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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

THE

THEORY AND USES

NATURAL RELIGION;

THE DUDLEIAN LECTURE,

'READ BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,

MAY 8th, 1839.

By JOHN GORHAM PALFREY, D. D., LL. D.,
PROFESSOR OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

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TEXNITHN.

SOMA SaAOMON, it'.

BOSTON :
PUBLISHED BY FERDINAND ANDREWS.
1839.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1839, by
Ferdinand Andrews,
in the Clerk's office of the District Court of tho District of Massachusetts.

CAMBRIDGE:
FOLSOM, WELLS, AND THURSTON,
printers to the university.

THEORY AND USES

NATURAL RELIGION,

The object of the present lecture, as de
fined in the words of its founder, is,
" The proving, explaining, and proper use and
improvement of the principles of natural religion,
as it is commonly called and understood by divines
and learned men."
Natural Religion is a phrase more compre
hensive than Natural Theology, which stands
only for the science of the being and attri
butes of God, as ascertained by the light of
nature. Natural Religion is the science of
the being and attributes of God, of the rela
tions which man sustains to him, and of the
duty of man, as these are discovered, or dis
coverable, by the human understanding, exert
ed without supernatural aid.

4 THEORY AND USES OF
I. Religion, in the first place, affirms, and
atheism, as its name imports, denies, the ex
istence of God ; by which word we mean, a
Being apart from, and controlling, the sensible
universe, — the producer and the sovereign of
all else which exists.
The a priori argument for the existence
of God, I shall pass over in this discussion. It
is now generally given up as indefensible ; and
the writers who maintain its validity, still
allow it to be of that subtile character, which
makes it unfit to work conviction on the minds
of the mass of men.
The a posteriori argument proceeds upon
the postulate, that every effect must haye a
cause. But how do we know that any thing
is an effect*? for we must not beg that ques
tion. We know it by remarking something
in its structure or phenomena, which satisfies
us that it is now a thing different from what
it once was. If not now what it always was,
it has undergone some change. Change is
not produced by any inherent principle of
change ; though, if it were, the argument

NATURAL RELIGION. 5
would be the same ; for then that principle
would itself be a cause, immediate or final.
Change is produced by some operative agency.
The condition into which that agency has
brought the thing in question, is the effect ;
and whatever it was that exerted that agency,
is the cause.
We may have different sorts and degrees of
proof, that a thing is an effect, a result, the
accomplishment of a process, the product of a
change. But by no kind of proof are we
more completely satisfied of this, than when
we discern curiously exact adaptation. And
this proves to us not only the exertion of some
agency, but the exertion of some intelligent
agency, more or less remote ; that is, it proves,
that, whether the process was longer or shorter,
there was intelligent agency at its beginning.
Nothing is more incredible to us, than that
separate things shall be found so exactly fitted
to each other, that, thus adjusted in numerous
minute particulars, they accomplish a purpose,
which the absence of any one particular of the
adjustment would defeat, and yet that no in-

6 THEORY AND USES OF
telligent agency has wrought so to fit them.
Complicated adaptation, wherever observed,
declares to our minds, that it has been brought
about on set purpose. To our unavoidable
conviction, the chances are infinite against
its having come to pass in any other way.
Complicated arrangement and adaptation
imply to our minds design and contrivance ;
and, where there have been design and contriv
ance, there of course has been a designer and
contriver. Show me a blank sheet of paper,
and tell me that it has always been what it
is now, and, if I know nothing of the art of
paper-making, I may hesitate, it is true, to
admit what you say, but I shall not know on
what ground I stand, if I offer a contradiction.
Show it to me, covered with a picture, in which
I recognise a perfect resemblance of the form
of my dwelling, or the features of my friend, —
show it to me, in other words, so prepared as
to represent those objects, and to call up their
idea in my mind while I contemplate it, —
or show it to me inscribed with letters, which
I not only see arranged in straight lines, equal

NATURAL RELIGION. 7
pages, and fair divisions, but in which I read
an elaborate history or poem, and tell me that
it is so without any care having been used to
make it so, — and I shall need no metaphysics
to reply, that you are attempting very bold
practice upon my credulity. Place in my
hand a ragged fragment of native iron, and
inform me that it is an independent, uncaused
existence, and I may not be prepared to gain
say the assertion. But look with me at a
steam-engine ; let us trace together the trans
mission of power from the piston, that falls
and rises with the condensed and expanding
fluid, along the perfectly constructed labyrinth
of shafts, and joints, and cogs, till, in the or
derly revolution of some wheels, it does a
marvellous labor-saving and gain-getting office
for man, and assure me that these pieces of
iron have always had this shape and combina
tion, and that they took to performing, or that,
at all events, they perform this part without
any cause making them so to do, — and you
stagger my belief in nothing except your seri
ousness, or your sanity.

8 THEORY AND USES OF
It is thus that men in all ages, philosophers
and no philosophers, have reasoned up from
the wonderful mechanism of the universe to
its unseen Author. It is thus that philoso
phers, in our day, have reasoned with pecu
liar ability and richness of resource, finding
their topics in the constitution and motions of
the heavenly bodies, the structure of the earth,
vegetable organization and life, the anatomy
and instincts of animals, the intellectual capaci
ties of man, and a variety of similar sources.
The actual accumulation of such facts for the
purposes of this argument is already vast.
Their possible accumulation is endless. And
they are undoubtedly of the same class with
others, which, when human agency is in ques
tion, forbid tis for a moment to doubt that such
agency has been employed.
But the production of them is the province,
not of a lecture, but of a series of treatises ;
and I believe I shall speak most to the pur
pose, on the present occasion, if, instead of at
tempting a partial exhibition of them, I give
attention rather to what I conceive to be the

NATURAL RELIGION.

only argument capable of influencing a reason
able mind to doubt for a moment the validity
of the conclusion which they are said to sus
tain. I premise, that the mere fact of our be
ing unable to conceive of a Creator who never
began to be, will not be mentioned by any in
telligent atheist as an objection to the doc
trine, inasmuch as any difficulty, which is here
presented, attaches of course equally to his
own scheme. Foreign as the mode of exist
ence of an eternal Being is from our experi
ence, it is still demonstrably certain, that some
being has been eternal. For nothing can act
before it exists ; and so, if there ever was a
past time when nothing existed, nothing could
in any time have come into existence, nothing
could exist now. On this point atheism and
theism agree. The question is, What is that
existence that never began ? Is it God, or is
it the sensible universe ?
The objection to which I have referred may
be stated as follows j You argue from the ex
cellence of what you call the creation, that
it must have had a creator. That creator,
2

10 THEORY AND USES OF
as your own hypothesis and the reason of
the case declare, must have been more excel
lent than his work. If, then, from the ca
pacities of the creation, you infer that it must
needs have had a creator, a fortiori you must
infer, from the superior capacities of the cre
ator, that he must have had one also ; and so
on, in an infinite series. How, then, does
your hypothesis relieve the difficulty ? Is it
not as well, or better, to regard the universe
as having existed from eternity, as to account
for its existence by referring it to the power
of a creator, whose own existence becomes
then equally a problem to be solved ?
I cannot think it a sufficient answer to this
argument to say, that the sensible universe
has not existed from eternity because we
know that some parts of it have been creat
ed in time ; we know, for instance, from
geological phenomena, and the recent begin
ning of all histories, that the origin of the hu
man race is to be dated only a few thousand
years back. I cannot esteem this a sufficient
answer ; because it might be replied, that the

NATURAL RELIGION. 11
universe, though itself eternal, may assume,
at different periods, different forms ; in other
words, may, periodically or not, yield differ
ent productions ; as my knowledge of the re
cent growth of fruit now borne by a certain
tree, would not assure me that the tree itself
had not always existed.
Nor am I satisfied with the reply, that to
say, that all things have existed from eternity,
instead of saying, that one thing has so ex
isted, — namely, God, — is to multiply the
difficulty indefinitely, and adopt infinitely the
harder faith. For from this the objector would
take refuge in saying, that his theory is that
of pantheism ; — which, though often called
one form of the atheistical doctrine, it would
not cost many words to show, differs in
nothing from other forms, except in calling it
self by a preposterous name, which is just as
applicable to those others as to itself. He
would say, that the sensible universe is not
many things, but one thing, comprehending in
itself all known attributes and powers.
Nor am I willing to take the ground of the

