at the same time a reason why one who is not convinced of its
sufficiency should, nevertheless, not renounce it.
2. This second reason for believing in the existence of the soul is
the practical universality of that belief. Even if one who is convinced
of the failure of the materialistic and monistic hypotheses were com
pelled by his investigations to hold that the Christian view also fails
in part or wholly, still the universality of the beUef in the reality of
spirit in man should hold such a one to the doctrine of Christianity.
To this it may be replied that this reason for belief is of force only on
the supposition that those who believe do so on good grounds, which
Th e uni ver- remains to be proved. We cannot agree to this, however ;
beilei In the ^or i* assumes that the few who are not convinced are as
soul" likely to be right as the many who are. Majorities are by
no means always in the right, but the presumption is always in their
favor ; and when anyone confesses that the view held by the minority
1 The Evolution of Man, New York, 1879, vol. 11, p. 453 f.
' Division 1, section ill, chap. 3.

Reasons for the Christian Belief. 379
is untenable the opinion of the majority ought to have great weight
with him. In other words, where there appear to be equal difficulties
pertaining to two opposing views, the fact that a majority of mankind
in aU ages have held to one of these views should rouse in the objector
the suspicion that the difficulties in the way of the majority opinion are
not as great as he has supposed.
Particularly is this the case when, as with Christianity, the majority
is composed of those who are at least equal to the minority in point of
inteUigence and opportunity for attaining knowledge. This is but an
other form of the argument employed by Mr. Herbert Spencer to prove
' ' that the diverse forms of reUgious beUef which have existed and which
stfll exist have all a basis in some ultimate fact."1 This presumption,
according to him, arises in part "from the omnipresence of the be
hef s."9 " The universahty of religious ideas, their independent evo
lution among primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in show
ing that their source must be deep-seated instead of superficial.""
Now, if we are to trust Mr. E. B. Tylor's findings, in Primitive Cul
ture,4 the belief in the existence of the soul is universal, independent
in origin in each race, and possessed of great vitality." It so happens
that, according to Tylor, whatever variations of opinion or beUef
concerning the same may have existed, all peoples have united in the
belief that the soul is a real something ; as real an element in the
composition of the human being as a body. If "to suppose that these
multUorm (and often contradictory) conceptions (of religion) should
be, one and aU, absolutely groundless discredits too profoundly that
average human intelUgence from which aU our individual intelligences
are inherited,"8 how much more does the supposition that the harmo
nious judgment of the race with reference to the reaUty of the soul is
absolutely groundless discredit that average human inteUigence in
which Spencer puts so much faith.
' First Principles, p. 13. 5 Ibid. a Ibid., p. 14.
' London, 1873, vol. i, chap. 11. B Primitive Culture, vol. I, pp. 428, 429.
"Spencer, First Principles, p. 13. For clearness we have added the words in the
parentheses.

380 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER H.
VALIDITY OF THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF THE SOUL.
To all this it may be objected that it is just to Tylor's own theory of
animism that we can trace the groundless character of beUef in the
existence of the soul.1 According to Tylor men came to believe in
the existence of the soul as an element of the human nature distin
guishable from the body by trying to answer two questions : first,
" What is it that makes the difference between a Uving body and a
dead one— what causes waking, sleep, trance, disease, death ? " and,
second, " What are those human shapes which appear in dreams and
visions?"" Now U, in the course of time, " ancient savage philoso
phers " came to regard the human shapes they saw in dreams and
visions as realities, and then as the souls of the human beings to whose
bodfly shape they corresponded, have we not a proof that the beUef
in the reaUty of the soul, however general, is based entirely upon a
deception ?
We answer, No. In the first place, it is altogether uncertain whether
Tof°r'animism Tyl°r nas given us the true and entire explanation of the
examined, belief in the existence of the soul, even among primitive
peoples. He supposes that these " ancient savage phflosophers" at
tributed to every man a phantom, the image or second seU of the
individual, able to appear at a distance from the body, and a Ufe
which enabled the body to feel, think, and act.' He admits, by his
use of the word "probably," the conjectural character of the func
tion of the life as distinguished from the phantom. Why say that
they held the life to be that which enabled the body to feel, think,
and act ? Is it not just as Ukely that they regarded the Ufe as that
which itself felt, thought, and acted ? that the body was the instru
ment of the lUe, or, as we now say, the soul ? In fact, several early
languages use the same word for both life and soul. "Ancient savage
philosophers" who had the discrimination which Tylor attributes to
them must have observed what we to-day caU mental phenomena.
They must have known that they thought and felt, and that they did
not think and feel with their bodies, though they did act with them.
1 So, for example, Clifford. Lectures and Essays, p. 247 f.
* Primitive Culture, vol. I, p. 428. » Ibid.

Validity of the Christian Idea of the Soul. 381
In other words, they must have distinguished between mental and
physical phenomena, though they may have denned the difference
very unclearly. If they did notice these differences that fact may
have been a part of their reason for believing in the existence of a
soul distinguishable from the body — logicaUy and, as they believed,
phenomenally distinguishable.
We judge it impossible to decide whether a dim logical discrimi
nation supported the distinction based upon the idea of a phantom, or
whether the latter idea supported the former. Quite evident, how
ever, does it seem that, whichever was the first in order of time and
strength, both combined very early in sustaining the belief that a dis
tinction between soul and body must be made, and that the former
is as real as the latter. As to the existence of the soul after death it
is probable that the belief in it was based upon the idea of the phan
tom. If there be any foundation for our supposition that Capacities of
primitive men were as able and likely to distinguish be- men.
tween physical and mental phenomena, and to postulate a somewhat
as the cause for each of them, as they were to trouble themselves
about the causes of waking, sleep, trance, disease, death, and the na
ture of the human shapes which appear in dreams land visions, then
it is plain that the origin of the belief in the reality of the soul can
furnish no argument counter to that which we have drawn from the
universaUty of the belief ; for in the case now supposed the beUef had
everywhere a fairly respectable origin. But even U the origin of the
belief be as Tylor supposes, without the additional cause which we
have suggested, stiU that only proves what was the origin of the be
lief. No one will assert that the mass of inteUigent believers in the
reality of a soul distinguishable from the body hold that belief on the
ground of anything seen in dreams or visions. However the belief
originated we, to-day, do not believe for the reason adduced by Tylor.
Hence, again, the argument drawn from the universaUty of the beUef
cannot be met by pointing out the deceptive origin of it.
We beUeve in the reaUty of t\e soul, then, because no other theory
is tenable, and because it is exceedingly improbable that practically
the whole human race, without regard to the degree of inteUi
gence, has been deceived, while a Uttle handful of men who can give
no clear account of their opposing view, and of whom the more
honest confess its inadequacy, are right. But there is a third reason
for the belief we hold. It is the fact that the supposition of a soul to
do our thinking, feeling, and wflling accounts for the facts of the
mental Ufe. There can be no thought without a thinker. Brain can-

382 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
not think, nor can matter jn any form think. Hence there must be
something immaterial in us or about us which thinks. We have not
Thought must spoken of that something as a substance, and U anyone
uct of some- insists on using that term in connectiqn with the idea of
terial a soul he must distinctively disavow at least the concep
tion of material substance. Wundt is entirely correct in claiming
that the idea of substance as ordinarily understood in the natural
sciences, where the term had its origin, is wholly inappUcable to the
idea of soul.1 Professor Bowne, in his chapter on The Subject of
the Mental Life,3 well says: "Thoughts and feelings demand a sub
ject and have no meaning apart from it. ... If it were clearly seen
that thoughts and feelings imply something that thinks and feels,
materialism would seldom begin." Again he says :' "How there can
be states which are states of nothing, and how consciousness, which
is itself a mental state, can also have states, are questions passed
over in profound silence" by those who deny a unitary subject of the
mental lUe. Says Professor George P. Fisher : * "To talk of thought
without a thinker, or beUef without a believer, is to utter words void
of meaning."
Paulsen admits the contention that wherever there is a feeling there
must be some one who feels,1 but he claims that in so arguing we
misunderstand our own requirements in the case. According to him
we do not need a unitary subject, but simply a recoUection of the fact
that a thought or a feeling is never a soUtary mental phenomenon,
but is always a part of the entire soul-Ufe. Each thought or feeling
is a necessary member of a connected whole. On this theory it is the
whole soul-life which feels or thinks or wills. This can mean but one
thing ; that is, that that which we call the seU, which we regard as
thinking, feeUng, and willing, is a sum total of thoughts, feelings, and
volitions, and not a unit. If this be true, then our consciousness of
unity is a delusion. There is no unitary seU as the subject of aU these
states ; the states are the seU, and this aggregation feels itseU a unit,
though it is deceived in this feeling.
Now, what reason is there for holding that we are deceived by our
consciousness of unity ? When it seems to me I am the same one who
° o"pauisen,n thou£nt> felt' willed, or acted in a certain way yesterday,
views. why should I not accept this datum of consciousness?
why should I declare that I am not one, but a succession or an aggre-
1 System der Philosophie, pp. 289 ff.
2 Introduction to Psychological Theory, New York, 1886, p. 25. « Ibid., p. 13.
« The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, New York, 1891, p. 3.
0 Einleltung in die Philosophie, p. 135.

Validity of the Christian Idea of the Soul. 383
gate of mental states ? The only answer is, We must override the
testimony of consciousness and conscience in the interests of the ma
terialistic or of the monistic philosophy. But those philosophies
ought to exist only as explanations of the facts, whereas they are
obliged to deny the facts in order to exist. For U we must repudiate
the testimony of consciousness, which is so perfectly universal and
unUorm, it wiU be impossible for us to know what is fact, i Dualism
is probably very hateful to materialists and monists, but, for all that,
it alone accounts for both physical and mental phenomena by postu
lating a somewhat behind and corresponding to each class of phe
nomena. Our theory does not require us to assert thought without a
thinker, or else to make God the only reality, as Paulsen appears to
do. ' The Christian theory leaves dualism to be explained ; but that
is a bugbear raised by materialism and creates no difficulty, for the
simple reason that we know nothing whatever of the real nature
either of matter or spirit. For aught we know they may differ
greatly and yet cooperate perfectly. We decline to contradict the
plainest requirements of common sense and consciousness in order to
avoid a difficulty for whose existence we have absolutely no proof.
All objectors to the Christian doctrine make much of the fact that
we cannot define the nature of the soul. But it is no more necessary
to define the nature of spirit in order to beUeve that it exists than it
is to define the nature of matter in order to believe that it exists. Yet
no scientist and no philosopher will attempt to define the Nature of tne
nature of matter apart from its activities. We often ^definable
read eddying accounts of what matter is not, or of What t^an matter.
the phenomena of matter are ; but all admit that every attempt to
define matter is a total failure. StiU, we all continue to believe that
there is such a thing as matter, because there are material phe
nomena. Precisely in the same way it is entirely allowable to be
lieve that there is such a thing as spirit because there are mental
phenomena, though in the same breath we confess that we do not
know what spirit is. It is no more correct to say that spirit is the mere
negation of matter than it is to say that matter is the mere negation
of spirit. Why should matter be made the standard by which to test
reality ? If such a preeminence is to be granted to either spirit or
matter it must be accorded to the former. Impossibility of definition
proves only our incapacity for comprehending all reaUty, hot the non
existence of reality. • Einleitung In die Philosophie, p. 136.

384 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER IH.
the personality of man and his superiority to the brutes.
Perhaps the most formidable argument of our opponents is that
which is professedly drawn from the doctrine of the evolutionary
descent of man. Christianity holds that the soul of man, with its
. . seU-consciousness, its consciousness of unity, identity,
The Christian
position. and selfhood, its consciousness of freedom and personal
responsibility, is, so far, different in kind from aU other created exist
ence known to this earth. Atheists and agnostic evolutionists under
take to prove, on the contrary, that man is simply a higher grade of
animal. Says Haeckel:1 "Comparative Psychology . . . teaches
that this frontier post between man and beast is altogether unten
able." Now, how does he proceed to show this? First of aU by the
attempt to prove that, physicaUy, man is developed from the lower
animals. To this we need give no attention here, since it is not the
point in question, although it is proper to add that the difficulties in
the way of proving man's physical origin from the beasts by any
process known to atheistic or agnostic scientists are constantly demon
strating themselves to be increasingly formidable." What we are in
terested in is his alleged evidence in favor of the evolution of mind.
He says : a " All naturalists, without exception, agree that the central
nervous system is the organ of the mental Ufe of animals. ... If the
central nervous system is whoUy or partiaUy destroyed, the 'mind/
or the psychical activity of the animal, is wholly or partially annihi
lated at the same time. We must, therefore, next inquire what is the
character of the mental organ in man . . . Man's mental organ is,
in its whole structure and origin, the same as that of all other verte
brates. . . . Physiological observation and experiment teaches, more
over, that the relation of the ' mind ' to its organ, the brain and spinal
marrow, is exactly the same in man as in all other mammals. The
former can in no case act without the latter ; the one is connected
with the other, as is muscular movement with muscle. Therefore,
the mind can develop only in connection with its organ."
1 The Evolution of Man, vol. 11, p. 453.
' Comp. AndresenN Die Entwlckelung der Menschen, p. 35.
s The Evolution of Man, p. 450.

Personality of Man and his Superiority to Brutes. 385
It will be better to pause here and examine his argument up to this
point. The reader wfll recall the discussion of this subject under a
somewhat different aspect in the earlier pages of this Haeckel's de-
book.1 There it was proved that U the central nervous tinction b'e-
system is partially destroyed it does not partiaUy an- ^d "beast
nihilate the mind at the same time. Cases were cited in excised.
which, with considerable portions of the brain gone, mental power was
in no degree decreased, while it is the fact that under such circum
stances the brain wearied the sooner. This showed that the brain
is the organ of the mind in a far different sense from what Haeckel
supposes. Mind and brain are indeed connected in some mysterious
way, but the evidence goes to show that a fully developed mind needs
the whole of the brain which developed along with it ; not that, if the
brain is gone, the mind is gone also. The fact is that Haeckel's
argument is based on the supposition of the truth of the materialistic-
monistic phflosophy, which regards mind as a function of brain the
same as muscular movement is a function of muscle. For a refuta
tion of this wholly absurd notion we refer the reader to our treatment
of Haeckel's monism in the earUer parts of this book. If, in the
nature of the case, mental action cannot be regarded as a function of
brain, then, though the mind apparently develops in proportion as
the brain develops, this furnishes no proof that there is no mind
without brain. Hence his assertion that the "frontier post between
man and beast is untenable" fails of adequate support. The testi
mony of consciousness that I am not aU matter still holds. His
assertion can be proved, if at aU, not by the apparent fact that mind
and brain develop simultaneously in man, and in lower animals as
weU, but only by a comparison of the mental phenomena as found in
man and beast.
This brings us to the method employed by Romanes, in the day of
his enthraUment to atheism, to prove that there is no distinction
in kind between mind in man and mind in beast. In a very elaborate
treatise, * which, however, is far more learned and acute than con
clusive, he attempts to estabhsh the proposition just mentioned. We
cannot undertake here to summarize the argument, which he carries
through several hundred pages, nor even his seventeenth chapter,
entitled General Summary and Concluding Remarks. We can only
point out his methods of procedure and examine briefly the force of
his reasoning.
It must be said that any one who carefully reads Romanes's work
1 Pages 119 f. * Mental Evolution in Man, New York, 1889.

386 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
wiU discover that it is reaUy difficult to get at the exact purpose of
the author. The title of the book is, Mental Evolution in Man — Origin
of Human Faculty. The second part of the title, compared with the
first part, seems to indicate that the whole should be something like
Romanes on this: "The Human Mind the Result of the Process of
alid beast"1 Evolution." This is probably what the title signifies,
U we may judge from certain sentences on page 390 of the work
referred to. Now, Christianity gives us no theory as to how the
human mind came into existence, and it would not be at all unchris
tian to suppose that it came into existence by the process of evolution.
It is simply a question of fact, concerning the outcome of which
Christians as such need not be troubled, however much they are inter
ested. But some sentences in his Preface would seem to indicate that
the title of the book, even when its two diverse parts are interpreted
into one, does not reveal the author's real purpose. He says •: " Touch
ing the present installment,' it is only needful to remark that from a
controversial point of view it is, perhaps, the most important. If
once the genesis of conceptual thought from nonconceptual ante
cedents be rendered apparent, the great majority of competent read
ers at the present time would be prepared to allow that the psycho
logical barrier between the brute and the man is shown to have been
overcome." That to overcome this psychological barrier between brute and
man is his real purpose in writing, or at least the real end to which he
thought his investigations led him, a careful study of the entire work
undoubtedly reveals. And here is where Christianity is obliged to utter
a protest. If both the physical and the psychological barriers between
man and beast are broken down then man is only one kind of brute,
and Christianity is wrong in regarding him as the special object of
God's care. Only on the theory that man is different in kind, at least
psychologicaUy, from the brute, can Christianity maintain itseU. Man
has a mind in a sense in which a brute has none or Christianity is
false ; for it assumes a godlike nature of the human mind, in spite of
sin, in all its utterances concerning the relation of God to man.
We begin by caUing attention to Romanes's statement that by " dU-
ference of kind " between brute and human mind he means " difference
of origin," claiming that the only real distinction between difference
of kind and difference of degree consists in difference of origin.8 Much
1 Page vi.
a The book is one of three on the same general subjeot of psychical evolution.
•Mental Evolution In Man, p. 3, n.

Personality of Man and his Superiority to Brutes. 387
of the error and vagueness of this statement must here be ignored.
It is, however, necessary to point out first that sameness of origin
may be perfectly compatible with difference of kind. Sameness of
iim. • • j if n -j. -j. origin com-
The origm of a thing " may mean its source, or it may paflbie with
., ., .. , , . . .. difference in
mean its cause, or it may mean the process by which it kind.
came into being, or it may mean aU three. The theistic theory of
evolution could aUow that as God brought about the gradual advance
ment of being physically, so he provided for the addition of mind to
physical organization and, finaUy, of a higher kind of mind to a lower
kind. However low the grade of consciousness it is different in kind
from any material phenomena, even though both were admitted to
have had the same origin. In the sense of "source" theists firmly
believe the " origin" of both to be the same ; they are not particular
as to the process.
Atheistic evolution cannot account for the changes and advance
ments in physical phenomena, much less for the phenomena of con
sciousness even in its lowest form. AU it can do is to trace out the
order of those changes and advancements. As soon as it begins to in
quire into the why of things it is confronted with insurmountable dif
ficulties. Hence consistent atheists, agnostics, and positivists content
themselves generaUy with a description of the evolutionary process.
As soon as they begin to assume any power at work they are on the
road to theism, whither straight thinking is sure to lead them. But
the description of a process is not a complete account of the origin of
a thing. It is perfectly conceivable that the same process (evolution)
might be applied to whoUy diverse materials. So that sameness of
origin, whether as to the source or process, or both, is not incompati
ble with difference of kind. It is characteristic of the mental confu
sion into which atheism leads men that so fundamental a fact should
have been overlooked by a really great thinker. And in fact Romanes
himseU continually speaks of differences of kind, although at the out
set he has notified us that he has in mind differences of origin.
This failure to observe that identity of origin (source, cause, process)
is not one with identity of kind vitiates Romanes's reasoning, and in
no particular more completely than with reference to his H ( s e r ror
main contention, that the proof of the genesis of concep- h!sereason-
tual thought from nonconceptual antecedents breaks down mg'
the psychological barrier between brute and man. Nor need we foUow
his elaborate terminology and discrimination of mental states in order
to show how his dogmatic assumption that sameness in origin and
sameness in kind are identical leads him to confuse as identical in

388 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
kind things which his own reasoning and terminology ought to have
revealed as diverse. The very words, "evolution of this conceptual
from preconceptual self -consciousness," ' are a confession of a differ
ence in kind. That which is preconceptual is not yet conceptual, or,
in other words, it is nonconceptual. To affirm that self -consciousness
is both conceptual and nonconceptual at the same time is to utter sheer
nonsense. No one makes the distinction between the two more sharply
than Romanes himself. Yet, because he had assumed that sameness
in origin was identical with sameness in kind, he was obUged, after
having proved to his own satisfaction that the laws of evolution
apply to self -consciousness, to assert, or at least imply, that the non-
conceptual and the conceptual are the same in kind. That which is
conceptual differs from that which is nonconceptual as contradictories
differ. If there is no difference in kind between that which is and
that which is not possessed of a quality, then there are no differences
in kind. The difference may not always be great, but it isa difference
in kind, however small or large. The only distinctions in kind of
which we know anything are those which are based on observed dif
ferences in qualities. If any two things have the same quahties in
different degrees they do not differ in kind unless the difference in de
gree is infinite. Things which have all quaUties but one in common
differ in kind by the greatness or insignificance of that one quality.'
1 Mental Evolution in Man, p. 409.
8 C. L. Morgan, after a careful study of the whole subject, concludes that animals do
not reason, and that the anecdotal character of all accounts which seem to Indicate the
contrary must restrain us from accepting any conclusions based upon them as to the rea
soning powers of animals. See his Introduction to Comparative Psychology, London and
New York, 1894, chap, xvi ; also p. 358.

Man's Personal Superiority to the Brute — Romanes. 389

CHAPTER IV.
MAN'S PERSONAL SUPERIORITY TO THE BRUTE — ROMANES.
Following out this same principle we are able to see that man is
vastly different as to kind in his psychology from the brute. Ro
manes confesses that seU-consciousness exists only in man.1 It de
pends on what estimate we fix for self -consciousness e s t i m a t e
whether we shall think that man differs in kind from self- con"
the brute which has it not. No matter though the little seiousness-
child has no self -consciousness, as Haeckel and Romanes are so fond
of emphasizing. This proves only that mind evolves in its manifes
tation, not that the mind is not there. If the mind of a child and the
mind of a brute are the same in kind why is it that the one comes to
self -consciousness and the other does not ? If it be said that the dif
ference is in the brain only, then the materiaUstic position is thus
assumed. Even if we suppose that up to a certain point infant psy
chology is but on the same level with the powers of the brute, stfll it is
evident that there was at least in the mind of the child what is not
found in the "mind" of the brute, namely, the capacity for attain
ing to self -consciousness. Nor is this fact invaUdated even U we
grant that the faculty of language aided the child in reaching self-
consciousness, for it is here not a question of how or by what means
the power is developed. Man has seU-consciousness and the brute
has it not. The only way by which we can account, on evolutionary
principles, for the fact that to man was given the faculty of language
is on the supposition that there was latent in the human mind a power
or capability not existing in the mind of the brute.
Romanes seems to see that if man alone has self -consciousness man
must differ in kind from the brute ; for after stating that it exists only
in man he tries to show, (1) that in some sense it exists in animals,
and also (2) that after all there is no great difference between the be
ing which possesses seU-consciousness and the being which possesses
it not. Let us examine these two points.
As to the first, Romanes's whole discussion of seU-consciousness is
confused and contradictory. For example, he says:' "It wfll be
granted that self-consciousness consists in paying the same kind of
1 Mental Evolution in Man, p. 406. s Ibid.
27

390 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
attention to internal, or psychical processes as is habitually paid to
external or physical processes." But this is not granted. SeU-con-
Romanes's in- sciousness is not a mere function of introspection. Ro-
nition of self- manes grants that the power of introspection does not be-
ness. ' long to the brute. J So that the mental phenomena in man
would differ in kind from that in the brute by so much even if Romanes's
description of seU-consciousness were correct, which it is not. For
self -consciousness is a consciousness of seU. And here Romanes
seems to apprehend the truth, and to try to make it appear that at a
certain " stage of mental evolution the individual, whether animal or
infant, so far reaUzes its own individuaUty as to be informed by the
logic of recepts that it is one of a kind." Here he evidently means to
suggest that U the aiiimal has no consciousness of personaUty it at
least has the consciousness of individuaUty in some sense. But there
is a vast difference between the consciousness of individuaUty, even
U the brute has it, and the consciousness of personaUty.' So that, ac
cording to his own reasoning and confessions, there is no true sense in
which the brute has seU-consciousness — neither in the sense of the
power of introspective thought nor in that of personaUty. The reader
of Romanes should note this subtle attempt to rob seU-consciousness
of personality, on the one hand, and to give the brute a sense of indi
viduaUty approaching personality on the other. This same vicious
purpose wfll be apparent when we treat, as we immediately proceed
to do, of the second point mentioned above.
In order to reduce the differences which distinguish beings possess
ing from those not possessing seU-consciousness he uses his distinction
of mental faculties as perceptual, receptual, and conceptual. He says:'
Perceptual,™- " Pre-conceptual (that is, receptual) seU-consciousness is
conceptual exhibited by all children after they have begun to talk,
but before they begin to speak of themselves in the first
person, or otherwise to give any evidence of realizing their own ex
istence as such." This same thing in a brute, or an infant, he calls a
"rudimentary or nascent form of seU-consciousness." In estimating
this it is necessary to define exactly the issue. If Romanes is trying
to show by the language quoted that seU-consciousness dawns grad
ually we find no fault. If he is trying to prove that because seU-con-
sciousness is preceded by something which is not, but which ap
proaches, self -consciousness, we again make no objection. But, while
1 Mental Evolution In Man. p. 406.
a See The Evidence of Christian Experience, being the Ely Lectures for 1890, by Lewis
French Stearns, New York, 1890, p. 78.
s Mental Evolution In Man, p. 407.

Man's Personal Superiority to the Brute — Romanes. 391
he is not clear, he seems to be attempting to show that this something
which precedes self -consciousness is a kind of seU-consciousness ; for
he says : ' "There is a form of self-consciousness which may be termed
receptual as well as that which may be termed conceptual." Now, if
we take his own description of self -consciousness quoted above, this
receptual form of that faculty is not a form of the real thing ; for it
does not involve introspection. That it does not involve the idea of
personality Romanes would at once admit. Hence he is calling that
seU-consciousness which is not, even judged according to his own
standard, what he calls it. This is a specimen of his confused and
confusing manner of thought and utterance throughout his entire
book, and at the same time a refutation of his attempt to make it ap
pear that there is not much difference between beings which have and
beings which have not self -consciousness.
But in order to minify this distinction, which, after all shuffling, he
stiU admits exists between man and brute, he offers some subsidiary
considerations. We take them up as given in his Summary," treating
his second consideration first. It is that ' ' the vast majority of our
verbal propositions are made for the practical purposes of communi
cation, or without the mind pausing to contemplate the His subsidiary
..,,.,.„,„' . „ t. , . considera-
propositions in the hght of seU-consciousness." But in tions.
reality this is nothing to the point. We may not always be self-con
scious. The point, however, is that we are self-conscious at times;
the brute never. With this simple, brief, and obvious criticism we
pass to the first of his subsidiary considerations. We quote, s ' 'Although
the advance to true self -consciousness from lower grades of mental de
velopment is no doubt a very great and important matter, still it is
not so great and important, in comparison with what this develop
ment is afterward destined to become, as to make us feel that it con
stitutes any distinction sui generis— or even, perhaps, the principal
distinction — between the man and the brute. For even when seU-
consciousness does arrive, and has become fairly weU developed, the
powers of the human mind are still in an almost infantile condition.
In other words, the first genesis of true self-consciousness marks a
comparatively low level in the evolution of the human mind. . . . But,
U so, does it not follow that, great as the importance of self -conscious
ness afterward proves to be in the development of distinctively human
ideation, in itself, or in its past beginning, it does not betoken any
very perceptible advance upon those powers of preconceptual ideation
which it immediately follows ? "
1 Mental Evolution in Man, p. 410. ' Ibid., p. 412. • Ibid.

392 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
To say that such reasoning is amazing is, under the circumstances,
a mild form of utterance. The fact that preconceptual ideation pre
pared the way, even though causally, for conceptual ideation does not
prove that the difference between the two forms of ideation is slight.
By Romanes's own use of language it is admitted that the difference is
the difference between nonself -consciousness and self -consciousness.
The fact that self -consciousness becomes more clear and pronounced
as life continues, and that the accompanying mental powers may grow
with the growth of self-consciousness has no power to minify seU-
consciousness. The beginnings of things are always the most impor
tant parts of their history, for upon them aU else depends. The con
ception of a child is the most important fact in its Ufe, and the fact
that the human embryo at conception has reached but a small degree
of its possible development in nowise minifies its significance. It is
so significant that it marks the infinite difference between that which
is not and that which is.
But he carries the argument further, and by so doing brings out the
absurdity of his position into stfll more striking reUef. "There is
thus shown to be even less reason for regarding the first advent of
conceptual seU-consciousness as marking a psychological difference
of kind than there would be so to regard the advent of those higher
powers of conceptual ideation which subsequently — though as gradu
ally — supervene between early childhood and youth. Yet no one has
hitherto ventured to suggest that the inteUigence of a child and the
inteUigence of a youth display a difference of kind."
One who can employ such an argument is indeed hard pressed.
According to his own words both the child and the youth have self-
He makes the consciousness, the difference being one of degree, and ac-
wwien deny™ cording to his own words the child, however young, has
ng lt- the capacity for obtaining conceptual seU-consciousness
which the brute has not. If his reasoning were followed elsewhere
we might have results Uke the following : Two seeds are planted on
the same day. One has the power to develop into an apple tree, the
other into a peach tree. Yet there is not as much difference in kind
between the apple seed and the peach seed as there is between the
embryonic peach tree in its seed and the full-grown peach tree. Or,
one germ of life has the power to develop into an oyster and another
into a horse. Yet there would not be, on Romanes's principles, as
much difference in kind between the embryonic oyster and the em
bryonic horse as between the latter and the fully-developed racer. If
all this were true, difference in kind would be marked by degrees of

Man's Personal Superiority to the Brute — Romanes. 393
development, not by tendencies of development. Men who have no
case to make out will repudiate such absurdities.1
These considerations, with those in the earlier part of this work, will
suffice to show that no argument is sufficient to overthrow man's
recognition of his own personaUty, including all that is necessary to
constitute one a personal being. The superiority of man in kind as
compared with the brute is established by irrefragable argument.
Thus far the tenets of Christianity have shown themselves capable of
triumphant vindication in the presence of thought, though not in the
judgment of prejudice.'
i Wundt affirms that there are no existing species or individuals of animals which will
ever reach the point of intelligence proper, though he thinks man has reached that point
by passing through the stage of association which the child has in common with the
brute. Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology, translated from the second German
edition by Creighton and Titchener, London and New York, 1894, pp. 365 ff . If he is correct
the germinal difference between man and brute is established.
8 We recommend for further perusal, Andresen's Die Entwickelung der Menschen, pp.
10-90. See, also, E. L. Thorndike's Animal Intelligence, Supplement to the Pyschologist,
June 8, 1898.

394 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION II.-THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL."
CHAPTER I.
MAN'S CAPACITY FOR IMMORTALITY.
This is a doctrine held by aU Christians, though there are some who
affirm the doctrine in a less general form than that in which we have
stated it. In other words, some Christians hold what is known as the
doctrine of conditional immortality, which may mean several things.
In the first place it may mean that only those souls are immortal
which have received the principle of eternal Ufe through Jesus Christ.
This would leave room for the annihilation of the finaUy impenitent.
In this form the doctrine of conditional immortality belongs to the
domain of polemics rather than of evidences. But U by conditional im
mortality is meant that immortaUty is conditioned upon the continu
ous maintenance of the soul in lUe by the divine action aU wfll agree
to the doctrine. All created things, human souls included, would van
ish into the nothingness from which God caUed them were he to with-
The question draw his support.' Whether God will continue exist-
of condition
al immortal- ence to a soul forever is to be ascertained in this Ufe onlv
ity left to ,...„,
polemics. by revelation, U at aU. Unfortunately theologians are not
in perfect unity as to the question of what revelation says on the sub
ject of immortality for all, though the vast majority hold to universal
immortality ; that is that, having once brought a soul into being, God
wfll not withdraw his support and let it disappear into nothing
ness. For this view there are strong reasons. First, the analogy of mat
ter, which is held to be indestructible. "We cannot answer the in
quiry ' Why preserve matter and motion, and not consciousness and
inteUigence ? '—and the idea is nearly irresistible that they may be pre
served in states of existence separable from matter and motion." '
However science may view it, from the Christian standpoint the inde
structibility of matter depends solely upon the will of God. There is
1 W. T. Harris has written a valuable " survey of the grounds upon which Philosophy
bases Its doctrine of human Immortality," entitled The Immortality of the Individual,
New York and London, 1885.
2 Andresen, Die Entwlckelung der Menschen. p. 19.
11 Quoted approvingly from an unnamed correspondent of Sir Edwin Arnold In the lat
ter's Death— and Afterwards, seventh edition, Loudon, 1889, p. 54 f.

Man's Capacity for Immortality. 395
nothing in the New Testament revelation to suggest that matter wfll
ever be destroyed. Though it is said that the earth and the heavens
shaU pass away, matter itseU is apparently assumed to be indestruc
tible. It is not likely that God wfll withdraw his support from spirit
while he continues to give his support to matter. Second, there is a
dignity attaching even to a sinful soul which renders it probable that
God wiU never rob it of existence. ' We recognize that there are diffi
culties which can be solved only by the doctrine of annihilation of
rebellious souls. But it is doubtful whether they are not offset by the
difficulties connected with the doctrine of annihilation. So that, in
our opinion, though we do not pretend that the above is an adequate
discussion of the case, the weight of argument is in favor of the idea
that all souls wiU be maintained in everlasting lUe.
We wish to take up the question from a somewhat different point
of view and to give some reasons why Christians believe that the
soul is immortal. We group the discussion about two heads : (1) the
capacity of the soul for immortality, and (2) the probability of the
soul's immortaUty.
There is no reason to doubt the soul's capacity for immortality un
less it be a reason drawn from the soul's intimate connection with the
brain. Of course, if the soul is a sum of brain functions in the sense
that brain produces thought, it must cease to exist when the brain
dissolves." But, as we have repeatedly shown, this and The capability
every other materiaUstic and monistic theory of the °or ilnmor-
nature of the soul is untenable. The only view which tallty-
satisfactorily explains mental phenomena is that which postulates a
somewhat, called the soul, capable of being the subject of the mental
phenomena in question. The only objection of any force against this
view is that it compels us to accept dualism. But duaUsm is a per
fectly harmless theory unless men read into it difficulties which they
do not know to exist.
The fact of the soul's existence being demonstrated as practicaUy
certain it is exceedingly unlikely that it dissolves with the body. No
one, indeed, ever saw a soul enter or leave the body of a human or
any other being. But by hypothesis the soul is invisible ; hence the
fact just mentioned proves nothing. Nor is anything contrary to the
soul's capacity for outliving the body proved by the fact that with the
death of the body aU the dead man's manUestations of mental activ
ity cease ; for aU we can say is that they cease to be manifested to
1 Andresen, Die Entwickelung der Menschen, p. 83.
' Comp. James's Human Immortality, pp. 7-30.

396 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
us.1 For aught we know the soul's consciousness of itself, which went
on unknown to others except as the soul saw fit to reveal it through the
body, is as active as ever. This brings us face to face with the old
question whether the mind or spirit is in any sense independent of the
brain and body. We think there are the best of reasons, whether Mr.
MiU wfll grant that they are scientific or not, for holding that the soul-
Ufe is in a large measure independent.
We adduce some simple and weU-known facts. The same nerves of
sensation leading to the same brain produce diverse effects according
to the diverse inteUectual content of the matter spoken or seen. If
the message brought by a friend be favorable the words by which it
is conveyed affect the same nerves as are affected by the words which
convey an unfavorable message, but the effect on our f eelings is en
tirely different in the two cases. As far as the brain was concerned
the operation was the same up to the point at which the content was
made clear to consciousness. When the intellectual process was rela
tively complete the appropriate feeling was produced. Accompanying
these feelings there may have been brain modifications; but these
The soui-Hfe could not have produced the feelings. For example,
independentof the brain, there was also a modification of the flow of the blood ac
companying these feehngs; but the feelings affected the flow of
blood, not the flow of blood the feeUngs. Or, the first page of a
letter gives us an account of the safe arrival of a friend across the
sea, and we are glad ; the second page tells us of his death by disease
soon after his arrival, and we are doubly sad because of the contrast
with the feelings excited by the first page. Both pages affected the
same nerves and the same brain, but produced opposite feelings.
The materialistic theory would not only pretend that the brain is
capable of distinguishing between two pieces of news alternately, but
that disappointment is produced by the reaction of the brain in the
second against its condition in the former case. If the reaction ap
peared as physical pain we should be led to think that mental phe
nomena were caused by brain reactions ; but such not being the case
we must conclude that the mind is capable of carrying on activities
independent of the brain, at least as far as any causal connection is
concerned. This leads up to another fact indicating the same thing. We
are clearly capable of distinguishing between bodily and mental
1 J. S. Mill says: " There Is, therefore, in science, no evidence against the immortality
of the soul, but that negative evidence which consists in the absence of evidence in its
favor. And even the negative is not as strong as negative evidence ofteu is."— Three
Essays, p. 201.

Man's Capacity for Immortality. 397
pleasure and pain. Unless we are entirely in error when we think
ourselves capable of making such a distinction we have here a fact
which is almost equivalent to a demonstration that the soul life
is, even whfle the body stiU Uves, independent of the body.
Closely aUied with this is another class of facts, namely, those con
nected with the ethical changes attendant upon religious conversion.
That such conversions occur no one who has studied the subject can
deny.1 Men of the vilest passions, mental and physical, have, out of
curiosity, or similar motives, dropped in at religious services, and in
side of an hour have met with some change, whatever it may be
caUed, which altered all their moral and spiritual tastes and habits
from that time forth to the end of life. Hate has been thus suddenly
exchanged for love, malice for tenderness, lust for purity. These
things are not uncommon, but of frequent occurrence. Whether we
attribute the change to the power of God, or to the influence of man
over man, the fact of the change is indisputable. Now, in all such
cases of sudden conversion the change must be spiritual ; that is, it
pertains to the spiritual nature, not to the physical. Such an enor
mous change in the brain in so short a time as one of these sudden con
versions would indicate is impossible.
Here is indubitable proof that the mind is not determined by the
condition of the brain, for the effect of conversion is the same for
physical and mental evil passions. Even while the brain is inflamed
by the use of alcohol the converted victim of the drink habit feels no
impulse to drink, and in some cases conversion is followed by a per
manent sense of loathing for intoxicating liquors. Should anyone
attribute the result to the change in the center of gravity of the feel
ings, to the tremendous force of a new impression, of fear, or hope, or
aspiration, or the Uke, still it would not alter the fact that the men
tal change was neither caused nor accompanied by a corresponding
change in the brain. The force of these facts is such as to make it
practically certain that the mind is not dependent upon the brain in
any such sense as that it cannot act apart from it. My mind cannot
manifest itseU to another without the use of the brain, but it has
the power to act in ways for which the brain is wholly unprepared,
and even contrary to brain conditions. This being the case it is
evident that the soul can go on with its activities when the brain is
dead.' 1 Comp. Martineau's A Study of Religion, vol. ii, p. 39.
' For an extended argument see The Relations of Mind and Brain, by Professor H.
Calderwood, London, 1879. Comp. also Professor Eucken's Der Kampf um einen Geistigen
Lebensinhalt, Leipzig, 1896, pp. 1-19.

398 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
The foregoing remarks will suffice to show that the soul is capaci
tated to survive the death of the body. There is absolutely no evi
dence of the simultaneous death of soul and body, much less is such
a catastrophe capable of proof. When Nordheim says that we are
unable to discover the time when the soul leaves the body of a dying
man" he brings no argument for the beUef that it never leaves and
that there is nothing that can leave, the body. AU he shows is,
what all confess, that we know soul only in thought, not by means
of the physical senses. It is impossible for us to know aU
being through the medium of the physical senses. Indeed, had we
this medium only we could not know matter. Both matter and spirit
are known by thought, and thought alone. Both are known to
Weakness of thought alone by their phenomena.' Strictly speaking,
Hams™ 6im- we see neither body nor spirit. Hence Nordheim's argu-
mortahty. ment is simply a statement of his lack of evidence that
the soul exists after the death of the body. And the reason that he
lacks evidence is that he searches for it through the channels of the
physical senses, which, in the nature of the case, can convey him no
such information as he demands. If he wfll attack the problem by
thought he wfll see that the first step in the furnishing of evidence
for the soul's existence apart from the dead body is given in the proof
that the soul is capable of such existence.
1 Die Erf ttllung des Christenthums, p. 286. Haeckel has an absurd passage in which he
says that, according to the Christian view, we must suppose that " a little piece of the
father's mind accompanied the sperm-cell, a little piece of the mother's mind remained
with the egg-cell.— The Evolution of Man, vol. ii, p. 415 f . In answer it is sufficient to say
that Christianity has no theory as to the process by which the soul originates. Haeckel
can think only in terms of matter, else he would not speak of a " piece" of mind.
a Comp. Menzl, Der Materialismus vor dem Richterstuhl der Wissenschaft, part i.

Grounds for the Belief in Human Immortality. 399

CHAPTER II.
GROUNDS FOR THE BELIEF IN HUMAN IMMORTALITY.
In the absence of any evidence against the soul's survival of the
death of the body a very slight presumption in favor of such a sur
vival would turn the scales of belief in its favor except with those
who are controlled by prejudice rather than reason. But the argu
ments for immortality are such as to produce a very strong presump
tion in its favor. We offer here a few of those arguments, omitting
the proof from revelation.
Man's rank in creation is such as to render highly probable his con
tinued existence after death. (1) However near to the level of the
higher animals man's physical structure may be it has been made
plain that the human being is vastly different from and superior to
the brute in his spiritual nature. Personality, freedom, responsi
bility, accountabflity, are terms which can be applied to man alone of
aU created beings. Indeed, it is not too much to say that, Man's rank in
creation as
aside from the word of revelation, man gives evidence of an argument
for lmmor-
being created in the image of God. In support of this taiity.
well-known view we give the substance of the argument on that sub
ject by Professor James Orr, D.D.1 First, man bears the rational
image of God.' This we know, since man can understand the world
God has made. The first condition of success in the attempt to trans
late a book from a foreign language is similarity of inteUigence be
tween the man who wrote it and the one who attempts to decipher it.
If the reason of the former were totally different from the reason of
the latter the attempt to understand each other would be hopeless.
Precisely the same condition applies to the possibility of our knowl
edge of the world. Reason in man and the reason expressed in na
ture must be the same in kind, or no relation between them could be
established. Second, man bears God's moral image ; not now in the
possession of actual righteousness, but in the possession of the inde
structible elements of a moral nature, (a) He is a being with the power
of moral knowledge. The idea of good, and with it the moral
1 In his The Christian View of the World, being the Kerr Lectures for 1890-91, third
edition, New York, 1897, pp. 139 ff.
11 Comp. also W. N. Clark's Outline of Christian Theology, Cambridge, 1894, p. 171.
There is a later editiou of this excellent work to which we have not access.

400 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
'• ought " or ethical imperative, is part of his constitution. (6) He is a
free, spiritual cause, that is, he has moral freedom. At present this
freedom is sadly impaired by sin, yet it is one of the constitutive ele
ments of his nature. As a free, spiritual, seU-determining cause he is
in a very marked sense the image of his Maker. It is this power of
wiU and seU- decision in man which most of aU constitutes him a per
son. Through it he stands out of and above nature's sequences, and
can react on and modify them.1 He is, as some have chosen to regard
him, a supernatural cause in the order of nature.' (c) Man is a being
with moral affections. Without these he would not be a true image
of the God who is love. Thus man has a conscience which reveals
moral law, a will which can execute moral purposes, and affections
which create a capacity for moral love. Third, man bears the image
of God in his deputed sovereignty over the creatures; a sovereignty
abundantly testified to by aU man's conquests over material condi
tions, his achievements in art and civilization, and his employment
of nature's laws and forces for his own ends.3
(2) Man is the highest being that wfll ever dweU upon earth. Even
if anyone were disposed to dispute that nature tended toward a goal
with which man must be identified, still it is plain from other reasons
that no being higher than man wfll ever make this earth his dweUing
place. For, on the theory of evolution, the earth has become too old,
and its process of cooling off has gone too far, to admit of the advent
of a new order with any chance of survival. *
We cite in this connection some of the majestic sentences and forci
ble deductions of Mr. John Fiske. " " Chief among these agencies,
[that is, in the process of development] is natural selection. ... In
the desperate struggle for existence no pecuharity, physical or psy
chical, however sUght, has been too insignificant for natural selection
to seize and enhance. . . . Psychical variations have never been un
important. ... At length there came a wonderful moment. . . .
1 So also Andresen, Die Entwlckelung der Menschen, p. 60.
3 Horace BushneU, Nature and the Supernatural, New York, 1867, pp. 23-25.
' On the Image of God In man comp. Laidlaw's Bible Doctrine of Man, Cunningham Lec
tures, Edinburgh, 1879, Lecture ill. Dr. J. H. W. Stuckenberg quotes Professor Bastian
as saying: " The serious mistake made by Buckle is that he thought what is true of man
in his savage state Is also true of him during all the stages of development, namely, that
he always remains under the dominion of his environment. The truth, however, is. that
man frees himself from his environment in proportion as he rises in civilization, so that
instead of being nature's slave he becomes Its master."— Introduction to the Study of
Sociology, New York, 1898, p. 227. This recognizes man as nature's master, but not early
enough. It would be truer to say that man's progress in civilization Is marked by his
increasing mastery over nature. The mastery, in some degree, he had from the begin
ning; else he never could have risen at all.
* Andresen, Die Entwlckelung der Menschen, p. 40.
• The Destiny of Man viewed in the Light of his Origin, Boston, 1885, pp. 26-34.

Grounds for the Belief in Human Immortality. 401
Silent and unnoticed . . . there arrived that wonderful moment at
which psychical changes began to be of more use than physical changes
to the brute ancestor of man. . . . No fact in nature is Jonn Fiske on
fraught with deeper meaning than this two-sided fact of eWef of God's
the extreme physical similarity and enormous psychical creatures-
divergence between man and the group of animals to which he traces
his pedigree. It shows that when humanity began to be evolved an
entirely new chapter in the history of the universe was opened.
Henceforth the Ufe of the nascent soul came to be first in importance,
and the bodfly lUe became subordinated to it. . . . Henceforth, in
short, the dominant aspect of evolution was to be, not the genesis of
species, but the progress of civUization. . . . According to Darwinism
the creation of man is stiU the goal toward which nature tended from
the beginning. Not the production of any higher creature, but the
perfecting of humanity, is to be the glorious consummation of nature's
long and tedious work. Thus we suddenly arrive at the conclusion
that man seems now, much more clearly than ever, the chief among
God's creatures. . . . He who has mastered the Darwinian theory
. . . sees that . . . the whole creation has been groaning and travail
ing together in order to bring forth that last consummate specimen of
God's handiwork, the human soul. . . . The destinies of aU other liv
ing things are more and more dependent upon the will of man. It
rests with him to determine, to a great degree, what plants and ani
mals shall remain on earth and what shaU be swept from its surface.
. . . Natural selection itseU wfll by and by occupy a subordinate place
in comparison with selection by man."
Thus man's position in creation is exhibited to be such as to preclude
as unreasonable the supposition that the spiritual life, the goal of all
earthly existence, should itseU be as ephemeral as all the precedent
existences upon which it, according to the evolution theory, was condi
tioned. As before stated, there is no reason to suppose that the soul-Uf e
is extinguished with the lUe of the body ; but, if there were, we should
certainly have reason to regard all creation as the most Ascription of
. folly to the
stupendous piece of folly conceivable to God or man. Creator.
That so much time and energy and such infinitely varied resources
should be expended, resulting in a form of being so exalted as the
mind of man, and all be allowed to lavish itself for nothing, is simply
incredible. The chfld's pleasure in building his houses of blocks for
the pleasure of knocking them down again is a manUestation of
highest wisdom compared with the creation of a soul capable of con
tinued existence with the understanding that when it is created it shall

4.02 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
be immediately destroyed. Were such an outcome possible thought
ful men would be compelled to write aU over this seemingly wondrous
world of ours one word, with infinite repetitions, FOLLY, FOLLY,
FOLLY. Nor can escape be had from this conclusion by the impersonal kind
of immortality talked about by some who feel the force of the above
reasoning. Carus, it will be remembered,1 says that the parents are
immortal in their children, which we answered by pointing to the
fact that there are many who never become parents, and who there
fore have no immortality. George EUot has a much more real kind
of impersonal immortality to offer in her noble poem which begins :
O may I join the choir invisible
Of those immortal dead who hve again
In minds made better by their presence.2
In a very good sense she truly says, "So to live is heaven," and "This
George Eliot's is hfe to come." One can but sympathize with her when
immortality, she expresses the ardent longing, "May I reach that
purest heaven." One is lifted up to such a height of Christian delight
in the spirit of helpfulness to others by the reading of the poem that
the question of a personal future existence appears insignificant in the
comparison. But it appears so only because the great Christian prin
ciple of conduct finds such attractive and impressive utterance at the
hands of genius as to make us forgetful of other truths and principles.
For example, under such an inspiration we forget that it is the beUef
in personal immortality — in the lofty dignity and immense signifi
cance of the individual human soul — which makes us feel that it is
worth while to live for others.3 Says Mr. John Stuart Mill:* "The
beneficial influence of such a hope is far from trifling. It makes life
and human nature a far greater thing to the feelings, and gives greater
strength as well as greater solemnity to aU the sentiments which are
awakened in us by our feUow-creatures, and by mankind at large.
It allays the sense of that irony of nature which is so painfully felt
when we see the exertions and sacrifices of a lUe culminating in the
formation of a wise and noble mind only to disappear from the world
when the time has just arrived at which the world seems about to
begin reaping the benefit of it." Hope is absolutely essentia] to sus
tained effort in our own or in another's behalf. Were we sure that
we have no personal immortality we might, as companions in a mutual
despair, strive to alleviate each other's sufferings as much as possible ;
1 Division I, section Hi, chap. 5. » Jubal and Other Poems, Boston, 1874.
8 Comp. Uhlhorn's Christian Charity in the Ancient Church, New York, 1883, p. 33 f.
1 Three Essays, p. 249.

Grounds for the Belief in Human Immortality. 403
but it is unreasonable to suppose that we should expend so much of
our own affection and energy upon the development of the minds and
hearts of others if we felt that neither we nor they would reap any
but the briefest benefits from all our pains.
Besides, if we may trust the combined teaching of both science and
the Bible, even this impersonal immortality is immortality only in
name — a mere fiction set up for the reaUty. For the imm0rtaiity
time wiU come when the human race shall disappear only in name.
from the face of the earth. If there is no mind left to retain the influ
ences of good which we have exerted where wfll be our immortality ?
The only hope we can cherish of immortaUty, in the sense in which
the word is employed by the gUted authoress, is in the personal im
mortaUty of those in whose minds we live again.
We repeat that, if man's spirit be not immortal, this world, with
aU its intelUgence, is a gigantic monument of imbecility and folly. To
suppose that such a being as man came into existence except under
the guidance of inteUigence is absurd ; but if man is the product of
intelligence he will be too much prized by his Maker for his spiritual
destiny to be involved in the dissolution of material combinations like
the brain.
Very weighty, therefore, is the presumption in favor of hnmortaUty
from this point of view.

404 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER III.
presumptions in favor of immortality.
From yet another standpoint this presumption is greatly strength
ened. The time aUotted to man even in the longest Ufe on earth is in-
The argument sufficient for the full development of his mental and moral
suf? iciency powers. It is true that the inteUectual and moral progress
man™6 de- °^ *ne majority of human beings is much slower than it
veiopment. neeri be, and some seem incapable of great progress with
or without sufficient time ; but there are large numbers whose physical
natures become a clog to their mental powers long before the latter
appear to have reached the limit of their possibiUties. Once it is clearly
seen that the human mind, while in some measure dependent upon the
brain, and indeed upon the entire physical system, is also independent
of these material conditions in such a sense that it could carry on aU
its operations of seU-consciousness, and the like, were it separate from
the body, it becomes evident that there is no telling what the capacities
of the mind are. Until the body begins to clog the mind's activities
these appear to improve through eight or nine decades of Ufe. It is
natural to suppose that were the body as capable of enduring as the
mind is, the latter would continue to develop indefinitely. The brain
is dependent upon the whole organism for its health, and when the
latter becomes diseased it affects the strength of the former.
As long as brain and mind are so intimately connected the improve
ment of the mind must apparently cease when the brain begins to de
teriorate. But there is not the slightest reason for thinking that when
the mind is set free from its bodily limitations it cannot proceed to
expand to an indefinite degree. Its capability for expansion under
right conditions here would seem to indicate that with right condi
tions hereafter it wiU continue to expand. And there is nothing to
show that those conditions wUl not be afforded. They are provided
here to the full extent of the possibilities permitted in a world of mat
ter and of sin, why not hereafter ? If the superior opportunities con
ceivable hereafter shall be given, the limitless development of the men
tal powers so much dreamed of and desired wfll be realized. It is
impossible to believe that the Intelligence which produced the mind
naturaUy capable of such attainments wUl prevent them by annihilat-

Presumptions in Favor of Immortality. 405
ing the mind. Here would be a mark of foUy even greater than the
one before mentioned. Only those who are ready to believe with the
pessimist, " Vanity of vanities, aU is vanity," can deny that the pre
sumption is in favor of the mind's finding further time for reaching
its highest possible power. And when it has attained the goal it will
be so majestic that the foUy which could annihilate would be as in
finite as we now suppose the wisdom of God to be.
Furthermore, the moral nature in man is and can be but partially
developed in this lUe. Here the facts are much more simple than
with reference to mental improvement ; for the very con- The same ap-
ditions which hinder inteUectual progress are oftentimes moral nature.
exceedingly favorable to the promotion of ethical advancement.
Hence moral ripening does not necessarUy cease up to the last moment
of Ufe. Yet aU thoughtful people feel that under the best of condi
tions no one becomes moraUy, in this life, what he might become were
Ufe longer. Now, there are the best of reasons why life should not be
unduly prolonged in this world, but there are no reasons that man
can conceive why it should not be indefinitely prolonged under other
conditions than those which make its brevity desirable here. Why
are we possessed of a moral nature and of the capacity for ethical
betterment ? Did God, who made us, not give us these capacities ?
Were he to cut us off when our moral progress is but fairly begun he
would be chargeable, not only with folly, but with contradicting the
opinion which the gift of a moral nature has strengthened within us,
namely, that he cares for moral beings. The folly and the indiffer
ence to high moral attainment attributable to God on the denial of
immortality furnish an irresistible presumption in favor of the Chris
tian doctrine of life after death. An artist does not spend his lUe be-
ginning works of genius only to destroy them before they are haU
complete ; and God does not, U we may judge of him by any measure
known to ourselves, start his creatures on a career of majestic ethical
possibility with the predetermined purpose of preventing its attain
ment. Says Mr. John Fiske : " I believe in the immortality of the soul
... as a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God's work."
Thus, while, as Mr. Mill admits, there is no evidence of weight
against the immortality of the soul, there is evidence in favor of the
belief sufficient to create a high degree of probability. Unless we
are to suppose that the being who, according to both science and the
Bible, is fitted to survive, and who, to reach his best, ought to sur
vive, is after all to perish with the unfit, we must beUeve in the im
mortaUty of the soul.
28

406 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Another fact which creates a strong presumption in favor of Ufe be
yond the grave is that it is needed to meet the demands of justice.
We all feel that there are, in large numbers, moral heroes who have
The argument n°t been adequately rewarded in this lUe. Men and
mands6 Iff women die in the midst of then deeds of virtue and love
justice. before they have received even so much as the meed of
praise which their own consciences would surely have bestowed had
they not been so suddenly cut off. On the other hand, there have been
many men whose wickedness never caused them a pang of remorse
nor any conscious inconvenience whatever. Here are defects of di
vine administration if this is our only lUe. But U the soul Uves on,
and continues to be conscious of its past, with conscience alive and
the ability to recognize and appreciate the approval and disapproval of
others which is a characteristic of human nature here, aU this can be
remedied, and God can justUy his ways to man. ¦
We do not wish to continue the discussion, as the presumption is
absolutely all on the side of immortaUty, and it is at the same time
The presump- very powerful. There is, however, one objection which
favor of im- should be briefly met. It arises from the firm beUef that,
and they are as the mind is always connected with a body here, it can-
very power-
ful. not exist apart from it hereafter ; that is, that it would
be hampered without a bodily organ. The objection springs from the
materialism of the day, which makes it impossible for some to con
ceive of a purely spiritual existence. But the Christian has no motive
for asserting that the spirit wiU be left without a body in the future
Ufe. The doctrine of the resurrection assumes that we shall have
bodies, though they will be different from our present ones in many
ways, when the consummation of all things takes place. It is useless
to speculate, and we refrain. But this much must be said : The Chris
tian doctrine provides for a body as well as a soul ; and he who insists
that the soul cannot Uve without a body simply confirms the Christian
view, therefore, that the resurrection is credible and at least probable.
Before closing this discussion attention should be again called to the
fact that no attempt has been made at a demonstration. AU that can
possibly be secured is a high degree of probability. This we believe
the considerations adduced will provide for all unprejudiced minds.
And when we come to the treatment of the revelation brought by Christ
' Another strong presumption In favor of Immortality we have not thought It necessary
to develop. It Is that which arises from the universality of the belief. The declaration
of Dr. Richards, that "there seems to be no certain connection between belief and the
reality " (The Mystery of Life, New York, 1898, p. 62) Is met by the considerations found
on pp. 878, 379 supra.

Presumptions in Favor of Immortality. 407
that probability will become a practical certainty. ' Nevertheless, even
when it is inteUectually conceded that the doctrine of immortality is so
probable that we can but accept it, stfll it must be remembered that
for the f uU and effective conviction needful in reference to it some
thing more than inteUectual assent, however hearty, is demanded.
Says Dr. Clarke, in the excellent work above referred to :' " Only as
men know and feel themselves immortal, and are impressed with the
deathlessness of their kind, does immortality obtain its rightful power.
Hence much of the evidence must be inward, subjective, and more or
less indefinable. . . . Men are Uable to doubt immortaUty until they
have inwardly learned it. All low, worldly, and unspiritual Ufe tends
toward doubt of it, and aU high living tends to beUef in it." In other
words, he who has the certainty that he is a child of God through
Jesus Christ is certain that he shaU never die. 3
1 Those readers who wish to connect that discussion with this are referred to division
viii, section viii, chap. 3.
3 An Outline of Christian Theology, pp. 172, 173.
s For a masterly treatment of the doctrine of Immortality from the standpoint of the
Bible, see Professor Salmond's The Christian Doctrine of Immortality, Edinburgh, 1895.

408 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION III.-THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN SIN.
CHAPTER I.
EXAMINATION OF THE NON-CHRISTIAN VIEW.
Attention has often been caUed to the fact that Christianity did not
place, but found, men in a condition of sin. One of the fundamental
and essential characteristics of Christianity is its doctrine concerning
the origin and nature of sin. And nowhere is our faith more in dan
ger than just at this point. There can be no doubt that the doctrines
of sin and salvation are closely linked together hi the Christian sys
tem, and that our conception of the latter is inevitably modified by
our conception of the former. Any view which makes the interven
tion of Christ nonessential, however it may aUow that it is helpful, is
antichristian. And while the doctrine of sin in Christianity is not
framed to suit the doctrine of Christ's redemptive work, nor the latter
framed to suit the former, stfll anything which touches the one affects
faith in the other.
The Christian doctrine of sin makes man, not God, responsible for the
moral evfl which is in the world. In opposition to this view there are
Man, not God, two current conceptions of the origin and nature of moral
responsible ... . . . ,, .
for sin. evil, the existence of which is universaUy admitted.
They may be termed the pantheistic-evolutionary, and the atheistic-
evolutionary. It wfll be seen that they have the evolutionary idea in
common, and it may be added that both practically release man from
aU responsibility for the presence of sin in the world, since both re
gard his moral condition as the product of forces for the most part be
yond his control. They differ in that the former makes God, that is,
God as understood by pantheism, responsible for moral evil,1 while
the latter, which is atheistic in the sense that it either denies or ignores
God's part in evolution, places the origin of sin in the necessities aris
ing from the struggle for existence. Both, in effect, deny the abso
luteness of the distinction between moral good and evil. Pantheism
makes moral evil a part of the divine plan, and regards it as a lesser
good, while evolution is constantly tending to substitute for the lesser
1 On the pantheistic versus the Christian doctrine of sin, see Stearns's The Evidence of
Christian Experience, p. 93.

