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THEOLOGICAL ESSAYS

REPRINTED FROM THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

NEW YORK & LONDON :
WILEY AND PUTNAM
1846.

Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1846, by
WILEY & PUTNAM,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New York,

R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER, 113 FULTON STREET.

PREFACE.

It is no more than justice to the conductors of the Princeton Review, to
state distinctly, that the thought of this republication did not originate
with them. For the selection of the articles, and the mode of their
present appearance, neither they nor the respective authors have any
responsibility. For a number of years it has been impossible to make up complete
sets of this periodical work; and numerous orders for the earlier volumes
remain unfulfilled. As, however, the demand for these discussions was
manifestly increasing, it was judged suitable to make choice among the
more valuable theological articles : the result is the volume now
offered. This^ it is confidently believed, will have a permanent value,
as representing a class of doctrinal opinion which, not without conflict,
is making wide and rapid progress in America. The topics here treated,
by some of the ablest pens in the Presbyterian Church in the United
States, are of great importance in theology. They involve the grave
questions agitated between the Evangelical scheme, on one hand, and
Infidels, Papists, Socinians, Pelagians, Arminians, and Enthusiasts, on
the other. In reproducing, for the use of clergymen, theological
students, and accomplished laymen, dissertations which have a polemical
aspect, it is by no means intended to revive old controversies ; yet it is
the persuasion of those who make this publication, that the value of the
truths contended for cannot well be overrated.
The " Biblical Repertory" has now reached its twenty-second volume.
It was commenced, at Princeton, in the year 1825, by Professor Hodge,
to whose care and learning it has continued to owe much of its value
and popularity. At the time of its inception, the plan did not extend
much beyond the field of criticism and hermeneutics ; and it was largely

JV PREFACE.
occupied with translations and reprints of biblical treatises, thus verifying
both parts of its title. After three or four years, it began to assume
more of the attributes of a theological and literary review, which charac
ter it has avowedly sustained for the last seventeen years.
To speak of the living contributors to this work might savour of
indecorum ; nor have we authority to intrude upon the privacy of those
respected men whose labours we use. Among the dead, we may record,
as ornaments of this publication, by essays and reviews of great merit,
the following honoured and beloved names : — The Reverend Dr. John H.
Rice, the Reverend Dr. Fisk, the Reverend Dr. John Breckinridge,
President Marsh, Professor Patton, the Reverend Mr. Winchester, and
the Reverend Professor Dod. In regard to the writings of the eminent
man last-mentioned, it is proper to say, that the publishers have been
restrained from incorporating his valuable contributions into this volume,
by the welcome information that a separate edition of his remains is in
preparation. Ample materials still remain for a similar volume, in case that which
is now respectfully offered should meet with the patronage which is
expected. New York, April 15, 1846.

CONTENTS.

Page
Essay I. The Rule of Faith 1
 II. The Sonship of Christ 27
—f— III. The Decrees of God 60
 IV. The Early Histery of Pelagianism 80
—r— - V. Original Sin 109
 VI. The Doctrine of Imputation 128
 VII. The Doctrine of Imputation 165
 VIII. The Doctrine of Imputation 195
 IX. Melancthon on the Nature of Sin 218
 X. Doctrines of the Early Socinians 228
—t— XI. The Power of Contrary Choice 250
 XII. The Inability of Sinners 265
-t— XIII. The New Divinity Tried 285
 XIV. Beman on the Atonement 308
 XV. Sacerdotal Absolution 352
 XVI. Regeneration 367
 XVII. Sanctification 405
 XVIII. Transubstantiation 444
 XIX. Sunday Mails 470
 XX. Bodily Effects of Religious Excitement 510
— r XXI. Tholuck's History of. Theology 524
 XXII. Transcendentalism 608
 XXIII. Cause and Effect 694

ESSAY I.
THE RULE OF FAITH:

The recent publication in England of so many works on Tra
dition indicates a new and extended interest in the subject ; and
their republication in America shows that the interest is as great
here as it is in England. It is not difficult to account for this.
The rapid increase of Romanism in some parts of the world, the
revival of zeal and confidence among the Papists, and the advo
cacy of the leading principles of the church of Rome by the Ox
ford Tracts, have rendered this and kindred points the prominent
subjects of religious discussion in Great Britain, and consequently,
to a great extent in this country. We question whether at any
period since the Reformation, or, at least, since the days of Arch
bishop Laud and the non-jurors, the public mind has been as much
turned to these subjects as it is at present. This is no doubt prin
cipally owing to the publication of the Oxford Tracts. It is
enough to arouse a Protestant community, to hear the Reforma
tion denounced as a schism, Protestantism decried as anti-chris-
tian, and all the most dangerous errors of Romanism espoused -and
defended by members of the leading Protestant university of Eu
rope. It is no wonder that this movement excites the joy of Pa
pists, and the indignation of Protestants. It is no wonder that the
press teems with answers to the artful and subtle effusions of men,
who, though sustained by a Protestant church, direct all their ener
gies to obliterate her distinctive character and to undermine her
doctrines. The wonder rather is that men, professing godliness,
can pursue a course so obviously unfair; or that they are allowed
to retain the stations which give them support and influence.
* Originally published in 1842, in review of the following works :
1. The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice. By William Goode, M. A., of Trinity
College, Cambridge.
2. Jl Treatise concerning the Right Use of the Fathers in the Decision of Con
troversies in Religion. By John Daille, Minister of the Gospel in the Re
formed Church at Paris.
3. JVot Tradition, but Scripture. By Philip N. Shuttleworth, D.D., Warden of
New College, Oxford (late Bishop of Chichester).
4. The Authority of Tradition in Matters of Religion. By George Holden,
M.A.
5. Tradition Unveiled. By Baden Powell, of Oriel College, Oxford
1

3 THE RULE OF FAITH.
It is certainly time, when not only the Romanists are redoubling
their efforts for the extension of their errors, but when they find
their most efficient allies in our own camp, that Protestants should
rouse themselves to a sense of their danger, and renew their pro
test against the false doctrines of Rome, and their testimony in
behalf of the truth of God. It is conceded that the turning point
in these controversies is the Rule of Faith. Are the scriptures of
the Old and New Testaments the only infallible rule of faith and
practice ? if so, Romanism and Puseyism are confessedly without
any adequate foundation. We say confessedly, first because their
advocates admit that the whole controversy turns upon the author
ity due to tradition ; and secondly, because, in enumerating the
doctrines which tradition is necessary to prove, they include the
very doctrines by which they are distinguished from Protestants.
" The complete rule of faith," says a distinguished Romanist, " is
scripture joined with tradition, which if Protestants would admit
all the other controversies between us and them would soon
cease."* " It may be proved," says Mr. Keble, " to the satisfac
tion of any reasonable mind, that not a few fragments yet remain,
very precious and sacred fragments of the unwritten teaching of
the first age of the church. The paramount authority, for exam
ple, of the successors of the apostles in church government ; the
three-fold order established from the beginning ; the virtue of the
blessed eucharist as a commemorative sacrifice ; infant baptism ;
and above all, the Catholic doctrine of the most Holy Trinity, as
contained in the Nicene creed. All these, however surely con
firmed from scripture, are yet ascertainable parts of the primitive
unwritten system of which we enjoy the benefit."f " Without its
aid [i. e. ol primitive tradition] humanly speaking. I do not see
how we could now retain either real inward communion with our
Lord through his apostles, or the very outward face of God's church
and kingdom among us. Not to dwell on disputable cases, how
but by the tradition and the practice of the early church can we
demonstrate the observance of Sunday as the holiest day, or the
permanent separation of the clergy from the people as a distinct
order ? Or where, except in the primitive liturgies, a main branch
of that tradition, can we find assurance, that in the holy eucha
rist, we consecrate as the apostles did, and consequently that the
cup of blessing which we bless is the communion of the blood of
Christ, and the bread which we break is the communion of the
body of Christ V'% This, in the language of the sect, means, How
but by tradition can we establish the doctrine of the real presence?
Again the same writer says, " The points of Catholic consent,
known by tradition, constitute the knots and ties of the whole sys
tem ; being such as these : the canon of scripture, the full doc
trines of the Trinity and Incarnation, the oblation and consecra-
* See Goode, vol, i., p. 90.
t Keble, Sermon on Tradition, p. 32. J lb., p. 38.

THE EULE OF FAITH.

tion of the eucharist, the apostolical succession." To these he
afterwards adds, " baptismal regeneration," and the doctrine " that
consecration by apostolical authority is essential to the participation
of the eucharist."
After quoting these and many other passages from Mr. Keble's
sermon, and from other writings of the Tractarians, Mr. Goode
thus enumerates and classifies the doctrines, which according to
their system depend on tradition alone, or upon scripture as ex
plained by tradition. " Relating to points disused, 1. The non-
literal acceptation of our Lord's words respecting washing one
another's feet. 2. The non-observance of the seventh day as a
day of religious rest.
'• Relating to ordinances in use among us, 1. Infant baptism.
2. The sanctification of the first day of the week. 3. The per
petual obligation of the eucharist. 4. The identity of our mode
of consecration in the eucharist with the apostolical. 5. That
consecration by apostolical authority is essential to the participa
tion of the eucharist. 6. The separation of the clergy from the
people as a distinct order. 7. The three-fold order of the priest
hood. 8. The government of the church by bisfiops. 9. The
apostolical succession. .
"Of points purely doctrinal, 1. Baptismal regeneration. 2. The-
virtue of the eucharist as a commemorative sacrifice. 3. That
there is an intermediate state, in which the souls of the faithful are
purified, and grow in grace ; that they pray for us, and that our
prayers benefit them.
" Of points concerning matters of fact, and things that do not
immediately belong either to the doctrines or the rites of Christian
ity, 1. The canon of the Scripture. 2. That Melchisedec's feast
is a type of the eucharist. 3. That the book of Canticles repre
sents the union between Christ and his church. 4. That wisdom,
in the book of Proverbs, refers to the Second Person of the Trinity..
5. The alleged perpetual virginity of the mother of our Lord."
" It is impossible," says Mr. Goode, " not to see that, among all
these points, the stress is laid upon those which concern the gov
ernment and sacraments of the church ; and our opponents being
persuaded that patristical tradition delivers their system on these-
points .... are very anxious that this tradition should be recog
nised as a divine informant ; and in the zealous prosecution of this
enterprise, are desirous further of impressing it upon our minds,
that almost all the other points relating either to doctrine or prac
tice, yea even the fundamentals of the faith, must stand or fall.
according as this recognition takes place or not."* This is true.
The writers of the Tracts, knowing and admitting that their pecu
liar doctrines, that is, doctrines which they hold in common witfi
the Romanists, and which distinguish both from Protestants, can
not be proved except by tradition, are led to assert, not only that
* Goode, vol. ii., p. 18.

THE RULE OF FAITH.

the doctrines peculiar to Episcopalians, but even some of the fun
damental doctrines of the Gospel, rest on the same unstable founda
tion. If we understand the fundamental principles of Romanism
and of the Oxford Tracts they are the following. That sacraments
are the only ordinary channels of communicating the grace of the
Holy Spirit and the benefits of Christ's merits ; that participation
of these sacraments is therefore the great means of salvation : that
the sacraments have this efficacy only when administered by duly
ordained ministers (except that the Papists admit the validity of lay
baptism in cases of necessity) ; that ordination confers the Holy
Spirit, and imparts the power and authority to consecrate the bread
and wine in the eucharist so that they become the body and blood
of Christ, and when offered, are a propitiatory sacrifice effectual for
the remission of the sins of the living and the dead ; and that the
right to ordain and the power to confer the Holy Spirit belong
exclusively to prelatical bishops as the successors of the apostles.
These, as it seems to us, are the bones, or, as Mr. Keble would say,
the knots and ties of the whole system. This is the foundation of
the whole fabric of papal and priestly domination and delusion.
Bishops are the successors of the apostles " in all the plenitude of
their power ;" " what Christ was in his own house, such now are
they. The authority which he possessed in his human nature, he
transfers to them ;"* they alone have the right to confer the
authority and power to administer the sacraments which are the
appointed channels of grace : hence they are the dispensers of sal
vation ; those whom they excommunicate, justly or unjustly, perish ;
those whom they receive and retain in communion of the church
are saved. Everything depends on them. They are in the place
of Christ. That such a system should find favour with the clergy,
human nature would lead us to expect ; and that it should be
adopted by the people, experience teaches us not to be surprised at.
It is the easiest of all methods of salvation ; the least self-denying,
the most agreeable to the indolent and depraved heart. But as it
is contrary to the word of God, men adopt it at their peril ; and its
very attractiveness is a reason why its falsehood and its dangerous
tendency should be exposed.
As the advocates of this system urge its acceptance on the
ground of tradition, it is not surprising that so large a portion of the
works written against the system, are directed against tradition as
a rule of faith. All the books mentioned at the head of this article,
with one exception, are the productions of clergymen of the
Church of England, and were written in answer to the Oxford
Tracts. The work of Daille" on the Use of the Fathers, is an old
book, which has retained its place as a standard for nearly two cen
turies, and is the store- house whence modern writers draw not a
few of their arguments and illustrations. Its publication by our
.Board in an improved form, thus rendering it easily accessible at a
* Mason's Tract on Catholic Unity, p. 10.

THE RULE OF FAITH. 5
cheap rate, is an important service to the church, and we heartily
recommend it to the careful study of our fellow ministers. The
works of the Bishop of Chichester, of Professor Powell, and of Mr.
Holden, have been already noticed in our pages, and are here men
tioned again only with a view of renewing our recommendation
to our readers to sustain the publisher in his laudable enterprise to
disseminate such reasonable books.
Mr. Goode's book, which is dedicated to the Archbishop of Can
terbury and the Bishop of London, is devoted to the refutation of
the Oxford Tracts. It gives at length the doctrine on tradition
taught in those writings ; proves that it is identical with the Popish
doctrine on the same subject ; demonstrates that patristical tradi
tion is not " a practically infallible witness of the oral teaching of
the apostles, nor receivable as a divine informant ;" and vindicates
the claim of holy scripture as the sole divinely-revealed rule of
faith and practice, and sole infallible judge of controversies, and
consequently, in the credenda of religion, the sole authority which
binds the conscience to belief in what it delivers. He vindicates
the fulness and sufficiency of the divine revelation as contained in
the scriptures, and in doing this examines at length the doctrines
which, as Tractarians affirm, tradition is necessary to establish.
He then shows that his doctrine on this whole subject is the doc
trine of the fathers themselves, as well as that of the Church of
England. He pronounces the appeal made by the Tractators in
their Catena Patrum, to the opinions of the English divines in sup
port of their doctrines, " one of the most unaccountable, and pain
ful, and culpable (however unintentional) misrepresentations with
which history supplies us." He convicts them of the grossest
unfairness in quoting in support of their views distorted fragments
of works written in direct and avowed opposition to them.
He accuses them of borrowing not merely their arguments, but in
a great degree their learning, at second hand from the Romanists ;
and brings forward cases of egregious blunders in their quotations
from the fathers. He shows that the famous tract No. 90, design
ed to show that the thirty-nine articles are consistent with the Tri-
dentine decrees, is little else than the reproduction of a work writ
ten by a Jesuit more than two centuries ago.*
The theory of the traditionists is, that the holy scriptures are
both defective and obscure. They contain, indeed, all the essential
doctrines of the Gospel, but they give, in many cases, mere hints
or notices of them, which could not be understood unless explain-
* The title of this work is, " Deus, natura, gratia, sive, Tractatus de Predestina-
tione, de mentis, et peccatorum remissione, seu de justificatione et denique de sancto
rum invocatione. Ubi ad trutinam fidei Catholicae examinatur confessio Anglicana, &c.
Accessit paraphrastica expositio reliquorum articulorum confessionis Anglicanae."
It was written^by an English convert to Popery, named Christopher Davenport, and
after his conversion called Francis a Sancta Clara, and designed to prove the English
articles to be conformable to the Tridentine doctrines. " And for learning and in
genuity our modern reconciler," says Mr. Goode, "is not to be compared to him.
But in all the most important points, the similarity between the two is remarkable."

6 THE RULE OF FAITH.
ed and developed by 'tradition, " It is a near thing," says Tract
85, " that they are in scripture at all ; the wonder is that they are
all there ; humanly judging, they would not be there but for God's
interposition ; and therefore since they are there by a sort of acci
dent, it is not strange they should be but latent there, and only
indirectly producible thence." The same writer says, the gospel
doctrine " is but indirectly and covertly recorded in scripture un
der the surface." But besides these doctrines which are essential
to salvation, there are others which are highly important which are
not in the scriptures at all, which we are bound to believe. These
doctrines we must learn from tradition ; it is, therefore, " partly the
interpretation, partly the supplement of Scripture."*
The authority due to tradition is the same as that which belongs
to the written word of God. In the language of the Council of
Trent,^" Traditiones non scriptas pari pietatis affectu, et reverentia,
cum scriptura esse recipiendas." So Mr. Keble says, that con
sentient patristical tradition is " God's unwritten word, demanding
the same reverence from us." Dr. Pusey says, " we owe faith to
the decisions of the church universal." " Our controversy with
Rome," he says, " is not an dpriori question on the value of tradi
tion in itself, or at an earlier period of the church, or of such tradi
tions as, though not contained in scripture, are primitive, universal,
and apostolical, but it is one purely historical, that the Romanist
traditions, not being such, but on the contrary repugnant to scrip
ture, are not to be received."
The ground on which this authority is ascribed to tradition is,
that it is a practically infallible informant of the oral instructions of
Christ and his apostles. " Let us understand," says Mr. Newman,
" what is meant by saying that antiquity is of authority in religious
questions. Both Romanists and ourselves maintain as follows : that
whatever doctrine the primitive ages unanimously attest, whether
by consent of fathers, or by councils, or by the events of history, or
by controversies, or in whatever way, whatever may fairly and
reasonably be considered the universal belief of those ages, is to be
received as coming from the apostles." This is the ground com
monly taken both by Romanists and the Oxford writers. Certain
doctrines are to be received, not on the authority of the fathers,
but upon their testimony that those doctrines were taught by the
apostles. Both however rely more or less on the gift of the Holy
Spirit communicated by the imposition of hands, who guides the
representative church into the knowledge of the truth, and renders
it infallible. "Not only," says Mr. Newman, "is the church
catholic bound to teach the truth, but she is ever divinely guided
to teach it ; her witness of the Christian faith is a matter of pro
mise as well as of duty ; her discernment of it is secured by a
heavenly as well as a human rule. She is indefectible in it, and
therefore not only has authority to enforce it, but is of authority in
* Newman's Lectures, p. 298.

THE RULE OF FAITH.

declaring it. The church not only transmits the faith by human
means, but has a supernatural gift for that purpose ; that doctrine
which is true, considered as an historical fact, is true also because
she teaches it."* Hence he says, " that when the sense of scrip
ture, as interpreted by, reason, is contrary to the sense given to it
by Catholic antiquity, we ought to side with the latter." Page 160.
Such being the high office of tradition, it is a matter of great
moment to decide how we are to ascertain what tradition teaches.
The common answer to this question is, Catholic consent ; what
ever has been believed always, everywhere, and by all, must be
received as derived from the apostles.
Sueh then is the theory. The scriptures are obscure and defec
tive. They contain only covertly and under the surface even, some
of the essential doctrines of the Gospel ; and some important doc
trines they do not contain at all. The oral teaching of the apos
tles was sufficient to explain these obscurities and to supply these
defects, and was of course of equal authority with their written
instructions. This oral teaching has been handed down to us by
the church catholic, which is a divinely appointed and divinely
guided witness of the truth. To her decisions, therefore, we owe
faith. And as every particular church may err, our security is
in adhering to the chureh universal, which is practically infallible.
It rarely if ever happens that any theory on any subject gains
credence among any number of competent men, which has not a
great deal of truth in it. And of the two great causes of the long-con-
1»nued and extensive prevalence of faith in tradition as a divine
informant, one no doubt is, that there is so much truth in the theory
as above propounded ; and the other is, that men find tradition to
teach what they are anxious to believe. The principal elements of
truth in the above theory are, first, that the testimony of God is the
only adequate foundation of faith in matters of religion ; second,
that as much confidence is due to the oral teachings of the apostles
as to their written instructions ; and third, that the fact that all true
Christians in every age have believed any doctrine, admits of no
other satisfactory solution, than that such doctrine was derived from
the apostles.
The application of these principles and the arguments founded
upon them by the traditionists, are, however, full of fallacy and un
fairness. They speak of the church catholic being, in virtue of
the promise of God, indefectible, and practically infallible, as far as
concerns fundamental truth. This every one will admit, if you
take the word church in its scriptural sense. The church is the
body of true believers ; the company of faithful men. That this
company cannot err in essential doctrines ; that is, that all true'
Christians will, by the grace of God, ever believe all that is essen
tial to their salvation, we have no disposition to dispute. And
moreover, that the promise of our Lord secures the continued ex-
* Lectures on Romanism, Sec., p. 225.

THE RULE OF FAITH.

istence of his church, or, in other words, a continued succession ot
true believers, we also readily admit. And we are consequently
ready to acknowledge, that if you can ascertain what this church
(i. e., true Christians) has ever, everywhere, and universally be
lieved, you have a practically infallible rule for determining, as far as
fundamentals are concerned, what is the true faith. But of what avail
is all this 1 How are you to ascertain the faith of all true believers in
every age and in every part of the world ? They have never formed
a distinct, visible society, even in any one age or place, much lesg
in all ages and places. They are scattered here and there in all
visible churches, known and numbered by no eye but His who
searches the heart. You might as well attempt to collect the suf
frages of all the amiable men who have ever lived, as to gather the
testimony of all the people of God to any one doctrme. And if it
could be done, what would it amount to ? You would find them
agreed in receiving the doctrines which lie on the very face of
scripture, and in nothing else. You would find that the plain tes
timony of God had been universally understood and received by his
people. This would not be a source of new information, though it
might be a consolation, and a confirmation of our faith.
The first fallacy and unfairness of traditionists then is, confound
ing the true church, or the company of faithful men, with the ex
ternal and visible church. As it is an acknowledged impossibility
to ascertain the opinions of the sincere people of God, they ap
peal to the promiscuous mass of professing Christians, organized in
different societies in various parts of the world. This proceedir%
is obviously fallacious and unfair. There is no promise of God,
securing any or every external church from apostasy, even as to
fundamental truth. As far as we know, every external organiza
tion connected with the Jewish church had apostatized in the
days of Ahab ; the seven thousand, who had not bowed the knee
to Baal, were hid from the sight of Elias. During the prevalence
of the Arian heresy, the great majority of the churches had de
parted from the faith ; popes and councils declared in favour of
Pelagianism ; and in the ages before the Reformation, if the voice of
the external church, or the mass of professing Christians, is to be
taken as the voice of the true people of God, and a practical and
infallible witness of the truth, we shall have the Bible completely
superseded, and the whole mass of popish error and superstition
firmly established. The rule of the traditionists, therefore, which
is true in relation to " the faith of God's elect," is as false and fal
lacious as possible in its application to the external church.
But besides this, the voice of all professing Christians, every
where and at all times, it is impossible to ascertain. And if it
could be ascertained, the points of agreement would not include
one half of the doctrines admitted to be fundamental. It is notori
ous that neither the doctrines of the Trinity, nor of the atonement^
nor of regeneration, have been received everywhere, always, and by
all ; much less have all so far agreed in their explanations of these

THE RULE OF FAITH. 9
doctrines as to retain what all admit to be essential to their inte
grity. To meet the former of these difficulties, that is, to obviate
the difficulty arising from the impossibility of gathering the faith of
the whole visible church, traditionists insist that we are bound to
take the testimony of the pastors or rulers of the church. But in
the first place, the pastors are not the church, and the promises given
to the church were consequently not given to them. The declara
tion, that the church shall never perish, does not mean that the
great body of its pastors shall never become unfaithful. Again,
though the number of pastors is so much less than that of the whole
church, the impossibility of gathering their united testimony to any
one truth is not less clear and decided. This cannot be done in
any one age, much less in all ages and places. Who can gather
the opinions of all the present ministers of the Church of England?
Their public creed does not express their opinions, for they differ
fundamentally in their explanation of that creed. Some are vir
tually Romanists : some are Pelagians ; some are Calvinists ; some,
we know, have been Socinians. Mr. Newman tells us, " In the
English church, we shall hardly find ten or twenty neighbouring
clergymen who-agree together ; and that, not in non-essentials of
religion, but as to what are its elementary and necessary doctrines ;
or as to the fact whether there are any necessary doctrines at aU,
any distinct and definite faith required for salvation."* And on
the same page, speaking of the laity, he says, " If they go to one
church they hear one doctrine, in the next that comes they hear
another ; if they try to unite the two, they are obliged to drop im
portant elements in each, and waste down and attenuate the faith
to a mere shadow." The leading modern advocate of tradition
therefore assures us that we cannot gather the faith of the English
clergy, even as to " elementary and necessary doctrines," from
their public creeds ; that they do not in fact agree, and that it is impos
sible to find out what they believe. , All this is said of a church with
which we are contemporary; in an age of printing, of speaking, of as
semblies, and of every other means of intercommunion and publica
tion of opinions ; an age of censuses and statistics, when the colour
of every man's eyes may almost be ascertained and published to the
world. And yet this same man would have us believe that he can
tell what all pastors everywhere believed, seventeen centuries ago,
not in one church, but in all churches ! If the creed of the church
of England does not express the faith of the English clergy, how
are we to know that the creeds of the ancient church express the
faith of the clergy of the early centuries? The difficulty is
greatly increased by the consideration, that there was no one
creed which the clergy were then obliged to adopt and subscribe,
as at the present day. What is now called the apostles' creed, was
only the creed of the Church of Rome, and did not assume its
present form before the fourth century. Irenseus, Tertullian and
* Lectures, p. 395.

10 THE RULE OF FAITH.
Origen have left formulas of doctrine for which they claim the
consent of all the churches, but even these afford very imperfect
evidence of the consent of all the pastors. In the first place, the
testimony of a few men as to what all other men believe, is of no
decisive weight. Let Dr. Pusey, or Mr. Newman, state the faith
of the English church, and it will be one thing ; let the Bishop of
Chester state it, and it will be quite a different thing. In the
second place, these creeds contain some things which are incorrect,
and in all probability the faith of a very small part of the existing
church. Thus Origen says the whole church believed, that the
scriptures " have not only a sense which is apparent, but also
another which is concealed from most. For those things which
are described are the outlines of certain mysteries, and the images
of divine things." He says, it is not clearly discerned whether the
Holy Spirit is to be considered " as begotten or not," or as Je
rome says the words were, " made or not made." Origen him
self believed him to be a creature. Tertullian's exposition of the
Trinity, if understood according to his own sense of the terms, is
as little orthodox as that of Origen. Here then the very earliest
creeds now extant, for which the faith of all churches was claimed,
are yet infected with acknowledged error. They did not and
could not represent the faith of all the pastors of the age of their
authors, much less the faith of all who had preceded them.
But suppose we should admit that the early creeds ought to be
taken as expressing the sense of the whole ancient church, what
should we gain by it ? They contain nothing beyond the simplest
doctrines of the scripture, and that in such general terms as decide
nothing against Arianism, Pelagianism,- and various other forms of
error. They have no relation to the points in dispute between
Papists and Protestants, or between Oxford and the English Re
formers. They yield no support to the baptismal regeneration, the
sacrifice of the mass, or episcopal grace. As far as the creeds
are concerned, they are an insufficient and uncertain evidence of
catholic consent ; and, if admitted, decide nothing as to any one of
the questions between Protestants and traditionists.
Appeal however is made to the decisions of councils. These
bodies, called together by public authority and representing all
parts of th? church, are regarded as bearing trustworthy testimo
ny as to the Catholic faith. But to this argument it has been fairly
objected that the church catholic does not admit of being repre
sented. The delegates from the several provinces can at best re
present only the majorities in the bodies deputing them. The mi
norities, whether large or small, must be unrepresented. Experience
teaches us that truth is not always with the many. What would
have been the fate of orthodoxy had it been put to the vote under
Constantius or Valens ? What would have become of Protestant
ism, had all churches sent delegates to Trent, and the cause of God
been confided to the decision of the urn ? Our objection, however,
now is, that no general council can so represent the church as to

THE RULE OF FAITH. 11
give us satisfactory evidence of the faith of all its members. Ano
ther objection is that the councils called general are not deserving
of the name. They have in no case been either a full or fair re
presentation of the existing church. Take that of Nice for exam
ple. We should be glad to believe that Christendom was, as to
the main point, there fully represented. But what are the facts ?
There were present at that council about three hundred and
eighteen bishops ; of these, seventeen were from the little province
of Isauria ; while there was but one from all Africa, but one from
Spain, and but one from Gaul. Is it not absurd to say that one
bishop could represent the faith of a whole province, and that one
acting without authority and without delegation ? Suppose the at
tempt to be now made to hold a general council, and an invitation
to be issued to all bishops and presbyters to assemble at a given
time and place. Suppose further that Mr. Newman should attend
from England, Bishop Hughes from America, the Abbe" Genoude
from France, could the assent of these volunteer delegates, with
any show of reason, be taken as proving what was the faith of the
Church of England, or of the church of God in these United
States ? Yet this was the way in which councils were generally
called. The reigning emperor issued his summons, and those who
had the inclination or ability attended ; those who were disinclined
to the object of the council, or unable to travel, remained at home.
It is obvious that such councils could not give a fair expression to
the voice of the church. It may be said indeed, that, however im
perfect the representation, the acquiescence of all parts of the
church in their decisions, affords proof of unanimity of faith.
There would be some force in this suggestion, had we any evidence
of such acquiescence. We know however that decisions in coun
cils were in almost all important cases more or less resisted ; and
the struggle continued until one party or the other obtained the
advantage, and then, by excommunicating the dissentients, the
voice of the whole, church was claimed for the majority. This
has been the course of Rome from the beginning. Refusing to
recognise as a part of the church all who do not adhere to her,
she boasts of having the suffrage of the whole church in her favour.
A still more decisive proof that councils cannot be relied upon
as expressing the faith of the whole church, is that they contradict
each other. The council of Nice decided against Arianism ; a
much larger council, within twenty-five years, decided in its favour.*
The church was thrown into a state of violent contention. At
one period or in one part of the empire the orthodox prevailed ; in
others, the Arians. Each party had their councils ; each at differ-
* The council which met for the western church at Ariminum, and for the eastern
at Seleucia, "which," says Bishop Stillingfleet, "make up the most general council
we read of in church history. For Bellarmine owns that there were six hundred
bishops in the western part of it. So that there were many more bishops assembled
there than were in the councils of Nice ; there was no exception against the sum
mons nor against the bishops present."

12 THE RULE OF FAITH.
ent times could claim the majority of the whole church ; one
bishop of Rome was with the orthodox, another with the Arians,
and thus the conflict was continued with various success for more
than three hundred years. How then can catholic consent be
claimed for the Nicene creed ? If catholic consent means the con
sent of all, everywhere, and at all times, it is a gross imposition
and absurdity to claim it for a creed with regard to which for a
long time Christendom was nearly equally divided.
The heresy of Eutyches, respecting the person of Christ, was
first condemned by a council held at Constantinople, A. D. 448 ;
then approved by the second general council at Ephesus, in 449 ;
and then again condemned by the council of Chalcedon, in 451.
Pelagianism was condemned in Africa, sanctioned in Palestine, ap
proved by the council of Diospolis, pronounced to be according to
scripture, in the first instance, by the Bishop of Rome, afterwards
repudiated by the same bishop, and finally condemned by the coun
cil of Ephesus, A. D. 431. Even with regard to the canon of
scripture, we have council against council ; that of Laodicea ex
cluding the Apocrypha, that of Carthage including them in the list
of inspired books. It is therefore a plain historical fact, that even
those councils, which have most deserved the name of general,
have not agreed, and therefore can neither be regarded as infalli
ble, nor as any conclusive evidence of catholic consent.
There is another objection to the notion that the faith of the
church universal can be gathered from the decisions of councils,
which ought not to be overlooked. The authority of tradition is,
both by Romanists and the writers of the Oxford Tracts, defended
mainly on the ground of its apostolic origin. The fact that all
Christians have received any doctrine is held to be proof that it
was derived from the apostles ; and to ascertain what all the early
Christians believed, we are referred to the decisions of the ancient
general councils. But unfortunately, there was no council, having
the least pretension to be called general, held during the first three
centuries. How is this chasm to be got over ? We can under
stand how an assembly, even at the present day, with the scriptures
before them, can give a judgment as to the doctrines of Christiani
ty, which shall be entitled to all the deference due to their opinion.
But since the world began, has any such thing been known as the
transmission of unwritten doctrines unchanged for three hundred
years ? Without a miracle, for which we have neither promise nor
evidence, the thing is impossible. Would it be possible for the
present clergy of Germany to bear trustworthy testimony to the
unwritten teaching of Luther and Melancthon ? Does there exist
now in England any knowledge of the doctrines of the Reformers,
not to be gathered from their writings ? Would not the claim of
an English convocation to enforce any doctrine, not contained- in
their Articles, Liturgy, or Homilies, on the ground of traditionary
knowledge of the oral teaching of Cranmer or Latimer, be received
with ridicule by the whole church ? How then can we believe

THE RULE OF FAITH. 13
that the council of Nice had any tradition or knowledge of the oral
teaching of the apostles worthy of confidence ? If a tradition
cannot be traced up historically to the times of the apostles, it can,
on the very principles, though not according to the practice, of our
opponents, be of no authority. The prevalence of an opinion in
the church, three hundred years after the apostles, is no proof that
it was derived from the apostles, any more than the prevalence of
Arminianism in the Church of England, or of Rationalism in Ger
many, proves that these forms of error were derived from the Re
formers. It is therefore not from the decisions of councils that we
can gather catholic consent.
The only other important source of knowledge of the faith of the
early church, is the writings of the fathers. It has been assumed
that the consent or agreement of the early Christian writers, in the
belief of any doctrine, is to be considered satisfactory evidence of
the derivation of such doctrine or usage from the apostles. Tra
ditionists have generally felt the necessity of some caution in lay
ing down this rule. It is so obvious that the fathers differ among
themselves, and that the same father differs in many cases from
himself, that we are cautioned carefully to distinguish between
what they deliver as teachers, which is often erroneous, from what
they deliver as witnesses. It is necessary that we should have
not only their unanimous consent, but also their unanimous testi
mony, that the doctrine taught is part of the faith of the church.
We do not say that traditionists adhere to these limitations, for they
do not, but they feel the necessity of stating them, to secure even
the semblance of authority for their rule.
The question then is, whether the unanimous consent of the
fathers is proof of the apostolic origin of any doctrine ? This
question, as far as it has any bearing on the present controversy,
must be understood of doctrines, not clearly contained in the scrip
tures. Their unanimous consent to the being of a God, to the di
vine mission of Christ, to the fact that he was born of the Virgin
Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and bu
ried, that he rose again on the third day and ascended into heaven ;
cannot be considered as in any degree increasing our assurance
that these doctrines and facts are contained in the New Testament.
It is not for such purposes that their testimony is required. But is
their consent a warrant to us of the oral teaching of the apostles ?
Must we believe what they happen to agree in believing ? We
think this a most unreasonable demand, for, in the first place, the
consent of some sixteen writers, is very insufficient evidence of the
faith of the whole Christian church for three hundred years, and it
is only as witnesses for catholic consent that their writings are as
sumed to be of any authority. • The fact that the remains of the
first three centuries are so scanty, creates of itself almost an im
possibility that we should find in them any fair or full representa
tion of the whole church during that long period. Would any
man dream of extracting from some ten or twenty works, many of

14 THE RULE OF FAITH.
them mere fragments, taken at hazard from the whole list of Eng
lish divines, any knowledge of the doctrines of the English Reform
ers, which is not to be found in their authentic writings ? Would
it not be considered in the highest degree absurd, to maintain that
the interpretation of the thirty-nine articles must be regulated by
the consent of these fragments ? Suppose all these remains of
English theology were of one school, say the Laudean, what view
should we then be forced to take of the English articles? Or sup
pose that some were of the school of Whitgift, some of that of
Laud, and some of that of Hoadly, contradicting each other on
almost all points, each accusing the others of departure from the
faith of the church ; would it not be a perfectly hopeless task, to
attempt to gather from their conflicting statements, the meaning of
the articles 1 Yet this, and even worse than this, is the rule of
faith which traditionists would impose upon the church. We say
worse, for the supposed fragments of English writers would at
least be all genuine, in a language we understand, relating to con
troversies with which we are familiar. The remains of the first
centuries have no one of these advantages. They are confessedly
more or less mutilated and corrupted. It is really a matter of sur
prise to read the frequent and loud complaints made by the fathers
of the frauds to which they were subje«ted. Spurious writings
were issued on all occasions ; the writings of distinguished men
curtailed or interpolated to serve the purposes of a party. We hear
not only of the gospel of St. Thomas, the epistle to the Laodiceans,
of the acts of Paul and Thecla, but complaints are made of the
name of one father being put to the writings of another to give
them currency. This is a difficulty and an evil which Romanists
themselves are forced to admit. On this point Mr. Goode remarks,
" Above one hundred and eighty treatises, professing to be written
by authors of the first six centuries, are repudiated by the more
learned of the Romanists themselves, as, most of them, rank forgeries,
and the others not written by those whose names they bear ; though,
be it observed, they have been quoted over and over again by cele
brated controversial writers of the- Romish communion, in support
of their errors against Protestants." An evil still greater than for
gery, because more difficult to detect, is interpolation. Many of
the early Greek works are extant only in a Latin translation, which
is so corrupt as to be unworthy of credit. This is the case with
the work of Irenaeus, and with the translations by Ruffinus, whom
Jerome charges with the most shameless adulteration of his authors.
This is a subject which cannot be treated without going into details
which our limits forbid. It is however a notorious fact that the
remains of the early ages have come down to us in a most cor
rupted state, and that it is a task of great difficulty, if not of abso
lute impossibility, to separate what is genuine from what is spuri
ous. What a rule of faith is here !
But besides this difficulty, the writings of the fathers are on va
rious accounts hard to be understood ; not only because of the Ian-

THE RULE OF FAITH. 15
guage in which they are written, but from the principles on which
their authors proceeded. They relate also in a great degree to
controversies with which we have no immediate concern, being
directed against Paganism, or obsolete heresies. These are the
writings which are to remove the obscurities of scripture, and sup
ply its deficiencies. We might as well take the waters of the
Thames, after it has traversed all London, to purify the limpid river
at its source.
Besides all this, the fathers are not trustworthy, as witnesses of
the faith of the early church. They are too credulous. This is
proved by the fact, that they claim the support of tradition for ac
knowledged error or for opposing doctrines. Some say they de
rived it from the successors of the apostles, that our Lord was fifty
years old at the time of his death ; others, on the same authority,
assure us that his ministry continued but for one year ; Origen, as
we have seen, claims the tradition of all the churches in support of
the allegorical sense of the historical parts of scripture ; he says
tradition leaves it doubtful whether the sun, moon, and stars, have
souls or not. Papias, who flourished about ninety years after
Christ, says, " As the elders remember, who saw John the disciple
of the Lord, that they heard from him what the Lord taught about
those times, and said, The days shall come in which vines shall ex
ist, each containing 10,000 shoots, and in each shoot shall be 10,000
arms, and in each true shoot shall be 10,000 branches, and on every
branch 10,000 clusters, and in every cluster 10,000 grapes, and
every grape, when pressed, shall give twenty-five firkins of wine,"
&c, &c, &c. This account is endorsed by Irenaeus, who quotes Pa
pias " as a hearer and companion of PolyCarp." The eastern
churches affirmed that the observance of Easter on the fourteenth
day of the moon, had been delivered to them by the apostle John ;
the Romans and those in the western parts said that their usage
was delivered by the apostles Peter and Paul. Cyprian insisted
that those who had been baptized by heretics and schismatics,
should be rebaptized, and appeals to tlm catholic faith and church
in his support. Stephen, the Bishop offtome, said, " The apostles
forbade that those who came over from any heresy should be bap
tized, and delivered this to posterity to be observed." Augustirl
says, it is the " catholic faith," that all unbaptized infants are lost,
though he is suspected of being himself the father of the doctrine.
Many claim the authority of the church for the notion that the
angels have bodies. Some say that tradition taught that all souls
are immediately created, others that they are derived, ex traduce.
So in all their disputes, each party appealed to tradition in its own
behalf, arid condemned all others. The heretics, especially, driven
by argument from the scriptures, were distinguished by their ap
peals to patristical tradition. Irenaeus says, "When they are re
proved by the scriptures they immediately begin to accuse the
scriptures themselves, as if they were not correct, nor of authori
ty, and that they are not consistent ; and that the truth cannot be

16 THE RULE OF FAITH.
found out from them by those who are ignorant of tradition." The
same complaint is made by other fathers.
The thing to be proved is, that certain doctrines are derived
from the oral teaching of the apostles. The proof is, that the
fathers say so. We answer, their saying so is no sufficient proof.
They are too few, too far removed from the apostles ; their testi
mony is hard to get at, since so many writings are attributed to
them which they never wrote, and since their genuine writings are
so much corrupted; besides, their testimony when obtained is not
decisive, because they testify to what cannot be true. They say
they received doctrines from the apostles, which everybody must
admit to be false ; and they make the claim for conflicting state
ments. No court, civil or ecclesiastical, would decide any cause
involving the value of a straw on such testimony.
To all this it may be said, that admitting all thathas been urged,
still, where the fathers do all concur, there we have ground to be
lieve they are right, often as they are individually wrong. To
this we answer, that the consent of the few writers of the first three -
centuries is as nothing compared with the whole church which they
are assumed to represent. But further, their consent can be fairly
pleaded for nothing which is now a matter of dispute. They agree
in nothing but the plainest and simplest biblical facts and doctrines.
Hear what even Bishop Taylor, one of the witnesses quoted by
Mr. Keble in his Catena Patrum in favor of tradition, says on this
subject. " Catholic consent," he says, " cannot be proved in any
thing but in the canon of scripture itself ; and, as it is now re
ceived, even in that there is some variety." Again : " There is
no question this day in contestation in the explication of which all
the old writers did consent. In the assignation of the canon of
scripture, they never did consent for six hundred years together ;
and when by that time the bishops had agreed indifferently, and
but indifferently upon that, they fell out in twenty more ; and ex
cept it be the apostles' creed and articles of that nature, there is
nothing which may, with^ry colour, be called a consent, much less
tradition universal."* Tros want of consent of the fathers of the
first three centuries ; their silence or their conflicting statements
on all questions having any bearing on present controversies, is so
obvious and notorious, that it is virtually conceded even by tradi
tionists themselves. The author of Tract 85 says, in reference both
to the canon of scripture and to " catholic doctrines, " We be
lieve mainly because the church of the fourth and fifth unanimous
ly believed." " We depend for the canon and creed upon the
fourth and fifth centuries  Viewing the matter as one of
moral evidence, we seem to see in the testimony of the fifth, the
very testimony which every preceding century gave, accidents
excepted, such as the present loss of documents once extant, or
the then existing misconceptions which the want of intercourse
* See his Liberty of Prophesying, sec. v., 8.

THE RULE OF FAITH. 17
among the churches occasioned. The fifth century acts as a com
ment on the obscure text of the centuries before it, and brings out
a meaning which, with the help of the comment, any candid person
sees to belong to them. And in the same way as regards the
catholic creed, though there is not much to account for. Not so
much, for no one, I suppose, will deny that in the fathers of the
fourth century, it is as fully developed and as unanimously adopted
as it can be in the fifth." This is the precise doctrine of the Ro
manists. The obscurities and deficiencies of scripture are to be
explained or supplied by the writings of the first three centuries ;
the obscurities and deficiencies of those centuries are to be made
good by the writings of the fourth and fifth ; those of the fourth
and fifth, by the tenth and twelfth, those of the tenth and twelfth,
by the fifteenth and sixteenth. Thus we have the whole accumu
lated mass of superstition and error sanctioned by apostolic au
thority, and imposed upon the church. It is as plain as it can be
that we have here the concession of the failure of the whole theory.
The theory is, that the oral teachings of the apostles are a part of
our present rule of faith ; that catholic consent is our warrant for
believing certain doctrines to be part of that oral teaching ; catholic
consent is the consent and testimony of the whole church at all
times. But it is admitted that the first three centuries do not testi
fy to what are called catholic doctrines. This fact is accounted
for by loss of documents and misconceptions of the churches. To
account for a fact is to admit it. It is admitted, therefore, that the
first three centuries do not consent to or testify catholic doctrines.
To say that the first three do, because the fourth and fifth do, is so
unreasonable as to give the whole matter the air of insincerity and
imposture. Is the rationalism of the present German churches an
exponent of the faith of those churches during the preceding cen
tury ? Is the Socinianism of the modern clergy of Geneva a proof
that Calvin and Beza were Socinians ? Or are the Pelagianism
and infidelity of the English church, during a large part of the 18th
century, when, according to Bishop Butler, Christianity itself
seemed to be regarded as a fable " among all persons of discern
ment," to be considered as proving the faith of that church in the
preceding centuries ? Here is a church, a true church, an episcopal
church, an apostolic church, to which all the promises ever made to an
external church belong in all their plenitude, sunk so low as scarcely
to retain the semblance of belief ; and even now, according to Mr.
Newman, you cannot find any ten or twenty of its neighbour
ing clergy who agree even in the elementary and necessary
doctrines of the gospel. With what colour, then, of reason, or
even honesty, can it be maintained that all the superstitions and
false doctrines of the fifth century are to be taken as part of the
faith of the first three centuries, and of the apostles themselves ? Of all
rules by which to determine what men must believe in order to be
saved, this would seem to be the most absurd. We believe, say
the Tractarians, not because the apostles believed, not even be-
2

18 THE RULE OF FAITH.
cause the early church believed, but because the fifth century be
lieved. This, however, is not the only way in which traditionists aban
don their own theory. They believe many doctrines for which
catholic consent cannot be pleaded, and they reject many in which
the early church were to a very great degree unanimous. With
regard to the first class, we of course do not believe that the con
sent of the three centuries can be fairly claimed for prelatical
episcopacy. We might, without undue confidence, say we know
that it cannot be so claimed ; not only because such consent, ac
cording to Bishop Taylor, can be claimed for nothing except such
principles of the faith as are contained in the apostles' creed, but
because it is notorious that the identity of the office of bishop and
presbyter was maintained by many in the early church, and that
presbyters had the right of ordaining bishops even after the intro
duction of prelacy. Mr. Goode himself, while he holds episcopacy
to be of apostolical origin, admits that its necessity cannot be
proved. " If," he says, " in any church, a presbyter be appointed
by his co-presbyters to be bishop, or superintendent, or president
of that church, and perform the usual duties of the episcopal func
tion, we cannot prove either by scripture, or by the consent of the
apostolically-primitive church, that his acts are by apostolic ordi
nance invalid." Again : " Supposing the apostles to have ap
pointed the first bishops in twelve churches, I want to know where
we are informed that when the bishop of one of them died, the
church of the deceased bishop depended upon the will and pleasure
of the remaining eleven bishops for a president, and could not ap
point and create, to all intents and purposes, its own president, out
of its own body of presbyters."* As for the popish doctrine of
orders, episcopal grace, the sacrificial character of the eucharist,
&c, it is, as we have already seen, virtually admitted, that they
cannot be sustained by the consent of the first centuries. They
rest upon the fifth, even in the creed of their advocates.
But besides these false doctrines, which are not only not in the
scriptures, but anti-scriptural, there are important and even funda
mental scriptural doctrines for which not even the general consent
of fathers can be produced. The early fathers were accustomed
to use the language of the Bible in their religious discourses, and
unless driven to explanations by the errors of opposers, they sel
dom so defined as to render their testimony available against the
subtle heretics of later time. They spoke of Christ as God, they
prayed to him, they worshipped him ; but the Arians were willing
to do all this. And if the doctrine of the essential equality of the
Father and Son in the adorable Trinity is to depend upon tradi
tion, it cannot be proved at all. It is also a notorious fact that the
divinity of the Holy Spirit, plainly as it is taught in scripture, is not
a doctrine for which catholic consent can be claimed. Jerome
* Vol. ii., pp. 58, 59.

THE RULE OF FAITH. 19
says, " Many, through ignorance of the scriptures, assert that the
Father and Son are often called Holy Spirit. And while we
ought clearly to believe in a Trinity, they, taking away the third
person, imagine it not to be a hypostasis of the Trinity, but a
name." Basil says, the question concerning the Holy Spirit was
" passed over in silence by the ancients, and owing to its not being
opposed, was left unexplained." And he therefore proceeded to
discuss it " according to the mind of scripture." A doctrine-which
the ancients passed over in silence, they cannot be cited to prove.
If, therefore, tradition is our rule of faith ; if we are to believe no
thing for which catholic consent cannot be produced, we shall have
to give up even the essential doctrines of the gospel.
The traditionists moreover depart from their own theory, or
rather, show that they proceed in a perfectly arbitrary manner, .by
rejecting many doctrines for which a much greater degree of una
nimity among the fathers can be produced than for those which
they adopt. Mr. Keble says, " We know with certainty that Mel-
chisedec's feast was a type of the blessed eucharist," " from the
constant agreement of the early church." ,In proof, he refers to
Cyprian, Augustine, Jerome, and the Roman liturgy, as " represent
ing the sense of the western church," and to Chrysostom for the
Greek. This is proof of the constant agreement of the early church !
One man in the first three hundred years of the church, and one
for the whole Greek church, and this is taken as fulfilling the con
dition, quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus ! Why, twice
the amount of evidence of antiquity and catholicity may be pro
duced for the grossest heresies or the greatest absurdities. This
is only an illustration of the coolness with which catholicity is
claimed for any doctrine which suits the feelings of the writer. It
cannot be denied that three times as much evidence can be pro
duced of a general belief in the early church of the unlawfulness of
oaths, of the necessity of infant communion, of the establishment of
a glorious visible kingdom at Jerusalem, of the re-appearance of
Enoch and Elias to wage war with antichrist, and for other doc
trines and usages which modern traditionists unhesitatingly reject.
It is true, therefore, what Bishop Taylor says, that " it is not honest"
to press the authority of the fathers, unless we " are willing to sub
mit in all things to the testimony of an equal number of them,
which I am certain neither side will do." It is a sheer impossibili
ty to prove anything by the rule of the traditionists as they state
it, because catholic consent is absolutely unattainable. The rule is
worthless as it stands ; and if they choose to assume catholic con
sent in one instance on a certain amount of testimony, let them
assume it in others, on the same degree of evidence, before they
attempt to urge it upon others as " the unwritten word of God."
The advocates of tradition as a part of the rule of faith are
therefore chargeable with great fallacy and unfairness. They lay
down a rule which, according to its obvious meaning, commands
the assent of all men. They say what all true Christians, in all

20 THE RULE OF FAITH.
ages and everywhere, have believed, must, as far as the essential
doctrines of the gospel are concerned, be regarded as part of the
faith once delivered to the saints. This is undoubtedly true ; but
they immediately and artfully substitute for true Christians, the ex
ternal visible church, with regard to which it is not true that it
cannot err even in fundamental doctrines. And further, though
the consent of all visible churches, at all times and places, would
not be conclusive proof of the truth of any doctrine, it would be a
very strong proof, they assume such consent on the most insuffi
cient evidence ; evidence which they themselves reject in its ap
plication to the church at the present time, and, in many cases, in
its application to the ancient church. If an ancient church had a
creed, that creed expressed the faith of all its members. The
Church of England has a creed, which is no index, according to
these same writers, to the faith of its clergy. If a delegate at
tended an ancient council from Africa or Gaul, he fairly represent
ed his province, and committed his brethren to the decisions of the
council. The delegate of the Church of England sanctions Calvin
ism at the Synod of Dort, and he is a mere individual, misrepre
senting and dishonouring the church to which he belonged. Some
half-dozen fathers in the course of as many centuries testify to one
doctrine, and it is " catholic consent ;" twenty or thirty testify to
another doctrine, and it is set down to the " misconceptions of the
churches." Antiquity is said to be necessary to prove a tradition
apostolical ; but if the first of these three centuries is silent on the
subject or opposed to the tradition, we may suppose loss of docu
ments or misinformation. We must believe what the fifth century
believed, and take for granted that the preceding centuries agreed
with it. This boasted rule therefore turns out to be no rule at all.
It cannot from its nature be applied, and therefore we must take
the opinion of one age, as evidence of antiquity, universality and
catholicity. One of the most natural and uniform effects of making tradition
a part of the rule of faith, is to destroy the authority of the Bible.
Our Saviour charged the Pharisees with making the word of God
of none effect by their traditions. The Talmud has superseded the
Law of Moses among the modern Jews ; and the whole system of
popery is sustained on the authority of the church teaching for
doctrines the commandments of men. Chillingworth well says,
" He that would usurp an absolute lordship and tyranny over any
people, need not put himself to the trouble and difficulty of abro
gating and disannulling the laws, made to maintain the common
liberty ; for he may frustrate their intent and gain his own design
as well, if he can get the power and authority to interpret them as
he pleases, and add to them what he pleases, and to have his inter
pretations and additions stand for laws ; if he can rule his people
by his laws, and his law by his lawyers."* This is the avowed
• Chillingworth's Works, American edition, p. 105.

THE RULE OF FAITH. 21
office of tradition, as the interpretation and supplement of scrip
ture. It undertakes to explain the sense and to supply the defects
of the word of God ; and in doing this it effectually supersedes its
authority. " When the sense of scripture, as interpreted by rea
son," says Mr. Newman, " is contrary to that given it by catholic
antiquity, we ought to side with the latter." This is practically
saying, that when scripture and tradition clash, we must side with
tradition. This must in practice be its meaning. For to say when
scripture interpreted' by reason gives a certain sense, can mean
only, when we believe it to convey that sense. That is, we must
give up what we believe to be the meaning of the word of God, to
the authority of tradition, which is but another name for the au
thority of man. If the Bible says, we are justified by faith in
Jesus Christ ; and tradition says, we are justified by baptism ; then
the Bible is made to mean not the faith of the individual, but
of the church. If the Bible says, Except a man be born again he
cannot see the kingdom of God ; and tradition says, Whosoever is
baptized is born again ; then the Bible is made to mean, that bap
tism conveys the Holy Spirit in every case, where there is not the
special impediment of mortal sin. If the Saviour says, Come unto
me all ye who are heavy laden and I will give you rest ; and tra
dition says, There is no remission of sin without priestly absolution ;
then our Lord is made to mean, we must come unto him through
the priest. If the Bible requires repentance, and tradition penance ;
then repentance means penance. The Bible addresses its instruc
tions, its promises, its threatenings, to every reader, according to
his character. It speaks to him that reads it, promising to the
penitent believer pardon of sin, the aid of the Holy Spirit, and the
light of God's countenance ; tradition says there are no promises
but to the church, and there is no church where there is not a cer
tain form of government. Thus, through the whole system of di
vine truth, the Bible yields to tradition ; the voice of God is
drowned in that of men ; the merits of Christ are abstracted by the
priest, who for bread gives us a stone, and for an egg, scorpions.
The writings of the traditionists are consequently filled with ir
reverent depreciation of the scriptures. They are said to contain
even essential truths only by a sort of accident ; it is a wonder that
they are all there, and though there, they are latent, hid under the
surface, intimated by mere hints and notices. " The Bible," it is
said, " does not carry its own interpretation." The texts of scrip
ture " may imply the catholic doctrine, but they need not ; they are
consistent with any of several theories, or at any rate other per
sons think so." The answers which Unitarians make to Trinita
rians, in defence of their claim to be considered orthodox, are said
to be resistless, if we grant that the Bible is " the sole authoritative
judge in controversies of faith." Certain individuals, says Mr.
Newman, may not be injured by this principle, but " the body of
men who profess it are, and ever must be injured. For the mass
of men, having no moral convictions, are led by reasoning, and by

22 THE RULE OF FAITH.
mere consistency of argument, and legitimately evolve heresy from
principles which to the better sort of men may be harmless." In
the same tone Dr. Hook says, " I believe it to be only on account
of their being bad logicians, that they are not Socinians. I be
lieve that they ought to be, if consistent, both Dissenters and Soci
nians. If they accuse church principles of tending to popery, we
think that their opinions must lead logical and unprejudiced minds
to Socinianism."* According to the traditionists, therefore, men
may, and the mass of them must, legitimately evolve heresy from
the Bible, which, if taken by itself, " must lead logical and unpreju
diced minds to Socinianism." It is thus that men allow themselves
to speak of the word of God, in order to exalt tradition. Nay,
worse than this, they seem willing to destroy all faith, that they
may introduce their system of priestly and ecclesiastical domina
tion. For, unable to meet the obvious objection, that if the Bible
is obscure, so are the fathers ; if the latent doctrines of the
scriptures are hard to find, so is catholic " consent ; they say
that doubt is essential to faith ;f that we have, at most, only
probability to show for revelation at all, or even for the exist
ence of an intelligent Creator. J They assert that there is but " a bal
ance on the side of revelation ;" " there are, so to say, three chances
for revelation, and only two against it." The whole ground of
faith is swept away, and mere feeling put in its place. " Why," asks
the author of Tract 85, " why should not the church be divine ?
The burden of proof is surely on the other side. I will accept
her doctrines, and her rites, and her Bible — not one, and not the
other, but all — till I have a clear proof that she is mistaken. It is,
I feel, God's will that I should do so ; and besides I love these, her
possessions — I love her Bible (?) her doctrines, and her rites, and
therefore I believe." This is the same gentleman who says, " We
believe mainly because the church of the fourth and fifth centuries
* This is quoted by Mr. Goode, vol. i., p. 4S7, as said of those who hold that "the
Bible is the sole, infallible rule of faith."
f " Evidence complete in all its parts,'' says Mr. Keble, " leaves no room for faith."
Sermon on Tradition, p. 82. Newman says, " Doubt may even be said to be implied
in a Christian's faith." Lectures, p. 104.
J Speaking of the appeal to antiquity. Mr. Newman says, " Where men are indis
posed to such an appeal, where they are determined to be captious and to take ex
ceptions, and act the disputant and sophist instead of the earnest inquirer, it admits
of easy evasion, and may be made to conclude anything or nothing. The rule of Vin
cent is not of a mathematical or demonstrative character, but moral, and requires*
practical judgment and good sense to apply it. For instance, what is meant by being
' taught always V Does it mean in every century, or every year, or every month ?
Does 'everywhere' mean in every country, or in every diocese ? And does the
' consent of fathers' require us to produce the direct testimony of everyone of them?
How many fathers, how many instances, constitute a fulfilment of the test proposed ?
It is, then, from the nature of the case, a condition which never can be satisfied as
fully as it might have been ; it admits of various and unequal application in various
instances; and what degree of application is enough must be decided by the same
principles which guide us in the conduct of life, which determine us in politics, or
trade, or war, which lead us to accept revelation at all, for which we have but pro
bability to show at most, nay, to believe in the existence of an intelligent Creator."
Lectures, p. 69.

THE RULE OF FAITH. 23
unanimously believed." That is, he likes the doctrines of those
centuries, and therefore he believes. Here is the whole logic
of tradition. This same writer says, our Saviour required the
Pharisees to believe " on weak arguments and fanciful deduc
tions ;" and hence we have no right to complain if we are
required to believe on the slight and fanciful evidence which
traditionists can produce. He seems to have no conception of
the infinite difference between the cases, which is no less than
the difference between the authority of God and that of man. The
Pharisees were required to believe on the authority of Christ : " If
I do not the works of my Father, believe me not ; but if I do,
though ye believe not me, believe the works ; that ye may know
and believe that the Father is in me and I in him." To call the
reasons proposed by such a teacher weak and fanciful, is in the
highest degree irreverent. And to represent the Saviour as resting
the whole authority of his doctrines on the exposition of certain
passages of the Old Testament, is to misstate the fact. Christ
showed the Jews that his doctrines were confirmed by their own
scriptures ; and his expositions of those scriptures were to be
received, not only because they were in accordance with the
principles of his opponents, but because of his authority as a teacher
whose divine mission was fully established. The declaration of
Christ is the strongest of all possible reasons as a ground of faith ;
and his testimony to the sense of scripture is the strongest of all
possible grounds of assurance that such is its true sense. It is not,
however, to the irreverence of the language referred to that we
would call attention ; it is to the implied admission that tradition
can offer us nothing but weak reasons and fanciful deductions as a
ground of belief, which the passage quoted contains. The uncer
tain teaching of tradition is admitted. It may, as Mr. Newman
says, be made to conclude anything or nothing. But then, say the
traditionists, we have no better ground of faith in anything. Our
Saviour required his hearers to believe on weak reasons ; we have
only a probability to offer even for a divine revelation ; three
chances, so to say, for it, while there are two against it. The
stream, says Mr. Keble, can never rise higher than the fountain ;
we have but historical tradition for the scriptures themselves,
and of course nothing more for any of the doctrines which they
contain; and we have the same historical tradition for catholic
doctrines, i. e., for the oral teaching of the apostles. Every step
of this argument is unsound. It is not true that we .have nothing
but historical tradition for the authority of scripture and of the doc
trines they contain. Mr. Goode, in accordance, we had almost
said, with all Christians, says, " It will not, I hope, be denied that
a saving belief in scripture being the work of God, must be the
work of the Spirit of God upon the heart ; and that such a faith
might be produced under that influence, even though the external
evidence should be in itself weak and insufficient; and that such a
faith is of the highest and most perfect kind, including all and more

24 THE RULE OF FAITH.
than all, which can be produced by a faith wrought by the force
of evidence alone ; and that any other faith, as long as it stands
alone, is, in fact, useless."* No true Christian's faith rests exclu
sively or mainly upon historical tradition, but upon the testimony
of the Spirit, by and with the truth upon the heart. And in the
second place, it is not true that we have the same historical tradi
tion for the oral teaching of the apostles, that we have for the
authenticity of the scriptures. TheN historical tradition in the
Church of England, in favour of the derivation of the Thirty-Nine
Articles from the Reformers, is perfect and conclusive. No man
ever has doubted the fact, or ever can doubt it. Though the evi
dence is of a different kind, no mathematical demonstration is more
convincing. But the tradition of that church for any oral teach
ing of the Reformers, is absolutely null, it is nothing. In like
manner the testimony of the church to the authenticity of the New
Testament is as strong as historical testimony can be, while its
testimony to the oral teaching of the apostles may be made " to
conclude anything or nothing."
It is very clear that the men who remove our faith from the sure
and stable foundation, and place it on one which is false and feeble,
are in fact taking the best course to destroy faith altogether. The
testimony of the scripture is true and trustworthy ; the testimony
of tradition, taken as a whole, is in the highest degree uncertain,
unsatisfactory, and erroneous. This is so, and men cannot but find
it out, and when required to believe on grounds which they see to
be so unstable, they will either not believe at all, or they will
commit themselves blindfold to the guidance of their priests. In
fidelity, therefore, or blind, superstitious faith, is invariably attend
ant on tradition. Speaking in general terms, such is and ever has
been its effect in the Romish Church. Those who think are
infidels ; those who do not, are blind and superstitious.
As it is the tendency and actual working of tradition to super
sede the word of God, and to destroy the very foundation of faith,
so it has never failed to introduce a system of false doctrines and
of priestly tyranny. If you take men from the infallible teaching
of God, and make them depend on the foolish teaching of men, the
result cannot fail to be the adoption of error and heresy. This is
a conclusion which all experience verifies. And as to ghostly
domination, the result is no less natural and certain. The inalien
able and inestimable right of private judgment, which is nothing
else than the right to listen to the voice of God speaking in his
word, is denied to us. We are told that we must not trust that
voice ; it is too indistinct ; it says too little ; and is too liable to
lead us into error. We must hearken to tradition. When we ask,
where is this tradition ? we are told, in the church. When we ask
further, which church ? we are told, the catholic church. When
we ask which church is catholic ? we are told, that one whose
* Vol. i., p. 59.

THE RULE OF FAITH. 25
teachings and institutions can stand the test of antiquity, universality,
and catholicity. When we say that this is a test exceedingly diffi
cult to apply, requiring immense labour and research, and that it is
exceedingly precarious, concluding " anything or nothing ;" we
receive two answers, one on rare occasions, which is absurdly in
consistent with the whole theory, and that is, that we must judge
for ourselves ; we must use our " common sense," and act as we
do in " trade, politics or war ;" take that for the true church, and
that for the teaching of tradition, which we on the whole think
most likely to be so. That is, although we are forbid to judge for
ourselves what our blessed Lord means, when he says, " Come unto
me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest ;"
" Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on me hath ever
lasting life ; and him that cometh to me, I will in no wise cast out ;"
yet we are told to judge for ourselves, what all the Greek and Latin
fathers mean ; in what points they all agsee ; which of the conflict
ing councils were truly general, whether that in which three hundred
bishops decided right, or that in which six hundred decided wrong.
When we have done all this, then we may judge for ourselves,
which is that true catholic church which is authorized to tell us
what those things mean which are revealed even unto babes. As
this is such a many-sided absurdity, we rarely hear this answer
given. It is only when an unwonted sprightliness or levity leads
the traditionist, as in the case of Mr. Newman, to strip the mask
from the whole system of fraud and imposture.
It is so manifest an impossibility for the mass of ordinary Chris
tians to apply the test of antiquity, universality, and catholicity, in
order to decide which is the true church, and what tradition really
teaches, that the inquirer is commonly simply told to " hear the
church ;" and as he cannot tell which church he ought to hear, he
must hear the one that speaks to him, be it the Romish, the Greek,
or the English. If the church within whose pale he happens to
live, teaches him error, even fundamental error, he has no relief.
He must submit his soul to his church ; he must subject his heart,
his conscience, and his life to her guidance, and wait until he enters
eternity to find out whither she has led him. Still further, as every
church speaks to its members mainly through the parish priest ;
as he is her organ of communication, the parish priest is to the
great majority of Christians the ultimate arbiter of life and death.
They must take his word for what is the true church, and for what
that church teaches. Thus, what in sounding phrase is called the
church catholic and apostolic, turns out in practice to be one poor
priest. The Bible, Christ and God, are all put aside to make the soul
depend on the fidelity and competency of one sinful, feeble man.
Where tradition has its perfect work, there, in point of fact, the
souls of the people are in the power of the priest, their faith and
practice are subject to his control.
This same result is reached in another way. We have seen that
it is virtually admitted by traditionists that their system cannot be

26 THE RULE OF FAITH.
found in the scripture, nor in the first three centuries. We believe,
say they, what the fifth century believed, and because the church
of that age believed. The reason of this is obvious. Priestly
power was not fully established before the fifth century. To find
a system suited to their taste, they must come away from the Bible
and from the early church, and turn to an age in which salvation
was doled out for pence ; when priestly excommunication was a
sentence of death ; when pardon, grace, and eternal life were
granted or withheld at the option of the clergy ; when the doctrines
of episcopal grace, and sacramental religion, had subjected all
classes of men and all departments of life to ghostly domination.
We do not say that the modern traditionists love this system,
merely or mainly because of the power it gives the clergy ; but we
say that the system which they love, has ever had, and from its
nature must have, the effect of exalting the priesthood and of de
grading the people.
Where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty. The men who
read the Bible and hear there the voice of God, cannot but be free.
It commands their assent and secures their homage. They cannot
be subject to men in things whereof God has spoken. All the tra
ditionists in the world cannot persuade them that the Bible is not
the intelligible voice of God, or that there is either duty or safety
in closing their ears to that voice, in order to listen to the mutter-
ings of tradition. Our blessedness is to be free from men, that we'
may be subject to God ; and we cannot be thus subject, without
being thus free.
We have reason then still to assert and defend the position that
the Bible, the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants ; we want
no> other and we want no more. It is the rule of our faith. It is
infallible, perspicuous, complete, and accessible. It is able to make
us wise unto salvation ; being inspired of God, it is profitable for
doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteous
ness ; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished
unto every good work. A better, surer rule than inspired scrip
ture we cannot have ; and it must stand alone, or fall. If men
bring their torches around the pillar of fire, the sacred light goes
out, and they are left to their own guidance ; and then the blind
Sead the blind.

ESSAY II.
THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
PUBLISHED IN 1829.

One of the most difficult points of knowledge is, to know how
much may be known ; to decide where the limits are to be placed
to the speculations of the inquisitive mind of man. Neither philo
sophers nor theologians have, in any age, observed these limits,
and the consequence has been, that philosophy and theology, in
stead of being a systematic arrangement of the phenomena of the
material and spiritual world, so far as they come within the range
of our observation, or of the facts revealed in the word of God,
are to so great an extent the useless and contradictory specula
tions of men on things beyond the reach of our feeble powers.
These speculations, as it regards divine things, are so mixed and
inwoven with the facts and principles contained in the sacred
scriptures, that it is no easy task to determine, in every instance,
what is revelation, and what is human philosophy. Yet, with re
spect to almost every doctrine of the Christian faith, this is a task
which every sincere inquirer after truth is called upon to per
form. The modes of conceiving of these doctrines, in different
minds and in different ages, are so various, that it is evident at first
view, that much is to be referred to the spirit of each particular
age, and to the state of mind of every individual. The history of
theology affords so much evidence of the truth of this remark, that
it probably will not be called in question. It must not be sup
posed, however, that everything, either in philosophy or theology,
is uncertain ; that the one and the other is an ever-changing mass
of unstable speculations. There are in each fixed principles and
facts, which, although frequently denied by men whose minds have
so little sense of truth, that evidence does not produce conviction,
have maintained, and will maintain, their hold on the minds and
hearts of men. With regard to theology, the uniformity with
which the great cardinal doctrines of our faith have been em
braced is not less remarkable than the diversity which has pre
vailed in the mode of conceiving and explaining them. The fact,
that there is one God, and that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost
are this God ; that there is such a distinction between the Father,
Son, and Spirit, as to lay a sufficient ground for the reciprocal use

28 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
of the personal pronouns, has been the faith of the Christian church
from first to last. And yet there is probably no one doctrine con
tained in scripture which has been so variously defined and
explained as this. In the earlier ages of the church, when the
religion of the gospel was glowing in the hearts of all the followers
of Christ, when it was peculiarly a religion of feeling, it was not to
be expected that this mysterious doctrine should be very accurately
defined. To the early Christians, Jesus Christ was God ; to him
their prayers were directed, their praises given — in him all their con
fidence was reposed. In their preaching, sermons, and apologies,
they presented God the Father, Son, and Spirit, as the great object
of their worship, — as the Christian's God. It is true, that very
early some few of the fathers, who had previously been specula
tive men, introduced their speculations into the doctrine of the
Trinity, but this was far from being the prevalent character of this
period. Irenaeus is a much better representative of this age than
Justin Martyr, and we find him expostulating against the various
attempts which had been made to'explain the inexplicable myste
ries of the Godhead. When religion had, in some measure, passed
from the heart to the head ; when the different modes of thinking
and speaking on the subject of the Trinity, which had long pre
vailed, began to give rise to serious evils ; and when opinions were
adopted inconsistent with the great Bible-fact, which had pre
viously been almost universally admitted ; theh a necessity arose
for those in authority to state with more precision what was the
faith of the church on this important point. That the modes of
expression employed in their authoritative exposition of this doc
trine were derived from the prevalent modes of thought of that
age, and were intended to meet particular forms of error, may be
readily admitted ; while we maintain that the truth which they
meant to convey was nothing more than the great fundamental
doctrine of the Christian church. It need not be concealed, that
the expressions which, in various ages, and by distinguished writers,
have been employed on this subject, have often been infelicitous
and improper ; expressions which, if strictly interpreted and urged,
would imply either Tritheism on the one hand, or Sabellianism
on the other. While, at the same time, to the minds of those who
used them, they implied only what all Christians recognise as the
corner-stone of their faith. It is much to be lamented that so much
animosity has been excited, and so much time and labour wasted on
points of dispute, which arose from the imperfection of human lan
guage, or the weakness of the human mind. There has this good
effect, however, resulted from these controversies, that the Church
has been driven from one unguarded mode of expression to another,
until it has come back to the sinlple statement of the word of God,
and consented to leave the inexplicable unexplained. It is to be
remarked, too, that this advantage has been derived mainly from
the opposers of the doctrine in question. They have seen and
exposed the difficulties attending the various definitions of the doc-

THE S0NSHIP OF CHRIST. 29
trine of the Trinity, and have falsely imagined, that in showing the
inconsistency of a theological definition they have thereby refuted
the doctrine itself. It would certainly be very unjust to accuse
the modern defenders of the doctrine of the Trinity of having
renounced the faith of the church, because in their statement of
this article they abstain from the exceptionable or unintelligible
terms which, in former times, have been employed to set it forth.
The Bible-fact has ever been, and still is, by the great body of the
Christian community, maintained and defended, although we have
been taught to confine ourselves more closely to what the scrip
tures more immediately teach.
The same series of remark may be applied, with equal propriety,
to the doctrine of the Sonship of Christ. With regard to this doc
trine, even in a greater degree than the one just alluded to, it is true
that the explanations and definitions of which it has been the sub
ject have obscured the great truth meant to be taught. It may be
stated, with the consent of the opposers of what is called the
eternal generation, of the Son, that in every age of the church the
great body of Christians have believed that Christ is called the Son
of God, on account of the relation existing between him as God
and the first person of the Trinity. Whether this doctrine is
taught in the word of God, is disputed ; but that it has been the
faith of the church, is admitted. In the early ages, it is not impos
sible that the ideas attached to the expression were more vague
even than those which, from the nature of the case, are still enter
tained by those who maintain the common doctrine on this point.
Christians were taught to believe in the Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, and they were led to consider these terms as the appro
priate names of the several persons of the Trinity as such. As
soon, however, as men began to ask what was the nature of the
relation indicated by these terms, we find the same variety of
modes of thinking, and the same diversity of language, which have
been exhibited in the explanation of most other leading doctrines
of the Scriptures. In the first few centuries, almost every mode
of explanation and illustration was adopted, which has ever been
employed since. Some of the Fathers had recourse to the distinc
tion between the Logos ivSiaesros, and the Logos jrpo^op«i?t. To what
extent this philosophical theory prevailed in the church, it is not
our object to inquire. We merely wish to note the diversity
which obtained among those who all united in believing that Christ,
as Logos, was the Son of God. Irenaeus objected to this and
all other explanations of the doctrine, while he maintained the
doctrine itself. What the nature of Christ's Sonship, or genera
tion, was, he pretended not to say, and complained of those who
did. " When any one asks us," he says, " how the Son is produced
from the Father ? we answer, no one knows. Since his genera
tion is inexplicable, they who pretend to explain it know not what
they say. That a word proceeds from the understanding every
body knows. What great discovery, then, is made by those who

30 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
apply what is familiar to every one, to the only begotten Word of
God, and undertake to explain so definitely his incomprehensible
generation."* Origen's explanation was derived from the Platonic doctrine of
the relation of the ».«$ to the <)*, as the latter was always revealed
in the former, so the Father is from eternity exhibited in the Son,
as the effulgence of his glory. He maintained an eternal genera
tion of the Son, but rejected every mode of expression, and every
illustration borrowed from material objects, as utterly inconsistent
with the spirituality of the Supreme Being. He objected to the
expression, " generation from the divine essence" (yimicis u t^ oicas
nv Oeov), as implying that God was capable of division. Tertul-
lian's mode of thinking was far less refined. " He could," as Nean-
der (Kirchengeschichte, p. 1035) says, " very well conceive, ac
cording to his emanation theory, how a being could emanate from
the Godhead, possessed of the same substance, though in a less
degree ; just as a ray emanates from the sun. He maintained,
therefore, one divine essence in three intimately united persons."
Una substantia in tribus cohaerentibus. And says of the Son,
Deus de Deo, modulo alter, non numero.
The mode of explaining this doctrine, adopted by the Nicene
fathers, is familiar to every one. " We believe in one Lord Jesus
Christ, the Son of God, the only begotten of the Father, that is,
of the essence of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very
God of very God, begotten, not made, of one essence with the
Father, by whom all things were made," &c. Since this period,
this has been the general, though by no means the universal, me
thod of speaking on this subject.
Amongst Protestant divines, there is a general coincidence as to
the manner of explaining the generation of the Son of God. It is
commonly defined to be, " an eternal and incomprehensible com
munication of the same numerical essence, from the Father to the
Son."f Not that the divine essence produces another divine es
sence, but the Father as a Person, communicates the same divine
essence to the Son.J It will be seen at once, that this is not a
simple statement of a Bible fact, but a philosophical explanation of
what the scriptures are supposed to teach, viz., that Jesus Christ is
the eternal Son of God. This definition is founded almost exclu
sively on the idea of generation itself, and has arisen from urging
unduly the analogy of the relation between Father and Son,
among men, when applied to God. De Moor expressly says, we
must consider the' generation of Christ, as including all that is
essential to the idea of generation ; and as, among men, generation
* Adv. Haer., lib. ii., c. 28.
f Aeterna et incomprehensibilis, ejusdem numero divinae essentiae communicatio
a Patre facta Filio. De Moor, Com. in Markii Comp., torn, i., p. 742.
j: Generatio inquam Filii a. Patre, non enim essentia gignit essentiam  sed Per
sona generat personam. De Moor, Commentarius in Joh. Markii Compendium,
Theol. Christ., caput v., § 8.

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 31
is the communication of life, therefore, there must be a like com
munication in the case of the Son of God. (See De Moor, torn.
i., p. 736.) This analogy, and the passage in John v. 26, in which
the Father is said to have given the Son to have life in himself
(which some of the advocates of this doctrine explain as referring
to Christ in his divine nature), are almost the only grounds, as far
as we know, for this particular view of the subject. It should be
remarked, however, that the venerable men, who felt themselves
constrained to present the doctrine in question, in this light, were
very far from attaching any of those gross ideas to the phrase,
" communication of the divine essence," which have been supposed
to be necessarily included in it. They expressly state, in what
sense they use the expression ; that all ideas, inconsistent with the
spirituality and infinite perfection of God, are to be excluded from
it; and consequently, all idea of posteriority, dependence, or
change. Generatio, non nisi summa impopxi Deo tribuitur, itaomnes
imperfectiones, quae finitam creaturarum generationem sequi so-
lent, a generatione hac divina longissime sunt removendae, nimirum
dependentia^successio, mutatio, divisio, multiplicatio, &c. (De Moor,
p. 736.) If it be said, that the ideas of posteriority, dependence,
and mutability are necessarily included in this phrase, and that if
these be denied, the very thing asserted is denied ; the friends of
this definition would say, that all such objections arise from trans
ferring the gross ideas which we derive from sensible objects, to
an infinite spirit. That it is just as impossible to conceive how the
Father and Son should have the same divine essence, and yet
remain distinct persons, as that this essence should be communi
cated from one to the other. And we are free to confess that if
the d priori objections urged against this doctrine, are to be con
sidered valid, we cannot see how we can consistently remain be
lievers in God's omnipresence, eternity, or any other doctrine which
is confessedly incomprehensible. We are not, however, the advo
cates of this definition, nor do we consider it as at all essential to
the doctrine of Christ's divine and eternal Sonship. It has never
secured the favour of many who are firm believers in this doctrine.
Lampe, in his Commentary on John v., 26, expressly rejects the
interpretation of the passage which is considered as the chief
ground of this particular view of the Sonship of Christ. The life
there said to be given to the Son cannot, he maintains, be referred
to his divine nature ; because such a gift would be inconsistent
with his independence and necessary existence. He opposes, stre
nuously, the idea of any communication of essence, and yet de
clares, se generationem Filii Dei naturalem, ad ipsam divinam es-
sentiam pertinentem, unicam, aeternam absolute necessariam,
sancte agnoscere, libere confiteri masculeque asserere. (See Pre
face to vol. iii. of his Commentary.) It is true that Lampe, by
many of his brethren, was blamed for taking this course, and they
accused him of thus committing an " atrocious injury" on the
cause of orthodoxy. This, however, does not alter the case, nor

32 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
affect the correctness of our position, that the doctrine of Christ's
divine Sonship does not consist in this idea of the communication
of essence. The same view of John v. 26, as that presented by
Lampe, had been given before, by Calvin, Beza, and many others.
Morus, in his Commentarius Exegeticus in suam Theol. Christ.
Epitomen, torn, i., p. 256, would explain the doctrine thus : Filius
per Patrem est, et talis, qualis est, per Patrem est ; which in the
language of the church, would be, Filius natus est ex Patre, and
in philosophical language, Pater cum Filio essentiam communi-
cavit. On page 249, and seq., when speaking of the appellation
viaS tov 9rou as applied to Christ, he says, Significatus dogmaticus
nominis vUs mv 9cov hue redit ; aequalis Deo, qui habet eandem natu
ram ; eadem attributa, eadem opera, quae Pater. Such passages
as John v. 26, Matthew xxviii. 18, and John xvii. 2, in which life,
power, and ability to save, are said to^ be given to the Son, he un
derstands, not as referring to Christ as Mediator, but as God, and
consequently as affording ground for the statement, that the Son
has what he has, and is what he is, through the Father. He ap
pears to lay no stress upon the philosophical definition of the Son-
ship, so often mentioned ; but says that we should tell the people,
that when they hear the word generation used in reference to
Christ, they should think that the Son is even as the Father, has the
same essence and the same attributes ; that he can and does do
whatever the Father does. Only the Son is through the Father.
Knapp, in his Vorlesungen uber die Christliche Glaubenslehre
Erster Theil, p. 214, in speaking of the sense in which God is
called the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, after stating that the
expression sometimes refers to the relation which Jesus, as the
Saviour of men, sustains to the Father, says that " it undeniably
refers, in several passages, to a certain internal relation in the God
head, of the Godhead of Jesus to the Godhead of the Father ; the
real nature of which, however, the Bible has nowhere clearly ex
plained, and which indeed must be incomprehensible to men. Only
the Son, says he, has all from the Father, although he makes him
self equal with God." In like manner he maintains that the name
vim nv etov in Rom. i. 3, 4, John v. 17, John i., and Heb. i., un
questionably refers to the divine nature of Christ. The name, Son
of God, he says, should only awaken in us the idea of the partici
pation of Christ in the divine essence — that he is of the same
nature with the Father, even as, among men, a son is of the same
nature with his parent.
Zacharia, in his Biblische Theologie, Gottingen, 1775, vol. i., p.
503, gives, as the result of his examination of the scriptural doc
trine of the Sonship of Christ, in substance the following state
ment. There is in God himself, that is, in the divine essence, an
internal relation which has some similarity to the relation between
father and son among men. This follows from the names father
and son, if these names refer, as in his opinion they do, to the first
and second persons in the Trinity as such, and are founded on

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 33
their relation the one to the other. This relation includes the idea
of the sameness of nature, and this is the only idea essential to it.
Everything else included in it, being merely human, cannot be
transferred to God. The Son, therefore, must have the divine na
ture because the Father has it, or in other words, there must be a
certain relation, in virtue of which the Son is a partaker of the
divine nature or essence. A nearer or more definite explanation
of the nature of this relation between the Father and the Son, can
not be given, on account of our limited knowledge of the divine
Being ; or because there is nothing analogous to it among men.
And at best our analogical knowledge of God extends but a little
way. This relation must have existed from eternity, and is there
fore a necessary and unchanging relation.
The idea of generation, strictly speaking, considered as an in
ternal act of the Father, by which he confers the distinct charac
ter of Son on the second person in the Trinity, is neither in his opi
nion taught in the scriptures nor essential to the doctrine of Christ's
divine and eternal Sonship.
We think that it must be admitted, that the essence of the doc
trine under consideration is something different from any, or all of
the various definitions of which it has been the subject. The re
vealed fact, as we believe, is that Christ, in his divine nature, is the
Son of God. That this implies that there is some ground in the
nature of the relation of the Father and Son, for the application of
these relative terms, will hardly be questioned. But what the na
ture of this relation is, the scriptures have not revealed, and we
therefore cannot undertake to decide. It will not be denied, that
much evil has been produced, by the attempt to reduce to distinct
formulas the general truths of the Bible, nor that many have been
led to reject this, as well as other doctrines of the word of God,
from the difficulties with which they conceived the definitions of
them to be incumbered. Calvin long ago exclaimed, Utinam
sepulta essent nomina (Trininatis ipaovaitm, &c.) constaret modo haec
inter omnes fides, Patrem Filium et Spiritum Sanctum esse unum
Deum : nee tamen aut Filium esse Patrem, aut Spiritum Filium ;
sed proprietate quadam distinctos. (Inst. Christ., Lib. i., cap. 13, §
5.) It might, with equal propriety, be desired, that theologians had
contented themselves with asserting the Bible fact on this subject,
without attempting to decide whether Christ was the Son of God
by emanation, communication of essence, or merely by oneness of
nature. A mere statement of the principal a priori objections to the di
vine Sonship of the Redeemer, will be sufficient to show, that they
are all directed against the idea of derivation of the second per
son in the Trinity from the first, and consequently that they bear
not against the doctrine itself, but against some few of the forms
in which it has been exhibited. We shall mention the principal of
these objections, as they are given in substance, in RoelPs Disser
tatio de generatione Filii Dei, as they are the same which have
3

34 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
been presented both before and since. It is said that the doctrine
contains a contradiction in terms, that it is utterly incomprehensi
ble how the divine essence can be communicated to the Son, and
yet retained by the Father.* That this objection is directed to
the idea of communication of essence, its very terms imply. And
that it is valid, may be admitted, if the word communication is to
be taken in a physical sense. But those who employ this term,
tell us that this is not the sense in which they use it ; that being
applied to a spiritual being, it is absurd to speak of whole and part,
as though God were capable of division ; and that if it be allowa
ble to demand how the divine essence can be communicated from
the Father to the Son, and yet retained by the Father, the ob
jector must submit to a similar demand, how three distinct persons
can have the same numerical essence ? how God can be in heaven
and on earth at the same time, and yet not partly in the one and
partly in the other ? It is evident, that when we speak thus, we
use words nearly without meaning ; human language is so little
adapted to the things of God, and our knowledge is so limited,
that we may be said not to know what we say, nor whereof we
affirm. When speaking of God's essence, his omnipresence, his
unsuccessive eternal existence, or mode of subsistence, our ideas
are at best merely negative. We endeavour to deny everything
inconsistent with absolute perfection, but we are unable to state
affirmatively, what we mean by any of these terms. Frequently,
as the distinction between the &™ and the ™s is upon our lips, we
are constantly disposed to forget it. Nor do we feel as we ought
how infinitely such subjects are beyond our reach.
A second objection is, that the doctrine in question is inconsis
tent with the eternity of the divine nature of Christ, since, from
the nature of the case, the Father must be prior to the Son.f And
thirdly, it is objected that it necessarily involves a denial of the
independence and self-existence of the Son. J These objections
amount to the same thing, that this doctrine is inconsistent with
the proper deity of the Son of God. Now whether this is so or
not, it should be recollected that the uncaused, self-existent, inde
pendent divinity of Christ, is as strongly asserted by the advocates
of this doctrine, as it is by any class of theologians whatever.
It is true that some of the Fathers used language apparently in
consistent with this statement. But even Bishop Bull objects to
calling the Son and Spirit (atnarovs) caused. Although he says he
can conceive of a sense, in which the Son may be called an eter
nal and infinite effect of an eternal and infinite cause. Such lan-
* Vel Pater totam Filro dedissetvitam, quando ipse eandem amisisset; vel partem
essentiae divinae tantum, quando nee Pater nee Filius earn possideret. See De
Moor, caput v.
f Si generatio illi tribuatur qui cum conscientia operatur, ut enti mere rationali,-
vel ratione saltern praedito, voluntarius sit oportet generandi actus. Ex quibus aper-
tum est, in ejusmodi proprie dicta generatione generatum esse genito priorem.
| Quis non hoc per se intelligit, — id omne quod et quatenus genitum est, eatenus
dependere a generante, tanquam effectum a causa.

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 35
guage, however, has never been adopted by the great mass of be
lievers in the eternal generation of the Son of God. It is impossi
ble to express in stronger language, faith in the uncaused, self-ex
istent, and independent deity of Christ, than has been done by
these men. Calvin, Beza, Mark, De Moor, and as far as we know,
Protestant divines generally, teach that Christ is properly called
avTo6coS, Deus a se, and prove that it must be so, from the verity,
supremacy, and independence of his Godhead. De Moor says (p.
772), Si Filius sit verus Deus, est Deus independens : nam inde
pendent est inter attributa Dei facile prima, atque ab essentia
Dei inseparabilis. See also Calvin's Theological Tracts, tom. 7,
" of his works, p. 672, where he maintains that the Son and Spirit
not less than the Father are to be called ainSsos. They further
deny any kind of dependence of the Son on the Father, in refer
ence to his divine nature, but maintain that the several persons in
the Trinity are alike independent, of equal dignity and perfection.
Omnis igitur iwseoX>i Patri supra Filium tributa, spectat non ad
naturalem Patris et Filii subsistendi modum in se consideratum,
sed ad redemtionis oeconomiam et munus mediatorium a Deo
Filio voluntarie susceptum. (De Moor, p. 721.) It must not be
supposed, therefore, that it is the exclusive privilege of those who
deny the Sonship of Christ, to regard their Redeemer as self-ex
istent, uncaused, and independent, — nor that it is necessary to give
up the self-existence of the Logos in order to believe that he is the
Son of God. The only question is, whether the communication
of the divine essence from the Father to the Son, be consistent
with this belief in the self-existence and independence of the lat
ter ? We find the advocates of this definition, almost with one
voice, asserting that it is ; declaring that they associate no ideas
with the phrase in question, inconsistent with these divine attri
butes ; that it is as unreasonable to force upon them a meaning of
the expression which they disclaim, as it is for Unitarians to assert
that we are necessarily Tritheists in believing that there are three
persons in the Godhead ; that there is no more necessity for using
the word " communication," as applied to God, in its common
sense, than there is for using the word person in the same sense
when applied to God, as when applied to men ; that, the npann \pcvim
of all such objections lies in pressing the analogy between divine and
human things too far, and thinking and speaking of God as though
he were material, or at least altogether such an one as ourselves. It
is plain that if it be permitted to apply to God forms of expression in
the same sense in which they are used among men, there is no one
subject on which we may not be involved in contradiction and absur
dity. We say that the Father and Son have the same numerical
essence, and yet we say that the Son became incarnate, and the
Father did not, that is, that the same numerical essence did and
did not become incarnate. Is it not something worse than useless
for us to speculate so confidently on subjects at such an infinite
remove above our conceptions, and to avail ourselves with so

36 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
much confidence of the most dangerous of all arguments, the re-
ductio ad absurdum, when applied to subjects like the present.
We are, however, no advocates for the definition under conside
ration, not because we consider the a priori arguments against it
as just and conclusive, but because we cannot find that it is founded
on the clear statements of the word of God, and because we regard
it as one of the vain attempts to bring down by formulas and de
finitions, the infinite mysteries of the Godhead, within the grasp
of man's infant intellect. Still we think that it is much to be la
mented that so many distinguished men should have been influ
enced, either in whole or in part, to reject the doctrine of Christ's
divine Sonship, by objections, which, if of any weight at all, bear
only on a philosophical formula for expressing the • nature of the
fact on which the doctrine is founded. It is still more to be re
gretted that they should have been led to use such harsh language
as has at times been applied to this doctrine. That it is an " infi
nite " and " awful absurdity," even in its most objectionable form,
would require stronger arguments than any which we have yet
seen, to induce us to believe. Nor do we think, after all that
has been written upon the subject, and the express denial on the
part of its advocates of all ideas of derivation and dependence,
that exclamations against the thought of " a derived Deity " are
altogether candid or courteous. The idea that " this strange con
ceit" was derived from the Platonic or Gnostic Philosophy, is
about as reasonable, as that the doctrine of the Trinity was derived
from Plato, because the terms employed to set it forth, were bor
rowed from the new Platonic school. We have no objection to
the rejection of all such terms, but do not let us reject with them
the great Bible-fact upon which the whole Gospel rests. Let who
will reject the explanation of Origen, Tertullian, or the Nicene
fathers, of the divine Sonship of Christ, but let him seek some
better reason than the faultiness of a definition, for rejecting the
doctrine itself. We do not mean to intimate that these a priori
objections are the only ones urged against the doctrine in question,
but we verily believe that they are by far the most efficacious.
For that " any man can believe that a doctrine is " abhorrent to
reason," and inconsistent with all just notions of the spirituality of
God, and yet go with a perfectly unbiassed mind to see whether it
be taught in a book which he regards as infallible, we deem a
moral impossibility. And should he find it there, he would not
and could not believe it. No man can believe what he deems to
be absurd. He must either renounce his faith in the Scriptures,
or explain away the passages in which such absurdity is taught.
We have been led to the consideration of this subject, from
observing how frequently and strongly the divine Sonship of Christ
is denied, and from noticing that the main objections to it are di
rected against a mode of presenting it neither essential to the
doctrine itself, nor adopted by some of its ablest advocates. The
question is a very simple one, Why is Christ called the Son of

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 37
God ? Is this name given to him in reference to his divine nature,
and founded on the relation which as God he sustains to the first
Person in the Trinity, or are his incarnation, resurrection, exalta
tion, &c, the sole reasons for his being so called ? Our object in
the remainder of this article, is to show that there are passages in
which the name, Son of God, is referred to the divine nature of
Christ, or in which it necessarily involves the assumption or
ascription of equality with God.
Our first argument is an a priori one, that such has always been
the faith of the church. This may be regarded as unworthy of a
Protestant, and some may revolt at the idea of an appeal to the
authority of men as to the meaning of the word of God. We
have$|frd;we^r, no intention of calling in question the right of
•private judgment. The argument is only one of presumption,
and as such, is founded on the very first principle of Protestant
ism, viz. the perspicuity of the scriptures. We assume the fact
(because it has often been admitted, and cannot with any plausi
bility be denied), that in all ages, the mass of intelligent readers
of the Bible have believed that Christ, in his divine nature, is the
Son of God, that the names, Father and Son, are applied to the
first and second Persons in the Trinity, as expressive of their
mutual relation as such. If this be so, then it affords a presump
tion, strong as proof, that such must be the obvious meaning of the
word of God. For how is the supposition, that the mass of read
ers have always mistaken its meaning, to be reconciled with the
favourite principle of Protestants, that the Bible js easy to be un
derstood ? We are unable to call to mind any one doctrine which
has been thus generally received, by the great body of intelligent
and pious Christians, as taught in the scriptures, which the scrip
tures do' not really teach. The explanation of these doctrines
may vary as the systems of philosophy and modes of thinking
vary, but the doctrines themselves are retained ; nor can they be
rejected, without rejecting what we have the strongest of all rea
sons for regarding as the plain and obvious meaning of the word
of God. We cannot see how the force of this argument is to be
denied, without denying that the obvious meaning of scripture is
its true meaning, which, after all our learning and laws of exege
sis, is the sheet anchor of the church. By obvious meaning, is
not to be understood, the import which at first view an individual
would be disposed to assign to an isolated passage, but that sense
which the general tenor of scripture, the logical connection, and
constant comparison of analogous passages would naturally lead,
and in fact have led the mass of Christians to adopt. This is the
general way in which men form their opinions of what is taught
in the word of God ; and if this be not a safe and proper way,
then must the scriptures be but little adapted for general instruc
tion, and the bulk of the people must depend on what the learned
shall tell them, of the things involving their eternal interests.
These remarks, of course, apply only to those doctrines which are

38 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
so plainly taught, as to secure the assent of the great mass of the
readers of the Bible. The results which are thus obtained, are in
the great majority of instances, the same as those at which the
learned exegete arrives after a laborious and scientific investiga
tion. And when they differ, the presumption is in favour of the
multitude, rather than of the learned individual. The ground of
this presumption is, that the causes which operate upon the latter,
to produce error of judgment, are peculiarly numerous and pow
erful. It is rare to see any commenta,tor, even if his general the
ory of interpretation is correct, who does not carry some one
principle to an inordinate length, or who is not unduly swayed by
one species of evidence, to the neglect of others, of equal impor
tance ; giving, for example, opinions respecting th#meanttig of
particular passages, on merely philological grounds, contradicted
by the whole train of the argument and drift of the context. The
writings of J. D. Michaelis afford many striking illustrations of
this remark. A whole class of commentators, whose main prin
ciples of interpretation are perfectly correct, might be brought as
examples, of pressing some favourite principle unduly. Thus, be
cause the apostles were Jews, and used the same words and
phrases which were common among their countrymen, these
words and phrases are presumed to mean exactly as much, and
no more, than they would do in the mouth of an ordinary Jew, as
though there were no modification of their import to be expected,
when used to express the peculiar doctrines and feelings of Chris
tians. It is in this way Paulus, Rosenmuller, and to a certain ex
tent, Morus, have rendered flat and powerless some of the most
spiritual portions of the word of God.
We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, that far more respect
is due to the clear common-sense view of scripture, that which
commends itself to the judgment and pious feelings of the mass of
Christian readers, than to the views of the learned few. This is
the ground of the presumptive argument, which we have stated in
favour of the divine Sonship of Christ. If it be a fact, that the
readers of the scriptures have, as a body, been led to think that
the name, Son of God, is applied to Christ in reference to his di
vine nature, there is a presumption in favour of the opinion, that the
name is so applied, which it should require the strongest evidence
to induce us to resist. To ascribe the prevalence of this opinion
to the influence " of fathers, doctors, and framers of systematic
divinity," is to have a strange notion of the relation of cause and
effect. And to suppose that it could not stand a day before the
light of " sacred philosophy," without this adventitious support,
argues a forgetfulness of the fact, that it has stood its ground,
amid the wreck of the whole fabric of scholastic terminology and
divinity. That such mere-as Morus, Knapp, Flatt, and others,
who will not be despised as deficient in philological knowledge,
nor suspected of being held in the trammels of system, have re-

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 39
tamed the doctrine in question, is a sufficient answer to such an
assertion. But we proceed now to the examination of a few of those pas
sages, which seem to us clearly to teach that Jesus Christ, as to
his divine nature, is the Son of God. And here we would remark,
that it is not to be expected that a name or title, which so fre
quently occurs, should in every case be attended with circum
stances, which enable us to decide with certainty what is the
ground of its application ; it is enough if some few passages of
this kind occur : such a passage we consider Romans i. 3, 4.
Paul commences this Epistle with his usual assertion of his
apostolical authority. He had been divinely appointed to preach
the Gospel concerning the Son of God. " Who was, indeed, born
of the seed of David, as to his human nature ; but powerfully ex
hibited as the Son of God, as to his divine nature, by the resur
rection from the dead.  tov yevopivov Ik cirkppaTos Aav'iS Kara cupna: tov hpitr-
Sforos diou tov Beov iv Svvipei, Kara xvcvpa dytacririis, 11; dvao-ria-eas venpaiv. That
yevopevos u crtrtppaTos AamS, means born of the race of David, will not
be questioned, yewao-Bai and ytvUBai being used precisely in the same
sense : as Gal. iv. 4, yevipcvos in ymauds made or born of a woman.
The first point to be established in justifying the interpretation
given of this passage, is to fix the sense of /car* <ruj«a. It need
hardly be remarked, that the word aapi is used in such a variety
of significations in scripture, that we must depend, in a great
measure, on the context for its meaning in any particular passage.
It is used for the flesh literally, for the body, for the body and soul
united, for man, mankind, human nature, the corrupt principle in
man, &c, &c. Hence Kara cap** may mean according to the flesh,
in any one of these senses, which the context demands. The
question here is, in what sense was Christ born of ^he family of
David ? the answer is Kara dpta. as to his human nature, or, in so
far as he was a man. The word is used in this sense, Acts ii. 30
(according to the received text), Rom. ix. 5. Philem. 16., &c.
The word then admits this sense, and the context would seem to
require it, since it is only as a man, or as to his human nature, that
Christ can properly be said to be the Son of David. A compari
son of this passage with Rom. ix. 5, will serve to confirm this in
terpretation. There, the apostle says, that Christ in one respect
to Kara uipKa was descended from the Fathers, while in another he
was God over all, blessed for ever. That r«< cipua here, is cor
rectly rendered — according to his human nature, or, as a man, is
generally admitted, and the similarity of the passages would con
strain us to take them in the same sense in both cases.
The corresponding clause in the antithesis, is to.™ ™»p dyiucnbw ¦:
as to his human nature, Christ is the son of David ; as to his di
vine nature, the son of God. The grounds for this interpretation
of this latter phrase are the following. 1. That the word *»«»/«• is
the proper and scriptural designation for the divine Being, or na-

40 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
ture, as such. The word iyiuaivn, which, by a very common He
brew idiom, qualifies xvcvpa, as an adjective, is used in the LXX.
Ps. cxliv. 5, for tin decus, majestas ; in Ps. xcv. 6, for ts robur,
and in Ps. xcvi. 13, for EH-!?, that is, it is a general term for that
which is the object of admiration or veneration, and, therefore,
xvcvpa ayiao-vvm is majestic, glorious, or holy Spirit. The idea ex
pressed by xvcvpa is by the addition of this word exalted. It can
not be denied, therefore, that the proper import of the phrase is
suited to express the divine nature. But 2d, the higher nature of
Christ is elsewhere called xvcvpa, as 1 Peter iii. 18, BavaraBcu piv <rap«;,
^oioxoinBeU a xvevpan, which is thus rendered, in Robinson's Transla
tion of Wahl's Lexicon, " subjected to calamity and death in his
human nature, but enjoying perfect happiness and glory as to his
spiritual nature." (See article xvcvpa.) Wahl makes xvcvpa as spo
ken of Christ, equivalent with b Ao>$ as used in John i. 1. Per
haps 1 Tim. iii. 16, belongs here also. In 1 Cor. xv. 45, Christ
is called xvcvpa guoxowvv, and in Heb. ix. 14, his divine nature
xvdpa aiaviov. We shall have occasion to refer to these passages
more particularly afterwards. 3d. The antithesis requires that
Kara xvcvpa aytuicivvs should answer to wo cdpaa. If the latter, there
fore, be understood of his human nature, then the former must be
understood of his higher or divine nature ; if the one informs us
in what respect he was the son of David, the other must inform
us in what respect he was the son of God. This is so plain, that
few critics have felt themselves authorized to interpret one of these
phrases, in a way which destroys its correspondence with the
other. Hence, the sense put upon o-apt determines that which is
given to xvcvpa. Those who make the former mean a low condi
tion, make the latter mean an exalted one. To this it may be ob
jected, that fhis sense of the word <mpf, does not so well suit the
context, nor the form of expression (««¦& o-ipxa), as to the flesh :
since it was not as to a state that Christ was the son of David.
The use of the phrase also in Acts ii. 30, and Rom. ix. 5, is against
this interpretation, and finally it would require us to give a very
unusual, if not, an entirely unauthorized sense to the words xvcvpa
ayiuavvr,!, viz. state of exaltation. We cannot find a single passage,
either in the Old or New Testament, where xvcvpa has this mean
ing. No such sense is assigned to it by Wahl, or Schleusner.
Those passages which are adduced by the author of the article
Vom Wort xvcvpa, wenn es von Christo gebraucht wird ; in Eich-
horn's Repertorium, vol. ii., p. 1 — 24, are to us entirely unsatisfac
tory. The first is 1 Peter iv. 6, where the apostle is exhorting
Christians to holiness, in view of a future judgment, and then refers
them to the case of those who had already died, to whom the
Gospel had been preached, so that (iva) though they might be con
demned of men (»<¦<>«:) as to the body, yet through God they live
(xvcvpan) as to the spirit. Here, from the opposition of cdet and
xvcvpa, the latter can hardly have any other sense than the soul.