12 THEORY AND USES OF
recent treatise of Lord Brougham, who says,
that in this argument " we set out with as
suming the separate existence of our own mind,
independently of matter. Without that, we
never could conclude, that superior intelligence
existed or acted. The belief that mind ex
ists, is essential to the whole argument by
which we infer that the Deity exists." I am
unwilling, I say, to take this ground, because,
spiritualist as I am, and persuaded, perhaps as
much as any one, that the opposite doctrine is
a great and hurtful error, I would not admit,
without necessity, that the materialist must
needs be without proof of the divine existence.
I reply, in the first place, to the argument
which I have undertaken to consider, that one
part of its statement furnishes us with a refu
tation of it. It is by no means evident, that,
to our minds, a perfect existence requires a
creator to explain it, more than an imperfect
one. It is so far from being evident, that the
contrary is undeniably true. It is impossible,
that we should ascribe to any thing imperfect
the idea of independent existence, of self-

NATURAL RELIGION. 13
sufficiency ; the very idea, which, as soon as
we can ascribe it to any being, relieves us,
of course, from the necessity of finding any
cause for that being. It is the very imper
fection of sensible things, which satisfies us
beyond a question, that they are not self-
sufficient, and compels us to seek elsewhere
for that self-sufficiency, that independent, un
caused being, which, as has been seen, must
demonstrably exist somewhere. If the human
body were perfect, — perfect, I mean, as a
mere bodily organization, — it would not die.
Its decay and dissolution are consequent upon
its imperfection ; and, when we know that it
does die, there can be no question with us
as to its possessing independent existence. If
a watch, or a machine for perpetual motion,
were a perfect machine, it would dispense with
a renewal of the impelling force, and yet never
run down. But, without a renewal of that
force, they do run down. Were it otherwise,
we might say, that, as they are dependent on
nothing external now, so they never were de
pendent on any thing external ; in other words,

14 THEORY AND USES OF
that they have an uncaused existence. As it
is, we can pretend no such thing, since it is
plain, that they are dependent on some exter
nal force to keep them in action, or that by
some external force they are liable to have
their action stopped. We trace this fact every
where, to the very limits of our knowledge ;
it keeps up with us in every direction to
the vanishing points, where the objects of our
research escape us. It is not more true of
the short swing of a pendulum, than of the
longer one of a planet, that it receives im
pulse and law from what is external to it.
It is equally true of the vehicle, and of the
limbs, which convey me to any place, that they
are brought thither by a power not originating
in themselve's.
I do not say, then, only that all the parts
of nature decay. That is not a decisive con
sideration ; for what is decay, and what is
reproduction, it might often be difficult to de
termine. But, as far as we can follow them,
we know, that all the parts of sensible nature
are dependent. Each is dependent upon some

NATURAL RELIGION. 15
other. Many of them are undoubtedly de
pendent upon human volition. They have
not, therefore, self-sufficiency. They have not
that attribute which is essential to a First
Cause. Accordingly, they do not solve our
problem, nor give any aid towards solving it,
except as they direct us away from themselves.
Self-sufficiency, self-dependence, — independ
ence, rather, — undoubtedly exist somewhere ;
else, as we have seen, nothing could ever
have been. We find no trace whatever of it
in the sensible universe. On the contrary, as
far as we are acquainted with this, we know
dependence to be one of its attributes ; when
we enlarge our acquaintance with its constitu
tion and course, we find, that the same law still
holds good ; nor does any thing which appears
respecting what we are unacquainted with,
lead us to suppose, that the jurisdiction of
that law is short of universal, — so far from
it, that all presumptions are in favor of its
being so. ; That which we must find some
where, and can find nowhere in the sensible
universe, we cannot be mistaken in referring

16 THEORY AND USES OF
to a power external to the sensible universe,
to which power we give the name, God. And
when we have advanced thus far, we have
plainly gone to the end of the inquiry. We
have found a First Cause, as soon as we
have found that which has no dependence on
other things, and needed nothing anterior to
produce it.
I would show the fallacy of the argument
in another form. If, it is said, the excellence
of what is called the creation can be urged
to show, that it must have had a creator, then
it follows from the superior excellence of the
creator, that he must have had one also, and
so on, in a series ; so that nothing is gained
by the hypothesis. I reply, that the argu
ment, which* is urged for a designing Author
of the creation, is not drawn from the excel
lence of the creation simply, but from a pecu
liar excellence which it exhibits, significant,
as we say, of external, antecedent design ;
namely, the excellence of adaptation, of the
adjustment to one another of things mutually
independent, so as to produce a definite result ;

NATURAL RELIGION. 17
— the adjustment, for instance, of the eye to
light, or of the position and material of the
teeth, or the solvent virtue of the gastric juice,
to the substance of things provided to sustain
life, through the processes of mastication and
digestion. This adaptation, we say, of different
things to one another, in order to the produc
tion of an ulterior result, proves design, inten
tion, contrivance. It proves the action of a
cause, and that an intelligent cause. It testifies
to an intelligence, which knew what needed to
be done, and how it was to be done. Now it is
impossible to retort this argument upon the the-
ist, with a view to show, that, on his own prin
ciples, his Creator must have been created, and
therefore his theory explains nothing. On the
very terms of the statement, that fact, which
makes the basis of the argument in the other
case, has no existence in respect to the Creator.
The Creator has powers ; he has infinitely
varied capacities ; but what is the Creator
adapted to ? What sense would there be in
speaking of the adaptations of the Creator to
his works ? For the very reason that they are
3

18 THEORY AND USES OF
his works, there can be no adaptation between
him and them. Adaptations subsist between
things, which, being mutually independent, are
brought together in order to conspire to some
common end. It is essential to the theory of
theism, that there is nothing independent of
God ; from which it follows, that there is
nothing, which, when brought into comparison
with him, can suggest the idea of adaptation,
in any such sense as that in which I have
now been using the word. The sensible uni
verse displays many and wonderful adaptations.
We say, that the things manifesting them must
have had a designing author. Nothing of the
kind can be predicated of the Creator, as any
one conceives him. The First Cause, the in-
dependent existence, the source of all other
existence, can be adapted to nothing. In re
spect to him, such reasoning has no place, be
cause its element is wanting.
Such, I think, is an outline of considera
tions, which satisfy a reasonable man, that
the sensible universe had an intelligent Crea-

NATURAL RELIGION. 19
tor, and that the existence of that Creator is
independent and uncaused.
II. I proceed to the second great division of
the subject. Having become satisfied of the
existence of a Creator, we wish to acquaint
ourselves, as far as may be, with his attri
butes, his properties, the modes of his being.
And, among these, we wish especially to be
come acquainted with his powers and disposi
tions ; inasmuch as it is on his capacities for
action, and the principles and spirit of his ac
tion, that our interests, the interests of his
creatures and subjects, depend.
Under this head, I must needs confine my
self within very narrow limits, compared with
the vast range to which it extends itself. I
propose merely to hint at the method of proof
of some of the divine attributes, and to say a
few words upon the two most prominent dif
ficulties relating to the subject.
Our knowledge of God's attributes is made
up, in part, like our knowledge of his existence,
of inferences from observations on the structure

20 THEORY AND USES OF
and movements of the sensible universe, and,
in part, of conclusions from the essential notion
of him as being underived and independent.
To affirm the personality of the Deity is to
take no step beyond affirming that there is
a Deity. If there is meaning in words, an
intelligent agent is a person. No one will
speak of a God, yet deny to him personality,
unless, for the greater confusion's sake, he
designs to adopt for himself a different lan
guage from that which is current, j. Deny that
there is an intelligent First Cause of all things,
and you throw us back upon the proof of a
God. Affirm it, and yet say, that that intelli
gent cause is not a person, and to others, who
use words in their common acceptation, you
only utter two contradictory propositions in the
same breath ; while, for yourself, you do but
trifle, in rejecting the use of a significant term,
which expresses in one form what you have
just been expressing in another. Still, in so
trifling, you are likely to do your own mind
great harm, confusing a notion which it is
your own fault if you do not keep plain, as

