PORTUGUESE

COLONIZATION

IN BRAZIL.

YALE UMi • ,

APR 22 '
LIBRARY
A PAPER BY
ALBERT G. KELLER,
Ph
D.
Assistant Professor of the Science ot Society
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in Yal
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[From the Yale Review, February, 1906.]
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PORTUGUESE COLONIZATION IN BRAZIL.

A PAPER BY
ALBERT G. KELLER, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of the Science of Society in Yale University.

[From the Yale Review, February, 1906.]

PORTUGUESE COLONIZATION IN BRAZIL.
THE exploits of the Portuguese in India, because of their con
nection with the "golden East," and their semi-religious
character, have drawn the attention of the world, not only in ear
lier centuries but in a later age as well. The imagination of their
contemporaries was captivated by phenomenal successes in the
realization of aims that existed or came to exist in the minds of
all. The Portuguese' had, to all appearance, successfully con
summated the conneption long striven for between the trade-areas
of East and West, and were in consequence the envied holders
of exclusive commercial advantages. That the worth of this
monopoly was consistently overestimated but added to the power
and reputation of its possessors. And, in subsequent time, the
romantic tale of Portuguese achievements, bereft by distance
of any unpleasant or sordid aspects, has exercised a peculiar
fascination upon recounters and their audiences. The "wealth
of Ormus and of Ind" is familiar to those whose interests lie
far from markets and colonies. And yet, when the tale of the
exploits in India is done, we have the really enduring contribu
tions of the Portuguese to the history of colonization still to
consider. Vasco da Gama, relying upon the accumulations of nautical
experience made by the captains who had preceded him, and
profiting by his own special knowledge, provided Cabral, who
commanded the next Indian fleet, with sailing directions which,
to catch the southeast trades, carried him far toward the west.1
In the pursuance of this course, or in fortuitous deviation from
it, Cabral made the coast of South America. He thus discovered
(April, 1 501) what proved to be the new world, on the count
of Portugal, some nine years after the voyage of Columbus; and
the occurrence was thought important enough to warrant the
'Varnhagen, I, 17 ff.; cf. Rio-Branco, 105; Martins, Hist, de Port I
217-218. For a brief description of the voyage of Yanez Pinzon, see Bourne'
Spain in America, 69. '

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 375
return of one ship to convey the news to Portugal. Cabral was
unable, of course, to estimate the magnitude of the new acquisi
tion. He conceived it to be another of the Antilles islands, and
named it Ilha da Vera Cruz. This was subsequently modified
to Terra de Santa Cruz, and finally changed, upon the discovery
of a dyewood similar to the valued brazil-wood of the East, to
Brazil.1 The only appeal which Brazil could make to Portugal was on
the score of profits from the forests, and even of these but little
is heard. It is characteristic of the age and its aims that the
Portuguese repeatedly tried to get around or through Brazil
toward the west, and thus it was presently discovered that the
supposed island was part of a very large land-mass._ For many
years, however, Brazilian harbors were little better than substi
tutes, along a more satisfactory route, for the declining African
stations. Preoccupation with the riches of India anticipated
any vital interest in a rough and virgin land. The government
sent out colonists, but at first rather with a view toward its own
relief than toward Brazil's betterment, for the exiles were
mostly convicts and women of ill repute. Little more was done
during the first decades of the sixteenth century than to establish
small settlements or factories on the best harbors. According
to Varnhagen, the earliest real colony was at Sao Vicente (near
Sao Paulo). But it was already the intention of the government
that the fleet which should hold and defend the Brazilian coast
should be supported out of local resources. The money which
Portugal could spare for such objects had been swept into the
current that set toward India.2
However, as time went on, the original nuclei of population
received additions from the voluntary immigration of a much
better quality of colonists. These were represented in large part
by Jews, who had fled from Portugal to escape the Inquisition,
1 It is perhaps significant of the relative predominance in Portuguese
minds of the commercial over the religious aspects of their new posses
sion that in this christening the "'gainful wood" (lenho lucrativo) thus
supplanted the "sacred wood." Varnhagen, I, 24; cf. 17-24; Watson, I,
91; Zimmermann, I, 117-118.
! Varnhagen, I, 30; 43; 53; Stephens, 220 ff.; 347.

376 Yale Review. [Feb.
and who proposed to make their homes in Brazil.1 This growth
of population and the increasing interest of the French in South
America gradually attracted the attention of the Portuguese
to their lightly esteemed dependency. The necessities of
development and defense were met, in the absence of impossi
bility of a display of individual initiative, by the adoption ( I532)
of a semi-feudal system of proprietary grants or fiefs. The pro
prietors (donatarios) were lords who should defend the country
and settle it on their own counts, thus releasing government
resources for the India enterprises. In pursuance of this
expedient the whole dependency, back theoretically to the
Demarcation meridian, was divided by lines running parallel to
the equator into fifteen sections, forming twelve hereditary cap
taincies of from 600 to 12,000 square leagues.2 These were dis
tributed to favored persons, and so differed in size with the
favor shown. The powers of the donatarios were, roughly
speaking, somewhat more than vice-regal. The home govern
ment exercised over them a sort of protectorate with limited
control, in return for the payment of a few taxes and the right
of instatement at every change of possession. The donatario
could issue land-grants, found cities, name officials and judges,
and exercise other similar powers. The colonists were assured
only of protection of property, freedom of trade with the Indians,
and non-extradition on account of former crimes. Catholics
of all nations were allowed to settle, but non-Portuguese were
discouraged from trade by various restrictions.3
The history of the captaincies is for the most part a dull chron
icle of life on a small scale. Few of them actually prospered.
The donatarios were eager, of course, to get people to come
with capital and take up land ; but their efforts met, on the whole,
'Zimmermann, I, 119. Leroy-Beaulieu (I, 51-52) assigns great import
ance to this element in the population. Stephens (227 ff.) says that Brazilian
colonization was essentially popular, not royally or otherwise artificially
initiated. 2 A map of these doagoes or capitanias is given by Varnhagen, I, opp.
p. 88; a list with dates, in Martins, O Brazil, etc., 10.
"The details of the system are to be found in Varnhagen, I, 60-63; 72
ff. ; Watson, 155 ff. ; Zimmermann, I, 119 ff. The idea was earlier utilized in
the Azores and Madeira Islands, (Martins, O Brazil, etc., 3 ff.) and later in
Mozambique (prasos da coroa), Corvo, II, 119-121 ; 243.

igo6] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 377
with little success. The scattered and backward native popula
tion1 offered but, few inducements to traders. No one believed
that Brazil had any value. Two ships a year conveyed from
Portugal the aforesaid men and women of questionable
character,2 and brought back wood, parrots and other curious
products. The scanty European population, exhibiting scarcely
any of those qualities of energy and self-sufficiency which we
have come to associate with the term "settler," took to the ways
of the natives in its attempt to conform to an environment which
it could not control. Native products were raised, and native
arts and crafts were imitated. Fusion of races began early, and
several varieties of half-breed came soon to be distinguished.
On the part of the government no effort was directed toward
exploration. . The interior was unvisited and unknown. The
whole colony was systematically neglected. Portuguese indif
ference under the proprietary system "recognized the independ
ence of Brazil before colonizing it."3
A great deal of this adversity was directly chargeable to the
regime of the donatarios, and when, toward the middle of the
sixteenth century, Brazil had come to be regarded as of some
importance to Portugal, the fact was immediately recognized.
The original division had been made on too sweeping a scale
and with little or no discrimination, the grants were too large,
and no reservation of land for future assignment had been
made. The massing of smaller holdings about the ports would
have concentrated population and encouraged industry, whereas
the system adopted had effected the exact reverse. The dona
tarios, also, had been given too much authority. It was
impossible for the supreme power from across the Atlantic to
control the virtually separate governments of the captaincies.
The lives and property of the colonists were at the mercy of
the several lords, and the many complaints made to the King
witness for the fact that some, at least, of the captains did not
fail to take advantage of the situation. Even where they were
1 See Martins, O Brazil, etc., 133 ff.
2 Of these the donatario of Pernambuco wrote to the king (1546) : "These
people are worse than the plague; therefore I beg you, for God's sake, to
spare me this poison in the future." Quoted in Zimmermann, I, 124.
8 Varnhagen, I, 74; cf. 98; 170-172.