Examination of the Non-Christian View. 409
the greater good. Atheistic evolution makes moral evfl merely a
stage in the progress of Ufe on its road to perfection. It is a part of
man's brute inheritance which he is gradually throwing off. Both
make the redemption in Christ nonessential, since man would without
the intervention of Christ, though perhaps more slowly, attain to free
dom from sin. Sin itself is, under both views, maladjustment to envi
ronment, not the responsible act or state of a human being.
Since both the atheistic and pantheistic theories have been already
considered and refuted we may leave these two views of sin to fight
out their differences between themselves. But as far as they turn to
us a common front we must meet and overthrow them. We take as
the spokesman of the non-Christian view Mr. John Fiske, who, though
neither a pantheist nor an atheist, holds practically their John Fiske's
views of the origin of human sin. One sentence reveals the evoiu-
his whole thought: "This original sin (of theology) is gin of sin.
neither more nor less than the brute inheritance which every man
carries with him." ' To this we add the following, which more fuUy
sets forth the evolutionary idea of the origin of moral evfl: "For
thousands of generations, and until very recent times, one of the
chief occupations of men has been to plunder, bruise, and kill one
another. The selfish and ugly passions which are primordial — which
have the incalculable strength of inheritance from the time when
animal consciousness began — have had but Uttle opportunity to grow
weak from disuse. The tender and unselfish feelings which are a
later product of evolution have too seldom been allowed to grow
strong from exercise.'" "And thus at length we see what human
progress means. It means throwing off the brute inheritance— grad
ually throwing it off through ages of struggle that are by and by to
make struggle needless. Man is slowly passing from a primitive
social state in which he was little better than a brute, toward an ulti
mate social state in which his character shall have become so trans
formed that nothing of the brute can be detected in it. The ape and
the tiger in human nature will become extinct." '
There is no niistaking the significance of aU this. Man when he
emerged from the brute stage was Uttle better than the brute from
which he was evolved. The fundamental passions of propagation of
the species and self-preservation he received in all their native strength
and unbridled application from his brute ancestor. Man is not respon-
1 The Destiny of Man, p. 103. This exceedingly valuable little book is a condensation
of several of Fiske's larger works.— Preface to the Destiny, p. vi.
' Ibid., p. 100 f. a Ibid., p. 103,

410 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
sible for his sinful state, though individual men may be for the faflure
to check the lower and to cultivate the nobler passions.
There are two questions which demand consideration here. First,
Did man spring from the brutes ? Second, If he did, was he so slightly
different from his ancestors as evolutionists would have us believe ?
In reality it is the second question which is chiefly important to
Christianity. The first might almost be ignored. Stfll, since it is an
swered in the affirmative by evolutionists, and as this answer is the
„ . . chief basis for an affirmative answer to the second ques-
The doctrine
of the brute ^ion. it wiU not be amiss to show the real facts with
origin of man '
challenged, reference to it. Our purpose, however, is not to prove
that man is a distinct and separate creation for which the brute world
was in no sense a preparation ; but that the atheistic theory of man's
evolution is unproved and improbable.
We examine first into the alleged great antiquity of man as a proof
of his brute origin. In fact, this great antiquity is a theory by which
it is proposed to account for the aUeged brute origin. The argument
is like this : How do we know that man originated so long ago ? By
the laws of evolution — which require him to have sprung from ani
mals lower than himself and to have differed but very sUghtly from
them at the first — we must beUeve that he originated long ages ago.
Thus the antiquity of man is supposed to be proved. Turning to the
proof for man's brute origin one argument runs thus : How do we
know that man sprang from the brutes ? His great antiquity pre
supposes it. Thus the antiquity is made to depend upon the brute
origin, and the brute origin upon the antiquity for support.
More recent investigations and studies are leading thoughtful men
to the conclusion that the long periods once affirmed for the age of
the world must be given up. Instead of hundreds of millions of years
The alleged science now holds to but ten mflUons, or at most twenty
ffquity8, of millions.1 So also the antiquity of man is being greatly
reduced. Haeckel says :" It is true that, in the present
imperfect state of our paleontological and prehistoric knowledge, we
cannot solve the problem as to whether the development of Man from
the nearest allied Ape-forms took place in the beginning of this
Anthropolithic Epoch or as early as the middle or toward the close of
the preceding Tertiary Epoch. This much, however, is certain — that
the true development of human culture dates only from the Anthro-
1 The latter figure Is given by Lord Kelvin. See Report of President Archibald Geike
before the British Association in 1892. The smaller figure is that of Professor Tait, in
Recent Advances in Physical Science, p. 167. Comp. Oil's. The Christian View of the
World, p. 446.

Examination of the Non-Christian View. 411
polithic Epoch, and that this latter constitutes only an msignificantly
smaU section of the entire enormous period of time occupied in the de
velopment of the organic earth." ' On the same page with the above
and on the page foUowing his language indicates that the whole period
of man does not amount to one per cent of the entire age of the
world. Reckoning this latter at twenty mUlions the whole period of
the development of man from the man-apes would be about two hun
dred thousand years. Reckoning at ten millions it would be about
one hundred thousand years. Large as these figures are they are
smafler than those of earher calculations. But stfll more recent cal
culations of a thoroughly reliable kind place the close of the glacial
epoch not more than ten thousand years ago, which is only one tenth
of the smaUest figure we can get from Haeckel's admissions. At any
rate it must be said that there is no sufficient proof for the extreme
antiquity of man, and so far no evidence for his brute origin.2
Besides, there are no existing remains to support the idea that man
sprang from the lower animals. Haeckel, who always Lack of exist-
r a ing remains
knows more about unknown things than most others are t o prove
0 man's brute
wflling to conjecture, admits that " only very uncertain origin.
conjectures can be formed as to the time and place of this true ' Crea
tion of Man,' " s that is, his development from the ape-men or speech
less men. He adds : " It is probable that Primeval Man originated
during the Diluvial Epoch, in the torrid zone of the Old World, either
on the continent of tropical Asia or Africa or on an earlier continent
which has now sunk below the surface of the Indian Ocean." Here
is a clear admission of the lack of evidence that man had for his pro
genitors a series of man-apes, ape-men, and the like. As the time
and place are uncertain conjectures, so is the whole theory that man
so originated. It is sometimes said that no stress should be laid upon
the fact that the missing Unks have not been found, since but a smaU
portion of the earth's surface has been searched and, besides, remains
of extinct animals are so easily destroyed. This plea for quarter on
the part of our opponents could be heeded were it not always accom
panied by the assertion that the evidence surely exists or has existed.
It is in reply to this assertion that we insist on the fact that the evi-
1 The Evolution of Man, vol. ii, p. 16.
2 Of course Haeckel is not here credited with allowing the briefer reckonings of world-
time. For full discussion see Wright's Man and the Glacial Period, New York, 1892, and
a paper read before the Geographical Section of the British Association, August 4, 1892.
by Messrs. Kendall and May. Comp. also Orr's, The Christian View of the World, p. 445.
Even Haeckel's figures will have to be considerably cut down if, according to him, man
originated in the Diluvial Epoch.— The Evolution of Man, vol. Ii, p. 183.
s The Evolution of Man, vol. ii, p. 182 f.

412 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
dence has not been found, and in accord with Haeckel's surmise that
the evidence lies at the bottom of the Indian Ocean, never wfll be
found. ' We can imagine Haeckel's scorn should the Christian at
tempt to base the facts of the Ufe of Christ upon aUeged documents
which had perished in a conjectural fire in a conjectural city at a con
jectural period of the Christian era.'
1 Haeckel is reported to have said in a recent address that it is useless to search further
for the missing link.
"See a brief but valuable statement of the Christian position relative to the brute
origin of man and the responsibility of man for his own sin In Max Reischle's Christen
thum und Entwickelungsgedanke, Leipzig, 1898, pp. 21 ff.

The Fall of Man. 413

CHAPTER II.
THE FALL OF MAN.
The strongest argument which can be adduced in favor of the evolu
tionary theory of the origin of man is the speculative argument
from analogy. The analogical argument at its best is never a scien
tific proof ; so that the theory can at most be established as probable,
and not as fact. This does not, indeed, militate against it in the
eyes of thoughtful people, for nearly aU our so-caUed knowledge is
nothing more than probability ; but it does rob it of the force which
the magic word science is supposed to lend it. It is a scientific theory,
not in the sense that it is scientifically established, but in the sense
that it is a theory in science. It is obliged, in view of the lack of
evidence, to support itself by speculations drawn chiefly from an
alogy. How much probability does this argument lend it ? It may be
said that it is practically certain that, since the missing links have
been found connecting other animals with their past, analogy would de
mand credence of the theory that the links are or have The argument
been in existence between man and ape. In fact, the is against the
analogy here is in the finding or not finding of the links, of man.
The greater the number of Unks found in the chain of being elsewhere
the more striking becomes the faflure to find them in the case of man
and ape. So the argument here is against the brute origin. Analogy
demands that these links, if they ever existed, should have been
found. Again, it may be said that as aU lUe below man is connected by a
series of gradations, so analogy requires us to believe that man, in
physical structure so similar 'to the apes, must have descended
through them and is thus a part of the ascendmg series ; its crown, if
you choose. But there is so much in man that is out of analogy with
aU else that analogy demands rather that we should suppose his ori
gin to have been out of analogy with the origin of lower forms of lUe.
In other words, we place analogy against analogy, thus destroying, or
at least neutralizing, our opponent's argument. In view of all this it
is clear that the argument from analogy, the only real argument of
the atheistic evolutionary theory of the origin of man, lends the
theory very little, if any, probability.

414 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
We wish now to show that the improbabflity of the brute origin
of man is very great. This improbability arises, first, from the practi-
Facts showing *ical impossibility that man should be able to sustain
probability1" Uimself in the midst of animals so much superior in
sprang from capacity for maintaining the struggle for existence.
the brutes. physicaUy he was far weaker than many other animals ;
he was, to say the least, not more agile than many others ; and the
theory of evolution forbids that he should have been so much more
intelligent that this could have compensated for his physical deficien
cies. [ A second and more convincing source of the above-mentioned
improbability is one which Andresen very clearly states as foUows :
"Even U those species which originate by crossing were generally
capable of propagating themselves, which they are not, stiU the new
species must be, not a higher species, but one lying between the two
from which it sprang. In order to produce man by crossing both an
ape and a creature higher than man would have to unite." '
In this same connection the point made by WaUace already men
tioned 3 should be repeated. He shows that the brain of the earUest
men of whom we have any trace was nearly as large as the brain of our
most advanced races ; whereas, according to the evolutionary theory,
the functions it was to perform were such that the brain of the gorilla
would have answered every purpose. Now, supposing the theory of
very small changes to be true in the progress of animal Ufe, as evolu
tion teaches, and that this law holds good until we come to man,
where the law fails, as WaUace points out, our faith that man is a part
of the same chain of physical being with the lower animals is rudely
shaken. These slight changes are essential to the evolutionary the
ory. In the chain of evolution there was a break upon the appear
ance of man upon the earth. But if evolutionary methods do not
hold with reference to man there is reason to beUeve that, however
much he may resemble certain animals in physical structure, he is
not the mere offspring of those animals.
The above arguments against the atheistic form of the doctrine of
man's brute origin are intended to show that sin in man is not prob
ably a portion of his brute inheritance. If the Creator interfered
with the orderly development of the animal world at the point where
¦Some evolutionists go so far as to claim that at first man could not even distin-.
guish a human being from a plant. See Wilhelm Mannhardt, in Sammlung gemeln-
verstlinclllcher wissenschaftlicher Vortrage, herausgegebeu von Rudolf Virchow und
Franz von Holtzendorff, Nr. 239, Berlin, 1876. His language Is quoted by President
Warren in his Paradise Found, Boston, 1885, p. 409, where also may be found an excel
lent criticism of that position.
a Die Entwlckelung der Menschen, p. 35. » See division il, section II, chap. 4.

The Fall of Man. 415
man appeared it is exceedingly improbable that man's sin is inherited
from the brute.
A consideration of the second question mentioned on page 410 wiU
shed further Ught on the evolutionary theory of human sin. Intel
lectually at least man must have been very far superior to any other
animal in existence at the time when men first appeared on earth.
President Warren has shown • that evolutionists hold our Tne evidence
savage races not to be representatives of the culture of Jsr *m u i ve
primitive men. He quotes from Herbert Spencer as f ol- co*"1'11011- ,
lows : "There are sundry reasons for suspecting that existing men of
the lowest types, forming social groups of the simplest kinds, do not
exemplify men as they originaUy were. Probably most of them, if
not all of them, had ancestors in higher states, and among their beUefs
remained some which were evolved during those higher states. . . .
There is inadequate warrant for the notion that the lowest savagery
has always been as low as it is now. . . . That supplanting of race by
race, and thrusting into corners such inferior races as are not ex
terminated, which is now going on so actively, and which has been
going on from the earliest recorded times, must have been ever going
on. And the implication is that remnants of inferior races, taking
refuge in inclement, barren, and otherwise unfit regions, have retro
graded." ' He cites similar opinions from Darwin,3 Lubbock,4 Tylor,"
and others.
Professor James Orr in his Christian View of the World, in a note
on "Alleged Primitive Savagery of Mankind," 6 cites from the Duke
of Argyll ' and many others to the same effect. Professor Max Midler
says : "We know now that savage and primitive are very far indeed
from meaning the same thing."8 As Professor Orr remarks, "The
greatest civilizations of antiquity do not show traces of an earlier
period of barbarism," " and he quotes Canon RawUnson to show that
all authorities agree that, however far we go back, we find in Egypt
no rude or uncivilized time out of which civiUzation is developed;
and that in Babylon there is not only no sign of early rudeness, but
positive evidence of an advanced state of certam arts even in the
earliest times.
Now, U it be true that the savage lUe still existing in certain parts
of the globe is the result of deterioration from a higher primitive
1 Paradise Found, p. 387 f.
2 The quotation is from Spencer's Principles of Sociology, pp. 106-109.
s Descent of Man, vol. i, p. 66. 4 The Origin of Civilization, p. 483.
• Primitive Culture, vol. i, p. 321. e Page 440 f. ' Unity of Nature, p. 426.
8 Anthropological Religion, London, 1892, p. 150. 9 Christian View, p. 441.

416 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
state of culture, it is most likely that the sinfulness of man also is the
result of degeneration. In fact, Fiske shows clearly that much of the
cruelty and immorahty of the human race result from defective men
tal development,1 and says that the fundamental inteUectual differ
ence between civilized men and savages Ues in the difference in
their power of representing in imagination objects and relations not
present to the senses. Fiske apparently beUeves that the savage or,
if we may so say, the beastly state was the primitive state of man.
But, if his scientific brethren who take the other view be correct, then
primitive man had the power which is wanting in our savages. Hence
they must have been more moral than our savages.
The natural question is, How much more moral? Perhaps some
light may be thrown on this question U we take into account some of
the conclusions heretofore reached, according to which man is the
product of the divine creative agency, whether through the lower
animals or not, and, according to which, further, man is even now in
several respects an image of God. It is not to be supposed that man
ever was or wUl be an exact copy of his Creator in inteUect or morals.
But it is exceedingly unUkely that as he came from the hand of God
he had a moral nature opposed to that of God who created him. The
most probable view is that man was originaUy endowed with con
siderable capacity of an intellectual kind, which gave him an advan
tage in the struggle for existence, but which needed development in
the course of that struggle, and that he was at least sinless in aU his
feelings and volitions, though needing positive ethical development.
So the Bible represents him, and to this the probabilities in the case,
when purely speculative considerations are left out of the account,
point. In fact, it is impossible to account for man's present moral condition
and sentiments except on the Christian view of sin, which makes it,
Man's present not the result of God's method in creation, nor of any
moral senti-
ments as purely evolutionary process, in which the struggle for
fact of a fall, existence produces strongly selfish impulses, but of man's
own act. As men become more moral they condemn their sin the
more vigorously, whereas, if it were true that with every step in moral
progress we are throwing off the brute inheritance, we ought not to
condemn ourselves at all but to commend our virtue, won in spite of
our origin.' The conscience is so constructed that it makes little, U
1 The Destiny of Man, p, 99.
* Somewhere we have read of a witty writer who says: "Evolution says not, 0
wretched man that I am; but, O, progressive creature that I am, who shall help me to
evolve myself!"

The Fall of Man. 417
any, allowance for the historical origin of sin either in the individual
or in the race. It condemns us for sinning and refuses to aUow us
comfort from the thought that we inherited our tendencies to evil
from our progenitors. This can be explained only on the ground that
we are responsible, which we are not U sin is a brute inheritance.
Besides, the doctrine of the brute origin of sin fails to account for
the fact that, whfle the range of actions regarded as morally wrong
has greatly enlarged since human history began, from the first the
race, as a whole, has as strongly condemned those acts which it held
to be sinful as it does to-day. This fact indicates that man is not
naturaUy as depraved as some scientists would have us believe. The
original condition of man must have been one in which all his impulses
favored righteousness. By virtue of his humanity he has a strong
love for the good which no abandonment to sin can quite eradicate.
The evolutionary theory of the origin of sin cannot explain this uni
form strength of conscience from the earliest to the latest period of
human history. Furthermore, this very fact of conscience in man
shows that the moral nature of human beings is not a brute inherit
ance. A brute wfll sometimes exhibit fear after doing an act disap
proved by its master, but of what we know as shame there is no
trace. We have not the slightest reason to suspect that brutes have
any conception of right and wrong, any conscience which constantly
urges to the choice of righteousness, or any sense of ever fading be
low the ideal which a noble personality sets for itself. In other
words, the brute is a moral neutral, and has no consciousness of sin.
But man has this consciousness, which would be impossible were he
moraUy the mere lineal descendant of the brute. Between the moral
nature of the lower animals (U it be proper to attribute to them any
moral nature whatever) and the moral nature of man there is an
•enormous and impassable guU. Man may do deeds as vile as those of
the beast, but he cannot do them with the impunity of the beast. This
is because man is moraUy responsible, while the beast is not.
Many object to the story of the faU given in the Book of Genesis,
but, even though its details may be discarded, probabihty strongly
favors the notion that sin came into the world just as the Bible tells
us it did, by the responsibility of a human being ; and as long as the
facts upon which we must base our judgment favor that view we shall
not give it up simply because there are those who ridicule it. Every
man knows that, however he came by his impulses, he feels himself
responsible for them ; and the fall is at least so far repeated in every
man's life that we are almost compelled to believe in the substance of

418 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
the story in Genesis. The Bible theory of the introduction of sin into
the world— the theory of a fad of a previously pure being — has a clear
advantage over that which assumes that we are the offspring of the
brutes and have inherited their brutal tendency to sin. Since it is a
question of beUef on both sides, we prefer that side which has' the
stronger reason.1
1 On the original moral condition of man and the origin of human sin, comp. Kaftans,
Dogmatik, Freiburg, 1. B., Leipzig und Tubingen, 1897, pp. 346-371. Also, The Gospel of
Experience, The Boyle Lectures for 1895, by W. C. E. Newboldt, London and New York,
1896, Lect. ii, pp. 26-50.

The Doctrines Concerning Cod. 419

DIVISION vn.
THE DOCTRINES CONCERNING GOD.

In this connection there are but two doctrines which demand our
attention. They are the existence and the personality of God. And
here, as with reference to the soul, Christianity, as given in the New
Testament, offers no proof, at least no direct proof, of the doctrines in
question, but everywhere assumes their truth. Hence, so far at least,
we might feel ourselves excused from assigning any reasons for be
lief. Besides, as aU phflosophy and religious history show, belief in
the existence of God, at any rate, is a natural condition, while denial
of his existence is unnatural. The burden of proof is, therefore, upon
the little handful of those who deny. The hopelessness of their task
is plain to all observers, for it is impossible to prove the nonexistence
of a spiritual, invisible being.
But whfle the Bible does not afford us proofs of the existence and
personality of God, and while from the mere standpoint of argument
the burden of proof is upon the deniers of God's existence, yet there
are the most weighty reasons for belief in the doctrines stated, and
Christians are glad to give these reasons to aU sincere inquirers.
Nevertheless, here again it is necessary to remind the reader that we
are not attempting a demonstration. Science boasts of its knowledge
and ignores in large measure the immense amount of mere belief
with which it must content itself. Christianity is not only more
modest, but more honest. It believes. Still, this does not detract from
the degree of certainty with which the weU-informed Christian holds
to his tenets. We are certain of many things which we cannot
absolutely demonstrate. The reasons for the Christian's belief in the
existence and personality of God are such as to afford a certainty
which leaves no room for doubt, but we do not claim for them the
force of demonstration except in the sense in which the best of evi
dence is capable of demonstrating, for example, the guilt or inno
cence of anyone accused in a court of law. We repeat, the reasons
for the belief in the existence and personality of God are so imperative
that no one who gives them due attention can suffer a doubt.

420 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION I.-THE EXISTENCE OF COD.
CHAPTER I.
NECESSITY, UNIVERSALITY, AND PERSISTENCE OF THE BELIEF.
The first reason we offer is similar to the first argument advanced
in favor of the reality of the soul, namely, that all other theories fail
First reason to account for the facts. Every form of the atheistic
i^ttfe'exist- view, together with its agnostic modifications, has been
ence of God. prove(j inadequate. Atheism, as also that agnosticism
which works into the hands of atheism, fails to meet the demands of
thought, ethics, and the reUgious nature. In fact, atheism so far fails
as to make necessary the total annihilation of reUgion, which it re
gards as superstition. Speaking of religion Mr. Herbert Spencer
says : ' "Two suppositions only are open to us : the one that the feel
ing which responds to reUgious ideas resulted, along with other hu
man faculties, from an act of special creation, the other that it, in
common with the rest, arose by a process of evolution. If we adopt
Herbert Spen- the first of these alternatives . . . the matter is at once
cer quoted. se^ie(j . Taan js directly endowed with the reUgious feel
ing by a creator ; and to that creator it designedly responds. If we
adopt the second alternative, then we are met by the questions — What
are the circumstances to which the genesis of the reUgious feeling is
due ? and — What is its office ? We are bound to entertain these ques
tions, and we are bound to find answers to them. Considering all
faculties, as we must on this supposition, to result from accumulated
modifications caused by the intercourse of the organism with its en
vironment, we are obUged to admit there exist in the environment
certain phenomena or conditions which have determined the growth
of the feeling in question ; and so are obliged to admit that it is as
normal as any other faculty. Add to which that as, on the hypothe
sis of a development of lower forms into higher, the end forward which
the progressive changes directly or indirectly tend must be adapta
tion to the requirements of existence, we are also forced to infer that
this feeling is in some way conducive to human welfare. Thus both
alternatives contain the same ultimate implication. We must con-
1 First Principles, p. 15 f.

Necessity, Universality, and Persistence of Belief. 421
elude that the religious sentiment is either directly created or is cre
ated by the slow action of natural causes ; and whichever of these
conclusions we adopt requires us to treat the religious sentiment with
respect." This shows how completely atheism must ever faU to meet the re
quirements of a theory which shall include and conserve aU the prin
cipal phenomena of Ufe. Because it fafls some theory which admits
the existence of God must be adopted. By the same course of reason
ing it is clear that as not only atheism fafls, but also agnosticism, pan
theism (monism), and deism, we are obliged to adopt the theistic view
of God. However, this is in advance of what we wish now to show.
As a second reason for believing in the existence of God we name
the universality of the beUef . There are those who have tried to cast
doubt upon this universaUty, but, as Tylor points out, second reason
further investigation in every case proves that their re- fortneDelief-
searches were incomplete, and therefore the basis for a conclusion
incompetent. A similar argument we have already employed with
reference to the soul, and hence we may, as in the case of the preced
ing argument, give it the less emphasis here. And once more we rely
on Mr. Spencer for the form of the argument. In a preliminary
way he says : J "In proportion as we love truth more and victory less
we shaU become anxious to know what it is which leads our opponents
to think as they do. We shaU begin to suspect that the pertinacity of
belief exhibited by them must result from a perception of something
we have not perceived. And we shad aim to supplement the portion
of truth we have found with the portion found by them." He then
proceeds to say :' " When duly realized, the general principle above
illustrated must lead us to anticipate that the diverse forms of reU
gious beUef which have existed and stiU exist have all a basis in some
ultimate fact." "To suppose that these multUorm conceptions should
be, one and all, absolutely groundless discredits too profoundly that
average human inteUigence from which all our individual intelli
gences are inherited." " To the presumption that a number of diverse
beliefs of the same class have some common foundation in fact must,
in this case, be added a further presumption derived from the omni
presence of the beliefs." "Their endless variety serves but to
strengthen this conclusion, showing as it does a more or less inde
pendent genesis." " That these countless different, and yet allied, phe
nomena presented by aU reUgions are accidental or factitious is an
untenable supposition. A candid examination of the evidence quite
' First Principles, p. 12. » Ibid., pp. 13, 14.
29

422 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
negatives the doctrine, maintained by some, that creeds are priestly
inventions." This argument is, indeed, originally designed, not to favor the truth
of the Christian idea of God, but rather that there is an ultimate
Somewhat which aU must acknowledge to exist. But it is applicable
to the existence of God, since that is a universal belief. And we con
sider it incapable of overthrow. It is so exceedingly improbable that
the whole human race should be deceived in this respect that only
they whose self-conceit knows no bounds would assert such deception.
The argument would amount to but Uttle were it a question of ma
jorities merely, and particularly U the majority, which beheves, were
composed of ignorant, and the minority, which disbeUeves, of educated
and powerful minds. But such is not the case. For beUef is so nearly
universal that the unbelievers can scarcely be dignified by the term
Moral and in- minority ; and those who believe are, generaUy, the in-
periority o f teUectual and moral superiors of those who do not believe
neve. in the existence of God. As far as scientists and phfloso
phers are concerned but few are atheists. AU pantheists (monists)
and deists, and some agnostics, beUeve in the existence of God, though
the latter declare that we cannot define him. As the world grows
older and human knowledge and thought develop atheism becomes
no stronger, but rather has a weaker hold upon the minds of men.
Modesty demands of the pitiful few who stfll disbelieve that they ad
mit that those who beUeve have a perception of something which un
believers have not perceived. The one juror of twelve who con
demned the stubbornness and unreasonableness of the eleven who
disagreed with him is proverbial.
On the basis of the doctrine of evolution the universaUty of the be
lief in the existence of God is a striking evidence in favor of its reten
tion. It is one of those beliefs which have survived, and the rarity of
atheists, in the strict sense of the word, is evidence that even among
the most thoughtful of mankind some idea of God is regarded as
reasonably well supported. There is at least so much in its favor that
few wfll deny it. That the belief has been held in corrupt and unten
able forms is no more a reason for rejecting it altogether than the cor
rupt and untenable forms which scientific doctrines have assumed are
a reason for rejecting them. As President Schurman says : ] "If we
cast out our belief in God because it is prescientific the same logic
will forbid us to believe in the existence of a seU, or of an objective
world." • Belief in God, New York, 1893, p. 133.

Necessity, Universality, and Persistence of Belief. 423
This leads naturaUy to the only form of the ontological argument
for the existence of God which has any value. ¦ There is something in
the idea of God which compels us to believe in a reality The only valu
able form of
corresponding to that idea. When we strip the idea of the ontoiogi-
cal argu-
God which is common to aU mankind of the peculiarities ment.
which diverse phflosophical or religious creeds have attached to it we
find that what remains is essentially that which Hamilton, Mansel,
and Spencer call the unknowable, the unconditioned, the absolute, and
the like. This idea falls far short of that which we gain through the
revelation of Jesus Christ, in point both of dignity and completeness.
In the same way it is far less satisfactory than the God which philoso
phy demands. It may be called the idea which is given in spontane
ous thought. It appears in consciousness as a mystery. It clamors
to be clarified and defined ; and the attempt to answer the questions
connected with it has led to the development of the various systems
of unrevealed reUgious thought.
But this mysterious somewhat does not prove its own existence alone
by the universal prevalence of its idea. Rather is it the pressure of
the idea which makes us so certain that there is a reality behind it. It
is one of those ideas of which we cannot rid ourselves. It persists in
making itself felt ; for at first it is felt rather than thought. Spencer
sums up the facts as they appear at this stage of development (which,
however, he regards as final) in the oft-quoted words. : * "Though the
Absolute cannot in any manner or degree be known, in the strict
sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive existence is a neces
sary datum of consciousness ; that so long as consciousness continues
we cannot for an instant rid it of this datum; and that thus the
beUef which this datum constitutes has a higher warrant than any
other whatever." Here the proof is derived solely from the persist
ency of the idea. We should be inclined, as above, to emphasize also
the pressure of the idea. It is not only persistently but also obtru
sively present. Taken in connection with the facts that atheism and
all forms of agnosticism aUied therewith fail to explain the world,
and that the presence of this idea is universal, the argument here
presented from the persistence and force of the idea becomes very-
strong. In any other department of practical lffe than religion the
sensible man would at once yield to the combined force of the argu
ments already adduced.
1 For a review of the different forms ofthe ontological argument see Flint's Theism ; also
Fisher's The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, chap, ii; and Stearns's The Evi
dence of Christian Experience, pp. 60 ff. Miley also gives a good summary, Systematic
Theology, New York and Cincinnati, 1892, vol. i, pp. 73 ff. » First Principles, p. 98.

424 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN.
The ontological argument as just presented is augmented in force
by the consideration of the sources from which this persistent and
urgent idea springs. Were we convinced that the idea is not intui
tive we should stfll, for the sake of simpUcity, not here combat that
theory. But passing it by we ask, what are the unquestionable
The source of sources from which the idea of God, as described above,
augmenting springs ? The first source is undoubtedly that which has
cal0 aigu'i generaUy been worked out into the cosmological argu-
ment- ment for the existence of God. The kernel of this argu
ment is the idea of causation. Not the doctrine of causaUty as known
to materiaUstic science, but the general doctrine that every event
must have an adequate cause. Starting with this principle we ob
serve that the world must be accounted for. Spontaneous thought
suggests a being which caused it. It appears to be a product. A
producer is postulated by a necessary law of our minds. This pro
ducer may be variously conceived, but the one thing in which all
agree concerning him is that he is the cause of the world. Although
the idea in this form carries with it all the weight which attaches
to our fundamental idea of causality, yet there are objections to it
which thought in its more advanced stages alone can raise and
answer. Admitting the doctrine of causaUty, it may be asked, Why postu
late a being who is distinct from the world as the cause of the world,
when the very law of causaUty demands that we shall account for
the existence of this being? To this the answer is, We must, of
course, find somewhere a first cause ; but the first cause cannot be the
world, in any phase of its evolution, nor in any or all the powers it
possesses. For the farther we trace back the idea of cause the more
certain we become that the only cause we know anything about is
will. But matter cannot have will. Hence there must be an imma
terial somewhat in which the will resides which brings about the
material changes observable by us. Thus the law of causation as it is
understood in the higher ranges of thought confirms the beUef that
there is a being who produced this world, which being men call God.

The Argument from Design. 425
To one who believes that aU real causation springs from wfll the
argument is irresistible.1
Another source of the all-prevalent, persistent, and obtrusive idea of
God is that which is generaUy called the teleological argument, or
the argument from design.' It admits of exceedingly simple state
ment. When we observe anv product of apparent human The argument
" from design
skill we at once infer a human mind as the designer of stated.
it. We make this inference on the basis of aU we know of our own
activities. SoUpsism is impossible. We must suppose other minds
when we see products of other hands than our own. Now, assured
as we are that there are objects in this world which are not the
product of human skill, we naturaUy reach the conclusion that as
those objects bear evidence of design they must be the product of a
mind other than human. The proof for mind behind any object is
just as strong as the reason for holding it to have been designed. If
there is the serving of a purpose it is out of all analogy to suppose that
it was not designed for that purpose.3 It is in the highest degree ab
surd to say : "Eyes were not made for seeing ; but we have eyes, and
see in consequence. The propagation of Ufe was never purposed ; but
reproductive processes and mechanisms exist and life is propagated." *
Unquestionably such considerations have lent impressiveness to the
universal idea of God.
But evolutionists declare that since the days of Darwin we can no
longer trace the wonderful adaptations we see in nature to a design
ing mind. All these are affirmed to result naturaUy from the action
and reaction of the particles of matter upon each other according to
necessary laws." In the struggle for existence those forms which are
best adapted to their surroundings survive, and those which cannot
adapt themselves perish. Those which survive transmit to their
offspring the quaUties by which they themselves survive. Thus the

1 The cosmological argument is the one which is alone relied upon by many, especially
such as deny personality to God. Comp., for example, Nordheim.Die Erfttllung des
Christenthums, pp. 299 ff.
' Comp. Paul Janet's Final Causes. Translatedby W. Affleck from the second edition of
the French. Second edition, 1883. Ebrard discusses the argument from design with
great fullness and force in his voluminous work entitled Apologetics ; or, The Scientific Vin
dication of Christianity, translated by Stuart and Macpherson, Edinburgh, 1886, vol. i,
pp. 164-208. See also Modern Scepticism. A Course of Lectures delivered at the request
of the Christian Evidence Society, New York, 1871, pp. 3-31.
3 Hegel's celebrated saying, that though wine be useful to man we must not suppose
the cork tree to exist for the purpose of providing stoppers for wine bottles, misses
the point. If bottles grew with cork stoppers in their necks we should be compelled to.
see design.
4 Comp. Bowne's, Philosophy of Theism, New York, 1887, p. 90.
s Comp. A Candid Examination of Theism, by Physicus (Romanes), pp. 52, 63.

426 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
weak or unfit are eliminated, and the natural tendency, according to
the laws of heredity and environment, is to adapt everything to every
thing else. No one has worked out this argument against design
more forcibly than Romanes.1 He admits that "arrangement, dis
position of facts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instru
ment to a use, implies the presence of intelligence and mind," ' but
says that the assumption that mechanism could have no other cause
than that of a designing mind is false. He then proceeds to give in
stances in which inorganic nature produces certain remarkable
results by purely natural laws, where there is certainly no im
mediate design, and draws the conclusion that appearances of design
in the organic world are no better founded than in the inorganic.
Let us examine this. He proposes to prove that no evidence of
immediate design is furnished by the organic world on the ground
Romanes's that the results of the action of natural forces must be
against de- regarded in the same light whether in the organic or
ined. inorganic world. He says:' "He (a supposed teleologist)
would now find that every one of the adjustments of means to ends
which excited his admiration on the seacoast were due to physical
causes which are perfectly well understood. The cliffs stood at the
opening of the bay because the sea in past ages had encroached upon
the coast line until it met with these cliffs, which then opposed its
further progress ; * the bay was a depression in the land which hap
pened to be there when the sea arrived, and into which the sea conse
quently flowed ; 6 the successive occurrence of rocks, shingle, and
sand was due to the actions of the waves themselves ; the segregation
of seaweeds, shells, pebbles, and different kinds of sand was due to
different degrees of specific gravity ; the fresh- water streams ran in
channels because they had themselves been the means of excavating
them ; and the multitudinous forms of lUe were aU adapted to their
several habitats simply because the unsuited forms were not able to
live in them." And again : ° "Given the facts of heredity, variation,
struggle for existence, and the consequent survival of the fittest,
what foUows? Why, that each step in the prolonged and gradual
development of the eye was brought about by the elimination of aU
the less adapted structures in any given generation, that is, the selec-
1 See some articles prepared prior to 1889 for the Nineteenth Century, but first pub
lished in his Thoughts on Religion.
J The words are quoted from Paley. » Thoughts on Religion, p. 58 f.
' But were not placed there by a designing mind to prevent the encroachments of the
sea. ' And was not hollowed out by the Creator that there might be a bay at that spot.
• Thoughts on Religion, p. 62.

The Argument from Design. 427
tion of all the better adapted to perpetuate the improvement by
heredity. Will the teleologist maintain that this selective process is
itself indicative of special design ? If so, it appears to me that he is
logically bound to maintain that the long line of seaweed, the sheUs,
the stones, and the little heap of garnet sand upon the seacoast are aU
equally indicative of special design."
We can see no sufficient reason for questioning the idea that the
peculiar results arising along the shore of a bay from the action of the
waves are not the product of special design. None but an omniscient
mind could be able to say what the supposed infinite designer would
or would not design to accomplish, nor how, nor in what he would
take delight ; while if utility to man be chosen as the criterion of
judgment it is certain that the results in question were specially de
signed. For they minister, or may minister, to man's sense of the
marvelous, the curious, and the beautUul. Even those things in na
ture which we caU grotesque are, from this standpoint, as truly the
work of the beneficent Artificer as the more sober, for they add to life
a constant source of recreation and amusement ; for both of which we
are adapted and both of which we need.
Romanes has not proved, then, that there may be any other cause
than mind for the adaptations we see all about us, but at At most hig
most that if they are the product of a mind they are proveVoniy
brought about by a process of fixed laws. The argument g yprflCxeesJ
from design does not assert the absence of a process, laws-
long or short. It merely argues that as we look at adaptations we
naturaUy think of them as resulting from design, because man's
adaptations are the result of design. Proximately a structure may be
due to the operation of physical causes, whfle more remotely the oper
ation of those physical causes may be due to an intelligent purpose.
There is, therefore, nothing to show that the appearance of design is
delusive. Until it can be demonstrated that there is no mind to design
the world we shall have to follow the only method of reasoning we pos
sess and believe that the world is designed. The more definite and uni
form the process involved in the method by which structures are pro
duced the more compulsory this reasoning becomes. Nor is there
anything in the fact that the designer of the world must be regarded
as immanent in it, instead of external to it, as man is external to his
products, which can in any degree modify the force of the conclu
sion. The point at issue is not whether the designer be immanent or
external, but whether there is evidence of thought, purpose, adapta
tion, adjustment

428 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER III.
INADEQUACY OF THE PROCESS OF NATURAL SELECTION.
We must here point out a fatal flaw in Romanes's reasoning concern-
The fatal flaw ing the eye. As quoted above he says : "Each step in the
soning con- prolonged and gradual development of the eye was
eye.1 brought about by the elimination of all the less adapted
structures in any given generation ; that is, the selection of aU the
better adapted to perpetuate the improvement by heredity." Now we
ask, What determined the direction which things were to take ? How
did the environment come to be what it is ? Everything is part of the
environment of something else. How does it come that things do not
degenerate instead of improve ? There is a total condition of things
which tends ever to greater complexity and perfection. Why ? The
tendency must determine it; but it is just as conceivable that selection
by elimination should have resulted in the survival of the weakest,
which would be the fittest for a world constructed on the principle of
degeneration rather than progress. Or the world might have been
constructed on the principle of the kaleidoscope, so that there would
be change but neither permanent degeneration nor progress. If the
world is not the product of an infinite mind, but of chance, or U it
were the product of a mind bent merely on doing something, no mat
ter what, we should expect a kaleidoscope world. The fact that the
world tends ever toward progress is the strongest argument for design.
Such a scheme is worthy the great designer. So, then, the fact that
the eye, which probably began, as scientists teU us with a layer of
pigment, changed for the better by the elimination of those features
which were less perfect, shows, not that there was no designer, but
that he proceeded by a process which must commend itseU to aU who
believe in perfection.
Furthermore, natural selection works not constructively, but de-
Naturai seiec- structively. It does not produce variations, but it is sim-
destructive- ply the process of eUminating the unfit. The question is
structively. stiU open, how or why the variations appear, and why
they tend toward the perfection of the structure. Even if evolution
could trace the method, the how, it could not determine whether there
was a purpose, a why. That is a matter of judgment with -which

Inadequacy of the Process of Natural Selection. 429
science, as such, has nothing to do. Above aU it would be very false
reasoning were we to assume, as do those who argue against design
from the fact of evolution, that because we can trace the how there
is no why. In human affairs we believe in design all the more
where a method is apparent. Where method is wanting we suspect
madness. In fact, Romanes admits that when we consider the broad area of
nature as a whole the argument acquires a weight which, if long and
attentively considered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. He
says : ' "How is it that aU physical causes conspire, by their united
action, to the production of a general order of nature ? It is against
aU analogy to suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished,
by such means as those, in the way of mere chance or ' the fortuitous
concourse of atoms.' We are led by the most fundamental dictates of
our reason to conclude that there must be some cause for this coopera
tion of causes." So, then, Romanes after all does believe in the argu
ment from design, though basing it, not on specific instances of design,
but on nature as a whole. But nature as a whole is just the sum total
of these specific instances. If the whole is designed the parts are at
least so far designed that they work in harmony, or else we should
have a chaos and not a cosmos.
Anyone not blinded by the sight of second causes to the perception
that the law of causation demands a first cause must believe in design
when he considers the marvels of the physical world, especially as
they appear in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. We advise any
one who thinks that these things can be accounted for without the
hypothesis of a superintending mind to read such a work as Darwin's
Insectivorous Plants, ' and then consider the foUowing points : If
we suppose the wonderful organs by which the Sun-dew catches and
devours insects which light upon it to operate mechanicaUy, or even
instinctively, we have stiU to account for the organs themselves.
Natural selection, or adaptation, attempts to say that these organs re
sult from the necessity of caring for the hfe in question ; its preserva
tion, its nourishment or perhaps pleasure, and its propagation. But
who felt the necessity ? the Ufe in question, or a Being who watches
over aU life ? Or, if We say that here and there an animal Four points to
or plant varied from its original to the possession of an ed.
organ or a device adapted to any of the above ends, and that by the
union of that animal or plant with another which had varied in the
same way a variety was propagated, what have we to suppose ?
1 Thoughts on Religion, p. 67 f. a With Illustrations, New York, 1886.

430 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
1. The accident of the same variation in at least two plants or ani
mals. 2. The accident of their finding one another.
3. The accident that their peculiar organ or device was inherited by
their offspring, which, considering the known laws of heredity, is
highly improbable.
4. Or, if not 2 and 3, then the accident that there was a considerable
number which varied in the same way, so as to make 2 and 3 more
probable, in which case we have the variety already established to
account for the variety itself. So that, in fact, we have a modifica
tion of 1 into an accidental variety, instead of an accidental variation
in occasional individuals.
In fact, we are obliged to think of a natural tendency in things to
develop as they do, in which case the tendency is to be accounted for ;
or else of a power in environment which has a tendency to force in
dividual life into conformity with itself, or into adaptation to itseU, in
which case we have another tendency to be accounted for ; or else of
a union of both, in which case we have to account for the harmonious
working of these two independent tendencies. We are shut up to
materiaUsm, with its doctrine of chance as to the origin of aU these
wonders, or else we must adopt some form of the doctrine of God.1
The doctrine of natural selection cannot be stated except hi terms of
teleology. The necessity for the preservation, nourishment, and prop-
impossibii- agation of species of Ufe is itseU teleological. Note, for
tne°aoctfine example, the following, taken from a firm beUever in the
se /e^Yon doctrine of natural selection : ' " The highest point in this
terms Por te- respect is that attained by those seeds which are covered
leoiogy. with edible fruit. By their being eaten by animals they
receive the widest dispersion. In order that this purpose may be
achieved the more perfectly they clothe themselves in a variety of
colors and assume a pleasing odor." The very quality of natural
selection is that it provides for a definite result. If we are not to be-
lie%'e in a purpose on the part of a creator we must believe the pur
pose to be part of the whole system. In any event we are compehed
to believe in purpose in the order of the world, and of something
which has set that purpose. Human beings, as long as they remain
true to the only principles upon which they can rightly reason, must
believe that that purpose is the deposit of mind.
1 These considerations are Intended to answer all such theories as that of Huxley con
cerning the evolution of a watch from a revolving barrel. Huxley, Lay Sermons, pp.
330, 331, cited by Fisher, The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, p. 55 f.
3 Nordheim, Die Erfullung des Chrlstenthums, p. 66.

Inadequacy of the Process of Natural Selection. 431
So then, as a source of the admittedly universal belief in God, the
natural disposition to see design where there is the appearance of skill
is justified. We believe in a God who made the world just as we be
lieve in a man who made a watch. The argument for a mind behind
the phenomena of the world is parallel with the argument for a mind
behind human activity. There is, for human beings, as much reason
for beUef in one as in the other. Unless we deny mind everywhere
we must admit it as the cause of the world ; for there is more evidence
of intelligence in nonhuman products about us than there is in the
products of man's hand and brain.
We consider the above arguments ample for the establishment of
the existence of a creator of the world, and also of the inteUigence of
the Creator. Of course they do not exhaust aU possible reasons upon
which the belief is based ; but we have not proposed to ourselves an
exhaustive, but rather a conclusive, treatment of the subject. Never
theless, we find in Professor Bowne's Phflosophy of Theism some re
marks which, because of their cogency, we are constrained Citation from
D "" Professor
to add : ' ' The oversight referred to is the failure to see that Bowne.
man and mind are a part and outcome of the universe. The speculator,
in curious seU-forgetfulness, fixes his thought on the physical system
and ignores himseU. He assumes a monopoly of intellect in the uni
verse and forgets that his rare and lonely endowment must still have
its roots in the universe. The problem then arises how to deduce the
conscious from the unconscious, the inteUigent from the nonintelU
gent, the purposive from the nonpurposive, and freedom from neces
sity. But psychology shows the hopelessness of such a task. This
insight has led to the modern device of a double-faced substance which,
whfle stopping short of affirming an independent creative intelligence,
does still insist upon intelligence as one of the original factors of the
world-ground. . . . But if, on the other hand, we stfll insist on regard
ing the world-ground as mechanical, then we reach the same conclu
sion by a different road. For if everything is to be mechanically
explained then human life, thought, and action must be phases of the
aU-embracing necessity. But man can form purposes and determine
himseU accordingly. Hence it foUows that in the department of
human life, at least, the cosmic mechanism does form purposes and
execute them. Here design actually appears as real and controlling.
. . . But if it act purposely in the human realm there is no theoretical
objection to admitting that it acts purposely in the physical realm U
the facts call for it. The only escape from this conclusion is to deny
our consciousness that purpose rules at all in our mental life. But as

432 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
long as this is allowed the so-caUed cosmic mechanism must be viewed
as one which can form plans and determine itseU for their execution ;
that is, it must be what we mean by mind." '
"The same argument which discredits mind in nature throws equal
doubt upon mind in man. But further reflection shows that U there
be no controUing mind in nature there can be no controUing mind in
man. For U the basal power is blind and necessary, aU that depends
upon it is necessitated also. In that case aU unfolding is driven from
behind, and nothing is led from before. Thought and feehng also
come within this necessary unfolding. As such they are products,
not causes. The basal necessity controls them in every respect, yet
without being in any sense determined by them. Thought as thought
counts for nothing. . . . Hence any fancy of seU-control we may
have must be dismissed as delusive. Human Ufe and history, then,
express no mind or purpose, but only the process of the aU-embracing
necessity. . . . They (thought and purpose) must be put outside of the
dynamic sequence of events, and be made a kind of halo which, as a
shadow, attends without affecting the cosmic movement." '
With one more thought we close the discussion of the existence of
God. When we consider the general fact that the universe is knowa
ble by us, that we reproduce it in thought and formulate the laws of
its activities, that consequently there is, as far as we can affix any
test, an exact correspondence, even to the minutest particular, between
the laws of mental activity and those of nature's processes, the argu
ment for an infinite mind as the Creator of the universe seems conclu
sive. Given such a mind, we can explain the fact that nature is intel
ligible to us • apart from it that fact is, to say the least, inexpUcable.
1 Pages 99-101.
* Ibid., p. 107 f. Comp. also Paul Christ's Die sittliche Weltordnung, Leiden, 1894, pp.
132-153.

The Personality of God Ascertainable. 433

SECTION II.-THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.1
CHAPTER I.
THE PERSONALITY OF GOD ASCERTAINABLE.
While fully recognizing that the foregoing reasons for belief in the
existence of God do not logically carry with them his unity also, it
wfll probably be unnecessary to construct here an argu- Tjnity 0{ Go(j
ment for that unity. In effect it is conceded to-day by conoeded-
all leading schools of thought that if there be anything corresponding
to our idea of God he must be unitary and not plural. That is, the
world is a unit, and U it had a creator he must be one, and not many.
The agnostics, as far as they allow themselves to speak of a God
freely admit this ; as also the deists and the pantheists or monists.
Monism is, indeed, not very consistent in its utterances on the subject,
though its adherents mean to say that God is one as well as aU. This
practically universal concession renders argument in its favor unnec
essary, unless for the mere purpose of completeness in logical develop
ment. Such completeness would be demanded in a work on theism,
but, as it can perform no useful function, may be omitted from a
work on Christian Evidences.
Nor do we consider ourselves bound formally to defend the trinity
in unity. This is to be left, together with much other matter belong
ing to systematic theology, for which this work is not designed as a
substitute, to the realm of polemics. Here it will suffice Trinity left to
to say that, so far from being irrational, the doctrine of theology.
the trinity (plurality) seems to be necessary to any proper conception
of God as related to the world and man. The notion that trinity and
unity in God are contradictory ideas arises from the crude concep
tion of God under forms of substance. Any purely spiritual concep
tion of God admits the idea of plurality in unity.'
With the utmost frankness we admit the probable inadequacy of
the formulae we employ to express the entire range of the facts con
cerning God. The infinity of God may be apprehended as fact, but no
' The reader will find a strong and enjoyable treatment of this subject in Dr. G. A.
Fricke's Ist Gott persenlich? Leipzig, 1896.
2 The argument for the Trinity is well presented in Orr's Christian View of the World
Lect. vii. See also Loot's Das Apostolikum, Halle a. S., 1895, pp. 37-39.

434 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
finite being would be bold enough to assert that he comprehended the
infinite. The limitations of human faculty must be conceded, and
the scriptural affirmation that we know but in part sustained. Even
Our knowledge the revelation of God in Jesus Christ was such as adapted
tiai. itself to our human incapacity. It did not give us the
whole knowledge of God — U for no other reason, because we are in
capable of receiving it. So that when we say that God is a person we
may have the best of reasons for making the assertion, yet we cannot
be at all sure that in declaring the personaUty of God we exhaust the
entire fact concerning his nature. He is personal, that is, he has the
attributes necessary to personality in human beings, but he may be
more than personal. What lies beyond the range of our comprehen
sion we do not know, and it is futile to conjecture. But, whfle we
thus concede the symbolic character of our credal declarations rela
tive to God, we claim that this does not invaUdate what knowledge
we do possess. Though but in part, we know.1
A further caution must be suggested. When we speak of the per
sonality of God we do not signUy thereby any kind of form, corporeal
or other. The attributes which in man are supposed to constitute him
a person are self -consciousness and seU-direction, or freedom. Rob
him of these and he is a thing. SeU-consciousness pertains, not to
the physical being and form, but to the unitary subject of the mental
lUe which, because it is not material, cannot be thought of as having
any of the attributes of matter. So also freedom is not predicated of
the body. The physical man may be hindered from the exercise of
any freedom of movement while at the same time the spirit feels itseU
as free as ever. Self -direction, therefore, whfle etymologicaUy indica
tive of the physical, is a purely spiritual attribute. Matter has, and
can have, no power of self -direction. Hence it is plain that by per
sonaUty, even in man, we do not refer to the physical but to the spirit
ual nature. Whether there are good grounds for asserting of God
self -consciousness and freedom wiU appear as the dicussion proceeds.
We take up first the principal reasons which have stood in the way
of belief in God's personality.
It is said that, even if God be personal, we cannot know it. This
is made out by conceiving of God as the absolute or the infinite, which
Treatment of it is declared we cannot positively conceive. " On the
the first ob- . J
stacie to be- one hand we can conceive neither an absolute whole,
lief in God's , '
personality, that is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it
as a relative part of a still greater whole ; nor an absolute part, that
1 Comp. Herbert's Realistic Assumptions of Modern Science Examined, London, 1879.

The Personality of God Ascertainable. 435
is, a part so small that we caimot conceive it as a relative whole divis
ible into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively repre
sent, or realize, or construe to the mind (as here understanding and
imagination coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done
by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would
itself require infinite time for its accompUshment ; nor, for the same
reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of parts."
. . . " The absolute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivabfl-
ity." ¦ The argument appears at first sight to be conclusive. There is
no way by which we can conceive an absolute or an infinite whole.
Hence our conception of such a whole must be a negation of conceiva-
bility. But, if we cannot make the infinite and the absolute a distinct
object of thought, how can we attribute to it personality ?
Clear as this argument appears it is exceedingly fallacious. All that
HamUton says of absolute and infinite wholes is true. But God is not
thus to be thought of under physical conditions. By the Christian
hypothesis God is a spirit, and does not fill space as though he were
material. AU apparent contradictions of this conception Fallacy of
of God in the Bible are mere attempts to aid the mind in re asorang
getting a vivid idea of his omnipresence. And such con- pointedout.
descensions are needful, even in our present stage of inteUectual de
velopment, since the vast majority of mankind are incapable of gain
ing a purely spiritual conception of God or the human soul. When
we remember that God as spirit has no space-filling quality— that he
cannot be thought of under terms of number and quantity — all Ham
ilton's talk about syntheses of wholes demanding infinite time for their
accomplishment is seen to be irrelevant to the question of the con-
ceivability of the infinity of God.' Hence the terms absolute and infi
nite as applied to God are not the expressions of the negation of con-
ceivability, but of a conceivable though not a comprehensible positive
reality. Such a God is not unknowable because of his infinity and
absoluteness, and hence he can be an object of thought of which we
can affirm self -consciousness and freedom.
Before leaving this point we wish to give Mr. Herbert-Spencer's crit
icism of the position of Hamilton, a position adopted by Mansel. Says
Mr. Spencer:3 "In the very denial of our power to learn what the
Absolute is there Ues the hidden assumption that it is ; and the mak-
1 Sir William Hamilton, Philosophy of the Unconditioned, in his Discussions on Philos
ophy and Literature, New York, 1868, p. 21.
aComp. J. H. Kennedy's Natural Theology and Modern Thought, the Donnellan Lec
tures for 1888-89, London, 1891, p. 274 n.
s First Principles, p. 88 f.

436 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
ing of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the
mind, not as a nothing, but as a something. Similarly with every
Spencer's critl- steP m tne reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld.
fiton's' ^osi- Tne Noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of
tlon- the Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as
an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowl
edge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without at the same time
conceiving a ReaUty of which they are appearances ; for appearance
without reality is unthinkable. Strike out from the argument the
terms Unconditioned, Infinite, Absolute, with their equivalents, and
in place of them write, 'negation of conceivabflity,' or 'absence of the
conditions under which consciousness is possible,' and you find that
the argument becomes nonsense. Truly to realize in thought any
one of the propositions of which the argument consists, the Uncon
ditioned must be represented as positive, not negative. How then can
it be a legitimate conclusion, from the argument, that our conscious
ness of it is negative ? An argument, the very construction of which
assigns to a certain term a certain meaning, but which ends in show
ing that this term has no such meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide.
Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a definite consciousness of
the Absolute is impossible to us unavoidably presupposes an indefinite
consciousness of it."
Spencer's argument, as far as it attempts to show that we must
think of the unconditioned, the absolute, the infinite, as positive, not
negative, is valid. But there is nothing in his argument to show that
this positive conception must be indefinite rather than definite. In
fact, that which can appear in consciousness at aU cannot be whoUy
indefinite. Every concept which has reaUty behind it is given by the
qualities of the supposed reality as they appear in consciousness ; and
were these not in some sense definite there could be no concept. The
positive, therefore, must be more or less definite. Mr. Spencer was
concerned to prove that there is a positive somewhat, and he gives an
elaborate and powerful argument in favor of that proposition. The
principal fault we find with his proposition is that it unnecessarily
asserts that whfle we know that something is we cannot construe its
nature in any degree. In this respect, as our criticism of his agnos
ticism shows, his conclusion is unwarranted. Thus far we have found
nothing to forbid our believing that God is personal.

False Assumptions of Denial. 437

CHAPTER II.
FALSE ASSUMPTIONS OF DENIAL.
A second difficulty which has stood in the way of beUef in the per
sonality of God is strongly stated by Mansel,1 though for the purpose
of exhibiting, not the unreliability of our belief in per- Mansel and
sonality, but the unreliability of the arguments of natural obstacle.
theology in its support. It consists in the aUeged mutual contradictions
which arise in connection with the terms First Cause, Absolute and
Infinite. "By the First Cause is meant that which produces all
things and is itself produced by none. By the Absolute is meant that
which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other
Being. By the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible
Umitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable, and which,
consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence
which it had not from aU eternity.'' " The metaphysical representa
tion of the Deity as absolute and infinite must necessarily, as the
profqundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing
less than the sum of all reality. ' What kind of an Absolute Being is
that,' says Hegel, ' which does not contain in itself aU that is actual,
even evU included ? ' We may repudiate the conclusion with indig
nation, but the reasoning is unassailable. If the Absolute and Infinite
is an object of human conception at all, this, and none other, is the con
ception required." There is more of this same kind, but we forbear.
Up to this point the argument of Mansel is invalidated by the material
conception of the absolute and infinite which he had in mind as he
wrote. This is betrayed in the use of terms indicative of number and
quantity. He speaks about the sum of all reality, and quotes ap
provingly Hegel's language about an absolute being which can con
tain all that is actual. We have before pointed out that God cannot
be thought of under such terms as these, and hence any criticism of
our knowledge of God which proceeds according to them is valueless,
and may be ignored.
Proceeding now, Mansel says : " A. Cause cannot as such be abso
lute ; the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. On the other hand,
the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all
1 Limits of Religious Thought, Boston, 1860, pp 75 ff.
30

438 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction by
introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first
by itseU, and afterward becomes a Cause. But here we are checked
by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite
become that which it was not from the first ? If causation is a possi
ble mode of existence that which exists without causing is not
infinite ; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former
limits." If aU these contradictions in our notions of God as First Cause,
Absolute and Infinite, are real, we are forced into a dilemma. Either
we must admit our inability to think of God consistently, or else we
must yield these conceptions of God as invahd. As a matter of fact
Mansel plunges us into these contradictions only by so defining the
terms that they necessarily lead us to his results. We question the
Mansel's er- correctness and adequacy of his definitions. The term
initfonSdeof First Casue need not mean that the Being so designated
terms. was a cause DUt 0nce ; it may designate him in whom aU
things have their ground ; him without whom nothing would have been
as it is, not even himself. The absolute need not be conceived as re
stricted, but it may be defined as unrestricted ; so also the infinite. It is
erroneous, in deaUng with God, to think of him under forms of mate
rial existence. Remove the idea of space from the conception of spirit
and God can be conceived as the ground— First Cause — of aU things,
even of matter. The words cause, absolute, infinite, have an entirely
different significance when appUed to matter from that conveyed
when the same words are apphed to spirit. In this realm absolute
need not mean unrelated ; infinite need not mean that which admits
of no other mode of existence ; causation need not mean conjunction
in time and space ; and when the terms are used understandingly of
God they do not mean the things just mentioned. Should anyone
ask what they do signUy we reply that they are to be understood
as the nature of spirit demands. He who wfll get a proper concep
tion of spirit, or one freed from the notions of number and quantity
wfll be able to discover the true application of the terms in ques
tion to God. Until one has such a conception of spirit he will think
of these terms quantitively and materially, no matter how carefully
they are defined. In fact, even the whole conception of matter is
crude and inaccurate with the vast majority. What it is we do not
know, and yet we are ready to take it as the measure of aU thought.
If matter were thought of as an activity of God, not capable of fur
ther definition, aU such arguments as Mansel's would be impossible.

False Assumptions of Denial. 439
Thus again we see no sufficient reason for aUowing that our
knowledge of God is so bound up in contradictions that the ascrip
tion of personaUty to him is unfounded. Hold with the theist that
the relations of the infinite to the finite are seU-imposed, not
necessary, and aU Mansel's formidable array of contradictions would
vanish. The two foregoing difficulties in the way of beUef in the personaUty
of God were founded on our aUeged inabiUty to know him sufficiently
to assert that he is personal. Mansel has, however, gone further,
and by an analysis of the conditions of human conscious- The thira 0D_
ness, which is the only consciousness we know anything : u' !l
about, asserts that to attribute consciousness to God is to contradict
aU we are obUged to hold concerning him. And as consciousness is
essential in personaUty we have no foundation upon which to build
the doctrine in question. Strangely enough, Mansel, after arguing
against the allowability in thought of regarding God as personal, stfll
asserts that it is our duty so to regard him.1 Upon what ground,
then, does he assert that we are forbidden to attribute consciousness
to God?
First, consciousness impUes distinction between one object and
another. " To be conscious we must be conscious of something; and
that something can only be known as that which it is, by being dis
tinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is necessarily
limitation ; for, U one object is to be distinguished from another, it must
possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not
possess some form which the other has. But it is obvious that the
Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the Finite by the
absence of any quality which the Finite possesses, for such absence
would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence
of an attribute which the Finite has not ; for, as no finite part can be
a constituent of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic
must itself be infinite, and must at the same time have nothing in
common with the finite. We are thus thrown back upon our former
impossibility, for this second infinite will be distinguished from the
finite by the absence of qualities which the latter possesses. A con
sciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus necessarily involves a self-
contradiction." '
It is somewhat difficult to apprehend clearly all the elements in this
supposed argument. In this difficulty lies its strength. As one be
comes able to analyze it, and thus subject it to detailed examination,
' Limits of Religious Thought, p. 106. J Ibid., p. 93 f.

440 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
its weakness is discovered. The first criticism we offer against
Mansel is that in the language we have cited he has not so much
demonstrated our incapacity to think of God as conscious as he has
the impossibility of the coexistence of the finite and infinite. We
can think of the infinite and the finite as existing together, but U he
has proved anything it is that when we so think we are in error.
We ask the reader to go back over Mansel's words and verify this
statement for himseU. But any proof that there cannot be a finite
lands us in pantheism, which is also, as we have seen, to be rejected.
Hence we must regard his argument as nugatory. The second criti
cism caUs attention once more to his material way of thinking of the
The denial is infinite as made up of parts and consisting of a whole.
based on a _. . . .
material Given an infinite not defined and conceived in terms of
conception . , , . ...
of God. number and quantity, and his argument faUs to the
ground. The third criticism is that the argument has no bearing
whatever on the question of possible consciousness in God. The
fourth is that, strictly speaking, we are not conscious of anything ob
jective to our own mental states. There is a clear distinction between
being aware of the presence of an object and being conscious of an ob
ject. I can be conscious of an object, not directly, but only as I have
the object in thought. So I may be aware of the existence of God and
conscious that he is an object of my thought. When I am aware of
the infinite I do not in any sense limit that infinite ; though when I
make it an object of thought I limit it.
We are not quite sure that Mansel intended the argument we have
just criticised as a proof that we cannot attribute consciousness to
God. If he did so intend we see that he fafled. If he did not so intend
it is impossible to discover what he wished to accomplish. But the
second point made by him which we shall mention leaves no room for
doubt. " Consciousness is only conceivable as a relation. There must
be a conscious subject and an object of which he is conscious. . . .
This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded by distinguish
ing between the absolute as related to another and the absolute as
related to itself. The Absolute, it may be said, may possibly be con
scious, provided it is only conscious of itself. But this alternative is,
in ultimate analysis, no less self -destructive than the other. For the
object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's existence
or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness or has an
existence independent of it. In the former case the object depends
upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the
latter case the subject depends upon the object, and the latter alone

False Assumptions of Denial. 441
is the true absolute. Or, if we attempt a third hypothesis, and main
tain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute
at all, but only a pair of relatives ; for coexistence, whether in con-
consciousness or not, is itself a relation."1
We have quoted him at length, but the point is whether the Abso
lute may be conscious provided he is conscious only of himseU. For U
he is the Creator there was a time when creation was not ; and when,
therefore, seU-consciousness could not have arisen or existed in God
by reason of the relation of subject and object.' Can self, then, be an
object of consciousness ? The Christian doctrine of the Trinity answers
in the affirmative. If God be a spirit we get an affirmative answer
from this fact also. For a spirit must think by its very Bearing of
nature. If it be a free spirit it chooses its thoughts, ofthe Trinity
These thoughts are not "created in and by the act of tion.
consciousness," but the thinker thinks them. They are not created
at aU. They have no existence in the sense in which the thinker
exists. They have no true objective reality. Therefore they do not
Umit the thinker; rather does the thinker limit the thought.
Yet, as having these thoughts, the thinker is conscious. As for
self -consciousness, or the consciousness of selfhood, it arises in man
by contact with the objects external to him; but once it is awak
ened it does not need those external objects for its perpetuation. As
we cannot suppose that the vicissitudes of the human mind are in
all respects a counterpart of those of the divine we are not at hberty
to assume that self -consciousness in God could arise only in connec
tion with external objects. Whfle it is perfectly conceivable that
God's self -consciousness might need awakening it may have been
always existent. Thus from the nature of consciousness and seU-
consciousness in men no vaUd argument against the same in God can
be drawn.
1 Limits of Rehgious Thought., pp. 77, 78.
2 Herbert Spencer puts the difficulty in this way in an essay on " Religion : a Retrospect
and a Prospect," found in The Insuppressible Book—; a Controversy between Herbert
Spencer and Frederick Harrison, Boston, 1885, p. 14.