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 41
Though their bodies be dead, their spirits live. The second is 1
ireter iii. 18, ^pivrds BavaroiBcU 0-apni, guoxotriBcis xvcvpan. Here the word
guoxoiia, after the Hebrew rfii5! may either mean, to preserve alive,
continue in life, or, to render happy. Wahl takes it in the latter,
Pott in the former sense. According to the first, the meaning of
the passage is, Christ indeed was put to death as to the body (<ra<m
dative as before), but continued in life as to the spirit (xvcipari).
For Wahl's view see above. The sense in which xvcvpaTi is here
taken, depends upon the view adopted of the following verse, iv «
(l. e. xvcvpaTi), xai this Iv <pv\aKji xvcvpaci xopevBcis, iaripv^cv k. t. X. The Spirit,
therefore, here spoken of, is that in which Christ preached to
the spirits in prison. If this preaching occurred before the
flood, then is xvcvpa his pre-existent nature, i. e., his divine nature.
If it occurred immediately after his death, then xvcvpa may be his
human soul : but in neither case can it be his exalted state.
The third passage is 1 Tim. iii. 16, where Christ is said to have
been " manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, &c." That is,
he was proved or shown to be just ; to be all that he claimed to
be, the Messiah, the Son of God. This was done iv xvcvpaTi ; which
may mean either, by the influences of the Spirit miraculous and
ordinary, by which the claims of Christ were established ; or it
may mean his divine nature, the xvctpa which dwelt in him, and
which was manifested in all his life and in all his works ; and in
and through which he was justified. To render xvcvpa here, his ex
alted state, would be to make this clause tautological with bvc\i,^6n
iv Sofa Besides, it is inconsistent with the natural order of the par
ticulars here specified by the apostle, according to which, the
glorification of Christ follows his justification. In the passage, as
commonly .understood, everything is natural. The incarnation of
Christ, the establishment of his claims as Messiah, his being seen
and served of angels, preached and believed upon in the
world, and his ascension ?o glory, follow each in natural ar
rangement. We have, therefore, no reason, and consequently
no authority, for adopting so unusual a sense of the word
xvcvpa in this place. The only other passage is Heb. ix. 14, where
Christ is said tea xvevpam ai^viov to have offered himself unto God.
Though Storr in his CommentoryT on the Epistle to the Hebrews,
p. 167, renders these words by "in dem Zustande einer ewigen
Herrlichkeit," in the state of eternal glory ; and although Professor
Stuart, in the XVIIIth Excursus to his commentary on the He
brews, inclines to the same view, we cannot think it correct for
the following reasons. 1. We think the passages adduced, and
which have been noticed above, are insufficient to prove that xvcvpa
is ever used in scripture, for the exalted or glorified state of Christ :
and if not, then this interpretation of the word here, is contrary to
the usus loquendi. 2. The sense given by the word in its ordina
ry acceptation, is perfectly good and suitable to the context. " If,"
says the apostle, " the blood of bulls and goats purified  how

42 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
much more the blood of Christ, who was endowed with an eternal
spirit," i. e. was a divine Being. That lid may be taken in this
sense, is admitted : it occurs frequently in this way, particularly in
the writings of Paul — sea ypdppaTos having the written law, ia xcpinpris
with circumcision, &c. See Wahl's Lexicon under Sia. 3. The
words cUvtov xpocnvcyxcv are descriptive of what occurred on earth,
i. e. of Christ's sacrifice, see v. 25, and v. 28 of this chapter, and
not of what was done in heaven. Besides, the point of the compari
son is not between the different places, where the sacrifices of bulls
and that of Christ were offered, but between the sacrifices them
selves, and therefore iii xvcipam aiavM must express the personal
dignity of Christ ; which it does in the strongest possible language.
If the blood of animals was of the least value, what may we not
expect from that, of a Being possesed of a divine nature ?
As these are the only passages adduced to show that the word
xvcvpa may be rendered, exalted state, if these are insufficient, it
will certainly not be contended that we are at liberty to give it
that sense in the passage under consideration. To make it mean,
according to the revelations or predictions of the Holy Ghost, as is
done by Calvin, and more recently by Michaelis and Ammon, is
so directly at variance with the structure of the passage, which
requires us to make KaT& xvcvpa ayiuo-ivm answer to Kara o-AfKa, that this
interpretation cannot be considered sound, and has, in fact, very
few advocates. Nothing but the exigency of the case can author
ize us to do violence to the rule, which governs the interpretation
of antithetical passages. As no such exigency exists here, it evi
dently should not be departed from, especially as Paul, perhaps
more than any other of the sacred writers, abounds in such
passages, and depends most on his readers gathering his meaning
by the aid of the mutual light afforded by the contrasted terms.
The only other ground for the interpretation given of the
phrase in question, which we shall present, is the analogy between
this passage and Rom. ix. 5. There the apostle, as before re
marked, is speaking of Christ in a two-fold respect. According
to the one, he is descended from the fathers, according to the
other, he is God over all, blessed for ever. So here, in one re
spect, he is the Son of David ; in another, the Son of God. As
Son of David is equivalent with being descended from the Fathers,
so is Son of God equivalent with God over all, blessed for ever.
We designedly passed over the word bpioBcvTos, that we might be
permitted to derive an argument from the interpretation, which
we have endeavoured to show must be given to the words *ara
xvcvpa ayiaamiis in favour of that given of bpigciv. This word is pro
perly to fix the limits of anything, to define, &c, in the New Tes
tament, to appoint, constitute, determine, &c. Accordingly, the
most obvious meaning of ipmBcvTos vlov Qcov is constituted the Son of
God. But it is familiar to every student of the scriptures, that it
is very common to say of any person (or thing), that he is made
that, which he is only pronounced or declared to be. Thus, to

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 43
make guilty, is to pronounce guilty ; to make just, is to pronounce
just ; to make clean, is to declare clean ; and so in cases without
number. See Storr's Observationes ad Analogiam Heb., p. 14.
Hence bpweivns vlov Beov, in the strictest accordance with the usage
of the Hebrew-Greek, may be rendered, pronounced, or declared,
the Son of God. That it must be so rendered is, we think, clear
from the following considerations: 1. Christ cannot be said to be
constituted the Son of God, /to™ xvcvpa iyiaaivra, if these words mean,
as shown above, the divine nature. 2. It cannot be said, that he
was constituted the Son of God, by or after his resurrection, as he
was the Son of God before it. If this title is equivalent with Mes
siah, or king of Israel, still he was Messiah and king of Israel be
fore his resurrection. And hence, even those, who make xvcvpa
here to mean exalted state, translate bpioBas by declaratus..
There is another process by which the same sense may be shown
to be expressed by the term, without having recourse to the fami
liar Hebraism above alluded to. Thus Morus says, bpiga in com-
muni vita est : terminos pono, nam tyos est terminus, limes, agro-
rum terminus. lam metonymice opiguv in communi vita est, con-
firmo aliquid, facio ut sit certum. — Ita bptoSeis »!os tov Qcov erit : der
bestatigte Sohn Gottes, certo confirmatum est eum esse »fo» tov Qcov.
Yet Morus translates Kara xvcvpa hy. quoad statum suum excelsiorem.
He cannot, therefore, be supposed to be biassed in his judgment as
to the force of the word bpC^civ, by theological prepossessions. We
shall not undertake to decide, whether the passages quoted from
the common Greek authors, in support of this sense of bpi&v by
Eisner, are sufficient to prove the point, as the process by which
Morus explains the term is so simple and satisfactory. Does not
however the phrase bpigciv nva Bedv more properly mean to declare
or pronounce that one is a God, than to constitute one a God ?
Both Chrysostom and Theodoret (if further confirmation of this
point be necessary), explain bptoBcvTos by dxoieixBcvTos. The Syriac
gives it the same sense. The majority of modern critics, however
they may differ in their expositions of other parts of this passage,
agree here. So Koppe, declaratus per resurrectionem filius Dei.
Flatt, fiir Gottes Sohn kraftig erklart wurde ; — Tholuck — ist nun
offenbar wurden als Gottes Sohn. And to the same effect, many
others. The words h Hvapei may either be connected adverbially with
bpioBtvTos. or adjectively with vioS Qcov. In the former case, the sense
would be, was powerfully manifested as the Son of God : in the
other, he was manifested as the powerful Son of God. This mani
festation was H avaaraacus vcKpav, either by the resurrection from the
dead ; or after the resurrection, as « admits of either sense. In
both cases the meaning is the same, it was the resurrection which
was the great decisive evidence that Christ was all that he claimed
to be, the Messiah, the Son of God, and Saviour of the world. It
is in this light that the apostles were accustomed to speak of the
resurrection of their Master. It was one important part of their

44 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
official duty to bear testimony to this fact. Hence, when Judas
fell, they said, " one must be ordained to be a witness with us of
his (Christ's) resurrection." It is recorded of them, that " with
great power gave the apostles witness of the resurrection of the
Lord Jesus." Paul tells the Jews that the evidence that God had
fulfilled the promise made to their Fathers, was that he had raised
up Jesus. And in 1 Cor. xv., he makes all our hopes as Christians
to depend upon the fact that Christ has risen from the dead. This
was the final proof that he was the Son of God.
We have now given the grouuds, on which we are constrained
to believe that the passage before us contains an explicit declara
tion, that Christ in his divine nature is the Son of God. The view
here given, is not only that which Beza and the older commenta
tors had presented, but which such men as Flatt, Knapp, and others,
who cannot be considered to be influenced by theological prepos
sessions, have adopted. The oftener we have examined the pas
sage, the more thorough has been our conviction, that the interpre
tation given above is not only admissible, but that it is the only
one which the text will consistently bear. And, therefore, we con
sider this passage decisive on the point at issue. For all that we
have undertaken to prove, is, that Christ, as Logos, is called the
Son of God ; not that this title, in the mouths of Jews, Heathen,
and evil Spirits, or even of the apostles, was uniformly used in a
sense involving the ascription of true divinity.
We have endeavoured to show that the doctrine of the divine
and eternal Sonship of Christ does not include the idea of deriva
tion of the Logos from the Father ; and, consequently, that the
objections which proceed in the assumption, even admitting
their force, are not conclusive. We remarked, that a distinc
tion was to be made here, as in many other instances, between the
fact as revealed in scripture and the explanations of its nature, as
given in different ages and by different men. The simple point we
wish to establish is, that .the Logos is the Son of God. In support
of this point, we referred to Romans i. 3 & 4, where, we think, it
is expressly asserted, that Christ, as to his human nature, is the Son
of David ; but, as to his divine nature, was clearly exhibited to be
the Son of God, by his resurrection from the dead. Those of our
readers who admit the correctness of the interpretation of this pas
sage as here given, would demand no other proof of the position
which we have assumed. For it is to be borne in mind that it is
no part of our object to prove that the name, Son of God, is always
used in direct reference to Christ's divine nature ; or that it is
always employed in a sense implying equality with God. Our
object is merely to show that Christ as God is called Son ; and for
this purpose we will now advert to some other passages.
These are principally in the writings of the Apostle John. And
here it may be well to remark, that if any expression be suscepti
ble of two interpretations, the one of more, the other of less depth
and tenderness of meaning, the presumption is greatly in favour of
the former, when used by this apostle. There is something in the

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST 45
whole manner in which the beloved disciple speaks of his divine
Master ; of his relation to the Father as his Son ; of the intimate
union between them as such, and in his use of the phrase Son of
God, which must impress every unbiassed reader with the convic
tion that it is a mysterious and inscrutable relation, which he en
deavors to shadow forth by this expression. It is difficult distinctly
to exhibit this kind of evidence, consisting, as it does, in the general
spirit and manner of an author ; yet every one will probably feel
it. We are sensible that the full meaning of the apostle is not
reached, by paraphrasing. Son of God, King of Israel, or the man
miraculously begotten. Such expositions substitute a distinct, in
tellectual conception for a vague but elevated impression ; and we
are conscious of being great' losers by the exchange. We feel this
when we hear the unity, which John makes his Master assert to
exist between himself and his Father, explained as mere coinci
dence of purpose or will. If we could not prove it to be other
wise, we should still believe that this was not all that was intended.
The characteristic of this apostle, to which we are now alluding,
has been felt by all commentators who have any congeniality of
spirit with the sacred writer. Those of a different description
have either reduced to the coldest and flattest sense everything in
this Gospel, or questioned its genuineness altogether. There is
great force in the remark made (we think) by Storr, that nothing
betrays such an utter destitution of all proper feeling for the true
spirit of Christianity as these sceptical doubts and low interpreta
tions of the writings of St. John. We think our readers will admit
that there is at least a presumption in favour of St. John's meaning
something more by Son of God, than King of Israel. That this
is really the case, we hope the following passages will prove.
The first is in these WOrds : " O Xo'yoj <rap£ cysvcro, xal 'eCKiivaocv Iv },pTv (nai
IBeaadpeBa thv Sb^av airov, 66$av 035 povoycvovs xapa xarpds), xXjiprjs %dpT0s Kal a^qBeias.
John i. 14. The Logos, full of grace and truth, became incarnate,
and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, a glory that became
the only begotten of the Father.
It seems natural, as wX^s is in the nominative, to make it
the predicate \6yoS, and to consider the words included in the
brackets as parenthetical. Grotius, Tittmann, and others, connect
it with povoycvovs; then Ji-Mpij is by enallage for x\*povS. A similar in
stance may be seen in Revelations i. 5 : dxo hoov Xpurnv s pdprvs 6 xictos.
Still, as in the Gospel of St. John, such departures from the usual
grammatical construction are rare, we prefer the common method
of explaining the passage.
The is before povoycvovs is not a sign of comparison, but is used as
the a veritatis, in Hebrew. Hesychius explains is by «x»9wj. This
interpretation has been adopted in this instance by almost all com
mentators from the time of Chrysostom. " We saw his glory, the
glory truly, of the only begotten of the Father." Or it is equiva
lent with ut decet. Tittmann paraphrases the passage thus : Vidi
mus majestatem ejus, dignam Filio Dei. Gloriam talem et tantam,

46 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
qualis et quanta nonnisi Filii Dei esse potest. He gives from Chry-
sostom, as an illustration, the common expression, He walks as a
King ; that is, as becomes a King.
The word u(a is here to be taken for all the perfections of the
Logos ; and if the Logos is God, as John asserts in the first verse,
then Sofa is the sum of the divine excellence. It is in this sense that
TO5 is very frequently used in the Old Testament. It expresses
all God's perfections as manifested to his creatures. The word is
here, therefore, not to be restricted to the display of divine power
made in the miracles of Christ, or to the exhibition of his glory in
his transfiguration ; but the apostle means to say, that he had seen
a fulness of excellence, wisdom and power, in Christ, that could
belong to no creature.
Movoycvovs xapa xarpds. It seems hardly necessary to remark, that
vUv is to be supplied after the first word in this phrase, as this is so
evident from the import of the word povoycvris itself, and from the
fact that John so frequently uses the full phrase, " only begotten
Son," as chap. iii. 16, and elsewhere. As no part of our argument
from this passage rests on the meaning of the word povoycvfn (if vios
be supplied), we might admit that it may be translated " only" or
" beloved." We would remark, however, that the reasons com
monly assigned for giving it the second sense just mentioned,
appear to us very unsatisfactory. It very often happens, it is true,
that, in compounds, their strict etymological sense is in common
usage neglected or considerably modified. And this is, no doubt, so
far the case with the word before us, that the idea expressed by
the first part of the word is sometimes mainly or solely retained,
as in Psalm xxv. 16, where it is used for povos; hence povoycvns vios
is, in the scriptures at least, an only son, whether an only surviv
ing or only begotten son, or the only son by the same mother. It
is in this sense that it corresponds to the Hebrew word T^ni alone,
only. That this Hebrew word is sometimes translated in the
LXX. by hyaxrtTds, does not prove that povoycvris and dyaxwos are syno
nymous, but merely that Tiri is sometimes taken in the sense of
the one, and sometimes in that of the other, of these Greek words.
We are inclined, therefore, to think that povoycvris as applied to
Christ, can only, with propriety, be rendered uhigenitus or unions ;
i. e., unus in suo genere.* It matters not, however, for our pur
pose, how this word is rendered. Christ is the povoycvris xapi xaTpds,

* As to the classical use of this word, which is, indeed, of less weight in the pre
sent instance, it may be well to quote part of a note given by Liicke in his Comment,
page 422, from Prof. Nake, of Bonn. " From the earliest Grecian poets, in philoso
phical language (as in Plato's Timaeus), to the writers in the time of the Emperors,
of different centuries, after Christ, povoycvvs retained its full meaning ; povos ycvopcvos
or povos yeyovas ; for example, povoycvris xais (in Hesiod and later writers), the only
son, that is, the only son born to its parents, so that the only surviving son of two or
more cannot be called povoycvris. The only departure from the usual sense of the
word, he says, is found in its application to Minerva, born of only one parent."
This, however, relates to the first, and not to the second, part of the compound.

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 47
the Son, unus in suo genere, such as no other being in the universe
is ; and is so called in distinction from the v'wi ni Qcov or Tina nt e«0«.
He is the only son, in the sense in which the apostle uses the ex
pression. This, of course, does not decide in what sense he is thus
peculiarly the Son of God ; and, therefore, we lay no stress on
the use of this particular word, except so far as it expresses the
idea just mentioned.
Any one, who will throw his eyes on the passage under consi
deration, will see that the words xapd xarpds are much more naturally
connected with povoycvovs than with sifav. According to the latter
method of construction, the sense would be, We saw his glory, a
glory {SoBaffav) given by the Father ; so Erasmus and Grotius. This is
unnecessary and forced. Those, however, who connect them with
povoycvovs, explain the phrase variously. Beza supplies cjiMdvns, others
6vto ; but neither is necessary. Noesselt (Opuscula Fasciculus, ii.,
p. 179) translates iro^o xarpds, apud Patrem; majestatem tanquam
unici filii, qui erat apud Patrem. This gives a sense well suited
to the analogous passages, v. 1, and v. 18 ; but it would seem that
*of>n, in this sense, would require the dative or accusative. It is
better, therefore, to take xapd xarpds for the simple genitive, as may,
with strictest propriety, be done ; see Rom. xi. 27. h xa? epov StaB/m for
iiaBfiKrj pov.
The whole question to our purpose, as it regards this passage,
is, who is the povoycvris xapd xdrpds ? We think the A6Yos is such. This
appears clearly from the passage itself. The Logos became flesh,
and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory ; that is, the glory
of the Logos, which was as of the only begotten of the Father.
The meaning is, we saw a glory which could belong to no other
being than the Logos, who is God, the only begotten of the Father,
full of grace and truth. It seems evident that John uses the words
\6yos and povoycv>)s xapd xirpis in the same sense, exchanging the one
expression for the other ; and, if this is the case, then is the Logos
the Son of God.
A reference to the context will make this still more obvious, and
will show that no relief is obtained by saying that it is only the
Logos as incarnate that is called the Son of God.* The apostle's
object is, to set forth the true nature of Christ. He, therefore,

* If this were the case, it could not be on account of the miraculous conception of
the human nature of Christ that he is here called the Son of God ; for the incarnation
of the Logos, and the miraculous production of Christ's human nature, are two very
different things. Another reason, therefore, beyond those usually assigned for the
application of this name, must, in this case, be assumed, viz , the union of the divine
with the human nature ; or, as Storr, in his note on Hebrews, i. 5, expresses it,
" Because he, who, before all things, was with the Father, and in his bosom, became
man ; or, because he, who, before the foundation of the world, was the beloved of
the Father, God's dear Son, has united himself in one person, with the miraculously-
conceived man Jesus." Weil der, am Anfange der Dinge bei (John i. 1), dem Vater
(1 John, i. 2), 10 seinem Schoos war (John i. 18), Mensch worden ist, oder weil sich
der von dem Vater (17, i. 5), vor dem Daseyn der Welt Geliebte (v. 24.)— der liebe
Sohn Gottee — mit dem iibematiirlicher Weise empfangenen Jesu zu Einer Person
verbunden hat.

48 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
says, that the Logos was in the beginning' with God, and was God,
the creator of all things, the source of all light, and the fountain of
life. This divine Being became man, and we (the apostles) saw,
even under this veil, the glory of the Godhead, of the Logos, for it
was such as could belong to none other than the only begotten of
the Father ; i. e., to one who was partaker of the divine nature and
attributes. We think nothing can be clearer than that John inter
changes Xiiyos and pwoyeviis xapd xarpds, and, consequently, calls the
Logos the Son of God, which is all that we are contending for.
We think that it is also clear, from this passage, that John intends,
by the name Son of God (or, which is the same, only begotten of
the Father), one who is of the same nature with the Father ; not
one who is derived from him, nor exalted by him, but one who is
what he is, knows what he knows, and does what he does ; one
who stands in the most intimate of all- relations to him. We shall
have occasion to refer to some passages, in which Christ evidently
uses this name in the same sense.
If authority was of any weight with our readers, we might quote
the opinions of critics of every description to prove that the Logos
is here called the only begotten of the Father. The opinion of the
older, though not on that account less estimable, commentators
would probably be set down to the score of theological prejudice.
We shall, therefore, only remark, that the view of this passage
given above is presented by almost all the German critics of any
note with whom we are acquainted. Kuinoel, on this verse, after
explaining povoycvns cui nemo par, nee Deo carior, remarks : " Re-
spexit vero etiam Johannes sublimiorem Christi naturam, interio-
rem tov Aoyos a Deo prognati, cum Deo conjunctionem." Liicke,
now Professor in Gottingen, after speaking, in no very measured
terms, in reference to the modern interpretations of the word
povoycvris, and quoting from Hermann a cutting reproach against the
recent theologians for their numerous perversions of the language
of scripture, says, that all that Paulus, in his commentary, has said
to show that povoycvris means unique (einzig in seiner Art), at most
proves that it can be so rendered ; but that this is nothing to the
purpose, until he proves, from the usage of the New Testament,
that " when applied to Christ, to the Logos, to the Son of God," it
does not contain the idea of sonship. See his Comment, iiber die
Schriften des Evangelisten Johannes, vol. i., p. 420, et seq.
Tittmann, in his remarks on this verse, after stating that some
would refer the name, Son of God, to the office, and not to the
nature of Christ ; to his mission, and not to his union in nature
with the Father ; and thus make it equivalent with Messiah, says :
Verum hsec interpretatio est haud dubie alienissima a mente Apos-
tolorum et Domini ipsius. And, as the conclusion of his argument
on this subject, adds, Igitur vlov tov Qcov, isque povoycvM, est Filius Dei
in suo genere unus, quatenus talis est, qualis est Pater, idem est,
qui Pater, eadem habet, qua? Pater, eadem facit quae Pater, cui
eadem competunt, qua? Patri. See his Meletemata Sacra, p. 59,

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 49
seq. Tholuck, although his manner of speaking on this particular
passage is undecided, yet, on John ix. 35, says expressly, that the
phrase, Son of God, is used in a higher and lower sense in the New
Testament. On the one hand, it denotes the divine nature in
Christ, the Logos (einerseits bezeichnet es das Gottliche in Christo,
den Logos) ; and, in the other, is a name of the Messiah. In proof
of the first point, he refers to the passage before us, and, of course,
understands it as it has just been explained. So also Knapp, as
before quoted, appeals to this passage to prove that Christ, in his
divine nature, is the Son of God. And even Paulus, who, of all
•commentators with whom we are acquainted, has laboured hardest
to remove everything miraculous or mysterious, and, in fact,
everything elevated and characteristic from the sacred writings,
•considers John as here calling the Logos the povoycvds xapd narpis. The
Logos, he says, in the theology of the Alexandrian Jews, was a
Spirit sui generis, which had proceeded from the Eternal Father ;
and, accordingly, the sense of this passage is : " The more closely
we could observe Jesus, the more did we see that all his excellent
attributes were like the excellence of a Spirit sui generis, that had
proceeded from God."* From this, it is clear that the povoycvhs xapd
-xarpds is, in his opinion, the Logos, whatever may be thought of his
view of the passage in other respects. Our object in making these
-quotations is merely to show that it is a mistake to suppose that
the divine Sonship of Christ is an antiquated notion, believed only
by those who are held, fast in the trammels of obselete systems.
There is another passage in this chapter, which we think is
equally clear in proof of our position, that the Logos is the Son of
God, and that is the 18th verse : Qav ovScis i&paie x&xotc- b povoycvris vios, i
iiv c\s rdv k6\xov na xarpos, iieelvos Ur/yfro-aro- The diversity of reading which
exists as to the second clause of this verse, some MSS. having
•povoycvhs vids, others povoycvvs Beds (and so, many of the Fathers), others
Beov, and others vios tov &ob, does not affect the force of the passage,
as far as our purpose is concerned ; since .povoycvris is retained in all,
and vios, if not expressed, is implied. In the words & &» as. tov k6\xov,
the accusative with ck is probably to be taken for the dative with
iv, as is frequently the case in the New Testament Greek. The
o uv is by Erasmus, Bengel, Tittmann and many others, taken for
is r)v, " who was in the bosom of the Father," agreeably to the frequent
'use of Hebrew participles. There is, however, no necessity of de
parting from the common use of the present, either here, or in iii. 13
lb vids tov dvBpdxov, b Sm iv n, oipavd)). The intimate relation expressed by
the figurative expression, " in the bosom of the Father," is a per
petual and unchanging relation. The Apostle had said, v. 17, that
the Law came by Moses, but grace and truth through Jesus Christ;
* So war der Gott-Logos in der jud. alex., Theologie ein aus dem ewigen Vater
hervorgegangener, ganz eiziger Geist ohne seines gleichen. Sinn : je genauer wir
Jesus beobachten konnten, desto mehr war uns der Unfang all seiner vortrefflichen
Eigenschaften der Vortrefflichkeit eines in seiner Art einzigen, von Gott herge-
kommenen Geistes gleich. See Commentar uber das neue Testament.
4

50 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
and then in the 18th, states how it is that the most precious reve
lation of the divine character and purpose, came to be made by
him. No other has ever seen God, or has that knowledge of his
being and counsels, which was possessed by Jesus Christ. The
only begotten Son, who sustains the most intimate of all relations
to the Father, he has revealed him and his purposes. Or (as others
would supply after ifnyrio-aro, r>> ^dpu' ko.\ riiv d\fi6eiav), has revealed his
grace and truth. The Son is the divine Exegete (Hvyirris) of the
Father, his Word, the Logos.
We are aware, that no decisive argument can be derived from
this passage, taken by itself, to prove that the Logos is called the
Son of God. We know, that even if the words povoycvris vids prima
rily and properly designated the human nature of Christ,' they might
be used for the whole person of the Redeemer, as is the case with
the name, Son of man, as used in John iii. 13, just quoted. But
still we think that the context affords clear evidence that John
here intended to designate, by these words, the divine nature that
became incarnate. For, in the first place, his object renders such
an interpretation peculiarly appropriate. He designs to tell us,
why the revelation made by the Redeemer was so superior to any
that preceded it. No man had ever seen God, but the Son, who
now and ever exists in the most intimate union with him, who
knows all the purposes of the Father, has appeared on earth in
human form, and made them clearly known. Secondly, it should
be recollected, that from the 1st to the 18th verse inclusive, is one
continued discourse on the dignity of Christ. These verses con
stitute the prologue to the whole Gospel, and are intimately con
nected. It is not probable, therefore, that the same expression
should occur in two different senses in so short a passage. Hence,
if John, in verse 14th, calls the Logos the povoycvhs xapa xarpds, we may
infer with confidence that the Logos is intended by the povoycvris vids
in the 18th verse. No man hath seen God, but the Logos, the only
begotten Son, he has seen him, and sustains the most intimate of
all relations to him. He therefore can reveal his purposes fully.
A third reason for this interpretation is, the striking analogy be
tween this and the first verse of this chapter. There it is said,
" The Logos was with God," and here, " The only begotten Son,
who is (or was) in the bosom of the Father." The same idea is
expressed by the words, ",with God," as is intended by being " in
the bosom of the Father." They both express intimate relation
ship, or union. In the one case, this union is said to be between
the Logos and God ; in the other, between the Son and Father.
This analogy between the two passages, taken in connection with
the 14th v., where the terms Logos and only begotten of the
Father are evidently interchanged, we think prove that John
intended to designate the divine nature of Christ, by the words
povoycvris vids.
In John v. 17, we find another instance in which Christ is called,
Son of God, in reference to his divine nature ; or, what amounts to

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 51
the same thing, in which he calls God his Father, in a sense which
implies participation of the same nature. This passage is the more
interesting, as it contains our Saviour's own words, and gives us
his own exposition of what is to be understood by his being the
Son of God.
In the former part of the chapter, the Evangelist relates the cir
cumstance of Christ's healing a man on the sabbath, whom he
commanded to take up his bed and walk. The Jews persecuted
him for this supposed violation of the sabbath. The word is
isioiKov, and may mean, " they prosecuted " him, brought him before
the Sanhedrim. Jesus defended himself against this charge, by
saying, v. 17, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." That
is, " as my Father is constantly active, exercising on the sabbath,
as on other days, his power for the good of his creatures, so I
have authority to dispense blessings on this as on any other day."
If this be the meaning of this passage, then it is plain that Christ
calls God his Father, or himself the Son of God, in a sense which
implies that he is equal with God. That this interpretation is cor
rect, and consequently that the argument derived from it is valid,
we think will appear from the following considerations.
First, the Jews so understood the declaration of Christ. They
were therefore not content with what they had already done, but
they moreover sought to kill him ; not only because he had broken
the sabbath, but because he had called God his Father, in a sense
which made him equal with God. (iVov lavrdv xotmv ™ fc's ) If the
meaning thus put upon his words was not correct, it would seem
that Christ would not, and could not with any propriety, suffer so
serious a perversion of them to pass without correction. Does
Christ, then, tell the Jews that they had misunderstood him ; that
he did not intend to call God his father, in any sense which in
volved the claim of equality with him ? By no means, but directly
the reverse ; and this is the second consideration in favour of the
view given of the 17th verse.
Instead of correcting any misapprehension of his meaning, he
goes on to declare, that the union between the Father and Son was
such, that all the Father did, he did, and that all he did, the Father
did ; that he never acted nor could act otherwise than in union
with the Father. " Verily, verily, I say unto you, the Son can do
nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do : for what
things soever he, doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise."* The
meaning of this verse becomes perfectly plain from what follows ;
for Christ immediately proceeds to show, that he has the same
power and authority with the Father, and consequently is .entitled
to the same homage. " For as the Father raiseth up the dead and
quickeneth them ; even so the Son quickeneth whom he will. For
the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the
* The ov Svvarai may be taken here in its strictest sense. Such is the union be
tween the Father and Son, that the Son can do nothing aft Uvtov of himself alone,
out of connection with the Father,

52 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
Son ; that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the
Father. He that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father
that hath sent him." Here is surely a claim to divine power,
authority, and homage. So far, therefore, is our blessed Saviour
from correcting the interpretation given to his words by the Jews,
that it seems to be his very object to prove that he is, in a proper
sense, the Son of God ; that is, in such a sense, that he has the
same nature with the Father. The plain meaning of this passage,
therefore, is, " I have a right to labour on the sabbath, for my Father
does it. He has not remained inactive from the creation, but
works until now." The Jews reply, " Then God is your Father in
such a sense, that you are equal with God." " So I am. I act in
union with him, what he does I do. As he raises the dead, so do
I, and execute judgment, and am entitled to equal honour ; so that
he who denies me this honour, does thereby refuse to honour the
Father. For (as he elsewhere says), I and the Father are one.
He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father also." See c. xii., 45.
We think that it is clear, from this passage, that Christ calls
God his Father, not because he had miraculously called his human
nature into existence, nor because he had sent him into the world,
nor because he had made him his Son (or a king), but because he
was partaker of the same divine nature and attributes. If this be
so, then is Christ the Son of God, in a far higher sense than merely
as Mediatorial King.
It is not at all necessary to our argument, that we should prove
that the term Son, throughout this interesting passage, is applied
exclusively to Christ's divine nature. The whole argument is
founded on the 17th v., as explained by those which follow it
God is the Father of Christ. In what sense ? In a sense which
includes equality. So the Jews understood our Saviour, and so he
clearly explained his meaning. This is the argument. It is no
objection that the word Son is used immediately after, for the whole
person of the Redeemer ; as in v. 20. The Father loveth the Son ;
i. e. that complex person, who is his Son, and who, being such,
though at the same time a man, has the right and ability to do
whatever the Father does. This person, thus constituted (Son of
God and Son of man), acts in obedience to the Father. He does
nothing without the Father's direction, co-operation, and consent.
Hence the Father (xdvra SeiKvvmv air?) exhibits and marks out all
things for him. Hence, too, it is said, that the Father hath com
mitted all judgment to the Son, i. e. to that individual who is his
Son. Thus, v. 26, it is said, the Father hath given the Son to
have life in himself. Here again, Son, is the name of the whole
person. Life, is here divine power, a vital life-giving principle -t
and the meaning is, God has so constituted the Redeemer's person,
that he possesses all the divine life-giving power of the Father.
(Or, as the same idea is expressed in Colossians i. 19. It pleased
the Father that in him should all fulness (xav to x\/,po>pa) dwell. What
that fulness is, we learn from the next chapter, it is xav rd x\d9apa rrlS

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 53
ecdrnros, all the fulness of the Godhead). And having thus consti
tuted his person, and given him this life, he has given him (this
person, not the Son. as such) authority to execute judgment (to
hold the general judgment), because he is the Son of man, i. e. the
Messiah. It pleased God, that the Messiah should be what is here
described, and being such, should exercise all the prerogatives of
the Godhead.
Any one, therefore, who bears in mind how frequently names
derived from one nature of Christ, or from his office, are applied
to him as one individual person, will find no difficulty in explain
ing those passages in which the name, Son of God, is used for the
Messiah, who, as such, is inferior to the Father and dependent upon
him. Whenever, therefore, the Father is said to give life, author
ity, or power to the Son, it is to this mysteriously constituted per
son ; not to his divine nature as such. When the Son of man is
said to be in heaven, the divine person, who is called the Son of
man, is declared to be omnipresent, not the human nature of the
Saviour, in itself considered. When Christ is said to be God over
all, it is asserted that the person who has assumed the office of the
Messiah, is truly divine. Passages, therefore, in which the Son is
said to be inferior to the Father, to be delivered unto death, &c,
afford no objection to the opinion that the name is given in virtue
of the eternal relation which he sustains to the first Person in the
Trinity. This obvious remark is made in this connection, in order
that it may be present to our readers' minds, when they turn to the
passage under consideration (John v. 17, et seq.), as it is obvious,
that in many parts of this chapter the word Son is used for the
whole person of the Redeemer.
A passage very similar to the one just considered, occurs in
John x. 30 — 39. In verse 30, Jesus had said, " I and the Father
are one." The Jews understood this as a declaration that he was
God, and accordingly again took up stones to stone him, as they
had done before, c. viii. 59. Christ demanded why they did this.
He had performed many of the works of his Father,* for which
of these did they stone him ? The Jews reply, for no good work,
but for his making himself God. How had he done this? Why,
by saying Jyu ««' b xar,)p 'iv Upcv v. 30. According to the interpreta
tion given to these words by many commentators, Trinitarians as
well as others, they contain no claim to equality with the Father.
Erasmus, Calvin, Melancthon, and many others say, that they ex
press nothing more than unity of purpose and counsel or will. It
may be admitted that the phrase l» chat expresses any kind of union
of purpose, affection, spirit, or nature. It depends entirely upon
* In tov xarpds pov, where Ik is probably a mere sign of the Gen., see v. 37, where
tpya tov xarpis pov stands in the same sense. See for similar examples xviii. 3, Rev.
ii. 9, Luke ii. 35, Acts xix. 34, John iii. 25, and perhaps Rom. xi. 26, Ik Siwv 6
frvdpevos deliverer of Zion. Or if ix expresses the efficient cause, " works which I do
through the Father," then is this passage to be explained by a reference to cap. v.
17, 19, and to John xiv. 10, where Christ says of the Father, he doeth the works.

54 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
the connection in what sense it is to be taken in any particular
passage. It is surely a presumption in favour of an unity of power
and divinity being here intended, that the persons to whom these
words were addressed so understood them. The whole drift of
our Saviour's discourse impressed them with the idea that he meant
to make himself God (xoteTs oeavrdv Bcdv), an exposition which our
Saviour does not refute but confirms. That the Jews understood
him correctly, will appear from a view of the context. Jesus was
walking, in the porch of the Temple, when the Jews came and
demanded that he should tell them plainly whether he were the
Christ or not. This he would not do ; but referred them to his
previous declarations and to his miracles. They neither believed
the one nor the other, because they were not of his sheep : his
sheep did hear his voice, and he gave to them eternal life (is not
this claiming to be God?) and they shall never perish. Why?
because " none can pluck them out of my hand." But how is it
that Christ can say of himself, that he gives eternal life and can
protect his sheep against all their enemies? Because he and
the Father are one, and he can do all that the Father does, his
Father is greater than all. There is surely something more than
unity of will or purpose here intended, it is unity of power ; and if
he and the Father are one in power, the Jews were certainly right
in concluding that they must be one in nature. Ei bi 'iv xard Svvapw,
says the Greek commentator Euthymius, ?» ipa Kat Kard r,\v Bcdmra rat
oioiav Kat ipiviv. Now what reply does our Master make to this accu
sation of the Jews, that he " made himself God ? " He in the first
instance makes no direct reply at all. He neither says that he
was or was not God, but does what was his frequent custom when
questions were proposed to him, or objections started, and that is,
turns the attention of his hearers to themselves, that they may no
tice the disposition whence their questions or objections arose, and
then so turns his discourse, that all who had ears to hear, should
find in what he said an answer to the question or solution of the
difficulty proposed. Christ will convince the Jews of their stub
born unbelief, and perverse opposition to everything he said.
They objected to the fact, that he had called himself God. Jesus
does not explain in what sense he had done so, but says, in effect,
you would not be so ready to accuse me of blasphemy for this, if
you were not bent on opposition to me and my cause ; for your
own scriptures call kings and magistrates gods, and if the title can
be given with propriety to divinely commissioned men (xpis bis b \67oS
nv Qcov iyivero either to those who received commands of God and
acted in his stead ; or xfh ws Mark xii. 12, Luke xii. 41, for xtpt&»
concerning whom this declaration of God is made), surely it may
be given in the same, if in no other sense, to the great personage
whom God has selected, and set apart (sanctified), and sent into
the world. But that I am the Son of God in a far higher sense, a
sense which authorizes me to say " that I and the Father are one,"
v. 30, is plain, from the fact that I do the works of my Father (the

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 55
same divine and almighty works, raise the dead, heal the sick, exe
cute judgment, see v. 32, and 37, c. xiv. 10), if you will not believe
me, believe these works and know that " I am in the Father and the
Father in me." Were the Jews satisfied with this explanation? Did
they imagine that he assumed the name Son of God as an official
title, and that he meant no more by it than when applied to kings
and magistrates ? By no means ; they saw that he used it in a
sense, which involved equality with God, and they accordingly
immediately endeavoured to seize him, but he escaped out of their
ands. There is another remark to be made on this passage, and that is,
it is perfectly clear that Christ uses the terms God and Son of God,
tej, and b vids roi Qcoi, in exactly the same sense. The Jews said
xouzs o-cavrdv Bdv, thou makest thyself God ; Christ replies, is it blas
phemy to make myself the Son of God ? Where it is evident, that
making himself God and making himself the Son of God, are con
sidered as precisely the same. The remark of Storr, therefore, on
this passage is well founded, that God and Son of God are, as to
Christ's meaning here, synonymous.*
There are several other passages which might be adduced in
support of the opinion which we are advocating, as Matt. ii. 27,
and Heb. 1 ; but this our object does not demand, and our limits
will not permit. We have already stated, that we purposed only
to endeavour to show, that Christ is called Son of God, in reference
to his divine nature, or in virtue of the eternal relation between
himself and Father. If any one can prove that there are other
reasons for his being so called, it militates nothing against the posi
tion which we have assumed. As the term, Son, is used in Scrip
ture to express such a variety of relations, as dependence, deriva
tion, similarity, community of nature, &c, there is no antecedent
improbability in Christ's being called Son of God, not only because
he is of the same nature with the Father, but also because he
is the object of his peculiar love ; because, as man, he is derived
from him and dependent on him. And if kings are called sons of
God in the Old Testament, as the representatives of God, why then
Christ, as the great Mediatorial King, may pre-eminently be called
the Son of God. We say there is no antecedent improbability
that this is the case ; and if any one is satisfied that such is actually
the fact, we should not be disposed to dispute the point. Still we
confess ourselves unable to see the conclusiveness of the argument
to prove, that the Redeemer is called the Son of God, in virtue of
his exaltation to the Mediatorial throne. This opinion, however, is
a very general one, and is adopted by many who still believe in
his being the Son of God in a far higher sense. For ourselves,
however, seeing that this name is peculiar, in the New Testament
* Dass er der Sohn Gottes, order Gott sey— denn beides lief nach dem, von den
Juden wohl gefassten Sinn Jesu aufEihes hinaus. See Zweck der evang. Ge
schichte, p. 467.

56 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
at least, to Christ (with the exception of Luke iii. 36> where the
reason of its being applied to Adam is perfectly obvious), and that
it is used by Christ and his apostles in many instances, in direct
reference to his relation as God, to the Father, we prefer consider
ing this relation as the primary and most important, if not the
sole ground of its application to him by inspired men, whenever
they intend using it in any other than a mere historical manner.
Luke i. 35, may be an exception to this remark. In the great ma
jority of instances, the phrase occurs merely as a designation of
the Messiah. In the Old Testament, it was predicted that the
Messiah was to be the Son of God. It was very natural, therefore,
that this name or title should be very common among those who
were waiting for his appearance. Hence, when Nathaniel exclaim
ed, " Thou art the Son of God," he doubtless intended to say,
Thou art the Messiah, and so in a multitude of cases. These pas
sages, however, only prove that the Messiah was called the Son of
God ; not why he was so called. Our Saviour styling himself so
frequently the Son of man, informs us that this was a proper ap
pellation for the great Deliverer, but gives us no information of
the grounds of its application. This is a very distinct question.
The arguments which are commonly adduced to show that Son
of God, as applied to Christ, is a title of office, and equivalent with
Messiah, are principally the following. It is said, that in the Old
Testament, kings and magistrates are called Sons of God. This is
exceedingly rare. The passage in Ps. Ixxxii. 6, is peculiar;
Princes are here called fcTiJtt as being objects of reverence, and
Ti^,5 ^ Sons of the Highest, in the corresponding clause, may,
in this instance, receive the same meaning. But it is very far from
being the common usage of the scriptures, to call kings the Sons
of God. And even if it were, this would prove very little as to the
proper meaning of the phrase, Son of God, in the singular : as there
is such a marked difference in the use of these expressions, through
out the word of God. We are not prepared to say, that the term
Son of God is never applied in the Old Testament, to any royal
personage. But in the cases in which it is so applied, it does not
express their royal dignity, but merely their being the objects of
God's peculiar care and love. Thus, if 2 Sam. vii. 14, be referred
to Solomon (in any sense), " I will be to him a Father, and he shall
be to me a Son," the meaning obviously is, I will regard and treat
him with peculiar favour. He shall be my child, and I will treat
him accordingly. We should be at a loss to fix on any one
instance, in which this phrase is expressive of the kingly office. Ps.
Ixxxix. 27," I will make him my first-born, higher than the kings of
the earth," can hardly be considered as a case in point. For the
expression, " I will make him my first-born," means nothing more,
than that I will treat him as " my first-born," that is, with peculiar
favour. We think, therefore, that the argument from the Old Tes
tament is very far from being conclusive on this point. It seems

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 57
hardly to afford a presumption in favour of the opinion, that Christ
is called Son of God, on account of his dignity as Messiah.
Another argument is derived from the second Psalm, v. 7,
" Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." The first re
mark which we should make on this passage, is, that the second
clause probably expresses no more than the first. Thou art my
Son, this day, now, art thou my Son ; now more clearly than
ever. This is agreeable to a common characteristic of the Hebrew.
So in Jeremiah ii. 27, " Saying to a stock, thou art my father, and
to a stone, thou hast begotten me." — And 2 Sam. vii." 14, " I will
be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son." See also Deut.
xxxii. 6. In all these passages, the second clause is synonymous
with the first. Secondly, we would admit, that the word triTi
this day, refers to the time contemplated in the preceding verse ;
i. e., the time in which Christ, the subject of the Psalm, was anoint
ed, or inaugurated as king, on the holy hill of Zion ; that is, to the
time in which he was clearly set forth as King of Israel. The
whole question is, does the passage declare that he was then con
stituted the Son of God, or was then clearly proved to be such?
We prefer the latter mode of interpretation. First, because from
the connection, these words do not appear to contain the inaugur
ating formula, so to speak, addressed to Shrist ; but rather, the
ground of the universal dominion which is committed to him.
They form no part of the decree giving him universal dominion ;
they are merely the solemn introductory address. The sense is,
Thou art my Son ; therefore, ask of me and I will give thee uni
versal dominion, &c. That is, these introductory words of the
address express the dignity of Christ's person, and assign the rea
son, why he has the right and power to rule over all nations, and
why all people should put their trust in him. In solemn discourse,
such introductions are very frequent ; and they often contain the
reason or ground of what follows : as, " I am the Lord* that brought
thee out of the land of Egypt ; thou shalt have no other gods
before me ;" that is, because I am the Lord, &c. So here, because
thou art my Son. This is agreeable also to the constant manner
of the sacred writers, presenting the personal dignity of Christ as
the ground of his universal power and authority. Since he is pos
sessed of divine perfections, is the Son of God, of the same nature,
therefore he is made universal King.
But again, if peculiar stress be laid upon the second clause, " I
have begotten thee," it must be admitted, that it can with equal
propriety be rendered, I have made thee my Son, or I have declar
ed thee to be such. In other words, 'rptiiji'1 may here be taken
declaratively, according to the canonso fully illustrated by Glas-
sius, Phil. Sacra, lib. iii., tr. iii., can 15, and which is of such
frequent application in Hebrew. The meaning then would be,
Thou art my Son, this day have I declared, or exhibited thee, as
such. This view of the passage is given by Venema, by Morus in

58 THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.
his Com. Exegeticus, p. 260, by Anton as quoted by Rosenmiiller,
p. 30 of vol. i., Part iii., of his Scholia, by Kuinoel on Acts xiii.
32, and many others. We think the proper method of deciding
which view of the passage is most correct, is to inquire which is
favoured by the analogy of scripture. Is Christ said to be constituted
the Son of God, by his exaltation or resurrection ; or, is his resur
rection and exaltation given as evidence that he is the Son of God ?
Agreeably to the remark made in our last Number, the resurrection
of Christ is almost uniformly presented as the great decisive evi
dence of his Sonship, as well as of his Messiahship. See Rom. i.
3, 4, Acts xiii., &c. He was neither made Son nor Messiah by
his resurrection, but was thereby proved to be both the one and the
other. We think it clear, therefore, that no argument can be derived
from this passage to show why Christ is called Son. It simply
declares, that he is the Son of God ; but what this imports, must
we learn from other passages.
The words in 2 Sam. vii. 14, " I will be bis Father, and he shall
be my Son," are adduced as an argument on this subject. It is
said, that it is not easy to conceive how a thing can be predicted
as future, which has existed from all eternity. This is very true.
But the point of the prediction is simply this ; the king that shall
arise, shall be my Son. So it is predicted that the Messiah should
be the " Mighty God ;" not that he was to become such; but was
to be such. Whether 2 Sam. vii. 14, be referred to Christ, or Solo
mon, it is of no weight in this discussion. It simply declares, that
the king that was to arise, should stand in a very near and tender
relation to God. What that relation is, must be learned else
where. Acts xiii. 32, 33, " We declare unto you glad tidings, how that
the promise which was made unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled
the same unto us their children, in that he hath raised up Jesus
again ;" as it is written in the second Psalm, " Thou art my Son,
this day have I begotten thee," is considered as proving that Christ
is called Son of God, in virtue of his resurrection, as the commence
ment of his elevation to supreme dignity. We question very
much, even adopting the common translation of this passage,
whether this be its proper meaning. According to our version,
the point to be proved by the passage from the second Psalm, is
indeed, that Christ has been raised from the dead. But this point
is fully proved by this Psalm, according to our interpretation of it.
It contains a prediction that God would clearly set forth the Mes
siah, as his Son. How was this done ? In various ways, and
among others with peculiar clearness, by his resurrection ; as Paul
elsewhere says, Rom. i. 3, 4. This passage, therefore, according
to our view of it, is as applicable to the apostle's purpose, as on the
opposite one. But it is far from being certain that there is any
reference in this passage (Acts xiii. 32, 33), to the resurrection at
all. The words dvaorf,aas 'In<nw, rendered, " having raised up Jesus

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST. 59
again," properly mean, "having raised up Jesus," which may
express his being called into existence, or sent forth as the Messiah.
The grounds for preferring this view of the passage are strong, if
not conclusive. In the first place, the verb dvwmpi, when it refers
to the resurrection, has commonly i* vupav, or some equivalent
expression after it. 2. It is often used to express the idea of call
ing into existence : as Matt. xxii. 24, " raise up seed." Acts iii.
22, " A prophet like unto me will God raise up." See also, Acts
vii. 27. The verb iycipa is used in the same sense, see Acts xiii.
22 (and according to the common text). 3. The context favours
this interpretation. Paul is here endeavouring to prove that Jesus is
the Christ. In verse 23, he asserts that of the seed of David, God,
according to his promise, hath raised unto Israel a Saviour, Jesus.
That Jesus is the Saviour, he proves first by the testimony of John
the Baptist, and secondly by the resurrection of Christ. The fact
of his resurrection, he says, 31st verse, may be proved by those
who saw him many days. Having thus established the point that
Jesus is the Christ, he says, " we declare unto you glad tidings,
how the promise made unto the fathers (what promise? why, the
promise referred to in the 23d v. that God would raise up a
Saviour), God hath fulfilled unto us, in that he hath raised up Jesus."
There is no allusion here to the resurrection, for the promise to
which the apostle had reference, was not that Christ should rise
from the dead, but that a Saviour should appear ; and of this the
second Psalm is a clear prediction. The 34th verse makes this
still plainer ; for Paul, having announced to the Jews the glad tid
ings that the Saviour had come, turns to another subject, and
says, " But that he raised him from the dead (as he had asserted,
v. 30), — he said on this wise," &c. ; and then goes on to prove
that his resurrection was predicted in Ps. xvi. It seems clear,
therefore, that verse 33 has no reference to Christ's rising from the
dead, and consequently that Ps. ii. 7, is not quoted to prove that
point. If this be the correct interpretation, of this passage, it of
course affords no argument in favour of the opinion that Christ is
called the Son of God, on account of his being raised from the
dead, and exalted as Messiah.
Such passages as Matt. xvi. 15, " Thou art the Christ, the Son
of the living God," John i. 49, " Rabbi, thou art the Son of God,
thou art the King of Israel," do not prove that Son of God and
Christ are synonymous, any more than the expression " Christ, the
Saviour of the world," proves that the word Christ means Saviour.
They prove simply, what no one denies, that Son of God was a
very common appellation for the Messiah among the Jews ; but
they throw no light on its import or the ground of its application.
In the great majority of cases, it is used very much as a proper
name, and therefore, such cases prove nothing, one way or the
other, as to its meaning.

ESSAY III.
THE DECREES OF GOD.*

We are so much accustomed to receive our literature from Great
Britain, that we are prone to overlook valuable compositions pro
duced in our own country; especially, if they proceed from a sec
tion of the United States not famous for book making ; or from the
pen of an author but little known. Notwithstanding the national
pride, in relation to American literature, so disgustingly displayed
in some of our popular journals, it is a fact, that our booksellers are
in the habit of reprinting British works on particular subjects, much
inferior to writings of home-production which lie in utter neglect.
Perhaps the eastern States ought to be considered as an exception
from this remark ; where, from the first settlement of the country,
authorship has not been uncommon ; and where almost every
preacher, at some time in his life, has the pleasure of seeing some
thing of his own composition, in print. Still it may be observed,
that the literature of New England circulates freely only within her
own limits. Of the thousands of printed sermons which run the
round through her homogeneous population, very few copies find
their way into the other States, except where her sons form the mass of
the population. This restriction, however, is becoming less and less
every year ; and as the population of other parts of the country
acquire a taste for reading, the literary wares of our eastern
brethren get into wider circulation, and find a readier sale. But
leaving out of the account large towns and cities, there is but a
small share of literature in the greater part of our country. There
are scattered everywhere through the land well informed and well
educated men ; but very few of them ever think of writing anything
more than a paragraph for the newspapers ; or, at most, a Fourth of
July speech. Even in the oldest of the United States, celebrated
for men of talents and extraordinary political and legal attainments,
all the writings of a theological kind which have ever issued from
the press, might, I presume, be easily compressed within the nar
row limits of a common portmanteau. When, therefore, anything
in the shape of a religious book proceeds from that quarter, it should
receive particular attention. It has on this account, as well as on
* Originally published in 1831, in review of the following work :
The Divine Purpose displayed in the works of Providence and Grace. By Rev.
John Matthews, D.D., (late of) Shepherdstown, Virginia.

THE DECREES OF GOD. 61
others, seemed to us proper to bring more conspicuously before the
public the little volume, the title of which stands at the head of this
article. These Letters, we have understood, were originally pub
lished in the Evangelical and Literary Magazine of Virginia.
They were afterwards collected and published in a small volume
at the Franklin press, Richmond ; and in the following year, were
reprinted at Lexington, Kentucky, with the author's name, which
did not appear in the Richmond edition. This then may be reck^
oned the third edition of these Letters ; but still they are almost
entirely unknown to the reading population of the middle and
northern States. Since this work was published, the worthy author
has been appointed Professor of Theology in a seminary in Indiana,
and has entered on the duties of his office.
The object of the writer seems to have been, to exhibit, in a clear
and familiar way, some of the strongest arguments for the scrip
tural doctrine of the universality and, particularity of the divine de
crees ; and to remove the prejudices, and answer the objections of
many serious well-meaning people, who are shocked at the mere
mention of this subject, even if it be couched in the very language
of inspiration. There are persons of some mental cultivation, and
of a serious and devout character, who cannot bear to read, or
hear read, the eighth and ninth chapters of the Epistle to the Ro
mans ; or the first chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians.
The real opinions of serious people cannot, with any certainty,
be judged of by the doctrinal standards of the denominations to
which they have attached themselves. This is especially the case
in the south and the west, where many people have been brought
up without religious education of any kind whatever. Now, where
such persons become serious inquirers, or hopeful converts, they
join any religious society among whom they happen to have re
ceived their serious impressions : or, if there be different denomi
nations mingled together, they commonly attach themselves to one
or the other, not from any distinct knowledge of the system of
doctrines which they hold, but from a preference to their order of
worship and mode of preaching ; or, from an opinion, that the
members of one society are more intelligent, consistent, or pious
than those of another. Persons thus introduced into a particular
church, are often much perplexed and offended at some of the
doctrines which they sometimes hear preached, and which they
find in the creed of the society to which they have attached them
selves : particularly, they are apt to stumble at the doctrine of
predestination and election, as held by Calvinists. It is not uncom
mon to find serious people, whose feelings are so affected with the
mere contemplation of these doctrines, that they are thrown into
deep distress, and even agony, whenever they occur to their minds ; j
and while they dare not totally reject them, as many do, they are
altogether reluctant to receive them, and are afraid of the light by
which they are shown to be a part of divine revelation. We have
known many estimable persons to continue in this state of conflict,

62 THE DECREES OF GOD.
between their judgment and their feelings, many years ; who
could never, with the least composure or patience, hear anything
said on these points. Not that they were convinced that these
doctrines are not revealed in the word of God, but because, through
some prejudice or unhappy association, they always excited in
them feelings of horror and distress. To meet cases of this sort,
the Letters under review, seem to have been written : and, in our
opinion, they are the production of no ordinary mind. In the dis
cussion, not only is all harsh and all technical language avoided,
but there is a sparing use even of scriptural phrases, until the au
thor has proceeded to some extent, in developing the true nature of
the doctrine.
The plan adopted is, first, to deprecate " the pernicious effects of
party spirit in the church" — next, to show " the importance of truth"
— then " the influence of prejudice" — the true doctrine of divine de
crees, and of divine providence — the doctrine of a particular provi
dence, extending to all events — that free agency is not suspended, or
violated by the divine purpose — proof of the extent of the divine plan
from the promises and prophecies — the purposes of God and moral
agency consistent, but incomprehensible — the nature of moral gov*
ernment — salvation by grace — all favours bestowed according to
God's purpose, good pleasure or fore-ordination. Therefore, it de
pends on the will of God,who shall be saved. — The means of salvation
suited to each individual, included in the divine purpose — providence
subservient to the purposes of grace — great events and small cannot
be separated, in the plan of the Almighty — the former are made up of
the latter. — Man, as far as he has foresight and means, is apredesti-
narian in all his own important schemes — the architect, the farmer,
6fC, determine on ends, and elect means to accomplish them.
The eighteenth and nineteenth letters are on the subject of " the
final perseverance of Christians ;" and in the last, the author un
dertakes to show, that these views are adapted to excite devotion ;
and, consequently, cannot be unfriendly to piety and morality.
It will be seen by the above syllabus, that in this little volume,
very interesting and important subjects are brought into discus
sion : and it is one recommendation of this work, that a doctrine,
most commonly handled in a forbidding and polemical style, is
here treated with great calmness, and brought down to common
apprehension, by means of familiar and appropriate illustrations.
There is not a harsh or censorious word in the whole book. It
may, therefore, be recommended as a specimen of mildness in the
discussion of a subject, which commonly produces warmth and
hard speeches. It would afford us real pleasure, to see a treatise
on the other side, equally characterized by the spirit of candour
, and kindness : and whatever cause may be promoted by fierce
controversy and denunciatory declamation, we are sure that the
cause of truth gains nothing by such weapons. The pool must be
calm in order to be transparent ; and truth is rendered invisible,
or undistinguishable, in the perturbed waters of wrathful contro-

THE DECREES OF GOD. (, 63
versy. The Christian warrior should ever remember, that the
weapons of his warfare, though " mighty to the pulling down of
strong holds," are not carnal but spiritual. Though he must con
tend for the faith, he may not strive. All " vain janglings" and
" logomachies" are strictly forbidden ; and all discussions that tend
rather " to engender strifes, than godly edifying." We should,
therefore, be desirous of giving currency to this unpretending book,
on account of the Christian spirit which pervades it throughout.
No one, however he may differ from the author, need be afraid of
having his feelings wounded by the perusal of these pages. But
this is not the only recommendation of this little volume. It con
tains much sound, and we may say, profound reasoning : or, to
express ourselves more correctly, the result of profound reasoning ;
for there is no long and elaborate chain of ratiocination — here
everything is simple, and remarkably adapted to the capacity of
common readers ; but no man could render such a subject familiar,
and easily intelligible, who had not deeply and maturely pondered
it, and viewed it in all its important aspects, and especially, in its
practical bearings.
The fact cannot be denied, that the doctrine of absolute decrees ;
or the divine purposes ; or predestination ; or election ; or by
whatever terms it may be expressed, is viewed by most men — and
not the unlearned only — as an absurd and unreasonable doctrine.
From the days of Lucian, it has been set up to ridicule, and scur
rilous abuse ; and they who hold it, are considered and repre
sented, by men of the highest order of intellect and greatest learn
ing, as denying human accountableness ; or as grossly inconsistent,
in holding that all things are decreed in the eternal purpose, and
yet that men are free in their actions. Seldom, however, are we
favoured with any calm, impartial reasoning on this subject. It is
treated, as if the doctrine was self-evidently false and absurd ; and
as if there was no need of argument ; since every man's reason
must' teach him, that he cannot be justly accountable for actions,
which by no possibility he could avoid, as they were from all eter
nity, absolutely decreed.
This strong prejudice against the doctrine of predestination, is
not confined to the men of the world ; it has entered the church ;
and by a large majority of those who have assumed the office of
interpreters of the mind of God, it is rejected with abhorrence ;
and by many of them scouted as not only absurd, but subversive
of all morality. And, which is somewhat surprising, ministers of
churches, which formerly held this doctrine firmly, and expressed
it strongly in their formulas of faith, do strenuously oppose it ; and
contrary to all common usage of words, and correct rules of inter
pretation, pretend, that it is not contained in their articles of reli
gion. If a thousand impartial, intelligent men could be brought to
peruse the seventeenth Article of the Church of England, and of the
American Episcopal Church, whatever might be their own belief,
they would, as we suppose, unanimously declare, that the doctrine

64 THE DECREES OF GOD.
of predestination, as held by Calvinists, is clearly and strongly ex
pressed in that Article ; and the whole history of the reformation
in the Church of England goes to prove, that this interpretation is
correct ; for in the early days of that reformed church, all her dis
tinguished ministers were predestinarians ; just as much as were
the ministers of Geneva. No stronger evidence of this is needed,
than the fact, that the institutes of John Calvin— so grossly
calumniated by many leading men of that church now — was the
text book, enjoined by authority in both the universities. But our
object in the remarks which we are about to make, is, to inquire,
whether there is any foundation, in truth and reason, for the gene
ral aversion to this doctrine.
It cannot be doubted that the language of scripture, in many
places, is favourable to the doctrine. All things seem to be there
ascribed to the counsel and will of God ; and the minutest events,
as well as the greatest, to be under the government of his provi
dence. Things, to our apprehension, most casual and most trivial,
are specified, as under the direction of God : for what is more
casual than the drawing of a lot, but the whole disposal thereof is
of the Lord ; and what seems more trivial than the falling of the
hairs of your head, and yet this event, apparently unimportant as
it is, never takes place, without our Heavenly Father.
But while the Bible, throughout, ascribes the occurrence of all
events, of every kind, to the will of God ; yet, it as uniformly re
presents man as a free, accountable agent ; yea, it represents
him as acting most wickedly, in those very transactions which
are most expressly declared to be determined by the counsel
of God. It would seem from this, that the inspired writers per
ceived no inconsistency between a purpose of God, that a certain
event should occur, and that it should be brought about by the free
and accountable agency of man. And it is believed, also, that men
of sound minds, who have never heard of any objections to this
doctrme, are not apt to be perplexed with any apparent inconsis
tency between these two things. And, we are persuaded, that
were it not for the ambiguity of certain words, and the artful
sophistry with which truth and error are confounded by those who
oppose the doctrine, very few persons would experience any diffi
culty on this subject. If a man of plain sense should be informed
by prophecy, that he would certainly kill a fellow creature the
next day or year, and that in perpetrating this act he would be
actuated by malice, it would never be likely to enter his mind, that
he should not be guilty of any crime, because the action was cer
tain before it was committed. But if you change the terms, and
say, that he would be under a necessity to perform this act ; that
it being absolutely certain, he could not possibly avoid it ; imme
diately the subject becomes perplexed, and involved in difficulty ;
for every man of common sense feels that he cannot justly be ac
countable for what he could not possibly avoid ; and that for what
he does from absolute necessity he cannot, in the nature of things,

THE DECREES OF GOD. 65
be culpable. Here, the whole difficulty is produced by the use of
ambiguous and improper terms. While nothing was presented to
the mind, but the certainty of the event, coupled with voluntary
action, no relief from responsibility was felt : but the moment we
speak of the act as produced by necessity, and as being unavoid
able, the judgment respecting its nature is changed. These terms
include the idea of a compulsory power acting upon us, not only
without, but in opposition to our own will. A necessary event is
one which cannot be voluntary or free ; for if it were spontaneous,
it could not be necessary ; these two things being diametrically
opposite. So, an unavoidable action is one which takes place
against our wishes and will. But a voluntary action may be as
certain as any other ; and by one who knows futurity, may be as
certainly predicted. Even a man may often be certain before
hand, how a voluntary agent will act in given circumstances, pro
vided he knows the moral character of the agent. As if a being
actuated by no other feeling towards another but malice, should be
placed in such circumstances, that he has the choice of performing
a benevolent action towards that individual or omitting it, he will
most certainly neglect to do it, or, if he may with impunity in
jure such an one, or do him good, he will most certainly choose the
former ; yet is such a malignant agent perfectly free, and perfectly
accountable. These things are agreeable to the common feelings
of all men, and depend on no metaphysical niceties. And there
can be no doubt, but that a large share of the difficulty which
perplexes honest minds, in the contemplation of the divine purpose,
which fixes the certainty of events, arises from the confounding of
things totally distinct, by the use of ambiguous terms.
But still it may be thought by some, that as to the point of man's
responsibility, there is no difference between certainty and necessi
ty ; that if it be certainly fixed, that a man shall act in a particular
way, it is impossible that he should do otherwise, and therefore he
cannot be free. To which we would reply, that the whole diffi
culty supposed to exist, arises, as before, from confounding ideas
which should be kept distinct. There is no manner of inconsis
tency between the certainty of a future action and liberty in the
performance of that action. A voluntary action may be as cer
tainly future as any other ; and spontaneity is the only liberty
which can be predicated of the will itself. If an action is volun
tary, it is free : and the idea of a necessary volition is absurd and
contradictory. When, however, we speak in accordance with
common sense and experience, of liberty, as being essential to moral
agency, we always mean liberty of action ; that is, the liberty of
doing what we will. Now, if certainty were inconsistent with free
dom, it would seem that uncertainty was that which constituted
the liberty of an action ; but. it is evident that an action produced
by compulsion may be as uncertain as a voluntary act ; and, as
was before stated, an action may be perfectly voluntary and free, and
yet certain. If we know what we will do the next hour, surely
5

66 THE DECREES OF GOD.
this knowledge of the certainty of our own act does not alter the
nature. If, when considered as uncertain and unknown, it is free
and voluntary, if the same action and produced by the same cause
is viewed as certain or as known, it cannot affect the nature of the
action, as to its moral quality. And if it were the fact, that the
certainty of the existence of a future act destroyed its freedom,
then the probability of its occurrence would have the same effect,
so far as the event was probable. And according to this doctrine,
every human act, or nearly every one, would be affected as to its
liberty ; for what action ever occurs, of the existence of which be
forehand, there may not be a probability in the view of some one ?
But why should uncertainty render an action free and moral,
which would not otherwise be so ? Surely this is no self-evident
truth. So far from it, that in thinking of the morality of an act, or
responsibility of an agent, we never take this circumstance into
view, whether before it happened it was certain or uncertain.
And if certainty affected the character of an get before it occurred,
why should not absolute certainty after the event, have the same
effect 1 When an act is performed, its certainty is so great, that
no power can render it uncertain ; and no good reason can be
assigned, why this should not destroy its freedom, as much as pre
vious certainty. But the truth is, that the moral character of an
action is not in the least affected by its previous certainty or un
certainty, but is determined by its own nature ; — its conformity or
nonconformity, to a moral rule.
Let us now return to the consideration of the decrees of God,
or the Divine purpose. And the whole subject may be reduced to
these two points. First, did God, when about to give existence to
the universe, comprehend in his infinite mind a perfect plan of his
own work ? And secondly, is the existing state of things accord
ant with the original plan ? If both these questions are answered
in the affirmative, then the dispute about the decrees of God is
ended ; for by his decrees nothing else is intended, than that per
fect plan which originally existed in the mind of the Great Archi
tect : and if creation and providence answer to this plan, then is it
true, that God has "fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass." If
any objection is felt to the word " decrees," it may be changed for
another less exceptionable ; especially as it is not the term usually
employed in the scriptures to express this idea ; and also, because
it is in relation to this subject, used in a sense considerably different
from its commonacceptation. The phrase, " Divine purpose," em
ployed by an author, is both scriptural and appropriate, and liable
to no objection which occurs to us. It is a principle with us, not
to contend about words, where there is an agreement in ideas. Let
us then see what exception can be taken to the first position laid
down above, viz., that God, when about to produce the universe of
creatures, had in his mind a perfect plan of the whole work. This,
of course, would include every creature and every action and
event, with the nature which should be possessed by each, and the

THE DECREES OF GOD. 67
causes and qualities of every action. If the Supreme Creator
formed any plan of operation, this plan would certainly include
everything which should ever come to pass, unless there are some
things which are of such a nature, that they could not be embraced
in any pre-conceived plan. This brings us up to the very gist of
the objection. It is alleged, that the free actions of moral agents
could not possibly form any part of such a plan, because, if fixed
by a purpose or plan, they could not come to pass as free actions,
" and depending for their existence on the free will " of voluntary
agents, could not, in the nature of things, be fore-known. This is
the foundation of two distinct theories ; both of which must be
fairly brought into view, and subjected to the examination of reason.
And we begin with that one which is most remote from what we
believe to be the true theory. According to this, God neither pro
posed anything respecting the free actions of moral agents, nor was
it possible for him to know what they would be. As this theory
has, at first view, the appearance of denying the omniscience of
God, its advocates have taken great pains to obviate this objection.
They allege, that as it is no disparagement of God's omnipotence
to say, that there are impossible things which his power cannot ac
complish ; so in regard to omniscience, there may be things which
cannot be known, not from any imperfection in this attribute, but
because, from their uncertain nature, they are not capable of being
known. There is the appearance of plausibility in this represen
tation, but it is only an appearance, for in regard to the perform
ance of impossibilities, the thing is absurd and inconceivable, as for
exarnple, to cause a thing to be and not be at the same time.
There is here really no object on which power can be exerted.
But the case is far different in regard to the knowledge of future
contingencies. The defect of a knowledge of these argues a real
imperfection in this attribute. We cannot conceive of a being
possessing an increase of perfection by a power to do that which
is impossible ; for, as was said before, the thing is wholly incon
ceivable. But we can conceive of knowledge which extends to
free actions of moral agents. Man himself possesses some degree
of this knowledge ; and we cannot attribute omniscience to the
Deity without including in our idea, the perfection of this know
ledge. To say that there are things which from their nature can
not be known, is only to say, in other words, that there is no om
niscient being in the universe ; for if there were, there would be
nothing unknown to him. Moreover, it should be well considered
before this theory is adopted, that this ignorance must relate to alf
actions of this class ; for if one can be certainly known as future,
without destroying its freedom, so may all. And it matters not by
what means the knowledge of future contingencies may be acquired,
it must equally, in all cases, affect the freedom and morality of the
actions known. So that, if the governor of the universe, from ob
serving the conduct of creatures in time past, should be able with:
certainty to foreknow what they will do in future, such knowledge
would be incompatible with the freedom of actions thus known.

68

THE DECREES OF GOD.

And, as we observed in another part of this review, if certain
knowledge is thus inconsistent with moral agency, no reason can
be assigned, why probable knowledge, in proportion to its approxi
mation to certainty, should not have the same effect.
But what idea does it afford of the government of the universe
to suppose, that the Supreme Ruler is totally ignorant of all the
future volitions of his creatures, and of all the consequences of
these volitions ? Dark, indeed, are the prospects of the wise Di
rector of all things, on this theory ; and miserable must be the sus
pense and anxiety of him who sits at the helm, if every future vo
luntary act, of so many millions of free agents, is utterly unknown
to him. No provision can be made beforehand to meet any emer
gency. The universe must be governed by sudden shifts and ex
pedients, adopted as the exigence may demand. And on this prin
ciple, general laws, for the government of the world, would be
altogether unwise, because they could not be so arranged as to
meet the cases which might, in the course of events, occur ; these
being entirely unknown. Such a theory, if pursued, must lead
inevitably to atheism. Nothing more is necessary to prove the
falsity of this theory, than to trace it to consequences so absurd and
dreadful. The theory which takes from the Deity all certain knowledge of
future free actions of moral agents, is not only repugnant to right
reason, but contrary to the whole tenor of scripture. According
to it, the fall of our first parents was an event unknown to God be
fore it actually took place ; and no provision, therefore, could have
been made to meet the exigency. No plan of recovery could have
been devised. All which is expressly contradictory to numerous
plain declarations of the B.ble. That evidence, however, which
demonstrably proves the falsity of this theory, is, the long chain of
prophecy, which foretells innumerable events which are dependent
on the free will of man. Many of these predictions have been ex
actly fulfilled, by men who knew not God ; and generally, by agents
who had no idea that they were executing any divine purpose, or
accomplishing any divine prediction: and the responsibility of these
agents, and the morality of their actions, were not in the least af
fected by the circumstance that they were fore-ordained, and
foretold by the prophets. The illustration of this position from the
scriptures, is full, and could easily be adduced ; but this has often
been done by others, and is inconsistent with the narrow limits
allotted to this review. We would simply refer the reader to the
history of Adam, of Pharaoh, of Joseph, of Saul, of Nebuchad
nezzar, of Cyrus, of Judas who betrayed Christ, and of the Jews
who crucified him. If the scriptures contain one word of truth,
it is most certain that the free actions of moral agents are fore
known. To evade the horrible consequences of denying foreknowledge
to the Deity, as being subversive of his absolute and infinite perfec
tion, some speculative men have invented a theory, if possible, more
absurd ; and hat is, that God has the perfection of omniscience,

THE DECREES OF GOD. 69
but it is not necessary that he should exercise it, in regard to all
events. They suppose, that he could know all the volitions of free
agents which ever will exist, but that he does not choose to know
them, before they come to pass, lest he should infringe the liberty
of the creature. The former theory attributed the ignorance of
the Deity of future contingencies to the necessity of nature ; this
ascribes it to his will. But according to both, actual knowledge
of such events is not possessed ; and the only difference in regard
to the divine attributes which exists between them, is, that accord
ing to the first, God is supposed to be necessarily imperfect, while
by the second, he is voluntarily imperfect. But as it relates to the
difficulty, or rather impossibility, of governing the world with wis
dom, they are precisely the same. God remains ignorant of every
free action, of every moral agent, until it actually takes place. To
whom the world is indebted for this extraordinary hypothesis, we
eannot tell, but the Chevalier Ramsay was the first writer, known
to us, who published it. And it ought to have died with him ; but
to the grief of many of his brethren, and the surprise of all re
flecting theologians, it has found an advocate in the learned Dr.
Adam Clarke. But there is so little danger of its being adopted
by any considerate, sensible man, that we may safely leave it to
sink by its own absurdity. We are not a little astonished to find
such a man as Dr. Beattie, in his Elements of Moral Science, se
riously proposing the first mentioned theory, as a relief from the
inevitable consequences of the doctrine of certain foreknowledge.
It seems, however, to show how heavily these consequences press
upon the Arminian scheme.
We now come to the consideration of the second general theory,
mentioned above. According to this, God, it is admitted, does cer
tainly and perfectly foreknow whatever shall come to pass, without
any exceptions ; but in regard to the free actions of moral agents,
he has formed no purpose, nor made any decree, but leaves them
fully to the freedom of their own will. And to support this theory,
much pains is taken to prove that mere knowledge cannot affect
the freedom or morality of the actions which are its objects ; and
it is, moreover, attempted to be shown, that a purpose, that an
action shall exist, in future, must render it necessary. Now, in
regard to the first position, we not only admit, but strongly main
tain, that the foreknowledge of the certain existence of an action
does not render it a necessary action ; if the agent be free, the
action is free, whether we suppose it to be foreknown or not. And
we agree also, that it is not the knowledge of a future action which
renders it certain : it must, in the order of things, be certain before
it can be foreknown. But if an event be certainly foreknown, it
must have a certain future existence, and for that certain future
existence, there must be some reason or cause. Now that cause
is either the purpose of God that it should be so, or it is something
else. If the former, then it is decreed ; but if it be some other
cause, whatever that may be, as it fixes the certainty of the event,

70 THE DECREES OF GOD.
it must be as inconsistent with freedom, as if the same effect was
produced by the divine purpose. If another cause may render an
event so certain that it may be infallibly foreknown, without any
interference with moral agency, then the purpose of God may ren
der an event certain, without any violation of the freedom of the
creature. But if it be alleged, that there is no other cause of the
event necessary to be supposed, than the free agency of the crea
ture ; we reply that, in one sense, this is true. It is true, as it
relates to the proximate efficient cause. But, if God knows how
such a creature will act, there must be some foundation on which
this knowledge rests ; that is, there must be some reason why the
free creature should act as it is foreseen that he will act. For, as
every free agent has the liberty of acting, or not ; or of performing
a different action from the one which he eventually performs ; if
there existed no reason why the one took place and not the other,
all knowledge of the action before it occurs is necessarily excluded.
It would be to suppose knowledge, without the least foundation for
that knowledge in the object. In answer it is sometimes alleged, that
God's knowledge is not like ours ; nor can we judge of his man
ner of knowing things, by what takes place among creatures.
While we readily admit the general truth, we deny that it can have
any application to the case before us. God cannot know that
something exists where there is nothing. God cannot know that
an event is certainly future, where there is, by the hypothesis,
nothing seen by him which can be the cause of this certainty ;
or, in other words, God cannot see that an effect, yet future, will
certainly be produced, if he does not know any cause of its exist
ence. This mode of knowing things is indeed incomprehensible,
but it does not involve a palpable impossibility.
But waiving this discussion, let us resume only what is granted,
that if a future event be infallibly foreknown, it must be infallibly
certain ; as certain as any decree can make it. In this point the
two theories are perfectly the same. The event is as certain as it
can be ; for it will be perceived by all, and must be admitted,
that it is as impossible, that an event foreseen by omniscience can
fail, as that a decreed event can fail. If mere certainty of exist
ence, therefore, is inconsistent with free agency, the theory of fore
knowledge is as subversive of freedom as a fixed purpose. But it
is alleged, that the purpose influences the action, and, therefore,
there is a wide difference. We answer, that if the divine purpose
— as we maintain — has no other influence on the action than to
render it certain there is no difference at all ; for on some account,
and for some reason, it matters not what — the thing is as certain
as it can be, on the theory of mere foreknowledge. But it will be
asked, how can an event be rendered absolutely certain, by a divine
purpose, without rendering that event necessary ? If "an end is
purposed and rendered certain, the means must be also put into
operation, and made as certain as the end ; therefore, he who pur
poses that a thing shall be, must be its proper and efficient cause ;

THE DECREES OF GOD. 71
for how can he otherwise give effect to his own purposes, than by
putting into operation such causes as will produce the pre-de-
termined end ? And therefore that being who decrees an event,
and provides for its accomplishment, must, in all reason, be con
sidered the proper cause of it, which, when the object of the
decree is a sinful action, must lead to the blasphemous consequence,
that God is the author of sin. A mere purpose without efficient
action cannot possibly secure the certainty of any event ; there
fore a decree which shall secure the certain futurition of any
thing, must be followed by an actual agency, which will be
sufficient to accomplish the end. And if God decrees that an
intelligent, voluntary being shall certainly perform an action, it
is necessary to suppose that, directly or indirectly, he should exert
a power to influence the actions of this voluntary agent, in which
case, the being thus influenced by the controlling power of another,
cannot be free and accountable.
Here we have the whole strength of the objection to absolute
decrees. This is the gordian knot, which it has been found so
difficult to unloose, that most men are disposed to cut it. And it
must be confessed, that there seems to be something incompre
hensible to us, in this thing ; and perhaps, the common method of
acknowledging, that human minds cannot reconcile the fixed pur
poses of God with the free agency of man, is best ; yet it would
be easy to show that the difficulty is fully as great, and even
greater, on the Arminian, than the Calvinistic theory. The former,
indeed, talks of conditional decrees or purposes of God, which
are mere hypothetical things ; a purpose to do this or that, if some
other event should occur ; but if this should not occur, to act dif
ferently. This, indeed, is to make the great omniscient God like
ourselves. It is to represent him as dependent for his eternal
purposes on creatures not in existence. But, really, this theory can
afford no manner of relief: for, as God, from the beginning, knew
what the actions of free creatures would be, his own purposes
were as much fixed as they could be, on any other hypothesis. If
a ruler determines to punish his subjects if they commit certain
crimes, and is at the same time assured that they will commit
them, his purpose to punish is as certainly fixed as it can be.
But before we dismiss this subject as incomprehensible, let us
examine whether there is not a theory on which the divine fore
knowledge and purpose may be reconciled, and on which Calvin-
ists and Arminians may become united in their views.
Whatever plan the Almighty determined on from the beginning,
or whatever purpose he formed in regard to the universe of crea
tures, all was done under the guidance of infinite wisdom. That
God decreed, in wisdom, everything which he did purpose, is
admitted by all. To form a plan for the creation, arrangement,
and government of the world, supposes that out of all possible
plans, that was selected which seemed best to infinite wisdom.
In the order of nature, therefore, the whole congeries of creatures

72

THE DECREES OF GOD.

and events, which compose the universe, must have been present
to the Divine Mind before his purpose was formed ; or to speak
more correctly, all creatures, with all their relations and actions,
were in the view of God's infinite understanding, when he decreed
their future existence ; and the whole was viewed as one con
nected plan or system, and was contemplated at one comprehen
sive glance, and all future existence was decreed by one single
act. Now, whatever the nature and qualities of acts were view
ed to be in the divine purpose, the same must they be in the
event. If God determined that free agents should exist, and that
their actions should be free, when this part of his plan is executed,
free agents with their free actions will exist ; and the decree, so
far from being inconsistent with their freedom, is the very thing
which renders it certain that such free agents and voluntary acts
will ever have a being. Could not God from all eternity decree,
that creatures endued with liberty should exist, and if this was his
purpose, will not the event answer to it ? And if such creatures exist
and act, will not their actions be free ? If, then, the plan of the uni
verse adopted byinfinite wisdom, included the existence of free moral
agents and their free actions, such creatures and such actions must
come into being, in consequence of the decree ; human liberty,
therefore, instead of being destroyed by the decree, is established
upon an immutable basis. If God is omnipotent, and wills the exist
ence of a free agent, the next moment, such a being would instantly
start into being ; if he wills that such a creature should exist six thou
sand years after the creation, the effect will as certainly follow, and
will as exactly answer to the purpose of the divine mind. It would be
very strange, indeed, if the Almighty could not effectually will the
existence of a free, voluntary act : to suppose the contrary, would
be to deny his omnipotence. Now, if he can decree the future
existence of such an act, it will surely come to pass, agreeably to
the design ; that is, it will exist as a free act. Now whether we
can tell how God can secure the freedom of such an act or not, we
ought not to hesitate to believe that a being of infinite perfection
can accomplish it. To say, then, that the decree by which the
certainty of a free act is secured, violates free agency, seems very
much like a contradiction in terms.
The objection, that the doctrine of absolute decrees necessarily
makes God the author of sin, derives its whole force from over
looking the important fact, that there may be created agents, who
are endued with the power of originating action by the very con
stitution of their nature ; and who, although dependent on God for
their existence and faculties, yet being supported in being, are
capable of acting, and of acting freely. If such creatures did not
exist, there neither would be, nor could be, any such thing as moral
agency ; and consequently, no such thing as praise or blame. But
if God accomplishes his purposes by creating such agents, who are
free and voluntary in their actions, and capable of doing right or
wrong, it is not sound logic to infer, that the moral qualities of

THE DECREES OF GOD. 73
their actions must be ascribed to him. They are answerable for
their own acts. If such active, accountable beings be created — and
why should we doubt it — their actions ought not to be ascribed to
the Creator.
But still the difficulty occurs, that if God positively decrees that
such creatures shall perform certain acts ; to execute this purpose,
it is necessary to suppose that he exerts an influence, mediately or
immediately, on their minds : and if a superior being causes one
dependent on him to perform certain actions, the latter, it is thought,
cannot be accountable for such acts.
There are two methods of answering this objection. We first
admit the fact, that God does exert his power in the production of
all the acts of creatures, by such a concurrence with them, that the
physical part of the act is the effect of his agency, but so fur as it
is of a sinful nature it is their own. Thus it is acknowledged that
God is the efficient cause of our free acts, considered merely as
acts of intellect or will ; but at the same time the act of the
creature determines the moral quality of the thing done. This is
the distinction invented by the schoolmen, and adopted by most
Calvinistic theologians of former days ; and which they attempt to
illustrate by various comparisons. It is, however, a distinction not
easily understood ; and has never been so explained as to remove
the darkness and perplexity in which the subject is involved. For,
if God is the efficient cause of the action, as it is an act of the mind,
and if he determines its physical nature, it does not appear that any
thing is left for the creature, but to yield : the physical part of an
act is the substance of that act, and its morality is the relation
which it bears to something else. Now, although we may con
ceive of an act as purely a mental energy, without taking into view
any of its relations ; yet when such an act is produced in the mind
of man, who stands in certain relations to God and his fellow
creatures ; and is under a moral law, which measures and esti
mates the moral character of every act ; it does not appear how we
can admit that it is as to its substance the effect of divine power,
and yet as to its morality the act of the creature.
Others come up directly to the difficulty, and maintain that God
is the author of sin, or the efficient cause of sin, but that there is
nothing of the nature of sin in him. They allege, that there is no
necessity that what God makes should be like himself; or that he
should possess the qualities and attributes of his creatures. God
creates matter, but he is not therefore material. He creates
poisonous reptiles, but who would think of inferring that, on this
account, he possesses properties answering to this ? So God may
be the author of sinful acts in creatures, and not be, in any degree,
a partaker of sin. It is, moreover, alleged, that we are so con
stituted, that we judge of the morality of actions without any refer
ence to their cause. If a man is conscious of a voluntary exercise,
forbidden by the law of God, conscience immediately pronounces
sentence of condemnation, without the least regard to the cause.

74 THE DECREES OF GOD.
We feel guilty on account of a wrong choice, however that voli
tion may have been produced in our minds. Free agency, accord
ing to this theory, consists in voluntary action alone ; and for all
such exercises we are accountable. There is, therefore, no incon
sistency whatever between the divine purpose and free agency.
This theory has many advocates in our country, and is considered
an improvement of the old Calvinistic theology. But it is repug
nant to common sense ; and the arguments employed in its defence
are sophistical.
For, in the first place, reasoning from the effect to the cause is
one of the most clear and logical methods of demonstrating truth
which we possess, and if it were abolished, almost all useful reason
ing would be at an end. By the works of creation we prove con
clusively, that God is wise, and powerful, and benevolent, because
we can see manifest indications of these attributes in the creatures.
We do not, indeed, conclude from such reasoning, that there is a
perfect resemblance in the thing made to the Creator, which is
impossible ; but we legitimately infer from effects which could not be
such as they are, unless their cause was powerful, wise, and be
nevolent. There must be in the cause that which will account for
the effect : and when a free intelligent agent is the cause, his
character may be known as far as his design in the effect is mani
fest. If these principles are not admitted, and it should be denied
that the nature of a cause can be determined from its effects, then
it would follow that an evil being may have created this world ;
and that a superior excellence to any that existed in the cause,
might be in an effect. Now, if the evidence of goodness in the
constitution of creatures proves that God is good ; if he is the
author of sin the conclusion would be as legitimate, that evil exists
in him, which is blasphemous. But it is said, that though sin in
itself be evil, yet God in producing it has a good end in view ; and
then we establish the principle, that it is consistent with infinite
purity to do evil, that good may come ; and if this is consistent
with divine perfection, it is also with human virtue ; but such a prin
ciple is severely reprehended in the word of God.
By some writers, the difficulty is got over by what may properly
be called a metaphysical quibble. They reason thus. There can
be no sin before the first sin ; he, therefore, who is the author of
sin, cannot be sinful, for that would be to suppose that sin existed
before it did exist ; that is, sin before the first sin. Now, if such
sophistry deserves an answer, it may be briefly given thus. When
we speak of God as the author of sin, the meaning is, sin in the
creature ; and when of the first sin, we mean the first sin of man ;
but if it be true that God, by an immediate agency, produces this
sin in man, the consequence would be, that moral evil in man or
any other creature, is not the only or the first evil, of that kind,
since it must have had a previous existence in the cause of these
sinful • acts of the creature. A parallel case is this : God is the
author of holiness, but if holiness be produced by God, then it did

THE DECREES OF GOD. 75
not exist before it was produced ; and thus we come to the impious
conclusion, that because God is the author of holiness, there is no
holiness in him, otherwise, holiness existed before it was produced,
that is, before it did exist.
Again, if God produces, by his Almighty power, all the evil
thoughts and purposes which arise in the mind of the sinner, they
are not properly the acts of the sinner, but of him who produces
them. It is, indeed, said, that God acts upon us to cause us to act,
and that the act is properly our own, if it be our feeling or volition,
and it matters not how it was produced. The judgment of con
science is, that the man is guilty of whatever he wills improperly,
however that will may have been produced in him. As was men
tioned before, they insist that we have nothing to do with the cause
of an act, in judging of its moral nature. If, on our part, it is
voluntary, that is enough : the sin is as much our own as it can
be ; and the appeal is made to our own consciousness of what
passes within our minds, when we pass sentence of condemnation
upon ourselves. Now, there is some truth in this statement, which
gives plausibility to the whole. It is true, that when we are con
scious of an evil purpose, we immediately experience a sense of
guilt, without any inquiry after the origin of this volition ; but why
is this, but because we take it for granted, in all our judgments
respecting our sins, that they are our own acts. And if men could
be convinced that God was the author of all their sinful acts, they
would cease to feel that they were accountable for them. Men,
commonly, do not believe in their own existence more fairly, than
in the fact, that their thoughts are the actions of their own souls,
and that they originate in the activity of their own minds. We do
not deny the power of God to produce what he pleases in any
mind, but if he produces evil, the creature is excusable, for who
can resist omnipotence ? Who can think anything else, upon this
hypothesis, than what is created within him ? But an attempt has
been made to show that God may produce sin in the creature, and
the acts remain sinful, because it is admitted, by all who believe in
the operations of grace, that he works in all his people, both " to
will and to do." If then the holy exercises of the pious are pro
duced by the agency of God, and yet these are holy exercises, and
are felt by the saints to be their own ; then there is no reason why
he may not work in sinners all their sinful exercises, and yet they
be their own sins. To which we would reply, that sin is sin by
whomsoever produced. As was said before, we do not deny the
power of God to produce evil in the sinner's mind ; but we deny
that it is consistent with his holiness. The question now, however,
is, whether the .sinner can be justly punished for evil thoughts
wrought in his heart by Almighty power. And we are willing to
admit the parallel brought for illustration, and when extended to
its proper length, it will overthrow the cause which it was brought
to support. When God works in his people to make them willing
to love and obey him, is the praise of their exercises of grace due

76 THE DECREES OF GOD.
to them 1 Do they not universally ascribe all the praise to God,
saying, Not unto us, &c. ? They feel that if such acts are rewarded,
it is a mere matter of favour. Look, then, at the other side of the
parallel. When God works in the hearts of the wicked to do evil,
the blame is not to be ascribed to them, but to him who is the true
author of their exercises ; and they deserve no punishment for such
acts, unless God should choose, gratuitously or arbitrarily, to inflict
punishment on them.
And if God can create an active being, we mean one essentially
active, capable of originating action, why have recourse to other
efficient causes to account for the existence of the free actions of
such creatures ? Some writers assume it as a maxim, that no
creature can act without the physical efficient energy of God
co-operating, to give him the ability to put forth the act ; or as it
is more simply expressed by the abettors of the last-mentioned
theory, no creature can act but as it is acted on. But we deny
that this is a self-evident truth ; and we are sure it never can be
demonstrated. It is freely admitted that every creature is conti
nually sustained in existence, and in the possession of its faculties,
by the power of God ; but if that creature be in its very essence
active, it is evident from the premises, that nothing more is neces-
• sary to cause it to act, than to continue its existence. According
to our theory, therefore, the efficient cause of free actions is to be
looked for nowhere else but in the free agents themselves ; except
in special cases where God may choose, for wise and good ends,
supernaturally to operate on their minds. And if there be no
necessity of introducing other causes of free and voluntary actions,
why should we encumber the subject more deeply with the doc
trine of divine efficiency or concourse in the performance of sinful
acts. No distinctions, however nice, will ever be sufficient to
guard that system from the shocking consequence of making God
the author of sin.
But it is feared, that the theory which we defend will make the
creature independent of the Creator ; there is no reason for appre
hension, as we not only admit that the power of God is, every
moment, necessary for the sustenance of the creature, but we
maintain that every action of the creature will be accordant with
his eternal purpose. To obtain a distinct view of this subject, it is
requisite to recall to mind a few undeniable principles. The first
is, that in the production of creatures, God acts wisely, or as a
being of intelligence ; like finite beings, God has no need to delibe
rate, compare, and reason, but he perceives instinctively all pos
sible things with all their possible relations. In wisdom he made
all things that are made. Every minute part of every animal
and of every vegetable was wisely ordained to occupy its ap
propriate place, and suited to answer its appropriate end. The
whole system, in the various relations of one part to another,
was arranged and adjusted in infinite wisdom. This supposes
that the whole existed in idea before the infinite mind when

THE DECREES OF GOD. 77
his purpose was formed to give it existence. In this plan free
agents formed a part ; these, with all their actions, also, were
contemplated previously (in the order of nature) to the decree
which determined their future existence to be certain.
Again, in selecting his plan, the great Creator acted with perfect
freedom. He was under no necessity to create anything. He is
independent of all creatures, and stands in need of nothing. Not
only was he at perfect liberty to create or not, but he was free to
adopt any system which pleased him. If there had been anything
in the existing plan which did not please him, or would not answer
his purpose perfectly, he was at liberty to reject the whole, and
would have done so. When he purposed to create the progenitor
of the human family, he had it in his power to have given existence
to another of the same species : he might, for example, have made
the last man first; or have formed a person distinct from any who
ever shall actually exist. Now this being the case, the inquiry
arises, could not God have placed at the head of the human family,
on whom the destiny of the rest should depend, one who would not
have sinned? If he could not: if every creature that could have
been created of the human species would certainly have sinned as
well as Adam, then it follows eventually that sin could not be
avoided if man existed ; and the conclusion is, that a determination
to create man involved in it the purpose to permit the existence of
sin. But if the alternative be taken, and it be said, that God could
have created, in the place of Adam, one who would not have
sinned, still the same conclusion forces itself upon us ; for if, when
he might have formed a creature who would not have transgressed,
he chose to form one whom he knew would, it is as evident as any
thing can be, that by this selection he did determine to permit the
existence of sin.
Let us now, for a moment, examine the theory which supposes
that the plan of the Almighty, as it originally existed in the eternal
mind, is not the one which is actually in existence ; but that while
it was his purpose that evil should have no place in the universe,
contrary to his will and plan, it has come in through the transgres
sion of free agents ; and that in consequence of this a new plan
has been adopted, accommodated to the exigence of the case. If
we understand the Arminian theory, this is the point by which it
stands distinguished from the theory which we believe. The mere
statement of this opinion seems to us to carry with it a confutation.
For, when the original plan was formed and adopted, according to
the premises, it was certainly known that it would utterly fail ; and
was it ever heard of among creatures, that any intelligent being
seriously formed a purpose which he knew at the time could not
and would not be accomplished ? To suppose, then, that God, with
a perfect prescience of all future events, resolved upon a plan of
the universe entirely different from what he knew would come to
pass, is a scheme so unreasonable, that we know not how any one,
after distinctly considering it, can adopt it: and we seem to our-

78 THE DECREES OF GOD.
selves now to perceive the reason why some speculative Arminians
have been driven to the theory mentioned above, that God did not
choose to know what would really take place.
But passing by the inconsistency of this theory on account of
these reasons, let us see to what consequences it will lead us. The
hypothesis is, that the present state of the world does not accord
with the original plan of the Almighty; but that by the introduc
tion of sin against his will, the whole state of the moral world is
changed, and of course the government of the world by providence
must be entirely different from what it would have been if man
had not sinned. One undeniable consequence is, that the end which
God had in view in the creation is lost, unless we suppose that his
glory can be promoted as well by a state of things which pros
trates his own plan, as by its execution. But if the ruler of the
universe was frustrated in his purpose by the first sin, so he must
be by every subsequent transgression ; and, therefore, the existence
of creatures, instead of answering his original purpose, whether
that was to make them happy or to promote his own glory, has
entirely failed of its complete accomplishment. And if this has
occurred by the actual course of events in time past, what security
is there, that the same will not be the fact in time to come ? yea,
what security is there, that things will not continue to grow
worse and worse, until all nature shall rush to some dreadful cata
strophe, in which everything good in the creation shall be utterly
lost in everlasting darkness and confusion ?
It will not be satisfactory to answer, that God has wisdom and
power sufficient to prevent such a catastrophe ; for his wisdom and
power, according to the hypothesis, are not adequate to the pre
vention of sin and its consequences ; and if these may arise and
spread and increase, how can the consequence supposed be pre
vented ? If the plan of the Almighty Ruler of the universe may
be thwarted in one instance, it may in all. No security for the
final well-being of the universe can be found anywhere. Now is
it reasonable to think that, on these principles, a God of infinite
wisdom would ever have made creatures capable of frustrating all
his plans, and disappointing all his most benevolent purposes ?
But it may be alleged, that God, foreseeing the evil which would
arise from the abuse of free will, determined to provide against it,
and accordingly has done so, by sending his son into the world to
repair the ruins which sin has made ; and thus, although God will
not be glorified according to his original design, he will, neverthe
less, be honoured by the new remedial scheme. The ground of
the objection, however, still remains. If God's first plan was
entirely frustrated by the sin of his creatures, what security is there
that the same will not happen in relation to this new plan ? As the
will of man is still free, and as the success of the mediatorial
scheme depends on the choice of man, why may it not happen
that the end aimed at in the second will also be frustrated ? Indeed,
according to this theory, the fact has already occurred ; for the

THE DECREES OF GOD. 79
design of God in sending his Son was to save all men, but it is
acknowledged, that only a small part of the human race has been
brought to salvation hitherto. And there is no better hope for the
future, for men are not better now than formerly, and judging from
the past, we may conjecture, that the greater number will continue
to neglect this great salvation. Hence it appears, that the great
God has been disconcerted and disappointed in all his designs : not
only was his original plan of a universe without sin frustrated, but
his remedial plan, which was to save all men from sin, has also
failed. These are consequences which inevitably flow from the
hypothesis, that the cause of events in the world is not in accord
ance with the original plan of the Creator. But it is impossible,
after an impartial view of the divine attributes, to believe in these
conclusions. They are repugnant to reason. They are dishonour
able to the divine perfections.
It may be, however, that the sober Arminian will be disposed to
take different ground, and to maintain that God did, with the pre
science of all his sins, determine to create man ; and that the
existing state of things he did resolve to permit ; but that he
decreed nothing respecting these actions, but left them free ; so
that when the creature sins, he is not under any necessity of doing
wrong from any divine purpose. Now, here it is evident, again,
that there is an idea attached to the doctrine of decrees which does
not belong to it, and which we have heretofore laboured to separate
from it. It is, that if their sinful actions are decreed, they cannot
be free, and must come to pass by an unavoidable necessity. To
remove all difficulty, however, on this account, we will agree to
meet the Arminian on the ground last selected. And we do aver,
that in this theory he comes substantially into the very doctrine
which we maintain. For if God formed man with the full cer
tainty of all his sins, then the purpose to create such a being with
a foresight of such acts, is virtually decreeing the future existence
of such acts. If, when the purpose was formed to create Adam,
his fall was distinctly foreseen, then the determination to give Adam
existence involved the purpose that such an act as his transgression
should also exist. Not that God intended or needed to do anything
to cause man to sin ; this we reject, as much as the Arminian :
but he resolved to permit this event. And here is the true ground
of distinction between effective and permissive decrees ; in the
execution of the first, God acts himself; but in the execution of the
last, other agents act, and act freely, and without constraint.
It does appear, therefore, that there is a ground on which the
sober Arminian and moderate Calvinist can meet ; and on which
even their views of the divine decrees can be made to harmonize.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
PUBLISHED IN 1830.