378 Yale Review. [Feb.
honest, the donatarios were generally pitiful failures. Those
in northern Brazil had almost all come to grief by I55°» an^
misunderstandings with the natives and miniature wars of all
kinds constituted the order, or rather disorder, of the day. In
view of all this the King was led in 1549 to revoke the powers of
the captains while leaving them their grants, and to appoint
over them a governor-general, who should regulate abuses and
correct and unify ill-considered and divergent policies. The
seat of government was fixed at Bahia.1
This move led, of course, to the breakup of the captaincies,
although the latter would inevitably have passed away with the
growth of population. The system was, like that of the chartered
company, simply a governmental makeshift. The donatarios
displayed the semblance of administration and defense, until the
state had satisfied itself that it was worth while to take over the
burden. This persuasion was reached when the India dream
had begun to betray its illusive nature, and when Brazil had
commenced to attract the attention of European irivals.2
"Little by little the kings of Portugal recovered all these fiefs
through inheritance, purchase or otherwise. The last captain
cies still existing under feudal regime were bought back by the
crown in the eighteenth century in the time of D. Jose I and
Pombal.3 The fundamental charge against the captaincy-system was,
of course, its artificiality, or, to put it another way, its contra
vention of natural development. The provinces were crudely
ruled off on the map with little or no regard to natural condi
tions. The stream of emigration was split up into a number of
currents, each setting under direction toward the locations in each
captaincy upon which, for sufficient or insufficient reason, the
donatarios had pitched. Consequently, as Martins says, settle
ment started in several distinct centers of "social ossification,"
and the colony tended to subdivide itself into a number of dis-
1 Varnhagen, I, 69-71; 192; 200; Watson, I, 155-158; Zimmermann, I,
125 ff.
2Cf. Martins, Hist, de Port., I, 52.
8 Rio-Branco, no ff. ; Watson, II, 239; cf. Martins, O Brazil, etc., 13.
For a list of the early governors of Brazil, see Martins, O Brazil, etc.,
25, note.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 379
connected areas.1 Thus a variety of small centers of feeble
development, and therefore exposed to many special exigencies,
took the place of several strong and populous nuclei in locali
ties naturally selected as favorable to man and his activities.
Again, the attempt to impose an aristocratic system upon a
virgin country was sure to encounter the fate reserved for such
attempts, under similar circumstances, throughout the history
of colonization. The efforts of noble Portuguese houses to
transplant their less promising offshoots beyond the seas in the
natural course of events came to naught.2 The establishment
of the capital at Bahia was a further exhibition of the same arti
ficial methods. Although cartographically central among the
scattered nuclei already mentioned, Bahia was the focus neither
of economic development nor of population. It took a time
of stress, forcibly calling attention to the superiority in
these respects of the southern provinces, to secure the removal of
the capital to Rio de Janeiro.3 One must, however, realize that
at the outset the southern provinces were regarded as relatively
unimportant, since they produced none of those tropical pro
ducts which alone appealed to the Portuguese. The flow of
population to these regions was slight and almost unnoticed until
the gold discoveries.
The man chosen to be the first Governor-general was D.
Thome de Souza, and the selection was apparently a happy one.
He attended to the much-neglected interests of the crown,
reduced the excessive power of the donatarios, and established
better relations with the Indians. He also saw the value of
the "new Christians" {novaes christiaos) and tried to protect
them. Without using his position to justify undue interference,
and leaving locally established government, where it was stable,
alone, he yet punished prevalent acts of atrocity with great
severity and labored always to curb the mutual hostility and to
effect the consolidation of the almost independent captaincies.4
1 0 Brazil, etc., 126, 127 ; cf . 12. This tendency was later accentuated
in consequence of the "adventurous hunt for Indians and mines."
' See Martins, O Brazil, etc., 12.
* See p. 406, below.
'Stephens, 225 ff.

380 Yale Review. [Feb.
His administration is looked upon as one of the landmarks in
Brazil's early history. Under his successors, although they
were in general men of an inferior stamp, population increased
and the state of the colony became more satisfactory. This
was more particularly the case during the governorship of
Mem de Sa (1558-1570).1
At the very outset of their acquaintance with Brazil, as has
been said, the Portuguese, judging that country and India
according to the same criteria, regarded it as of comparatively
slight value. Of the one local product which appealed to them
with any force; relatively but small and variable quantities
could be gotten at the coast. For the native population of Brazil
were and remained practically insensible to economic stimuli,
presenting in this a complete contrast to the Eastern peoples to
whom the Portuguese were used. In the East, European
demand impinged upon the native rulers, and these took
measures to secure an increasing output, but in South America,
as the Portuguese knew it, there was no native organization
to receive and transmit pressure. A certain amount of settle
ment and of production under European management was thus
in Brazil an almost necessary condition for the development of
trade. We have seen that the earliest settlers were largely con
victs and fugitive Jews. The latter, with characteristic
resource and industry, speedily introduced the cultivation of the
plant which furnished in time the staple of Brazil — the sugar
cane. Sugar-production once started in a favoring environ
ment, plantations developed rapidly and yielded good profits.
Each plantation demanded a rather numerous European per
sonnel,2 and since the Portuguese government, in its low esti
mation of Brazil, spared it a good part of that petty regulation
which discourages individual initiative, a number of desirable
emigrants were gradually attracted across the seas. Because
Brazil had shown no promise of wealth in gold and silver, it
had for a time been on the verge of official abandonment. It
was the "wholesome neglect" which fell to its share that saved
it in some degree, especially during its early years, from the
'Or Men de Sa, as Varnhagen insists (I, 233).
2 Watson, II, 120.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 381
system of ruthless exploitation under which tropical dependen
cies have so often languished.1
In spite of the fact that the Portuguese frequented this trop
ical climate with some impunity, it soon became clear that they
were incapable of doing justice to the sugar-industry without
aid. They were not numerous enough, many were physically
unable to put forth the effort required, and almost all were by
character unfitted. They began early to have recourse to native
labor, and experienced little difficulty in coercing the rude and
mutually hostile Indian groups to their will. The Portuguese
have always taken readily to the slavery system, and here it was in
many ways indispensable to the preservation of economic life.
But it was not put into operation unopposed. If in their
material preoccupations the Portuguese as a whole had ceased
to think much about the extension of the faith, there was among
them a class of professional zealots who claimed to think about
nothing else — the Jesuits. This powerful order set itself
strongly against Indian slavery, for it contemplated the organi
zation of the untouched savages, their segregation from
demoralizing association with Europeans, and their conversion
en masse. The incompatibility between the economic needs of
the planters and the religious aims of the Jesuits manifested itself
in the early days of the Portuguese settlement, and the story of
the collision of the two conflicting interests forms a good part
of the history of the colony.
The country was, then, primarily an agricultural one, and
sugar and woods long formed its major exports. About 1580,
Sao Salvador had 57 sugar-works, exporting annually 2400
hogsheads; Pernambuco had 50. In addition to sugar, many
1 "A policy of rational freedom exempted agriculture, -industry and com
merce from vexatious restrictions, opening the colony to foreigners upon
the payment of light differential duties. The imposts were moderate, the
monopolized articles few, and the movement of individuals from one
captaincy to another, or from any one of them to foreign parts, was free.
Such was the first constitution of Portuguese America . . " Martins,
O Brazil, etc., io-n. In fact, after 1640 and the loss of the Oriental
empire it was seen to be useless to prohibit the cultivation of spices, etc.,
in America. Id., 67. It was much later (eighteenth century) that limi
tation of Brazilian production in the interest of Portugal took place.
Zimmermann, I, 172; Stephens, 227 ff.

382 Yale Review. [Feb.
products for a prevailingly local use were raised. The orange,
lemon, and palm trees grew well, likewise the cocoa and tea
plants. There were also some valuable Indian foods like
manioc. Cattle and horses, imported from the Cape Verdes,
throve and multiplied. Aside, therefore, from a single main
staple, Brazil grew many other products valuable for the main
tenance of life. All through the sixteenth and seventeenth1
centuries the colony proceeded toward a more settled and
extensive agricultural economy, and although only an occasional
portion of its immense periphery was settled, the stations were
of a common type. The colony became constantly more
valuable to Portugal; for one thing, the mother country
enjoyed its exclusive trade. Toward the end of the sixteenth
century about forty-five ships came to Brazil annually for sugar
and brazil-wood, and Portugal likewise monopolized the coast
ing trade.1 When the decadence of India had now become appar
ent, it was realized that Brazil was the most valuable national
possession, and it went steadily on in its development, despite
checks presently to be mentioned, until its trade with Portugal
equalled that of Portugal with all the countries of Europe.2
In spite of the value of Brazilian sugar, however, the
Portuguese trade policy was, at least in comparison with the
Spanish, liberal. Non-Portuguese were early handicapped by
certain disabilities, but these were not prohibitive, as is proved
by the constant increase of foreigners and their factories from
the sixteenth century on. Commerce was subjected to the
system of regular "caravans," but this was rendered but
slightly oppressive because of the number of ships allowed and
the number of stations visited. 3 Here again the treatment
accorded to Brazil was markedly distinct from the measures
'Watson, 251-252; cf. Martins, O Brazil, etc., 67.
1 Varnhagen, I, 303 ; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 53. In 1688, "the fleet which sailed
from Bahia was the largest which ever left that port, and yet it did not
contain tonnage sufficient for the produce . . ."A further indication
of commercial advance lay in the betterment of the currency (1694).
Watson, II, 109.
8 These were six in number : Lisbon, Oporto, Rio Janeiro, Paraiba,
Olinda, San-Salvador. Pombal replaced the caravans with privileged com
panies. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 53.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 383
that hampered the India trade. In fact, the Brazilians embarked
so eagerly in commerce that the civil and judicial officers and
even the clergy showed great readiness to become involved in
speculation.1 The settlers too, had something to say about the
system. In 1649 when a privileged company was founded,
commanding a large number of armed ships and a regiment of
infantry and artillery, the merchants of Rio and Bahia were
able by their representations to secure needed reform, and
finally the suppression of the organization (1720).2
What has been said is perhaps enough to establish the fact
that for two hundred years Brazil's development followed the line
of agricultural production and exchange. It is not surprising,
therefore, to find the writers on Brazil adopting a sort of self-
congratulatory vein as they remark upon the lateness of the dis
covery of the country's mineral wealth. For, as they say,
Brazil's very poverty and its consequent neglect gave it the oppor
tunity for an unhurried, natural development as a transplanted
portion of the Portuguese nation, and as a result they adduce
the conservation in Brazil of the Portuguese language, the
Catholic religion and many another national character which
causes the powerful western state, now that India is gone, to
reflect glory upon its diminutive metropolis, and to lend it
economic and other support. This is an a posteriori judgment
with the usual excellences of its kind; the Portuguese of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries felt nothing but chagrin
at their commonplace colony, when they compared it with the
golden soil of Peru. There were from the outset certain
rumors of mineral wealth and convictions that "the ground of
Brazil and of Peru were the same," but for generations no veri
fication appeared.3 The discoveries for which the pioneers
longed and toiled were delayed until the eighteenth century.
'Watson, II, 116-117.
2Rio-Branco, 135; Varnhagen, II, 37 ff.
8 "There existed a conviction that the 'ground of Brazil and that of Peru
were the same.' . . . But it did not please God to ordain that this
should be confirmed before Brazil was more secure. The expeditions
which were undertaken did not come to anything. And it is lucky that
they did not, for the discovery of mines in the interior, when there were
still so few people on the coast, would have left the latter district deserted,
and the French would have perchance seized upon it." Varnhagen, I, 214,
Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 54-55.