NATURAL RELIGION. 21
it is plain, and laying a basis for ulterior er
roneous conclusions.
God is one. It is customary to infer his
unity from the unity of design manifest in the
universe, a unity which we are able to trace
to the remotest parts of the universe, of which
we have any cognizance. The law of gravita
tion, for instance, is the same for the most
distant body in motion or rest, as for the
body the nearest to our eye. The laws of
light are the same for the fixed stars, as for
our earth. But I think it is sufficient to say,
that where one First Cause is adequate to ex
plain all phenomena, it is unphilosophical, and
contrary to the rules of reasoning, to suppose
another, or others. He who maintains, that
there is more than one source of created
being, takes upon himself the burden of proof,
and of proof which he will find himself un
able to provide, consisting, as it would need
to do, in showing that one First Cause is not
competent to the production of all existing
effects. This is, I say, to my view, sufficient
and satisfactory; though it would be easy fur-

22 THEORY AND USES OF
ther to show, that the doctrine of two su
preme intelligences would involve the most
fatal incongruities of statement. I do not in
sist on the possibility of their coming into
practical conflict in the government of the
world, in which case there would be only
this alternative, that the supremacy of one
must yield, or else the supremacy of both,
either of which would afford a refutation of
the argument, in the way of a reductio ad
absurdum. But some of the divine attributes
are such, as to be essentially incapable of sub
sisting together in more than one being. This
might be largely illustrated. Let the attri
butes of omniscience and omnipotence furnish
a single, example. If there were two deities,
and one could prevent the other from knowing
something which he thought or did, then that
other would not be omniscient. If he could
not so prevent the other, then he himself
would not be almighty.
God is eternal. As he never began, so he
will never cease to be. This knowledge we
obtain by reasoning upon his uncaused ex-

NATURAL RELIGION. 23
istence, and not, like the knowledge of that
existence, by observation of his works. { To
say that his being originated in no external
agency or influence, is to say that it is above,
and independent of, any such agency or influ
ence, and accordingly does not lean on any
such for its prolongation, nor is liable to be
brought by it to decay. This being so, there
is no conceivable agency by which the being
of God could be terminated, except his own ;
and, not to enter into any metaphysical argu
ment to the point, that that which is self-
existent cannot but continue to exist, the idea
of a suicidal God is such as no one has felt
called upon to argue against.
God is omniscient; by which is meant, that
he perfectly knows all knowable things. This
doctrine, again, is a necessary inference from
that of a universal Creator. He who made
all creatures and things, — that is to say, who
gave them their being and properties, — can
not but know the being and properties which
himself has given, and the ways in which they
will be developed and will operate. Connected,

24 THEORY AND USES OF
however, with the doctrine of the divine om
niscience, is one of the difficulties to which
I shall presently ask attention.
God is all-wise; wisdom being a different
thing from knowledge, in having reference,
which the other has not, to action. It may
be certainly concluded, that he who, being
omniscient, is perfectly acquainted with the
properties, relations, tendencies, and uses of
things, will be able to judge unerringly how
they may and should be disposed.
God is almighty; that is, he can do all
things which are essentially possible to be
done. This is another easy and safe inference
from the original idea of Deity as a creative
power. He, who made all things, can un
doubtedly alter, or unmake them, and, in short,
do with them what he will.f Nor is any lim-
itation imposed to the Divine power by the
suggestion, that it does not apply to impossi
ble things. To speak of a thing being made
to be and not to be, in the same time and
place, is to utter a contradiction in terms ; and
to a statement involving a contradiction in

NATURAL RELIGION. 25
terms every metaphysical impossibility (such
as, for instance, the drawing of a triangle
whose angles shall amount to more or less
than two right angles) is capable of being re
duced. Now that which is expressed in a
self-contradictory proposition, is nothing. Ac
cordingly, to do what such a proposition ex
presses, is to do nothing ; and to do nothing
is the appropriate act, not of infinite power,
but of no power.
In speaking of the omnipresence of God,
I suppose that, in a safe way of representing
the subject, we can only be understood to
affirm the omnipresence of his perceptions
and power. The human sensorium occupies
only a limited space. However difficult, or
rather impossible, it may be to explain the
nature and method of that occupation, there
is no difficulty in imagining the space occupied
to be greater, much greater, indefinitely great
er ; and to say that God, in every moment,
perceives, and has power, throughout his uni
verse, appears to be as safe as to say, that
he would not make more than he could watch
4

26 THEORY AND USES OF
and regulate. But I think a just distrust of
our powers forbids us to go further, and extend
our affirmation, on any grounds which natural
religion furnishes, to a constant, actual, personal
presence. In so doing, we should be entering
a field of speculation, which in a similar case,
where the facts are before us, our consciousness
tells us, that we have not the needful capacities
to explore.
The difficulty consists in defining the idea
of presence. Our notion of a spirit occupying
space, — whether a portion of space, or the
whole, — is unavoidably to the last degree
vague. My limbs are not myself, but I am
certainly present with them ; how present,
as certainly, no one can explain. I act upon
another person by my touch, and no one hesi
tates to say that I am present with him. I act
upon another with my voice, exerted at its
highest pitch, and with him too I may be said
to be present, but it is certainly in a qualified
sense. On yet another I act by my written
words, and then the idea of personal pres
ence is out of the question. Agency, in the

NATURAL RELIGION. 27
strictest sense of the word, as referred alone
to the person acting, no doubt implies the
presence of that person (whatever presence
is), (at the time and place when and where
he acts. But the subject acted upon is not
necessarily, in the same sense, in the agent's
presence ; and whether or not the constant ex
ertion of the power of God upon his universe
requires his constant actual presence in every
part of it, is what, I suppose, we are too
ignorant of some important elements of the
question to affirm. Nor do I perceive, that,
apart from this, there is any other medium of
proof on which we can rely, to show the per
sonal omnipresence of the Deity, as distin
guished from his constant universal perception
and operation.
\ I pass over the doctrine of the divine spiri
tuality, both because of the extent of remark
which a satisfactory treatment of it would re
quire, and because I conceive it to belong
to the department of metaphysics rather than
of natural religion. That is to say, I suppose
that a person, who should imagine the intelli-

28 THEORY AND USES OF
gent principle to be incapable of existing with
out a material organism, might entertain the
same persuasions respecting God, as the ob
ject of the religious sentiment, with another
who held to what I esteem the true theory
upon the subject.
The benevolence of the Deity has been com
monly argued, and that with great force, and
in the use of topics suited powerfully to inter
est and excite the mind, from the great pre
ponderance of happiness over misery in that
part of his creation which we can examine ;
from the existence of the numerous express
contrivances to that end ; and from the absence
of all contrivances to produce the contrary re
sult. The argument is good, because we can
only reason 'from what we know, and must be
content with such results as that will yield us.
But, inasmuch as it is subject to the reply,
'that just as, in that part of the universe sub
ject to our inspection, there is evil over which
the good predominates, so it is possible, that
the good which is within the narrow range
of our observation, may be overborne by a

NATURAL RELIGION. 29
balance of evil in that much larger part of the
creation which we are unable to bring into the
comparison, — inasmuch, I say, as the cogency
of the argument is subject, or may appear to
be subject, to some abatement on this ground,
there is satisfaction in seeing it corroborated
by more abstract and comprehensive consider
ations. A decisive one I take the following to be ;
that Jt is inconceivable, that a being capable
of moral perceptions, capable of knowing the
right and understanding its character, should do
the wrong, except with a view to some safety
or some gain ; the converse of which is, that
a being perfectly wise, so as to be incapable
of being deceived as to the character of con
duct, and almighty, so as to have nothing to
hope or fear from others in yielding his own
preferences, will infallibly, on all occasions,
choose the right in conduct. He will do this
for the reason, that moral rectitude, holiness,
goodness, is the supreme good, the absolutely
eligible thing. Through his wisdom he sees it
to be so, and sees, in every individual instance,

30 THEORY AND USES OF
wherein the quality resides ; and through his
almightiness he is free from any influence re
straining his choice. The consideration applies
to the universal moral perfection of the Divine
Being. This established, particular qualities, as
benevolence, justice, veracity, necessarily fol
low, or rather are involved.
| I proposed, under this head, to say a few
words upon two principal difficulties attaching
to the theory of the divine attributes. The
first relates to the reconcilement of the om
niscience of God with the freedom of will in
inferior intelligent agents. \ How, it is asked,
can God certainly foreknow how a man will
act at some future time, unless it is absolutely
unavoidable that the man should so act, — in
other words, unless he will act under a ne
cessity ? Or, to arrive at the alleged incon
gruity in a little different method, as the fore
knowledge of God cannot possibly be frustrat
ed, how can a man, when he fulfils it, be said
to be at liberty ?
An answer to this inquiry, taking the rep
resentation of the case to be correct, may be

NATURAL RELIGION. 31
stated as follows. The action of one being
does not depend upon, nor is governed by, the
persuasions of another being, respecting that
action. On the contrary, in the order of logic,
the persuasion is consequent upon the event
which it contemplates, and that, equally whether
the one or the other precedes in the order of
time ; that is, whether the persuasion, — the
belief or knowledge, — respects a past event
or a future. The action of another person,
past or future, has not been, or will not be,
of a certain kind, because I believe or know
that it has been or will be of that kind. On
the contrary, I believe, or I know, that it has
been, or will be, such and no other, because
this is the probable truth, or the truth, —
probability or truth independent of my knowl
edge, and which would be equally what it is
(whether probability or truth), if I knew, be
lieved, or thought nothing of the matter. With
my limited knowledge of facts and feeble
power of reasoning, I can often make up a
confident judgment how another would act un
der certain expected or possible circumstances.