442 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER III.
ERRONEOUS CONCEPTIONS OF PERSONALITY — THE THEORIES OF SCHOP
ENHAUER AND VON HARTMANN.
But Mansel goes stfll further and denies our right, in thought, to
regard God as personal. He says : " Personality, as we conceive it, is
Mansel's d e - essentially a Umitation and a relation. Our own person-
r i'gVtf, Tn ality is presented to us as relative and limited ; and it is
regard 'God from that presentation that aU our representative notions
as personal. Qj personaiity are derived." l Now, admitting the truth
of the last sentence, is the first one true? We think not. Person
ality is not essentially a Umitation and a relation. Our personality is
not presented to us as relative and limited. We do not, nor do the
facts demand that we should, think of personaUty under any form of
relation or limitation. When I think of my relations to others I am
reminded of the fact that I am not the only being ; but there is noth
ing in my conception of personaUty to suggest the thought. It arises
solely by experience, and subsequent to the concept of myself as per
sonal. So my sense of being related springs from contact with
others. It is not given in the idea of personality, nor is there any
thing in that idea to suggest it. Only by taking my physical form
for my person could I entertain the thought that I am essentiaUy
related or limited.
As for spirits, they cannot be mutually exclusive of each other in
any sense in which we know the term. They can be occupied by the
same thought without the necessity of josthng one another. Hence,
though spirit may know itseU in relations, it cannot know or think
of itself as limited by those with whom it is related, nor by anything
else which has objective reality. Even our sense of Umitation as to
possible mental achievement is accidental. We do not consider it an
essential of mind or personality, but only of our finiteness. Nor are
we sure, by any process of thought which we can project, that we are
not infinite in our capacity rather than finite. On the contrary, there
are some facts to suggest that we are infinite in possibility and Umited
only in realization.' Very far, then, from the essential notion of per-
1 Limits of Religious Thought, p. 102.
' For Instance, the fact that the limitations of our mental powers are being constantly
broken down.

Erroneous Conceptions of Personality. 443
sonaUty is the idea that the person is of necessity either related or
Umited. With the f oUowing overwhelming language Professor Bowne turns
on those who assert that personaUty is a relation and a limitation : '
"OnaU these accounts we regard the objections to the professor
personality of the world-ground (God) as resting on a theTib'jec-
very superficial psychology. So far as they are not ver- peTsonaf-
bal they arise from taking the limitations of human con- 1 y
sciousness as essential to consciousness in general. In fact, we must
reverse the common speculative dogma on this point, and declare that
proper personaUty is possible only to the Absolute. The very objec
tions urged against the personaUty of the Absolute show the incom
pleteness of human personality. Thus it is said, truly enough, that
we are conditioned by something not ourselves. The outer world is
an important factor in our mental life. It controls us far more than
we do it. But this is a limitation of our personaUty rather than its
source. Our personality would be heightened rather than diminished
U we were self -determinant in this respect. Again, in our inner Ufe
we find similar limitations. We cannot always control our ideas.
They often seem to be occurrences in us rather than our own doing.
The past vanishes beyond recaU; and often in the present we are
more passive than active. But these, also, are limitations of our per
sonality. We should be much more truly persons U we were abso
lutely determinant of all our states. But we have seen that aU finite
things have the ground of their existence, not in themselves, but in
the Infinite, and that they owe their peculiar nature to their mutual
relations and to the plan of the whole. Hence, in the finite con
sciousness, there will always be a foreign element, an external com
pulsion, a passivity as weU as activity, a dependence on something
not ourselves, and a corresponding subjection. Hence in us per
sonality will always be incomplete. The absolute knowledge and
seU-possession which are necessary to perfect personality can be
found only in the absolute and infinite being upon whom aU things
depend." The preceding discussion sufficiently disposes of the objections to
belief in divine personality drawn from the doctrine that self -con
sciousness and personality are impossible in God, contradictory of the
idea of the infinite, and the like. There is, however, a phase of the
subject, springing from the philosophy of Schopenhauer and von
Hartmann, which demands treatment.
1 Philosophy of Theism, pp. 132-134.

444 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
According to Schopenhauer the true nature of things is wfll, uncon
scious or blind effort or impulse. This impulse is seen in everything —
The positions in the polyp as weU as in man, and even in the inorganic
hauer and world. This wUl is all present in every aspect of the uni-
mann. verse. The only distinction observable is in what is
willed. In the world wUl is prior to intelligence, and hence, though
working out intelligent results, pursues its purposes blindly, some
what as instinct is supposed to do. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer talks
about ends in creation, and about motives, as though this bUnd wfll
really knew what it would achieve. He says: " On closely regarding
final causation in nature we must not shrink, in expressing its tran
scendent essence, from boldly saying, the end is a motive, operating
on a being that knows it not. For assuredly .the nests of the Ameri
can ant supply the operative motive which has produced the ant-
eater's toothless jaw with its long, threadhke, clammy tongue ; the
hard shell which imprisons the chick is the motive for the horny tip
with which its beak is furnished in order to break through ; after
which it is cast off as of no further use. And, in like manner, the
laws of reflection and refraction of Ught supply the motive for that
extremely complex optical instrument the human eye. . . . But these
motives operated before they were apprehended ; so it is, however
contradictory it may sound." ]
Martineau cites this language, and shows the nonsensical character
of this feature of Schopenhauer's phflosophy by the foUowing comment :
iur„ ?• „„ ,»= " This contradiction, namely, that a cause can propose to
JVL n i 1 1 n 6 fll i 8
criticism. itself an end, and realize it by adapted means, without
knowing either end or means — that a future which sleeps unsuspected
in the dark can act before it exists, and make preparations for its
birth — was too strong for Hartmann, who insists that it is impossi
ble to wfll without wflling something, be it this or be it that ; that, tfll
there is a determinate object presented, the wiU is a blank, and with
out the conditions of action or change ; and that, as it always involves
a transition from a present condition to another, it is attended by two
representations, namely, of the state immediately felt, and of the state
to be realized in its place. Thus, then, the mental element is restored
to the will, which is no longer left in the dark, but able to fix its eye
on what it wants." We let Martineau complete the statement of
Hartmann's view : " Does the will in nature, then, know what it would
1 Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. II, Kap. xxvi, p. 379, cited by Martineau, A
Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 267 f. On the metaphysics of von Hartmann, see also Ebrard's
Apologetics, vol. il, pp. 116-124.

Erroneous Conceptions of Personality. 445
be at ? Does it design and plan and realize preconceived intentions ?
Nothing can be further from Hartmann's meaning ; and when he
seems on the verge of this admission he flies off from it by an unsus
pected turn ; there is indeed a mental representation in the instinc
tive wfll, but it is an unconscious one; it Uves in the creature, it
directs the organism, it inspires the movement with regulated system,
but remains unrecognized and hid." 2
These doctrines may be criticised from two standpoints : (1) as to
their own intrinsic absurdity, and (2) as to their relation to the effect
upon human freedom and thought.
(1) There is but httle difference, in fact, between the position of
Schopenhauer and that of Hartmann. In the former the will is blind ;
it has no notion of what it is doing, and yet it works to- intrinsic ab-
_ surdity of
ward ends and is prompted by motives in the shape ot their views.
ends to be achieved. In the latter wfll knows what it will accom
plish ; it is inteUigent, and yet it is unconscious. It might be denom
inated unconscious intelligence, but the term "unconscious intelli
gence " is merely an attempt to join two mutually contradictory ideas;
for when we are unconscious we are not intelligent. All actions per
formed unconsciously are wanting in the very quality of intelligence.
From the human standpoint, therefore, nothing can be more obviously
erroneous than the theories of the universe proposed by Schopenhauer
and Hartmann. We know something of blind impulses which, we
may tautologically say, know nothing of what they are about. But
we clearly distinguish between these impulses and our wills, which
know what they propose. Impulse is blind; wfll is clear sighted. Just
because the former works blindly it cannot have a motive, which of
necessity implies more or less of intelligence. Impulse achieves, but,
left to itself, it is prone to achieve that which intelligence would forbid.
But impulse can be subjected to inteUigent control. It can be checked
where its results are held to be undesirable ; it can be directed where
they are desirable and made the servant of intelligence. In so far,
therefore, as we acknowledge the presence of the alleged impulse
which resides in all things, and which accomplishes ends approvable
by sound judgment, we must suppose, not that it is controlled by mo
tives, but that it is subjugated to the wfll of a higher inteUigence,
which, working like ours, like ours also controls the impulses which
are in the world.
(2) But from another standpoint, also, the theories in question are
open to criticism. If there is no conscious inteUigence in the world,
> A Study of Religion, vol. 1, p. 268 f .

446 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
excepting, perhaps, in man, then there is, after aU, no freedom either
of choice or of thought hi man. We are reduced to the position
Their denial of conscious automata. We are in a condition where
of freedom. QUr bought has no bearing upon the outcome of things.
And as our thought is thus rendered useless so we are not responsi
ble for our choices. The contradiction between these consequences of
robbing the world of a presiding conscious inteUigence and what our
own consciousness reveals to us is so great, and the conviction that
what our consciousness reveals is correct is so powerful, that the sub
stitution of unconscious inteUigence must be forbidden. Apart from
inteUigence there is no freedom and no wfll, but only blind force. And
even this is a mere abstraction from observed activities which we
must ultimately refer to a self-conscious intelligence as their ground.
We may conclude, therefore, that God is free aud intelUgent, seU-
conscious, and seU-directive, and, hence, personal.

The Argument for Personality. 447

CHAPTER IV.
THE ARGUMENT FOR PERSONALITY.
Repeatedly, during the foregoing discussions, have we pointed out
that we naturaUy and inevitably think of God as having the attri
butes which go to make up personaUty as known to us. Nor by ' ' we "
do we mean theists only. For aU men, in those moments when they
allow their real thought of God to assert itself, think of him as per
sonal. Strauss's demand for reverence for his universe-God can mean
nothing else. And those who most firmly adhere in theory to the
doctrine that we cannot logicaUy attribute personality to God come
around at last to the assertion that we are shut up to the belief in his
personality as the better alternative. ¦
This inalienable beUef is worthy of profound respect. Along with
the question of the existence of God goes that of his nature. We dare
not, with pantheism, think of God and the world as identical, hence
by no possibility can we think of him as material. But, as the only
modes of being known to us are matter and spirit, if God is not ma
terial he must be spiritual. And as the only spiritual being of whose
existence we are immediately certain is personal it is nat- Naturalness
ural to think of the infinite spirit as personal also. Thus in the per-
may be explained in part the universality of the belief in God.
God as spiritual and personal. Long before men were able to name
the steps in the process by which they reached the conclusion the log
ical understanding, which does not depend whoUy upon a knowledge
of itself for its correct operation, had worked out the results which
the most enlightened minds more intelligently attain to-day.
But this is by no means the whole explanation of the naturalness
and inevitableness of the belief in the personality of God. The argu
ment from design for the existence of God is also an argument for the
possession by him of those attributes which fill our idea of personaUty.
A designer, whatever the method by which he executes his design,
must possess the attributes of inteUigence and free volition. The par
ticular method chosen for the accomplishment of his purposes may
indicate the wisdom which distinguishes and measures his inteUi
gence. So that from an illimitable display of wisdom we should be
1 For example, even Mansel himself. See Limits of Rehgious Thought, pp. 103-105.

448 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
compelled to conclude an infinite intelligence, and hence an infinite
personality. But for the disclosure of his personaUty we need only
the evidence that he is intelligent and free. This the evidence from
design supplies. In the physical world we see both adaptation and
uniformity of method. The method is such as to result in adaptation
among things existing at any one period of time, and yet to provide
for progress from lower to higher, and from the simple to the com
plex. Here is the sure mark both of inteUigence and free voUtion.
Indeed, we can scarcely think of the former without the latter ; but,
aside from this fact, the very existence of the actual world-order indi
cates a purpose to establish such an order, and thus the rejection of
a haphazard method of procedure. The choice of a method furnishes
the proof of freedom.
In a more or less conscious way these thoughts are inevitable to the
human mind. And they help to account for the naturalness of man's
belief in the personality of God, even in the earhest stages of human
thought. But when the thought of man is enticed from the physical
world about him and fixed for a time upon the world of human beings
of which he is a part another cause begins to operate whose tendency,
also, is to make him believe in personaUty in God. This cause is the
perception of the fact that there is a moral order in the world. This
moral order is, for our present purposes, nothing more nor less than
a special instance of design. An indestructible element in the nature
of man is his sense of moral obligation. This sense is twofold in each
individual, pertaining primarily to the abstract question or duty of
righteousness, and secondarily to the duty of maintaining proper rela
tions to other human beings. Could I suppose myself the only human
being on earth I should still have the feehng of obhgation to do right.
Now, this is a part of the moral world-order. But another feature of
the same is that in proportion as individual men give themselves up
to this sense of moral obligation are they conscious at once of greater
nobility and happiness ; and, at the same time, in proportion as com
munities give themselves up to this sense of obligation do they pro
gress in all that goes to make life worth living. Here, then, we have
the same evidence of adaptation and method which is afforded by the
physical world, and the moral world-order appears as designed, thus
further accounting for the universaUty of belief in the personality of
God, and helping us to see why that beUef is so natural, so apparently
spontaneous, in man. ¦
' Comp. Tyler's Bases of Religious Belief Historic and Ideal, New York and London,
1897, part II, chap. 2, and Frlcke, Ist Gott persOnllch, pp. 52-66.

The Argument for Personality. 449
But it might be admitted that it is natural to man to think of God
as personal, and that it is natural for the reason that aU the causes
named conspire to compel, or at least to produce, that is the belief
legitimate
belief, yet it might be affirmed that it is not necessarily also?
legitimate because it is natural ; in other words, that all the argu
ments mentioned merely account for, but do not justify, the behef.
The naturalness of the beUef being conceded the question of its legiti
macy remains unsettled.
In attempting to determine this question it must be remembered
that we have gone over all the points involving objection either to the
idea of the personaUty of God or to the validity of argu- justifiability
ments heretofore adduced in this work in favor of that t a°n e oPuDs
idea, and that in every instance the objections have been thinking.
answered. This fact itseU legitimizes the belief. Our natural, spon
taneous thinking must be rejected only where there are the best of
reasons for so doing. Both spontaneous thought and spontaneous
action have the right of indulgence unless there are good grounds for
their repression. Were this not the case we should soon degenerate
into artificial modes of thought and life. Those thoughts and those
impulses which arise from the very constitution of our nature must
be legitimate, though they may need restraint or guidance lest they
become perverted by improper use. And if there is any test of
such spontaneity as we have just described it is found in the fact of
universality. That all men, or the overwhelming majority, think and
feel in a certain way under the same circumstances proves that that
way of thinking and feeling is natural. If, therefore, the natural be
the legitimate, except in cases where there is good reason for repress
ing the natural, the beUef in the personaUty of God must be legiti
mate, since there is no good reason for rejecting it ; in other words,
since it violates no principle of sound philosophy, science, moraUty,
or religion.
We might let our case rest here, secure in the feeling that for aU
unprejudiced persons it is sufficiently strong. But, inasmuch as
Christianity is rich in the reasons for the hope that is within its ad
herents, we proceed to add some considerations confirmatory of our
position. In the first place, U God is the ground of the world he must
be personal because we are personal. This is not, like the facts men
tioned in the first part of this chapter, a mere reason for thinking
that he is personal. It is compulsory of behef. It is inconceivable
that a God should be the ground of the world who is less than any of
"the phenomena of which he is the ground. This would be to make

450 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
the effect greater or more perfect than the cause. The only alterna
tive would be to make God identical with the world, which is impos-
Our personal- sible for a variety of reasons already given ; among oth-
with it the ers, that man knows himself as personal and therefore as
of God. not capable of being identified either with a nonpersonal
world-god or with a personal God. The only possible conclusion is
that, since man is personal, the world-ground must be personal ; that
is, intelligent and self-directive.1
But, again, our religious natures demand a personal God for their
gratification and development. Just as our moral natures are acknowl-
Our religious edged to be legitimate so must our reUgious natures be. In-
mand that deed, there are few to-day bold enough to deny this. The
sonal.6 pel" only question which remains here is that which pertains
to the form of the religion. Now, there is an inteUectual side to these
religious natures of ours, which, as reUgious beings, we may not stul
tify. Hence he who is conscious of his own personality cannot at
tempt to enter into a truly religious relationship with an impersonal
existence. Such an attempt would stamp one as inteUectuaUy un
balanced. Not only in its inteUectual aspects, however, does the religious
nature demand a personal God, but also in its moral and social aspects.
There can be no true morality apart from a person, and hence it is
that our moral natures look for their complement, as also for their
source, to a personal God who is himself capable of the morahty he
has made imperative in us. For this a mere moral world-order does
not suffice. If the God who imposed this moral order upon the world
is himself incapable of morality the imperative character of moraUty
would be immediately and histinctively denied. The God of the moral
world must be more than "a power not ourselves which makes for
righteousness." What may be called the social relation between the
soul and the object of its rehgious worship also demands that God
should be personal. We can neither love, reverence, petition, nor
commune with an impersonal God ; nor can we receive from such a
God the love and care which a personal being needs for the sustenance
of his religious life. The doctrine of an impersonal God, carried to its
legitimate consequences, would land us in the conclusion that the re
ligious nature in man is unmeaning, unworthy of respect and culture,
and that its source, so far from being implanted within us by an intel
ligent Creator, is bestowed upon us as the result of a blunder such as
an impersonal God might be supposed to make, or else that in the
l The same line of argument would suffice to demonstrate the moral nature of God.

The Argument for Personality. 451
process of evolution there came out a being so constituted that one of
the profoundest elements of his nature has no needful function to
perform. But in another sense than that mentioned above the intellect de
mands that God should be personal. It has been often noted that be
tween the laws of the natural world and the laws of So also our in
thought there is a correspondence which makes it possi- teliects.
ble for us to understand the world. But we understand the world
only as we employ the powers we possess in accordance with the laws
of correct thinking. Did we violate these laws the world would be
unintelligible. In the same way the attempt to attain an intelligible
conception of God in the violation of the laws of human thought must
always fail. All such attempts have led men into confusion. The
utmost ingenuity of pantheists and agnostics has hitherto been un
equal to the task of making clear to the human mind what kind of an
intelligence that is which is not in some way united with personality.
The words "impersonal intelligence " cannot be united in thought.
Even that intelligence which is displayed'by animals requires us either
to posit a brute personality or else to trace the intelUgence to the
world-ground as personal. The only clear thought of an intelligent
God is that of a personality ; and this is attained as soon as we f oUow,
instead of violating, the laws of our minds.1
Closely connected with the foregoing is another consideration. The
only possible way of accounting for the intelligibility of the world is the
supposition that it is the product of intelligence. It is impossible for
human beings to believe that a rational world should spring from a
blind and nonintelUgent cause. This is due to the fact that among
human beings the more inteUigent the producer of any- Parallel be-
thing, whether in language or in mechanism, the more tive and hu-
i ,.,,..,,, - , man intelli-
profound, significant, and intelligible the product is, and gence.
vice versa. The only exceptions to be noted are such as spring from
the inherent difficulty of the subject treated ; and even here the dis
cerning discover that, considering the obscurity of the subject, the
treatment of it is remarkably simple. If an easy theme is treated in
a confused or confusing way we are certain that the thinker is not
himself clear or else that he purposely chose to confuse his readers.
1 A good illustration of the absurdity of the results obtained in the violation of the laws
of mental action is found in Herbert Spencer's doctrine that God may be higher than
personal, and that our inability to conceive of anything higher than personality, so far
from being an argument against this higher-than-personal God, is an argument in its
favor. That is, as we have before pointed out, it leads him to make the inconceivable the
test of the real. See above, p. 95.

452 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
But not only are we shut up to the thought of an inteUigent Creator
by reason of the mteUigibflity of creation, we are also shut up to the
thought that this intelligent Creator must be mteUectuaUy constituted
on lines parallel to or identical with our mental nature. For, though
we must admit that God's thoughts are higher than our thoughts as
the heavens are higher than the earth, yet were his thoughts out of
all analogy to ours we could not understand his wof ld. That we can
understand it is indubitable evidence that we are created in the image
of God, and hence that God is constituted, at least in some respects, like
ourselves. It does not follow that U we knew aU about ourselves we
should know aU about God, for we have no adequate opportunity of
making the entire comparison. But that God's intelUgence is similar
to our own is unquestionable. And with this foUows, as before pointed
out, the doctrine of his personal nature.

The Possibility of a Kevelation. 453

division vin.
REVELATION.

SECTION I.-THE NATURE AND FACT OF SUPERNATURAL REVE
LATION.
CHAPTER I.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A REVELATION.
In the introduction to this work revelation was considered as the
impartation of truth by one person to another, and divine revelation as
but one species of such communication. Ordinarily, however, when
we speak of revelation in this division we have in mind divine or
supernatural revelation. It is often said that the object of revelation
is God himself.1 But this is not the whole fact. In the Christian
revelation God does disclose himseU, but besides he re- God not tne
veals man's true relations to God and to his feUow-men, Sf'reve^ia-
and also human destiny. It is necessary to scan closely tl0U'
the brief statement just made, for the reason that many either fail to
give sufficient scope to what is actually revealed or else unduly extend
the limits of the supposed revelation afforded us in the Christian Scrip
tures. Multitudes mistake form for substance, method for result.
When they open their New Testaments and read they And themselves
in the midst of angelic appearances and are Uable to the error of sup
posing that these and kindred miraculous phenomena are part of reve
lation itself, whereas they are rather a part of the method which God
employed ; or, U you please, accompaniments of God's communication
of needful truth to mankind.
So also, many seem to suppose that as far as revelation pertains to
God it reveals aU truth concerning him. Nothing in the Old or New
Testament warrants such a supposition. He is revealed as the object
of our worship, love, and allegiance, but not as to his fuU nature.
Even the revelation of God which we have in Christ is presumably
not complete ; for the purpose of divine revelation is not theoretical or
scientific knowledge even of God himself, but such a knowledge of
1 So Christlieb, Modern Doubt and Christian Belief, New York, 1874, p. 95.
31

454 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
him as is necessary to the gratification of our reUgious natures and to
our development in the ethical likeness of God.
Revelation may be either incidental or purposed. We often reveal
ourselves to observant minds when we least intend it. And it is not
Revelation improper to beUeve that God has revealed himseU in both
propositions of the ways mentioned. But even when God purposed to
alone. reveal himself to men, and set about the accomplishment
of that end, it is erroneous to suppose that he always put his revela
tion into the form of propositions to be mastered by the intellect and
that he employed no other method, or this method chiefly.1 Chris
tians believe that God is love, not so much because that fact is dis
tinctly stated in the New Testament as because he is represented
as performing loving deeds. In Uke manner they beUeve in the
awfulness of sin, not chiefly because it is declared to be "exceed
ingly sinful," but because it is represented in Scripture as having
received merited punishment. In other words, historical facts trace
able to divine purpose are as available sources of a knowledge of God
as definite propositions addressed to our understandings. The diffi
culty which might arise in connection with a revelation through facts
alone, however, is that it would be left to the faUible interpretation of
the human mind to determine their significance. This difficulty is
obviated in Christianity by the combination of the method by facts
with that by distinct and definite propositions ; or at least by hints
which are sufficient to give the observant reader the correct interpre
tative clew. Thus it is that the entire Bible, its history, its precepts, and
its foundations of reUgious truth constitute one complete whole which,
directly or indirectly, completely or partiaUy, perfectly or imperf ectly,
reveals to man those things which he ought to know.
Strangely enough, it is still necessary to defend the possibility of a
revelation, which is doubted by a variety of classes. These doubts
center around the two parties to revelation — God and man. It is
questioned whether God could reveal himseU and whether man could
receive a revelation.
God, says the first form of the objection in substance, is absolute,
The allegation unrelated, and, as such, cannot reveal himseU. One can
npttG°reveai make terms mean anything by depositing within them the
significance we wish them to convey. But, unless we
are wflling to go back to the deism of the preceding century, it is absurd
1 Comp. C. A. Row's Christian Evidences Viewed in Relation to Modern Thought, Third
Edition, London, 1881, pp. 117 ff. ; andC. M. Mead's, Supernatural Revelation, New York,
1889, pp. 80, 84.

The Possibility of a Revelation. 455
to speak of God as absolute and unrelated in such a sense that he can--
not reveal himself. For according to all believers in God he is the
ground of the world, if not, as the pantheists think, identical with the
world. Hence he is related to the world in some way by all who be
lieve in him, the deists not excepted, although the latter place his
relation to it in the past.
When we come to the actual beliefs of those who hold any doctrine
of divine existence — when we look away from their words and gather
their real faith from their philosophies as a whole — we find nothing
in their conception of God to forbid the possibility of his revealing
himself. And, in fact, all believers in God do beUeve that he has
revealed himself, at least in some degree, though not aU believe that
the sacred books of the Christians or of the adherents of other
religions contain the record of a special revelation. Their belief in
God is founded upon what they take to be the works or manifestations
of God. The very doctrines of the relation of God to the world
which we find in the various philosophies show that their adherents
see something of the nature of God in the world of which we form a
part. What they question is, not that God has revealed himself in
the world, but that he has ever purposely revealed himself. His
works, as the works of any other, betray something of his thought
and qualities ; and the principal dispute is as to the extent to which
his works as known to us are adequate to a disclosure of his char
acter. Among unbelievers in a special revelation there is also a
divergence of opinion as to the degree of success men have achieved
in reading the language of nature, and hence as to how we must
think of God, and as to the accuracy of any inferences we may draw
on that subject. But all these things are confessions of the unsatis-
factoriness of natural theology rather than the denial of the possibil
ity of any revelation whatever.
As no doctrine of God implies any fundamental impossibility of
his self -manifestation in and through the world, so there is nothing in
any of these doctrines to militate against a special reve- Speciaireveia-
lation to a single people. As a matter of fact, God is gie people.
somewhat differently conceived by different races and tribes of un
instructed men. And this is doubtless in some measure due to the
particular aspect which nature presents to the observation of men in
each general locality. Men must think of God anthropomorphically.
And, as nature and man are so interrelated that the former in a good
degree molds the latter, it follows that to each particular race of
men God reveals himself, if at all, in a special manner and aspect.

456 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Nor is there any falsehood or injustice in this. Each tribe reads as
much as possible of God from what its members discover within and
without themselves. In any incidental revelation either of ourselves
or of God the subjective element must be eliminated if the exact
truth is to be ascertained. And no tribe or race of men is warranted
in supposing that what they see of the works of God constitutes the
whole of what he has done. The error, therefore, is the result of bad
logic, not of God's self-manifestation throughout his works, and
might have been avoided by greater thoughtfulness on man's part.
In the same way there is no injustice in such special revelation
unless it is unjust to afford a variety of soil, climate, fertility and
products of the surface and bowels of the earth, and of topography
and scenery, as well as of stellar grouping and the Uke.
There is, then, no difficulty in the doctrine of supposing that God
can and does reveal himself through his works, nor in the idea of a
special revelation to each particular tribe or race; but for the doc
trine of a purposed revelation only that idea of God which regards
Doctrine of a ^m as Personal wm suffice. For it is one thing to reveal,
languished an<* ** ^s <luite another to distinctly plan to that end.
dentafreveiiv -^-11 deniers of the personality of God, therefore, must
tion. deny the possibility of a designed revelation. In former
parts of this work the personaUty of God has been sufficiently estab
hshed. The question stfll remains, however, as to the possibflity that
a personal God should purposely reveal himseU to men. We do not
here raise the question of probability, but whether, even though
personal, he can disclose his nature and character to man. The pos
sibility of such a design is involved in the notion of personaUty ; for
a person can design or propose to himseU any end whatsoever.
Furthermore, there appears to be nothing in the idea of a personal
God to prevent his carrying out a purpose to make other inteUigences
acquainted with himself, or at least of affording them the means of
such an acquaintanceship. He has every resource at his command.
He made the earth and all that dwell upon it. He lives in the world
and by his will sustains its every operation. He has access to all the
forces and existences of the universe. What can hinder his giving a
special, purposed, intelligently adapted revelation to man? There
seems nothing in the way unless it be man himself.

Human Capacity and Need. 457

CHAPTER II.
HUMAN CAPACITY AND NEED.
The question is, then, could man receive a revelation U God desired
to -give it? With regard to some of the contents of the supposed
' Christian revelation there is no room for doubt. It is is man capa-
•, • bleofreceiv-
entirely possible for man to grasp the general facts ot his ing a reve-
obligations to God, of his true relation to his f eUow-men, God ?
of the probationary character of the present Ufe, and of heaven and
hell ; though in all their significance man could not understand any
of these things, even U revealed to him, except by long and thought
fully pondering or experiencing them.
As to man's abflity to receive a revelation of the nature and charac
ter of God the matter is not at first so evident. The simplicity of it,
as it appears to us who are accustomed to the idea, arises from the
fact that consciously or unconsciously we have denned and limited
the notion of God's nature and character until they stand in clear
and bold outline before us. If by some means all the results of our
instruction could be annihilated, or banished from our minds, we
should not find it so easy to believe that man is capable of receiving a
revelation of God himself. And, in fact, did we make no distinction
between the revelation of God which we have received and the com
prehension of him in all his infinity we should be compelled to deny
such a capability in man. But it does not follow that because man can
not comprehend God he can know nothing about him. The Bible
teaches the incomprehensibility of God, while it uses every means to
convey to us some notion of him. God a Spirit, a Father, a King ;
God as Light and as Love — these are some of the figures of speech by
which the Scripture writers strive to make us know at least a
minimum concerning him.
It is not to be supposed that a revelation of God is designed to
relieve us of the necessity of pondering on the great philosophical
questions which have ever engaged and baffled the human mind;
much less to afford us full and complete answers to or solutions of
them. Nowhere in the Bible do we find more than the purpose 0I
attempt to meet and supply the religious needs of man- revelation.
kind. What man needs to know of God in order to the fulfillment of

458 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
all his obligations and the accomplishment of the noble purposes for
which he is created is all that revelation professes to afford. ' It is a
revelation for reUgious purposes. The possession by man of a reli
gious nature warrants us in asserting that a revelation of the kind
. now described can be received by man. And on the supposition that
the revelation in question be proposed by the Deity we must allow
that, unless God possesses less power of adapting truth to the weak
ness of human thought than man does, he would be able to put the
truth to be revealed into such concrete form that the least talented
could grasp it for all practical purposes. And a study of the facts as
they appear in the Bible warrants us in asserting that, U it is God's
work, God did exhibit the greatest pedagogical skill in the presenta
tion of the needful truths.
The possibility of a special, purposed revelation from God to man
being established, it is still pertinent to question our need of such a
disclosure. And as it is highly improbable that God would provide it
were it not needed the discussion of this question is an essential factor
in the determination of its actuaUty. Does man, then, for religious
purposes, need a revelation from God specially designed and adapted
to human conditions ?
We can best answer this question by removing ourselves in thought
to the beginning of the human race. When man first appeared in the
Man's need of world he was a stranger. There was no creature to ac-
a divme reve-
lation. quaint him with his origin, destiny, or duty. He found
himself subject to physical wants, the instinct for the supply of which
he could, and, if we accept the evolutionary origin of his physical
nature, probably did, inherit from his animal ancestors. It would
require but the slightest and briefest acquaintance with nature to
discover that it provided for all his most immediate bodfly needs.
The first questions which occurred to him in connection with his
physical nature and the physical environment in which he was
placed would receive their answer through the medium of the physi
cal senses. But to the remoter and more abstruse questions as to
whence he came, whittier he was bound, how he was related, and
what were his obligations, there could be no prompt answer except it
were communicated to him from another intelligence.3 Yet these
questions must have pressed for answer almost, if not quite, at the be
ginning of man's history. For conscience is an integral element in
the human nature, and its force must have been early felt and recog'
1 Mead, Supernatural Revelation, p. 80 f.
3 Comp. the Duke of Argyll's Unity of Nature, London, 1884, p. 3.

Human Capacity and Need. 459
nized, and the consciousness of personality or selfhood makes it cer
tain that each individual human being must have said to himself, " I
ought;" to which he could only reply, "What ought I?" Less than
this conscience and self-consciousness could not have brought about.
Then, too, if we are to accept the best judgment of the authorities
on the rehgions of the world, we must beUeve that the religious im
pulse is native to man. It would not be long until the habit of self-
observation would be developed to the point where this impulse would
become an oppressive mystery. For his hunger there was food which
his own senses could perceive, but this strange, undefined reUgious
feeling has no visible means of satisfaction. Were there but some one
to teU him that these strange emotions are religious, had he but a hint
as to their significance, he might seek some means of gratification;
but he is and must remain, at least for a long period, in darkness and
in torment, unless a being, higher than himself, come to his help.
For, even were we to admit that the germs of this religious nature are
inherited from our supposed animal progenitors, there was no animal
which ever felt this reUgious craving as man feels it, nor was there
any animal which could communicate to man any facts by which
these profound feelings could be explained. As, therefore, the reli
gious nature in man renders possible and probable a revelation from
God,1 so it demonstrates man's need.
As to this religious feeling and its gratification man must have been
in greater perplexity than with reference to any other. For his hunger
and thirst there were food and drink apprehensible by perpiexity of
the senses ; for the inteUect there were the problems set manPas toThis
by daily necessities and by the questions concerning his fng^and' Its
origin, destiny, duty, and the like; for companionship gratification.
and human affection there were the creatures about him, especially
others of his own kind. Even in moral questions an approximately cor
rect practice might soon be discovered. All these things lie in the realm
of the visible and tangible ; but the need of God finds no satisfaction
in the world in which men chiefly live. Just because God is a Spirit,
whose presence is not made known to us by the medium of flesh and
blood, as in the case of other spirits, it is needful that he should re
veal himself in some unusual way. The only method, except that of
revelation, open to man for discovering the existence and character of
God is speculative thought, and just in proportion as the speculative
element enters into thought do conclusions become uncertain. The
1 Comp. Beyschlag's Leben Jesu, vol. i, p. 24. On the same page he makes the point
that revelation is the necessary correlative ofthe religious nature in man.

460 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
chances that, U by the processes of speculation man had reached the
inference that there is a God of such and such a character he would
have been far from the exact truth are, therefore, very great. But
once the idea of God was attained and his nature determined to be of
a certain kind, these conclusions would inevitably and profoundly
affect human conduct in aU its aspects.
Hence for the most practical of reasons man needed instructions
concerning God from God himself. True it is that in the course of
long ages the idea of God might be purified and ennobled, and the
practical errors arising from erroneous religious opinions graduaUy
eliminated, but the history of reUgion shows that this is an exceed
ingly slow and painful process, attended meanwhile by influences
which tend to keep man down toward the level of the beasts from
which evolutionists believe we have sprung. In order, therefore, that
with reference to reUgion man might have as fair an opportunity of
ascertaining the truth most needful for practical purposes as he has in
other departments of his Ufe, some kind of a revelation was needed.
Nor wfll it be denied, probably, that U man had had and retained from
the first, in all its purity, a correct though not necessarily full knowl
edge of God, his progress in civilization and culture would have been
much more rapid and uniform;

Primitive Revelation. 461

CHAPTER ni.
primitive revelation.
In view of aU these considerations it seems perfectly clear that if
God is personal, and U he created man, he gave primitive man some
kind of a revelation of himself and of man's origin, destiny and rela
tions. We are not, indeed, specially concerned to establish the fact
of such primitive revelation ; our chief concern is with the revelation
of Jesus Christ. Yet, U it could be believed that God left the stranger,
man, in the midst of a world so f uU of perplexing yet practical prob
lems for which no sure answer could be found, it would be a strong ar
gument against any revelation whatever. On the other hand, if man
needed a revelation at first he stands in little less need of improbability tnat God
the same at the present day. It is highly improbable would leave
man umn-
that with each man's need of counsel and instruction structed.
from other men, and with the capability for receiving them, God
would have left his creatures without a knowledge of that which he
alone could accurately impart. If he did he is less soUcitous for the
welfare of his creatures than earthly parents, by the instincts God has
implanted within them, seem to be for their children.
The only argument worthy of mention against the probability of
a primeval revelation is that primitive man, with his undeveloped
faculties, could not have comprehended the revelation had it been be
stowed. ' But we have seen reason to believe that man was not, when
he came into the world, so feeble in inteUect as the evolutionists
would have us believe. And, besides, whether or not men could com
prehend the revelation would depend on what was revealed. As we
have before admitted, man, at the beginning or at the present time,
could not comprehend God in his infinity, but there is no reason to
suppose that man was at first so feeble-minded that he could not get
the idea of a spiritual being (though he, no more than we, can picture
spirit to ourselves), or that he could not comprehend the idea that
God made him and would care for him. and that he expected certain
things of him. As Mead well says : " It sounds little less than ridicu
lous to hear the primeval human race pictured as such a benighted,
groping company of creatures, stumbling along, through thousands
1 O. Pflelderer, Religionsphilosophie, vol. ii, pp. 24 ff.

462' Foundations of the Christian Faith.
of years, with no positive knowledge of that which it is of most con
cern to know — and that simply because God could not be known tfll
after these thousands of years of searching. And the strangeness of
the theory comes out all the more strikingly when we find that the
original man is, after all, credited with the faculty of seeking and find
ing a superhuman power in the world. Suppose, now, that the reve
lation did not attempt to go beyond what man himseU was able to
think or conjecture by himseU ; suppose the revelation consisted only
in a palpable seU-manUestation which simply confirmed, as correct, the
native longings and surmises of the human soul ; suppose, in short,
that God revealed himself in order to transform speculation and desire
into assured knowledge, and without attempting to present any higher
and more difficult conception than human apprehension could grasp ;
what then ? In so far as man's conjectures and premonitions were
correct they would be confirmed. Man would stand consciously over
against a God whom before he had only felt after, U haply he might
find him. . . . The whole difficulty in the doctrine of a primeval rev
elation is an artificial one, coming from the gratuitous assumption
that its only object could have been to impart a neatly scientific and
philosophically perfect conception of God's essential nature and in
finite perfections." *
The probability that God gave primitive man some kind of a reve
lation is, therefore, very great. It is probable just in proportion as it
Probability in is possible and needful. The thought of a malevolent God
the necessity as the ground and ruler of the universe is unendurable ;
ity. so also is the conception of God as indifferent to the wel
fare of his sentient creatures. Even though man might have discov
ered in the course of time the way of truth we could but regard it as
a most unloving procedure had God left him to himseU for the accom
plishment of that end. The babe, U it be fed and physically sheltered,
could grow up to manhood uninstructed in morals and other concerns
of practical life ; but a father who would allow his child to learn for
itself that fire would burn it, water drown it, edged tools wound it,
would be a most unnatural parent. The child might learn for itseU by
experience many of these things and still survive, but at what cost of
suffering and delay of physical, mental, and moral improvement!
Every caution uttered by a parent, every word of instruction afforded
by a teacher, every provision by community or state for the education
and training of the young cries out against the notion that God would
leave man in the condition of perplexity and uncertainty in which he
1 Supernatural Revelation, p. 81.

Primitive Revelation. 463
must have found himseU at the first dawn of his human conscious
ness. The objection that the earth is too insignificant a portion of the uni
verse to be made the scene of such interest on the part of xne msignifi-
the infinite God scarcely deserves mention. It is based earth as 'an
on the theory that bulk determines worth, and that God, a purposed
Uke man, is so limited that he can attend only to the ieye
most important things. But to the infinite God our distinction be
tween the difficult and the easy must be unknown in experience ; and
none who will take the pains to renounce his prejudices and study
man in the light of the facts will consider it beneath the dignity of
God to consider man's needs. If we are not too insignificant for God
to create we are not too insignificant to become the object of his prov
idence and care. Sound judgment will not estimate God by the great
ness of his works alone, but also by the evidence of heart and morals
which are manifest in the universe ; and hence will regard it as divine
not only to devise so wonderful a being as man, but to watch over him
with an attention so minute that it may be literally true that the very
hairs of our heads are numbered by the loving Father of all.
It may be asked why, U a primitive revelation was bestowed, another,
such as is recorded in the Bible, was also necessary. A moment's re
flection ought to show the questioner that, according to Wh a f urtner
all analogy, a primitive revelation could not be complete "^ ^re"
and would require to be supplemented, and even to be sary-
put into written form. Whatever view we may take of primitive
man — whether we regard him as lower in intellect and morals than
the lowest savages of whom we have any historical knowledge ; or, as
being possessed of normal character and inteUectual powers, though
as yet undeveloped ; or, as even having been created with the highest
ethical nature and mental abflity possible to the race — we are equally
certain that a good pedagogical method would demand a gradual rev
elation. Even were it proposed to communicate all possible religious
truth at a single sitting, so to speak, stfll the discourse would be long,
and it would be necessary to unfold the truth in that order and man
ner which would render it most comprehensible by the mind and most
readily available in practice.
But all this is to suppose that which most certainly did not take
place. For nowhere does any revelation, acknowledged by competent
judges to be such, profess to have been complete when given in bulk,
"but partial and preparatory to something which was to follow later.
The only exception to this is the revelation given in Jesus Christ, and

464 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
even this is progressive both in the bestowment and in its comprehen
sion. All good pedagogy requires the mastery in experience of prin
ciples given before others are enunciated. Education, in whatever
department, proceeds slowly. And while a skiUful and beneficent
teacher will prevent by proper counsel aU needless waste of time, and
aU possible pain, yet the school of experience teaches us the lessons of
lUe most impressively. In accordance with this the divine Teacher is
represented in the Bible as revealing the truth to man as it were con
cretely in connection with the dafly vicissitudes of Ufe, not abstractly,
after the old-fashioned manner of teaching the grammar of a language
apart from and prior to the actual reading of the same. If for no other
reason, therefore, revelation subsequent to the primitive one would be
needed. But entirely aside from the considerations just mentioned a later
revelation would be demanded on the supposition that man f eU from
a condition of innocence into a state of sin. It requires but the most
superficial examination of the professed biblical revelation to demon
strate the fact that it presupposes a voluntarily sinful race as its recip
ient. Unless we are ready to deny the voluntary element in moral
evil we must admit that sin would pervert in some measure the truth
acquired in a primitive revelation and thus make a later one neces
sary. This fearful fact of voluntary sin, U nothing else, must have
made such a draft upon the divine compassion, not to say justice, as
to terminate in his intervention for the benefit of our race. To one
who has dispassionately studied the blinding effects of sin upon the
human inteUect it is evident that man could not of himseU have a true
conception of God, of himself, of his proper relations to God and his
fellows, or of his destiny.1 If man was to be rescued from the doom
toward which he was hastening he must in some way be put into a
position to recover an at least approximately correct conception of
the above-mentioned subjects, so necessary for his happiness and the
attainment of his highest possibilities.2
1 On the superiority of the teachings of Christianity to those of the philosophies Bow
has a very fine lecture in his Christian Evidences Viewed in Relation to Modern Thought.
Lecture ill.
* Comp. Steude's Beitrage zur Apologetik, p. 210.

Natural Revelation. 465

CHAPTER IV.
NATURAL REVELATION.
For the purposes just described the so-caUed natural revelation is in
sufficient, as a study of it will abundantly show. This natural revela
tion is afforded, as far as it is a reaUty, by what is without us, by what
is within us, and by what we can learn from experience. We may
affirm, with a good degree of certitude that none of these things were
originally designed as means of revelation to man. Hence U they re
veal anything to us they do so incidentally, not because they were
specially adapted by the Creator to that end. It does not f oUow that
they absolutely could not afford an adequate disclosure of the truth
needed for man's religious and moral guidance through life ; still, in
asmuch as a thing is not planned for any given purpose, it is liable
not to accomplish that purpose. The probability, therefore, of the
sufficiency of natural revelation is quite smaU. We could beUeve in
the adequacy of nature, man, and experience, as a revelation of God
and human destiny, only on condition that we had some sound evi
dence that God brought these things into existence with a direct, if not
an exclusive, view to that end.
However, it would be erroneous to suppose that the above-men
tioned means of natural revelation have no revelatory significance.
The works of God, as the works of any other, must in some measure
be an expression of himself. If we find power or benefi- Revelatory
cence in nature about us we must conclude that they of nature?0
point to power and beneficence in the Creator. When we discover the
feehng of moral obUgation in our own breasts we must infer a moral
nature and purpose in God. When we see the benefits of obedience to
the behests of conscience and the disaster that attends their neglect
we are confirmed in the idea that we are subjects of a moral gov
ernor. But whfle we would not deny the aid these things afford us,
we cannot agree that they are sufficient. Several facts lead to this
conclusion. We have already pointed out the improbability that a system not
devised for the purpose of revelation should adequately reveal, but be
sides this, there are two other facts which bear on this question. The
first is that the powers of man are exceedingly fallible. This scarcely

466 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
needs illustration. But the result is that men interpret nature not
only partially and erroneously, but diversely. Some interpreters of
Further rea- nature find no proof there for the existence of a God ; oth-
b°°iefrthat ers are the more convinced of his existence the further
aTpTcfal tney Press their investigations ; stfll others are in doubt.
revelation. Among believers in the existence of some kind of God
some see in nature only a blind force ; others a personal being. Some
are gloomily pessimistic when they study the order of nature and the
progress of civilization; others are cheerfully optimistic.1 True it is
that these varying conclusions are reached chiefly because to different
minds different facts appeal ; or because few take a comprehensive
view of nature and history. But since the same facts are exposed to
the observation of all, this very incompleteness of induction affords
the evidence that up to the present time the mind of man has been un
able to interpret nature and history in such a manner as to secure from
them any uniform, consistent, and reliable system of truth adapted to
man's religious needs.
Should anyone retort that theologians have succeeded no better in
the interpretation of the revelation supposed to be contained in the
Bible, we reply that, were we to admit the truth of the statement,
this would not reheve the case for the adequacy of natural revelation,
which cannot be proved sufficient by demonstrating the inconsistency
of any or every aUeged supernatural disclosure of the unseen. If the
powers of men are too feeble to construct a correct conception of the
teachings of the Bible, that does not make them the more able to inter
pret the teachings of nature and history.
But, as a matter of fact, theologians do agree as to the principal
teachings of the Bible. It is universaUy agreed that the Bible teaches
Agreement of tne existence of God as Creator and Upholder of the world
ase<t1oStii1e an<* au *na* *s therein; as omniscient, omnipotent, and
teachings of omnipresent ; as infinite in love, mercy, truth, justice,
the Bible. righteousness; as interested profoundly in the good
morals of the human race, and the Uke. On some other points, as, for
example, Christology, there is less agreement ; but this arises not so
much from any equivocalness in Bible utterance, or inadequacy of the
human mind for the understanding of Bible teaching, as from a rejec
tion of the plain statements of Scripture on the ground that they are
not our final authority in religion and morals. Whenever it is held
that the Bible is " the rule, and the only sufficient rule, both of our
1 On the contradictory views of philosophers see Christlieb's Modern Doubt and Chris
tian Belief, pp. 78 ff.

Natural Revelation. 467
faith and practice" there is practical unanimity as to aU essential
points. The disputes which have raged between those who accept
the Bible in the above sense have all concerned points of minor im
portance which the heat of controversy unduly magnified, or else
they have been occasioned by the attempt (unconscious, perhaps) to
impose upon the Scriptures a phflosophy foreign to it. It is not here
denied, but freely admitted, that there are textual obscurities in the
Bible upon which exegetes have labored in vain ; and that there are
many perplexing questions centering about the very idea of revela
tion concerning which men differ. But it is affirmed that if Scripture
be interpreted by Scripture, in the use of a legitimate method, there
will be no room for wide divergence of opinion on the main points, and
that among those who proceed as just described there is no such
divergence. The fallibility of the human judgment, then, hinders the availa
bility of the natural order of things for purposes of revelation. But
there is a second fact which must be added. It is the perversity of
nature, and especially of the course of history, resulting from human
sin. Whatever might be the defects of nature, considered as but
partiaUy evolved, it is most certain that a being so The perver-
numerously represented as man is, and having such ture and of
,.„ , . „ , history for-
power to modify the operations of nature as he unques- bids that it
should re-
tionably possesses, must, U he is himself perverse, add to veal God.
the contradiction supposed by evolution already to exist between
nature and himseU. Not only wiU sin give man an unnatural direc
tion in the progress of his evolution, but man's selfishness and disre
gard of what ought to be in the natural world must render the evolu
tion of nature capricious and vicious. It is impossible to estimate the
damage sin has caused in the realm of physical nature; but many
things suggest that it is exceedingly wide-reaching and profound. If
it be true that every portion of the physical universe is affected by
what occurs in every other portion of it, the whole universe must be
greatly modified by the action of man. We mention merely the dis
astrous floods and hurricanes which result from the denuding of the
forest lands for the sole purpose of enriching the individuals who
direct the work ; the pestilences that have resulted from uncleanU-
ness and neglect of sanitary conditions by municipal authority ; and
the famines which have been brought about by the unnecessary
crowding of populations. Flood, hurricane, and famine are generaUy
reckoned as purely natural products, and as such a portion of the
natural revelation. Now we submit whether nature as interfered with

468 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
by the sin of man is adequate to represent what God would have pro
vided for sinless creatures. Only he who believes that God is the
original author of human sin can accept as a truthful representation
of the character of God a world so greatly modified by the action of
man as ours.
When we consider the realm of history the evidence of man's per
versive influence is even more palpable. Here it is perfectly evident
that man's own wickedness has been the chief hindrance to his prog
ress in civilization and happiness. The devious paths along which
the race has traveled, our tardy advancement, the swirls and eddies
in the stream of history, have not been due to divine provision but to
human vice. The world is provided with abundant wealth, yet men
are poor because they are idle, wasteful, debauched, or selfish. Most
of the sickness of the world results from the violation of well-known
laws of health in the interest of appetite, pride, or fashion. He who
studies the history of our race, therefore, without making proper
allowance for the direful consequences of willful sin wfll find no true
portrayal of the divine character— and no one can be quite sure how
much to aUow ; so that there seems to be no way by which nature
and history can be made to yield a sufficiently clear, evident, and
trustworthy revelation concerning the essential elements of a reU
gious lUe.

The Biblical Revelation. 469

CHAPTER V.
THE BIBLICAL REVELATION.
If men need a revelation for rehgious reasons did God ever give
it to us in any special form, and, particularly, is it found in aU its
purity and finaUty in the sacred books of the Old and the New
Testaments? To answering this question the remainder of this book
is devoted.
Two preliminary facts must be here cleared up. The first is that,
judging from the whole spirit of the Bible itseU, the revelation it con
tains was given chiefly for the purpose of supplying the reUgious
needs of humanity. It would be too much to say that this revela
tion included nothing except religious truth. It is not too much to
say that, U any scientific, philosophical, or other truth was either
whoUy or partially revealed, the Bible makes no special account of
it, but places the emphasis upon the reUgious facts brought to the
attention of man. The religious element is the principal ; aU else is
subsidiary. But in the Bible the idea of reUgion includes aU human
conduct. Now the devotional or the ceremonial side may be brought
forward, now the moral ; but the writers of the Bible regard aU true
reUgion as covering aU true moraUty. What is immoral is displeas
ing to God, and hence irreligious, no matter how accompanied by the
performance of ceremonial duties, the punctilious observance of which
was positively displeasing when associated with selfishness and sin or
dissociated from the practice of virtue.1 To us, therefore, who so
sharply distinguish between ethics and reUgion the Bible appears to
be a revelation concerning both ; yet, in the Biblical sense of reUgion,
it is reaUy but a revelation in the interest of the latter.
It foUows that we need not concern ourselves in the reUgious study
of the Bible with anything not specially religious as the Bible under
stands that idea.2 The Hebrew and Christian sacred The real pur-
books contain some marvelous examples of the beautiful, revelation
and even of the sublime, in literary style ; but we do not the Bible.
study the Bible specificaUy for this. The same books are a principal
source of information concerning the ancient history, manners, and
customs of certain oriental peoples; but our chief interest in the
1 Isa. i, 10-16, and elsewhere. s The term " religion" is almost wholly nonbiblical.
33

470 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Bible is not in this. These writings give us utterances with ref
erence to many matters of physical science; but the devout man
does not go to the Bible for these.
Nor would the religious reader of the Bible prize less the reUgious
revelation contained in those records were his confidence shaken in
their literary, historical, or scientific worth. It is an additional cause
for gratification, and even of sacred wonder, to be convinced that the
Bible treatment of its multifarious themes is correct. But when the
reader finds his sins rebuked ; his approach to God for forgiveness
encouraged ; his sense of moral feebleness met with promises of divine
assistance ; his consciousness of the need of divine f eUowship satis
fied with the assurance that God, though unseen, walks with men ;
his longing for eternal lUe fed on the blessed certainty that Jesus
Christ brought Ufe and immortaUty to Ught, it matters but Uttle to
him whether the Book of Jonah is history or, like Bunyan's Pil
grim's Progress, fiction for religious uses ; whether the writer of
Matthew believed bis genealogy of Jesus absolutely correct or whether
he purposely arranged it in three artificial groups of fourteen genera
tions each ; or whether the bUnd man was restored to sight at the en
trance to or at the exit from Jericho ; or whether any or none of the
numerous alleged discrepancies and errors of the Bible can be ex
plained away. The comfortable f eeling that God is our Creator and
Benefactor is not destroyed by the suggestion that perhaps he did
not create us suddenly out of a quantity of Uteral dust gathered from
some definite portion of the surface of the earth, but graduaUy,
through constantly differentiated forms of sentient Ufe. In any case
we are the sons of "Adam, which was the son of God."
But not only is the revelation contained in the Bible specificaUy
religious (including the ethical element), the Bible is the record of a
revelation progressively bestowed. This statement is not identical
The Bible the with an assertion of the truth of the modern critical
reTfat fo* theory of the origin of the Old Testament writings. That
Pvefyebe theory may or may not be true. If it is true it shows
stowed. the progressiveness of which we speak in a somewhat
clearer light than can be obtained by the ordinary view. The Umits
of this book forbid an examination of the question. It belongs to the
department of Biblical Introduction, and has been ably treated in
favor of the traditional side by one of the contributors to this library. '
We have already given some reasons why revelation to man must
1 Professor Henry M. Harman, Introduction to the Holy Scriptures, Fourth Edition,
New York, 1884.

The Uiblical Kevelation. 471
be progressive.1 Here we shall emphasize the fact that, according to
the Bible, the revelation it contains was given principally in connec
tion with the history of the people through whom it was communi
cated to the world. As far as the Old Testament is concerned it is
chiefly a record of the deaUngs of God with the nation of Israel, or
with individuals or tribes of that nation, under the vicissitudes of
their national Ufe induced by their own actions, or by their relations
to surrounding peoples, or by God himself. The conception of God in
the Old Testament was, therefore, given mostly in connection with
these vicissitudes. No one of them, nor all of them combined, afforded
God an opportunity of revealing himself fully to humanity. But more
and more his nature and character, and his relation to mankind, came
out in clear hght. Much of this was due, indeed, not to any fixed
purpose of God, but rather to the inabiUty of man to receive at first
the pure truth. The difficulty was not in the willingness or abiUty of
God, but in the tendency of men to misapprehend or to forget the les
sons he gave them. This same difficulty is no less apparent in the first
disciples of Christ than in the early recipients of the revelation con
tained in the Old Testament. The disciples did not fairly get the
thought of the nature and mission of Jesus until after his resurrection
and ascension. As was pointed out in the Introduction to this work,
knowledge can be attained only when the recipient of any piece of in
formation rightly conceives the facts as they exist.
The result was that men attributed to God what he never did, and
thought of him in ways unworthy of his holiness. And by the faflure
of many readers to distinguish between God's revelation Human misun-
and man's apprehension — between the divine and the hu- ofrSreveaifd
man elements — God has been represented as repenting, faots-
and lying, and even as deliberately planning to deceive. That God
never revealed himseU as erring or false is perfectly certain. AU such
representations of God, even though coming professedly from proph
ets approved of God, are part of the revelation only in the sense that
revelation implies both a revealer and a receiver.2 Each conception
of God was, therefore, of necessity, subject to modification by a sub
sequent revelation, and not until the final revelation in Jesus Christ
was the entire fact made known to the world. Every conception of
God must now be brought to the test of the teachings of Jesus Christ.
In like manner, only more strikingly, the revelation was progressive
1 On the progressive character of revelation comp. Fisher's The Nature and Method of
Revelation, New York, 1890, chap. ii.
' Comp. Christlieb's Modern Doubt and Christian Belief, p. 95.

472 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
on its ethical side. Ethical practice lagged behind the ethical ideal ;
and this latter, which might have been expected to keep pace, lagged
behind the revelation of the character of God. This is particularly
evident in studying the idea of God's holiness as conceived by the
prophets (such as Isaiah), and by the Jews in the time of Christ, and
by comparing these ideas of God with the moral practices prevalent
among those who held them. But the ethical ideal, which is pecul
iarly an object of revelation in the Bible, is there portrayed as having
developed graduaUy. Nor could it be otherwise. Anyone who has
attained to middle Ufe can look back to his boyhood and see how, from
that time onward, his conceptions of right and wrong have been cor
rected or strengthened. What appeared sin in youth appears more
sinful to the man of mature years. This is true in aU cases except
those in which artificial views of sin were imbibed in chfldhood. As
a wise teacher, therefore, God adapted his instruction to his pupils.
Some of them were capable of gaining a clearer conception both of
him and of duty, and these became the leaders and prophets among
the people. But even they had their treasure in earthen vessels ; and
at times they not only tolerated, but themselves practiced wrong. As
with the revelation of the nature and character of God, so on the eth
ical side we have the truth in its completeness, both as to precept and
practice, first in Jesus Christ.
But whfle the revelation was gradual, because of the necessity of
adapting it to the capacities of men, it is nevertheless true that at each
At each stage stage it was in advance of human attainment. Only thus
t h e reveia- could it be progressive and at the same time educative,
advance o f which was its real purpose. The proof of this must be
human at- ,,.,, .-,...•<¦ , ¦
tainment. postponed for the present, but it is found m a comparison
of the Jewish moral ideal with that of other nations. Here it is suf
ficient to point out the fact. Whenever we may suppose the so-called
Ten Commandments to have been given, it is perfectly evident that
they are far beyond the average practice of mankind even at the pres
ent day. Much more is this true of the ethical revelation in Jesus
Christ ; for his was a revelation of required character as weU as of
conduct, behind which the race is following at a slow pace. And not
only in practice, but also in comprehension are we stfll making prog
ress. Jesus will lead the world in its apprehension of the ethical
ideal for a long while to come.
These general facts illustrate something of the method of revelation
as well as furnish in some degree, in advance, the evidence that the
religious and ethical elements of the Bible were really revealed.

Limitations and Effect of Old Testament Revelation. 473

CHAPTER VI.
limitations and effect of the old testament revelation.
It has been objected to a written revelation, such as we have in the
Old and the New Testaments, that since the sacred books of other relig
ions also profess to afford a revelation it is unfair to admit the correct
ness of the claim for the Hebrew and Christian writings and deny it for
all others. But, first, we do not deny that there has been a degree and
kind of revelation to others than the Hebrews. There is Tne superior
nothing in our faith to require such a denial ; rather is it Biblical rev-
demanded that we shaU think of God as having given a elation-
degree of Ught to aU peoples, even apart from and subsequent to the
primitive revelation.1 What is claimed is that theother religions either
have such a preponderance of error in amount, or else that their rul
ing ideas are so vicious that they must be designated as false in con
trast with the Hebrew as true ; though this does not mean that the
Hebrew reUgious ideas were in aU respects correct, nor that the ideas
of other nations included no truth. The superiority of the Hebrew
conception of God and the world to that of other peoples is evident to
aU who have made the comparison." The same is true with reference
to the revelation concerning morals.3 Unless, therefore, one should
deny aU revelation we must admit that at least one of the professed
revelations is true. And no one who beheves in a personal God can
doubt that he has revealed himself, and with himself all other truth
necessary to our reUgious welfare. If we are caUed upon to choose
between the various religions there can be no hesitation. Hence this
difficulty is easily met.
More serious is the objection that God would not limit his revelation
to a single people, thus exhibiting an unworthy partiaUty. Says John
Stuart Mill : ' ' There is one moral contradiction, insepara- Mill on the ap-
ble from every form of Christianity, which no ingenuity tianty^of
can dissolve and no sophistry explain away. It is that Jews.
so precious a gift, bestowed on a few, should have been withheld
1 Mead, Supernatural Revelation, p. 64. a Beyschlag, Leben Jesu, vol. I, p. 25.
3 No one will accuse Professor Huxley of prejudice in favor of the Old Testament, yet
he says : " There is no code of legislation, ancient or modern, at once so just and so mer
ciful, so tender to the1 weak and poor, as the Jewish law."— Agnosticism and Christianity,
p. 200.

474 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
from the many ; that countless mfllions of human beings should have
been allowed to live and die, to sin and suffer, without the one thing
needful — the divine remedy for sin and suffering — which it would have
cost the Divine Giver as little to have vouchsafed to aU as to have be
stowed by special grace upon a favored minority." * As a matter of
fact the divine remedy for sin was vouchsafed to aU in Jesus Christ.
Any revelation of God to man must be bestowed under conditions of
time and space. Unless Jesus had Uved, suffered, and died in the
presence of every man God could not have done better than he did ;
and had such a scheme been proposed, even that would have required
time. That the Church of Jesus has not at aU periods of its history
understood and performed its duty in carrying the good tidings to
every soul of man is attributable to human stupidity and selfishness ;
it does not prove that a revelation could have been given under any
conditions more favorable to an immediate pubUcation to aU the
world. The zeal and activity, in this respect, of the early Christians
afford no occasion for censure.
If the revelation in Christ had to be bestowed under conditions of
time and space, there can be no criticism in the choice of the Jewish
people in the land of Palestine at the time selected. Time, place,
people, were well chosen. But since revelation must be progressive,
the time could not well have been earUer, and we must beUeve that
God proceeded wisely in making the Hebrew people the depository
The Jews well °f nIS special revelatory providence. For the coming of
become3 the Christ the world had to be prepared ; or, rather, for the re-
aTevrtation ception of the truth he brought and the work he accom-
from God. pushed. Since Jesus could not Uve and die everywhere
at once, God prepared one special people for his advent, that among
them he might live and die, and that from them might go out the mes
sengers of his truth. The Jews were not selected because they were to
be specially or arbitrarily favored, but because they were peculiarly
adapted to his purposes. They misunderstood his design, and regarded
his manifestations of himself to them as a token that they were the
favorites of heaven. Yet they did not all so fail ; and, whether inten
tionally or not, the Jews did make known to other peoples some of the
precious truths which had been committed to their care. That not
more of it was lodged in their hearts and minds was due, at least in
part, to their national religious prejudices. Thus it appears that the
plan of selecting one people to whom to impart revealed truth was, in
1 Three Essays, p. 115. See this point ably treated in Bruee's Chief End of Revelation,
London, 1881, pp. 105 ff.