With propriety the term militant has been applied to the church
upon earth. No sooner was the light of truth sent down from
heaven, than it fell into interminable conflict with the darkness of
error. And not only was it necessary to contend with the powers
of darkness without the kingdom of Christ, but hideous forms of
error were generated within the bosom of the church ; according
to the prophetic warning of our Saviour, " Beware of false
prophets which come to you in sheep's clothing ;" and that of the
apostle Paul, in his solemn valedictory to the elders of Ephesus,
" For I know this, that after my departing shall grievous wolves
enter in among you, not sparing the flock. Also of your own selves
shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples
after them." Even while Paul lived, the churches were exceed
ingly d sturbed and distracted by false teachers, who brought in
" another gospel," and endeavoured to overthrow from the founda
tion the doctrine of gratuitous justification by faith without works ;
and to substitute a legal system, according to which justification'
before God could be expected only from obedience to the ceremo
nial law of Moses. A large portion of the inspired writings of this
apostle have direct reference to the opinions of these Judaizing
heretics. Others arose in the church who denied the resurrection
of the body, and maintained that all the resurrection to be expected
was already past. They seem to have explained all that our Lord
had said respecting the resurrection spiritually, or as relating to the
purification or revivification of the soul. As the former errorists
manifestly came out from the sect of the Pharisees, the latter might
have derived their origin from the Sadducees, or from some of the
schools of heathen philosophy. From these facts in the history of
the apostolic church, we learn, that when converts were made to
the society of Christians, many of them retained something of the
leaven of their old errors, and endeavoured to modify and corrupt
the pure doctrines of the Gospel, by accommodating' them to their
preconceived opinions. And as all the first Christians had been
brought up in another religion, it is not wonderful that errors
abounded among those professing Christianity, even in the times of

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 81
the apostles. This is, indeed, contrary to the vulgar opinion,
which considers the primitive church as being in all respects near
perfection. This opinion, however, is not founded on any informa
tion given to us in the apostolic writings ; for, in addition to what
has already been observed, we may refer to the epistles of our
Lord to the seven churches of Asia, for further proof of the exist
ence and prevalence of error in the days of the apostles. And to
wards the close of that age, the impudence and licentiousness of the
propagators of error may be learned from the catholic epistles of
John, the second of Peter, and the epistle of Jude ; all of which are
filled with descriptions of false teachers, and warnings against their
pestiferous influence.
Of the age immediately succeeding that of the apostles, our in
formation is very imperfect ; either because there were few who
had leisure or inclination for writing ; or because their works have
perished ; which we know to have been the fact in regard to some
important records. But from all the authentic history which has
reached our times, we learn that swarms of heretics infested the
church, even while she was struggling under the direful strokes of
sanguinary persecution. No age has produced more monstrous
errors than the second century, of which Irenaeus has given us a
detailed account : and all this congeries of extravagant opinions
originated in the false philosophy of those who professed to em
brace Christianity, The loathsome spawn of Gnosticism was cast
upon the church from the corrupt but fertile source of the oriental
philosophy. The original fountain of this extraordinary inundation
of absurd heresy, was a fanciful doctrine of the nature of God. It
would be interesting to pursue this subject, but we are admonished
by the narrowness of our limits to forbear.
It does not appear, however, that, amidst the multifarious errors
which were broached in the first four centuries, any controversy
arose respecting the doctrines of sin and grace. In regard to the
person of the Mediator, error had assumed almost every possible
shape, both as it related .to his humanity and divinity, and the na
ture and effects of the union between them. Council after council
had been convened to discuss and decide on points connected with
this important subject ; and theologians of the first learning and
highest reputation employed their pens in defence of the catholic
doctrine. But early in the fifth century, a new doctrine began to be pub
lished by Pelagius, a British monk, on the subject of man's natural
condition, and the connection which subsisted between Adam and
his posterity. That the doctrine of Pelagius was new, and different
from the opinions which had commonly been received in the
church, needs no other proof than the impression which it made on
the minds of the great majority of learned theologians who lived at
that time. And that the doctrine of original sin then received by
the church, was the same which had been always held from the
times of the apostles, is exceedingly probable, from the fact that the
6

82 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
subject never underwent any public discussion ; while it is rarely
the case that a doctrine entirely new can be introduced and propa
gated everywhere, without giving rise to much controversy, and
exciting much public attention. Pelagius did, indeed, in his contro
versy with Augustine, allege, that this father had invented the doc
trine of original sin, which was unknown to preceding ages ; but
in answer to this charge, Augustine appealed to many writers of
the first ages, to show that they entertained the same views as those
which he now advocated. These testimonies are not so explicit as
could be collected from the writings of those who lived after the
discussion of this subject took place. But this is always the case.
When any point of doctrine is undisputed and received by all,
while it is everywhere tacitly admitted or incidentally referred to,
it is never made the subject of accurate definition ; nor is it ex
pounded with that fulness and caution which become necessary
after it has been called in question or opposed. When Augustine
was urged to bring forward proofs from the fathers who preceded
him, he answered the demand in the following sensible manner :
" Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam
ipsa haeresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad
solvendum quaestione versari, quod proculdubio facerent si respon-
dere talibus cogerentur?" That is, "What occasion is there that
we should search the works of those, who, living before this heresy
arose, had no necessity of handling this difficult question, which
doubtless they would have done, if they had been obliged to an
swer such men as we have to deal with ?"
Jerome, in several places in his works, ascribes the new opi
nions propagated by Pelagius to Rutin, who, he alleges, borrowed
them from Origen : but as Jerome is known to have cherished an
implacable hostility to Rutin, and also to the memory of Origen,
his testimony on this subject ought to be received with caution.
And we cannot find that he brings forward any passages from the
writings of Rutin which are sufficient to gain credit to the allega
tion against him.
Pelagius is admitted, by his keenest opposers, to have been a
man of learning, and of estimable character. And on other points,
especially on the warmly-contested doctrine of the Trinity, he not
only was orthodox, but wrote three books in defence of the catholic
opinion, in which he gave deserved praise to Athanasius for his
great constancy and soundness in the faith, and did not hesitate to
pronounce the opinions of Arius impious. He, moreover, published
fourteen books, containing an exposition of the epistles of Paul ;
which, in the opinion of several learned men, are still extant in the
commentaries subjoined to those of Jerome on Paul's epistles. One
thing is certain in relation to these commentaries ; they do not con
tain the opinions of Jerome on the subject of original sin, but pre
cisely those of Pelagius. Besides the books already mentioned, he
wrote many letters to distinguished individuals, most of which are
lost ; and also a book, De Natura, in which he extols the powers

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 83
and virtues- of human nature ; and a small book addressed to Pope
Innocent, containing a confession of the_ catholic faith, as he had
received it. But it was a complaint against him by some of his
contemporaries, that he left it to his disciples principally to write,
so that he might have the opportunity, when he judged it expedient,
of denying that the opinions published by them were his own. Yet,
on the whole, it cannot be denied that the reputation of Pelagius
stood high in the church before he began to propagate his heretical
opinions. Jerome, who was never inclined to spare his adversa
ries, seems to have respected him, for in his first piece against his
opinions he refrains from mentioning his name, but speaks of him
self under the fictitious name of Atticus, and of his adversary by
the name of Clitobulus. Another writer of that age, who seemed
solicitous to speak evil of Pelagius, found nothing to hold up to cen
sure or ridicule but his bodily defects. Augustine acknowledges
that he was a man of chaste and unblemished character ; and Chry-
sostom laments that a man of so great probity should have fallen
into heresy.
But, although Pelagius was the author of the system which has
been denominated from him, yet some of his disciples were much
more distinguished in the defence and propagation of these opi
nions. Among these, the most celebrated was Coelestius. Augus
tine admits that he was a man of most penetrating genius. Before
he became a follower of Pelagius, he published three small treatises,
addressed to his parents, in the form of epistles, which contained
nothing erroneous, but were full of incitements to a virtuous life.
What he wrote afterwards, we know only from the citations and
references of Augustine, and others of his opponents. When he
was condemned by the council of Carthage, he travelled into Asia,
where, it is said, he was ordained a presbyter, and afterwards took
up his residence in Sicily, where he continued by his discourses
and writings to propagate the doctrines of Pelagius.
Julian, an Italian bishop, the son of Memorius, bishop of Capua,
was, however, the most zealous and able writer in favour of the
opinions of Pelagius. When quite a young man he was known to
Augustine and greatly beloved by him, as appears from a letter
which he addressed to the father of Julian. This young man was
so rich in mental endowments, and possessed of an eloquence so
commanding and persuasive, that he received the appellation of
the Roman Demosthenes. And from what remains of. his contro
versial works, it is manifest that he had a mind of uncommon vi
gour and penetration. The character given of him by Gennadius
of Marseilles, is, "That he was a man of a penetrating genius,
learned in the scriptures, and an accurate scholar both in the Greek
and Latin languages." Before he embraced the impious doctrine
of Pelagius, he was distinguished among the doctors of the church.
Afterwards, he undertook the defence of the Pelagian errors
against Augustine ; first in a work consisting of four books, and
then in another work of eight books.. He is said also to have writ-

84 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
ten a work in the form of a dialogue, in which the parties in thig
controversy are introduced as defending their respective opinions.
But Gennadius, and others who followed him, are entirely mistaken
in ascribing this dialogue, or disputation, to Julian. It is the pro
duction of Augustine, who selects from the eight books of Julian
the arguments which are there used in favour of Pelagianism, and
then answers them in his own name. The title of this disputation
is Alter catio Amborum. The occasion of writing this book Augus
tine himself has informed us of in his own preface, where he says
that an illustrious man sent him certain extracts which some per
son had made from the books of Julian, the Pelagian heretic, and
requested that he would give an answer, " To these," says he, " I
now return an answer, first setting down the very words of Julian
and then subjoining my answers to each particular in order."
Julian also indited two letters, which were published ; the one
addressed to Zosimus, bishop of Rome, the other, in the name of
eighteen bishops who united with him, to Rufus, bishop of Thessa-
lonica. The venerable Bede, in his commentary on the Song of
Solomon, mentions and refutes a work of Julian on the same sub
ject. Julian prefixed to his exposition of the Canticles a work en
titled De Amore, in which he labours to prove that there is implant
ed in all men, a natural principle of love, which continues from in
fancy to old age, and is preserved, without loss of vigour, by mere
human exertion.
He wrote, moreover, a book concerning the virtue of constancy,
and an epistle to Demetrius ; in both of which, according to Bede,
he defended the Pelagian doctrine of free-will.
Pelagius came to Rome about A.D. 410, when Innocent, the
bishop, was absent in consequence of the capture of the city by
Alaric, and there began to scatter the seeds of his doctrine, under
the specious veil of certain interrogatories which he proposed for
consideration and discussion. Ccelestius, in Sicily, pursued the
same policy and about the same time. Not long after this, both
Pelagius and Ccelestius passed over to Africa, but Pelagius did not
long continue there, but travelled on to Asia Minor. By this time
the rumour of his heresy was spread abroad ; Jerome in the east,
and Augustine in the west, had taken up their pens against what
they considered a pestiferous doctrine. A council was therefore
called at Diospolis, or Lydda, in Palestine, and fourteen bishops
met to investigate the doctrines of Pelagius. Everything here
was as favourable to him as he could have wished ; for neither of
the two bishops who were his accusers were present ; and as the
writings of Pelagius were in the Latin language, his judges were
totally incompetent to form an accurate judgment of his doctrines',
for want of a correct knowledge of the Latin tongue. Moreover,
John, bishop of Jerusalem, warmly espoused the cause of Pelagius,
and he was without difficulty acquitted of the charge of heresy,
and received by the assembled bishops as an orthodox brother.
The presbyter Orosius, coming to Carthage from Palestine,

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 85
brought with him the accusation preferred against Pelagius by He-
rus and Lazarus, and communicated this document to a council
then sitting at Carthage, on the affairs of the church. The bishops
there assembled before they heard of the decision of the council of
Diospolis were much alarmed, and wrote to Innocent, of Rome,
their view of the opinions of Pelagius ; adding, that if he and his
partisans did not unequivocally reject these errors they ought to
be immediately excommunicated. These resolutions were signed
by sixty-eight bishops. Another synod met shortly afterwards at
Milevum, in Numidia, and addressed letters on the same subject to
the bishop of Rome. The result of the eastern council being now
known in Africa, Augustine, Alypius, and Aurelius, with two other
bishops, wrote a more full and particular account of the whole con
troversy to Innocent, and explained how the council of Diospolis
had most probably been imposed on by the subtilty of Pelagius.
Innocent entered fully into the views of the African bishops, and in
his answer expressed the same conditional condemnation of the au
thors of the heresy. But as Pelagius had diffused his doctrine ex
tensively, and put on it a fair face, it was necessary that he should
be met with argument, as well as decisions of councils : and no
man in the church was so well qualified for this work as Augustine,
who did not shrink from the arduous task, but entered into this field
of controversy, in which he was occupied for twenty years.
Pelagius gloried greatly in his acquittal ; on which occasion he
wrote to a friend, that fourteen bishops had agreed with him that
man might live without sin, and easily keep the commandments of
God if he would. He also wrote to Augustine an account of his
acquittal ; and immediately proceeded to publish his opinions more
boldly, in four books which he wrote on the subject of free-will,
and in which he entirely denied the doctrine of original sin.
The first thing which Augustine wrote expressly against the
opinions of Pelagius, was three books addressed to Marcellinus,
Concerning the demerit and remission of sins, and the baptism of
children. In these, Pelagius is treated very respectfully, because
Augustine still believed him to be a pious man, and because his re
putation in the church was very high. In these books, Augustine ,
said that it was possible for a man, by the aids of divine grace, to
live without sin, but that no one had ever yet attained to that per
fection, or ever would in time to come. At this opinion, Marcelli
nus expressed some surprise ; which gave occasion to Augustine
to write another book, Concerning the Letter and Spirit, in which he
keenly contends with the opposers of the doctrine of grace.
As Pelagius had now, by means of his letter to Demetrius, made
known his opinions, and spread them abroad, Augustine did not
any longer consider it necessary to forbear mentioning his name ;
he therefore provided an antidote to the aforesaid letter, in an epis
tle addressed to Juliana, the mother of Demetrius, which is num
bered 143 in the Collection of his epistles.
In the year 414 he seems to have written his famous work, De

86 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
Natura et Gratia, which he dedicated to two young gentlemen, Ti-
masius and Jacobus, who had recently been converted, from being
disciples of Pelagius, to the catholic faith. These two young men
had been induced by the persuasions of Pelagius to devote them
selves to a monastic life, and at the same time drank in his self-
righteous spirit ; but by the exertions of Augustine they were
brought back to the acknowledgment of the truth.
In the following year, 415, Augustine wrote a particular account
of the proceedings in relation to Pelagius which had taken place
in the council of Palestine, and addressed it to Aurelius, bishop of
Carthage. In the year 416 the council of Carthage met and addressed a
letter to Innocent ; and Augustine, in addition, wrote one in his
own name and that of several of his friends, Aurelius, Alypius,
Euodeus and Possidius. As Augustine had already commenced
writing against Pelagius, a request was made by this council that
he should go on with the controversy ; in consequence of which he
published this year two books ; the one Concerning the Grace of
Christ, the other Concerning Original Sin.
About this time, also, it is supposed that his letter to Dardanus
was written, which is numbered fifty-seven in the collection of
his epistles, and, moreover, his book against Ccelestius, addressed
to the Bishops Eutropius and Paulus, Concerning the Perfection of
Righteousness. In the year 417, Augustine, having heard that there were some
persons at Nola who had imbibed the doctrine of Pelagius, wrote
to Paulinus, bishop of that place, Concerning the Pelagian heresy,
which letter is the one hundred and sixth in the collection.
In 418 he wrote two epistles to the Roman presbyter, Sixtus,
one of which was intended as an express refutation of the Pelagian
heresy. Thus it appears how indefatigable this father was in opposing
the heresy of Pelagius. Almost every one of the above works is
particularly mentioned in The Retractations of Augustine.
Innocent, bishop of Rome, dying about this' time, was succeeded
by Zosimus, to whom both Pelagius and Ccelestius addressed epis
tles, in which they gave such a complexion to their system, and
spoke in language so plausible and ambiguous, that Zosimus was
completely deceived by their fair speeches. He accordingly wrote
to the bishops of Africa that he considered Pelagius an orthodox
man. But they showed in their answer that it was not enough for
these men to acknowledge the truth in general terms ; but that they
should explicitly confess that we need the grace of Jesus Christ in
every act. Zosimus did not remain obstinate, but upon receiving
accurate information from Augustine of the true nature of the opi
nions of these men, issued a sentence of condemnation against them.
Upon this, the Emperor Honorius also passed a sentence of ban
ishment from Rome against the Pelagians. This was in the year
418. Ccelestius, on being condemned, went to Constantinople

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 87
where he met with determined opposition from Atticus, the bishop
of that city ; so that his designs of propagating his opinions there
were disappointed.
Pelagius still continued in Palestine, and complained grievously
of the hard treatment which he received by the decisions and acts
respecting him at Rome, and by the books written against him ;
and again succeeded in imposing on some respectable persons who
held a conference with him, by leading them to think that his doc
trine did not materially differ from the common belief. These per
sons, on whom he made this impression, were so much interested
in his favour that they wrote to Augustine stating their favourable
views of the doctrine of Pelagius. This communication seems to
have been the occasion of Augustine's writing his books Concern
ing Grace and Original Sin.
Julian, of whom we have already spoken, having published se
vere animadversions on the conduct of Zosimus and his clergy,
Boniface, the successor of Zosimus, sent them to Augustine, for the
purpose of having them refuted ; which he did in four books, in
scribed to Boniface. And Count Valerius, having received another
of Julian's writings, in which he charges the Catholics with con
demning marriage, deriving this as an inference from their doctrine
of original sin, caused this work to be sent to Augustine, who soon
published an answer in his work De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia.
To this work Julian replied in four books. To these Augustine
opposed six books ; in the first three of which he answers what is
contained in Julian's first book ; but the fourth, fifth and sixth, are
employed in refuting the second, third and fourth of Julian ; the one
answering to the other in order. Julian was not a man to be
easily silenced, for he now came out with eight books against the
six of Augustine. These the venerable polemic was preparing to
answer, when he was called away from all his earthly labours.
Only two books of this last work were completed ; these have
come down to us with his other works.
The death of Augustine occurred, according to the testimony of
Prosper, in his Chronicon, A. D. 430 ; the latter was the friend and
correspondent of Augustine, from whom this father received par
ticular information of the progress of Pelagianism, or rather Semi-
Pelagianism, at Marseilles, where these opinions took deep root,
and continued long to flourish.
It may be satisfactory now to give a more particular account of
the decisions of the several councils which met for the considera
tion of this subject, in their chronological order.
The first was the council of Carthage, convened, A.D. 407, on
account of the dissemination by Ccelestius of the opinions of Pela
gius, which also he pertinaciously defended. Of the proceedings
of this council no fragment remains but one preserved in Augus
tine's work on original sin. Mention is made of this council, how
ever, in the letter of the fathers of the second council of Carthage,
addressed to Innocent. From the fragment preserved by Augus-

88 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
tine, we learn that the accusation against Ccelestius was, that he
had taught " that the sin of Adam hurt himself alone." Ccelestius
acknowledged that he had doubted concerning the communication
of sin by descent from Adam, but professed his willingness to be
better instructed by those to whom God had given greater wisdom ;
yet observed that he had heard from presbyters of the church a
doctrine different from that which was held by the council. And
being called' upon to name one from whom he had heard such an
opinion, he mentioned Rutin, a holy presbyter of Rome. On being
asked whether he had not asserted' that infants are born in the
same state in which Adam was before transgression, he would
make no other reply but " that infants needed baptism, and ought
to be baptized."
The council of Diospolis, in Palestine, consisted, as has been
mentioned before, of only fourteen bishops. The accusers of Pela
gius were not able to attend ; one of them being prevented by sick
ness, and the other by some other cause.
Augustine mentions this council in several of his works, and as
cribes the acquittal of Pelagius to his artful use of equivocal terms,
by which his judges were deceived, and were induced to pronounce
him innocent.
Jerome, in his seventy-ninth epistle, calls this " a miserable syn
od ;" and says, that although they did not err in doctrine, they
were deceived in the man, who deceitfully seemed to condemn his
own opinions. Photius, in his Bibliotheca, gives a more particular
account of this council ; but his information seems to have been
derived from the works of Augustine, already referred to.
A. D. 416. Another council met at Carthage, which has already
been noticed ; not convened, indeed, to attend to this controversy,
but Prosius, having brought intelligence respecting the proceedings
instituted against Pelagius in Palestine, the fathers of this council
took up the business, and wrote a letter to Innocent, in which they
expressed their opinion freely and fully, relative to the heresy of
the opinions of which Pelagius was accused, and of the course
which ought to be pursued in regard to him, if he did not
explicitly abjure them. Sixty-seven pastors were present at this
synod. About the same time, or a little later, a synod met at Milevum,
in Numidia, consisting of sixty bishops, or pastors, who took up the
subject of the errors of Pelagius and Ccelestius, and, in imitation of
the council of Carthage, addressed a letter to Innocent, bishop of
Rome. It appears from several notices in the writings of Augustine,
that another full synod met in Africa, and addressed letters on this
subject to Zosimus, the successor of Innocent ; but all traces of the
acts and proceedings of this council, except the short notices refer
red to above, have disappeared. This synod is said to have con
sisted of two hundred and twenty-four bishops, and is supposed to

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.

have been held, A. D. 417 or 418. But great obscurity rests upon
the whole matter.
A. D. 428. When Coelestinus was bishop of Rome, a council
was held in Gaul, occasioned by a deputation from Britain, who
represented that the poison of Pelagianism had been imported into
that country by one Agricola, the son of Jenerianus, a bishop ; and
that they greatly needed aid to prevent its diffusion among the peo
ple. On this occasion a large council convened, and two eminent
men, Germanus and Lupus, were sent on a mission to Britain
to check the progress of Pelagianism. By their exertions the
catholic doctrine appeared to be everywhere restored ; but no
sooner had they taken their departure than heresy began again to
germinate ; so that the request to the Gallican church for help was
repeated, and Germanus was again sent, and was accompanied by
Severus, a disciple of Lupus, his former colleague. The witnesses
for these facts are Constantius, in his life of Germanus, and Bede,
in his History of the British Churches,
The next council in which the subject of Pelagianism was
brought up for consideration, was that of Ephesus, A.D. 431.
This is called an oecumenical council. It was convened, not on
account of the heresy of Pelagius, but to condemn Nestorianism ;
but as the followers of Pelagius would not join in the censure of
Nestorius, the council expressed their disapprobation of that heresy
also, which they denominate the wicked doctrine of Ccelestius. And
in their synodical epistle to Coelestinus, bishop of Rome, they ap
prove of the sentence of condemnation which had been passed
on Pelagius, Ccelestius, Julian, and their abettors, whom they call
impious men.
The Pelagian doctrine was next condemned in a council which
met at Aries, in France ; the exact year is not settled. This synod
denounced an anathema against the impious doctrines of Pelagius ;
and especially against the opinion that man was born without sin ;
and that he could be saved by his own exertions. They considered
it a presumption worthy to be Condemned for any man to believe
that he could be saved without grace.
The council of Lyons met soon after that of Aries, and approved
its decrees ; but some other doctrines were also brought under
consideration and subjected to censure.
A.D. 494. Gelasius, bishop of Rome, convened a council of
seventy bishops in that city, by whom the writings of Augustine
and Prosper were approved and recommended ; while those of the
semi-Pelagians, Cassian and Faustus, were censured.
Other councils were held in after ages, which condemned the
Pelagian heresy ; but our object now is to give a view of this con
troversy in its first rise in the fifth century.
Before we proceed to give a view of the opinions entertained
and propagated by Pelagius and his followers, it will be satis
factory to ascertain what were the opinions of the church on this
subject.

90 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
The doctrine of the church, then, on the subject of original sin,
may be thus stated. It has ever been the judgment of the catholic
church, that the first sin of Adam was imputed to all his posterity
by the righteous appointment of God, and that its effects are
transmitted to all his children ; which effects, the church always
believed were, that they were born destitute of original righteous
ness, subject to the sentence of death, and obnoxious to eternal
separation from God.
Man being created in the image of God and being fully endued
with all powers necessary for obedience ; and, moreover, being
blessed with everything requisite for his comfort, did transgress
the law of his Maker by disobeying that commandment which was
given as a test of his whole obedience.
This first act of transgression, it is true, was the criminal act of
Adam as an individual ; but as he was the root and principle of
our whole nature, it may be considered the sin of the human race :
so that his voluntary act, in opposition to the will of his Creator,
may be reckoned that of his descendants ; not indeed strictly and
properly (for those not yet born could not perform an act), but in-
terpretatively or by imputation ; for this act was not only imputed
to Adam to condemnation, but to all his posterity.
That the above is a correct statement of the commonly received
doctrine of the church, at the period of which we treat, will appear
from many explicit declarations, not only of Augustine and other
individuals, but from the decrees and letters of councils, consisting of
numerous bishops, living in every region of the earth to which the
universal church extended.
Augustine, in book xvi. of his work De Civitate Dei, has these
words, " Nascuntur, non proprie, sed originaliter, peccatores."
•" Men are born, not properly, but originally, sinners." And in
book i., c. 15 of his Retractations, he says, " Peccatum eos ex Adam
dicimus originaliter trahere ; id est, reatu eos implicatos, et ob hoc
poenae obnoxios detineri." We affirm that they derive sin origi
nally from Adam ; that is, they are involved in guilt, and on this
account are held liable to punishment.
In his work concerning the demerit and remission of sin, he says,
that to impute and to remit are opposites ; therefore he asserts, to
impute is to subject one to guilt ; to remit is, not to impute to con
demnation. Here it may be proper to remark, that by imputation
Augustine meant, not a transfer of moral acts or moral character,
but the opposite of remission ; to impute a sin, therefore, according
to him, is to hold the person bound to suffer its punishment. And
by the word reatus, or guilt, he understood an obligation to suffer
the punishment of sin, or a subjection to the penalty of the law. It
is necessary to understand accurately the meaning of these terms
as used by theologians, or we shall be involved in perpetual per
plexity in relation to their opinions. Most of the objections now
made to the doctrine of imputation and to the transfer of guilt,
proceed from a misapprehension of the true import of these terms.

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 91
We, therefore, hear a great deal of declamation respecting the im
possibility of making a transfer of moral character, and respect
ing the impossibility of ever removing the guilt of a sinner ; but if
the exact meaning of these terms was apprehended, the supposed
difficulty or absurdity would vanish. For, although personal acts
cannot be transferred, the consequences or legal penalties of those
acts may be transferred ; and although the ill-desert of one man
cannot be transferred to another, the punishment due to one can be
inflicted on another.
But to return, Augustine says again, book xiv., c. 1 1, De Civitate
Dei : " A duobus primis transmissum est tam grande peccatum, ut
in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana, etiam in posteros obliga-
tione peccati, et mortis necessitate transmissa." Which may be
thus rendered into English : " From the first pair so great a sin has
been transmitted, that by it human nature is changed for the worse ;
also the bond of iniquity and the necessity of death are transmitted
to their posterity."
And this manner of speaking of original sin was not peculiar to
Augustine ; for we find the same sort of language in Bernard.
When speaking of the first sin, he has the following words :
" Aliena est quia in Adam omnes nescientes peccavimus ; nostra,
quia, etsi in alio, nos tamen peccavimus, et nobis justo Dei judicio
imputatur." The meaning of which is, " That this first sin, of
which he is here treating, was another's, inasmuch as in Adam we
sinned ; being unconscious of it, our own, inasmuch as. although by
another, yet we ourselves have sinned, and in the just judgment of
God it is imputed to us."
Nicolas Lyra, who lived about four hundred years ago, speaks
the same language when explaining the fifth of Romans. " Pec
catum Adas imputatur omnibus ab eo descendentibus, secundum
vim generativam, quod sic sunt membra ejus, propter quod vocatur
peccatum originale." A literal translation of which is, " The sin
of Adam is imputed to all descending from him by natural genera
tion, because they are his members, on which account it is called
original sin."
And the later writers, until the council of Trent, do not deviate
from this language of the ancient church. Cajetan, commenting
on the same (Romans v.), says, " The punishment of death is in
flicted on him with his whole posterity ; by which it is proved that
the sin of which death is the punishment is imputed to him and to
his whole posterity."
And even Bellarmine uses as strong language on the subject of
imputation as any who went before him. " Adam," says he, " alone
committed that (sin) by actual volition, but it is communicated to
us by generation, in that mode in which it was possible for that
which is past to be communicated, viz. by imputation."
It is scarcely necessary to adduce testimonies from early Pro
testant writers ; for it is known to all in the least acquainted with
the opinions of the reformers, that with one consent they held that

92 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
the sin of Adam was imputed to his posterity ; and that in conse
quence of this imputation a corrupt nature was communicated to
all his natural descendants. We could fill volumes with citations
in proof of this fact, but it is unnecessary. Indeed, until Socinus
arose, no one connected with the reformation ever intimated a
doubt concerning the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity.
This ingenious but heretical man utterly denied, as all his followers
do, the whole doctrine of original sin. His words are, " Although
all the posterity of Adam are liable to eternal death, this is not be
cause the sin of Adam is imputed to them, but because they are
his natural descendants ; so that their doom to death does not
arise from imputation, but from the propagation of the human
race." It is now, by many who would be esteemed orthodox, and Cal
vinistic too, considered so absurd to hold the doctrine of the im
putation of Adam's sin to his posterity, that they will not even con
descend to argue the point and demonstrate its falsehood. If these
be correct in their views of the subject, it must create some sur
prise that all theologians, from the days of Augustine, who were
not acknowledged heretics, believed firmly in this doctrine, and
considered it as fundamental in the Christian system. Is it certainly
the fact that these modern impugners of the ancient doctrine of the
church understand the scriptures better than all who have gone
before them ? Or is it undoubted that they are endowed with a
perspicacity so much superior to thaf of Augustine, Calvin, Owen
and Edwards, that what these thought after profound considera
tion might be defended as reasonable, is so absurd as not to merit
a refutation ? Now we confess ourselves to be of the number of
those who believe, whatever reproach it may bring upon us from
a certain quarter, that if the doctrme of imputation be given up the
whole doctrine of original sin must be abandoned. And if this doc
trine be relinquished, then the whole doctrine of redemption must
fall, and what may then be left of Christianity they may contend
for that will ; but for ourselves, we shall be of opinion that what
remains will not be worth a serious struggle.
But we must return to our proper subject. It will next be satis
factory to know by what sort of arguments the ancient theologians
defended the doctrine of original sin. And although we will not
vouch for the soundness of every interpretation of scripture which
the ancient expositors gave, yet it cannot but be satisfactory to the
advocates of this doctrine now, that as far back as we can trace
the history of opinions, the same views were entertained of the
meaning of the principal texts which bear on this point as are now
maintained. The fathers, then, supported the doctrine of original sin by such
texts as Gen. vi. 5. — xiii. 21. " And God saw that the wickedness
of man was great on the earth, and that every imagination of the
thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. For the imagina
tion of man's heart is evil from his youth." Ambrose, in his re-

EARLY HISTORY Of PELAGIANISM. 98
Marks on this text, does not confine it to the antediluvians, but con
siders it a description of human nature in every age, and extends
It to persons in every period of human life : for he says, " Even
the child of a day old is not without sin, for infancy cannot be ex
empt from sin on account of the infirmity of the body."
Another text which they adduced in proof of original sin was Gen.
xvii. 14. "And the uncircumcised man child, whose flesh of his
foreskin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his peo
ple : he hath broken my covenant." On this text Augustine re
marks, " That the soul which is not regenerated shall perish, since
he, with all others, sinned in Adam." It seems that they interpreted
the breach of the covenant to have reference to the covenant made
With Adam, and not the covenant of circumcision. For thus we
find Bede commenting on this text, " Not the covenant of circum
cision, which an infant that could neither will good nor evil could
not break, though his parents might ; but that covenant is signified
which God entered into with the first man, and which every one
who has only lived a day upon earth has violated, and so stands in
need of a saving remedy."
Job xiv. 4. " Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean ?
not one," is another text on which the ancient theologians re
lied for the proof, of original sin. As they followed the Seventy,
however, they found more to their purpose in this text than is con
tained in the Hebrew. For in the Greek version the text reads thus,
TiS yap Kadapds coral dxo jiixov; uXV ovBcls, edv Kat pia ripipa b /3ios airov ixl rns yrji.
Which literally translated is, " For who is clean from filth ? not
one, if even his life has been but of one day on the earth." Hence,
we find Augustine, in reference to this text, saying, " The stain of
the vitiated root is diffused through the branches, being transmitted
by natural generation ; so that there is not an infant of one day old
free from the guilt of sin, unless saved by unmerited grace. For
he who has no sin properly of his own, has derived to him the sin
of another, concerning which the apostle speaks where he says, by
one man sin entered into the World, &c."
The next argument the fathers derived from Psalm li. 5.
" Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother con
ceive me." It was left for modern critics to discover that David
Was here bewailing the sinfulness of his mother ; such an idea
never seems to have entered the mind of any of the ancient com
mentators. They argue thus from the text. If David, that most
holy king, and born of pious parents, contracted pollution in his
conception, then certainly the same must be true of all other men.
Thus reasoned Origen, Basil the Great, Theodoret, Rutin, Cassio-
dorus, Euthymius and Remigius, in their scholia on this text.
Likewise Hilary, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Faustus, Isychius, Gregory ,
the Great, Alcuin, Bede, and every other orthodox commentator
for seventeen centuries after Christ. They who still believe that
the Psalmist is here speaking of the sin of his birth, notwithstanding
the learned criticisms which have recently appeared on this text,

94 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
have the comfort of knowing that they are supported by the opi
nions of all the ancients and all the moderns whose opinions carry
weight in matters of this kind.
Another text adduced by the ancient advocates of this doctrine
is Is. xliii. 3. " And wast called a transgressor from the womb."
On which Cyril, on Hosea, makes several remarks, tending to show
the original depravity of man.
But let us now come to the New Testament ; and here the first
text which the fathers urge in proof of original sin is John iii. 3, 6.
" Verily, verily I say unto you, that which is born of the flesh is
flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit." From which
it was argued, that whatever was carnally propagated could only
savour of carnal things, which in order to become spiritual must
be born of the spirit; without spiritual regeneration it was impos
sible to enter into the kingdom of heaven. Augustine often makes
use of this text in his controversy with the Pelagians ; and it is
used in the same manner by Prosper, and by Gregory the Great.
But the passage of scripture on which they depended above all
for the support of the doctrine of original sin, was the fifth of Ro
mans, from the twelfth verse to the end of the chapter. " As by
one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, so death
passed on all men, because that (or in whom) all have sinned."
Ver. 14. "Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam to Moses,
even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's
transgression." Ver. 18. " Therefore as by the offence of one, judgment came
upon all men to condemnation."
Ver. 19. " For as by the disobedience of one many were made
sinners." From these passages they reasoned in the following manner : That
sin which the apostle so describes as that which has brought death
on all men ; — that by it all men have sinned ; — and by it have been
constituted sinners, even those who have not sinned after the simili
tude of Adam's transgression (that is, have not committed actual
sin) ; — and in consequence of this sin all are become subject to
death and condemnation ; therefore, this sin, although committed
by Adam alone, as it was a personal act, yet may be considered as
the sin of human nature, since he stood as the representative of us
all, who were then included in his loins ; and are all therefore laid
under an obligation to suffer the punishment of his sin.
The fathers also were particular in noticing that Adam was here
called the type of Christ, whence they inferred, that as we are jus
tified by the imputation and not the imitation of Christ's obedience,
so the disobedience of Adam becomes ours, not by imitation but
by imputation. They, moreover, remarked, that the particles if i>
(in whom) teach us that the posterity of Adam sinned in him : or
if you prefer rendering these words, because that, or inasmuch as,
all have sinned, they must contain a sufficient reason for the death
of all, infants as well as others ; and therefore the word all must

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 95
be considered as including infants ; when it is said, therefore, all
have sinned, it will follow that infants also have sinned. This
method of reasoning is pursued by Augustine in many different
parts of his works ; and the same method of reasoning from this
passage is followed by Theodoret, by Prosper, by Faustus, by
Gennadius, and also by the Carthaginian and Arausicanian coun
cils. Another passage of scripture which the ancient theologians con
sidered conclusive, on the subject of original sin, was Rom. vii.,
where Paul speaks of " a law in his members warring against the
law of his mind. For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, there
dwelleth no good thing. For to will is present with me, but to per
form that which is good I find not." The necessity of the aids of
divine grace is argued from this passage by Irenaeus, Tertullian
and Augustine, in more places than one. This father, indeed, gives
us two distinct expositions of the apostle's meaning in the afore
cited words. According to the first of these, the conflict here de
scribed is between conscience and sinful desires drawing the soul
to evil ; but according to the latter, the struggle is between the
sinful nature which remains in the regenerate, and the new man or
principle of grace, implanted by the Holy Spirit. But in either
sense it furnishes strong proof of the natural proclivity of man to
evil : but especially in the latter sense, in which a remaining leaven
of iniquity is found in the regenerate, continually hindering his
holy exercises, it furnishes an undoubted proof of the depravity of
our nature.
They also appealed to 1 Cor. xv. 22, " For as in Adam all die,
so in Christ shall all be made alive." On this text the writer of
certain ancient commentaries, which have been ascribed to Am
brose, says, " Paul says this because as Adam by sinning found
death, so he subjected all his posterity to the same punishment ; so
also Christ by not sinning, overcame death and acquired life for all
those who are of his body ; that is, the resurrection." And again,
"As all die in Adam, whether they be just or unjust, so also all,
whether believers or unbelievers, shall be raised from the dead by
Christ ; but they who believe not, to punishment."
Augustine expresses his views of the import of this passage thus :
" The opinion of the apostle is here clearly exhibited, that none are
subject to death but through Adam, and that none enter into eternal
life unless by Christ. For by the word all repeated in this verse,
we are to understand in the first instance, all who are naturally de
scended from Adam, and in the second, all who are united to Christ
by a spiritual regeneration : so then it is declared that none die ex
cept by their connection with Adam, and none are made alive but
those who are quickened in Christ." The argument is simply this,
as all are vivified in Christ, in like manner all die in Adam ; but
Christ vivifies those for whom he has merited the forgiveness of
sin, and on whom he bestows a new life by regeneration : there
fore Adam, in like manner; by his sin, has merited death for all his

96 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
posterity, and transmitted to them a corrupt nature by ordinary
generation. The last text of scripture which we will mention, as furnishing
satisfactory proof to the fathers of the doctrine of original sin, is
Ephes. ii. 3. " And were by nature the children of wrath, even
as others." On this many ancient writers comment, and all agree
in the opinion that it means that when born we are under con
demnation, from which Christ came to deliver us.
Four of the texts above cited, as teaching the doctrine of original
sin, Jerome applies to the same purpose in a single paragraph of
his commentary on Ezekiel. Of his remarks, however, we shall
only cite. that which relates to the famous text in the fifty-first
Psalm. " David says, I was conceived in iniquity, and in sin did
my mother bring me forth : not in the iniquity of his mother, or
his own personal sin, but in the sin of human nature. Whence,
the apostle says, death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over
those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's trans
gression." From this remark we learn, not only what Jerome thought was
the meaning of being conceived in sin, but also that he understood
the apostle to mean infants, where he speaks of those who had not
sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. And we
believe that in regard to both these texts he speaks the language of
all antiquity.
Among the reasons by which the doctrine of original sin, as held
by the ancients, was supported, the sufferings and death of infants
were believed to hold the first place, because it was considered that
it would be altogether unjust that they should be thus punished,
unless they were charged with the guilt of some sin. Hence,
Augustine, in his fourth book against the two letters of Pelagius,
says, " But how is it that the Pelagians hold that death only is
derived to us from Adam ? According to them, we die because he
died ; but he died because he had sinned. They hold, therefore,
that punishment passes upon us without any fault : innocent infants
then are punished by an unjust sentence ; suffering death without
having merited this punishment." And again, in his sixth book
against Julian, he says, " The sins of parents, in one respect, are
not ours, but in another respect they are ours. They are not ours
as it relates to the personal act, but they are ours by the contagion
of our descent ; which, if it were not true, a grievous yoke would
be upon the children of Adam from the day of their birth, which
could by no means be reconciled with justice." And in his last
answer to Julian he says, " This judgment (viz. death) on infants
would be altogether unjust if there were no original sin." And
again, " Why are little children so grievously afflicted if they have
no sin at all. Could not an omnipotent and just God prevent these
unjust punishments from falling on infants ?"
The writer of the book entitled Hypognosticon argues in a simi
lar manner. " If the sin of our first parents hurt no one but them-

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 97
selves, how does it happen that the punishment of their fault falls
upon us ? unless you maintain that God is unjust, who suffers those
who are free from all sin to be held bound under the chain of pun
ishment," Prosper reasons in the same manner. In his book against Col
lator he says, " Unless you choose to affirm what is evidently
false, that punishment, not sin, has been transmitted to the posterity
of Adam ; for it is too impious to think this of the justice of God,
that it is his will to condemn those who are free from sin to the
same punishment as the guilty. But wherever punishment is mani
fest, there is complete evidence of the existence of sin ; for sin and
punishment are indissolubly united ; therefore human misery is not
from the constitution of the Creator, but from the retribution of the
Judge." It must be confessed, however, that some among the orthodox
of that age held that God, as a sovereign, might punish his crea
tures, and even doom them to eternal death, although they had
never sinned. Of this opinion was Macarius the Egyptian. The
opinion of Augustine and Prosper, however, has commonly been
entertained by sound theologians in all ages. Some indeed think
that the two opinions may be reconciled, by supposing that the one
party speak of" the punishment of loss merely, while the others
speak of the punishment of sense. But this is not very satisfac
tory ; and the opinion of Macarius, which has been received by
some since the reformation, is dishonourable to God. And so it
was esteemed by the council of Arausicanum ; for in their second
canon they declare, " That to say that God inflicts death, which is
the punishment of sin, where no sin exists, is to charge him with
injustice." The same opinion is given by Anselm, who says, " It
is repugnant both to wisdom and justice, that they whom God hath
fitted for eternal happiness should, without being chargeable with
sin, be forced to suffer punishment."
The fathers also relied on this argument, " That if infants were
not involved in the guilt of sin, Christ cannot be their Saviour," On
this subject Augustine says, in his first book against the two letters
of Pelagius, " They contend that infants are in a safe state already,
so that they dare deny that they owe their salvation to the Sa
viour." And again, in book second, " The Pelagians assert that
God is not the Purifier, Saviour, and Deliverer of men of all ages."
And in his answer to Julian, ch. xxxi., " The multitude whom you
despise, that acknowledge the catholic faith, confess that infants
are redeemed by the Saviour; and therefore they detest the error
of the Pelagians who deny this." The same sentiments are found
in many other passages of the writings of this father.
But scarcely any argument was more frequently resorted to by
the advocates of the doctrine of original sin, than that derived from
the baptism of infants. This argument is handled by Augustine in
the following manner : " The church borrows for them (infants)
the feet of others that they may come, the heart of others that they
7

98 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
may believe, the tongue of others that they may confess. For
being sick, they are oppressed with the sin of another ; so, when
made whole, they are saved through the confession of another for
them. This practice the church always had ; always held. Let
no one, therefore, whisper in your ears a contrary doctrine. The
church received it from the faith of our ancestors, and perse-
veringly holds it fast, even to the end. For where there are none
sick, there is no need of a physician. What need, therefore, can
infants have of Christ if they are not sick ? If they are well, why
seek a physician to take care of them ? If they are infected with
no sin when they are brought to Christ, why is it not said to those
who bring them into the church, ' Carry these innocents hence ;
they that be whole need not a physician, but the sick.' ' Christ came
not to call the righteous, but sinners.' "
So also the council of Milevum, or rather of Carthage, de
nounced such as denied that infants should be baptized for the
remission of original sin. Can. 17. "For in no other sense can
that be understood which was spoken by the apostle — that by one
man sin entered into the world, and death by sin ; and so death
hath passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned — than in that
adopted by the universal church everywhere diffused. For by
reason of this rule of faith, even infants, who were never capable
of committing any sin themselves, are nevertheless baptized accord
ing to truth for the remission of sins : so that the pollution con
tracted by them in their birth might be cleansed by their regene
ration." . But that which was thought to give peculiar force to this argu
ment was, that Ccelestius himself, in a book which he edited at
Rome, was constrained to confess, " That infants are baptized for
the remission of sins, according to the rule of the universal church,
j and according to the doctrine of the Gospel." It seems, then, that
from this argument the Pelagians were never able to extricate
themselves ; but of this more hereafter.
The view which has been1 given of the opinions of the universal
church, on the subject of original sin, relate only to the age of the
Pelagian controversy. It may still be a matter of proper and
important inquiry, what opinions were commonly entertained on
this point before the commencement of the fifth century ? From
the almost universal concurrence of theologians in Africa, Asia,
and Europe, in the belief of this doctrine, we may infer that it did
not originate in this age. We may be sure, from this considera
tion, that the doctrine of original sin was not invented by Au
gustine, as some have pretended. Jerome was more learned,
and at this time much more known than Augustine, and he held
the same doctrine, and commenced writing against the heresy of
Pelagius before Augustine took up his pen ; and these distinguished
fathers lived in parts of the church widely separated from each
other ; the one in Africa, the other in Palestine. But in every
council, except the little one of Diospolis, the doctrine of Pelagius

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 99
was condemned, and the doctrine of original sin affirmed ; and
commonly without a dissenting voice. At some of these coun
cils there were present several hundreds of theologians. Even
in the council of Diospolis, which acquitted Pelagius, there was
nothing determined inconsistent with the catholic doctrines ; but
the case was, that Pelagius, by artfully concealing his true opinions
under plausible but ambiguous terms, deceived the fathers who sat
in that council, as Augustine has shown. If it be a fact then that
at the commencement of the fifth century all the theologians in the
world, except a few who were soon rejected as heretics, agreed in
maintaining the doctrine of original sin, how shall we account for
the universal prevalence of such a doctrine, but by supposing that
it was handed down from the first planting of the Christian church ?
For if it had been an error introduced by some particular doctor,
or by some section of the church, it would not have been universal
in its diffusion, nor would it have united the suffrages of all the
faithful ministers of the Gospel, as we see it did. And again, sup
posing that by extraordinary efforts this doctrine, so repugnant to
the natural feelings of men, could have been everywhere propa
gated by the commencement of the fifth century, would there be
no trace of such an universal change of opinion, and no record of
the extraordinary efforts necessary to bring it about ? Among all
the writers who have touched on this subject, is it not strange that
not one is found who gives the least hint of any such thing 1
Surely a change in relation to a doctrine so radical must have
occasi6ned controversy. All would not have adopted a new and
distasteful doctrine upon its first proposal. These are things which
can never be cleared up on the hypothesis that the doctrine of
original sin was not the doctrine of the apostolic churches.
Here we might gather up, from the writings of almost all the
fathers who preceded Augustine, testimonies incidentally given,
which would serve to show that they all believed in the same doc
trine of original sin, which was so strenuously defended by the
whole Christian church in the beginning of the fifth century : and
it would be easy to pursue this course, because Augustine has
travelled over the same ground before us, and has adduced testi
monies on this subject from Ignatius, from the work under the
name of Dionysius the Areopagite, from Justin Martyr, Irenaeus,
Origen, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Chrysostom, and others, who,
although they do not enter into any discussion on this subject (for
it was not a matter of dispute), yet drop such expressions incident
ally, when treating other subjects, as are sufficient to prove that
there was from the beginning one uniform faith on this fundamental
point. The reader who is desirous of further information on this
subject is referred to the various treatises of Augustine on original
sin. But our limits and our plan require that we should now
exhibit a brief but impartial view of the real opinions of Pelagius
and his followers, which shall, as far as possible, be given in their
own words ; which testimonies, however, are taken from the

100 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
writings of Augustine and others, their own works having for the
most part perished.
Pelagius, in his book De Natura, as quoted by Augustine, says*
" When it is declared that all have sinned in Adam, it should not
be understood of any original sin contracted by their birth, but of
imitation." Again,t " How can a man be considered guilty by
God of that sin which he knows not to be his own ? for if it is
necessary, it is not his own ; but if it is his own, it is voluntary ;
and if voluntary, it can be avoided." In his exposition of the
epistle to the Romans he says,J " The opposers of the propagation
of sin thus endeavour to impugn the doctrine. The sin of Adam
has not injured those not sinning, just as the righteousness of Christ
does not profit those not believing : for it is said, that in like man
ner, yea much more, is salvation by one, than perdition by one.
And if baptism cleanses that ancient sin, then they who are born
of two baptized persons must be free from that sin ; for they could
not transmit that to posterity which they no longer possessed them
selves. Moreover, they say that if the soul is not by traduction,
but the flesh only, then the flesh only is concerned in the propaga
tion of sin, and it alone deserves to be punished ; for they allege
that it would be altogether unjust that a soul just born should be
obliged to bear that ancient sin of Adam, from whom it has not
derived its origin. For they allege that it can by no means be
conceded that God, who pardons our own sins, should impute to
us the sin of another person." Pelagius does not speak here in
his own name, but as personating others, whose opinions and argu
ments he exhibits ; for at this time he durst not openly declare his
real sentiments. In like manner Coelestius disseminated the same
doctrine, as will be shown below, and also pursued the same insidi
ous policy in propagating his opinions.
Julian, also, in his last work against Augustine, charges this
father with holding, " that infants were oppressed with the guilt of
no sin of their own, but only with that of another person." Again
he says, "whoever is accused of a crime, the charge is made
; against his conduct, and not against his birth." And in the con
clusion, where he recapitulates what he had written, he says,
", Therefore we conclude that the triune God should be adored as
* " In Adamo peccasse omnes, non propter peccatum nascendi origine attractum,
sed propter imitationem dictum est."
t " Quomodo Deo pro illius peccati reatu subditus esse poterit, quod suum non
esse cognoverit ? Suum enim non est, si necessarium est. Aut suum si est, volunta-
rium est. Et si voluntarium est, vitari potest."
| " Hi qui contra traducem peccati sunt, ita ilium impugnare nituntur. Si Adae,
inquiunt, peccatum etiam non peccantibus nocuit, ergo et Christi justitia etiam non
credentibus prodest : quia similiter, imo et magis dicit, per unum salvari, quam per
unum ante perierunt. Si baptismus mundat antiquum illud delictum, qui de duobus
baptizatis nati fuerint, debent hoc carere peccato : non enim potuerunt ad posteros
transmittere, quod ipsi minime habuerunt. Illud quoque accedit, quia si anima non
est ex traduce, sed sola caro, ipsa tantum habet traducem peccati, et ipsa sola poenam
meretur ; injustum esse dicentes, ut hodie nata anima non ex massa Adae, tam anti
quum peccatum portet alienum. Dicunt etiam, nulla ratione concedi ut Deus qui
propria pecoata remittit, imputet aliena."

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 101
most just ; and it has been made to appear most irrefragably, that
the sin of another never can be imputed by him to little children."*
And a little afterwards, " Hence that is evident, which we defend
as most reasonable, that no one is born in sin, and that God never
judges men to be guilty on account of their birth."f Again,
"Children, inasmuch as they are children, never can be guilty,
until they have done something by their own proper will." And
as the ground on which the doctrine of communicated guilt was
held was a certain natural conjunction of the parties, by reason of
which Paul declares that we sinned in Adam, therefore they used
their utmost exertion to elude the force of this argument. Julian
reasons thus, " If there was no such thing as one man imitating
another, and the apostle had declared that all had sinned in Adam,
yet this mode of speaking might be defended by scripture use : for
Christ called the devil a father, although he is incapable of genera
tion ; so the apostle, in describing how the first man was imitated
by those who came after him, might without impropriety use such
language as that before cited." And again, " The apostle Paul
gave no occasion to error, and said nothing improper, when he
declared that the first man was a sinner, and that his example was
imitated by those who followed him." "By one man sin entered
into the world ; but one man was sufficient to furnish an example
which all might imitate." " He speaks of one, that he might teach
that the communication of sin was by imitation, not by generation."
" Which sin, although it did not become a part of our nature, was,
however, the pattern of all sin ; and hence, although it is not
chargeable on men in consequence of their birth, it is by reason of
their imitation of it." Prosper, in his epistle to Demetrius, ex
presses the opinion thus, " The sin of Adam hurts his posterity by
its example, but not by natural communication."
These opinions were rejected and firmly opposed by the ortho
dox. Jerome, at the close of his third book against the Pelagians,
writes thus, " If it be objected that it is said there are some who
have not sinned, it is to be understood that they did not actually
commit the sin of which Adam was guilty by transgressing the
commandment of God in Paradise, but all men are held to be guilty,
either in consequence of the sin of Adam, their ancient progenitor,
or by their own personal act. The infant, by the engagement of
his parent in baptism, is released : and he who has arrived at years
of understanding is delivered, both by another's engagement and
his own, namely, by the blood of Christ. And let it not be sup
posed that I understand this in a heretical sense, for the blessed
martyr Cyprian, in the letter which he wrote to Tidus the bishop
concerning the baptism of infants, says, ' how much more ought
infants not to be debarred from baptism, who being recently born
* " Conclusum est, nos Deum aequissimum in trinitate venerari ; et irrefutabiliter
apparuit, non posse ab eo peccatum alienum parvulis imputari."
f " Ex quibus necessario conficitur, nos rectissime defendere, neminem cum pec-
cato nasci, et Deum reos non posse judicare nascentes."

102 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
have committed no sin, unless that by their carnal birth from
Adam they have contracted the contagion of that ancient death in
their first nativity. They ought, therefore, more readily to be
admitted to receive the remission of sins, since that which is for
given them is not their own sin, but that of another." Augustine
also strenuously opposed this opinion of the Pelagians in all his
writings, " For," says he, " we were all in that one man, when he,
being one, corrupted us all." De Civ. Dei, lib. xiii., c. 14. And in
lib. i., c. 10 of his Retractations, he says, " The opinion which I de
livered, that sin injures no nature but that in which it is committed,
the Pelagians apply to the support of their own doctrine, that little
children cannot be hurt by the sin of another, but only by their
own ; not considering that, as they belong to human nature, which
has contracted original sin, for human nature sinned in our first
parents, it is true, therefore, that no sins hurt human nature but its
own." Orosius, in his Apology for Free Will, says, " All have sinned
and come short of the glory of God, either in Adam or in their own
proper persons : the universal mass, therefore, i£ obnoxious to pun
ishment. And if the punishment of condemnation due to all
should be inflicted, certainly it is not unjustly inflicted." In like
manner, the writer of the book entitled Hypognosticon says,
" Truly then the sin of Adam hurt him alone while he was alone,
and Eve his wife : but in them we were all included, because they
were the nature of the whole human race, which is one in all of
us, for we partake of their nature."
What has been brought forward relates to the imputation of the
first sin ; let us next inquire what was the Pelagian doctrine re
specting the communication of its stain or pollution. Pelagius, in
his book De Natura, says, " First it is disputed concerning this,
whether our nature is debilitated and deteriorated by sin. And
here, in my opinion, the first inquiry ought to be, what is sin ? Is
it a substance, or is it a mere name, devoid of substance ; not a
thing, not an existence, not a body, nor anything else (which has a
separate existence) but an act : and if this is its nature, as I believe
it is, how could that which is devoid of substance debilitate or
change human nature V And in his book Concerning Free Will,
" Everything, good or evil, praiseworthy or censurable, which we
possess, did not originate with us, but is done by us ; for we are
born capable both of good and evil, but not in possession of these
qualities ; for in our birth we are equally destitute of virtue and
vice ; and previously to moral agency, there is nothing in man but
that which God created in him."
Ccelestius held precisely the same doctrine. Augustine testifies
that he held and taught " That the sin of Adam hurt himself alone,
and that infants are born in that state in which Adam was before
he sinned." Julian maintained the same doctrine, which he repeat
edly expresses and pertinaciously defends ; " Human nature," says
he, " in the time of our being born, is rich in the gift of innocence."
Again, " Even if the devil should create men, they would be free

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 103
from all evil in their origin ; and so now they cannot be born in sin
because no one can help being born, nor can it be just to demand
from any one, what is to him altogether impossible." The same
says, " There is no sin in the condition of our nature." And, " No
body is born with sin ; but our free will is so entirely unimpaired,
that before the exercise of our own proper will, nature in every one
is free from every taint." Hence Prosper, in his Chronicon for the
year 414, has this remark, "About this time Pelagius, the Briton,
published his doctrine, that the sin of Adam injured himself alone,
and did not affect his posterity ; and that all infants are born as
free from sin as Adam was before his transgression." It cannot be
a matter of surprise that the Pelagians held that Adam's posterity-
inherited from him a corrupt nature, when they did not believe that
his own nature was deteriorated by sinning. Julian, therefore,
says, " A man's natural state is not changed by sinning, but he be
comes guilty and the subject of demerit ; for. it is of the very es
sence of free will that the man should have it in his power as much
to cease from sinning, as to deviate from the path of rectitude."
In opposition to these opinions, the doctors of the catholic church
held, that all the posterity of Adam were now destitute of original
righteousness, with which he was endowed, and hence proceeds an
inordinate exercise of all the powers of the mind, which is called
the fuel of sin, the law in the members, concupiscence, &c.
Augustine is full and explicit on this subject. Lib. xxi., c. 3, De
Civitate Dei, he says, " On account of the greatness of the crime,
the nature of man was changed in its punishment ; so that what
was inflicted as a punishment on our sinning first parents, comes
naturally on others born of them." Again, lib. xiv., c. 12, " Hu
man nature was changed by the sin of the first pair ; so that a silent
corruption pervades it, such as we see and feel, and by reason of
which we are subjected to death, and to so many and great evils,
and are disturbed and agitated with so many contrary and con
flicting passions, such as had no existence in Paradise before man
sinned, although he was there invested with an animal- body."
Also, " How else shall we account for that horrible depth of igno
rance, from which all error originates, by which all the sons of
Adam are involved in a certain dark gulf, from which they cannot
be delivered without labour, sorrow and fear V Speaking again of
the many kinds of vices to which men are subject, he adds, " All
these sins of wicked men proceed from the same root of error and
perverse love with which every child of Adam is born."
Prosper also expresses himself strongly on this subject. " By
the wound of original sin the nature of all men is corrupted and
mortified in Adam, whence the disease of all manner of concupis
cence hath sprung up." The same writer says, in another place,
" Whence is it, that if what Adam lost his posterity did not lose,
he himself is not alone the sufferer by his sin, and not his posterity?
but the truth is, all have sinned in one, and every branch from this

104 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGrANISM.
corrupt root is justly condemned. 'What Adam lost, then, by the
fall, all have likewise lost."
The writer concerning the Vocation of the Gentiles, lib. i., c. 6,
has these words : " Human nature was vitiated by the transgression
of the first man ; so that even in the reception of blessings, and in
the midst of helps and divine precepts, there is a continual procli
vity of the will to evil ; in which, as often as we confide, we are de
ceived." Again, "All men were created in the first man without
fault, and we all have lost the integrity of our nature by his
transgression." "Adam was by nature free from sin, but by the
disobedience of his will he contracted many evils, and transmitted
them to be multiplied more and more by his posterity."
Vincentius Lyra asks, " Who, before Ccelestius, that monstrous
disciple of Pelagius, ever denied that the whole human race was
held guilty of Adam's sin ?"
Peter, the deacon, in his book concerning the Incarnation, says,
" Therefore, seduced by the cunning of the serpent, of his own ac
cord he became a transgressor of the divine law ; and so, agreea
bly to the threatening, he was in the .just judgment of God con
demned to the punishment of death ; that is, both body and mind
were changed for the worse, and having lost liberty, he was en
slaved under the servitude of sin ; hence it is that no man is born
who is not bound by the bond of this sin, with the exception of
Him who was born by a new mode of generation, that he might
lose the bond of sin ; even the Mediator between God and man,
the man Christ Jesus."
It was also a doctrine of the Pelagians, that temporal death was
by the necessity of nature, and did not fall on the human race in
consequence of the sin of our first parents. They alleged that
Adam would have died, although he had never sinned. Very far,
then, were they from acknowledging that we had incurred eternal
death by the sin of Adam. Augustine relates, that it was one of
the charges against Pelagius, in Palestine, that he held the doctrine
of Ccelestius, "that neither by the death nor transgression of Adam
do the whole human race die, nor do the whole human race rise
from the dead in virtue of Christ's resurrection." " Death," said he,
" passed to the posterity of Adam by imitation of his sin, not by ge
neration." Augustine, in his last answer to Julian, addresses him
thus, " You will not agree that by reason of original sin death
passes on the human race, for then you would be forced to ac
knowledge that sin had been propagated through all our race. For
you cannot but perceive how unjust it would be to inflict punish
ment where there is no guilt."
Orosius, against Pelagius, has these words, "Your followers,
who have sucked the poison abundantly from your breast, assert,
that man was made mortal, and that he incurred no loss from the
transgression of the precept." And the writer of the Hypognosti-
con says, speaking of the Pelagians, " They tell us, that whether
Adam had sinned or not, he would have died,"

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM. 105
On the other hand, the orthodox maintained, " That death, tern- '
poral and eternal, together with all pains and diseases connected
with the death of the body, flow from the first sin ; and that unless
Adam had sinned, he never would have died."
Augustine fully expresses the opinion of the church catholic in
his book De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss. " Although, as to his body,
he was of the earth, and partook of an animal nature, yet if he had
not sinned, his body would have been changed into a spiritual body,
and into that incorrupTiDTIity which is promised to the saints at the
resurrection." Again, " If Adam had not sinned, he never would
have been divested of his body, but would have been clothed with
immortality and incorruption ; so that mortality would have been
swallowed up of life ; that is, there would have been a transition
from animal to spiritual life." " According to my judgment, he
had a resource in the fruits of the trees of the garden against the
decays of nature, and in the tree of life against old age." " So
great a sin was committed by the first two of our race, that human
nature underwent a change for the worse : also the obligation of
their sin and the necessity of dying have been transmitted to pos
terity. And the reign of death over men will prevail until due
punishment shall precipitate into the second death which has no
end, all except those whom the unmerited grace of God shall bring
into a state of salvation."
From this last question arose another. Why are infants baptiz
ed ; and if they should depart without baptism, in what state do
they deserve to be placed ? Pelagius, lest he should be obliged to
confess that they were under the bond of original sin, and by their
birth exposed to eternal death, denied that they received baptism
for the remission of the guilt of the first sin, or that they might be
translated from the power of darkness into the kingdom of God.
Thus Augustine declares, " That the Pelagians will not believe that
original sin is removed by baptism, for they contend that no such
thing exists in those just born." Hence many inferred that they did
not believe that infants were redeemed by Christ : and some affirm
ed that they denied the propriety of the baptism of infants alto
gether. But Pelagius, in the book which he addressed to Innocent,
bishop of Rome, clears himself from imputations of this kind.
" Who was ever so impious," says he, " as to wish to interdict in
fants from a share in the common redemption of the human race ?"
And the council of Carthage acknowledges that Ccelestius admitted
the redemption of infants. Augustine also, in his 89th epistle, ad
dressed to Hilary, among other things says, " He was forced to
confess, on account of the baptism of infants, that redemption was
necessary for them also. Where, although he was unwilling to
speak explicitly concerning original sin, yet by the very naming of
redemption he involved himself in difficulty ; for from what should
they be redeemed but from the power of the devil, under which
they could not be unless they were under the guilt of original sin ?
Or with what price are they redeemed, unless with the blood of

106 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
Christ, concerning which it is most manifestly declared, that it was
shed for the remission of sins ?" But Pelagius put another meaning
on the word redemption, concerning which Augustine speaks in
another place. Hilary expresses their opinion thus : "That an in
fant dying unbaptized, cannot justly perish, since it is born without
sin." And Augustine describes it in these words, " Nor do little
children need the grace of the Saviour, by which, through baptism,
they may be delivered from perdition, because they have contract
ed no guilt from their connection with Adam." The Pelagians,
however inconsistent it may appear, not only retained the baptism
of infants, but also the very form which had been long in use, ac
cording to which it was said to be for the remission of sins. On
which subject Augustine remarks, " Of what advantage is it that
you make use of the same words in the baptism of infants as adults,
when you take away the thing signified in this sacrament ?" And
the author of the Hypognosticon addresses them with severity re
specting the same thing ; " Who is not shocked at the mere nam
ing of your practice, in which you make the faithful word of God in
part true and in part a lie ; that is, true as it relates to adults, for
you admit that they are indeed baptized for the remission of sins :
but false as it relates to infants, who are not, according to you, bap
tized for the remission of sins, although you use in their baptism,
this very form of words." To these things the Pelagians had no
thing to reply, except that although infants were free from sin, they
were the subjects of the same sacrament, which, when applied to
adults, was for the remission of sins. But when urged to state why
they were at all baptized, they offered two reasons ; the one was,
that by baptism they were adopted into the number of sons ; the
other, that by it they received the promise of the kingdom of hea
ven. This made it necessary for Pelagius to feign some interme
diate place between heaven and hell, to which unbaptized infants
might be sent after death. But he was cautious about what he
said on this point. We learn from Augustine that he was wont to
say, " Whither infants do not go I know, but whither they do go, I
know not." This same father, therefore, in writing against Julian,
adverts to this opinion in the following words : " You make two
places of everlasting happiness ; the one within, and the other
without the kingdom of God." From what has been said, it is evi
dent what were the opinions of the Pelagians respecting the future
state of infants, and the reasons of their baptism. The opinions of
the orthodox on these points were far different, for although they
disputed among themselves what kind of punishment was due to
infants, on account of original sin, whether of loss or of sense, yet
there was an almost universal consent among them, that in conse
quence of original sin, we are children of wrath, and obnoxious to
eternal punishment ; and, moreover, that baptism was for the re
mission of sins ; and that by baptism infants were regenerated, and
thus made partakers of life and eternal felicity.
Augustine often brings up this subject, and may be considered as

EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.

107

speaking the sentiments of the whole church in his time. "I do j
not affirm," says he, " that infants dying without baptism will be in j
a worse condition than if they had never been born, for our Lord i
use's this expression respecting sinners of the most abandoned j.
character : for from what he says about Sodom, and does not re- ,
strict to the wicked inhabitants of that city, that it will be more ';
tolerable for them than some others in the day of judgment, the in
ference is clear that there will be a difference in the future punish
ment of men ; who then can doubt but that unbaptized infants, who
are chargeable with the guilt of original sin only, which has not
been aggravated by any actual transgressions of their own, will
fall under the lightest punishment of all 1 But what will be the
nature or the degree of their punishment, although we cannot de
fine, yet I should not dare say, that it would have been better for
them never to have been born, than to exist in the state which will
be allotted to them." Again, " It may be truly said, that unbap
tized infants, leaving the body without baptism, will suffer the very
mildest punishment ; yet he who says that they will fall under no
degree of condemnation, both deceives others and is deceived him
self; for the apostle has said that the condemnation is of one sin ;
and that by one offence condemnation hath come upon all men."
" We say that little children should be baptized ; and of this no one
doubts, for even they who differ from us in other points, all concur
in this ; we maintain, however, that this is that they may be saved,
and may inherit eternal life, which they cannot possess unless they
are baptized in Christ ; but they say, it is not for salvation, not for
eternal life, but for the kingdom of God."
Jerome also, in book iii. against the Pelagians, says, " This one
thing I say, and will then conclude : either you should have another
creed, which after the words Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, should
contain a clause, that ye shall baptize infants for the kingdom of
heaven ; or if you use the same baptism for infants and adults, you
should confess that the former as well as the latter are baptized for
the remission of sins."
Paullinus, in his book addressed to Zosimus, after the condemna
tion of Pelagius and Ccelestius, says, " They strive against the apos
tolical doctrine of original sin, which hath passed on all men, for
our race will possess that inheritance received from Adam, even
unto the end of the world, and which is only by the sacrament of
baptism removed from infants ; who cannot inherit eternal life nor
obtain the kingdom of God by any other means." A multitude of
testimonies might be adduced of the same import, but it is unne
cessary. The reader will perceive from those above cited, what
is exceedingly evident to every one in the least conversant with
ecclesiastical history, that the fathers of this period seem universally
to have fallen into the mistake of confounding baptism with regene
ration. From an erroneous interpretation of John iii. 5, they con
cluded that there was no salvation without external baptism ; and
the next step was that the internal grace of regeneration uniformly

108 EARLY HISTORY OF PELAGIANISM.
accompanied the external rite ; and this notion had taken such full
possession of their minds, that they commonly gave the name re
generation to baptism. We have not kept back the evidence of
this fact, whatever may be its operation ; for we now have to act
the part of faithful historians, and to exhibit fairly to the view of
our readers the opinions of the ancient church on an important
point of doctrine, which may be considered as lying at the founda
tion of the Christian system.
The cardinal point of the Pelagian system was the denial of ori
ginal sin ; this was their xpurov tycvSos, their radical error, from which
all the rest naturally germinated. The controversy did, however,
include many other distinct points of no small interest, concerning
which our limits do not permit us to say anything at present. Pro
bably, in some future number we shall resume the subject, and ex
hibit a view of other controversies which have arisen in the church
respecting original sin. It is attended with many advantages to
bring into view ancient heresies ; for often what modern innova
tors consider a new discovery, and wish to pass off as a scheme
suited to remove all difficulties, is found upon examination to be
nothing else than some ancient heresy clothed in a new dress.
That the doctrine of original sin is involved in many difficulties,
which no mortal has the wisdom to explain, we are ready to admit :
but the question with us is, — is it taught in the Bible ? And if any
one choose to move a previous question, it will be, — can that book
be divinely inspired which contains such a doctrine ? And here,
if we could get clear of the thing by rejecting the scriptures,
something would be gained ; but the evidence of original sin is
deeply recorded in the acknowledged depravity of our race, and in
the dispensations of God towards us. To account for the facts
which experience teaches beyond all possibility of contradiction,
we need the testimony which the Bible contains, which if we re
ject we may escape one set of difficulties, but shall assuredly
plunge into others more formidable and unmanageable, although
they may be more out of sight.
It is our opinion, therefore, after looking on all sides, and con
templating the bearing and consequences of all theories on this
subject, that no one is on the whole so consistent with facts, with
the scriptures, and with itself, as the old doctrine of the ancient
church, which traces all the sins and evils in the world to the im
putation of the first sin of Adam ; and that no other theory of ori
ginal sin is capable of standing the test of an impartial scrutiny.

ESSAY V
ORIGINAL SIN.
PUBLISHED IN 1830.

Although, as has been shown in the former Essay, the Pelagian
doctrines respecting original sin were condemned by councils and
by popes, the heresy was not soon extinguished ; but was in whole
or in part adopted by many learned and ingenious men. To many,
the opinions of Augustine appeared harsh, and hardly reconcilable
with moral agency and human accountableness. They, therefore,
endeavoured to strike out a middle course between the rigid doc
trines of Augustine and the unscriptural opinions of Pelagius. This
led to the adoption of an intermediate system, which obtained the
denomination of Semi-Pelagianism ; and as these views seem to
have been generally received about Marseilles, in the south of
France, the abettors of this theory were very commonly called
Massilienses. Augustine entered also into this controversy, and
carried on a correspondence on the subject with Prosper and Hilary,
two learned men of that region ; the former of whom ardently op
posed the Semi-Pelagians, while the latter was inclined to favour
them. By degrees, however, the public attention was called off
from this subject. The darkness and confusion produced by the
incursion of the northern barbarians took away all opportunity and
disposition to discuss those abstruse matters. Ages of ignorance
succeeded, which have emphatically been called " the dark ages."
Superstition advanced, indeed, with rapid strides, but doctrinal in
vestigation was neglected ; or degenerated into mere logomachies,
or useless thorny disputations.
We shall therefore pass over this long dark period with this slight
notice, and will proceed to take a survey of the period antecedent
to the Reformation ; and endeavour to ascertain the opinions of
some of those acute and metaphysical men, denominated schoolmen.
It has become customary for almost all classes of modern writers
to treat the scholastic theology with sovereign contempt ; and this
often without any adequate knowledge of the system which they
contemn. It is true, these ingenious men often exhausted their
energies and lost their labour by a vain attempt to fathom an abyss :
but it would surprise some modern metaphysicians and theologians
to learn how exactly they themselves are running in the track, and
pursuing the very footsteps of these despised schoolmen.

110 ORIGINAL SIN.
Our first object, therefore, will be to lay before the reader a brief
abstract of the discussions of the angelical doctor, St. Thomas
Aquinas, on the subject of original sin. The subject is treated in
the eighty-second question of his second book.
On this subject he starts four queries. 1. " Whether original
sin is a habit? 2. Whether original sin is one, in man ? 3. Whether
it consists in concupiscence ? 4. Whether it exists in an equal de
gree in all ?"
This author, in his vast work, entitled Summa Theologiae, inva
riably commences his discussion by briefly stating some arguments
on each side of the question.
On the first question proposed above, he brings forward the fol
lowing objections to the affirmative. 1. " Original sin consists in
the privation of original righteousness, as is declared by Anselm ;
but a privation is not a habit, therefore original sin is not a habit."
2. " Actual sin is more deserving of blame than original sin, be
cause it possesses more of a voluntary nature; but a mere habit
of actual sin is not chargeable with guilt ; for if it were, then a man
would be guilty of sin all the time he was asleep. Original sin
therefore is not a habit." 3. " Besides, in evil, the act always pre
cedes the habit ; for no evil habit is ever infused, but always ac
quired : but no act precedes original sin ; therefore original sin is
not a habit.
"But, onthe other hand, Augustine declares that infants are the
subjects of concupiscence ; but they are not so in regard to the act ;
therefore original sin in them must be a habit."
The conclusion which he draws from a view of both sides of the
question, is the following : " Original sin is a habit, but not in the
same way as knowledge is a habit ; but it is a certain inordinate
condition of nature, and a debility consequent on the privation of
original righteousness," which proposition he proceeds to explain
as follows : " The word habit is taken in a two-fold sense ; in the
first, it signifies a power by which one is inclined to act; in this
sense, knowledge and virtue are called habits : but in the other
sense, habit is a disposition or state of nature composed of many
particulars, according to which nature is in a condition favourable
or unfavourable for any given exercise. Now, according to the
first sense of the word, original sin is not a habit, but according to
the second it is ; just as we speak of health as a good habit or state
of the body ; and sickness as the contrary. Original sin, may,
therefore, be described to be a certain inordinate condition or
disposition proceeding from the loss of harmony in the exercise of
the moral powers, in which harmony original righteousness con
sisted : just as sickness is a certain disordered state of the body and
its functions, arising from the loss of that equal temperament in
which health consists. On account of this analogy, original sin is
often called ' a disease of the mind.' And as in bodily sickness,
there is not a mere privation of that regular state and action in
, which health consists, but also an inordinate disposition, so also,

ORIGINAL SIN. Ill
original sin includes both a privation of original righteousness, and -,
a disorder of the faculties of the mind : it is not, therefore, merely ;
a privation, but is also a corrupt habit."
" Again, as actual sin consists in the irregularity of our moral
exercises, and original sin in the inordinate disposition of our na
ture, original sin may have the true nature and ill-desert of sin ;
but such an inordinate condition of the soul has not the nature of
an act, but of a habit ; therefore, original and actual sin are distinct,
although both are connected with ill-desert."
But in regard to the third objection, stated above, in which it
was alleged, that in evil, acts must precede the habit, as there can
be no infusion of evil habits, " I would observe," says he, "that it
has already been stated, that original sin does not consist in that
kind of a habit in which there is a power inclining us to act ; for
although from original sin there does follow an inclination to
inordinate action, yet not directly, but indirectly : namely, by the
removal of original righteousness, by which these inordinate mo
tions were restrained, and everything preserved in its regular con
dition : just as in the case of bodily sickness there follows indirectly
an inclination to irregular bodily motions. Original sin, therefore,
ought not to be considered ' an infused habit,' nor a habit acquired
by repeated acts, but an innate disposition derived from the volun
tary transgression of the first man."
The above will serve as a specimen of the manner in which this
subject was discussed in the thirteenth century. It is not to our
purpose to take any notice of the author's answers to the other
questions stated above.
It is now time to bring distinctly into view the opinions of the
Reformers on the subject of original sin. And here it may be ob
served in the general, that while these distinguished and holy men
appealed to the Bible for the proof of their doctrines, and would
agree to submit to no other judge in matters of faith, yet they were
all much in the habit of studying the writings of Augustine, whose
views of doctrine appeared to them to be remarkably accordant
with the sacred scriptures. From a knowledge of this fact, it might
readily be inferred that the reformers agreed with the father be
fore-mentioned in his views of original sin. There is no occasion,
however, to have recourse to reasoning on this point : the confes
sions, catechisms, and treatises of these men, are as explicit as we
could wish them to be ; and although they fell into deplorable di
visions about other matters, yet in regard to doctrine, it is remarka
ble, they were all of one mind. This unanimity is not a conclu
sion merely inferred from their writings ; but at the famous con
ference between Luther and Zwingle, and their respective friends
and adherents at Marpurg, where they were unable to come to any
agreement respecting the eucharist, it was ascertained by a par
ticular comparison of ideas on all the important doctrines of reli
gion, that no difference of opinion existed among them on these
points. And that this conference, from which the friends of peace

112 ORIGINAL SIN.
had expected so much, might not be altogether without fruit, a
paper, or confession, consisting of fourteen articles, was prepared
and signed by all the theologians present. The fourth of these
articles related to original sin, and was in the following words :
" Quarto. — Credimus, quod peccatum originale sit nobis innatum, et
ab Adamo in nos propagatum. Et quod sit tale peccatum, quod
omnes homines damnationi obnoxios faciat. Ita, quidem, ut nisi
Jesum Christum nobis sua morte et vita subvenisset, omnes homi
nes propter originale pe.ceatujm damnati fuissent,nec in regnum Dei,
et ad asternam felicitatem pervenire potuissent."
These doctrinal articles were subscribed by Luther, Melancthon,
Jonas, Osiander, Brentius, Agricola, Oecolampadius, Zwingle, Bucer
and Hedio.
It is true, however, that Zwingle fell, for a while, under some
suspicion of error, in regard to the doctrine of original sin ; be
cause he maintained that infants, the offspring of believing parents,
would not finally perish for want of baptism : and it has been al
leged, that in some of his writings he spake of original sin rather
as our disease and curse than as our sin. On this account Rhegius
addressed an admonitory letter to him, to which Zwingle replied
explicitly and fully, so as to give full satisfaction to Rhegius and to
others; and now, A.D. 1529, at Marpurg, he and his followers
were as ready to subscribe this doctrine as LiUther himself. After
the breach was found to be irreconcilable on the subject of the sa
crament of the Lord's supper, the Lutherans indulged great bitter
ness of spirit towards this noble reformer, and often spoke of him
and his adherents as pelagianising : although, in fact, they were as
orthodox on this point as the Lutherans themselves.
As it appears that no diversity of opinion existed among the re
formed on this subject, it will be sufficient, in addition to what has
been said already, merely to exhibit the words of the famous con
fession of Augsburg, sometimes called the Augustan confession.
" Peccatum originis habet privationem originalis justitiae, et cum
hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animae ; unde non est priva-
tio, sed quidam habitus corruptus." " Original sin consists in the
want of original righteousness, and in an inordinate disposition of
the faculties of the soul : so that it is not merely a privation, but a
certain corrupt habit."
The perfect agreement of all the reformers on the subject of the
imputation of the first sin of Adam to all his posterity, must be well
known to all who are conversant with their writings. Their opi
nions on this subject have, however, been collected by the very
learned Andrew Rivet, in his work on Original Sin, which is con
tained in the third volume of the folio edition of his works. It will
be unnecessary, therefore, at present to exhibit their testimony on
this point.
The far-famed council of Trent formed several canons on the
subject of original sin, but they were expressed in the most ambi
guous terms. Their object was, in general terms, to recognise the

ORIGINAL SIN. 113
ancient doctrine of the church on this point, but not to censure any
of their own doctors, who differed exceedingly from one another
in their views of the subject. That this was indeed the motive
which actuated them, is explicitly declared by one of their most
learned members, Andradius, who became also the principal de
fender of the canons and proceedings of that body. He informs us
that the decrees of the council on this subject were not intended to
condemn even the opinions which had been published by Albert
Pighius, who confined original'sin entirely to the imputation of the
sin of Adam, and asserted that there was no such thing as inherent,
hereditary depravity ; for, he says, it was their purpose to leave all
men at liberty to form what opinions they pleased respecting the
nature of original sin.
Andradius himself, in treating this subject, makes a free use of
this liberty, and discourses in the following manner : " Man, in his
original creation, received a constitution, in which were implanted
a number of appetites, desires, and affections, between which, con
sidered in themselves, there was not a perfect concord, for the flesh
naturally lusted against the mind, and vice versa : but over these
purely natural affections there was superinduced a moral charac
ter, called ' original righteousness,' by which all the irregular ten
dencies of the nature of man were restrained within proper bounds,
and the exercise of the whole rendered harmonious." " The pro-
pension of these natural inclinations," he says, " is not in itself sin
ful, but when original righteousness is removed, then it becomes
sinful by its disorder and extravagance. The very essence of ori
ginal sin therefore consists in the absence of original righteousness,
from which defect all sinful concupiscence proceeds. These natu
ral inclinations, therefore, called ' concupiscence,' are not evil per
se, but only by irregularity and excess ; therefore, when the mind
is renewed by the Holy Spirit, and they are again restrained within
their proper limits, theyT cease to be sinful." But as all sin sup
poses the transgression of a law, Andradius asks, " whether the
loss of original righteousness is repugnant to any law ;" and an
swers, " that there is, indeed, no express law to which it is op
posed," but says, " it is contrary to the general law of our nature,
which requires everything essential to our moral perfection." But
here our ingenious author falls into a difficulty, for he lays it down
as a principle, " that all sin is the act of an intelligent and volun
tary agent in violation of the law of God ;" but the loss of original
righteousness was owing to the personal fault of Adam, who was
the only voluntary agent concerned in the transaction. His an
swer is subtle, though unsatisfactory; but it is borrowed from
.Augustine. " As all men were then included in Adam, so our wills
were included in his will, and thus original sin may be said to be
voluntary in us." But whereas there was but an obscure exercise
of our will in the commission of the first sin, he maintains, and it is
accordant with the common opinion of popish theologians, " that of
all sins, original sin is the least ;" but as this is directly contrary to
8

114 ORIGINAL SIN.
the declaration of the fathers, they say that the reason why it had
been called great by them was on account of its wide diffusion and
universal propagation.
It is very evident, therefore, from the explicit declarations of this
great defender of the council of Trent, how much they obscured
and misrepresented this fundamental doctrine of scripture : and,
accordingly, he finds great fault with a writer of his own church
who had taught that from the soul infected with original sin no
good thing could naturally proceed ; asserting that human nature
was not so entirely depraved, but that from it, by proper discipline,
some good thing might proceed without the aid of grace ; and this
good he does not confine to external acts, but extends to spiritual
exercises ; therefore, according to him, the seeds of genuine piety
must exist in our corrupt nature previous to regeneration.
Chemnicius, from whose Examen the preceding account is taken,
gives his own views and those of his brethren on this subject ; an
abstract of which we will here insert, and which may be consider
ed as expressive of the opinions of all the reformers, as this defence
of their opinions met with universal approbation.
He utterly denies the truth of the principle asserted by Andra
dius, that in the original constitution of man, there existed a ten
dency to disorder, which was only restrained by the superadded
gift of righteousness ; and maintains, that man in his state of ori
ginal integrity possessed perfectly the image of God, which con
sisted in a conformity to his law ; so that with his whole heart and
mind, with all the faculties of the soul, and all the appetites and
members of the body, there was perfect strength, and no tendency
to excess or evil. The law of God which required him to love
his Creator with all his soul, and mind, and strength, was fully
written in his heart, to which there was a perfect conformity in
every thought and desire. There existed, therefore, in man thus
pure and holy, nothing of that struggling of carnal appetites and
desires against spiritual exercises which is now experienced by the
regenerate, and which is called concupiscence. Now the law of
God requires a complete conformity to its precepts in our acts, and
in the whole frame, and state of our minds, and where this is not
found condemns us as sinners. Experience, as well as the word of
God, teaches that man's mind in its unrenewed condition, instead
of being illumined with the rays of truth, is replete with horrible
darkness ; that his will is turned in aversion from God, and indulges
enmity towards him ; that the affections are perverse ; and that in
all the powers there is a horrible ara^a and depravation, so far as
relates to spiritual things. Then this able polemic goes on to ad
duce the texts of scripture which bear on this point, which we shall
at present omit ; and only remark, that no modern author has in
sisted more strenuously on the depth of original sin, and the total
depravity of the human heart in all ages and in all persons. As to
the seat of depravity, he says that the scriptures refer it to the

ORIGINAL SIN. 115
mind, the will, and the heart ; it has infested all our faculties, and
commences with our very being.
" Nor," says he, " need we fear, as does Andradius, lest we
should exaggerate the evil and extent of our innate corruption ; for
if we attend to the language of scripture, we shall be convinced
that the depth of the disease exceeds all conception ; as says David,
' who can understand his errors V And Jeremiah, ' the heart
is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked, who can
know it ?' The papists acknowledge that original sin exists, but
pretend that it is not safe to define what it is ; and allege that the
ancient church never defined it. But let the impartial reader only
compare the awful descriptions of this evil in the word of God
with the frigid, mitigating discourses of the papists, and their ab
surd philosophising respecting puris naturalibus, and he will be
convinced that their doctrine is not that of the Bible. And as to
the pretence of Andradius, that the council of Trent did not think
proper to give any definition of original sin, we oppose to it the
explicit testimony of the Holy Spirit repeatedly given in the scrip
tures, in which the nature of this fountain of all iniquity is clearly
exhibited. And in regard to the fathers, they certainly call it the
vice of our nature, pollution, inbred corruption, Spc" And he con
cludes his proofs of" the doctrine of original sin with the following
weighty sentence : " Et quando Domini os loquitur omnis caro de
bet silere, coelum et terra auscultare : Andradius vero mavult cum
concilio Tridentino opinari, quam cum scriptura credere."
The doctrine of total depravity, derived as an inheritance from
our first father, is not inculcated more strongly by any writer than
by Luther, in his work, entitled " De Servo Arbitrio," written
against the celebrated Erasmus. It was our first purpose to have
given an abridgment of this treatise of the great reformer ; but
Luther's style and manner are so peculiar, that his writings do not
bear to be abridged without much loss ; and having met with a
treatise on the subject of original sin, by a celebrated professor of
the Lutheran church, D. G. Sohnnius, who lived and wrote in the
sixteenth century, we have concluded to lay before our readers an
abstract of this discourse, from which may be learned what views
were entertained on this subject, in the age immediately after that
of Luther and Calvin. This theologian received the first part of
his education at Marpurg, but when he was only fifteen years of
age his residence was transferred to Wittenberg, a. d. 1589, where
his progress in learning was astonishing. At first his extraordinary
talents were most assiduously devoted to the study of the civil
law : but, in the twenty-first year of his age, he seems to have
been led, by a remarkable divine influence on his mind, to relin
quish the profession which he had chosen, and devote himself to
theology, which he pursued with unremitting ardour at Marpurg
for two years, when his proficiency was so remarkable, that
although no more than twenty-three years of age, he was made
theological professor, and continued in this office to give instruction's

116 ORIGINAL SIN.
to candidates for the ministry with extraordinary diligence and
conspicuous success for ten years. But differing in opinion with
some of his older brethren, respecting the doctrine of the ubiquity
of Christ's body, which he strenuously opposed, and also in some
other points of theology ; for the sake of a good conscience he
resigned his office at Marpurg ; but after a very short interval,
such was his celebrity, he received two invitations, the one from
Prince Casimir to become professor of theology at Heidelberg, and
the other to a similar station at Herborn. He accepted the first,
and was inaugurated July 18, 1584. In this situation he conducted
himself with consummate wisdom and incessant diligence, in pro
moting the cause of truth, and by giving his aid and influence to
every enterprise for the benefit of learning and religion ; and a. d.
1588, he was chosen one of the ecclesiastical counsellors and sena
tors, but without any interference with his office as professor. But
this extraordinary young man soon finished his work upon earth.
While in the midst of his useful labours, and when the influence of
his peaceful and pious example had become extensive, he was unex
pectedly taken out of the world by a pleurisy, in the thirty-seventh
year of his age. His theological writings, in Latin, were published
soon after his decease, including something like a system of the
ology ; and are remarkable for profound research and accurate
discrimination, as we think will be acknowledged by all who im
partially peruse the following translation, or rather abstract, of his
treatise on original sin. But our object in bringing forward this
work is not so much for the sake of its explanations and argu
ments, in all of which we do not concur, as to furnish the inquisi
tive reader with a full view of the opinions of Protestants on this
point, in the period immediately succeeding the reformation. And
no one acquainted with ecclesiastical history will suppose that the
doctrines here inculcated were peculiar to this author : the very
same are found in the works of every Protestant writer of credit
in that age.
The first part of the treatise of Sohnnius, in which he discusses
the nature of sin and its various distinctions, we omit, as not being
now to our purpose : we shall therefore commence with his answer
to the objections urged in his day against the doctrine of original
sin, from which it will clearly be understood what opinions were
then commonly entertained on this subject.
" Having given some account of the nature and divisions of sin,
our next object will be to refute some of those errors which relate
to original sin. The first question then is whether there is any
such thing ; and this inquiry is the more necessary, because many
of the papists so extenuate original sin, that they will scarcely
admit that it partakes of the nature of sin. And the Anabaptists
have gone to the impudent length of asserting that original sin is
a mere figment of Augustine. In opposition to this error of the
Anabaptists and of some, of the Romanists, we assert, that their
doctrine is not countenanced by scripture, and therefore cannot be

ORIGINAL SIN. 117
true. They appeal, indeed, to Ezek. xviii. 20, where it is said, (
" The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father ; but the soul
that sinneth it shall die." From which they infer, that the posterity
of Adam cannot be guilty in consequence of his fall. To which it
may be replied, that Ezekiel is not speaking of the sin of our first
father and federal head, which was the sin of the whole species,
but of the sins of individuals of the Jewish nation. In this sense,
it is true that the son shall not bear the punishment of his father's
sin, unless by imitation he is led to do the same ; but the sin of
Adam was not the sin of an individual, but of the whole race, for
he represented the whole species. The first man stood in a situa- 1
tion in regard to his posterity which no other man ever did, and :
his first sin was theirs in a sense in which no other of his sins
could be ; for his after sins were personal, and he alone was an
swerable for them ; but his first sin was public, and that which
brought death upon all his posterity. The gifts with which Adam
was endowed, if they had been retained, would have been for the
benefit of all his posterity, but being lost, they were not only for
feited for himself but for them. For as Levi paid tithes while in^-
the loins of his progenitor Abraham, so the whole human race
were included in Adam, to stand or fall with him. Hence Paul, in
Rom. v., says, that Adam, was a type of Christ ; so that " as by
the disobedience of the first Adam many were constituted sinners,
by the obedience of the second Adam many were constituted
righteous." In this passage it is clearly signified, that the integrity
which was given to our first father would have been available for
our benefit if he had stood firmly in innocence : but that it was
also committed to him to forfeit and lose all blessings for his pos
terity as well as for himself, if he should prove disobedient. This
was the event, and accordingly the precious deposit with which
he was intrusted for the whole human race, was lost. Now, this
being the state of the case, it is manifest that no son bears the sins
of any other father as he does those of Adam ; but the soul that
sinneth in the common administration of God's government, dies :
but surely this general principle in relation to sin and punishment,
does not in the least affect our condition as fallen in the fall of our
federal head and representative. The son does not bear, com
monly, the sins of his other progenitors with which he has nothing
to do, but he does and must bear the first sin of Adam, which was
his own ; for though not guilty of the act in his own person, he
did commit it by his representative.
2. Another argument brought against the doctrine of original
sin is, that what is not voluntary cannot be sinful, because nothing
can have the nature of sin which does not proceed from the exer
cise of understanding and choice ; but what is called original sin,
especially in infants, is not voluntary, therefore it cannot possess
the nature of sin. „
The maxim on which this argument rests is acknowledged in
courts of justice among men ; but it ought not to be transferred

118 ORIGINAL SIN.
to the church, so as to affect the doctrine of original sin, which
she always held and believed. Moreover, this maxim has relation
altogether to actual sins, but not to original sin : and it is repug
nant to the declaration of Paul, Rom. vii., What I will that I do not,
but what I hate that I do. And Gal. v., The spirit lusteth against
the flesh, so that ye cannot do the things that ye would. Augustine,
in his Retractations, lib. i., c. 13, declares, " that this political maxim
ought to have no place in relation to this point." And in his book
against Julian he says, " Frustra putas ideo in parvulis nullum esse
delictum, quia sine voluntate, quas in illis nulla est, esse non potest."
That is, " In vain do you pretend that there can be no sin in infants,
because they are not and cannot be the subjects of voluntary exer
cise." The maxim is true enough in regard to our own proper
acts, but can by no means be admitted in relation to the contagion
of original sin; which, however, had its origin in the voluntary act
of the first man.
3. A third argument against original sin is that all sin consists in
acts, but infants are capable of no acts, therefore they cannot be
the subjects of sin ; for, to sin is an active verb, and signifies to do
something actively ; original sin, therefore, cannot exist.
To which it may be answered, that in the Hebrew language the
words which signify " to sin," express not only acts, but habits ;
not only positive actions, but defects and inherent pravity which is
born with us.
4. It is again argued that that which is the property of an indi
vidual cannot be propagated through a whole race, but the sin of
our first parents was the property of those individuals, and cannot
be communicated to their posterity.
It is true that the qualities or properties of individuals are not
universally propagated through the whole species, except such as
are of the nature of diwapiat or imperfections ; for these are con
stantly propagated through the whole race. For example, that
corruption of human nature which is the cause of death, whatever
it may be, is universally propagated, for all the descendants of
Adam are mortal ; so also original sin is dSwapia, or a natural impo-
tency, or a defect, or a depraved inclination, or drafia — a disorder of
the affections of the mind. Besides, the proposition on which the
argument is founded is only true of separable qualities, but does not
apply at all to such as are inseparable and which perpetually in
here in the subject, so that they cannot even in thought be se
vered from it. We do in fact witness many evils which are propa
gated from both parents. Moreover, the proposition stated above
is only true of those qualities which are only found in some indi
viduals, but not to those which are common to the whole species ;
but original sin is not a quality of a few individuals, but of the
whole race ; for Adam was the representative of the whole race,
and forfeited that depositum with which he was intrusted as the
head of the whole family. *
5. It is again alleged that punishments are not sins, but those

ORIGINAL SIN. 119
defects and irregular inclinations which belong to human nature
are the punishment of the sin of the first man, and cannot be of the
nature of sin.
Here again there is an application of a political maxim to a sub
ject to which it does not belong ; for it is a fact clearly established
in the divine government, that the privation of the divine image
and favour is both a sin and a punishment, but in different respects.
In respect to God inflicting it, it is a punishment, for he in just
judgment may deprive his creatures of his grace ; but in respect to
man, this privation is a sin which by his own fault he has brought
upon himself and admitted into his own soul.
6. It is again objected, that nature being from God must be good :
therefore there can be no such thing as original sin or a vitiated
nature. To which it may be replied that nature was good before the fall,
and before sin entered to corrupt it ; and nature still, so far as it is
the work of God, is good ; that is, the substance of the soul, the
faculties and the natural principle of rational action are good ; but
nature, as it is depraved, is not the work of God, but something
added to his work, namely, drafta, or disorder and corruption in the
faculties which God created in a state of order and integrity. God
is the creator and preserver of the faculties, but not of the sin.
7. The Anabaptists argue that Adam having been received into
favour, was in a state of grace when his children were procreated ;
and therefore, upon the principle that everything begets its like, he
could not propagate offspring infected with original sin.
Answer. There is more in the conclusion than in the premises ;
for the procreation of offspring is not according to grace, but ac
cording to nature, so that whatever the nature of man is since the
fall, that only can be propagated. Adam obtained freedom from
guilt, not from nature but from grace ; but grace cannot be propa
gated. Man, therefore, cannot propagate anything but that cor
rupt nature derived from the fall.
Moreover, the regenerate are not perfectly delivered from the
evil nature of sin, which still dwells in them, and renders imperfect
all that they do. So far as the regenerate act from nature, they act
sinfully : all the good which is in them is from the spirit of God,
to whom they are indebted for every good thought : it is evident,
therefore, that grace, for every motion of which we are dependent
on another agent, cannot be propagated : but sin, consisting in a de
fect or disorder of our nature, and having its origin and proper
seat in our own nature, may be propagated. " In me, that is, in
my flesh," says Paul, " there dwelleth no good thing." " That
which is born of the flesh is flesh." And we never hear of a man
being regenerated by a natural birth from pious parents, but the re
generate are " born of the Spirit — born of God." They further al
lege, indeed, that men cannot propagate what they do not possess ;
and therefore the regenerate cannot communicate original sin to
their offspring, for the guilt of all their sins is removed by a full

120 ORIGINAL SIN.
pardon. To which we reply as before, that though it is true that
a man cannot propagate what he has not, yet as far as nature pre
vails, all men are sinful, and it is that which properly belongs to
our nature which is capable of being propagated ; therefore, when
a sinful nature is communicated to posterity, it is the communica
tion of what a man does possess ; for neither remission of sins
nor the infusion of grace do in the least affect the laws by which
the propagation of the human species is regulated, for reasons al
ready stated.
8. But the opposers of the doctrine of original sin even appeal to
scripture for support to their opinion. They allege Rom. xi. 6, and
1 Cor. vii. 14, as texts which declare in favour of the children of
the saints being born free from original sin. In the former, Paul
asserts, " That if the root be holy, so are the branches." But they
are deceived by the mere sound of a word, for "holiness" in this
place does not refer to internal moral qualities, but to external con
secration : whatever is devoted solemnly to the service of God, or
has a relation to his worship, is called holy. Thus the tabernacle,
the altar, the ark, the sacrifices, the priests, and even Jerusalem it
self, were holy. The whole nation of Israel, as being in covenant
with God, are continually spoken of as " a holy people ;" and as the
promises of God's covenant with Abraham have respect to his pos
terity even to the end of the world ; so, in a certain sense, these
branches which are now broken off, are holy, as they stand in a
peculiar relation to God, which other people do not. And in the
latter passage, the children of believers are called " holy" on ac
count of their relation to the Christian church, as being connected
with the visible church by baptism, or as being capable of such
connection in consequence of their relation to parents who are mem
bers of the church. For God makes the same promise to each be
liever which he formerly made to Abraham, I will be a God to thee
and to thy seed after thee, But this text by no means signifies that
the children of believers are born in a state free from all pollution.
9. It is again objected that the phrase " original sin," never oc
curs in scripture, and never should have been introduced into the
church. Answer. Many words are conveniently used in theology which
are not found in scripture ; and this must be the case where the
truth is denied and error introduced : and appropriate words and
phrases, expressing a clear and definite meaning, save us the ne
cessity of much circumlocution. Now the truth is, that the scrip
tures use various words to express what is usually denominated
" sin," without entering into the distinction between original and
actual sin ; but the idea conveyed by the phrase, " original sin,"
can be logically inferred from numerous passages of scripture, as
we shall show presently. When the Pelagians denied the doctrine
of original sin, which the church had before held without dispute,
the orthodox fathers invented this name for the sake of avoiding all
ambiguity, and that the matter in dispute might be clearly and dis-