32 THEORY AND USES OF
The time comes, the circumstances occur, and
he acts as I predicted that he would ; and this,
without experiencing the slightest coercion or
influence from me. I say, without the slight
est ; with none whatever ; for this is material
to the argument.
Now suppose the knowledge and sagacity,
which enabled me confidently to anticipate
what time presents as the actual result, to be
greatly increased ; the resources, and with
them the strength, of my conviction respect
ing the future event will of course be great
ly increased also, and this still without the
exertion of any influence upon the decisions
of the individual, whose course I am fore
telling. But this knowledge and wisdom are
capable of oeing increased in an indefinite de
gree, and with each increase their conclusions
make a nearer approach to certainty, without
making any approach whatever to compulsion ;
and in an infinite being they exist in an infin
ite degree, so that it would seem, that in him
the certainty might be absolutely attained, and
still without compulsion being at all involved.

NATURAL RELIGION. 33
In few words ; if the limited sagacity of a wise
man may predict with confidence, from his
knowledge of another's character, what that
other's behaviour will be in a given case, and
this without putting the smallest constraint up
on his action, what hinders that the perfection
of the same quality in God should enable him
to predict the same thing with absolute cer
tainty, without any force exercised on a man's
free choice ?
But, again, the assertion out of which the
supposed difficulty arises is, that the divine
mind knows, with strict and absolute certainty,
the decisions which in future time inferior in
telligences, in the use of their free will, may
make. And it is possible, that, in thus assert
ing, we proceed to an indefensible corollary
from the doctrine of God's omniscience. His
omniscience no more implies that he can know
things not possible to be known, than his al-
mightiness implies that he can do things not
possible to be done. Both capacities, when put
into language, fall alike under the category of
contradictions in terms ; — that is, they are no
5

34 THEORY AND USES OF
capacities. There is, then, a preliminary ques
tion occurring here. That which is, strictly
speaking, contingent, is it, strictly speaking,
knowable ? That which is not a certain event,
— that is, in the present case, the future decis
ion of a free mind, — is it a subject of certain
knowledge ? Because, if not, then to say that
God does not certainly know it, is no more to
take away from the infinite vastness of his
capacities, than to say that he does not see a
sound, or imagine an axiom. The faculty ex
ists in perfection, but the case in question does
not present its object. Nor could it be replied
to such a view, that to suppose it correct would
be to suppose more left to the unascertained
discretion of inferior agents, than would be for
the safety of God's universe. For, in the first
place, we are only making a dialectical dis
tinction. Actually, the foreknowledge of God,
immense as are its resources, would prove to be
justified by the event on the one theory as well
as on the other. And, in the second place, if
we will insist on the metaphysical possibility of
some unanticipated event, there would still be

NATURAL RELIGION. 35
the infinite resources of the divine power and
wisdom, to meet the exigency whenever it so
befell. The other chief difficulty, belonging to the
theory of the divine attributes, relates to the
reconcilement of the divine benevolence, the
proper office of which is to produce good, with
the unquestionable existence of what we call
evil ; of physical evil, which is pain, and of
moral evil, which is wickedness.
Nothing is done towards the solution of this
problem by the representation so commonly
urged, that good greatly preponderates over
evil ; for the question still remains, Why any
evil whatever ? ; If it belonged to the divine
goodness to take care that good should prevail,
why not that it should prevail unopposed, un
qualified, undisturbed ? Nothing, I say, is thus
done towards a solution of the problem. That
is, nothing directly. Indirectly something is
done. The preponderance of good over evil
indicates to us the prevailing design of the one
Disposer, and so creates a presumption, that, if
we had the whole case before our minds, which

36 THEORY AND USES OF
from our ignorance we have not, we should see
that design to be not only prevailing but uni
form. Nor may it be averred, that the difficulty is
disposed of by simply saying, that moral evil is
the abuse, and physical evil often results from
the abuse, of. the free agency of created intelli
gences. For the question would recur, Why,
— since their free action is not omnipotence,
but on the contrary, very many other things
are excluded from its range, — why was evil
of both kinds not among the things thus ex
cluded ?
There are two chief considerations which go
to the explanation of this difficulty. In the
first place, many things called evils are sim
ply imperfections./ Let me choose a different
phraseology, which will perhaps bring out their
character more fully. They are evils, in respect
to a comparison of them with other things
which are better. They take their character
of evil simply from the point of view in which
we choose to look at them. It is evil to me
that I cannot do, or possess, or enjoy, all that

NATURAL RELIGION. 37
some other being can. I complain, for instance,
of my physical weakness as an evil. What do
I then mean ? I mean, that I am not as strong
as Atlas, or as many others, or as most others,
or as I was myself at some other time. I do
not mean that I have not some strength ; I
have ; and strength is the opposite of weak
ness, and a good. My complaint then is, that
I have no more of a good, of which I have
some. And this I have no right to complain
of, torturing my sense of deficiency into a sense
of evil, unless I am prepared to complain, that
all excellences and felicities do not meet in
me, that is, that I am not a perfect being.
Every created being is imperfect ; if mere im
perfection in any form be an evil and a ground
of complaint, then it is reasonable to complain
that God gave us life ; but, on the contrary,
every one allows that existence is a good. All
things called evils, — more or fewer, lighter or
more grievous, — which can be shown to be so
only in this way, must be put out of the pres
ent account ; for it is no impeachment of the
divine benevolence, that finite being is not infi
nite, that man is not God.

38 THEORY AND USES OF
Further, different degrees and kinds of im
perfection are incident to the variety in God's
creation. And that variety is a great good.
It better illustrates the divine greatness than a
more uniform and limited display of creative
energy would have done. It quickens inquiry,
and feeds thought, in man and other finite
intelligences. It is the foundation of endless
mutual dependencies and relations, and so of as
many diversities of sentiment and action on the
part of sentient beings.
The other chief consideration is, that what
we call evils are probably in all cases the ne
cessary accompaniments or means of greater
good. But here a twofold task is presented to
the inquirer. He must ascertain, in the first
place, that etils in fact are, in some cases, inci
dents or means of good, and this to that extent,
that a probability arises that they are so in
other cases, less subject to our examination ;
and, in the second place, he must satisfy him
self how it could be, or rather that it reasona
bly might be, that an almighty being could not
produce all the good, without any evil for its
accompaniment or instrument.