Limitations and Effect of Old Testament Revelation. 475
view of the crowning act of revelation which was to be given in the
Son of God, not only a wise method, but the only method which could
have been wisely employed.
As the Jewish people were not the only nation to whom religious
truth was imparted subsequent to the primitive revelation, so they
were not the only people who were in some way prepared Preparation
L 1 ii • • n * , , , , •, ,. °f other na-
to become the recipients and propagators of the truth of tions for the
Jesus Christ. It has been often pointed out that the roads the Gospel.
built by the Romans in many parts of the empire, though not of the
best, in our modern sense of excellence, were yet so superior to all that
had been before known as to render them available for purposes of
travel, thus literally preparing the way of the Lord. The unitary
government of Rome made the Gospel heralds equaUy safe wherever
they journeyed. The general diffusion of the Greek language afforded
a common and excellent medium of communication with all the prin
cipal races and tribes. But, what was even more important, the moral
and religious conditions in the Gra3co-Roman world were favorable for
the rapid spread of Gospel principles. In practice the ethical condi
tions were indeed bad enough ; but theoretically men prized virtue as
seldom, if ever, before in the history of the world. When the lofty
moraUty of Jesus was proclaimed to men, therefore, they were rather
pleased than displeased : and when they saw this morality exemplified
in the lives of its adherents they were convinced that here was no
mere theory, but, in reality, also a power for righteous conduct. There
was, also, at this time a favorable reaction from the contempt in which
religion had for a time been held. Men believed in reUgion, though
the bands which held them to their own national religion had been
loosened by the breaking down of national prejudices through the
combination of many nations in the one empire and by the presence in
all the principal centers of population of adherents of various religions,
assembled for purposes of trade. This destruction of bigotry made it
possible for any new religion to procure a hearing if the law did not
interfere. So that it is as true of the Grffico-Roman in general as of
the Jewish world in particular that Jesus came to it in the fullness of
time.1 It is impossible to believe that all this preparation for the
preaching of the Gospel was not providentially designed and executed.
1 For an excellent and scholarly treatment of religious conditions in the Roman empire
during the centuries prior and subsequent to the advent of Christ see the Keligionsge-
schichte of P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Freiburg i. B., 1889, Zweiter Band, pp. 250-
297. A new edition, to which we have not access, was issued in 1896-97. See also Jean
Reville, La Religion a Rome sous les Severes, Paris, 1886. Reville and Saussaye hold
essentially the same views as to the point here referred to.

476 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
The aUeged partiality of God for the Jews, therefore, has no founda
tion in fact.
It will not be necessary to give here an analysis of aU the reUgious
ideas of the Old Testament. For this we refer the reader to the nu
merous excellent works on Old Testament theology.1 What we are
chiefly concerned with is the relation of the revelation the Old Tes
tament contains to the revelation in Christ. That the former revela-
incompiete- tion is incomplete aU who believe in Jesus must affirm.
ness of the _ „ ., . , , , ...
revelation ExceUent as it is, and capable as many of its portions are
of the Old . . ^ ™. • *• j * • j
Testament, of expressing our present Christian doctrines and experi
ences, if it had been complete and perfect no revelation through Christ
would have been needed. But U it was not complete and perfect it
must have been defective and imperfect. This, many hesitate to ad
mit ; just why, it is difficult to discern. Anyone who wfll pause to
consider must concede that the idea of God in his relation to man is
more exalted and religiously precious in the New Testament than in
the Old. In the latter he is the king with absolute power, and he is
therefore in some measure an object of fear. In the former he is a
father whose character is so loving that he is an object of love. This
difference in our human attitude toward God under the Old and the
New Testament respectively is the direct result of the difference in the
revelation of himself. These two ideas of power and love are not mu
tually exclusive, and in the New Testament they are combined. But
the emphasis laid upon the former idea in the Old Testament proves
how defective is the revelation of God there found. Lest we be mis
understood, however, it is necessary that we should again remind the
reader that in reveaUng himself to man God must give what truth
man could receive, and what would be most useful to those who re
ceived it. Better to know only that God is power than, without the
ability to apprehend and utflize the revelation, to be told that he is
power and love. God's wisdom is displayed in nothing more certainly
than in the progressiveness of the revelation he has vouchsafed to
men. So far from asserting the infallibility of the Old Testament we should
its fallibility strongly emphasize the contrary. It is fallible in the sense
f rf|rtN e w that it contains (even though not by divine command) and
estament. gan^jQjjg precepts and practices which must be rejected as
positively wrong." The imprecatory psalms cannot be justified in the
1 One of the best Is Plepenbrlng's Theology of the Old Testament, New York, 1893, trans
lated by Professor H. G. Mitchell, of Boston University.
3 On this whole subject of the Infallibility of the Bible comp. Mead, Supernatural Kev
elation, pp. 342 ff.

Limitations and Effect of Old Testament Revelation. 477
light of the teachings of Jesus. If the principles of love toward all,
including our enemies, which Jesus enunciated and practiced are bind
ing, then the imprecatory spirit of the authors of some of the psalms
is wrong. Jesus expUcitly says that Moses gave the Old Testament law
of divorce on account of the hardness of the hearts of the people with
whom he had to deal.1 That law Jesus abrogated ; and in its place he
gave another of a much stricter type. The law of retaliation, as stated
in various passages in the Old Testament, was also abrogated by our
Lord.2 These are specific instances, to which others might be added.
But when we find the writers of the New Testament distinctly assert
ing that the first covenant was not faultless, else there would have
been no place for the second,3 all questioning must come to an end.
And the writer of Hebrews interprets Jer. xxxi, 31-34, as showing that
away back, even in Old Testament times, the inadequacy and imper
fection of the earlier revelation were recognized.4
In the face of all these facts Christians cannot afford to bear the
burden of everything which the Old Testament contains. Many of
the practices of the worthies of that time are intolerable in the light
of the Christian revelation, and excusable only because in those days
the knowledge of the truth was less complete than it is to-day.
The principal objection to the admission that the Old Testament in
culcates or tolerates practices, religious and moral, which are not
aUowable from the Christian standpoint is that it seems to make God
the revealer of error as though it were truth and righteousness. And
it is easy to ask, If God did that in the Old Testament times, how do
we know that his revelation in the New Testament wiU not also some
time appear to contain error ? To this it must be replied, in the first
place, that as Christians we dare not, at the peril of contradicting
Christ and the New Testament writers, and of making everything in
the Old Testament equal in binding force to the contents of the New,
deny the assertion controverted in the above question. If we wish to
side with Jesus we must unhesitatingly affirm that the Old Testament
distinctly provided for religious and moral practices which would be
sinful to-day. But, again, in reply to the above question, it must be
said that as Christians we foUow the teachings of Christ, To the chris-
and we judge everything religious and moral in the ofchri^Ms
light of him. We do not, as Christians, feel ourselves the criterion-
bound by any other standard of authority. If anything anywhere
contradicts him we reject it. This because we are Christians. And
1 Matt, xix, 8. 3 Comp. Matt, v, 38, with Exod. xxi, 24 ; Lev. xxiv, 20, and Deut. xix, 21.
8 Heb. viii, 7 ; comp. also chaps, ix, 9, 10 ; vii, 18, 19 ; x, 1, 2. * Heb. viii, 8.

478 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
U anyone should contend that those things in the Old Testament
which Jesus condemns were not revealed by God at all he would still
not have to deny any revelation to the Old Testament, for there is
much there that Jesus confirms.
Besides, one who pauses to consider the purpose of revelation,
namely, instruction, wiU see how inevitably the instruction must be
adapted to the capacities of the learners. We have referred to this
before, and it wiU not need much additional enforcement here. With
reference to morals, all who have had experience know that the rela
tively right may be the highest conception of which a person is
capable. To bring one up to this plane of the relatively right may
be the only practical procedure. Yet, in the light of a perfect stand
ard, the relatively right may be a positive wrong. The problem
which God had before him was the elevation of a race sunken in
sin. To any practical mind it wfll plainly appear that, U in the
process of this elevation God provided for something above the lowest
though below the highest ideal, he did not thereby give bis sanction to
the wrong nor stamp it as the right, even for a short period of time.
If God provided for them he must be supposed to have done so, not as
Ueing contented therewith, but as regarding them the best attainable
at the time. As far as the temporary reUgious provisions are con
cerned they had their place and use. It would be sinful to-day for a
Christian to offer animals in sacrifice, because Christ is our aU-suffi-
cient sacrifice. But, as typUying him, as impressing the iU desert of
•sin, and, in general, as satisfying in some measure the religious
nature, the sacrificial and ceremonial system of the Old Testament
performed a useful function.
Whfle Jesus and the writers of the New Testament generaUy con
cede the imperfection of the Old Testament they nevertheless main-
The Old Tes- *am that i* accomplished the purposes for which it was
compushed designed.1 This is, in particular, the doctrine of Paul in
its purpose. jlig iettel. t0 tne Qalatians, though it is almost equally
marked in Romans. The law was a schoolmaster to bring us to
Christ, and the law developed the sense of sin. But when we con
sider that the Old Testament contains many of the fundamental ideas
of the Christian religion its office in preparing the way for Christ will
be still more clear. Now, the Bible is not, in any of its parts, an end,
but a means. Indeed, this may be said even of revelation, as distin
guished from the record of it. It must therefore be judged as a
means. If it accomplishes its purpose it is worthy of aU honor. Be-
1 Mead, Supernatural Revelation, p. 347 f.

Limitations and Effect of Old Testament Revelation. 479
cause the Old Testament is superseded in some measure by the New
we should not discard the Old, for it is not to be forgotten that it was
one of God's instruments. As it is unreasonable to censure, because
it is not ideaUy perfect, any means which answers its ends, so it is
absurd to discard the Old Testament because its moral and religious
standpoint has been in some respects overtaken and superseded. In
aU those many particulars in which it stands the clear light of the
teachings of Christ it is as valuable as ever, and to that extent the Old
Testament wfll be a permanent element in the religious Ufe of the
world. But, more than this, the Old Testament has some advantages for the
religious Ufe which even the New cannot afford. In the first place it
offers us the means of studying the process of revelation. Again, it
provides us the record of a long history of God's dealings with nations
and individuals ; it is not too much to say that in this regard the New
Testament is relatively lacking. Besides, the Old Testa- superiority,
ment furnishes us, particularly in the Psalms, an elevated spects.of the
and appropriate expression of many of the profoundest ment.
religious feelings and experiences without which the Christian would
be poor indeed. As long as we need a Bible at all we shall need the
Old Testament portion of it. As a final quaUty in favor of the Old
Testament, making it worthy of the love of all Christians, it should
be mentioned that without it the New could not be clearly under
stood — either historically, ethicaUy, or religiously. Its facts are a key
with which to unlock the New Testament storehouse of truth. The
contents of the Old Testament furnish background for the divine pic
ture given us in the New. Therefore it must be said that it not only
did its work, but that it is stfll doing a work which is absolutely
necessary to the welfare of Christianity. It has not merely an his
torical but also a present interest and value. It is the record of a part
of the revelation of God to man. It must be cherished and honored
as such. '
1 Row has some excellent remarks on the relation of the Old Testament to Christianity
as a revelation.— Revelation and Modern Theology Contrasted, chap. iv.

480 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION H.-CHRIST THE CHIEF SOURCE OF REYELATION.
CHAPTER I.
THE doctrine of inspiration.
When we turn to the revelation contained in the New Testament
we are confronted with the clear distinction between the utterances
of Christ and the New Testament writers. It is very certain that we
cannot attach as much importance to those who write about Jesus as
to Jesus himself. There is, however, in some quarters a disposition to
regard the apostoUc writers as equaUy important with Jesus as re-
vealers of divine truth. It is affirmed that since those writers were
inspired by the Holy Spirit they must have been possessed of the same
truth which Jesus would have uttered. Now, we have no disposition
to deny the divine inspiration of the writers of the New Testament,
but we assert on the authority of Jesus that the promise of inspiration
pertained principaUy to himself. Speaking of the work of the Spirit,
who should guide them into aU truth, he said, "He (the Holy Spirit)
shall teach you aU things, and bring all things to your remembrance,
whatsoever I have said unto you."1 "He shall glorify me; for he
shaU receive of mine, and shall show it unto you." 3 Their inspira
tion, therefore, was not mainly for the purpose of carrying on a reve
lation begun by Jesus Christ, but to fit them for the work of proclaim
ing him and his truth to others, whether orally or in writing.
The chief importance of the New Testament writers is, then, that
they give us the portrait and the utterances of Jesus. He is primary ;
they are secondary. The revelation was through him ; they record
and interpret it for us. For this important work they unquestionably
needed and received supernatural enUghtenment. We need not won
der that up to the very close of his ministry they misunderstood his
mission and fafled to comprehend its significance. Jesus was so dif
ferent from ordinary men that it was difficult for them to break
through their usual method of interpreting mankind, in accordance
with their own nature, sufficiently to see him as he was and catch the
correct meaning of his words. To secure this result time was required.
But the presence in their hearts of the Spirit of Jesus himseU was also
¦ John xiv, 26. « Ibid., xvi, 14.

The Doctrine of Inspiration. 481
necessary to the understanding of Jesus. They could not comprehend
him until they were at least in some measure like him. And it is
probable that this moral illumination was supplemented by an aid
granted to the intellects of these (for the most part) simple-minded
men. It may be weU, at this point, to enter a little more fully into the
fact and nature of the inspiration vouchsafed to the apostles. In gen
eral it must be said that the men, and not their writings, are declared
by the Bible to be inspired. Indeed, it is impossible for a The men, not
writing to be inspired, though a man may be inspired to inspired.
write. And such seems to be the idea of 2 Pet. i, 21, which de
clares that holy men of old spoke as they were moved by the Holy
Ghost. The words of 2 Tim. iii, 16, however translated, appear to
prove the contrary ; but this only on the surface. For the passage
really signifies, not that the writings are inspired in the sense that
the words were dictated by the Spirit, or even the subject-matter,
but that the contents breathe a divine quaUty; the truth is divine;
they are God-breathed. Otherwise expressed, the words translated
"divinely inspired," or "given by inspiration of God," refer not to
the origin of the Scriptures, but to their quality.
Our only true source of information with reference to the inspira
tion of the New Testament writers must be gathered from the New
Testament itself — its direct statements on that subject, or other of its
contents which warrant inferences relative thereto. No one has
more strongly developed the impossibihty of our being able to judge
a priori what kind or what degree of inspiration God would grant to
those who were chosen to record his revelation than Bishop Butler, in
the third chapter of the second part of his immortal Analogy. Canon
Row J has summarized Butler's views in nine propositions, as foUows :
" 1. As a priori principles are inadequate guides to the knowledge
of the reaUties of the universe ; and as they lead us when we yield
ourselves to their guidance, to erroneous views of its Summarv of
actual constitution, so they must be equaUy invaUd £j!?°p J5ut"
guides as to what must be the contents of a revelation, or tsttmates°of
the mode of its communication. inspiration.
"2. They afford us no reliable information respecting the amount
of knowledge which God would be pleased to communicate in any
given revelation, supposing that it has been his pleasure to impart
one. "3. We are equaUy unable to determine what method he would
1 Christian Evidences Viewed in Relation to Modern Thought, pp. 438-440.

482 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
employ in the communication of such knowledge; and by conse
quence we are ignorant of the nature and extent of the divine assist
ance which would be imparted to those who would be employed in its
communication. Of only one thing have we a priori certainty, that,
U God gives a revelation, it will realize the divine purposes in giv
ing one ; but the precise nature of those purposes we can only learn
from the contents of the revelation itseU.
"4. We have no means of deternnning in what degree or propor
tion supernatural illumination would be afforded ; and consequently
our a priori knowledge fails to enable us to determine to what extent
an element of human frailty would be permitted to underhe the
record of that revelation.
"5. EquaUy invalid is our a priori knowledge to determine how
far, or in what way, ' God would interpose miraculously to quaUf y
those to whom he should impart a revelation for communicating the
knowledge of it to others, or to insure their transmission of it to
others.' "6. We are equally ignorant, U a revelation were communicated,
whether the record of it would be committed to writing or left to be
handed down and, consequently, ' corrupted by verbal tradition and
at length sink under it, U mankind so pleased.'
"7. We are equally ignorant as to the degree in which 'obscurity
or inaccuracy of style, or various readings, or disputes about the
authors of particular parts of it, or any other thing of the Uke kind,'
would become mixed up with its contents ; and consequently we have
no right to assume that the presence of such things is inconsistent
with the idea that the book which contains them also contains the
record of a divine revelation.
"8. If it be objected that the presence of such imperfections would
be inconsistent with the purpose of God in communicating a revela
tion, the answer is that we have no knowledge of what the divine
purpose is beyond the facts of a given revelation ; and that such facts
(be they what they may) are certain to be consistent with those pur
poses. Hence the only mode of forming any theory as to the nature
and extent of the inspiration that guided the human authors of the
Bible must be by a careful investigation of its contents.
" 9. The only mode in which our knowledge of the contents of a
revelation can receive enlargement is by careful study of its facts
and phenomena, in precisely the same way as we acquire increased
knowledge of the universe; and there is no valid a priori objection
against the possibility of such increase in knowledge."

The Doctrine of Inspiration. 483
This is a somewhat formidable array of propositions in support of
the simple assertion that the Bible alone can furnish the facts upon
which to base an opinion as to the nature and extent of the inspira
tion accorded the New Testament writers; and these are rendered
more formidable by the great name of Butler. But they are aU
needed, and Butler's name besides, to prevent our being overcome in
these days by a disposition to bring a theory of inspiration to the
Bible rather than to find such a theory there.
If, however, the considerations just noted vindicate the right and
enforce the duty of seeking in the Bible itself for the nature of the
inspiration of its writers it must be remembered that, along with the
right and duty, there is the obligation to be extremely cautious in
their exercise. The task of defining inspiration from xhe obligation
facts presented in the Bible is by no means easy ; and o£ ca™lon-
some of us are tempted to omit the formulation of a general theory.
In fact, it is doubtful whether the Bible suggests any definite theory
applicable alike to all parts of the book, as was the verbal theory.1
The time was when the verbal or mechanical theory held almost uni
versal sway among theologians. To-day it is not so. The absence of
any theory which can lay claim to general acceptance is one of the
striking features of the theology of our time. We find it much
simpler to say what inspiration is not than what it is. The only
thing for which we here plead is mutual patience and forbearance
during the discussion of the subject. We should not too severely
censure those who have discovered the untenabflity of the old theory
but who have as yet no definite theory to offer in its place.
If it be true that Jesus is the great source of revelation we are con
cerned for the inspiration of the New Testament writers only so far
as to assure ourselves that they correctly represented the grand facts
of his lUe, character, and mission. We need not assert, nor need we .
deny, error in the New Testament. It is sufficient U, taking the New
Testament as a whole, it gives us the information we need and the
incentive desired relative to the way of lUe. If the ut- Tne jnfaiijDji.
terances of the New Testament writers are not in all cases New°Testa^
inspired, as Paul confesses they are not,2 does that mili- ™entinaieto
tate against the truth they do utter ? Should it be object- {^ }£c*Jj£
ed that we are notified when the utterances are not reve- tams'
lations, it must be repUed that Paul did not always know for a certainty
whether he was communicating a fact revealed by the Spirit.3 But,
1 Comp. Row's Christian Evidences Viewed in Relation to Modern Thought, p. 452 f.
* For example, 1 Cor. vii, 12 » Ibid., verse 40.

484 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
even if aU the writers of the New Testament professed to be always
under the inspiring influence of the Spirit, stfll they themselves dis
tinctly teach us to try the spirits, whether they be of God,1 thus
placing upon us, as readers of the Bible, the burden of determining
for ourselves the divine origin of every professed revelation. This is
an obligation from which we cannot release ourselves by the assump
tion that there are no errors in the holy book. And, although the
writers of the Bible give us the criteria by which we can judge of the
divine origin of any portion of the Scripture, yet we are the ones who
must employ those criteria. It wfll be noticed that Jesus Christ is
made the standard ; and U we study him and grow in the knowledge
of him we shall be able to detect any error into which any of the New
Testament writers may be supposed to have faUen.
The purport of aU this is not to assert nor even to intimate a behef
that there are errors touching religious truth in the New Testament,
but to show any who think they have found such that, unless they
find nothing there but error, they are bound by the truth, notwith
standing some error. Because inspiration did not prevent the ex
pression of some mistaken opinions we are not released from the
obligation to obey the mandates of Jesus and to live according to his
spirit. The same thing would hold even with reference to Jesus him
self. Were it supposed that he had made mistakes in some things,
still the evident truth he brought must be accepted and heeded. The
discovery of fallibility in a teacher causes us to lose confidence in him
only in case we have yielded ourselves whoUy to him, refraining from
any exercise of our own judgment. But, as we have seen, this we
are distinctly taught in the New Testament not to do. Jesus himseU
gave criteria by which the true prophets could be distinguished from
the false.' In fact, Christianity, being a religion of the inner Ufe,
cannot but require the individual to know for himself, since it presup
poses investigation, reflection, conviction. When we put ourselves
into such an attitude toward the Bible we can reject what seems
false, and yet, foUowing the apostoUc precept, hold fast that which
is good.
We have not thought it relevant, though it might have gratified
the curiosity of some, to enter into a discussion of the actual Umita-
tions of inspiration as revealed by a study of the Bible itseU. For our
purposes it is sufficient to prevent, U possible, the attempt to force a
theory of inspiration upon the Bible which it does not itself suggest,
and to show that, U we occupy the attitude toward revelation which
1 1 John iv, 1. a Matt, vii, 15-20 ; comp. John x, 9-12.

The Doctrine of Inspiration. 485
Jesus and the apostles would have us occupy, we shall not be stag
gered in our confidence in the revelation the Bible affords by the
apparent discovery of error in the book. Such as desire fuller discus
sion are referred to the many excellent treaties on this subject. ]
We cannot see the importance in the fact of inspiration — except in
so far as inspiration is identical with revelation, or a divine commu
nication to man — which some attach to it. Inspiration is generally
supposed to affect the record, but the revelation is prior The real ad-
to the record. It would be an advantage to the New Tes- inspiration.
tament writers to be inspired only in order that they might the more
accurately give us the revelation they received. But inspiration would
be as necessary to protect the recipients of revelation from misappre
hending the truth revealed as to enable them to communicate it, and
even more necessary. For, on the supposition that the Bible contains
a real revelation, uninspired human beings are stiU charged with the
duty of preaching the truth it affords, so that neither for the commu
nication nor the reception (understanding) of the revelation is inspira
tion an absolute necessity. Professor Ladd well says that " the evi
dence for the inspiration of the authors can never equal the evidence
for the authenticity of their history." * Therefore we are not depend
ent upon the fact of inspiration for the proof of revelation.8 Never
theless, it is proper here to bring out some of our reasons for beheving
that a divine fllumination, commonly caUed inspiration, was granted
to the writers of the New Testament such as was not granted to the
Christian writers of any subsequent age.*
1 We recommend Row, Revelation and Modern Theology Contrasted, chap, vi ; and the
same author's Christian Evidences Viewed in Relation to Modern Thought, Lect. viii;
also, Mead, Supernatural Revelation, chaps, ix and x.
* The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture : an Inquiry into the Nature of the Old and New
Testaments, New York, 1883, vol. ii, p. 674.
8 Comp. Mead's Supernatural Revelation, pp. 281-283. Dr. William Nast recognized that
the fact of a revelation in Christ was independent of the doctrine of inspiration. See his
The Gospel Records, p. 305.
* W. Sanday's invaluable treatise should be consulted for full information on the origin
and nature of the doctrine of inspiration. It Is entitled Inspiration: Eight Lectures on
the Early History and Origin of the Doctrine of Biblical Inspiration. Being the Bampton
Lectures for 1893. London, 1893. See especially, Lect. viii.
33

486 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
THE FACT OF INSPIRATION.
The first evidence to be adduced is the claim that for other than
purposes of personal holy living the early Christians had the aid of
u , , a ? ,o„0„t, the Holy Spirit. This is seen in the so-caUed charismata,
r irs i rtiaiSon *
t°haetietVhe or spiritual gUts, of which we find traces in so many
theteN e w localities that we must suppose them to have been corn-
were inspir- mon to au tne Churches. Paul gives an extensive Ust of
ed- them and an estimate of their relative value in 1 Cor.
xii and xiv. True it is that Paul valued these gUts in proportion as
they ministered to the edification of the Church and the winning of
men to Christ, and that he prized the ethical influences of the Spirit
above all others. l But we have the authority of this great apostle for
believing that, aside from the ethical, there were gUts of tongues, gov
ernments, interpretations of tongues and discerning of spirits, some of
which had a decidedly inteUectual as distinguished from an ethical
quality. It is probably a fact that even this inteUectual illumination
was specially available for purposes of practical reUgion and moral
conduct. But the point is that, if there was such an inteUectual illu
mination for the protection of the early Church from imposture and
to aid them in the development of their work, it is highly improbable
that it did not assist them in the true comprehension of the teachings.
of Jesus and in accurately recording them.
It is not necessary to discuss at length the question whether the in
fluence of the Spirit upon the writers of the Bible for the purposes of
their writing was specifically different from that granted to other
Christians of their time. Though Paul does not mention in his list of
charismata a gift which had to do with the writing of the sacred
books, yet it is improbable that for such a duty there was no special
provision. And indeed we must suppose that the gift of prophecy had
to do with this very work. Prophecy is not mere prediction, nor is it
mere oral utterance of reUgious truth, but it may be written as weU
as spoken. According to Paul prophecy was peculiarly edifying in
1 See Hermann Gunkel's critical study entitled, Die Wirkung des heillgen Gelstes nachi
der populilren Anschauung der apostollschen Zelt und nach der Lehre des Apostels-
Paulus, GSttlngen, 1888, pp. 62-110. Comp. also A. C. McGiffert's A History of Christian
ity in the Apostolic Age, New York, 1897, pp. 517-630, and 653 f .

The Fact of Inspiration. 487
the spoken form, and we must attribute to it a no less degree of im
portance when written. But since not aU had the gUt of prophecy
not all had the spiritual iflumination requisite to the writing of the
sacred books, which were to become to us what the spoken prophecy
was to the mass of beUevers in the days of the apostles. Without as
suming, then, that the writers of the New Testament were speciaUy
commissioned to perform the task they did perform, and without de
nying that each particular book of the New Testament was called out
by some concrete historical situation, we must suppose that some were
signaUy qualified, not only by natural endowment, but also by special
divine illumination, for the work which they did in the biographies,
histories, and epistles they wrote.
If it be objected that we have above affirmed that neither for the
reception nor the communication of a revelation was the special in
spiration a necessity, and that it is not probable God would inspire if
it Were not necessary, we reply that many things which are not nec
essary are highly desirable. That the writers of the The desirabii-
Bible could understand and communicate a revelation inspiration.
from God better with than without inspiration cannot be questioned.
And as God probably desired to make his revelation as apprehensible
as was consistent with the necessary limitations of the human mind
it is most likely that he would do exactly what has been claimed,
namely, provide for the special enlightenment of certain individuals —
among whom were the New Testament writers. If he did not render
them whoUy infallible it was because he could do this only by annihi
lating for the time their human limitations. In that case they would
have been superhuman, and the revelation given would have been
adapted to superhuman, not to human, beings.
Further, we find that some of the writers of the New Testament
claim a special divine authority for their utterances in the letters they
address to their correspondents or hearers. Paul in his letters and
John in the Apocalypse make this claim, and the speeches of Peter
recorded in the early chapters of the Acts of the Apostles leave the
impression that he had the consciousness of authority not born of seU-
confidence. That the claim is not specificaUy made by every writer
of the New Testament is by no means an evidence that Some New
only those who claim inspiration possessed it ; for, in view writers
of the prevalence of the prophetic gUt among the early spiration.
disciples, anyone who presumed to prophesy, whether by writing or by
oral utterance, thereby announced himself as having the divine fllu
mination. This accounts for the fact that it was not so much the divine

488 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
authority which was specificaUy noted as the occasional lack of it, or
uncertainty as to whether the writer at the time possessed it. ' The
objection that the writers speak as though they went about their work
the same as other men,3 and that they used processes of reasoning
just as other writers/ and therefore cannot be regarded as inspired, is
to be met with the reminder that, except on the theory that the writ
ers were mere instruments in the hands of the Holy Spirit, we have
no reason to question the human element in the writings of the Bible.
Inspiration was not intended to spare the writers the necessity of
gathering their material and of thinking through the problems which
were before them. If it had any function, which we beUeve it had, it
was to prevent them from making such mistakes as would start the
Church — which depended upon the New Testament writings for a
knowledge of Christ — on the wrong track.
There is one consideration which must convince any unprejudiced
mind that in some important sense the writers of the New Testament
were favored by a divine illumination not granted to any other
writers known to reUgious literature, not even excepting the writers
of the Old Testament. Let us suppose a commission composed of a
sufficiently large number, say one thousand men, of eminent ability,
the number and quality of the men affording us a guarantee that on
a total vote prejudice and idiosyncrasies would have no weight. Let
this commission examine and estimate the value of aU the Christian
literature of the world, eliminating and rejecting all that is not abso-
Superiority of Uitely essential to Christianity. What would be the
men teSto result ? Can anyone doubt that, if they were preserving
gious htera- 0Iuy that which is most fundamental and valuable, they
''""'' would preserve little, U any, besides the documents con
tained in the New Testament ? Few wiU be found to doubt this ; and
so we have in reality the result which such a commission would give us.
Every generation has had its great Christian writers, but it is almost
universafly conceded that even the most talented fail to measure up
to the New Testament standard. This is not because the New Testa
ment writers were notably better qualified for the work than their suc
cessors, for most of them proved by their literary style that they were
men of no extraordinary talents. Nor is it because they were more
godly and zealous than those who came after them, for in many ages
of the Church there have been those who fully equaled any of the
1 See passages in 1 Cor. vii and 2 Cor. xi, 17; Rom. iii, 5; vi, 19; Gal. 111,15.
3 For example, Luke, in Luke i, 1-3.
s Throughout Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews.

The Fact of Inspiration. 489
apostles in holiness and consecration. Nor can it be accounted for on
the ground that the writers of the New Testament were the original
recipients of the revelation, whfle we receive it at second hand ; for
on the whole they must have put into their writings their whole con
ception of the fundamentals of Christianity, so that we get from their
histories, letters, and other documents all that they had in their minds
and hearts.
It appears, then, that the diff erence between the religious writings
of the authors of the New Testament and those of men contemporary
with or subsequent to them consists in some external aid granted to
them and denied to others. We must suppose that in the order of
divine providence these men were guided in such a way that the
Church of the future ages should have as good a substitute for the
bodily presence of Christ as it was possible to give. For such an
end, as near as we can judge of God's manner of thought, we must
suppose he would be wflling to make special provision. Such a
provision is not only not unworthy of God but would naturally be
expected from all we otherwise know of him. There is, then, ex
ceUent reason to beUeve that, while Jesus is the true revelation, the
New Testament writers had a divine aid in recording and interpret
ing it for us.

490 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER in.
THE CLAIMS OF CHRIST — HIS PEEMUNDANE EXISTENCE.
In this chapter it is proposed to offer the beginning of an argument
which is to be continued through the remaining chapters of this
work. The facts presented can prove nothing less than that Jesus
Christ was, and was adequate to the necessities of, a revelation of
God to man. It is not here insisted upon that Jesus Christ was
divine, though we cannot personaUy infer anything else from the
facts under consideration. The plan we propose is simpler and less
pretentious, though we believe it will be more efficient than a bolder
undertaking would be; that is, it wfll carry conviction more com
pletely. Were we making an examination mto the nature of Christ
we should combine certain other facts with the facts to be presented
here, and from them conclude that Jesus had a divine element in his
nature. But, as a complete Christology is not essential to a beUef in
divine revelation through Christ, the facts will be employed chiefly in
regard to their relation to revelation.
The first of his claims which we shall mention is his premundane
existence. We quote from the Revised Version. "What then, U ye
His pre- should behold the Son of man ascending where he
e"xUistenncl was before?" (John vi, 62;) "Before Abraham was, I
claimed. am„ (John viii) 58) . «0 Father, glorify thou me with
thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world
was " (John xvii, 5) ; and, " Thou lovedst me before the foundation
of the world (John xvii, 24). On their face these passages appear to
teach plainly the premundane existence of Christ in the form of the
divine. This is the orthodox interpretation, which is generaUy ad
mitted to be correct even by those who deny the preexistence on
other grounds.1 Some, however, hold that John's gospel faithfully
reports the words of Christ, but deny the correctness of the orthodox
interpretation. So Beyschlag. Thus between them they raise two
questions ; one as to the trustworthiness of the report, and the other
as to the correctness of the interpretation.
1 For instance, Dr. Haupt, who, however, claims that the writer of John's gospel gave
the words of Christ a significance somewhat different from what Christ intended them to
convey. See Studien und Krltlken, 1887, vol. i. See alsoHarnack'sDogmengeschlchte,2
Autlage, Freiburg 1. B. 1888, vol. I, p. 90.

The Claims of Christ — His Premundane Existence. 491
There are two arguments by which the opposition has attempted to
overthrow the trustworthiness of John's report of Jesus's words. The
first is that U he had uttered them in the form given by John the
synoptists could not have failed to record them also. To this it
must be replied that it is a peculiarity of the gospel of Jonn.s g0Spel
John that it furnishes us almost aU that Jesus is reported most of htne
to have said concerning himself. If the many things of utterances
this kind which Jesus records are not genuine then we !farediSng
have practicaUy no knowledge of what Jesus thought of imse "
himself. It is improbable that Jesus gave no expression to his
thought of his origin, nature, mission, and character. It is also im
probable that expressions of this kind should not have been recorded
by some one. And further, it is improbable that such a series of
utterances regarding himself as John's gospel affords should have
been invented, or that they should have resulted from misunder
standing. Such a series could not seriously misrepresent the thought
of Christ. It is too extensive and self-consistent. Besides, if John
was one of a little inner circle who were closer to Jesus than others of
the twelve,1 and particularly if he was that disciple whom Jesus
loved,2 as is generally supposed, he would be the one best qualified
and most likely to know and accurately report what Jesus said of
himself. And even if John did not personaUy write the fourth gospel
it is generally conceded that it was at least written by one who knew
his thought of Christ, and so we may safely trust his report. Further,
while the synoptic gospels do not record any expressions relative to
the preexistence of Christ they say nothing to forbid it, and Paul, as
far as he is an authority on the person of Christ, is wholly in favor
of the preexistence. " And when such firm opponents of the pre-
existence as Beyschlag accept the essential trustworthiness of these
utterances we are confirmed in the opinion based on the evidence
given. The second argument referred to is closely connected with the first.
It is drawn from the fact that it was customary in the time of Christ
to attribute preexistence to all objects of considerable importance.
The Jewish apocalyptists and the rabbis attributed pre- The objection
existence to the patriarchs, Moses, the tabernacle in the istence was
wilderness, the temple, the city of Jerusalem, etc. Some- to ail im-
times, also, logic demanded the doctrine of preexistence. jects.
For example, in the Shepherd of Hermas it was argued that, since
the world was created for the sake of the Church, the Church must
1 See Matt, xii, 1, and Mark xiv, 32 , 33. ' John xiii, 23. » Phil. ii. 6.

492 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
have existed before the creation of the world.1 These apocalyptists
had, independent of any knowledge of Jesus Christ, in some cases
predicated preexistence of the Old Testament Messiah.2 Now it is
claimed that, whfle Jesus may have attributed preexistence to him
self in some sense, he did not do so in the sense in which the fourth
gospel represents it. If the late date of the gospel according to John
be accepted there might be room for the opinion that in the course of
time the words of Jesus came to be misunderstood, and that there
fore the report of them in John is not correct. But the difficulty
with this is that Paul teaches the preexistence in Philippians, which,
according to Harnack,3 was composed not later than 59 A. D., and ac
cording to JiiUcher during the (first) Roman imprisonment, * which is
not later than 64 A. D. Paul's beUef must have had a good founda
tion. He had a remarkably keen and discrirninating mind and was
not likely to have been deceived. Had the earliest disciples not be
lieved that Jesus taught his own preexistence Paul would not have
believed it. For in this he could not depend upon his power of cor
rect inference, as in some other things, but must have been de
pendent upon the testimony of those who had known and heard Jesus.
Had there been any flaw in the testimony he would have discovered
it quickly.
We may safely assume, then, that John correctly reports Jesus in
the words quoted above. Beyschlag, as we have said, and others teU
us that while there is no reason to doubt the report of Jesus's words
we must not interpret them to mean a literal preexistence, but that
they must be interpreted according to the Jewish conception. If this
be correct then Jesus had no other than an ideal preexistence. He
preexisted, not objectively, but only in thought. It is doubtless true
that in scriptural language little, U any, distinction is sometimes
made between subjective existence in thought and objective existence
in reality. In Eph. i, 4, Christians are declared to have been chosen
in Christ before the foundation of the world. Matt, xxv, 34, speaks of
the kingdom prepared for the followers of Christ from the foundation
of the world. Rev. xiii, 8, speaks of "The Lamb that hath been slain
from the foundation of the world," and xvii, 8, has the words,
"Whose name hath not been written in the book of life from the foun
dation of the world." These passages show that some things existed
or were done conceptually that had no other reaUty until later. This
1 See Visions, 1, 2, 4; 11, 4, 1. Comp. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, vol. 1, pp. 89, 90.
* Ibid. » Chronologic der Altchristlichen Litteratur, p. 71T.
* Einleitung In das Neue Testament, p. 80.

The Claims of Christ — His Premundane Existence. 493
fact is, so far, an argument in favor of the ideal interpretation of the
passages on which the doctrine of Christ's preexistence rests. Stfll,
since it does not foUow that because the distinction is not everywhere
made it is nowhere made, it wfll be necessary to examine each passage
by itself.
We examine them then one by one. John vi, 62: "What then if
ye should behold the Son of man ascending where he was before % "
Now, the Son of man did not exist merely in thought on Examination
earth. If he ascended where he was before he must as- upoifwiuch
cend in all his external reality. The plain intimation is 0fe chn'st's
that he was as real before he appeared on earth as he was encode-
when he lived among men or as he would be after he as- pen s-
cended. Beyschlag tries to escape the force of this by saying that the
term Son of man means the man Christ Jesus ; ' and that as it is not
pretended that Jesus's preexistence was in the form of man his pre
existence is not at all taught in this passage. But it is sufficient to
answer that the term Son of man cannot be understood exclusively
with reference to the man Jesus. It designates the person of Christ
as a whole, though sometimes, perhaps, chiefly in one aspect of his
mission. By " Son of man" he meant himself. It was as though he
had said, " What U ye should see me ascend where I was before ? "
John vifl, 58: "Before Abraham was, I am." Beyschlag admits
that this language expresses his consciousness of being the manUesta
tion of the eternal in time ; and that compared with Abraham he was
eternal.3 But unless he goes further, and admits that it also expresses
Jesus's recollection of a premundane existence, it can mean only that
Jesus was eternaUy significant, not that he was eternal. The natural
interpretation of the words makes him preexistent. To make them
express merely the thought that through him God manifested certain
eternal things is artificial. There is none of us of whom that much
could not be said.
John xvii, 5 : " O Father, glorify thou me with thine own seU with
the glory which I had with thee before the world was." In and of
itself it would be possible to understand the glory here spoken of as
existing in God's thought. And the attempt has been made to show
that such is the true interpretation. It is said that U Jesus had reaUy
existed in glory with God before the world was he need not have
asked for restoration to that state as a reward for what he had accom-
pUshed on earth. In fact, Jesus does not claim it as a reward. He
simply asks that, as his work is now done, the state of humiliation
1 Leben Jesu, vol. I, p. 208. ' Ibid, p. 205.

494 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
shaU end and the former state of glory be restored. To what glory was
he actually restored ? Not to a glory in the thought of God, for that he
never lost, and a glory merely in God's thought could not be changed
by any external conditions. He was restored to the real glory which
he had with God, which real glory could be, and was, lost by his
earthly humiliation. If it were merely a question of ideal glory and
humiliation then aU the apparent realities in Christ may be reduced
to a system of ideahties.
John xvii, 24: "Thou lovedst me before the foundation of the
world." If the other passages teach a real instead of an ideal pre
mundane existence this one wfll be aUowed to do so ; hence we need
not discuss it.
This examination has shown that, in order to satisfy the words of
Jesus upon which the premundane existence rests, they must be in
terpreted in such a way as to make him say by them, not only that
¦eternal facts were exhibited in him, but that he was eternal, and
therefore divine.
This makes the person of Christ a mystery. But are we never to
learn that mystery is no proof of unreality ? Some of the opponents
of our view admit the mystery of our Lord's seU-consciousness.1 And,
further, they make him conscious of what was no reality ; for they
admit that in his consciousness he was eternal, and then deny that he
was eternal. If we thus destroy the vaUdity of his seU-consciousness
with reference to his premundane existence we cannot escape a doubt
of its validity in general.
In closing this discussion it ought to be said that, though some
things exist ideaUy in God's thought which have as yet no eternal re
aUty, it is plain that when Jesus speaks of himseU as being with God,
or in the enjoyment of glory with God, we are to think of external
reality, not subjective ideality.
It is no part of our immediate purpose to consider the vaUdity of
Christ's claims. At present we are concerned to ascertain what they
were. But no one can fail to see the significance of the claim of pre
existence with God, from "before the foundation of the world," for
the knowledge of heavenly things requisite to a revelation of God to
man. It makes him adequate to a revelation in a sense in which no
other ever was. 1 Beyschlag, Leben Jesu, vol. I, p. 204.

Other Claims made by Christ. 495

CHAPTER IV.
OTHER CLAIMS MADE BY CHRIST.
Upon such a stupendous fact, carrying with it such complete quaU-
fication for his revelatory work, we might rest our entire case. But
it is unnecessary for us to do so, since Jesus made, U possible, even
greater claims. We mention next in order his assertion Tne right t0
of the right to forgive sin, of which there are several in- for6ive sin8-
stances. On one occasion his language was such as to warrant us in
saying that he claimed this right as one exclusively divine. To the
angry question, Who can forgive sins but God only ? he proceeded to
offer the proof of his right and power. ' Should anyone so turn his
words as to make them signify that the forgiveness of sin is not a pre
rogative exercised by Deity alone, stiU the meaning could not be that
every man, but only the Son of man, had that right along with
God. If the mysterious passage, John xx, 23, conferred upon those
apostles who were present the Uteral power to forgive sins, then Jesus
proves thereby that his power was coequal with God's in this respect,
since he delegated it to others.
It may not be amiss here to mention a peculiarity about the words
of forgiveness which Jesus spoke ; that is, that they seemed to satisfy
the consciences of those to whom he spoke them. There Jesus'snnique ?owcr over
he con-
sciences o f
assertion of the right to forgive which produced their men.
faith and caused them to go in peace. True it is that absolution
granted by a Roman Catholic priest satisfies the mind of the penitent,
but there are probably few Roman Catholic penitents so ignorant as
to believe that the priest has any other than a power of announcing
the forgiveness. No one claims that the priest can forgive. Jesus
did claim to forgive, and he made the impression upon people of at
least ordinary intelUgence that he had the power.
The unique relation to God involved in such authority is a stfll
further proof, then, of his qualifications as a revealer. One who
had the right to dispense pardon for sin, whether it was original or
divinely conferred, must have a practicaUy perfect knowledge of the
divine mind. 1 Matt, ix, 2-8; Mark II, 3-12; Luke v, 18-26.

496 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Several claims which Jesus made with reference to his relation to
the kingdom of God are weU adapted to display his qualifications
His relation to as a revealer. (1) Whfle all others must become sons
the kingdom „ _ , , „
of God. of God by means of a change of purpose, a turning
about, by becoming as Uttle children, by being born anew, he was the
Son of God without any such process. (2) AU others must become
sons of God, U at all, through him. No one knoweth the Father
"save the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal him."1 He
knows the Father by immediate communion with him; aU others
by his mediation. His relation to the Father was thus original (not
derived) and absolute ; since it is adequate to the task of bringing aU
others into the relation of sons. (3) In the same way aU others have
to receive the kingdom of God, whfle he brought it to the earth and
established it. (4) Jesus was conscious of being the divinely pre
destined Judge of the world. This could be only if aU bis thoughts of
the kingdom were the thoughts of God. The Judge of the world must
see all character and aU conduct as God sees them. If Jesus was
justified in thinking of his mission in relation to the kingdom of God
in this way he was eminently weU qualified to reveal the facts concern
ing the relation of God to man, of man to God, and of man to man.
We note also his assertions of equality with the Father. "If ye
had known me, ye should have known my Father also : and from
henceforth ye know him and have seen him." " Have I been so long
time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip ? He that hath
His claim of seen me hath seen the Father." * In these words he de-
not of iden- clares himself to be the complete and adequate revela-
Father. tion of the Father to men, not by his utterances concern
ing him, but by what he was. That is, he possessed and exhibited aU
the qualities of God which are necessary to a knowledge of him and
which can be revealed to man. If anyone should object that these
passages are from the aUeged unreliable Gospel of John we beg to
remind them that Matt, xi, 27, alleges that Jesus only was the
revealer of God. These passages simply give the method.
Again, " I and my Father are one."' Even if we admit that this
oneness of the Father and Jesus was one of feeling and purpose only,
and not of substance, stfll it suffices to exhibit the adequacy of our
Lord for his work of revelation.
If we have good reason for believing that aU or any of the claims of
Jesus here considered are well founded there can be no doubt as to the
1 Matt, xi, 27. » John xiv, 7, 9. » John x, 30.

Other Claims made by Christ. 497
completeness of the revelation he could have given to men. It ought
here to be emphasized that there is nothing which needs to be re
vealed to men which Jesus did not have means of knowing, and
which he did not know, U his claims are worthy of credit. • And as
Jesus spoke on all the questions pertaining to revelation we may
be sure that between what he was and what he taught we have the
facts, U we are convinced that his assertions concerning himseU are
within the limits of the truth. To the examination of the trustwor
thiness of Jesus's representations we now address ourselves.
1 On Christ's testimony concerning himself see Schaff's The Person of Christ, New
York, 1866, pp. 113-130.

498 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION Ill.-THE VALIDITY OF CHRIST'S CLAIMS-THE EVIDENCE
FROM HIS CHARACTER.
CHAPTER I.
HIS HUMILITY AND SINLESSNESS.
For our purposes it wfll be unnecessary to attempt a delineation of
the character of Jesus in all its completeness. Doubtless it was weU
balanced and beautUul; a worthy ideal for every member of the
human race. Still, for the purpose of exhibiting the trustworthiness
of Christ's claims, but two points in his character need to be estab
lished The first of them will demand but Uttle space. It is his humflity
and unselfishness. Notwithstanding aU that he claimed to be, and aU
the prerogatives he asserted, he does not leave the impression of being
The humility lifted up with pride. His claims, which would be most
fshnes sof extravagant in any other, appear to befit him ; they fall
Jesus. ^ ^^ ajj ^at is related of him. At the same time he is
portrayed as exceedingly meek and lowly ; never once do his stupen
dous assertions of authority or personal quaUty leave the impression
that he is striving to secure the esteem of mankind. On the other
hand, aU are affirmed in such connections as to carry with them the
invitation to the hearers to avail themselves of his services. He de
clares himself that men may know what he can do for them ; and all
his activities are devoted to the service of mankind.
Such is the portrait of him given in all the gospels, and it is im
possible to beUeve that it is the portrait of one who never lived. But
it also carries with it the inevitable conviction that he who claimed
so much, and was yet so humble and unselfish, must have been aU
that he claimed. He was too intelligent to have been deceived, and
too humble and unselfish to have misrepresented. Had he been a
conscious impostor he would have founded upon his claims a demand
for their service instead of making these claims a means for inducing
them to accept his assistance.
But, as far as his character is adapted to demonstrate the validity
of his claims, the chief dependence must be placed upon his sinless
ness.

His Humility and Sinlessness. 499
And here we have to do with another claim of Christ ; ' for he is
the one upon whom we must chiefly rely for the assertions of his sin
lessness. Nor is it argumentatively wrong for us to attach prime
importance to what Jesus said of himself in this re- Argumenta-
spect. If he did not know his own inner state no one f 1% c™po0T~t
did, though others could judge somewhat correctly as to s eru'^n Tt
his outer Ufe. sinlessness.
Attention should also be here called to the conception of sinlessness
which Jesus entertained. It was not merely negative, denying sins
of commission; but positive, asserting that he performed all duty.
In the foUowing passages he denies the commission of sin.
' ' Which of you convicteth me of sin ? " " The prince of Hisconcep-
the world cometh, and he hath nothing in me."2 His iessness.sm
purpose to perform all righteousness is recorded as follows : " I seek
not mine own wfll, but the will of him that sent me." " I am come
. . . not to do mine own wiU, but the wiU of him that sent me."
"My meat is to do the wiU of him that sent me, and to accomplish
his work."3 The achievement of that purpose is declared in the fol
lowing language : " What things soever he (the Father) doeth, these
the Son also doeth in like manner." " I do always the things that
are pleasing to him." " I have kept my Father's commandments." *
The above are not the only passages that declare the sinlessness of
Jesus in the negative and positive sense ; but they suffice, and they
are fuUy representative of what he is reported to have said. The only
fault that can be found with them as evidence given by Jesus himself
is the suggestion that, after all, he never used these expressions con
cerning himself . In answer to this suggestion it must be said that, if
these eight alleged utterances, taken as they are from the different
parts of the gospel of John, and interwoven with its very tissue, are
invented, then there is no way of knowing that anything peculiar to
John in connection with utterances or deeds of Jesus is true.
Should it be said that it is strange that the other evangelists give
us no such utterances from his Ups we reply that they give us almost
nothing that he said of himself. Most of his words as reported by
them relate to the kingdom. If Jesus said much concerning himself
it is John who has left us the record of it. And who could know
these things better than John the beloved ? It is almost impossible
that the marvelous series of sayings regarding himseU reported by
John as having been spoken by our Lord should be inventions, or
1 This claim, however, is more capable than some of the others of easy Investigation.
2 John viii, 46 ; xiv, 30. 3 John v, 30 ; vi, 38 ; iv, 34. 4 John v, 19 ; viii, 29 ; xv, 10.

500 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
mere doctrinal statements put into the mouth of Jesus without war
rant of truth. The fact that John so persistently gives the one side
of the sayings of Jesus, a side neglected by the other evangelists, is
one of the strongest evidences of the essential truth of these sayings,
and also that they were penned or dictated by John the apostle.
But whfle the synoptists report none of these utterances, express-
Agreement iye of the self -conscious positive and negative sinlessness
synopTi s ts of Jesus, they do give us facts from which that seU-con-
and John, sciousness is to be inferred. They afford us not the
slightest trace of a conscious need of forgiveness, of conscious guilt or
moral error, either in anything he said to others or in his public
prayers. In none of his temptations and sorrows does he betray any
suspicion that his own guilt had brought his troubles upon him.
Whenever they represent him as speaking or acting it is always in ac
cordance with his own ideal of righteousness. 1 Furthermore, the ac
count of the temptation in the wilderness represents him, not, indeed,
as asserting his sinlessness, but as evincing it, as having no thought
of yielding to the tempter. The synoptists represent him as always
so speaking of sinners as never including himseU with them.' They
represent him as caUing himself the physician who came to heal the
sick,' and as forgiving sins and asserting his power to forgive against
the objections of the scribes. * The story of the woman that was a sin
ner portrays, even more strongly than his direct claim, his sense of au
thority to forgive sin. ' All these considerations practicaUy compel us
to assume that the synoptists presupposed Christ's consciousness of
sinlessness. It will be noted that we have left out of account aU those severe
condemnations of sin in others which so distinguish his dealings with
men. We have omitted them purposely, as not absolutely convinc
ing. But when we see that the synoptists and John agree in attrib
uting to him a consciousness of sinlessness we are at liberty to inter
pret those condemnations as virtual assertions of his own moral per
fection. Thus they add to the frequency with which the seU-con-
sciousness of Jesus meets us in the synoptists — thereby filling them
even more full of this thought than is John, though by indirect rather
than by direct statement.
But if the gospels unitedly represent Jesus as professing a con
sciousness of sinlessness in comparison with other men, no less do
they do so in comparison with God. This is clearly the case with the
1 For instance, his prayer for his persecutors during the crucifixion.
3 Comp. Luke xl, 13. 'Matt, ix, 12. * Mark ii, 5-10. 5 Luke vii, 36-50.

His Humility and Sinlessness. 501
gospel of John, but it is equally plain in the synoptists. It should be
observed that he makes God the Father of aU men, but he does not
teach that all are the sons of God. Those whom he taught were to
become the chUdren of God by becoming morally perfect, as their
Father in heaven is perfect.1 Thus he makes ethical Ukeness to God
essential to divine sonship. But he is the Son of God already." That
Jesus, with his lofty ethical ideal, could have felt himself so com
pletely the Son of the Father is exphcable only on the supposition
that he felt himself to be perfect, as his Father in heaven is perfect.
We turn now to what his contemporaneous friends thought of him,
giving but a portion of the passages that might be adduced.
"Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf." 3 "In
aU points tempted,. . . yet without sin."4 "Holy, The opinions
guileless, undeflled, separated from sinners."6 "Christ
... a lamb without blemish and without spot." " " Who did no sin,
neither was guile found in his mouth." ' While it is not legiti
mate to cite in addition to the above passages those given to show
the seU-consciousness of Jesus, yet that they wrote as they did
proves that his lUe and words made upon them the impression that
he was sinless. This testimony of the friends of Jesus cannot indeed
be regarded as of any great weight, since sinful men have in them
selves no adequate standard by which to predicate sinlessness of
anyone, to say nothing of their lack of insight into the individual
heart. Jesus's own seU-consciousness, therefore, must always be a
stronger argument in favor of his sinlessness than the testimony
either of enemies or friends ; for we know that his standard of ethical
perfection was higher than that of any other, and he must have known
his own heart as no other knew it. Nevertheless, the argument from
the testimony of his friends is valuable, since though men cannot
with certainty predicate sinlessness, they can detect evidences of sin.
They received the idea of his sinlessness from himself, but they saw
nothing in him to contradict it. This combination of his own with
their testimony is of great significance. Some of us have known at
least an occasional individual in whom after long and intimate ac
quaintance we saw no sin, but conversation with them revealed that
they knew they were sinners. In such cases our testimony would
have been nullified by theirs. In Jesus they unite — even his profes
sion of sinlessness failing to impress them as sinful.
1 Matt. V, 44, 45, 48.
* Matt, xi, 27 ; M ark xn, 6 ; xiii, 32 ; John v, 20, 26, and frequently in the same chapter of
John and subsequently.
a2Cor. v, 21. "Heb, iv, 15. » Ibid., vii, 26. « l Peter i, 19. ' Ibid., ii, 22.
34

502 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
ALLEGED SINS OF JESUS.
Before we can fairly estimate the strength of the evidence for sin
lessness already adduced we must hear the arguments of the opposi-
sition and weigh them with aU candor. We arrange them in such an
order as to make them as strong as possible, that we may not be
accused of winning a too easy victory.
1. It is said that this ideal lUe might have been invented.
In answer it must be said that there is no evidence to support such
a supposition, and that it is not suggested by anything in the record,
but is merely an unsupported hypothesis to help out a theory.
First argu- Again, there is excellent reason to doubt whether such
his sinless- an ideal lUe could have been thought of, much less so
ness consld- .
ered. consistently portrayed, in the absence of the reahty.
Furthermore, the disciples saw sin in him or they did not. If they
did not, we understand their record. If they did, they are convicted
as deceivers. The only other supposition would be that Christ himseU
succeeded in hiding aU evidences of sin while asserting his sinlessness.
But the hypothesis that Christ was a deceiver is universaUy aban
doned to-day.
Finally, there must have been a perfect collusion among the early
Christians if he was not sinless in their sight and according to his
own declaration. SeU-deceived they could not have been, for his
words and deeds were unequivocal.
2. But it is said that, while his friends thought him sinless, his ene
mies charged him with numerous sins. An enemy is a poor judge of
the character of one with whom he is at enmity. But whose testi
mony shall we believe, that of Jesus or that of the scribes and Phari
sees ? Who is the unselfish one in the whole matter ? Who gives evi
dence of calmness and seU-possession, and who of rage and agitation ?
The answer to these questions wfll aid us in judging of the value of
the testimony of Jesus, on the one side, and of the scribes and Phari
sees on the other. They had accused him of sin ; he challenged them
to convict him of it.
What, then, are the sins of which they accused him J
(a) Sabbath breaking.

Alleged Sins of Jesus. 503
From their standpoint he was guilty, but he denied the rightfulness
of their standpoint. He affirmed that it was lawful to do good on the
Sabbath. They said the suffering could wait until the Exammation
Sabbath was past. He did none but works of charity on °fns XTged
the Sabbath. He never employed the day for selfish pur- by the Jews-
poses. Only those who are willing to say that the Jews were right
can affirm that Christ was wrong.
(b) Conspiracy against Rome.
The circumstances recorded show that this charge was not the one
of which they thought him primarily guilty. It was brought against
him as the only one possible which a Roman governor could notice.
They based it on the fact that he claimed to be the Messiah, the king
of the Jews. Throughout, however, he claimed to be a spiritual king.
If he had undertaken to lead a revolt against Rome his accusers would
have been his friends. This proves their hypocrisy.
(c) That he was in league with Beelzebub, the prince of devils.
The point of difference here was the question of the power by which
he wrought his miracles. He claimed it was from God, they that it
was from the devil. He proved to them by the nature of his work
that he was not aided by the devil, since his works were destructive
of the interests of Satan's kingdom.
(d) Blasphemy.
Even if he had been wrong in supposing himseU to be the Son of
God, and thus had made a blasphemous claim, stfll it would not have
proved a sinful but only an ignorant state. In spirit he was most
reverent. He made no selfish demands because of what he thought
himseU to be. AU his assertions of sinlessness and divine sonship
were made iii a spirit of evident humility. He was not hfted up by
the thought that he possessed these attributes. In other words, even
if he mistook his own character and nature it was not evidence of a
sinful heart.
How much of these accusations was due to malice we need not
judge. It is evident that his enemies have not succeeded in maintain
ing their case.
3. Again, it is affirmed that in the gospels we have the Alleged rec-
° ' r -j ord of sinful
record of actual sins committed by him. Let us consider deeds and
words inves-
the most prominent of them. tigated.
(a) The cleansing of the temple.
Whether this occurred twice or only once we need not inquire. It
is the only instance of the use of violent means we have in his whole
history. That it angered its victims we may weU believe, but this is

504 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
no proof that he was angry. One thing is sure— that an ordinary
man, let him be ever so angry, could not drive out of any ordinary
market its buyers and seders. They would resist and overpower him.
That Jesus succeeded proves that his act was not prompted by anger,
but that it was a protest, against what they felt in their inmost hearts
to be sin, made by one who somehow left on them the impression
that he was without sin. Their yielding is evidence that they per
ceived in him a divine messenger.
(b) His condemnation of the scribes and Pharisees.
The language he employed does sound harsh to us ; but that is be
cause we are accustomed to diplomatic rather than truthful character
izations of things. When John the Baptizer called the same people a
generation of vipers no one thinks he felt sinful temper, but aU feel
that he was uttering what he regarded as a just and needful condem
nation. In the mouth of the usually geDtle Jesus the words might
seem to indicate a ruffling of his ordinary temper ; but of this there is
no proof, except as we attribute to him our feelings when uttering sim
ilar language. But we have no right to interpret him by ourselves.
His words may be taken as the authoritative expression of fact by one
who knew the hearts of men, and who felt that nothing but the most
unequivocal condemnation would suffice to make them see them
selves, and to reveal them to others, in their true Ught. His predom
inant feeling at the time may indeed have been, not pity, but indigna
tion. But indignation is not anger, much less ordinary human anger;
and it is not only not sinful, but the necessary reaction of a righteous
character under given circumstances. As long as the feeling does not
warp the judgment there is nothing sinful in it. There is no evidence
whatever that the language of Jesus is that of feehng rather than of
fact. (c) His rebuke of Capernaum and other cities which refused to re
pent is to be regarded in much the same Ught.
It is pure assumption that he took any deUght in prophesying their
condemnation in the day of judgment. Rather are his words to be
thought of as a most solemn warning. And this idea is supported by
his tears over Jerusalem in a similar strain of utterance. Even U
we should say he exhibited bad judgment it would stfll not prove his
feeling sinful. But there is reason to believe that the rebukes of Jesus
were eminently useful. They were frequent, and he must have
known their utility, for he was wise in the adjustment of means to
ends. The conclusion would be that he purposely employed rebuke
as a proper means to good ends.