ORIGINAL SIN. 121
tinctly exhibited ; for the Pelagians strenuously maintained that all
sins were actual, or consisted in acts ; but the orthodox maintained,
that besides the acts of sin, there existed a corruption of nature, —
an inherent moral disorder in the faculties, which, for convenience,
they denominated " original sin."
Having shown that the doctrine of those who oppose original
sin is not contained in scripture, nor can be proved from it ; we
now proceed to demonstrate, that it is absolutely repugnant to the
testimony of God, in his word ; and therefore is a false doctrine,
which should be exterminated from the church.
The first testimony which we adduce is from Genesis v. 5, " And
God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and
that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil
continually ;" and Gen. viii. 21, " For the imagination of man's
heart is evil from his youth." The objection to this testimony is,
" that this is only spoken of adults, and only shows that there is in
man a proneness to go astray ; but nothing is here said respecting
a hereditary corruption of the human heart." But is it not evident
that if all the thoughts and imaginations of the heart are constantly
evil from youth upwards, the nature of man must be corrupt?
What stronger evidence could there be of a corruption of nature
than the fact that all men sin and do nothing else but sin, from the
moment that they are capable of actual transgression ? An effect
so universal can never be accounted for by imitation, for children
begin to sin before they have much opportunity of imitating the
sins of others, and even when the examples before them are pious
and good. If from the fruits of holiness we may infer that the tree
is good, then certainly on the same principle, from a production of
bad fruit it is fairly concluded that the nature is evil. " A good
man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which
is good ; but an evil man, out of the evil treasure of his heart, that
which is evil." " Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth
speaketh." Our next testimony we take from Rom. iii. 10. " There
is none righteous, no not one." Now if man's nature be not cor
rupt, how can it be accounted for on any rational principles, that
all men, without the exception of one, should be unrighteous ? To
this proof, indeed, Albert Pighius excepts that it relates to the Jew
ish nation, and not to the whole race of man. But this is contrary
to the express design of the apostle in this passage, which was to
prove that both Jews and Gentiles were all under sin and wrath,
and all stood in absolute need of salvation by faith in Christ. And
in the preceding verse he explicitly declares that he had " proved
both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin." And his gene
ral conclusion is, " That all the world may become guilty before
God," Indeed, if the nation of the Jews only was referred to in
this passage, yet it might be fairly inferred that all other nations
were in the same corrupt condition ; for why should it be supposed
that universal depravity should be confined to this one people ?
And history confirms the sentence of the apostle, for it represents

122 ORIGINAL SIN.
other nations as wicked as the Jews. The apostle must, therefore,
be considered as describing the moral condition, not of one nation
or one age, but of human nature in all countries and at all times ;
so far as it is not restored by Christ.
A third testimony for original sin is found in Rom. vii., where
Paul, in strong language, describes the power and depth of indwell
ing sin, as experienced by himself, now in his renewed state. He
calls it " a law of sin and death," as working in him " all manner of
concupiscence ;" as " deceiving him." And he speaks of it as an
abiding principle — "sin that dwelleth in me." As an evil ever
present with him in all his exertions to do good ; " as a law in his
members warring against the law of his mind ;" so that he exclaim
ed, " O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the
body of this death 1" The Pelagians, it is true, will not agree that
Paul is here speaking in his own person, but pretend that he per
sonates a Jew under conviction of the duty which the law requires,
but sensible of his inability to comply with the demands of the law.
But that the apostle is here giving us his own experience is evident
from all the circumstances of the case ; which opinion is not only
held by Augustine in his controversy with Julian, but was maintained
by the fathers who preceded him, particularly Cyprian and Hilary.
Other testimonies not less direct and conclusive are, Job xv. 14,
" What is man that he should be clean ? and he which is born of a
woman, that he should be righteous 1"
Psalm li. 5, " Behold I was shapen in iniquity ; and in sin did my
mother conceive me."
John iii. 3, " That which is born of the flesh is flesh."
Rom. v. 12, " As by one man sin entered into the world, — and
so death passed upon all men, because that all have sinned." On
this text it is worthy of remark that it is not only asserted that the
punishment of death hath passed upon all men, but the reason is
added, namely, " because all have sinned ;" so that the fault and pun
ishment, the guilt and pollution, are by the apostle joined together.
Rom. v. 19, " For as by one man's disobedience many were
made sinners."
Rom. viii. 7, " Because the carnal mind is enmity against God, for
it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be."
Ephes. ii. 3, "And were by nature the children of wrath, even
as others."
And as infants die, as universal experience teaches, it is evident
that they must be chargeable with sin ; for Paul clearly represents
sin as the cause of death — of the death of all men. " And the wa
ges of sin is death."
It would be tedious to enumerate all the objections which Pela
gians and others make to the interpretation of these texts. The
specimen given above may be taken as an evidence that they never
can succeed in proving that their doctrine is consonant with the
testimony of God in the holy scriptures.
Hitherto we have disputed with those of the Papists and Ana-

ORIGINAL SIN. 123
baptists who deny the existence of original sin altogether ; but now
we come to consider the opinion of those who acknowledge origi
nal sin, but insist that it is not anything inherent in man at his birth,
but only the guilt of another's sin imputed. This opinion is main
tained by some of the papists, who think that original sin is nothing
else than the debt of punishment contracted from the sin of Adam,
but that nothing of the pollution of sin is propagated by natural
generation. A.D. 1542, Pighius, after the conference which was
held at Worms, expressed his opinion in writing as follows : " Ori
ginal sin does not consist in any defect, nor in any vice, nor depra
vation of nature ; not in any corrupt quality nor inherent vicious
habit in us, but solely in our subjection to the punishment of the
first sin ; that is, in contracted guilt, without anything of depravity
in our nature."
It is a sufficient refutation of this doctrine that it is nowhere
found in scripture, and nothing should be received as an article of
faith which cannot be proved from this source. Its abettors do in
deed endeavour to establish it by an appeal to the Bible, but they
are obliged to beg the very point in dispute, as will soon be made
to appear.
Pighius, the chief advocate for this opinion, brings forward Rom.
v. 12, " By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin."
Rom. v. 15, "By the offenee of one, many are dead." Rom. v. 16,
"For the judgment was by one to condemnation." Rom. v. 17,
" For by one man's offence death reigned by one." Rom. v. 18,
" Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men
to condemnation." In all these texts, says Pighius, the apostle at
tributes condemnation to the sin of Adam, and nothing else. To
which it may be replied, that when the apostle declares that " sin
had entered into the world," he does not mean, merely, that Adam
had become a sinner, but that it had come upon all his descendants ;
that is, upon all men in the world ; for he does not say in this place
that guilt had entered, but that sin had entered into the world.
And this is not left to be inferred, but is expressly asserted in the
same verse : " in whom all have sinned ;" or, "for that all have
sinned." Moreover, when he declares that all are subject to death
and condemnation by the sin of one, it is a just inference that they
are all partakers of his sin, and are born in a state of moral pollu
tion. In the 19th verse it is said, "By the disobedience of one
many are constituted sinners ;" now to be constituted sinners, in
cludes the idea not only of being made subject to the penalty, but
partaking of the nature of sin ; for they who are entirely free from
the stain of sin, cannot with propriety be called " sinners." Again,
the apostle in this chapter teaches, that " while we were yet sin
ners Christ died for us, to deliver us from death and reconcile us
to God ;" certainly he died for none but sinners : but if infants are
not sinners then Christ did not die for them, nor do they belong to
him as their Saviour ; which is most absurd.
"But," says Pighius, "infants being neither endued with the

124

ORIGINAL SIN.

knowledge of the law, nor with freedom of will, are not moral
agents, and are therefore incapable of obedience or disobedience ;
they cannot therefore be the subjects of sin, and cannot be bound to
endure the penalty of the law on any other account than for the
sin of another."
Answer. Although infants have not the exercise of free-will,
and are noLrjaoral agents, jret they possess a nature not conforma
ble to the law of God: they are not such as the law demands that
human beings should be, but are depraved ; " children of wrath,"
and guilty on account. of_thejr own. personal depravity : for the
authorized definition of sin is HvopU, that is, whatever is repugnant
to the law of God.
But they insist further, " that God being the author of nature, if
that be depraved, he must be the author of sin."
To which we reply in the words of Augustine : " Both are pro
pagated together, nature and the depravity of nature ; one of
which is good, the other evil : the first is derived from the bounty
of our Creator, the latter must be attributed to our original con
demnation. The first has for its cause the good pleasure of God,
the latter the perverse will of the first man : that exhibits God as
the former of the creatures, this as the punisher of disobedience.
Finally, the same Christ for the creation of our nature, is the
maker of man ; but for the healing of the disease of this nature
became man."
Again, this doctrine may be refuted by express testimonies from
scripture ; and ought therefore to be rejected as unsound. Gen. v.
3, " Adam begat Seth in his own image." Job xiv. 4, " Who can
bring a clean thing out of an unclean ? — not one." Psalm li. 5,
" For I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive
me." Rom. v. 19, "By the disobedience of one man, many were
made sinners." Ephes. iii. 2, " And were by nature the children
of wrath, even as others ;" that is, we were born subject to con
demnation, because born in a corrupt state. From all which pas
sages it appears that original sin does not consist merely in guilt
or liableness to punishment, but in amoral depravation of the whole
nature ; and that it is not contracted by imitation, but by genera
tion. Paul often speaks of that which we call " original sin" under
the general name of " sin." In Rom. vi. 8, he speaks of the " old
man" being crucified ; of the " body of sin" being destroyed ; and
in chap. vii. he speaks of being " sold under sin," of no good thing
dwelling in his flesh ; of evil being present with him when he would
do good ; and of being led captive by " the law of sin" in his mem
bers. Another cogent proof of the heterodoxy of this doctrine may be
derived from the baptism of infants, which certainly supposes that
' they are conceived and born in sin.
It is also worthy of observation that spiritual regeneration is, in
scripture, continually put in contrast with " the flesh," and with our

ORIGINAL SIN. 125
fleshly birth. But where is the propriety of this, if the flesh is natu
rally free from stain ?
And finally, the catholic church has ever held an opinion con
trary to the one which is now opposed. Augustine, in his second
book against Pelagius and Ccelestius, expresses most explicitly what
we maintain : " Whosoever," says he, " contends that human na
ture, in any age, does not need the second Adam as a physician,
on the ground that it has not been vitiated in the first Adam, does
not fall into an error which may be held without injury to the rule
of faith; but by that very rule by which we are constituted Chris
tians, is convicted of being an enemy to the grace of God."
It is again disputed, whether concupiscence, or that disease of
our nature which renders us prone to sin, is itself of the nature of
sin. This the papists deny ; we affirm.
They allege that whatever exists in us necessarily, and is not
from ourselves, but from another, cannot be of the nature of sin ;
but this is the fact in regard to concupiscence, ergo, &c.
Answer. In a merely political judgment this may be correct,
but not in that which is divine. And if the principle here asserted
was sound, it would prove too much : it would prove that even
the acts of concupiscence are not sinful : for there is a sort of ne
cessity for these, supposing the principle of concupiscence to exist
in the soul. i- ,
It is next objected, that that which is wholly the work of God,
as is the whole nature of man, cannot be corrupt, and therefore
whatever belongs to this nature as it comes from the hand of God,
cannot be otherwise than free from sin.
If there were any force in this argument, it would prove that
there could be no such thing as sin in the universe, for all creatures
are not only dependent on God for existence at first, but for con
tinuance in being every moment ; and if the power of God could
not, consistently with its purity, be exerted to bring into existence
the children of a corrupt parent, in a state of moral corruption,
neither could it be to continue their being, which equally requires
the exertion of omnipotence. But the truth is, so far as human
nature or human actions are the effect of divine power, the work
is good : the essential faculties of the mind and members of the
body are good, and the entity of every human act is good ; but
the evil of our nature is received by natural generation, and is the
consequence of the fall of our first parent, and the sinfulness of our
acts must not be ascribed to God, " in whom we live and move,"
but to the perversity of our own wills.
But they allege that God inflicts this depravity on the race of
men, and therefore it cannot partake of the nature of sin, without
making God its author.
To which it may be replied that God inflicts it, as it is a punish
ment, but not as it is sin ; that is, he withdraws all divine influence,
and all the gifts of innocence with which the creature was origi
nally endued in just judgment Does not God in just displeasure

126 ORIGINAL SIN.
for obstinate continuance in sin, often send blindness of mind as a
judgment: in the same manner he can inflict thatpravity of nature
which we bring into the world with us as a punishment for the sin
of our first parents : that is, he withholds all those gifts and all that
influence which are necessary to a state of moral purity. The
texts of scripture which might be adduced to establish the doctrine
which has been advanced, have already been cited, and need not
now be repeated. But Albert Pighius asserts, that the divine law
only prohibits vicious acts, not the latent qualities of the mind : the
command says, " Thou shalt not covet," but it does not say thou
shalt not have a disease which may induce yrou to covet. It is
true the act only is mentioned in this prohibition, but the disposi
tion is doubtless included : as in the sixth commandment it is only
said, " thou shalt not kill ;" and in the seventh, " thou shalt not
commit adultery ;" but we know from high authority, that in the
one case the law is violated by sinful anger, and in the other by a
wanton desire ; so in the eighth commandment the act of theft
only is forbidden expressly, but we know that to covet our neigh
bour's goods is sin ; and in like manner, although the tenth com
mandment only prohibits expressly the act of concupiscence, yet
undoubtedly the disease, or corrupt disposition from which the act
proceeds, is included by implication in the prohibition. And this
will appear very clearly by considering the preceptive part of the
law : this requires that we should love God with all our heart, and
mind, and strength ; and of course whatever in us that is opposed
to a compliance with this command is forbidden, but such an ob
stacle is this disease of concupiscence, therefore this being forbid
den by the holy law of God is sinful. Infants, therefore, are chil
dren of wrath, because they have in them a disease of irregular
propensity, although it has not yet been exerted.
Pighius still urges the objection already refuted in another form,
that no law can prohibit equitably what it is impossible for the
creature to avoid ; but the infant can no more avoid being born
with a proneness to irregular indulgence, than it could avoid coming
into the world with the sense of touch or taste ; he concludes,
therefore, that concupiscence is not prohibited in the tenth com
mandment. Now we answer, as before, that if it is true that nothing is for
bidden which cannot be avoided, then sinful acts are not forbidden,
for with a nature labouring under the disease of concupiscence, sin
ful acts cannot be avoided ; and so the argument is not sound, since
it proves too much ; nay, the renewed themselves cannot avoid sin
in this life, as Paul abundantly teaches in the 7th of Romans ; there
fore God does prohibit what we cannot avoid, and does command
what we cannot perform.
The author then proceeds to refute the opinion of the Flaccians,
that original sin corrupted the substance of the soul ; an opinion
industriously propagated by Flaccius Illyricus, one of the most
learned of the reformers ; and which was embraced and pertina-

ORIGINAL SIN. 127
ciously maintained in several places in Germany. But as this
error is not now maintained by any with whom we are acquainted,
we do not think it necessary to exhibit the elaborate and conclusive
arguments by which Sohnnius refutes it.
As we stated before, our object in giving an abstract of this
treatise, is not so much to defend the doctrine «of hereditary depra
vity, as to give a correct view of the state of opinion on this sub
ject at the time of the reformation and afterwards. And it cannot
fail to occur to the intelligent reader, that none of the objections
now made to this doctrine are new, or supported by any new ar
guments. The whole ground of controversy now occupied by the
various discordant opinions has been gone over before. And the
result will probably be as before, that while those who adhere
strictly to evangelical doctrine will continue to maintain the old
doctrine, its opposers will deviate further and further from ortho
doxy. There has never yet been an instance in the history of the
church of the rejection of any doctrines of the Gospel, where the
opposers of the truth have been contented to stop at the first step
of departure from sound doctrine. If they who first adopt and
propagate an error are sometimes restrained by habit, and by a
lurking respect for the opinions of the wise and good, as also by a
fear of incurring the censure of heresy, from going the full length
which their principles require ; yet those who follow them in their
error will not be kept back by such considerations. Indeed, the princi
ples of self-defence require, that men who undertake to defend their
opinions by argument, should endeavour to be consistent with
themselves : and thus it commonly happens that what was origi
nally a single error, soon draws after it the whole system of which
it is a part. On this account it is incumbent on the friends of truth
to oppose error in its commencement, and to endeavour to point
out the consequences likely to result from its adoption ; and to us
it appears that nothing is better calculated to show what will be
the effect of a particular error, than to trace its former progress by
the lights of ecclesiastical history.

ESSAY VI.
THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION,

In a previous Essay (No. IV.) we presented our readers with
a condensed view of the early history of Pelagianism. In the course
of that article it fell in our way to express our belief in the doctrine
of Imputation, our conviction of its importance, and of its being
generally received among orthodox Christians. This doctrine, our
readers are aware, has long been, nominally at least, rejected by
many of our New England brethren. Without much argument on
the subject, it has been discarded as intrinsically absurd ; and it has
not unfrequently been presented as an unanswerable argument
against other doctrines, that they lead to all the absurdities of this
exploded dogma. We have long been convinced that the leading
objections to this doctrine arose from an entire, and to us, an un
accountable misapprehension of its nature as held among Calvin-
ists. We therefore thought it proper, and adapted to remove
prejudices, to state the common views on this subject, that our
brethren might see that they did not involve the absurdities which
they imagined. Unfortunately, as far as the author fof the
article under review is concerned, our object has not been an
swered. The writer, who signs himself A Protestant, is evident
ly much dissatisfied with our opinions. His object, in his com
munication to the Spectator, is to impugn several of our state
ments, and to present his difficulties with regard to the doctrine
itself. To our surprise, these difficulties are almost all founded on
the very misapprehension which it was our object to correct. Al
though our readers, we think, will sympathize with us in our regret
at many of the statements of this author, and feel hurt that he should
have allowed himself to make the unguarded imputations contained
in his piece, we are not sorry that we are called upon, by this di
rect appeal, to state more fully.our views on this subject, and the
grounds on which they rest.
* Published in 1830, in review of an article in the June number of the Christian
Spectator, entitled, " Inquiries respecting the Doctrine of Imputation."

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 129
Before proceeding to the doctrine of imputation and of the Pro
testant's difficulties, there are one or two subjects on which we
would make a passing remark. This writer attributes to us great
subserviency to the opinions of the fathers. Such expressions as
the following clearly convey this imputation. " Can any one inform
me to what age this ' orthodoxy' belongs ; and where the history
of it is to be found among the fathers whose authority is so much
relied on by this historian ?" P. 340. " Can the historian honestly
say, with all his attachment to the fathers, &c." " Last of all, I
would particularly request, if any writer should favour me with an
answer to these inquiries, that reasons, and not names, may be
given in support of his statements. If it be suggested that none but
a heretic could ask' such questions, I would reply that there are
minds in our country which are not satisfied that calling hard
names is argument ; or that the argumentum ad invidiam is the
happiest weapon which a meek and humble Christian can use.
Men are apt to suspect that such arguments would not be em
ployed, if better ones were at hand in their stead. I only add that
I am A Protestant." And so are we, however unworthy that gen
tleman may think us of the title. We would not knowingly call
any man master upon earth. We profess to believe, with him,
that the Bible is the religion of Protestants ; and that it matters lit
tle what men have taught, if the word of God does not support
their doctrines. As we agree with him in these leading principles,
we hope that he will agree with us in certain others. While we
hold that the opinions of men are of no authority as to matters of
faith, we at the same time believe that much respect is due to uni
form opinions of the people of God ; that there is a strong pre
sumption in favour of any doctrine being taught in the Bible, if the
great body of the pious readers of the Bible have from the begin
ning believed and loved it. We are free to confess, that it would
startle us to hear that there was no antecedent probability that the
doctrines of the deity of Christ, atonement, native depravity, are
really taught in the word of God, if it can be made to appear that
the church, in all ages, has believed these doctrines. And we think
that a man places himself in a very unenviable situation, who un
dertakes to prove to the men of his generation, that the great body
of the good and pious before him were utterly mistaken, and that
he alone is right. Here is a phenomenon, which any man who
assumes this position is bound at the outset to account for, that the
Bible, a plain book as Protestants call it, should have been utterly
misunderstood for more than a thousand years, by its most careful
and competent readers. It will not meet this case, to tell us that
this man or that man has held this or that absurdity ; or that whole
ages or communities of men, who neither read nor loved the scrip
tures, believed this or that heresy. This is not the question. It is
simply this, is it not probable that what the vast majority of the
most competent readers of a plain book, take to be its plain mean
ing, really is its meaning ? We take it for granted, that the Pro-
9

130 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
testant would answer this question in the affirmative ; and that, if
arguing with Unitarians, he would not scruple to appeal to the fact,
that the unprejudiced and pious en masse of every age have un
derstood the Bible as teaching the divinity of Christ, as a presump
tive argument in its favour. We suspect that he would go further,
and that in giving the exposition of any passage he would fortify
his own conclusions, by stating that he did not stand alone, but
that others of the accurate and the learned had arrived at the same
results. Now we think that a man who would do this, ought not
to sneer at us on this very account. We know that it is easy to
ring the changes, on want of independence, subserviency to the
fathers, slavery to a system, and so on ; but what effect does all this
produce ? It may excite prejudice, and lead the superficial to join
in a sneer against men whom they suppose to a pitiable extent in
ferior to themselves ; but does it convince anybody ? Does it
weaken the legitimate force of the argument from the concurrence
of the pious in any doctrine ? Does it produce any favourable im
pression on that class of readers whose approbation a writer should
value ?
We say, then, that the opinion of the church is entitled to respect,
if for no other reason, at least as a presumptive argument for any
doctrine, in favour of which this concurrent testimony can be cited.
, Whether the church has, with any important uniformity, held the
' doctrine of imputation, is a mere question of fact, and must be de
cided accordingly. If it can be fairly proved, let it pass for what
it is worth. It binds no man's conscience ; yet the Protestant him
self would hardly say, that it was to him or others a matter of in
difference. He greatly mistakes if he supposes that the opinion of
a man who lived a thousand years ago, has any more weight with
us than that of an equally pious and able man who may be still
living. His telling us, therefore, that some of the men who are
called fathers, held sundry very extravagant opinions, is really say
ing very little in answer to the argument from the consent of the
good and great as to the plain meaning of a plain book. We are
not now assuming the fact, that the church has, with perfect una
nimity, gathered the doctrine of imputation from the word of God ; ,
but exhibiting the ground and nature of the respect due to the uni
form opinion of God's people.
There is another point of view in which, we presume, the Pro
testant will agree with us in thinking this opinion entitled to respect.
Truth and piety are intimately related. A man's moral and reli
gious opinions are the expression of his moral and religious feel
ings. Hence there are certain opinions which we view with ab
horrence, because they express the greatest depravity. Now we
say, and the Protestant doubtless will join us in saying, that it is no
very desirable thing for a man to throw himself out of communion
with the great body of the pious in every age, and place himself in
communion of language and opinion with the opposers of vital god
liness. We think that any man, who had any proper sense of the

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 131
deceitfulness of his own heart, the weakness of his understanding,
and of the vital connection between truth and piety, would hesitate
long before he avowed himself opposed to the views which have
for ages been found in connection with true religion, and became
the advocate of doctrines which the opposers of piety have been
the foremost in defending.
These are mainly the grounds on which our respect for the opi
nions of the church rests, and these remarks show the extent of that
respect. So far the Protestant would go with us ; further we have
not gone. If we have cited the concurrent opinion of the church
improperly ; if we have supposed the great body of the people of
God to have believed, what they did not believe — let the Protestant
set us right, and we shall be thankful. But do not let him join
men, with whom he would scorn to be associated, in running over
the common-places of free inquiry, minds that think, &c, &c.
A word as to the argumentum ad invidiam. We are of the num
ber of those who agree with this writer in thinking that " this is
not the happiest weapon which a meek and lowly Christian can
use," nay, that it is utterly unworthy of his character to use it at
all. We think, too, that the charge of having used it should not be
lightly made. Unless we are mistaken as to the nature of this ar
gument, the charge, in the present instance, is unfounded. We un
derstand an argumentum ad invidiam to be one, which is designed,
not to prove the incorrectness of any opinion, but to cast unmerited
odium upon those who hold it. Such was not the design of the
article to which the Protestant objects. Every one knows, that
within a few years, there has been more or less discussion in this
country respecting sin and grace. We thought it would be useful,
to present our readers with a short historical view of the various
controversies which have existed in the church on these subjects.
We commenced with the earliest and one of the most important ;
and gave, to the best of our ability, an account of the Pelagian con
troversy.- We called no man a Pelagian, and designed to prove
no man such, and therefore made little application of the history to
present discussions. So far as the modern opinions differ from the
ancient, there was no ground for such application, and none such
was intended. So far as they agree, it is no more an argumentum
ad invidiam to exhibit the agreement, than it is to call Belsham a
Socinian, or Whitby an anti-Calvinist. If no man agrees with
Pelagius in confining morality to acts of choice ; in maintaining
that men are not morally depraved, before they voluntarily violate
a known law, and that God cannot prevent sin in a moral system ;
then is no man affected by the exhibition of the Pelagian system.
But if there are those who assume this ground, and proclaim it, it
does them no injustice to say that they do so. So long, however,
as these brethren hold to a moral certainty that all men will sin
the moment they become moral agents ; that the first sin leads to
entire moral depravity ; and that an immediate influence of the
Spirit is necessary in conversion, they differ from that system in

132 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
these important points. Wherein they agree and wherein they
differ, should be known in justice to them, as well as for the benefit
of others. How far the assumption of the fundamental principles
of a system has a tendency to lead to its thorough adoption, every
man must judge for himself. For ourselves, we fear the worst:
because, we think consistency requires an advance, and because
history informs us, that when men have taken the first step, they
or their followers soon take the second. Now, we ask, what is
there invidious in this history of opinions, or in this expression of
apprehension? apprehension of what? of injury to the cause of
vital piety. Is there any sin in expressing this apprehension, when
conscientiously entertained ? Suppose we had gone further than
we did, and exhibited, what we supposed our readers capable of
observing, the exact points of agreement and disagreement between
the two systems, would there have been the least injustice in such
a proceeding ? We think not, and therefore think the charge of
using the argumentum ad invidiam out of place. Let us now re
quest our author to review his own piece, and ask himself, what is
its whole spirit and tendency (we do not say design). Is it not to
cast on us the odium of being opposed to free investigation, of " call
ing hard names for argument," of being held in bondage to a system,
of relying on names instead of reasons ; in short, of being anti-pro-
testants ? Would not a little reflection have prevented his casting
this stone ?
There is a sensitiveness about some of our New England brethren,
that has often surprised us. If any one in this quarter ventures to
question the tendency of their opinions, or express apprehension as
to their results, all of love and Catholicism that there is within
them, is shocked at the suggestion, and we are borne down with
the cry, " you are breaking the bonds of charity," " you argue ad
invidiam," &c. ; and yet these same brethren can find it in their
fiearts to say, that we are setting " in motion all the enemies of re
ligion ;"* that our doctrines (though known to be held by a de
cided majority of evangelical Christendom) are exploded absurdi
ties ;f that we believe in physical depravity and physical regene
ration ; and teach, " that God first creates a wrong essence, and,
then creates a right one ; first plunges into the fire and then pulls
out again"J (a misrepresentation as gross as the language is irreve
rent). They do all this, without appearing to dream that there is
aught in it to justify complaint, or to trouble the waters of peace.
However, let this pass. We love peace, and shall try to promote
it. Our readers will soon see that we need our full share of self-
command and forbearance.
The Protestant quotes on p. 339, the following passage from our
former article : " Now we confess ourselves to be of the number
of those who believe, whatever reproach il may bring upon us from
* Prof. Stuart's Examination of the Review of the A. E. Society, p. 93.
f Review of Harvey and Taylor on Human Depravity, in the Christian Spectator.
X Fitch's Inquiry and Reply, p. 89.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 133
acertain quarter, that if the doctrine of imputation be given up, the
whole doctrine of original sin must be abandoned. And if this doc
trine be relinquished, then the whole doctrine of redemption must
fall ; and what may then be left of Christianity, they may contend
for that will ; but for ourselves, we shall be of opinion that what
remains will not be worth a serious struggle." He then proceeds,
" Here then permit me to inquire, have men no sins of their own
from which they need to be redeemed ? Or is it true, as the his
torian's position seems plainly to imply, that the whole object of
Christ's death was to redeem men from a sin which is not their
own ? And is this sin, then, which (to use the writer's own words)
is not ' strictly and properly theirs, for those not yet born could not
perform an act' (p. 90) ; is this sin so much greater than all the
sins that men have themselves committed in their own persons, that
the death of Christ, or the redemption wrought by him, is not even
to be named as having respect to these transgressions, and nothing
of Christianity is left, unless you assume the position that redeeming
blood is designed simply to expiate original sin ? Can any one in
form me to what age this ' orthodoxy' belongs ; and where the his
tory of it is to be found among the fathers, whose authority is so
much relied on by this historian?" Again; on p. 341, he quotes
Rom. iv. 15, as an argument against imputation, " Where no law
is, there is no transgression," and then inquires, " But how can this
be, where there is not only original sin prior to all knowledge of
law, but original sin so great as to absorb the whole of the re
demption of Christ ; so that the redemption is annulled, if we con
sider it as expiating the guilt of actual violations of known law, and
there is nothing left in the Gospel worth contending for."
We must now be permitted to take our turn as interrogators.
We seriously, then, put it to that gentleman's conscience to say
whether he really believes that the conductors of this work, or our
historian, which is the same thing, actually hold that " the whole
object of Christ's death was to redeem men from a sin which is not
their own," and has no reference to "actual violations of known
law ?" If he does, we can only express our astonishment at the
readiness with which he can believe his brethren capable of hold
ing and advancing the most monstrous opinions, in the face of their
open and repeated declarations of adherence to a confession which
notoriously teaches the very reverse. We cannot, however, think
that the writer, whoever he may be, seriously entertains this idea.
Our complaint is, that he should have been so heedless as to seize
on the first impression which an isolated passage made on his mind,
and without stopping to inquire whether he apprehended its mean
ing aright, or whether his interpretation was at all consistent with
the known opinions of the conductors of this work, should at once
proceed to hold up and denounce this first and false impression as
the " orthodoxy" of the Biblical Repertory. The gentleman, on
the slightest reflection, will perceive, that just so far as confidence
is reposed in his discrimination and judgment, the readers of the

134 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
Spectator will be led to believe that we hold, " that redeeming
blood is designed simply to expiate original sin," " that the redemp
tion is annulled if we consider it as expiating the guilt of actual vio
lations of known law and there is nothing left in the Gospel worth
contending for." He must know, too, that those who adopt this
idea on the faith of his assertion, must be filled with astonishment
and contempt for men who. they suppose, hold this opinion ; and
moreover, that the Spectator will go into many hands where a cor
rection from us of this marvellous misapprehension can never come.
He may hence judge how serious an injury may be done, in one
inconsiderate moment, by ascribing, on utterly insufficient grounds,
obnoxious opinions to his brethren. Let us now see what reason
the gentleman has for this wonderful statement. We had ventured
to agree with the Christian Spectator, No. 2, p. 349, that the doc
trine of original sin could not be consistently held, if that of impu
tation were abandoned. And we had made bold to say, with Presi
dent Edwards,* that the rejection of the doctrine of original sin
rendered redemption unnecessary. Why? Because actual sins
need no redemption, as the author most amazingly supposes ? No.
But because, as Edwards supposed and as we suppose, the salva
tion of men could have been effected without it, by merely preserv
ing pure and unfallen children from sinning, and thus needing a
Saviour. Had our author attempted to show that God could not
do this, or that these doctrines are not thus intimately related, we
should not have had a word to object as to the propriety of such a
course, whatever we might have thought of his arguments. But
that a paragraph, which expresses nothing more than he might find
in any and every Calvinistic book he ever condescended to look
into, should be so interpreted as to make us teach an almost un
heard of doctrine, is indeed passing strange. Why has he not dis
covered and long ago denounced this palpable absurdity of Calvin
ism ? for surely we have said nothing new upon the subject. We
hope, indeed, that the readers of the Spectator will have discrimi
nation enough to see, what that gentleman's rapidity of mind pre
vented his discovering, that the paragraph in question contains no
thing but a common and very harmless opinion, which the majority
of them, we trust, have heard from the nursery and pulpit from
their earliest years. We shall not be expected to say much in re
ply to the " inquiry," " to what age this orthodoxy (making the death
of Christ refer only to original sin) belongs ?" As it is the poles
apart from any doctrine we have ever believed or taught, we feel
no special interest in the investigation. We must, therefore, leave
to the discoverer of the heresy the task of tracing its history. Our
present concern is with the doctrine of imputation.
It has struck us as somewhat surprising, that while the Protest-
* " It will follow," says Edwards, " on our author's principles (that is, on the de
nial of original sin and the assertion of sufficient power to do our duty), not only with
' respect to infants, but even adult persons, that redemption is needless, and Christ is
dead in vain." — On Original Sin, vol. ii., p. 515.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 135
ant represents us as teaching a doctrine involving the greatest ab
surdities, the editors of the Spectator regard the matter in a very
different light. They think we have renounced the old doctrine,
and are now teaching one which is substantially their own. They
say :—
" We have inserted the above communication (the Protestant's) at the particu
lar request of a respected correspondent, whose familiarity with the subject entitles
his inquiries to a serious consideration. We cannot but think, however, that the
question respecting the imputation of Adam's sin to his descendants, has become,
in this country at least, chiefly a dispute about words. The historian, if we under
stand his statements, has abandoned the ground of Edwards and other standard
writere on this subject. He states unequivocally, that Adam's ' first act of trans
gression,' was ' not strictly and properly that of his descendants (for those not yet
born could not perform an act), but interpretatively, or by imputation.' P. 90.
Now Edwards affirms the direct contrary. ' The sin of the apostasy is not theirs
merely because God imputes it to them, but it is truly and properly theirs, and on
that ground God imputes it to them.' — Orig. Sin, p. 4, chap. 3. Stapfer too lays
down the doctrine of imputation in the same way." Again ; " We are glad likewise
to see him proceed one step farther. He not only denies that we had any share in
the act, but even in the guilt of Adam's first sin, in the ordinary acceptation of that
term. He tells us 'that the ill-desert of one man cannot be transferred to an
other ;' that ' imputation does not imply a transfer of moral acts or moral charac
ter, but the opposite of remission.' To impute, according to this explanation of
the term, is simply to hold the descendants of Adam subject to the ' consequences'
of his fall, though not sharing in the act nor its criminality." " Now in this state
ment all who bear the name of Calvinists will unite, and they all regard it as ex
hibiting a cardinal doctrine of the Gospel. And we cannot but think that most of
the disputes on this subject, result simply from a diversity in the use of terms." —
Pp. 342, 343.
We presume the Protestant will consider these remarks of the
editors as reflecting rather severely on his want of discrimination.
Certain it is, that one or the other must be under a great mistake.
For if our statement is substantially one in which " all who bear
the name of Calvinists will unite," and which " they all regard as
exhibiting a cardinal doctrine of the Gospel," then it is very strange
that the Protestant should hold us up as teaching so many absurdi
ties, and so unceremoniously sneer at our orthodoxy. In this
difference between the editors and their correspondent, we very
naturally take sides with the former, and wish to be considered as
teaching nothing but plain common Calvinistic doctrine. There is
a question at issue, however, between the editors and ourselves.
Have we abandoned the old doctrine, as they affirm, or have they
been labouring under a misapprehension as to its nature ? Here
then we have a question of fact, and with the Protestant's permis
sion, we shall appeal to names for its decision.
We would say in the out-set, that the views which we have ex
pressed are those which we have always entertained, and which
we have always understood our brethren, who believe the doctrine
of imputation, to hold. If there is any departure, therefore, in
them from the opinions of " standard writers on the subject," it is a
departure of long standing, and widely extended. We are persuad-

136 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
ded, however, that the Spectator is mistaken as to this point, and
that the view which we have presented of imputation, is that held
by Calvinists and the Reformed churches generally.
As we are not prepared to adopt the Spectator's exposition of
our opinions, we proceed to state how we hold the doctrine in
question. In imputation, there is, first, an ascription of something
to those concerned ; and secondly, a determination to deal with
them accordingly. Sometimes one, and sometimes the other idea
predominates. Thus, in common life, to impute good or bad mo
tives to a man, is to ascribe such motives to him. Here the first
idea alone is retained. But when Shimei prayed David, " Let not
my lord impute iniquity unto me," he prayed that the king would
not lay his sin to his charge, and punish him for it. Here the se
cond predominates. Hence, not to impute is to remit. " Blessed
is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity ;" that is, blessed
is the man whose iniquity is pardoned. To impute sin, therefore,
" is to lay it to the charge of any, and to deal with them according
to its desert." — Owen. If the thing imputed be antecedently ours,
then there is merely a recognizing it as such, and treating us ac
cordingly. If it be not ours, there is necessarily an ascription of it
to us on some ground or other, and a determination to deal with us
according to the merit of the thing imputed. When Paul begged
Philemon to impute to him the debt or offence of Onesimus, he
begged him to regard him as the debtor or offender, and exact of
him whatever compensation he required. When our sins are said
to be imputed to Christ, it is meant that he is treated as a sinner on
account of our sins. And when Adam's sin is said to be imputed
to his posterity, it is intended that his sin is laid to their charge and
they are punished for it, or are treated as sinners on that account.
In all such cases there must be some ground for this imputation ;
that is, for this laying the conduct of one to the charge of another,
and dealing with him accordingly. In the case of Paul it was the
voluntary assumption of the responsibility of Onesimus; so it was
in the case of Christ. The ground of the imputation of Adam's sin
to his posterity, is the union between them, which is two-fold ; a
natural union, as between a father and his children, and the union
of representation, which is the main idea here insisted upon. A
relation admitted on all hands. The Spectator affirms it when he
says " that Adam was not on trial for himself alone," but for his pos
terity also, as is clearly implied in the sentence.
What we deny, therefore, is, first, that this doctrine involves any
mysterious union with Adam, any confusion of our identity with
his, so that his act was personally and properly our act ; and se
condly, that the moral turpitude of that sin was transferred from
him to us ; we deny the possibility of any such transfer. These
are the two ideas which the Spectator and others consider as ne
cessarily involved in the doctrine of imputation, and for rejecting
which, they represent us as having abandoned the old doctrine on

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 137
the subject. We proceed now to show that they are mistaken on
this point.
In proof of this, we would remark in the first place, on a fact that
has always struck us as rather singular, which is, that while those
who hold the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, do, at the
same time, hold the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of Christ's
righteousness to us, we seldom or never hear (from Calvinists at
least), the same objections to the idea of imputation in the two lat
ter cases as in the first. Is there any one who has the hardihood
to charge the whole Calvinistic world (who taught or preach the
doctrine of imputation) with believing, that Christ personally and
properly committed the sins which are said to be imputed to him ?
or that the moral turpitude of these sins was transferred to him ?
Now, we ask, why is this ? Why, if the imputation of Adam's sin
to his posterity supposes that they were the personal actors of his
transgression, the imputation of our sins to Christ does not make
him the agent of our acts ? Why,,since at every turn we are asked
if we have ever repented of Adam's sin, is it not demanded of us if
Christ ever repented of our sins ? We have never been so unhappy
as to have our hearts torn by being told that we believe and teach
that the blessed Saviour was morally a sinner ; that our " moral
character" was transferred to him. If this is imputation, if this
" transfer of moral character" is included in it, we have not words
to express our deep abhorrence of the doctrine. We would hold
no communion with the man who taught it. And if this is what
our brethren mean to charge us with, then is the golden cord of
charity for ever broken ; for what fellowship can there be between
parties, where one accuses the other of blasphemy ? We do not
harbour the idea, however, that our brethren can seriously make
such a charge. Nor can they imagine, that when we speak of the
imputed righteousness of Christ, we are so insane as to mean that
we personally performed the acts of his perfect obedience, and in
person died upon the cross. Neither can they suppose that we
mean to assert that his moral excellence was transferred to us.*
They never ask us whether we feel self-approbation and compla
cency for what Christ did ; why then ask us if we feel remorse and
self-reproach for what Adam did ? We say then, that the fact,
that Calvinists speak in the same terms of the imputation of our
sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us that they use of the
imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, and illustrate the one by
the other, is an a priori argument, we should hope, of conclusive
force to prove that they do not consider either the idea of personal
identification, or the transfer of moral character, as included in the
doctrine of imputation.
There is another presumptive argument as to this point, drawn
* We know there have been some pitiable instances in which such ideas have been
advanced by certain Antinomians ; but we are not speaking of the cKTpapara of the
human head and heart, but of a common doctrine of a large and pious portion of the
Christian world.

138 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
from the common technicalities of theology. What is meant by
calling Adam a public person, a representative, a federal head, as
is so constantly done by those who teach the doctrine of imputa
tion ? Are not these terms intended to express the nature of the
union between Adam and his posterity ? A union of representation
is not a union of identity. If Adam and his race were one and the
same, he was not their representative, for a thing cannot represent
itself. The two ideas are inconsistent. Where the one is asserted,
the other is denied. They therefore who affirm that we sinned in
Adam as a representative, do thereby deny that we sinned in him
personally. When our formularies say that Adam was " a public
person," or representative, and that we " sinned in him," it is to
make them affirm and deny the same thing in the same breath, to
quote them as teaching that we were personally one with him and
personally acted in him. With the same propriety it might be as
serted that Alexander of Russia personally signed the treaty with
the Turks, because he did it in his minister.
The same terms are used in reference to Christ, who is called
the head, representative and substitute of his people, and they all
express the nature of the relation which is the ground of imputa
tion, and are absolutely inconsistent with the idea of personal iden
tity and consequent transfer of moral character. When the Spec
tator, therefore, congratulates us on having rejected a philosophy
which confounds all notions of personal identity, he does so under
a wrong impression. The fact is, there is no philosophy about it.
We do not mean to say that no man has ever philosophized on this
subject, or that there have not been men who taught a mysterious
union of the race with Adam. What we mean to deny is, that such
speculations enter at all into the essence of the doctrine of imputa
tion, or are necessary to it. In every doctrine there are certain
ideas which constitute its formal nature, and make it what it is ; so
that if they are rejected, the doctrine is rejected. It would be the
most unreasonable thing in the world, to require of a man who
undertakes to defend any doctrine, to make good all the explana
tions of it which have ever been given, and to justify all the modes
of expression ever employed respecting it. What a task would
this impose on the advocate of the doctrine of the Trinity, of the
deity of Christ, or of any other doctrine. This is a task which We
would never undertake, and have not now undertaken. Our busi
ness is to make it appear that the notions of personal oneness, com
munity in action, transfer of moral character, are no part of the
doctrine of imputation ; not that none of the schoolmen or scholas
tic divines ever held any of these ideas. For what have they not
held? We know that it is often asserted that Augustine and his
followers held the personal unity of Adam and his race. Doderlein,
Knapp, and Bretschneider all assert it, and assert it one after the
other, on the same grounds. But we would remark in the first place,
that we are not prepared to believe this ; first, because the passages
which these writers produce in proof of their assertion do not make

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 139
it out. The same forms of expression occur in the Bible, and in
the writings of men who expressly reject this idea, and even the
doctrine of imputation itself. Dr. Hopkins uses as strong language
on the connection of Adam and his posterity, as we have ever seen
quoted from Augustine. And secondly, because there are modes
of expression adopted by Augustine on this subject, in explanation
of the ground of imputation, inconsistent with this idea. Turrettin
quotes and explains Augustine thus : " Quicunque, inquit August.,
ep. 106, ex illo multi in seipsis futuri erunt, in illo uno, unus homo
erant, unitate non specifica, vel numerica, sed partim unitate origi-
nis, quia omnes ex uno sunt sanguine, partim unitate repraesenta-
tionis, quia unus omnium personam repraesentabat ex ordine Dei."
— Tom. i., p. 679. According to this, Augustine taught that we
were one in Adam, because he was our common father and com
mon representative, in which there is no mysticism. Let it be ad
mitted, however, that Augustine did give this explanation of the
ground of imputation. Do we reject the doctrine because we reject
the reason which he gives to justify and explain it ? It might with
as much propriety be said that every man rejects the doctrine of
the Trinity, who does not adopt every tittle of Athanasius's expo
sition of it. It is therefore no special concern of ours, what Augus
tine held on this point. What we affiirm is, that this idea is not
essential to the doctrine, and is not embraced by the great body of
its defenders. Any man who holds that there is such an ascription
of the sin of Adam to his posterity, as to be the ground of their
bearing the punishment of that sin, holds the doctrine of imputation ;
whether he undertakes to justify this imputation merely on the
ground that we are the children of Adam, or on the principle of
representation, or of scientia media ; or whether he chooses to phi
losophize on the nature of unity until he confounds all notions of '>
personal identity, as President Edwards appears to have done.
As it is in vain to make quotations before we have fixed the
meaning of the terms which are constantly recurring in them, we
must notice the allegation of the Spectator, as to our incorrect use
of certain words, before we proceed to bring any more direct testi
mony to the fact, that the views which we have given of the doc
trine of imputation are those commonly entertained among Calvin
ists on the subject. The words guilt and punishment are those
particularly referred to. The former we had defined to be, liabili
ty, or exposedness to punishment. We did not mean to say that
the word never included the idea of moral turpitude or criminality.
We were speaking of its theological usage. It is very possible
that a word may have one sense in common life, and another,
somewhat modified, in particular sciences. A legal or theological
sense of a term may, hence, often be distinguished from its ordinary
acceptation. It is, therefore, not much to the purpose, when the
question relates to the correct theological use of a word, to quote
Dr. Webster's Dictionary as an authority on the subject. We must
appeal to usage. Grotius, who, we presume, will be regarded as

in

140 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
a competent witness, in his treatise De Satisfactione Christi, uses
the word constantly in the sense which we have given it. Thus in
the phrase, " De auferendo reatu per remissionis impetrationem apud
Deum." — Opera Theol, vol. iii., p. 333, On p. 336, "Sanguis pe-
cudum tollebat reatum temporalem, non autem reatum spr.tualem."
A little after, "' Hinc KaBapi(ctv est eum reatum tollere, sive efficere
remissionem." In all these cases guilt is that which is removed by
pardon, i. e.. exposure to punishment. Turrettin, " Reatus theolo-
gice dicitur obligatio ad poenam ex peccato." — Tom. i., p. 654.
Owen, " Guilt in scripture is the respect of sin unto the sanction
of the law, whereby the slnriex becomes obnoxious unto punish
ment." — On Justification, p. 280. On the same page ; in sin there
is, " Its formal nature, as it is a transgression of the law ; and the
stain or the filth that it brings upon the soul ; but the guilt of it is
nothing but its respect unto punishment from the sanction of the
law." Again, " He (Christ) was alienae culpae reus. Perfectly in
nocent in himself; but took our guilt upon him, or our obnoxious-
ness unto punishment for sin." Edwards says, " From this it will
follow, that guilt, or exposedness to punishment, &c." — Vol. ii., p.
543. Ridgeley, vol. ii., p. 119, "Guilt is an obligation or liableness
to suffer punishment for sin committed." If there is anything fixed
in theological language, it is this sense of the word guilt. And if
there is anything in which Calvinists are agreed, it is in saying that
when they affirm " that the guilt of Adam's sin has come upon us,"
they mean, exposure to punishment on account of that sin. It
would be easy to multiply quotations, but enough has been pro
duced to convince the Spectator that our sense of the word is not
so " peculiar" as he imagined.
" The word punishment, too," he says, " has a peculiar sense
in the vocabulary of the historian." — P. 344. Here again he ap
peals to Dr. Webster, and here again we must dissent ; not so much
from the doctor's definition, as from the Spectator's exposition of
it. The Dr. says that punishment is " any pain or suffering inflict
ed on a person for a crime or offence." To this we have no spe
cial objection. But that the crime or offence must necessarily
belong personally to the individual punished, as the Spectator
seems to take for granted, we are very far from admitting ; for this
is the very turning point in the whole discussion respecting impu
tation. Punishment, according to our views, is any evil inflicted
on a person, in the execution of a judicial sentence, on account of
sin. That the word is used in this sense, for evils thus inflicted on
one person for the offence of another, cannot be denied. It would
be easy to fill a volume with examples of this usage, from writers
ancient and modern, sacred and profane. We quote a few instan
ces from theologians, as this is a theological discussion. Grotius
(p. 313), in answering the objection of Socinus, that it is unjust that
our sins should be punished in Christ, says, " Sed ut omnis hie er
ror dematur, notandum est, esse quidem essentiale poenae, ut infli-
gatur ob peccatum, sed non item essentiale ei esse, ut infligatur ipsi

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 141
qui peccavit." On the same page, " Puniri alios ob aliorum delicta
non audet negare Socinus." If he uses the word once, he does, we
presume, a hundred times in this sense in this single treatise.
Owen says, "there can be no punishment but with respect to the
guilt of sin personally committed or imputed." — P. 287. Storr and
other modern and moderate theologians, use the word in this sense
perpetually. Storr says, "Jedes durch einen richterlichen Aus-
spruch um der Siinden willen verhangte Leiden, Strafe heisst," that
is, " Every evil judicially inflicted on account of sin, is punishment."
— Zweck des Todes Jesu, p. 585. No one has ever denied that in
its most strict and rigid application, punishment has reference to
personal guilt; but this does not alter the case, for usage, the only
law in such matters, has sanctioned its application in the manner
in which we have used it, and that too among the most accurate of
theological writers.
Having fixed the sense in which these terms are used by the
writers to whom we shall refer, we will now proceed to establish
our position, that the doctrine of imputation, as taught by standard
Calvinistic authors, does not involve, either the idea of a personal
oneness with Adam, so that his act is strictly and properly our act,
or that of the transfer of moral character.
Our first testimony is from Knapp, whom we quote, not as a Cal-
vinist, but as a historian. In his Christliche Glaubenslehre, section
76, he says, " However various the opinions of theologians are re
specting imputation, when they come to explain themselves dis
tinctly on the subject, yet the majority agree in general as to this
point, thit the expression, God imputes the sin of our first parents
to their descendants, amounts to this, God punishes the descendants
on account of the sin of their first parents." This testimony is no
otherwise valuable than as the opinion of an impartial man, as to
the substance of the doctrine. That there are various views, ex
planations, and modes of defending this doctrine, no one ever
dreamed of denying, and it would stand alone, in this respect, if
there were not.
Turrettin (Quaest. ix., p. 678) thus explains his views of this
subject. " Imputation is either of something foreign to us, or pro
perly ours. Sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally
ours, in which sense God imputes to sinners their transgressions,
whom he punishes for crimes properly their own ; and in reference
to what is good, the zeal of Phineas is said to be imputed to him
for righteousness. — Ps. cvi. 31. Sometimes that is imputed which
is without us, and not performed by ourselves ; thus the righteous
ness of Christ is said to be imputed to us, and our sins are imputed
to him, although he has neither sin in himself nor we righteous
ness. Here we speak of the latter kind of imputation, not of the
former, because we are treating of a sin committed by Adam, not
by us." (Quia agitur de peccato ab Adamo commisso, non a
nobis.) We have here precisely the two ideas exdudrd from the
doctrine which we have rejected, and which the Spectator seems

142 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
to think essential to it. For Turrettin says, that in this case the
thing imputed is something without us (extra nos, nee a nobis prae-
stitum), and secondly, the moral turpitude of the act is not trans
ferred, for it is analogous, he tells us, to the imputation of Christ's
righteousness to us, and our sins to him, licet nee ipse peccatum in
se habeat, nee nos justitiam. That there must be some ground for
this imputation is self-evident, and this can only be some relation
or union in which the parties stand to each other. This union,
however, according to Turrettin, is nothing mysterious, nothing
which involves a confusion of identity. The union which is to
serve as the ground of imputation, he says, may be threefold : " 1.
Natural, as between a father and his children ; 2. Moral and poli
tical, as between a king and his subjects ; 3. Voluntary, as among
friends, and between the guilty and his substitute." The bond be
tween Adam and his posterity is twofold : " 1. Natural, as he is the
father, and we are his children. 2. Political and forensic, as he
was the prince and representative head of the whole human race.
The foundation, therefore, of imputation is not only the natural con
nection which exists between us and Adam, since, in that case, all
his sins might be imputed to us, but mainly the moral and federal,
in virtue of which God entered into covenant with him as our
head." All the arguments which Turrettin urges in support of his doc
trine, prove that he viewed the subject as we have represented it.
He appeals, in the first instance, to Rom. v. 12 — 21. The scope of
the passage he takes to be, the illustration of the method of justifi
cation, by comparing it to the manner in which men were brought
under condemnation. As Adam was made the head of the whole
race, so that the guilt of his sin comes on all to condemnation, so
Christ is made the head of his people, and his obedience comes on
all of them to justification. On page 681, he says, "We are con
stituted sinners in Adam in the same way (eadem ratione) in which
we are constituted righteous in Christ ; but in Christ we are con
stituted righteous by the imputation of righteousness. Therefore
we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin, other
wise the comparison is destroyed." Another of his arguments is
derived from the native depravity of men, which he says is a great
evil, and cannot be reconciled with the divine character, unless we
suppose that men are born in this state of corruption as a punish
ment. As this evil has the nature of punishment, it necessarily
supposes some antecedent sin, on account of which it is inflicted,
for there is no punishment but on account of sin. " It cannot, how
ever, be a sin properly and personally ours, because we were not
yet in existence. Therefore it is the sin of Adam imputed to us."
Non potest autem esse peccatum nostrum proprium et personale,
o.uia nondum fuimus actu. Almost the very form of expression
quoted from us by the Spectator to prove that we have abandoned
the old doctrine of imputation.
In order to evince his sense of the importance of the doctrine, he

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 143
remarks on its connection with that of the imputation of the right
eousness of Christ, and says that all the objections urged against
the one, bear against the other ; so that if the one be rejected, the
other cannot stand. We shall give in his own words a passage
from page 689, which appears to us very decisive as to the point
in hand. " Voluntas ergo A dami potest dici singularis actus pro-
prietate, universalis repraesentationis jure, singularis quia ab uno
ex individuis humanis profecta est, universalis quia individuum illud
universum genus humanum repraesentabat. Sic justitia Christi est
actus unius, et bene tamen dicitur omnium fidelium per divinam
imputationem ; ut quod unus fecit, omnes censeantur fecisse, si unus
mortuus est, omnes sunt mortui." — 2 Cor. v. 15. Is it possible to
assert in clearer language, that the act of Adam was personally his
own and only his, and that it is only on the principle of representa
tion that it can be said to be ours ?
These quotations from Turrettin we think abundantly sufficient
to establish our assertion, that the doctrine under consideration nei
ther involves any confusion of personal identity, nor any transfer
of the moral turpitude of Adam's sin to his posterity. As Turrettin is
universally regarded as having adhered strictly to the common
Calvinistic system, and on the mere question of fact as to what that ^
system is, is second to no man in authority, we might here rest our
cause. But we deem this a matter of much practical importance, and
worthy of being clearly established. Misconceptions on this subject
have been, and still are, the means of alienating brethren. They
are the ground of many hard thoughts, and of much disrespectful
language. It is not easy to feel cordially united to men whom we
consider as teaching mischievous absurdities ; nor is it, on the other
hand, adapted to call forth brotherly love to have oneself held up
to the public as inculcating opinions which shock every principle
of common sense, and contradict the plainest moral judgments of
men. We hope, therefore, to be heard patiently, while we attempt
still further to prove that our doctrine is such as has been so often
stated. We refer in the next place to the testimony of Tuckney, not only
because he was a man of great accuracy and learning, but also be
cause he stands in an intimate relation to our church. He was a
member of the Westminster assembly of divines, and of the com
mittee which drafted our confession of faith.* He is said also to
have drawn up a large portion of the larger catechism. He is,
therefore, a peculiarly competent witness as to the sense in which
our formularies mean to teach the doctrine of imputation. In his
Praelectiones Theologicae, read, as royal professor, in the univer
sity of Cambridge, and published in 1679, there is a long and learn
ed discourse on the imputation of Christ's righteousness. In the ex
planation and defence of this doctrine, he enters into an accurate
Reid's Memoirs of the Lives and Writings of the Divines of the Westminster
Assembly, vol ii., p. 187.

14 4 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
investigation of the whole subject of imputation. This discourse
abounds in the minute scholastic distinctions of the day, which it is
not necessary for our purpose to detail. It will be sufficient to
show that his view of the subject is the same as that which we
have presented. In reference to the two passages, 2 Cor. v. 21,
and Rom. v. 18, he says, " We have a most beautiful twofold ana
logy. We are made the righteousness of God in Christ in the same
way that he was made sin for us. That is, by imputation. This
analogy the former passage exhibits. But the other (Rom. v. 18)
presents one equally beautiful. We are accounted righteous
through Christ in the same manner that we are accounted guilty
through Adam. The latter is by imputation, therefore also the for
mer." — P. 234. The same idea is repeatedly and variously pre
sented. As, therefore, he so clearly states, that in all these cases
imputation is of the same nature, if we can show ( f indeed it needs
showing) that he does not teach that our sins are so imputed to
Christ as to make him morally a sinner, or his righteousness to us
as to make us morally righteous, we shall have proved that he
does not teach such an imputation of Adam's sin to h s posterity as
involves a transfer of its moral character. The cardinal Bellarmin,
it seems, in arguing against the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's
righteousness, urged the same objection which we are now con
sidering, maintaining that if Christ's righteousness is imputed to us,
then are we really inherently righteous in the sight of God. To
this Tuckney replies, " Who of us has ever been so much beside
himself as to pretend that he was inherently righteous, in the sense
of Bellarmin, so that he should think himself pure and immacu
late ?" — P. 226. The same sentiment is still more strongly ex
pressed on page 220. " We are not so foolish or blasphemous as
to say, or even think, that the imputed righteousness of Christ ren
ders us formally and subjectively righteous." And adds, we might
as well be made wise and just with the wisdom and integrity of
another. " The righteousness of Christ belongs properly to him
self, and is as inseparable and incommunicable as any other attri
bute of a thing, or its essence itself." Bellarmin, however, as so
often happens in controversies of this nature, admits the very thing
he is contending against. Tuckney quotes him as confessing,
"Christum nobis justitiam factum quoniam satisfecit Patri pro no
bis, et earn satisfactionem ita nobis donat et communicat cum nos
justificat, ut nostra satisfactio et justitia dici possit, atque hoc modo
non esse absurdum si quis diceret nobis imputari Christi justitiam et
merita cum nobis donentur et applicentur ac si nos ipsi Deo satisfe-
cissemus." On which our author remarks, that neither Luther nor
Calvin could more appropriately describe justification by imputed
righteousness. To the other objection of Bellarmin (which proceeds upon the
same erroneous suppos.tion, that imputation conveys the moral
character of the thing imputed), lhat Christ must be regarded as
morally a sinner, if our sins were imputed to him, Tuckney replies,

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 145
" Although we truly say that our sins are imputed to Christ, yet
who of us was ever so blasphemous as to say, that they were so
imputed as if he had actually committed them, or that he was inhe
rently and properly a sinner, as to the stain and pollution of sin."
Bellarmin admitted that our sins were imputed to Christ, quoad
debitum satisfaciendi, and his righteousness to us, quoad satisfac-
tionem, and the Protestants replied, this was all they contended
for. We do not know how it could be more pointedly or variously
denied, that the transfer of moral character is included in this doc
trine. The testimony of Tuckney is the more valuable, as he not
only clearly expresses his own opinion, but utterly denies that any
of his fellow Calvinists ever understood or taught the doctrine in
this manner.
The same views are presented by Owen, who carried matters
as far as most Calvinists are wont to do. In his work on justifica
tion, this subject naturally presents itself, and is discussed at length.
A few quotations will suffice for our purpose. The imputation of
that unto us which is not antecedently our own, he says, may be
various. " Only it must be observed, that no imputation of this
kind is to account them unto whom anything is imputed, to
have done the things themselves that are imputed to them. That
were not to impute, but to err in judgment, and indeed to over
throw the whole nature of gracious imputation. But it is to make
that to be ours by imputation which was not ours before, unto all
the ends and purposes whereunto it would have served if it had
been our own without any such imputation. It is therefore a mani
fest mistake of their own, which some make the ground of a charge
on the doctrine of imputation. For they say, if our sins were im
puted unto Christ, then must he be esteemed to have done what we
have done amiss, and so be the greatest sinner that ever was : and
on the other side, if his righteousness be imputed unto us, then are
we esteemed to have done what he did, and so stand in no need of
pardon. But this is contrary unto the nature of imputation, which
proceeds on no such judgment, but, on the contrary, that we our
selves have done nothing of what is imputed unto us ; nor Christ
anything of what was imputed unto him." — P. 236.
Again, on the same page, " Things that are not our own origi
nally, personally, inherently, may yet be imputed unto us, ex justi
tia, by the rule of righteousness. And this may be done upon a
double relation unto those whose they are, 1, federal ; 2, natural.
Things done by one may be imputed unto others, propter relatio-
nem foederalem, because of a covenant relation between them. So
the sin of Adam was, and is imputed unto all his posterity, as we
shall afterwards more fully declare. And the ground hereof is, that
we stood in the same covenant with him, who was our head and
representative." Here then it is asserted that the sin of Adam is not ours, " origi
nally, personally, inherently," and that the ground of imputation
10

146 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
is not a mystic oneness of person, but the relation of representa
tion. On page 242 he says, " This imputation (of Christ's righteousness)
is not the transmission or transfusion of the righteousness of another
into them that are to be justified, that they should become perfect
ly and inherently righteous thereby. For it is impossible that the
righteousness of one should be transfused into another, to become
his subjectively and inherently." Neither is it possible, according
to Owen, that the unrighteousness of one should be transfused into
another. For these two cases are analogous, as he over and over
asserts ; thus, p. 307, " As we are made guilty by Adam's actual
sin, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us ; so are we
made righteous by the righteousness of Christ which is not inherent
in us, but only imputed to us." On page 468 he says, " Nothing is
intended by the imputation of sin unto any, but the rendering them
justly obnoxious unto the punishment due unto that sin. As the not
imputing of sin is the freeing of men from being subject or liable
unto punishment."
It would be easy to multiply quotations to almost any extent on
this subject, from the highest authorities, but we hope that enough
has been said to convince our. readers that the doctrine of the im
putation of Adam's sin includes neither the idea of any mysterious
union of the' human race with him, so that his sin is strictly and
properly theirs, nor that of a transfer of moral charcter. This we
are persuaded is the common Calvinistic doctrine.
It is proper to state, however, that there is another theory on
this subject. About the middle of the seventeenth century, Pla-
caeus, professor in the French Protestant school at Saumur, reject
ed the doctrine of imputation, and taught that original sin consisted
solely in the inherent native.depravity of men. In consequence of
his writings, a national synod was called in 1644-5, in which this
doctrine was condemned. The decree of the synod, as given by
Turrettin and De Moor, is in these words ; " Cum relatum esset ad
synodum, scripta quaedam alia typis evulgata, alia manu exarata
prodiisse, quae totam rationem peccati originalis sola corruptione
haereditaria, in omnibus hominibus inhaerente definiunt, et primi
peccati Adami imputationem negant: Damnavit Synodus doctri-
nam ejusmodi, quatenus peccati originalis naturam ad corruptionem
haereditariam posterorum Adae ita restringit, ut imputationem ex-
cludat primi illius peccati, quo lapsus est Adam : Adeoque censuris
omnibus ecclesiasticis subjiciendos censuit, Pastores, Professores,
et quoscunque alios, qui in hujus quaestionis disceptatione a com-
muni sententia recesserint ecclesiarum Protestantium, quae omnes
hactenus et corruptionem illam, etimputationem hanc in omnes Ada-
mi posteros descendentem agnoverunt, &c." — Tur., p. 677.
In order to evade the force of this decision, Placaeus proposed
the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation. Ac
cording to the latter (which is the common view), the sin of Adam
is imputed to all his posterity, as the ground of punishment antece
dently to inherent corruption, which in fact results from the penal

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 147
withholding of divine influences ; but according to the former, the
imputation is subsequent to the view of inherent depravity, and is
founded upon it as the ground of our being associated with Adam
in his punishment. This distinction, which Turrettin says was ex
cogitated ad fucum faciendum, merely retains the name, while the
doctrine of imputation is really rejected. " For if the sin of Adam
is only said to be imputed to us mediately, because We are rendered
guilty in the sight of God, and obnoxious to punishment on account
of the inherent corruption which we derive from Adam, there is
properly no imputation of Adam's sin, but only of inherent corrup
tion."— P. 677.
Our readers may find a long account of the controversy which
arose on this question in De Moor's Commentary on Mark's Com
pend, vol. iii., p. 262, et seq. One of the most interesting works
which appeared at this time, was the tract by the celebrated Rivet,
intended to prove that all the Protestant churches and leading di
vines held the doctrine of imputation as it was presented by the
national synod of France, in opposition to Placaeus. In a com
mendation of this work, the professors of theology at Leyden ex
press their grief, that among other doctrines recently agitated in
France, that of the imputation of Adam's sin had been called in
question, " Cum tamen eo negato, nee justa esse possit originalis
naturae humanae corruptio, et facilis inde via sit ad negationem
imputations justitiae secundi Adami." While they rejoiced in the
unanimous decision of the French synod, they deeply regretted that
any should disregard it, and endeavour to disseminate a doctrine
" contrarium communi omnium ferme Christianorum consensui, so-
lis Pelagii et Socini discipulis exceptis." They recommend strong
ly the work of their colleague, Rivet, who, they say, had endea
voured, " Synodi nationalis decretum tueri, dogma vere Catholicum
stabilire, bene sentientes in veritate confirmare, aberrantes in viam
reducere auctoritatibus gravibus, et universali totius orbis Christi
anorum consensu." — Opera Riveti, tom. iii., p. 223, or De Moor,
tom. iii., p. 274.
Instead of writing an article, we should be obliged to write a
volume, if we were to take up and fully discuss all the subjects, re
levant and irrelevant, presented in the Protestant's inquiries. We
have followed our own judgment in the selection of" topics, and
touched on those points which we thought most likely to be inte
resting and useful. We feel, therefore, perfectly authorized to dis
miss, at least for the present, the history of this doctrine. Turret-
tin, the French synod, the professors of Leyden, the Augsburg
Confession, assert as strongly as we have done, its general preva
lence among orthodox Christians. The second article of the
Augsburg Confession runs thus ; " Item docent, quod post lapsum
Adae, omnes homines naturali modo propagati nascentes habeant
peccatum originis. Intelligimus autem peccatum originis, quod sic
vocant Sancti Patres, et omnes orthodoxi et pie eruditi in Ecclesia,
videlicet reatum, quo nascentes propter Adae lapsum rei sunt irae

148 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
Dei et mortis aeternae, et ipsam corruptionem humanae naturae
propagatam ab Adamo." These quotations will at least satisfy
our readers that we have not been more rash in our assertions than
many others before us, and is as much, we think, as the Protes
tant's inquiry on this point calls for. Our principal concern is with
the editors of the Spectator, who have presented the most interest
ing subject of investigation. We revert, therefore, to their state
ment, that Edwards, Stapfer, and "other standard writers on the
subject," taught the doctrine of imputation differently from what we
have done. That this is not correct, as relates to the great body
of the Reformed Theologians, we have, we think, sufficiently proved.
How the case stands with Edwards and Stapfer we shall now pro
ceed to inquire.
As Edwards appears to have borrowed, in some measure, his
views on this subject from Stapfer, we shall begin with the latter.
We must, in the outset, dissent from the remark of the Spectator,
that Stapfer is to be regarded as a " standard writer" on the doc
trine of imputation. So far from it, the synod of Berne refused to
sanction his views on the subject, as inconsistent with the doctrines
of the reformed churches.* And in his work, as now printed, he
apologizes for his statements on this point, and endeavours to make
it appear that they do not involve a departure from the common
doctrine (Theol. Pol., vol. iv., p. 562), with h*ow much success the
reader may judge. On page 156, in answer to the common objection
that imputation is inconsistent with justice, he says, in substance, no
one could accuse God of injustice, if in virtue of a divine constitution,
had Adam remained holy, his posterity had been holy also ; and
therefore no one should complain, if in virtue of the same constitu
tion, they are born in the image of their unholy progenitor. He
then says expressly, this is the whole amount of imputation, " Pec
cati autem primi imputatio in nulla alia re consistit quam quod pos-
teri ejus et eodem loco habentur et similes sunt parenti." And
plainer still a little afterwards, " dum Adamo similem dare sobolem,
et peccatum ejus imputare unum idemque." This, as we under
stand it, is precisely Dr. Hopkins's doctrine ; that in virtue of a di
vine constitution the posterity of Adam were to have the same
moral character that he had. This too is the Spectator's doctrine ;
he says, " That Adam was not on trial for himself alone, but by a
divine constitution, all his descendants were to have in their natural
state, the same character and state with their progenitor."  P. 348.
And yet these brethren denounce in no very measured terms the
old doctrine of imputation. It is rather singular, therefore, that
they should quote Stapfer as a " standard writer" on that doctrine,
who asserts their own view nearly totidem verbis. As to the pas
sage which the Spectator produces to prove that he held the old
* This statement is made confidently, although from memory. In the first copy of
his work which fell into our hands this fact is stated, and our impression of its cor
rectness is confirmed by the nature of his opinions as now presented, and his apology
for them.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 149
doctrine as they understand it (that is, as including personal union
and transfer of character), it amounts to very little. The passage
is this : " God in imputing this sin (Adam's) finds this whole moral
person (the human race) already a sinner, and not merely con
stitutes it such." He says, indeed, that Adam and his race form
one moral person, and so would Turrettin and Tuckney, and so
would we, and yet one and all deny that there was any personal
union. The very epithet moral, shows that no such idea is intend
ed. When lawyers call a corporation of a hundred men a legal
person, we do not hear that philosophy is called in to explain how
this can be. And there is no need of her aid to explain how Adam
and his race are one, in the sense of common Calvinists. But he
says, God finds " this whole moral person already a sinner !" yes,
he denies antecedent and immediate imputation, and teaches that it
is from the view and on the ground of inherent hereditary depravity
imputation takes place. This is mediate imputation, "quae hae-
reditariae corruptionis in nos ab Adamo derivatae intuitum conse-
quitur, eaque mediante fit ;" and which Turrettin says is no impu
tation at all, "nomen imputationis retinendo, rem ipsam de facto
tollit." Though we do not believe that Stapfer held either of the
ideas which the Spectator attributes to him, identity or transfer, it
is of little account to us what his views on those points were, as we
think it clear that he rejected the doctrine of imputation, as held by
the Reformed generally. He appeals indeed to Vitringa and
Lampe to bear out his statements. How it was with the former we
do not pretend to say, but as to Lampe, the very passage which
Stapfer quotes contradicts his theory. Lampe says, " Gott hatte
die Nackkommen Adams nicht in Siinden lassen gebohren werden,
wenn seine Schuld nicht auf seine Nachkommen ware iibergegan-
gen ;" i. e., " God would not have permitted the descendants of
Adam to be born in sin, if his guilt had not eome upon them."
Here the guilt of Adam {exposure to punishment on account of his
sin) is represented as antecedent to corruption and assumed to jus
tify it, and not consequent on the view of it. This is the old doc
trine. That this is the fact, is plain from the quotations which we-
have already made. "Imputation being denied," say the Leyden
divines, "inherent corruption cannot be just." So Turrettin and
Calvinists generally argue ; of course imputation is antecedent to
corruption. The Spectator must have seen that Stapfer's state
ment was inconsistent with the old doctrine, had he recollected how
often it is objected to that doctrine, " that sin cannot be the punish
ment of sin."*
We are inclined to think that president Edwards agreed with
Stapfer in his views of this subject ; because he quotes from him
'with approbation the very passage which we have just produced ;
and because his own statements amount to very much the same
* We do not teach, however, " that sin is the punishment of sin." The punish
ment we suffer for Adam's sin is abandonment on the part of God, the withholding of
divine influences ; corruption is consequent on this abandonment.

150 THE doctrine OF IMPUTATION.
thing. In vol. ii., p. 544, he says, " The first being of an evil dis
position in a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve the
sin of his first father, so far as to imply a full and perfect consent
of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a consequence of
the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of
Adam's own heart in the act of sinning ; which was not consequent
on the imputation, but rather prior to it in the order of nature. In
deed the derivation of the evil disposition to Adam's posterity, or
rather, the co-existence of the evil disposition implied in Adam's
first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the
union that the wise Author of the world has established between
Adam and his posterity ; but not properly a consequence of the im
putation of his sin ; nay, it is rather antecedent to it, as it was in
Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of
that sin, are both the consequence of that established union ; but
yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of
guilt consequent, as it was in the case of Adam himself." We think
that Edwards here clearly asserts the doctrine of mediate imputa
tion ; that is, that the charge of the guilt of Adam's sin is conse
quent on depravity of heart. According to the common doctrine,
however, imputation is antecedent to this depravity, and is assumed
to account for it, that is, to reconcile its existence with God's jus
tice. The doctrine of Edwards is precisely that which was so for
mally rejected when presented by Placaeus. Turrettin in the very
statement of the question says, " It is not inquired whether the sin
of Adam may be said to be imputed to us, because, on account of
original sin inherent in us (depravity of heart), we deserve to be
viewed as in the same place with him, as though we had actually
committed his sin," p. 678, " but the question is, whether his sin is
imputed to his posterity, with an imputation, not mediate and con
sequent, but immediate and antecedent." It is of the latter he says,
" nos cum orthodoxis affirmamus." The imputation consequent on
depravity of heart is precisely that which the old Calvinists declared
was no imputation at all of Adam's sin, and which they almost with
one voice rejected. It is on the ground of this theory that Edwards
says, as Stapfer had done, that "the sin of the apostasy is not theirs
(mankind's) merely because God imputes it to them ; but it is truly
and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them."
P. 559. That is, imputation, instead of being antecedent, is conse
quent, and founded on the view of inherent depravity. When the
Spectator, therefore, quotes this sentence as contradicting our state
ment, we readily admit the fact. It not only contradicts us, how
ever, but is, as we have shown, utterly inconsistent with the doc
trine of imputation as taught in the Reformed churches. To say,
either that the sin of Adam is imputed to us, because it is inherent
in us (or is truly and properly ours), or that it becomes thus in
herent, or thus ours, by being imputed, is, as Owen, Turrettin, Rivet
and others over and over affirm, to overthrow the whole nature of
imputation. It might with as much justice be asserted, that the

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 151
righteousness of Christ is first inherently and subjectively ours, and
on that ground is imputed to us : or that our sins were subjectively
the sins of Christ, and on that ground were imputed to him. Tur
rettin, in so many words, asserts the very reverse of what Edwards
maintains. The latter says, " the sin is truly and properly ours ;"
the former, " non potest esse peccatum nostrum proprium et per-
sonale." The fact is, that Edwards's whole discourse on this subject was
intended more to vindicate the doctrine of native depravity than
that of imputation. It is for this purpose that he enters into his
long and ingenious, though unsatisfactory argument on the nature
of unity, and the divinely constituted oneness of Adam and his race.
He hoped, in this way, the more readily to account for the exist
ence of moral corruption, and this he makes the ground of imputa
tion. We are surely, therefore, not to be burdened with the de
fence of Edwards's theory on this subject, which, we think, we have
abundantly shown is not the doctrine commonly received among -
Calvinists, but utterly inconsistent with it. As he had rejected all
of imputation but the name, it is no matter of surprise that his fol
lowers soon discarded the term itself, and contented themselves -^
with expressing the substance of his doctrine in much fewer words,
viz. that God, agreeably to a general constitution, determined that
Adam's posterity should be like himself; born in his moral image,
whether that was good or bad. This is Stapfer's doctrine, almost
in so many words ; and Edwards quotes and adopts his lan
guage. We are bound in candour, however, to state that we are not able
to reconcile the view here given of Edwards's doctrine, with seve
ral passages which occur in his work on Original Sin. Thus, in p.
540, he says, " I desire it may be noted, that I do not suppose the
natural depravity of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course
of nature only : it is also owing to the just judgment of God." And
in the same paragraph, " God, in righteous judgment, continued to
absent himself from Adam after he became a rebel ; and withheld
from him now those influences of the Holy Spirit which he before (
had. And just thus I suppose it to be with every natural branch of
mankind : all are looked upon as sinning in and with their common
root ; and God righteously withholds special influences and spiritual
communications from all, for this sin." But how is this ? If these
special influences are withheld " for this sin," and as a " righteous
judgment," then assuredly the sin for which this righteous judgment
is inflicted, must be considered as already theirs, and not first im
puted after the existence of the depravity resulting from these in
fluences being withheld. According to Edwards, depravity results
from withholding special divine influences, and according to this
passage, the withholding these influences is a just judgment for
Adam's sin ; then of course this sin is punished before the depravity
exists ; but it cannot be punished before it is imputed ; the imputa
tion, therefore, according to this passage, is antecedent to the de-

152 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
pravity. But according to the other passage quoted above, the de
pravity is first and the imputation subsequent. We are unable to
reconcile these two statements. The one teaches immediate and
antecedent imputation, which is the old doctrine ; the other mediate
and consequent, which the old writers considered as a virtual de
nial of that doctrine. However this reconciliation is to be affected,
we have said enough to show that neither Stapfer nor Edwards
can be considered '¦ standard writers on this subject," and that old
Calvinists are under no obligations to defend their statements.
We hope our readers are now convinced that we have made
good our position, that neither the personal identity of Adam and
his posterity, community in act, nor transfer of moral character, form
any part of the doctrine of imputation as taught by standard Cal
vinistic writers.
We have left ourselves very little room to notice the Protestant's
difficulties. As they are almost all founded upon misapprehension,
they are already answered by the mere statement of the doctrine.
On p. 340 he has the following sentences : " The writer in question
holds, that the sin of Adam was imputed to all his posterity, to their
guilt, condemnation and ruin, without any act on their part." P. 90.
Of course, then, from the moment they began to exist, that moment
they were involved in this imputation. This he does not expressly
affirm, by adopting, on p. 94, the statement of " ancient commenta
tors," that David " contracted pollution in his conception." Here
are two great mistakes. First, the writer does not discriminate be
tween imputation and inherent depravity. He grounds his asser
tion, that we teach that all men are involved in the imputation of
Adam's sin from the first moment of their existence, because we
said that David was conceived in sin ; as though these two things
were one and the same. He should have remembered that Dr.
Dwight, and a multitude of others, hold one of these doctrines and
reject the other. The Spectator, who understands the subject bet
ter, says, that we teach that " native depravity is a punishment in
flicted on us for the sin of Adam." We hardly teach, however,
that the punishment is the thing punished. This confusion of the
imputation of Adam's sin and inherent depravity runs through this
writer's whole piece, and vitiates all his arguments. The second
mistake here is, that imputation makes the thing imputed subjective
ly ours ; which is a contradiction in terms, or as Owen says, is "to
overthrow that which is affirmed." " To be alienae culpae reus,
makes no man a sinner." The same mistake is the ground of his
inquiry, how Paul could say of Jacob and Esau, before their birth,
that they had done neither good nor evil, if the doctrine of imputa
tion is correct? This doctrine does not affirm that they had done
either good or evil. When it is affirmed that the sin of Adam is
imputed to them, it is thereby said that they did not commit it, and
that it is not subjectively theirs.
Most of the other difficulties of the Protestant are founded on the
principle that " a knowledge of law and duty is necessary, in order

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 153
that sin should exist." Supposing we should admit this, rwhat
has it to do with imputation ? There have been men who adopted
this principle and built their theology upon it, who still hold this
doctrine. The whole difficulty results from the Protestant not dis
criminating between two very different things, the imputation of
Adam's sin, and native depravity. All his queries founded on this
principle, go to show that children cannot be morally depraved be
fore they are moral agents, but have nothing to do with imputation.
This is not the time or place to answer these inquiries, but we
would ask in our turn, how Adam could be holy before he volunta
rily obeyed the law, as the Protestant perhaps still holds, if a child
may not be unholy before he voluntarily transgresses it?
The true question appears to have glimmered for a moment on
the Protestant when he asked : " Is it a scripture doctrine that the
guilt of others is imputed to men as their own ?" What does this
mean ? Does he intend to ask whether the (moral) guilt of one
man is ever transferred or transfused into others ? We apprehend
not. The question here must be tantamount to this : Is the sin of
one man ever punished in another ? for he asks, how is this impu
tation of guilt to be reconciled with Ezek. xviii. 20 ? " The son
shall not bear the iniquity of the father ; neither shall the father
bear the iniquity of the son, &c." The Protestant will hardly
maintain that the Israelites, to whose murmurs the prophet gave
this reply, believed that the sins of their fathers were infused into
them, their " moral character" transferred to them. Their com
plaint was ; " The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's
teeth are set on edge," that is, our fathers sinned and we are pun
ished for it. To be punished for the sin of another, then, is, ac
cording to the Protestant's doctrine, for this once at least, to have
the guilt of that sin imputed. This is our doctrine too. Now, does
the gentleman mean to ask whether it is a scripture doctrine that
one man ever bears the iniquity of another ? If he does, it is easily
answered. God says of himself that he is a jealous God, "visiting
the iniquities of the fathers upon their children," a solemn and often
repeated declaration. — Ex. xx. 25, xxxiv. 37 ; Num. xiv. 18. Job
says from his observation of divine providence, " How oft is the
candle of the wicked put out ? God layeth up his iniquity for his
children." — xx. 19. Jeremiah says, " Thou recompensest the ini
quities of the fathers into the bosoms of their children after them."
— xxxii. 18. Lament v. 7, he says, " Our fathers sinned and are
not ; and we have borne their iniquities." Surely the gentleman's
question is answered in the only sense it can possibly bear in the
connection in which it stands. If it be said that these expressions
are to be taken in a general and popular sense, and not as affirming
the doctrine of imputation ; very well — then why quote them on
the subject ? The one form affirms precisely what the other, in a
given case, denies. As to the question, how the assertion that one
man ever bears the iniquities of another (i. e. the doctrine of impu
tation), is to be reconciled with Ezekiel, it is no special concern of

154 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
ours. That is, it is as much obligatory on the Protestant as on us, to
say how two passages, one of which affirms and another denies the
same thing, are to be brought into harmony. One thing however
is certain, that Ezekiel cannot be so construed as to assert that no
man ever has, nor ever shall bear the iniquity of another ; for this
would make him contradict positively what is more than once as
serted in the word of God. The context, it is presumed, will show
the meaning of the prophet, and the extent to which his declaration
is to be carried. The Jews complained that they had been driven
into exile, not for their own sins, but for those of their fathers. The
prophet tells them they had no need to look further than to them
selves, but should repent and turn unto God ; and assures them that
they should have no more any occasion to use that proverb, " The
fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on
edge ;" but that the principle on which God would administer his
government towards them would be, that every man should bear
his own burden. Is anything more asserted in this passage than a
general purpose of God as to his dealings with his people ? And is
there anything inconsistent in this general declaration, with those
other passages in which one man is said, under peculiar circum
stances, to bear the iniquity of another ? And can such a passage, con
taining nothing more than a general principle, from which, even as
it regards temporal affairs, there are many solemn departures record
ed in the word of God, be brought up in contradiction to other solemn
declarations, in which God declares he would act upon a different
principle ? This passage asserts nothing in opposition to any doc
trine of ours. We admit, in its full force, that it is a general prin
ciple in the divine government, that every man shall bear his own
burden ; but we do not admit that because this is the case, there
can be no such connection between one man and another, that one
may not justly bear the iniquity of the other. A declaration, there
fore, which, at most, has reference only to the private and personal
sins of individuals, bound together by no other tie than consan
guinity, and which, even there, is only true as a general principle,
can never with any propriety be made the ground of an argument
in reference to cases entirely dissimilar. The Protestant, however,
may be much better qualified than we are, to reconcile the declara
tion of Ezekiel with those quoted from Moses and Jeremiah, and
with the obvious departures from the principle it contains, recorded
in the word of God and observed in his providence, and it is surely
as much his concern to do this as ours.
The concession which the gentleman has here unintentionally
made, is, however, important. According to him, for one man to
bear the iniquity of another, is to have his guilt imputed to him.
This is our doctrme, and the doctrine of the Reformed churches.
This is what is meant by imputation, and nothing more nor less.
That this is the case is evident, not only from the numerous quota
tions already made, but also from the fact that Calvinists constant
ly appeal to those passages in which Christ is said to have borne

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 155
our sins, as teaching this doctrine. He is said to bear our iniqui
ties, precisely in the sense in which in Ezekiel it is declared that
" the son shall not bear the iniquities of the father." If, therefore,
as the Protestant thinks, the passage in Ezekiel denies the doctrine,
the other passages must assert it in reference to Christ. Now let it
be remembered, that these Calvinists affirm that we bear the sin of
Adam, in the same sense (eadem ratione, eadem modo) in which
Christ bore our sins, and what becomes of all his objections ?
Our wonder is, that when the Protestant had caught the glimpse
of the doctrine which is betrayed in this paragraph, he should in
the very next entirely lose sight of it, and ask, " Whether the first
principles of moral consciousness do not decide, that sin, in its pro
per sense, is the result of what we have done ourselves ; not of
what was done for us without our knowledge or consent ? I ask,
in what part of the Bible are we called upon to repent of Adam's
sin ? And finally, whether the historian would honestly say, with
all his attachment to the opinions of the fathers, that he has ever so
appropriated Adam's sin to himself as truly to recognise it as his own,
and to repent of it as such ?" — P. 342. That is, imputed sin be
comes personal sin. The old mistake. Just before, to impute the
sin of one man to another, was not to render that sin personally his,
but merely to cause the one " to bear the iniquity" of the other, in
the Hebrew sense of that phrase. He never could have imagined
that when Ezekiel declared " the son shall not bear the iniquity of
the father," he meant to say, that the son shall not have his father's
sin made personally and subjectively his ; when he quoted the
prophet, therefore, he must have seen that to impute sin, meant to
cause those to whom it is imputed to bear the punishment of it. We
regret that our author did not arrive at this idea sooner, and that
he did not retain it longer, as it would have saved him the trouble
of asking all these questions, and us the trouble of answering
them. We have frequently been asked by young men if we have ever
repented of Adam's sin, and have uniformly, to their obvious dis
comfort, answered in the negative. Knowing the sense in which
the question was put, it would have confirmed their misconceptions
to have answered otherwise. We have never so appropriated that
sin as to recognise it as properly and personally our own, or as the
ground of personal remorse. We have always considered this
question as unreasonable as it would be to ask us, if we have ever
felt self-approbation and complacency for the imputed righteous
ness of Christ. That there is a very just and proper sense in which \
we should repent of the, sin of Adam, we readily admit ; and are '
perfectly aware that old writers insist much upon the duty. Not
however on the principle that his sin is personally ours, or that its
moral turpitude is transferred from him to us ; but on the principle ,
that a child is humbled and grieved at the misconduct of a father ; j
or that we are called upon to repent of the sins of our rulers, or of

156 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
our nation, or of our church (as was the case with the Corinthians) ;*
not as personally guilty of their sins, but in virtue of the relation in
which we stand to them. It is just and proper, too, that we should
recognize the justice of that constitution by which we bear the sin
of our first father, remembering " that he was not on trial for himself
alone," but also for us, and consequently that we fell when he fell,
and should, therefore, bow before God as members of an apostate
and condemned race.
We have now gone over those inquiries of the Protestant which
we consider it important to notice, and answered them to the best
of our ability. If there is anything in our reply adapted to disturb
Christian harmony and brotherhood, we shall deeply regret it.
Some apology, however, will be found in the fact, that we have
been held up by the Protestant to the contempt and reprobation'of the
public for doctrines which we never held, and which we never, even
in appearance, advanced. As this has been done ignorantly, we feel
no manner of unkindness towards the writer, whoever he may be,
although we think he was bound to understand what our doctrines
were, before he thus unqualifiedly denounced them. There is not
here a mere misapprehension of our meaning, which might be as
much attributable to our want of perspicuity as to his want of dis
crimination ; but there is an entire misapprehension of the whole
doctrine of imputation, as held by common Calvinists. We are
aware that some excuse for this is to be found in the manner
in which President Edwards has presented the subject. But
a man who undertakes to write on any doctrine, and especially se
verely to censure his brethren, ought to extend his views beyond
one solitary writer, who, as in the case before us, may prove to be
no fair representative of its advocates.
Our main object has been attained if we have succeeded in disa
busing the minds of those brethren who have been accustomed to
reject and contemn the doctrine of imputation, under the impression
that it teaches a " oneness with Adam in action," and a " transfer
of moral acts or moral character" from him to us. That this is
not the doctrine, we hope we have abundantly proved. Nothing
more is meant by the imputation of sin, than to cause one man to
bear the iniquity of another. If, therefore, we bear the punishment
of Adam's sin, that sin is imputed to us ; if Christ bore the punish
ment of our sins, those sins were imputed to him ; and if we are
justified on the ground of Christ's righteousness, that righteousness
is imputed to us.' The question here arises, is this scriptural doc
trine ? As this, after all, is the main point, we regret that our limits
absolutely forbid a full and satisfactory answer. As the decision
of this question turns on principles which it would require much
time and space fully to discuss, it would be in vain to argue about
details while these principles remain unsettled. The difference of
* This is one of the cases to which old writers refer for. illustration. See Good
win's Works, vol. iii., p. 372.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 157
opinion on this subject, although manifested here, does not com
mence at this point, its origin lies further back, in diversity of views
on the divine character and government.
Let us see, however, what the difference between our brethren
and us as to the doctrine of imputation really is. They agree
with us in saying that Adam was the federal head and representa
tive of his race. Many of them use this precise language ; and the
Spectator employs a mode of expression perfectly tantamount to it
when he says, " Adam was not on trial for himself alone," but for
his posterity. They agree with us also in saying that the des
cendants of Adam suffer the consequences of his fall. What these
consequences are, is a subject on which there is great diversity of
opinion. Many maintain that the only direct consequence of the
fall is mortality, or liability to temporal death ; others, as Dr.
Dwight (who may be taken as an example of a large class), say
that depravity or corruption of nature is this consequence ;* others,
as the Spectator, " that by a divine constitution, all his descendants
were to have in their natural state the same character and condition
with their progenitor ; the universality and certainty of sin, there
fore, are not the result of imitation or accidental circumstances, but
of a divine constitution" (p. 343) ; others again, as the old Calvin
ists, say that the consequence of the fall was, that the same penalty
which Adam incurred, came upon his posterity. Now it is evident
that there is one difficulty, and it is the main one, which presses all
these schemes in common, viz., that all mankind are made subject
" to those consequences which Adam brought upon himself person
ally by his fall." — Spectator, p. 343. It is~ therefore evidently un-
candid, though very common, for those who deny the doctrine of
imputation, to represent this difficulty as bearing exclusively on that
doctrine. They ask, with the utmost confidence, how it can be
reconciled with the justice or goodness of God, that millions of in
nocent beings should suffer for a crime which they never commit
ted ? as though this difficulty did not press their own theory with
equal (and we think tenfold greater) force. For what greater evil
for moral and immortal beings can there be, than to be born " con
taminated in their moral nature," as Dr. Dwight teaches ; or under
a divine constitution, as the Spectator says, which secures " the
universality and certainty of sin," and that too with undeviating
and remorseless effect. It is, as Coleridge well says, " an outrage on
common sense," to affirm that it is no evil for men to be placed on
their probation under such circumstances, that not one of ten
* See his Sermon on Human Depravity derived from Adam. His doctrine is that
" human corruption" is the consequence of Adam's sin. By corruption he means de
pravity of heart, or nature, antecedent to actual transgressions, or to moral agency.
Because, he says, "Infants are contaminated in their moral nature, and born in the
likeness of apostate Adam." This is irresistibly proved, he says, " by the depraved
moral conduct of every infant who lives so long as to be capable of moral action." —
P. 486, vol. i. Again, on p. 485, he says this depravity is proved by the death of in
fants. " A great part of mankind die in infancy, before they are or can be capable of
moral action, in the usual meaning of that phrase."

158 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
thousand millions ever escaped sin and condemnation to eternal
death. It is therefore idle to assert that there is no evil inflicted on
us in consequence of Adam's sin, antecedent to our own personal
transgressions. It matters not what this evil is, whether temporal
death, corruption of nature, " certainty of sin," or death in its more
extended sense ; if the ground of the evil's coming on us is Adam's
sin, the principle is the same.
The question then is, is this evil of the nature of punishment ? If
it is, then the doctrine of imputation is admitted ; if not, it is denied.
The Spectator thinks this a mere dispute about words. We think
very differently. A principle is involved in the decision of this
question, which affects very deeply our views, not only of the na
ture of our relation to Adam, and of original sin, but also of the
doctrines of atonement and justification ; the most vital doctrines of
the Christian system. The distinction on which so much stress is
laid by many who deny the doctrine of imputation, between mere
natural consequences and penal evils, though it may be correct in
itself, is not applicable to the case before us. An evil does not
cease to be penal, because it is a natural consequence. Almost all
the punishment of sin is the natural consequence of sin : it is accord
ing to the established course of nature (i. e., the will of God, the
moral governor of the world), that excess produces suffering, and
the suffering, under the divine government, is the punishment of the
excess. Sin produces, and is punished by remorse. The fire that
" is not quenched," and " the worm that never dies," may, for what
we know, be the natural effect of sin. It matters not, therefore,
whether mortality in Adam and his descendants be a natural con
sequence of eating the forbidden fruit (from its poisonous nature),
which is a very popular theory, or whether death is a direct and posi
tive infliction. Nor would it alter the case if native depravity was
a natural result, as many suppose, of the same forbidden fruit, by
giving undue excitability and power to the lower passions ; because
these effects result from the appointment of God, who is the author
of the course of nature, and were designed by him to be the pun
ishment of sin. We think the position of Storr is perfectly correct,
that the consequences of punishment are themselves punishment, in
so far as they were taken into view by the judge in passing sen
tence, and came within the scope of his design. — Zweck des Todes
Jesu, p. 585.
But, admitting the correctness of this distinction, we do not see
how it is applicable to the present case, that is, how Dr. Dwight,
and those who think with him, would make it appear that the
moral corruption of the whole human race was the natural conse
quence of Adam's sin ; much less how the Spectator can make it
out, that " the universality and certainty of sin" is the natural con
sequence of that offence. Indeed, he appears to abandon that
ground when he says that this certainty is by " divine constitution."
Here then is an evil, not even a natural consequence, our being
born under a constitution which secures the certainty of our being

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 159
sinners, and the ground or reason of this evil is of course not our
own sin, but the sin of Adam. Is this evil a penalty ? According
to our view, it unquestionably is. It is an evil judicially inflicted on
account of sin ; it comes from God as the moral governor of the
world. The Spectator, however, and many others, deny that the
evils we suffer on account of Adam's sin are of the nature of pun
ishment. The ground on which they do this, is, that it is utterly (
unjust that the punishment due to one, should, under any circum
stances, be inflicted upon another. The assumption of this princi
ple, without removing any difficulty, greatly aggravates the case,
by representing that as a matter of sovereignty, which we regard
as a matter of justice. The -difficulty is not removed, for the diffi
culty is, that we should suffer for a crime which we never com
mitted ; but this the Spectator admits. The evil may be material-
iter precisely the same, the question is now merely as to its formal
nature. Is it then more congenial with the unsophisticated moral
feelings of men, that God should, out of his mere sovereignty, de
termine that because one man sinned all men should sin ; that be
cause one man forfeited his favour, all men should incur his curse ;
or because one man sinned, all men should be born with a contami
nated moral nature ; than, that in virtue of a most benevolent con
stitution, by which one was made the representative of the whole
race, the punishment of the one should come upon all ? We know
that a man's feelings are very much modified by his modes of;
thinking, and consequently, what shocks one person may appear \
right and proper to another ; and, therefore, these feelings can be
no certain criterion in such a case as this. For ourselves, how
ever, we are free to confess that we instinctively shrink from the
idea, that God in mere sovereignty inflicts the most tremendous
evils upon his creatures, while we bow submissively at the thought
of their being penal inflictions for a sin committed by our natural
head and representative, and in violation of a covenant, in which,
by a benevolent appointment of God, we were included. Besides,
is it not necessary that a moral being should have a probation be
fore his fate is decided? When had men this probation ? Not, ac
cording to Dr. Dwight, in their own persons, for they are born de
praved, and consequently under condemnation. Not in Adam —
for this supposes that his sin forfeited for us the divine favour, or
is the ground of our condemnation ; but this is imputation. Is it
then more unjust to condemn mankind for the act of their natural
representative, in whom they had a fair and favourable probation,
than to condemn them without any such probation ? Determine,
out of mere sovereignty, to call them into existence depraved, and ,
then condemn them for this depravity ? Nor does the Spectator's
view much relieve the difficulty. For a probation to be fair, must
afford as favourable a prospect of a happy as of an unhappy con
clusion. But men are brought up to their trial, under a " divine
constitution," which secures the certainty of their sinning ; and this
is done because an individual sinned thousands of years before the

160 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
vast majority of them were born. Is this a fair trial ? Would not
any man in his senses prefer to have his fate decided by the act of
his first father, in the full perfection of his powers, intellectual and
moral, than to have it suspended on his own first faltering moral
act of infancy, performed under a constitution which secures its
being sinful ? According to the Spectator, therefore, the probation
of man is the most unfavourable possible for that portion of the
race which arrives at moral agency ; and those who die before it
never have any, at least not in this world. The race as such is not
fallen ; for this implies the loss of original righteousness and of the
divine favour. The former, however, was never possessed ; the
latter, by one half mankind, never forfeited, and for them no Sa
viour can be needed.
The principle which the Spectator so confidently lays down, is,
in our apprehension, decidedly anti-scriptural, subversive of impor
tant doctrines, and requires a mode of interpretation to reconcile it
with the word of God, which opens the door to the utmost latitudi-
narianism. This expression of opinion is not intended ad invidiam ;
very far from it. If there is no foundation for this apprehension, the
expression of it will pass unheeded ; and if there is, it deserves seri
ous consideration. The Spectator will agree with us in saying, that
any objection brought against a doctrine taught in the Bible, or sup
posed to be taught there, is answered, if it can be shown to bear
against the providence of God. If, therefore, the assertion, that it
is unjust that one man should, under peculiar circumstances, suffer
the penalty due to another, can be shown to militate with facts in
the dispensation of the divine government, it is thereby answered.
Is it then a fact that the punishment due to one man has ever, in
the providence of God, been inflicted on others ? We think no
plainer case can be cited, or well conceived, than that of the fall
itself. God threatened our first parent with certain evils in case
of disobedience ; he did disobey ; the evil is inflicted not only on
him, but on his posterity. If any part of this evil is antecedent to
personal sinfulness, then the ground of it is Adam's sin. But it is
admitted on almost all hands, that some evil is inflicted antecedent
ly to personal ill desert ; some say it is temporal death, others cor
ruption of nature, the Spectator certainty of sinning (an awful in
fliction !) ; it matters not what it is, it is evil inflicted by a judge in
the execution of a sentence — and that is punishment. We think,
therefore, that it is arguing against an admitted fact, to maintain
that one man can never bear the iniquity of another.
Although one instance, if fully established, is as good as a thou
sand to show that the principle of the Spectator is untenable, we
may refer to others recorded in the scriptures. The case of Achan
is one of these. The father committed the offence, and his whole
family were put to death by the command of God. Was not the
death of the children, in this instance, of the nature of punish
ment? It was evil, not a natural consequence, but a posi
tive infliction, solemnly imposed on moral agents by divine com-

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 161
mand, for a specific offence. It is on the ground of this and simi
lar examples ; as the punishment of Canaan for the act of Ham ; of
the sons of Saul for the conduct of their father, 2 Sam. xxi. 8, 14;
of the children of Israel for the sin of David, 2 Sam. xxiv. 15 and
17 : that Grotius, the jurist and theologian, says, " Non esse simpli-
citer injustum aut contra naturam poenae, ut quis puniatur ob alie-
na peccata." — De Satisfaction, p.' 312.
The objection, therefore, of the Spectator, founded on the supposed
injustice of one man ever being punished for the sin of another, we
consider as answered ; first, because it bears with equal, if not with
accumulated force against his own doctrine of evil consequences ;
and secondly, because we think it militates with facts in the provi
dence of God, and if valid, is valid against the divine administra
tion. We have other reasons, however, for the opinion which we ven
tured to express, that the Spectator's principle was anti-scriptural.
It contradicts the positive assertions of scripture, as we understand
them. We can only refer to two instances of this kind. In the
fifth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, from the twelfth verse
to the twenty-first, we consider the apostle as not only asserting,
but arguing on the principle that one man may bear the iniquity of
another. His object is to illustrate the method of justification. As
we have been condemned for a sin which is not our own, so we
are justified for a righteousness which is not our own. That we
have been thus brought under condemnation, he proves from the
universality of death, the penalty of the law. This penalty was
not incurred by the violation of the law of Moses, because it was
inflicted long before that law was given ; neither is it incurred in
all cases by the actual violations of a law which threatens death,
because it comes on those who have never actually violated any
such law ; therefore it is for the one offence of one man that the con
demnatory sentence (the Kpipa lis xardKptpa) has passed on all men.
The disobedience of one man is no more simply the occasion of all
men being sinners, than the obedience of one is merely the occa
sion of all becoming righteous. But the disobedience of the one is
the ground of our being treated as sinners ; and the obedience of
the other is the ground of our being treated as righteous. This
view of the passage, as to its main feature, is adopted by every
class of commentators. Knapp, in his Theology, quoted above,
sect. 76, in speaking of the doctrine of imputation, says, " That in
the Mosaic history of the fall, although the word is not used, the
doctrine is involved in the account." In the writings of the Jews,
in the paraphrases of the Old Testament, in the Talmuds and rab
binical works, the sentence, " the descendants of Adam suffer the
punishment of death on account of his first sin," frequently occurs,
in so many words. This doctrine of imputation was very common
among them, he says, in the times of the apostles. " Paul teaches
it plainly, Rom. v. 12 — 14, and there brings it into connection with
the Christian doctrines. He uses respecting it precisely the same
11

162 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
expressions which we find in the writings of the rabbins." On the
following page, in reference to the passage in Rom. v. 12 — 14, he
says that the doctrine of imputation is here more clearly advanced
than in any other portion of the New Testament. " The modern
philosophers and theologians," he remarks, " found here much that
was inconsistent with their philosophical systems. They, therefore,
explained and refined so long on the passage, that they at length
forced out a sense from which imputation was excluded ; as even
Doederlein has done in his system of theology. They did not con
sider, however, that Paul uses precisely the same modes of expres
sion which were current among the Jews of that age respecting
imputation ; and that his cotemporary readers could not have un
derstood them otherwise than as teaching that doctrine ; and that
Paul, in another passage, Heb. vii. 9, 10, reasons in the same man
ner. Paul shows, in substance, that all men are regarded and
punished by God as sinners, and that the ground of this lies in the
act of one man ; as, on the other hand, deliverance from punishment
depends on one man, Jesus Christ." He immediately afterwards
says, that unless force is done to the apostle's words, it must be ac
knowledged that he argues to prove that the ground on which men
are subject to death, is not their personal sinfulness, but " the impu
tation of Adam's sin."*
Zachariae, of Goettingen, understands the apostle in the same
manner. In his Biblische Theologie, vol. ii., pp. 394, 395, he says,
" Imputation with Paul, is the actual infliction on a person of the
punishment of sin ; consequently the sin of Adam is imputed to all
men, if there is any punishment inflicted on them on account of that
sin. His whole reasoning, Rom. v. 13, 14, brings this idea with it.
Sin is not imputed according to a law, so long as that law is not
yet given ; yet punishment was inflicted long before the time of
Moses. His conclusion, therefore, is, where God punishes sin,
there he imputes it ; and where there is no punishment of a sin,
there it is not imputed." " If God, therefore, allows the punishment
which Adam incurred to come on all his descendants, he imputes his
sin to them all. And in this sense Paul maintains that the sin of
Adam is imputed to all, because the punishment of the one offence
of Adam has come upon all." On page 386 he gives the sense of
Rom. v. 18, thus, " The judicial sentence of God, condemning all
men to death, has passed on all men, on account of the one offence
of Adam." This is precisely our doctrine. It matters not, as
far as the principle is concerned, how the Bavaros in this passage
is explained.
Whitby has the same view. He insists upon rendering ift «, " in
whom," because, he says, " It is not true that death came upon all
* Knapp does not himself admit the doctrine of imputation ; at least, not without
much qualification. He does not deny the apostle's plain assertion of the doctrine,
however, but gets over it by saying that he is not to be interpreted strictly, but as
speaking in a general and popular sense.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 163
men, for that, or because, all have sinned. For the apostle directly
here asserts the contrary, viz. : That the death and condemnation
to it which befell all men, was for the sin of Adam only." " There
fore the apostle doth expressly teach us that this death, this con
demnation to it, came not upon us for the sin of all, but only for the
sin of one, i. e., of that one Adam, in whom all men die." — 1 Cor.
xv. 22.
We refer to these authors merely to make it appear, that even
in the opinion of the most liberalized writers, the plain sense of
scripture contradicts the principle of the Spectator, that one man
can never be punished for the sin of another. This sense, we are
persuaded, cannot be gotten rid of, without adopting a principle of
interpretation which would enable us to explain away any doctrine
of the word of God. The older Calvinists, as we have seen, con
sidered the denial of imputation, or in other words, the assumption
of the principle of the Spectator, as leading to the denial of original
sin or native depravity. They were, therefore, alarmed when some
of their French brethren rejected the former doctrine, though they
at that time continued to hold the latter. Their apprehensions
were not unfounded. Those who made this first departure from
the faith of their fathers, very soon gave up the other doctrine, and
before long relapsed into that state from which, after so long a de
clension, they are now struggling to rise. Without any intention
of either casting unmerited odium on any of our brethren, or of ex
citing unnecessary apprehensions, we would seriously ask, if there
is no evidence of a similar tendency in the opinions of some brethren
in this country. The doctrine of imputation has long been reject
ed by many, both within and without the bounds of our own eccle
siastical connection, who still hold, with Dr. Dwight, to native de
pravity, or that men are born " contaminated in their moral nature."
How this can be just, or consistent with the divine perfections, if
not a penal infliction, it is difficult to perceive. We are, therefore,
not surprised to find that some of the most distinguished theologians
of this school, now deny that there is any such contamination of
nature ; or that men are morally depraved before they are moral
agents, and have knowingly and voluntarily violated the laws of
God. These gentlemen, however, still maintain that it is certain
that the first moral act in every case will be sinful. But this seems
very hard : that men should be brought up to their probation, under
" a divine constitution" which secures the certainty of their sin
ning. How this is to be reconciled with God's justice and good
ness any better than the doctrine of Dr. Dwight, we are unable to
discover ; and therefore apprehend that it will not long be retained.
The further step must, we apprehend, be taken, of denying any
such constitution, and any such dire certainty of sinning. And then
the universality of sin will be left to be explained by imitation and
circumstances. This, as it appears to us, is the natural tendency
of these opinions ; this has been their actual course in other coun
tries, and to a certain extent, also, among ourselves. If our brethren.