384 Yale Review. [Feb,
The history of the colony from the time of Mem de Sa
(about 1570) until the period just mentioned, shows little worth
remark upon the purely administrative side. The doings of
many decades are really massed about two great and protracted
struggles — that between the planters and the Jesuits in regard
to the labor-supply, and that of the Portuguese colonists as a
whole with the aggression of foreign nations, chiefly France
and Holland.1 That the former and internal contest was sub
ject to periodic truces during which erstwhile enemies worked
shoulder to shoulder in a common cause goes almost without
saying, if one recalls the traditional qualities of the Portuguese
when forced to the defensive.
Of the quality of the European population in Brazil some
thing has already been said. Taking into account the fact that
Brazil was at the outset practically a penal colony, it is not dif
ficult to understand why the ecclesiastics soon found themselves
obliged to raise a voice against the depravity of religion and
morals. There was no honor in the public business, but in its
stead a "cynical egoism." Justice, good faith, and confidence had
fled the land. Robberies and assassinations were everyday
affairs. The average of crime was for some time higher than in
Portugal itself.2 This state of things was peculiarly characteristic
of the time of the captaincies. But there were other influences
at work to modify the character of the population, and one was
the change of natural environment. The climate of tropical
Brazil proved hurtful to many Europeans, and new diseases or
new forms of old ones constantly appeared. Of the children
born not one in three lived until the Portuguese mothers had
learned to adopt native methods of care-taking.3 If, in spite
of these facts, it is said that "in no instance have Europeans suf
fered so little by transplantation from their own country into
one of very different climate as did the Portuguese in Brazil",4
the implication is that other Europeans suffered excessively
rather than that the Portuguese escaped wellnigh scatheless.
'Watson, II, 112.
2 Watson, I, 122, 253; Varnhagen, I, 203-204, especially 185-189.
8 Southey, I, 345.
'Watson, I, 252-253.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 385
Out of this tropical climate and other physical influences arose
also the plantation-system of agriculture, to which some
allusion has been made, and its general adoption and prosperity
had produced a singular modification of customs on the part
of what had been at one time a fairly laborious and economical
element of the population. "In the more flourishing settle
ments . . . nothing could exceed the luxury of the
female costume, the wives of the planters being attired in silks
and satins covered with the richest embroidery, with pearls,
rubies and emeralds. . . . The ladies of Bahia were so
indolent of habit that on going abroad they had to lean on
their pages lest they should fall. Even the men — if men they
might be called — were unable to descend the declivity on which
Bahia stands, and were carried down on a contrivance called a
serpentine, that is to say, a hammock suspended from a pole, a
slave attending meanwhile with a parasol."1 About 1560
gaming had to be prohibited under severe penalties, for it had
become a prevalent vice of an idle people.2 The officials gam
bled with the opportunities of the colony itself in no less con
sistent a manner, and the governors, appointed generally upon
a three-year term as in India, enriched themselves by every
means. The underpaid functionaries were almost compelled by
their exigencies to be dishonest. Even the priests, except the
Jesuits, were chiefly engaged in securing gain. 3 The population
was vain of material successes, but raw and uncultured, and it was
still very small toward the end of the seventeenth century. The
number of Portuguese who held this vast area subject should
not be overestimated. Until mining led them inland they held
small coast stations only. Spaces equal in size to an average
European kingdom are still uninhabited. During the seven
teenth century the numbers were "so scanty that it seems strange
that the Portuguese could have at the same time contended
successfully with a foreign invader and with hostile tribes in
the interior."4 In 1585 the settlements had a population of
'Watson, II, 121.
2 Varnhagen, I, 252.
"Southey, I, 345; Watson, 114-115.
'Watson, II, 119; cf. 112.

386 Yale Review. [Feb.
about 57,000, of whom 25,000 were whites in scattered groups,
18,500 civilized Indians, and 14,000 African slaves,1 and the
next century saw relatively slight increase.
The whole system was based upon the domination and
exploitation of the reduced country and people. For reasons
assigned, the vital condition of economic existence was a cheap
labor-supply, and the natives were early enslaved. Against this
outcome the Indians struggled with all the desperation of the
American savage, choosing death and race-extermination to
a servile station and labor. By the influence of the Jesuits
their case was repeatedly brought before the King and State,
and from early times orders of various kinds looking to their
freedom were emitted from Lisbon. Without a strong local
agency for their enforcement these would have been of no avail,
and as it was they were again and again rendered null and void
by the necessities and self-will of the colonists. The natural
conditions demanded native slavery and it took all the force of
the most powerful of religious and political brotherhoods to
stem the tide.2 The planters grew to hate the Jesuits as the
authors of their misfortunes, and did not fail to assert that the
fathers profited largely by the discomfiture of their victims.
Yet it is to be noted that the Jesuits were not opposing slavery
as an institution, but the specific enslavement of the Indians,
of heathen whom they wished to gather into' the fold while
they were still uncontaminated by contact with the lambs
already technically in, but not as yet wholly above suspicion.
Whatever the theories, the facts speak for themselves. The
colonists at first repaid themselves for their labors in reducing
the country by drawing upon the physical forces of the con
quered.3 But as the plantation grew, these products of "just
wars" were not numerous enough, and periodic slave-raids com
parable to the better-known razzias of Africa were the regular
thing. These were attended by an enormous waste of life
'Rio-Branco, 116.
2 Watson, I, 161-163; Varnhagen, I, 257 ff. A good general sketch of
the Indian situation and the conflict of planters and Jesuits is given by
Zimmermann, I, 128 ff.
"Martins, O Brazil, etc., 50.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 387
under cruel treatment and exposure. As slaves the Indians
were not able to perform the hard labor imposed upon them
and to which they were totally unused, and they died away as a
race beneath it. At first the colonists were allowed to enslave
at will. Later King Sebastiao issued a clerically inspired
regulation (1570) declaring all Indians free "excepting such
as should be taken in war made by command of the king or
governor, or such as were aggressive cannibals." In later times
many similar decrees were published, but these were almost
invariably made to suit every individual occasion.1 As in the
Spanish Indian legislation, the intent was of the best, but the
force of natural conditions in the distant colony completely
negatived its realization. Even the so-called free Indians, who
had voluntarily submitted to the Portuguese, were forced to
leave their families destitute of support, while they raised and
prepared tobacco on the plantations.2 The aggressions of the
Europeans rendered the efforts of the Jesuits in collecting the
coast-natives into villages, there to civilize them under a paternal
direction, a constant disappointment. Continued raids and
fomentation of inter-tribal strife brought it about that by the
end of the sixteenth century both missionaries and slave-raiders
had to penetrate much further into the interior in quest of con
verts and captives.3 This was particularly marked in the dis
trict of Sao Paulo. In this relatively temperate climate the
inhabitants (Paulistas) exhibited a superior energy and per
sistence in the enslavement and extermination of the natives.
Attacked by the exasperated savages, they retaliated in a seven-
years' war (1592- 1 599) in which about three hundred villages
were destroyed and thousands of Indians slain or enslaved.
Man-hunts of this nature then became periodic, and the Pau
listas gained a disgraceful reputation for their exploits in a
bad business. The bewildered natives, a prey to epidemics of
'Watson, II, 82-83; 85; 115-116; Varnhagen, I, 173 ff. ; Zimmermann,
I, 128 ff.
"Watson, II, 84.
8 Watson, I, 258. Varnhagen (I, 174-178) regards the early enslave
ment as a civilizing process, and asserts that the tales of cruelty represented
exceptional cases, many of which were punished; the effects of a mistaken
humanitarianism, sustained by the Jesuits, were deleterious.
36