Alleged Sins of Jesus. 505,
(d) His language to Peter (Mark vfli, 33), "Get thee behind me,
Satan; thou mindest not the things of God, but ... of men." This
is not the language of hot temper, but of solemn warning. Peter
would deter him from the performance of recognized duty. Jesus
showed him the Satanic character of such an attempt.
(e) The cursing of the fig tree. (Mark xi, 14.)
This miracle has, to our human judgment, less to commend it than
any other attributed to our Lord. But it should be said that the con
text, as found in verses 21-23, indicates that the tree was not cursed
because it failed to meet unreasonable expectations, but in order to
emphasize the power which faith could command. A tree which
might have borne fruit later was sacrificed in order to teach a spirit
ual lesson which may have been necessary just at that particular
time. In judging any single act we must do so by the general con
duct of him who performs it. It is not Ukely that this was a wanton
act of destruction on the part of Christ. In the absence of justifying
circumstances we must give him the benefit of the doubt. That he
had no consciousness of sin in connection with it is evident from the
religious teaching he coupled with it in verse 24, and also according
to Matt, xxi, 22.
(f.) His treatment of the Syrophenician woman.
This, too, lends itself more easily to unfavorable criticism than most
that we know concerning Jesus. But there are several things to be
said which show that there is here no proof of sin. There are other
explanations of it more charitable, and equaUy plausible with that of
narrowness and want of compassion. He may have meant it for her
own good, in showing her the dependence of man on Jehovah's
mercy, a thought naturally foreign to her. He may have meant to
emphasize the contrast between himseU and the narrow Jews on the
one hand and the Gentiles on the other. Very sure it is that some
thing in his manner led her to feel that his words were not the expres
sion of his own feelings and that he meant her not to take his words
in their natural significance. He may have meant the whole for a
lesson of some kind to his disciples. These suppositions are more
probable, considering all we know of Jesus, than the supposition of
his having sinned in connection with the event.
(g) His dealings with his mother.
(1) John ii, 4 : Woman, what have I to do with thee ?
(2) John xix, 26 : Woman, behold thy son.
(3) Mark iU, 31-35 : Who is my mother?
We notice first that he addresses his mother, not by the word

506 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
"mother," but by the word "woman." Had this occurred only in
connection with the miracle at Cana it might be suspicious ; but in
the tender act of giving his mother and John to each other he also
caUed her " woman." This can be explained only on the ground that
it was perfectly respectful to address her thus. A far more serious
difficulty, apparently, is his evident rebuke administered to his mother
at Cana, " What have I to do with thee?" or, as it would perhaps
be better translated, "Is my affair thy affair ? " ' As much as to say
that her affairs and his were not identical, and that she was interfer
ing with him. It would undoubtedly be natural to attribute a lack of
filial regard to him U we were permitted to judge him by ourselves
under like circumstances.
In order that we may estimate the incident at Cana aright we must
consider his own expressed estimate of his relationship to his mother.
This we have in the passage in Mark above referred to. There he
says, Who is my mother and my brethren? and answers, "Whoso
ever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister,
and my mother." This can mean but one thing, namely, that in his
thought there are lodged in the term mother, brother, sister, ideas
higher and more obligatory than those of blood relationship. In fact,
it is one of the most prominent of the teachings of Jesus that duty is
a stronger obligation than regard for earthly ties, and this doctrine is,
as far as we know, universally agreed to. But in the case of aU men
it may lead to disregard of a parent's wish. We may be very sorry
to have to go contrary to the will of our parents, but many a one has
felt obliged to do so. And, further, U our parents undertook, after we
had reached the age of responsible action, to lead us to do what we
feel we ought not to do we should aU think it proper, and even neces
sary, to rebuke them. For in that case they would in reaUty be act
ing, not as parents, but as tempters.
Now, in the instance referred to in Mark, nis mother and brethren
wished to interrupt him in the midst of his duties. If he allowed this
he acknowledged that not his Father's business was paramount, but
the wish of his mother and brethren. To defend himself against the
charge of unfilial conduct in not responding to the call of mother and
brethren, and at the same time to teach his hearers an important les
son, he gave expression to the truth that more is meant by the terms
mother, brother, sister, than is generally understood.
The case in Mark, then, argues no disregard for earthly relation-
• Welzsiicker translates: " Ist melne Sache deine Sache ?" See his Das Neue Testa
ment, 0. und 7. Auflage, Freiburg, 1. B, aud Leipzig, 1894.

Alleged Sins of Jesus. 507
ships, but, rather, an unusual regard for spiritual and moral relation
ships. And this fact reflects a light upon the incident at Cana, only
there he called his mother's attention to the difference between her
interests and his. She looked upon him as her son ; he looked upon
himself as under obbgations higher than those of a son to a mother.
His affairs were not, therefore, necessarily her affairs. He made it
plain to her and to all generations that he got his orders from heaven
only. He could not allow that even his mother might so much as
suggest what course he should pursue. The course indicated might
be innocent ; but he was in the world to do the wfll of his Father, who
made known his will to him in all things. Blind must be that reader
of the gospels who does not see that not only in the case of his mother,
but in aU cases, he rejected interference with his action throughout
his entire public ministry. Ordinarily, indeed, this very kind of con
duct is a mark of unreasonable self-will, but Jesus was not seU-wflled.
His wfll was his Father's wfll in aU things. He bowed to authority,
but it was to the authority of God alone. From sinful, erring man
he could not even receive a suggestion if he wished to preserve his ab
solute integrity from beginning to end. With us it is not so, because
we have no direct revelation of the Father's wiU in every concern of
lUe as he had. Hence it is our highest wisdom to consult the judg
ment of our fellow-men, though even we consult only those who
most conscientiously seek to discover God's will.
The only other way to convict Jesus of sin, in these words to and
concerning his mother, would be to regard them as the expression of
ill nature. But this would be to contradict all we know of him in
other respects. Though at the age of twelve he felt that the claims of
his heavenly Father were strong enough to excuse his remaining
behind in the temple, yet he went home with his parents and was
subject to them. And, again, on the cross he exhibited the most
tender human regard for his mother. There is absolutely no reason
to think that he ever neglected any filial duty, although when the
consciousness of his divine mission became predominant he would
not allow even his parents to interfere.
(h) His apparent harshness in demanding absolute loyalty to him
seU. This is best expressed in his saying, "Let the dead bury their
dead." The words were spoken to one who offered himself as a dis
ciple, but who wanted first to attend to a conventional duty. The
words say to the candidate that aU things must yield to Christian
discipleship. The formal acts and ceremonies of mourning for the

508 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
dead must give way to the stress of moral duty. If these formal acts
are to be done let them be performed by those who are not alive to
the interests of the kingdom of God. The foUower of Jesus must
not aUow such things to interfere with his work. This interpreta
tion harmonizes with, while that which makes it a spirit of harsh
ness contradicts, aU we know of Jesus. Thus we see that aU the
aUeged recorded sins are acts or words which, properly interpreted,
display, not a spirit of evil, but a spirit of righteousness.

Objections to the Doctrine of Sinlessness. 50&

CHAPTER III.
objections to the doctrine of sinlessness.
4. But, it is said, he himseU confessed that he was not good, and
affirmed that God only is good (Mark x, 18). In view of the many
instances in which Jesus declared his own positive and Did Jesus
negative sinlessness it would hardly seem proper to un- goo^ness'of
derstand by these words a contradiction of every claim lmse
he made elsewhere. Hence it is natural to seek some other inter
pretation. To those who accept the doctrine of the deity of Christ it
is plain that he meant to say, " By calling me good, if you understand
yourself, you attribute to me deity." It is not likely that he here
meant to deny at once his deity and his sinlessness. Rather, in view
of the many other words of Jesus, must we suppose that he wished
the young ruler to acknowledge both of these attributes. Hence we
see that the words are not a confession of lack of moral perfection. '
5. Again, it is declared that perfect sinlessness is impossible to man.
This may mean that our conduct must sometimes, at least, be a com
promise between ideal right and the possible right. And such a
proposition is unquestionably true, applying to Jesus as to others.
Jesus undoubtedly did and said some things other than he would had.
he been surrounded by ideal conditions. He would not have rebuked
the scribes and Pharisees, nor the unrepentant cities, had there been
no wickedness to rebuke. Ideally he would have preferred other
conduct to that which he chose. But all righteousness, The objection
tnat Pel'fect
as all sin, in conduct is iudged by the inner life of the sinlessness
^ is impossible
actor. The one whose inner Ufe is right may be accused to man.
of error in judgment, but he cannot be accused of sin, however
wrong his conduct may appear to us. Two questions, then, arise.
First, Was Jesus perfect in judgment in all his dealings with his
feUow-men ? And, second, Was his inner lUe ideal ? Let us an
swer the first question by saying that anyone who should declare
that in any of the cases recorded in the New Testament the judgment
of Jesus was wrong, even if his heart was not, would thereby lay
claim to more wisdom than we accord to anyone we know. A care-
1 Comp., however, the fact of his moral development, Infra, p. 512, where it is shown that.
moral development does not Imply sin.

510 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
f ul study of the conduct of Jesus has led to the impression that it was
the appropriate conduct in each case ; that he acted with good reason
always. The probability that he did so is increased by the considera-
(tion that he evidently sought to know the right. There is nothing in
ithe conduct of Jesus, when it is interpreted in the Ught of himseU
rather than of our own natures, to suggest that he made any mis
takes. If we were ourselves perfect we should not suspect imperfec
tions in him. But it may be asked, Why should we assume that
.Jesus was an exception to the universal fact of error in judgment ?
We answer, Because he was so exceptional in everything else, and
because there is nothing in his conduct to warrant the idea that he
erred. With reference to his inner Ufe it may be said that as Jesus was
a man, he must have had man's nature, which is sinful, and hence
his inner Ufe was not right at aU times. But what is meant by
saying that it is part of a man's nature to have a sinful heart?
Sin is a universal moral disease. Is moral disease, therefore, neces
sary to manhood? It is also true that aU men sooner or later be
tray bodfly ailments. Shall we say that one would not be human
who had no bodily diseases ? The fact is that, while sin is found in
every one we know, it is not a necessary element in the concept man,
but rather are we so much the less men because we are sinners. So,
then, the possibflity of a perfect inner Ufe in man is clear.
But it may be asked, If Jesus was ready tempted is not that a
proof that his inner lUe was perverted in some degree, however
Relation of smaU? Is one reaUy tempted unless his wfll inclines in
temptation ... . .
to sin. some measure toward the wrong course ? That this is
the popular' view of temptation is unquestionable ; and it arises from
the fact that in nearly every case where we are tempted our wills
do so incline, though as Christians we check them in time and save
ourselves from the consciousness of guilt. Stfll, there are other
instances in which our wfll, our emotional nature, instantly recoils
from what we call the temptation. Now, between these two ex
periences of temporary yielding, excusable in sinful man, and in
stant recoil, is another class of experiences in which time is taken to
consider all phases of the suggestion, and in which the judgment and
emotions are ahke involved, yet without any incUnation to act either
way. Such is generally the experience of aU those who are distin
guished for self-possession. Take for an example the temptation
of Christ to satisfy his hunger after his fast. What are the elements
of it? (1) The recognition of hunger. (2) The natural desire to par-

Objections to the Doctrine of Sinlessness. 511
take of food. (3) The knowledge that he could provide the desired
food at wfll. (4) The suggestion, from without or from within, to
gratify his desire for food before being released from the fast by the
Spirit, who led him into the fast. Now, the least and briefest inclina
tion to foUow this suggestion would have been sin. But aU these
factors might have been present, and fuUy measured both by judg
ment and emotion, yet without any inclination whatever to yield.
The Uke has been experienced frequently by every weU-balanced man
or woman.
Thus, from whatever point we view that objection to the doctrine
of sinlessness which is based on the impossibiUty of sinlessness, we
see that the alleged impossibility turns out to be without support.
6. Once more, it may be said that, though Jesus may have been
positively and negatively sinless in his mature years, his positive per
fections were, both of necessity and according to the Scripture, the
result of years of struggle, while the arguments given for the possi
bflity of sinlessness in the negative sense apply only to manhood,
and we are at liberty to suppose that in boyhood he had his faults
the same as others.
Let us first take up the latter part of this objection to the doc
trine of sinlessness. It is unconsciously based upon the supposition
that Jesus as a human being must have been born with The aVIegation
the sinful tendencies of other babes, and that prior to navehe been
the assertion of his subsequently sanctified wiU he must U^6^ ^jf!
have sinned. But we have seen that inner propensity bood-
to sin is no necessary part of the nature of man, and hence Christ
could have been born free from such propensities. The question is,
Was he so born ? The New Testament seems to teach that he was.
He was caUed the "holy thing" that was to be born of Mary. The
early Church called him the " Holy Child Jesus." Paul describes his
spirit as a " spirit of hoUness."
Again, his self -consciousness points to the same conclusion. We
find no reference in his words to any wrong that he ever did. His
later conscience was so delicate that the memory of the slightest sin
in his past Ufe must have given him the most intense pain, even
though he knew his sin forgiven and the tendency to it overcome. A
child with all his propensities strongly incUned toward virtue would
be an exception, but Christ was so exceptional that we need not be
surprised if he proves to be an exception in this particular also. Such
a being could be truly tempted, even to the danger point. One can
act contrary to his propensities. All of us have done so many a time.

512 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Thus a sinless childhood for Christ is as possible as a sinless manhood,
and as probable.
We turn, next, to the first part of this objection to sinlessness,
namely, that, both of necessity and according to Scripture, his posi
tive perfections were the result of years of struggle. This is the
Scripture doctrine. We are told that Jesus grew in stature and wis
dom and in favor with God and man, and that the Captain of our
salvation was made perfect through suffering. We think this
last passage, properly interpreted, means that Jesus was the Captain
of our salvation in the perfect sense of the expression only as he suf .
fered perfectly ; that is, the greatest extreme of suffering. That is, he
could not have saved us had he not suffered. He is our perfect
Saviour because he suffered. If this be correct it does not refer to his
moral development ; but, though we do not accept the passage as in
fact proving his moral development through suffering, we are per
fectly wflling to allow anyone else that interpretation. But when we
have said that his moral struggles perfected his character how do we
conceive the process ? Such a doctrine does not necessarily mean that
he struggled against an inner sin in order to be positively perfect.
To overcome an inner evfl propensity need only mean that he strug
gled until he was negatively perfect. The struggle with temptation
from without is all we need suppose to account for his being made
perfect through suffering. Struggle with inner evfl is purely sup
posititious, and contrary to all we know of Jesus. That he struggled
with temptations from without is certain. By this struggle alone may
we rightly assume that his moral development was aided.
But it will be said, Does not this very language about his moral de-
Morai devel- velopment imply imperfections in his earUer Ufe ? We
notneces°iv answer that at least it does not imply imperfection in the
previoussin- sense of positive evil. For the development of evil never
"  leads to moral perfection; and the change from evfl to
good is not development. The only imperfection, then, that the ex
pression moral development implies is an imperfection of develop
ment. It means, and can mean only, that his development, say at
the age of twelve, was not as great, measured by an absolute stand
ard, as his development at the age of thirty-three. But this does
not mean that his development at the age of twelve was not perfect
for one of that age. If anyone should demand that Jesus be as mor
ally developed in boyhood as he was in manhood he would thereby
demand that he should be developed without struggle.
7. It may be said that, although no one of the arguments against

Objections to the Doctrine of Sinlessness. 513
sinlessness wfll prove that he was not sinless, their cumulative force
will prove it, or at least prevent our beUeving that he was sinless.
But this could be the case only if each argument had some force.
Where there is no force in any argument there can be no cumulative
force in all the arguments. Hence, combined, they neither prove
that he was not sinless nor afford any ground for doubt. On the
other hand, the faflure of such strenuous efforts to prove him sinful
in some degree or at some time in his lUe leaves the probability
strongly in favor of our view. If he was sinful the argument ought
to have afforded us some proof of it.
But, as we have seen, there is strong proof that he was without in
ward or outward sin ; and that he was so we must beUeve, or show
ourselves refractory to the laws of thought. !
The sinlessness of Jesus being established we have a fact of pro
found significance for the claims of our Lord. In the first place, it
abundantly assures us that he would not knowingly mis- significance of
represent himseU and his mission. And, secondly, it tne£ act-
proves that he was a miraculous personage, and that, no claims he
made being more incredible than sinlessness, we may regard the
others as probable. In other words, the sinlessness showed him to
have been so unique that we are prepared to accept the remaining
distinctive qualities and relationships which he asserted for him
seU. 1 On the whole subject of the sinlessness of Jesus we are indebted for many sugges
tions to Beyschlag, Leben Jesu, vol. i. pp. 185 ff. ; and to Paul Schwarzkopf on Die Sttnd-
losigkeit Jesu Christi, in Beweis des Glaubens, December, 1895. See also Steude's
Evangelische Apologetik, pp. 185 it. ; and Carl Ullmann's classic, The Sinlessness of Jesus,
Translated by R. C. Lundin Brown, Edinburgh, 1858. New edition, translated by
Sophia Taylor, 1870.

514 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION IV.-THE WIRACLES AS EVIDENCE OF THE VALIDITY OF
CHRIST'S CLAIMS.
CHAPTER I.
THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF THE GOSPEL MIRACLES.
The sinlessness of Jesus proves that our Lord had a communion
with God which is whoUy unparalleled in the history of the human
race, and was thus fitted to be a revealer of God as no other ever was.
But there is other evidence in the New Testament equally strong,
namely, in the miracles it records.
It is often said that the miracles, so far from supporting, are a bur
den to our faith. The assertion is both true and false according to
what we mean by our faith. If it is meant that the miracles are a
Are the mira- burden to our faith in the trustworthiness of the New
den to our Testament we must admit that within certain limits the
assertion is true; for in proportion as any document re
lates that which is unusual are we inclined to question its truthful
ness. But U it be meant that we could more easily beUeve in the
remarkable claims of Jesus without than with the miracles the asser
tion must be regarded as false ; for U there had been nothing extra
ordinary about him except his sinlessness the picture would have
been so abnormal as to insure its own rejection. And here it is
that the character of the miracles attributed to him and declared
to have been wrought for or upon him, so consistent with the al
leged sinlessness, supports it and receives support from it. For
almost, if not quite, all those miracles are of a moral and reUg
ious character. As far as Jesus wrought them they are such as
ministered directly to the temporal or spiritual welfare of men. Had
there been any incongruity between the miracles and the character of
Christ the picture would have been spoUed. As it is it is harmonious,
and therefore credible. The writers described what they saw before
them. So that we have here a reason at once for trusting the report
of the New Testament writers and for beheving that what Jesus
claimed is true. '
1 Fisher cites some fine words of F. D. Maurice on the fitness of the miracles of Jesus.
—The Nature and Method of Revelation, New York, 1890, p. 39 f. See also Terry's The
New Apologetic, New York, 1897, p. 189 f.

The Evidential Value of the Gospel Miracles. 515
The question, then, hinges upon the trustworthiness of the report of
the evangelists that Jesus professed to work miracles ; for if Jesus did
so profess we must believe him or else suppose that he Reasons not
did not understand his own works. Now, why should ble3 "for6 de-
the accuracy of their report be questioned ? They were reports of
adherents of a religion which not only inculcated honesty acies.
and truthfulness, but which condemned as grossly sinful the practice
of falsehood. It is highly improbable that in the interests of virtue
men with such zeal for truth would misrepresent the facts. Should it
be said that they were so zealous for their master, such blinded parti
sans, that they did not detect their own misrepresentations, it must
be replied that their narrations are evidently not written in a parti
san spirit. There is no trace of a determination to make their readers
believe regardless of the truth, nor in any way to force their beliefs on
others. Rather is their whole style and manner that of men who
were narrating for purposes of instruction what they had seen. There
is nothing in their story difficult of belief unless it be the miraculous
portions of it ; and but for them no one would have doubted the essen
tial portions of the record. It is unnecessary to recite here even the
outlines of the discussion on miracles in the earUer portions of this
book. There it was amply proved that miracles are possible, and that
historians do not deny that they are. Furthermore, the fact was
brought out that miracle is capable of such attestation as to com
pel belief in all unprejudiced minds. So, then, if there is nothing im
possible in miracles, why should we question the accuracy of their
account ? Besides, for the most part their record is that of miracles
which Jesus professed to perform, and we need not tax them with
misrepresentation in this respect. Surely they knew whether or not
Jesus professed to work miracles. They would not affirm this of him
simply because they believed miracles possible, but only because he
performed works which he claimed to do by the power of God.
Hence there is absolutely no reason for doubting their accounts of the
miracles. That Jesus performed many wonderful works is not doubted
by any thoughtful person to-day. Historical critics admit it without
hesitation. Thus the real question left to be considered is whether Jesus
was right in thinking that he did these things by special divine aid.
There are those who do not hesitate to make his works of healing
dependent, not upon special divine aid, but upon a power naturally
resident within him, similar in quaUty to that possessed by other men,
though greater in degree.1 Some attribute this greater degree of heal-
• So Bishop Temple, Relations Between Religion and Science, p. 201.

516 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
ing power to his greater spirituality.1 But aU such agree that it was
a superior grade of the power which some people can exert, with or
The attempt without physical contact, upon the bodies of others. Now,
the miracles & is unnecessary to make it appear that Jesus did not em-
wfthout8 the pl°y this po wer in certain of his healings. We have no in-
of Pspeciai terest in proving that Jesus wrought his miracles either
divine aid. jn violation or in disregard of natural law. But the
question is, How did Jesus come by this superior degree of power ?
Weisse's answer, referred to above, cannot be the correct one, since
otherwise aU men of superior inteUectuality or spirituality would pos
sess that power in an eminent degree, even though in this, as in other
respects, they feU below Jesus. The only remaining supposition is
that God bestowed this power upon Christ in this preeminent degree
and, we might venture to add, in order that he might the better per
form his mission among men. If this be the case, not the power, but
the degree of the power to heal, would stiU prove the claim of Christ
that he wrought his works by special divine aid.
But, as a matter of fact, the influence which Jesus exercised over
the bodies of others is not parallel with that known to modern times.
For, though some men can exercise control of the bodily motions and
even of the health of others without physical contact, yet they cannot
heal, as Jesus did, at a distance, and without the knowledge on the
part of the patient that the healer is at work. This unique power of
Jesus finds its most complete illustration in his raisings from the dead.
Men may heal the sick by their superior force of wfll if the sick are
conscious. But the patient might be dead, and therefore wholly un
able to hear the words or note the presence of Jesus, and yet he could
restore him to life. Beyschlag, who does not question the historicity of
these raisings from the dead, still thinks that Ufe was not wholly ex
tinct," and supposes that a time might have come when the separation
of soul and body would have been so complete that even Jesus could
not have brought them together again. Without discussing the merits
or demerits of this view it still remains that no one but Jesus has ever
done the like. His power over the bodies of men was whoUy unique.
We must take into further account the fact that Jesus performed
Miracles in- miracles which involved absolute control over the forces
volving con
trol over and operations of nature, even to the extent of a creative
forces of na
ture, power. Such, for example, was the miracle of the mul
tiplication of food, which has never yet been explained away.' Now,
1 Weisse, Die Evangelische Geschichte, vol. i, pp. 366 ff.
5 Leben Jesu, vol. 1, pp. 316 ff. = Comp. Mead's Supernatural Revelation, p. 212 f.

The Evidential Value of the Gospel Miracles. 517
we may admit that such a miracle is difficult for a thoughtful man to
believe. Yet, since it is attested alike by all four of the gospel writ
ers, and is given without any serious discrepancies, the chief reason
for doubting it must be the opinion that such a miracle is impossible.
That is, there is no natural explanation ; it is out of analogy with aU
we know of the preparation of food, and hence highly improbable.
Such stories as this, therefore, show that we cannot explain the mira
cles of Jesus without the supposition of divine aid. But, U we are right
in thinking the evangeUsts trustworthy when they make Christ pro
fess to work miracles, we must believe them when they make him
profess to work such a miracle as this.1
1 See Matt, xvi, 9, 10, and John vi, 26.
35

518 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER II.
SPECIAL DIVINE AH) IN THE MIRACLES OF JESUS.
We pointed out in a former portion of this work the lofty character
of the miracles wrought by Christ in comparison with the perf orm-
The superiori- ances of mere wonder-workers. This superiority is a
miraciesUan strong argument in favor of the divine aid in their ac-
forSttieedi- complishment. They not only fit the character of Jesus
th1eirlper" as portrayed in the gospels, but they are appropriate to
formance. ^e crmract,er 0f Qocl as revealed in Christ, and as held by
thoughtful men in aU Christian lands to-day. If God intervened in
human affairs at aU it is easy to beUeve that he would intervene as
most of the reported miracles of Christ represent. This proves that
not merely are miracles possible, but that the miracles ascribed to
Jesus are possible. We may go farther, and say that such miracles as
those attributed to Jesus are highly probable unless our ideas of the
character of God are wholly at fault. If he is beneficent he would be
disposed, we suspect, to suggest through Christ the nature of the bene
fits he would have man confer upon man. The predominant element
in the works of our Lord on earth was not, indeed, the relief of
human suffering ; yet no Christian can thoughtfully contemplate the
many bodfly healings attributed to him without feeling that aU Chris
tians should be exceedingly diligent in affording reUef for aU man
ner of temporal suffering. That the example of our Lord's miracles
has powerfully stimulated his foUowers to works of mercy and charity
cannot be doubted. And only those who have taken the pains to
study this side of the life of the Church can form any estimate of the
blessings thus conferred on the human race. And not only so ; the spirit
of Jesus has, in this respect, permeated the lives of multipUed thou
sands of those who, at least openly, acknowledge no aUegiance to him.
We dare not speak with too great assurance on subjects which, in the
nature of the case, are speculative ; but it will hardly be questioned
that God would willingly institute such a spirit of beneficence upon
earth. And when Jesus, who " went about doing good," informs us
that God did actually send him to do these very works, and lent him
the power to do them, the probability of the truth of what he says is
exceedingly high.

Special Divine Aid in the Miracles of Jesus. 519
To this must be added some other considerations. We have called
attention to the fact that the sinlessness of Jesus favors belief in his
other claims. But one of the claims of Jesus was this very otner consi(i.
divine power in working miracles. And indeed it would eratl0lls-
be amazing U he whose character was miraculous had wrought no
miracles. Besides, he made upon the early Christians the impres
sion that God was with him. His injunctions to judge prophets by
their fruits must have made them in some degree critical, and we have
seen that they were not overcredulous. They could not see the di
vine power he claimed any more than we can see the power by which
we lUt our hands. But they could have detected any lack of discern
ment in him. Apparently they discovered' no such lack ; for they have
portrayed him to us as one of the keenest of men. Indeed, they have
made him such a discerner of the thoughts of men that some have
suggested that he possessed a clairvoyant power, ! though this power
was not, in the case of Jesus, accidental or pathologic, but wrought by
the Spirit of God and employed for God's service. But not alone the
marvelous, U not supernatural,2 insight into the thoughts and per
sonal history of men and women indicates his power to understand
himseU. No one can read the words of Jesus, whether as reported by
the synoptists or by John, without feehng that they are those of one
distinguished for clear discrimination, profound thought, penetrating
insight, and amazing wisdom. We need not, in the presence of such
evidently superior human wisdom, assert his omniscience in order to
prove that he thoroughly understood himself. He must have known
whether the power by which he wrought was of God or of himself.
His upright character forbids the supposition that he would announce
what he did not certainly know and his inteUectual abiUty that he
would be deceived in a matter of this kind. We are, therefore, shut
up to the belief that he enjoyed, as he claimed, special divine aid for
the miracles he performed.
But there is stfll another consideration which gives probability to
the view that God would lend his aid, as asserted, in the miracles of
Jesus. Those miracles were not wrought with a purpose to make men
believe in his power, but as the expression of his loving and mercUul
disposition; nevertheless, an incidental effect was to convince men
that he was aUied with the Deity in an unusual manner and degree.
An immediate consequence of his miracles, therefore, was to secure
1 Beyschlag, Leben Jesu, vol. i, p. 303.
3 There must ever be a doubt as to whether some part of Jesus's insight was not purely
human. Beyschlag cites the case of Zschocke as one who was able In some instances to
read the past history of men.— Leben Jesu, vol. i, p. 303.

520 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
for his doctrines and principles an authority which they could scarcely
have gained in any other way. His miracles did result in giving his
truth a hold upon the minds and hearts of men so that its beneficent
influences could continue, for the ages to follow, to bless the human
race. The possibilities of the miracles of Jesus demonstrated, it stUl re
mains to determine whether there was sufficient occasion for them. *
The question J^J1(^ ** wm ^e agreed that, U interventions in the regular
cifentSoeci£ processes of the world were ever warranted, they were
divineTnter- warranted by the exigencies of the work which Jesus
vention. came to institute. We have pointed out the beneficent
results to the bodies of men. Greater than these, however, are the
blessings which have flowed and are yet to flow from the spiritual
mission which Jesus fulfilled. This had to do with the proclamation
of the truth concerning God's character and concerning the actual and
ideal relations of men toward him and each other. He came to
initiate the incalculably benign work of banishing sin and its conse
quences. If men can be brought to a knowledge of the truth con
cerning God, and into right relations with him and with their f eUow-
men, far more wfll be accomplished for the amehoration of human
woe than was ever wrought by all the bodfly healings performed by
our Lord and by all the charities and beneficences of the Christian
world ; for, to heal the sick, feed the hungry, and clothe the naked
but relieves distress, while the banishment of sin tends strongly and
successfully to prevent it. Besides, to the knowledge of our true re
lations to each other must be traced nearly aU of the ministries to the
bodies of the unfortunate which have been and are being exercised.
Hence it is difficult to overrate the value of the spiritual work of
Christ in preventing and ameliorating human misery.
To this must be added the positive happiness which Christianity has
brought to the world : the freedom from the slavish fear of God, the
assurance of his loving Fatherhood, the blessedness of communion
with him, the fellowship of his people, the hope for the future, the
content in the midst of misfortune arising from trust in God's good
providence, the elevation of woman, the regard for chfldhood, with
the joy that this develops in the young ; the uphfting of aU classes to
a position of self-respect, the happiness of milUons of homes, the bless
ings of free education, the progress of science in its practical and
theoretical aspects, civil freedom, the growing spirit of kindliness
among men, and numerous other classes of benefits. AU these are
1 Comp. KSstlin, Der Glaube und seine Bedeutung, p. 115.

Special Divine Aid in the Miracles of Jesus. 521
the almost direct result of the introduction of Christianity into the
world as a gift from heaven. That the history of Christianity has
often been marred by reactions from these peculiarly Christian in
fluences is frankly and sorrowfully confessed. But it is also confi
dently asserted that aU such eddies in the stream of Christian history
have been caused by the mixture of the pure truth with unchristian
error and sin.
Now, valuable as is the order of nature, it is not so valuable that it
could not be sacrificed for the accomplishment of such results, and
particularly when the sacrifice did no harm to man and Order of na-
fafled to affect the general operation of natural laws. ly. interfered
We think no thoughtful and weU-informed person wfll results.
venture to assert that the same results could have been accomphshed
without the miracles. There is much boasting to-day of our willing
ness to beUeve the truth though unaccompanied by miracles, but we
doubt whether if a veritable new and divine religion were offered for
the acceptance of our present-day unbelievers they would believe ex
cept on the basis of miracles. Truth has its power over all honest
hearts, but the difficulty is to make truth appear such. The blindness
and prejudice of men hinder the recognition of truth now as in the
days of Christ. How could men accept Jesus as a revelation of
God except on sufficient evidence ? And nothing can prove the pres
ence of divine power but its evident exercise; and, be it noted, the
only way to exercise it in such a manner as to be convincing was to
deviate from the natural order. If Jesus had prepared bread and
fish for the five thousand according to the usual method nothing
would have been proved thereby except his remarkable compassion,
for anyone can prepare them in the ordinary way. But when he
made the few loaves and fishes sufficient for so large a number, and
had more left than he began with, there was manifest creative power.
By his miracle he had proved himseU in league with the power that
governs the world ; his miracles, though not wrought for that pur
pose, had the effect of making the observers believe bis claim. We
may say, U we will, that the miracles were a condescension to the
weakness of mankind,1 but stfll the condescension was necessary.
Jesus himseU was grieved because the people would not beUeve ex
cept for his works' sake.'
We are bound to conclude, then, that Jesus would not assert the
divine aid unless he had every reason to beUeve he possessed it ; that
1 So Edersheim, The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah, fourth edition, New York
and London, 1884, vol. 1, p. 489 f. 2 John xiv, 11.

522 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
he was so discriminating and otherwise intellectuaUy qualified that
he could not be in error on this point ; that his works were, in some in-
„ , , stances, at least, of such a kind as no human being unaid-
Conclusion. '
ed by divine power has ever wrought ; that the mission
which Jesus was to accomplish was so important as to justify the in
terruption of the usual order ; that without such an interruption there
was no way by which blind and prejudiced men could be convinced
that Jesus had the divine aid ; and, as a result of all this, that Jesus's
claims are correct : he was of such a nature and in such a position
that he could give us a true revelation from God.

The Theory of Apparent Death. 523

SECTION Y.-THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS AND THE VALIDITY
OF HIS CLAIMS.
CHAPTER I.
THE THEORY OF APPARENT DEATH.
Thus far we have considered chiefly the evidence from the miracles
wrought by our Lord. If possible, those wrought upon him or in his
behaU have even greater evidential value. We cannot Miracles
aUow ourselves space for the detailed treatment of most on Jesus.up'
of the miracles of this class : comprising the Old Testament prophe
cies concerning him, the angelic appearance to the shepherds at the
time of his birth, the providential guidance of his parents during his
infancy, and the like. It is to be observed, however, that there is no
reason for rejecting these miracles U we believe in miracle at all.
The resurrection of Jesus was so striking an event, and it had so
fundamental a significance in the earliest propagation of the Gospel,
that it must receive careful attention. It wfll be admitted that, if
Jesus was raised from the dead, that fact is conclusive evidence of his
divine mission U not of the divine element in his nature. For his case
is essentially different from the cases of the ruler's daughter, the son
of the widow of Nain, and Lazurus. He made claims of power over
death which they never made,1 and prophesied both bis death and
his resurrection,2 which they never did. Hence, while his resurrec
tion was a vindication of him, their rising from the dead Distinction
had no such significance for them. Besides, they simply resurrection
resumed their places in the world for a time, to meet ings from
again the inevitable lot of aU mankind. But Jesus rose
to die no more ; in his resurrection he triumphed over death. Had he
been, therefore, either a deceiver or deceived he would not have been
raised from the dead. His faflure to reappear among his disciples
would have been a sure evidence of his error, however innocent.
Plainly, therefore, it is of the utmost importance that the entire ques
tion of the resurrection of Jesus be considered with greatest care. For U
Jesus did not rise from the dead much of what he taught is rendered
uncertain. If he did rise we have the highest possible attestation of
the truth of aU he taught.
i John x, 17, 18. ' Eor example, Matt, xvi, 21.

524 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
In treating this miracle for evidential purposes it wiU be unneces
sary to deal specifically with many questions which would arise in
connection with an historical study. Whether the aUeged appearances
of Jesus to his disciples took place in and near Jerusalem, or in GaU-
lee, or in the two localities alternately ; whether the first witness of
the risen Lord was a man or a woman; whether there were two
angels or only one — all these and many other similar points may be
passed by with only so much attention as they may incidentaUy de
mand in connection with weightier matters. There are just two
questions of chief importance from the standpoint of evidences,
namely, whether Jesus really died and whether he ready rose from
the dead. The further discussion of the fact of the resurrection wfll
center about these two questions.
That construction of the records which denies the actual death of
Jesus has been announced and defended chiefly by the rationalists.
Rationalis- In all its forms it is felt by most modern critics to be
the actual totally inadequate. Nevertheless, it must be considered
sus. " here, partly for its historical interest, and partly because
in certain circles it still has a degree of weight. In its coarsest form
the theory was proposed by K. F. Bahrdt. J Unwilling to admit the
possibiUty of an actual resurrection from the dead, and yet unable to
deny the beUef in that resurrection on the part of the early Christian
disciples, he aUeged a deliberate fraud in Christ himseU. Jesus had
fafled to purify the Messianic idea, as entertained by his disciples, of
its political aspects. The only way which he could see to accomplish
that end was to undergo crucifixion, and to secure a removal from
the cross before actual death occurred by pretending to die, trusting
to the skiU of his fellow-conspirators to restore him to health. Thus
his disciples would look upon him as the heavenly King and would
preach him as such.
Notwithstanding the good end which Jesus is supposed to have had
in view this theory is whoUy untenable, because it makes Jesus the
perpetrator of a pious fraud. Such an act on the part of Jesus is
utterly impossible. This was felt by later rationalists, who, whfle
they could not deny his appearances subsequent to his burial," still
could not allow a real resurrection. Hence, they proposed that the
1 In his Ausfiihrung des Plans und Zwecks Jesu. For a characterization of this coarse
doubter see History of Rationalism, by Bishop John F. Hurst, New York and Cincinnati,
pp. 139 ff.
3 Paulus argued for these appearances on the ground that they explain the opposition
of the Sadducees to Christianity. The views of Paulus maybe seen in his Exegetisches
Handbuch, Heidelberg, 1830-42.

The Theory of Apparent Death. 525
fraud should be perpetrated, not by Christ, but by his disciples.
They, we are told, gave him a stupefying potion which caused his ap
parent death, thus saving him from actual death by securing his,
early removal from the cross. He was then taken in hand and resus
citated. Upon this Strauss remarks:1 "But of all this our evan
gelical sources give no intimations, and for conjecturing such detaUs
we have no ground. Judicious friends of the natural explanation,
who repudiate such monstrous productions of a system which re
models history at wfll, have renounced the supposition of any remains
of conscious Ufe in Jesus." To this we add that the hypothesis of
fraud on the part of the disciples is almost as incredible as that of
fraud in Jesus himself.
But there is another form of the theory which is summarized, though
rejected, by Keim as follows:2 "In the youthful body of Jesus,
weakened by no passions, the abode of a cheerful and A s e c 0 n d
pious mind, the vital forces, though suddenly strained by theory-
excessive irritation and maltreatment, were not exhausted. He be
came torpid, respiration and consciousness were suspended; but he
could not have been dead according to the testimony of physicians-
and of so many accredited narrations. In the springtime the sep-
ulcher of Jesus had a medium temperature, peculiarly suitable to his
needs and to the gradual dissolving of the stimulating oily fluid spices.
The body was protected by the linen wrappings. The non-fatal
wounds had, with the aid of the Eternal Wisdom which watched over
the loved one, the effect of bloodletting and, when the vital activity
was afresh aroused, checked the first violent flow of the blood to the
nobler parts. Hence, Jesus gradually revived; white-robed ad
herents, perhaps Essenes, opened his grave ; and he left the place of
the dead in gardener's clothes which happened to be at hand. After
the excessive exertions of the first day he kept himself more private,
and rested and nursed his fatigued body, during which time his un
known coadjutors undertook the duties of guardians and providers.
After he had from time to time left his unknown asylum, and had
appeared in disguise to his foUowers here and there from Galilee to
Jerusalem, at last, when he found that the feverish wasting of his
strength was increasing, in order to spare his followers the sight of
the dissolution of his earthly nature, perhaps also in order to die, like
Moses and Apollonius, without witnesses, he took his farewell on the
1 The Life of Jesus, vol. ii, p. 844 f.
' The History of Jesus of Nazara, translated by Arthur Ransom, London and Edin
burgh, 1883, vol. vi, p. 327 f.

526 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Mount of Olives, when a cloud did him the service of snatching his
person from the eyes of the assembled company. Venturini has yet
more vividly described the fainting, and the lance thrust, which for
tunately wounds only the lower part of the body ; then the beneficial
influence of the air, of the perfumes, of the open wounds, of the
byssus strips, of the bed of moss, even of the shaking earthquake, and
finaUy of sleep and food and the affecting administrations of Joseph
and Nicodemus, and others of the Essene brotherhood. Jesus dweUs
sometimes in a sequestered quarter of Jerusalem, sometimes in GaU-
lee. He ascends Carmel and the Mount of Olives ; and once more, be
fore his ardently longed for but carefully concealed dissolution, he
gathers up his strength to appear near Damascus to Paul, who subse
quently became an apostle."

Untenability of the Theory of Apparent Death. 527

CHAPTER II.
UNTENABILITY OF THE THEORY OF APPARENT DEATH.
Strange, indeed, is it that the gardener's clothes happened to be at
hand, and that the cloud on the Mount of Olives should have so accom
modatingly appeared just at the proper time, and have been so dense,
and have reached so close to the earth, as to fit themselves into the
purpose of Jesus to spare his foUowers the sight of the dissolution of
his earthly nature ! These remarkable coincidences strongly remind
one of the resources of writers of fiction in the extrication inherent im
probabilities
of their characters from undesirable situations ; but they of the theory.
are quite unlike real Ufe. Then, too, we cannot help inquiring how it
came that "Joseph, Nicodemus, and others of the Essene brother
hood " came to know or suspect that Jesus was only in a swoon, unless
he or they, or both, had agreed beforehand tq deceive, in which case
we have the old theory of deception again. Then how did the apostles
come to beUeve in the resurrection ? Did Jesus wfllingly allow them to
believe that his resuscitation was a resurrection ? or, if that belief were
their mistake, why did not Joseph and Nicodemus correct it ? But
how could they make such a mistake ? As Strauss says : l ' 'One who
crept forth from his grave half dead, and who was compelled to go
sneaking about in need of medical care, of bandages, of stimulants
and protection, and who at last must fall a victim to his sufferings,
could not possibly make upon the disciples the impression of the
Victor over death, the Prince of Ufe, which lay at the source of then-
later activity. Such a coming to life could but have weakened the
impression he made upon them in Ufe and death. ... It could not
possibly have transformed their sorrow into enthusiasm, their rev
erence into worship. " Says Keim : a " Then there is the most impossible
thing of all : the poor, weak, sick Jesus, with difficulty strauss's and
° r ' ' Keim's criti-
holding himself erect, in hiding, disguised, and finally cisms.
dying— this Jesus an object of faith, of exalted emotion, of the triumph
of his adherents, a risen conqueror and Son of God ! Here, in fact,
the theory begins to grow paltry, absurd, worthy only of rejection,
since it makes the apostles either miserable victims of deceit, or, with
i In his second Leben Jesu, 1864, p. 298.
' History of Jesus of Nazara, vol. vi, p. 330 f .

528 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Jesus, themselves deceivers. For they would then have a suspicion
of the apparent death, and the condition of Jesus must have shown
them that there was no question in this case of a resurrection. If
Jesus were looked upon as one who had risen, U he gave himseU out
as such, there was a lack of sober thought ; and if he took pains not to
betray bis condition there was, after aU, a lack of honesty also." No
one can, indeed, read the views of Venturini given above without
recognizing the moral turpitude which they attribute to Jesus and the
easy deception to which St. Paul is supposed to have fallen a victim.
These things make it psychologically impossible for one who con
siders the question in aU its aspects to accept the theory of apparent
death. Nor is this sense of impossibility in any degree weakened by
the positive arguments against the certainty of actual death. What
are those arguments ? Briefly, the impossibility of the reanimation
of a body by the soul, and the absence of actual proof of death. The
a principal first of these arguments is based on the monistic psychol-
theory is ogy, which holds that the soul ceases to be when its do-
tion. minion over the body ceases. This psychology finds it
impossible for the soul to be reconveyed into the body without a
miracle, to which, it claims, must be added the restoration to lUe of
the bodily organs in order that the soul could resume its sway over
the body. This is pronounced " an immediate interposition of God in
the regular course of nature, irreconcilable with enUghtened ideas of
the relation of God to the world." l No one but the most prejudiced
would to-day assert that enlightened ideas of the relation of God to the
world would forbid the possibility of immediate interpositions of God
in the regular course of nature. The only question, then, is whether
there is any sufficient reason for such an intervention. This question
must be postponed for the present, though Christians can scarcely
hesitate to answer it in the affirmative. But not only are miracles
possible, this very miracle of the reunion of the soul and body after
death, with the renewed dominance of the former, can by no knowledge
of fact which we possess be declared impossible. For we know noth
ing of the actual relations of soul and body, since we know nothing
of the inner nature of spirit and matter. And as for the assumption
that the soul ceases to be when its functions in connection with the
body cease, it is refuted by the arguments against monism. Monism
is too unsatisfactory a philosophy to be allowed to carry with it the
overthrow of a fact so well attested as the resurrection of Jesus.
The absence of actual, formal proof of the death of Jesus must be
1 Strauss, The Life of Jesus, vol. ii, p. 843.

Untenability of the Theory of Apparent Death. 529
admitted. But, on the other hand, there is no reason to question the
fact of his death. Though there is no proof that putre- No reason for
faction had begun, but rather that Jesus did not see cor- tSe SfactiDof
ruption,1 stiU the universal beUef of the early Christians his death-
is good evidence that Jesus was dead. The attempt has been made to
show by examples of actual crucifixion followed by resuscitation, and
by various tortures which men and women have survived, that Jesus
might have escaped death. Josephus gives us an account of the cru
cifixion, of a number of captives, three of whom he recognized as
former acquaintances, and these were, at Josephus's request, taken
down from the cross and given careful medical attention in order to
their recovery. In spite of aU effort, however, two of the three died.2
That this fact of the recovery of one out of three lends any strength
to the opinion that Jesus did not actuaUy die cannot be believed. For
supposing the friends of Josephus to have hung upon the cross about
the same length of time as Jesus, as Strauss thinks, stfll there is this
difference, that they were removed from their crosses while still
showing signs of Ufe, whereas Jesus was not taken down until lUe
was apparently extinct. If of the three men taken from the cross whfle
evidently still aUve only one recovered, with the greatest possible med
ical care, what hope could there be of the resuscitation of Jesus, who
was apparently dead when removed and for whose recovery no meas
ures were taken ? And that there was no effort made to restore him
to lUe and consciousness is evident from the whole story as given in
the gospels, and from the unanimous opinion of the early Christians
that he rose from death, not from apparent death. There is, on the
other hand, nothing whatever to suggest that he had any medical
care after his removal from the cross. That supposition is made
merely to help out the theory that he did not really die on the cross.
It is highly improbable that either the Jewish enemies of Jesus or
the Romans would aUow our Lord to be taken down from j e w s a n d
the cross until they were convinced of his death. The c^mD?nednto
representations, therefore, as given in the gospels, bear fakeastohU
internal evidence of trustworthiness. True it is that deatn-
Pilate wondered at the early death of Jesus, but, according to the
record, he inquired of the centurion before he would be convinced.8
Either those who are responsible for the record had good reason to be
Ueve it true or else they were skillful deceivers, for they themselves
1 So both Peter and Paul. See Acts II, 27 and xiii, 35.
2 Complete Works of Flavius Josephus, Life, p. 75.
» Mark xv, 44, 45, and John xix, 33.

530 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
note the surprise of Pilate and his apparent doubt. But even U we
suppose that the friends of Jesus were deceivers, and Pilate and the
centurion both deceived, still the Jews would not aUow any mistake
to be made. If the Jews and Romans alike beUeved Jesus dead it is
unlikely that these hypocritical friends of Jesus beUeved him' stfll
alive. It is really difficult to understand why to the early Chris
tians should be ascribed such profound and abundant resources of
trickery. It is high time that they should be credited with at least
common honesty, which would prevent such marvelously skillful
falsifications being carried on through many years and without any
sign of repentance.
The conclusion of the whole matter is that Jesus was dead when he
was taken down from the cross and laid in the tomb of Joseph of
Arimathaea.

The Vision Hypothesis — Strauss. 531

CHAPTER III.
THE VISION HYPOTHESIS— STRAUSS.
The hopelessness of the theory of apparent death in any of its
forms is, viewed from every standpoint, as we have seen, easily evi
dent. As a result of this conviction that theory has had almost no
advocates since the first years of this century.1 Nevertheless, there is
a very large class of theologians who cannot bring themselves to be
lieve in a literal resurrection of Jesus from the dead. Some of these
stfll attempt to explam on purely natural principles the belief of the
early Christians as to the appearances of Jesus, while others admit
the divine origin of the apparitions. The one thing in which all these
theorists agree is the fact that something took place a .....
0 ° * Something
which changed the despair of the disciples upon the to°aitplatne
death of Jesus into abounding hope. Says Strauss : * " It th|linfiSa c u
is a just argument of modern apologists that the aston- Ples-
ishing revulsion from the deep depression and utter hopelessness of
the disciples at the death of Jesus, to the strong faith and enthusiasm
with which they proclaimed him as the Messiah on the succeeding
Pentecost, would be inexplicable unless in the interim something ex
traordinarily encouraging had taken place — something, in fact, which
had convinced them of his resurrection. But," he adds, "that this
cause of conviction was precisely a real appearance of the risen Jesus
—that, indeed, it was necessarily an external event at all— is by no
means proved."
We take up first of all, among the theories which admit the death
of Jesus and the belief of the early Christians in his resurrection but
which deny any objective reality in the appearances of Jesus to the
disciples, the earliest theory of Strauss himself.3 He says : * "During
several years' intercourse with them (the disciples) he strauss's ear-
(Jesus) had constantly impressed them more and more her tneory-
decidedly with the belief that he was the Messiah ; but his death,
which they were unable to reconcile with their Messianic ideas, had,
1 J. A. M. Mensinger favored it as late as 1870. See Keim's History of Jesus of Nazara,
vi, p. 329 n. * The Life of Jesus, vol. ii, p. 847.
'Strauss's views underwent several material changes on the subject of the resurrec
tion of Chrls't. In his Der alte und neue Glaube, seventh edition, 1874, he speaks of ltas the
" world-historical humbug." * The Life of Jesus, vol. ii, p. 849.

532 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
for the moment, annihilated this belief. Now when, after the first
shock was past, the earlier impression began to revive, there spon
taneously arose in them the psychological necessity of solving the
contradiction between the ultimate fate of Jesus and their earUer
opinion of him— of adopting into their idea of the Messiah the char
acteristics of suffering and death. As, however, with the Jews of
that age to comprehend meant nothing else than to derive from the
sacred Scriptures, they turned to these to ascertain whether they
might not perhaps find in them intimations of a suffering and dying
Messiah. Foreign as the idea of such a Messiah is to the Old Testa
ment, the disciples, who wished to find it there, must nevertheless
have regarded as intimations of this kind all those poetical and pro
phetic passages which, like Isa. UU, and Psa. xxu, represented the Man
of God as afflicted and bowed down even to death. . . . When they
had in this manner received mto their Messianic idea ignominy, suf
fering, and death, the ignominiously executed Jesus was not lost, but
still remained to them ; by his death he had only entered into his
Messianic glory (Luke xxiv, 26), in which he was invisibly with them
always, even unto the end of the world (Matt, xxvfli, 20). But how
could he fail, out of this glory, in which he Uved, to give tidings of
himself to his followers ? And how could they, when their mind was
opened to the hitherto hidden doctrine of a dying Messiah . . . and
when in moments of unwonted inspiration their hearts burned within
them (Luke xxiv, 32) — how could they avoid conceiving this to be an
influence shed on them by their glorified Christ, an opening of their
understanding by him (verse 45), nay, an actual conversing with him ?
Lastly, how conceivable it is that in individuals, especiaUy women,
these impressions were heightened, in a purely subjective manner,
into actual visions ; that on others, even on whole assembUes, some
thing or other of an objective nature, visible or audible, sometimes
perhaps the sight of an unknown person, created the impression of a
revelation or appearance of Jesus."
This theory may be caUed that of reflection and consequent vision ;
for it presupposes the reflection as a necessity to the vision. It will
be noticed that it attributes to the disciples a peculiarly logical method
Theory of re- °^ procedure, and at the same time makes their wish
consequent father to their method, whfle, on the other hand, it
vision. makes them ignore the main facts of the Old Testament
and the teaching of Jesus himseU — who by the hypothesis could not
have foretold to them his death — in favor of a few scanty and isolated
passages. And these men who could thus deceive themselves in the

The Vision Hypothesis — Strauss. 533
interests of their feehngs were those who held fast with such tenacity
to the actuaUty of both the death and resurrection of Jesus. Truly a
marvelous result ! For generaUy what men reason out in spite of the
facts loses (U it ever gains) aU hold on their minds. Profound con
victions such as theirs are not the product of evidence so meager
and uncertain. Then, too, the very point in question, namely, as to
how they came to think of their Lord as risen, finds in this theory-
even less support than their behef in the sufferings of the Messiah.
Strauss based this entirely upon the idea that they must have be
Ueved he would give them tidings of himself U he was in his Mes
sianic glory. But what reason is there for thinking that they would
entertain such an expectation ? None whatever; since by the theory
Jesus prophesied neither his death nor his reappearance. Thus far
the chain is composed of two threads so slender that they could not
possibly support a faith like that of the early disciples.
In fact, the causes which the hypothesis assumes are quite insuffi
cient to produce a state of mind, even in women of the Tne theory
most nervous temperament, such as to make possible crltlclsed-
their deception by subjective visions or by the sight of an unknown
person. People do see subjective visions, which they take for objec
tive, but not as a result of processes of reasoning, and especially proc
esses so attenuated as Strauss suggests ; and most human beings are
too accustomed to the sight of unknown people to admit of their mis
taking one such for Christ. Furthermore, though an individual
might mistake a vision for a real appearance, or an unknown person
for Jesus, it is incredible that all should be thus deceived and that
there should be none to point out their error. The variability in the
operations of the mind of different individuals and the insuscepti
bility of the majority to visionary illusions argue strongly against the
theory. Those early Christians who wrote the gospels were not
easily deceived.1 They demanded, not a glimpse of an unknown, but
an examination of his body before they would believe that the appa
rition was that of Jesus himseU. Even if it were supposed that not
one of the gospels is the work of an eyewitness, stfll those who did
write them evidently knew how to test the competency of a witness.
This is emphatically true of Paul, who is supposed by Strauss to have
at first received his belief in the resurrection of Jesus from the primi
tive disciples.3 His sober method of thought forbids that he should
have received " the belief of the sect which he persecuted," and that
» See, for example, Acts xii, 5-15, particularly verse 15.
a The Life of Jesus, vol. ii, p. 849.
36

534 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
he would have " vivified it with his own imagination " unless they
had had something better to offer than the reflective process and self-
deceptions supposed by Strauss. Besides, the method which this
theory assumes, U possible at all, could result but slowly in the con
viction the disciples had. Hence the theory does not at aU account
for the quick revulsion in the feelings of the disciples which led them
within a few days to the belief in the resurrection. Strauss rejected
the theory of apparent death in favor of the one just discussed. Both
theories are false, but as between the two the former is the less unsat
isfactory. Strauss himseU abandoned later the theory just considered, and it
lives only in that vague way in which error continues its hold upon
people of a certain type of mind after more thoughtful men and
women have entirely discarded it. But he never gave up that ele
ment of the theory which made the belief in the resurrection of Jesus
its abandon- the result of subjective visions rather than of objective
men t by . ,.,..,
Strauss. appearances of the risen Saviour to his disciples. In
studying this theory of visions without the influence of the super
natural we shaU take Renan's development of the subject as a
specific instance of the theory, though we shaU endeavor to over
look no important aspect of it as presented by its other adherents.

The Theory of Renan. 535

CHAPTER IV.
THE THEORY OF RENAN.
Partly by direct quotations and partly by summary Renan's
theory may be stated as foUows :' Jesus had frequently spoken of
the resurrection but never distinctly said that he should rise in bodily
form from the grave ; and at first the disciples had no such definite
hope. Rather did they feel that all their hopes in Jesus had been
vain. But enthusiasm and love admit no situation with- Summary of
Renan's hy-
out reUef . They mock at impossibiUty, and, rather than potheses.
despair, they repudiate the brute fact. Many words of the Master
were recalled, chiefly those in which he spoke of his later coming,
and these might be explained as a prediction of his rising from the
tomb. Such a belief, too, was so natural that the disciples' faith was
enough to have created it outright. Enoch and Elijah never tasted
death. A behef was coming to prevail that the bodies of the patri
archs and the chief men of the ancient law were stfll living and
breathing in their sepulchers at Hebron." The same must come to
pass in the case of Jesus. The hero does not die. Would the dis
ciples consent to let Christ molder in the tomb ? No ; he had lived
too long in those who foUowed him for them not to affirm that after
his death he stUl lived.
All handiwork was forbidden by the Sabbath, but never was rest
more fruitful. To the Christian heart there was but one object, the
entombed person of the Master. Especially the women did not for
one moment forget Jesus, now reposing in his bed perfumed with
myrrh— attended doubtless by angels who hid their faces in his
winding sheet. He had said that he would Uve again, and God
wfll not leave his soul in hell. He will Uft off the ponderous
tombstone, rise, and ascend to the Father. We shaU see him and
hear him and again enjoy his companionship. Vainly has he been
slain. To admit that Death could have the victory over Jesus, who had
1 See its full development in his The Apostles, translated and edited by J. H. Allen,
Boston, 1898, chaps. 1-3. .
a Christlieb characterizes this as a piece of Renan's lively oriental imagmation.-Moaern
Doubt and Christian Belief, p. 461. We have assumed the fact of such a belief as Renan
describes, since he supports it with learned references.

538 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
come to conquer Death, was the height of absurdity. His disciples
had once revolted at the very idea that he could suffer. They had
now, ' therefore, no other choice than keen despair or an heroic
resolve. A person of insight might have predicted on that Saturday
that Jesus would live again. The little Christian company on that
day wrought the true miracle, bringing Jesus back to Ufe in its
heart by its own intense affection for him, and resolving that he
should not die. In a sense Jesus was already risen. The empty
grave would estabUsh the faith in the resurrection. When Mary
Magdalene arrived on Sunday morning the body was no longer
there. Whither had it gone ? Rejecting the thought of a violated
sepulcher, she felt, it may be, an instant's gleam of hope, and with
out delay went to report to Peter and John. They also find the
tomb empty, and return to their lodgings in extreme perplexity. If
they did not actuaUy speak the decisive words, "He is risen!" we
may yet say that the inference is irresistible, and that the beUef
which was the Uving germ of Christianity was already fixed.
Mary lingers at the tomb. Suddenly, hearing a sUght sound, she
turns about and sees a man standing whom she supposed to be the
gardener: "O," she cries, "if you have taken him, ted me where
you have laid him." As the only reply she hears her own name
spoken — "Mary" — in the very voice, the very tone, so familiar in
her memory, and cries, "O, my Master !" pressing forward as if to
touch him, or with an instinctive gesture to kiss his feet. The vis
ion lightly recedes, and, with the words, " Touch me not," graduaUy
disappears. But the miracle of love is already wrought. Mary has done what
Peter could not do ; she has found a Uving form, a sweet and penetrat
ing voice, by the very border of the tomb. It is no longer a matter
of inference ; Mary has seen and heard. The resurrection has now
its first immediate witness. WUd with love and joy she now returns
to the city, saying to the first of the disciples whom she met, "I have
seen him; he has spoken to me." Some think her insane; but Peter
and John believe. Many doubts stfll remained ; but the strong as
surance of Mary, Peter, and John became that of the rest. In such a
critical event it is nothing to see after others have already seen. The
first witness determines all; the vision vouchsafed to others is
modeled upon a type already existent. The glory of the resurrection
is due to Mary Magdalene. Next after Jesus's part hers was the most
essential in the founding of Christianity.
Such is the theory of Renan ; and we must confess that it proves

The Theory of Eenan. 537
him to be a visionary, whether the early disciples were visionaries or
not, and so far he is pardonable for conceiving and expressing the
view he did. The first criticism is that, for this amazing com
bination of gospel data with his own imaginings, the only occasion
is the unwillingness to believe in miracle. In order to support himseU
he is obUged to twist and turn the most prosaic statements into ima
gery, and to pervert the plainest meaning of words and ideas.
Let us descend now to the level of common sense and examine the
theory. It teaches that Jesus had never predicted a bodfly resurrec
tion, yet the disciples asserted that he appeared to them -weakness of
in bodily form. How is it that their reflections led them his Position-
to expect what Jesus never promised ? Then the cases of Enoch and
Elijah could have afforded no expectation of a rising from the dead ;
for they are represented as having never died. The ancient men who
were supposed to be still living in their tombs in Hebron might have
suggested that Jesus would Uve in the tomb, but not that he would
rise therefrom. He need not molder U, like those men of old, he
lived in the tomb. What was there to suggest that he would hf t off
the tombstone, rise, and ascend to the Father? The ancients who
lay, Uving and breathing, in their tombs did not come forth. The
disciples might think of a continued spiritual presence, but there is
nothing in the Une of thought which Renan supposes they foUowed to
suggest his bodfly presence. When he appeared they supposed they
saw a spirit ; but they did not think of a bodily appearance. That
came by indubitable proofs. This occurred even after Mary had de
clared that she saw him. They could beUeve in ghostly appearances
but not in a bodUy resurrection. There was nothing in the empty
grave to suggest his resurrection, though that fact might tend to con
firm it. Even Renan does not pretend that it suggested it ; notwith
standing that he supposes the disciples were inteUectuaUy and
emotionaUy prepared and determined that Jesus should Uve. Mary
did not suspect his resurrection, but his removal. So, then, aU this
reflection on the part of the disciples, as imagined (for it is pure
imagination) by Renan, passes out of view, since it has no bearing on
the final result. Indeed, one can scarcely escape the feeling that
Renan wavered, as to the more likely, between a pure theory of
reflection and one of vision, so little have they to do with each other
as he has actually combined them.
We come now to the theory of visions. Let us admit that U Mary,
Peter, and John were firm in their conviction that he was risen, and
that they had seen him, others would believe and have visions also.

538 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
Still, his account of the behef of these three is whoUy unsatisfactory.
Note that the man she sees she supposes to be, not Jesus, for him she
supposed stfll cold in death, but the gardener. Under such circum
stances she would not at aU expect to hear the voice of the Master,
but a strange voice. Yet Renan says that when the supposed gar
dener called her by name it was with " the very voice, the very tone
so famihar in her memory." Now we submit that such a thing is
psychologically impossible except on the theory that the voice which
impossibility spoke was "the very voice, the very tone so familiar in
positions her memory." If he had made Mary expect to find him
real. risen, and the empty grave a further proof to her of that
fact, and the person she saw not the gardener, but the Lord, then she
might have been expected also to be deceived in the voice.1 But Jesus
dead, and absent, at least to her thought, and the gardener present
and speaking— this situation forbids her being deceived in the voice
she heard. For even U her name had deceived her she would have
been undeceived by the pronunciation of the words, "Touch me
not." 2 Or, U he means to make this whole scene a vision, still it is
so inconsistent as to be incredible. We repeat : the only way to ac
count for her hearing the voice of Jesus from one whom she did not
suppose to be Jesus is the supposition that the one whom she took for
the gardener was Jesus.
These considerations alone are sufficient to warrant us in entirely
rejecting Renan's views. But the case becomes even worse when we
consider how Renan makes Peter and John accept Mary's word. In
the first place, he is obliged to do violence to the text by making it
say what it does not say in order to carry his point. He says:'
"Greatly disturbed in her fancy, with broken and wandering speech,4
she was taken by some of them to be insane, whfle Peter and John re-
His violation late what they had seen, and other disciples go to the
of the record, tomb and see for themselves. The fixed conviction of all
this first group was that Jesus was indeed risen from the dead." The
record is quite different in many respects,5 but we note only the fol
lowing points. The record says that Mary (with certain other
women) returned and told all these things unto the eleven and aU the
rest, and that the words of the women appeared unto them, that is,
1 Comp. Row's Christian Evidences Viewed in Relation to Modern Thought, pp. 387 ff.
a Renan gives but these three words. The record In John xix, 17, however, shows that
the words she heard were numerous. During their utterance she could not but have
noted the difference between the voice which was speaking and the one " so familiar in
her memory." s The Apostles, p. 48.
4 His only foundation for this Is that out of Mary were cast seven devils.
6 See Luke xxiv, 1-12.