NATURAL RELIGION. 39
As to the first point, the proposition is clear
ly true, in that case in which we are best able
to trace it ; that is, in our own experience.
As things are constituted, evil is in fact, on a
large scale, the occasion of good. Physical evil
leads to physical good. My painful toil makes
provision for my appetite ; or it feeds others ;
or their toil feeds me. Physical evil is the basis
of moral good. It is good for me to know the
sentiment of gratitude ; that I may, I am placed
in some respects in a condition of want and de
pendence. That I should feel the emotion of
pity, and know the pleasure of usefulness, is a
great good to me ; to excite the feeling and
afford opportunity for the service, I see near
me needy and suffering persons. < Even moral
evil provides a basis for moral good. There
are no higher social virtues than compassion for
the guilty, and forgiveness of the injurious.
Where would be such compassion and forgive
ness, if there were no obliquity, and no of
fence ?
But it is quite needless to multiply such
illustrations. Certain it is, that our moral edu-

40 THEORY AND USES OF
cation, — which, apart from the connexion that
Christianity represents it to have with the con
dition of a future life, must be regarded by.
every reflecting man as the most worthy end of
living, — certain it is, that, as things actually
are, that education is in great part conducted
through the instrumentality of evil. This be
ing so, the eminent excellence of the end con
verts the painful means into a good. I cannot
ask to be spared the conflict with suffering. I
want that conflict. I want the satisfaction of
knowing the strength of my nature. How am
I to know it, till I have put it forth and used
it ; and how am I to use it, with nothing to
use it upon ? I want to strengthen that strength,
and train it to its highest point of efficiency.
As things ar*e, how am I to do this, except by
exercising it in efforts and struggles ? But the
occasion of effort and struggle is inconvenience,
difficulty, opposition, the existence of some
thing unsatisfactory and adverse.
The real perplexity in this part of the sub
ject relates to the sufferings, not of rational,
but of brute nature. I do not think it material

NATURAL RELIGION. 41
to urge, that these are greatly exaggerated in
our imagination, through our adoption of a
standard of judgment which belongs to our
own nature, and not to that of lower animals ;
though such is undoubtedly the fact. The
statement, that
" the poor beetle which we tread upon,
In corporal sufferance, feels a pang as great
As when a giant dies,"
is good poetry, but very bad physiology. The
truth is, that Providence, by a beautiful ar
rangement, seems not to have allowed sensi
bility, in any case, to be keen to a degree
beyond its uses. The arrangement of the ner
vous system in insects (that peculiarly exposed
class), so different from that in the human
frame, in respect to the absence of the brain
and spinal cord, is such as to forbid all com
parison of the sensibility of the two. A crane-
fly will lose half its legs, and fly about with
apparent unconcern. The tail of a wasp or bee
will sting, and the head of a dragon-fly will eat
voraciously, after it is severed from the body.
The tortoise walks, in the same condition ; and
6

42 THEORY AND USES OF
Mr. Kirby saw a cock-chafer move about with
no appearance of uneasiness, after some bird
had nearly emptied its body of the viscera.
Also, to lower animals are unknown the pains
of memory and apprehension, which grievously
exasperate to us, what, condensed into a point
of time, would be light to bear. But, however
the supposed amount of their sufferings may be
reduced in a just estimate, still what remains,
remains to be accounted for as a thing consist-
ent with the goodness of him who appointed it.
It is partly accounted for by considerations
of the same class with those which relate to
the same problem in the case of man. They,
like ourselves, are warned of danger by pain.
For them, as for us, toil brings acquisition, and
fatigue sweetens rest. So the fact, that by
turns they prey and are preyed upon, amounts
to this, — that now they suffer for others' good,
and now others suffer for theirs. To which it
has been well added, first, that, immortality be
ing out of the question, a violent death is bet
ter than natural decay (which is the only alter
native), for animals without forethought to

NATURAL RELIGION. 43
make provision against a period of infirmity,
and without social relations, assuring to them
the attentions of others ; and, secondly, that the
principle of supeifecundity, a provision attend
ed with great advantages, requires the antago
nist principle of destruction to keep it in proper
check. A portion, I have said, of the evil attendant
upon their lot can be accounted for, on the basis
of its being the step towards an ulterior and
greater good. A portion remains, correspond
ing to what in man is explained by the consid
eration of its being the instrument of his pro
bation and moral progress. Not being author
ized to apply this consideration to the case of
brutes, we are fain to say, that when, in that
sphere where we are most competent to the
examination, we are able to trace goodness so
far as we do, (and that often with its most
striking signatures, where the first aspect has
been the most inauspicious,) it is right that we
should infer it further than we are able to trace
it. And certainly, when we remember, that
the explanation, above all others satisfactory,

44 THEORY AND USES OF
which we are able to give of human sufferings,
is founded on our knowledge of the object of
human life, it cannot surprise us, that we are
not able to point out all the purpose of brute
sufferings, till we know, far better than we
now know, the use which brute existence was
intended to serve in the system of things. I
do not pretend to be hinting at any thing prob
able, but certainly it is not any thing mani
festly incredible, when I suggest, that the in
fant human soul, when it starts upon its human
probation, may be not a new creation, but a
result ; that the powers and tendencies, brought
then to the work and discipline of a man, may
be the fruit of previous training in other forms.
It may possibly be, that I became acquainted
with the elementary action of consciousness
when I was a zoophyte, the thing placed at
the shortest remove above vegetable life ; that
I had some of my earliest practice in sensation,
when I was an oyster, or some animal more
inefficient ; that I learned motion when I was
a snail ; that I was taught to love order and
subordination in a bee-hive, and so passed on

NATURAL RELIGION. 45
through various processes of preparation for my
higher human experience. It is perhaps no
more incredible that from lower animals we
have become men, than, — what is the subject
of very general belief, — that from men we
may become angels. I repeat, that I do not
urge the likelihood of any thing of this kind ;
but only that, baffled as we are by the whole
mystery of the life of inferior animals, we are
not justified in denying, that they may be un
der some training for some end, and that ac
cordingly their sufferings are capable of being
vindicated on principles having some analogy to
those employed in the case of man. At all
events, it is safe to say, that, in our profound
ignorance respecting the object, we are little
prepared to affirm any unfitness in the means.
These remarks have borne upon the fact of
the connexion of evil with greater good as its
concomitant or cause; a connexion, which in
no case of the existence of the former can be
disproved ; which in many cases is clear ; and
which is so clear in so many, where the pre
sumption, on a hasty view, or antecedent to

46 THEORY AND USES OF
experience, would be the other way, as to cre
ate a strong probability that it would appear
equally in other cases, were we, in those others,
equally qualified for the investigation. I pass
to the second point, that of the actual connexion
being also a needful one. The actual connex
ion, it will be said, between evil and preponder
ating good, may be granted ; but why should
not God, being unlimited in power and benev
olence, have given us the one unmingled with
the other ?
The question, if I view it rightly, owes its
apparent perplexity to a mere artifice of words.
In its simplest forms it is reducible to this ;
Why could not God at the same time have done
a thing, and not have done it ? And, in forms
more complicated, it is still susceptible of the
same analysis. I am persuaded, that the true
answer to it is one which should expose the
fallacious uses, of which that human instru
ment, language, is capable, and show how it is
actually used to represent that as a metaphys
ical possibility, which is only an inconsistency
and contradiction ; in other words, to represent

NATURAL RELIGION. 47
that as something, which really is nothing, and
which therefore it belongs to no divine attribute
to do. No significant question can be raised
upon the actual omission of that, the effecting
of which is no subject for the operation of
power. Does any one make such an inquiry,
as whether God can be almighty, when he
cannot make a square circle, or cause a rose to
be at the same time a logarithm ? I think it
enough to answer, that the name rose stands for
one thing, and the name logarithm for another.
The nominal difference was devised to corre
spond to the real. Men assigned different
names, because they had first seen what the
names represented, to be actually and essen
tially different things ; and, after contriving a
language founded in the perception of such dif
ferences, then to turn round and employ that
language in asking why things, being different,
may not be the same, is to put their invention
to a very unprofitable use.
In a word, then, upon this basis we are au
thorized to say, that physical evil is, in some
instances, (and if actually in some instances,

48 THEORY AND USES OF
then it may be in all, — the d priori argument
for the negative is barred in all cases, as soon
as we have detected its falsity in some,) phys
ical evil is the necessary instrument of moral
good, the greatest good of man. It is as im
possible as any other contradiction, that I
should be courageous, which is a good, inde
pendently of danger, which is an evil ; because
courage, of its nature, has reference to danger ;
without the perception of danger it has no be
ing. What is patience ? It is that quality of
the mind, which rises superior to painful cir
cumstances. It is as impossible as any thing
which can be put into words, that, where pain
ful circumstances are not, there patience shall
be. Self-collected, self-relying virtue, in all
forms, is virtue which can trust itself. And
how can it trust itself, unless it can remember
that it has been tried, and been true ; and
how are you going to give me the memory of
trial, till you have allowed me the trial itself?
A maturely good man is a man ripened in
goodness ; and all we know of the human mind
assures us, that, being the nature that it is, it