388 Yale Review. [Feb.
disease strange to them, with everything going against them,
became panic-stricken and intractable, choosing death in pref
erence to the hazards of the strange and repulsive fate forced
upon them.1 The Jesuits, seeing the futility of their strenuous
and for the most part disinterested efforts for the natives, were
gradually driven to the conviction that it was impossible to pro
ceed with the conversion and civilization of the latter so long
as the civil authorities should have any power over them. Dur
ing the seventeenth century, under the leadership of the single-
minded and energetic Vieyra, their efforts to secure the sole
authority over the Indians were unremitting. They gradually
gained extensive control ; large sections of the aboriginal popula
tion were delivered entirely to them, and they enforced their
authority with characteristic fearlessness.2
The jealousy of the settlers now passed the bounds of repres
sion. They were so given over to the slave-system that they
could no longer provide for themselves. A biological dif
ferentiation of function, as it were, had left them, like Darwin's
slave-making ants, in a sort of parasitic relation to a subject
race. "Men of noble lineage could not bring their children
to the city because they had no slaves to row their canoes."
On account of the activity of the Jesuits many planters "had
no one to fetch them wood or water, and were perishing for
want of slaves to cultivate their lands." Respect for law, here
tofore manifested at least in form, broke down, threats of
separation from Portugal were uttered, and a general tumult
of hostility to the Jesuits broke out. The mob dragged the
fathers from their cells, forced a resignation of control over the
Indians in favor of the civil authorities, and undertook the
speedy deportation of the whole Order. A skillful governor,
Segueira, managed to uphold authority without an appeal to
force (1662), but the planters did not forget their day of
triumph, and the Jesuits never again dared so imperiously to
assert their dominance in the colony's affairs.3 Thus their
'Rio-Branco, 127 ff. ; cf. Martins, 0 Brazil, etc., 25-26; Watson, II,
97-98, 115-116, 270.
2 Watson, II, 85, 88-89; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 52; Martins, O Brazil, etc.,
30, note.
8 Watson, II, 92-94.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 389
struggles against the enslavement of natives on the plantations
were of little ultimate avail, and the outcome of their subse
quent efforts to save their proteges from the mines was, as will
presently appear, still more disastrous, at least to themselves.
The Indians constituted the labor force nearest at hand.
Their conquest and capture afforded an employment which had
been, and is said still to be, congenial to the Portuguese as a peo
ple.1 Their initial cost was, especially at the outset, negligible.
Hence the prevalence of Indian slavery and the resistance to
its abolition. However, from the earliest years of its occu
pation, Brazil had been the destination of an increasing number
of African slaves, chiefly from the Guinea coast.2 The various
hindrances thrown by government and clergy in the way of the
enslavement of the Indians caused the less tenacious or more
law-abiding of the cultivators to have recourse to the imported
labor-supply. And it was speedily recognized that the negro
was far superior to the Indian for the purpose at hand. Indeed,
it has been observed through history that the former race, both
by physique, resistance to environment, and temperament, has
been almost preordained to serve its more energetic fellows.
But the great difficulty was that the planters could not afford
the initial cost of the negroes, however great their superiority.3
There was no opposition to negro slavery, per se, however, on
the part of anyone, and it steadily increased with the decline or
liberation of the natives. By 1585 Pernambuco counted some
10,000 African slaves, Bahia 3,000 to 4,000. Elsewhere they
were relatively few in number, for they found their greatest use
fulness on the sugar-plantations. At one time in the seven
teenth century the proportion of negroes to whites in Bahia was
estimated at twenty to one, but this was by no means true of
Brazil as a whole.4 It need scarcely be said that this trade in
human working animals exhibited the stock features of heartless-
ness and incredible cruelty. The voyage from Guinea was rela
tively short, but its terrors were manifold. There are not lacking
'Watson, II, 81-82.
2 Varnhagen, I, 182.
8 Watson, II, in; Martins, O Brazil, etc., 52.
'Watson, II, 116-117, 121.

390 Yale Review [Feb.
those who believe that the scourge of yellow fever was fixed
upon Rio Janeiro and other American ports by reason of the
dumping of filth and diseased corpses from the slavers into the
waters of the harbor and its environs. Once at work, however,
the very value of the negroes insured them against such harsh
ness of treatment as fell to the lot of the unadaptable and gener
ally obdurate Indians, and with their increase there were added to
the constituents of population several new varieties of mon
grel, and a body of runaway or bush-negroes, who ranged the
forests in a condition of dangerous tribal independence.1
This internal struggle over the labor-question was not allowed,
in the course of events, to monopolize the attention of govern
ment and people. The more northern nations of Europe were
gradually losing, as the sixteenth century wore on, both their
respect for the papal awards to Spain and Portugal and their
fear of the exaggerated naval power of these once irresistible
states. Plucking up their courage, they began to infringe first
of all upon the Spanish and Portuguese possessions on the
Atlantic. From the time of the discovery of Brazil the French
had occasionally visited the region; indeed it was their appear
ance in this quarter which incited in the Portuguese a realization
of the possible value of their neglected acquisition in America.
The first serious attempt of the French to establish themselves
in what is now Brazil occurred in 1558, when an adventurer,
Villegagnon, occupied an island in the bay of Rio Janeiro. He
was actively encouraged by Coligny, and was left unmolested
by the Portuguese for four years. "Some ten thousand
Huguenots were ready to emigrate with their arts had they been
sure of meeting with toleration, but the governor's arbitrary
proceedings ruined the project." By this time the court at
Lisbon had been aroused by the Jesuit Nobrega to a realizing
sense of the rivalry of the French, and after some hard fight
ing, the latter were expelled from their position. Several sub
sequent attempts of the French in the same region were speedily
thwarted; Rio was again taken by them in 171 1, but was held
'Martins, O Brazil, etc., 62-63. For the "republic" of Palmares, which
attained its greatest vigor about the middle of the seventeenth century,
see Watson, II, iio-iii, 134; Martins, O Brazil, etc., 64, 66.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 391
for a brief period only. It was not until the latter half of the
seventeenth century that they actually established themselves
in Cayenne.1
If the French peril was a serious one, that which attended the
appearance of the Dutch came near to being fatal. Up to the
incorporation of Portugal by Spain (1580) the Portuguese and
Dutch had been common enemies and combatants against the
latter power, but with the accession of Philip II. to the throne
of Portugal, both this and other fortunate rapprochements
were terminated. For sixty years Portugal was destined to
share the odium of Spain and to receive blows delivered at her.
Dutch successes in the East had led to the formation of the West
India Company (1621), one of whose main objects was the
harassing and conquest of Brazil. The difference between the
enterprises of the Dutch and the predatory expeditions of the
French and English speedily became apparent to the Brazilians.
They found, to their astonishment, that the Dutch intended to
stay. This situation roused the national spirit in the contests
with the Hollanders as it had not been stirred in the brushes
with other Europeans.2
The history of the Dutch occupation of Recife (Pernambuco)
and six provinces of Brazil might be more fitly taken up from
the standpoint of the West India Company and its career. The
Portuguese steadily opposed the Dutch occupation and, owing
to the short-sighted and parsimonious policy of the Company,
with some success. The turning-point came in 1640 with the
separation of Portugal from Spain and the accession of the
house of Braganza, an event which detached Portugal from the
destiny of Spain, and ranged her again among Spain's enemies,
among the chief of whom were the Dutch. The altered situa
tion was at once recognized in form, and a truce for ten years
was arranged beween the States and Portugal (1641). This,
however, was illusory. A year's time was given for notifying
the truce to the Dutch authorities in the Indies, and aid was
' Watson, I, 160-161 ; II, 106-108, 184 ; Varnhagen, I, 36 ff. ; 329 ff.
A chapter of the Huguenots in Brazil is given in Parkman's France and
England in North America, Pt. I (Pioneers of France in the New World,
ch. ii).
"Martins, 0 Brazil, etc., 39-40.

392 Yale Review. [Feb.
afforded to Portugal against the common enemy; but the interval
was employed in, pushing forward the Dutch conquests in Bra
zil, and in seizing Sao Paulo de Loanda in Angola, the source
of the entire supply of slaves for Brazil.1 This, besides cutting
off a lucrative trade, was a severe blow to the prosperity of the
plantations; and after the recall of Count Nassau from Brazil
the policy of the Dutch became less and less conciliatory, and the
exasperation of the Portuguese more pronounced. In Maran-
hao, Bahia, and Pernambuco the people began to work for their
own deliverance. The general revolution was headed by Joao
Fernandes Vieira, a very wealthy planter, operating in the
region of Pernambuco. It was not at first a universal move
ment, for many thought it hopeless and wished for peace at any
price; but the impolitic procedures of the Dutch, who in their
inability to reach the actual insurgents began to oppress the
lukewarm who had stayed at home, speedily rendered a neutral
status untenable. The party of Vieira constantly gathered
momentum, and advanced from guerilla warfare to battles and
sieges. The Company provided insufficiently against the dan
ger, and J:he outcome was not long delayed. The Dutch,
hampered by the English war, were driven by 1654 to a sur
render of all their holdings on the coast of Brazil, and
further activity on the part of Holland was discouraged by the
attitude of England and France. In 1661 negotiations were
concluded whereby the Dutch renounced attempts on Brazil in
return for certain considerations in money and trade and the
restoration of their captured cannon.2
Thus ended the most serious danger to Portuguese dominance
in Brazil. Under a more enlightened policy on the part of the
Dutch the whole destiny of the country might have been altered.
But an outcome of the kind described was quite characteristic
1 The pretext given for this action was disbelief in the permanent separa
tion of Spain and Portugal. It must also be borne in mind that peace
concluded between European nations never strictly applied, in these ear
lier periods, to their respective colonies.
2 On the Dutch in Brazil see Watson, II, p. 1 ff. ; Varnhagen, I, 335-
404; Zimmermann, I, 138 ff., Van Rees, Staathuishoudkunde, II, 182 ff.;
G. Edmundson, The Dutch Power in Brazil, in the English Historical
Review, vol. 11 (1896), 231 ff.; vol. 14 (1899), 676 ff.; vol. 15 (1900), 38 ff.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 393
of the West India Company. Of course the violence and dis
order of the period were very unfavorable to the economic
prosperity of Brazil; in partial compensation, however, cer
tain distinct advantages emerged from the Dutch occupation.
First of all, the Brazilians attained a sense of self-sufficiency
and power and a consciousness of unity not experienced before.
Like the Spanish-Americans of a later period, they had expelled
a powerful invader practically unaided, for Portugal, though
in sympathy with the insurgents, did not dare to offend her
Dutch allies against Spain by openly lending aid. Thus the
Brazilians felt, in a sense, that they had attained their political
majority. Portugal realized the changing conditions, and in
1645 tne colony was made a Principado by the designation of
the King's eldest son and presumptive heir as Prince of Brazil.1
During this period of misfortune the Brazilians came also to
realize the nature of the Inquisition2 as a check upon the country's
development, and were able better to secure commercial and other
enterprises against the peril of confiscation of capital, ecclesiasti
cal interference and like impediments. A Brazil company, in
imitation of the Dutch company, was created against clerical
opposition, and aided considerably in bringing the war to a
successful end. It should be said, too, that the Brazilians
profited by the fact that the Dutch introduced, as it were, their
country to Europe. The conquerors not only described Brazil,
in the course of their commercial operations, to people to whom
it had been but a name, but they also made Brazilian products,
chiefly sugar and rum, familiar articles in European markets.
Their charts and records of soundings remained in use up to
a very recent time. It can hardly be said that the Dutch occu
pation exerted otherwise any considerable influence upon the
'Varnhagen, I, 246; II, 2.
" The Holy Office, as has been intimated, never attained a firm footing in
Brazil; but it interfered more or less regularly in affairs. Immediately
preceding and during the union with Spain its influence waxed, and it
assumed at times an independent judicial power. About 1702 a second
period of vigor ensued, and between 1707 and 1711, 160 persons were seized
and persecuted. The total number of colonists condemned by the Office
acting in Lisbon was about 500. At times physicians, lawyers and even
ecclesiastics came . under its displeasure. Autos-de-fe were relatively infre
quent. Varnhagen, II, 179-183.