The Theory of Kenan. 539
the eleven and all the rest, as idle tales. There is in the record abso
lutely nothing to indicate that "some of them" regarded the woman
as insane, whUe Peter and John accepted her report. Besides, Renan
has made Peter and John go to the grave before Mary reports what
she has seen and heard ; the record makes Peter go after the women
report. Furthermore, Renan makes Mary report that she had seen
the Lord, whfle the record makes the women report the vision of
angels. From the account in John,1 when Mary told of seeing the
Lord and being spoken to by him, it was not received with incredulity.
Renan has perverted the record to suit his own fancy, and yet pro
poses to pass for a scientific historian. If he had said that from the
records it was impossible to make out what did happen we could re
spect him. But when he warps the record in the interest of a theory
he proves himself not only unworthy of aU respect as an historian,
but dishonest as weU.
But suppose that Peter and John had seen the empty grave before
Mary came and reported having seen and conversed with the Lord ;
can we suppose that they believed so easily ? Would they begin to
see visions and hear the Saviour speak simply because a woman pro
fessed to have seen him and heard him ? This is incredible. For they
had no expectation of his resurrection, and, as we have seen, there was
nothing in the reflections which Renan supposes them Kenan's the-
to have indulged to create such an expectation, or even Sccount8 for
to prepare the mind for the announcement of it. In spite * he ' e'ar i°y
of the empty grave and her testimony they would have Cnristians-
been skeptical. If after a time she had succeeded in persuading them
that she was correct their opposition must have cooled her ardor so
much that she could not have imparted to them the enthusiasm and
lack of mental balance which sees visions.
We cannot f oUow this theory longer, growing, as it does, more and
more absurd the further we pursue it.a The case of persecuted
Protestants going in crowds to the ruins of a chapel and hearing
angels sing psalms is not paraUel, since long before this angels were
supposed to have been heard to sing. But for the resurrection of Jesus
there was no precedent. It was the first of the kind, and therefore
much more difficult of belief, not to repeat the fact that the disciples
had not the slightest expectation of such a thing. The cause is not
adequate to the effect.
1 Chap, xx, 18. •
» See, for example, his ridiculous construction of the walk to Emmaus, The Apostles,
pp. 53-55; also of the case of Thomas, p. 57 f.

540 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER V.
GENERAL DEFECTS OF THE VISION HYPOTHESIS.
So determined is the opposition to the objective reaUty of the resur
rection, and so clear the necessity of accounting for the behef of the
early disciples in the same without resort to the theory of fraud in
any intentional form, that every realm which can afford an argu
ment for the hypothesis of vision has been ransacked and utilized.
One of these arguments is that which is professedly drawn from a
comparison of the belief in Christ's resurrection with the beUef in Mo-
The dreams of hammed's dreams as the foundation of a religious organi-
andhthe™es^ zation. Now, let us suppose that at first Mohammed was
j'eslis"1 a°l sincere in beUeving that he had received revelations from
religious3 ac- God, and that his conviction was so strong that he could
tl0n' sincerely though mistakenly lay claim to a divine mis
sion. In that case we should have, apparently, two great reUgious
bodies buUt up on two great delusions, Mohammedanism on the de
lusions of Mohammed, and Christianity on the delusion of the early
Christians that Christ was risen from the dead. So the unbeUever
would apparently be able to assert that the greatest results can foUow
from the most illusory beliefs, and accordingly Christianity can be
accounted for without the supposition of the reality of the resurrec
tion of Christ. All that was needful was the belief of the primitive
disciples which, the case of Mohammedanism proves, might have
arisen without any good grounds.
The fallacy in this argument is exhibited the moment it is made
clear that the Mohammedan Church was not built upon the hallucina
tions of Mohammed. That this is the fact is notorious. During the
twelve years from 610-622, while he carried on his propaganda by peace
ful means, he made but few converts. Not until he took up the sword
did he succeed in gaming any large number of adherents. That some
of these were convinced of the reality of his divine commission is un
questionable ; but the religion of Mohammed spread chiefly, not as a
result of the preaching of his doctrine, but by the conquests of his
, arms. How different the progress of the Gospel of Christ ! Jesus himself,
indeed, secured but few followers during his lUe on earth. For the

General Defects of the Vision Hypothesis. 541
wider spread of his truth his resurrection and the gUt of the Holy
Spirit on the day of Pentecost were necessary. But what immense
numbers of foUowers were gathered under his peaceful banner during
the first twelve years subsequent to his resurrection I Here is the first
contrast. But besides this, in spite of persecution and by the use of
none but peaceful methods, the faith of Christ spread with such
rapidity during the first three hundred years that Constantine felt it
to be the only safe plan to grant it perfect liberty of exercise and
growth. Mohammedanism spread by the employment of the sword.
Christianity spread in spite of the sword. These contrasts show that the
hallucinations of Mohammed did not furnish a sufficient cause for the
growth of Mohammedanism, and hence in nowise suggest that
Christianity might have resulted from the illusory belief in the resur
rection of Christ. The sword accounts for Mohammedanism. It was
astern reaUty.1 The reaUty of the resurrection accounts for Chris
tianity. But it is insisted that there are circumstances under which men and
women do mistake their own subjective states for external realities.
Keim, who holds a modified form of the vision theory, says that
" Maximilla and the Montanists saw Christ ; the Maid of Orleans re
ceived the archangel Michael and Saints Catherine and Examination
Margaret ; Francis of Assisi saw the Lord as a seraph parallels to
and Savonarola looked upon both obscure and clear pic- posed visions
of the early
tures of the future through the ministry of angels." The disciples.
haUucinations of so-called spiritualism are also brought forward as
parallel. Now, there can be no question but that great waves of epi
demic illusion do make their appearance from time to time, and that
individuals can, by ascetic practices or by mystic contemplation, work
themselves into such a state of body and mind as are most favorable
to illusion. But attention must be caUed to the difference between
reported appearances of Jesus to his disciples and these epidemic and
other illusions of history. In the first place, the appearances of Jesus
were to those who did not expect them ; secondly, they were vouchsafed
to the followers of one of the soberest characters the world has ever
known, one who must have impressed somewhat of his sobriety upon
them. Thirdly, when individuals see visions it is generally the result
of long continued expectancy or of constitutional nervousness. The
appearance of Jesus from the third day onward, and the lack of
expectancy, forbid their being attributed to the former cause in the
case of the disciples, and too many individuals saw Jesus to allow
1 Comp. Row's Christian Evidences, pp. 374 ff.

542 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
the supposition that all were of the requisite nervous temperament.
Fourthly, too few of the early Christians saw Jesus to aUow of the
supposition that the appearances were an epidemic illusion.1 Pro
fessedly they lasted only forty days, and there is not the sUghtest
foundation for Renan's supposition that they lasted a year. But had
they continued a year the time would have been too short. The en
thusiasm did not die out so soon as that, and it is inconceivable that
those to whom were written the words : "Whom not having seen ye
love ; on whom, though now ye see him not, yet beUeving, ye rejoice
greatly with joy unspeakable and full of glory, " " should not have had
a vision of him, if a vision were aU that was involved. AU who never
saw Jesus were far more likely to have had visions of him than those
who had seen him ; for they who never saw him felt their loss even
more than those who did see him.
The vision theorists strive generally to make it appear that the few
instances mentioned by Paul 3 are the only manifestations of Jesus to
his disciples. They do this to cast doubt on the record in the gospels.
But it is strange they do not see that the fewer the appearances the
less explicable they are on the vision hypothesis. Even the appear-
Biindnessof ances mentioned in the gospels are so few that it is in-
toetheerde- credible that they are, as is supposed, the result of enthu-
argumenta^ siasm. If, under proper physical and mental conditions,
the enthusiasm of the early Christians was sure to result
in visions these ought to have been seen over wider areas and for a
time far beyond the ascension. But as soon as he ascended the aUeged
visions ceased. The only apparent exceptions were those of Stephen,4
Paul, 6 and the Revelator. " In the cases of Stephen and Paul Jesus was
seen in the heavens, and in the Revelation the appearance is evidently
figurative, so that these are not real exceptions.
The consideration so often urged in favor of the vision hypothesis,
that, according to the New Testament, visions and revelations of one
sort and another were common among all classes of Christians, reaUy
militates against that hypothesis ; for U it was so easy for Christians
to see visions, and U it had become a sort of epidemic to see Jesus, why
did not more see him ? The vision hypothesis breaks down, therefore,
in that within a very short period, while aU the love of Jesus and in
tense enthusiasm for him and his cause continues, there is evidently
no fanaticism, but a calm, though determined and enthusiastic, view
1 Comp. Keim's The History of Jesus of Nazara, vol. vl, p. 355 f.
1 1 Pet. i, 8, Revised Version. » l Cor. xv, 5-3.
« Acts vii, 55, 56. * 1 Cor. xv, 8. • Rev. 1, 13.

General Defects of the Vision Hypothesis. 543
of the situation and a purpose to carry the Gospel everywhere. This
fact is unaccounted for on the theory of visions, which if begun under
the conditions supposed, must have continued indefinitely. With the
cessation of the visions Christianity would have waned. But, without
any theory on the part of the early Church that only a few should see
him and the rest believe on their testimony— that was just what took
place. A movement like that, based on mere illusory visions, would not
have been filled with such deUberation, modesty, and reserve.
But, fifthly, these Christians not only saw Jesus ; they also heard
him speak and give them most important instruction. If all this was
illusion it was illusion of both sight and hearing. The if an illusion
extreme critics try to make it appear that there could not both of sight
have been any such communication. But, if his visual fngd bear"
appearance may be explained on the theory of illusion, why not his
oral utterances ? In fact, these alleged utterances of Jesus subsequent
to his resurrection, taken as a whole, are so sober and so important
that they cannot have been the product of iUusion. They are the prod
uct of earnest thought and high and wide-reaching purpose. He was
not mad who composed them. The only conclusion is that, if Jesus
did not speak them, they were invented. But our theorists have no
purpose to attribute them to conscious invention. If it be said that
he might have spoken them prior to his crucifixion we reply that
then the invention consists in deliberately placing them subsequent to
his aUeged resurrection instead of prior to his death. As far as spir
itualism is concerned it has nothing to offer worthy of comparison.
It never gives us more than the most commonplace sayings from
its supposed spirits. Their words are inanities; those of the risen
Christ were majestic. They accomplish nothing; his have moved
the world.1
1 Comp. Row's Christian Evidences Viewed in Relation to Modern Thought, p. 390 f. The
reader should not overlook Row's Interesting reference to Mr. Wallace, who apologizes
for the nonsense uttered by the materialized spirits by saying that they had talked little
but nonsense during their earthly life and could not be expected to talk sense all at once
upon arriving in the spirit world. Strange that here and there one who had talked sense
in life should not reappear and talk sense when materialized. Perhaps that class do not
approve of the spiritualistic folly.

544 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VI.
the theory of a divinely wrought vision.
There are those who hold to the hypothesis of a divinely wrought
vision of Jesus * who deny the fact of the literal resurrection, and to
this form of the theory attention must now be turned. It is distinctly
more worthy of our respect than the usual vision hypothesis, though
for the most substantial reasons it too must be rejected. Keim has put
this form of the theory in a plausible light. After considering the
Keim's piausi- whole subject of the resurrection of Jesus he concludes
ment. that historians cannot "arrive at a certain and incontest
able result concerning the mysterious events that closed the Ufe of
Jesus. . . . For history, which reckons only with concrete numbers
and with sequences of tangible, recognized causes and effects, there
exists as factual and unquestionable simply the beUef of the apostles
that Jesus rose again, with the immense result of that beUef , the Chris
tianizing of mankind." "Christian faith can, however, go a step
further ; not because it is able, by prejudice or conviction, to make
the uncertain certain, but because its yearning to rise from the world
to God . . . impels it to overstep the boundaries of material percep
tion and the natural order of the world to which science and history
are bound. It oversteps these boundaries ... in the conviction that
it was he and no other who, as dead yet risen again, as celestially
glorified even if not risen, vouchsafed visions to his disciples, revealed
himself to his community." "If the visions are not something
humanly generated or seU-generated, if they are not the blossom and
fruit of an illusion producing overexcitement, if they are not some
thing strange and mysterious, if they are directly accompanied by
astonishingly clear perceptions and resolves, then there remains one
originating source, hitherto unmentioned (by him) ; namely, God and
the glorified Christ. Spinoza incidentaUy expresses this opinion ; and
those recent critics who are as little satisfied with the mythical as
with the visionary have reverted to this assumption of a higher power,
1 The theory concedes the necessity of admitting the objective source of the disciples'
Impression that they had seen the risen Lord. Schenkel says that considering the state
of the apostles' minds it Is Impossible to suppose that the visions arose subjectively.— Das
Christusblld der Apostel, 1879, p. 18. Stapfer also holds this theory, See his Death and
Resurrection of Jesus, New York, 1898.

The Theory of a Divinely Wrought Vision. 545
of a divine impulsion, or of a continued interposition of the glorified
person of Christ." a
There is something very alluring about this theory, and if it were a
mere question of faith or belief, apart from basis of fact, it might pos
sibly answer; for it specificaUy preserves the supernat- The theory pre-
, . . , .. . servesthesu-
ural. But even as a question of behef we can see no pernatmai.
reason why it should be preferred by a historian to the actual resur
rection ; for it, no less than the other, presupposes divine intervention
in the affairs of men. The whole difference is one of form. In the
one case " God and the glorified Christ" are supposed to have caused
these visions ; in the other, God is supposed to have raised Jesus from
the dead, and the disciples saw him. In the one case God operated
upon the disciples and in the other upon the dead body of Christ. In
point of fact, to a believer in God the latter is the preferable view ;
for the former involves God in a deception, since he caused the visions
but left them under the impression that they had seen the real body
of Christ and the empty grave when they had not. From this point
of view the difference may be described, in part, at least, as the differ
ence between an iUusion and a delusion. If it is a matter of faith,
therefore, the doctrine of the resurrection of the actual body of Christ
must be chosen. So far as the kind of phflosophy of history is con
cerned which Keim appears to have adopted, it would be as obnoxious
to talk about visions induced by God as about a resurrection brought
about by God, for God is not one of the "tangible, recognized causes
and effects" of that philosophy. Such a phflosophy can, however,
recognize the illusions of history. So that when Keim rejects the
ordinary theory of visions and adopts the supernatural theory — rejects
the theory of illusion and adopts that of delusion— he rejects his own
phflosophy of history in the interest of his faith. The scientific unbe
liever does not want any better weapon with which to assault the
Christian than just this doctrine, that between faith and science there
is a contradiction.
We feel ourselves under obligation, therefore, to say that the beUef
of the disciples that they had seen the risen Lord is not a question of
faith in the sense in which Keim uses the term, but a The question
one of fact,
question of fact. They had that beUef. How did they not of faith.
come by it ? If it was not illusion, as Keim admits, what did cause
it ? These are questions which, not faith, but history, must answer ;
1 The History of Jesus of Nazara, vi, 359-361. Keim's view is akin to that of Schenkel
as given in his Characterbild Jesu, 3d edition, 1864, pp. 231 ff. Holsten also gives his ad
herence to a similar opinion.-Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus, pp. 20 ff.

546 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
and that philosophy of history is defective which can find no room for
an answer. The effect cannot Ue within the realm of history and the
cause beyond it. So that Keim has in fact admitted God into history,
though he has deceived himself into thinking that he did not. Be
tween an atheistic and a theistic construction of the facts he chose the
latter, though in the name of faith. To this procedure both atheists
and theists must justly object. Every atheistic construction of his
tory falls when atheism falls, and the theistic construction stands
whfle theism stands. Theism demands that God be given his place in
history, and asserts that miracle is possible. Hence, within a theistic
construction of history, the miracle of the resurrection is possible.
The only question is, Was it actual ? The early disciples beUeved it
was, and unless there is some reasonable method other than the sup
position of an actual resurrection by which to account for that beUef
we shall have to assume that they were correct. That the theory of
apparent death and any theory of Illusory visions yet proposed fafls is
beyond doubt. Our remaining duty is to examine the theory of delu
sory visions. Did God delude the early disciples into thinking that
Christ rose from the dead ? We think this putting of the theory, by
its ethical implications, is its sufficient negation. But as not aU wfll
admit, probably, the implication that God deluded those who thought
they saw the risen Christ, we shall proceed to consider it from other
points of view.
The first great difficulty with the theory is that it leaves unex
plained the firm belief of the apostles that it was the veritable body of
First diffl- Christ, and not some vision of him, however produced,
culty" which they saw. Paul and aU the writers of the New
Testament who mention the matter make the point that Jesus died,
was buried, and rose again.1 Aside from many references, some of
which we have given, their belief is fixed by their appUcation to the
case of the words, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in heU; neither
wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." * No criticism of
their incentive for using this passage in reference to the resurrection
can weaken the force of the fact that they meant thereby to say that
the body of Jesus came forth from the grave. The same fact Ues at
the foundation of the record in Matt. xxvU, 64-66, and xxvUi, 12-15.
We can see no good reason for doubting the historicity of these ac
counts, but whether they are historical or not they can mean only that
the disciples believed it was the body of Jesus which they saw. So
' Comp. Matt, xx, 19; xxvil, 63; Mark vlll, 31; ix, 31; x, 34; Luke xviii, 33; xxiv, 7;
Acts ii, 24 ; Horn, viii, 11. s Psa. xvi, 10.

The Theory of a Divinely Wrought Vision. 547
also it is with the reported chaUenge of Christ to those who, unable to
beUeve it was really he who stood before them, explained their im
pressions on the theory that it was his ghost. He said to them, "A
spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have." l In spite of aU
criticism these and many similar passages prove by direct statement
or by certain implication that they both believed in the resurrection
of the body of Jesus and professed to have been incredulous enough to
demonstrate the objective reality corresponding to their behef .
Now, it would be vain to pretend that because they believed it we
must believe it also ; but it is nevertheless a fact that their belief mil
itates strongly against any theory of vision, whether illusive or delu
sive. The only real difficulty in accepting their testimony on this
point is the difficulty in beUeving in miracle. But U there is no other
way of satisfactorily explaining their belief the only thing left is to
beheve that this miracle occurred. We cannot escape the conviction
that U God vouchsafed them their visions, as this theory of super-
naturally induced visions supposes, he would have made it clear to
them that it was not the real body of Christ which they saw, but such
a vision of him as would suffice to convince them that he had, though
dead, ascended to his glory.
And this brings us to the next serious objection to this theory of de
lusion, namely, that it fafls to account for the belief of the early Chris
tians that he was seen in the body on earth until the as- second diffl-
cension, but never after that. If what they saw was a culty-
vision divinely produced, why any impression of an ascension ? and
why any cessation of those visions with the ascension ? The objection
that the dates of the ascension and of Pentecost are artificial does not
affect their belief that there was at some time a real departure from
the earth, prior to which they saw and conversed with him and sub
sequent to which they never did. The theory under consideration
supposes him to have been in his glory from the time of his death,
and that out of his glory he appeared to his disciples, his body being
still in the grave. Their belief in the ascension blocks the way to our
beUef in this theory. 1 Luke xxiv, 39.

548 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER VH.
PAUL AND THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS — OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.
But the great argument in favor of the vision hypothesis in aU its
forms is Paul's vision, especially his reference to it in 1 Cor. xv, 3-8. J
The language there, " he was seen of Cephas," "he was seen of the
twelve, " "he was seen of about five hundred, " " he was seen of James, "
' ' he was seen of aU the apostles, " " he was seen of me, " is supposed to in-
Did Paul see dicate that aU saw Jesus in the same way in which Paul saw
Jesus as the
primitive him. We have, as a matter of fact, very Uttle inf ormation
apostles saw
him? as to how Paul saw Jesus. The accounts in the Acts give us
no direct information on that point, and, indeed, they do not state
that Paul saw Jesus at all, but only that he saw a great Ught and
heard Jesus speak to him." StUl, since Paul himseU speaks, not, in
deed, of his seeing the Lord, but of whatever he saw and heard as the
"heavenly vision"3 we may suppose that when, in First Corinthi
ans, he says, " Last of aU he was seen of me also," 4 he may mean to
say that he saw him in a vision at the time mentioned in the three
passages of the Acts above referred to. His own words, we aUow,
may settle the question of Paul's seeing our Lord ; though Paul's fre
quent seeing of visions has no weight, since the content of these
visions is always specificaUy given, so that we could not conclude
from them alone that when he saw Jesus on the way to Damascus
it was a vision-sight. On the other hand, since aU the other vis
ions which Paul saw are directly or by plain impUcation referred
to a divine cause," we must suppose that this vision-sight of Paul
1 Keim says that in these verses Paul " determinedly excluded the speaking of Jesus,
the sitting and walking together, the eating and handling, every gross representation of
or restoration of the previous corporeity of Jesus."— History of Jesus of Nazara, vol. vi,
p. 290. He forgets that Paul was professedly giving them a mere recapitulation of former
elaborate instruction (verses 1-3), When Keim immediately adds that Paul undoubtedly
conceived the coming of Jesus to the primitive disciples as exactly similar to Jesus's ap
pearance to himself he puts himself squarely iu opposition to the facts, as we shall see.
a See Acts ix, 3-8 ; xxii, 6-11 ; xxvi, 12-15. 'Acts xxvi, 19.
* We assume the almost universally admited Pauline authorship of the principal epistles
attributed to Paul. The Dutch school of critics, which flies in the face of the more sober
criticism of Germany, England, and America, is making so little headway, even on its
native soil, as to demand no special attention here. Those who wish to look into the
matter more fully are referred to an article on The Recent Critical Attack on Galatians,
by this writer, in the Methodist Review for May-June, 1894.
¦ Acts ix, 12; xvi, 9; xviii, 9; xxvii, 23-25.

Paul and the Kesurrection of Jesds. 549
was no iUusion, unless all were, but that, like them, it was divinely
wrought. ¦
The real point, then, is not the objectivity of Paul's vision of Jesus
on the road to Damascus (or at some time subsequent to the resurrec
tion), but whether the " ' seeing " of Paul was the same as the ' l seeing"
by the others referred to in 1 Cor. xv.2 The general assumption,]^
that as Paul saw Jesus so the others whom he mentions must have
seen him.3 With this position we must take issue. We learn from
the accounts of Paul's Ufe, as given in the New Testament, what was
the nature of the sight he* had of Christ. It was a vision-sight, di
vinely, supematurally, wrought. From the records of the New Tes
tament, also, we learn the nature of the sight which the primitive
Christians had of Jesus subsequent to the resurrection and prior to
the ascension. It was a natural sight by natural means.
This is the actual difference which must be noted if we leave out of
account the words of 1 Cor. xv, 3-8. Is the language there employed
sufficient to warrant our rejection of this difference in significance of
the manner of the sight indicated by the records as a 1Cor-xv>3-8-
whole ? We think not. The two points which tend to the oblitera
tion of that difference are that Paul classes them all together and that
he uses the same word to describe what happened to all. Now, in
order to estimate correctly the first point it must be remembered that
Paul was stating the grounds of his and their belief in the resurrec
tion of the body. It was the resurrection of Jesus. This resur
rection the primitive Christians knew by the fact that they had
seen him. And he had seen him too, so that to their testimony he
could add his also ; only that, if they knew the manner in which he
saw him, it would afford the Corinthian Christians not merely a
proof of Jesus's rising from the dead, but also of the residence of
Jesus in glory. His testimony must be classed with theirs, since with
out it not aU could be proved that Paul wanted to prove. Men
desire, not only to rise from the dead, but also to feel that they wiU
live in heaven in a glorified state. Without the testimony of the
primitive Christians Paul's assertion that he had seen Jesus in heaven
would hardly be received ; without his testimony theirs would not
suffice for the purposes of Paul 's argument. Paul must, therefore,
class his seeing of Jesus with theirs.
1 The passage, 1 Cor. ix, 1, " Have I not seen Jesus our Lord ? " probably refers to a
sight he had of him prior to the crucifixion. But comp. Acts ix, 27.
3 Comp. Row's Christian Evidences Viewed in Relation to Modern Thought, Lecture vii,
Supplement I.
8 So Weizsacker, Das apostoliche Zeitalter der christlichen Kirche, Zweite Auflage,
1892, p. 7 ; also Stapfer, Death and Resurrection of Jesus, p. 206.
37

550 Foundations of the Christian Faith..
Nor is it proper to base upon the use of the same word the identical
character of the seeing. For, admitting that the word is used in the
New Testament chiefly, if not solely, hi cases where angels, God, or
the dead are said to have appeared to men,1 still this would not fix the
character of the "seeing " on the part of the primitive disciples unless
we had sound reasons for assuming that Paul deUberately employed
the word to convey a technical significance. That he did this is im
probable, for if he did he deliberately set himself against the current
view, namely, that our Lord did ready appear to the disciples subse
quent to the resurrection and prior to the ascension. Besides, on the
supposition that he did this, he robbed his doctrine of the resurrec
tion of one of its chief supports.
But chiefly is it essential to call attention to the fact that he could
not have used the word translated "see " in the sense of a vision when
applied to the apostles and the five hundred, since it is not upon his
own, but upon the authority of eyewitnesses that he professes to have
told them that these saw Jesus. "I delivered unto you . . . that
which also I received." s Their seeing was, with him, a matter of tra
dition, and the tradition was that they had seen the actual body of
Jesus risen from the tomb. Unless he meant to pervert the tradition
Paul could not have used the word which he employed to describe his
visions for the purpose of saying that the sight of Jesus was a vision.
The word must be supposed to carry with it the traditional idea when
appUed to them, though it might have a technical significance when
used of his own "seeing."
So, then, the testimony of Paul is not opposed to the idea of a Uteral
resurrection of the body of Jesus, but rather impUes that idea. But
in further support of the objective reaUty of their beUef is the fact of
The argument the empty grave. This argument is combated by Weiz-
fromtneemp- .,-,,, , -, .
ty grave. sacker with such subtlety as to demand special attention
in the light of his utterances.3 Weizsacker holds that those of whom
Paul speaks in 1 Cor. xv were convinced that they had seen the risen
Lord, and that with this was united the conviction that the experiences
which had led them to believe they had seen him did not arise from
themselves. This removes him from the list of those who would adopt
1 The word is not used exclusively in such connections in the New Testament ; see, for
example, Acts vii, 26; Tisehendorf's eighth edition of the Greek New Testament.
8 1 Cor. xv, 3. That Paul understood their view to be that of a literal resurrection is evi
dent from such passages as Rom. vl, 4. Hase calls attention to the fact that Paul must
have been thoroughly acquainted with the views of the early disciples concerning the
nature of the resurrection belief.— Geschlchte Jesu, p. 592.
8 See his Ingenious treatment of the resurrection of Jesus in his Das apostolische Zeit-
alter der christllchen Kirche, Zweite Auflage, Freiburg, i. B., 1892, pp. 1-17.

Paul and the Resurrection of Jesus. 551
the theory of subjective illusions. He further says that, whatever those
experiences were, they lie beyond the possibility of historical research
on the one side, but fail to prove the theory of bodfly appearances on
the other. In this respect his view appears to coincide with that of
Keim. This coincidence is found to be practically complete when we
discover that he makes Paul teach that his seeing of Christ was iden
tical in kind with that of the primitive disciples. Hence our discus
sion of Paul's testimony, given above, is so far an answer both to
Keim and Weizsacker.
But Weizsacker undertakes also to show that the thought of the
empty grave formed no original part of the proof of the resurrection
of our Lord. His argument is that, as Paul makes no mention of the
events represented in the gospels as having occurred at the grave of
Jesus on the morning of the resurrection, we must infer that the
primitive apostles, from whom Paul professedly received his informa
tion, knew nothing of such events. In other words, the primitive
apostles trusted entirely to the appearances of Jesus to them, and not
at all to the fact of the empty grave, for their belief that the Lord was
risen indeed. In answer to this several points must be considered
In the first place, Paul might have been moved to omit the mention of
the events at the grave as well by a desire for brevity as by ignorance
of a tradition of such events. That the motive we have suggested
for the omission was his real motive is rendered probable by the fact
that Paul was giving a mere recapitulation of the points previously
elaborated by him in his preaching to the Corinthians. But, second,
Paul does actuaUy imply the empty grave in his statement. For he
says that Jesus was crucified, was buried, and rose1 again the third
day, according to the Scriptures. These last words are an almost ex
act reproduction of the language and spirit of the gospel records rela
tive to the events at the grave on the morning of the third day. They
strongly suggest that Paul had heard, among the primitive apostles,
the accounts of aU that had happened, and that it had happened ac
cording to the Scriptures. But, furthermore, Paul distinctly says
that Jesus was buried and rose again, not merely was buried and ap
peared to his disciples. He was buried, he rose or was raised from the
dead, and he appeared. This does not indeed state that the disciples
had seen the empty grave ; but it states that, as really as Jesus went
into the grave in the body, so really did he in the body go forth from
the grave ; and we might add, in the body appeared to the disciples.
¦Weizsacker translates auferwecket (awakened or raised up from the dead).— See his
Das Neue Testament, in loc.

552 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
But a third fact is that Weizsacker himseU, after discussing the
theory that Paul and the primitive disciples must have seen the Lord
in the spirit, and not with the physical vision, confesses that this was
not the conception of the matter which prevailed in the earUest
Church. And he accounts for then* belief that they had seen the Lord
in the body by the general beUef that the bodies of the dead did some
times rise from their graves and, reanimated, walk the earth once
more and mingle with men. But U the earliest Church did beUeve
that Jesus was one of those who had so risen why should Weizsacker
say that Paul did not mention it because no such tradition' existed ?
For even though we might concede that the visits of the disciples to
the grave and the visions of angels, and the like, were afterward in
vented, still the essential point of their belief in a bodily resurrection
Weizsacker himseU admits. And with this they must have beUeved
the grave empty, though the empty grave would not have been their
proof of the resurrection.
As a fourth fact we mention that Weizsacker has missed the main
point in the proof from the empty grave. If the beUef of the early
disciples in the resurrection was the result of a series of visions rather
than of his actual bodUy appearance to them, then the body of Jesus
might still have been in the grave. But U such were the case why did
not the Jews forever silence the Christians' assertion of the bodfly
resurrection of Jesus by clearly demonstrating that his body was still
in the grave ? If it was in the grave Paul must have known it when
he was a persecutor of the disciples ; why, then, did he not correct
their erroneous views by plainly pointing out that what they saw was
not the risen body of the Lord, but a vision of him ? Furthermore,
knowing, as according to the theory he must have known, both the
Christian claim that the body of Jesus had come forth from the grave
and the refutation of that claim, namely, that the body of Jesus was
actually in the grave, the psychological conditions were wanting for
the scene on the Damascus road. On the other hand, U Paul knew that
the grave was empty, but erroneously supposed that the disciples of
Christ had emptied it by removing and afterward secreting the body
which they then declared to be risen, all is clear. Under these circum
stances the revelation of Jesus to Paul on the approach to Damascus
would have the effect he described. On the other supposition it could
not possibly have convinced him that Jesus was risen and ascended
into heaven. Thus the argument from the empty grave stands un
shaken. '
1 Row, Christian Evidences Viewed in Relation to Modern Thought, pp. 377-379.

Paul and the Resurrection of Jesus. 553
Keim realizes the force of the argument and tries to refute it.
"Did it occur to the acute and anxious tetrarch Antipas," he asks,
" to establish or to calm his fears by disproving the resur- Keim' s at-
rection of the Baptist, of which his conscience dreamt, ply.
by an examination of the grave ? " J We beg Keim's pardon, but how
does he know that Antipas did not calm his fears by an examination
of the grave of John the Baptist ? To us it seems sure that if his anxiety
continued for any considerable length of time he would relieve it by
such an examination. But Keim proceeds, ' ' Still less could it have oc
curred to the apostles and beUevers, who were made happy by the living
appearance of Jesus, distrustfully to examine his grave." Certainlynot;
for they had examined it before they were made happy by his appear
ance, and had no need to examine it again. ' ' Finally, " says Keim, "we
have no reason to think that the Jews at Jerusalem were more acute
and calculating than Antipas ; they were not nearly so interested in
the question as he had been, and the news of the disciples' belief in the
resurrection would not reach them until late." Here we have once
more the erroneous, or at least doubtful, supposition that Antipas did
not examine, or think to examine, the grave of John the Baptist.
And it is not true that the interest of the Jerusalem Jews was not the
greatest possible in the question of Christ's resurrection. They had
cried, "His blood be on us, and our children." * It would be a frightful
thought to them that he had risen from the dead. Every incentive was
offered them for refuting the assertion of the resurrection, not only
because they would fear the awful curse they had called down upon
themselves, but also because his resurrection would mean the over
throw of their hierarchy. Then, too, it is certain that, whether the
examination of John the Baptist's grave occurred to Antipas, such an
examination must have occurred to the Jerusalem Jews, for the dis
ciples brought it to their attention. And it is by no means certain
that the news of the disciples' beUef did reach Jerusalem late. It cer
tainly was not very late, according to Paul's testimony. For, suppos
ing him to have been converted a year after the resurrection, the
Church at Jerusalem was strong long before that time, and its chief
source of strength there, as everywhere, was the belief in the resur
rection. "When it (that is, the news of the disciples' belief) did reach them
(the Jerusalem Jews) they would content themselves with a deter
mined or a half-hearted denial of the belief, and they would be the
more likely to forego an examination of the grave because— quite
» History of Jesus of Nazara, vol. vi, p. 299. * Matt, xxvii, 25.

554 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
irrespective of the prohibition to remove the golal (that is, the stone)
from a grave — they would most carefuUy avoid the impurity of
the dead and the grave." Why should they content themselves
with a half-hearted denial when the very continuance of their hier
archy depended upon a determined and successful refutation ? But
Keim does not know whether it was a half-hearted or a (teterniined
denial. Let us suppose it to have been as determined as the situation
would demand ; still this would not have answered when the Chris
tians were saying, " He is risen ; we have seen his empty grave, and
he has appeared to us." Under such circumstances it would not be
sufficient to deny the appearance to the disciples; they would be
compelled, whether or not they wished to avoid the impurity of the
dead and the grave, to examine and assert that the grave was not
empty ; or, if they had to admit that it was empty, to explain on some
other theory than the resurrection the absence of the body.
Finally Keim says that "The inspection of a body in advanced de
cay must have appeared not only disagreeable but also futile, since,
according to Jewish opinion, it was no longer possible to identify a
dead body after the third day." We repeat, it might bring about
ceremonial defilement to examine the grave, and it might be also a dis
agreeable task ; but when the Christians were triumphantly crying,
' ' His grave is empty ; he is risen, " they could not help themselves. Nor
would such an examination be futile, for the result would not depend
upon an identification of the body of Christ. The disciples declared
that the golal was rolled away. Had they been found in error regard
ing this, stiU the grave could have been and must have been exam
ined. And though even a year afterward a body in an advanced
state of decay had been found it would have been almost certain
proof that Jesus did not rise bodfly. Luther had been buried hun
dreds of years in the Castle Church at Wittenberg, when, it being
rumored that his body was not really there, some workmen dug at
the spot where he was supposed to have been buried and, far deeper
down than usual, came upon the remains of a human being. No one
questions that this settled the fact that Luther's remains had not
been removed.1 Besides, had the examination not been delayed
too long, Jesus could have been identified more easily than most by
the prints of the nails and by the opening in his side caused by the
spear. 1 See the account cited from Theolcglsohe Studlen und Kritiken In Die Christliche
Welt, 1897, Nr. 27 (July 8), column 643 f., and in the Methodist Review for November-De
cember, 1897, p. 994.

Alleged Contradictions in tne Records. 555

CHAPTER VIII.
ALLEGED CONTRADICTIONS IN THE RECORDS— RECAPITULATION.
So much has been made of alleged contradictions in the records1
by those who oppose the idea of a resurrection of the body of Jesus
that this subject may not be passed over in silence. It is no part of
our purpose to attempt a harmony of the records or a Universal be-
selection among them." All testUy to the main fact, early Church!
. however they may differ as to the details. The universal belief
of the early Church was that Jesus died, was buried, was raised to
hfe, and appeared in the flesh to his disciples. The simple question
is how to account for that belief. After every hypothesis has been
tried and found wanting there is left no other way of accounting for
their behef than on the supposition of the truth of the resurrection.
That wiU account for their belief ; nothing else wiU.
Nor can any discrepancies or even contradictions in the reports of
the details weaken our faith in the main fact. Whfle these lines are
being written there are the most contradictory reports from the pas
sengers of tiie fll-fated La Bourgogne as to the conduct of the crew ;
but those same passengers agree that the ship went down ; and that
the crew did something, and were not idle. Those who Modern in-
were present when Martin Luther stood before the Diet of discrepant
Worms differ materiaUy in their reports of what he said winch the
just before he left the session chamber ; • are we to believe not denied.
therefore that he said nothing? that aU were in error when they
thought they heard him speak? Reports as to the antecedent and
attendant circumstances of the crowning of Charlemagne are quite
contradictory ; must we suppose that he was not crowned at all ?* It
is really pitiful to find men of learning and inteUectual power making
such a bugbear of discrepancies in testimony and contradictions
1 This is Strauss's almost sole weapon against Christianity as found in his Life of
Jesus. It is much used even by Keim. On the discrepancies of the Bible in general see
Terry's Biblical Hermeneutics, New York and Cincinnati, 1890, part ii, chap. 21.
8 The opponents of the resurrection select such matter as suits their purposes, reject
ing as contradictory or otherwise untrustworthy all that militates against them.
8 See for a full discussion of the exact form of the celebrated words, Kostlin's Luther's
Rede in Worms, and Schaff, History of the Christian Church, vol. vl, p. 309 f.
* Comp. Bryce's Holy Roman Empire, chap. v. An instance from ecclesiastical history is
the council of Laodlcea, whose date is so uncertain that it has been placed as early as
314 A. D. and as late as 399 A. D. ; yet no one doubts that the council was held.

556 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
which are fatal only on the theory of verbal inspiration. As Bey
schlag well says, the ground of doubt lies, not in the nature of the
record, but in the nature of the recorded fact.1 Surely, they prove
thereby that they know nothing'of real life, for one who has had the
smaUest opportunity for observation is aware that no two witnesses
can describe a railroad accident alike, nor any other event containing
a number of particulars ; and yet we never think of denying the main
fact because the witnesses vary as to the details. Criticism is good
and valuable when conducted on common-sense principles; it is
baneful and useless, not to say ridiculous, when those principles are
ignored, as they have been by the vast majority of the opponents of
the fact of the resurrection of Jesus.3
The possibiUty of miracle being estabUshed the evidence for the
miracle of the resurrection is incontrovertible. The only room for
remaining doubt is the question of the demand for such a miracle.
But we think that no one who understands the facts will hesitate about
the importance of the part it has performed in the progress of Chris
tianity. Without it Christianity never could have advanced a step
beyond the crucifixion. And, on the supposition that the belief in
the resurrection rested upon the testimony of Mary Magdalene,
Renan is right in saying that next to Jesus the world is indebted to
her for the Christian reUgion.
But more than the fact of belief in his resurrection was necessary
to Christianity. In order to the perpetuation of the religion of
Christ the resurrection must be a fact. For were it not capable of
establishment beyond aU reasonable doubt as a fact men would cease
to believe in the divine origin of our reUgion. And particularly is it
true that whoever accepts the vision hypothesis in any of its natural
forms, that is, as distinguished from the theory of supernaturaUy
induced visions, must give up his Christian faith. The one way by
which we can retain our faith is to include the supernatural Ui the
The fact of the facts pertaining to the resurrection. The visions must
resurrectiona necessity to have had objective reahty ; that is, they must have been
Christian .
faith. the result of a divine influence, not of subjective haUu-
cination, or the appearances of Jesus must have been naturaUy
real, in which case the supernatural has to do with the resurrection
1 Leben Jesu, vol. 1, p. 444.
8 We do not deem It worth while to consider the objection that Jesus ought to have ap
peared to his enemies as well as to his friends, if we were to believe in his real resurrec
tion. We only remark that If we cannot trust Paul's testimony we cannot trust that of
anyone ; and that, strong as is the evidential value of his resurrection and appearances,
he did not rise nor appear for the purpose of evidencing himself.

Alleged Contradictions in the Records. 557
of the body of Jesus. We have seen, however, that there are insu
perable difficulties in the way of accepting the theory of divinely pro
duced visions. Hence we are confined to the hteral resurrection as
our only belief. It is of this literal resurrection that we say that its
influence upon Christian progress has been, and is destined to be,
such as to warrant the divine interposition for Christ's triumph over
the grave. Without this Christianity and its attendant blessings
could never have been given to the world. With it the conqueror of
death has become the King of the ever-growing kingdom of God. It
is easy to say that all the teachings of Jesus would have appealed to
us as powerfully apart from the resurrection as in connection with it ;
but it ought to be remembered that but for his resurrection his teach
ings would not have been preserved to us. With his crucifixion his
doctrines were condemned ; with his body they were buried in Joseph's
tomb ; when he rose they rose with him. But for his resurrection he
and his teachings would soon have been forgotten.
Strauss, the most determined of all in his opposition on critical
grounds to Christianity, admits that in the resurrection of Jesus we
have the decisive question, and that if the natural-historical view
fails to explain this everything belonging to that view must be re
tracted. 1 We think the foregoing discussion of the various natural
istic explanations of the belief of the early Church shows that they
signally fail, and that we are shut up to the supernatural in some
form. For the purposes of our argument the theory of Keim and
others would answer, since all we have attempted to do is to show
that Christ had a divine attestation in the fact of his reappearance to
the disciples subsequent to his death. We have chosen the theory of
actual bodily resurrection because of the two theories involving the
supernatural it is the more reasonable.
We very briefly recapitulate here the course of the argument for a
genuine divine revelation in the New Testament.
The New Testament revelation is given chiefly in and through
Jesus Christ, whose claims, if true, prove him abundantly qualified
for the duties of a perfect Revealer. These claims were Recapituia-
soberly made, as is evinced by the great humility of Je- argument for
sus notwithstanding what he asserted himseU to be. His v)nen"evei£
claims are further attested by his absolute sinlessness,
which is a guaranty that he would not lay claim to that which he did
not have every reason to believe he possessed. He was also pro
foundly wise and discriminating, so that he could not have mistaken
1 In his Leben Jesu, ol 1804, p. 288.

558 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
the facts. The miracles he wrought, by their exhibition of moral
character and of power over the forces of nature, further attest his
supernatural endowments. To this must be added the great miracles
wrought upon him ; in particular, his resurrection from the dead in
accordance with his own prediction.
We submit that aU this forms an entirety so seU-harmonious that it
is impossible to regard it as anything but actual history, considering
the class of people from whom the records of these things sprang.
The probability that we have a divine revelation in the New Testa
ment is thus so high that, when one reflects upon the momentous
character of the things revealed, he is chargeable with extreme temer
ity who neglects to avail himself of the benefits Jesus brought within
the reach of every human soul.
There is, however, another argument of great weight which we now
proceed to offer.

Christianity and Buddhism. 559

SECTION V1.-THE SUPERIORITY OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION.
CHAPTER I.
CHRISTIANITY AND BUDDHISM.
Whatever miraculous or supernatural attestation the revelation in
Christ might have received it could not command the respect of men
were it opposed to the best moral and inteUectual sense of mankind.
It is, therefore, very strong evidence in favor of the divine origin of
the Christian reUgion that it commends itself, when properly under
stood, to the great majority of the most enlightened and upright por
tion of humanity. In any system of phflosophy or ethics which is
to find and retain large numbers of adherents Christian elements
abound, and in proportion as they predominate does the system ap
prove itself to the more thoughtful classes. The occasional exceptions
to this statement in the history of thought serve only to emphasize
the general fact. Sooner or later all antichristian or unchristian
' systems demonstrate their untenability and are abandoned. Thus a
most striking fact appears, namely, that not a single idea upon which
Jesus laid special stress has ever had to be discarded. l This is aU the
more remarkable when we consider how minutely the whole range of
his teaching has been scrutinized by the keenest minds the world has
ever produced. Romanes weU says that this point has not been suffi
ciently valued by writers on Christian Evidences. Our only method
of emphasizing it would be to exhibit it in detail, and for this we lack
the requisite space. But there is a related truth which must be
pointed out ; it is that no idea omitted by Jesus has ever been found
needful for the reUgious and ethical life of man. So that his teachings
are not only true, but he has taught all needful truth. To this point
we shall have occasion to revert again.
If the statements just made are correct they furnish a powerful evi
dence in favor of the supernatural origin of Christianity, since of aU
the many forms of religion ours is the only one of which such state
ments can be truthfully made. So that, U we have in the non-Chris
tian religions a gauge of what the human mind can achieve, Chris-
1 Comp. Romanes's Thoughts on ReUgion, p. 157, and Bishop R. S. Foster's The Super
natural Book, New York and Cincinnati, 1889, p. 45.

560 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
tianity, being so much more complete than they, is proved to be
superhuman. We frankly admit that this argument is compulsory
only to those who assume that the non-Christian religions are purely
human constructions, and that they represent the best that the un
aided human race could accomplish. But, whUe the argument is not
compulsory, it does render the divine origin of Christianity so highly
probable as to require aU to give Christ their allegiance as the great
est of religious teachers. And this is true as weU for those who claim
that in the other reUgions there is divine revelation ; for U it is in
them, though so defective, how much more is it a factor in Christian
ity as taught by Christ.
The force of this whole argument from the contents of the Chris
tian revelation is greatly augmented when we make a direct compari
son of Christianity with other forms of reUgion.1 In order to bring
out the greatness of this superiority in aU its strength, and to place
before the mind of the reader an argument logically unassailable, it
would perhaps be necessary to show the inferiority to Christianity of
every other religion, however low down in the scale of dignity or
worth. For all practical purposes, however, it will be sufficient to
show that Christianity is superior to the greatest and most honorable
of the non-Christian faiths. If it surpasses these it surpasses allTower
ones ; so that the comparison we propose to make, while not formaUy
exhaustive, is argumentatively complete.
Perhaps all will admit that U Christianity is superior to Budd
hism and Mohammedanism it is superior to aU other non-Christian
religions. The only other faith with which we might be expected to
compare it is Judaism ; but the majority of unbelievers do not make
the issue between Christianity and Judaism, but between Christianity
and Buddhism or Mohammedanism. Our assault must, of course, be
against the position of the enemy.
Our first comparison wfll be between Christianity and Buddhism,
and pertains both to doctrine and morals.
Since Buddhism ignores, if it does not deny, the existence of God J
we shall be obliged to begin with some lower doctrine. We choose
the doctrine of the human soul. In Buddhism there is no recognition
of a soul, in the ordinary sense of the word. There are certain
1 Comp. Bruce's Apologetics, pp. 494 ff.
8 On this subject the authorities differ. For a variety of views see Allan Menzies's
History of Religion, New York, 1895 p. 374 ; Hardwick's Christ and Other Masters, fourth
edition, edited by F. Proctor, London and New York, 1886, p. 162; and H. Dharmapala,
a Buddhist, on Buddha and the Points of Resemblance and Difference between Bud
dhism and Christianity, in The World's Parliament of ReUgions, edited by J. M. Barrows,
Chicago, 1893, vol. 11, pp. 868, 1288.

Christianity and Buddhism. 561
powers, or what we call mental states, but they have no permanent
substratum. In fact Buddhism boasts of its doctrine of the imper-
manence of all things,1 and makes, not being, but becoming, the
fundamental fact of its philosophy. This of necessity affects the
whole doctrine of the future Ufe, which Buddhism must First point o£
deny, if true to itself, at least in the form of individual comParlS011-
immortality. That which is impermanent cannot be truly immortal.
It is difficult to determine whether one who reaches the state of
Nirvana is supposed to have any lUe after death. Nirvana, indeed,
assures him who attains it that he will never be reborn, as he is cer
tain to be if he has not attained ; but it does not f oUow that this
collocation of mental conditions might not continue even after
death. If Nirvana is not extinction it is something quite akin to
it, and Buddhism certainly lays no stress on the life after death.8
It may be truthfully said, therefore, that Buddhism is a system
without God or a doctrine of the future ; for the highest goal has
been reached in Nirvana, whose one positive, ascertainable fact is the
assurance that henceforth the individual shaU never be reborn into
this world.3
Now, in so far as definiteness is superior to vagueness, Christianity,
with its doctrine of a personal'God, a personal soul, and a personal
immortality, is superior to Buddhism. But this is even more evident
when we come to those things in which both systems are clear. For
example, the Buddhist doctrine of Kharma is that the conduct of the
individual in his past lives, of which he is supposed to have had an in
definite number, determined his condition in this life, and „ .
' Second point.
that this life wfll determine his condition in the next,
and so on. Hence it is affirmed in favor of Buddhism that it affords a
powerful motive to right living. But it is overlooked that there is in
aU this an element of injustice which could be corrected only on the
condition that the present life were consciously connected with the
lives past. The person who suffers now may believe that it is because
of some defect in his past existences, but he has not the remotest con
ception of what those defects were for which he is suffering. Chris-
1 Comp. T. W. Rhys-Davids in Religious Systems of the World, by C. P. Tiele and others,
London, 1892, p. 143, and in his Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, New York,
1889, p. 211.
8 On Nirvana see Hardwick's Christ and Other Masters, p. 165; F. B. Jevons, An
Introduction to the History of Religion, London, 1896, p. 319; Menzies's History of
Religion, p. 373 f . ; Chantepie de la Saussaye's Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, vol. i,
p. 416 f .
3 T. W. Rhys-Davids says that Nirvana is a blissful, holy state, a moral condition, a
modification of personal character, to be followed by utter death, extinction.— Buddhism,
London and New York, pp. 110-112.

562 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
tianity, no less than Buddhism, teaches that what we do in this Ufe
determines our condition in the next ; but it teaches, not that what
we suffer here is the consequence of a past existence, for we had no
such existence, but of universal sin, and that U we continue in sm by
our voluntary choice we shaU not only suffer in conscience, which is
the worst suffering, but in the next Ufe we shall trace our misery to
our voluntary sins in this. Both in its tendency to produce a correct
life and in point of the justice involved, which always requires that
when one suffers for his own sins he should know or be able to ascer
tain for what sins he suffers, Christianity is superior to Buddhism.
If it be said that the doctrine of Kharma teaches that our conduct
affects the general welfare, we reply that Christianity teaches the
same even more clearly.
But let us come to the main point in both reUgions. In Buddhism
The main fact that which overtowers everything else is the conscious-
is BtempOTai ness of the evil which is in the world. It is this which
evil" makes Buddhism a pessimistic system, though the
Buddhist himself may be happy.1 The whole doctrine is in fact
summed up in the Four Noble Truths : 1. The Noble Truth of Suffer
ing ; 2. The Noble Truth of the Origin or Cause of Suffering ; 3. The
Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering ; 4. The Noble Truth of the
Path which leads to the Cessation of Suffering."
The first of these Noble Truths teaches the universaUty of suffering;
the second, as stated by Menzies, places the cause of suffering in
"thirst that leads to rebirth, accomphshed by pleasure and lust,
finding its delight here and there. This thirst is threefold, namely,
thirst for pleasure, thirst for existence, thirst for prosperity." The
third teaches that suffering "ceases with the complete cessation of
this thirst, a cessation which consists in the absence of every passion,
with the abandoning of this thirst, with the deliverance from it, with
the destruction of desire." The fourth concerns the holy eightfold
path, or "Right Belief, Right Aspiration, Right Speech, Right Con
duct, Right Means of Livelihood, Right Endeavor, Right Memory,
Right Meditation."
The eightfold path doubtless designates an exalted moral life ; and
it is claimed that it contains everything found in the Christian
morality, which, accordingly, is denied to be superior to Buddhist
1 Saussaye Is undoubtedly In error when he asserts that we cannot describe Buddhism
as pessimistic— Lehrbuch der Religlousgeschichte, vol. 1, p. 413.
8 We have followed closely Menzies's terminology.— History of Religion, p. 365. It is
the common one, though Hardwick's "four grand verities" is more pleasing If not so
hteral.

Christianity and Buddhism. 563
moraUty. What we here wish to pomt out is that whatever morality
there is in the Buddhist scheme is not there because holiness is re
garded as an end, but because it is supposed to lead to the cessation of
suffering. The whole emphasis of Buddhism is on pain, suffering,
evil ; and the problem it attempts to solve is how the individual may
rid himself of evfl and help to rid the world of it. In contrast with
this Christianity, whfle not ignoring evil, lays the chief stress on sin
and how to rid the individual and the world of it.1 Buddhism seeks
redemption from suffering ; Christianity from sin. The Buddhism
ideal of Buddhism is perfect bliss ; of Christianity perfect dempt ion
holiness. Now, supposing the actual morality of Bud- ing™ chrls-
dhism to be as good as that of Christianity, stfll Christianity sin?1 y rom
is superior to Buddhism as holiness is superior to happiness. What
ever holiness Buddhism recommends it recommends as a means, thus
making it secondary. If there were any way of being happy and at
the same time remaining immoral its devotees might remain immoral.
Christianity seeks hoUness, though the search may lead us into the
path of suffering. Christianity declares sin to be the cause of suffer
ing, and knows that where sin is not suffering cannot be ; hence it ex
pects a state of blissful and eternal freedom from pain. But its very
conception of happiness involves, U it is not wholly identical with, holi
ness. Nevertheless, with or without happiness, it presses on toward
the moral likeness or image of God.2
The superior moral character of Christianity as compared with
Buddhism is seen even more clearly when the relation of the Bud
dhist to the world is contrasted with that of the Christian. The perfect
Buddhist, he who perfectly foUows the eightfold path, is one who has
in a good degree fled from the world, no longer participating in its
duties but leading the monastic Ufe." " The accounts of the previous
existencies of the Buddha," says Saussaye,* " contain touching traces
of good will, sympathy, mercy, friendly interest, mildness, benevo
lence, and love ; also the Dhammapadaand other writings praise such
1 This one contrast is sufficient to silence forever the suggestion that Jesus copied
from Buddhism, which is indeed older than Christianity but also totally different. The
doctrine of sin in the Christian system is a continuation of Judaism and the Old Testa
ment. 8 For an extended and able discussion of the contrast between Buddhism and
Christianity see Sir Monier Monier- Williams's Buddhism in its Connexion with Brah-
manism and Hinduism, and in Contrast with Christianity, London, 1889, Lecture xviii,
pp. 537-563.
3 The world-fleeing tendencies of Buddhism are well illustrated by the Buddha himself,
who not only forsook his family but never returned to live with them. See A Buddhist
Catechism, by Subhadra Bhikshu, London, 1890, pp. 23-26. Comp. also the distinction be
tween the Layman and the Bhikshu, pp. 43-45.
* Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, vol. 1, p. 419 f.

564 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
virtues as love which conquers hate. On the other side, however, the
value of these performances is placed somewhat low. They may be
useful, but only in the lower, preparatory stages ; the Bodhisatva '
practices them, but not the Buddha. Indeed, to hold this active
The Buddhist morality for the highest is heretical. Buddhism, afford-
tian'^s'aVnt ing as it does almost whoUy prohibitions, not positive
compared. commands, makes the ethics of the Buddhist saint, the
monk, purely negative. Action of any and every kind is a chain
which would bind him, and from it he is set free ; the more he be
comes like one dead the higher he has risen. If Buddhistic ethics
has its admirable side in the earnestness which it inspires in its
endeavor to attain salvation, as also in the struggle with the tempter,
Mara, and in its theory of virtue which it preaches by word and ex
ample, it has also its dark side in its underestimation of virtue and of
all social relations and active moraUty. The necessary consequence of
all this is the lack of a positive sense of duty, the disdain of labor, of
woman, and of all the conditions of our earthly lUe. The task of the
Buddhist saint is, not to take a given attitude toward the world, but to
flee from the world."
Let us follow the consequences of this system a Uttle further. It is
evident that the highest attainments in Buddhism are inconsistent
with the continued existence of the human race, and, indeed, with the
world itself. The monk dare not marry, and U one is married and de
sires to attain Nirvana he must forsake wife and family. If aU were
to do this how long would it be until the human race would disappear
from the face of the earth ? The only hope of the continuance of the
race is that some will be content to be reborn, and wfll not seek Nir
vana. Such may not be excommunicated from the society of Bud
dhist religionists, but they must live on what Buddhism holds to be a
lower plane. Thus Buddhism proves itself unadapted to aU classes or
else to the continuance of mankind on earth. But further than this :
as rebirth is as liable to be into an animal as into a human state of ex
istence, and as there is therefore practicafly no distinction between
animals and men, Nirvana would endanger all animal lUe. Besides,
since everything follows a regular order of development and decay, U
all were unconsciousness there would be no world in any sense known
to philosophy.
On this extreme consequence of the Buddhistic system we have,
however, no disposition to insist. Rather is it our purpose to contrast
the Christian saint with the saint of Buddhism. The latter ignores
1 That is, one on the way to becoming a Buddha.

Christianity and Buddhism. 565
the world and its demands upon him, withdrawing himseU from its
interests and active pursuits. In his thought there is no kingdom of
God, no society of human beings to which he is under obhgation, and
of which he is a member. The layman exists for him,1 not he for the
layman. The laity are permitted to support the monks, who contrib
ute nothing toward the maintenance of society, but whose ideal, U
reached, would involve the extinction of society. The Christian saint
is, on the other hand, one who labors to improve society. He does
not flee from the world, though he seeks to avoid its contamination ;
but he finds his highest duty in the world.2 To his thought society is
not to be destroyed, but transformed. He owes something to his fel-
lowman. It is not wicked to live in families, but to forsake them and
leave them to care for themselves is wicked. Marriage is not a less
holy estate than celibacy, but is honorable U honorably contracted
and faithfuUy maintained. The Christian's treasure must not be on
earth ; that is, his highest good must not be earthly possessions, butU
worldly goods come to him he is required, not to dispossess himself of
them, as though poverty were a virtue, but to use them for the good
of mankind. Not homelessness, but the home, is sacred in Christian
ity. So that whUe the Buddhist saint is characterized chiefly by what
he does not the Christian saint is distinguished for what he does.
We think no unprejudiced mind can fail to see from this brief
comparison that, much as there is to admire in Buddhism, aU that is
of real worth is found in Christianity in much better form and spflit,
and that, whereas Buddhism is impractical, Christianity is practical ;
and that whfle Buddhism, in striving to eliminate pain, is to be com
mended, Christianity is more to be commended for striving to elimi
nate sin, and with it pain.
1 Saussaye, Lehrbuch, vol. 1, p. 424.
8 So-called Christian monasticism is no more Cbristian than is Buddhistic monasticism.
38

566 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER n.
CHRISTIANITY AND MOHAMMEDANISM.
We turn next to Mohammedanism, beginning with its doctrine of
God, which emphasizes chiefly his unity and sovereignty. The very
name, Islam, by which the Mohammedan reUgion is designated, ' ' means
simply and UteraUy resignation to the wfll of God." * " Their (the
The idea of Mohammedans') conception of him is that of an absolute
hammedan- oriental monarch, and his unlimited power to do what he
Christianity, pleases makes entire submission to his will the first, most
prominent duty." " The essential difference in the Christian and Mo
hammedan conception of God Ues in the fact that the Moslem does not
think of this great being as having anything in common with his sub
jects, from whom he is infinitely removed. . . . The idea of feUow-
ship with God, which is expressed in calling him Our Father, is alto
gether foreign to Mohammedan thought. God is not immanent in the
world in the Christian sense, but apart from the world and infi
nitely removed from man." a Closely akin to this is what Mohammed
Webb says of prayer:" " His (the Moslem's) prayer is not a servile,
cringing petition for some material benefit, but a hymn of praise to
the one incomprehensible, unknowable God, the omnipotent, omnis
cient, omnipresent ruler of the universe. He does not beUeve that by
argument and entreaty he can sway the judgment and change the
plans of God, but with all the force of his soul he tries to soar upward
in spirit where he can gain strength to be pure and good and holy,
and worthy of the happiness of the future lUe. His purpose is to rise
above the selfish pleasures of earth and strengthen his spirit wings for
a lofty flight when he is, at last, released from the body."
Now, aU this sounds very well ; but will it bear examination ? The
Christian regards God as in some sense sovereign also, though not in
such a sense as to involve fatalism. But while the Mohammedan is
resigned, submissive, the Christian is acquiescent. God's wfll is not
only incontestable ; it is good, and it is the joy of the Christian to ful
fill and perform it. Resignation to the will of God is not a Christian
1 Mohammed Webb, in The World's Parliament of Religions, vol. II, p. 991 f.
8 President George Washburn, D.D., Robert College, Constantinople, In The World's
Parliament, vol. 1, p. 669 f.
• The World's Parliament, vol. 11, p. 1048.

Christianity and Mohammedanism. 567
virtue ; but resignation to the evils which spring from human imper
fection is. This is distinctly a higher relation than that of Islam.
The Christian does not offer "a servile, cringing petition for some ma
terial benefit ; " but as his heavenly Father cares for the sparrows so
he cares for his human creatures, and in the spirit of children going
to their father, not of subjects going submissively to their sovereign,
the Christian tells the Father his earthly needs. Mohammedanism
betrays a contempt for the body and its wants when it discourages
prayer for temporal needs ; Christianity exalts both body and spirit.
Mohammedanism makes God indifferent to human pain. Christianity
makes him pitUul and helpful in our sorrow. Which is superior it is
not difficult to determine. The Moslem's prayer does not, apparently,
rise into God's ear, for it has no influence with God. Prayer, to the
Moslem, is not for the purpose of securing divine aid even for spiritual
good, but an attempt, with aU one's force of soul, to soar upward in
spirit. The Christian's God hears his prayer and answers it by send
ing assistance, whether temporal or spiritual. The Christian does not
think he can " sway the judgment and change the plans of God" U
they are already formed, but he beheves that in some cases God's
judgment and plan wait on human action. This is the very idea of
fellowship between God and man. It teaches that man is created in
the image of God, and that God delights in man. Man is thereby the
better, and God and his plans are none the worse. As before stated,
providence is the resultant of the combined action of God and men.1
This is a higher conception both of God and man, and particularly of
the relation between the two, than that of Mohammedanism ; just as
theism is higher than deism.
But Christianity is superior to Mohammedanism in point of morals
also. It may be that " polygamy never was, and is not, a part of the
Islamic svstem," as Mohammed Webb assures us it is Mohammed-
J ' , anism and
not,3 though President Washburn says that m regard polygamy.
to polygamy, divorce, and slavery, the morality of Islam is in direct
contrast with Christianity." s The truth probably is that polygamy
was never an essential of the Islamic system, but that it is perfectly
admissible to an adherent of the system is unquestionably true; for
the Koran expressly allows though it restricts it. "And if ye fear
that ye shall not act with equity toward orphans of the female sex,
take in marriage of such other women as please you, two or three or
i See divisionii, sec. ii, chap. 7. ¦ The World's Pariiament, vol II p 989
8 Ibid., vol. I, p. 575. His statement is the more credible since he exhibits a spmt of
great fairness toward Mohammedanism.