NATURAL RELIGION. 49
can no more be ripened without various dis
cipline, than a fruit can be ripened without
sunshine and rain. Being the nature that -it is.
You may say, that it might have been a differ
ent nature from what it is. But then we part
with our elements for an argument, and also
come back upon the ground of variety in na
ture, and consequent imperfection of its parts.
Physical evil, I have urged, for a being in
the stage of improvement at which we find
man, is the necessary instrument of moral good.
Moral evil, I add, — or, to speak more precise
ly, the probability of moral evil, which for the
purposes of this argument is the same, — is the
necessary incident of moral good. If virtue
consists in using rightly a freedom of choice
between a right and a wrong course of action,
then liability to sin is an absolutely necessary
condition of the existence of virtue. When
it should become impossible for men to be
wicked, then of course their virtue would be
compulsory ; and, being compulsory, it would
be no longer virtue. If the capacity of making
a choice between right and wrong be, by its
7

50 THEORY AND USES OF
very statement, a liberty susceptible of abuse,
and if enforced virtue be a mere senseless col
location of words, there is an end of the pres
ent question.*
III. In laying out our subject, we said that
Natural Religion, besides treating of the divine
being and attributes, comprises the doctrine of
* I am not strenuous about the propriety of the application
of the term training to the case of brutes, in part of the dis
cussion here closed (see pp. 44, 45), though I have carefully
employed it instead of discipline, which I understand still more
distinctly to imply some method of influence operating through
reflections, and consequent determinations, of the party disci
plined. Allowing it to be a somewhat violent use of the term,
to make it denote the influence under which any habit is form
ed, however unintelligent the subject of the process, — still, for
want of one more appropriate, I may be permitted here to adopt
it in this broad sense. — It can scarcely be necessary to say,
that the notion of men's advancing to be angels (p. 45) is not
adduced as presenting a strict analogy with the other progress
which I have imagined. The analogy fails in the important
particular of consciousness being retained in the one case, and
not in the other. But, were I to proceed to argue (against
Locke's doctrine), that consciousness is not personal identity,
but only evidence of it, — an evidence which it is supposable
might be wanting, where the identity existed, so that identity,
with which habits would pass, might be continued with an
interruption of consciousness, — I might risk being misappre
hended, as if (instead of merely suggesting a specimen of pos
sibilities) I were proposing a theory ; a purpose which I have
sufficiently disclaimed.

NATURAL RELIGION. 51
the relations sustained by man to God, and of
the duty of man. I have occupied so much
time with the first two branches of the argu
ment, that you will expect me to study the
utmost conciseness in my further observations.
Upon the ground of our preceding consider
ations, the relation of man to God is that of a
creature, subject, and dependent, to a Creator,
Sovereign, and bountiful Friend. As such, it is
evident he is bound to do God's will, and has
reason to do it cheerfully. I say, to do God's
will. I am not denying that moral rectitude
has an inherent obligation, independent of the
ordinance of any being. But that is not the
subject which we are now treating, but reli
gious obligation, of which a reference to God's
will is the essential element. What is his
will, as ascertained independently of revela
tion ? What instruction does Natural Religion
offer us respecting obedience or virtue ? Of
course, I attempt no answer to this question,
which descends into details. These belong to
the science of deontology. I do not undertake
the composition of an ethical treatise ; and there

52 THEORY AND USES OF
is no medium between this, and a mere brief
statement of the principles of the subject.
We cannot dispose of our present question by
an appeal to conscience. Conscience, as it ex
ists native in the mind, is a principle extensive
ly intelligent, no doubt, but still of imperfect
intelligence compared with the extent of duty.
Often it is doubtful, and applies to reason, —
as well as to revelation, where that is enjoyed,
— to have its doubts resolved. It also makes
its own express demand, that its intimations
shall be confirmed, as far as may be, by in
tellectual perceptions of moral truth. To say
that it may be perplexed, that it requires to
be enlightened, and that reason, — reason ap
plied to the principles of religion, — is its in-
structor, is no more than to say, that there is
place for such a science as casuistry.
The most simple and satisfactory view of
the principles of Natural Religion, involved in
the question of man's duty, I take to be as
follows ; that every fbeing will delight in what
promotes his purposes, and every good being
in what resembles himself ; and that every

NATURAL RELIGION. 53
creator of any thing which can act, will in
tend that it shall act suitably to its constitu
tion and place. Because God delights in what
promotes his purposes, he will have man prac
tise the virtues of a self-denying character,
these virtues having a tendency to make him
efficient and happy, as God designed him to be.
For the same reason, as well as that he delights
in resemblance to himself, he will have men
practise virtues of the class of justice and be
nevolence. Because he will have his creature
act suitably to its place, he demands from man
such dispositions and observances as gratitude,
humility, and worship, of which, from his own
different nature, he is himself incapable.
With these principles for guides, conclusions
respecting the demands of virtue, for the most
part (though not altogether) correct and satis
factory, may be and have been reached, in
dependently of revelation. Upon this subject
the views of cultivated and reflecting men have,
in all ages, corresponded to a great extent
with each other. The exceptions, however, to
this remark, though not many, I need not say,

54 THEORY AND USES OF
are of extreme importance. The obligation of
humility, that of meekness under affronts and
injuries, and of philanthropy, as distinguished
from more restricted forms of friendship, — that
is, of the charity which extends itself to man
as man, and therefore to the criminal, the in
jurious, and the distant, — these, it is not using
too strong language to say, were discoveries
of the religion of Jesus Christ. Again, while
experience of what contributes to personal dig
nity and well-being, and to the welfare of the
social state, afforded substantially a correct
guidance in respect to the personal and social
virtues, the comprehension of that department
of virtue, of which God is the immediate ob
ject, has always been just so far embarrassed
as the character of the Divine Being was im
perfectly understood.
But, the will of God being more or less
known, did Natural Religion furnish any thing
additional to the abstract sense of obligation,
to prompt men to its fulfilment ? Or, — to
arrive at the same point by another path, —
beside the present relation of man to God,

NATURAL RELIGION. 55
did it teach that there was any other and more
permanent, which had a right to be brought
into consideration, when the question of a
course of conduct was entertained, and which
will quicken us by showing that right conduct
is our great interest ' as well as our duty ?
Does Natural Religion establish the truth of
the doctrine of human immortality, or even
that of another life after death ?
I cannot but profess my dissatisfaction with
the arguments, which have been used to prove
that it gives instruction in either the more or
the less comprehensive of these doctrines. I
cannot find that either can be safely argued
from any of the attributes of the Divine Be
ing. Not from his benevolence. When he has
given us so much, we have no right to say,
that he will give us more ; his benevolence,
too, embraces the brute creation, but we do
not therefore suppose that he has appointed
for them another life beyond the present. Not
from his justice, which it has been thought is
a pledge to us, that, since retribution is imper
fect in the present life, there must be another,

56 THEORY AND USES OF
in which the adjustment of condition to desert
will be complete. His justice cannot be shown
to require any thing more, than that no being
shall suffer a wrong at his hands| or, — to in
clude also the case of ill desert, — any thing
more, than that, taking the whole of life to
gether, be that life longer or shorter, a man
shall be the happier for being virtuous, and
the less happy for being wicked ; and let any
one who believes in the essential felicity of vir
tue, — who recognises virtue for the supreme
good, — answer, whether it would not, at least,
be very hard to prove, that the most persecuted
and afflicted man is not even in this world the
happier for his goodness, and the most success
ful man (so called) the less happy for his want
of it. \|At all events, to allow to this argument
all that it claims, it would only go to prove,
that there will be a future life long enough to
make compensation for an existing inequality
in the dispensations of this. It would still fall
infinitely short of showing, that that future life
will be unending. Nor only so ; it would go
to sustain the opposite inference, since there

NATURAL RELIGION. 57
is no proportion between the most eminent hu
man virtue, and an immortal blessedness for
its reward.
Nor can I allow force to the argument from
the immaterial nature of the human soul, ex
empting it from that dissolution which affects
the body. Supposing that doctrine to be true
(which I believe), still it remains to be said, that
the mere freedom from essential tendency to
decay gives the soul no security for continued
existence, since he who made that immaterial
essence is doubtless able to annihilate it; and
the only pertinent question is, whether he will
do so ; a question which other considerations
must determine, if it be determinable. I agree
to what has been said, — and much has been
very powerfully said, particularly of late, — re
specting the soul's independence of the body.
But it all amounts only to the negative argu
ment, that there is no proof of a death of the
soul, simultaneous with the body's death. It
goes no further than to show, that the question
is an open question, whether the two events
occur together. And whether the soul is to