394 Yale Review. [Feb.
future of the country. The Hollanders furnished an example
of industry and extreme domestic cleanliness to a people who
had a good deal to learn along these lines. They also benefited
the country by their experience in the treatment of damp soils,
in horticulture, in the construction of public works and in other
lines. But they had not time to develop any of these things to
the full, nor did they intermarry to any great extent with the
Portuguese, for difference of religion presented insuperable
obstacles. They were in the country twenity-five years, but
"when they departed they left little or no trace behind them
either in religion, language or manners." 1 In fact the
departure of the Hollanders was signalized by a reaction
toward Catholic fanaticism, and oppression of the Jews and
Protestants.2 There was no ominous menace to Brazil from other enemies
than the French and Dutch. During the Spanish predomi
nance English fleets occasionally raided the coast, notably in
1582, 1586, and with most damage in 1594. Although con
siderable booty was secured, none of these attacks threatened
the conquest of the country.3
An attempt has been made thus far to clear up the perspective
of Brazilian history previous to the eighteenth century; for
with the end of the seventeenth the general trend of develop
ment in this colony takes a decided turn which provides a con
venient break in presentation, and an apt point of departure
for the ensuing narrative. Hitherto the colony had been
almost wholly devoted to agriculture and the exchange of agri
cultural products;4 but with the eighteenth century there is
'Watson, II, 118; life in the interior still remained distinctly primitive.
Id., II, 266.
2 Varnhagen, II, 42.
8 Watson, II, 254-258.
'Martins, O Brazil, etc., 15-16, summarizes the early development of
Brazil as follows : "a) First material of colonization : convicts and Jews
deported by the sovereign; escaped criminals; colonists assembled by the
donatarios; in Brazil, enslaved Indians, and everywhere Guinea negroes,
exported as instruments of labor, b) Species of colonial enterprise : agri
culture, characterized almost exclusively by the culture of cane and the
manufacture of sugar, c) Social constitution : feudal, by way of ter
ritorial grants, seigniories or captaincies; or by mercantile monopolies, as

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 395
injected into its life the new element of the exploitation of the
mines, destined here as elsewhere to set a characteristic stamp
upon social development. But it is to be noted in the case
of Brazil, as has been intimated already, that, unlike the
majority of gold and jewel-producing countries, it had already
worked out two centuries of development along other and sub
stantial lines, before the rush of prospectors and the formation
of mining communities could introduce disorder and a perver
sion of steadier and more normal development.
Hopes of a second Peru were early indulged, but the seven
teenth century was well on to its end before any real promise was
disclosed. A succession of arduous exploring expeditions
culminated in 1693 with the exhibition of some promising
specimens of gold,1 and the consequent establishment of a
smelting-house. The district toward which attention was
turned was Minas Geraes, and, although the section was unin
viting, it speedily became the Mecca of those who were impatient
of laborious methods in the acquisition of wealth. The stam
pede for claims was so wild that special regulations had to be
passed as early as 1702 limiting grants and defining tenure.2
The plantation system was all but ruined ; farms were deserted
and ran to waste; negroes were transferred, by an excess of
demand for their services, from the sugar-producing areas to
the mines. The rise in the price of raw sugar disabled the refin
ing industries, and the French and English in the West Indies,
taking advantage of the situation, began to invade the European
market hitherto supplied almost exclusively from Brazil.
With the decline of the staple commodity, general trade suf
fered a great reverse. Some attempts were made to remedy
this situation, but they were presently given up, for the Lisbon
government was not hard to persuade that mining was more
in Guinea; conjointly with the governors-general as representatives of
the sovereign. Ecclesiastical organization; in imitation of the kingdom,
in bishoprics and parishes. Free missions, chiefly of Jesuits." For the
status of Brazil at the end of the seventeenth century, see Varnhagen, II,
92 ff. ; 136 ff.
' For the earlier efforts, see Martins, O Brazil, etc., 78, note.
"The regulations in force about 1710 are rehearsed in Varnhagen, II,
103 and ff.

390 Yale Review. [Feb.
profitable than sugar-raising.1 The old preoccupations which
had once rendered Brazil inconsiderable to the Portuguese now
exalted it to a position of superlative importance. With the
development of the mines, then, it may be said that Brazil
ceased for the time to be an agricultural colony. And the dis
covery in 1730 (also in the Minas Geraes) of the diamond
fields carried the change considerably further. Brazil fell back
from its dignified status as a producing and developing region
into the position of a California or a South Africa.
The results of heightened interest on the part of the home
government began at once to make themselves visible. The
Crown demanded its fifths and marked out its allotments, and,
as was inevitable under the conditions, it gradually enacted
more and stricter regulations in its effort to control the illicit
export of gold dust. All the gold was to pass through the
royal smelting-house. Restrictions of the entrance of foreign
ers to Brazil were rendered more stringent than before, and
even the Portuguese were required to exhibit passports. The
ineffectiveness of the crown levies on the gold production led
in time to the substitution of a poll-tax upon slaves; and yet,
in spite of its strenuous efforts, the government was constantly
defrauded. In the case of the diamonds, the system of the
royal fifths was found impracticable from the first and a capi
tation tax on slaves was early adopted. The diamonds were
to be remitted in the royal ships only, one per cent, on their
value being charged as freight. It was necessary likewise to
limit the output of diamonds, for within two years their price in
Europe had declined seventy-five per cent. 2 The state under
took to reserve the diamond country and to limit the extraction,
and the profits thus derived were very large. Between 1700
and 1820 Portugal consistently derived from takings and
taxes in gold mines and diamond fields a revenue upon which
rivals looked with undisguised envy.3 However, prosperity
'Watson, II, 171-174; Varnhagen, II, 174 ff.
"Leroy-Beaulieu (I, 55"56) defends upon economic grounds this limita-
tation of output, at the same time stigmatizing the means adopted by the
government. Cf. Watson, II, 171-172. 186-190, 244-245; Martins, O Brazil,
etc., 80.
"Definite estimates of such income are, of course, impossible. Eschwege
calculated the total product of the fifths as about $65,000,000. They are

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 397
based upon such hazardous undertakings is apt to be illusory.
It has been calculated by a competent authority that the value of
the diamonds extracted between 1740 and 1820 scarcely equalled
the product of eighteen months derived from the sugar and
coffee-plantations.1 The social effects of the discovery of the mines were naturally
very marked. The passion for gambling with large hazards
induced a general movement among the population towards the
uncertain and away from the secure and substantial. In a
certain sense the temper of the Portuguese in India was repro
duced. That this movement was not more disastrous than it
was is referable largely to the tardiness of the discoveries, as
occasion has already been taken to show. Of course the min
ing districts themselves were the centers of turbulence, irregu
larities, and disorder. In the arid interior, conditions of
existence were very hazardous. Life in the diamond fields was
about synonymous with sojourn in a desert. The necessaries
of life rose to famine prices. Men were driven by a shortage
of food to cultivation or cattle-raising, occupations which were
often found to be more profitable than mining. However, the
great enticements of the golden harvest led to a considerable
settlement,2 much of which was referable to the immigration
of the stubborn, independent, half-Indian Paulistas. In 1776
Minas Geraes had a population of some 320,ooo.3 The
thought by others to have reached a minimum of $2,000,000 annually. A
valuable list of estimates is given by Martins ; O Brazil, etc., 83, note. Others
are found in Watson, II, 244; Stephens, 348; Zimmermann, I, 168-169; Mar
tins, Hist, de Port., II, 151 ; Branco, Port, na Epocha, etc., 99. It should
be realized that these sums represented a much greater value in the eighteenth
century than they would at the present time.
' Eschwege, quoted in Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 56.
" "Brazil attracted, early in the eighteenth century, the entire Portuguese
emigration. The rapidity with which this emigration developed was such
that Dom Joao V promulgated a decree in 1720 in order 'to
prohibit the yearly migration from this country to the captaincies of Brazil
of so many people . . . chiefly from the province of Minho, which,
from being the most populous, today finds itself in a state of not having
enough people to cultivate the soil, or to perform social services.' "
Corvo, I, 15.
"Watson, I, 269. Martins believes that the very names of the new mining
settlements, which are mainly of local origin and seldom Portuguese,
witness a progressive nationalization or assimilation of the stream of