568 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
four, and not more." " Ye may with your substance provide wives
for yourselves." l These are probably the passages of which Moham
med Webb says "there is only one verse in the Koran which can
possibly be distorted into an excuse for polygamy, and that is, practi
cally, a prohibition of it." " That it may have tended toward mo
nogamy in a country where unUmited polygamy was permitted we
allow, and give to Mohammed a corresponding honor ; but that it
prohibited polygamy is not true. Particularly must we reach the
conclusion that in the Mohammedan system polygamy is entirely per
missible in view of Mohammed's own conduct. Much is made of the
fact that during the life of Kadijah Mohammed never took another
wUe. But Dr. Leitner, a defender of Mohammedanism, admits that
after the prophet reached the age of fifty -five he took wife after wUe,
though he thinks it was due to a charitable purpose to protect the
widows of his persecuted followers. 3 We may accept Leitner's moti
vation of Mohammed's acts ; but that does not set aside the fact that
he did practice polygamy as well as tolerate it in his foUowers.
In reference to divorce also Mohammedanism occupies a distinctly
lower plane than Christianity. The Koran says : " Ye may divorce
your wives twice, but if the husband divorce her a third time she
shaU not be lawful for him again until she marry another husband.
But if he also divorces her it shall be no crime in them U they return
to each other." * And again, " If ye be desirous of exchanging a wUe
for another wUe, and ye have already given one of them a talent, take
not anything away therefrom." "Ye are also forbidden to take to
wife free women who are married, except those women whom your
right hands shall possess as slaves." 6
These restrictions on divorce, we may grant, were an improvement
on the previous conditions. But they are much more Uke the pro-
Mohammedan visions of Moses than Uke those of Jesus. And, worse
practice11 "of than this, the example of the prophet himseU was in
divorce. favor of laxity. He had an adopted son by the name of
Zeid who had a beautiful wife named Zeinab, of whom Mohammed
became enamored. When Zeid heard of it he divorced Zeinab that
Mohammed might marry her. For this proceeding the way seemed
1 Koran, chap. 4, cited in The World's Parliament, vol. 11, p. 1097, by Dr. George E. Post,
of Beirut.
8 The World's Parliament, vol. II. p. 1046.
8 In Religious Systems of the World, p. 298. Ameer All takes the same position  The
Life and Teachings of Mohammed, or the Spirit of Islam, London, 1891, pp. 338 ff.
Strangely enough, he asserts that Jesus overlooked the subject of polygamy, the prac
tice of which All does not regard as an unmixed evil.— Ibid., p. 339.
* From chap. 2. e From chap. 4.

Christianity and Mohammedanism. 569
to be perfectly clear, so far as the matter of divorce was concerned.
But for marrying the wUe of his adopted son a special revelation
from heaven was granted,1 in accordance with which Mohammed
married a woman who was divorced for no other reason than that he
wished to marry her.8 We take no pleasure in pointmg to these facts
in the Ufe of Mohammed, who, compared with his times, was doubt
less a superior man. But when it is claimed that Mohammedan
morals are as lofty as those of Christianity it becomes necessary to dis
play the facts.
The defenders of Islam declare that the vast majority of Moham
medans have but one wife. 3 It wUl grieve no good man to know that
most Moslems are better than the founder of their faith, but the fact
of the superiority of Christianity is tacitly admitted by their very as
sertion. They further affirm that polygamy tends to provide for the
surplus female population, to check prostitution and its attendant evUs,
and to guard against fllegitimacy of birth.* This may be a good de
fense from the Mohammedan standpoint, but the higher morality of
the New Testament finds it repulsive. Particularly is it of little con
sequence to check prostitution by making it possible to give to a man
in marriage any woman whom he may desire. From the Christian
point of view this is simply a legalization of crime.
But it is also said that Mohammed expressly prohibited the use of
intoxicating liquors, which Jesus did not, and that as a result we have
total abstinence wherever Mohammedanism rules and drunkenness
wherever Christianity prevails. Probably no inteUigent Toaiabsti-
. nence from
advocate of Mohammedanism would assert that drunken- intoxicants.
ness is in accord with the spirit of Christianity. In fact, it was not
Jesus's method to utter commandments or prohibitions ; rather did he
give precepts and principles by which men might voluntarily guide
their Uves if they chose. He spoke to man as a teacher, not as an
officer of government, and the title Master, so often given him by his
disciples, conveys this meaning." Hence each hearer was regarded as
1 Koran, chap. 33. See the story of the marriage with Zeinab told in language not alto
gether complimentary to Mohammed, in Sir Wm. Muir's Mahomet and Islam, pp. 126 ff.
8 See citations from the Koran, in The World's Parliament, vol. ii, p. 1096.
'ReUgious Systems of the World, p. 297, and World's Parliament, vol. ii, p. 1046.
«Leitner, in Religious Systems of the World, p. 297. He thinks it a great thing that
Mohammedan law will not allow the offspring of concubines to be branded with infamy,
p. 299. He seems to forget that Christians are allowed no concubines.
"The two Greek words, translated Master, applied to Jesus by his disciples are
Siiaamloc and kmaTan/c, the former meaning teacher, the latter being the Greek equiv
alent of the Hebrew Rabbi. The latter word is employed only by Luke. The distinc
tion we have made between commandments and precepts or principles is not invalidated
by Christ's reference to his kvro'kai (commandments). The precepts or commandments
of Jesus are entirely free from the spirit of legal requirement.

570 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
a voluntary learner, not as a subject. He threw the responsibility
upon each individual, thereby raising each to the rank of a partici
pant with God in the moral government of the world. The differ
ence between Mohammedanism and Christianity is very marked in
this particular. The former gave minute directions, and assumed
that men need to be kept under commandments and governors. ' The
latter held that though this was needful for a time it was but a tem
porary arrangement, and that the ideal was self-government.2 It is
according to the Mohammedan idea of the relation between God and
man that man should be treated as a servant ; and it accords with
the Christian idea of that relation that man should be treated as a son.
That the latter conception is higher cannot be questioned.8
Nevertheless, it must not be supposed that Christianity is silent on
the subject of indulgence in mtoxicating drinks. It does not, indeed,
directly command total abstinence, although it strongly implies such
abstinence as a duty under so great a variety of circumstances as to
make it practicaUy universal. But neither does it directly forbid
drunkenness and the traffic in intoxicants, although no one who reads
the Bible can doubt that both Jewish and Christian morals condemn
them. Jesus, for example, simply assumes the turpitude of drunken
ness in such passages as Matt, xxiv, 49 ; and Luke xu, 45 ; xxi, 34.
And the spirit of Christianity is further plainly indicated in such
epistolary passages as Rom. xiii, 13 ; 1 Cor. v, U4 vi, 10. But there
was the less necessity for Jesus and the apostles to condemn the abuse
of intoxicants, since they were known to approve the Old Testament
utterances on that subject, which are far stronger than those of the
Koran. What can be stronger than this: "Woe unto him that
giveth his neighbor drink, that addest thy venom thereto, and
makest him drunken also. " ' Or than this : ' ' Who hath woe ? who hath
sorrow? who hath contentions? who hath complaining ? who hath
wounds without cause ? who hath redness of eyes ? they that tarry
long at the wine ; they that go to seek out mixed wine. Look not
thou upon the wine when it is red, when it giveth its color in the cup,
when it goeth down smoothly (margin, "moveth itself aright ') : at the
last it biteth Uke a serpent, and stingeth Uke an adder." *
As to the practical results of the methods employed by Christ and
Mohammed for the suppression of indulgence in intoxicants, they are
1 See Mohammed Webb, In The World's Parliament, vol. 11, p. 992 f.
8 See Gal. Iv, 1-7.
8 Comp. Principal Grant's Religions of the World In Relation to Christianity, New York
and London, p. 39.
4 nabakkuk, 11, 15, Revised Version. » Prov. xxiii, 29-32, Revised Version.

Christianity and Mohammedanism. 571
certainly as good under the former as under the latter, notwithstand
ing the original drinking habits of the peoples among practieal re.
whom Christianity has most spread. If it be true that Jmit„si °f ^
most Moslems abstain, it is nevertheless a fact that great system
numbers of them drink, and that to excess.1 They may do this and
be good Moslems, but a drunken Christian is a contradiction in terms.
The Christian doctrine excludes the drunkard, however he may be
long to the visible Church, from the kingdom of grace and glory.
While the moderate use of intoxicating drinks is not forbidden in the
gospels and epistles, and many Christians have therefore tried the
experiment of such use, it is graduaUy becoming apparent that any
use of strong drink in a nation devoted to active business Ufe endan
gers the sobriety of the individual and the community, and as a result
total abstinence is rapidly becoming the rule among Christians. This
is a lesson which men have been too slow in learning ; but it is better to
practice abstinence late, because the contrary practice is perceived to
be wrong, than to practice it early because of an authoritative com
mand. In the one case it is the result of moral principle ; in the other,
of external pressure.
These facts speak for themselves. This intrinsic exceUence of
Christianity and its relative superiority demand explanation.
Many nations surpassed the Jews in power of thought and in keen
ness of insight, yet among the Jews arose those reUgious ideas which
are destined to outhve aU others. It has been suggested that as the
Greeks had a genius for beauty and the Romans for government, so
the Jews had a genius for reUgion and morals. Were we to admit
this the theist must stfll insist that this genius for reUgion and
morals is divinely imparted and directed. Besides, the genius of the
Jew was of a higher type in the department of reUgion and morals
than was the genius of the Greeks and Romans in art and govern
ment. For the results of their genius are not adopted as the highest
conceivable, while the religion and moraUty of the Jews (including
Christianity) are. But of this assertion we must now furnish the
evidence. 1 See Dorchester's Liquor Problem in All Ages, New York and Cincinnati, 1884, p. 21 f.

572 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

SECTION YII.-CHRISTIANITY THE FINAL REVELATION.
CHAPTER I.
ITS SATISFACTORY CONCEPTION OF GOD AND OF MAN.
Belief in the finality of the reUgion of Jesus is based upon a num
ber of considerations, first of all, upon the assertions and expectations
of Jesus himseU. His invitations were universal, and aU nations
were to be discipled. The field in which the seed was to be sown was
the world ; the harvest was the end of the world. His kingdom was
the kingdom of God, which cannot be less than universal. Such
were his claims; and after the examinations we have made of his
character, words, and deeds, any claim of his must carry conviction
with it. But U his kingdom is universal it must be final, for its uni
versality appUes to aU earthly places, and reaches to the end of
earthly time. And while the earth stands there can be nothing to
supplant it.
But also from the nature of the Christian revelation we must con
clude that it is final.1 This may be seen in its doctrine of God, of
The exalted man, and of the relation between God and man. No
r f, 1 i lt io u. s
conceptions higher conception of God is possible than that of Chris-
ity prove it tianity. It satisfies the intellectual, moral, and reUgious
the final re
ligion, nature. This is not seriously denied by the representa
tives of any faith or unfaith. At the most it is said that person
aUty may not be the highest psychological reahty; but it is not
claimed that we can picture to ourselves anything higher. As long
as man believes in his own personaUty he wfll be compeUed to think
of God as personal, and he can think of nothing more exalted. Nor
is any higher conception possible of the relation of God to the world
than Christianity affords, according to which he is immanent in the
world yet not identical with it, controlling it in a manner so orderly
that we can predict many of the events of its future, yet able to inter
vene in man's behalf when he will. He is neither impersonal nor
unconscious Uke the deity of pantheism, nor idle nor helpless like the
God of deism.
1 Dr. M. S. Terry seems to think modern revelations possible, though not such as
could supersede or surpass the revelation contained in the Bible. See Biblical Apoca-
lyptics, New York and Cincinnati, 1898, p. 15.

Its Satisfactory Conception of God and of Man. 573
So also his relation to man cannot be conceived of in any higher form
than that of a loving Father. The fatherhood of God is the highest
possible thought of God. Nor can there be anything higher than the
Christian doctrine of man, teaching, as it does, that he was created in
the image of God and capable of communion with him, and that all
men are brothers, whose law of action toward each other is love.
Even if the doctrines of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of
man were as clearly taught in any other religion, which we do not
beUeve, stiU this would not prove anything against the finahty of
Christianity, since it confessedly teaches those doctrines. The doc
trines of Christianity are gradually winning their way among the
adherents of other reUgions, who are never so proud of their own faith
as when they can make it appear that any of their own beliefs are also
taught by Christ. This was conspicuously the case at the World's
Parliament of ReUgions held in Chicago in 1893, as anyone can see
who wfll examine its published proceedings. Jesus is the acknowl
edged leader of reUgious thought andlUe among the more enlightened
portions of mankind in every land. This is a significant fact. Others
decrease, but it is his to increase in the regard and affection of men.
GraduaUy it is coining to be seen that he not only gave to man a
religion higher and nobler than any other, but that it is the noblest
and highest possible.
Furthermore, Christianity is exactly adapted to man's fundamental
needs, whether we think of the individual or of society.1
What are the fundamental reUgious and ethical needs of the indi
vidual man? This is essentiaUy an inquiry for the permanent ele
ments of religion, so ably discussed in the Bampton Lectures for 1887
by W. Boyd Carpenter, Bishop of Ripon.2 By an analysis of man's
nature he reaches the conclusion that the elements which are required
by man are three, namely, dependence, f eUowship, and progress ; and
that the history of religions furnishes the evidence that these three,
and these only, are demanded by mankind.8 We might make his
conclusions the answer to the question with which this paragraph
begins. Perhaps, however, it wiU be better to put the answer in a
1 Professor Max Miuler defends the proposition that Christianity is the fulfillment of all
that the world has been hoping and striving for.— Anthropological Religion, p. 388, and
throughout the entire work. Archdeacon Trench supports the same view in his Christ
the Desire of AU Nations— Hulsean Lectures for 1845-46, New York, 1866.
8 The Permanent Elements of Religion, London and New York, 1889.
8 Ibid., Lecture ii. The study of religions will convince anyone that dependence and
fellowship are essential demands of religion. E. von Hartmann makes the need of
redemption the sole demand of man upon a reUgion. Comp. his Religion des Geistes,
which is a part of his ReUgionsphilosophie.

574 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
somewhat different form, although the essence must be practicaUy
identical. We answer, then, that the individual demands of a reU
gion five things: 1. A right and helpful conception of God; 2. A
true and inspiring thought of himseU; 3. Satisfaction for his con
science ; 4. Redemption from temporal evil ; 5. Certainty with regard
to the future.
1. It has been a principal object of this work to show that the
Christian conception of God is the correct one, and that it is helpful
to man. Without such a basis no permanent reUgion is possible.
Many writers have pointed out man's feeling of dependence upon
a power mightier than himself , and not a few of the ablest thinkers
have regarded this fact as the aU -inclusive fact of religion.1 Notwith
standing the objection to this definition, that it makes reUgion too
The needs of exclusively passive and is therefore one-sided, the feeling
the human . .
heart per- of dependence makes imperative demands upon any reh-
fectly met
by the Chris- gious system, which the Christian doctrine of God alone
tian doc-
trine of God. can meet. A religion without God or gods, or one which
permits its adherents to find its gods wherever it will, as Buddhism
does, cannot satisfy this sense of dependence. Nor can any religion
satisfy it which denies to its deity intelUgence, power, or love. For
intelligent man cannot depend upon a nonintelUgent power, nor
will he commit himself to a loveless power; while intelligence and
love, if powerless to aid, cannot possibly eUcit the confidence of man.
In the same way it is clear that aU the other moral attributes, such
as justice and holiness, are required in the Deity U man is to find sat
isfaction therein for his consciousness of dependence.
The Bishop of Ripon has shown that, whfle some writers have
emphasized the feeling of dependence, others have defined religion
rather as fellowship." It is possible that many mdividuals have
gone on in the practice of their religion without any consciously felt
need of divine fellowship. Such must be the case with the consistent
Buddhist, who ignores the Deity ; and of the consistent Mohammedan,
1 So, principaUy, Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers.
Translated by J. Owen, London, 1893. John Fiske makes the idea of dependence a
primitive element in theistic belief.— The Idea of God, p. 62.
8 The Permanent Elements of Religion, p. 54 f. Auguste Sabatier defines reUgion as
" a commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in distress enters with
the mysterious power on which it feels that It and its destiny depend." See his OutUnes
Of Philosophy of Religion, based ou Psychology and History, New York, 1897, p. 27.
This emphasizes fellowship, though it involves dependence. Comp. with this his some
what different definition of religion In his Theologlsche Erkenntnlstheorie, Freiburg i. B.,
1896, pp. 38, 39. The reader should also consult Kaftan's very discriminating study of
the true nature of all religion in Das Wesen der christlichen Religion, Zweite Auflage,
Basel, 1888, pp. 64-99. Marcus Dods defines religion as the medium of communication
between God and man.— Mohammed, Buddha, and Christ, London, 1877, p. 194.

Its Satisfactory Conception of God and of Man. 575
whose deity is all-transcendent ; but it is nevertheless true that that
idea of God which excludes us from fellowship with him cannot
satisfy those who do desire such feUowship. And while there may
possibly be some in whom the need of fellowship can never be awak
ened it is plain that accessibility must be postulated of God for those
in whom the feeling does exist. Hence God must be, not only omnis
cient and omnipotent, but omnipresent ; not only infinitely exalted
but infinitely mercUul, patient, and loving toward his intelUgent
creatures. Furthermore, he must be personal, for in no true sense
of the word can we have feUowship with an impersonal being.
It scarcely needs to be pointed out that the Christian idea of God
fully meets this human demand for a God on whom we can safely
depend and with whom we can hold fellowship and communion.
Thus it satisfies both the intellect and the heart of man. • It is final
because it is the highest conceivable, and because it is the completely
satisfactory conception of God.
2. When we turn to the Christian conception of man we find it
equaUy satisfactory. We have said that reUgion must furnish a
true and inspiring thought of man. It wUl be unneces-
, . , „ „ And of man.
sary to emphasize the first of these attributes ; but that
the thought of man in the final religion must be inspiring needs em
phasis. Any doctrine of man which makes him the victim of fate or
necessity win, by its depressing effect upon his feelings and its insist
ence upon the uselessness of action, faU to furnish the conditions of
human progress." There is, indeed, Uttle danger from this source;
since however determinism may be held theoreticaUy it is proved
false in practice, and men forsake the theory for the fact.
More dangerous is any doctrine which makes man the subject rather
than the companion and colaborer of the Deity. Human progress is
possible only in a world which has room enough for both man and
God in cooperation. This does not mean that man must think of
himseU as God's equal. Such a thought would be injurious by being
false and by leading to erroneous conduct. But man must regard
himself as bearing God's image and as fitted for divine companion
ship and cooperation. Only such an idea of man wfll furnish the
inspiration to endeavor and the aspiration for personal exceUence
requisite to human advancement and happiness. The doctrine of
man's origin, whether by direct creation or by the process of evolu-
1 Professor Max Midler truly says that religion appeals to the head, and not to the
heart only.— Anthropological Religion, p. 1.
8 On progress as an essential element in reUgion, see Carpenter's Permanent Elements
of ReUgion, p. 55 f .

576 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
tion, is not essential ; but it must be held by that religion which is to
command the future that man is human, not animal ; that he is per
sonal, not an automaton ; that he is God's creature, not the mere off
spring of the brute world; that his capabilities of advancement are
practicaUy boundless, and that God hath created "of one blood aU
nations of men." ' If, with all this, man admits his present mental
and moral imperfections, thus filling out the truth of his thought of
himseU, every conceivable motive for endeavor is supplied ; and U
man does not progress it wfll be in spite of his knowledge of himself.
It is needless to say that Christianity, and it alone, furnishes this
needful, true, and inspiring thought of humanity. On this point also
we find, then, that no revelation can ever supersede Christianity.
» Professor Leon MarilUer calls attention to the fact that In none of the Inferior re
ligions does the notion of exalted human dignity find a place. See The World's Parlia
ment, vol. Ii, p. 1361.

The Threefold Satisfaction of the Conscience. 577

CHAPTER II.
the threefold satisfaction of the conscience.
3. The third of the fundamental religious and ethical needs of the
individual is satisfaction for his conscience. This need is threefold.
(a) It involves a perfect yet flexible moral standard ; (b) Release from
the burdening sense of guilt ; (c) Power for righteousness, or power to
resist temptation from within and from without, and to fulfill aU duty.
(a) The conscience can never rest in the thought of anything but
the morally perfect. A standard which appears imperfect it at once
rejects. With regard to this standard conscience does The conscience
not ask whether it is attainable. What it demands is an pl^t1 to*
ideal upon which no apparent improvement can be made. al standard-
Conscience takes such delight in this ideal that sometimes the mind
is rendered forgetful of the chasm between it and actual attainment ;
but whatever the ideal be, U it be regarded perfect, the soul delights
in it. The cry of the psalmist, " O how I love thy law ! it is my medi
tation all the day," * is the expression of all moraUy earnest souls.
Now, it is plain that this standard must also be flexible. No set of
rules, no coUection of precepts, can cover all the situations in
which one is liable to be placed ; and U such a code were possible the
conscience could take no delight in it, since it would be a foreign
product, and so cumbersome in its application as to be a perpetual tax
on the memory and judgment. In order to be satisfactory it must
be simple, and it can be simple only by being flexible.
It scarcely need be said that Christianity in its law of love furnishes
this perfect and perfectly flexible moral standard. It is a law which
can be employed and applied on aU occasions without unduly taxing
the mind. The principal thing is that one should have and constantly
maintain the purpose to fulfill the royal law according to the com
mandment." Such a purpose is love, and love is the fulfiUing of the
law.3 It is impossible for the mind to conceive any expression of the
relations of moral beings higher than that of love as taught and ex
emplified by Jesus Christ, nor better adapted to all races of men and
every exigency of lUe, whether individual or social. Here again, then,
Christianity meets the demands of the final form of religion.
» Psa. cxix, 97. » James ii, 8. a Bom. xiii, 10.

578 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
(b) However we may account for the origin of the conscience such a
faculty exists in aU human beings.1 Furthermore, aU men are aware
of having voluntarily done that which their moral judgment con-
Release from demned, and as a result aU know the pangs of an offended
Ing s^nseeoi conscience. To all those who beUeve in a God with per-
guiit. sonal moral attributes this consciousness of moral obliq
uity assumes the form of a consciousness of sin. But the sense of hav
ing done wrong oppresses aU men, though behevers in God generaUy
have a peculiarly tender conscience since to them, especiaUy to Chris
tians, wrongdoing is not only a departure from the moral ideal and
an injury to our feUow-men but, in addition, an offense to that lov
ing Bemg to whom we owe every blessing we enjoy. It is this
contradiction of the will of a wise and beneficent friend, this ingrati
tude for aU his favors, which lends moral delinquency and obUquity
much of its turpitude in the sight of the Christian. Nevertheless, aU
men are burdened with a sense of guilt," and the conscience cannot be
at ease while this is the case. The memory of our sins haunts us by
day and by night, and happiness is impossible.
Just here it is that Christianity proves itseU again exactly adapted
to our human needs. Any system which does not provide for forgive
ness must leave men not only unhappy but without hope of attaining
morally to the best of which they are capable. For the consciousness
of guilt both absorbs the attention and paralyzes the moral energies.
Our time and strength are spent in vain regrets, or, U we determine
to escape from this unhappy condition by f orgetfulness, we can do so
only by silencing within ourselves the voice of the inward monitor to
whose holy inspirations we have traced all the earnestness of our moral
endeavor. In the one path there is misery, in the other there is ob
duracy. But, it wiU be asked, how does pardon of sin help the case ? Does
not the hope of pardon tend to make men sin lightly ? Is it not better
to leave men in the wretchedness of their guilt in order thereby to warn
them against future iniquity ? Now, there doubtless are those who
gain nothing from the promise of forgiveness but the ease of conscience
for which all men seek. Such, however, are not the kind who would
profit by being left to their misery. He who can be profited can be
profited by pardon far more than by suffering. And in the Christian
system the problem of pardon is not one of justice alone but of the
1 On the whole subject of the conscience see the Prize Essay by Theodor Elsenhans,
Wesen uud Entstehung des Gewlssens, Leipzig, 1894.
a The word guilt Is not bere employed in any technical sense.

The Threefold Satisfaction of the Conscience. 57ft
happiness and moral development of sinners. Even were the question
one merely of justice pardon would be demanded in many instances ;.
for sin is not always the result of deliberate choice but often arises
from the overwhelming power of inherited passion. As before pointed
out, a God who was just, yet lacking mercy, would tend Pardon cannot
to harden men's hearts ; and the spirit of gratitude for stowVlasthe
pardon is at least a loftier motive for right-doing than the ereign wa"
fear of suffering and its influence upon the Ufe is also far more benefi
cent. But U pardon is granted it must not be bestowed as the mere
act of a sovereign wfll. Such a procedure would rob it of all its moral
value in the sight of man. It would represent sin as committed
against God only, and as being merely a violation of his wfll. He
could forgive U he wished, or withhold forgiveness U that suited him
better. If his forgiveness or refusal to forgive could be supposed to
have any ground in his ethical nature it would be of the character of
a conflict between his justice and his mercy. If he forgave it would
be in spite of justice ; if not, it would be regardless of his mercy.
Forgiveness under the Christian scheme affords full scope for the co
operation of the most exact justice and the tenderest mercy. There1
is neither conflict nor compromise between them. So that God can be
just and yet the justifler (pardoner) of the sinner.
The Christian scheme not only avoids aU the dangers attendant
upon an unforgiving system, secures to the individual all the benefits
of pardon, and enables the attributes of God to exist in harmony, but
it escapes the danger of minifying sin in the eyes of man, thus sub
verting the moral government of God. This is accomphshed in two
ways, both of which are essentials in the so-called plan of Christian sys-
tem does not
salvation. The first is by what God does, or rather did, minify sin.
through the atonement in Christ. A discussion of this doctrine is im
practicable here, and we must content ourselves with the briefest state
ment of its relation to forgiveness.1 The death of Christ was God's
protest against sin, and expressed the fact that it cannot be committed
without suffering. Nevertheless, the sufferings of Christ were not in
tended as a fuU equivalent for the sufferings sinners deserve. Rather
were they a governmental expedient. They called all men's attention
to the fact that God hates sin, though he forgives it. God's justice,
which is not an abstract, unrelated quality, but an administrative attri
bute, having to do with his relation toman, not only as a sinner, but as
1 For those who wish a fuUer treatment of the subject we recommend The Atonement
in Christ, by John Miley, New York and Cincinnati, 1879. See also his Systematic The
ology.

580 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
a moral possibility, is thereby satisfied. Since, though it was substi
tution, it was not an exact equivalent, it leaves room for his mercy.
And since the sufferings of Christ were voluntary they did him no
wrong. Then the plan, so far, provides for a most effectual protest
against sin the moral effect of which is to dissuade men from its com
mission, while it protects God's administrative justice and yet aUows
him to exercise that mercy which must win men to him and to the
Obedience of his law.
But as a further safeguard the plan includes man's cooperation.
Man is not forgiven alone on the ground of the atonement in Christ,
though this is absolutely necessary to it. There is forgiveness in no
other. The divine condition is the atonement, but the human condi
tion is faith. This again has its prerequisites. It is possible only to
those who realize something of the sinfulness of sin ; who abhor it in
The human themselves and others ; who seek to free themselves, not
condition of , . .. ,,,,-,, .., •, ,,
pardon. alone from its penalty, but also from its power and poUu-
tion ; who have come to choose the perfect moral standard of the Gos
pel in preference to their own sinful propensities ; who see in Jesus
the embodiment of that standard and are wflling to accept him as their
moral and spiritual guide. When anyone is in the condition just de
scribed he will be glad to throw himseU upon the mercy of God in
Christ and trust in him for pardon ; in other words, exercise saving
faith. Penitence, repentance, faith, these aU combine with the atone
ment to save the hardened soul from ever thinking Ughtly of sin and
to impel him to the service of his f eUow-men as the highest service of
God. Without here attempting to defend the doctrine[that the sense of for
giveness realized by the soul which exercises this faith is supematu-
raUy imparted we pass on to state that, as the conditions upon which
forgiveness is bestowed prevent the moral disaster which its arbitrary
communication might work, the nature of the forgiveness realized also
precludes it. For it does not have the effect of making us forget that
we were sinners, but merely makes us realize that by the mercy of
God we are in a position to start anew. At the same time our sense
of shame and regret is mitigated to such an extent that they are no
longer the prominent elements of our reUgious consciousness. We
have confidence, not only in God's pardoning mercy, but also in his
judgment ; and we see that U he ignores the past we must do the
same. We had lost not only the sense of the respect of God but our
self-respect. If God is now seen to respect us we can in a proper
measure respect ourselves. Besides, we see that there is something

The Threefold Satisfaction of the Conscience. 581
which God now requires of us. We are pardoned that we may have
the consciousness of being children of God and that we may become
his companions and colaborers. Our energies must not be spent in
sin, nor in regret for sin, but iii uplifting men and inspiring them with
the mind of Christ. Such a plan, and no other, can release us from the
burdening sense of guilt and hold us at the same time to the majes
tic tasks which we believe God has set for us.
(c) At this point, however, a new difficulty meets the morally ear
nest soul. He has a moral standard in which his conscience can rest
satisfied, and all his violations of that standard are forgiven, but he
does not feel able to live in accordance with it. There are within him
unwelcome impulses toward evU conduct, and when these are excited
by soUcitations from without he is in danger of falling into the very
sins of which he recently repented and was forgiven. This is the uni
versal experience of those who are striving to live up to a lofty moral
ideal. They lack power for righteousness. They can neither resist
every temptation nor stimulate themselves to the fulfillment of every
duty. Here again Christianity comes to our rescue and meets one of
our most urgent needs. For the conscience insists that we are censur
able for this faflure, however energetic the exertions of our wflls, and
it will never approve us as long as this symptom of moral weakness
continues to exhibit itself. Our only hope is in the correction of our
inward evU tendencies and hi the fortification of our wills with the
energy requisite to keep us up to the advance line of duty. Some part
of this is accomplished by the development within us of a profound
abhorrence of sin. But besides this there must be born within us a
new affection, powerful enough to neutrahze all other attractions and
to hold us to the performance of positive duty in the face of aU obsta
cles. Such a new affection is the love of God for which Christianity
provides. J Love of country, family, riches, fame, and even of self,
have contributed much to the heroisms and glories of human history ;
but the one universal love, which includes and elevates and purifies
and strengthens aU others, is the love of God. Men have often mis
taken God's wfll, but the love of God never fafls to produce its effects.
"The love of Christ constraineth us"2 has been the expression of a
mighty fact in the lives of hundreds of millions of human beings.
So Christianity satisfies the conscience by its moral standard, by its
release from the burdening sense of guilt, and by supplying the power
needed for a holy Ufe.
i See Chalmers' sermon on The Expulsive Power of a New Affection.
' 2 Cor. v, 14.
39

582 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER HL
CHRISTIANITY AND THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORAL EVTL.
4. While Christianity lays the chief stress on the fact of sin, rather
than the fact of evil, it is by no means indifferent to the latter and
gives it a large place in the plan of salvation. According to Christian
teaching neither sin nor evfl is essential, but both are accidental ele
ments iii the world-order. Evil is the result of sin. This means that
most of the evil is the direct or indirect consequence of sinful condi
tions or deeds, but also that much which we regard as evil would ap
pear in an entirely different light were our hearts perfectly free from
aU moral taint and defect. It has often been made a reproach of
Christianity that it, like many other systems, places the golden age
of the world in the past. This is not a true statement of the facts.
Christianity aims at a golden age to come, when sin, with aU its evfl
consequences, shall have been destroyed. But it does not propose to
offer men no relief until that time comes, and the provision it makes
is exactly adapted to the requirements.
(a) In the first place it teaches men that this is not the only sphere
in which they shall consciously exist. It offers to aU men, on such
its doctrine of conditions as will give them only benefit even here, a Ufe
a future life „,,.-,
as affecting after death free from the oppressions which burden the
earthly hap
piness, present hfe. This promise sustains the soul in the midst
of its experiences of sorrow. It is a universal fact that pain loses
much of its power to grieve us when it is expected to be of short dura
tion and to be foUowed by a prolonged period of joy. Christianity
utilizes this spirit of hope. "Weepiiig may endure for a night, but
joy cometh in the morning."1 These light afflictions which are but
for a moment are to be foUowed by an eternal weight of glory."
(b) But Christianity not only points men from temporary evil to
eternal joy, it teaches us to prize chiefly the joys of the soul, to lay up
its emphasis our treasure in heaven, "where neither moth nor rust
on the joys
of the soul, doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through
nor steal." 9 This does not deny the value of earthly good ; and it has
never been the effect of Christianity to interfere with the most dili
gent pursuit of wealth and every temporal blessing. What it does insist
1 Psa. xxx, 5. >2 Cor. Iv, 17. • Matt, vl, 20.

Christianity and the Problem of Temporal Evil. 583
upon is that, good as these things may be, they must never be secured
at the expense of spiritual blessings nor prized to such a degree that
our happiness depends upon them. They can contribute much, but
the one thing needful they cannot supply. In proportion as men take
this Christian view are they diligent " in business," yet independent
of earthly success for their real happiness. It is heathenism, not
Christianity, which makes men set their hearts upon worldly goods
more than upon spiritual. "
(c) Furthermore, Christianity affords a present joy which has a
tendency to minimize the impression which affliction makes upon us.
Unless one is exceedingly ungrateful he cannot complain when denied
the realization of some of his earthly hopes U he has the assurance of
pardoned sin and of divine companionship. Although the Christian,
if he be such in all his thoughts, will employ great energy in whatever
he undertakes he can never forget that the highest things are already
his and that no one can rob him of them. He is joyful in the thought
that neither tribulation, nor distress, nor persecution, nor famine, nor
nakedness, nor peril, nor sword, shall be able to separate him from
the love of God in Christ Jesus his Lord."
(d) We shaU not here emphasize the comfort which God bestows
upon aU who suffer in his cause ; that he does so is not only taught by
Christ, but is testified to by unnumbered millions who have not counted
their Uves dear unto them and have finished their self-sacrificing
course with joy. Here we wish rather to speak of the demand of
Christianity that the ameUoration of human woe and the betterment
of human conditions shall be earnestly striven after in All christians
incited to
this world. The Christian reUgion has often been re- labor for the
° betterment
proached for pointing the poor and oppressed to heaven of hum»n
instead of offering them present relief. It is amazing that on earth.
anyone could make such a charge in the face of Christian history,
with its vast network of eleemosynary institutions and activities ex
tending back to the very days of the apostles themselves. But it is
even more astonishing that anyone should so misunderstand the spirit
of Christianity as to suppose that the Christian may leave his f eUow-
men in distress U it is in his power to reUeve them. The superiority
of Christianity in this particular is most marked when we recall the
answer of Buddha to the appeal of the poor woman with her dead
child in her arms; he merely sent her from house to house— to teach
« Matt vi, 32. Let anyone who is in doubt as to the Christian view of wordly as com
pared with spiritual good read Matt, vi, 19-34, in the Original or In the Revised Version.
3 Rom. viii, 35, 39.

584 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
her that in every home there had been a Uke sorrow. ' Jesus went
about, not teaching the gospel of sorrow and flight from the world,
but doing good, healing the sick, and comforting the sorrowing. And
he taught and empowered his disciples to do the same. The parable
of the Good Samaritan and all the reiterated enforcements of broth
erly love, as weU as the example of Jesus, stamped indeUbly upon the
Christian system the spirit of helpfulness to aU men.
For whatever can be done to ameliorate human misery in this world
Christianity provides, and it proposes the complete annihilation of
evil some time — not by the destruction of conscious existence, but by
banishing sin, its cause ; leaving human souls to enjoy eternaUy the
good things which God has planned for those that love him. It is im
possible to conceive a more practical and helpful treatment of the
great fact of evfl than Christianity affords.
5. The fifth, and last, demand which the individual soul makes upon a
religion is certainty as to the future. This, also, Christianity perfectly
Its doctrine suppUes. No human being can be satisfied without the
of the future *^ °
life as satis- assurance of immortality, of the possibility of freedom
fymg human
longings. from evil in the future Ufe, of restoration to the beloved
dead, and of everlasting communion with God. The first of these is
met by the Christian doctrine of immortaUty, the second by the
Christian doctrine of Salvation, and the third and fourth by the
Christian doctrines of the continued personal existence of the soul,
and of heaven.
Does anyone reply that though, if true, these doctrines are weU
adapted to accomplish their purpose it is just this certainty that is in
question ? We ask anyone who so speaks to go over the course of
thought we have pursued, and then ask himseU whether he stiU de
mands greater proof of the truth and certainty of the teachings of
Christ." If it is not certain that Jesus knew whereof he spoke there
is nothing certain in the communications of fact between man and
man. In this place, however, we are insisting, not so much upon the
certitude of these things as upon their capacity, U true, to satisfy the
human soul. It is this power to satisfy all who believe which proves
that no other religion can ever supersede Christianity. The Christian,
by virtue of his Christianity, is certam of all these things, and he se
cures all the benefits of them so far as this lUe is concerned, and will
undoubtedly realize them eternally in the life to come.
1 See the touching story inimitably told in Sir Edwin Arnold's The Light of Asia, Bos
ton, 1885, pp. 101-105.
11 For another and final argument see sec. viii, chap. 3, of this division.

Christianity and Human Progress. 585

CHAPTER IV.
CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN PROGRESS.
But if Christianity perfectly satisfies all the fundamental religious
and ethical needs of the individual no less does it perfectly meet the
demands of society, of associated humanity. These demands may be
formulated thus : 1. The proper adjustment of the relations of indi
viduals to individuals ; 2. The proper adjustment of the relations of
the individual and of society to each other ; and, 3. The proper adjust
ment of the individual and of society to the future of this world.
That Christian love, properly understood and perfectly applied,
would result in the first two adjustments will not be denied by any
one worthy of being considered. In other words, Christianity pro
vides for the most perfect adjustment of all the relations of men at
any stage of human progress — for the famUy, society, and the State.
Whether Christianity is adapted to advance human progress is
another question. There are not a few who affirm that every reli
gion, not excepting the Christian, is inimical to the progressive de
velopment of human conditions. Such critics of reUgion are, how
ever, evidently prompted rather by passion than by observation in the
formation of their judgments. For it is perfectly certain that just
where Christianity is most strongly intrenched, and ex- Material prog-
. rc s s in ost
ists in that form which is nearest to the teachmgs of advanced m
Christian
Jesus, humanity is furthest advanced in all material and lands.
moral and cultural conditions. This may possibly not be wholly due
to Christianity ; but the fact mentioned at least proves that our faith
is not inimical to progress ; for it is not supposable that were such the
case the progress would have been so great. Admitting that power
ful representatives and branches of the Church have sometimes at
tempted to block the way of advancement, it by no means follows
that they truly represented Christianity in so doing.
But it is difficult for an unprejudiced student of history to believe
that the chief advances of the human race are not the direct result of
the stimulus which Christianity gives to aU peoples with whom it
comes into contact. Defenders of Mohammedanism point with evi
dent satisfaction to the civilization which Islam produced in the eighth
to the thirteenth centuries, though we must beUeve with Renan that

586 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
this civflization was neither Arabian nor Mohammedan in its spirit
and origin, since it has left no trace of a Uke influence in those coun
tries where the faith of Islam has complete control. Not so with
Christianity in its purer forms ; for wherever these go they introduce
and maintain the spirit of education and of material and moral prog
ress. To attempt to trace aU the influences which have contributed
to the progress of humanity from the dawn of history to the present
time is a task which, were we able to perform it, could not be under
taken here. But, U we are right in thinking that modern civilization
is superior to ancient, Christianity must certainly be reckoned as one
of the factors which has brought this advancement about. "
Possibly a religion has done all that can be demanded of it when
it meets the religious needs of mankind and then stands aside to make
room for material progress. When a religion furnishes a pure mo-
Limits to the raUty it has done much ; and if we cannot truthfuUy at-
upo'n "eii- tribute to it the whole credit for material advancement
gl0n' we should not be surprised. Christianity proposes to per
vade every realm of human activity ; but it does not profess to be the
whole of that activity. Christianity is a rehgion, and it should not
astonish us U it does not provide for the details of civil government,"
education, and the like.
In order to determine whether Christianity has been a chief cause
of the progress which has been made wherever — and in proportion as
— our faith prevaUs in any nation, we should ask ourselves whether
there is hi it that which would naturally tend to such a result.
Conducting an examination along the line suggested we discover,
first, that there is in Christianity that which makes men successful in
Christianity business. Jesus assumed throughout aU his teachings
successfufin that whatever legitimate occupation men pursue they
business. sh0uld engage in it with aU their might.3 In this he fol
lowed the Old Testament, particularly the Proverbs, and was in turn
followed by the apostles, particularly Paul. * Besides, Christianity con-
dems idleness and wastefulness, two of the principal foes to the
accumulation of wealth ; as also the costly vices, such as gluttony and
drunkenness. Again, it inspires a sense of self-respect and a claim
upon the general benefits which the world has to offer which cannot
fail to produce energy in action.
1 This is the opinion of many of the ablest writers on the history of civilization. See
especially Benjamin Kldd's Social Evolution, new edition, New York and London,
1895, particularly chaps. 5-7.
* See Professor Shaller Mathews's The Social Teachings of Jesus; an Essay in Chris
tian Sociology, New York, 1897.
s See the parables for example. * See Rom. xii.

Christianity and Human Progress. 587
But we discover, second, that Christianity tends directly to the
study of nature. Jesus was a close observer of the natural world,
and taught, together with the Jews generaUy, that this is Encourages
God's world and was designed for our benefit. From the nature.
moment when God gave to man dominion over the earth and aU that
it contains he inspired him with a desire to master and utilize it for
his own purposes. The preservation of that bit of revelation in the
Christian Scriptures must, even though often unconsciously, have
made men feel that they had, in this matter, not only a right but a
duty. Furthermore, the Christian duty of amehorating aU untoward
human conditions has contributed in no smaU degree to inventions and
discoveries in medicine, surgery, and other practical arts and sciences.
Third, we discover that Christianity directly impels men to the pur
suit of education and culture. The dignity and worth of the human
personaUty are so strongly emphasized in the Christian impeis to the
system as to result inevitably in the determination on the Scation °a!id
part of every Christian to make the most of himself, not culture-
only for his own sake, but as well that he may the better contribute
to the welfare of his feUow-men. The Christian recognizes that "a
true individuality is the condition for the highest personal social
power." ' Accordingly it is a common thing for men of depraved
tastes, when converted, to begin at once a course of self-discipline,
prompted solely by the inspiration of the new worth they discover
in themselves. But this same motive has led the Church in all ages
to found schools of learning, in which intelligence is disseminated and
inteUectual training in its varied aspects may be secured."
Here indeed it may be safely claimed that Christian feeling has ac
complished more than aU other motives combined. Besides, wher
ever Christianity goes it carries with it a sense of freedom and a love
for truth which neither ecclesiastics, ecclesiastical councUs, nor any
other obstacle can crush out or keep down. Whatever may be the
fact with reference to individual instances, the instinctive feeling
of every Christian is to rise inteUectually and morally and to lift up
his fellow-men with him. That our religion has not figured so promi
nently in the advancement of material wealth is not to its discredit ;
the selfish, worldly passions of men were sufficient for that. Chris
tianity has at least never in principle stood in the way of the accumu-
' Comp. Dr. J. H. W. Stuckenberg's Introduction to the Study of Sociology, p. 224.
* See Bishop Hurst's interesting history of education and of universities in his History
of the Christian Church, New York and Cincinnati, 1897, vol. i, chap. 57. On the special
relation of Christianity to art, see Bennett's Christian Archaeology, Second Edition, re
vised by A. W. Patten, New York and Cincinnati, 1898, especially Book First.

588 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
lation of wealth by honest means ; though it discourages the selfish
hoarding of riches which might be employed for the general good of
mankind. " The ultimate aim of social progress," says Stuckenberg,
"cannot be anything short of social perfection. All the parts and
forces and functions of society are to be made perfect."1 This is ex
actly the aim of the kingdom of God as preached by Jesus Christ."
In aU these ways the Christian religion is adapted to produce true
progress. It stimulates self-respect, intellectual activity, love of aU
its spirit of that is beautUul and good, and, by its spirit of freedom,
freedom. opens the way for progress in aU time to come. That
there have been among Christians periods and phases of history and
belief which were inimical to progress does not alter the fact that
Christianity in its pure form provides aU the conditions and motives
which a reUgion can possibly supply for the material, mental, and
moral progress of the individual and society. When, then, we find
the greatest progress wherever Christianity exists in its purest form,
and see nations advance in civilization wherever Christianity enters,
and consider that our reUgion is adapted to foster such development,
we are bound to conclude that the constant conjunction of a pure state
of Christianity and a high civilization indicates that the two facts are
related to each other as cause, or at least as condition and effect.
Our civflization wfll reach its perfection when it completely elimi
nates aU elements contrary to the spirit of Christ and perfectly
appropriates and appUes the principles of his rehgion.
This perfect adaptation of Christianity to the needs of human beings
in their individual and associated capacities is proof of the most indu
bitable sort that it is not of human origin. If anyone shaU insist
still that it is a product of the general law of evolution we must re
frain from closing with him on the main point, because aU he is say
ing is that evolution is the method God employed. But if WaUace
was right in claiming that natural selection could not account for the
origin of man, and that the general laws of development were guided
by a higher power with a view to man's production, we can assert,
with even greater evidence on our side, that in the case of the Jews
religious history was guided by a higher power, and the only higher
power of whom we know anything, capable of producing a reUgion so
universally and perfectly suited to the needs of man is the God and
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Human wisdom is inadequate to such
a product. Its very nature and content prove its origin divine.
1 Introduction to the Study of Sociology, p. 229 f .
' Comp. Bruce's The Kingdom of God, Edinburgh, 1891.

The Discoveries Eeached by this Test. 589

SECTION YIII.-THE EXPERIMENTAL TEST.
CHAPTER I.
THE DISCOVERIES REACHED BY THIS TEST.
We have thus far endeavored to meet the difficulties which thought
finds in the way of Christian behef . We have exhibited the evidence
of the divine character of the revelation brought by Jesus Christ which
the claims, the character, and the miracles wrought by Jesus, as weU
as those wrought in his behaU, afford ; and we have studied the con
tents of his revelation in comparison with other religions and with
the needs of man, and have reached the conclusion that only the
divine interposition for the purposes of a perfect and final revelation
can account for the facts. We now ask every man to test Chris
tianity as a personal experience for himseU. After aU, though we
may give many reasons for the "hope that is within us," our personal
experience is our most Christian reason for believing that Jesus
brought us a reUgion all divine. He who is convinced by this argu
ment is not only inteUectuaUy on our side, but is, by virtue of his expe
rience, a beneficiary of all the good things Christianity offers and of
necessity an active and ardent promoter of the tasks which Jesus left
his disciples to perform.
In appealing to rejecters of the Christian faith to make this per
sonal test we caU attention to two special points. The first is the
great improbability that the uncounted mfllions who have professed
this experience were either deceivers or deceived as to the nature or the
source of their experience. The facts of Christian experience are as
palpable as other experiences of Ufe. They are capable of The^ facte _of
examination and classification the same as any other experiencecapable of
mental phenomena. Multiplied thousands of men who are ^^s|n5cex"
perfectly accustomed to the art of introspection have made animation.
just the examination we have mentioned with reference to some, at
least, of these facts of personal reUgion if not with reference to all.
Facts which are so universal in their appearance, experiencing almost
no modification as the result of national or parental inheritances,1
1 Says Romanes, " To pure agnostics the evidence from conversion and regeneration
lies in the bulk of these psychological phenomena, shortly after the death of Christ, with
their continuance ever since, their general similarity all over the world, &c, &c" —
Thoughts on Religion, p. 163.

590 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
must follow some great law of the mind — of the inner Ufe of
man. We have said that the facts of religious experience are capable of
careful scrutiny. This is not always the case with professed expe
riences. Men may be deceived into thinking they hear sounds or see
objects when there is no corresponding external reaUty, and there are
some Christian experiences — such as fellowship with God, answer to
prayer, providence, and the Uke— which are not easy to test and estab
lish beyond the possibflity of doubt to a doubting mind ; though it is
a significant fact that many naturally skeptical minds have had such
repeated experiences of this kind as to make them certain of an
objective cause as their ground. But other experiences are easily
tested. Of their reaUty the simplest or the greatest mind can be equaUy
sure. There is no mistaking the change of feeling which the convert
undergoes. This is a matter so whoUy within that U one knows any
thing about himseU he can know whether it is real. What the scien
tific mind finds more difficult to determine is the cause of this change.
This we shall discuss in due time.
Now, we say that any system having facts of such importance,
capable of being personally tested, so weU supported by such a large
body of people many of whom cannot be charged with lack of dis
crimination, makes a demand upon the faith of a scientific mind. If
he cannot believe the things testified to he must test them for himseU or
else no longer oppose them ; and he must expect to suffer whatever loss
attends his unbelief. But U he is a conscientious man, and knows the
value of Christianity as a practical system, he will be constrained to
undergo the experiences necessary to convince him. of its complete
truth. The appeal here, however, is not that men shall verUy the
doctrinal system but test its practical value. And there is aU the
more ground for insisting upon this since upon a careful and pains
taking examination of Christian theory we find so much in its sup
port. True it is that we cannot test everything which presents itseU
as a claimant for our adherence, but it will be admitted that U the
facts of Christianity are capable of verification they are so momen
tous as to lift them out of the ordinary range of facts. So that few
systems, if any, have a claim upon us at all comparable to that of
Christianity. The second point to which we refer, as a reason why aU unbeUevers
should experiment with Christianity in order to the discovery of its
truth, is that any other procedure is unscientific. We live in an age
when we have learned that it is venturesome to determine by any

The Discoveries Reached by this Test. 591
theoretical considerations alone what is or is not possible. Science
strives to base its theories upon discovered facts, not to to decline the
discover facts by preconceived theories. And when, as t^me'thlfd
in astronomy, mathematical calculation anticipates the tSaSty is'to
fact observation is stUl employed, and it is the obser- feientific-
vation, npt the calculation, upon which the astronomer ally-
depends for his certainty. There is scarcely an existing invention for
the utilization of steam or electricity which was not by some regarded
beforehand as incapable of realization. Experiment alone wfll con
vince in such cases. If in all practical science experiment is the
condition of sound knowledge the scientifically disposed should not
rest until they have put Christianity to the same test in their own
lives. But it may be questioned whether Christianity can be experi
mentally verified as any scientific theory can. Now, we have the
words of Jesus himseU for the assertion that it can be so verified
by whoever wfll. We have contended throughout that Christianity
Christianity is scientific in that it perpetually asks scFentific
after facts and ignores theory. And Jesus confirms this verification.
view when he says, "If any man wiUeth to do his (God's) wiU, he
shaU know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I
speak from myseU." • Here is the chaUenge to unbeUevers to submit
his teaching to a practical test within the reach of aU men. Nor is
this an isolated passage ; for Jesus said, "Ye wfll not come to me, that
ye may have life ; " s and we think that any one familiar withj his
words will recognize that his entire teaching is not pervaded by the
spirit of dogmatism, but by the presupposition that in its practical
handUng men must discover the truth of what he taught. True,
this was not the only method he had of convincing men that he
taught the truth of God ; but it was one method, and as such we shaU
examine it.
The first question to be asked is, What is God's will? How shaU
we distinguish it? Plainly he could not mean that if anyone at
tempts to do the will of God as he understands it he shall know
whether Christ's doctrine is from God. The will of God is that will
as revealed by Christ, which revelation is a part of the teaching to be
experimentally tested. But what is the will of God as revealed by
Christ ? It unquestionably includes many things, but, so far as man
can perform it, it is probably summed up in the words : "Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with aU thy heart; and thou shalt love thy
» John vii, 17. " John v, 40.

592 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
neighbor as thyseU." " Love is the fulfilling of the law" of God as
What God's revealed by Jesus ; and for the present we may regard
wm is. iove as an emotional attitude toward God and our fellow -
men, not as an activity sprmging from the emotion. As a further
concession to the weakness of men we may limit the exercise of this
feehng to man alone, siiice theoreticaUy, at least, it is supposable that
those even who do not beUeve in the existence of God might wish to
make the experiment.
Having determined what is the will of God we next inquire what it
is to will to do God's wUl. It must be noted that it does not say that
And what is ^ any nian doeth God's will he shaU know. The simple
willing 'to do requirement is that he shall wfll to do it, regardless of
lt- success or failure in his attempt. But it is also evident
that one must really wiU to do it, and not make a mere feeble and sim
ulated attempt. To the person who would make this experiment the
great moral ideal of Christianity must commend itseU as a state to he
desired. Only such a one could be truly said to wfll to do God's will.
He may recognize that he does not love his neighbor as himseU, but
he must wish to do so, else he cannot and will not make the attempt.
Nor may this desire to do the wiU of God be a mere passing state of
feeling ; it must be sufficiently profound and permanent to result in
an earnest and continued endeavor.*
Now, no one will object to the demand that the conditions requisite
to the experiment shall be fulfilled. AU experiments which are to be
successful require the fulfillment of the proper conditions. But some
The condi- one may say that the conditions made by Christ exclude
experiment the very people iii whose interest the experiment is to be
within the , Jl , , . , , . . „ „
reach of all. made. We do not think this objection weU founded.
There are doubtless unbeUevers who do not wish to love their neigh
bors as themselves and who especiaUy do not regard such love as the
will of God; but there are also unbeUevers who feel that the love
which Christ inculcated is a moral ideal to be earnestly striven after,
and they are sincerely endeavoring to Uve up to it. Now, all such
already wiU to do God's wUl, and can learn, U they wish, whether
Christ's doctrine be of God. If any unbeUevers have so completely
withdrawn themselves from Christian influences that they do not even
desire to Uve up to the Christian standard they must admit that they
are no proper judges of Christian truth,
What, now, wfll any unconverted man discover who undertakes to
love his neighbor as himself ? The first and principal thing wfll be
1 This is what made the famous Tyndall prayer-test Impossible.

The Discoveries Reached by this Test.

593

that he cannot. He may be able to love some of his neighbors,
but unless they are of his own famUy he wfll not be able to love them
as himself. Particularly will this be the case U these neighbors be
uncongenial by reason of ignorance, uncleanliness, lack of native re
finement, or the like. And when the neighbor is one who has done a
wrong to him who would love him, or who is perpetuating against him
a wrong, the would-be lover of bis f eUow-men finds himseU completely
defeated. By sheer force of will he may compel himself to associate
with them or to attempt to confer upon them some benefit ; but of love
for them he can find no trace. In proportion as he strives to bring
' himself to love them as he loves himself he will be convinced of the
impossibility of the task. So much is this the case that not a few un
beUevers have declared the Christian standard whoUy unattainable
and impracticable.
The one who has reached this stage has gone far on the way toward
the discovery of the truth of the teaching of Jesus. He is now in a
position where he may realize, if he will, the significance The first ef-
of the Christian doctrine of sin.1 Christianity teaches ex^erfmerft
that the reason why men cannot love their neighbors as v i n c e° us
themselves is that they are sinful. Jesus could love as sinfu we are
himself men of aU classes and conditions, including his enemies and
maligners and persecutors. According to Christianity the quality of
sinfulness is marked just by its unlikeness to the spirit of Jesus. Like
ness to him is holiness ; unlikeness, sinfulness. By our faflure we are
convicted of sin at the bar of our own judgment and conscience ; for
conscience says we ought, and we admit that we do not. Judged,
therefore, either by his own conscience or by the law of love he is a
sinner, and he has discovered by experiment that so far the teaching
of Jesus is true and, hence, of God.
But U he is as earnest as we have supposed he will be only the more
discontented when he learns that his faflure is due to his own unholy
condition. He wfll be humiliated and ashamed because of bis fault.
He wfll trace to the same source all the conscious deflections from the
straight path of righteousness in his past lUe. If he meditates upon it
as he ought he will be fiUed with the spirit of Christian penitence ; but
above aU he will leave no method untried for conquering this inward
spirit of evil. Though he has never prayed before he wfll pray now.
Having learned the truth that he is a sinner, he wfll the more readily
beUeve it possible that Christ is a Saviour. At any rate he is ready
1 Comp. Frank's, System of the Christian Certainty, second edition, translated by M.
J. Evans, Edinburgh, 1886, vol. i, pp. 189 ff.

594 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
to throw himseU upon God for power to overcome himself and to Uve
as Christ requires. Faith in Christ, which he has hitherto rejected
The second as iutde, he now exercises, and the confidence the sinner
that°byrLith reposes in God and in his Son Jesus Christ is never disap-
we are saved, pointed. By faith he is saved. He now finds this spirit
subdued which, hitherto unconquerable, has restrained him in the
pursuit of his ideal. Incredible as it seems, he now loves those uncon
genial people, and even those who have done or are doing him wrong.
He is as well aware of their faults as ever, but these are not the quali
ties in them most prominent in his thoughts. He sees their defects as
due to human limitations and their sins as the result of the same spirit
which made him a sinner. He is conscious of feeling toward them
somewhat as Jesus appeared to feel. Henceforth he serves them, not
by force of will, but because of a compassionate interest in them. He
is wUling and glad to make sacrifices for their good. The painful
sense of unlikeness to Christ is, at least in some measure, gone ; in
stead he feels that he is a colaborer with God.
He has proved the second great truth which Jesus taught — that
there is salvation from sin.1
1 Comp. Frank's, System of the Christian Certainty, vol. i, pp. 109 ff. John Henry New
man says that the divine origin of Christianity is shown " not in its marked effects on the
mass of mankind, but in its surprising power of elevating the moral character when it Is
received in spirit and In truth."— University Sermons, p. 40. John Wesley, as early as
1749, in a letter to the Rev. Dr. Middleton, mentioned as the strongest evidence of the
truth of Christianity the experience of the truly regenerated man.— The Works of the
Rev. John Wesley, A.M., New York, 1856, vol. v, pp. 758, 759.

Christian Experiences Divinely Wrought. 595

CHAPTER II.
christian experiences divinely wrought.
To the soul that has passed through all this it will appear little short
of sacrilege to admit even so much as a doubt concerning The sugges-
,. . , „. , ,. , , ,, ,. . tion that all
the divine source of this salvation, but the question is the forego
ing is true,
raised for us and we must meet it. The unbehever who but naturai-
lynotdivine-
has not made the experiment and gamed the experience ly wrought.
stfll doubts, though no other one doubts. He admits that all may occur
as we have described it, but wants to know whether it is not altogether
explicable without the supposition that God interposed to change the
spirit of the man in question. May it not have been a merely natural
revulsion of f eeling, or the final victory of his will over himself ?
We caU attention to the fact that this doubt springs from the doc
trine that, U there be a God, he has nothing to do with the world. In
reaUty, the only one who can consistently deny or doubt that the re
sultant conversion is produced by divine agency in answer to prayer
is the atheist, whose doctrine has been weighed in the balance and
found wanting. The agnostic may doubt, but he cannot deny ; the
pantheist cannot even doubt, because to him everything is Four reasons
r for rejecting
a manUestation of God. The deist cannot doubt, because, the sugges-
tion fust
according to his doctrine, everything that has been, is or mentioned.
shaU be results directly from what God put into the world at its
creation. The theist, believing as he does in the immanence of God,
beUeves in the actuaUty of divine interventions, and asserts that
conversions of the kind we have described are the results of such
interventions. A second reason for believing that conversion is the result of a di
vine work is that Jesus teaches this doctrine. No one who has thor
oughly studied the claims, the character, the miracles, and the intelli
gence of Jesus wUl be able to reject his testimony on this point.
A third reason is that there is no way of explaining Jesus's knowledge
of the process except on the supposition that it was revealed to him
by the Father. This Christian process of conversion follows the laws
of the mind's operations in a marvelous manner. It is a process which
is essentially alike to whomsoever appUed, in whatever race or age,
and which invariably leads to the same results. For the knowledge

596 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
beforehand of such a law of the mind as this Jesus must have been
indebted to a divine insight ; but U he had this he also knew whereof
he spoke when he taught that conversion is wrought by divine
power. The fourth reason is that it is according to scientific procedure to
attribute the result to a divine cause. The use of certain fixed means
for the production of electrical results invariably accompUshes the de
sired ends. No one dreams that the means are sufficient unto them
selves. Besides the intelligent manipulator of the instruments and the
instruments themselves scientists postulate a force called electricity,
which is necessary to the result. The real foundation for the behef that
electricity does the work is that whenever the means are employed the
ends are obtained. This presupposes a force which is obedient to the
wUl of the operator. Only a positivist can deny or doubt that there is
a cause external to the manipulator and his instrument. ButU there is
good reason to beUeve that it is electrical force which responds to the
means employed, there is at least equaUy good reason to believe that
it is divine force which responds to the means caUed prayer — or,
rather, faith. This is aU the more certain in view of the fact that
only in connection with the express reliance of the soul on God does
the conversion follow. As long as one strives by himseU, in his own
strength, refusing divine aid, there is failure. Such a course may in
deed succeed in breaking off certain bad habits ; but for that change
of heart known as conversion, whether gradual or sudden, only faith
or reUance upon God as distinguished from seU-reUance, wiU suffice.
To say that the wfll has at length overcome the rebellious disposition
would require us to suppose that just when human effort is practically
abandoned the will is most effective. The theory supposes the greater
effect to be the result of the slackened exertion. This is contrary to
experience and to common sense. If the change is not traceable to the
exercise of forces resident within ourselves it must be wrought by some
external force operating within us. If, under these circumstances,
we are to doubt the divine agency in conversion we shaU be compelled
to doubt all causation. For the only external agency to which we can
trace our conversion is God.
These four very weighty considerations require us to beUeve that
God is at work in the conversion of the soul ; and thus the experi
menter is made aware of the divine truth of the two great fundamen
tal doctrines of Christianity — sin and salvation from sin. These reasons
for beUeving that conversion is a divine work are given, not for the
confirmation of the faith of the one who has made the experiment, for

Christian Experiences Divinely Wrought. 597
he has no doubt, but for the sake of those who hesitate to submit to
the scientific test proposed by our Lord.
This certainty of him who has had the experience described above
grows as the way is further foUowed. The wfll to do God's wfll is a
part of the converted man's character. He had it before he met the
great change. But it is as necessary to the continuance of his reli
gious experience as it was to its initiation. Sometimes, indeed, through
the fickleness of the human nature he falters in his purpose, but this
is followed by a loss of God's conscious presence, which is a further
proof to him that the way marked out by Christ is the divinely true
way. But in proportion as he maintains the spiritual momentum at
tained in the first days of his Christian experience does he become
convinced that the whole Christian scheme is no "cunningly devised
fable." The longer he does the wUl of God the more firm he becomes
in his conviction that the doctrines of Christ are the truths of God.
The experiences upon which this growing conviction are founded
are several. We mention a few. First, there is a grow- Experiences which in-
ing sense of power over temptation within and without, crease the
..... certainty
This, after his original experience of conversion, he can gained by the
earlier ex-
only attribute to an increasing ability to appropriate the periments.
proffered divine aid. Second, in this opinion he is confirmed by what
seems to him a divine companionship. He hears no voice, he sees
no form, but he is sure of a spiritual presence. It does not speak to
him, but he is certain that it is there. At unexpected turns he seems
to perceive it with a kind of inner sense. If he sins, especiaUy by his
own consent, this presence is gone. When he is loyal he is aware
of deUverances from temptation and spiritual danger at moments
when it seems to him that but for this presence he might have been
entrapped. This is an experience which, naturaUy, some possess more
consciously than others ; but it comes as truly to the one who was not
as to him who was taught to expect it. Men may say it is imagina
tion, but only he who denies the personaUty of the Deity has any log
ical need to say so, and no one can account for this psychological phe
nomenon except on the Christian theory. Doubt on this point is
absolutely groundless and unreasonable. Men doubt it only because
it is possible to doubt anything whatever.
But, third, the faithful soul graduaUy comes to feel that he is under
the special protection and guidance of God. His lUe's experiences are
not always to his Uking, but in the end he sees that, whether they
were pleasing or painful at the moment, they led surely to his greater
happiness or usefulness, or both. During the years so many such cases
40

598 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
accumulate that, if occasionally he cannot trace the divine guidance or
overruling, he attributes it to his want of insight rather than to the
lack of the divine care. Fourth, in a similar manner he comes to feel
that God hears his prayers. Not that he always secures what he asks
but that when he is refused a good reason why soon or later ap
pears. His conviction that God hears his prayers is not based on any
one remarkable case or upon a few. Rather is it based upon the ob
servation that as the days go by he has constant evidence that his
trust in God is not misplaced. '
The incorrigible skeptic wfll say that these things are superstition ;
but there is no reason why they may not be reaUties. If God is active
in his world why may not men experience things at his hand which
they must trace to him ? If these experiences were given to the iso
lated few there might be reason to doubt them. But they are, or
have been, enjoyed by unnumbered multitudes, of whom many have
been altogether capable of inspecting their own mental processes and
tracing the causes of their mental operations. It is incredible that
improbability such large numbers are hi error. Far more likely is it
that so many . ,.,.,.,
intelligent that they are m error who, with nothing but their skep-
persons should mis- tical dispositions to depend upon, deny the objective
readthe source of ground of the experiences above mentioned. The be-
rience. liever has a great array of facts which are inexplicable
except on his hypothesis ; the unbeUever doubts without a shred of
evidence to support him. Nor is the unbeliever more talented than
the behever or more gUted with power of discrimination. Hence the
argument is all with the latter.
Again, the experiences mentioned teUy exactly with the predictions
of Jesus. He affirmed that a certain attitude toward God would re
sult in the very things which men by experience discover to be true.
There is no faflure anywhere. AU his promises, aU his threatenings,
and all his theories of the spiritual Ufe are realized. Where did Jesus,
the uninstructed youth of Nazareth, get this profound insight into the
workings of the human heart? Why did he not give some false
recipes for the cure of spiritual disease ? Why does his system, and
his alone, meet all the needs of the human heart ? How did he come
by this truth, so aU-comprehensive, so errorless, so exactly appUcable
and readily verifiable ? There is only one answer — his doctrine was
of God. Admit this, and all is accounted for. Deny it, and attribute
his knowledge to human intelUgence, and all is unexplained, whfle all
1 Comp. Theodor H&rlng's Die Lebensfrage der systematlschen Theologie die Lebens-
frage des chrlstllchen Glaubens. Tubingen, 1895, pp. 11 ff.