58 THEORY AND USES OF
die, if not when the body dies, at some other
time, is an inquiry which it does not touch
at all.
The " fond desire " of immortality, allow
ing it to be universal, affords no satisfactory
assurance on the subject. \_ The Ciceronian, or
the Platonic question, why we " startle at de
struction " if we are to be destroyed, might
be asked respecting the brutes as well. Our
instinct of love of life is the same as theirs.
That we, unlike them, dread the extinction of
life in future time, as well as at the present,
is only an incident of our better faculty of fore
thought. Nor is the capacity of endless improvement,
which we think we discern in every man, a
pledge, that every man will be permitted to
pursue that improvement in an endless life. ' At
the most, it would only show, that, since the
provision must be understood to contemplate
some result, the supposed end will, in some
single cases, be attained. When we propose
to press it to the extent of proving the immor
tality of each and every man, we find it in-

NATURAL RELIGION. 59
validated, as the foundation of such an infer
ence, by numberless analogies in nature. The
human infant is formed capable of reaching the
mature human stature ; but one half of the
race die within the first five years. The oak
is capable of living more than half a milleni-
um ; but probably, of many thousands born of
acorns, not one actually attains to that age.
Each embryo in the spawn of a cod-fish has a
capacity of growing to the size of the parent
animal ; but, of the score or two of millions
computed to be produced by it in one season,
how very few is it likely ever reach that size.
In confirmation of what has been said of
the incapacity of human reason to find its way
to a conviction of the doctrine of immortality,
I might appeal to the fact, so familiar to my
audience, of the unsatisfied state of mind of
the ancient sages on this subject. Certainly
I do not mean to take the general ground, that
what those great intellects failed to discover
was essentially undiscoverable, or that Natural
Religion contains no more than they saw it
to contain. But we cannot account for their

60 THEORY AND USES OF
ignorance of this doctrine, as we may for their
ignorance of some others, in consistency with
the supposition of its having been actually with
in their reach. It was not one of those which
they passed over ; on the contrary, they pon
dered it with a solemn and intense curiosity ;
and the processes, by which they endeavoured
to arrive at it, were substantially the same that
have been employed in more recent times.*
Of course, if Natural Religion cannot prove
so much as a future life, it can prove nothing
respecting the retribution of a future life ; a
doctrine, which, to those who possess it, sup
plies the chief sanction of duty.
IV. I proceed, in the prescribed order of the
discussion, to* say a few words respecting the
proper use and improvement of the principles
of JYatural Religion.
For such as are not addressed by Revealed
Religion, the proper use and improvement of
* Cicero actually presents three of our modern arguments,
mentioned above, in the first book of his Tusculan Questions ;
and Plutarch has what strongly resembles the fourth in his
treatise on the Delay of Retribution (Opera, edit. Xyl. p. 560).

NATURAL RELIGION. 61
the principles of Natural Religion of course
consists in the satisfaction to be derived from
them, such as they can be ascertained to be,
and the personal application of them to the
conduct of life. For those whom Revealed Re
ligion has not reached, Natural Religion is the
rule of life ; the rule for them to act, and the
rule for them to be judged by. So the rea
son of the case attests, and so the Christian
apostle understood, when he said, that the
Gentiles, " having not the law, are a law unto
themselves ; which show the work of the law
written in their hearts, their conscience also
bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean
while accusing, or else excusing, one another."
In the faith of those who have been ad
dressed by, and who have received, Revealed
Religion, the system of Natural Religion still
holds a large place of independent authority.
The Christian believer does not owe to Chris
tianity his knowledge of the being of God, or
of the divine benevolence in its general out
line, because, as is sufficiently manifest, these
must first be known, before the peculiar evi-

62 THEORY AND USES OF
dence presented for Christianity can be allowed
to be valid. Christianity, when its authority
is proved, does very much towards making
these doctrines distinct and practical in my
mind, but they must be in my possession be
fore there can be reasonable grounds for my
becoming a Christian ; and, when I have be
come so, they still remain with me, as posses
sions derived from another origin. No intel
ligent Christian can speak lightly of Natural
Religion. When he feels that the idea of God
is an essential one, — is the fundamental one,
— in his system of faith, let him remember,
that it is to that source specifically that he is
indebted for it.
One great use of Natural Religion, though
the remark *at first view strikes one as a para
dox, is furnished by its own insufficiency. ' I
have hinted, that it prepares the way for the
reception of Revealed Religion. This it does
in part by showing, that, of what is greatly
desirable to be known in respect to the prin
ciples of God's government! the relations in
which men stand to him, and the duties thence

NATURAL RELIGION. 63
resulting, there is much that it has received
no commission to teach. If it can give no
satisfactory assurance of the immortality of the
soul, for instance, or if it cannot answer such
a question, as whether God, consistently with
his justice, can pardon sins that have been re
pented of, (and that it cannot answer this ques
tion is plain from the fact, that, under Chris
tianity, while his readiness to pardon sins is
agreed to be a revelation of that faith, it is
still disputed between different classes of be
lievers, whether this can be, without an equiv
alent being rendered to his justice) ; if it has
to own its incompetency to such disclosures,
then it declares, that, after having discharged
all its office, there remains an office for di
vine benevolence to do for man through other
instrumentality ; in other words, that there is
reason to hope, that the deficiency will be
supplied by direct revelation.
Thus, so far from pretending to supersede
Revealed Religion, Natural Religion volunteers
its declaration of the necessity of the former to
supply its defects. It bears its humble testi-

64 THEORY AND USES OF
mony, that man, being what it represents him
to be in his relations to God, is in want of,
and would be benefited by, what it has not to
give him. \ To this effect reasoned and so hoped
Plato, when, revolving these themes, he said,
" We ought to take the best and firmest human
reason, and, borne on this, as one venturing
on a raft, sail through life, unless one might
pass over more easily and safely upon some
stronger vehicle, or divine word." * Of the five
principles asserted by Lord Herbert of Cher-
bury to be alone essential in religion, and to
be all comprised in Natural Religion, making
revelation needless, two are, the forgiveness of
sins repented of, and the ordinance of retribu
tion beyond the grave. Whoever, believing in
a God, cannot find these among the sufficiently
clear instructions of Natural Religion, for him
it remains to own, that a revelation is to be
wished and hoped for. And the same is a
concise answer, though it might be extended
much further, to the doctrine (still from time
to time virtually revived) of that once famous
book, " Christianity as old as the Creation."
* Phasdo, § 78.

NATURAL RELIGION. 65
Natural Religion thus developes to us a want,
which it informs us at the same time that it
cannot supply. It goes further, and tells us,
that in him, to whom its instructions relate,
there are power and disposition to supply it.
Its doctrine of his omnipotence declares that he
can supply it. Its doctrine of his benevolence
creates a presumption that he will. Its doctrine
of his veracity is our pledge, that, when he
declares that he is supplying it, his revelation
cannot be intended to deceive. Nature reveals
to its attentive interpreter a power above it and
caring for it ; able, — sufficient cause being
presented, — to interrupt, as it had established,
its order, and so to authenticate the message,
which, by selected lips, it utters in the ear of
man. It is a marvellous delusion into which they
fall, as well as a most calamitous loss which
they sustain, who, in their imagined high esti
mation of Natural Religion, put out of view
that great discovery of Natural Religion, that
there is One in the universe whose almightiness
9

66 THEORY AND USES OF
enables him, and whose infinitely tender benev
olence may engage him, to do more for his
creatures than before he has done, and to do
it, as the necessity of the case requires, by ex
traordinary means. I say, the necessity of the
case ; for, whatever human reason is incompe
tent to discover, it is plain, that only an extra
neous communication can put it in possession
of, and such extraneous communication is an
extraordinary means. There are those who
attribute a force to what they call laios of
nature, to hinder that occasional extraordinary
exercise of God's omnipotence in this part of
his universe, which the theory of revelation
affirms. But the idea of a Deity restrained by
any such laws, is one which Natural Religion
does not tolerate. It is its glory to present
us with a being, who is above all law, but that
of equitable and benevolent intention ; and who
accordingly will break in upon his accustomed
course of operation, whensoever and howsoever
the paramount benevolent purpose, which caus
ed him originally to establish that course, shall

NATURAL RELIGION. 67
demand. What we call laws of nature are but
our own generalizations of the remarks which
we make upon the ordinary methods of divine
operation. Those methods are for the most
part uniform ; because it is for man's benefit
that they should be so, and thus afford a basis
for contrivance and calculation. Whenever it
is more for man's benefit that they should cease
to be so, whenever such an exigency occurs,
as that by their interruption men would be
better served, then that self-same divine pur
pose, which was the principle of their institu
tion, becomes the principle and pledge of their
infringement. That is, whenever it becomes fit
that God should speak directly to men, mira
cles being the only apparent method of ratify
ing the claim of him who pretends to bear the
message, miracles become under such circum
stances the most credible events. So distinctly
pronounces Natural Religion; and so its con
siderate disciple is prepared to lend a favorable
ear to what, the due conditions being met,
professes to come to him with the authority of
Revelation.