398 Yale Review. [Feb.
temper of the miners was lawless from the outset, and they had
to be quelled again and again by governmental forces, as well
as constantly spied upon and restrained in the interest of the
crown revenues. Insurrections against such restraints were put
down only after prolonged resistance, and by summary methods.
Again, the large importation of negroes into Minas Geraes
rendered race-conflicts the order of the day, and special effort
had to be put forth to check the formation by escaped slaves of
dangerous predatory bands. However, despite the perversion
of law and order that resulted from the gold and diamond
discoveries, the outcome of the movement toward the interior
was a progressively increasing exploration of the country, its
resources and waterways.1
One of the consequences of the gold discoveries was, naturally
enough, the accentuation of differences regarding the treatment
of the natives, for not only were slaves of all kinds in demand
at the mines, where their position could scarcely be better than
on the plantations, but the penetration of the interior and the
rapid growth of European population worked toward the
infringement of that isolation in which the Jesuits desired to
keep their actual or prospective converts. The idea of the
Jesuits, which perhaps appears more typically in the Paraguay
missions, was to keep the* Indians under their own tutelage
and in a life of repose under discipline. They divided the
country systematically, and their aldeias or industrial missions
rose at regular points over the whole. They labored exces
sively, building churches and establishing schools, learning
native tongues and translating into them the prayers of the
Church. Their system was mild and paternal; they neither
corporally punished their charges nor would they sell or other
wise part with them. They did much to introduce civilization
among the Indians, and, in order to make their work secure and
to spare bad examples, they strove to keep the settlers at a dis
tance.2 In this they were aided by the laws of Pedro II. (1667-
immigration. O Brazil, etc., 85 and note. He also thinks the frontier educa
tion was one that strengthened the love for independence and at least
indirectly contributed to the emancipation. Id., 79.
'Watson, II, 171; Martins, O Brazil, etc., 19; 32-34; 80-81.
"Watson, II, 267.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 399
1706), which forbade Portuguese to dwell in the missions.
However, the Indians in Brazil, still subject to civil authority,
never clung to the fathers as did the Guaranis of Paraguay;
nor could the settlement of the whites be prevented, when strong
enough motives for such establishment were once developed.
But the activity of the Jesuits, hateful as it was to the planters,
and the legislation secured in favor of the Indians, were not
without their influence. For when the mines were opened the
effect upon the condition of the natives was far less disastrous
than would have been anticipated. This was partially due, of
' course, to the increased use of negro labor.1 The natives'
sphere of rights had been extended and with fewer qualifica
tions as time went on. It is a curious coincidence that the
Indians were made unqualifiedly free before the law almost
coincidently with the expulsion from Brazil of their old-time
defenders, the Jesuits (1758).2
It has been shown how the popular mind became inflamed
against the Jesuits in consequence of the determined efforts of
the latter to prevent the settlers from taking full advantage of
what seemed to them a naturally provided labor-supply. It was
practically impossible to persuade the planters that the Jesuits
were disinterested antagonists. The conviction grew apace that
the aldeias were simply competing plantations, worked at a
merely nominal cost by converts adroitly turned into slaves.
There was much color to this persuasion, for the missions did
not lag behind in production. The planters felt that they were
being overreached even before the opening of the mines, and
when, in consequence of this latter event, they lost a large pro
portion of their workers, and the price of negroes rose, their
exasperation over the relatively prosperous status of the Jesuit
plantations steadily increased. The Company had become "a true
industrial association with which no single capitalist could com
pete." 3 It had acquired or assumed a degree of political power,
'Watson, II, 170; 201-202; Varnhagen, II, 93 ff.
2 Martins, O Brazil, etc., 30, note ; for a general account of the Indian
legislation, etc., see Zimmermann, I, 136 ff.
"Varnhagen, I, 260; cf. 257-261; Martins, Hist, de Port. II, 185; Rio-
Branco, 131.

400 , Yale Review. [Feb.
in the attainment of its economic strength, which galled the
settlers, especially in the southern provinces where population
was more dense. The fathers were driven from the south first
of all, and then from the Bahia region. They were not secure
even in the extreme north.1 It is probable, therefore, that with
the growth of population Brazil would alone have rid herself
of her incubus, but it was from the metropolis which had
fostered the Jesuits that final relief came.
King Joao V. (1706- 1750) had been the unresisting tool of
the Society,2 but with the accession of Jose I. (1750) the
situation changed. Carvalho, the Marquis of Pombal, became-
the dominant figure of the new reign, and, in the estimation of
some, the most eminent statesman of his time.3 Of his many
projects those which touch vitally upon our subject were the
freeing of the Indians in Brazil and the universal and merciless
pursuit of the Jesuit order. Pombal's object in freeing the
Indians was that they should blend with the Portuguese popu
lation in Brazil. His hostility to the Jesuits resulted from his
desire to strengthen the monarchy both in Lisbon and in the
colonies.4 In 1757 the temporal power of the mission was sup
pressed. The Indians were definitely freed in 1758, and the
aldeias were transformed into villages under common law.
Naturally the Society suffered much from this cancellation of
its means of support, being reduced almost to penury. Lay
directors were appointed to carry out the royal purpose of
christianizing and civilizing the Indians; needless to say, they
neither possessed the preparation nor gained the successes of the
Jesuits.5 But there was more opportunity given for the
amalgamation of races, and it was improved. "This is the
true reason," says Varnhagen, "why the Indian type has dis
appeared almost absolutely from our provinces." 6 From this
1 Martins, O Brazil, etc., 70-73.
2Cf. Branco, Port, na Epocha de D. Joao V., passim.
8 Watson, II, 232.
'Pombal and the King showed the greatest devotion to the welfare of
Brazil. Rio-Branco, 146; Martins, Hist, de Port., II, 204-205; cf. 207-
208; cf. also Branco, Port, na Epocha, etc., 109 ff.
"Watson, II, 236-237; Martins, O Brazil, etc., 72-73; Rio-Branco, 148-149.
"Varnhagen, I, 205.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 401
time on little is heard of the natives, for, as will be seen, the
possibilities of African slave-labor began to engross the atten
tion of those who had hitherto made requisition upon the Indians.
As for the Jesuits, the reasons for their expulsion from
Portugal and the colonies go back to a series of wide-reaching
activities of which the championing of the Indians was but one.
"For two hundred years the Society had exercised unbounded
influence over kings and courts. Its machinery for governing
was so perfect, and its system was so subtle, that it began to
appear to statesman that unless this ambitious order were
speedily and effectually opposed it must soon dominate Chris
tendom. . . . The doctrines of Ignatius Loyola admitted
of nothing short of an absolute obedience. Kings were afraid
to act without the approbation of an Order whose system of
espionage was so complete as even to baffle secret confidential
intercourse between sovereigns and statesmen. No one Catho
lic monarch felt himself strong enough single-handed to
throw off the humiliating yoke."1 Meanwhile the economic
and political strength of the Order waxed steadily; it had
already, and with considerable success, resisted the royal
authority in India. A strong desire to free his country from
this element led Pombal to seize the Jesuits in Portugal and ship
them off to the Papal States (1759) ; and to decree their expul
sion from Brazil together with the other colonies, an operation
which was carried out in America with considerable gusto, and,
it is said, with much brutality.2 Their expulsion from France
(1764) and Spain (1767) followed — events which attest the
widespread misgivings occasioned by their economical and
political activities.
The ignominious exit of the Jesuits from Brazil must not divert
attention from the great services performed by them, before,
having become conscious of the power of their well-knit organi
zation, they yielded to the temptations of wealth and power.
They performed herculean toil in their attempts to better the
1 Watson, II, 232. For an extremely eloquent arraignment of the Jesuits,
see Martins, Civ. Iber., 289-294; Hist, de Port, II, 85-100; 147 ff., and
elsewhere in this author's works.
2 Watson, II, 233-234; 237-238; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 52-53; Martins, Hist.
de Port., II, 147-148; 153; 182 ff. ; Varnhagen, II, 194 ff.