Christian Experiences Divinely Wrought. 599
history rises up to point the finger of scorn at the denier, who must
search in vain for such intelligence apart from Jesus Christ. ' Whoso
ever will do God's wfll knows that the doctrine of Christ is from God.
None other knows anything about it. Theories such may have in
abundance ; but of knowledge they have none.
• Archbishop Whately clearly saw that the divine origin of Christianity could be es
tablished only by proving that regeneration and the regenerate Ufe are the result of di
vine influences. His proof of this does not, however, seem to us complete. See On the
Truth of Christianity, London, 1865, pp. 88 ff.

600 Foundations of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER III.
THE EXPERIMENTAL TEST AND THE FUTURE LIFE — FINAL SUMMARY AND
APPEAL TO UNBELIEVERS.
In one aspect of the case, however, it is too much to say that the
Christian convert who Uves a Ufe conformable to the principles of
the Gospel knows that Christ's teachings are of God. We do not
refer to the nature of knowledge as limiting that assertion ; for
an analysis of our religious experience shows that we know both what
it is and how we came into possession of it. Our mental-reUgious
The limit a- changes and states we know as well as we know any
method. other mental conditions, and our examination of the
cause of these changes shows that they are wrought by divine power.
This we know in the same sense in which we know that electrical
force propels the car along the track. The Umitation we refer to is
one of extent or range. Strictly speaking, the knowledge gained by
experiment is confined to those things with which we can experiment.
It is doubtful whether some writers have not claimed too much here.
When it is asserted that the Christian has a distinct experience of
each of the three persons in the Holy Trinity — an experience in which
he can distinguish which of the three is affecting him — it is prob
able that the distinction is one of deduction rather than one based
on direct experience.' However this may be, it is very sure that
some of the doctrines of Jesus lie beyond the range of present experi
ment. Such are aU the teachings relative to the lUe after death. By this
we do not mean that these teachings are therefore of doubtful cer
tainty. This whole discussion of the evidence from Christian experi
ence is not chiefly designed to make more certain in thought the
teachings of Christ, but to show to those who are not convinced by
arguments addressed to the inteUect a method by winch they may as
certain for themselves whether the doctrines of Christ are the truth
of God. There is an intellectual conviction which could not be ren
dered more firm by any experience ; though the conviction or opinion
1 An examination of the argument of Stearns In his The Evidence of Christian Expe
rience shows that such is the nature of the certainty he there claims. Knowledge gained
by deduction is scarcely relevant In an argument from experience.— Pages 219-226.

The Experimental Test and the Future Life. 601
that Jesus is able to save from personal sin and guilt is rendered more
Uvely and vivid by experience. Belief is turned into knowledge, but
the knowledge gives in reaUty no greater certitude than was involved
in the belief. What is gained is zeal and holiness. Even the devils
beUeve ; but the converted man has met a change of wUl and tendency
of which the mere inteUectual beUever has no experience. And for
those to whom this evidence from experience is particularly ad
dressed the ordinary conditions are reversed. Knowledge does not
follow, but conditions, beUef . '
The fact, then, that we cannot learn by present experience the
truth of life after death, and of holy and immediate association with
God and the saints of all ages, does not detract from the certainty of
our conviction that these doctrines are true. Some of them are ren
dered so probable by reflection that none but the determined skeptic
can question them U he gives unprejudiced heed to the facts. Others
are to be taken largely on the word of Christ, which, indeed, is the
chief source of our certitude with reference to aU Christian doctrine.
Those who foUowed the discussion of the competency of Christ as the
revealer of divine truths will recognize how impossible it is to ques
tion his words.
Nevertheless, for the doctrine of the lUe after death in aU its phases as
taught by Christ we do have an additional support in the experimental
method here presented. That is, we have in this experience The experi-
another reason for beUeving that Jesus knew whereof he method
spoke when he talked of the life beyond the grave. He t tonal sup^
, ,, . , , , , , port even to
told us we were smners, and by experiment we found fhe doctrine
this to be true. He told us that God could save us from ture life.
the guilt and power of sin ; and by experiment we proved the truth of
this also. He tells us of the fact and something of the nature of the
lUe beyond the grave. With this we cannot, in the nature of the
case, now experiment, nor can we test it by observation. But the
fact that he knew the truths we can test affords us the presump
tion that he is not in error concerning the things which he beyond
our present reach. In proportion as the statements of any informant
are found to be accurate are we disposed to beUeve even those affir
mations which we have as yet had no occasion to prove. Such a dis
position is not only approved by aU men in everyday lUe, even
concerning the most important affairs, but it is in accordance with
the principles of science that this should be so. No investigator can
1 The reader will not confuse belief and saving faith. The latter is necessary to experi
ence, but it is not incapable of exercise in the absence of a true intellectual behef.

602 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
personally study every realm of physical nature ; yet each branch of
science is so intimately connected with every other that the devotee of
one must know, at least in some measure, the latest results and con
clusions in aU. For this knowledge he must depend on others than
himself. This he does without hesitation, giving credence to this or
that authority in proportion as he is considered or found to be reU-
able. Now, Jesus professes to be an authority concerning things re
ligious, including the future. If he is found correct in those things
which can be tested here, by what right do we question or doubt his
utterances concerning those things which we cannot now test ? To
do so is to deal with him as we would deal with no other. We de
part from the practice of common lUe and of scientific men. An
alogy demands belief ; we doubt. But do we doubt ? Nay, verily ;
he who has foUowed the spiritual leadership of Jesus to the point
where he experiences salvation from the power of sin believes that
Jesus knew, and to some extent revealed, the facts concerning the
future Ufe. He who for no other reason beheves in Christ's knowl
edge of the future lUe believes it for this, namely, that he has found
him correct on all else concerning which he professes to know.
The conclusion is that no scientific mind dare refuse to put Christ's
doctrine to the test, thus dealing with Christianity as he deals with
nothing else. Unless he has tested it by actual experiment, conducted
on the principles named by Jesus Christ, his a priori arguments have,
or should be aUowed to have, no weight. This age demands experi
ment, observation, not theory. All the theoretical objections of aU
the unbelievers the world has ever known lose their entire force in the
presence of the fact that millions of men and women have experi
mentally proved the truth of what skeptical theory says must be false.

It is not too much, at the close of the somewhat prolonged investiga
tion we have been making, to claim that the Christian view has been
vindicated at every point. The conflict with atheism, agnosticism,
pantheism, deism, unbelieving science, skeptical historical criticism
and opposing ethical and religious systems has not been shunned, but
fought out ; and in every battle Christianity triumphed. The great
Summary of fundamental facts and postulates of Christianity, con-
resuit of the sidered as a revelation, have been examined with pains-
concluded, taking care and, we think, with all the thoroughness con
sistent with the necessary brevity ; and Christianity has not fafled
to sustain its positions. Compared with other religions it has exhib-

The Experimental Test and the Future Life. 603
ited its great superiority ; compared with the needs of the individual
and society it has proved its perfect adaptation ; and neither of these
results can be accounted for except on the supposition that its origin
is divine. Tested experimentally it fulfills all its rich promises and
affords to those who need it an indubitable proof of its divine truth.
And all this evidence that it is from God is supported by the central
personage of all history made since his time — Jesus Christ, who is
himself accounted for only on the supposition that he was what he
claimed to be, the perfect revealer of the perfect truth of God in re
Ugion and ethics. His marvelous wisdom ; the unparaUeled sobriety
of his teachings ; the beneficence of his works, his example and his
influence ; the majesty of his character ; his power to win the affec
tion and undying loyalty of the strongest of mankind, all of which
have given him a power over individuals, societies, and nations
which, in spite of the most strenuous opposition, grows greater as cen
turies roU on, prove him and his religion the highest gUt of God to
man. We cannot close this book without an appeal to those who have
hitherto opposed Christianity to unite their forces with the mighty
host that has been endeavoring to spread its blessings over the earth.
However honest may have been their intentions they have prevented
many from owning the rulership of Jesus ; and yet they have given
such no leadership equal to that which they have refused. Appeal to un-
We are not concerned for the final outcome ; nor indeed ceas^oppc?
are we in doubt about the present prospects of the cause fend" their
of Christ. In no age of the world has Christianity so
mightily influenced human hearts and nations as it does to-day. But
it is grievous to reflect that there are men who oppose Christianity,
and thus hinder its progress, and then in turn criticise it for not do
ing the very things they have prevented it from accomphshing. It
is a source of profound sorrow that any should deprive the young
of the moral and even the temporal advantages to be reaped from
loyal adherence to Jesus Christ. If the energy which the opponents
of the Gospel expend in preventing its progress were spent in fur
thering its ends how much more beneficial would be their lives ! As it
is, they block the way of aU true moral progress ; by the other course
they could give it an added impetus.
UnbeUevers should reflect that in the judgment neither of immedi
ate contemporaries nor of remote generations has any man ever been
called blessed for his opposition to Christianity. Historians have not
been able to trace the benefits which unbelievers claim they are con-

604 Foundations of the Christian Faith.
ferring on mankind. Later ages have not fafled to trace to powerful
skeptics mjurious consequences which earnest Christians have had to
labor hard to overcome. But the judgment of mankind has no meed
of praise for the skeptic's skepticism. On the other hand, just so far
as men have cooperated with and helped to apply the principles of
Jesus have future ages seen the beneficial results of their endeavors.
Surely this judgment of mankind is worth something. It cannot be
ignored with safety either to one's reputation and usefulness or to the
weUare of the human race. The world has aU too few earnest souls
ready to make sacrifices for human good. May the time soon come
when there shall be none to discourage, but when aU shaU advocate by
word and deed the spirit of human helpfulness which is the very
spirit of Jesus ! Whatever gives men the purpose to reUve, in their
measure, his Ufe is good ; whatever hinders this is bad. Not by opposing
either Christ, or his theories, or his reUgion, but by vigorously adopt
ing and propagating them, will men become partakers with Christ in
the perfecting of mankind.

Index of Topics.

605

INDEX OF TOPICS.

Absolute, The, a necessary assumption,
88.
Abstinence from intoxicants in Chris
tianity, 569 ff.
in Mohammedanism, 569 ff.
Aergisticism, 62.
^Esthetics, failure of monism in, 130.
Agnosticism, philosophical, and atheism,
SUght difference between, 53.
based on a false philosophy, 63.
creed of, 55, 57.
defined, 17, 53.
Huxleyan, as a method of investiga
tion, 54, 56.
discussed, 53 ff.
unscientific in principle, 58.
results reached by, 56 f .
Agnosticism, Scientific. (See Division II,
Section I.)
Angels, Argument for existence of, fur
nished by Wallace, 210.
Anima mundi, 99 f .
Anthropology, Christian, 375-418.
Monistic, 301.
Anthropomorphism In Christianity, 145.
Apisticism, 62.
Apologetics defined, 13.
Apology, Definition and purpose of, 12 f.
Asceticism in Buddhism, 563.
Atheism a prejudice, 18.
accessibility of, to argument, 18.
and monism, 129.
defined, 17.
fails to satisfy thought, 43.
Huxley's relation to, 99.
in relation to materialism and pessi
mism, 18.
of the physical senses, 20.
rare, but sometimes real, 17 f.
three forms of the argument for, 19.
Atheistic argument from regularity of
nature, 23.
Atheistic egoism, 283 ff.
Atom and ceU souls, 30, 117.
Atonement, Christian doctrine of, aUeged
to be immoral, 323.
stated, 579 f .
Augustine's treatment of universal skep
ticism, 98.
Authority as related to belief and knowl
edge, 4 f .
danger of, to religion and science re
spectively, 5.
external, in ethics, 291-295, 304 ff.;
309 ff.; 348.
Automaton, Man as a conscious, 35.
Averroes, Pantheism of, 99 f.
Bastian on man's mastery of nature, 400.

Belief as an element In knowledge, 3.
authority as related to, 4, 5.
defined, 3, 4.
faith distinguished from, 6.
knowledge distinguished from, 3.
Belief and knowledge not always distin
guishable, 6.
Belief and the wiU, 10.
Beliefs, Religious, should not be too sud
denly changed, 88 f .
Bible, Agreement of theologians as to.
principal teachings of, 466.
Bible, Science of; is it of fundamental im
portance ? 190 ff .
Biot on the science in Genesis, 192.
Birth, Law of, criticised and defended,,
49 f.
Birth-law of species criticised and de
fended, 50.
Bowne, criticism of realism, 223 f.
on demonstration, 14.
on ideaUsm, 224.
Brain and mind, Relation between. (See
chapters on materialism, monism,.
and on immortality.)
Buchner on articles of reUgious faith, 181.
quoted, 25.
Buddhism, Asceticism in, 563.
doctrine of kharma in, 561.
Nirvana in, 561 ff.
the soul in, 561.
ignores or denies existence of God,
560.
places emphasis on temporal evil,
562 f.
Christianity and, 559-565.
Bugge, A., quoted, 12.
Butler, Bishop, on a priori estimates of
inspiration, 481 f.
Carneri on the denial of God's existence,
18,20.
Carus on human immortality, 124 f .
Cause, Effect and, 65 f., 74 f.
force or power the essential idea of , 75,
Causal relation, Origin of the idea of the,
75 ff.
Charismata of the apostolic age, 486.
Christ (see Jesus), Claims of, 490 ff.
495 ff.
premundane existence of, 490-494.
the chief source of revelation, 480-497
Christ and Mohammed compared as reli
gious founders, 540.
Christian experiences capable of being
tested, 589 f .
divinely wrought, 595 ff .
Christianity alone furnishes a perfect yet
flexible moral standard, 577 f.

606

Index of Topics.

Christianity and abstinence from intox
icants, 569 ff.
and Buddhism compared, 559-565.
and human progress, 278 ff., 585-588.
and Mohammedanism compared,
566-571.
and philosophy. (See Division I.)
and the problem of temporal evil,
582 ff.
and the suffering classes, 325 f.
emotional rejection of, 9.
may be experimentally verified, 591 f .
nature of ethical authority in, 305.
places emphasis on sin rather than
evil, 563.
progress of, 278 f.
satisfactory doctrine of God and man
in, 574 ff .
6atisfies the conscience, 577 ff.
spirit of freedom in, 588.
the final revelation, 572-588.
why not more effective, 280 f.
Christian Science, 360-369.
Christians, True attitude of, toward scien
tific research, 158.
Clergy, Many of the, fear results of mod
ern science, 158 f.
Clifford criticised, 10.
on man as a conscious automaton,
35.
on the relation of mind and brain, 32.
quoted, 9.
Commandments, Positive, necessary,
308.
Comte : his misunderstandings of Chris
tianity, 329 f .
Conscience demands a perfect moral
standard, 577.
the sense of guilt and the, 578.
Copernican theory, at one time feared by
Christians, 160, 194.
Creation by evolutionary process not
unworthy, 195.
essence of Scripture account of,
found in its religious aspects, 191.
God's agency in, not generally denied
by scientists, 186.
man's rank in, 399.
not a problem for science, 185 f .
Credibility and incredibility, significance
of, 4.
Credulity as a ground for rejecting mir
acles, 243 ff.
of many In accepting miracles, 227 f.,
243.
Criticism ; difference between that ofthe
. literary critic and that of the his
torian, 276.
of the New Testament records 265 ff.
Custom does not explain the idea of
cauBal relation, 75.
Darwin : on the divine agency in crea
tion, 186 f.
on the sting of the bee, 48.
Death, Law of, criticised and defended,
51.
Deism dangerous to the ethical side of
religion, 151.
defined, 17.
fatal to the spirit of prayer, 151.

Deism, freedom and, 152.
in apologetic literature, 150.
incompatible with evolution, 157.
in modern thought, 149 f .
pantheism and Christianity compared
with, 149.
Demonstration, 1, 2.
Design in nature as an argument for
the existence of God, 42, 424 ff.
Determinism of monism, 124.
Development, natural, Breaks in the
progress of, 206 ff.
Disciples, early, Caution of, in accepting
the miraculous, 246 ff.
Divorce in Mohammedanism, 568 f.
Dogmatism in science and theology, 5, 6.
Dualism and brain and mind activity,
113 ff.
argument against, by Romanes, 105
ff.
of monism, 125, 139, 147 f .
opposed by physiology, 115.
reasons for its rejection by monists
105.
regards the world as an aggregate,
137.
unity known to, 140 f.
Du Bois-Reymond ; his controversy with
Haeckel, 27 ff.
his views of materialism, 27 ff.
Dudevant, Madame, quoted, 49.
Egoism, Atheistic, in ethics, 283 ff.
Emotion and faith, 7, 8.
Emotional rejection of Christianity, 8, 9.
Energy, Conservation of, and miracle,
105 f.
Ether, The function of, in monism,
147 f.
Ethical authority, Nature of, in Chris
tianity, 305.
Ethical culture as religion, 339-350.
ethics of German, 287 ff .
its denial of need of divine aid, 316 f .
Ethics, antichristian, 283 ff., 296 ff.
Christian, makes moral perfection an
end, 300.
egoistic-atheistic, 283 ff.
evolutionary, makes moraUty a
means, 300.
external authority in. 289, 291-295,
304 ff., 309 ff.
motives needed in, 811.
of monism, 291 ff.
of the German ethical culturists,
287 ff.
proposed substitutes for Christian,
283 ff.
rewards and punishments in, 301.
value of a fixed ideal standard in,
299 f.
Ethics of Jesus, Complete, 319 ff.
practicable, 317 ff.
Evidences, Idea, method, limitations, and
value of, 12-16.
indirect, great value of, 372 ff.
positive, nature and necessity of,
373 ff.
Wesley on the best, 594.
Evil, good and, moral, Denial of distinc
tion between, 297 ff.

Index of Topics.

607

Evil, Temporal, Buddhistic emphasis on,
562 f .
treatment of, in Christianity, 582 ff.
Evolutionary account of the origin of
sin, 409.
ethics makes morality a means, 300.
method of creation not unworthy,
195.
Evolutionists ignore, minify, or invent
facts, 207 f .
Faith always intellectual, though not
always intelligent, 7, 8.
conditions under which it originates
and is sustained, 7.
employed both in science and the
ology, 174, 177.
Faith and belief, Distinction between, 6.
Faith and emotion ; how related, 6.
Faith and love, Relations of, in Christian
ity, 306.
Faith and unbelief, Ambiguity in the
antithesis between, 6.
as related to religion, 6-9.
Faith, religious, Intellectual character
of, 6-8.
Feuerbach, a genuine atheist, 18.
Flint ; his criticism of Lowenthal's argu
ment for the eternity of matter, 41 .
Force, Idea of, not deceptive, 76 f.
Spencer's doctrine of persistence of,
criticised, 44.
Forel opposes materialism, 25.
Forgiveness of sin alleged to be danger
ous, 323.
in Christianity, 578 ff.
Freedom, according to deism, 152.
denial of, in materialism, 36, 296.
denial of, in monism, 124, 296.
spirit of, in Christianity, 588.
Genesis and modern science ; are they
reconcilable? 189.
Haeckel's concessions concerning,
192.
¦God, A, demanded by thought, 43.
and man, real doctrine of the rela
tion between, in Christianity, 145
f., 573.
celebrated men who have believed in
the existence of, 20.
degrading conception of, in deism,
156 f.
discernible only by mind, 21.
doctrine of, in Mohammedanism, 566.
existence of, assumed in Christian
Scriptures, 419.
ignored or denied in Buddhism, 560.
inscrutability of, a Christian doc
trine, 91.
monistic proof for the existence of,
126 f.
not discernible by the physical senses,
20.
origin of the idea of, 72 f.
satisfactory doctrine of, in Christian
ity, 574 f .
sole attribute of, in monism, 127.
suspicious source of pantheistic idea
of, 101 f.
<God, argument for the existence of, 419-
432.

God, argument for the existence of, from
design in nature, 424 ff.
from universality of the belief, 421 f.
not determined by opinions of schol
ars, 21, 158.
ontological, 423 ff.
God, personality of, 433-452, 572.
denied by monism, 140 ff .
denied by pantheism, 101.
denied by Spencer, 94.
Gospel records, Harnack, Jiilicher, Weiss,
and Zahn on the dates of, 274.
mythical theory of, 265 ff.
trustworthiness of, 273.
Haeckel : Concessions of, as to the scien
tific accuracy of Genesis, 192.
controversy of, with Du Bois-Rey
mond, 27 ff .
dogmatism of, 5.
his ignorance of Christianity, 143.
on the atom-soul, 30.
on the causes of man's superiority,
206.
on the distinction between man and
the animal, 135.
on the love and hate of the atoms,134.
on the relation between mind and
brain, 30.
on religious dogmas, 179.
on scientific articles of faith, 177.
opposed by Hoffding, 122 f .
regards all science as physical, 163.
rejects materialism, 25.
Hamilton on the personality of God, 434.
Harman on verbal inspiration, 190.
Harnack on the credibility of the gos
pels, 274 f.
on the dates of the gospels, 274.
Helmholtz on the human eye, 48.
Hindu magic, Wonders of, 258.
Historical science, modern, Christianity
and, 226 ff.
Hoffding on change of direction in physi
cal movement, 107.
on some of Hseekel's positions, 122 f.
Hume, Distinction of, between impres
sions and ideas, 64, 68 ff.
on cause and effect, 65, 66, 74 f.
on limits of knowledge, 65 ff., 74 f.
on Umits of the world as disproving
an infinite cause, 78.
on mental limitations, 78 f .
on miracles, 228 ff.
philosophy of, as a basis for Huxley's
agnosticism, 64 ff.
representational theory of, 65, 74.
Huxley, Agnosticism of, 53 ff.
more correctly termed apisticism and
aergisticism, 62.
and Spencer compared, 89 f.
denies pressure necessary for action
in reUgion, 61.
on action without sufficient evidence,
60.
on the evidences of religion, 60.
on. the excellence of the Jewish law,
473.
on the place of faith (belief) in sci
ence, 177.
relation of, to atheism, 99.

608

Index of Topics.

Huxley, reserve of, as compared with
Haeckel, 6.
Idea of self, The, 71.
Idealism contrasted with realism, 224 f.
Ideal standard, Value of a fixed, in ethics,
299 f.
Ideas, Hume's distinction between im
pressions and, 64, 68 ff.
origin of, 71.
Immortality, 394-407.
capacity of the soul for, 395 ff.
conditional, 394 f.
denial of individual, in monism,
124f.
George Eliot's impersonal, 402.
individual, W. T. Harris on, 394.
presumptions in favor of, 404 ff.
testimony of Jesus to, 601 ff.
Impressions, Hume's distinction between
ideas and, 64, 68 ff.
Inspiration, a priori estimates of, Bishop
Butler on, 481 f .
claimed by some New Testament
writers, 487 f.
doctrine of, 480 ff.
fact of, 486 ff.
no theory of, generally accepted at
present, 483.
pertains to writers, not to writings,
481.
real advantages of, 485.
relation of, to doctrine of Scripture
inerrancy, 483.
valuable to the New Testament writ
ers, 487.
verbal, Harman on, 190.
Intelligence fatal to materialism, 41 f.
Intervention, Divine, affirmed by WaUace,
155.
necessitv of, denied in deism, 154.
possible, 168 f .
Jacobi, the forerunner of HamUton and
Mansel, 85.
Japp on the origin of life, 210.
Jesus (see Christ), Alleged disinclination
of, to work miracles, 232 f.
aUeged to have denied his own moral
goodness, 509.
and thaumaturgy, 231 ff.
claims right to forgive sin, 495.
full knowledge of the character of,
dependent upon the miracle sto
ries, 271.
his law of love, originality of, 312 ff.
humility of; 498.
marvelous insight of, 519.
relation of, to the Father, 496.
relation of, to the kingdom of God,
496.
relation of, to our communion with
God, 371 f.
resurrection of, 523-558.
testimony of, concerning the future
Ufe, 601 ff.
theory of the apparent death of,
523-530.
the standing proof of the reality of
miracle, 230, 244 f., 263.
unique power of, over the consciences
of men, 495.

Jesus, Ethics of, complete, 319 ff.
practicable, 317 ff .
sinlessness according to, 499.
Jesus, Miracles of, contrasted with apoc
ryphal and other miracles, 238 f.,
518.
good reasons for denying the, not
discoverable, 515.
introduce a new historical order, 251.
Jesus, Sinlessness of, alleged to be impos
sible, 509 ff.
discussed, 498-513.
Jewish law, Huxley on the excellence of
the, 473.
Jews, Adaptation of, as recipients of a
revelation, 474.
John, gospel according to, PecuUarity of.
491, 499 f.
Jalicher on the dates of the gospels, 274.
Kant on the limits of knowledge, 80.
philosophy of, as a basis for Huxley's
agnosticism, 80 ff.
three transcendental Ideas of, 82 ff .
whole phUosophy of, inculcates beUef
in God and the soul, 84.
Karma (see Kharma), Theosophic doc
trine of, 355 f .
Keim criticises the theory of the apparent
death of Jesus, 527 f .
Kelvin, Lord, on the age of the world,
410.
Kharma (see Karma), Buddhistic doctrine
of, 561.
Knowing, Our powers of, must be trusted,
43, 136.
Knowledge as related to authority, 4, 5.
defined, 1.
differentiated from belief, 3.
element of beUef in, 3.
not always distinguishable from be
lief, 3.
theological, method of acquiring,
criticised by scientists, 163 ff.
Lamettrie referred to, 36.
Lange on design in nature, 50.
Law, natural, Miracles and, 215 ff., 219 ff.
Law, The moral, not self-imposed, 290.
Law of love, OriginaUty of, with Jesus,
312 ff.
Laws, Alleged higher, miracles and, 216 f .
Life, a break in the continuity of develop
ment, 208 ff .
incomprehensibility of, 209.
Professor Japp on, 210.
Love, faith and, Relations between, in
Christianity, 306.
law of, original with Jesus, 312.
Madler on the existence of God, 21.
Magic, Hindu, Wonders of, 258.
Man as a conscious automaton, 35.
beast and, biblical distinction be
tween, 196.
doctrine of brute origin of, chal
lenged, 410 ff.
fall of, 413 ff.
God and, relation between, according
to Christianity, 145 f.
natural selection not adequate to the
explanation of, 202 f.
primitive condition of, 415 ff.

Index of Topics.

609

Man, progress of, Relation of Christianity
to, 278 ff., 585-588.
rank of, in creation, 399 ff .
satisfactory doctrine of, in Christian
ity, 575 f .
Martineau on the alleged imperfections
of the world, 46 ff.
Materialism, Damaging admissions of,
25, 39.
defined, 24.
denial of freedom in, 35.
destroys the validity and significance
of thought, 37, 38.
difficulty of, with intelUgence in the
world, 41.
difficulty of, with matter and motion,
39, 40.
evil practical effects of, 37.
futility of repentance in, 35.
how related to atheism, 18.
present standing of, 24.
rejected by monists, 25.
uselessness of thought in, 35.
Matter, Hypothesis of eternity of, 41.
influence of, upon matter, a mystery,
107.
influenced by mind, 105 ff., 222 f.
Mechanical theory of the world inade
quate, 202 f .
Mill, J. S., on the partiality of God, 473 ff.
Mind, Activity of, in perception, 69 f., 72.
brain and, relation between. (See
chapters on materialism, monism,
and immortality.)
motion in matter caused by, 105 ff.,
222 f.
Miracle and natural law, 215 ff., 228, 252,
370, 371.
and our knowledge of nature, 215 f.
and the doctrine of conservation of
energy, 221 f .
and unknown or higher laws, 216 f.
assaulted by science, 198.
asserted by Strauss incompatible with
historical science, 227.
belief in, as evidence of a wrong
method in theology, 168 ff.
Christian and skeptical requisites for
faith In, compared, 254 ff.
credulity of many in accepting, 2271,
243.
denial of, by modern historians, 226f .
frequent violations of truth concern
ing, 252.
human analogies to, 219 f.
Hume on, 226 ff.
Jesus Christ a sufficient witness for,
230.
necessity of, to religion, 198 ff.
New Testament idea of, 212 ff., 371.
possibility of, 169.
Professor Baden Powell on, 218, 230.
stories of the New Testament written
by unschooled men, 250.
stories, prevalence of, 249.
sufficient occasion for, 520.
why necessary, 370.
Miracles, Actuality of, denied by Renan,
227.
as unusual events, 240 ff.

Miracles, Biblical and non-biblical com
pared, 259 ff., 518.
caution of early disciples in accept
ing, 246 ff.
chief difficulty concerning, one of
evidence, 228 ff.
do those of the New Testament make
science impossible ? 212 ff .
Gospel, evidential value of, 514 -517.
involving control over inanimate
nature, 516 f.
of Jesus and marvels of theosophy,
359.
of Jesus, good reasons for denying
the, not discoverable, 515.
of Jesus contrasted with apocryphal
miracles, 238 f.
of Jesus, why not more frequently
alluded to in apostolic preaching
and teaching, 267.
of Jesus, special divine aid in, 516 ff.
sufficient evidence for, possible, 230.
wrought on or in attestation of Jesus,
523.
Mohammed, Christ and, as reUgious
founders, 540 f .
Mohammedanism, Christianity and, com
pared, 566-571.
divorce and, 568 f.
doctrine of God in, 566.
doctrine of prayer in, 566.
polygamy and, 567 f .
total abstinence from intoxicants
and, 569 ff.
Monism, 104 ff.
and brain and mind activity, 112 ff.
as a cosmological theory, 132 ff.
as superstition, 173.
atheism and, 129.
denies personality of God, 140 ff .
determinism of, 124, 296.
dualism of, 125, 147 f.
failure of, in aesthetics, 130.
fails to provide for consciousness of
personal unity, freedom, and im
mortality, 123 ff.
immortality and, 124.
in what sense pantheistic, 104.
metaphysics, not science, 140.
prevalence of, in modern Christian
thought, 104.
reasons of, for rejecting dualism, 105.
Monistic anthropology, 301.
Monistic denial of the distinction between
good and evil, 297 f.
Monistic ethics, 291 ff.
Monistic piety, Feelings connected with,
127 f.
Monistic psychology, Idealistic, 112 ff.
materialistic, 116 ff.
Monistic theology, 126 ff.
inconsistency and vagueness of, 146 f .
Monists misunderstand Christian idea
of God, 132 f.
on truthfulness, 298 f.
reject materialism, 25.
Moral law, The, not self-imposed, 290.
Moral standard, A perfect yet flexi
ble, found only in Christianity,
577.

610

Index of Topics.

Morality, Inadequate motives for, apart
from Christianity, 300 f .
Motives for morality, Inadequate, apart
from Christianity, 300 f.
needed for good morals, 311.
Mosaic cosmogony, Superiority of, 193.
Mythical theory, 265 ff. (See Strauss.)
Nature, Conditions of preservation of
order of, 108 ff.
design in, 42, 424 ff.
lack of uniformity in certain depart
ments of, 220 f .
the supernatural and, false distinc
tion between, 22.
why not sufficient as a revelation of
God, 465 ff.
Natural selection, Inadequacy of, to ac
count for natural phenomena,
428 ff.
limits of, as applied to man, 202.
Newman, F. W., on the origin of the idea
of God, 72.
New Testament, The. (See Gospel rec
ords), Criticism of, 265 ff.
infallibility of, not essential to faith
in the truth it contains, 483 f .
superiority of, to other religious lit
erature, 488 f .
Nirvana, Buddhistic doctrine of, 561 ff.
Novalis quoted, 101.
Old Testament, The, accomplished its
purpose, 478 f.
fallibility of, asserted in the New Tes
tament, 476 f .
high value of, 479.
incompleteness of revelation in, 476.
Pantheism (see Monism) defined, 17.
denies personality of God, 101.
Herbert Spencer's relation to, 99.
objections to, 102 f.
of Averroes, 99 f.
of Spinoza, 99 f .
prevalence of, in modern thought, 99.
Pardon. (See Forgiveness.)
Paul, St., on the resurrection of Jesus,
548-552.
PersonaUty of God considered, 433-452.
denied by monists and pantheists,
101, 140 ff.
denied by Spencer, 94 f.
why believed in, 95.
Pessimism ; how related to atheism, 18.
Philosophy, assault of, upon Christian
ity, Fourfold form of, 17.
Christianity and. (Division I.)
palmed off as science, 168, 188.
Physiology opposed to dualism, 115.
Piety, Feelings connected with monistic,
127.
Polygamy in Mohammedanism, 567 f.
Positivism, 329 ff.
Powell on miracles, 218.
Prayer, Doctrine of, in Mohammedan
ism, 566.
inconsistent, except on the theory of
miraculous Intervention, 200.
reflex influence of, 201.
said to weaken moral energies, 824.
Tyndall's proposed test of, 592.
Prophecy in the apostolic age, 486.

Providence, Alleged ill effects of, 324 f.
belief in, impossible, without belief
in miraculous intervention, 199.
Rationalistic denial of the death of Jesus,
524.
Realism and idealism contrasted, 224 f.
Reality, Methods of ascertaining, 1.
Reason, fallibility of the individual, 58.
place of, in Huxley's agnosticism,
54 ff.
true use of, 58 f.
Reconciliation of science and reUgion
attempted, 14, 15.
Religion, Essentials of the final, 573-588.
limits to the demands upon, 586.
science and, attempts at reconcilia
tion between, 14, 15.
Renan attempts to degrade our Lord's
miracles, 235 ff.
denies the actuality of miraculous in
tervention, 227.
falsifies the New Testament records,
232, 235, 236.
makes Jesus dishonest, 234.
requisites of, for belief in miracle,
254 ff.
vision hypothesis of, 535 ff.
Representational theory, The, 65, 74.
Resignation, Christian doctrine of, 152 f.
Resurrection of Jesus, 523-558.
Revelation, 453-604.
adaptation of the Jews to be the recip
ients of, 474 f .
as a method of ascertaining reality, 2.
biblical, the, 469 ff.
Christ the chief source of, 480-497.
fallibility of the Old Testament, af
firmed in the New Testament,
476.
God not the sole object of, 453.
human misunderstandings of, 471.
in Christ, the, final, 572-588.
limitations and effect of the Old Tes
tament, 473 ff.
man capable of receiving a, 457 ff .
man in need of a, 458 ff.
natural, 465 ff.
not given in propositions alone, 454.
Old Testament, incomplete, 476.
possibUity of, 453 ff.
primitive, 461 ff., 463 f.
progressive, 470.
purpose of, 457 f .
Rewards and punishments in ethics, 801,
314 f.
Ritschl, Albrecht, and his school, 10.
Romanes argues against mind as a
cause of motion in matter, 105 ff .
changes of religious opinions of,
105.
criticises Spencer on persistence of
force, 44.
fails to state the real difficulty of du
alism, 107.
on the argument from design, 426 ff.
on mind in man and beast, 385 ff.
on the relation between mind and
brain, 34.
Schurman on the survival of the fittest,
206 f.

Index of Topics.

611

Science, Faults of, confessed by scien
tists, 160 f .
Genesis and, are they reconcilable ?
189.
not all, physical, 163 f.
religion and, attempts at reconcilia
tion between, 14, 15.
results of modern, feared by many
clergymen, 158 f .
theology and, conflict between, un
necessary, 164 f .
Scientists criticise methods of acquiring
theological knowledge, 163 ff.
false assumptions of some, 172.
proceed unscientifically in some in
stances, 171.
speaking as philosophers, 168.
theologians and, assumptions of,
compared, 173 ff., 179 ff.
Scripture, Inerrancy of, not involved In
inspiration, 483.
Self -consciousness, 389 ff.
Sin, origin of, according to the Christian
view, 408.
origin of, according to the non-Chris
tian view, 408-418.
relation of, to temptation, 510 f.
Sinlessness of Jesus, 498-513.
alleged to be impossible, 509 ff.
Sins, Alleged, of Jesus, 502-508.
Skepticism, universal, Augustine's treat
ment of, 98.
Soul as a function of brain, 117.
Buddhistic doctrine of, 560.
capacity of, for immortality, 395 ff.
discoverable by thought, 21.
existence of the human, assumed in
the New Testament, 376.
immortality of the, 394-407.
life of, independent of brain condi
tions, 396 ff .
meagre account of, in the New Testa
ment, 376.
nature of, no more indefinable than
matter, 383.
not discoverable by the physical
senses, 20.
personality of the human, 384 ff.
reasons for believing in the exist
ence of, 377 ff.
so-called atom and cell, 30j 117.
Spencer, Admissions of, relative to the
mystery behind all things, 85.
agnosticism of, 85 ff.
and Huxley compared, 89, 90.
argument of, for something higher
than personality in God, 94 f.
error of, as to knowableness of God,
source of, 91.
limits to belief set by, 92.
on symbolic conceptions, 87.
on the divine personality, 94.
philosophy of the unknowable, 90 ff ,
on the existence of the absolute, 88.
on the Inscrutable Power, 85.
on the limitations of scientific knowl
edge, 182.
on persistence of force, criticised, 44.
on the relativity of thought and
knowledge, 87 f.

Spencer, on the validity of the religious
senti ment, 86.
recoil of, from the consequences of
his own argument, 97.
relation of, to pantheism, 99.
Spinoza on the finite and the infinite
mind, 100 f.
pantheism of, 99 f ., 102.
Spirit, Personality of the human, 385 ff.
Spiritual gifts, The, of the apostolic age,
486.
Steude on the science of Genesis, 191.
Stigmata, 371.
Strauss criticises the theory of the appar
ent death of Jesus, 525, 527.
denies the compatibility of miracle
and historical science, 227.
on the origin of sensibility, 29.
on the relation of philosophy to
science, 121.
vision hypothesis of, 531-534.
Strecker on scientific articles of faith, 176.
Supernatural, Modern exclusion of, from
history, 226 ff.
nature and the, false distinction be
tween, 22.
Survival of the fittest, Schurman on the,
206 f.
Synoptic gospels, John and the. Points of
agreement between, 491, 500 f.
Temptation, Relation of, to sin, 510 f.
Thaumaturgy, Christ and, 231 ff.
Theologians, scientists and, Assumptions
of, compared, 173 ff., 179 ff.
Theological knowledge, Method of acquir
ing, criticised by scientists, 163 ff.
Theology, Monistic, 126 ff.
science and, conflict between, unnec
essary, 164 f .
scientific character of modern, 166 f.
wrong methods employed in, 165 f.
Theosophy, 351-359.
Thought fatal to materialism, 41, 42.
freedom of, denied in monism, 124.
uselessness of, on materialistic hy
pothesis, 35.
Truth, The love of, as a check to the be
lief in the marvelous, 244.
Truthfulness, Monists on, 298 f.
Tyndall on the relation of mind and brain,
33.
prayer test of, 592.
Unbelief defined, 6.
distinguished from emotional rejec
tion of Christianity, 7-9.
intellectual character of, 7, 8.
often unintelligent, 8.
Uniformity, Lack of, in some departments
of nature, 220.
Unknowable, Spencer's philosophy of the,
90 ff.
Vision hypothesis, The, 531-554.
Vision of Jesus, Theory of a divinely
wrought, 544-547.
Wace, Charge of, against the use of the
term agnosticism, 53.
Wagner on the limitations of scientific
knowledge, 182 f.
Wallace on divine agency in creation,
186.

612

Index of Topics.

Wallace on limits of natural selection as
applied to man, 202.
Weiss on the dates of the gospels,
274.
Weizsacker on the empty grave, 550 ff.
Wesley on the best evidences for Chris
tianity, 594.
Will, The, in its relation to the acceptance
or rejection of Christianity, 10-12.

World, Age of, 410 ff.
aUeged imperfections of, and athe
ism, 45.
alleged imperfections of, questioned,
45 ff.
evils of, militate against the goodness
rather than the existence of God,
45.
Zahn on the dates of the gospels, 274.

Index of References.

613

INDEX OF REFERENCES.

Adler, Creed and Deed, 340.
Agnosticism and Christianity, 473.
Ameer Ali, Life and Teachings of Mo
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568.
Andresen, Die Entwickelung der Mens
chen, 149, 150, 168, 220, 384, 393-
395, 400, 414.
ArgyU, Duke of, Unity of Nature, 415,
458.
Arnold, Sir Edward, Death — and After
wards, 394.
The Light of Asia, 584.
Augustine, De vera religione, 98.
Bahrdt, Ausflihrung des Plans und
Z weeks Jesu, 524.
Balfour, The Foundations of Belief, 297,
302.
Barrows, The World's Parliament of Re
ligions, 566-570, 576.
Bates, Christian Science and its Prob
lems, 361.
Baur, A., Die Weltanschauung des Chris-
tenthnms, 20.
Bennett, Christian ArchEeology, 587.
Beweis des Glaubens, 191, 319, 320, 370,
513.
Beyschlag, Leben Jesu, 215, 266, 459, 473,
493, 494, 513, 516, 519, 556.
Biot, TraitC elementaire d'astronomie
physique, 192.
Blackie, Natural History of Atheism, 17.
Bowne, Christian Revelation, The, 159.
Introduction to Psychological Theory,
382.
Metaphysics, 38, 92, 169, 185, 223.
Philosophy of Theism, 14, 425, 431,
443.
Principles of Ethics, The, 302, 303.
Theory of Thought and Knowledge,
68, 71, 223.
Brace, Gesta Christi, 326.
Brewer, Dictionary of Miracles, 258, 261,
262.
Brockhaus, Konversations Lexikon, 177.
Bruce, Apologetics,13, 560.
Chief End of Revelation, 474.
Kingdom of God, The, 588.
Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, 555.
Buckle, Historv of Civilization in Eng
land, 173, 319.
Buckley, Faith Healing, Christian Science,
and Kindred Phenomena, 369.
BushneU, Nature and the Supernatural,
400.
Caird, The Social Philosophy and Religion
of Comte, 190, 336.
Calderwood, The Relations of Mind and
Brain, 397.
41

Carneri, Der moderne Mensch, 18, 20, 298,
301.
Carpenter, W. Boyd, The Permanent El
ements of Religion, 573-575.
Carus, Monism : Its Scope and Import,
133 137
The Soul of Man, 37, 112, 115, 116,
119, 124.
Chalmers, On the Power, Wisdom, and
Goodness of God, 18.
The Expulsive Power of a New Af
fection, 581.
Christ, Die sittliche Weltordnung, 432.
Christliche Welt, Die, 12, 323, 554.
Christlieb, Best Methods of Counteract
ing Modern Infidelity, 9.
Modern Doubt and Christian Belief,
453, 466, 471, 535.
Clark, Outlines of Christian Theology,
399, 407.
Clifford, Lectures and Essays, 10, 29, 33-
35, 324, 380.
Clodd, Pioneers of Evolution, 35.
Coit, Ethical Culture as a Religion for
the People, 316, 339.
Comte, Catechism of Positive Religion,
329-338.
Conn, The Living World, 210.
Crooks and Hurst, Theological Encyclo
pedia and Methodology, 14.
Dahl, Die Nothwendigkeit der Religion,
18, 168.
D'Alviella. Lectures on the Origin and
Growth of the Conception of
God, 72.
Darwin, Descent of Man, The, 186, 415.
Insectivorous Plants, 429.
Life and Letters of, 187.
Origin of Species, The, 48, 186, 194.
Defense of the Eclipse of Faith, 72.
Dod, Mohammed, Buddha, and Christ,
574.
Dorchester, Liquor Problem in All Ages,
371.
Problem of Religious Progress, 278.
Du Bois-Reymond, Vortrage, 27, 28, 31,
164, 180, 182, 209.
Dutoit-HaUer, Schopfung und Entwick
elung, 20, 21, 192.
Ebrard, Apologetics, 425, 444.
Eddy, No and Yes, 361-368.
Rudimentary Divine Science, 361-368.
Science and Health, 360.
Edersheim, The Life and Times of Jesus
the Messiah, 521.
Elfeld, Die Religion und der Darwinismus,
198, 199, 207, 212.
Eliot (George), Jubal and Other Poems,
402.

614

Index of References.

Elsenhans, Wesen und Entstehung des
Gewissens, 578.
Essays and Reviews, 218, 230.
Eucken, Der Kampf um einen Geistigen
Lebensinhalt, 397.
Farrar (A. S.), Critical History of Free
Thought, 100, 314, 370.
Fechner, Psychophysik, 114.
Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysic, 71.
Feuerbach, Wesen des Christenthums,
283.
Fischer, Ueber das Prinzip der Organiza
tion und die Pflanzenseele, 209.
Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and Christian
Belief, 382, 423, 430.
Nature and Method of Revelation,
471,514.
Fiske, The Destinv of Man viewed in the
Light of his Origin, 400, 405, 409,
416.
The Idea of God, 574.
Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories, 17, 18, 329,
333, 335-337.
Philosophy of History in Europe,
336.
Theism, 423.
Forel, Gehirn und Seele, 25, 37, 99, 116-
119, 126, 129, 132, 134, 135, 141,
146, 160. 297.
Forum, The, 340, 344.
Foster (Bishop), The Supernatural Book,
559.
Frank, System of Christian Certainty,
593, 594.
Fricke, Ist Gott personlich ? 433, 448.
Frohschammer, Das Christenthum und
die moderne Wissenschaft, 150,
152.
Gieseler, Text-book of Church History,
166.
Gizycki, Moralphilosophie, 287, 288, 286,
297, 301, 309-311, 316.
Glaube, Der christliche, und die Natur-
notwendigkeit aller Dinge (anon
ymous), 151.
Grant, Religions of the World in Relation
to Christianity, 570.
Graue, Die selbstandige Stellung der Sitt-
lichkeit zur Religion, 289.
Green, Thomas Hill, Works, 75.
Gunkel, Die Wirkung des heiligen Geistes,
486.
Haeckel, Entwickelungslehre,Dieheutige.
im Verh'altniss zur Gesammt-
wissenschaft, 198.
Evolution of Man, 378, 384, 398, 411.
Freedom in Science and Teaching, 6.
32, 34.
Generelle Morphologie, 206.
History of Creation, 192.
Monismus, Der, als Band zwischen
Religion und Wissenschaft, 5, 25,
31, 116, 117, 121, 123, 130, 134,
135, 142, 147, 163, 177, 179, 181,
182, 293.
Perigenesis, Die, der Plastidule, 80.
Hamilton, Philosophy of the Uncondi
tioned, 85, 435.
Hamilton (Gail), The Insuppressible
Book, 441.

Hanstein, Das Protoplasma als Trager
der pflanzlichen und thierischen
Lebensvorrichten, 209.
Hardwick, Christ and Other Masters, 560,
561.
Haring, Die Lebensfrage der systematis-
chen Theologie die Lebensfrage
des christlichen Glaubens, 598.
Harman, Introduction to the Study of the
Holy Scriptures, 190, 470.
Harnack, Das Christenthum und die
Geschichte, 266, 277, 371.
Die Chronologie der altchristlichen
Litteratur, 273, 274, 276, 277, 492.
Dogmengeschichte, 490, 492.
Harris (George), Moral Evolution, 315.
Harris (Samuel), God the Creator and
Lord of All, 189.
Harris (W. T.), Immortality of the Indi
vidual, 394.
Hartmann, von, Religion des Geistes, 573.
Hase, Geschichte Jesu, 550.
Heinsoldt, Article on the Wonders of
Hindu Magic, 258.
Helmholtz, Popular Lectures on Scien
tific Subjects, 48.
Recent Progress of the Theory of
Vision, 48.
Herbert, Realistic Assumptions of Mod
ern Science Examined, 434.
Hoffding, Grundlage der humanen Ethik,
"291, 293, 297, 302, 304, 306, 308.
Psychologie, 107, 112-114, 119, 122.
Holsten, Zum Evangelium des Paulus
und des Petrus, 545.
Hopkins, The Law of Love and Love as
a Law, 314.
Horton, Revelation and the Bible, 193.
Hume, Inquiry Concerning the Human
Understanding, 64-<57, 72.
Philosophical Works, 226, 228, 230,
240, 243, 245, 249, 250, 253.
Hurst, History of the Christian Church,
587.
History of Rationalism, 524.
Huxley, Essays upou Some Controverted
Questions, 53-55, 58, 60, 63, 6S,
177.
Hume, 63, 71.
Lay Sermons. Addresses, and Reviews, 37,
430. '
James, Human Immortality, 117, 120, 395.
Principles of Psychology, 3, 10.
The Will to Believe, 10.
Janet, Final Causes, 425.
Jevons, Introduction to the History of
Religion, 561.
Josephus, Works. 529.
Judge, Ocean of Theosophy, 351-353, 357-
359.
Jalicher, Einleitung in das Neue Testa
ment, 274, 277, 492.
Kaftan, Das Christenthum und die Phi
losophie, 168.
Das Wesen der christlichen Religion,
574.
Dogmatik, 418.
Kiihler, Der sogeuanntehistorisehe Jesus
und der geschichtliche, biblische
Christus, 270.

Index of References.

615

Kant, Critique of the Judgment, 84.
Critique of Practical Reason, 84.
Critique of Pure Reason, 80-82.
Keim, The History of Jesus of Nazara,
525, 527, 531, 542, 545, 548 553.
Kennedy. Natural Theology and Modern
Thought, 435.
Kidd, Social Evolution, 586.
Kimball, Answers to Questions in Chris
tian Science, 362.
Koran, The, 568, 569.
KostUn, Der Glaube und seine Bedeutung
filr Erkentnniss, Leben und
Kirche, 376, 520.
Luther's Rede in Worms, 555.
Kiilpe, Outlines of Psychology, 107.
Ladd, Doctrine of Sacred Scripture, The,
485.
Philosophy of Knowledge, 68, 71.
Philosophy of Mind, 29, 114, 125.
Laidlaw, Bible Doctrine of Man, 400.
Lange, History of Materialism, 36, 41, 50.
Leibnitz, Principes de la Nature et de la
Grace, 72.
Lewis, Tayler, The Six Days of Creation,
194, 196.
Lipsius, Lehrbuch der Evangelisch-Prot-
testantschen Dogmatik, 199.
Loofs, Das Apostolikum, 433.
Lotze, Microeosmus, 71.
Lubbock, The Origin of Civilization, 415.
Mansel, Limits of Religious Thought, 85,
437, 439, 441, 442, 447.
Martineau, A Study of Religion, 46, 100,
397 111 H5.
Types o'f Ethical Theory, 296.
Mathews, The Social Teachings of Jesus.
586.
McGiffert, History of Christianity in the
Apostolic Age, 486.
Mead, Supernatural Revelation, 454, 458,
462, 473, 476, 478, 485, 516.
Menegoz, La nation biblique du miracle,
212.
Menzi, Der Materialismus vor dem Rich-
terstuhl der Wissenschaft, 24,
398.
Menzies, History of Religion, 560-562.
Methodist Review, 158, 548, 554.
Miley, Atonement in Christ, 579.
Systematic Theology, 423, 579.
Mill, Three Essays, 398, 402, 474.
Mitchell, Piepenbring's Theology of the
Old Testament, 476.
Moberly, Reason and Religion, 4.
Modern Skepticism, 425.
Moller. Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte,
166.
Monier- Williams, Buddhism in its Con
nection with Brahmanism and
Hinduism, and in contrast with
Christianity, 563.
Morell, Historical and Critical View of
Speculative Philosophy, 71, 100.
Morgan, Introduction to Comparative
Psychology, 388.
Muir, Mahomet and Islam, 569.
Milller, Anthropological Religion, 415,
573 575
Nast, The Clospel Records, 272, 485.

Nature, 209, 210.
New Englander, 336.
Newboldt, The Gospel of Experience, 418.
Newman, University Sermons, 594.
Nippold, Handbuch der neuesten Kirch
engeschichte, 283.
Nordheim, Die Erfulluug des Christen-
thums auf Grundlage der Ent-
wickelungslehre, 143, 265, 398,
425, 430. i
Orr, The Christian View of the World, '
399, 410, 411, 415, 433.
Patten, Bennett's Christian Archaeology,
587.
Paulsen, Einleitung in die Philosophie,
43, 99, 140, 169 221, 382, 383.
Paulus, Exegetisches Handbuch, 524.
Pfleiderer, Religionsphilosophie, 461.
Philipp, Ueber Ursprung und Lebenser-
scheinungen der tierischen Or-
ganismen, 180.
Piepenbring, Theology of the Old Testa-
tament, 476.
Porter, Science and Sentiment, 9.
Psychologist, The, 393.
Reischle, Christenthum und Entwickel-
ungsgedanke, 412.
Renan, The Apostles, 535, 538.
The Life of Jesus, 231, 232, 236, 240,
243, 254, 256.
Review, British and Foreign Evangelical,
340.
Review, Presbyterian, 187.
Review, Quarterly, 55.
Reville, La Religion a Rome sous les
Severes, 475.
Rhys-Davids, Buddhism, 561.
Lectures on the Origin and Growth
of Religion, 561.
Richard, The Mystery of Life, 406.
Riehl, Introduction to the Theory of
Science and Metaphysics, 111.
Riehm, Christenthum und Naturwlssen
schaft, 193.
Ritschl, Otto, Ueber Werthurtheile, 10.
Romanes, Candid Examination of The
ism, 9, 425.
Life and Letters, 21.
Mental Evolution in Man, 385, 386,
388-391.
Mind and Motion and Monism, 26,
34, 105, 109, 113, 163.
Thoughts on Religion, 9, 21, 44, 165,
188, 426, 429, 559, 589.
Rosanes, Ueber die- neuesten Untersuch-
ungen in betreff unserer Anschau-
ungen vom Raume, 183.
Row, Christian Evidences Viewed in Re
lation to Modern Thought, 454,
464, 481, 483, 485, 538, 541, 543,
549, 552.
Manual of Christian Evidences, 215.
Revelation and Modern Theology
Contrasted, 479, 485.
Sabatier (A.), Outlines of Philosophy of
Religion, 574.
Theologische Erkenntnisstheorie,
574.
Sabatier (P.), Life of Francis of Assisi,,
371.

616

Index of References.

Salter, Ethical Religion, 315, 320, 339-344.
Sanday, Inspiration, 485.
Saporta, Die Pflanzenwelt vor dem Er-
scheinen des Menschen, 209.
Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsge-
schichte, 475, 561-563, 565.
Schaff, History of the Christian Church,
555
The Person of Christ, 497.
Schenkel, Characterbild Jesu, 545.
Christusbild der Apostel, 544.
Schleiermacher, Reden uber die Religion,
101, 574.
Schmid, Die Darwinschen Theorien, 242.
Schmidt, Christliche Dogmatik, 165.
Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung, 444.
Schultz, Grundriss der christlichen Apol-
ogetik, 199.
Schurman, Agnosticism and Religion,
71, 184, 206.
Belief in God, 53, 422.
Schwegier, History of Philosophy, 85.
Schweizer, Die Zukunft der Religion, 150.
Scripture, The New Psychology, 117.
Semper, Der HaeckeUsmus in der Zoolo-
gie, 6, 171.
Sheldon,HistoryofChristianDoetrine,166.
. Shepherd of Hermas, 492.
Shoup, Mechanism and Personality, 3.
Spencer, Data of Ethics, 800.
First Principles, 15, 41, 85-92, 132,
161, 165, 379, 420, 421, 423, 435.
Illustrations of Universal Progress,
138.
Principles of Sociology, 415.
Stapf er, Death and Resurrection of Jesus,
544.
Stearns, Evidence of Christian Experi
ence, 390, 408, 600.
Steude, Beitrage zur Apologetik, 14, 464.
Christenthum und Naturwlssen
schaft, 149, 152, 164, 185, 189, 191,
202.
Evangelische Apologetik, 327, 513.
Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum,
283.
Storrs, Divine Origin of Christianity, 326,
Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube.
29, 121, 127, 129, 130, 132, 272, 273,
275, 312, 319, 323, 372, 531.
Leben Jesu fur das deutsche Volk,
266 527 557
The Life of Jesus, 227, 231, 259, 266-
269; 525, 528, 531, 533.
Strecker, Welt und Menschheit, 24-26, 86,
37, 39, 40, 177. 178, 181, 198, 202,
265, 283, 296, 298, 317-319.
Stuckenberg, Introduction to Sociology,
400, 587. 588.
Studien und Kritiken, 490.
Subhadra Bhikshu, A Buddhist Cate
chism, 563.
Supernatural Religion, 230.
Tait, Recent Advances in Physical Soi-
ence, 410.
Temple, Relations Between Religion and
Science, 515.
Terry, Biblical Apocalyptics, 572.
Biblical Hermeneutics, 555.

Terry, The New Apologetic, 514.
Things Common to Christianity and The
osophy, 351 f .
Thoburn, India and Malaysia, 258.
Thorndike (see Psychologist, The), Ani
mal Intelligence, 393.
Tiele (and Others), Religious Systems of
the World, 561, 569.
Tischendorf, Greek Testament, 550.
Traub, Die sittliche Weltordnung, 290.
Trench, Christ the Desire of all Nations,
573.
Tyler, Bases of Religious Belief, Historic
and Ideal. 448.
Tylor, Primitive Culture, 379, 380, 415.
Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, 99.
Uhlhorn, Christian Charity in the Ancient
Church, 402.
Ullmann, The Sinlessness of Jesus, 513.
Vetter, Die moderne Weltanschauung
und der Mensch, 126, 297, 299, 312.
Wagner, Christenglaube im Bunde mit der
Naturwlssenschaft, 150, 159, 182.
WaUace. Natural Selection and Tropical
Nature, 154, 155, 186, 202, 207, 210.
Warfield, Charles Darwin's ReUgious
Life, 187.
Warren, Paradise Found, 414, 415.
Weiss, Lehrbuch der Einleitung in das
Neue Testament, 274.
Weisse, Die Evangelische Geschichte, 516.
Weizsacker, Das Apostolische Zeitalter,
549, 550.
Das Neue Testament, 506, 551.
Wellhausen, IsraeUtisehe und Jildische
Geschichte, 231, 312.
Wesley, Works, 594.
Weygoldt, Darwinismus, Religion, Sitt-
lichkelt, 283.
Whateley, On the Truth of Christianity,
Whewell, History of the Inductive Sci
ences, 191.
White, History of the Warfare of Science
with Theology in Christendom,
159, 160, 194.
Willkomm, Ueber die Grenzen des Pflan-
zen-und Thierreiches, 180, 195,
209.
Windelband, History of Philosophy, 98.
Wissenschaftliche Vortrage uber religi
ose Fragen. Zweite Sammlung,
41.
Wright, Man and the Glacial Period, 411.
The Logic of Christian Evidences,
15, 178.
Wundt, Aufgabe der Philosophie in der
Gegenwart, 168.
Lectures on Human and Animal Psy
chology 393.
System der Philosophie, 882.
Zahn, Einleitung in das Neue Testament,
274.
Ziehen, Introduction to Physiological
Psychology, 104^ 107.
Zockler, Geschichte der Beziehungen zwis-
chen Theologie und Naturwlssen
schaft, 159.
Zollmann, Bibel und Natur In der Har-
monie ihrer Offenbarung, 41.

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