164 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
will call this arguing ad invidiam, we are sorry for it. They do
not hesitate, however, to say, that our opinions make God the au
thor of sin, destroy the sinner's responsibility, weaken the influence
of the Gospel, and thus ruin the souls of men.
But if the Spectator's principle, that one man can never suffer the
punishment of the sins of another, is correct, what becomes of the
doctrine of atonement? According to the scriptural view of this
subject, Christ saves us by bearing the punishment of our sins.
This, as we understand, is admitted. That is, it is admitted that
this is the scriptural mode of representing this subject. Our brethren
do not deny that the phrase, " to bear the iniquity of any one,"
means to bear the punishment of that iniquity, as in the passage in
Ezekiel, " The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," and in
a multitude of similar cases. Where, therefore, the Bible says", that
'• Christ bore our sins," it means, that he bore the punishment of our
sins ; or rather, as Grotius says, it cannot mean anything else.
" Peccata ferre patiendo, atque ita ut inde liberentur alii, aliud in-
dicare non potest, quam poenae alienae susceptionem." — P. 300.
And not only the scriptures but even the Greek and Latin authors
who use this phrase, he says, " semper imputationem includunt."
This, however, on the Spectator's principle, must be explained
away ; and the ground be assumed, that the scriptures mean to
teach us only the fact that Christ's death saves us, but not that it
does so by being a punishment of our sins. But if this ground be
taken, what shall we have to say to the Socinians who admit the
fact as fully as we do ? They say, it is by the moral impression it
produces on us ; our brethren say, it is by the moral impression it
produces on the intelligent universe. If we desert the Bible repre
sentation, have they not as much right to their theory as we have
to ours ? This is a subject we cannot now enter upon. Our ob
ject is, to show that this is no dispute about words ; that the denial
of the doctrine of imputation not only renders that of original sin
untenable ; but involves, either the rejection or serious modification
of those of atonement and justification.

ESSAY VII.
THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.*

We would remind our readers that in the history of Pelagianism,
which called forth this discussion, we stated, " That Adam's first
transgression was not strictly and properly that of his descendants
(for those not yet born could not perform an act), but interpreta-
tively or by imputation ;" and secondly, that imputation does not
imply " the transfer of moral acts or moral character." The
mere declaration of our belief of this doctrine, and conviction of
its importance, led to the first communication of the Protestant on
the subject. He made no objection to the correctness of our
exhibition of the subject ; his inquiries were directed against the
doctrine itself. His article was written, as he now informs us,
" to lead the author of that piece (the history of Pelagianism) to
see and feel, that one who undertook the office of a corrector with
severity, should weigh well whether he had any faux pas of his
own to correct." This accounts for the schooling manner so obvi
ous in his communication, and which seems to have escaped his
observation. We think it right to turn his attention to this subject,
because he is abundant in the expression of his dissatisfaction
" with the spirit and manner" of our articles. We acknowledge'
that we are as blind to the bad spirit of what we have written, as
he appears to be to the character of his inquiries. This proves
how incompetent a judge a man is in his own case, and should
teach him and us how easy it is to slip into the very fault we con
demn in others, and to mistake mere dissent from our opinions for
disrespect to our persons. We are prepared to make every proper
acknowledgment for any impropriety of manner with which Chris
tian brethren may think us chargeable, although our sincere en
deavour to avoid an improper spirit, while penning the articles in
question, must prevent any other confession than that of sorrow
at our want of success.
We were much surprised to find that we had mistaken the main
object of the Protestant's first communication. He now says,
" The writer in the Repertory has chosen his own ground ; and,
* The remarks which follow were called forth by two articles in the Christian
Spectator of March, 1831.

166 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
passing over my main points and at least nine tenths of all I had
said, has selected the topic of imputation, which was only a very
subordinate one with me, and occupied no less than forty-eight
pages in descanting on this."— P. 156. The editors of the Specta
tor were no less unfortunate in their apprehension of his object, for
they head his communication, " Inquiries respecting the Doctrine
of Imputation." Indeed the Protestant himself seems to have la
boured under the same mistake. For, p. 339 (vol. 1830), he says it
was his object " to submit a few inquiries and difficulties in respect
to some statements which he (the historian in the Repertory) had
made." He then quotes our statement respecting " the imputation
of Adam's sin to his posterity," and no other. On p. 340, he adds,
" For the present, I neither affirm nor deny the doctrine of impu
tation. But I frankly confess I have difficulties." He then states
these difficulties in order, introducing them after the first, by
" Again," " Again," " Once more," " Finally," " Last of all," to
the close of the piece. We inferred from all this that the doctrine
of imputation, so far from being " a very subordinate point" with
him, was the main point, and indeed the only one. This is a very
small matter ; we notice it merely to let him see on what slight
grounds he sometimes expresses dissatisfaction.
To these inquiries communicated by the Protestant, the editors
of the Spectator appended a series of remarks, intended to show
that we had abandoned the views of the older Calvinists on this
subject. In these remarks they hold the following language:
" Adam's first act of transgression was not strictly and properly
that of his descendants, says the historian. The sin of the apos
tasy is truly and properly theirs, say Edwards and the rest."
Again, " We are glad, likewise, to see him proceed one step far
ther." This farther step, they tell us, is the denial of " any trans
fer of moral acts or moral character." That both the Protestant
and editors considered the doctrine as involving these two ideas,
is also evident from the nature of their objections. The former
inquires of us, whether we have ever repented of Adam's sin, and
founds most of his difficulties on the principle that there tan be no
sin where there is no knowledge of law, and as there can be no
knowledge of law at the first moment when men begin to exist,
he infers there can be no imputation of Adam's sin at that period.
See p. 341. And the Spectator says, " No one who does not
totally confound all notions of personal identity, can hesitate to
admit, that the historian has done right in rejecting the old state
ments on this subject." — P. 343.
In our reply to the above mentioned articles, we undertook to
prove that these gentlemen had misapprehended the views of old
Calvinists on the nature of imputation ; and maintained that this
doctrine does not involve " any mysterious union with Adam, so
that his act was personally and properly our act, or that the moral
turpitude of his sin was transferred from him to us." This state
ment was repeated so often and so explicitly, that no one could

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 167
fail to see it was our object to prove " that neither the idea of per
sonal identification, nor transfer of moral character, is included in
the doctrine of imputation."* This, therefore, is the real point in
debate ; and it is one of importance. For if the doctrine does,
when properly explained, include these ideas, then have its oppo
nents done well in rejecting it ; and its advocates, instead of wast
ing time in its defence, would serve the cause of truth by at once
following their example. And on the other hand, if these ideas
form no part of the doctrine, then do all the objections founded on
them fall to the ground. And as these objections are the main and
indeed almost the only ones, to establish the point at which we
aim is to redeem an important truth from a load of aspersions, and
vindicate it even in the eye's of its opposers. The question then
is, are we correct in the ground which we have assumed. If the
Protestant and editors have done anything to the purpose in their
reply, it must be in proving that old Calvinists taught that " Adam's
act was strictly and properly our act, and that its moral character
was transferred from him to us." If they have accomplished this
object, we owe them many acknowledgments for having opened
our eyes to a doctrine we have professed, without understanding,
the greater part of our life. And this obligation will not be con
fined to us. For we may state, without intending to compliment
ourselves, that we have heard from many old Calvinists of differ
ent denominations, in various parts of our country, and no whisper
has reached us of the exhibition of the doctrine made in the Reper
tory being a departure from the faith. Without an exception,
those who have spoken on the subject at all have said, as far as we
know, " So we hold the doctrine, and so we have always under
stood old Calvinists to teach it." As they who profess to receive
any doctrine, and to incorporate it in their system of faith, may be
supposed to feel a deeper interest in it than those who have always
been taught to reject it, we may, without arrogance, presume that
the probability is in favour of old Calvinists understanding their
own opinions, and our brethren being mistaken in their apprehen
sions of the subject. Let us, however, see how the matter stands.
It may facilitate the proper understanding of this subject to
state, in a few words, the distinct theories which have been adopted
respecting the connexion between the sinfulness of men, and the
fall of their first parent.
1. Some hold, that in virtue of a covenant entered into by God
with Adam, not only for himself but for all his posterity, he was
constituted their head and representative. And in consequence of
this relation, his act (as every other of a public person acting as
such) was considered the act of all those whom he represented.
When he sinned, therefore, they sinned, not actually but virtually ;
when he fell they fell. Hence the penalty which he incurred
comes on them. God regards and treats them as covenant-break-
* See Biblical Repertory for July, 1830, p. 436, et passim.

168 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
ers, withholds from them those communications which produced
his image on the soul of Adam at his first creation ; so that the
result is the destitution of original righteousness and corruption of
nature. According to this view, hereditary depravity follows as a
penal evil from Adam's sin, and is not the ground of its imputation
to men. This, according to our understanding of it, is essentially
the old Calvinistic doctrine. This is our doctrine, and the doctrine
of the standards of our churchT "For they make original sin to
consist, 1st, in the guilt of Adam's first sin ; 2dly, the want of
original righteousness ; and 3dly, the corruption of our whole na
ture. This, too, is President Edwards's doctrine throughout two
thirds of his book on original sin. We never meant to say any
thing inconsistent with this assertion, with regard to this great
man. We stated that in the portion of his work from which the
Spectator quoted, he had abandoned the old ground, and adopted
for the sake of answering a particular difficulty the theory of
Stapfer, which, however, contradicted the general tenor and expli
cit statements of the former part of his work.
2. Others exclude the idea of imputation of Adam's sin, but
admit that all men derive by ordinary generation from our first
parents a corrupt nature, which is the ground, even prior to actual
transgressions, of their exposure to condemnation. This is essen
tially the view of Placaeus, against which, as we endeavoured to
show, the Calvinistic world of his time protested. This is the
view, in the main, of Stapfer, and in one place of Edwards. This
is Dr. Dwight's doctrine, and that of many others. Most of the
older advocates of this opinion retained at least the name of im
putation, but made the inherent corruption of men the ground
of it.
3. Others again on the same principle involved in the former
theory, viz., that the descendants should be like their progenitor,
suppose that the nature of Adam having become weakened and
disordered, a disease or infirmity, not a moral corruption, was en
tailed on all his posterity. So that original sin, according to this
view, is not vere peccatum, but a malady. This is the view of
many of the Remonstrants, of Curcellaeus, of Limborch, of many
Arminians and Lutherans. Many refer this disorder of human na
ture to the physical effect of the forbidden fruit.
4. There are those, who rejecting the ideas of imputation of
Adam's sin, of moral innate depravity, or of an entailed imbecility
of nature, and adopting the idea that all sin consists in acts, main
tain that men come into the world in puris naturalibus, neither
holy nor unholy (as was the case with Adam at the time of his
creation) ; and that they remain in this neutral state until they
attain a knowledge of law and duty. They account for all men
sinning, either from the circumstances in which they are placed, or
from a divine constitution.
The view taken by the true Hopkinsians, who adopt what is
called the " exercise scheme," is somewhat different from all these,

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 169
as they suppose the moral exercises of the soul to commence with
its being ; and that these in every case should be sinful, was de
cided by the fall of Adam.
These, as far as we know, are all the radical views of this sub
ject. There are, of course, various modifications of these several
systems. Thus, some retain the idea of the imputation of Adam's
sin, but reject that of inherent hereditary depravity. This was the
case with many of the most distinguished catholic theologians of the
age of the Reformation. Others again, uniting part of the first and
third view, teach that original sin consists in the imputation of
Adam's first transgression, and an enfeebled, disordered constitu
tion, but not a moral corruption.
This enumeration of the various opinions on original sin, and of
our relation to Adam, is given, not because we suppose our readers
ignorant on the subject, but because it is necessary in order to un
derstand the language of the old authors and confessions, to bear
in mind the opinions which they meant to oppose or condemn.
Had the Protestant done this it would have preserved him from the
strange oversight of quoting from the old confessions the declara
tion that original sin is vere peccatum, as having any bearing on a
discussion on the nature of imputation. Of this, however, in the '
sequel. In order to the correct interpretation of particular modes
of expression occurring in any author it is, however, not only
necessary that we bear in mind the nature of the opinions which
he may be opposing, but most especially the nature of his own
system, whether of philosophy, theology, or of whatever else may
be the subject of discourse. Here, as we think, is most obviously
the great source of error in the gentlemen of the Spectator. They
seem entirely to overlook the distinctive theological system of the
old Calvinists, and detaching particular modes of expression from
their connexion in that system, put upon them a sense which the
words themselves will indeed bear, but which is demonstrably
foreign to that in which these writers employed them, and directly
contradictory of their repeated and explicit statement of their
meaning. These gentlemen err precisely as the early opponents
of the Reformers and Calvinists did, by insisting on taking in a
moral sense, modes of expression which were used, and meant to be
understood, in a judicial or forensic sense. This is the xpanv rpcvSos
of our New Haven brethren on this subject, and it runs through
all their exhibition of the views of the old Calvinistic doctrine. In
this respect they are treading, as just remarked, in the footsteps of
all the early opposers of these doctrines. When the reformers
taught that we were rendered righteous or just by the imputation
of Christ's righteousness, their opponents at once asked, How can
the righteousness of one man be transferred to another ? If this
doctrine be true, then are believers as just as Christ himself — they
have his moral excellence. They further asserted, that the reform
ers made Christ the greatest sinner in the world — because they
taught that the sins of all men were imputed to him. To these

170 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
objections the reformers answered, that imputation rendered no
man inherently either just or unjust — that they did not mean that
believers were made morally righteous by the righteousness of
Christ, but merely forensically, or in the eye of the law — and that
it was mere confusion of ideas on the part of their adversaries
which led to all these objections. We take it, this is precisely the
case with our brethren of the Spectator. We find them making
the identical objections to the doctrine of imputation which were
urged by some of the Catholics, and afterwards by the Remon
strants ; and we have nothing to do but to copy the answer of the
old Calvinists, which is a simple disclaimer of the interpretation
put on their mode of expression. They say they never intended
that the moral character of our sins was conveyed to Christ, nor
of his righteousness to us, nor yet of Adam's sin to his posterity —
but that all these cases are judicial or forensic transactions ; that
in virtue of the representative character which Christ sustained,
he was in the eye of the law (not morally) made sin for us, and
we righteousness in him; and in virtue of the representative
character of Adam we are made sinners in him, not morally, but
in the eye of the law. A moment's attention to the old Calvinistic
system will convince, we hope, the impartial reader that this repre
sentation is correct.
In reference to the two great subjects of the fall and redemp
tion, they were accustomed to speak of the two covenants of works
and grace. The former was formed with Adam, not for himself
alone but for all his posterity ; so that he acted in their name and
in their behalf. His disobedience, therefore, was their disobe
dience, not on the ground of a mysterious identification or transfer
of its moral character, but on the ground of this federal relation.
When Adam fell, the penalty came on all his race, and hence the
corruption of nature which we all derive from him is regarded by
old Calvinists as a penal evil. The second covenant they repre
sent as formed between God and believers in Jesus Christ, in
virtue of which Christ stands as the representative of his people.
Their sins were imputed to him, or he assumed their responsibili
ties, acted and suffered in their name and in their behalf. Hence,
on the condition of faith his righteousness is imputed to them, that
is, is made the ground of their being judicially justified. No one
at all familiar with the writings of the older Calvinists, can fail to
have remarked that this whole scheme is founded on the idea of
representation, and that it involves the assumption of the transfer
of legal obligation but not of moral character — two things which
the Spectator perpetually confounds. And here is their radical
misconception, as we have already remarked. Nothing is more
common than to illustrate this idea by a reference to transfer of
pecuniary obligations, which is a matter of every day occurrence.
But, as the cases are not in all respects analogous, the old Calvin
ists are very careful in stating the difference, and in asserting the
justice and propriety (under certain circumstances) of the transfer

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 171
of legal obligation even in cases of crime. And although this,
from the nature of the case, can rarely occur in human govern
ments, as no man has a right to dispose of life or limb, yet it is not
without example.
It is on this idea of representation, of one acting for another,
that they maintained the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity,
of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us. The nature
of this imputation is in all these cases the same. They are all
considered as forensic transactions. The obligation to punishment
in the two former cases, and the title to pardon and acceptance in
the last, arising not out of the moral character but the legal stand
ing of those concerned. Christ's obligation to suffer arose not
from the moral transfer of our sins, but from his voluntary assump
tion of our law-place, if modern ears will endure the phrase. And
our obligation to suffer for Adam's sin, so far as that sin is con
cerned,* arises solely from his being our representative, and not
from our participation in its moral turpitude. And so finally they
taught that the believer's title to pardon and heaven is not in him
self. Christ's righteousness is his, not morally, but judicially.
Hence the distinction between imputed and inherent righteousness ;
and between imputed and inherent sin. The former is laid to our
account on the ground of its being the act of our representative,
but is not us, nor morally appertaining to us ; it affects our stand
ing in the eye of the law, but not our moral character : the latter
is ours in a moral sense.f
We have stated that the imputation spoken of in all these cases
is in nature the same, and therefore, that what is said of the impu
tation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us, is pro
perly appealed to in illustration of the nature of imputation, when
spoken of in reference to Adam's sin. To this the Protestant
strongly objects. " I cannot but notice one thing more," he says,
" the reviewer everywhere in his piece appeals to the imputation
of Chrisfs righteousness, as decisive of the manner in which
* These are points taught to children in their catechism ;
Q. How is original sin usually distinguished ?
A. Into original sin imputed, and original sin inherent.
Q. What is original sin imputed ?
A. The guilt of Adam's first sin.
Q. What is original sin inherent ?
A. The want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature.
Q. What do you understand by the guilt of sin ?
A. An obligation to punishment on account of sin. Rom. vii. 23. [Of course
the guilt of Adam's sin which rests on us, is an obligation to punishment for that
sin, not its moral turpitude.]
Q. How are all mankind guilty of Adam's first sin ?
A. By imputation [not inherently]. Rom. v. 19, " By one man's disobedience
many were made sinners."
Q. Upon what account is Adam's first sin imputed to his posterity ?
A. On account of the legal union betwixt him and them, he being their legal head
and representative, and the covenant being made with him, not for himself only, but
for his posterity ; likewise, 1 Cor. xv. 22, " In Adam all die."'— See Fisher's Cate
chism. t Our exposure to punishment for our own inherent depravity is a different affair.

172 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
Adam's sin is imputed to us. Now this is the very point which
Calvin in so many words denies," &c, p. 161. Again, on the next
page, " As the reviewer so often refers to the doctrine of imputation
as triumphantly established in Christ's sufferings and merits, and
seems to think that nothing more is necessary than merely to make
the appeal in this way, in order to justify such a putative scheme
as he defends ; I add one more question for his solution, viz : ' Is
the righteousness of Christ ever imputed to sinners, without any
actual repentance and faith ? If not, then how can the analogy
prove that Adam's sin is imputed to us without any act on our
part, and that we are condemned before any actual sin at all ?' He
does not appear once to have thought that here is a difficulty,
which no part of his explanations has even glanced at. Nay, he
does not even suppose it possible to make any difficulty." He is
mistaken as to both points. The idea is one of the most familiar
connected with the whole subject; and in our former article,
the distinction to which it refers is clearly stated, and abun
dantly implied elsewhere. The Protestant's difficulty evidently
arises from his allowing his mind to turn from the nature to the jus
tice of imputation in these several cases. Now although there is a
great and obvious difference between the appointment of a person
as a representative, with the consent of those for whom he acts,
and his being so constituted without that consent, yet the difference
does not refer to the nature of representation, but to the justice of
the case. Thus a child may either choose its own guardian, or he
may be appointed by a competent authority, without the child's
knowledge or consent. In either case the appointment is valid ;
and the guardian is the legal representative of the child, and his
acts are binding as such. Any objection, therefore, to the justice
of such an appointment, has nothing to do with the nature of the
relation between a guardian and his ward. Nor has an objection
to the justice of Adam's being appointed our representative without
our consent, any bearing on the nature of the relation which old
Calvinists supposed to exist between him and us. If they believe
that this was the relation of representation ;* and if this were as-
* This opinion is not confined to old Calvinists. " In this transaction between
God the Creator and Governor, and man the creature, in which the law, with the
promises and threatenings of it, was declared and established in the form of a cove
nant between God and man, Adam was considered and treated as comprehending all
mankind. He being by divine constitution the natural head and father of the whole
race, they were included and created in him [this goes beyond us] as one whole,
which could not be separated ; and therefore he is treated as a whole in this transac
tion. The covenant made with him was made with all mankind, and he was consti
tuted the public and confederating head of the whole race of men, and acted in this
capacity, as being the whole ; and his obedience was considered as the obedience of
mankind ; and as by this Adam was to obtain eternal life had he performed it, this
comprehended and insured the eternal life of all his posterity. And on the contrary,
his disobedience was the disobedience of the whole of all mankind; and the threatened
penalty did not respect Adam personally, or as a single individual ; but his whole
posterity, included in him and represented by him. Therefore the transgression,
being the transgression of the whole, brought the threatened punishment on all man
kind." We are glad that this is not the language of an old Calvinist, bu t of Dr.
Hopkins.— See System of Doctrines, vol. i., p. 245, and abundantly more to the same
purpose in the following chapter.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 173
sumed as the ground of imputation in all the cases specified, there
is the most obvious propriety in appealing " to the imputation of
Christ's righteousness as decisive of the manner in which Adam's
sin is imputed to us ;" according to the opinion of old Calvinists,
especially as they state with the most abundant frequency, that
they mean by imputation in the one case precisely what they mean
by it in the other.
This analogy is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever
wrote. " We are constituted sinners in Adam, in the same way
that we are constituted righteous in Christ ; but in Christ we are
constituted righteous by imputation of righteousness ; therefore we
are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin, otherwise
the comparison fails." — Turrettin. " We are accounted righteous
through Christ, in the same manner that we are accounted guilty
through Adam." — Tuckney. " As we are made guilty of Adam's
sin, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed' to us ; so are we
made righteous by the righteousness of Christ, which is not inhe-
rent in us, but only imputed to us." — Owen. We might go on for
a month making such quotations. Nothing can be plainer than that
these men considered these cases as perfectly parallel as to the
point in hand, viz., the nature of imputation. And consequently if
they taught, as the Protestant and Spectator imagine, that the moral
turpitude of Adam's sin was transferred to us, then they taught
that Christ's moral excellence was thus transferred ; that we are
made inherently and subjectively holy, and Christ morally a sinner,
by imputation ; the very assertion which they constantly cast back
as the slanderous calumny of Papists and Remonstrants. Why then
will our brethren persist in making the same representation ?
But if these cases are thus parallel, how is it that Calvin, Turret-
tin, Owen say they differ ? asks the Protestant. It might as well
be asked, how can cases agree in one point, which differ in another ?
Because the imputation of Christ's righteousness is, as to its nature,
analogous to the imputation of Adam's sin — does it hence follow
that our justification can in no respect differ from our condemna
tion ? or, in other words, must our relation to Christ and its conse
quences be, in all respects, analogous to our relation to Adam and
its consequences? Paul tells us, and all the old Calvinists tell us,
" As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to con
demnation ; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came
upon all men to the justification of life," and yet, that these cases
differ. The judgment was for one offence, the " free gift" had
reference to many ; one is received by voluntary assent on our
part, the other comes in virtue of a covenant or constitution (if any
man prefers that word), which, though most righteous and benevo
lent, was formed without our individual concurrence. And be
sides, we are exposed to condemnation not on account of Adam's
sin only, but also on account of our own inherent hereditary de
pravity ; whereas the righteousness of Christ is the sole ground of
our justification, our inherent righteousness, or personal holiness

174 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
being entirely excluded. And this is the precise point of difference
referred to by Calvin in the passage quoted by the Protestant,
which he not only misunderstands, but mistranslates. After saying
there are two points of difference between Christ and Adam, which
the apostle passes over because they were not to his purpose, he
adds, " Prior est, quod, peccato Adae, non per solam imputationem
damnamur, acsi alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis poena ; sed ideo
poenam ejus sustinemus quia et culpae sumus rei quatenus scilicet
natura nostra in ipso vitiata, iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud
Deum." The plain meaning of which is, that we are not con
demned on the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin solely, but
also on account of our own depraved nature ; whereas, the right
eousness of Christ is the sole ground of our justification, our sancti
fication having nothing to do with it. This is the difference to
which he refers. Precisely the doctrine of our standards, which
makes original sin to consist not only in the guilt of Adam's sin, but
also in corruption of nature. Two very different things. The rea
son of Calvin's insisting so much on this point was, that many of
the leading Catholics of his day, with whom he was in perpetual
controversy, maintained that original sin consisted solely in the im
putation of Adam's sin; that there was no corruption of nature, or
hereditary depravity. Hence Calvin says, it is not solely on the
former ground, but also on the latter that we are liable to condem
nation. And hence, too, in all his writings he insists mainly on the
idea of inherent depravity, saying little of imputation ; the former
being denied, the latter admitted by his immediate opponents.
This is so strikingly the case, that instead of being quoted as hold
ing the doctrine of imputation in a stronger sense than that in
which we have presented it, he is commonly appealed to by its ad
versaries as not holding it at all.
The Protestant need only throw his eye a second time upon the
above passage, to see that he has misapprehended its meaning and
erred in his translation. He makes Calvin say, "We are con
demned, not by imputation merely, as if punishment were exacted
of us for another's sin, but we undergo its punishment (viz : the
punishment of Adam's sin), because we are chargeable with its
criminality (viz : the criminality of Adam's sin) [directly against
the reviewer again]." Yes, and against Calvin too ; for there is
nothing in the original to answer to the word its, and the insertion
entirely alters the sense. Calvin does not say that we are charge
able with the criminality of Adam's sin, but just the reverse : " non
per solam imputationem damnamur, acsi alieni peccati exigeretur
a nobis poena ; sed ideo poenam ejus sustinemus, quia et culpae su
mus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitiata, iniquitatis
reatu obstringitur apud Deum." " We are condemned not on the
ground of imputation solely, as though the punishment of another's
sin was exacted of us ; but we endure its punishment because we
are also ourselves culpable (how ? of Adam's sin ? by no means,
but we are culpable), inasmuch as, viz : our nature having been

the doctrine of imputation. 175
vitiated in him, is morally guilty before God" (iniquitatis reatu ob
stringitur apud Deum). Here is a precise statement of the sense in
which we are morally guilty, not by imputation, but on account of
our own inherent depravity. Two things which the Protestant
seems fated never to discriminate.
Besides, the Protestant, after making Calvin say, " we are charge
able with its criminality" (viz : the criminality of Adam's sin), thus
renders and expounds the immediately succeeding and explanatory
clause, beginning, " quatenus scilicet," &c. : " Since our nature be
ing in fact vitiated in him, stands chargeable before God with crimi
nality, i. e., with sin of the same nature with his." Now it certainly
is one thing to say we are chargeable with Adam's sin, and another
that we are chargeable with sin of the same nature with his. Hun
dreds who admit the latter, deny the former. Yet the Protestant
makes Calvin in one and the same sentence say, we are chargeable
with the one, since we are chargeable with the other. That is, we
are guilty of Adam's sin, because guilty of one like it. This, in our
opinion, is giving the great Reformer credit for very little sense.
We make these criticisms with perfect candour. Of their correct
ness let the reader judge. This " egregious mistake" of the Pro
testant (we use his own language, p. 158) doubtless arose from his
not having thought it his " duty to launch into the dispute about
imputation," nor, as we presume, to examine it. To the same
cause is probably to be traced the character of the following para
graph ; which strikes us as being peculiarly out of taste and unfor
tunate : " This (the passage quoted from Calvin) settles the whole
controversy at a single stroke — not as to what is truth — but as to
what is old Calvinism. If Calvin be not permitted to speak for
himself, this is one thing ; but if he be, then Tuckney, and De
Moor, and the reviewer's notable French synod, would have done
well to read Calvin instead of arguing a priori in order to prove
what he has said." It settles nothing at all, except that Calvin ad
mitted both doctrines, the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent
depravity. It is true, if the clause, " acsi alieni peccati exigeretur
a nobis poena," be cut to the quick, and taken apart from its con
nection, it does deny our doctrine and Calvin's own assertion. For
in saying that Adam's sin is not the sole ground, it admits that it is
one ground of our condemnation. If I say a man is condemned,
not for piracy merely, but also for murder, do I not assert that both
are the ground of his condemnation ? If the clause in question be
viewed historically, in the light thrown upon it by the opinions of
those with whom Calvin was contending, and in connection with
other declarations in his works, its consistency with the common
Calvinistic theory will be apparent. He meant to say, in opposi
tion to Pighius and other Catholics, that men were not condemned
on the ground of the act of another, solely, without having a de
praved moral character; but being inherently corrupt, were in
themselves deserving of death. '
This is a distinction which he often makes. In his creed written

176 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
for the school at Geneva, he says, " Quo fit, ut singuli nascuntur ori-
ginali peccato infecti, et ab ipso maledicti, et a Deo damnati, non
propter alienum delictum duntaxat, sed propter improbitatem, quae
intra eos est." Whence it is clear that according to Calvin, men
are condemned both propter alienum peccatum, and their own de
pravity. The same sentiment occurs frequently. But supposing
we should admit, not that Calvin taught that Adam's sin was
morally our sin, for of this the passage contains not a shadow of
proof, but that he denied the doctrine of imputation altogether, nul-
lius addicti jurare in verba magistri, it would not much concern us.
We have not undertaken to prove that Calvin taught this or that
doctrine, but that Calvinists, as a class, never believed that imputa
tion involved a transfer of moral character.
It is, moreover, a novel idea to us, that a sentence from Calvin
can settle at a single stroke a controversy as to what Calvinists as
a body have believed. We have not been accustomed to suppose
that they squared their faith by such a rule, or considered either
his Institutes or Commentaries the ultimate and sole standard of
orthodoxy. Tried by this rule, the synod of Dort, the Westmin
ster divines, the old Puritans, and even Beza and Turrettin were no
Calvinists. Sure it is, we are not. There is much in Calvin which
we do not believe and never have. We do not believe that Christ
descended ad inferos and suffered the pains of the lost. Yet Calvin
not only taught this, but that it was of great importance to believe
it. A controversy of this kind is not so easily settled. The only
proper standard by which to decide what Calvinism is, is the
confessions of the Reformed churches and the current writings
of standard Calvinistic authors. We make these remarks
merely in reference to the Protestant's short and easy method of
dispatching the business ; not at all as admitting that Calvin reject
ed the doctrine of imputation. Controversy seems to have had in
him, in a measure, its natural effect. As his opponents went to
one extreme, he may have verged towards the other. As they, in
regard to original sin, made too much of imputation, he was under
a strong bias to make too little of it. As they denied entirely the
corruption of nature, he was inclined to give it an overshadowing
importance. Yet, as we have just seen, his works contain explicit
declarations of his having held both points, as the great body of
Calvinists has ever done.
But to return from this digression. The point of difference be
tween " Christ and Adam," to which Calvin refers, does not, there
fore, pertain to the nature of imputation, which is the matter now
in debate, but to the fact, that although inherent sin enters into the
ground of our condemnation, inherent righteousness is no part of
the ground of our justification. It is stated very nearly in the same
terms by Turrettin and others, who, notwithstanding, uniformly
maintain that we are constituted sinners in Adam (eodem modo, ea
dem ratione), in the same manner that we are constituted righteous
in Christ. Turrettin, vol. ii., p. 703, in refuting the Catholic doc-

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 177
trine of justification, says, " Christus per obedientiam suam recte
dicitur nos justos constituere non per inhaerentem justitiam, sed
per imputatam, ut Rom. iv. 6 docetur, et ex oppositione anteceden-
tis condemnations, cap. v. 19j!colligitur. Justi enim non minus
constituuntur coram Deo, qui propter obedientiam Christi ipsis im
putatam. absolvuntur a meritis poenis, quam ii qui propter Adami
inobedientiam injusti constituuntur, i. e., rei sunt mortis et condem-
nationis." Here then it is expressly stated, the obedience by which
we are constituted just in the sight of God is not inherent (that
which affects or forms our own moral character), but imputed (i. e.
laid to our account), exactly as the disobedience of Adam by which
we are constituted unjust,, i. e., exposed to death and condemnation,
is not inherent in us. So far the cases are parallel — that is, so far
as imputation is concerned. But after this the parallel does not
hold ; because we derive from Adam a corrupt nature (inherent
depravity) which is also, a ground of exposure to death, whereas
the internal holiness which is the fruit of Christ's Spirit is no part
of the ground of our justification. " Nee si Adamus nos etiam in-
justos constituit effective per propagationem vitiositatis inhaerentis,
propter quam etiam rei mortis sumus coram Deo, sequitur pariter
Christum nos justos constituere per justificationem forensem judicii
Dei per justitiam inhaerentem nobis ah ipso datam." The precise
doctrine of Calvin, and our standards, and of the Repertory.
This seems the proper place- to correct another mistake of the
Protestant. After quoting from the Gallic Confession, 1566, the de
claration, " Original sin, is vere peccatum, hy which all men, even
infants in the womb, are subject to eternal death," he says, " Now
the old Calvinists did not make two sins, first Adam's, and second
ly original sin as resulting from it. All was one sin (peccatum ori
ginis), reaching throughout the whole race, even to infants in the
womb. It must then be in their union to: Adam, that infants in the
womb have vere peccatum, i. e., what is really and truly sin. But.
the reviewer says their sinning in 'Adam was merely putative —
that to make it really and truly their sin, destroys the very idea of
imputation. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that his view of the
subject is diametrically opposed to that of the Gallican churches."
It need hardly be remarked that we have here again the pervading
misapprehension to which we have so often referred. Old Calvin
ists did make two sins, first the sin of Adam, and secondly inherent
depravity resulting from it. The former is ours forensically, in the
eye of the law ; the latter morally. The former is never said to be
in us vere peccatum; the latter, by Calvinists, always. This is a
distinction which Calvin makes iii the very passage quoted by the
Protestant. It is made totidem verbis by Turrettin, as we have
just stated. It is made in the very catechisms of the church. Ori
ginal sin consists "in the guilt of Adam's first sin," "-and the cor
ruption of the whole nature." See also the passage quoted above
from Fisher. " Original sin is usually distinguished into original
sin imputed, and original sin inherent" The Augsburg Confession,
}2

178 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
in a formal definition of original sin, makes the same distinction.
" Intelligimus autem peccatum originis, quod sic vocant Sancti Pa-
tres, et omnes orthodoxi et pie eruditi in ecclesia, videlicet reatum
quo nascentes propter Adae lapsum rei sunt irae Dei et mortis
aeternae, et ipsam corruptionem humanae naturae propagatam ab
Adamo." Turrettin, in speaking of the adversaries of the doctrine
of imputation, includes those who do not make the distinction in
question. Thus of Placaeus, he says, " AdversariOrum commentum
adoptavit, et dum totam rationem labis originalis constituit in ha-
bituali, subjectiva et inhaerenti corruptione, quae ad singulos per
generationem ordinariam propagatur, imputationem istam rejicit."
Our French synod, for which.the Protestant seems to have so little re
spect, but who in charity may be supposed to have known what were
their own doctrines, formally condemned the View which he asserts
was the common doctrine of Calvinists. " Synodus damnavit doctri-
nam ejusmodi, quatenus peccati originalis naturam ad corruptionem
haereditariam posterorum Adae ita restringit, ut imputationem ex-
cludat primi illius peccati, quo lapsus est Adam." The Westmin
ster Assembly, as we have already seen, in their catechism assume
the, very same ground. Burgess, one of the leading members of
that Assembly, in his work on Original Sin, p. 32, says, " As in and
by Christ there is an imputed righteousness, which is that properly
which jus.tifieth, and as an effect of this we have also an inhe
rent righteousness, which in heaven will be completed and perfect
ed ; thus by Adam we have imputed sin with the guilt of it, and
inherent sin the effect of it." Again, p. 35, " The apostle distin-
guisheth Adam's imputed sin and inherent sin, as two sins" (" di
rectly in the very teeth of the" Protestant, if we may be permitted
to borrow one of his own forcible expressions). " By imputed sin
we are said to sin in him actually, as it were, because his will was
our will (jure repraesentationis), but by inherent sin we are made
sinners by intrinsical pollution." We sin in Adam as we obey and
suffer in Christ, the disobedience of the one is ours, in the same
way and in the same sense in which the obedience of the other is
ours. In neither case is the moral character of the act of one per
son transferred to another, which is a glaring absurdity. We hope
there is not a single reader who does not perceive how surprisingly
the Protestant has erred in his appeal to the old confessions. The
passages which he quotes have nothing at all to do with the subject
of imputation, but were intended to define the, nature of that here-
ditarium vitium which is diffused through the race. As the term
original sin is used sometimes in a broader, and sometimes in a
more restricted sense, sometimes as including both imputed and
inherent sin, and sometimes only the latter, the Protestant -has
strangely confounded the two things. The early Reformed
churches were anxious to guard, on the one hand, against the doc
trine of some of the Catholics, that original sin consisted solely in
imputation, without any corruption of nature ;' and on the other.
against the idea that the hereditary evil of which they spoke was a

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 179
mere disease, and not a moral corruption. Hence we find the as
sertion reiterated, that this hereditarium vitium is vere peccatum.
But never that imputed sin is vere peccatum. One might as well
assert, that as the sanctification of the heart, or inherent righteous
ness wrought by the Spirit of God, is truly of a moral character,
therefore Christ's imputed righteousness is so too.
In danger of utterly wearying the patience of our readers, and
proving to them the same thing for the twentieth time, we must be
allowed to make a few more quotations in support of the position,
which we have assumed. That is, to prove that imputation does
not include the transfer of moral character ; that in the case of
Adam there is a sin, which, by being imputed to us, renders us fo-
rensically guilty, but not morally ; as in the case of Christ, there is
a righteousness, which, by being imputed to us, renders us" judi
cially, but not morally righteous. One would think that enough
had been presented, in our former , article, abundantly to establish
this point. The declaration of Owen, however, that, "To.be
alienae culpae reus, makes no man a sinner," passes for' nothing.
His affirming that, " Nothing more is intended by the imputation
of sin unto any, than the rendering them justly obnoxious unto the
punishment due unto that sin ; as the not imputing of sin is the
freeing of men from beihg subject or liable to punishment ;" pro
duces no effect. In vain, too, does Tuckney say, in one breath,
that it is blasphemous to assert that the imputation of our sins to
Christ, or his righteousness to us, conveys the moral character of
either, and in the other, that we are accounted righteous through
Christ in the same manner that we are accounted guilty through
Adam. Let us see, therefore, whether we can find anything still plainer
on the subject.
Turrettin, vol. ii., p. 707, after stating that imputation is of two
kinds, 1st, where something is laid to a man's charge which he him
self performed, and 2d, where one is regarded as having done what,,
in fact, he did not perform, infers from, this, that to impute " is,-a-
forensic term, which is not to be underst6od physically of infusion
of righteousness (or unrighteousness) but judicially and relative
ly." " Unde colligitur voc.em hanc esse forensem, quae non est
intelligenda physiee de infilsione justitiae, sed judicialiter et rela
tive." ;
Immediately after, in answer to the objection that if a thing is
only putative, it is fictitious, he says, the conclusion is not valid :
"Cum sit res non minus realis in suo ordine scilicet juridico et fo-
rensi, quam infusio in genere morali seu physico." Again, p. 715,*
" Justitia inhaerens et justitia imputata, non sunt sub eodem genere.
Ilia quidem in genere relationis, Ista vero sub genere qualitatis :"
Whence he says, the same individual may be denominated just or
* Having already sliown that, according to» Turrettin and other Calvinists, the na- -
ture of imputation is the same, whether spoken of in reference to sin or righteous
ness, such passages are perfectly ad rem.

180 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
unjust, sub diversa e>xlm- " For when reference is had to the in
herent quality, he is called a sinner and impious, but when the ex
ternal and forensic relation is regarded, he is pronounced just in
Christ. It is true, indeed, no one can be called inherently just by
the righteousness of another, because if it be inherent it is no longer
another's. Yet he can, by imputation, be declared justified."
Again, same page, " When God justifies us on account of the im
puted righteousness of Christ, his judgment is still according to
truth, because he does not pronounce us just in ourselves subjective
ly, which would be false, but in another imputatively and relative
ly, which is, in the strictest sense, true."
Now, in all these cases, if language be capable of expressing
ideas, it is most distinctly asserted that imputation is a forensic
term ; that the act which it expresses does not affect the moral
character, but the legal relation of those concerned : that imputed
sin and imputed righteousness do not come sub genere qualitatis,
but sub genere relationis. Hence Turrettin says, p. 715, " Christus
propter imputatum ipsi nostrum peccatum, non potest dici pecca-
tor, quod importat corruptionem inhaerentem."
On p. 716, the following passage occurs : " Ut inobedientia
Adami vere nos peccatores constituit per imputationem* (a decla- '
ration which will be seized upon with both handsf but hear the
whole). Ita et justitia Christi vere nos justificat imputative. Ita
imputatum bene opponitur inhaerenti, sed non vero, quia non fingi-
mus imputationem, quae consistat in mera opinione et juris fictione,
sed quae maxime realis est et vera, sed ista Veritas est imputa-
tionis, non infusionis, juridica, non moralis." We shall for ever
despair of proving anything, if this does not prove that imputation,
according to Turrettin at least, does not involve the transfer of
moral character. The imputation of the disobedience of Adam
constitutes us sinners, and the imputation of the obedience of Christ
constitutes us righteous. Now in what sense ? Ans. Juridical
ly, not morally.
There are many passages in the old authors which distinctly as
sert the absurdity and impossibility of such a transfer of moral cha
racter, as the ancient and modern opposers of the doctrine of im
putation charge them with believing. Turrettin, p. 71 1, in proving
that we are. justified by the righteousness of Christ, which is ours,
"non utique per inhaesionem, sed per imputationem," gives, among
others, the following reasons, 1. " Quia actus unius non potest fieri
* Some may say here is a direct contradiction. Imputation constitutes 'one truly a
sinner, yet just before, our sin being imputed to Christ does not render him a sinner.
And so there is a point-blank contradiction. Exactly such an one as the Protestant
says he has a thousand times charged on old Calvinists, and which he, or any one
else, may charge on any author in the world, if you take his words out from their con
nection, and force on them a sense which they by themselves may bear, but which
was never intended. To any man who thinks a moment on the subject, there is no -
contradiction. Imputation of sin constitutes us sinners in one sense, but not in ano
ther ; in the eye of the law,, but not morally. Thus Paul says that Christ, though he
knew no sin, was made sin (i. c, a sinner). As much of a contradiction, as in the
passages before us.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 181
plurium, nisi per imputationem." (It cannot become theirs by
transfer, or infusion, it can only, on some ground of union, be laid
to their account.) 2. " Quia karUpipa (Rom. v. 18), cui opponitur
iiKaiurms £u>js, non est actus physicus, sed forensis et judicialis." That
is, as the act by which we are constituted, or declared guilty on
account of Adam's sin, is not a physical act rendering us morally
guilty ; so our justification, on account of the righteousness of
Christ, is not a rendering us formally or subjectively righteous. In
each case the process is forensic and judicial. And immediately
after he quotes the following passage from Bellarmin, as containing
a full admission of the doctrine of imputation : " Peccatum Adami
communicatur nobis eo modo, quo communicari potest quod transit,
nimirum per imputationem." Sin, therefore, cannot pass by trans
fer. To this passage from the Catholic Cardinal, Turrettin sub
joins the remark, that it cannot be inferred from the fact, that we
are also rendered sinners and liable to condemnation by the corrupt
nature which we inherit from Adam, we are also justified by our
inherent righteousness communicated by Christ in regeneration ;
because the apostle did not mean to teach that the cases are paral
lel throughout, though they are, as far as imputation is concerned.
This is the point of difference to which we have already referred.
On the same .page we have the declaration, "Quod est inhaerens
qpponitur imputato." And on the opposite, Christ is our righteous
ness before God, " non utique inhaerenter, quia justitia unius ad
alium non potest transire, sed imputative." It follows too, he says,
from 2 Cor. v. 21. " Eo modo nos eflici justitiam Dei in ipso, quo
modo factus est pro nobis peccatum. At Christus factus est pro
nobis peccatum, non inhaerenter aut subjective, quia non novit pec
catum, sed imputative, quia Deus ei imputavit peccata nostra."
In, every variety of form, therefore, is the idea of transfer of
moral character denied and rejected as impossible and absurd, and
the assertion that it belongs to the Calvinistic doctrine of imputa
tion treated as a calumny. Turrettin, towards the close of his
chapter on the imputation of Adam's sin, in speaking of some, who
on certain points agreed with Placaeus, says,, that as to this, they
do not depart from the common opinion. This, he states, was the
case with Amyraldus, " qui fuse probat "peccatum alienum posse
juste imputari lis qui cum authore aliquo vinculo juncti sunt, licet
culpam non participarint." Here then is a distinct assertion, that
imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the
sin imputed. In this case the word culpa is used in its moral
sense. In proof of his assertion, Turrettin" quotes such passages as
the following : — " Ex eo clarum esse potest, quomodo Apostolus
intelligat doctrinam justificationis, nempe quod ut cbndemnatio qua
condemnamur in Adamo, non significat qualitatem inhaerentem sed
vel obligationem ad poenam, vel obligationis illius declarationem a
potestate superiore ; Ita justitia qua justificamur in Ghristo, non sit
etiam qualitas inhaerens, sed vel jus obtinendae in judicio divino
absolutionis, vel absolutio ipsa a judice."

182 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
We have taken our extracts principally from Turrettin, because
we thought a clearer view would be presented, by a comparison of
various statements from the same author, than by disjointed decla
rations from several. We have pursued this course, the rathej,
because the Spectator does not pretend that Turrettin differs from
common Calvinists in his views on this subject. They themselves
quote him as holding, what they consider the old Calvinistic scheme,
and endeavour to show from his writings, that we have erred in
our understanding and exposition of the point under discussion.
He is an authority, therefore, to which, as to the question of fact, they
will cheerfully bow. It would be easy, however, to multiply quo
tations to almost any extent from the whole range of standard Cal
vinistic writers in support of the views which we have presented.
A very few, by way of example, will suffice. Mark, who has ever
been considered as one of the most thorough and consistent theo
logians of the old school, in his Historia Paradisi Ulustrata, has a
chapter on imputation, in which, as well as in his System of The
ology, the doctrine is presented precisely as we haye exhibited it.
According to him, the union, which is the ground of the imputa
tion of Adam's sin — is that of representation, he being the common
father and representative of the race. In his introductory para
graph he says, he proposes to speak, " de omnium naturalium pos-
terorum repraesentatione in Adamo ut communi parente et foederis
capite." — P., 753. In Rom. v. 12, he says, we are taught the doc
trine of imputation because all men are said " to have sinned in
Adam." This sinning. in Adam, however,. according to him, is as
serted, not on the ground of a mysterious personal union — but
" Peccatum omnibus tribui actuale in eo uno homine Adamo, eos
repraesentante." (The same doctrine is taught in the passage, he
says, though if' « be rendered eo quod, or quandoquidem.)
The analogy between the imputation of Christ's righteousness
and the sin of Adam is repeatedly and strongly asserted. An ana
logy so strict, as far as imputation is concerned, that all the diffi
culties, " turn exceptiones, turn objectiones," which are urged
against the one, bear against the other ; whether they be derived
" a Dei justitia et veritate, ab actus et personae Adamicae singu-
laritate, ex sceleris longe ante nos praeterito tempore, ex postero-
rum nulla scientia vel consensione in illiud, ex non imputatis aliis
omnibus factis et fatis Adami," or from any other source. Hence,
he says, there is the greatest ground of apprehension (" metus jus-
tissimusisit"), if the one be rejected, the other will be discarded
also. And, therefore, "mirandum aeque quam dolendum est,"
that some (Placaeus and his followers) bearing the name of Re
formed Theologians, should, " sub specie curatioris attentionis et
majoris cujusdam sapientiae," revive these very objections, which,
in his apprehension, the orthodox had answered '« tam solide et
late," against the Socinians and Remonstrants. "Quod ne serpat
latius ad.ecclesiae patriaeque totius novam turbationem et Pela-

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 183
gianismi importunam reductionem, faxit pro sapientia et bonitate
sua Deus !"*
In direct opposition to the Protestant's assertion, that " Old Cal
vinists did not make two sins, first Adam's sin, and secondly origi
nal sin (depravity) as resulting from it," he, in common with all the
Reformers, almost without exception, and the whole body of the
reformed, constantly make the distinction between imputed sin and
inherent corruption, maintaining that the latter could not be recon
ciled with God's justice, without the admission of the former.
" Whatever is said," he remarks, " of a natural law, according to
which corrupted Adam should beget a corrupt posterity, as a
wolf begets a wolf, and a diseased man diseased children ; and of
no one being able to communicate to another what he has not him
self, &c, it is all utterly vain, unless the judicial imputation of
Adam's act be admitted." "Id omne, absque admissa judiciafi im-
putatione Adamici facti, va'nissimum est." — P. 756. And on the pre
ceding page, he complains of Placaeus as " not admitting imputa
tion as the antecedent and cause of native corruption flowing from
it." And adds, " Enim vero si ipsa Adami transgressio prima nos
non constituit damnabiles, nee corruptio nativa pro poena illius in
nobis debet haberi, sed ob Adami peccaminosam similitudinem tan-
tum rei coram Deo simus aut fiamus, jam revera imputatio ilia tol-
litur." The idea, therefore, that we are guilty, i. e., exposed to
condemnation, because of our sinful likeness to Adam merely,
which the Protestant represents as the true Calvinistic doctrine, is
expressly rejected. This view of the judicial imputation of Adam's
sin, as the cause and ground of innate corruption, is not a later ad
dition to Calvinism, as has been inconsiderately asserted, but was
taught by Calvin hirnself, and almost all his brother reformers.
Calvin says, " Deum justo judicio nobis in Adamo maledixisse ac
voluisse nos ob illius peccatum corruptos nasci, peccasse unum,
omnes ad poenam (trahi," &c. It is by the just judgment of God,
therefore, according to Calvin, and as a punishment for Adam's sin,
that we are born corrupt. To the same effect Beza speaks of the
" corruptio, quae est poena istius culpae imposita tam Adamo quam
posteris." And. Martyr strongly asserts, " profecto neminem esse
qui ambigat, peccatum originale nobis infligi in ultionem et poenam
primi lapsus."
This view, as already stated, is not confined to Calvinists. The
Augsburg confession, as quoted above, clearly expresses it. And
further, the standards of the Lutheran Church assert that, " Justo
Dei judicio (in poenam hominum) justitia concreata seu originalis
amissa esset," by which defect, privation, or spoliation* human na
ture is corrupted. SeeBretschneider, vol. ii., p, 33. This writer
* We presume our brethren, will consider this as another specimen of the ad in
vidiam argument. Though .we question whether the idea entered their minds, that,
their making Owen assert that those who held our doctrine wpre pretty near Soci
nianism, was anything of the like nature. We do not object to their remark, for we
are not, as we think, quite so sensitive as they are.

184 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
immediately adds, the same sentiment is contained in the assertion
of the Apology I., p. 58. " Defectus et concupiscentia sunt poenae
(des Adamischen Vergehens, von dem die Rede ist). Melancthon
held the same doctrine. " Melancthon betrachtete au.eh den Ver-
lust des Ebenbildes und des Enstehen der concupiscentia als Strafe
fur Adam's Vergehen." And in the next page he quotes. from his-
Loci Theolog. the following passage, " Revera autem perpetua
Ecclesiae sententia est, prophetarum, apostolorum et scriptorum
veterum : peccatum originis non tantum esse imputationem, sed in
ipsa hominem natura caliginem et pravitatem."* Here we have
the common view to which we have so often referred, original sin
includes both imputation of Adam's sin, and inherent depravity.
Bretschneider himself says expressly, that according to the Schmal-
kald Articles and the Form of Concord, "Beides, das Vergehens
Adams sowohl als das dadurch enstandene Verderben selbst Ursa-
che der Strafe sey." " Both Adam's transgression, and the corrup
tion thereby occasioned, is the ground of punishment." Here
"are two sins — first Adam's, and secondly depravity resulting"
from it."
We refer to this expression of opinion by the early Reformers,
to show that not merely Calvinists, but Lutherans also, held the
doctrine of imputation as we have exhibited it. That they held the
doctrine cannot be denied, and the way in which they understood
it, is plain, from their calling imputation a forensic or judicial act,
a declaration of one as a sinner in the eye of the law, in opposition
to his being rendered so in a moral sense ; precisely as justification
is a rendering just legally, not morally. The same thing is plain
from the illustrations of the subject, with which their works abound
— illustrations borrowed from the imputation of our sins to Christ,
of his righteousness to us, of parents' sins to their children, &c, and
finally from the constant representation of inherent, innate depra
vity, as a penal evil. If penal, of what is it the punishment? Of
Adam's sin. Then, if this sin be morally ours, they taught that
men are punished with moral depravity for being morally depraved
— they assumed the existence of corruption, to account for its exist
ence I All becomes plain, if you will allow these men to mean
what they say they meant, viz., that in virtue of our union with
Adam as our common father and representative, his offence is ju
dicially regarded (not physically rendered) ours, and on the ground
of its imputation to us (i. e., of its being judicially laid to our ac
count), the penalty came on us as well as on him ; hence the loss
of original righteousness and corruption of nature are penalevils.
This, we are persuaded, is the common Calvinistic doctrine on
this subject. The Protestant blames us for being so confident as
to this matter. We are confident, and to such a degree, that we
are willing to submit to all the mortification arising from the ex
posure of ignorance, where ignorance is most disgraceful, viz., of
* Loci Theologici, p. S6. Detzer's edition, 1828.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 185
one's own long-cherished opinions, if either the Protestant or
Spectator will accomplish the task as to the point in debate. Let
it be recollected what that point is : Does the doctrine of imputa
tion, as taught by old Calvinists as a body, include the ideas of
" literal oneness" and transfer of moral acts or moral character ?
Prove the affirmative of this, and we stand ready to confess igno
rance, and to renounce old Calvinism. As both the Protestant and
Spectator have made the attempt and repeated it without in our
judgment, with modesty be it spoken, throwing the weight of a
straw's shadow into the .opposite scale, our confidence, to say the
least, is not weakened. We make this remark in no overweening
spirit ; but having been thus taught the doctrine, in question on our
mother's knees — having heard it thus explained from the catechism
and pulpit all our lives, — to have it now asserted, "you know
nothing of the matter ; the true doctrine includes impossibilities
and absurdities (and blasphemies too) of the most monstrous kind,"
takes us not a little by surprise, and finds us not a little incredulous.
Let us, however, for a moment see what are the most plausible
grounds on which their allegations rest. The Protestant, indeed,
tells us, " he has not thought it his duty to launch into the dispute
itself about imputation," but intended to make only " a few obser
vations." In these observations he does not deny that the exhibi
tion given in the Repertory of the views of Turrettin, Owen,'&c,
is correct. He says, indeed, these writers contradict themselves,
but that they taught as we have represented them to do he admits ;
for he has not said a word to rebut the positive declarations which
we adduced from ' their writings, but questions their competency
as witnesses as to what Calvinism is. If, therefore, we had no
other opponent in this discussion, we assuredly should not have
thought it necessary to . say another word on the subject, until he
had so far condescended as to show either that Turrettin, Owen,
De Moor, Tuckney, and the French Synod of 1645, were not Cal
vinists, or that we had misapprehended or misstated their views.
He expresses great surprised our appealing to such authorities.
"I confess," he says, "this mode of establishing the reviewer's
opinions struck me with not a little surprise. What ? A Presby
terian, and leave the Westminster confession out of view?" Again,
" But why did he not go to the standards of the Calvinistic churches
instead of Turrettin and Owen ? As he has not done it I must do
it for him." — P. 159. The answer to all this is very easy. The
point in debate is not, whether Calvinists held the doctrine of impu
tation, for this is not denied, but how did they understand it 1 This
question is not to be decided by appealing to the old confessions,
because in them we find the mere assertion of the doctrine, not its
explication. They tell us that " original sin includes the guilt of
Adam's first sin ;" the question is, what does this mean ? The
Protestanf and Spectator say it means one thing ; we say it means
another. Who is to decide ? One would think the original framers,
adopters, and expounders of these confessions — the very persons

186 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
to whom we appealed— and whose testimony the Protestant so
disrespectfully rejects. But if the framers of an instrument are
not to be permitted to tell us in what sense they meant it to be under
stood, we know not where to go for information. We were very
much surprised to find even the Spectator saying, that from our
silence with regard to their reference to the Westminster cate
chism, they supposed we meant tacitly to admit our dissent from
the doctrine of imputation as taught by the Westminster divines,
p. 163. This remark is the more singular, as the very point in
dispute was, in what sense those divines and Calvinists generally
held the doctrine. It would have been strange indeed to admit
our dissent from the very men with whom we were labouring to
prove we agreed. Besides, in introducing the testimony of Tuck
ney, p. 445, we stated that he was a member of the Westminster
Assembly, and of the committee to draft the confession of faith,
and the author of a large part of the catechism, and therefore, " a
peculiarly competent witness as to the sense in which our formula
ries mean to teach the doctrine of imputation."*
But the Protestant thinks we had very good reasons for not ap
pealing to the old confessions. " What ? A Presbyterian and
leave the Westminster confession out of view? Why this? was
the spontaneous question ! For a reason plain enough. The re
viewer recollected the answer he used to give, when a child, to a
catechetical question, viz., Sinned in him and fell with him in his
first transgression. Indeed ? Sinned in him ? Then there is
something more than putative sin ; for here Adam's sin is our sin,
and his guilt is our guilt," and so on, p. 159. We shall endeavour
to answer this seriously. What do our standards and old Cal
vinists generally mean when they say, "All mankind sinned in
Adam ?" The expression obviously admits of two interpretations ;
the one, that which the Protestant and Spectator would put upon
it, viz., that in virtue of a " literal oneness," all mankind really
acted in him — his act was literally our act ; the other proceeds on
the principle of representation — we acted in him as our representa
tive. This latter interpretation is at least possible. First, because
it is a very familiar mode of expression. Nothing more common.
Every monarch is said to do what his representatives do. " The
good people of the United States, in Congress assembled." Were
* On the same page the Spectator says of us, that notwithstanding our tacit ac
knowledgment of dissent from Calvin and the Westminster divines, " Still they
maintain that the doctrine, as they hold it, was the real doctrine of the reformed
churches, though they acknowledge that Doederlein, Bretschneider, and other distin
guished writers on theology, are against them on this point.", If the Spectator will
turn to the passage, p. 438, to which he refers, he will find that we make no such
acknowledgment. We were speaking, not of the " reformed churches," but of " Au
gustine and his followers." It was to fhe latter, we stated, these writers attributed
the idea of literal and personal oneness, between Adam and his posterity  not to the
reformed churches. So far from it, they expressly distinguish the theory of Augustine
from that of federal union, which they say prevailed among the reformed. We know
of no " distinguished writer on theology" who maintains the ground assumed in the
Spectator, in reference to the opinions of the great body of Calvinists.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 187
they ever thus actually assembled ? Are not the people said to do
everything that is. done in their name ? Good, says the Protestant,
but we never appointed Adam our representative. True. But
this bears on the justice of his being so constituted and so acting ;
,not on the propriety of saying " We sinned in him," on the sup
position of his being our representative, which is the only point
now at issue. Common usage, then, bears out this interpretation.
Secondly, biblical and theological usage does the same. The
apostle says, " Levi paid tithes in Abraham." Again, Paul says,
in reference to this subject, 'cf & xavres lipaprov, which a multitude of
commentators, Pelagian, as well as others, render "in whom all
sinned." Do they all hold the doctrine of literal oneness with Adam ?
Does Whitby, who maintains the words will admit of no other ren
dering, understand them as expressing this idea ? Besides, when the
Bible says we died with, or in Christ — are raised in him— do they
mean we actually died when he died, and rose when he rose ?
The interpretation, therefore, which we put on the phrase in
question is possible. But, further, it is the only interpretation
which, with a shadow of reason, can be put upon it in our stan
dards. First, because, times without number, their authors, and
the theological school to which they belonged? expressly declare
this to be their meaning — and secondly, because their illustrations
prove it. Yet the Spectator, p. 168, says, " The oneness described
by Turrettin is, a literal oneness, not something resulting from stipu
lation or contract." We are filled with Wonder that such a decla
ration should come from such a source.1 They had before attributed
the same doctrine to our standards. Had they been Presbyterians,
and learnt the catechism, they never could have made such an
assertion. " The covenant being made with Adam, as a public
person, not for him only but for his posterity, all mankind descended
from him by ordinary generation sinned in him and fell with him
in his first transgression."* If English be any longer English, this
means that it was our representative — as a public person we sinned
in him — in virtue of a union resulting from a covenant or contract,
Let it be noted that this is the only union here mentioned. The
bond arising from our natural relation to him, as our common pa-
rent> is not even referred to. It is neglected because of its second- 1
ary importance, representation being the main ground of imputation ; I
so that when representation ceases imputation ceases, although the
natural bond continues. Let us now hear Turrettin, who holds
" this literal oneness." " Adamus duplici isto vinculo nobiscum
junctus est : 1. Naturali quatenus Pater est, et nos ejus filii ; 2.
Politico ac forensi quatenus fuit princeps et caput repraesentati-
vum totius generis humani.'' This is a formal, precise defipition
of the nature of the union. Is there anything mysterious in the
bond betwpen parent and child, the representative and those for
whom he acts ? " The foundation, therefore," he continues, " of
* Larger Catechism.

188 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
imputation, is not merely the natural connexion which exists be
tween us and Adam, for were this the case all his sins would be
imputed to us — but principally the moral (not physical ; just above
it was called political) and federal, on the ground of which God
entered into covenant with him as our head. ( Hence in that sin
Adam acted not as a private but a public person and representa
tive, &c." — P. 679. Here, as before, it is a " oneness" resulting
from contract which is made the ground of imputation — the natu
ral union is frequently not mentioned at all. Thus, p. 689, in
stating in what sense we. acted in Adam, or how his act was ours,
he says it is " repraesentationis jure." Again, p. 690, " Although,
after his first sin, Adam did not cease to be our head ratione ori
ginis, yet he did cease to be our representative head relatione foe
deris." And therefore the ground of imputation no longer existed.
Thus Marck says, as quoted above, " All men sinned in Adam,
eos repraesentante." Again, in his Medulla, p. 159, "Justissima
est autem haec imputafio, cum Adam omnium fuerit parens, coll.
Exod. 20, 5, ' visitans iniquitatem patrum super fiilios,' &c, et
praeterea foederaliter omnes repraesentaverit." The natural con
nexion with Adam is, therefore, the relation between parent and
child. AU mankind, says Fisher, in his exposition of the cate
chism, " descended from Adam by ordinary generation, were
represented by him as their covenant head, and therefore .sinned
in him." " Qui enim actu nondum fuimus, cum Adamus peccaret,
actu quoque peccare non potuimus." — Wendeline (a strict Calvin
istic Hollander), Christiana Theologia, p. 258. It is ju-ut, however,
he says, that Adam's sin should be imputed to us, i. e., considered
ours ; " Quia Adam totum quoque humanum genus repraesen-
tavit." Now for some of the illustrations of the nature of this union.
First, we were in Adam, as >we were in Christ, the act of the one
is ours, as the act of the other is. So Turrettin repeatedly, p. 689.
As the act of Adam is ours, repraesentationis jure, sic justitia
Christi est actus unius, and yet ours, on the same principle. Again, ,,
Quamvis non fuerimus (in Adamo) actu — yet being in him as a "
father and representative, his act was ours — Ita quamvis non
fuerimus actu in Christo, still, since he died for us, his death is vir
tually our death. " Ergo ut in Christo satisfecimus, ita et in Ada-
i mo peccavimus."* Again, we were in Adam as Levi was in
\ Abraham, p. 687. Was this literally?
It is surely unnecessary to dwell longer on this point. The
Spectator, indeed, tells us that, according to the old writers,
" Adam's posterity, ' were in him as branches in a root,' • as the
members are in the head.' " Well, what does this mean ? Literal
oneness ? Surely not. Does every writer who speaks of a, father
as the root of his family, hold to the idea of a " literal oneness" be
tween them. You may make as little or as much as you please
* Zanch. Epist, quoted and approved by Leydecker, Fax Veritatis, p. 444.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. *,,> 189
out of such figurative expressions, taken by themselves. But by
what rule of interpretation they are to be made to mean directly
the reverse of what those who employ them tell us they intend by.„.
them, we are at a loss to divine. It must be a strange " literal -
openess" which is founded on the common relation of parent and
child, or of representation. Yet these are the only bonds between
us and Adam which Turrettin acknowledges, and of these the for
mer is comparatively of so little importance, as very commonly to
be left out of view entirely, when speaking on the subject.
But we must hasten to another point. The main dependence of
the Spectator, in his attempt to prove our departure from the old
Calvinistic system, is on the use of the word "ill-desert." But
words, he tells us, p. 321, are nothing. Let us have ideas. We
said, the ill-desert of one man cannot be transferred to another.
Turrettin says, " The ill-desert of Adam is transferred to his pos
terity." Admitted, freely. Is not this a direct contradiction? „ Not
at all. Turrettin says, on one page, " Imputation of sin does not
constitute one a sinner,"* on the very next, " The imputation
of Adam's sin does constitute all men sinners." Is there any
contradiction here? So the Protestant would say: but there
is none. Let language be interpreted, not by the tinkling of the
words, but by the fair and universal rules of Construction. Im
putation does render a man a sinner, in one sense, and not in
another — judicially, not morally. So justification renders a man
just in the eye of the law, but not inherently. How often may the
same verbal proposition be, with equal propriety, affirmed or de
nied ! How obvious is it, that the same man may, at the same
time, be pronounced both just and unjust, sub diversa aXco-ci'. This
is an evil — an ambiguity in the sense of terms, which pervades all
language, and which subjects every writer to the charge -of con
tradicting himself and everybody else, any one may take a fancy
to place in opposition to him. The word guilt is as ambiguous as
the word sinner. It is sometimes used in a moral, at others in a
legal sense ; and so is the word ill-desert. We used it in the for
mer, Turrettin in the latter. These are points to be proved. As
' to the first, viz., that we used the word ill-desert in its moral sense,
it is plain, if from no other fact, at least from this, that the Specta
tor so understood it, so understands, and so urges it. He, there
fore, at least, must be satisfied. It is plain, too, from this fact, that
we (in the history of Pelagianism) interchanged it with the phrases
" moral acts " and " moral character," in a way clearly to evince
that we employed them as equivalent expressions. And the Spec
tator quotes them, as meaning precisely the same thing. That this
was our meaning is still plainer, if, possible, from the fact, that in
the long discussion of the nature of imputation, the word ill-desert
does not occur at all. Seeing the confusion of ideas which pre
vailed, we endeavour to prevent all cause of stumbling, by avoid-
* So Owen; " To be culpae alicnae reus makes no man a sinner."

190 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
ing an ambiguous word, and by repeating, we fear to weariness,
that it was " moral acts," " moral character," " moral turpitude,"
the transfer of which we denied ; and so again the Spectator un
derstood us. The difficulty is, not that they have mistaken our
meaning, but that they misunderstand Turrettin. All we have to
prove is, that they consider Turrettin to use the word ill-desert in
a moral sense, as equivalent to moral turpitude, or moral charac
ter ; and secondly, that in this they commit an obvious mistake: If
we establish these two points, we shall be in clear day again. As
to the first, it hardly needs proof, for it is the very point they have
from the beginning been labouring to establish — viz., that imputa
tion conveys the moral character of the act imputed. On p. 165,
they ask, " What then was our sin in Adam ? It was, as Turret-
tin tell us, in a passage quoted above (commune peccatum, commu
nis culpa), ' a sin, a criminality common to Adam and his whole
race.' But they all affirm, that it was ' vere peccatum,' ' truly sin,'
AS TRULY SO AS ARE ANY OF OUR PERSONAL, i. C, ACTUAL TRANSGRES
SIONS."* Now as to the second point, viz., that Turrettin and other Cal
vinists do not use the words guilt, demerit, ill-desert, &c, as the
Spectator understands them, in a moral sense, we have already
proved it, and might abundantly prove it again, because they ex
pressly, repeatedly and pointedly affirm the contrary. Thus, when
he says, " We are constituted truly sinners by the imputation of
Adam's sin," he tells us as plainly as language permits, in what
sense, " Ista Veritas est imputationis, non infusionis, juridica,
non moralis." The sin of Adam is a common sin. Ihthe Specta
tor's sense or ours ? Let Turrettin answer. " The act of Adam is
universal (or common) repraesentationis jure — quia individuum illud
universum genus humanum repraesentavit. Sic Justitia Christi,"
is common on the same ground and in the same way, p. 689.
Again, to impute is a forensic term, meaning to set ^o one's ac
count, " non est actus physicus, sed forensis et judicialis ;" it is to
render one a sinner in the eye of the law, not morally — as the im
putation of righteousness renders legally, and not inherently just.
Alas ! how often must this be said ? Again. Imputed sin is con
stantly opposed to inherent. The one comes under the category
of relation, the other under that of quality — one affects our legal
standing, and the other our moral character. See above.
We mighl; prove the point in hand, 2dly, from the illustrations
which he gives of the subject. These illustrations are drawn from
theimputation of Christ's righteousness to us, of our sins to Him—
of those parental sins, which are visited on children, &c. Take
two passages in addition to those already quoted. " As the right
eousness of Christ, which is one, can yet be communicated by im
putation, to an innumerable multitude ; and as the guilt of those
sins of parents which are imputed to their descendants, is one and
* These capitals' are ours.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 191
the same, which passes upon all ; so nothing prevents the guilt
of Adam's sin being one and equal, which passes on all men." — P.
690. The guilt of Adam passes, therefore, as the righteousness of
Christ doesj and as the guilt of those parental sins which are im
puted to their children. Now, if any sane man will maintain that
the righteousness of Christ, according to Turrettin, is rendered mo
rally ours j or, more monstrous still, that the moral turpitude of pa
rents is transferred to their children— then we shall leave him in
undisturbed possession of his opinion. Again, to the same effect,
p. 689. "It is inconsistent with divine justice thatany should be
punished for a sin foreign to him, foreign in every sense of the
word ; but not for a sin, which, although it be foreign ratione per-
sonae, is yet common in virtue of representation or some bond of
union, by which its guilt may involve many — for, that this may
justly happen, the threatenings of, the law, and the judgments by
which they are executed, andithe example of Christ, to whom our
sins were truly imputed, demonstrate." Here, then, notice, first, in
what sense Adam's sin is a common sin, viz., in virtue of union with
him as our , representative and parent; and secondly, that as his
guilt involves us, so the guilt of parents involves their children (when
their sins are imputed to them), .and so our guilt involves Christ.
Now will .not the Spectator frankly, admit that the guilt, the de
merit, the ill-desert of which Turrettin speaks as being transferred
— is not moral character or turpitude — but legal responsibility —
such as exists between a sponsor and him- for whom he acts— a
surety and debtor — Christ and his people — an obligation to suffer —
a dignitas poenae arising out of the legal relations, and not out of
the moral character. of those concerned ? Will they, or can theyi
charge the greatest and holiest men of the church with holding the
blasphemous doctrine, that Christ was rendered morally a sinner,
by the transfer of our sins ?
We should have to go over the whole ground anew, were we to
exhibit all the evidence, which we might adduce, to prove that Tur
rettin and old Calvinists generally, do, not use the words guilt, de
merit, ill-desert in a moral sense. If they do, then they held the
transfer of moral character ; admit the validity of all the objections
of their opponents ; acknowledge, as true, what they pronounce to
be as absurd and impossible, as to be wise with another's wisdom,
honest with another's integrity, or comely with another's beauty ;
they maintain the communication of that which they declare to be
" as inseparable and incommunicable as any other attribute • of a
thing or its essence itself." Into such a maze of endless self-con
tradiction and absurdity do we necessarily involve them, when we
insist on interpreting their language, out of its connection, accord
ing to bur own preconceived notions — insisting upon it, that be
cause we are aeeustomed to attach the idea of moral pollution to
the words guilt, sinner, demerit, they must have done so too.
Accordingly the Protestant has nerve enough to say, for the thou
sandth time1-^— that all these men are travelling a perpetual round

192 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
of self-contradiction — affirming and denying, in rapid succession,
precisely the same thing. But what* let us ask, is the use of the
" new exegesis" (sensus communis redivivus), if all its principles
are to be trampled under foot — if a writer, instead of having his
language explained agreeably to the usus loquendi of his age and
school — to his own definitions, explanations, and arguments, and in
accordance with his own system 'and the nature of the subject — is
to be made, without the slightest necessity, to use terms in the sense
in which we may happen to be accustomed to employ them ? What
kind of reasoning, for example, is this, To be truly a sinner, is to
have, a sinful moral character. Turrettin says, we are rendered
trnly sinners by imputation of sin — ergo, Turrettin taught that
imputation of sin conveys a sinful moral character. Q. E. D.?
Or this : Tb be truly righteous, is1 to have a righteous moral cha
racter (i. e., a moral character conformed to the law)* Calvinists
say, we are constituted truly righteous by the imputation of right
eousness — ergo, imputation conveys moral character. Q. E. D. ?
Yet here is the concentrated essence of sixty pages of argumenta
tion. And what does it amount to ? To a very ingenious specimen
of that kind of syllogism in which the major proposition includes a
petitio principii. In assuming that the terms " sinner" and " right
eous" are used in a moral sense, the very thing to be proved is
taken for granted. Against this assumption old Calvinists con
stantly protest, and state with tiresome frequency, that they use
these words as they occur in the Bible, in courts of law, and a
thousand times in common life, not in a moral, but in a legal or fo
rensic sense ; that to be legally a sinner is one thing, and morally
so, another— to be legally righteous is one thing.and morally so, ano
ther. If our brethren, however, will have it, that because the terms,
in their opinion, should always include the idea of moral character,
therefore old Calvinists do in fact so employ them, we venture to
predict they will stand very much alone in their opinion.*
* The passages quoted from Calvin by the Spectator, p. 165, are of a different char
acter, though quite as little to the purpose. When Calvin uses the expression, " acsi *
nulla nostra culpa penremus," the Spectator understands him as saying that Adam's
sin was properly our sin. They ask, " What then Was our sin in Adam >" and an
swer, " They (1. e., old Calvinists) all affirm it was truly sin— as truly so as are any
of our personal, 1. e., actual transgressions. It is " nostra culpa," " our criminality "
says Calvin." Now Calvin says no such thing. He does not say that Adam's sin was
our sin : " Sunt qui contendunt," he says, " nos ita peccato Adae perditos esse, acsi
nulla nostra culpa penremus, ideo tantum quasi ille nobis peccasset " " There are
some who contend that we are so destroyed by the sin of Adam, as that we perish
without any criminality of our own— as though he only sinned for us " These
"some" were the Catholic divines with whom he was in constant opposition, who
taught that original sin consisted m the imputation of Adam's sin solely • that there
was no depravity of nature. Tins it is he denies-we do not perish on account of
that sin solely, without being personally depraved. This too he thinks the apostle de
nies when he says, Rom. v. i 2, Since all have sinned" i. e. , all are corrupt " Istud
peccare est corruptos esse et vitiatos Ilia enim naturalis pravitas quam e matris
utero afferimus, peccatum est." Calvin therefore is speaking of one subject, and the
Spectator applies his words to another. We have adverted to this point already, and
clearly shown that Calvin taught we are condemned, both propter peccatum alienum,
and propter improbitatem, which is m our own hearts. So in Ezek. xviii. 20, he

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 193
But it is high time to draw this article to a close. There are
properly two questions involved in this discussion. The one re
lates to the nature of imputation : Does it include the ideas of lite
ral oneness and transfer of moral character ? The other : Sup
posing these ideas not to belong to the doctrine, how far is there
any real difference of opinion between those who hold the doctrine
and those who reject it? The Spectator says the difference is
merely verbal : we think it real and. important. There is, however,
a measure of truth in their assertion. For it has happened here,
as it is wont to happen in such cases, men often violently denounce
a doctrine in one breath, and in the next assert radically the same
idea. Thus Bellarmine denies with singular vehemence the impu
tation of Christ's righteousness, and yet comes out with the doc
trine so fully and plainly, that Tuckney affirms, neither Luther nor
Calvin could have presented it with more precision and distinctness.
And Turrettin quotes him as stating the doctrine of the imputation
of Adam's ..sin, to his entire satisfaction. Such things still happen.
We question whether any man, since the days of Augustine, has
stated the latter doctrine in stronger terms than Dr. Hopkins, in
the passage quoted above; yet he rejects the doctrine. That
Adam is our federal head and representative, and his disobedience
is our disobedience, he admits, and this is the whole doctrine. So
too our New Haven brethren revolt at the idea of representation,
and of our being included in the same covenant with Adam, and
yet tell us, " Adam was not on trial for himself alone," but also for
his posterity. How one man can be on trial for another, without
that other standing his probation in him — falling if he fall, and stand
ing if he stand — we cannot conceive, and happily, it is not for us to
explain. Though the opposers of such doctrines, driven by the
stress of truth, do thus occasionally come out with the admission of
what they are denying, still, we cannot thence infer that there is
no real difference, even as to these very points, between them and
those whom they oppose. We should err very much if we were
to conclude from the fact that Bellarmin states so clearly the doc
trine of the imputation of righteousness, that he agreed with Luther
and Calvin on the subject of justification. The case was far other
wise. He retained his idea of inherent righteousness and moral
justification, and sapped the foundation of the cardinal doctrine of
the Christian system — justification on the ground of Christ's merits,
to the exclusion of everything subjective and personal. And the
evils of this theory, notwithstanding his admission, by turning the
confidence of men from Christ to themselves, were not the less fatal
to truth and holiness. This is no unusual occurrence. It is a
common saying, that every Arminian is a Calvinist in prayer, yet
we cannot thence infer, he is really a Calvinist in doctrine.
says, " Si quaeratur causa maledictionis, quae incumbit omnibus posteris Adae, dici-
tur esse alienum, peccatum, et cujusque proprium." The ground of our condemna
tion is peccatum alienum, as well as peccatum cujusque proprium. Two sins — im
puted and inherent. 13

194 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
Though we are ready to admit, therefore, that at times the Spec
tator comes near admitting all we ask, there is still, we fear, a hia
tus valde deflendus which continues to separate us. What the dif
ference is, we distinctly stated in our previous article. They deny
the transfer or assumption of legal obligation or responsibility, and
therefore maintain that the punishment of one man can never, un
der any circumstances, come upon another. We use the word
punishment precisely as they do ; it is evil inflicted on a person by
a judge in execution of a sentence, and with a view to support the
authority of the law. This is the principle which they reject. A
principle which, entering, as it does, into the view of original sin as
entertained by all the Reformed churches (for all held that the loss
of original righteousness and corruption of nature were penal
evils), essential as it is to the doctrine of substitution, and, as we
think, to all correct views of atonement and justification, we deem
of the highest consequence to the cause of evangelical truth and
piety. This is a part of the subject on which we have not time to
enter, and which is entirely distinct from the task which we origi
nally assumed ; which was to vindicate ourselves from the charge
of having abandoned the common Calvinistic doctrine of imputa
tion, by proving that the doctrine was held by old Calvinists pre
cisely as we have presented it. If after this proof and this exhibi
tion, our New Haven brethren can intelligently say they agree
with us, we shall heartily rejoice.

ESSAY VIII.
THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.*

Joshua Placaeus, Professor of Theology in the celebrated school
at Saumur, published, towards the middle of the seventeenth cen
tury, the doctrine, that original sin consists merely in the heredi
tary corruption of our nature, without any direct imputation of the
first sin of Adam to his posterity. The case was brought before
the National Synod of the French Reformed Churches, which met
at Charenton, near Paris, in 1645. The name of Placaeus was not
mentioned, but the doctrine which he taught was examined and con
demned. The decree of the Synod was as follows : —
" Whereas a report has been made to the Synod of certain
writings, printed and manuscript, by which the nature of original
sin is made to consist solely in the hereditary corruption, original
ly residing in all men, but the imputation of the first sin of Adam
is denied ; the Synod condemns the aforesaid doctrine, so far as it
restricts the nature of original sin to the mere hereditary corruption of
Adam's posterity, excluding the imputation of the first sin by which
he fell ; and, under the penalty of censures of all kinds, forbids all
pastors, professors, and others, who may treat this subject, to de
part from the common opinion of all Protestant churches, which,
besides corruption, have always acknowledged the aforesaid im
putation to the whole posterity of Adam. And (the National Sy
nod) commands all synods and classes, in taking steps for the re
ception of students into the sacred ministry, to require of them sub
scription to this statute." — (Act. Syn. Char., c. 19, art. 1.)
Placaeus now contended that he was not touched by this de
cree, because, he said, he did not absolutely deny imputation of
every kind, but only that which was immediate and antecedent.
He invented a distinction between mediate and immediate imputa
tion ; immediate imputation being that which, in the order of na
ture, precedes inherent corruption ; mediate imputation that which,
in the order of nature, is consequent and dependent on corruption.
Placaeus, though an able man and learned theologian, had, at
* Published in 1S39, with some reference to the following work: — .
"Decretum Synodi Nationalis Ecclesiarum Reformatarum Galliae initio Anni 1645,
de imputatione primi peccati omnibus Adami posteris, cum Ecclesiarum et Doctorum
Protestantium consensu, ex scriptis eorum, ab Andrea Riveto collecto. '

196 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
that time, few followers. His doctrine was repudiated by the Pro
testant theologians of the day, with almost unanimous consent.
Nevertheless, many treatises were written, to refute this new form
of error. And as he claimed some of the earlier divines, and even
the reformers, as agreeing with him, Andrew Rivet, the greatest
theologian of the age, to show that such pretensions were unfound
ed, and to vindicate the decree of the synod, which declared that
the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity was the doctrine of
all the Protestant churches, undertook the labour of collecting tes
timonies from the formulas of churches, and the writings of the
most distinguished theologians on the subject. As these testimo
nies are highly interesting at the present time, and as the volume
which contains them is accessible to few, we propose to lay some
of them before our readers, in a literal translation. In making the
selection, we shall omit some testimonies, which, however clear
and satisfactory as to the question in dispute, have now less interest
than they had at first, because the writers are at present little
known. The churches or theologians bearing testimony, will be
indicated by the titles of the paragraphs.
First Helvetic Confession, 1538.
Since man was made holy by God, and fell into sin by his own
fault, he drew with himself into the same ruin the human race, and
rendered them obnoxious to the same calamity. And this defile
ment, which is called original, has so pervaded the whole race,
that the child of wrath and enemy of God can be cured by no help
but that of God through Christ.
Latter Helvetic Confession, 1566.
Such as Adam became after the fall, such are all those descend
ed from him ; that is to say, they are equally obnoxious to sin,
death, and all sorts of calamities. Confession of Basle.
_ We acknowledge that man was originally created in the image
ot God, in righteousness and holiness ; but that of his own accord
he fell into sin : by which fall the whole human race was render
ed corrupt, and made obnoxious to condemnation.
Confession of the Bohemians or Waldenses.
The first, the greatest, and most grievous of all sins, was un
doubtedly the sin of Adam, which the Apostle calls " the diso
bedience ;" by which death reigns over all, even over those who
did not sin by a transgression of the same kind as that of Adam.
The second sin is the sin of our origin, which is innate and heredi
tary. The virulence of this hereditary pollution may be ascer
tained and estimated from its guilt and blameworthiness.  (De reatu
et culpa.)