68 THEORY AND USES OF
In this connexion it is commonly added, that
the doctrine of the divine unity also cannot
be a subject for miraculous disclosure, but that
our conviction of that doctrine must precede
our reception of such a message, inasmuch as
otherwise we might doubt, whether what the
messenger of one deity revealed might not be
contradicted by the messenger of another ; a
remark, however, to which I cannot entirely
assent. If I were doubtful whether the Divinity
resided in one person or in many, yet, if I had
become persuaded that it was essentially good
and true, — in other words, that, whether there
were more or fewer divinities, this character
belonged to them all, — here would be enough
to command my assent to the truth of a mirac
ulously attested revelation. Before I had satis
fied myself whether a supernaturally endowed
messenger must be received as coming from
one sole in authority, or from one of many,
provided I was satisfied that veracity was an
attribute of the one or the many, that would
suffice to convince me of his credibility; and,

NATURAL RELIGION. 69
if he then proceeded to tell me of the unity
of the Godhead, I should reasonably take that
doctrine upon his word.
Another use of Natural Religion is, to do
away difficulties in the theory of Revealed.
In some cases, we might be inclined to say,
that such and such a principle or provision of
Revealed Religion was liable to objection, as
not apparently compatible with the divine at
tributes, and was accordingly an impeachment
of the credibility of the whole system. To the
believer in Natural Religion this presumption
is perfectly rebutted, if it can be shown to him
that the difficulty, such as it may be, attaches
equally to his own system. He cannot say,
the God of Nature, whom I acknowledge,
never gave a revelation in the alleged manner,
or never announced in it an alleged doctrine,
because it would offer a contradiction to his
principles of operation, — provided it can be
shown to him that that same principle is involv
ed in the visible and unquestionable course of
natural things. My hearers are acquainted with

70 THEORY AND USES OF
the masterly handling of this argument in Bish
op Butler's " Analogy of Religion, Natural and
Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of
Nature," a treatise of that admirable logic,
that, apart from the magnificent character of
its results, no one ever read it with attention,
but felt his faculties disentangled, and all his
mind grow in the perusal. tm^r— 1,'J
Once more ; Natural Religion has an im-
° A
portant use in giving illustration, and so clear
ness, and fixedness, and impelling power, to
truths which it would not have discovered.
I do not select an instance, to explain my
meaning, but take the first which occurs to
my mind. The Gospel declares, that humility
is a duty ; not humility before God, — that
Natural Religion would teach us, — but hu
mility before man, which Natural Religion
might not teach, and at any rate did not to
those of old, who listened most needfully for
its monitions. This annunciation of the Gos
pel turns our attention to the subject. What
ever God has commanded man to do or to be,

NATURAL RELIGION. 71
we are sure there must be reasons for, in the
relations of man, though those reasons may
not hitherto have been observed. If we can
discover a foundation for the humility in ques
tion in any relations of man, then it becomes
to us a duty of Natural Religion, inasmuch as
the system of Natural Religion, as far as it
relates to duty, is founded on the relations
which man sustains. Under the prompting
of Revealed Religion, we search for such a
reason ; and in the course of the inquiry we
find, that the temper of mind expelled by
humility, is eminently anti-social, and opposed
to the individual's dignity, self-possession, effi
ciency, and happiness. Pride leads us to
affront others, and provokes, and makes us
sensible to, their affronts ; and to us and to
them, as long as they and we are proud, insult
is offence of a much more galling kind than
injury, and harder to bear, except when the
latter takes some very gross form. This be
ing so, and the relation of man to God re
quiring, on the principles of Natural Religion,

72 THEORY AND USES OF
that man should serve God's purposes, — and
one of his purposes being that man should be
happy (in other words, that the individual
should be happy, and strive to make others
so), — humility, which Revealed Religion first
presented to our notice, is seen to be a duty of
Natural Religion also. The exhibition of such
illustrations of Christian duty from the pulpit
is apt to be stigmatized as moral preaching;
but I suppose, that he who exhibits them in
telligently is doing good service at the Chris
tian altar.
Here I close this unworthy discussion of a
most solemn, vast, and quickening theme. If
it be a glory and privilege for intelligent na
tures to trace up any short course of what
comes before the view, from consequence to
spring, above all is the endeavour an appropri
ate, a happy, and a profitable one, to ascend
from apparent things to the contemplation of a
great, unseen First Cause of all. Enviable he,
whose heart, in such investigations^ keeps up

NATURAL RELIGION. 73
with the firmly-planted steps of his reason !
Far truer is it to his strengthened spirit's ex
perience, than the elegant poet knew, that
" Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus."
Forbearing and avoiding all appeals to feel
ing, I have endeavoured to treat this high argu
ment with a severe calmness, just as if the
truth here were not infinitely precious ; just
as if, were it not truth, existence would not
be made a fathomless, an appalling, yes, a
maddening mystery ; just as if we, who speak
and hear, had not a far deeper stake in it than
in any thing else which could be named ; as if
our interest in it were not immeasurably great
er than in wealth, or health, or fame, or
friends, or any or all things present and seen.
But our omission to exhibit it as such majestic
and vital truth, will not make it to be any thing
less ; nor will he, who sees it to be truth, en
tertain the question, whether it is truth of even
such pretensions ; nor can he, who has come

10

74 THEORY AND USES OF
to discern that such is its sovereignty, doubt
whether it may command, always, the reverent
homage of his life, and, as occasion shall per
mit, the poor service of his best championship.
Such homage, young friends, it claims, such
specific service it may claim, from you. If it
is very old truth, how, for that, is it the less
deserving ? Youth loves novelty, no doubt ;
but enlightened youth can see reasons, and
constant youth can stand by them. Of this
priceless wealth of the soul, be it your pur
pose, " that no man spoil you by any vain phi
losophy." " See that ye be no more children,"
well said the Apostle, " tossed to and fro, and
carried about with every wind of doctrine."
The wind of doctrine may be as impalpable
as the moving atmosphere, but it is capable
of more awful ravages, and of more voluptu
ously stupefying power over the bewildered
sense. Now, the wind of atheistic doctrine
has revealed itself a tornado force, marking
its track by the wrecks of order, learning,

NATURAL RELIGION. 75
law, and all venerable things, — by the heaped-
up fragments of whatever the beneficent toil
of ages has reared to fence civilization and
humanity against the inroads of the bestial
element in man's highly endowed, but hetero
geneous nature ; and now, the light effluence
of some mystic's vagrant meditation, fanning
the passive sense, like an air of
" the sweet south,
That breathes upon a bank of violets,
Stealing and giving odor,"
it has but whispered its dainty melodies in
some flowery corner, and sighed itself to rest
in a sunshiny day. Open not your bosoms
to it, young friends, any more when it comes
with softness and insinuation, than when with
uproar and manifest ruin. Believe that if, by
accident, it may be ornate and sentimental, it
is not the less in essence mean and doltish,
barren at best to the mind, as well as a fatal
cheat to the soul. No trial worth the name,
for the truth we speak of, or for your loyalty
to it, may come in your day. But the wisdom

76 NATURAL RELIGION.
of a wise and true man is, to know and feel
how he will deport himself, if the trial should
come. Be the part of a prompt and stainless
allegiance yours, if you would not foully shame
your rearing. Stand you erect when the
tempest rages, and keep spiritually awake
while the perfume-laden breeze passes by.
" Be not children, tossed to and fro, and car
ried about by every wind of doctrine." " Be
not children in understanding," whom confi
dent or winning words may impose upon ;
" howbeit in malice be ye children, but in
understanding be men."

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