402 Yale Review. [Feb.
condition of the natives, and their preaching was not wholly
in vain, even amidst the exigencies of frontier-life. By 1750
no hostile tribes remained on the banks of the Amazon through
out its entire course. Such as had not submitted to the mis
sionaries had retired into the interior.1 We may pause here to
note that, partly because of the activities of the Jesuits, Brazil
had suffered from none of the direful native wars common in
the earlier stages of a colony's life. The teaching of the
Jesuits and their paternal system may have unduly hampered
the development of initiative on the part of their proselytes.
Their methods may often have been questionable and their lives
scandalous. It is significant, however, that the natives could
with difficulty be induced to leave the missions and work for the
settlers. The Jesuits were often, no doubt, especially in later
decades, examples of apathy and inculcators of superstition,
but "the conquest and colonization of Portuguese America in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is in large part their
work. As missionaries, they succeeded in winning thousands of
Indians for civilization, and the native race became, thanks
to their devotion, a considerable factor in the formation of the
Brazilian people." 2
One of the outcomes of Jesuit opposition to Indian servitude
was the growth of African slavery and the slave-trade. Des
pite the cost of the negro the colonist was forced to use him,
when the fathers had gained their day of success and had
drawn the native peoples into the missions under their paternal
protection. But it was the edicts of Pombal, freeing the
Indians and giving them actually or prospectively the same
rights as the Portuguese, that lent to the negro slave-trade an
impetus hitherto unknown.3 "In the first years (1755 ff.) of
the existence of the Companhia do Grao-Pard the import of
slaves into Brazil amounted to 100,000 per annum; of these
22,000 to 43,000 had Rio as their destination. . . . From
1759 to 1803 the colonial registers give, as consigned from
'Watson, II, 158-159; 199-202.
"Rio-Branco, 149; cf. Watson, II, 114-115; 123; Varnhagen, I, 202;
243- "Varnhagen, I, 181-185; cf. Martins, O Brazil, etc., 30, note.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 403 •
Angola to Brazil, 642,000 negroes. The income from the
exportation of negroes is estimated at 160 contos ($160,-
000). . . . From 181 7 to 1819 the average shipment
for Brazil was 22,000, and, despite the legal cessation of the
traffic, as late as 1839 there still issued from Angola 35 cargoes
of slaves." a These great numbers were demanded partially in
consequence of a heavy death-rate on the passage and in the
colony. To get 65,000 slaves to Brazil it was necessary to
start with some 100,000, and of the 65,000 some 3,000 to 5,000
died in the first two months after arrival. The profits of the
trade were of course high ; "the mine of negro labor was worth
as much as or more than the new world mines of silver and
gold." The colony acquired decidedly and definitely the
character common to all the (plantation) colonies of North
America and the Antilles — abandonment and extinction of the
indigenous races, colonization of whites, and negro slave-
labor." 2
The results for Brazil of the prohibition of the slave-trade
and the activities of the British cruisers were similar to those
experienced by those other American districts which were
devoted to tropical agriculture. If the outcome was less dis
astrous, it was because part of Brazil was a true settlement
colony, and because even the tropical portions had gotten a start
early in the country's history.
The gradual exhaustion of the mines toward the end of the
eighteenth century allowed the colony, though with some dis
tress, to return to its former and interrupted course of material
development. Abandonment of the famous, but not sterile,
source of wealth was hard, and it took almost a quarter of a cen
tury to give it up. It was during this period of transformation
that Brazil, by the fact of its separation from Portugal, passes
' M. de Sa, O Trabalho Rural Africano, quoted in Martins, O Brazil, etc.,
56, note. The close natural connection between Brazil and the source
from which it drew its indispensable labor-supply, the West African stations,
should receive especial attention. When the Dutch occupied Brazil (see
p. 391, above) they were led as a matter of course to acquire the slave-stations;
after their departure the Portuguese again managed to secure these com
plementary districts. See Martins, O Brazil, etc., vii; 37-38.
'Martins, O Brazil, etc., 54; 58-59; 73; 75; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 53.
37

404 Yale Review. [Feb.
from the field of our researches. However, before it ceased
to be a colony, Brazil had already turned back toward the type
of life in vogue before the gold discoveries. The province of
Minas Geraes had been the first to suffer from the decline of
the mines and the ensuing economic crisis. Early in the nine
teenth century, while its inhabitants were vacillating between the
mining of failing deposits and agriculture, many parts of the
province were practically in ruins. Apathy and abandonment
of all effort were all but universal.1 In time, however, it was
seen that cotton, coffee, tobacco, and other products of the soil
promised a better and more solid yield than had the mines at
their best. With this turn of the tide population began to grow
with great rapidity again, and export and coast trade took on
new life.2 The opening up of the interior had followed the
development of the mines and had not ceased with their virtual
abandonment. King Jose I. and Pombal had always had the
interests of Brazil at heart and the latter benevolent despot had
formed in 1755 a commercial company for Maranhao and Para
which had aided much in the exploration and colonization of
these regions.3 Pombal likewise curbed the power of religious
establishments other than those of the Jesuits, and rendered
life in Brazil more endurable for the Jews. 4 By 1800 Brazil
had a population of 3,200,000, half negro-slaves; in 1817-1818,
3,817,900 without counting children under ten years of age.
Of these about 1,000,000 were whites, 260,000 civilized
Indians, 526,000 mulattos or free negroes, and 1,930,000 slaves.
In 1800 Brazilian exports and imports amounted to over $11,-
000,000 and $10,000,000 respectively. 5
The advance of the Portuguese toward the interior in conse
quence of the discovery of gold and diamonds revived the old
contentions whose settlement was the object of the treaty of
'Martins, O Brazil, etc., 86-89.
"Martins, O Brazil, etc., 168-170.
"Watson, II, 238-239; Rio-Branco, 146.
'Watson, II, 242-243. Official corruption was, however, rife. The desire
to get rich quickly invaded the minds of the colonial appointees as it had
in India. The population was still raw and illiterate. Zimmermann, I,
173 ff.
5 Rio-Branco, 149-152; cf. Watson, II, 268; Martins, O Brazil, etc., 68-69.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 405
Tordesillas. The Demarcation Line had been respected neither
by the Portuguese in Brazil nor the Spanish in the East Indies.
Spain had kept the Philippines and exacted an indemnity or
purchase-price for the Moluccas. Admitting these facts as
evidence of a western shift of the Pacific demarcation meridian,
Portugal could claim a good part of Patagonia, Paraguay, and
the Plata region. But by a treaty of 1750, a division which
rested upon the principle of the maintenance of present hold
ings, boundaries essentially the same as those of to-day were
established. Unrealizable pretentions based upon the famous
papal bull were thus abandoned; the temper of 1493 had long
passed. Portugal renounced any rights to the navigation of
the Plata, and all trade between the two nations was forbidden.1
In order now to understand the impelling forces of that
movement which made of Brazil an independent state, it is
necessary to recall the fact that a certain part of the country-
lay within a temperate region, and as a result of vital and other
conditions was fitted to work out the line of development
natural to such environment. This favored district was the
south. From early times its population had been superior in
quantity and quality to that of the tropical regions, and the fact
that the mines lay within it lent it a still greater attractive
power. "Mountains, rivers, mines, men, geography and human
choice coincided to give to the region of Sao Paulo-Minas the
supremacy over all Portuguese America." 2 This district was
at first neglected as especially unpromising according to the
ideas of the time. It came however to a position of leadership
in all Brazilian history: in the exploration of the interior, in
Indian wars and slave raids, in mine discovery, in the beating off
of attacks from without. The Paulistas were the most energetic,
stubborn and independent component of the population of the
colony. As contrasted with the north, the progress of the
south was less speedy but more solid. While in the north atten
tion turned to an exotic culture dependent upon an imported
labor supply, the south exhibited a system approaching that of
'Watson, II, 144; 218; 220; cf. 212.
" Martins, O Brazil, etc., 125 ; cf. Stephens, 163 ff.

406 Yale Review. [Feb.
"free colonization." The north still formed a Portuguese
"plantation," while the south had acquired many of the rudi
ments of a developing nation. This supremacy was recognized
by the transference of the capital in the middle of the eighteenth
century from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro. x
The temper of this region was never tractable. It was
quarrelsome rather, violent and revolutionary, particularly
after the infusion of the miner element. When the eighteenth
century was drawing to a close, the ground was already prepared
for almost any degree of political assertion. The principles of
the French Revolution and the example of the American united
to render the Brazilians more uneasy. Indeed a revolution
broke out in Minas Geraes in 1789, which witnessed in some
degree to the receptivity of the Paulistas for the doctrines of
the French philosophers. It was repressed with needless
severity.2 Now it was precisely during this disturbed period that
the great European struggles impinged indirectly upon the local
situation, and with a result unique in the history of coloniza
tion. For, in consequence of Napoleon's activities in the
Peninsula, the Crown of Portugal itself was forced to emigrate
into its great transatlantic possession, thus completely perturbing
the antecedent status of affairs. Socially, a veritable experi
ment in the admixture of oil and water ensued. The Portu
guese "mandarinate" was brought into close proximity to the
Paulista type, rude and democratic. There was likewise an
inversion, as it were, of political relationship between Portugal
'Martins, O Brazil, etc., 31-32; 46-48; 75-77. "The Brazilian nation
evolved in colonial fashion (colonialmente) in the north, but organically
and spontaneously in the south. Semi-independent, the region of S. Paulo-
Minas with the great bay of Rio- Janeiro, the national capital of a future
empire, was working out in obscurity an organic structure; while the
Brazil of officialdom, of brilliance and opulence, the Brazil of the viceroys
and governors, was seated in the north, in Bahia and Pernambuco. That
Brazil, however, was not geographically the center of the empire. Its
climate seemed to condemn it to the eternal condition of a colony
dependent upon an exotic culture and upon African slavery, or to the
unhappy lot of a Jesuit Paraguay." Martins, O Brazil, etc., 76; cf. 31-
32; 46-48; 75-77; 9°- For the general status of Brazil at the end of the
eighteenth century, see Varnhagen, II, 236 ff.
"Martins, O Brazil, etc., 101-104; Rio:Branco, 151; cf. Varnhagen, II,
269 ff.