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 197
French Confession.
We believe that the whole offspring of Adam was infected with
this contagion which we call original sin ; namely, a fault flowing
from our propagation, &c. Let it suffice (to observe) that those
things with which Adam was endowed, were not given to himself
alone, but to his posterity also.
Articles of the Church of England.
Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pela
gians do vainly talk), but it is the fault and corruption of the nature
of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam ;
whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is
of his own nature inclined to evil ; so that the flesh lusteth always
contrary to the spirit ; and therefore in every person born into this
world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation ; and this infection
of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated, &c.
Old Scottish Confession.
By the transgression of Adam, which is commonly called " ori
ginal sin," the image of God in man is altogether defaced, and he
and his posterity are by nature the enemies of God, bond-slaves of
Satan, and the servants of sin ; and so we, in his person, were de
spoiled of all those gifts, and fell into all this misery and curse.
These things cannot be said without imputation. Haec sine imputa
tione did non possunt. Belgic Confession.
We believe, that by the disobedience of Adam, the sin which is
called original, is spread and diffused through the whole human
race : but original sin is the corruption and hereditary vice of our
whole nature, by which infants themselves, in the womb of their
mother, are polluted : and which, as some noxious root, germinates
every kind of sin in man. — (Art. 15.)
Saxon Confession.
Original sin exists ; and on account of the fall of our first parents,
and in consequence of the depravation which followed their fall,
they that are born are liable to the wrath of God, and deserving
eternal damnation, unless remission be obtained through the Me
diator. — (Art. ii.) Augsburg Confession.
The doctrine is, that after the fall of Adam, all men, propagated
in a natural way, have original sin. But we understand that ori
ginal sin (as it is called by the holy fathers, and all the orthodox
and pious men of learning in the church) consists of the guilt in
which we are involved by the fall of Adam, and by which we are;

198 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
exposed to the wrath of God and eternal death ; and that corrup
tion of human nature propagated from Adam. — (Art. ii.)
Articles of Smalcald, written by Martin Luther
Here, it must be confessed by us, that Paul, in the 5th of the Ro
mans, affirms that sin sprang from one man, Adam, and entered
into the world, by whose disobedience all men were made sinners,
subjected to death and the devil. This is called original, heredi
tary, principal, or radical sin.
Confession of Wittenberg.
We believe and confess that man was by God made just and
wise originally, endowed with free will, and adorned by the Holy
Spirit ; but afterwards, in consequence of disobedience, was de
prived of the Holy Spirit, made the slave of Satan, and rendered
obnoxious to corporeal, as well as eternal damnation ; and this evil
not only seized upon Adam, but was propagated to all his pos
terity. To these citations we may add, that the theologians who met at
Marpurg, to endeavour to settle the differences between the Lu
therans and Zwinglians, about the presence of Christ in the sacra
ment, though unable to agree on this point, nevertheless drew up
and subscribed a doctrinal confession, one article of which related
to original sin, and is as follows : " In the fourth place, we believe
that original sin is innate in us, and was propagated to us from
Adam ; and it is such a sin that it exposes all men to condemna
tion ; so that unless Jesus Christ had interposed for us by his death
and life, all men on account of original sin would have been con
demned ; nor could they have come into the kingdom of God, and
to eternal happiness." These articles were subscribed by Luther,
Melancthon, Jonas, Osiander, Brentius, Agricola, GCcolampadius,
Zwingle, Bucer and Hedio.
Rivet then gives the testimonies and explanations of certain theo
logians, from different countries, who had subscribed the confessions
before cited, beginning with those of Switzerland.
Wolfgang Mnsculus.
Let no one here allege, that as the universality expressed in the
latter clause is restricted to the elect only, when it is said that the
free gift came upon all men to justification of life ; so in the former
clause, when it is said, the condemnation comes upon all men, it
may be referred to the reprobate only ; for the comparison insti
tuted between Adam and Christ will not admit of it, since accord
ing to this the evil propagated from Adam is imputed to all those
descended from him ; and in like manner the good to all those who
are justified by Christ. — (Loc. Comm. cap. de Electione.)
Again, more expressly, in his exposition of 'Rom. v. 12 :  " Some
expound the words have sinned (r\pafTov) on account of sin are con-

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 199
demned, or virtually are constituted sinners ; which, indeed, is true ;
but there is no reason why you should not understand by it, the actual
sin of Adam, in whom all that existed in his loins have sinned. For
since we receive from Christ not only this benefit that we should
be virtually justified by his obedience ; but this also, that by the
very actual obedience of Christ, we obey the Father, as we are
Christ's ; so we are not only virtually made sinners in Adam, but
are condemned for this very sin of Adam. Whence the apostle
declares, that by the offence of one, or the one offence, judgment
came upon all men to condemnation. — (Comm. on Romans, ch. 5.)
Peter Viret, Pastor at Lausanne.
God permitted the fall and corruption of the whole human race,
and of the whole nature of man, in the man first formed. (Instit.
Christ., Dial. 1.) Amandus Polanus, Professor at Basle.
The parts of original sin are two, " the crime of disobedience,
or defection from God, while in the loins of Adam ; and the corrup
tion consequent upon the lapse of Adam, in the whole human na
ture. The fault of disobedience or defection from God while in the
loins of Adam," is the first part of original sin, which is iniquity, or
a stain from a blot contracted from that first sin, namely, a privation
of the due honour which should be present, of the nature of a bond
obliging to punishment, and binding us in punishment. So that the
sin was not that of Adam alone, but also ours, because not only did
Adam sin, but we also, as in Adam the root of the whole human
race sinned, and transgressed the law. Rom. v. 5, 12, 19. — (Syn-
tag. Theol., lib. vi., cap. 3.)
Although after the fall, Adam committed other sins, yet none of
them are imputed, but only the first, by which corruption and death
were spread through all human nature, and were decreed upon us.
This Paul teaches, Rom. v. 12. " By one man sin entered into the
world, and death by sin," where he speaks of sin in the singular
number, not of sins. So also, in the 16th verse, guilt (judgment)
was of one offence unto condemnation. And in ver. 17, "By one
offence, death reigned by one," and in the 18th v., "By one of
fence guilt (judgment) came upon all men to condemnation." —
(Ibid.) Henry Bullinger, Pastor and Professor at Zurich.
Sin is called original, or the sin of our birth, because it comes
from our first origin, or is derived from our first parent upon all,
by propagation or traduction. It derives its origin from the first
formed man, and hence it is termed, the hereditary depravity and
corruption of our nature. Moreover, this evil flowed from our first
parents to all their posterity. — (Decad. III., Serm. 10.)
After men became obnoxious to punishment, so far were we from
having any power by which we could deliver ourselves, that, by

200 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
reason of our native and inherent depravity, we rather increase the
same. — (Compend. Relig. Christ., v. 5.)
Peter Martyr, Professor at Zurich.
After discussing the import of the phrase if $, in the person of
Photius, maintaining the Latin interpretation in whom, that is, in
Adam all have sinned, he proceeds to observe : — But I am not
disposed keenly to contend for this interpretation, for I admit that
if w is a causal particle, so that the sense may be, that death has
passed upon all men because that all have sinned. For Chrysos-
tom says, by the fall of Adam, Paul has determined that other mor
tals who did not eat of the tree are infected ; and as a prudent
physician, when about to administer for a particular disease, does
not delay in the mere circumstances or sequences, but has recourse
to the head and primary cause : thus, all die because all sinned.
Nor should we in this place take the word sinned in such a sense
as would render it inapplicable to infants ; but as though he had
said, they are held in sin and are esteemed guilty (Rei), for he was
able from explanations given in the Epist. to Hebrews, to de
clare, " How we sinned in the fall of Adam ;" for there we read
that Levi paid tithes while in the loins of Abraham. By the same
reason it may here be understood that we were contaminated in
the loins, in the mass of Adam (Comm. on Rom., ch. v.). A little
after, he says, " For as by the disobedience of one man sin entered
into the world" the apostle declares what sin it was, which by one
man entered into the world, and by which death passed upon all
men: it was the disobedience of the first man, which he signifies
was communicated to all, when he says, " by it many were consti
tuted sinners." (lb.)
Original sin is a depravation of the whole nature of man, derived
from the fall of our first parents to their posterity by generation;
which, unless the benefit of Christ's mediation prevents, will subject
all who are born into the world, to infinite evils and to eternal
damnation. — (lb.)
The efficient cause is the sinning will of Adam. When, there
fore, he seems to assert that the sin for which we are condemned
is not another's, but our own, he means that the sin of Adam was
not so the sin of another but that it was ours also; besides, he had
respect to that error of Pighius, that original sin consists in nothing
else but the imputation of Adam's sin ; for he did not acknowledge
innate depravity, or denied that it partook of the nature of sin. —
(Ibid.) In the fifth chapter of Romans it is written, "In whom all sinned;"
which refers to Adam : for these words, if <5, cannot refer to the
word sin, for according to the syntax of the Greek language, the
pronoun in that case must have been in the feminine gender, and
the apostle should have said if J ; the true sense then is that we
sinned in the fall of Adam. And we have the same mode of speak
ing in his Epistle to the Hebrews, where he declares that Levi paid

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 201
tithes while yet in the loins of Abraham, who, according to the
genealogy, was the fourth from him in the line of descent. Now,
as it is said that while in the loins of Abraham he paid tithes to
Melchisedek ; by the same reason all men were contained in Adam
when he sinned, &c. — (Comm. on 1 Cor., ch. xv.)
Stephen Fabritius, of Berne.
f Since Adam representatively bore the person of the whole hu
man race, whatever of good or evil he received of God, he receiv
ed for himself and for others. — 1 Cor. xv. 22. Besides, when
Adam sinned, his posterity were in his loins, and to be propagated
from him by the laws of nature, and thus they inherit guilt from
him. Heb. vii. 9. — (Concion. in Psalm li.)
John Wollebius, Professor at Basle.
The proximate cause of original sin is the guilt of the first sin, in
regard to which the punishment of God is most just ; namely, a part
of that death which God threatened to man.
Although the soul of man is immediately breathed into us by
God ; yet united to the body it is truly guilty of the first sin which
is imputed to the whole man, and so it is infected with that original
stain. — (Christ. Theol., lib. i., cap 10.)
John Calvin.
Although Calvin dwells chiefly on the description and proof of the
natural corruption of all men, he shows aliso that this was the pun
ishment of the first sin. " After the divine image was obliterated,
he did not bear this punishment alone ; as in the place of wisdom,
virtue, sanctity, truth, justice (in which ornaments he had been
clothed), the basest plagues succeeded, blindness, impotency, impu
rity, &c. ; but he also involved and immersed his posterity in the
same miseries. This is that hereditary corruption which the an
cients called original sin ; understanding by the word sin, the de
pravation of a nature before good and pure. Concerning which thing
there was much contention among them, for nothing can be more
remote from common sense than that all should become guilty by
the sin of one. That certainly cannot be done without the imputa
tion of that one sin. — (Inst., lib. ii., cap. 1.)
And again, so undoubtedly it must be held, that Adam was not
only the progenitor of human nature, but, as it were, the radix ;
and so, in his deserved corruption, the race of man was vitiated. —
(lb., 66.)
The words are not obscure, that by the obedience of Christ
many are justified, so by the disobedience of Adam many were
constituted sinners. Therefore, between these two, this is the re
lation, that the one destroyed us, involving us in his own ruin with
himself; the other restores us by his grace to salvation. — (Ibid.)
It is not lawful to interpret otherwise what is said, " that in Adam

202 the doctrine of imputation.
all die," than that he by sinning brought so great destruction and
ruin, not only upon himself, but precipitated our nature also into
the same destruction. — (lb.)
With this we should be content, that whatever endowments the
Lord was pleased to bestow upon human nature, were deposited
with Adam, so that when he lost what he had received, the loss
was not his only, but that of us all. — (lb.)
Nor did it happen merely in a natural way, that all should fall
by the sin of one parent : the scriptures openly declare, that all men
were bound over to eternal death in the person of this one man. —
(Lib. iii., cap. 23, sect. 7.)
Adam, the common father of all, by his rebellion alienated him
self from God ; and the fountain of life and all good being forsaken,
he rendered himself obnoxious to all miseries. Whence it comes
to pass that every one of us is born infected with original sin, and
from the very womb of our mother we are under the curse of God,
and condemned not only on account of the crime of another, but on
account of the depravity which is then within us, though it does
not yet appear. — (Confession of Faith.)
In regard to man, we perceive, in passing over the scriptures,
that the thing is thus : that the whole human race has become cor
rupt by the fall of Adam, so that we have all become obnoxious to
destruction and damnation, not only because Adam himself sinned,
but because we ourselves are sinners from the womb. — (Confession
of the French churches, submitted to the Diet at Frankfort.)
But if it is proposed by you to subject God to the laws of nature,
will you condemn him for injustice, because for the sin of one man
we are all held implicated in the guilt of eternal death ? One sin
ned ; all are led to punishment ; nor is that all, but from the sin of
this one, all have contracted contagion ; so that they are born cor
rupt, and infected with a death-bringing pollution. — (Reply to one
of his Calumniators.)
It should be remarked how God, in the person of Adam, created
the whole human race after his own image : so Adam, by sin, was
not only despoiled of the gifts conferred, but was banished from
God ; and in consequence all his posterity. How was this ? Be
cause according to the will of God we were all included in his per
son. — (Comm. on Job, ch. xiv.)
It is worthy of remark, that there are two differences between
Christ and Adam, concerning which the apostle was silent, not be-
- cause he thought they might be neglected, but because it did not
pertain to his present argument to enumerate them. The first is,
that by the sin of Adam we are not condemned by imputation
alone, as though the punishment of another's sin was exacted of us ;
but we so bear his punishment because we also are guilty of his
fault ; for because our nature was vitiated in him, it is with God
bound by the guilt of iniquity. Here then we have the two things,
not only the imputation of the first sin ; but also our own fault, since
our nature is corrupted. — (Comm. on Rom. v. 17.)

the doctrine of imputation. 203
Theodore Beza.
Two things should be considered in original sin, namely, guilt
and corruption ; which, although they cannot be separated, yet
ought to be distinguished accurately. For as Adam, by the com
mission of sin, first was made guilty of the wrath of God, then as
being guilty, he underwent as the punishment of his sin, the cor
ruption of soul and body. So also he transmitted to posterity a
nature, in the first place guilty, next, corrupted. Concerning the
propagation of guilt, the apostle is properly treating in this passage,
in contrast with which the imputation of the obedience of Christ is
set forth. Hence it follows, that that guilt which precedes corrup
tion, is by the imputation of Adam's disobedience ; as the remission
of sins and the abolition of guilt, is by the imputation of the obedi
ence of Christ. Nothing can beplainer. — (Note on Rom. v. 12.)
Lambert Danaeus Aurelius, S. Theol. D. and Professor in the Academy of Geneva,
Leyden, &c.
Original sin flows from parents to their children by the ordina
tion of God, constituting and placing Adam for the whole human
species, as he constituted and substituted Christ as the second Adam
for all the elect. " That first sin rendered them guilty before
God, then the corruption (which followed guilt in Adam) was
transferred into us ; on the account of this inhering in us we are now
guilty, as infected with our own depravity — vile, and spotted, and
hateful to God, not only in Adam, or as we are viewed in him as
the fountain and root of the human race, but as we are considered
in ourselves and from ourselves corrupted."
Again. The guilt and punishment of the sin of Adam have
passed upon all the posterity of Adam and Eve, Christ excepted.
All men, the posterity of Adam, are by nature guilty before
God, involved in that sin, and are children of wrath. Hence, both
in mind and body we bear the punishment which we before de
scribed ; for the opinion is false, that punishment alone flowed to
us on account of this sin, and not the guilt and fault, for in that
case we should be punished as undeserving ; but first the sin, then
the punishment passes over and is laid upon us. Therefore, by
one man sin entered into the world, that is guilt, and that indeed
first in order, and by sin, death ; and so the penalty, both in soul
and body, afterwards pervaded all men also. For in one Adam
they sinned and are constituted guilty before God. But why was
this ? Because Adam not only was the propagator, but also the
fountain and root of the whole human race, from which the pollu
tion and vitiosity descended, as into the branches propagated from
this root, not only by imitation but by the actual communication of
the first sin, first of the fault (culpae) then of the corruption and
vitiosity both in mind and body.
Original sin then does not consist merely in imitation, nor solely
in imputation, but in inhesion, propagation, communication, and
installation of that corruption and depravity which Adam himself

'204 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
had contracted. And the same descends to' us, and dwells in us.
Therefore, when he sinned, Adam instilled his pollution into us all.
(Apologia pro Justif. per imputationem.)
There are three things which constitute a man guilty before
God. 1. The sin flowing from this that we have all sinned in the
first man, Rom. v. 12. 2. Corruption, which is the punishment of
this sin, which fell upon Adam and all his posterity, Heb. ix. 27.
3. The (actual) sins which adult men commit, and which are fruits
which this root of corruption brings forth, of which we are guilty
before the judgment of God.
Anthony Fay, Pastor and Professor at Geneva.
All sinned in Adam, and by the sin of Adam death passed on all
men, because that sin had passed unto all. We sinned in him
sinning ; we died in his dying. Ef i Theodoret takes as a causal
particle, as if a reason should be rendered why death has passed
upon all. Chrysostom understands if .Jin the same sense, namely,
that all had become sinners ; but it is better to take the preposition
if for iv as in Heb. ix. 10, so that it may be interpreted to relate to
Adam, whose sin was common to all, as the penalty or death is
common to all. — (On Rom. v. 12.)
We believe that the sin of Adam, whilst it was the act of an
individual, was common to the whole species, inasmuch as Adam
was not made a private person, but was constituted by God the
fountain of the whole race. For the human race lying hid in the
loins of Adam, was adorned by God with original righteousness
and grace ; but by the sin of Adam was despoiled of both. For
as a murder perpetrated by the hand is not imputed to the hand
only, but to the whole body, not to Adam alone, who was but a
member of the body of men, but to the whole race of men ; there
fore it is not of another's sin that we are reckoned guilty, but of
our own ; since in Adam we all eat of the forbidden fruit. — (En-
chirid. Theologie, disp. 37, thes. 15 — 18.)
A double disease pervaded the whole human race by the sin of
Adam. The first is guilt, by which all men are subjected to eter
nal death ; the other is the corruption of the whole man and of all
his faculties of mind and body : by reason of which he is neither
willing nor able to be subject to the divine law. — (Disp. 60, thes. 13.)
John Deodati, Professor and Pastor at Geneva.
This is the general conclusion of the preceding treatise concern
ing justification by faith, in which the apostle, after briefly repeating
what had been said, at the same time declares their foundation,
namely, that God out of his own good pleasure had constituted
Christ the head of grace and fountain of righteousness and life to
all his elect, by the imputation of whose righteousness they return
into favour with God, and consequently are sanctified and glorified.
For as Adam was constituted the head and root of the whole hu-

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 205
man race, so that by the imputation of his sin to all his posterity,
they became obnoxious to the divine curse, are deprived of origi
nal righteousness, corrupted in their whole nature, and liable to
death. — (On Rom. v. 12.)
Benedict Turrettin, Pastor and Professor at Geneva.
Our confessions include under original sin, the communion
which we have in the first sin, and. the loss of original righteous
ness and purity which we have sustained, and the inherent corrup
tion of the soul. — (On Rom. v. 12.)
Chrysostom, who well understood the import of the Greek word
(KaraaTaBi'ioovTai), explains it, by the fault and guilt into which we have
fallen in Adam ; by this first sin having become guilty in the judg
ment of God. — (On Rom. v. 18.)
Philip Mornay, Professor at Sauicur.
We know whence proceeded the corruption of the human race,
namely, from our grievous sin and the punishment which followed
it. We were all in the first man when he sinned. — (De Veritat.
Relig. Christ., cap. 16, 17.)
Since the whole human race was lost in Adam, and every one
in himself, God so loved the world that he gave the son of his love
as a price of redemption for the sins of all those whom out of mere
grace he gave to believe on him. — (In his Will.)
Francis Junius, Professor at Heidelberg and Leyden.
In the first Adam the whole species was, by God, naturally de
posited ; in whom all sinned, and became guilty, and the children
of wrath, and of an eternal malediction. — (De Pecc. Orig., thes. 4.)
The efficient cause is Adam and Eve, our first parents ; for since
Adam was constituted by God the instrumental principle in nature,
of the whole human race, and indeed a voluntary instrument, it is
necessary to suppose that this evil was effected by God, by nature,
or by this particular instrument: not by God, who left the volun
tary instrument to pursue his own course, and taught him what
was right ; not from nature, which is the subject of the voluntary
instrument, but does not govern it ; then it must proceed from the
instrumental principle. — (lb., thes. 6.)
God, as in the order of his creation, placed the whole human
race in Adam by nature ; so, in the dispensation of his righteous
ness, he said to the whole human race in Adam, in whom we
have sinned, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt die." — (lb.,
thes. 7.)
They who pronounce that sin to be simply involuntary, are very
much deceived, since the same thing may be said to be voluntary
and involuntary in different respects, whether you respect its gene
ration or its constitution ; for the whole race was voluntary in
sinning in Adam (although in respect to its particular origin it was

206 the doctrine of imputation.
to us involuntary), in whom we have a common origin, and as it
proceeds from the fault of our nature it is voluntary, though not
by a particular act of the will of each individual. — (lb., thes. 8.)
Hence it comes to pass (namely, by the transgression of Adam),
that all of us who are born bear the stigma and brand of our
rebellion ; so that before we enjoy the light we partake of the
injury of our origin. For, indeed, we all sinned in him in whom
we all were one man. — (lb., thes. 2.)
Our nature was deprived of the gift of righteousness in Adam ;
and the nature of Adam having become destitute, makes all per
sons procreated from it subject to the same destitution, sinners and
unrighteous ; and so the personal sin of Adam has passed upon all,
who according to nature are personally propagated from him. — (lb.,
thes. 8).
Kf ip should be interpreted in whom, namely, Adam. In this
chapter the apostle openly declares that all have sinned in Adam ;
that by the fall of one, Adam, many are become dead ; that guilt
is from one offence to condemnation ; by one offence death reigned;
by one man — by one offence guilt came upon all men to condem
nation — and finally, by the disobedience of one man many were
constituted sinners. — (De Nat. and Grat. rat., 71.)
Peter Molinaeus, Professor at Sedan.
In this argument the declaration of the apostle is most express,
where he says, " by one man," &c. Yea, infants he subjects in a pe
culiar manner to this necessity, saying, " death reigned over those
who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression,"
that is, who had not sinned actually, but only originally. And lest
any should refer to this imputation alone, in the 7th chapter he con
fesses his own proclivity to sinning. (Molinaeus denies, indeed,
that imputation is alone, but acknowledges and proves that this is
joined with corruption, which the synod also does.) " We," says
he, " sinned in Adam, and in him willed this depravation."
"Nor indeed would God impute the sin of Adam to his posteri
ty, unless they had in themselves something which was truly of the
nature of sin, and unless they were evil by nature."
It is evident that he acknowledges imputation, with inherent de
pravity conjoined ; but in his Anatomy of Arminianism, he asserts
the doctrine of imputation, professedly, and spends one whole chap
ter in its defence. Daniel Chamier, Professor of Theology at Montauban.
After bringing forward the various opinions of the Papists, he
reduces them all to two. First, those of the Catholics who agree
with the Reformed on this point. Second, those who acknowledge
nothing inherent which can be called sin. In the first class he
places Bellarmin, Peltanus, Dejphinus, Alvaresius, Vasquez, &c.
Against these he alleges nothing which need be made a subject of

the doctrine of imputation. 207
controversy. He then proceeds to dispute against those who made
original sin to consist altogether in the imputation of the first sin ;
but his arguments do not strike those, such as Bellarmin, who join
depravity proceeding from the first man, to the imputation of his
sin. " For Bellarmin," says he, " considers in sin, the act itself, and
that which from the act formally remains in the soul ; and these
two things may be distinguished, as heat, and causing heat. In
Adam both really existed ; in us, not the act of Adam, except by
imputation, but the quality from the act really. Wherefore, in the
first sense, original sin is the first transgression of Adam, committed
by him, as representing the whole human race, in whom all sinned.
But in the second sense, it is the destitution of original righteous
ness, with an habitual aversion to God, and perverseness of will,
resulting in a peculiar manner from the actual disobedience of the
first parent." — (Panstratria, Fam iii., lib. i., c. 2, sect. 9.)
" We grant that by the disobedience of Adam, all were truly and
in fact rendered unrighteous by inherent depravity ; but that the
unrighteousness of Adam was not imputed we declare to be false.
On the contrary, we deny that we could be made inherently un
righteous by one man, unless the unrighteousness of this one man
were imputed to us. Wherefore it is false that the disobedience
of Adam was not imputed to us." — (lb., lib. xxi., c. 2, sec. 9.)
Again. " We grant that the disobedience of Adam and the obe
dience of Christ do efficiently and meritoriously constitute us un
righteous and righteous ; for this we never denied ; for we deny
that they could render us righteous or unrighteous, unless they
were first imputed, for if not imputed, in no way are they ours ;
for they are the acts of individuals, and therefore personal. But
for personal acts to be common to others, is absurd and contradic
tory. Therefore it behoves that they should be imputed. For
this kind of communication is no how inconsistent with the proper
personality of act.s ; it proceeds on an entirely different principle.
Therefore the very sin of Adam, I say his own personal disobedi
ence, must be imputed to ins posterity. And so also in regard to
the obedience of Christ : because the whole human race was consi
dered as in Adam by nature; and because the whole multitude of
believers were in Christ, by grace. Hence it comes to pass that
we are not only made sinners by Adam, but are declared to have
sinned in him, which is a very different thing."
I say then that it is certain that all men are really constituted
unrighteous by Adam, and that all believers are really constituted
righteous by Christ. But I deny that that is the point which the
apostle had under consideration; for his inquiry here is into the
grounds of our condemnation and justification ; for although he con
siders KardKpipa as in Adam, yet not peculiar to him, but pertaining
to the whole human race; for the meaning is, then, when Adam
sinned, the whole human race was condemned, or made guilty of
disobedience to God ; whence also this by Augustine was called

208 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
original sin, the punishment of the first sin ; but how could it be
punishment, unless that very first sin were imputed ?
John Mistrezatius, Pastor of the Church at Paris.
It is necessary that that which is past should become ours by
imputation only, but that which resides in another, should be deriv
ed to us by inheritance. For as Cardinal Bellarmin very well
says, concerning the act of sin committed by Adam ; " It is com
municated to us in the only way in which a thing past can be,
namely by imputation." So the obedience of the second Adam,
as it has been past now more than sixteen hundred years, is com
municated to us by imputation. But in regard to his spirit, it flows
into us by regeneration, just as the inherent corruption of Adam is
derived to us by natural generation. — (Haec Hie, p. 37.)
If the doctors of the Roman church agree that the disobedience
of Adam is imputed to us, because he was considered the head of
his posterity, with what reason can they deny that the obedience
of the second Adam is imputed to us? But you will say, the cor
ruption of Adam has descended to us really, and inheres in us. So
it does ; but I say that the imputation of his disobedience precedes,
and corruption is derived to us by generation, because we sinned
in Adam as in our head ; God abandoning the posterity of Adam
to the corruption of their father, on account of his sin. — (lb., p. 43.)
Charles Drelincourt, Pastor of the Churclrat Paris.
As the sin of Adam is imputed to us because we all sinned in
Adam, so in like manner the righteousness of Christ is imputed to
us, since in the person of Christ, our head, we have fulfilled all
righteousness. — (On Rom. v. 19.)
John Sharp Sestus, S. T. Professor.
Original sin is two-fold, imputed and inherent. Imputed sh^is
the defection of Adam, which imputed to all his posterity that were
in his loins ; which sin was actually in Adam, but only in us by
imputation. It is imputed to us because we were in Adam, as in
our root and stock. — (Theol. Comm., Loc. xi., De Peccato.)
Again, concerning justification : —
It is objected, that it is absurd to say that any one can be right
eous, with a righteousness without him ; for this would be the
same as if I should say that the wall is white by the whiteness
which is not its own. To which I answer : In things strictly of a
personal nature, no one can be denominated, except the person in
whom the thing exists ; but in regard to the righteousness of Christ
it is otherwise, because it is not personally peculiar to Christ, but,
by the covenant of grace, is communicated to all believers ; for as
the sin of Adam was not personal, but imputed to every individual
of the whole human race ; so also the righteousness of Christ.

the doctrine of imputation. 209
John Dartesius.
By one man, namely Adam, sin entered into the world, by impu
tation and propagation : therefore in the same manner the thing
takes place with us, in regard to the righteousness of Christ. — (Cla-
vis Praedestinationis, part i.,c. 5.)
John Crayus Occitanus, Pastor.
Adam was a public person, representing the whole of his poste"
rity, and he sinned, not only for himself, but for all men descending
from him. As the descendants who were yet to descend from
Abraham, paid tithes in the person of their father, who afterwards
received tithes from their brethren, as the apostle teaches us, Heb.
vii. 7 — 9, so also men, who by natural generation from Adam have
their descent, become guilty, and are condemned to undergo pun
ishment on account of the action of their parent, in whose loins
they at the time existed ; for his fall was the fall of the whole hu
man race, who in the loss sustained by their first parent, lost all
their riches, with which it behoved them to be endowed. " By one
offence many were constituted sinners." — Rom. v. 19. [From
these things the imputation of the first sin may manifestly be in
ferred.]— (On the 10th article of the Confession of the Gallican
church.) There is no Christian who does not confess that the rebellion of
Adam was imputed to his posterity, but if any one can be found
bold enough to make such a denial, he will be compelled to ac
knowledge it from the words of Paul. For truly guilt could not
come upon all men to condemnation by one sin, unless by the im
putation of that sin. And death could not have reigned over those
who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression,
unless by the imputation of the sin of our first parent. — (On the
18th article of the Confession.)
* John Chenet, V. D. M.
Although actually and in very fact we did not eat the forbidden
fruit, as did Adam, nevertheless we all sinned in Adam, Rom. v. 12.
And, as Augustine teaches, Epist. xxiii., to Boniface, we subsequent
ly contracted from him an obligation to punishment, since we were
one with Adam when he sinned. — (Exam, of the Principal Art. of
Religion, lib. xL, c. 28.)
Original sin is the imputation of the transgression of Adam, and
fl #then a real vitiosity, as well of body as mind, which we have re
ceived from Adam.
Quest: Why do you extend this sin to the imputation of the
transgression of Adam ?
Ans. Because as we are not otherwise reformed and regenerated
by the Holy Spirit, but as we are pardoned and justified by the
gratuitous imputation of the merit of Christ ; so original sin does
not consist merely in that depravity which is the opposite of that
14

210 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
renovation which is by the Holy Spirit, but also in the imputation
of the sin of Adam, which is the opposite to the payment made by
Christ, and to his perfect obedience for us, even to the death of the
cross. — (Exam, of the Principal Art. of Religion, chap. 21.)
Abraham Collignon, V. D. M.
Quest. Why, on account of the sin of Adam, do all his posterity
lie in a state of misery ?
Ans. Because Adam represented the whole human race : for, as
the promises of good made to him would not only have been ful
filled to him, but to his posterity, if he had continued in obedience ;
so in like manner the threatenings of evil came upon them as well
as on him. — (Institutes of the Principal Articles of Faith, sec. iii.)
[Paul Ferrius, Pastor.
All we were in the loins of Adam, and sinned in him and with
him.— (Orthodox. Specimina.)
Daniel Tilenus, Prof. Sedan., Disp. xv.
Original sin is that hereditary corruption of human nature, by
which all who by natural generation are propagated from Adam,
are infected ; and so in the loins of this first parent, they sinned to
gether with him, and incurred the guilt of both temporal and eter
nal punishment.
William Whittaker, Doctor and Professor of Theology in the University of
Cambridge.
[Wm. Whittaker wrote a particular tract on Original Sin,
against Stapleton and other papists ; in the first book of which he
treats of the first sin of Adam.]
" Although," says he, " that act was of Adam alone, nor could
inhere in his posterity or in Adam himself, yet by imputation it is
the act of all of us. But does the word imputation, in this case,
give offence ? Then hear what Lyra, on the fifth chapter of the
Romans, says ; ' The sin of Adam is imputed to all descending from
him, according to the law of generation ; for they are his members,
whence this is called original sin.' But if you think that this testi
mony is out of date, I will refer you to two of the firmest pillars of
the Roman church, Cajetan and Bellarmin. Cajetan, on this pas
sage, says, ' The punishment of death on account of it is inflicted
on all his posterity ; and it is proved that the sin is imputed to him
and all his posterity, because the punishment of it is endured by
them all.' So Bellarmin, tom iii., lib. v., c. 17. — 'Adam alone
committed that by his. actual volition ; but it is communicated to us
by generation, in the only way in which it can be transmitted,
namely, by imputation.' "
Original sin is inherent and native depravity, but the actual and

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 211
free transgression of Adam is imputed to us. For we should nei
ther be held under the guilt or depravity thence contracted, unless
that act by which Adam violated the divine precept was ascribed
to us by imputation. But in regard that some scholastic theolo
gians place original sin in imputation alone ; in this they basely
and nefariously err. John Junius, Preacher at Delft.
In the sum of the matter, all the Reformed churches agree, and
teach with unanimous consent, in accordance with the sacred scrip
tures and the universal agreement of antiquity ; first, that the sin
of Adam was not a personal sin, but of the whole human race, in
asmuch as they were all included in the loins of Adam, and in
Adam, the first parent of us all and root of the whole human race,
they sinned. Secondly, there was transfused a principle contrary
to original righteousness, contracted from Adam in the first tran
sient act of his sin, and propagated by means of generation to all
his posterity ; so that all men by nature are guilty of death, and
averse from the love which they owe to God and divine things,
and turned or inclined to evil. — (Antapologia Posthuma, c. vii., p..
152. G. S. Frisius.
Nor is it merely the imputation of the sin of another, as if all on»
account of the first sin of their parents were only made obnoxious
to death ; as if this evil would not have the nature of their own
proper sin, unless their consent was added ; but it is the real sin of
the whole human race, through the fall of Adam, in whom all have
sinned, Rom. v. 12, and are all/by nature under an obligation, from
the just judgment of God, to endure the punishment of eternal
death. Again, as from the merit of Christ a double benefit is decreed to
us, the imputation of gratuitous righteousness, and the regeneration
of our corrupt nature, so a double evil has been transmitted to us
from the sin of Adam, namely, guilt, on account of the sin com
mitted by him and in him (Rom v. 12), and the depravation of na
ture, propagated from him to us. The individual person of Adam
is not here considered, but the nature common to all his posterity,
in respect to which all are propagated from him corrupt, as being
members of the one same nature. — (De Peccato Originali.)
John G. Vossius.
There are two questions ; whether the sin of our first parents
was imputed to all their posterity, and how far imputed. The
Catholic church has once judged that that first sin is imputed to
all ; that is, by the just judgment of God, all its effects are trans
mitted to all the children of Adam ; but these effects were believed
to be, that we are born destitute of original righteousness, subject;

212 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
to the necessity of death, and liable to an eternal separation from
God.— (Hist. Pol., lib. ii., p. 1.) The above he confirms by many
testimonies from the sacred scriptures, and from the ancients.
J. Lorentius.
The true and genuine exposition of these words is, that all men
sinned in Adam, as in their common stock and mass, and so in him
and by him. It is altogether a different thing to sin in Adam, and
to derive sin from him. And we should carefully distinguish the
sin which all committed in Adam, from original sin ; namely, as
the cause from the effect. For all sinned in Adam at the time that
he sinned by eating the forbidden fruit, as then naturally existing in
his loins. This first sin of Adam is the cause of original sin, which
is the effect ; therefore it is falsely asserted by Catharinus and Pi
ghius, " That original sin is nothing else but this first sin."
Again, Augustine in his 39th Epist. speaks of both these kinds of
sin, but distinguishes them, as also in several parts of his works. —
(In Epist. ad Rom., C. V. v., 12.)
Nic. Videlius, Professor of Theology in the University of Franequer.
The reason why God imputes the sin of Adam to his posterity
is his justice, and not mere will, as the Arminians teach.
The imputation of the first sin is such, that in fact the whole pos
terity of Adam is made liable to eternal condemnation, contrary to
what the Arminians hold. — (Theod., Disp. xx., thes. 5 and 6.)
.'S. Lubbertus, S. Theology, Dr. and Professor at Franequer, and a member of the
Synod at Dort.
When Faustus Socinus, the Photinian, that he might invalidate
the doctrine of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, in his
work, De Christo Servatore, lib. iv., c. 4, had objected to Covetus
and others of the orthodox, that we thus conclude ; " That as by
the crime and disobedience of Adam men are condemned and dead,
because that crime and disobedience were imputed to them ; so by
the righteousness and obedience of Christ they are absolved and
live, because that righteousness and obedience are imputed to them.
To which Socinus answered, that it was false that the crime and
disobedience of Adam were imputed." At these words, Lubbert
wrote in the margin, that we cannot be guilty of the sin of another
unless that sin is imputed to us.
But in his answer he uses the following arguments : It is agreed
between us and our opponent, that we are constituted sinners by
the disobedience of Adam, and are constituted righteous by the
obedience of Christ ; the only question is respecting the mode in
which this takes place. How are we constituted sinners by the
disobedience of Adam 1 and how are we constituted righteous by
the obedience of Christ? We say that in both cases the effect
takes place by imputation.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 213
For by the sin of Adam imputed to us we are constituted guilty.
When the apostle says that all have sinned in Adam, he means that
the sin of Adam, as our head, was imputed to us when we were yet
in his loins, and on that account we are reckoned guilty : and at
the same time it is the will of God, that as Adam by his transgres
sion was rendered averse to God, that is, corrupt and depraved, so
we by the same transgression imputed to us, as I said, are born
averse to God, corrupt and depraved. Therefore the sin of Adam
is imputed to us, and that corruption and depravity in which we
are born, we call original sin.
When Adam, by his total apostasy from God, became guilty of
death, all his posterity were implicated in the same guilt ; no other
wise than if they had all sinned against God, by perpetrating the
crime of murder.
It is manifest, therefore, that the same guilt is imputed ; or
which is the same thing, the same crime by which guilt was con
tracted.John Maccovius, Professor in the University of Franequer, and also a member of the
Synod of Dort.
It is called original sin, because man derives it from his first
origin, and it is imputed or inherent. The imputed sin of our ori
gin, is the defection or first transgression of Adam and Eve, com
mitted by eating the forbidden fruit ; and afterwards imputed to
the whole human race, naturally propagated from these two per
sons. — (Loc. Com., disp. xiv.)
John C. Emdan, of the same University.
Concerning all the posterity of Adam, we affirm that as well on
account of the fall of Adam, as by their own proper sins, they
are cast into a state of misery, in this following the scriptures
which teach that the first origin of death was from Adam ; so that,
in truth, his posterity are reckoned to have sinned in him, and so
on account of the sin of Adam, which Jie committed by eating the
forbidden fruit, not as if this sin was altogether another's, but as
being in some sort their own, they are adjudged to death. — (Rom.
v. 12.)
Agreeably to the scriptures it is said, that all who are born of
Adam sinned in his loins, because it was so appointed by God that
that sin which Adam first committed should not be reckoned only
the sin of Adam, but should be imputed to his posterity.
The meaning of the scripture is evident, since it pronounces that
men are constituted sinners by the disobedience of Adam, for it
clearly teaches that men are so constituted sinners by the sin of
Adam, that according to the divine ordination sin is imputed to his
posterity ; and on this account they are equally reckoned sinners,
as if in their own proper person they had committed it. — (Idea
Theologica.)

214 the doctrine of imputation.
Thomas Strackius.
As Martin Becan, the Jesuit, in his book concerning God, says,
" That by original sin these two things are understood : 1. The
actual sin of Adam, by which he destroyed himself and the whole
human race. 2. Habitual sin, which is contracted by his posterity
from the actual sin of Adam ; that is the corruption and vitiosity
of human nature ; hence that sin is truly described to be an actual
defection of the descendants of Adam, who, while in his loins,
made a defection from God to the devil. And this corruption or
vitiosity of nature is inflicted on man by God, as a just judge, on
account of the aforesaid defection, by both of which man is ren
dered miserable and made obnoxious to eternal damnation, until by
Christ he is liberated from that misery. Paul, in the epistle to the
Romans, v. 12, speaks concerning this first sin. — (Vindication of
the Catechism of the Palatinate, quest, vii.)
James Arminius, Professor in the University of Leyden.
Since the condition of the covenant first entered into by God
with the first man was, that if they would remain in his favour
and grace by the observance of this precept, and others, the gifts
conferred on him, with the same grace, would be transmitted to his
posterity ; but if they (our first parents) should render themselves
unworthy of these blessings by their disobedience, their posterity
also should be destitute of them, and should be obnoxious to the
contrary evils : hence it has happened, that all men naturally pro
pagated from them should be subjected to death, temporal and
eternal, and should be destitute of the gift of the Holy Spirit and
of original righteousness ; which punishment, the privation of the
image of God, is wont to be called original sin. From these things
the imputation of the sin of our first parents is necessarily inferred;
for wherever there is the punishment of sin there is the imputation
of the'same. — (Disp. 31, thes. 9.)
Neustadian Admonition of the Professors of the Palatinate.
• We acknowledge original sin to be not only guilt, but the heredi
tary depravity of human nature, which is repugnant to the law of
God and deserving eternal punishment.
Hieronymus Zanchius, Professor of Theology.
Because the whole human race which is propagated by natural
generation from Adam were in his loins, hence the precept, with
its penalty, was not addressed to the person of Adam alone, but
also pertained to the whole human race. Therefore, we believe
and confess with the apostle, that in Adam sinning all men sinned ;
so that that disobedience was not peculiar to Adam, but was the
common [disobedience] of the whole human race ; since his guilt
has involved all men naturally descended from his loins, as the
apostle Paul to the Romans hath manifestly taught. And as an

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 215
antithesis to the disobedience of Adam, he has firmly established
the obedience of Christ. For if the obedience of Christ is no less
ours by imputation than Christ's by his own proper action, because
we are born again by his incorruptible seed and from his spirit, it
follows that the disobedience of Adam also is imputed to us, and
we are held by his guilt, who have been born from his corrupt
seed, who is the father of us all.
That sin which by the first man entered into the world, was not
only the privation of original righteousness, and the total corrup
tion of human nature, but also the disobedience of Adam itself,
which was not ours in the act, nevertheless, in its fault and guilt
has come upon us by imputation. And by way of explication he
says, " We therefore say that that disobedience of Adam, which
was not ours in act, yet as to the fault and guilt, became ours by
imputation ; since God most justly imputes that sin of Adam, as
being the head, to us the members. — (Treatise on Redemption,
thes. i.)
For this the reason why all men have sinned in Adam, that is,
were made guilty, because Adam first sinned by his own actual
disobedience ; so we also in him as in our origin are made guilty ;
and his sin becomes ours by- imputation. Thus also the apostle
expresses it, when he says, " By the disobedience of one, namely,
Adam, we are all constituted sinners. This is our dvopia, the impu
tation of Adam's sin, which has become ours because we are his
members. And this is the principal thing in original sin."
Zachariah Ursinus.
Original sin is the guilt of the whole human race, on account of
the fall of our first parents, and the privation of the knowledge of
God, &c. Two things are included in it: 1. The guilt of eternal
damnation on account of the sin of our first parents. 2. The de
pravation of our whole nature since the fall. Concerning both
these Paul speaks, Rom. v. 12, By one man, &c. Some, while
they admit that we are guilty in consequence of this first sin, deny
that there is in all an innate depravity which deserves damnation and
wrath. For they allege that the concupiscence in which we are
born cannot be of the nature of sin.
Against such it must be held, first, that the whole human race
is guilty of the eternal wrath of God, on account of the disobe
dience of our first parents, unless they are delivered from this
guilt by the grace of the Mediator ; secondly, there is in us, be
sides this guilt, a defect, and inclinations contrary to the law of
God as soon as we are born. These defects and evil inclinations
are sins deserving the eternal wrath of God.
Paul clearly teaches, that by one man's disobedience we were
all rendered guilty, and made obnoxious to damnation. And he
compares this condemnation of all, on account of the sin of one,
to the justification of many on account of the satisfaction of one.
As then, by Christ, there is a two-fold grace, namely, the imputa-

216 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.
tion of righteousness, and the regeneration or restoration of cor
rupt nature, so also the evil flowing from the sin of Adam is double ;
first, guilt, on account of the sin committed by him, and depravity
of nature contracted from him and propagated to us. — (Explic. of
the Catechism, par. i., quest. 7.)
George Sohnius, the colleague of Ursinus at Heidelberg.
Original sin, as well in Adam as in his posterity, includes three
deadly evils, the demerit, the guilt or liableness to punishment, and
the depravity or corruption of nature. All these concur in the
parent and in his posterity in relation to the first sin, with this dif
ference only, that Adam sinning was the principal agent committing
the fault, deserving the guilt, and casting off the image of God,
and rendering himself depraved. Of all these do his posterity
partake by imputation and by generation from a corrupted parent.
Then it is in vain disputed by the sophists, whether the demerit, the
guilt, or the depravity is contracted by the fall, for all these do
actually exist ; so that taking the words in a wide sense, you may
say that the fall and disobedience of our first parents, and in them
of the whole human race, by which all of them in like manner
lost the image of God, depraved their nature, became the enemies
of God, and contracted the guilt of temporal and eternal death ;
unless deliverance and reconciliation should take place by the Son
of God, the Mediator.
Again, " all are dead by the offence of one man :" therefore his
offence was the offence of all, but theirs by participation and impu
tation, otherwise they could not be said to be dead by the offence
of one,, but by many offences.
Although it is truly said that the first sin was committed by
Adam, yet not as a single person but as the father of the whole
human race, however it is not correct to say that original sin
existed in Adam, or that Adam had original sin, for then the cause
and effect, actual and original sin, would be manifestly confounded.
The first sin of Adam, therefore, as we said before, must be viewed
in a double aspect. In one respect it was the sin of Adam, and
was not original sin, but actual, originating, that is, giving origin
to the original sin of his posterity ; in another respect it was the
sin of his posterity, who were in his loins ; so that in mass they
committed the same sin, and hence it is imputed to them all.
Thus this our fall pertains to our original sin.
Bellarmin's first proposition is, " that the first transgression of
Adam, which is the transgression of the whole human race, is ori
ginal sin, if by sin be meant an action." This is correct, if it only
be added, If sin be taken for an action not of Adam alone, but of
his posterity, who, in mass, sinned in Adam. For thus this action
was ours, pertaining in the first place to our original sin.
We here close our extracts from these witnesses to the doctrine
of imputation, as held by the Reformers. The careful reader can-

the doctrine of imputation. 217
not but be struck by the distinctness and uniformity of their views.
At this time, when the doctrine itself is perverted, and the opinions
of the Reformers and others are shamefully misrepresented, we
should be glad to see the whole collection of testimony made by
Rivet, translated and published in a volume.

ESSAY IX.
MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN/

Reflecting men have always wondered, that as there is in most
things in the universe so beautiful an order, there should exist so
great confusion, so many crimes and calamities, together with dis
eases and death, in the human race. The philosophers, in attempt
ing to account for these phenomena, have ascribed them partly to
matter, partly to the will of man, and partly to fate, which they say
is the necessary connection of the first cause with all second causes,
whether physical or voluntary. The Manicheans, adopting a cor
rupt philosophy, professed certain insane opinions, equally dishon
ourable to God and injurious to morality ; . maintaining, that there
were two eternal and independent principles, the one good and the
other evil, and also the doctrine of necessity ; by which opinions,
the church in ancient times was very much agitated. It is the part
of a pious mind to think and speak with reverence concerning God ;
and to embrace and hold fast those sentiments which are true, and
friendly to piety and good morals, and which have been approved
by the deliberate judgment of the judicious and pious in the church ;
and not to indulge vain curiosity, or a fondness for useless specula
tions, nor to enter into infinite labyrinths of disputation.
We ought, however, in the commencement, to lay it down as a
certain principle, from which nothing should induce us to depart,
that God is not the author of sin, that he does not will sin, nor ap
prove of sin, nor impel the wills of others to choose sin : but that
he is truly and awfully opposed to sin, which he has declared, not
only by his word, in which eternal misery is threatened, but also
by the unceasing manifestations of his wrath against it, in the dis
pensations of his Providence. And the Son of God, by becoming
a victim for sin to appease the anger of his Father, has demonstrated
in the most striking manner, by his death, that not God, but the
devil, is the author of sin. Let it then be received as an undoubted
truth, that sin was not created, nor ordained by God ; but that it is
a dreadful destruction of the divine work and order ; and that the
true cause of sin is the will of the devil, and the will of man, which
* This translation, from the " Common-Places" of Melancthon, was published in
1833.

PHILIP MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN. 219
freely apostatized from God, who neither willed nor approved their
disobedience. Ingenious men have, on this subject, stated many
inextricable questions ; but omitting purposely these abstruse dis
quisitions, we declare that doctrine which is true, and confirmed by
the testimonies of divine revelation, and which we embrace with
all our hearts ; although we do not undertake to answer all the
subtle objections which may be brought up by disputatious men.
Now, that God is not the cause or approver of sin, is made evi
dent by the following testimonies of scripture : " And God saw
e tferything that he had made, and behold it was very good." Gen.
i. 31. That is, everything was pleasing to God, regular, and ac
cordant with the plan of the divine mind ; and so formed as to be
profitable to man.
In Psalm v. 5, it is said, " Thou hatest all workers of iniquity."
And in John viii. 44, it is said of Satan, " When he speaketh a lie,
he speaketh of his own : for he is a liar and the father of it."
In the words of our Saviour just cited, a distinction is clearly im
plied between the substance of the evil spirit and his moral quali
ties. Satan himself, as to his substance, was the work of God, by
whom all the angels of heaven were created, some of whom fell
into sin ; but a lie he has of himself, which he produced by the
exercise of his own free will. And between these things there is
no repugnance ; for while the substance is upheld by God, the free
agent may be the cause of his own sins, by abusing his liberty and
apostatizing from God.
Another testimony may be found in Zech. viii. 17, "And let
none of you imagine evil in your hearts against his neighbour,
and love no false oath, for all these are things that I hate, saith the
Lord." Now God is sincere in his professed hatred of sin : it cannot,
therefore, be thought that he wills sin.
Again, 1 John xxii. 16, " The lust of the flesh is not of the Father,
but of the world." And 1 John iii. 8, " He who committeth sin is
of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning ;" that is, the
devil is the original author of sin. And in regard to the human
race, we read in Rom. v. 12, "By man sin entered into the world;"
that is, sin is not a thing created by God ; but man, in the exercise
of his own liberty, has turned away from God, and wasted the
gifts of God, and has propagated this his ruin to posterity.
Nor do those words of scripture, where it is said, " I will harden
the heart of Pharaoh," and other similar expressions, militate with
the sentiments expressed above ; for to those acquainted with the
Hebrew idiom, it is well known that such expressions signify per
mission only, and not an efficacious will ; as when we pray, " Lead
us not into temptation," the meaning is, do not suffer us to fall into
emptation ; or do not permit us to fall or to be overthrown by
temptation. It is here important, that we should have fixed in our minds, the
true idea of sin, that we may be able clearly to distingu ish be-

220 PHILIP MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN.
tween it and what is produced by God. Sin is the disturbance or
confusion of the divine order ; sin, therefore, in the simplest notion
of it, is not a substance, nor anything positive, but a delect, or pri
vation. Sin, as it exists in the mind, is darkness ; that is, we have
not the clear knowledge of divine things, nor do we yield a firm
assent to the divine threatenings and promises. But sin, in the
will, is aversion ; that is, the heart is destitute of the fear of God,
of confidence, and love towards him, and of that obedience of heart
which the law of his nature demands, but is carried away with
wandering desires which are opposed to God. Now, that those
evils are properly defects, and not things created by God, is evi.
dent enough. Instead of being his work, sin is the abominable de
stroyer of the order of his work. It does not follow that he is the
author of sin, because he preserves in being the creature in whom
it exists ; but he is exceedingly displeased with sin, and sent his
Son to appease his wrath, and to heal the wound made in our na
ture. Let it be kept in mind, therefore, that God is not the cause
of that vitiosity with which we are born ; nor can he will that
which is evil, or at all approve it. But here a cavil, not uncom
monly made, must be noticed. It is asked, if sin be nothing posi
tive, but only a defect, is God angry at nothing ? To which we
would answer, that there is a great difference between a privation
and a negation (inter nihil privativum et nihil negativum). A pri
vation requires a subject, and is a destruction of something which
properly belongs to that subject, and on account of which it is re
jected as worthless. Thus the ruin of an edifice is a destruction
of its frame, or a dissipation of its parts. So the depravity of our
origin is a pollution and disorder of our faculties, which defect in
our nature is the object of the divine hatred, and on account of
which he is displeased with the being in whom it exists. The na
ture of privation may be illustrated by a bodily disease, in which
the subject remains, but in a disordered state. On the other hand,
a negation is that which requires no subject, as the house of Alex
ander is now nothing — a mere negation, for it has no existence.
This simple illustration may be sufficient to shed more light on this
subject to learners, without involving them in subtle disputations or
inextricable labyrinths. Geometrical truths, by means of diagrams,
may be presented to the eye ; but it is not so with these metaphysi
cal truths, which can only be understood by a gradual and atten
tive consideration. A man who is wounded, when beholding his
wound, is certain that it is not a mere negation, but that the parts
are really lacerated. So Paul, beholding the wickedness and vices
of a Nero, grieves, and does not consider these things as mere ne
gations, but as a most abominable ruin of a divine work. When in
this light we view evil as a defect or privation, we never can think
that sin is a thing which should be extenuated. As in man, con
sidered as the workmanship of God, order is apart, and is the pro
duction of his power, and is pleasing to him, and conducive to the
beauty and happiness of man, and is called an excellent thing, a

PHILIP MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN. 221
great good ; so, on the contrary, the disorder in which consists the
ruin of this good work must not be ascribed to God, but to the
devil, and to the free will of man, and is hated of God, and brings
destruction upon the beings who are the subjects of it, and is called
evil ; that is, a thing not agreeable to the divine mind, but alto
gether displeasing to God, and destructive to men and devils.
_ This statement will in some degree illustrate the nature of actual
sin, concerning which there are so many intricate questions : it will
not be difficult to understand how it is merely a defect, if you will
look, not only at the external action, but at the state of the mind
which governs the action. Eve, for example, in eating the for
bidden fruit, was not governed by the light of God ; but not to be
governed by the light of God, is to have the will opposed to God,
and that this is a defect of a right will, it is easy to perceive. Ori
ginally, then, her sin was of a privative nature, although it was
followed immediately by external acts, which are, it is acknow
ledged, of a positive nature. First, it was an internal disorder ; the
motions of the soul wandering from their right course, just as a ship
without sails and rudder tossed by the winds and waves. This
figure will very well serve to show that the evil consists in defect ;
for as long as the ship remains on the bosom of the deep, it will
have some motion ; so man, while he exists, will have some sort of
action, however irregular and confused it may be. Neither be
cause God sustains man in being, is he the author of sin, for those
defects in the exercises of the mind are not produced by Him. In
the case of Eve, just mentioned, the cause was her own free will.
Her actions were her own, and she spontaneously turned herself
away from God.
Let it then be admitted as an undoubted principle, that God is
not the author of sin, nor wills sin, and it will follow that there is
such a thing as contingency ; that is, that all things do not happen
by necessity. For sin proceeds from the will of men or devils, and
not from the will of God. Contingency supposes that the actions
of men proceed from free will, and that they have the power to sin
and to refrain from sinning. The contingency concerning which
we here speak, relates to human actions, and not to the motions of
other things, concerning which it is common to treat when physical
causes are under consideration.
Moreover, it must be conceded that the scriptures attribute to
man, in his fallen state, some liberty of choosing those things which
are proposed to him as a rational creature, and of doing those ex
ternal works which are commanded by the law of God : for on this
account the righteousness which they render to the law is called
the righteousness of the flesh ; because, as Paul teaches, it is com
petent to the strength of nature to perform it. " The law is riot
made for a righteous man," that is, not to coerce the renewed, but
to punish the impenitent. Likewise, " the law is a schoolmaster ;"
and unless some sort of liberty remained to fallen man, there would
be no manner of utility in laws and commandments ; and, indeed,

222 PHILIP MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN.
the whole apparatus of civil government would be useless. It is
certain, therefore, that liberty, which is the source of contingency,
does exist, as I before said. But as God is said to determine con
tingencies, we must be careful to distinguish between his determina
tion of those things which are agreeable to his will, and those which
are not ; or, between those events which depend entirely on his
will, and those which are brought about by human agency, though
not to the exclusion of divine agency. God foresaw the crimes of
Saul, but he did not will them ; nor did he impel his will, but per
mitted him to act according to his own inclination, without inter
posing any obstacle to his freedom. But in the view of Saul's mis
conduct, which he clearly foresees, he resolves to remove him from
the high office to which, by divine direction, he had been advanced.
This foreknowledge did not cause Saul to act by necessity ; nor
did it at all affect the free agency of man ; nor take away that
liberty which belongs to man, even in his fallen state. Neither
does the fact that God sustains human beings in existence, and in the
exercise of their powers, interfere with the contingency and liberty
of their free actions. When Eve sinned, the cause cannot be
ascribed to the upholding power of God, but her own will was the
real cause of her act ; for when human nature was constituted, it
was endowed with liberty, and the continuance of human nature
by the same power which created it, does not destroy that freedom
which was thus conferred on man in his first creation. Thus, al
though God preserved Saul in being and in the exercise of his fa
culties, the cause of his sin was. not at all this divine sustentation,
but his own free will.
To the representation above made, the words of the prophet
Jeremiah are sometimes objected, where he says, " O Lord, I know
that the way of man is not in himself: it is not in man that walketh
to direct his steps." On which I would briefly remark that it is
one thing to speak of the choice of the will, and another of the
event, or accomplishment of what we will. Pompey willed to
make war upon Caesar, and freely willed it, but the event was
governed by many other causes besides the will of Pompey. This
declaration of Jeremiah is a delightful doctrine, and contains the
sweetest consolation. We are here taught, that " the way of a
man," which includes the regulation of his private affairs, and the
success of his public vocations, cannot be sustained and secured by
human wisdom and strength. The minds of the best men are not
sufficiently perspicacious to foresee all dangers, or to guard against
them, but human judgment is liable to be misled by errors, as was
that of king Josiah, when he judged it expedient to make war on
the Egyptians. Many sad errors from this cause might be enu
merated ; which led Cicero to complain, that no man was at all
times wise. Often, human counsels are involved in inextricable
difficulties by mistakes which are incident to all. How many dis
asters to the house of David arose from one false step ! But even
when human counsels are wise, and the cause good, the event may

PHILIP MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN. 223
not correspond with the hopes entertained. Great calamities,
which suddenly cast down the most sagacious and exalted of mor
tals, do, in the providence of God, take place, when human pru
dence and human power are of no avail to prevent the disaster, ac
cording to that true saying of the poet,
" Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo :
Et subito casu quae valuere ruunt."
It was concerning these various obstructions, and in relation to
human weakness, and the instability of human affairs, that Jeremiah
was speaking in the passage cited above. His object was to show
us, that the event of things depended on many secret causes, un
known to us, and that, therefore, we ought to fly to God, and ask
and expect direction, and the regulation of our affairs from his aid.
Here we see the benefit of those gracious promises, " I will not
leave you comfortless." " It is God that worketh in you both to
will and to do." " The steps of a good man are ordered of the
Lord ; and he delighteth in his way." By such promises as these,
we are warranted and encouraged to trust in the Lord for help,
in time of need ; and we should be ever ready to acknowledge,
that nothing spiritually good, or of a saving nature, can be accom
plished by us, without God helping us ; as Christ declares, " With
out me ye can do nothing." And John the Baptist says, " A man
can receive nothing except it be given him from heaven." Pom
pey, Brutus, Antony, and others, attempted great things, but it
pleased providence to disappoint their expectations, and to advance
other men to the supreme power. Although it is evident that the
help of God is needed in all actions which are connected with sal
vation, yet it must not be hence concluded, that man possesses no
liberty of any kind, much less that all good and evil are to be
ascribed to the divine efficiency : the true meaning of the passage
from Jeremiah, therefore, is, that salvation cannot be obtained by
human counsels and human ability. Let us therefore learn, that
we are indebted to divine aid, when we are made instruments of
saving benefit to ourselves or others ; and also, we owe it to the
same cause, that we are not the pests of the human race, like Pha
raoh, Nero, Manes, and other similar characters. We ought, there
fore, under the deep conviction that we can do nothing ourselves,
most earnestly apply to, God by prayer and supplication, that we
may be directed and governed by our heavenly Father. But it is
most evident that this, our dependence on God, does not make him
the efficient cause of our sin. The church of God, entertaining
correct views of this matter, while she acknowledges God as the
author of all good, holds in utter abomination the crimes of Nero,
and will neither say that such actions take place by necessity, or
that they come to pass by God's willing them.
Another text which has been made the occasion of objection, is
that of Paul, where he calls the Ephesian Christians, " Elect ac-

224 PHILIP MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN.
cording to the purpose of him who worketh all things according to
the purpose of His will." And again, where he says to the Corin
thians, " But it is the same God who worketh all in all." Now it
is perfectly manifest that these passages, taken in the connexion in
which they stand, relate only to the church, and to those saving
acts which God is pleased to excite and regulate in the members
of the church ; but are not intended to be applied to the universal
sustentation of all things, nor to all the particular motions of ani
mals. Let these texts then be interpreted according to their true
intention, and let them not be forced into a signification foreign to
their genuine sense.
Paul admonishes us that the church is saved and governed, not
by human wisdom or power, but by the wonderful operations of
God. The preservation of Noah from the deluge, the protection
of Israel in Egypt and in the desert, the achievements of Moses,
Joshua, Samuel, David, and other pious and distinguished persons,
are to be ascribed to the power of God which stirred up and
enabled them to lend effectual aid to the church, and the propaga
tion of the true doctrine ; wherefore the declarations of holy scrip
ture referred to above, are intended for the consolation of believ
ers, that they may be assured of the presence of God with his
church to afford her aid in all her dangers and afflictions. It was
God that helped David in his. wars, and made him victorious over
his enemies. It was God also who gave assistance to the dying
Lawrence, so that he was preserved from making shipwreck of
faith through fear of death. By such declarations and promises
our souls are consumed, and encouraged to pray in the words of
the Psalmist, " Direct me in thy truth and teach me." As, O Lord,
thou bringest salvation to thy church, so make me a subject of thy
grace and a vessel of mercy. And this explication of those texts
of sacred scripture will equally serve to cast light on many similar
passages. But it should, in the last place, be added, as a thing
requisite to the right understanding of this subject, that there is a
twofold necessity. The one is absolute, as when a proposition or
thing is simply necessary, so that the contrary is plainly and alto
gether impossible. Such propositions are said to be necessary
with an absolute necessity. Such is the proposition, that there is
a God — that he is intelligent, eternal, possessed of power, wisdom,
justice, and goodness ; and that he wills only what is just and good,
and cannot will anything which is repugnant to his own most holy
nature. He cannot be delighted with, or will injustice, cruelty,
lust, or any wickedness. But there is another necessity which is
denominated the necessity of consequence, that is, such propositions
or things, the opposite of which are not in their nature impossible,
and are only rendered necessary by preceding causes, or because
they are foreordained. And between things of this kind there is a
great difference. In regard to events of one class, which are in
their own nature good, God not only wills and foreordains them,
but- foretells them. Such, for example, is this, that on a certain

PHILIP MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN. 225
day, the dead will be raised up. This event is not necessary sim
ply and absolutely, but by consequence. But in regard to those
things which are evil, as wicked acts of every sort, God does not
"will them, but appoints bounds over which he will not permit the
wicked to pass. These events, however, may be said to be neces
sary in the second sense given of that term. Pharaoh persecuted
and oppressed the Israelites : this, in its own nature, was not ne
cessary, but altogether contingent ; for the opposite was not a
thing impossible, but because it so occurred from causes which
existed, it is said to be necessary by consequence.
Here also seems to be the proper place to speak of physical
necessity. Thus we say the fire burns by necessity, the sun is
moved ; but according to the doctrine of the church, this physical
necessity falls under the head of that necessity of consequence
which we have just described. Fire burns because God has given
to it this nature ; the sun is moved by the same power which cre
ated it, and we see in the history of Joshua and Hezekiah, that
motion is not essential to the sun.
We have now gone over all the principal questions which are to
be agitated on this subject, which if they be carefully considered,
we shall be able to form a correct judgment concerning all these
controversies ; and it will be evident that it is far from our purpose
to bring in a stoical necessity. How can any one pray to God
with the least confidence, who believes that all things are governed
by a fatal necessity? The saying which is found in the tragedy,
that the blame of our bad conduct is to be charged to fate, is highly
injurious to good morals. Every one is acquainted with the anec
dote of the servant of Zeno who, when he was about to be punished
by his master for some misconduct, excused himself by saying,
that it would be unjust to punish him, since he was forced by fate
to sin. But fate never made any man a sinner. The sentiments
of Plato, in the second book of his Commonwealth, are correct
and good. " If," says he, " we would have the state well governed,
we must contend with all our might that no one, old or young, in
poetry or prose, should ever utter the opinion, or be permitted to
hear it, that God is the cause of the crimes of any one ; for as
such an opinion is dishonourable to the Deity, so it is injurious to
the state and repugnant to sound reason." There is a common
argument on this subject which not a little disturbs the minds of
the pious, and which it may be useful to explain. It is said that
second causes cannot act without the concurrence of the first,
therefore, as the second cause (as, for example, the disobedience
of Eve) is sinful, the first must be so also. I have known some
persons who were by this objection driven to great confusion of
mind, and to the adoption of horrible conclusions. There is a
subtle metaphysical answer which is sometimes given to this ob
jection, but I prefer resorting to one which is better suited to com
mon apprehension. It is this : God is present with and concurs
with his creatures, not like the God of the Stoics, as if bound to
15

226 PHILIP MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN.
second causes, so that he is able to act only as they act ; but as a
perfectly free agent, sustaining them in existence, and with con
summate wisdom accommodating his agency to the nature of the
case, not only giving efficacy to second causes, but also, when he
chooses, counteracting them. Thus, though he upholds the laws
of nature by which corporeal things are governed, yet we find him
ordering the sun to become retrograde, and the clouds to withhold
the rain for three years, and then suddenly sent plentiful showers.
And we know that although God sustains second causes, He is not
confined to them, for every day events occur which are out of the
sphere of their operation. In the midst of battle, and on the seas,
and in diseases, many are delivered from various dangers when
second causes can be of no avail.
We ought not, therefore, to entertain the opinion of the Stoics,
that God is confined to second causes so as never to act independ
ently of them, but we should believe that he is always present
with the work of his hands, sustaining all things by his power, and
governing all events by his own most perfect freedom ; so that
there is good ground for praying for his aid and interposition in
any emergency. Thus God not only sustains, but willingly helps
those who act in an orderly manner ; but in regard to those who
act disorderly, although he upholds these also, yet he cannot be
said to aid them in doing wrong. Eve was so constituted and en
dowed with free will, that she had it in her power either to obey
or to transgress, and the existence of divine favour, as the first
cause, did not make God the author of her sin. It is indeed uni
versally true, that the second cause cannot act without the sustain
ing power of the first ; but, as was before observed, this upholding
providence must be carefully distinguished from that exercise of
power which assists in the production of the sinful act ; for that
effect which God does not will, he never aids the creature to bring
into being. If any one inquire, therefore, what was the immediate
cause of the sin of Eve when she turned herself away from God,
the answer must be, her own free will. The maxim, that the
second cause cannot act without the first, although admitted by all,
is very differently understood by the Stoic and by the Christian.
The former believes that in similar circumstances the same effects
must necessarily take place ; but the latter makes an important
distinction between good and evil actions, which the Stoic entirely
overlooks. It is true that the second cause cannot- act without the
first, that is, unless it is sustained by the first ; but this does not
-hinder the first cause from acting, when it seems good, without the
second, because he is a perfectly free agent ; and when the second
cause is a free agent it acts without the co-operation of the first in
the production of evil, for the power of originating such acts be
longs essentially to that liberty with which free agents are endued.
In this explanation I have endeavoured to avoid too much refine
ment, and to present the subject in such a manner as to be level to
the common apprehensions of men. Others, however, choose to

PHILIP MELANCTHON ON THE NATURE OF SIN. 227
explain this matter a little differently. They say that the second
cause cannot act without the first, in producing a positive effect ;
but in a mere delinquency, or defect of right action, the second cause
can act alone. For example, the will of Eve in the first trans
gression did not produce a positive effect, but was an aberration
from the proper mark, defect in the quality of the act. This ex
planation does not really differ from the one already given, and
may seem to render it more perspicuous. But after all it is best
to believe in the general, that God has established such a connexion
between the first and second cause, as he acting freely chooses
should exist ; so that while he co-operates to sustain the creature,
He is not the author of sin.

ESSAY X.
DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS.
PUBLISHED IN 1833.

It is known to all students of ecclesiastical history, that Poland,
and the neighbouring states of Transylvania, Bohemia, and Hun
gary, were the theatre of the Unitarian churches, during a consi
derable part of the sixteenth century. The reason why the propa
gators of heresy chose this region, for the dissemination of their
opinions, is easily explained. In all other countries of Europe,
they were restrained by the laws, but here liberty of conscience
was enjoyed. It may also be mentioned, that with the doctrines
of the Reformation was introduced a spirit of free, unshackled in
quiry into all opinions ; and as was natural, from the imbecility of
man, this liberty degenerated into licentiousness, and frequently
terminated in downright infidelity. At first, the heterodox of Po
land professed to be either Arians or Sabellians ; they did not, in
deed, adopt these denominations, but they held the opinions which
are commonly so denominated. There were, however, numerous
shades of difference among these Unitarians, and they separated
;into a great number of petty sects, which were usually denomi
nated from the town or province in which the leading members
respectively resided. One writer asserts, that at a particular time,
about the middle of the sixteenth century, the number of Unitarian
¦sects was above thirty, but he does not inform us in what points
they differed from each other.* According to the custom of the
times, many public disputations were held, and many synods were
convened, by which means it was attempted, but unsuccessfully,
to settle the points in controversy between the Trinitarians and
Anti-Trinitarians. In the midst of this confusion of sects and prevalence of heresy,
Faustus Socinus visited the country. His uncle, Laelius Socinus,
had been there many years before ; but though he left his opinions
as an inheritance to his nephew, he was himself either too timid
* Maimbourg.

DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 229
or too prudent to avow and defend the Unitarian opinions which
he held. But Faustus, with equal talents and address, possessed
that courage which is requisite to appear openly as the advocate
of unpopular tenets. When he first came to Poland, all parties
seemed to be afraid of him ; for they were aware that he had
pushed his Unitarianism to consequences which they were not
prepared to admit. None of the sects were disposed, therefore, to
receive Socinus into their communion. No doubt he was dis
pleased at being expelled from the communion of Unitarians ; but
he disguised his feelings, and artfully turned all to his own advan
tage. He now professed an unwillingness to be connected with
any particular sect, but declared himself to be the friend of all ;
and by intercourse with the leading ministers and teachers, he in
a short time brought them all into one harmonious body, and in
duced them to embrace his peculiar opinions, which have ever
since been called Socinianism. One dispute, however, arose,
which Socinus, with all his address, could never bring to a favour
able conclusion. Francis Davidis, a man of learning and abilities,
who had passed through many changes of theological opinion, was
a leading minister among the Unitarians in Transylvania, and now
began to teach and preach, that Jesus Christ being a mere man,
had no more claim to divine worship than any other saint ; a most
legitimate conclusion from the acknowledged premises. But the
broaching of this doctrine excited much uneasiness and alarm.
Blandrat, who was now physician to the young prince Sigismund
IL, over whom he had a decisive influence, sent to Poland for So
cinus, as being the only man who, byr his skill and address in man
aging men, would be likely to prevail with Davidis to renounce
his dangerous opinion. Accordingly Socinus came, and for several
months was lodged in the same house with the heretic, as he was
considered by the Unitarians. But all his arguments and persua
sions were ineffectual to convince Davidis of his being in an error.
How could they, when the doctrine which he held is so manifestly
correct upon Unitarian principles, that it is probable there is not
now a Unitarian in the world who does not adopt the opinion
of Davidis as correct, and dissent from that of Socinus as most
unreasonable ? But light does not break upon the world all at
once. Even Unitarians may for a while remain in gross error
and idolatry ; and what to their successors is still more mortify
ing, they may proceed so far as to persecute those who differ
from them. The young prince of Transylvania was induced to
cast Davidis into prison simply on account of his pertinacious
adherence to his opinion. Here the persecuted man died. We
ought not, however, to be too severe in our censures of such
conduct ; for the doctrine of toleration was not yet well under
stood, even by those who pleaded for it in their own case, when
they needed its shelter. We think that this case may fairly be
placed as a parallel to that of Calvin. It is not clear, however,
that Socinus advised this measure, although it is very certain

230 DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS.
that Blandrat directed the whole affair, as in all religious matters
the prince was governed by him. So far as Socinus's own decla
ration will go to exculpate him from all concern in this transac
tion, we must acquit him of being accessory to the death of this
learned man ; for we recollect to have seen in some history of the
churches in Poland, that when at a large synod Socinus was ac
cused of participating in the persecution of Davidis, he publicly
denied that he had advised his imprisonment, or had any concern
in the matter. But although the leading advocate of the obnoxious
opinion was thus put out of the way, the doctrine of Davidis pre
vailed more and more. Socinus not only never changed his
opinion respecting the worship of Christ, but he would hold no
communion with any one who denied that Christ should be wor
shipped, and publicly taught and published the opinion that those
who received the doctrine of Davidis, had no just claim to the name
of Christians.
The Unitarians of Poland cultivated biblical learning with assi
duity and no small success, as appears from the volumes entitled
" Poloni Fratres," &c. Most of the writings of Faustus Socinus
were at first anonymous ; and he strongly expressed his opinion in
favour of that mode of publication, because men are so prone to
be influenced in forming their opinions, by prejudices arising from
the name of the author. His principal work was on the person
and offices of Christ, entitled " De Christo." It was in answer to
a treatise in support of the divinity of Christ, written in the Polish
language, by a Jesuit, whose name was Wiek. This work of the
Pole was, indeed, nothing else than the treatise of Bellarmin on
the deity of the Saviour, translated into the Polish tongue. Soci
nus's book received many answers, of which it is not our purpose
at present to speak. The Racovian Catechism, of which we pro
pose to treat somewhat particularly in this article, received its
name from the town of Racow, where it was first published. It
was not written by Socinus, nor published during his life, but was
compiled by Smalcius, from his writings, and at first appeared in
the Polish language, A. D. 1606. It was not long, however, before
this Catechism was published in Latin by Moscorovius ; and also
in the German language, by Smalcius himself, who sent a copy of
it to the professors of Wittenberg. Among the fathers in this
cradle of the reformation, it was a matter of serious deliberation
whether an answer should be given to it or not. At length, how
ever, it was determined that it would not be expedient to neglect
it, lest the Socinians should consider silence as a sign that they had
achieved a victory, and should be led vainly to triumph in the
strength of their career. In conformity with the resolution now
adopted, a pious and solid theologian, Frederick Baldwin, was re
quested to undertake a refutation of this Catechism. An able an
swer was also published by that consummate theologian, Wolfgang
Crellius. The attentive reader will be in no danger of confounding
this orthodox theologian with another of the same name greatly

DOCTRINES, OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 231
distinguished among the Socinians. This work of Crellius was
unfortunately left unfinished, in consequence of the distinguished
author having been called to be court preacher to the Duke of Bran
denburg. But there was no lack of polemics to contend for the
faith, against this summary of all heresy. Alsted, Alting, Maresius,
Tarnovius, Hornbeck, John Gerhard, and others, undertook to re
fute it ; but no refutation was so full and satisfactory as that of N.
Arnold, professor in the University of Franequer ; in which he sets
down the questions and answers of the Catechism, without abridg
ment, and gives a solid answer to each, as he goes along. Arnold
took a deep interest in this controversy, not only because he con
sidered the questions in dispute as involving the essence of Christi
anity, but also because he himself was a native of Poland, and was
intimately acquainted with the condition of the reformed church in
that country.
It is our object to give a faithful translation of a part of this work,
principally for the purpose of showing by what sort of argument
and exegesis the old Socinians defended their cause ; and that
our readers may have the opportunity of observing the similarity
between the neology with which we are threatened, and the he
retical opinions of those who lived two centuries ago.
The part of this work which we have selected for translation
is the first part of the tenth chapter, De Libero Arbitrio.
ques. 1. " is it in our power fully to obey the commandments
of God ?"
Ans. " Certainly : for it is evident that the first man was so
formed by God, that he was endued with free will ; and no reason
existed why he should be deprived of this power, after the fall :
nor was it consistent with the justice of God that man should be
deprived of free will. Accordingly, in the punishment inflicted on
his sin, there is no mention made of any such loss."
Refutation by Arnold. — To obey the commandments of God,
to put off the old man, to desist from sinning, not to walk after, but
to mortify the flesh, to contract no evil habits, but only such as are
virtuous and good, this writer asserts, is altogether in our power.
But we affirm, that these things are not at all in our power ; ac
cording to the declaration of our Saviour, " Without me ye can do
nothing" (John xv. 5), and that of the apostle, " I can do all things
through Christ which strengtheneth me" (Phil. iv. 13). And the
same apostle says, " For it is God which worketh in you both to
will and to do of his good pleasure" (Phil. ii. 13). Why should
these things be ascribed to God and to Christ, if they are completely
in the power of man ?
It is true, indeed, that man when created by God was endued
with free will ; but a distinction must be made between man in a
state of integrity, and man as fallen. In the former he possessed
free will, and also the power of obeying all the commandments of

232 doctrines of the early socinians.
God, and of avoiding all that was forbidden. Not that man by the
fall was entirely deprived of liberty, but he became depraved, so
that in things pertaining to salvation he labours under an entire
blindness of intellect. " For the natural man receiveth not the
things of God : for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he
know them, because they are spiritually discerned." (1 Cor. ii. 14.)
And the will of man has become so rebellious, that it is not subject
to the law of God, neither indeed can be. (Rom. viii. 7.)
When this author says that there was no reason why God should
deprive man of free will, he errs, not knowing the Scriptures, which
clearly teach, that God, as a just Judge, denounced to man on ac
count of his fall, the punishment of interminable death. And this
was not merely eternal death, as the Socinians pretend, but the
threatening comprehended corporeal and spiritual death also ; so
that man is not only liable to eternal death, but to death temporal
and spiritual ; and is declared to be dead in trespasses and sins.
Now since every kind of death is a part of the penalty incurred by
sin, which a just God inflicts, who does not see that man in just
judgment is deprived of the right exercise of free will ?
Hence also we may understand what is to be thought of that
declaration, that it is inconsistent with justice for a man to be de
prived of free will. It certainly belongs to justice to inflict de
served punishment on the disobedient ; but this depravation is a
part of the punishment. Neither have you a right to say, that
other men are not chargeable with the sin of Adam ; that as they
never committed that sin they cannot be punished for it ; for un
doubtedly Adam should be considered as the head of the whole
human race, and so his sin was not personal but universal. As
the father and head of the whole family of man did he perpetuate
this crime, and so he involved all his posterity in guilt ; and thus
spiritual death has come upon them, as the merited punishment of
this sin, and this includes the depravation of the free will of man.
In regard to the last words of the answer to the question stated
above, that there is no mention of any such punishment inflicted on
Adam, it is false ; for we know that the punishment of the sin of
Adam was death ; but death is fourfold ; temporal, spiritual, eternal,
and the afflictions of this life. These several species of death, it is
true, are not distinctly mentioned, yet they should all be considered
as comprehended in the general denunciation ; and this is render
ed manifest where spiritual death is mentioned as the state of man,
by reason of which he is declared to be dead in sin. But if man
be dead in sin, how can his will remain upright and uninjured ?
In the primeval state, the judgment of man in regard to things
natural, civil, and spiritual, was correct ; and the inclination of his
heart was pure in the choice of the highest good ; not only possess
ing freedom from necessity and coaction, but also an immunity
from every degree of depraved disposition, and from all moral and
physical evil. And this is that goodness and rectitude in which
God is said to have created man. But, although man in a state of

doctrines oe the early socinians. 233
integrity was, in fact, inclined to that which was good, neverthe
less, by the sovereign dispensation of the Creator, and from the
very nature of a dependent creature, his will was mutable ; so
that it could be turned to either of two opposites, and was liable
to be deceived by the false appearance of objects presented, so as
to be led to embrace that which was apparent, instead of the true
good ; of which mutability the event furnished a certain demon
stration. But, in man's fallen state, his will is despoiled of its rectitude ;
and, although his judgment in other things may be, to a certain
degree, correct, yet in spiritual things it is entirely blind ; and his
inclination is so averse to all spiritual good, and so determined to
evil only, that he must be considered as entirely depraved. And,
accordingly, the scriptures represent him as being blind in his
understanding, perverse in his will, and rebellious in his affections ;
nay, as being " dead in sin ;" labouring under a complete impotence
as to all spiritual good. — Gen. vi. 3, Matt. vii. 13, Rom. viii. 7,
1 Cor. viii. 4, Ephes. ii. 1.
Now, although man in this state is free from the necessity of na
ture, and also from that of coaction, yet he is not free from the
servitude of sin and death. Before his conversion, he is not only
impotent, as it relates to spiritual good, but is turned away from it
with aversion. The fact, therefore, is, that man can contribute no
thing towards his own conversion, but simply the natural faculty
of the will, without which he would neither be a man, nor would
he be capable of conversion.
Ques. 2. " But is not the will of man vitiated by original,
SIN ?"
Ans. " There is no such thing as original sin ; the scripture
teaches no such doctrine; and the will of man could not be vitiated
by a cause which had no existence. The sin of Adam being a
single act could not corrupt his own nature, much less had it power
to deprave the nature of all his posterity. That this sin should be
charged on them, is, as has been said, a doctrine unknown to the
scriptures ; and it is utterly incredible that God, who is the foun
tain of equity, should be willing to impute it to them."
Refutation. — That the will of man is depraved by original sin,
we have already declared to be our belief. Our opponent denies
this, because, in his opinion, original sin has no existence, and could,
of course, be the cause of no such depravity. The affirmative,
however, is capable of being demonstrated by an appeal to facts,
and to the testimony of scripture. From both these sources, we
shall, therefore, now endeavour to show that original sin exists in
every man who has derived his nature from Adam by natural
generation. It is true the scriptures do not express the inherent and habitual
stain of our nature by using the technical phrase original sin ;
but they clearly designate the same thing, by words which have

234 DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS.
the same import. By a metonymy, it is called flesh. (John iii. 6.)
It is called, by way of eminence, sin, which reigneth in our mortal
bodies. (Rom. vi. 12.) And sin that dwelleth in us — evil present
with us. (Rom. vii. 17.) So also it is denominated the old man, as
indicating its origin from our first father, and to designate its vile-
ness and corruption ; as it is contrasted with the new man, which
signifies something precious and excellent. It is called " a law in
our members ;" that is, a principle which binds with force like a
law. It is also denominated " the body of sin" by which strength
and cohesion are represented as belonging to this evil principle.
It is also termed " the old leaven," and, by James, lust (ixiBvpia), by
a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct. But original sin is not
any one faculty, habit, or art, but a general disorder, or Ura^d.
With the fathers, original sin has various names, such as mali
tradux, a hereditary evil ; malum domesticum, a domestic evil ;
infusum et coagulatum delictorum contagium, the concentrated con
tagion of all crimes. Augustine called it naturae vitium, the vice
of nature ; also peccati contagium ex origine, the original contagion
of sin ; and, finally, peccatum originate, original sin ; which last
name, as most conveniently expressing the thing, was retained in
the schools, and has been in common use to this day. The word
original has no relation to God as the author of our being, and the
first cause of all things, but altogether to the second cause, namely,
our sinning first parent.
But to deny the existence of original sin altogether is the mad
ness of the Socinians ; and to assert that it cannot be proved from
scripture, is the dotage of reason. What, then, is that which is
said (Gen. iii. 5), where Adam is said to have begotten a son in his
own image ? In which passage we should carefully attend to the
antithesis between Adam and Seth ; that is, between the image of
God in which Adam was created, and the image of Adam in which
Seth was begotten. For, as the image of God designated the moral
excellence in which Adam was created, the wisdom of his under
standing and the sanctity of his will, so the image of Adam, now
fallen, signified the blindness of his mind and the depravation of his
will. Adam, by his apostasy, transformed himself from the image
of God to the opposite character. He could not, therefore, beget
a son in the image of God, in which he was created, but in his own
image ; that is, in a state of corruption.
It will not do to say that Adam begat Seth a man like himself,
as to his species, for that idea was fully expressed when it was
said " he begat a son ;" nor will it answer to say that he begat a
son, in figure, form, and external lineament,- like himself, for it is
supposed, not proved, that such a likeness existed between the
father and the son ; and if it had been the fact, this was not a mat
ter of so much consequence as that, to designate it, the Holy Spirit
should use the twofold expression of similitude and likeness, as had
been done before, when it was said that Adam was made in the
image of God. Certainly, in that case, the sacred writer had no

DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 235
respect to any external image or likeness ; neither, therefore, should
we suppose he had here, where he uses the same terms.
Another evasion is, that we should here understand the moral
image of Adam as regenerated by the Holy Spirit ; so that Seth
was the heir of that renovated image ; but that renovated image
did not pertain to man's nature, but was altogether the effect of
supernatural grace, which is never communicated by physical
generation, but by a mystical regeneration.
Again: does not Job prove the doctrine of original sin when, by
the Holy Spirit, he says, " Who can bring a clean thing out of an
unclean ? Not one." (Job xiv. 5.) To which Socinus has nothing
to except but this, that believers are not unclean, but washed and
sanctified. It is true, believers are holy, but not as they are natural
men, for " whatsoever is born of the flesh is flesh." The same
doctrine appears evident from the necessity of regeneration, con
cerning which, Christ says : " Except a man be born again, he can
not see the kingdom of God." From this, it is clear that our first
birth is corrupt ; for what need would there be for regeneration if
our first generation were holy ? And how does it happen, if
depravity is not born with us, that there should not be found a
man who, by the tendency of his own nature, does not rush into
the commission of sin ? And if the whole mass of human nature
had not become corrupt, it would never have been said of Christ
that he was in all things made like to us, sin only excepted ; for,
if this be not the fact, then all infants dying in infancy are as free
from sin as Christ himself was.
But, finally, infants die, and death is the punishment of sin ; yet
it cannot be the punishment of actual sin, for infants, dying in
infancy, are incapable of committing it ; they are destitute of the
use of reason and of the exercise of free will ; and those who are
our opponents in this question consider it a cardinal point that
there is no sin which does not consist in the exercise of the will.
Since, then, the punishment of death is not inflicted on infants for
actual sin, it must be for original sin.
There is no truth nor force in what is next asserted, " that the
fall of Adam did not corrupt his own nature, and, therefore, could
not corrupt that of his posterity." For they admit that eternal
death was the punishment incurred by the sin of Adam ; and why
should it seem strange, that that act, which subjected the trans
gressor to so great a penalty, should, at the same time, work a
corruption of his nature 1 Surely that which could effect the
greater might also produce the less. But the reason why the sin
of Adam corrupted the nature of his posterity was, because it was
not the sin of an individual, as your sin or my sin, but it was the
sin of a whole race. It was an universal sin. For Adam was the
stalk, the root, the head of the whole family of man.
That this corruption of nature came upon man as the punishment
of sin, is evident from this, that everything which properly comes
under the name of death is the punishment of sin ; for this was the

236 DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS.
penalty of the law, and it comprehended every kind of death; and
this depravation of nature is expressly called by this name by the
Apostle Paul (Ephes. ii. 1), wherefore original sin is the punish
ment of the first sin.
The conclusion of this answer, " that because God is the foun
tain of all equity, it is altogether incredible that he should punish
the posterity of Adam on account of his sin," is a mere assertion
totally incapable of proof; for why should God cease to be the
fountain of equity when he punishes the posterity of Adam on ac
count of his sin, when he has constituted him the head and repre
sentative of the whole race ? The legitimate course of reasoning
is, that because God does punish the posterity of the first man on
account of his sin, therefore it must be just, and should be so con
sidered, whether we can understand it or not. Whatever he does
is just, because he does it ; for his will is the rule of justice.
Ques. 3. " But are there not scripture testimonies which
TEACH THE CERTAIN EXISTENCE OF ORIGINAL SIN, SUCH AS THAT IN
Gen. iv. 5 : ' And God saw that the wickedness of man was great
upon the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his
heart was only evil continually ;' and that in Gen. viii. 21 : 'For
the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth V "
Ans. " These testimonies treat of voluntary sin ; therefore, from
them original sin never can be proved. For as to the text first
cited, Moses teaches that it was sin of that kind which caused God
to repent that he had made man, and which provoked him to bring
a deluge upon the world ; but who would venture to assert that
this was done on account of original sin inherent in the nature of
man ? And, in the other passage, it is declared that the sin of man
should not again be the cause of the destruction of the world by a
deluge, which certainly cannot relate to original sin, or inherent
depravity." Refutation. — That the doctrine of original sin is inculcated in
these kindred pages, is evident from several considerations. The
corruption of man is represented as being universal, habitual, and
unceasing. What could more clearly indicate that the principle
of human actions was vitiated ? What sort of proof could be more
convincing, that this depravity was born with us ? Our opponent,
however, replies, that the sacred historian is here speaking of actual
sins, on account of which God overwhelmed the world with a de
luge. I grant that actual sins are referred to in these passages,
but I deny that they alone are intended to the exclusion of original
sin : for the Holy Spirit makes a plain distinction between the
wickedness which was external and actual, and the imaginations of
the heart which are internal and habitual ; otherwise there would
be here a mere tautology, and the very same thing, without neces
sity, would be repeated. Another decisive evidence that inherent
natural depravity is included in the account, is, that infants, who
were incapable of actual sin, were nevertheless swallowed up in

DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 237
the deluge as well as adults. Now, this judgment was sent upon '
them justly or unjustly ; if the first, then they are chargeable with
sin, and grievous sin, too, to deserve such a punishment ; but this
of necessity must be original sin, for, as we have seen, they are
not capable of actual sin. But if this punishment should be
pronounced unjust, then we do no less than accuse the Governor
of the world of acting the part of an unjust judge, in bringing such
a calamity unjustly upon his innocent creatures ; which would be
blasphemy. In these passages, it was the design of the Holy Spirit not only
to indicate actual sin, but to trace it up to its internal cause,
namely, original sin. For the declaration is universal, in relation
to all the thoughts and imaginations of the heart ; and, to give it
the greater force, it is exclusive of everything of an opposite kind.
" Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil, and
that continually." Surely, if this be a just description of the moral
condition of man, his whole soul must be depraved. Total depra
vity could not be more emphatically represented. The evil is
universal — every imagination of the thoughts of the heart. It is
exclusively of all good — and only evil. And it is the same at all
times — and that continually. The true source of evil thoughts of
every kind is designated by Christ, where he says, " Out of the
heart proceed evil thoughts." When, therefore, we refer the
second cause to the first, the stream to its fountain, the effect to its
cause, the Socinian has no right to complain. To the eye of God,
both the cause and the effect are equally manifest ; the evil tree
as well as the bad fruit. This last was, indeed, the immediate
cause of the deluge, but the former was the cause of this. As in
fants perished in the deluge, and God is here giving the reason
why the deluge was sent, it must be comprehensive enough to in
clude them ; and, therefore, must include original as well as actual
sin, unless any one will choose to maintain that infants were pun
ished without any faults, which, as was before shown, would be an
impious impeachment of the character of God. But if it be alleged
that they could not be guilty of actual sin, then it follows that they
were punished on account of original sin. So much for the first
testimony. As to the second, our opponent says, " that it is merely
declared that the sin of man shall not again be the cause of a deluge
for the destruction of the world ; but this can have no relation to
original sin." But why not ? We have seen that, both on account
of original and actual sin, God brought the deluge on the world ;
so now, in this parallel passage, he makes known his will, that in
time to come, the sin of man, both original and actual, should not
induce him again to destroy the world by a deluge. As the form
of expression is nearly the same as in the former text, the argument
will be the same ; and as there it was shown that original might
fairly be inferred from the universality and constancy of the pre
valence of actual sin, so the same conclusion may be deduced from
the words now under consideration.

238 DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS.

Ques. 4. " But what do you think of that declaration of
David (Psalm li. 5), 'Behold I was shapen in iniouity, and in sin
DID MY MOTHER CONCEIVE ME ?' "
Ans. " It should be remembered that David is not here speak
ing about every man, but concerning himself alone, and that not
simply, but in relation to his fall ; and he uses that method of
speaking of which he himself furnishes an example in Psalm 1 viii. 4,
' The wicked are estranged from the womb ; they go astray as soon
as they be born, speaking lies.' Wherefore, neither can original
sin be evinced by this testimony."
Refutation. — When David says, " Behold I was shapen in ini
quity, and in sin did my mother conceive me," from the considera
tion of the actual sin committed by him, he ascends to the origin
of all his sins, and laments the proneness of his nature to sin ; and
this inherent depravity he represents as coeval with his existence
— a corrupt mass in which he was conceived and born, and which
he had derived from his parents ; all which, taken together, can
signify nothing but original sin.
Against this interpretation, Socinians make many objections, as
may be seen in the work of Volkelius, De Vera Religione ; all
which, however, have been fully discussed and refuted by our
Spanheim, in his " Collection of Theological Disputations." It is
alleged that David is not speaking here concerning the conception
of his own nature, but of the conception of sin. But the unreason
ableness of this gloss is too manifest to need any refutation. This
would be referring what is said about the subject to the act — what
is said about the sinner to his sin. Certainly David was not here
speaking of the mother of his sin, but of his own mother.
Again : it is alleged " that David is not here speaking of original
sin, but of the actual sin of his parents, and especially of his mo
ther." Now, this is frivolous. David was not here confessing the
sins of his parents, but his own sins. Moreover, his parents were,
in all probability, dead long before this time, as David was the
youngest of Jesse's sons, who was an old man when Samuel
anointed David to be king ; and this Psalm was composed when
David was past middle life. And for what purpose should he drag
his mother's sins into public notice in this manner ? Besides, there
is not the smallest evidence that David's mother was remarkable
for her transgressions. The sin of which David complains is that
from which he prays to be cleansed, and from which he entreats
that God would hide his face ; but who does not see that these
were his own sins, and not those of his parents ?
A third interpretation given to this passage, is, " That from it,
not even actual sin can be proved, much less original sin ; for it is
possible that one might be conceived in iniquity, and yet not be a
sinner, just as one might be conceived and born in blindness, who
was not himself blind." But that a person should be shapen in
iniquity, and yet not be a sinner, is a palpable contradiction. If it

DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 239
be meant that we may derive our being from a sinner without
being infected with sin, as the child of a blind man need not be
blind, the error consists in comparing things of an unequal kind.
Individual properties are not indeed communicated by ordinary
generation ; but qualities which affect the whole species are trans
mitted, of which nature is original sin.
They allege again, " that if it had been the design of David, in
this passage, to designate the innate corruption of our nature, he
would have ascended from his own sin to that of the first man ;
but since he does not do this, but stops with the mention of his im
mediate parents, and especially of his mother, it is a clear indica
tion that he did not mean here to speak of original sin." To which
it may be replied, that there was no need of David's ascending to
the sin of Adam, for he was not now speaking of the first origin
of sin, but of original sin itself; not of the originating sin, as we
say in the schools, but of sin originated ; although, indeed, the
latter supposes the existence of the former. It fully answered the
purpose of the penitent Psalmist, to describe that inbred corruption
which he was deeply convinced dwelt within him, and also the
immediate source from which it was derived to him, which was
by natural descent from his parents ; and this was substantially
the same, as if he had traced this corruption up to his first parent.
But it is still objected, " that, if the words of David are taken
literally, they can by no means be referred to any person but him
self, for he speaks of no other : if they are to be understood figura
tively, then, according to all just rules of interpretation, they can
not be the foundation of an argument." Take them as you will, if
they have any meaning at all; they must be considered as evincive
of the fact that David himself was infected with original sin ; and
if it existed in him, what reason can be assigned why it should not
be in others ? And as to a figurative interpretation, the words do
not appear susceptible of such an explanation without being sub
jected to great violence ; for what can it be supposed that he in
tended to represent by saying that he was shapen in iniquity and
conceived by his mother in sin ?
The author of this catechism, perhaps, distrusting such evasions
as these, confines himself to two particulars in his attempts to break
the force of the argument derived from these words. The first is,
that David was here discoursing of himself alone, and that he had
special reference to his own disgraceful fall, and did not design
to speak of the sin of other men. But this subterfuge takes for
granted that David alone was infected with birth-sin, which, for the
best reasons, is utterly denied. Moreover, this exposition concedes
the main point in controversy, namely, that at least one man has
been born in original sin ; for it is admitted that David was shapen
in iniquity, and conceived by his mother in sin. Now, this is pre
cisely what we assert, only we argue from the fact, that if this
was the origin of David, it must also be of every other man, and

240 DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS.
the argument cannot be invalidated as long as the fact is admitted ;
for what imaginable reason can be assigned why David, above all
other men, should be conceived in sin ? There is the less reason
to think that David would speak thus of his origin, as being in a pecu
liar manner polluted, when it is considered that he was born in law
ful wedlock, and was descended from pious parents, as appears by
the sacred history. But it would be' easy to show, if this were the
proper place, that what David so emphatically declares respecting
his own sinful origin, the Holy Ghost, in other passages, teaches to be
the condition of all men. See Psalm xiv. 4, Job xiv. 2, Ephes. ii. 3.
The second evasion to which our catechist resorts, is, that the
words ought to be understood hyperbolically, just as we must un
derstand those words of the same author, in Psalm lviii. 4. " The
wicked are estranged from the womb ; as soon as they are born,
they go astray, speaking lies." So in this place, David, under the
strong feelings of repentance, exaggerates his sin ; and therefore
speaks of it as if it was coeval with his existence. These people
blow hot and cold with the same breath. What is here said about
exaggerating his sin, is in direct opposition to what we read in the
Institutes of Ostorodus, who asserts that these words were spoken
by David, not with a view to exaggerate his criminality, but to ex
tenuate his sin, as proceeding from a constitution born with him.
But who that has ever read attentively the whole psalm, can be
lieve that the royal penitent had the least thought of extenuating
his sin ? If then it should be considered a hyperbole, in which
David exaggerates his sin, I would retort the argument, and say,
if his object was to speak in the strongest terms of the greatness of
his actual sin, he was led by the same motive to designate as its
source, his original corruption ; and how could he have more effec
tually represented his guilt, than by ascending from his actual
transgressions to his original corruption ?
The reference to the passage cited from the fifty-eighth psalm
can be of no service to the cause. The cases are entirely different ;
the passages are by no means parallel. It is one thing for a pious
man, descended from pious parents, to declare, " that he was sha
pen in iniquity, and conceived by his mother in sin," and another to
say, that the wicked go astray, and speak lies from the womb.
These last words evidently relate to voluntary, personal acts ; but
this can by no means be said of the former. I deny, however, that
even in these last words there is anything hyperbolical ; for the ob
ject was to describe the depravity of the wicked, both in relation
to act and habit. But admitting that there is a hyperbole in the
words from the fifty-eighth psalm ; yet that would not prove that
the same must be the fact in regard to the passage in the fifty-first
psalm. Therefore, I must, after impartially considering all the
evasions to which Socinians have had recourse, consider the doc
trine of original sin as fully established by this single text, if there
were no other in the Bible.

DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 241
Ques. 5. "But does not Paul say, Rom. v. 12, 'That all men
HAVE SINNED IN ADAM ?'"
" Ans. It is not declared in the text quoted, that all men sinned
in Adam ; for the words in Greek, if 3,, which are everywhere
rendered in Latin by in quo, in whom, may with more propriety be
rendered because that, or since, as in the parallel passages, Rom.
viii. 3, evZ, in that; Phil. iii. 12, if a, that for which; Heb. ii. 13,
cf $, in that ; 2 Cor. v. 4, if 3>, because that. It is evident, there
fore, that the doctrine of original sin cannot be built on this pas
sage." Refutation. — The passage of scripture which the Catechism
here brings into view, is certainly the most decisive for the proof
of the doctrine of original sin of any in the Bible. " As by one man
sin entered into the world, and so death passed upon all men be
cause that (in whom) all have sinned." In the Latin vulgate, the
latter part of this phrase is rendered, " in whom all have sinned."
The apostle in this place institutes a comparison and contrast be
tween Adam and Christ, and shows that the righteousness of Christ
avails to the justification of all who are united to him, just as the
fall and disobedience of Adam was the cause of the sin and con
demnation of all his posterity. He then proceeds to show that
death had actually invaded the whole human race, in consequence
of their connection with their first father. The fact is undeniable
that all die, not even excepting infants ; and it is vain to allege that
all became voluntarily sinners by the imitation of Adam, for to the
majority of men the first sin was unknown, and as to infants, it is
certain they could not become sinners by imitation ; nevertheless,
they are obnoxious to death as much as adults, and in circumstan
ces of as much bodily pain and distress ; which can only be ac
counted for by supposing that they are partakers of the blame and
punishment of the first offence. The apostle goes on to declare the
reason why all are infected with the pollution of sin, and are ex
posed to its punishment, which is, that in this first man all have sin
ned. The phrase if 3, ought in this place to be considered as of
the same import with a u>, in 1 Cor. xv. 22, where we have tv ™'ASip
in Adam all die, so i» m Xpdr™ in Christ shall all be made alive.
And in Mark ii. 4, this identical phrase is used in this sense, " They
let down the couch if 3> on which the paralytic lay." But if we
take this phrase as our adversaries wish, to designate, not the sub
ject, but the cause, it will come to the very same thing. For the
reason is here assigned by the apostle why death has passed upon
all men, and according to this interpretation, the reason is, " be
cause all have sinned ;" but this cannot be understood of actual sin ;
for in this sense all who die have not sinned, since infants are in
capable of sinning actually. The meaning therefore must be, that
all have sinned in their first father and representative. If they had
not sinned in him, they would not have been subjected to the pun
ishment of his first transgression. And that condemnation comes
16

242 DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS.
on the race on account of this one sin, is so clearly taught in the
following verses, that there is no room left for any reasonable
doubt, that the apostle meant to teach that this sin was imputed ;
or that hence condemnation was incurred by all men. It is re
peatedly declared that by the one sin of the one man many had
died — had come into condemnation — had been constituted sinners,
&c. : it seems, therefore, most natural and reasonable to suppose
that the apostle in the 12th verse, where he assigns a reason for
the death of our whole race, means the same which he evidently
does in the subsequent verses. This interpretation renders the
whole context consistent with itself; whereas, if by xavres tpaprov, we
understand the actual sinning of all, not only will infants, who also
suffer death, be excluded ; but the reason assigned for the death of
all, will be different from what it is in the following verse ; " Guilt
has, by one man, come upon all men to condemnation, not in effect
merely, but in righteous judgment."
In this passage then we are clearly taught, first, the universal and
total corruption of all men ; secondly, that this corruption is derived
from the first man, not by imitation of his first sin, concerning
which many knew nothing, and of which others were incapable,
but by a participation of the crime of the first man. Hence all
men are bound to suffer death, although not guilty of actual sin ;
for according to the nature of the apostle's argument, the partici
pation and propagation of sin and death must be derived from one
man, just as the participation and propagation of righteousness and
life are derived from another, even Christ. In a word, the argu
ment may be stated simply thus; "As by Christ alone life and
righteousness are introduced, so by Adam sin and death. And as
all who are justified and receive the gift of life, are indebted for
these benefits to Christ alone ; so as many as sin and die, do all sin
and die in Adam alone. Therefore original sin exists, as is evident
from the fact that infants die, who are altogether incapable of ac
tual sin.
The objection which they make, " that it is not asserted that all
men die in Adam," is of no force ; for the contrast which is here
set up between the first and second Adam, requires that the words
of the apostle should be understood in this sense. The same thing
is necessarily implied in those words, " As in Adam all sin, so in
Christ shall all be made alive ;" for evidently, if all die in Adam, all
must have sinned in him. It is repugnant to every idea of divine
justice, that any should be subjected to the punishment due to ano
ther, without any participation in his sin.
Where the catechist asserts that if 5 should be rendered because
that, or inasmuch, in accordance with the use of the same particles
in other passages, he gains no help to his cause, for I have shown,
that admitting this interpretation, still an unanswerable argument
for original sin may be derived from this passage. But I deny that
the words ought to be thus translated : and our opponent has ad
duced no reasons for his interpretation, unless that elsewhere these

DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 243
words are thus rendered ; which reason makes just as much for us
as it does for him. We might therefore argue thus : the particles
if 3. elsewhere signify in which, or in whom, therefore they ought
to be so understood here; but our opponent would not admit this
conclusion, because " a particulari ad particulare non valet conse-
quentia :" that is, we cannot draw the conclusion from the use of a
particle in one place, that its signification is the very same in ano
ther. Well, we can make the very same objection to his argu
ment. It is not, therefore, a satisfactory reason that if 3, should
signify inasmuch, or because that, merely because passages may be
found where the words are thus used. Besides, the places alleged
are not in point, for in Rom. viii. 3, the phrase is not the same ; it
is iv <5. In 2 Cor. v. 4, we do indeed read if 3>, yet the particles are
here used subjectively, that is, in a sense corresponding with our
interpretation, for ™ aKfiva is evidently the antecedent to which the
relative refers. And in Heb. ii. 18, the phrase is hi, and, there
fore, although it be taken casually, it does not affect the interpreta
tion of the words now under consideration. But while we judge
that the Latin version is correct in rendering this passage (in quo)
in whom all have sinned ; yet we are not of opinion that the force
of the argument for original sin is at all invalidated by the other
interpretation ; for as we have shown above, it comes eventually
to the same thing, whether you take these words as expressive of
the subject or the cause.
As to the exception of Ostorodus, that in this passage the word
" sinners" does not denote those who were really such, but persons
who are spoken of as if they had been sinners, it is too unreasonable
to require a moment's consideration ; but it is enough for ever to si
lence this objection, that these persons are really subject to the pen
alty of death ; if therefore they are liable to death, which is the
wages of sin, they must be sinners ; otherwise there would be no
correspondence between the crime and punishment. If the crime
was merely supposititious, and the punishment real, how could God
be a just judge when he treated those as real sinners, who were
only putatively such ?
Ques. 6. " As you have taught that man's free-will is not
VITIATED BY ORIGINAL SIN, EXPLAIN ALSO HOW FAR THE POWER OF
FREE-WILL EXTENDS?
Ans. "Generally, the strength of human nature in regard to
those things which God requires, is very small ; yet for those duties
which we are bound to perform, the will by which they may be
performed exists in all men ; so that human ability is not so small,
but that if any one sincerely desires to exert his power in obeying
the commandments of God, he, by divine assistance, will not make
his efforts in vain. This divine aid God never withholds from any
man to whom he has communicated the revelation of his will;
otherwise He could never justly chastise or punish the rebellious ;
but we know he does both."

244 DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS.
Refutation. — Although in man there is remaining some light of
reason and conscience, and some liberty of will in relation to ac
tions of a merely moral, civil, or political nature ; yet in regard to
things spiritual, and those which concern our salvation, the strength
of human nature is not only, as the catechist acknowledges, " very
small," but is absolutely nothing at all ; for man in his state of des
titution and ruin is " dead in trespasses and sins." Now we know
that in death there is not merely little strength, but not any strength.
This is the fact in regard to all those who have fallen under the
power of corporeal death, as it relates to natural actions ; and the
same is true of spiritual death, as it relates to spiritual actions.
And as the man who is naturally dead, is altogether impotent to
put forth the actions of a living man ; so he who is spiritually dead,
is equally unable to put forth those acts which appertain to the spi
ritual life. For although there remains in man the natural faculty
of willing, yet in this faculty there is no ability of willing that which
is good, and of refusing that which is evil, of a spiritual kind. But
what is this which our opponent teaches ? " That human strength
is not so very small, but that if a man will exert what he has, by
the divine aid which will be granted, he will not fail of obeying the
will of God." This is purely Pelagian. It is as if you should say,
" a man who is naturally dead, if he will exert the strength which
j he has, may, by divine aid, put forth the acts of a living creature."
But we know that a man naturally dead can do nothing toward
his own resuscitation, and the same is equally true respecting spi
ritual death. No man can produce strength in himself, if the cause
and principle of that kind of action be wanting. If he can, it must
be either in dependence on God, or independently of him. If the
former, it is not man but God who produces the effect ; if the latter,
the creature is independent of his Maker for at least one good thing
which he possesses. He produces ability in himself by his own
effort, and does not receive it from above ; but this pretension ap-
> proaches near to atheism, and is blasphemous. This is for a man
'. to attribute to himself what the scriptures expressly ascribe to God,
namely, " the power to will and to do ;" and the apostle asserts,
" That we are not sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of
ourselves ; but our sufficiency is of God " (2 Cor. iii. 5). And if
the words of Christ himself are true — and we know they are truth
itself — " Without me you can do nothing," the assertion of our
adversary is altogether false, when he asserts that a man, without
the help of God, or previous to that aid, can produce strength in
himself to perform the will of God. Indeed, his aid he will deny to
none of those to whom he has revealed his will. But this is true
only of those who, understanding his will, implore aid from God.
Thus in Psalm 1. 15, "Call upon me and I will deliver thee ;" and
in Luke xi. 9, " Ask and it shall be given you." But the pas
sage which best suits our purpose is that in the 13th verse:
'¦ How much more will your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit
to them that ask him ?" But even to ask aright, and to implore di-

DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 245
vine aid sincerely, are not in the power of man, until by the
operations of grace those groanings which cannot be uttered are
excited in him. For until the spirit of prayer is given to a man by
God, he cannot truly call Jesus, Lord ; nor can he with the spirit
of adoption cry Abba, Father. It is true then, that God does not
withhold his aid from those to whom he not only externally makes
known his will, but whom he internally persuades ; for indeed, that
the aids of grace are denied to many who externally have the will
of God preached to them, can be doubted by none except such as
are ignorant, that "God heareth not sinners," and that their
prayers are an abomination unto Him ; but he will hear the peti
tions of the righteous, and his ear is ever open to their cry.
In answer to what this writer says in the last place, " That God
cannot justly punish the rebellious, unless man is endued with the
power of free-will to obey, is of no force, because God most right
eously punishes that impotency which the first man incurred for
his posterity. For the devils themselves are evidently unable to do
anything truly good ; and yet who would deny that they are justly
punished for their wickedness ? They who urge this argument
allege that if you take away free-will, you take away all punish
ments and all rewards. But this is not true, as we know from the
case of the blessed angels, whose will is not a state of indifference
between two opposites, which is the Socinian notion of liberty, but
the will of the angels is unchangeably determined to that which is
good, and to that alone ; so that they cannot will that which is
evil ; and yet who would deny that these holy beings are deserving
of praise for the perfection of their obedience ? And this inclina
tion of theirs only to that which is good, God is pleased to crown
with a gracious reward of everlasting felicity.
Ques. 7. " But what is that divine aid of which you have
MADE MENTION ?
Ans. " Divine aid is two-fold, internal and external.
Ques. 8. " What is that divine aid which is external ?
Ans. " The principal is the word of God, especially its promises
and threatenings ; but of these, the promises have much greater
force than the threatenings. Here also it may be remarked, that
under the new covenant, the promises are far more excellent than
under the old. Moreover, it is much easier to do the will of God
under the new, than it was under the old covenant."
Refutation. — I observe, in the first place, that our author makes
external aid to consist in the promises and threatenings of God's
word. Now these may indeed furnish strong motives to induce a
man to accept the good proposed, and to reject the evil ; but there
seems to be no propriety in calling this by the name of " aid," un
less we give to the term an acceptation much broader than usual.
But that which is most objectionable in this statement is, that divine
aid is confined to the external promises and threatenings ; whereas

246 doctrines of the early socinians.
God not only promises good and threatens evil in his word, but
graciously operates within us, and by divine energy renders these
motives effectual, which without such an internal operation would
produce no effect whatever ; for the good contained in the promise
is neither apprehended nor desired, much less enjoyed, until the
mind is illuminated and excited by divine power. And what else
is that which we read in so many perspicuous texts of sacred
scripture, where God is said to enlighten those who are spiritually
blind? as in Ephes. i. 17, 18 — to regenerate and renew those who
are carnal, as in John iii. 5, 6 ; 1 Cor. iv. 15 ; Peter iii. 7. To
quicken the dead in sin, as in Ephes. ii. 1,5. To soften the hard
heart, as in Ezek. xi. 19 ; xxxvi. 16. To convert us to himself, as
in Jer. xxxi. 13, 19. To draw us effectually, as in John vi. 44.
To create within us a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within
us, as in Psal. Ii. 12. To open our understanding to understand
the scriptures, as in Luke xxiv. 31, 45. To confer upon us saving
faith, as in Phil, ii. 9. To excite good thoughts and volitions, as in
2 Cor. iii. 5 ; Phil. ii. 13. To cause us to walk in his statutes, as
in Ezek. xxxvi. 27 ; and to fear his name, as Jer. xxxii. 39 ; and to
love the Lord, as Deut. xxx. 6. From all these texts, and numerous
others which might be added, it is manifest that " divine aid" con
sists in God's efficient and gracious operation within us, and not in
the bare proposition of promises and threatenings. For without a
divine agency to illuminate our minds and cause us to understand
the promises, so as spiritually to apprehend the good which they
contain, the mere exhibition of them will never produce any saving
effect. Unless God incline our will to embrace the good revealed
in the word, with all our strength, we shall continue to be unaf
fected by it. " For the natural man receiveth not the things of the
Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he
know them, because they are spiritually discerned." The writer,
while he describes both promises and threatenings under the name
of " divine aid," intimates that the former are much more powerful
in their operation on the mind than the latter ; concerning which,
however, we are constrained to doubt, since there are many more
who hate and avoid sin through fear of punishment than from love
of virtue. Again, that the promises of the New Testament are
much more' excellent than those of the Old, and that the duties of
the new covenant are much more easily performed than those of
the old, is asserted, but not proved, by our author. We say, that
in substance the promises of the Old and New Testament are the
same, namely, Christ and his benefits, together with eternal life ; so
that, in substance, there is nothing promised in the new covenant
which was not also promised in that of the former dispensation.
It is true, however, that the blessings promised are much more
clearly exhibited under the Gospel than they were under the Law.
In regard to clearness and sweetness, it may be said, that the pro
mises of the New Testament are more excellent ; but not as it re
lates to the substance of the things promised.

DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 247
We are aware, however, that Socinians believe that the Old
and New Testaments differ, not merely in circumstances, but in
essence. Ques. 9. " What is that ' divine aid' which you call in
ternal ?"
Ans. '' It is this ; that God seals on the hearts of those who
obey him whatever he has promised."
Refutation. — Wonderful Theology I This sealing, which the
catechist calls " divine aid" of the internal kind, is produced by a
consideration of the divine promises and threatenings ; that is to
say, the seal of a thing which is sealed, is " aid." But sealing is
an act, the object of which is merely to produce a more perfect
confirmation. When, therefore, God is said to aid a man by seal
ing the promises, it is nothing else than for God to certify to a man,
running of his own accord in the right way, a prosperous issue to
all his efforts. According to this view of the helps of grace, there
is not in works of piety any such thing as the preventing, co-ope
rating, or accompanying agency of God ; but only a certain seal
ing of the work consummated by man, to assure him that his
labour shall not be in vain. Simply to state the Socinian theology,
in relation to this point, is a sufficient refutation. For if there be
any truth in the scripture doctrine of grace, it is God who first
excites us to works of piety, then co-operates with us in our spirit
ual exercises, and enables us to persevere in the performance of the
good thus commenced.
Ques. 10. "If the will of man remain free [and unhurt by
THE FALL], WHY IS IT THAT SO MANY HAVE SET THEMSELVES IN OPPO
SITION TO THIS DOCTRINE ?"
Ans. " They are induced to do so, from entertaining the opi
nion that there are certain testimonies of scripture which they are
confident teach that man is no longer possessed of free will.
Ques. 11. "But what are those scripture testimonies on
WHICH THEY DEPEND ?"
Ans. " They are of two kinds. The first are such, as that
from them they suppose this doctrine can be fairly inferred ; the
others are thought to contain express declarations, that free will
does not now exist in man."
Refutation. — It is not with the orthodox a mere matter of con
jecture or opinion that the will of man, since the fall, is enslaved to
sin ; but it is a truth which is capable of being confirmed by the
clearest demonstration : and we not only suppose that we have texts
of scripture from which it can be deduced that the will of man is en
tirely indisposed to all spiritual good, but we do actually accom
plish what we profess, as will appear when we come to the con
sideration of the particular passages on which this doctrine rests,

248 DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS.
Here we must, for the present, close our extracts from Arnold's
Refutation of the Racovian Catechism. The writer proceeds in
the following questions, in this tenth chapter, De Libero Arbitrio,
to treat largely of predestination. We should be pleased, if our
space would permit us, to follow this learned and solid theologian
through the whole discussion ; but what we have extracted may
serve as a specimen of the manner in which theological discussion
was conducted nearly two centuries ago. One thing must have
struck the reader as remarkable, namely, that the modern argu
ments, by which error attempts to defend her cause, are precisely
the same as those employed for centuries past. We know, indeed,
that those who now adopt and advocate these opinions, greatly dis
like this comparison of modern hypotheses with ancient heresies,and
denounce it as -invidious. But why should it be so considered ?
Or why should they be unwilling to acknowledge the conformity
of their opinions with those of ancient times, when the agreement
is so manifest, not only in the doctrines themselves, but in the ar
guments and interpretations of scripture by which they attempt to
support them ? If the " New Divinity" be correct, then certainly
many who were formerly condemned by the majority of Christians
as heretics, ought to be considered the true church, and their doc
trines as orthodox; while those who censured and condemned
them, ought to be considered as a set of unreasonable bigots, who
by their numbers and influence were able to suppress the cause of
true Christianity.
Certainly, then, they who are now so confident that they have
received new light, ought not to be ashamed of their brethren who
struck out this same light hundreds of years before they were
born, and defended their opinions by arguments as ingenious, and
by exegesis as learned, as any of those now living have a right to
pretend to. It is, however, a fact, that these theologians, who long
maintained the character of being orthodox, are very reluctant to
be classed with Arminians, Pelagians, and Socinians, even when
they are conscious that their opinions coincide with those desig
nated by such denominations. This does not arise from any real
abhorrence of the sects so denominated ; but from knowing that
the Christian public, with which they are connected, entertain strong
prejudices against these sects ; and it requires no small degree of
moral courage to stem the torrent of popular prejudice. There
has been, therefore, in our " new light" theologians, an unusual
solicitude to persuade the religious community that they were not
contemplating innovations upon the ancient creed of the orthodox,
but that they had merely adopted a more rational philosophy, by
which they were able to explain the knotty points in Calvinism, so
as to render doctrines naturally offensive to human reason, if not
entirely palatable, yet in a great degree free from objection. These
attempts at reconciling the new opinions with the commonly re
ceived doctrines of the church have been pushed so far, that even
some who have gone far into the " new divinity," have been

DOCTRINES OF THE EARLY SOCINIANS. 249
ashamed of the want of candour and ingenuousness which has
sometimes been manifested. And now, at length, the character
and tendency of these modern theories have created alarm even
in the largest body of professed Arminians on earth. We mean the
Methodist Episcopal church. The tables are strangely turned
upon us. Formerly we shrunk from contact with this increasing
body of zealous Christians, lest we should receive some taint of
Arminianism ; but now they are lifting up a warning voice to their
widely extended disciples, not against our Calvinism — for against
this they have uttered their anathemas long enough — but against
our Pelagianism ; that is, against the Pelagian character of the
" New Divinity ;" for they are at no loss to identify the system
which is now so zealously maintained and propagated with that of
John Taylor of Norwich. But while the affinity of the " New
Divinity" with Pelagianism has been well understood by considerate
men for some time past, it has not been commonly believed that there
is also a striking resemblance in the modern theories to the doctrines
of the ancient Socinians. This will, however, be remarkably evi
dent by a perusal of the Racovian Catechism, which contains the ac
knowledged standard of Socinian doctrine ; and even from the
extracts here given, the coincidence between the two systems is
exceedingly manifest. This, however, ought to be asserted with
some exception ; for it is true that in several points the Socinian
creed stops far short of the " New Divinity." This last makes no
scruple to assert the complete ability of man, in all respects, to do
the will of God, and that by the exercise of his own free agency ;
but in the catechism which we have had under consideration it is
taught that the strength or ability of man is very small ; and it is
not pretended that he can do anything without divine aid ; and
although they fall far short of the truth, yet they admit that there
is need, not only of external divine aid, but of that which is inter
nal also.
Whether the " New Divinity" will maintain the consistency of
the Socinianism of Poland, remains to be proved ; but there is
much reason to apprehend, that although the theologians who now
advocate it will not have the courage to carry it out in its legiti
mate consequences, yet their successors will be less timid, and
will feel that, in self-defence, it is necessary to go a great, deal
further in the line of deviation from orthodoxy than has yet been
done. Whoever lives to see another generation of men rising to
maturity, will see that the " New Divinity" is the stepping-stone to
German neology.

ESSAY XI.
THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.
PUBLISHED IN 1840.

The appearance of a new edition of the standard work of Presi
dent Edwards on the Freedom of the Will, furnishes an occasion,
which we are glad to embrace, of calling the attention of our read
ers to one particular part of the subject which has of late been a
matter of frequent debate.
No attentive and competent observer of the controversies which
of late years have harassed the church, will dispute that in a great
measure they turn upon the nature and functions of the human
will. It is as evident that the chief of these questions, on which all
others hinge, is that which relates to the Power of Contrary Choice.
It will be agreed that whatever goes to determine concerning the
reality, nature and operations of this power, does in that degree de
termine the controversy itself. In the hope of contributing to this
happy result, the ensuing inquiry will be conducted. No valuable
progress can be made in it, unless it is pursued with a clear con
ception of the real point at issue. Our first endeavour, therefore,
shall be to ascertain precisely what that point is.
1. The question is not whether the will might have made a
choice the contrary of that actually made, had its motives, either
internal or external, or both united, been different ; i. e. had the
state of the agent's mind within, or the outward inducements pre
sented to it, been different. No one disputes that on this suppo
sition there might have been a choice different from, or contrary
to, that actually made. No one disputes that should such a change
subsequently occur, it might produce a corresponding change of
choice. 2. The question is not whether there is a mere natural power of
contrary choice, as the phrase " natural power" has been under
stood by the best theologians. By this is meant that such a con
trary choice would not be extrinsic or contradictory to its nature
as will. Such a choice, supposing the requisite influence for its

THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. 251
production, would be a proper act of will, germane to its nature.
and involving no inherent absurdity or self-contradiction. It would
involve no increase of its faculties or powers, no change in its or
ganic structure, or appropriate nature as will. Had it chosen the
contrary, this would not have proved or implied it to be a larger,
stronger, or constitutionally different faculty. When men turn to
the love of God, they do it with the same faculties which were em
ployed in hating him, both as to extent and nature. The state
and action of. these faculties towards moral objects alone are
changed. The question is not whether, in this sense, the human
will is endowed with the power of contrary choice.
3. The question is not whether the will, in one and the same act
of choice, may or may not choose two contrary objects. This is
too palpably absurd to be maintained, and none avowedly or inten
tionally contend for it. Whether some theories do not involve this
position in such a degree that they stand or fall with it, is a fair
question for discussion.
4. The question is not whether men may choose whichever of
two objects they please. Those who do not examine carefully, are
often made to believe that this is the grand question at issue. No
one doubts the affirmative of this question.
5. Neither is the question whether the will has liberty of choice,
i. e. in every act of choice acts freely, according to the pleasure of
the agent, and not by constraint or compulsion. This is agreed on
all hands.
6. But the question is whether the will is so constituted, that, at
the moment of any given choice, under precisely the same motives
of inward inclination and external inducement, it may turn itself
either way ; either in the way it actually does choose, or the oppo
site ; either in accordance with its highest pleasure or inclination,
or in direct and utter hostility to them. And whether such a pro
perty in the human will be essential to liberty, moral agency, praise
and blame, rewards and punishments ; a question which lies at the
very root, as, will be perceived, of some of the chief questions in
divinity and ethics.
That we may not be obnoxious to the charge of raising a false
issue, and fighting a fiction of our own fancy, we shall quote from
the abettors of the notion in question, a few sentences showing
clearly what are the views of this subject widely entertained and
propagated at the present day.
Their cardinal doctrine on this subject is thus expressed, by a
leading advocate of it: " Choice in its very nature implies the pos
sibility of a different or contrary election to that which is made."*
This " possibility," as this writer explains himself, refers not to its
having different objects put at its election, so that it may choose
whichsoever it pleases ; but it refers to the possibility of making
the mind's choices themselves different or contrary to what actual-
* Beecher's Views in Theology, pp. 31, 32.

252 THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.
ly occur, at the same instant, under precisely the same internal and
external motives, and the same objects offered to their election.
For he says, " the question of free will is not whether men choose.
This is notorious, none deny it."* Again — " Free-agency is known
and defined by the confession itself, and admitted to be the capacity
of choice, with power of contrary choice."f And in various forms
he abundantly asserts, that " choice" and " voluntariness" are not
a sufficient ground of accountability, unless the mind not only
chooses, but exerts a " control" over its own choices.
Another writer speaks of " a will which has not its nature cor
related to any objects, but a will indifferent, for if its nature were
correlated to objects, its particular selection and determination
would be influenced by this, and consequently its action would be
necessary."J Again : " The only escape from necessity, therefore, is the con
ception of will as above defined — a conscious self-moving power,
which may obey reason in opposition to passion, or passion in op
position to reason, or obey both in their harmonious union ; and
lastly, which may act in the indifferency of all, that is, act without
reference either to reason or passion."§ Again : " The reason and
the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the will. The will has
efficiency, or creative and modifying power in itself — self-moved,
self-directed."|| A few sentences from a publication recently discontinued, in fur
ther explication of the properties of this power of contrary choice,
claimed to be essential to true liberty, will suffice under this head.
" We know that a moral system necessarily implies the existence
of free agents, with the power to act in despite of all opposing
power. This fact sets human reason at defiance, in every attempt
to prove that some of these agents will not use that power and ac
tually sin.Tf " This possibility that moral agents will sin, remains
(suppose what else you will), so long as moral agency remains ;
and how can it be proved that a thing will not be, when, for aught
that appears, it may be ? When in view of all the facts and evi
dence in the case, it remains true that it may be, what evidence or
proof can exist that it will not be ?"** Again : " It will not be
denied that free moral agents can do wrong under every possible
influence to prevent it. The possibility of a contradiction in sup
posing them to be prevented from doing wrong is therefore demon
strably certain." But we will not weary our readers with a more
prolix detail of extracts, which might be multiplied to any extent.
Most of them are familiar with these. It is notorious with what
ingenuity, zeal and industry these sentiments have been defended
and propagated in every variety of form, and what multitudes have
been brought, either to espouse them with enthusiasm, or submit to
them in silence.
* Beecher's Views in Theology, p. 32. f Id., p. 91.
% Tappan,Review of Edwards, p. 221. § Id., p. 227. || Id., p. 244.
11 Christian Spectator, 1831, p. 417. ** Id., 1830, p. 563.

THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. 253
While the first of the writers quoted teaches that it belongs to
the very nature of choice, that there should be a capacity of pro
ducing contrary choice, and that without this " control " of the
mind over its own choices, there is no true freedom, moral agency
or accountability ; the second clearly avows that indifferency of
will towards the objects either of reason or desire, without which
this faculty is rather a metaphysical figment than a living reality,
and maintains that no other constitution of the will can exempt us
from the despotism of fatal necessity : while in the last series of
extracts we reach the climacteric, to which the doctrine necessarily
rises by the demands of logical consistency, viz., that it belongs to
the very essence of moral agency, that the will is of such a nature
or in such a state as to be able to sin " despite of all opposing
power." And that this is no mere theory, but an awful fact in their
estimation, is evident, because they advance it to account for the
introduction of sin into the world — strongly arguing that God would
have excluded it, if he could have done so without destroying moral
agency. From all which it is most manifest that the will, accord
ing to their conception of it, cannot, without the loss of accounta
bility, moral agency, and merit of praise or blame, be put in such
a state that it may not sin, in spite of all the motives and influences
without and within the man, which the Almighty can employ to
prevent it. Such is the power of contrary choice, extensively and
confidently asserted in these days to be requisite to moral agency.
This notion we propose to discuss so far as the space allotted to us
will permit.
No evidence has yet been adduced of the existence of such a
property in the human will. The only evidence of the existence
of mental attributes, which sound philosophers have deemed ad
missible, is those mental operations which presuppose the faculty
in question. Thus we judge men to possess reason and under
standing, because we recognize in them exercises of reason and
intelligence. We conclude that they are endowed with consciences,
because they take cognizance of right and wrong in moral actions.
We attribute to them the faculty of will because they choose. And
adhering to this Baconian method of philosophising by induc
tion of facts (and on any other system what can prevent any dream
ing speculator from endowing the human soul with an endless num
ber of fictitious attributes ?) what legitimate evidence is furnished
of the existence of such a faculty of contrary choice, as we are now
canvassing ? That men choose as they do choose, all admit, and
of course maintain the existence of a faculty adequate thereto. But
that they choose the contrary of what they choose, none contend.
How then can they contend for the existence of a faculty in all re
spects adequate to do what confessedly is never done ?
Neither does consciousness testify to the existence of any such
faculty, though most of all relied on and appealed to bear such
testimony. But this is a vain refuge. For consciousness is the
mind's cognizance of its own operations ; it never beholds naked,

254 THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.
abstract faculties separate from their workings. It discerns them
in and by these workings, and so becomes conscious of their exist
ence and nature. This, and nothing else, is the office of conscious
ness. How then can it be cognizant of operations which do not
exist ? It may be conscious indeed of having been able to choose
differently, had it so pleased — because such has ever been the law
of its choice. Will any one pretend that it is conscious of a power
to choose contrariwise, its ruling inclination or pleasure being and
continuing to choose as it has chosen, or that such a faculty would
be any desirable addition to the moral endowments of men ; or lend
any new aid, finish or grace to moral agency ?
Neither is any evidence of such a power contained in the intui
tive convictions of men, as to what is requisite to moral agency
and accountability. For however it may be requisite in order to
men's being responsible, that they be able to do as they please or
choose ; yet who will claim that it is deemed necessary that they
should have the property of choosing the exact contrary of what
on the whole appears to them most eligible and desirable ? So far
from being essential to, would not such a property be declared by
them destructive of all responsibility ?
There is decisive evidence that such a property of the human
will does not exist. For that which is contended for is not merely
that the will may put forth a choice the contrary of what actually
occurs, supposing such a change to occur in its circumstances as
would induce it (which all admit), but that in precisely the case in
which it exercises a given choice, it is fully adequate to a contrary
election. Now this contrary choice is actually made or it is not:
if it is made, then the will chooses the contrary of what it does
choose, which is self-contradiction ; if it is not made, then those
conditions were wanting in it as a cause, which were indispensable
to the effect, and in the absence of which it was inadequate to the
effect. It is a trifling evasion to answer that the will could have
chosen otherwise had it been so inclined : this is not the point in
hand. The thing contended for is that it might have chosen other
wise at all events, whether inclined or not, and in spite of all op
posing inclination, yea, in spite of all opposing power, even of Om
nipotence : and that this is essential to moral agency. It might as
well be said that scales could turn the opposite way, if induced by
a preponderating weight. And does this illustration adequately
exhibit all that is intended by that famous power of contrary choice,
which has been so largely spoken of, as bringing in a new era in
the philosophy of theology ?
Neither is it any answer to say that this reasoning is inconclusive
in regard to such a faculty as is now contended for : by which its
advocates mean a cause unlike all others, and which they variously
define as a "self-active," "self-originating," "self-determining,"
" selecting " cause. For it did either thus of itself enact, originate,
determine or select a choice the contrary of what it did, which is
plain contradiction ; or it did not : and therefore wanted some con-

THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. 255
dition the presence of which was indispensable to that effect, and
the absence of which rendered the cause inadequate to the effect —
as really though not as blamelessly, or in such a degree so, as is the
hand to lift a mountain.
But again, all will doubtless admit, that although the natural
faculty of will exerts the choice, the direction of that choice under
given outward motives, is determined, not by the bare natural
faculty, but by its moral state. Thus the faculty of will equally in
good and bad men exerts their volitions : but their moral goodness
or badness determines the direction and quality of those choices.
To deny this, is to deny, confound and utterly vacate the distinc
tion in theology between natural and moral ability. If then the
will is in a given moral state, how can it be a property of it to put
forth choices of an opposite moral character ? Is this a real requi
site or desirable appendage to moral agency ?
Such a property of the human will really amounts to the liberty
of indifference. For if the will be in a condition, by which it is
fitted or liable to turn either way, then it cannot be already inclin
ed by a preponderating bias in one direction : for this is but saying
that it chooses the contrary of its own preference. This difficulty
is attempted to be evaded, but not answered, by alleging that al
though the will may not choose contrary to its own inclination,
yet it may reverse that inclination. But let it be explained how
this inclination can be reversed without choosing contrary to it.
Suppose, however, it might. Then surely that property or func
tion of will which thus reverses its own ruling bias, must at least
itself be free from the power of that bias, or it would never incline
against it, and work its destruction. It must therefore at least be
in a state of equipoise or indifference as to the objects of choice.
As we have already seen, one leading advocate of this notion,
clearly discerning this consequence, boldly marches up to it, and
embraces it, and contends that such a freedom of will as involves
its indifference either to the objects of reason or passion, in short a
will void of all " correlation " to other objects, is essential to free
dom from that necessity which destroys moral agency and accounta
bility. But it deserves to be considered, whether the will does not
by every act of choice pass out of this indifference, into a decided
inclination toward some object : and, by consequence.whether after
the first choice it can ever be endowed with that glorious indiffer
ence which is essential to moral agency and accountability, or on
this system can be responsible for any of its acts. And we would
inquire further, how it can make any first choice between objects,
while in a state of perfect equipoise between them : why should it
move towards either more than towards anything else, or why
should it not remain motionless, if there is no " correlation," no
ground of affinity and attraction between them ? Or could such
motion be referred to anything besides the purest contingency and
hap-hazard, or possess any property of a rational and accountable

256 THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.
act ? On this scheme all moral agency and accountability would
be exorcised from the universe.
Another class of advocates, hedged in by a view of this thicket
of absurdities, have taken ground more cautiously. Wishing to
navigate clear of the quicksands of indifference on the one hand,
and, on the other, to limit moral action to the workings of this fa
vourite power of choice with power of contrary choice, they have
struck upon the rock of self-love. They teach us, not that the
will moves from indifference, but that " self-love is the primary
cause or reason of all acts of choice that fix supremely on any
object." And they maintain that this self-love has no moral charac
ter, but only the choices prompted by it. At first sight this has
the appearance of accounting for the acts of the will, not by a good
or evil bias within it, but without it, and void of moral quality.
But let it be considered whether this solution, instead of disen
tangling the scheme, does not involve it in deeper perplexity. For
how can " self-love be the primary cause or reason of all acts of
choice or preference," unless the will is so constituted as to follow
its leadings ? If it cannot, then if there be any truth in the doc
trine, it is always a law of the will's choices that it should choose
that object which appears to minister most to self-love. For sup
pose it to reject that which offers more, and to elect in preference
that which offers less to self-love, it of course chooses in view of
the perceived difference between the two ; that difference in this
case is so much denial to self-love. Therefore self-love could not
have been the " cause or reason" of such an act of choice. Hence
it is demonstrable that if " self-love be the primary cause of all
acts of choice," these acts must be according to its promptings.
They cannot therefore be the contrary of them. Where then
shall we look for the capacity of contrary choice ? And how
does this scheme get rid of that bias in the will, or " correlation"
to self-love, or uniform law of action, which are deemed so preg
nant with fatalism, because fatal to free agency ? And if self-love
has no moral quality in any state or degree of it which determines
the will, if all its choices are merely imperate acts of desires hav
ing no moral quality, then how can they have moral quality them
selves? However biased in regard to objects void of moral
quality, must it not remain eternally indifferent to moral objects ?
And are not all moral agency and accountability thus swept from
the universe ? And is this conferring on moral agency any new
attribute of dignity, or element of perfection ? The self-love
scheme might easily be traced out to more absurd and ruinous
consequences. But we confine ourselves to those which bear upon
the power of contrary choice.
This scheme involves all the absurdities which attach to the
notion of the self- determining power of the will as held by the old
Arminians. For little value can be put upon a power of the mind
to choose either way, unless it can determine which of the two
choices in question it will put forth. Will they who assert a power

THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. 257
in the mind to choose in given circumstances the opposite of what
it does choose, tell us how this power could be made available
without the mind's choosing to make it so ; how its actual choice
could be in a condition either to be exercised or avoided, unless it
were so that the mind chose to exercise it, and could choose not to
exercise it ; or how, on their principles, the mind could be respon
sible for it, without such a liberty as this implies ? The question
involves its own answer. They never can. This control of the
mind over its own choices which they claim, is surely a mere nul
lity, unless that mind chooses those choices. If then a free act of
choice has not moral quality in its own nature, but can only ac
quire it from a previous act of" choice, the same is true of that pre
vious choice, also of its forerunner, and so on ad infinitum till we
reach a choice before the first choice in order to find moral respon
sibility, and indeed chase it out of being. We go from link to link
and never find a staple ; we sound from depth to depth and find no
bottom, for bottom there is none, neither can there be in this sea of
absurdities. Some of these metaphysicians have been fully aware that the
power of contrary choice contended for, was none other than the
self-determining power, and have accordingly undertaken to vindi
cate this doctrine of self-determination from the insuperable objec
tions which lie against it. They allege that it is not obnoxious to
the absurdity of choosing choices ; because, like all other causes,
it is its nature in working an effect to " select"* its object. That
the will selects its objects, and that such is its nature, all agree.
But this is not the question. As one of these writers says, " that
men choose is notorious, none deny it" The inquiry is not whe
ther different objects are put at men's election, or whether they
could choose differently if they pleased ; but whether in a given
state, all things remaining the same, their choice may be either
way, even the contrary of what it is. We object, that in order to
this, it must choose between its choices. The answer is, " by no
means ; for like all other causes it selects its objects." By this one
of two things must be meant ; either that it is its nature to " select"
the objects it does choose — then where is the capacity of contrary
choice or "selection?" or it "selects" which "selection" it will
make between two opposite objects ; in other words, chooses its
choices. So much for this evasion.
Such a property of the human will as we are now discussing
makes mere and blind contingency the final determinant of its choic
es. For it teaches that it is inconsistent with moral agency, that the
will should have any such ruling bias toward given objects, as
effectually and infallibly to prevent its choosing the opposite. Not
even Omnipotence itself can thus prevent it, without infringing
upon moral agency. If then it be requisite to free action, that the
will should be void of all bias or relation to any objects, which
* Tappan, Review of Edwards, p. 185.
17

258 THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.
will decisively direct its choices toward them : if, as has been
shown already, according to this scheme, it must be in a state of
equipoise or indifferenee ; then most clearly the will is not deter
mined either way by anything without or within itself, being in
stated in sublime equipoise or indifference above them all. To
what then but the blindest fortuity can they be referred ? And
where is the survey of those vast Providential dispensations which
hang on the choices of moral agents, except, as one has said, in
" all-powerful contingencies ?"*
Such a property, so far from being requisite to, utterly subverts
all moral agency and accountability. For, as has already been
shown, it drives all m >ral responsibility out of the world, by push
ing it to a choice back of the first choice. It makes choice pro
ceed from indifference and blind contingence ; and what moral
qualities can be attached to that which by its very terms has no
quality, is neither one thing nor the other, is blank nonentity or
blind contingence ? To state the case familiarly : If at any mo
ment a choice may spring up within us, " despite all opposing
power," all strength of inclination and force of persuasion which I
may have of myself, or omnipotence can work, how can I be re
sponsible for it, more than for an involuntary spasm of the nerves ?
We go still further, and assert that a kind of necessity is requi
site to the very freedom of actions, and cannot be divorced from
them without destroying or impairing that freedom. For is not a
free act one which possesses certain qualities ? If then such an
action as is possessed of such qualities, and no other, is free, it fol
lows that if a given choice be free it must be such an action and
no other. For example : let any person choose freely what his
inclination would prompt, as to property, location, opportunities of
study or usefulness, and would not such a choice, if free, be some
given thing to the exclusion and rejection of its opposite ? and
could a choice, if free and " unhindered by fatal coercion," elect
and prefer one thing or its opposite, e. g., affluence or poverty, at
the same moment ? On this point we may safely appeal to human
consciousness. The question speaks its own answer. Thus in
order to freedom in the manner and quality of an action, there must
be a necessity as to its event ; a necessity that it be as it is and
not otherwise. Thus, if you choose freely between two objects,
there is one on which that choice will fall ; nay, cannot but fall
without losing its freedom. This conclusion cannot be escaped
without plunging into blind contingency as the determiner of the will.
This pretended competency of the will, to one choice or its oppo
site, as effectually destroys all true freedom, as would a denial of
freedom to choose whatever it pleases ; nay, it is one and the same
thing. So true is that fundamental position of Calvinism, which,
so far as we are informed, all Calvinistic writers have maintained ;
that in respect to the choices of moral agents, there is freedom as
* President Day.

THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. 259
to the manner, and necessity or fixedness as to the event of them ;
and the one involves the other. Neander has beautifully expressed
Augustine's doctrine thus : " On the highest point of moral eleva
tion, freedom and necessity coincide."* So our Protestant confes-
sionst each that although " God unchangeably ordains whatsoever
comes to pass," yet he does it so that "violence is not offered to
the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of
second causes taken away, but rather established." And again :
" Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decrees of God,
the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly;
yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out, according
to the nature of the second causes, either necessarily, freely, or
' contingently.' " By " contingently," is meant, as another article
teaches, not that any " thing to God is contingent or uncertain ;"
but, as these confessions assert, " according to the nature of se
cond causes," by which is meant that to them the actions are con
tingent or avoidable if they choose to avoid them ; not that their
choices are liable to be of a given thing or its opposite, for they
teach that the choices themselves are immutably foreknown and
determined ; yet not so as to impair but establish their liberty, for
the manner of them also is immutably fixed.
This is precisely the view we have maintained ; that freedom as
to manner, and necessity as to event, stand or fall together. And
this is what Dr. Twisse, prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly,
not only means, but laboriously argues, in the context of that fa
mous passage, in which he says, " contingently means avoidably, as
every university scholar knows," which has been so abundantly
quoted to prove that he and with him the Assembly of Divines, and
their venerable confessions, held to the power of contrary choice,
in the sense contended for in the late controversies among us. It
is worthy of observation too, that in the very next page, Dr. Twisse
confines this power of avoiding evil to particular purposes and acts
of abstaining from given sins ; while he expressly asserts that
" fallen man has no power to abstain from them in a gracious and
holy manner." Thus Judas, had he chosen, could have refrained
from betraying Christ, but not in a holy manner, that is, from prin
ciples of faith and love. In other words, it was perfectly consis
tent with Judas's continuing a wicked man, that it should have
pleased him to refrain from his act of treachery ; and had it thus
pleased him he could and would have abstained from it. But there
is no conceivable act or state of the natural man, no desire of sal
vation, or resolutions to be holy, which do or can produce faith
and love. There is a gulf between the two which nothing can fill,
but the renewing work of the Holy Ghost. Now it is notorious
that the power of contrary choice has been chiefly handled in refer
ence to one point ; viz., to establish the ability of the unrenewed
man to turn himself to God, and make a new heart, without Divine
* Bib. Repository, 1833, p. 96.

260 THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.
Grace, and that other points interwoven are merely collateral and
subordinate to this. Whatever else Twisse meant by " avoidable,"
he directly denies this, almost in the same sentence. Is it alto
gether just to hold him forth as its champion ? If many of our
" University scholars," aye, and teachers too, were more conversant
with his treatises, and those of other kindred defenders of the faith,
it would go far to prepare the way of the Lord, and restore the
unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.
The most perfect moral agents in being are destitute of this pro
perty in question, which is asserted to be requisite to moral agency.
Such is God, all whose acts are immutably (freely as to the man
ner yet necessarily as to the event) determined by perfect wisdom
and goodness. It is impossible for God to lie. He cannot deny
himself. Is not he supremely excellent, and deserving of praise 1
To deny this is to deny his perfections, and blaspheme his name !
The elect angels can never become the subjects of sinful choices.
Regenerate men, who are kept by the power of God through faith
unto salvation, cannot prevailingly sin, or utterly fall away. Are
they not moral agents ? Are they the less excellent and praise
worthy, for being so inflexibly holy, that they cannot become the
prey of sin and Satan ? But you say they can lapse into sin if
they please. Indeed ! can they unless it be their pleasure so to
do ? Dare you question that it will always be their pleasure to
abide holy ? If not, where is the possibility of their apostasy ?
This is the very point at issue ; whether it ever will or can be their
pleasure to lapse 1 Will you presume to suggest that their pow
ers of moral agency would be improved by such a liability ? But
you say there can be no merit or worthiness in their standing if
they have not power to fall. That they have power to fall, if they
choose or please, none dispute. But if they will not choose or be
pleased to fall, is there no worthiness in such a character ? Then
is there none in the Universe. So this notion, like all other errors
in theology, cannot be maintained without striking at the Deity
himself. It puts his unchangeable holiness in jeopardy and doubt.
The foregoing reasons satisfy us that such a power of contrary
choice as that which has been canvassed is no indispensable pro
perty of moral agency. We will briefly advert to some of the
methods adopted to give this notion currency and popularity.
Its advocates speak of the opposite view as if it implied that
men were compelled to act, to sin, or to be holy, against their wills.
They abound in phraseology like this : If there is no possibility of
a contrary choice ; if men are compelled to act as they do by fatal
necessity ; if their inability is not wholly in their aversion of will,
if it is something which no purity of desire or purpose can remove,
and the like, then they are not accountable. Whereas our view is
exposed to no such objection ; for it implies that there is no sup-
posable, prevailing will, desire or choice, contrary to the actual
choice. Otherwise the actual choice would be omitted, and the
contrary put forth. Their system, if any, is in fact obnoxious to

THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. 261
this charge. For it supposes that choices may spring up contrary
to prevailing inclination, yea, " all opposing power." And yet the
changes are ever ringing on this idea of compulsion contrary to
their will, to bewilder careless theologians, and the more careless
multitude. They set it forth in glaring colours as stoicism, fatalism, heathen
ish destiny, and are abundant in such words as fatal necessity, ada
mantine bonds of fate, &c. They noise them abroad with great
frequency, variety and emphasis, as if they were of vital importance
to their cause.
Our present limits forbid any inquiry into the doctrines of the
ancient Stoics and Fatalists. But we beg leave to say that these
startling words neither answer nor constitute an argument.
Neither do they prove the identity of our doctrine with any held
by the Stoics and Fatalists : neither, if that were proved, does it of
itself prove its untruth, unless every sentiment ever held by their
schools is to be concluded false, to the suppression of all further in
quiry ; which few will be bold to assert. And if it be incumbent .
on some, is it not so on all, not to resort to " other means than truth
and argument" in this controversy ?
It is much insisted on and reiterated, that if their doctrine be de
nied, then there is no further use of endeavours to attain virtue in
ourselves, or of employing means, endeavours, and persuasions to
promote it in others. This is plausible, and strongly seizes the
sympathies of men. But let us examine whether this difficulty
does not press with more crushing weight on their own scheme.
For if the will be without bias or " correlation" to any object, if it
be liable to choose either way, in spite of all motive and induce
ment, and all internal inclination, which Omnipotence itself can
work, of what avail is it to employ means and persuasions with
such an agent? Were it not as hopeful and rational to expostulate
with the idle wind, which bloweth where it listeth, and none can
tell whence it cometh, nor whither it goeth ? But in the orthodox
scheme, there are some charaeteristical susceptibilities in man to
whieh appeals can be hopefully addressed. The impenitent even,
if not peculiarly obdurate, can be persuaded to refrain from exter
nal impurity and vice ; and by the efficacious grace of the Spirit
can bs " effectually softened, bowed and renewed, as to hear the
word with gladness, obey, and live." Our only and our sufficient
encouragement to preach the Gospel to every creature is, that God
can make them willing to embrace it in the day of his power. Are
there any who rely on any other encouragement ? If so, let them
avow it. If not, why tax our scheme with a perplexity which con
fessedly burdens their own ?
Lastly and pre-eminently, the chief allurement by which this.
scheme has fascinated multitudes of young ministers, and others, is
to be found in its vaunting airs of new light and discovery in reli
gion, and being the only true philosophy. This after all is the
occult enchantment, the magic wand by which it has spelled

262 THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.
throngs of votaries. And it is precisely this which needs to be dis
sipated, before a respectful hearing can be gained in behalf of the
true system, however masterly and irrefragable the style in which
it may be defended. That it has reared up a generation of preach
ers who pride themselves on their philosophic insight, and exten
sively given birth to a style of preaching, in which the dry bones
of lifeless metaphysical subtleties have had an undue proportion to
the milk and meat of God's word, which feeds his church, is un
deniable. But in view of the foregoing considerations, it is for our
readers to decide, whether the holders of this scheme do indeed
exhibit that extraordinary philosophical acumen, that rare genius
for solving metaphysical problems, that unexampled insight into
the true structure of the mind, which they would fain pretend.
We submit whether any theory ever advanced by the wildest scio
list, or most transcendent transcendentalist, surpasses this for crude
absurdities, and glaring self-contradiction ; and when we hear the
flourish of trumpets about new light and unparalleled discovery,
we submit to any one tolerably versed in the past controver
sies of the church, whether there be anything in this doctrine, or its
attendant sisterhood of errors, which has not, from the time of Pe
lagius till now, alternately infested the church, and been exorcised
from it, as God has seen fit to try his people, or to deliver them
with an outstretched arm. And we submit also to men's sober
judgments, without comment, the fulsome pretensions which have
been so largely made to intellectual greatness and superiority, in
the case of those competent to invent or defend such a scheme as
this ; as also the free imputations of dulness or insanity, or some
other malformation, in the case of those minds which cannot per
ceive its beauties, or lend it their sanction. Indeed, any scheme
which prides and vaunts itself much on its great display of meta
physical tact, and philosophic wonders, does so far forth evince its
inconsistence with the glorious Gospel of the blessed God. For this
is no philosopheme of men, but a testimony of God, which brings
to naught the wisdom of the wise and the understanding of the pru
dent. It teaches us that " vain philosophy" " spoils" men. True
philosophy takes the yoke and learns of Christ, as a disciple of his
master. Spurious philosophy is an usurper in the city of the great
King, commanding what Christ may and may not teach, and thus
lords it over our faith.
It will be perceived that in the several heads of this disquisition
we have barely struck and opened veins of thought, without ex
hausting them, each of which would yield a rich reward to the
most patient and thoroughgoing inquiry. We have a deep and
deliberate conviction, a conviction strengthened by every day's ex
perience, that this point is the hinge on which the chief theological
differences that agitate our Zion turn ; and that there will be no
relief, no sufficient check to those errors which have harassed the
church, until the truth on this subject is clearly settled.
It seems too plain, indeed, to be questioned, that if it be essential

THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. 263
to moral agency, that it be a property of the will to choose either
way in spite of all opposing power ; that it be endowed with such
independence, that no " evidence or proof" can exist that it will
act in a given way, not even in anything which Omnipotence can
do to direct it ; then there can be no proof or evidence that any
thing which God does or forbears to do through all eternity, is the
reason or cause, positive or privative, why moral agents act as they
do act. Of course the doctrine of decrees is subverted. There
ean be no evidence of God's providential government, as concerns
the actions of free agents or things depending upon them. There
can be no evidence that any work of his Spirit upon the souls of
men is the reason or cause of their turning to God. Indeed, no
work of any sort can be the cause of such a change in them who
have power to sin despite all opposing power, for it cannot pro
duce the change until they permit it by the very terms of the
statement. Thus an end is made of efficacious grace. With this
doctrine, as all know, Divine sovereignty and the orthodox view
of election stand or fall. If it is indispensable to moral agency
that the infallible prevention of moral agents from sinning " may
involve a contradiction ;" that they should not be in a state which
would be incompatible with their ever sliding into apostasy;
" what evidence or proof can exist" that the saints will persevere
unto salvation, or that the glorified saints and angels, and even God
himself, may not lapse from heavenly purity ? " For," as these
writers say, " how can it be proved that a thing will not be, when,
for aught that appears, it may be V A fearful prospect this for all
holy intelligences I And if nothing beside the actings of this power
possesses moral quality, or can be' sinful or holy, then surely there
can be no native or hereditary sinfulness in men, if indeed there
can be any of any sort
Is it not then clear beyond dispute, that those cardinal points of
the evangelical systems, which have been so much in controversy
of late, are thus shaken by this notion of contrary choice which
saps and mines the foundation on which they rest ? To us this is
past all doubt. Having often had occasion to reason with the ad
vocates of this new scheme, we have found them uniformly taking
refuge in this notion as their impregnable citadel. They have
uniformly confessed that the whole controversy hinges upon
it. Is it not then of vital importance to labour to establish the
true philosophy on this point; and not merely prune away the
branches of this poison-tree, but lay the axe at its root ?
While we build not our faith on the wisdom of men, but on the
sure testimonies of God, is if not lawful, nay, obligatory, to ward
off the boastful assaults of a pretended philosophy, by showing
that it is "philosophy falsely so ealled," evincing its folly, and
humbling its pride ? Has not this been the method of the most
successful defenders of the faith ? On this subject let the illustrious
Edwards, though dead, yet speak, whose own immortal treatise on
this very subject is a most noble example and confirmation of what

264 THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.
he says.* " There is therefore no need that the strict philosophic
truth should be at all concealed ; nor is there any danger in con
templation and profound discovery in these things. Indeed these
things never can be well established, and the opposite errors, so
subversive of the whole Gospel, which at this day so greatly and
generally prevail, be well confuted, or the arguments by which
they are maintained answered, till these points are settled. While
this is not done, it is to me beyond doubt that the friends of those
great Gospel truths will but poorly maintain their controversy with
the adversaries of those truths ; they will be obliged often to shuffle,
hide, and turn their backs, and the latter will have a strong fort
whence they can never be driven, and weapons to use, from which
those who oppose them will find no shield to screen themselves ;
and they will always puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends
of sound doctrine, and glory and vaunt themselves in their advan
tage over them ; and carry their affairs with a high hand, as they
have done already for a long time past"
Was this written near a century ago by so accurate a drafts
man as Jonathan Edwards ? If it truly delineates what then wasv
could it better describe what now is ? Who more valiant for the
truth, or mighty in counsel and act for its defence, than he? Shall
we not heed his counsels as well as revere his name ? There is
no new thing under the sun. If his history was prophecy as to
the danger, shall not his counsel be so as to the remedy ?
Let his testimony admonish us all to burnish and gird on our
armour for a victorious conflict with false doctrine, not only in its
outworks but also in this its strong citadel. While there may be a
presumptuous and perilous delving into the labyrinths of
"Fixed fate, free'will, fore-knowledge absolute,
To find no end in wandering mazes lost,"
there is also a safe and prudent study of them which is necessary
and profitable.
Particularly ought we to master and confound all reasonings
and doctrines which go, or tend, to a denial of the possibility of
" that which is the true system of administration in the city of
God;" that it is possible, at least, that the Maker of all things
should have his creatures at his own disposal ; that he may work
in them, to will and to do of his own good pleasure ; that he doeth
his pleasure in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of
earth ; that it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth,
but of God that showeth mercy. For of him, and through him,
and to him are all things, to whom be glory for ever I
* Works, vol. ii., p. 3Q0. New York Edition.

ESSAY XII.
THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.*

There has occurred within our recollection, a considerable dif
ference in the manner of treating this subject, especially in addresses
to the impenitent from the pulpit. It was customary formerly, for
Calvinistic preachers to insist much on the helpless inability of the
sinner. He was represented, according to the language of the
scriptures, to be " dead in trespasses and sins," and utterly unable to
put forth one act of spiritual life ; and too often this true represen
tation was so given, as to leave the impression that the person la
bouring under this total inability was not culpable for the omission
of acts which he had no power to perform. The fact of man's be- j
ing a free accountable agent was not brought into view with suffi
cient prominence ; and the consequence was, that in many cases
the impenitent sinner felt as if he were excusable ; and the conclu
sion was-too commonly adopted, that there was no encouragement
to make any effort until it should please a sovereign God to work.
And if at any time the zealous preacher urged upon his hearers in
private the duty of repentance, he was sure to hear the echo of his
own doctrines ; we are incapable of doing anything until God shall
be pleased to work in us " to will and to do of his good pleasure ;"
it is useless for us to attempt anything. We do not say that the
inability of man was so represented by all as to produce these im
pressions, for we know that by some, not only man's dependence,
but also his duty, was distinctly and forcibly inculcated.
Some excellent men, who saw the danger of so insisting on the
inability of man as to furnish an apology for the careless sinner,
borrowed a little aid from the Arminian scheme, and taught that if
the sinner would do what was in his power, and continue faithfully
to use the outward means of grace, the Spirit of God would assist
his endeavours : and thus a connection was formed between the
strivings of the unregenerate and the grace of God. But this was
not consistent with the other opinions of these men, and involved
* Published in 1831, in review of the following work :— " An Inquiry into that in
ability under which the sinner labours, and whether it furnishes any excuse for his
neglect of duty."

266 the inability of sinners.
them in many practical difficulties, and contradicted many clear
passages of scripture, which teach that " without faith it is impos
sible to please God :" and it seemed to be obviously absurd, that
the promise of grace should be made to acts and exercises which,
it could not be denied, were in their nature sinful. Some, indeed,
spoke of a kind of sincerity which they supposed an unregenerate
sinner might possess ; but it was found difficult to tell what it was ;
and another difficulty was to quiet the minds of those convinced
sinners who had been long using the means of grace. Such per
sons would allege that they had prayed, and read, and heard the
word for a long time, and yret received no communications of
grace. To such, nothing could on this plan be said, but to exhort
them to wait God's time, and to entertain the confident hope that
no soul ever perished, that continued to the last seeking for mercy.
The inconvenience and evil of these representations being per
ceived, many adopted with readiness a distinction of human ability
into natural and moral. By the first they understood merely the
possession of physical powers and opportunities ; by the latter, a
mind rightly disposed. In accordance with this distinction, it was
taught that every man possessed a natural ability to do all that God
required of him ; but that every sinner laboured under a moral ina
bility to obey God, which, however, could not be pleaded in excuse
for his disobedience, as it consisted in corrupt dispositions of the
heart, for which every man was responsible. Now this view of
the subject is substantially correct, and the distinction has always
been made by every person, in his judgments of his own conduct
and that of others. It is recognized in all courts of justice, and in
all family government, and is:byno means a modern discovery.
And yet it is remarkable that it is a distinction so seldom referred
to, or brought distinctly into view, by old Calvinistic authors. The
first writer among English theologians that we have observed
using this distinction explicitly, is the celebrated Dr. Twisse, the
prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, and the able
opposer of Arminianism, and advocate of the Supralapsarian doc
trine of divine decrees. It was also resorted to by the celebrated
Mr. Howe, and long afterwards used freely by Dr. Isaac Watts,
the popularity of whose evangelical writings probably had much
influence in giving it currency. It is also found in the theological
writings of Dr. Witherspoon, and many others, whose orthodoxy
was never disputed. But in this country no man has had so great
an influence in fixing the language of theology, as Jonathan Ed
wards, president of New Jersey College. In his w%-k on " The
Freedom of the Will," this distinction holds a prominent place, and
is very important to the argument which this profound writer has
so ably discussed in that treatise. The general use of the distinc
tion between natural and moral ability may, therefore, be ascribed
to the writings of President Edwards, both in Europe and America.
No distinguished writer on theology has made more use of it than
Dr. Andrew Fuller ; and it is well known that-he imbibed nearly

THE INABILITY OF SINNERS. 267
all his views of theology from an acquaintance with the writings of
President Edwards. And it may be said truly, that Jonathan Ed
wards has done more to give complexion to the theological system
of Calvinists in America, than all other persons together. This is
more especially true of New England; but it is also true to a great
extent in regard to a large number of the present ministers of the
Presbyterian church. Those, indeed, who were accustomed either to
the Scotch or Dutch writers, did not adopt this distinction, but were
jealous of it as an innovation, and as tending to diminish, in their
view, the miserable and sinful state of man, and as derogatory to
the grace of God. But we have remarked, that in almost all cases
where the distinction has been opposed as false, or as tending to
the introduction of false doctrine, it has been misrepresented. The
true ground of the distinction has not been clearly apprehended ;
and those who deny it have been found making it themselves in
other words ; for that an inability depending on physical defect,
should be distinguished from that which arises from a wicked dis
position, or perverseness of will, is a thing which no one can deny
who attends to the clear dictates of his own mind ; for it is a self-
evident truth, which even children recognize in all their apologies
for their conduct. We do not assert, however, that the dispute
between the advocates and opposers of this distinction has been a
mere logomachy. There is one important point of difference.
They who reject the distinction, maintain that if we have lost any
physical ability to perform our duty by our own fault, the obliga
tion to obedience remains, although the ability to execute it is ut
terly lost ; while the advocates of the distinction between natural
and moral ability hold that obligation and ability must be of equal
extent; and although they admit that we are accountable for the
loss of any faculty which takes place through our fault, yet the
guilt must be referred entirely to the original act, and no new sin
can be committed for not exercising a faculty which does not ex
ist, or which is physically incapable of the actions in question. To
illustrate this point, let us suppose the case of a servant cutting off
his hands to avoid the work required of him. The question then
is, is this servant guilty of a crime for not employing those mem
bers which he does not possess ? It is admitted that he is charge
able with the consequences of his wicked act, but this only goes to
show the greater guilt of that deed. It is also true, that if the
same perverse disposition which led to this act is still cherished,
he is virtually guilty pf the neglect of that obedience which was
due. Sin consists essentially in the motives, dispositions, and voli
tions of the heart, and the external act only possesses a moral na
ture by its connection with these internal affections. But it cannot
be truly said that a man can be guilty of a crime in not using hands
which he does not possess. Let us suppose this servant to have
become truly penitent, and to have nothing in his mind but a strong
desire to do his duty ; can any impartial man believe that he com
mits a sin in not doing the work which he has no hands to execute ?

268 THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.
We think not. The case will appear more evident, if the faculty
lost should be one which is essential to moral agency ; as if a man
should by his own fault deprive himself of reason. It is manifest
that a man totally destitute of reason is incapable of any moral
acts ; and this is equally true, however this defect may have been
contracted. If a man performs an act by which he knows reason
will be extinguished or perverted, he is guilty in that act of a crime
which takes its measure, in part, from the consequences likely to
ensue. Thus in the case of the drunkard ; he who destroys his
reason by ebriety, may be considered as guilty of an act, the guilt
of which has respect to all the probable consequences. In human
courts we are aware that intoxication cannot be pleaded as a justi
fication of crime ; but on this subject it may be observed, that
drunkards are not commonly so destitute of a knowledge of right
and wrong as to be deprived of their moral agency. And again,
it would be of dangerous consequence to admit the principle, that
a man might plead one crime in justification of another ; and it
would be exceedingly liable to abuse, as a man might become intox
icated for the very purpose of committing a great crime, or he
might affect a greater degree of intoxication than was real ; so that
it is a sound political maxim, that a man shall be held responsible
for all acts committed in a state of ebriety. But in foro conscien-
tiae, we cannot but view the matter in a different light. If by an
intoxicating liquor reason is completely subverted, and the man is
no longer himself, we cannot judge that he is as accountable for
what he does, as when in his sober senses. You may accumulate
as much guilt as you will on the act of extinguishing or perverting
his reason ; but you cannot think that what he madly perpetrates
under the influence of strong drink, is equally criminal as if com
mitted while reason was in exercise. This we take to be the de
liberate judgment of all impartial men.
The most difficult question relative to this matter is, whether
ignorance and error do wholly, or in any degree exculpate from the
guilt of actions committed under their influence. On this subject,
it has been customary to distinguish ignorance (and all error is only
a species of ignorance) into voluntary and involuntary. The for
mer, however great,' does not excuse ; the latter, if invincible, does ;
or mitigates criminality in proportion as it approximates to insuper
able ignorance. But when we speak of voluntary ignorance, we
do not mean that there is a deliberate volition to remain in igno
rance, or that it could be removed by an act of the will ; but we
mean that ignorance or misconception which is a part of our de
pravity, or a consequence of it. A mind depraved by sin is inca
pable of perceiving the beauty and sweetness of spiritual objects,
and is therefore totally incapable of loving such objects. This ig
norance constitutes an essential part of human depravity, and can
never be an apology for it, nor in the least exculpate from the guilt
of sins committed under its influence. It is, in fact, that very blind
ness of mind and unbelief of heart which tie^ at the foundation of

THE INABILITY OF SINNERS. 269
all departures from God. To which we may add, that the actual
exercise of corrupt affections obscures the intellect and perverts the
judgment, as has been remarked by all moralists, and the same is
observable in all the common transactions of life. Ignorance or er
ror, induced by criminal self-love or by malignant passions, forms no
excuse for the evil which flows from this source; but this very igno
rance and error form a part of that sinful character which belongs to
the moral agent. We are aware that there has been current with
many in our day, a theory which separates entirely between the in
tellect and will, and maintains that the former in its operations is in
capable of virtue or vice ; and to corroborate this opinion, a distinc
tion has been made of the powers of the soul itself, into natural and
moral. By this division, the understanding or intellect belongs to the
former class, the will and affections to the latter. According to this
hypothesis, all sin consists in voluntary acts or in the exercise of
the will, and the understanding is incapable of moral obliquity, be
cause it is not a moral faculty. They who have adopted this theo
ry (and they are many) entertain the opinion, that depravity con
sists very much in the opposition of the heart to the dictates of the
understanding. In regeneration, according to them, there is no
illumination of the understanding by the Holy Spirit. This, ac
cording to the theory under consideration, is altogether unnecessa
ry. This work, therefore, consists in nothing else than giving a
new heart, or a new set of feelings. If the person has received
correct doctrinal instruction, no other illumination is needed ; and
the whole difference in the conceptions of truth, between the re
generate and unregenerate, is owing to nothing else than a change
in the feelings ; for as far as mere intellect is concerned, the views
of the understanding are the same before regeneration as after
wards ; except that a renewed heart disposing the person to the
impartial love of truth, he will be more careful to collect and weigh
its evidences, and will thus be preserved from errors into which
the unregenerate, through the corrupt bias produced by the affec
tions, are prone to fall.
Now against this whole method of philosophizing we enter our
dissent This total dissociation of the understanding and heart,
and this entire repugnance between them, are contrary to all experi
ence. There can be no exercise of heart which does not necessa
rily involve the conception of the intellect ; for that which is cho
sen must be apprehended, and that which is loved and admired
must be perceived. And although it is true that the knowledge of
the unregenerate man is inefficacious, so that while he knows the
truth he loves it not ; yet we venture to maintain, that the reason
why his knowledge produces no effect, is simply because it is inade
quate. It does not present truth in its true colours to the heart.
It is called speculative knowledge, and may be correct as far as it
goes ; but it does not penetrate the excellence and the beauty of any
one spiritual object ; and it may be averred, that the affections of j
the heart do always correspond with the real views of the under- I

270 THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.
standing. The contrary supposition, instead of proving that man is
morally depraved, would show that his rationality was destroyed.
If it be alleged that this apprehension of the beauty, sweetness, and
glory of spiritual things, which is peculiar to the regenerate, arises
merely from the altered state of the heart, I have no objection to
the statement, if by heart be meant the moral nature of the renew
ed mind ; but it is reversing the order of nature and rational exercise,
to suppose that we first have an affection of love to an object, and
then see it to be lovely. We may ask, what excited this affection
of love ? If anything is known of' the order of exercises in the ra
tional mind, the perception of the qualities on which an affection
terminates, is, in the order of nature, prior to the affection. The i f
soul, in an unregenerate state, is equally incapable of seeing and/1 '
feeling aright in relation to spiritual objects. And indeed, we
hardly know how to distinguish between the clear perception of
the bea'uty of an object, and the love of that object ; the one might
serve as a just description of the other. Not but that the intellect
and heart may be distinguished ; but when beauty, sweetness, ex
cellence, and glory, or good in any of its forms, is the object of the
understanding, this distinction in experience vanishes. And accord
ingly the schoolmen distinguished between the understanding and
will, not by referring nothing to the latter but blind feeling ; but
by dividing all objects which could be presented to the mind, into
such as were received as true merely, and such as were not merely
apprehended as true, but as good. These last they considered as
having relation to the will, under which all appetitive affections
were included.
The Scriptures have been repeatedly appealed to, as placing all
moral acts in the will ; but they furnish no aid to those who make
this wide distinction between understanding and will. They do
often use the word heart for moral exercise, but not to the exclu
sion of the intellect. Indeed, this word in the Old Testament,
where it most frequently occurs, is used for the whole soul ; or for
any strong exercise of the intellect, as well as the feelings. We
are required to love with the understanding ; and " a wise and un
derstanding heart," is a mode of expression which shows how little
the inspired penmen were influenced by a belief of this modern
theory. And, in the New Testament, to " believe with the heart,"
includes the intellect as much as what is called the will. It means
to believe really and sincerely ; so to believe, as to be affected by
what we believe, according to its nature. But is not all moral ex
ercise voluntary, or an exercise of the will ? Yes, undoubtedly ;
and so is all mora! exercise rational, or such as involves the ex
ercise of intellect. If the will were a moral power, as many
suppose, then every volition would be of a moral nature — the
instinctive preference of life to death would be moral ; the choice
of happiness in preference to misery, which no sentient being can
avoid, would be moral. At this rate, it would follow, that mere
animals are moral beings, because it is certain they possess will.

THE INABILITY OF SINNERS. 271
But the simple truth is, that the understanding and will stand in
the same relation to the morality of actions ; and the latter no
more deserves to be called the moral part of our constitution than
the former. The only faculty belonging to our constitution, which
can properly be denominated moral, is conscience ; not because its
exercise furnishes the only instance of moral acts, for it may be
doubted whether the monitions of this faculty partake of a moral
nature ; but because by this we are enabled to perceive the moral
qualities of actions.
Our object in this discussion is, to establish the point, that igno
rance is a part of the depravity which sin has introduced into our
minds ; and we maintain, in strict accordance with the Scriptures,
that no unregenerate man has any adequate or true knowledge of
God ; nor, indeed, is he capable of such knowledge. It is a com
prehensive description of the wicked, that "they know not God."
" Know not the way of peace." To know the true God and Jesus
Christ is eternal life. " The natural man receiveth not the things
of the spirit of God, they are foolishness unto him, neither can he
know them, because they are spiritually discerned." The rege
nerate have the eyes of their understanding enlightened, and have
been translated from darkness to the marvellous light of the Gos
pel. As to invincible ignorance, it is manifest that it must stand
on the same footing with the want of the requisite physical powers.
It is equally impossible for a man to see, whether he be deficient
in the organs of vision or in light. If God has revealed his will on
certain points, and in consequence has demanded our faith and
obedience, the obligation to perform these duties will be co-exten
sive with the communication of this revelation, and no further.
The heathen, therefore, will not be condemned for not believing in
the Messiah, "for how could they believe in him of whom they
have not heard ?" This, however, will not be any excuse for not
seeking after more light by every means in their power. If per
sons, who are surrounded by the means of instruction, obstinately^
neglect to avail themselves of the opportunity of knowing the will
of God, they do render themselves exceedingly guilty by such per-
verseness, and make themselves responsible for all the omission of
duty which arises from this state of obstinate ignorance.
Let us now return to the inquiry respecting natural and moral
inability. We asserted that all men, and even children, were in
the constant habit of making a distinction between an impediment
to the doing of a thing, which arose from want of physical power,
and that which depended solely on the disposition or will. But it
may be useful to inquire, whether any advantage has been derived
from the use of these terms ; or, whether they have not rather
served to perplex and mislead the people, for whose benefit they
were devised. That this latter is probably a correct statement of
the truth, may with some probability be presumed from the fact,
that these terms are evidently falling into disuse with many who
were once tenacious of them. But to render this more evident, we

272 THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.
would remark, that there is an obvious inaccuracy in speaking of
two kinds of ability, both of which are requisite to accomplish the
same object. If both are necessary to the end, then evidently
either by itself is not an ability. If the strength of a man, together
with a machine of a certain power, be necessary to lift a weight,
it is evidently incorrect to say, that the hand of the man is able to
elevate this heavy body ; his strength is only an ability when
combined with the machine, which is needed to give it force ; so, if
the mere possession'of natural powers to do the commandments of
God is not of itself sufficient to reach the end, it is not properly
called an ability ; it is only such when combined with what is
called moral ability.
Again, the word natural is here used in an uncommon and tech
nical sense ; and the term being already in common use, in relation
to the same subject, in a sense entirely different, it is calculated to
perplex and mislead. When we say, man possesses a natural
ability, we mean by the word natural that which is contra-distin
guished from moral ; that which is destitute of any moral quality ;
but we are accustomed to say, and the usage is derived from
Scripture, that man is naturally depraved, naturally blind, naturally
impotent : but in this case we mean, that which is innate ; that
which is constitutional ; and when applied to this subject, the
meaning is entirely diverse from the one stated above ; for while
there, all idea of moral character is excluded, here it relates to
moral qualities. Man is naturally able to obey the commandments
of God : — man is naturally a depraved and impotent being, are
contradictions, if the word natural be used in the same sense, in
both cases ; but as intended, there is no contradiction ; for the
word, in the first instance, has an entirely different meaning from
what it has in the second. But surely, such confusion in the use
of terms should be avoided. And if you will inquire of the com
mon people what they understand by natural ability, you will be
convinced that it is a phrase which perplexes and obscures, rather
than elucidates the subject. We have known instances in which
clergymen of some learning, and even doctors of divinity, have
understood that they who held the doctrine of man's natural ability,
denied that of total depravity ; whereas the fact is, that there are
no sterner advocates of universal and total depravity than those
who make this distinction.
But an objection of a different but not less weighty kind, lies
against the use of the phrases, " moral ability " and " moral in
ability." By the former is meant, that state of the heart or affec
tions which leads a person to choose to perform any act of exter
nal obedience ; by the latter, the contrary, or an indisposition or
unwillingness to do our duty. Now, we know that the law of
God extends to the heart, and requires rectitude in every secret
thought and affection ; yea, the essence of obedience consists in
this conformity of the heart to the law of God. But according
to the import of this distinction, these internal affections are no

THE INABILITY OF SINNERS. 273
more than a moral ability to obey. The phrase seems to contem
plate external acts only as acts of obedience, and the affections of
the heart as the ability to perform them ; but this is evidently in
correct. What is the sum of the obedience which the law pf
God requires of man ? Is it not supreme and perfect love ? What
is moral ability? It is this very thing in which the essence of
obedience consists. This moral ability should relate to something
prior to love ; but what ability is that which is prior to all holy
affection ? If you say the nature or disposition, the law requires
that this be pure also, as well as the acts and exercises. There is,
then, no such thing as a moral ability to obey, as distinct from
obedience itself. And, again, what is moral inability but sin itself?
It is the want of a right temper and a holy will — the defect of
that love which the law requires ; and what is this but sin ? It
certainly can have no other effect but to mislead, to call the essence
of disobedience by the name of " moral inability." It can be no
question whether sin can furnish any excuse for disobedience.
Now what is called " moral inability," when it comes to be ana
lyzed, is nothing but the essence of sin as it exists in the heart.
Man labours under a moral inability to obey God, because he does
not love him ; but love is the sum and essence of all obedience ; it
is the same, therefore, as to say, that man in his natural state has
no love to God. Man is in a state of sin, which, while it continues,
must be an effectual hindrance to the service of God.
We have already remarked that the distinction of inability into
natural and moral, is much less used of late, than it was some
fifteen or twenty years ago. It has not answered the purpose for
which it was invented. If there be a real inability which man
cannot remove, it must have the effect of discouraging human
exertions. Let it be conceded that it does not render man
excusable ; yet it does render his unassisted efforts ineffectual ;
therefore, they who consider it all important, not merely to fix
upon the conscience the conviction of ill-desert, but to rouse the
powers of the soul to action, have adopted a new method of treat
ing this subject, which not a little alarms those who are tenacious
of old notions and the ancient forms of speech. These new
preachers, in their addresses to the impenitent sinner, say nothing
about natural and moral inability. They preach that man is in
possession of every ability which is requisite for the discharge of
his duty. That it is as easy for him to repent, to exercise faith,
and to love God, as to speak, or eat, or walk, or perform any
other act. And men are earnestly and passionately exhorted to
come up at once to the performance of their duty. Nothing is
more in the power of a. man, they allege, than his own will ; and
the consent of the will to the terms of the Gospel is all that is re
quired to constitute any man a Christian. When sinners are
awakened, and become anxious about their salvation, it is deemed
by these teachers improper to manifest any sympathy with their
feelings of pungent conviction ; for the only reason of their re-
18

274 THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.
maining in distress, is their obstinate continuance in impenitence!
All conversation with such, therefore, should assume the character
of stern rebuke, and continued earnest exhortations to submit to
God, to give up their rebellion, and to make choice of the service
of God. And if any convinced sinner ventures to express the opi
nion, that he labours under any sort of inability to do what is re
quired of him, he is severely reproved, as wishing to cast the blame
of his impenitence on his Maker. And it is believed, that upon the
new plan of treating awakened sinners, they are brought to the en
joyment of peace much sooner, than upon the old plan of treating*
them rather as unfortunate than as guilty. Men, upon being as
sured that salvation is in their power, are induced to make an ex
ertion to submit to God, and do often persuade themselves that now
they have complied with their duty, and have passed from death
unto life. There is much reason to fear, however, that many souls.
who have very slight convictions of sin, are deluded into the opi
nion, that they have submitted, and are reconciled to God, though
they have never been led to any deep views' of the dreadful sin->
fulness of their own hearts. And, others, who have deeper con
victions, find all their own efforts unavailing ; and while they con
fess that the fault is in the total depravity of their nature, continue
to profess their inability to repent ; and whatever power others
may have to change the heart, are more and more convinced, that
no such power belongs to them. The obstinate cases cannot but
be perplexing and troublesome to the zealous preachers of full
ability ; but they contrive to reconcile them with their doctrine, by
various methods, which it is not to our purpose to specify. Now,
as a large portion of our younger theologians appear to be adopt
ing this new theory of ability, and consider it a great improvement
upon both the old Calvinistic doctrine, and also upon the Ed-
wardean theory of natural and moral ability; and especially, as it
claims a near alliance with the many revivals of religion which
are now in progress in the church, it becomes a duty of high obli
gation to bring these opinions, which are now so widely and con
fidently inculcated, to the test of reason and scripture ; and we
trust that our readers will indulge us, while we enter, with some
degree of minuteness, into the discussion. And, to give our views
clearly and fully on the subject of man's ability and inability, we
shall endeavour to go back to first principles, and cautiously ex
amine those maxims, which, by most who speak on this subject, are
taken for granted.
I On the subject of man's moral agency and accountableness, there
is no controversy.
It is also agreed by most, that an obligation to perform an act of
obedience supposes the existence of the faculties or physical pow
ers requisite for its performance. An irrational being cannot be
under a moral obligation to perform a rational act. Man cannot
be under obligation to do what requires powers which do not be
long to his nature and constitution. For example, man could not
justly be required to transport himself from earth to heaven, as the

THE INABILITY OF SINNERS. 275
angels do, because this exceeds the power which belongs to his
nature. And it is admitted, that where there is a willingness to
perform a duty, anything which renders the execution of our de
sire impracticable, removes the obligation. For no man can be
bound to perform impossibilities. The maxim, that obligation to \ t,
obey any command supposes the existence of an ability to do the ac- \ '
tion required, relates entirely to actions consequent upon volitions.
If we appeal to the common sense, or universal judgment of man
kind, on this point, we must be careful to understand precisely the
common principle respecting which all men are agreed ; and must
be careful not to extend the maxim to other things, entirely dis
tinct from its usual application. An infant cannot justly be re
quired to build a house or a ship. A person of weak intellect and
little invention cannot be obliged to write an elegant poem. No
man can be under obligation to remember every word which he
ever spoke, and every thought which ever passed through his
mind. A man who has lost his hands or his feet, cannot after
wards be under a moral obligation to exercise these members.
This case is so plain, and the judgment of men so uniform on the
subject, that we need not dwell longer on the point.
The next thing to be inquired, is, whether this maxim applies to
the ability of willing as well as doing.
And here it may be remarked, that the possession of the faculty i
of willing, or of choosing and refusing, is essential to a moral agent ; /
and, therefore, a being who has no such faculty, can never be sub
ject to a moral law. On this point there can be no difference of \
opinion. Neither is it supposed by any, that we have the power 1
of avoiding an exercise of will, when an object is proposed ; or f
when a particular action is in the contemplation of the mind ; for, /
if we do not choose a proposed object, we of course refuse it ; and j
if we do not determine on an action which may be suggested, we
of necessity let it alone. There is here no other alternative.
Hence, it is evident, that the liberty of man does not consist in the
power to will or not to will. In regard to this, man may be said
to lie under necessity ; but it is obviously no hardship, since he is
at liberty to will as he pleases. But the most important question
is, has the moral agent the power of willing differently from what
he does in any particular case ? This is a very intricate subject,
and will require close attention and an impartial judgment, in order
to see clearly where the truth lies.
The word will is taken in a greater or less latitude. It signifies,
according to some, every desire and inclination ; every preference
and choice. According to others, volitions, or the acts of the will,
are properly such acts of the mind as result in some change of the
body or mind. The whole active power of man consists in an
ability, when he chooses to exercise it, to alter the train of thought,
by turning the mind from one subject of contemplation to another;
and in the ability to move the members of the body within certain
limits. Let any man seriously inquire, whether he possesses any

276 THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.
other power or ability than this. We know that there are many
things which he has no ability to perform. He cannot alter the
nature of the perceptions of sense ; he cannot excite in himself af
fections to any objects at will. If a man wish to enkindle love in
his breast to any person, he cannot possibly do more than contem
plate all the traits of character which are amiable in that person,
or all those circumstances which have a tendency to create an in
terest in the person : but it is a vain effort to endeavour to love
another by the mere effort of will. If we take the word will in
the larger sense, all clear distinction between desire and will is re
moved. If we call every preference an act of volition, then, ob
viously, will and affection are confounded ; for what is preference,
but a superior affection? and choice, if it result in no determination
to act, is nothing else but preference, or the cherishing a stronger
affection for one thing than another. It seems to us, therefore, to
be altogether expedient, to confine the words will and volition to
those distinctly marked actions, which lead to some change in
body or mind. Those determinations which lead directly to ac
tion, whether of body or mind, are properly called volitions ; as
when I resolve to raise my hand ; to direct my eyes to this quar
ter or that; to turn my thoughts from one subject to another.
These are acts which are clearly defined, and which are easily dis
tinguishable from mere desires or emotions. A late philosophical
writer has, indeed, attempted to sweep away all controversies re
specting the determination of the will, by confounding will and de
sire together : but still he is obliged to acknowledge, that som§ of
our desires are followed by action, or by a change in the body or
mind ; and these being thus clearly distinguished by their effects,
and being also the most important of all our acts, it is expedient to
have them put into a class by themselves, with an appropriate de
nomination. But let us return to the inquiry already instituted, which is,
whether, when we will any particular thing, we have it in our
power to will the contrary ? Here it will be acknowledged, at
once, that a man cannot will at the same time opposite things ; for
if he determines on an act, he cannot determine to let it alone.
When it is asked, whether the person who wills an action had it in
his power to omit it, the answer is, that if he had been so inclined,
he could have willed the opposite. The very nature of a volition
is, the resolving on that which is agreeable to our inclinations. To
suppose any constraint or compulsion in willing, is absurd; for
then it would not be a volition. No greater liberty can be con
ceived, than freely to choose what we please. But if the import of
the question is, whether with an inclination one way, we are able
to will the very contrary ? the thing is absurd. If we were capable
of such a volition, it would be a most unreasonable act. Such a
self-determining power as would lead to such acts, would render
man incapable of being governed by a moral law, and would sub
ject him, so far as such a power was exercised, to the most capri-

THE INABILITY OF SINNERS. 277
cious control. He could no longer be said to be the master of him
self; for while his whole soul was inclined to one thing, he might
be led in an opposite direction, without having any reason or mo
tive for his conduct. Such a power as this, no one, I think, will
plead for, who understands its nature. Man has the power to de
termine his own will, but in accordance with his own inclinations
— the only kind of power over the will which any reasonable being
can wish. If I can will as I please, surely I need not complain
that I cannot will as I do not please. If I govern my volitions by
my prevailing inclination, this is surely a greater privilege, and
more truly liberty, than a power to determine the will without any
motive, and contrary to all my wishes. My actions are as truly
my own and self-determined, when they accord with inclination, as
if they could spring up without any desire. Many philosophical
men, from a fear of being involved in the doctrine of necessity,
have talked and reasoned most absurdly, in relation to this point.
And it is to be regretted, that many writers, who have substantially
maintained the true doctrine of the will, have employed language
which has had the effect of confirming their prejudices. To talk
of a necessity of willing as we do, although we may qualify the
word by " moral," or " philosophical," is inexpedient. There can
be no necessity in volition. It is the very opposite of necessity.
It is liberty itself. Because volition has a determinate cause which
makes it what it is, this does not alter the case. If the cause be a
free agent, and the kind of volition be determined by the uncon
strained inclinations of the heart, the freedom of our actions is no
how affected, by this certain connection between ' volitions and
their cause. The contrary doctrine involves the monstrous absur
dity, that volitions have no cause, and no reason for being what
they are. If, then, we can will as we please, we have all conceiva
ble liberty and power, so far as the will is concerned. But the
maxim, that no man is under obligation to do that which he has no
power to perform, does not apply to the act of volition, as was be
fore observed, but to the ability to act according to our will.
We come now to the inquiry, whether a man has a power to
change the affections of his heart ; or to turn the current of his
inclinations in a contrary direction to that in which they run. On
this subject our first remark is, that the very supposition of a person
being sincerely desirous to make such a change is absurd, for if
there existed a prevailing desire that our. affections should not be
attached to certain objects, then already the change has taken
place ; but while our souls are carried forth in strong affections to
an object, it is a contradiction to say that that soul desires the affec
tions to be removed from that object : for what is affection but the
outgoing of the soul with desire and delight towards an object ?
But to suppose a desire not to love the object which has attracted
our affections, is to suppose two opposite affections prevailing in
the same soul at the same time, and in relation to the same object.
It is true that there may exist conflicting desires in regard to the

278 THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.
objects which are pursued ; for, while with a prevailing desire we
are led on to seek them, there may, and often do, exist inferior de
sires which draw us, according to their force, in another direction.
Thus, a drunkard may be prevailingly inclined to seek the grati
fication which he expects from strong drink, but while he is re
solved to indulge his appetite, a regard to health, reputation, and
the comfort of his family, may produce a contrary desire ; but, in
the case supposed, it is overcome by the stronger inclination which
a vicious appetite has generated. It is also true, as has been re
marked by President Edwards, that in contemplating some future
time, a man may desire that the appetite or affection which now
governs him may be subdued. And again, a man may be brought
into such circumstances that his desire of happiness, or dread of
eternal misery, may be so strong as to induce him to wish that
his predominant affections might be changed ; and under the pow
erful influence of these constitutional principles he may be led to
will a change in the temper of his mind and the inclinations of his
heart. The question is, whether a volition to change the desires
or dispositions is ever effectual. If our philosophy of the mind be
correct, this is a thing entirely out of the power of the will. Every
person, however, can put the matter to the test of experience at
any moment. The best way to prove to ourselves that we have a
power over our affections, is to exercise it. Who was ever con
scious of loving any person or thing, merely from willing to do so 1
What power, then, has the sinner to change his own heart ? He
does not love God, but is at enmity with him — how shall he change
his enmity into love ? You tell him that he has the power to re
pent and to love God, and urge him instantly to comply with his
duty. Now we should be exceedingly obliged by any one who
would explain the process by which a sinner changes the current
of his affections. We have often tried the experiment, and have
found ourselves utterly impotent to accomplish this work. Per
haps the zealous preacher of the doctrine of human ability will
say it is as easy to love God, or easier than to hate him. He
can only mean, that when the heart is in that state in which, the
exhibition of the character of God calls forth love, the exercise of
love in such a soul is as easy as the exercise of enmity in one of
a different moral temperament. The ability to repent and love
God then amounts to no more than this, that the human faculties
when rightly exercised are as capable of holy as of sinful acts,
which no one, we presume, ever denied ; but it is a truth which
has no bearing on the point in hand. The impenitent sinner can
not sincerely will to change his heart, and if under the influence
of such motives as he is capable of feeling, he does will a change
of affection, the effect does not follow the volition. Those per
sons, therefore, who are continually preaching that men have every
ability necessary to repent, are inculcating a doctrine at war with
every man's experience, and directly opposed to the word of God,
which continually represents the sinner as " dead," and impotent.

THE INABILITY OF SINNERS. 279
and incapable of thinking even a good thought. But we shall be
told that it is a maxim of common sense, that whatever we are
commanded to do we must have power or ability to perform —
that it is absurd to suppose that any man is under obligations to do
what he is unable to perform. Now, we are of opinion that this
is precisely the point where these advocates of human ability mis
take, and their error consists in the misapplication of the maxim
already mentioned — which is true and self-evident when properly
applied — to a case to which it does not belong. We have admitted,
over and over, that this doctrine is universally true, in relation to
the performance of actions consequent on volition ; but we now
deny that this is true when applied to our dispositions, habits, and
affections. We utterly deny, that, in order to a man's being ac
countable and culpable for enmity to God, he should have the
power of instantly changing his enmity into love. If a man has
certain affections and dispositions of heart which are evil, he is
accountable for them ; and the more inveterate and immovable
these traits of moral character are, the more he is to be blamed,
and the more he deserves to be punished. But as it is alleged that
the common judgment of man's moral faculty is, that he cannot be
culpable unless he possesses the power to divest himself of his
evil temper by an act of volition, we will state one or two cases,
and leave it to every reader to judge for himself, after an impartial
consideration of the facts.
In the first plaee, we take the case of a son, who being of a
self-willed disposition, and having a great fondness for sensual
pleasure and a strong desire to be free from restraint, has been led
to cherish enmity to his father. The father we will suppose to be a
man of conscientious integrity, who, from natural affection and from
a regard to higher principles, wishes to perform his duty, by re
proving, restraining, and correcting his child. But all this disci
pline, instead of working a reformation, has the effect of irritating
the son, who every day becomes more stubborn and incorrigible ;
until he comes at length to look upon his father as a tyrannical
master — an object of utter aversion. Hatred readily takes root in
the bosom of such a one, and by the wicked counsels of ill advi
sers this feeling is cherished, until by degrees it becomes so invete
rate that he cannot think of his father without being conscious of
malignant feelings. The effect of such feelings will be to pervert
every action of the hated person, however kind or just. Malice
also causes everything to be seen through a false medium. Now
suppose this process to have been going on for years, the first
question is, can this ungrateful son change in a moment these feel
ings of enmity and ill-wili for filial affection ? The impossibility
is too manifest to require any discussion ; he cannot. But is he,
on account of his inability to change his affections, innocent?
Surely the guilt of such a state of mind does not require that the
person be at once, or at all, able to change the state of his heart.
And we maintain that according to the impartial judgment of

280 THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.
mankind, such a man would be the object of blame without regard
to any ability to change his heart. And this is the case in regard
to impenitent sinners. Their enmity to God, and aversion to his
law, is deep and inveterate ; and though they have neither ability nor
will to change the temper of their minds, they are not the less
culpable on that account ; for the nature of moral evil does not
consist in that only which can be changed at will, but the deeper
the malignity of the evil, the greater the sinfulness, and the more
justly is the person exposed to punishment. We are of opinion,
therefore, that the new doctrine of human ability, which is so
much in vogue, is false and dangerous. And to corroborate this
opinion, we remark, that men who are forsaken of God, and given
over to believe a lie, and to work all uncleanness with greediness ;
or, who have committed the unpardonable sin, so that they cannot
be " renewed again to repentance," are surely unable to change
their hearts, and yet they are exceedingly guilty.
The same thing may be strongly illustrated by a reference to
the devils. They are moral agents and act freely, for they con
tinue to sin ; but who would choose to assert that they can change
their nature from sin to holiness, from enmity to love ? But they
possess, as fully as man, what has been called " natural ability."
They have all the physical powers requisite to constitute them
moral agents, and to perform the whole will of God, and are con
tinually adding to their guilt by their willing commission of sin.
But it is impossible for the devils to become holy angels ; and this
one fact is sufficient to demonstrate, that ,a power to change the
heart is not necessary to render a man guilty for continuing in sin.
The very reverse comes nearer the truth. The more unable a
sinner is to cease from his enmity, the deeper is his guilt : yet on
the very same principles on which it is argued, that it is as easy for
man to love God as to hate him, it might be proved that it was
perfectly easy for the fallen angels to love God ; or for the spirits
shut up in the prison of despair to begin to love God, and thus dis
arm the law of that penalty which dooms them to everlasting
death. If holiness is anything real ; if it has any foundation or
principle in the mind in which it exists ; and if this principle was
lost by the fall of men and angels, then it is certain that man can
not restore to his own soul the lost image of God. Again : they
who insist upon it, that the sinner has all ability to repent and turn
to God, and who so peremptorily and sternly rebuke the impeni
tent for not doing instantly what they have it in their power to do
so easily, ought to set the example which these sinners should fol
low. Surely the renewed man has the same kind of ability, and
as much ability, to be instantly perfect in holiness, as the unre
generate man has to renew his own soul or to change his own
heart. Let the preacher give an immediate example of this ability
by becoming perfectly holy, and we will consent that he preach
this doctrine.
But the strongest argument against this notion of human ability,

THE INABILITY OF SINNERS. 281
is derived from the scriptural doctrine of the necessity of regene
ration by the operations of the Holy Spirit. It is a maxim in phi
losophy, that no more causes should be admitted than are both
true and sufficient to account for the effects. And it is equally
clear, that if supernatural influence is necessary to repentance and
other holy exercises, then man has not the ability to repent with
out such aid. It is manifestly a contradiction to assert that man is
able to commence the work of holiness by his own exertions ; and
yet that he cannot do this without divine aid. Every text, there
fore, which ascribes regeneration to God, is a proof of man's ina
bility to regenerate himself. Indeed the very idea of a man's
regenerating his own heart is absurd ; it is tantamount to a man's
creating himself, or begetting himself. Besides, the scriptures posi
tively declare man's inability to turn to God without divine aid.
" No man," says the Lord Jesus, " can come to me except the
Father which hath sent me draw him." " Without me ye can do
nothing." " Christ is exalted a Prince and a Saviour, to give re
pentance and the remission of sins." " Which were born not of
blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of
God." " So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that
runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." " Not that we are suf
ficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves ;" but see
Cor. iii. 5. Our sufficiency is of the Lord. Everything is ascribed
to the grace of God, and man, in scripture, is continually represented
as " dead in trespasses and sins," as " blind," " not subject to the law
of God, neither indeed can be."
It will be objected, with much confidence, that if man has no
ability to repent he cannot be blamed for not repenting. But this
is only true if he desires to repent and is unable to do it. This,
however, is not the case of the impenitent sinner. He does not
wish to repent — if he did, there is no hindrance in his way. But his
soul is at enmity with God, and this opposition is so deep and total
that he has neither the will nor the power to convert himself to the
love of God. But will his wickedness, therefore, excuse him, be
cause it is so great that it has left no desire nor ability to change
his mind ? Certainly the judgment of mankind is sufficiently ascer
tained on this point, and is entirely different from this. The wretch
who is so abandoned to vice, that he never feels a wish for refor
mation, is not on this account free from blame ; so far from it, that
THE GREATER THE INABILITY, THE GREATER THE GUILT. The more
entirely a murderer has been under the influence of malice, the
more detestable his crime. The object of all judicial investigation
is to ascertain, first, the fact, and then the motive ; and the more
deliberate, unmixed, and invincible the malevolence appears to have
been, the more unhesitating is the determination of every juror, or
judge, to find him guilty. It is the common sense of all men, that
the more incorrigible and irreclaimable a transgressor, the more
deserving is he of severe punishment. It cannot, therefore, be a
fact, that men generally think, that where there is any kind of ina-

282 THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.
bility there is no blame. The very reverse is true. And it will
be found to be the universal conviction of men in all ages and
countries, that a totally depraved character creates an inability to
do good ; and that the greater this inability the more criminal is
the person who is the subject of it.
Another objection is, that if impenitent men are informed that
they can do nothing, they will sit still and make no manner of ex
ertion, but will wait until God's time, as it is certain all their efforts
will be in vain, until God works in them to will and to do. To
which we reply, that unregenerate men are ever disposed to per
vert the truth of God, so as to apologise for their own negligence ;
but this must not hinder us from embracing it and preaching it ;
though this should teach us to exercise peculiar caution when there
is danger of mistake or perversion. Again, it answers no good
end to set such persons to strive in their own strength, and some
times fatally misleads them ; for either they become discouraged,
not finding their strength to answer to the doctrine of the preacher,
or they are led to think that the exertions which they make are
acts of faith and repentance ; and thus, without feeling their de
pendence on God, are induced to rely on their own strength. Now,
the true system is to exhort sinners to be found in the use of God's
appointed means ; that is, to be diligent in attendance on the word
and at the throne of grace. They should also be exhorted to re
pent and to perform all other commanded duties, but at the same
time distinctly informed that they need the grace of God to enable
them rightly to perform these acts ; and their efforts should be
(: made in humble dependence on divine assistance. While they are
. reading, or hearing, or meditating, or praying, God may by his
-Holy Spirit work faith in their hearts, and while they are using the
.means of repentance, the grace of repentance may be bestowed
upon them. We should not exhort men to perform any duty
otherwise than as God has commanded it to be done ; but we may
exhort an unregenerate sinner to read and pray, for in attending on
these means he is making the effort to believe and to repent ; and
while engaged in the use of these external means, God may give
a believing and penitent heart. Besides, we do not know when
men cease to be unregenerate. They are often renewed before
they are aware that they have experienced a saving change ; and
if we omit to exhort them to pray, &c, under the apprehension
that they cannot perform the duty aright, we may be hindering the
access of some of God's dear children to his presence. And in re
gard to those who pray with an unregenerate heart, we are per
suaded that they do not, by making the attempt to pray, sin so
egregiously as by omitting the duty altogether. If the principle
on which some act in their treatment Of the awakened, were car
ried out to its legitimate consequences, they should be told neither
to plough nor sow ; no, nor perform the common duties of justice
and morality, because they sin in all these as certainly as in their
prayers.

THE INABILITY OF SINNERS. 283
It is thought that inculcating the doctrine of the inability of sin
ners, has a tendency to lead them to procrastinate attention to
their salvation, upon the plea that it is useless for them to strive
until God's grace shall be granted ; and it has been admitted, that
this abuse may be made of the doctrine ; but is there no danger
of abuse on the other side ? When men in love with sin are taught
that they possess all necessary ability to turn to God, and that they
can repent at any moment by a proper use of their own powers,
will they not be led to postpone attention to the concerns of the
soul, under the persuasion that it is a work which they can per
form at any time, even on a death-bed ? Will they not run the
risk of being suddenly cut off, when they are informed that in a
moment, or in a very short time, they can give their hearts to
Christ ? In fact, this is precisely the practical system of every
careless sinner. He knows that he is going astray at present ; but
then he flatters himself that after enjoying his sinful pleasures
awhile longer he will give them all up and become truly pious ;
and this common delusion is carried so far, that the secret thought
of many is, that if on a death-bed they should only be favoured
with the exercise of reason for a short time, they can easily make
their peace with God, and prepare for another world. Therefore,
faithful ministers have felt it to be their duty to endeavour to dissi
pate this delusion, and to convince men that their hopes of future re
pentance are fallacious ; and they have found nothing more effectual
to remove this dangerous self-confidence than to insist on the utter
helplessness and total inability of the sinner to convert his own
soul. But now the strain of preaching which is heard from many,
coincides most perfectly with the erroneous persuasion which ig
norance of their depravity leads natural men to cherish. We are
persuaded, therefore, that much evil will result from this new me
thod of preaching respecting man's ability. The evil will be two
fold : first, multitudes will be confirmed in their false persuasion of
their ability to become truly religious whenever they please ; and
will, in this persuasion, go on presumptuously in their indulgence
of sin, with the purpose to repent at some future day ; the second
evil will be, that multitudes, under superficial conviction, being told
that they have the power to turn to God, will, upon entirely insuffi
cient grounds, take up the opinion that they have complied with
the terms of salvation, because they are conscious they have ex
erted such power as they possess, and thus false hopes will be
cherished which may never be removed. We are of opinion,
therefore, that what is cried up as " new light," in regard to the
proper method of dealing with sinners, is really a dangerous prac
tical error ; or, if what is inculcated can, by any explanation, be
reconciled with truth, yet this method of exhibiting it is calculated
to mislead, and has all the pernicious effects of error.
The truth is, that no unregenerate man can change his own
heart, and yet he is accountable for all its evil, and culpable for all

284 THE INABILITY OF SINNERS.
the inability under which he labours. Man is a moral agent, and
free in his sinful actions ; that is, they are voluntary. He does
what he pleases, and he wills what he pleases ; but when his heart
is fully set in him to do evil, there is no principle from which a
saving change can take place. He must be renewed by the Spirit
of God. He must be created anew in Christ Jesus unto good
works.

ESSAY XIII.
THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.*

In the autumn of the year 1831 it appears that the Rev. Mr.
Finney delivered a sermon on making a new heart, founded
on Ezek. xviii. 13. The Rev. Mr. Rand being one of his auditors,
took notes of the discourse, which he published, attended with a
series of strictures, in a periodical work of which he was the editor.
As these notes, in the judgment of Mr. Finney's friends, presented
an imperfect view of his sermon, one of their number obtained the
outline used by the preacher himself, and sent the requisite correc
tions to Mr. Rand, who availed himself of the aid thus afforded.
The notes and strictures were afterwards published in a pamphlet
form, under the title, " The New Divinity Tried." It is the review
of this pamphlet by an anonymous writer, of which we propose to
give a short notice.
We are not prepared to justify the course pursued by Mr. Rand,
in thus bringing Mr. Finney before the public without his know
ledge or consent. The considerations which evince the general
impropriety of such a step are obvious, and are forcibly stated in the
Review. That there may be cases in which the evil produced by
a popular preacher constantly presenting erroneous views in his
discourses, is so serious, that the usual etiquette of literary pro
ceedings should be sacrificed in order to counteract its influence,
we do not doubt. Nor do we question that Mr. Rand felt the pre
sent to be such a case. As the publication has not only been made,
but noticed by the friends and advocates of Mr. Finney, there can
be no impropriety in our calling the attention of our readers, for a
few moments, to the contents of this Review. It is an elaborate
production, distinguished both by acuteness and research, and per
vaded by a tone of moderation. These are its favourable charac
teristics. On the other hand, it is lamentably deficient in open,
manly discussion. Instead of a clear and bold statement of the
distinguishing principles of the New Divinity, and a frank avowal
of dissent from the Old Divinity of New England, there is an anx-
* This article was published in 1832, in review of a pamphlet entitled " The New
Divinity Tried ; or An Examination of the Rev. Mr. Rand's Strictures on a sermon
delivered by the Rev. C. J. Finney on making a new Heart."

286 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
ious, attorney-like mincing of matters ; a claiming to agree with
everybody, and an endeavour to cast off his opponent into the po
sition of the solitary dissentient, and overwhelm him with the au
thority of great names. The evidence on which this judgment is
found will appear in what follows ; of its correctness the reader
must judge.
We gather from the Review itself (for we have in vain endea
voured to obtain in season a copy of Mr. Rand's pamphlet), that
the leading objections to the New Divinity are those which have
been urged from various quarters against some of the doctrines of
the Christian Spectator. Indeed, the reviewer, to show that Mr.
Rand was not obliged to publish the notes of an extemporaneous
discourse, in order to bring the opinions which it advocated before
the public, tells us the doctrines of the sermon are those which have
been repeatedly presented in the Spectator, and elsewhere. We
need therefore be at no loss for the distinguishing features of the
New Divinity. It starts with the assumption that morality can only
be predicated of voluntary exercises ; that all holiness and sin con
sist in acts of choice or preference. When this principle is said to
be one of the radical views of the New Divinity, neither Mr. Rand
nor any one else can mean to represent the opinion itself as a no
velty. It is on all hands acknowledged to be centuries old. The
novelty consists in its being held by men professing to be Calvin
ists, and in its being traced out by them to very nearly the same
results as those which the uniform opponents of Calvinism have
derived from it. Thus Dr. John Taylor, of Norwich, presents it
as the grand objection to the doctrines of original sin and original
righteousness ; and in defending these doctrines, President Edwards
laboriously argues against this opinion. Yet it is in behalf of this
radical view of the new system, that the authority of Edwards,
Bellamy, Witherspoon, Dwight, Griffin, Woods, as well as Augus
tine and Calvin, is quoted and arrayed against Mr. Rand. Almost
every one of these writers not only disclaims the opinion thus as
cribed to them, but endeavours to refute it. Thus President Ed
wards, after stating Dr. Taylor's great objection to the doctrine of
original sin to be, "that moral virtue in its very nature implieth the
choice and consent of the moral agent," and quoting from him the
declaration, " To say that God not only endowed Adam with a ca
pacity of being righteous, but, moreover, that righteousness and
true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature at
the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is
inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness," goes on to re
mark, " with respect to this I would observe that it consists in a
notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things and the
common notions of mankind." That it is thus inconsistent with the
nature of things, he proceeds to prove. In the course of this proof
we find such assertions as the following : " The act of choosing
what is good is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good
principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes- that a

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 287
virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice,
and that, therefore, it is not necessary there should first be thought,
reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition."
" There is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections
should be the effect of choice. And so, no such supposed necessity
can be a good objection against such a disposition being natural, or
from a kind of instinction, implanted in the mind at its creation."*
Again, p. 409, in showing Dr. Taylor's inconsistency, he says, "If
Adam must choose to be righteous before he was righteous," then
Dr. Taylor's scheme involves a contradiction, &c. A mode of ex
pression which clearly shows the position against which he argues.
Again, " Human nature must be created with some dispositions; a
disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and to be
averse to other things as odious and disagreeable * * * *. But
if it had any concreated dispositions at all, they must have been
right or wrong ; and he then says, if man had at first a disposition
to find happiness in what was good, his disposition was morally
right ; but " if he had a disposition to love most those things that
were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious."
" This notion of Adam's being created without a principle of holi
ness in his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. Taylor's scheme, is in
consistent with" the history in the beginning of Genesis, p. 413. It
would, however, be an endless business to quote all that might be
adduced to prove that Edwards did not hold the opinion which the
reviewer imputes to him. There can, it would seem, be no mis
take as to his meaning. These are not mere casual expressions,
which he afterwards retracts or contradicts. Neither is there any
room for doubt as to the sense in which he uses the words, dispo
sition, principle, tendency, &c. Because he carefully explains
them, and characterizes the idea he means to express by every one
of the marks which the reviewer and others give, in describing
what they spurn and reject under the name of "principle," "holy
or sinful taste." They mean something distinct from, and prior to,
volitions ; so does President Edwards ; it is that which, in the
case of Adam, to use his own word, was " concreated ;" it was a
disposition to love — not love itself — a relish for spiritual objects, or
adaptation of mind to take pleasure in what is excellent ; it was a
kind of instinct, which, as to this point (i. e., priority as to the order
of nature to acts), he says is analogous to other instincts of our na
ture. He even argues Jong to show that unless such a principle of
holiness existed in man prior to all acts of choice, he never could
become holy. Again, the " principle," or " disposition" which they
object to, is one which is represented as not only prior to volunta
ry exercises, but determines their character, and is the cause of
their being what they are. So precisely President Edwards, " It is
a foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind-of exer
cises pf the faculty of the will." f This he assumes in the case of
* Works, vol. ii., pp 407, 408. f Treatise on the Affections, p. 232.

288 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
Adam to have existed prior to his choosing God, and determined
his choice ; what in the case of men since the fall he assumes as the
cause of their universally sinning ; and in those which are renewed,
as the cause of their holy exercises. If President Edwards did not
hold and teach the doctrine which the reviewer rejects and de
nounces, then no man ever did hold it, or ever can express it. The
case is no less plain with regard to Dr. Dwight, who also gives
the two characteristic marks of the kind of disposition now in ques
tion, viz., its priority to all voluntary exercises, and its being the
cause of the character of those exercises. Both these ideas' are ex
pressed with a frequency, clearness, and confidence, which mark
this as one of his most settled opinions. Take a single specimen :
" There is a reason," he says, " why one being is holy and another
sinful." This reason, or " cause of moral action, is indicated by the
words principle, affections, nature, habits, tendency, propensity."
That he does not intend by " this cause of moral action," an act,
exercise, volition, is plain ; first, because he says, " these terms in
dicate a cause, which to us is wholly unknown ;" secondly, because
he expressly and repeatedly asserts the contrary. " We speak of
human nature as sinful, intending not the actual commission of sin,
but a general characteristic of man, under the influence of which
he has committed sins heretofore, and is prepared, and is prone to
commit others. With the same meaning in our minds, we use the
phrases sinful propensities, corrupt heart, depraved mind; and the
contrary ones, holy or virtuous dispositions, moral rectitude of
character, and many others of like import. When we use these
kinds of phraseology, we intend that a reason exists, although un-
definable and unintelligible by ourselves, why one mind will either
usually or uniformly be the subject of holy volitions, and another of
sinful ones. We do not intend to assert that any one, or any num
ber of the volitions of the man whom we characterize, has been, or
will be, holy or sinful, nor do we mean to refer to actual volitions at
all. Instead of this, we mean to indicate a state of mind general
ly existing, out of which holy volitions may in one case be fairly
expected to arise, and sinful ones in another.* Again, " When
God created Adam, there was a period of his existence after he
began to be, antecedent to that in which he exercised the first vo
lition. Every man, who believes the mind to be something besides
ideas and exercises, and who does not admit the doctrine of casual
ty, will acknowledge that in this period the mind of Adam was in
such a state ; that it was prepense to the exercise of virtuous voli
tions, rather than sinful ones. This state of mind has been com
monly styled disposition, temper, inclination, heart, &c. In the
scriptures it usually bears the last of these names. I shall take the
liberty to call it disposition. This disposition was the cause whence
his virtuous volitions proceeded : the reason why they were vir
tuous and not sinful. Of the metaphysical nature of this cause, I
* Works, vol. i., pp. 410, 411.