T9°6] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 407
and Brazil, whereby the latter became the metropolis and the
former the dependency.1 Rio Janeiro constituted, to all practi
cal intents, the capital of the Portuguese empire. Results of
great significance could not fail to follow upon this situation.
The royal family of the Braganzas arrived in Brazil early
in 1808, thus realizing a transference of the court projected
by Joao IV. in the seventeenth century, by Da Cunha in 1736,
and Pombal in 1761. The country at once, and by the logic of
the situation, became an independent empire. The King
hastened to issue a series of decrees assuring to Brazil such
industrial and other advantages as the metropolis had possessed.
Agriculture, manufacture, and commerce were put on their
feet and encouraged, foreigners freely admitted, departments,
courts, and councils established, roads built and exploration
furthered, schools, libraries, and scientific projects supported.
In 1 81 5 Brazil was accorded the title of Realm. For seven
years the country was administered directly by local officials
under a local sovereign. This event was extremely opportune,
for it had the merit of placing in evidence and politically
sanctioning an inevitable and imminent change of Brazil's
status.2 It also had a more lasting effect in binding the various
Brazilian provinces together, both politically and economically
(through the construction of roads and other means of inter
communication), as the Spanish South American colonies, for
example, were never united.3 And when the King, against his
will, was forced by the insistence of England to return to Lis
bon, he left his oldest son, Dom Pedro, behind as Regent of the
Realm. For all the benefits of the royal sojourn, however, the Bra
zilians were glad to see it end. The European court was an
exotic plant in the rude new country, and the ways of the
aristocracy palled upon the hardy settlers of the Paulista type.
There was nothing in common between the two. When now
'Martins, O Brazil, etc., 94; Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 56-57; Varnhagen, II,
297 ff. ; Zimmermann, I, 411.
" Martins, O Brazil, etc., 94. For the emigration of the Braganzas, see
also pp. 90 ff. ; Rio-Branco, 154-155 ; Watson, II, 263 ff. Leroy-Beaulieu, I,
56-57; general sketch of the period in Zimmermann, I, 175 ff.
"Watson, II, 260; 270.

408 Yale Review. [Feb.
the Lisbon Cortes opposed the royal policy, voted the suppression
of schools and higher courts, ordered the dissolution of the
central government in Rio and the recall of Dom Pedro, and
tried to break Brazilian unity by attaching each province
separately to the metropolis, an almost universal movement in
favor of Brazilian autonomy set in. Dom Pedro, in response
to overtures on the part of the people of Rio and Sao-Paulo,
declared (January, 1822) that he would remain in the country.
The Portuguese troops who opposed the resolution were allowed
to depart for Portugal, and the prince, after proclaiming the
independence of Brazil (Sept. 7, 1822), was acclaimed first
perpetual protector, then constitutional emperor (Oct 12). It
was impossible for the metropolis to resist this culmination,
for it had "a smaller population and perhaps less wealth than
its colony. It resigned itself cheerfully to an inevitable fact," a
and Brazilian independence was recognized in 1825.2
The achievements of the Portuguese in Brazil deserve a word
of notice in perspective, and by way of comparison with those
of other peoples operating under similar conditions. The case
is well put by Leroy-Beaulieu : "The end of the eighteenth cen
tury and the beginning of the nineteenth brought to Brazil
none of those calamities which broke over the English and
Spanish possessions. Portugal followed in all the European
conflicts the destiny of England, the mistress of the seas, from
which it resulted that free circulation beween the metropolis and
the colonies was never interrupted: Brazil was in a position to
gain rather than to lose during the maritime wars of the
Europeans, for these smote the sugar islands of her rivals while
leaving her intact. If the separation of Brazil and Portugal
came to pass without violence and almost without shock, this
must not be regarded as a fortuitous circumstance. It was not
alone the diminutiveness and powerlessness of the metropolis
which rendered the transition so easy; the colony was ready
for independence, and, when it had detached itself from its
trunk like a ripe fruit, it did not cease to grow and prosper.
'Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 57; figures for the decline of Portugal's commerce
in Martins, O Brazil, etc., 249.
"Rio-Branco, 163-164; for the activities of Jose Bonifacio and the
character of Dom Pedro, see Martins, O Brazil, etc., 107; 111-116.

1906] Portuguese Colonization in Brazil. 409
The fact is that the Portuguese administration in Brazil, despite
its errors and faults . . . had not been very oppressive;
liberty had been the cradle of colonization. The abundance of
fertile lands, the absence of exaggerated regulation, the
feebleness of the main morte, had allowed the colony, in spite
of certain restrictions and monopolies, to reach conditions which
were normal and appropriate to an adult age." 1 Brazil was
likewise saved from the Inquisition, the Santo Officio, "from
that Status in Statu whose dictation, superior to all law,
diminished the majesty of the king, the power of the govern
ment, the justice of the courts, the ecclesiastical authority of the
prelates, and the liberty of the people — liberty not only to dis
cuss but even as it were to think. No special inquisition was
ever created in Brazil." 2
"The relations of Portugal with Brazil are, besides, much
more familiar, more intimate, more frequent, than those of
Spain with her former colonies in America. This has been seen
by the number of Portuguese who (still) emigrate to Brazil.
Several years ago the trade with Brazil represented about one-
sixth of the export and one-seventeenth of the import movement
of the total trade of Portugal. ... In the Indies a
jealous, narrow, and ambitious policy lost no time in ruining
the edifice of Portuguese power: in Africa, a disgraceful and
degrading trade afforded Portugal a debasing wealth : in Brazil
alone the Portuguese demonstrated themselves colonists. They
managed to blend the spirit of adventure in a just degree with
practical patience and laborious perseverance, and they thus
succeeded in realizing one of the aims, if it is not the sole object,
of colonization, the creation of a great State, rich, industrious,
and free." 3
These statements may serve to bring out the special achieve
ments of the Portuguese in America as distinguished both from
those of other nations in the New World and from those of
the same nation in the Old. It is probable that Leroy-Beau
lieu, in his partisanship for the Latin nations and his solicitude
'Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 56. It should be realized that Brazil is about ninety
times the size of Portugal. Cf. Watson, II, 113.
"Varnhagen, I, 88.
"Leroy-Beaulieu, I, 58, 59.

4* o Yale Review. [Feb.
for their future and the persistence of what is distinctive in
their culture, somewhat exaggerates the favorable case of Bra
zil. But it is clear enough, nevertheless, that, partly because
the colony furnished a favorable environment, partly because it
was let alone, partly because it was treated with less incom
petence than ordinarily, partly for a number of lesser reasons,
Brazil has become an independent nation whose kindly feeling
for the metropolis, unbroken by bloody revolutionary struggles,
is an international asset; for it adds much to the importance
of an otherwise insignificant parent state. Continuous infu
sions of Portuguese blood, due to an immigration motived not
by governmental but popular initiative, have gradually over
come the native strain of what was a largely mongrel popula
tion, and a fortunate reversion toward the more developed
ethnic component, with its ,happier. adaptation to modern con
ditions, has ensued. The contrast with the outcome in the Portu
guese East is sharp. In Brazil there has arisen a new and power
ful sponsor for that in language, religion, customs, and literature
which is Portuguese. To a certain degree a nation and its life
have been transplanted, and a new society, inheriting its dis
tinctive characters from an old, has come into a relative fullness
of strength. Albert G. Keller.
Yale University. Main References.
Bourne, E. G., Spain in America ; New York , and London, 1904.
Branco, M. B., Portugal na Epocha de D. .Joao V. ; 2d edit, Lisboa, 1886.
Corvo, J. de Andrade, Estu'dosf.sbbre as Provincias Uitramarinas ; 4
vols., Lisboa, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1887.
Edmundson, G., The Dutch Power in Brazil, Eng. Hist. Rev., vols. 11,
231 ff.; 14, 676 ff.; 15, 38 ff.
Leroy-Beaulieu, Paul, De la Colonisation chez les Peiiples Modernes;
5th ed., 2 vols., Paris, 1902.
Martins, J. P. Oliveira, Historia da Civilizacao Iberica, 3d edit., Lisboa, 1885.
 Historia de Portugal, 6th edit., 2 vols., Lisboa, jgoi.
 O Brazil e as Colonias Portuguezas, 6th edit., Lisb©a','; 1888.* '''
Parkman, F, France and England in North America (Pioneers of France
in the New World, ch. ii).
Rio-Branco, Histoire du Bresil, in Le Bresil en 1889 (Paris Exposition
publication) ; Paris, 1889.
Southey, R., History of Brazil; 3 vols., London, 1822.
Stephens, H. M., Portugal, in Story of Nations, series ; New York, 1891.
Varnhagen, F. A. de, Historia Geral do Brazil; 2 vols., Rio de Janeiro
1854 and I857.
Watson, R. G., Spanish and Portuguese South America during the
Colonial Period; 2 vols., London, 1884.
Zimmermann, A., Die Kolonialpolitik Portugals und Spaniens (vol. I
of Die Europaischen Kolonien) ; Berlin, 1896.

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