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 289
am ignorant." " This cause of necessity preceded these volitions,
and therefore certainly existed in that state of mind which was
previous to his first volition."* This idea enters essentially into
his views of several important doctrines. Thus he says Adam was
created holy ; i. e., with holy or virtuous dispositions, prepense to
the exercises of holy volitions. See his Sermon on Man, and that
on Regeneration. Again, he makes original sin, or depravity de
rived from Adam, to consist in this sinful disposition — a contami
nated moral nature — and argues that infants are depraved before
they are " capable of moral action." And again, he represents re
generation to consist in " a relish for spiritual objects, communicat
ed to it by the power of the Holy Ghost," and explains his mean
ing by a reference to " the state of mind of Adam, in the period
antecedent to that in which he exercised his first volition." " The
soul of Adam was created with a relish for spiritual objects. The
soul of every man who becomes a Christian, is renewed by the
communication of the same relish. In Adam this disposition pro
duced virtuous volitions. In every child of Adam, who becomes
the subject of virtue, it produces the same effects."t It is impossi
ble, we should think, for any man to force himself to believe that
Dr. Dwight held the doctrine that " moral character is to be as
cribed to voluntary exercises alone." To reconcile all the declara
tions which we have quoted, and a multitude of others with which
his works abound, is an impossibility ; unless, indeed, we admit
that he did not really believe what he over and over declares to
have been his faith, and really adopted an opinion against which he
earnestly protests and ably argues, or that he was so little master
of the English language as to be unable to communicate ideas at
all. The reviewer may possibly say, that he does not deny that
Dr. Dwight and others held to the existence of a metaphysical
something, as the cause of moral actions ; but they did not attribute
to this something itself a moral character ; that it was called holy
or sinful, not from its nature, but only from its effects. To this,
however, the reply is obvious ; Dr. Dwight not only speaks of this
disposition as virtuous or vicious, calls it a sinful or holy propensi
ty, principle, nature, habit, heart ; terms which, in themselves, one
would suppose necessarily imply that the thing to which they ap
ply had a moral character : but he in so many words declares it to
be " the seat of moral character in rational beings ;" it is that
which mainly constitutes the moral character ; it is what we mean,
he says, when we use the phrases, corrupt heart, depraved mind;
or the contrary ones, holy disposition, moral rectitude, holiness of
character. He tells us he intends by these phrases " a state of
mind," which is not a voluntary exercise, but the cause of volitions.
" This cause is what is so often mentioned in scripture under the
name of the heart; as when it is said, ' The heart is deceitful above
all things, and desperately wicked.'" Will the reviewer have us
* Works, vol. ii., p. 419. t Vol. ii., p. 214.
19

290 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
believe Dr. Dwight taught there was no moral character in this
cause of voluntary exercises, which he supposed the Bible meant,
when it speaks of a desperately wicked heart ? Besides, he tells us
the communication of a holy disposition, or relish for spiritual ob
jects, constitutes regeneration — is not the moral character changed
in regeneration ? Has that no moral character, the reception of
which constitutes a man a new creature in Christ Jesus ? Yet
this, Dr. Dwight says, is not a volition (p. 418, vol. ii.), but " a relish
for spiritual objects," " a disposition which produces virtuous voli
tions." Again : the very same objections which the reviewer and
other advocates of the New Divinity, urge against the idea of mo
ral principles prior to voluntary exercises, and determining their
character, Dr. Dwight considers and refutes. And finally, the
reviewer tells that he and his friends agree on this point with the
advocates of " the exercise scheme," the very persons from whom
Dr. Dwight most earnestly dissents as to this very point, which, he
says, no one but a friend of that scheme, or of the liberty of indif
ference, would think of maintaining. Very much to the same pur
pose, President Edwards says, that this opinion concerning virtue
(as entirely depending on choice and agency) arises from the ab
surd notions in vogue concerning the freedom of the will, as if it
consisted in the will's self-determining power."*
If anything could be more wonderful than the reviewer's claim
ing the authority of Edwards and Dwight, in favour of the opinion
under consideration, it would be his claiming Dr. Griffin in the
same behalf; a theologian who is almost an ultra on the other side.
Our limits and time utterly forbid our exhibiting the evidence in
every case of the lamentable misrepresentations by the reviewer
of the opinions of the authors to whom he refers. In the case of
Dr. Griffin, it is the less necessary, as his Park Street Lectures are
so extensively known, and as he has so recently proclaimed his
dissent from the New Divinity in his sermon on Regeneration. We
refer the readers to these works. In the former, they will find him
speaking of sin as an " attribute of our nature," derived from our
original parents, "propagated like reason or speech (neither of
which are exercised at first), propagated like many other propen
sities, mental as well as bodily — propagated like the noxious nature
of other animals." — P. 12.
As to poor Augustine and Calvin being represented as holding
the radical doctrine of Pelagius, we must think it a great oversight
in the reviewer. It destroys the whole verisimilitude of his story.
It forces the reader to suspect the writer of irony, or to set down
his statements with regard to less notorious authors, for nothing.
Calvin defines original sin " an hereditary depravity and corrup
tion of our nature, diffused through every part of the soul [strange
definition of a voluntary exercise], which first makes us obnoxious
to the wrath of God, and then produces those works which the
* Works, vol. ii., p. 410.

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 291
scriptures denominate the works of the flesh." Do not the " works
of the flesh" include all sinful exercises ? and is there not here as
serted a cause of those exercises, which has itself a moral charac
ter ? Infants, he says, at their birth, are liable to condemnation,
" for though they have not at that time produced the fruits of their
unrighteousness, yet they have the seed inclosed in them ; nay,
their whole nature is a mere seed of sin, so that it cannot but be
odious and abominable to God." — Institutiones, lib. ii., cap. 1, 8.
And in another place he speaks of men being sinners, " non pravae
duntaxat consuetudinis vitio sed naturae quoque pravitate." Is this
the language of Mr. Finney ? Could any advocate of the New
Divinity say with Calvin, that the " whole nature" of man, prior to
the production of the works of the flesh, " is odious and abominable
to God ?" If not, why quote Calvin as agreeing with them as to
this very point, that all sin consists in voluntary exercises ? The
reviewer himself represents Calvin as teaching that original sin
consists in " inherent corruption," a mode of expression constantly
employed by such writers, to indicate moral depravity as distinct
from actual sins, and prior to them.
With regard to Augustine the case is still more extraordinary.
The reviewer quotes from De Moor the following passage from
this father : " Sin is so far a voluntary evil, that it would not be sin
if it were not voluntary," in proof that he also held, " that a moral
character was to be ascribed to voluntary exercises alone." And
yet De Moor immediately adds, in answer to the appeal which he
says Pelagians make to this passage, that Augustine did not wish
the declaration to be understood of original sin, but restricts it to
actual sin, and quotes in proof from his work against Julian, an ex
plicit statement that the principle was to be so restricted. " Hoc
enim," says Augustine, " recte dicitur propter proprium cujusque
peccatum, non propter primi peccati originale contagium." " This
is properly said in reference to the proper (or actual) sin of each
one, but not of the original contagion of the first sin." With this
declaration before his eyes, how could the reviewer make such a
representation ? *
It is this reference to such men as Edwards, Bellamy, and
Dwight, besides older writers, as holding opinions which they not
only did not hold, but which in every form, expressly and by impli
cation, they rejected and condemn, that we consider unfair and un-
candid. We are painfully anxious to have this course on the part
of the reviewer and others explained. We wish to know on what
principle such statements can be reconciled with honesty. We
take it for granted they must have some esoteric sense, some pri
vate meaning, some arriere pensee, by which to clear their con
sciences in this matter ; but what it is we cannot divine. This has
become so common and so serious an evil, that we are not sur
prised to find some of the leading theologians of Connecticut say
ing, " It is surely time that the enemies of truth were relieved of
the burden of making doctrines for us, or of informing us what we

292 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
ourselves believe."* It is just as easy to make Mr. Rand agree
with Mr. Finney, as it is President Edwards or Dr. Dwight. All
that is necessary is to take some declaration which is intended to
apply to one subject and apply it to another ; and adopt the prin
ciple that language is to be interpreted, not according to the writ
er's views of the nature of the subject, but according to those of
the reviewer. If he say with Dr. Griffin, " men are voluntary and
free in all their wickedness ;" or ask with Dr. Witherspoon, " Does
any man commit sin but from his own choice ? or is he hindered
from any duty to which he is sincerely and heartily inclined ?"
then he holds " that a moral character is to be ascribed to volun
tary exercises alone." These identical passages, referring as the
very language implies to actual sins, are quoted by the reviewer
in his defence of that position, and as implying that a moral charac
ter can be ascribed to nothing anterior to such voluntary exercises.
It matters not, it would seem, that these declarations are perfectly
consistent with the belief in moral principles, dispositions, or tastes,
as existing prior to all acts, or that their authors express such to be
their belief. This is gross misrepresentation of a writer's real
opinions, whatever be its motive, or on whatever principle its jus
tification may be attempted.
We have already admitted that there was no novelty in this
fundamental principle of the New Divinity, but that the novelty
consisted in its being adopted by nominal Calvinists, and traced to
much the same results as it ever has been by the open opposers of
Calvinism. Thus Mr. Finney says, with great plainness, " a na
ture cannot be holy. The nature of Adam at his creation was
not holy. Adam was made with a nature neither sinful nor holy.
When he began to act he made it his governing purpose to serve
God." This declaration is, at least, in apparent opposition to the
statements so constantly occurring in theological writers — that the
nature of Adam was holy at his creation — that the nature of man
since the fall is sinful, and others of similar import. The method
which the reviewer adopts of reconciling this apparent discre
pance is, as usual, entirely unsatisfactory. He tells us there are
three senses in which the word nature is used, as applied to moral
beings ; first, it indicates something which is an original and essen
tial part of their constitution, not resulting at all from their choice
or agency, and necessarily found in them of whatever character
and in whatever circumstances ;" second, it is used to designate
the period prior to conversion, as when Paul says, " we are by
nature," i. e., in our unregenerate state, " the children of wrath ;"
and •' a third sense is, an expression of the fact that there is some
thing in the being a thing spoken of, which "is the ground or occa
sion of a certainty that it will, in all its appropriate circumstances,
* See the prospectus of a new monthly religious periodical, to be entitled the
Evangelical Magazine, and to be conducted by the Executive Committee of the Con
necticut Doctrinal Tract Society.

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 293
exhibit the result or quality predicated of it." What the preacher
meant and only meant, according to the reviewer, was " that holi
ness was not an essential part of Adam's constitution at his crea
tion, so as not to result at all from his choice and agency." — Pp. 9,
10. There is in all this statement a great want of precision and
accuracy. The reviewer uses the expressions, essential part of
the constitution, and " not resulting from choice or agency," as
synonymous, though he must be aware that Mr. Rand and the
great body of Christians agree in saying, that holiness and sin are
not and cannot be essential attributes, in the sense of the reviewer.
An essential attribute is an attribute which inheres in the essence
of a thing, and is necessary to its being. Thus the attributes
of thought and feeling are essential to mind ; without them it is
not mind. Who ever maintained that holiness was so essential a
part of man's constitution that he ceased to be man when he lost
it ? Who ever maintained that either sin or holiness resided in the
essence of the soul, or was a physical attribute ? The reviewer
knows as well as anybody, that this Manichean and Flacian doc
trine was spurned and rejected by the whole Christian church.
But does it follow from this, that holiness and sin must depend en
tirely on choice and agency ; that there can be nothing of a moral
character prior to acts of preference ? Certainly not. For this
simple reason, that while the Christian church has rejected the idea
of the substantial nature of sin and holiness, it has with equal una
nimity held the doctrine of moral propensities, dispositions, or ten
dencies, prior to all acts of choice. It is in this sense that they
have affirmed, and it is in this sense the New Divinity denies, that
" a nature may be sinful or holy." And this denial, as Mr. Rand
correctly states, is a denial of the doctrines of original righteous
ness and original sin. "The doctrine of original righteousness, or
the creation of our first parents with holy principles and disposi
tions, has a close connexion," says President Edwards, " with the
doctrine of original sin. Dr. Taylor was sensible of this ; and
accordingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine in his book on
original sin." " Dr. T.'s grand objection against this doctrine,
which he abundantly insists on, is this : that it is utterly inconsis
tent with the nature of virtue that it should be created with any
person ; because, if so, it must be by an act of God's absolute
power without our knowledge or concurrence ; and that moral
virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent of the.
moral agent." This is the notion of virtue which he pronounces
quite inconsistent with the nature of things. Human nature, he
afterwards says, must be created with some dispositions ; these
concentrated dispositions must be right or wrong ; if man had a
disposition to delight in what was good, then his dispositions were
morally right. — Vol. ii., pp. 406 and 413. This is the view which
has been wellnigh universal in the Christian church ; this is the
idea of original righteousness which the New Divinity rejects,
urging the same objection to it which Dr. Taylor of Norwich, and

294 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
Pelagians and Socinians long before him had done. We are not,
any more than the reviewer, discussing the truth of these doctrines,
but merely endeavouring to correct his very uncandid representa
tions, as they appear to us.
It is further objected to the New Divinity, that it rejects the
doctrine of original sin. This the reviewer denies. What is this
doctrine ? If this point be ascertained, the question whether the
objection is well founded or not can be easily answered. Let us
advert then to the definitions of the doctrine as given in the lead
ing Protestant Confessions. In the Helvetic Confession, the Con-
fessio et Expositio brevis, 6rc, cap. viii., after stating that man
was at first created in the image of God, but by the fall became
subject to sin, death, and various calamities, and that all who are
descended from Adam are like him and exposed to all these evils,
it is said, " Sin we understand to be that native corruption of man,
derived or propagated from our first parents to us, by which we
are immersed in evil desires, averse from good, prone to all evil,"
&c. " We therefore acknowledge original sin to be in all men ;
we acknowledge all other sins which arise from this," &c. The
Basil Confession of 1532: " We confess that man was originally
created in the image of God," &c, " but of his own accord fell into
sin, by which fall the whole human race has become corrupt and
liable to condemnation. Hence our nature is vitiated," &c. The
Gallican confession, 1561 : " We believe that the whole race of
Adam is infected with this contagion which we call original sin,
that is, a depravity which is propagated, and is not derived by
imitation merely, as the Pelagians supposed, all whose errors we
detest. Neither do we think it necessary to inquire how this sin
can be propagated from one to another," &c. The ninth Article
of the Church of England states : " Original sin standeth not in the
following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the
fault and corruption of every man, that naturally is engendered of
the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from origi
nal righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that
the flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit." The Belgic Con
fession says, " We believe, that by the disobedience of Adam,
original sin has been diffused through the whole human race, which
is a corruption of the whole nature and a hereditary depravity, by
which even infants in their mother's womb are polluted, and which,
as a root, produces every kind of sin in man, and is so foul and
execrable before God, that it suffices to the condemnation of the
human race." The Polish Confession, Art. iii.: " All men, Christ
only excepted, are conceived and born in sin, even the most holy
Virgin Mary. Original sin consists not only in the entire want of
original righteousness, but also in depravity or proneness to evil,
propagated from Adam to all men." The Augsburgh Confession,
Art. ii. : " This disease or original depravity is truly sin, condemn
ing and bringing even now eternal death to those who are not
renewed by baptism and the Holy Spirit." And the Forma Con-

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 295
cordantiae : " Not only actual transgressions should be acknow
ledged as sins, but especially this hereditary disease should be
regarded as a horrible sin, and indeed as the principle and head of
all sins, whence, as from a root, all other transgressions grow."
We have referred to the leading confessions of the period of the
Reformation to show that they all represent as the constituent
essential idea of original sin — a corrupted nature, or hereditary
taint derived from Adam, propagated by ordinary generation, in
fecting the whole race, and the source or root of all actual sin.
This is not the doctrine therefore of Calvinists merely, but of the
reformed churches generally, as it was of the catholic church be
fore the Reformation. It is the doctrine, too, of the great body of
Arminians. It is unnecessary to refer to individual writers after
this reference to symbols which express the united testimony of
thousands as to what original sin is. That the more modern Cal
vinists (with the exception of the advocates of the exercise scheme)
unite in this view is as plain, and as generally acknowledged, as that
it was held by the Reformers. Thus President Edwards defines
original sin to be " an innate sinful depravity of heart." He
makes this depravity to consist " in a corrupt and evil disposition,"
prior to all sinful exercises. He infers from the universality and
certainty of the sinful conduct of men, first, " that the natural state
of the mind of man is attended with a propensity of nature to such
an issue ;" and secondly, that their " nature is corrupt and depraved
with a moral depravity." He speaks of this propensity " as a very
evil, pernicious, and depraved propensity ;" " an infinitely dreadful
and pernicious tendency." He undertakes to prove " that wicked
ness belongs to the very nature of men." He devotes a chapter
to the consideration of the objection, " that to suppose men born
in sin without their choice, or any previous act of their own, is to
suppose what is inconsistent with the nature of sin ;" and another
to the objection, that " the doctrine of native corruption" makes
God the author of sin. Precisely the objections of the New Di
vinity to the common views on this subject.
Dr. Dwight is not less explicit ; he makes this depravity to con
sist in " the corruption of that energy of the mind whence volitions
flow, and which is the seat of moral character in rational beings."
Vol. i., p. 488. He proves that " infants are contaminated in their
moral nature," from the sinful conduct of " every infant who lives
long enough to be capable of moral action." Here then is moral
pollution prior to moral action.
Dr. Woods also maintains the doctrine of depravity as natural,
innate, and hereditary, in his letters to Dr. Ware. " Sin," accord
ing to Dr. Griffin, " belongs to the nature of man, as much as rea
son or speech [which we do not believe ; but it serves to show
to what lengths the reviewer has permitted himself to go, when
he quotes this writer in support of the position, that all sin consists
in voluntary exercises], though in a sense altogether compatible
with blame, and must be derived, like other universal attributes,

296 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
from the original parent ; propagated like reason or speech (nei
ther of which is exercised at first) ; propagated like many other
propensities, mental as well as bodily, which certainly are inherited
from parents ; propagated like the noxious nature of animals." He
afterwards argues, " if infants receive their whole nature from their
parents pure," "if they are infected with no depravity," when
born, " it is plain that they never derived a taint of moral pollu
tion from Adam." " There can be no conveyance after they are
born, and his sin was in no sense the occasion of the universal de
pravity of the world, otherwise than merely as the first example."*
We think it must be apparent that Mr. Rand was perfectly jus
tifiable in asserting that the New Divinity rejects the doctrine of
original sin. What is the meaning of this assertion ? Is it not
that the idea commonly expressed by that term is discarded ?
This idea, as we have shown, is that of natural hereditary depra
vity, or of a corrupt moral nature derived from our first parent.
Sometimes indeed more is included in the term, as the idea of im
putation. Sometimes the phrase is explained with more and some
times with less precision, some resolving the idea of corruption
into its constituent parts — the want of original righteousness and
tendency to evil — and others not ; but with an uniformity almost
unparalleled in theological language and opinion, has the idea of
innate corruption been represented as the essentia] constituent idea
of original sin. The very distinction between original and actual
sin, so common, shows that the former expression is intended to
convey the idea of something which is regarded as sin, which is
not an act or voluntary exercise. The obvious sense, therefore, of
Mr. Rand's assertion is correct.
The reviewer's answer is a little remarkable. He tells us there
are various senses in which the phrase " original sin" has been
used in orthodox confessions and standard writings, in some one
of which senses Mr. Finney may, and doubtless does, hold to
"original sin." — P. 13. He then undertakes to enumerate eight
different senses, mainly by representing as distinct, different modes
of stating the same idea. 1. The first sin of the first man. 2.
The first sin of the first man and woman. (Is it not clear the re
viewer was anxious to swell his list?) 3. Natural or inherent cor
ruption. 4. Want of original righteousness and inclination to evil.
(Identical with the preceding.) 5. Imputation of Adam's sin, and
the innate sinful depravity of the heart. 6. Something not de
scribed, but distinct from natural corruption, and that came to us
by the fall of Adam. (This specification is founded on the answer
given in the form of examination before the communion in the
Kirk of Scotland, 1591, to the question, "What things come to
us by that fall ? Ans. Original sin, and natural corruption. Where
it is plain that by original sin is meant, the guilt of Adam's first
sin.) 7. The guilt of Adam's first sin, the defect of original right-
* Park Street Lectures, pp. 12 — 18.

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 297
eousness, and concupiscence. 8. The universal sinfulness of Adam's
posterity as connected with his first sin by divine constitution. —
Dr. Hopkins.
No one, we presume, could imagine that Mr. Rand intended to
charge Mr. Finney with denying the fact that Adam sinned, when
he said he denied the doctrine of original sin. The first and se
cond, therefore, of the foregoing specifications, might safely have
been omitted. As to all the others, excepting the last, they
amount to the simple statement of President Edwards, that the
phrase is commonly used to indicate either the guilt of Adam's first
sin, or inherent corruption, sometimes the one and sometimes the
other, but most frequently both conjoined. The cases in which
original sin is said to include both the want of original righteous
ness and corruption of nature, are, as we before remarked, but ex
amples of greater precision in the description of the thing intended,
and not statements of an opinion diverse from that expressed by
the single phrase, innate depravity. The absence of light is dark
ness, the absence of heat is cold, the absence of order is confusion,
and so. the absence of original rigt^oujmessjsjlegpLvity ;,and this
is all thatTresidenTEowards intended to ex"press in the passage
quoted by the reviewer, in which he says there is no necessity, in
order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total na
tive depravity of the heart of man, to suppose any evil quality in
fused, but that the absence of positive good qualities is abundantly
sufficient. The reviewer, we presume, knows very well that this
is the common view adopted by those who hold the doctrine of
physical depravity, as it is styled by the New Divinity. He knew
that, according to their views, it is just as supposable that man
might be created with an " instinctive" disposition to love God, as
with the disposition to love himself, love society, his children, or
anything else ; that Adam was actually thus created, that this dis
position was not constitutional in the sense in which the instinct of
self-love is constitutional, but supernatural, resulting from his being
in communion with the Spirit of God ; that the human soul, instinct
with the dispositions of self-love, natural appetite, &c, and desti
tute of any disposition to take delight in God or holiness, is not in
its normal state, but in a state of moral degradation and ruin ; that
they believe there is a great difference between the state of the
soul when it comes into existence since the fall, and the state of
Adam's soul ; between the soul of an ordinary man and the state
of the soul of the blessed Jesus ; that this difference is prior to all
choice or agency, and not dependent upon them, and it is a moral
difference, Adam being in a holy state, instinct with holy disposi
tions, and men being in a state of moral corruption at the moment
of their coming into existence. He doubtless knew also, as his
own enumeration shows, that the phrase, original sin, has been
with great unanimity employed to designate this state of the soul
prior to moral action, and that the fact that all men actually sin,
and that their sinfulness is somehow connected with the sin of

298 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
Adam, is not the fact which the term has been employed (to any
extent) to express ; that, on the contrary, the one fact (the univer
sally sinful conduct of men) has been the standing argument to
prove the other fact, viz., innate inherent depravity ; and he
should, therefore, have seen that it is preposterous to assert that the
fact of all men actually sinning, and that this is somehow connected
with Adam's sin, is the fact expressed by the term original sin. If
this be so, then all Pelagians, and all Socinians, and all opposers
of the doctrine of original sin, still hold it. For they all believe
that men universally sin, and that this is somehow (by example, &c.)
connected with Adam's sin. The reviewer's saying, " that men sin,
and only sin, until renewed by the Holy Ghost," although it may
make a difference as to the extent of the wickedness of men, makes
none in the world as to the doctrine of original sin. This doctrine,
as it has been held by ninety-hundredths of the Christian church,
he rejects just as much as the Pelagians do.* We presume this
will be called an ad invidiam argument. It little concerns us what
it is called, if it is but just and proper in itself. What is the state
of the case ? Here are a set of men who hold certain opinions,
which they assiduously and ably advocate. Not content with al
lowing them to stand on their own merits, they seek to cover them
with the robes of authority, asserting that this, and that, and almost
every man distinguished for piety and talents, has held or does hold
them. When currency and favour are thus sought to be obtained
for these opinions, by claiming in their behalf the authority of ve
nerable names, is it not a duty to say and show that this claim is
unfounded, if such be really the case ? What means this arraying
against Mr. Rand the authority of Augustine, Calvin, Edwards,
Bellamy, Dwight, &c, &c. ? What is the object of this array, if it
is not to crush him, and sustain Mr. Finney ? And yet we presume
there is no fact in the history of theological opinions more notorious,
than that as to the points in debate they agree with Mr. Rand,
and differ from Mr. Finney. The earliest advocate of some of the
leading doctrines of the New Divinity, the author of Views in The
ology, instead of pursuing this objectionable and unworthy course,
came out with a distinct avowal of dissent from the generally re
ceived doctrines on this subject. The same honourable course was
taken by Dr. Cox ; by the late Mr. Christmas, in his sermon on
Ability ; by Mr. Duffield, in his recent work on Regeneration ; and
we venture to commend it to the reviewer as the right course, and,
if such a consideration need be suggested, as the most politic. We
have little doubt some of the advocates of the New Divinity have
suffered more in public confidence from taking the opposite course,
* The appeal which the reviewer makes to writings of the disciples of Dr. Emmons,
is, as he must know, entirely unsatisfactory. Though as to the verbal statement, that
sin consists in voluntary acts, there is an agreement, the whole view and relations of
the doctrine as held by him and them are different, and some of the most zealous op
ponents of the New Divinity are these very Emmonites, to whom he is constantly
appealing for protection.

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 299
than from their opinions themselves. And we suspect the review
er's pamphlet will be another mill-stone around their neck.
Another inference from the leading idea of this new system is,
that regeneration is man's own act, consisting in the choice of
God as the portion of the soul, or in a change in the governing pur
pose of the life. Mr. Finney's account of its nature is as fol
lows : " I will show," says he, " what is intended in the com
mand in the text (to make a new heart). It is that a man
should change the governing purpose of his life. A man resolves
to be a lawyer ; then he directs all his plans and efforts to that ob
ject, and that for the time is his governing purpose. Afterwards,
he may alter his determination and resolve to be a merchant. Now
he directs all his efforts to that object, and so has changed his heart,
or governing purpose." Again : " It is apparent that the change
now described, effected by the simple volition of the sinner's mind
through the influence of motives, is a sufficient change, all that the
Bible requires. It is all that is necessary to make a sinner a Chris
tian." This account of making a new heart, the reviewer undertakes to
persuade the public, is the orthodox doctrine of regeneration and
conversion. This he attempts by plunging at once into the depths
of metaphysics, and bringing out of these plain sentences a mean
ing as remote from their apparent sense, as ever Cabalist extract
ed from Hebrew letters. He begins by exhibiting the various
senses in which the words, will, heart, purpose, volition, &c, are
used. We question the accuracy of his statements with regard to
the first of these terms. He is right enough in distinguishing be
tween the restricted and extended meaning of the word, that is,
between the will considered as the power of the mind to determine
on its own actions, and as the power to choose or prefer. But
when he infers from this latter definition, that not only the natural
appetites, as hunger and thirst, but also the social affections, as
love of parents and children, &c, are excluded by Edwards and
others who adopt it, from the will, we demur. Edwards says that
" all liking and disliking, inclining or being averse to, being pleased
or displeased with," are to be referred to the will, and conse
quently it includes these affections. However, it is not to our pur
pose to pursue this subject. The reviewer claims, as usual,
to agree with Edwards, and excludes all such affections as love of
parents, love of children, &c., from the will, until they involve a
preference or choice ; as though every exercise of these affections
did not in their own nature involve such a preference, as much as
love, when directed to any object. He then makes the will and
heart synonymous (thus excluding love of children, &c, from the
heart), and proceeds to enumerate the various classification of vo
litions into principal, ultimative, subordinate, immanent, and im
perative, and winds up his elucidation and defence of Mr. Finney's
statement, by making his " governing purpose" to be equivalent
with an "immanent volition," or "the controlling habitual pre-

300 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
ference of the soul." We cannot understand by what rule of in
terpretation this sense can be got out of the preacher's expressions
in their connexion in the sermon. Certain it is the common usage
of language would never lead any reader to imagine that, in a plain
popular discourse, not in a metaphysical essay from an avowed
advocate of the exercise scheme, the phrase, a " governing pur
pose," meant an immanent volition ; or " to alter a determination,"
meant to change the supreme controlling affection or choice of the
soul. The reviewer himself betrays his conviction that this is not
the proper acceptation of the terms, for he complains of Mr.
Rand for making Mr. Finney's governing purpose mean no more
than a mere determination of the mind ; and yet the preacher
substitutes one of these expressions for the other, as, in his own
view, synonymous. He tells us " a man alters his determination,
and so has changed his heart or governing purpose." But suppos
ing we should admit that, taken by themselves, the words " go
verning purpose" might bear the sense the reviewer endeavours to
place under them, how is this to be reconciled with the preacher's
illustrations ? "A man resolves to be a lawyer ; then he directs all
his plans and efforts to that object, and that for the time is his
governing purpose: afterwards he may alter his determination, and
resolve to be a merchant ; now he directs all his efforts to that
object, and so has changed his heart or governing purpose." What
is the nature of the change involved in the alteration of a man's
purpose, with regard to his profession ? Is it a radical change of
the affections, or is it a mere determination of the mind, founded
on considerations of whose nature the determination itself can
give us no certain information ? As one man may make the
change from one motive, and another from another ; one from real
love to the pursuit chosen, and another from extraneous reasons ;
it is evident the change of purpose does not imply nor necessarily
involve a change in the affections. When, therefore, Mr. Finney
tells his hearers that the change required of them is a change
analogous to that which takes place when a man alters his deter
mination as to his profession, and that this is all that is required,
all that is necessary to make a sinner a Christian, he is justly re
presented as making religion to consist in a mere determination of
the mind. Whatever may be his esoteric sense, this is the mean
ing his words convey, and his hearers, we have no doubt, in nine
cases out of ten receive. This impression would be further con
firmed by their being told that it is a very simple change, effected
by a simple volition of their own minds ; and that it is a very easy
change, it being as easy to purpose right as wrong. The review
er's defence of this mode of representing a change, which is said
in scripture to be effected by the mighty power of God, strikes us
as singularly weak. He tells us, " there are two different senses
in which a moral act may be said to be easy or difficult to a man ;
the one referring to the nature of the act and the capacity of the
agent, that is, his possession of the requisite powers for its per-

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 301
formance ; and the other referring to the disposition and habit of his
mind in reference to the act." — P. 11. Thus we may say, it is as
easy to be generous as covetous, and that it is very difficult for a
covetous man to be generous. It is admitted then, that it is very
difficult for a man to do anything contrary to the disposition or
habit of his mind, and of course it must be exceedingly difficult to
make an entire and radical change in the affections. But Mr. Fin
ney says it is very easy to change the heart — to alter one's pur
pose. Would not this prove that he supposed the thing to be done
was not the thing which the reviewer represents to be very diffi
cult ? Does it not go to confirm the impression that he makes the
change in question to consist in a mere determination of the mind,
to the exclusion of a change in the affections ? When the ease of
the work to be done is urged as a motive for doing it, we have a
right to suppose that an easy work is intended. But the transfer
ring the affections from one object to another of an opposite charac
ter ; to love what we have been accustomed to hate, and to hate
what we have been in the habit of loving, is a difficult work, and
therefore not included in the mere alteration of one's purpose,
which is declared to be, and in fact is, so easy. Not only, there
fore, the mode of expression employed in describing a change of
heart, but the illustrations of its nature, and the mode of enforcing
the duty, are adapted to make precisely the impression which Mr.
Rand received from. the sermon, that conversion, in the judgment
of the preacher, is a very trifling affair, effected as easily as a
change in our plans of business ; and we have reason to know
that this is the impression actually produced on the minds of hear
ers by the preachers of this class, and on the minds of the friends
and advocates of the new system themselves. Such, we think, is
the natural and fair impression of the popular mode of represent
ing the subject ; and we very much question whether the meta
physical explanation of it amounts to anything more. It is one of
the most singular features of the review under consideration, that
although the writer seems willing to take shelter under any great
name, his principal reliance is on the advocates of Emmonism.
Yet it so happens that his system and theirs are exactly the poles
apart. In the <jne, divine agency is exalted to the real exclusion
of that of man ; in the other, very much the reverse is the case.
According to the one, it is agreeable to the nature of sin and virtue
to be created ; according to the other, necessary holiness is no
holiness, there cannot be even an " instinct" for holiness, to borrow
President Edwards's expression. The same expression, therefore,
in the mouth of the advocate of the one theory, may have a very
different meaning from what it has in that of an advocate of the
other ; and even if the idea be the same, its whole relations and
bearings are different. It is not, then, to the followers of Dr. Em
mons we are to go to learn what is meant by the immanent voli
tions, primary choices, or governing purposes of the New Divinity.
We must go, where the reviewer himself in another part of his

302 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
pamphlet sends us, to the advocates of the new system itself. We
find that when they come to give their philosophical explanation of
the nature of regeneration, it amounts to little more than the popu
lar representations of Mr. Finney. In the Christian Spectator, for
example, we find regeneration described as the choice of God, as
the chief good, under the impulse of self-love or desire of happi
ness. The sinner is, therefore, directed to consider which is
adapted to make him most happy, God or the world ; to place the
case fairly before his mind, and, by a great effort, choose right.
This, as we understand it, is a description, not of an entire and
radical change in the affections, but of a simple determination of
the mind, founded on the single consideration of the adaptation of
the object chosen to impart happiness. If I determine to seek one
thing because it will make me more happy than another (and if
any other consideration be admitted, as determining the choice, the
whole theory is gone), this is a mere decision of the mind ; it nei
ther implies nor expresses any radical change of the affections.
On the contrary, the description seems utterly inappropriate to
such a change. Does any man love by a violent effort ? Does he
ever, by summoning his powers for the emergency, by a volition
and in a moment, transfer his heart from one object to another ?
Was it ever known, that a man deeply in love with one person, by
a desperate effort and at a stroke destroyed that affection and ori
ginated another ? He may be fully convinced his passion is hope
less, that it will render him miserable, but he would stare at the
metaphysician who should tell him it was as easy to love one per
son as another, all he had to do was to energize a new volition and
choose another object, loving it in a moment with all the ardour of
his first attachment. As this description of an immanent volition
does not suit the process of a change in the affections in common
life ; as no man, by a simple act of the will, and by a strenuous
effort, transfers his heart from one object to another ; so neither
does it suit the experience of the Christian. We have no idea
that the account given in the Spectator of the process of regene
ration, was drawn from the history of the writer's own exercises,
nor do we believe there is a Christian in the world who can re
cognize in it a delineation of his experience. So far as we have
ever known or heard, the reverse of this is the case. Instead of
loving, by a desperate effort, or by a simple volition effecting this
radical change in the affections, the Christian is constrained to ac
knowledge he knows not how the change occurred. " Whereas I
was blind, now I see," is the amount of his knowledge. He per
ceives the character of God to be infinitely lovely, sin to be loath
some, the Saviour to be all he needs ; but why he never saw all
this before, or why it all appears so clear and cheering to him now,
he cannot tell.
We cannot but think that the impression made by the mode of
representation adopted by the New Divinity of this important sub
ject, is eminently injurious and derogatory to true religion ; that

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 303
the depravity of the heart is practically represented as a very
slight matter ; that the change, and the whole change, necessary to
constitute a man a Christian is represented as a mere determina
tion of his own mind, analogous to a change of purpose as to his
profession ; that a sense of his dependence on the Spirit of God is
almost entirely destroyed, and of course the Spirit himself dis
honoured. This latter evil results not merely from the manner in
which the nature of the change of heart is described, and the
ability of the sinner to effect it is represented, nor from the fact
that this dependence is kept out of view ; but also from the ideas of
the nature of agency and freedom of the will, which, as we have
before had occasion to remark, appear to lie at the foundation of
the whole system, as it has been presented in the Christian Spectator,
and from the manner in which the Spirit's influence is described
by many of the most prominent advocates of the theory. These
views of human agency are such, that God is virtually represented
as unable to control the moral exercises of his creatures ; that not
withstanding all that he can do, they may yet act counter to his
wishes, and sin on in despite of all the influence which he can exert
over them consistently with their free agency. If this be not to
emancipate the whole intelligent universe from the control of God,
and destroy all the foundations of our hopes in his promises, we
know not what it is. When sinners are thus represented as de
pending on themselves, God having done all he can, exhausted all
his power in vain for their conversion, how they can be made to
feel that they are in his hands, depending on his sovereign grace,
we cannot conceive. What the nature of the sinner's dependence
on the Spirit of God according to Mr. Finney is, we may learn
from the following illustration. " To illustrate the different senses
in which making a new hearJ," says the reviewer, " may be
ascribed to God, to the preacher, to the truth or word of God, and
to the sinner himself, Mr. F. supposed the case of a man arrested
when about to step over a precipice by a person crying to him,
stop ; and said, This illustrates the use of the four kinds of expres
sion in the Bible in reference to the conversion of a sinner, with
one exception. In the case supposed, there was only the voice of
the man who gave the alarm, but in conversion, there is both the
voice of the preacher and the voice of the Spirit ; the preacher
cries stop, and the Spirit cries stop too." — P. 28. On this subject,
however, the advocates of the system profess not to be united.
Mr. Finney and others maintain that there is no mystery about the
mode of the Spirit's operation ; the reviewer is inclined to think
there is : the one says, " there is no direct and immediate act ;" the
other, if he must adopt a theory, is disposed to admit that there is
an immediate influence on the mind. The reviewer lays little
stress on the difference, as both views, he says, have not only been
held by many Calvinistic divines, but in connexion with a firm be
lief of the absolute necessity and universal fact of the special
agency of the Holy Spirit in producing conversion. We are

304 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
aware of the diversity of representation as to this special point
among orthodox writers, but we are fully persuaded that whatever
may be the private opinions of those who preach as Mr. Finney is
represented to have done in this sermon, the impression made on
their audience of the necessity of divine influence, of the sinner's
dependence, is immeasurably below the standard of the divines to
whom the reviewer appeals in their justification. For an audience
to be told that all the Spirit does for them is to tell them to stop;
that, antecedently even to this influence, they may and can do all
that God requires ; and, what is part of the system of the Spec
tator, that subsequently or during the utmost exertion of this influ
ence, they may and can resist and remain unconverted ; is surely a
representation from which those divines would have revolted, and
which has a necessary tendency to subvert what the reviewer calls
the fundamental doctrine of the absolute necessity of the special
agency of the Holy Ghost in producing conversion.
We believe that the characteristic tendency of this mode of
preaching is to keep the Holy Spirit and his influences out of
view ; and we fear a still more serious objection is, that Christ and
his cross are practically made of none effect. The constant ex
hortation is, to make choice of God as the portion of the soul, to
change the governing purpose of the life, to submit to the moral
Governor of the universe. The specific act to which the sinner
is urged as immediately connected with salvation, is an act which
has no reference to Christ. The soul is brought immediately in
contact with God ; the Mediator is left out of view. We maintain
that this is another Gospel. It is practically another system, and a
legal system of religion. We do not intend that the doctrine of
the mediation of Christ is rejected, but that it is neglected ; that
the sinner is led to God directly ; that he is not urged, under the
pressure of the sense of guilt, to go to Christ for pardon, and
through him to God ; but the general idea of submission (not the
specific idea of submission to the plan of salvation through Jesus
Christ) is urged, or the making a right choice. Men are told they
have hitherto chosen the world, all they have to do is to choose
God ; that they have had it as their purpose to gain the things of this
life, and they must now change their purpose and serve God. Our
objection is not now to the doctrines actually held by these bre
thren, but to their characteristic method of preaching, the effects
of which we have had some opportunity of learning. Conviction
of sin is made of little account, Christ and his atonement are kept
out of view, so that the method of salvation is not distinctly pre
sented to the minds of the people. The tendency of this defect,
as far as it extends, is fatal to religion and the souls of men. The
happiness is, that sinners are not under the influence of this kind
of preaching alone ; their religious character is not entirely formed
by this mode of representing what God requires ; but when excited
by the pungency and power with which these brethren frequently
address the conscience, and when aroused to the necessity of doing

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 305
something to secure the favour of God, they are influenced by the
truth already lodged in their minds, or derived from the immediate
perusal of the scriptures ; and hence, under the influence of the
Spirit of God, instead of following the directions of their teachers
which would lead to God in some other way than through Christ,
they feel their need of the Saviour, and go to him as the Gospel
directs. It is in this way, we have no doubt, much of the evil of
this lamentable neglect of the grand doctrines of the Gospel is
prevented. But just so far as this defective mode of representing
the mode of salvation has any influence, it is to introduce a radi
cally new system of religion. We again remark, we do not doubt
that if these preachers were asked if they meant to leave Christ
thus out of view, and to direct sinners to God without his inter
vention, they would answer, No. But we are not speaking of
what they may believe on the subject, but of the manner in which,
both from the press and the pulpit, the great duty of the sinner
under the Gospel is presented.
It was our intention to call the attention of our readers to the
panacea which the reviewer has discovered (or rather undertaken
to recommend) for the cure of all doctrinal differences. But
our notice of his pamphlet has already been protracted to three
times the length we originally intended, and we therefore have
time to say but little on the subject. , His prescription is, to draw
a distinction between the doctrines of religion and the philosophy
of the doctrines, which, he justly remarks, is an important distinc
tion, which it is of the highest moment should be understood' and
properly applied. " The doctrines of religion are the simple facts
of Christianity. The philosophy of the doctrines is the mode adopt
ed of stating and illustrating those facts in their relations to each
other, to the human mind, to the whole character and government of
God. From this distinction results the following most important
practical principle of Christian fellowship and of theological dis
cussion. All who teach the leading facts or doctrines of Chris
tianity are orthodox, though they differ greatly in their philosophy
of those doctrines." — P. 31. The reviewer gives these passages
in italics, to note his sense of their importance. We are con
strained, however, to think that although they contain a very ob
vious and familiar truth, they are of little consequence for his pur
pose. The truth they contain is, that there is a distinction between
the essentials and non-essentials of a doctrine. We care little
about his calling doctrines facts. But how is this to aid any one
in deciding on what is heresy, and what is not ? The reviewer
chooses to say that the fact which all the orthodox must receive
respecting sin is, that it exists and that it is a dreadful evil. But
how its existence is accounted for, is philosophising about it. But
if I assert it exists by the immediate efficient agency of God, do not
I assert a fact as much as when I say it exists 1 Or, if I say it ex
ists because God cannot control a moral agent, do I not assert a
fact ? Again, the orthodox fact about man's natural character is,
20

306 THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.
that in consequence of the fall of Adam men sin, and only sin, until
renewed by the Holy Spirit ; the philosophy is in accounting for it.
But is it not obvious, that when the church declares that the uni
versality of actual sin is to be accounted for by a sinful corruption
of nature, she means to declare that the scriptures account for
one fact by another 1 When it is said, we are condemned for the
sin of Adam, is it not a fact again asserted ? We think, therefore,
the reviewer's distinction between facts and the philosophy of them,
perfectly futile. The use he would make of it is still worse. " All
who teach the leading facts of Christianity are orthodox." But
what are these facts ? Let the reviewer state them and then he is
orthodox ; let Edwards state them and he is a heretic. The sub
stance of the fact regarding man's character is, that somehow, in
consequence of the fall, he sins, and only sins, &c. Is not this a
bald petitio principiil That somehow may be the very thing which
the scriptures clearly reveal, and reveal as a fact. Again : it is a
fact that we are saved by the death of Christ — this we have stated
as the doctrine of atonement. Yet, as so stated, there is not a So
cinian in the world who is not orthodox on this point. This fact
is not all that the scriptures teach, nor that it is necessary to be
lieve. The death of Christ saves us, and saves us as a sacrifice.
That it operates in this mode, and not in another, is as much a
matter of fact, as that it operates at all. Again : it is a fact that
men are renewed and sanctified by the Holy Spirit. But here
again, all Arminians, Pelagians, and even Socinians, are ortho
dox ; for they admit the fact as much as the reviewer does (allow
ing them to make the spirit of God mean " divine energy"). They
and he might philosophise rather differently about it ; but the fact
they all admit. How the Spirit does the work is a matter of ex
planation ; some say, by an immediate influence on the mind ;
others, by moral suasion, or presenting motives ; others, by having
revealed the truth in the scriptures ; so that the result may be
ascribed either to the truth as the immediate cause, or to its re-
vealer, the Spirit. And so, finally, though illustrations might be
multiplied without end, the scriptures are a divine revelation ; here
is a fact in which it would seem all might acquiesce and be ortho
dox, without asking how God reveals truth to man. Yet this fact
the neologists of Germany hold and proclaim. It is true, when
they come to the philosophy of the fact, they tell us they mean
that the scriptures are a providential revelation from God, in the
same sense as the Dialogues of Plato.
It is too obvious to need comment, that the reviewer's position
is all that any man in the world, who professes any form of Chris
tianity, needs to prove his orthodoxy. Let him have the stating
of scriptural facts, and he will do as the reviewer in many cases
has done, state them so generally, that Arminians, Pelagians, and
Socinians, as well as Calvinists, can adopt them, and, according to
this standard, be orthodox.
We have spoken of this anonymous pamphlet with sincerity :

THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED. 307
that is, as we really felt. We view it as highly objectionable in
the respect to which we have principally referred. Whoever the
writer may be, we think he has more reason to lament having
given occasion to the Christian public to ask how his statements
can be reconciled with notorious facts, than to be offended at the
strictures to which it may, and ought to subject him.

ESSAY XIV.
BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.'

The doctrine of which this little book treats has always been
regarded as the cardinal doctrine of the Gospel. It was the bur
den of apostolical preaching ; the rock of offence to Jews and
Greeks ; the corner-stone of that temple in which God dwells by
his Spirit. The cross is the symbol of Christianity ; that in which
every believer glories, as the only ground of his confidence toward
God. The rejection of this doctrine, therefore, has always been
regarded, and is, in fact, a rejection of the Gospel. It is the repu
diation of the way of salvation revealed by God, and the adoption
of some method not only different but irreconcilable. Whatever,
therefore, affects the integrity of this doctrine, affects the whole
system of religion. It lies in such immediate contact with the
source of all spiritual life, that the very nature of religion depends
on the manner in which it is apprehended. Though all moral and
religious truths are in their nature sources of power, and never
fail to influence, more or less, the character of those who embrace
them, yet some truths are more powerful, and hence more impor
tant than others. We may speculate with comparative impunity
on the nature of angels, on the origin of evil, on the purposes of
God, on his relation to the world, and even on the grounds and
nature of human responsibility ; but when we come to the ques
tion : How am I to gain access to God ? how can I secure the
pardon of my sins and acceptance with Him ? what is the true
ground of hope, and what must I do to place myself on that ground
so as to secure the assurance of God's love, peace of conscience,
and joy in the Holy Ghost ? then the less we speculate the better.
The nearer we keep to the simple, authoritative statements of
God's word, the firmer will be our faith, the more full and free our
access to God, and the more harmonious and healthful our whole
religious experience. Such is the informing influence of such
experience, when it is genuine ; that is, when really guided by the
* Published in 1845, in review of a pamphlet entitled " Christ, the only Sacrifice ;
or the Atonement in its Relations to God and Man." By Nathan S. S. Beman,
D.D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Troy, New York.

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 309
Spirit and conformed to the revelation of God, that it effects a far
nearer coincidence of views in all the children of God than the
multiplicity of sects and conflicting systems of theology would lead
us to imagine. The mass of true Christians, in all denominations,
get their religion directly from the Bible, and are but little affected
by the peculiarities of their cree'ds. And even among those who
make theology a study, there is often one form of doctrine for
speculation, and another, simpler and truer, for the closet. Meta
physical distinctions are forgot in prayer, or under the pressure of
real conviction of sin, and need of pardon and of divine assistance.
Hence it is that the devotional writings of Christians agree far
nearer than their creeds. It may be taken for granted that that
mode of stating divine truth, which is most in accordance with the
devotional language of true Christians ; which best expresses those
views which the soul takes when it appropriates the doctrines of
the Gospel for its own spiritual emergencies, is the truest and the
best. How, then, does the believer regard the person and work of
Christ in his own exercises of faith, gratitude, or love ? What is
the language in which those exercises are expressed? If we look
to the devotional writings of the church, in all ages and countries, and
of all sects and names, we shall get one clear, consistent answer.
What David wrote three thousand years ago, expresses, with pre
cision, the emotions of God's people now. The hymns of the early
Christians, of the Lutherans, the Reformed, of Moravians, of British
and American Christians, all express the common consciousness
of God's people ; they all echo the words and accents in which the
truth came clothed from the mouth of God, and in which, in spite
of the obstructions of theological theories, it finds its way to every
believing heart. Now, one thing is very plain, Dr. Beman's theory
of the atonement never could be learnt from the devotional lan
guage of the church ; ours can. Everything we believe on the
subject is inwrought, not only in the language of the Bible, but in
the language of God's people, whether they pray or praise, whether
they mourn or rejoice. We have, therefore, the heart of the church
on our side, at least.
It lies on the very surface of the scriptures :— 1. That all men
are sinners. 2. That sin, for its own sake, and not merely to pre
vent others from sinning, deserves punishment. 3. That God is
just ; that is, disposed, from the very excellence of his nature, to
treat his creatures as they deserve, to manifest his favour to the
good, and his disapprobation towards the wicked. 4. That to pro
pitiate God, to satisfy his righteous justice, the Son of God assumed
our nature, was made under the law, fulfilled all righteousness,
bore our sins, the chastisement or punishment of which was laid
on him. 5. That by his righteousness, those that believe are con
stituted righteous ; that his merit is so given, reckoned or imputed
to them, that they are regarded and treated as righteous in the
sight of God. These truths, which lie on the surface of the scrip-

310 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
ture, are wrought into the very soul of the church, and are, in fact,
its life. Yet every one of them, except the first, Dr. Beman either
expressly or virtually denies.
He denies that sin for its own sake deserves punishment. He
everywhere represents the prevention of crime as the great end to
be answered by punishment, even in the government of God. If
that end can be otherwise answered, then justice is satisfied ; the
necessity and propriety of punishment ceases. This is the funda
mental principle of the whole system, and is avowed or implied
upon almost every page. His argument in proof that repentance
is not a sufficient ground for pardon, is that it has no tendency to
prevent crime in others. In human governments, he says, punish
ment is designed to prevent a repetition of crime by the criminal,
and to prevent its commission by others. The former of these
ends might be answered by repentance, but not the latter. So in
the case of the divine government, repentance on the part of the
sinner might, " so far as his moral feelings are concerned," render
it consistent in God to forgive, but then " Where is the honour of
the law ? Where is the good of the universe ?" — P. 57. The design
of " penalty is to operate as a powerful motive to obedience." — P.127.
There is, he says, the same necessity for atonement as for the
penalty of the moral law, and that necessity he uniformly repre
sents as a necessity " to secure the order and prosperity of the
universe."— P. 128.
It is of course admitted that the prevention of crime is one of
the effects, and consequently one of the ends of punishment. But
to say that it is the end, that it is so the ground of its infliction,
that all necessity for punishment ceases when that end is answered,
is to deny the very nature of sin. The ideas of right and wrong
are simple ideas, derived immediately from our moral nature.
And it is included in those ideas that what is right deserves appro
bation, and what is wrong deserves disapprobation, for their own
sake, and entirely irrespective of the consequences which are to
flow from the expression of this moral judgment concerning them.
When a man sins he feels that he deserves to suffer, or, as the apostle
expresses it, that he is " worthy of death." But what is this feel
ing ? Is it that he ought to be punished to prevent others from
sinning ? So far from this being the whole of the feeling, it is no part
of it. If the sinner were alone in the universe, if there was no
possibility of others being affected by his example, or by his im
punity, the sense of ill-desert would exist in all its force. For sin is
that which in itself, and for itself, irrespective of all consequences,
deserves ill. This is the very nature of it, and to deny this is to
deny that there is really any such thing as sin. There may be
acts which tend to promote happiness, and others which tend
to destroy it ; but there is no morality in such tendency merely,
any more than there is health and sickness. The nature of moral
acts may be evinced by their tendency, but that tendency does not
constitute their nature. To love God, to reverence excellence, to

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 311
forgive injuries, all tend to promote happiness, but no man, who
has a moral sense in exercise, can say that they are right only
because of such tendency. They are right, because they are right,
in virtue of their own inherent nature. And the opposite disposi
tions or acts are in their nature evil, irrespective of their tendency
to produce misery.
The theory that the end of punishment, even in the divine
government, is to prevent crime, is only one expression of the
more general theory, that happiness is the end of creation, and
that all holiness is resolvable into benevolence. This theory is a
product of the mere understanding, and does violence to the in
stinctive moral judgment of men. We know that holiness is some
thing more than a means ; that to be happy is not the end and
reason for being holy ; that enjoyment is not the highest end of
being. Our moral nature cannot be thus obliterated, and right and
wrong made matters of profit and loss. The command not to do
evil that good may come, would on this theory be a contradiction,
since that ceases to be evil which produces good.x All virtue is
thus resolved into expediency, and the doctrine that the end sanc
tifies the means becomes the fundamental principle of virtue. It
is strange that even when the moral feelings are in abeyance, and
men are engaged in spinning from the intellect, a theory that will
reduce to unity the conflicting facts of the moral world, they could
adopt a view which reduces all intelligent beings to mere recipients
of happiness, and degrades the higher attributes of their nature
into mere instruments of enjoyment ; a theory which meets its
refutation in every moral emotion, and which has proved itself
false by its practical effects. We may safely appeal to the convic
tions of every man's breast, against this whole theory, and against
the doctrine that sin is punished and deserves punishment only as
a warning to others. No man, when humbled under the sense of his
guilt in the sight of God, can resist the conviction of the inherent
ill-desert of sin. He feels that it would be right that he should be
made to suffer, nay, that rectitude, justice, or moral excellence
demands his suffering ; and the hardest thing for the sinner to be
lieve, is, often, that it can be consistent with the moral excellence
of God, to grant him forgiveness. Into this feeling the idea of
counteracting the progress of sin, or promoting the good of the
universe, does not in any measure enter. The feeling would be
the same though there were no universe. It is ill-desert and not
the general good, which every man feels in his own case, is the
ground of his just liability to punishment. And without this feel
ing there can be no conviction of sin. We may also appeal against
this metaphysical theory to the universal consciousness of men.
Though it is admitted that governmental reasons properly enter
into the considerations which determine the nature and measure of
punishment, yet it is the universal and intuitive judgment of men,
that the criminal could not be rightly punished merely for the pub
lic good, if he did not deserve to be punished irrespective of that

312 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
good. His suffering benefits the public because it is deserved ; it
is not deserved because it benefits the public. That this is the
universal judgment of men is proved by every exhibition of their
feelings on this subject. When any atrocious crime is committed,
the public indignation is aroused. And when the nature of that
indignation is examined, it becomes manifest that it arises from a
sense of the inherent ill-desert of the crime ; that it is a sense of
justice, and not a regard to the good of society which produces
the demand for punishment. To allow such a criminal to escape
with impunity, is felt to be an outrage against justice, and not
against benevolence. If the public good was the grand end of
punishment, then if the punishment of the innocent would promote
that most effectually, the innocent should suffer instead of the
guilty ; consequently if murders would be most restrained by the
execution of the wives and children of the assassins, it would be
right and obligatory to execute them, and not the perpetrators of
the crime. If this would shock every man, let him ask himself
why. What is the reason that the execution of an innocent woman
for the public good, would be an atrocity, when the execution of
the guilty husband is regarded as a duty ? It is simply because
the guilty deserve punishment irrespective of the good of society.
And if so, then the public good is not the ground of punishment
in the government of God, but the inherent ill-desert of sin. Men
in all ages have evinced this deep-seated sense of. justice. Every
sacrifice ever offered to God, to propitiate his favour, was an ex
pression of the conviction that the sin for its own sake deserved
punishment. To tell a man who brought his victim to the altar,
that the real philosophy of his conduct was to express a desire for
his own reformation, or for the good of society, would be a mock
ery. Such an idea never entered any human heart, when in the
presence of God and seeking his forgiveness.
It is not pretended that this theory is taught in the Bible. It pur
ports to be a philosophy. The Bible contradicts it on every page,
because every page contains some expression of genuine human
feeling, of the conviction of the real difference between right and
wrong, of a true sense of sin, or of the great truth that our re
sponsibility is to God, and not to the universe. The doctrine there
fore that sin is punished merely to preserve the 'order and pros
perity of the universe, is an utterly false and revolting theory ;
inconsistent with the intuitive moral judgments of men, subversive
of all moral distinctions, irreconcilable with the experience of
every man when really convinced of sin, and contradicted by every
thing the Bible teaches on the subject.
Dr. Beman again denies, and it is essential to his system that he
should deny, the justice of God. He admits that God has a dispo
sition to promote the welfare of his creatures, and so to order his
moral government as to make it produce the greatest amount of
happiness. This however is benevolence, and not justice. The
two sentiments are perfectly distinct. This our own consciousness

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 313
teaches. We know that pity is not reverence, that gratitude is
not compassion, and we know just as well that justice is not bene
volence. The two are perfectly harmonious, and are but different
exhibitions of moral excellence. The judge of all the earth must
do right. It is right to promote happiness, and it is right to punish
sin ; but to refer the punishment of sin to the desire to promote
happiness, is to attribute but one form of moral excellence to God,
and to make his excellence less comprehensive than our own.
Dr. Beman speaks of commutative, distributive, and general justice.
The former has relation only to the regulation of property, and
has nothing to do with this subject. Distributive justice consists
in the distribution of rewards and punishments, according to merit
or demerit. General justice, he says, embraces the general
principles of virtue or benevolence by which God governs the
universe. The second kind, he correctly says, is justice in the
common and appropriate sense of the word. — P. 131. When we
siy that he denies the justice of God, we mean that he denies that
justice, in its common and appropriate sense, is an essential attri
bute of the divine nature. There is nothing in his nature that leads
to the punishment of sin, but benevolence, or a regard to the hap
piness of the universe. If that is secured, sin and all sin may. go
unpunished for ever. This, we say, is a denial of divine justice.
It is a principle of our nature, and a command of God, that we
should regard him as absolutely perfect ; that every moral excel
lence which we find in ourselves we should refer to him in an infi
nite degree. Why do we believe that God is merciful, but because
he has so made us that we approve of mercy, and because he has
in his word declared himself to be full of compassion ? Our moral
nature is as much a revelation of God's perfections, as the heavens
are of his wisdom and power. If therefore he has implanted in us
a sentiment of justice, distinct from that of benevolence, we are con
strained by the very constitution of our nature to refer that perfection
to God. All men in fact do it. It enters into the sense of responsi
bility, into the nature of remorse, and into that fearful looking for
of judgment which manifest themselves in every human breast.
Men know that God is just, for they in their measure are just; and
they instinctively fear the punishment of their sins. To be told
that God is only benevolent, that he punishes only when the hap
piness of his government requires it, is to destroy our whole alle
giance to God, and to do violence to the constitution of our nature.
This is a doctrine that can only be held as a theory. It is in con
flict with the most intimate moral convictions of men. This, as
already remarked, is evinced by the sacrificial rites of all ages
and nations, which derive their whole character and import from
the assumption that God is just. If justice is merged into benevo
lence, they cease to have any significance as propitiatory offerings.
If, then, distributive justice, justice " in its common and appropriate
sense," is by the common consciousness of men declared to be a
virtue, it is thereby revealed to belong to God ; and he can no

314 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
more cease to be just, than he can cease to be benevolent or holy.
This is only saying that if moral excellence leads us to judge that
sin in itself deserves punishment, then the infinite moral excellence
of God cannot but lead him to treat it as it deserves.
Again : it is included in our conception of God as absolutely in
dependent and self-sufficient, that the reasons of his acts should be
in himself. He is absolutely perfect, he acts with undeviating rec
titude, and by so acting he promotes the highest good of his crea
tures. But the good of his creatures is not the end of his actions,
for of him and through him and to him are all things. It is to sub
ordinate God to the creature, to make the creature the end of his
actions. He rewards one man and punishes another, not because
he will thus make others happy, but because it is right, and by doing
right the greatest good to others is the result. This is the view
which both reason and scripture present of God as infinite and
self-sufficient, who is the beginning and the end of all things. It is
hence plain how the justice of God necessarily flows from his ho
liness. He is so holy that he delights in all that is good, and hates
all that is evil ; and if he acts agreeably to his nature, he constant
ly manifests this love of excellence and hatred of sin. But what
is reward and punishment but the manifestation of the approbation
or disapprobation of God? If holiness is communion with him, sin
is alienation from him ; if his favour goes out towards the one, his
displeasure goes out towards the other ; if the one is attracted, the
other is repelled. The attributes of God are not so many distinct
qualities, but one perfection of excellence, diversified in our concep
tions, by the diversity of the objects towards which it is manifested.
The justice of God is therefore nothing but the holiness of God in
relation to sin. So long as he is holy, he must be just ; he must
repel sin, which is the highest idea we can form of punishment.
To say then that God punishes only for governmental reasons, is to
destroy our very conception of his nature.
That distributive justice is an essential attribute of God, is there
fore revealed to us in the very constitution of our nature, in which
we find a sense of justice, which is no more a form of benevolence
than it is of reverence. It is revealed in all the operations of con
science ; in the common consciousness of men, as expressed in all
their prayers, confessions and sacrificial rites. It is revealed in the
scriptures in every possible way ; in all they teach of the nature
of God, of his holiness, of his hatred of sin, of his determination
to punish it ; in the institution of sacrifices, and in the law. If the
precepts of the law are an expression of the divine perfection, so
is the penalty. If the one declares what it is right for God to re
quire, the other declares what it is right for him to inflict. If God
(does not command us to love him, merely to make his dominions
happy, neither does he punish merely for the public good. The
law is a revelation of what is right, and God will require and do
right for its own sake, and not for another and a lower end. God
then is just, and Dr. Beman and his theory, by denying that there

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 315
is any such attribute in God as justice distinct from benevolence,
do equal violence to conscience, reason, and the Bible.
Dr. Beman, again, denies that Christ made a true and proper
satisfaction to divine justice, and thus departs from the common
faith of Christendom, and seriously vitiates the whole doctrine of
redemption. It is well known that at the time of the Reformation
there was no controversy between Protestants and Romanists either
as to the necessity or nature of the atonement. All classes of Pro
testants and the church of Rome itself, united in teaching, 1. That
the Son of God having assumed our nature obeyed and suffered in
our stead, thereby making a true, proper, and complete satisfaction
for our sins. And 2. That his righteousness was so given or im
puted unto us as to constitute us righteous in the sight of God. The
Romanists even reproached Protestants for not coming up to their
doctrine on this subject, insisting that the satisfaction of Christ was
not only full and equivalent, but superabundant. " Pretium," says
the Cat. Rom. i., 5, 15, "quod Christus pro nobis persolvit, debits
nostris non par solum et aequale fuit, verum ea longe superavit"
It is one of the standing heads of theology in the Romish systems,
Satisfactio Christi fuit de rigore justitiae, which they prove ; and
answer the common Socinian objections, viz., that such a satisfac
tion destroys the grace of salvation ; that it is impossible that the
temporal sufferings of Christ should have such efficacy, &c. As
to their views of the second point above mentioned, it is enough to
quote the following passage from Turrettin, vol. ii., p. 709. " It is
not questioned," he says, " whether the righteousness and merit of
Christ are imputed to us ; for this the Papists dare not deny. The
Council of Trent, sess. vi., c. 8, says, ' Christ by his most holy pas
sion on the cross merited justification for us, and satisfied God the
Father in our behalf, and no one can be righteous to whom the
merits of the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ are not communi
cated.' Hence Vasques in 1. ii., q. 114, disp. 222, chap, i., says,
' We concede that not only what is within us, as sin, faith, right
eousness, may be imputed to us, but also what is without us, as the
merits and obedience of Christ ; because not only what is within,
but also what is without, on account of which something is given
to us, is said to belong to us (ad aliquem effectum),as though they
were really our own.' Bellarmin, lib. ii., de Justif., cap. vii., ac
knowledges the same thing, when he says, ' If Protestants meant
only that the merits of Christ are imputed to us, because God gives
them to us, so that we can present them to God for our sins, he
having assumed the burden of making satisfaction for us, and of re
conciling us to the Father, the doctrine would be true.' This is in
fact precisely what we do mean. For when he adds, ' we hold
that the righteousness of Christ is so imputed to us, as by it we be
come formally or inherently just,' he asserts what is gratuitous and
false, on account of his own perverse and preposterous theory of
moral justification."*
* It is characteristic of the church of Rome that while she holds the truth, she con-

316 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
The Lutheran church held the strictest form of doctrine as to
the nature of Christ's satisfaction, and as to justification. That
church teaches that the sufferings of Christ were strictly penal, that
his obedience and death made a full and proper satisfaction to the
law and justice of God, and are "'imputed to the believers as the sole
ground of their justification. We cannot swell our article with
numerous citations in proof of a well known fact. In the Apology
for the Augsburg Confession, p. 93, it is said. " Christus, quia sine
peccato subiit poenam peccati, et victima pro nobis factus est, sus-
tulit illud jus legis, ne accuset, ne damnet hos qui credunt in ipsum,
quia ipse est propitiatio pro eis, propter quam justi reputantur." In
the Form of Concord, it is said, " Justitia ilia, quae coram Deo fidei
aut credentibus et mera gratia imputatur, est obedientia, passio, et
resurrectio Christi, quibus file legi nostra causa satisfecit et peccata
nostra expiavit." — P. 684. Again, p. 696. " Humana natura sola,
sine divinitate, aeterno omnipotent! Deo neque obedientia, neque
passione pro totius mundi peccatis satisfacere valuisset. Divinitas
vero sola sine humanitate inter Deum et nos mediatoris partes im-
plere non potuisset. Cum autem. . . . obedientia ilia Christi
non sit unius duntaxat naturae, sed totius personae ; ideo ea est per-
fectissima pro humano genere satisfactio et expiatio ; qua aeternae
et immutabili justitiae divinae . . . satis est factum.-'
It will not be necessary to prove that the Reformed churches
held precisely the same doctrine. There was no controversy be
tween them and the Lutherans either as to the nature of the satis
faction of Christ, or as to justification. They differed only as to the
design of Christ's death, whether it had respect equally to all men,
or had a special reference to his own people, a point which we
hope to have room to discuss in the sequel of this article. We are
now concerned only about the nature of the atonement. Bretsch-
neider states, in a few words, the common doctrine on this subject
of the two great divisions of the Protestant world. After saying
that God, according to that doctrine, is immutably just, and there
fore must punish sin, and yet being immutably benevolent, he de
termined to provide redemption, he proceeds, " For this it was ne-
,' cessary, 1. That some one in the place of men should fulfil the
law which they ought to have kept, and 2. That some one should
endure the punishment (Strafen) which they had incurred. This
no mere man could do, for no man (since all are subject to original
sin) could perfectly keep the law, and every man must suffer for
his own sin. Neither could any divine person accomplish the task,
since he could not sustain suffering and punishment. He alone
who is at once God and man, with a human nature free from sin,
trives to make it of no effect by her traditions. Thus while she teaches that the merit
of Christ is the ground of our justification, she makes those merits accessible only
through her ministrations, and confounds justification and sanctification. And while
she holds the truth as to the nature of Christ's satisfaction, she chooses to confine it
to original and mortal sins, that she may make room for her own doctrine of satisfac
tion by good works and penances. The infinite value of the Saviour's merit, she per
verts as a source whence to derive the power to grant indulgences, &c.

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 317
could accomplish the work."* This righteousness, he adds, "God
imputes to men as though they had wrought it out themselves."
Against this doctrine of satisfaction to the divine justice the So
cinians were the first to object.f Under the pressure of their ob
jections the Remonstrants in Holland gave way, and Grotius in his
work, De Satisfactione Christi, though defending in the main the
catholic or common doctrine, introduced the principle, that the
satisfaction of Christ was rendered to the governmental justice of
God. Very far below the doctrine of Grotius, in many important
respects, is the theory of Dr. Beman. In some cases he falls even
below Socinus. " God, as the supreme governor," he says, " must
so conduct all his movements, whether of justice or mercy, as to
leave on the minds of dependent creatures a deep and just impres
sion, that the penalty of the law will be executed, and that the sin
ner must perish. To fix this impression indelibly in the breast of
the sinner, is the object of the atonement." — P. 41. J This, however,
is probably a lapsus, such an one, however, as few men could make.
He generally includes other intelligent creatures. Still, with him,
the atonement is a mere method of instruction ; a means to exhibit
a certain truth for the moral restraint or improvement of those to
whom it is made known. The gratuitous forgiveness of sin, it is
said, would tend to produce the impression that God was indifferent
to his law, and that sin might be committed with impunity. To
counteract that impression, to teach, or declare that sin was, in the
sight of God, an evil, and would be punished, and thus to open a
way to exercise mercy, without weakening the motive to obedience,
is the design of the death of Christ. Justice, in its " common ap
propriate sense," he says, " was not satisfied by the atonement of
Jesus Christ." — P. 131. "The law, or justice, that is, distributive
justice, as expressed in the law, has received no satisfaction at all."
— P. 133. So far as the atonement secured the government of God
from the evils of gratuitous forgiveness, it was a satisfaction to his
benevolence, but not to justice in any other sense. — P. 182. It
was designed to teach a certain truth ; it is " a symbolical and sub
stantive expression of God's regard to the moral law." — P. 35. "It
furnishes an expression of his regard for the moral law," and
" evinces his determination to punish sin." — P. 91. " To fix inde
libly this impression on the heart of the sinner is the object of the
atonement." — P. 42.
Our first remark on this subject, after showing, as we think we
* Bretschneider's Handbuck der Dogmatik, vol. ii. , p. 266.
f In the Racovian Catechism, it is asked, "Did Christ die that he might, properly
speaking, merit our salvation, or, in like manner, properly speaking, discharge the
debt due for our sins ? Ans. Although Christians generally now hold that opinion,
yet the sentiment is false, erroneous, and exceedingly pernicious."
J Socinus taught that the atonement was designed, 1. To confirm the new cove
nant and all its promises, especially those of the pardon of sin, and of eternal life.
2. To assure us of the love of God. 3. To induce us to embrace the Gospel. 4. To
encourage us by his example to trust in God. 5. To abrogate the old dispensa
tion, &c.

318 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
have done, that the whole basis of this theory is false, is that it is
destitute of any semblance of support from scripture. It hardly
purports to be anything more than a hypothesis on which to
reconcile what the Bible teaches with our views of moral govern
ment. It is a device to make the atonement rational, to explain
away the mystery which hangs over it, and makes the whole
august transaction perfectly intelligible. Dr. Beman says that the
doctrine of the atonement enters "into the very texture of revela
tion, warp and woof." It is, he says, " the vital principle, in the
very heart of the Gospel." — P. 62. Surely then we have a right
to have it treated as " a purely biblical question," as he affirms it
to be. Yet in his chapter on the nature of the atonement, as far
as we can find, he refers but to one solitary text in the whole
Bible I It is a theory woven warp and woof out of the under
standing, not even out of the conscience. The solitary passage
which Dr. Beman cites as teaching his doctrine is Rom. iii. 25,
where it is said that God set forth Christ as a propitiation for our
sins, to declare his righteousness. " The object of the atonement,"
he says, " is here stated in explicit terms. It was required and
made in order to open a consistent way for the publication of par
don, or for the exercise of grace to sinners. Its purpose was to
declare the righteousness or moral rectitude and perfection of God
in dispensing, in this instance, with the literal execution of the
penalty of the law, and in bestowing eternal life upon those who
deserved to die." — P. 124. He afterwards, p. 132, says, the
words just and righteousness as here used have " no direct refer
ence to law," but express " those principles of virtue or benevo
lence by which we are bound to regulate our conduct, and by
which God governs the universe." Then of course the passage
might be rendered, " Christ was set forth as a propitiation to de
clare the benevolence of God, that he might be benevolent even in
remitting the sins of those that believe ;" an interpretation which
needs no refutation. The first remark then to be made on this
passage is, that it teaches the very reverse of what it is cited to
prove. Dr. Beman himself says that in their " common and appro
priate sense," the words just and justice have reference to law, and
express what he calls distributive justice. Then if the language
of the apostle is to be taken in a " common and appropriate sense,"
it teaches that the propitiation of Christ was designed as an exhi
bition of justice in its proper sense, in order to make it apparent
that God was just even in remitting sin ; that the demands of
justice had not been sacrificed, but on the contrary fully satisfied.
It is only by taking the words in a sense that is inappropriate and
unusual, that any other doctrine can be got out of the passage.
Besides, Dr. Beman's interpretation is not only in direct opposition
to the common meaning of the words, but to the necessary sense
of the context. Satisfaction to justice is the formal idea of a pro
pitiation ; and saying that Christ was a propitiation, is only saying
in other words, that our sins were laid on him, that he bore the

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 319
chastisement or punishment of our sins, in order that God might
be just, in justifying those that believe. Again : this interpretation
is agreeable to the sense in which the words just, righteous,
righteousness, &c, are familiarly used by the apostle. Is God
unrighteous, he asks, who taketh vengeance ? Rom iii. 5. He
denounces the divine judgment, by saying, God will cut short the
work in righteousness. Rom. ix. 28. See also 2 Thess. i. 5, 6.
The obvious sense then of the passage in Romans iii. 25, is the op
posite to that which Dr. Beman gives it*
But if we admit that the passage in question does teach that the
atonement was designed to set forth God's regard for the good of
the universe, what then ? would it establish Dr. Beman's theory ?
Far from it. It is one of the most common fallacies of theological
writers, to seize upon some one passage, and shutting their eyes
to all others, assume that it teaches the whole truth on a given
subject. The death of Christ was designed to answer manifold
ends, more perhaps than it has yet entered into the heart of man
to imagine. It would be the extreme of folly to take one of those
ends, and infer that its attainment was its whole design, or let us
into the full knowledge of its nature. Is it not said a hundred
times that the death of Christ was designed to exhibit the love of
God ? does this prove that it does not display his righteousness ?
It is said to declare his wisdom ; does that prove it does not dis
play his love ? It was designed to bring us unto God, but does
that prove it was not also an atonement ? It is not by taking any
one view, or any one text, that we can arrive at the truth. We
must have a theory which will embrace all the facts ; a doctrine
which includes all the revelations God has made on this subject.
The objection to Dr. Beman's view of the design of Christ's death
is not that it is false, but that it is defective. It states only a part,
and a subordinate' part of the truth. The atonement is an exhi
bition of God's purpose to maintain his law and to inflict its penalty,
and thus to operate as a restraint and a motive on all intelligent
beings, because it involves the execution of that penalty. It is
this that gives it all its power. It would be no exhibition of jus
tice, if it were not an exercise of justice ; it would not teach that
the penalty of law must be inflicted, unless it was inflicted. We
hold all the little truth there is in Dr. Beman's doctrine, but we
hold unspeakably more.

* " We see ourselves obliged," says Tholuck, " to admit, in this place, the idea of
distributive justice (vergeltende Gerechtigkeit)."- He afterwards says that the loss of
that idea in theology has occasioned "unspeakable evil," and that the doctrine of
atonement " must remain sealed up until it is acknowledged." See his Romerbrief,
ed. 1842. He refers with approbation to Usteri's exposition of this passage in his
Paulinischer Lehrbegriff. On turning to that author we find he says, his object is to
prove "that the representation contained in Rom. iii. 24, 25, viz., that God, to de
clare his righteousness, laid on Christ the punishment of the sins of men, is the doc
trine of Paul." And he accordingly goes on to prove it, particularly from Rom. viii.
3. Usteri is one of those writers who do not feel called upon to believe what the
scripture teaches, though they make it a point of honour to state its meaning fairly.

320 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
Our immediate object, however, is to call attention to the entire
absence of all scriptural support for this theory. We have already
shown that the only passage directly referred to does not teach
what it is cited to prove, and that if it did, it would give no sup
port to the theory built upon it. The surprising fact, however,
should be more distinctly noticed, that while the Bible is said to be
full of the doctrine of atonement, scarcely an attempt is made to
prove its nature from the Bible. Christ is said to be a sacrifice, to
bear our sins, to be a propitiation, a ransom, &c, &c but no
attempt is made to tell us what all this means. There is no exa
mination of the terms, no elucidation of the meaning they bore in
the age of the apostles. The writer does not even pretend to
found his theory upon them. In the chapter in which he gives his
own view of the nature of the atonement, they are scarcely even
mentioned. The whole affair is a piece of pure Rationalistic spe
culation, formed on certain principles of moral philosophy which
have nothing to do with the Bible. It is assumed that happiness
is the end of all things ; that to promote happiness is the essence
of virtue ; that the prevention of crime, which causes misery, is
the end of punishment ; that the death of Christ, as it tends to pre
vent crime, supersedes the necessity of punishment. There is the
theory. And we can hardly avoid saying that it has more affinity
with Jeremy Bentham, and " the greatest happiness" system, than
it has with the Bible, or with the sympathies of Christians.
Our next remark on this theory is that it is perfectly arbitrary.
The Bible teaches that Christ was a sacrifice, that he bore our
sins, that the chastisement of our peace was laid upon him ; that
he propitiated God ; was a ransom ; was made sin, that we might
be made righteous. These and similar statements set forth the
nature of the atonement. There are many others describing some
of its manifold effects. It declared the justice of God, exhibited
his wisdom, set us an example, purifies his people, and in short,
glorifies God and promotes the best interests of his kingdom. If
you take in the former statements, there is perfect unity in all
these representations. The work of Christ is a display of the jus
tice and love of God, it leads men to repentance, and exerts this
moral influence on the universe, because it is a satisfaction to
divine justice, and answers the demands of his law. But if the
scriptural account of its nature be rejected, then it is a matter to
be arbitrarily decided, which of its effects shall be selected as de
termining its character. If Dr. Beman says it is an atonement
because it expresses God's regard to the order and welfare of his
government ; Socinus may say, it is an atonement because it
assures us of the love of God. The one is just as much right as
the other ; for both are right as far as they go ; but both are
arbitrary in selecting what suits their taste, or their philosophy,
and rejecting all the rest. Dr. Beman does not pretend that his
doctrine is taught in those passages of scripture which really
describe the nature of the atonement, neither does Socinus. Both

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 321
say all that is figurative. The one says its nature is to be infer
red from one of its effects, the other from another ; the one con
siders it as designed mainly to teach God's rectoral justice, the
other his love. ^ It is perfectly plain that on this plan the citadel is
surrendered. Dr. Beman can have nothing to say to the Socinian,
which the Socinian cannot retort on Dr. Beman. Both admit that
we are saved by the death of Christ ; the one affirming that it is
because it brings us to repentance, and thus makes our forgiveness
consistent with the character of God and the interests of his
kingdom ; the other, that it is because it reconciles forgiveness
with the good of the universe, in a different way.
It may also on this ground be made a fair subject of debate,
which view really assigns most importance to the death of Christ.
Is it clear that fear is more conservative than love ? that the exhi
bition of God's regard to law would have a greater effect in pro
moting holiness than the exhibition of his mercy ? We very
much doubt it. And we confess ourselves very much at a loss to
see, why the Socinian view of the design of the Redeemer's death
should be regarded as a rejection of the doctrine of atonement, if
his death was merely designed to exert a conservative influence
on the moral government of God. Certain it is that this is not the
doctrine against which the early Socinians contended.
It is further plain that the principles of interpretation which Dr.
Beman is obliged to adopt to reconcile his theory with the Bible,
are all that is wanted to serve the purpose of Socinians. They
both deny that we are to take the language of scripture according
to its " common and appropriate sense," and agreeably to the mode
of thinking prevalent in the age in which it was uttered. The
vastly different views entertained by Dr. Beman and Socinus as to
the person of Christ, make of course a corresponding difference
in their whole religious system. But as to the nature of the atone
ment, we have always considered the ground advocated by Dr.
Beman, as utterly untenable against the arguments of Socinians.
It is a rejection of the scriptural account, and after that is done,
one theory has as much authority as another.
Our third remark is, that this theory, besides being independent
of scripture, and perfectly arbitrary, is directly opposed to the ex
plicit teaching of the word of God. Be it remembered that the
Bible is admitted to be full of the doctrine of the atonement ; that
it is the great central point in the religion of redeemed man.
It is also admitted that God has revealed not only the fact that we
are saved by the obedience and death of Christ, but also the way
in which his work is efficacious to that end. The Socinian says,
it is by its moral effect upon men ; Dr. Beman says, it is from its
tendency to prevent crime and preserve the order of the universe ;
' the common faith of Christendom is, that Christ saves us by satis
fying the demands of law and justice in our stead. As the Bible
is full of this doctrine it must enable us to decide which of these
views is right, for the Bible was intended to teach us the way of
21

322 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
salvation. We are taught then first, that Christ bore our sins.
Heb. ix. 28, 1 Pet. ii. 24, Is. liii. 12, &c. It cannot be disputed
that the usual scriptural meaning of the expression, to bear sin, is
to bear the punishment due to sin. Lev. xxii. 9. If they keep
not my ordinance " they shall bear sin for it." Num. xviii. 22,
xiv. 33, Lev. v. 1, 17. " He is guilty, and shall bear his iniquity."
Ez. xviii. 20. " The soul that sinneth it shall die. The son shall
not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the
iniquity of the son." No one doubts that this means, me son shall
not be punished for the sins of the father, nor the father for the
sins of the son. When therefore the scriptures say that Christ
bore our sins, they say in express terms, that he bore the punish
ment of our sins. This is rendered the more certain, because he
bore them by suffering, or by dying ; and because the scriptures
express this same idea in so many other ways. > This account of
the nature of the atonement is found not only in poetical descrip
tions of Christ's sufferings, but in the most didactic portions of the
Bible. The language used had an established sense in the minds
of those to whom it was addressed, who could not fail to under
stand it according to its obvious meaning. That meaning, there
fore, we are bound, by all sound rules of interpretation, to believe
the sacred writers intended to convey. How does Dr. Beman
answer this ? Does he attempt to show that the phrase " to bear
sin" does commonly mean to bear the punishment of sin ? or that
it has not that meaning when used in reference to Christ ? As far
as we have been able to find, he contents himself with some gene
ral remarks against taking figurative language in its literal sense.
He subjects the passages, in which the phrase in question occurs,
to no critical examination. He makes no attempt to show that
figurative language may not convey a definite meaning, or that
that meaning is not to be learnt from usage, and the known
opinions of those to whom it is addressed. It is enough for him
that he does not like the truth, which the passages in question
would then teach ; that he cannot see how the innocent could so
take the place of the guilty as to bear their punishment ; that he
cannot reconcile this doctrine with the justice of God, nor with
his views of other portions of scripture. In the meantime the
plain meaning of the scriptures stands, and those who find all other
scriptural representations consistent with .that meaning, and to
whom it is in fact the very ground of their hope towards God, will
receive it gladly, and in all its simplicity. The theory of Dr.
Beman, then, which denies that Christ suffered the penalty due to
our sins, must be admitted to be in direct conflict with these ex
press declarations of the word of God.*
* Prof. Stuart, in his Commentary and Excursus on Heb. ix. 28, says, " To bear the
sins of others, is to bear or endure the penalty due to them." Having proved this,
he adds, " The sentiment of the clause then clearly is, that Jesus by his death
(which could take place but once), endured the penalty that our sins deserved, or
bore the sorrows due lo us," What he further says, that the sufferings of Christ

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 323
Secondly, the scriptures, in order to teach us the nature of atone
ment, say that Christ offered himself as a sacrifice unto God.
What, then, is, according to the scriptures, a sacrifice for sins ?
" The essence of a propitiatory sacrifice," says Storr, " is the for
giveness of sin, through the transfer of punishment from the actual
offender to another."* The moderate Bishop Burnett says : " The
notion of an expiatory sacrifice which was then, when the New
Testament was writ, well understood all the world over, both by
Jews and Gentiles, was this, that the sin of one person was trans
ferred on a man or beast, who upon that was devoted or offered to
God, and suffered in the room of the offending person ; and, by this
oblation, the punishment of the sin being laid on the sacrifice, an
expiation was made for sin, and the sinner was believed to be
reconciled to God."f That this is the correct view of the scrip
tural doctrine concerning sacrifices, may be inferred : — 1. From
its being confessedly the light in which they were generally
regarded by the Jews and by the whole ancient world, and from
its being a simple and natural explanation of the service. On this
hypothesis, everything is significant and intelligible. 2. From the
express didactic statements of the Bible. The life is said to be in
the blood, and "I have given it to you as an atonement for your
souls ; for it is the blood that maketh atonement for the soul (life)."
Lev. xvii. 11. The very nature of the service, then, was the sub
stitution of life for life. The life forfeited was redeemed by the life
paid. 3. From all the rites connected with the service, and all the
expressions employed concerning it. There was to be confession
of sin, imposition of hands (as expressing the idea of transfer and
substitution), the sins were said to be laid on the head of the vic
tim, which was then put to death, or, as in the case of the scape
goat, dismissed into the wilderness, and another goat sacrificed in
its place. All these directions plainly teach that the nature of
expiatory offerings consisted in the substitution of the victim for
the offender, and in the infliction of the penalty of death incurred
by the one upon the other. 4. That this is the scriptural doctrine
on this subject, is made still plainer by the fact, that all that is
taught by saying that the Messiah bore our sins, that our iniquities
were laid upon him, that he bore our sorrows, that the chastise
ment of our peace was laid on him, is expressed by the prophet
by saying, He made " his soul an offering for sin." Then an
offering for sin is one on whom sin is laid, who bears sins, i. e., as
has been shown, the penalty due to sin. 5. This view of the sub
ject is further confirmed by a consideration of the effects ascribed

were not in all respects, and considered in every point of view, an exact and" specific
quid pro quo, as it regards the penalty threatened against sin, that the Saviour did
not suffer a guilty conscience, or despair, would be pertinent, had he first proved
that any respectable body of Christians held any such doctrine, or that a guilty con
science, or despair, is an essential part of the penalty of the law.
* Zweck des Todes Jesu. § 8.
f Burnet on the Thirty-nine Articles. Article 2.

324 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
to these sacrifices. They made atonement ; they propitiated God ;
they secured the remission of the penalty incurred. When an
Israelite had committed any offence by which he forfeited his
standing in the theocracy (that is, the favour of God as his theo-
cratical ruler), he brought to the priest the appointed sacrifice,
made confession of his sin, the victim was slain in his place, and
he was restored to his standing, and saved from being cut off from
his people. These sacrifices always produced these effects ; they
always secured the remission of the theocratical penalty for which
they were offered and accepted. Whether they secured the for
giveness of the soul before God, depended on the state of mind of
the offerer. Of themselves they had no such efficacy, since it was
impossible that the blood of bulls and goats could take away sin.
But nothing is plainer from scripture than that the way in which
the Israelites obtained the remission of the civil or theocratical
penalties which they had incurred, was intended to teach us how
sin is pardoned in the sight of God through Jesus Christ.
If, then, the Bible, according to the almost unanimous judgment
of Christians, teaches that the idea of an expiatory sacrifice is, that
! by vicarious punishment justice is satisfied and sin forgiven ; if this
was the view taken of them by Jews and Gentiles, then does the
Bible, in so constantly representing Christ as a propitiation, as a
lamb, as a sacrifice for sin, expressly teach that he bore the penalty
due to our sins, that he satisfied divine justice, and secured, for all
in whose behalf that sacrifice is accepted, the pardon of sin and
restoration to the divine favour. To talk of figure here is out of
the question. Admit that the language is figurative, the question
is, what idea was it intended to convey? Beyond doubt that
which the sacred writers knew with certainty would be attached
to it by their immediate readers, and which, in fact, has been
attached to it in all ages of the church.* To tell a conscience-
stricken Israelite that a sacrifice was designed either to impress
his own mind, or the mind of others, with the truth that God is just
or benevolent, would have been a mockery. It was to him an
atonement, a propitiation, a vicarious punishment, or it was nothing.
And it is no less a mockery to tell a convinced sinner that the death
of Christ was designed to lead him to repentance, or to preserve
the good order of the universe. Unless the Redeemer was a sacri
fice, on whom our sins were laid, who bore the penalty we had
incurred, it is, to such a sinner, no atonement, and no adequate
ground of confidence toward God. f
* " It is not possible for us to preserve," says Bishop Burnet, " any reverence for
the New Testament, or the writers of it, so far as to think them even honest men,
not to say inspired men, if we can imagine, that in so sacred and important a matter
they could exceed so much as to represent that a sacrifice which is not truly so. This
is a subject which will not bear figures and amplifications ; it must be treated strict
ly, and with a just exactness of expression."— Burnet on the Thirty-JVine Articles,
the same page quoted above.
f " The innate sense of divine justice, which all men possess, demands that the
sinner should receive his due, that the stroke he has given to the law, should recoil

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 325
Again : it is a part of the common faith of the church, that Jesus
Christ is a true and proper priest ; that what was symbolical and
figurative with regard to other priests, is real as it regards him. He
is called a priest ; it is proved that he has all the qualifications for
the office ; that he was divinely appointed ; that he performed all
its duties, secures all its benefits ; and that his priesthood super
sedes all others. We are accordingly commanded to come to
him in the character of a priest ; to commit our souls into his hands,
that he may reconcile us to God, and make intercession for us.
This is the scriptural method of representing the manner in which
Christ saves us, and the nature of his work. Dr. Beman, in his
chapter on the " Fact of the Atonement," which is directed against
Socinians, avails himself of all the usual sources of scriptural proof;
and, in the course of the chapter, is forced to speak of Christ as a
sacrifice and a Priest. But when he comes to the exposition of his
views of the nature of the atonement, he finds it expedient, and even
necessary, to leave that mode of representation entirely out of
view. We hear no more of propitiating God, of Christ as a sacri
fice, of his character as a Priest. It is now all moral government,
the order and interest of the universe, symbolical teaching, exhibi
tion of truth and motives. Why is all this ? Why does not Dr.
Beman's doctrme admit of being thrown into the scriptural form ?
Why must the terms sacrifice, priest, propitiation, be discarded
when teaching the nature of the atonement ? For the very obvi
ous reason that there is an entire incongruity between his views
and the word of God. What has a sacrifice and priest to do with
governmental display? This fact alone works the condemnation
of Dr. Beman's whole theory. His plan of salvation, his method
of access to God, is irreconcilable with that presented in the scrip
tures. There we are taught that, as the Israelite who had offended
came to the priest, who made an atonement for him in the appointed
way, and thus reconciled him to God, so the penitent sinner must
come to Christ as his High Priest, who satisfies the divine justice
by presenting his own merits before God, and who ever lives to
upon himself. The deeper his sense of guilt, the less can he be satisfied with mere
pardon, and the more does he demand punishment, for by punishment he is justified.
Whence do we derive his intimate persuasion of God's justice ? Not from without ;
because men, as empirically guided, regard freedom from suffering as the highest
good ; it must therefore be implanted in our nature by God himself. The holiness of
God, which reveals itself to the sinner by the connexion between suffering and trans
gression, has, therefore, a witness for itself in every human breast. Hence, on the one
hand, the proclamation of pardon and reconciliation could not satisfy the conscience
of the sinner, unless his guilt had been atoned for by punishment ; and on the other
hand, divine love could not offer its blessings to the sinner, unless holiness was re
vealed together with love. It was therefore necessary that suffering commensurate
with the apostasy of man should be endured, which men would impute to themselves
as their own. Such was the suffering, inward and outward, of the Redeemer. Two
things were necessary, 1. That those sufferings should correspond to (entsprechen)
the greatness of the sin of mankind ; 2. That the sinner could rightfully impute
them to himself."— Tholuck, Beilage ii., zum Hebraerbrief, p. 104. There is more
real and precious truth, according to our judgment, in that short paragraph, than in
all Dr. Beman's book.

\

326 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
make intercession for him. Would this representation ever lead a
human being to imagine that Christ merely makes pardon possible
— that his death was a symbolical lesson to the universe ? Accord
ing to Dr. Beman's theory, Christ is not a priest. We are under
no necessity of recognizing him as such, nor of committing our
selves into his hands, nor of relying on his merits and intercession.
A mere possibility of salvation for all men is all that Christ has
accomplished. But does this make him a High Priest in the scrip
tural and universally received sense of the term ?
A third method by which the scriptures teach us the nature of
the atonement, is by express declarations concerning the nature of
his sufferings, or the immediate design of his death. It is expressly
taught that his sufferings were penal, that he endured the penalty
of the law, and that he thus suffered not for himself but for us.
This is a point about which there is so much strange misconcep
tion, that it is necessary to explain the meaning of the terms here
used. The sufferings of rational beings are either calamities, hav
ing no reference to sin, or chastisement designed for the improve
ment of the sufferer, or penal when designed for the satisfaction of
justice. Now, what is meant by the language above used is, that
the sufferings of Christ were not mere calamities ; neither were
they chastisements (in the sense just stated), nor were they simply
exemplary, nor merely symbolical, designed to teach this or that
truth, but that they were penal, i. e., designed to satisfy divine jus
tice. This is the distinctive character assigned to them in scrip
ture. Again : by the penalty of the law is meant that suffering
which the law demands as a satisfaction to justice. It is not any
specific kind or degree of suffering, for it varies both as to degree
and kind, in every supposable case of its infliction. The sufferings
of no two men that ever lived, are precisely alike, in this world or
the next, unless their constitution, temperament, sins, feelings, and
circumstances were precisely alike, which is absolutely incredible.
The objection therefore started by Socinians, that Christ did not
suffer the penalty of the law, because he did not suffer remorse,
despair, or eternal banishment from God, was answered, by cotem
porary theologians, by denying that those things entered essential
ly into the penalty of the law. That penalty is in scripture called
death, which includes every kind of evil inflicted by divine justice
in punishment of sin ; and inasmuch as Christ suffered such evil,
and to such a degree as fully satisfied divine justice, he suffered
what the scriptures call the penalty of the law. It is not the na
ture, but the relation of sufferings to the law, which gives them their
distinctive character. What degree of suffering the law demands,
as it varies in every specific case, God only can determine. The
sufferings of Christ were unutterably great ; still with one voice,
Papists, Lutherans, and Reformed, rebutted the objection of Soci
nus, that the transient sufferings of one man could not be equivalent
to the sufferings due to the sins of men, by referring, not to the de
gree of the Saviour's anguish, as equal to the misery due to all for

1 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 327
whom he died, but to the infinite dignity of his person. It was the
Lord of glory who was crucified. As the bodily sufferings of a
man are referred to his whole person, so the scriptures refer the
sufferings of Christ's human nature to his whole person. And he
was a divine, and not a human person ; but a divine person with a
human nature. This is an awful subject, on which all irreverent
speculation must be very offensive to God. Let it be enough to
say with the scriptures that Christ suffered the penalty of the law
in our stead, and that the penalty of the law was that kind and
amount of suffering, which, from such a Person, was a full satisfac
tion to the divine justice. All that our standards say on this point,
they say wisely, viz., that the Saviour endured the miseries of this
life, the wrath of God, the accursed death of the cross, and conti
nued under the power of death for a time. This was the penalty
of the law ; for the wrath of God, however expressed, constitutes
that penalty, in its strictest and highest sense.
That the scriptures do teach that Christ's sufferings were penal,
has already been proved from those passages in which he is said
to bear our sins, that our iniquities were laid upon him, that he suf
fered the chastisement of our peace, and that as a sacrifice he en
dured the death which we had incurred. The same truth is ex
pressed still more explicitly in Gal. iii. 13. The apostle thus
argues. The law pronounces accursed all who do not obey every
command ; no man has ever rendered this perfect obedience, there
fore all men are under the curse ; but Christ has redeemed us from
the curse of the law, having been made a curse for us. There can
be no doubt what the apostle means, when he says, that all men
are under the curse ; nor when he says, cursed is every one who
continueth not in all things written in the law to do them ; neither
can it be doubted what he means when he says, Christ was made
a curse. The three expressions, under the curse, accursed, and
made a curse, cannot mean essentially different things. If the former
mean that we were exposed to the penalty, the latter must mean
that Christ endured the penalty. He hath redeemed us from the
curse by bearing it in our stead.*
To the same effect the apostle speaks in Rom. viii. 3. What
the law could not do (i. e., effect the justification of men) in that it
was weak through the flesh, that God did, having sent his Son in
the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, or as a sin-offering, he con
demned, i. e., punished sin, in the flesh, i. e., in him, who was clothed
in our nature. This passage agrees, as to the principal point, with
the one cited from Galatians. The sentence which we had incur-

* In this interpretation every modern commentator of whom we have any know
ledge concurs, as for example, Koppe, Flatt, Winer, Usteri, Matthias, Ruckert, De
Wette. What the apostle adds in the next verse, " For it is written, cursed is every
one that is hung upon a tree," is evidently intended to justify from scripture the use
of the word curse. Those publicly exposed as suffering the sentence of the law,
are called cursed; hence, since Christ, though perfectly holy, did bear the sentence
of the law, the word may be properly applied to him.

328 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
red was carried into effect upon the Redeemer, in order that we
might be delivered from the law under which we were justly con
demned. In 2 Cor. v. 21, the apostle, in urging men to be recon
ciled to God, presents the nature and mode of the atonement, as
the ground of his exhortation. " For he hath made him to be sin
for us, who knew no sin, that we might become the righteousness
of God in him." The only sense in which Christ, who was free
from all sin, could be made sin, was by having our sins laid
upon him ; and the only way in which our sins could be laid upon
him, was by his so assuming our place as to endure, in our stead,
the penalty we had incurred. " God made him to be sin," says De
Wette, " in that he laid on him the punishment of sin." Here again
we have precisely the same doctrine, taught under all the other
forms of expression already considered. Christ was made sin, as
we in him are made righteousness ; we are justified, he was con
demned ; we are freed from the penalty, he endured it ; he was
treated as justice required the sinner to be treated ; we are treated
according to his merits and not our own deserts.
Fourthly, there are various other forms under which the scrip
tures set forth the nature of Christ's death, which the limits of a re
view forbid our considering. He has redeemed us ; he has pur
chased us ; he gave himself as a ransom, &c. It is readily admit
ted that all these terms are often used in a wide sense, to express
the general idea of deliverance without reference to the mode by
which that deliverance is effected. It cannot, however, be denied
that they properly express deliverance by purchase, i. e., by the
payment of what is considered equivalent to the person or thing
redeemed. In the Bible it is not simply said that Christ has deliver
ed us ; nor is it said he delivered us by power, nor by teaching, but
by his death, by his own precious blood, by giving himself, by being
made a curse for us. Such representations cannot fail to convey
the idea of a redemption in the proper sense of the term, and there
fore teach the true nature of the atonement We are redeemed ;
that which was given for us was of infinite value.
If the scriptures thus teach that Christ saves us by bearing our
sins, or being made a sin-offering in our place, then the more
general expressions, such as he died for us, he gave himself for us,
we are saved by his death, his blood, his cross, and others of a simi
lar kind, are all to be understood in accordance with those more
explicit statements. To the pious reader of the New Testament,
therefore, the precious truth that Christ died as our substitute, en
during in his own person the death which we had incurred, re
deeming us from the curse by being made a curse for us, meets him
upon almost every page, and confirms his confidence in the truth
and exalts his estimate of its value, by this frequency of repetition
and variety of statement.
Fifthly, there is still another consideration in proof of the unscrip-
tural character of Dr. Beman's theory, which is too important to
be overlookeJ. The apostle, in unfolding the plan of redemption

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 329
proceeds on the assumption that men are under a law or covenant
which demands perfect obedience, and which threatens death in
case of transgression. He then shows that no man, whether Jew
or Gentile, can fulfil the conditions of that covenant, or so obey the
law as to claim justification on the ground of his own righteous
ness. Still, as this law is perfectly righteous, it cannot be arbitra
rily set aside. What then was to be done ? What hope can there
be for the salvation of sinners? The apostle answers by saying,
that what the law could not do (that is, save men), God has ac
complished by the mission of his Son. But how does the Son save
us ? This is the very question before us. It relates to the nature
of the work of Christ, which Dr. Beman has undertaken to discuss.
Paul's answer to that question is, that Christ saves us by being made
under the law and fulfilling all its demands. He fulfilled all right
eousness, he knew no sin, he was holy, harmless, and separate of
sinners. He bore our sins in his own body on the tree, and thus
endured the death which the law threatened against sin. He has
thus redeemed us from the law ; that is, we are no longer under
obligation to satisfy, in our own person, its demands, in order to our
justification. The perfect righteousness of Christ is offered as the
ground of justification, and all who accept of that righteousness by
faith, have it so imputed to them, that they can plead it as their
own, and God has promised to accept it to their salvation. We
can hardly persuade ourselves that any ordinary reader of the
Bible can deny that this is a correct representation of the manner
in which Paul preached the Gospel. It is the burden of all his
writings, it is the Gospel itself as it lay in his mind, and as he pre
sented it to others. It is the whole subject of the first eight chap
ters of his Epistle to the Romans, and of all the doctrinal part of
his Epistle to the Galatians. In the former of these epistles, he
shows that there are but two methods of justification, the one by
our own righteousness, and the other by the righteousness of God.
Having shown that no man has or can have an adequate right
eousness of his own, he shows that- the Gospel reveals the right
eousness of God, that is, the righteousness which is by faith in
Jesus Christ, and which is upon all them that believe. This
righteousness is so complete, that God is just in justifying those
who have the faith by which it is received and appropriated. He
afterwards illustrates this great doctrine of imputed righteous
ness by a reference to the case of Adam, and shows that as on
account of the offence of one man a sentence of condemnation
passed on all men, so, on account of the righteousness of one man,
the free gift of justification has come upon all. As by the disobe
dience of one the many were made sinners, so by the obedience
of one the many are made righteous. It is involved in all this, that
we are no longer under the law, no longer subject to its demand
of a perfect personal righteousness, but justified by a righteousness
which satisfies its widest claims. Hence the apostle so frequently
asserts, ye are not under the law, ye are free from the law. But

330 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
how ? not by abrogating the law, or by dispensing with its right
eous claims, but legally, as a woman is free from her husband, not
by deserting him, not by repudiating his authority, but by his ceas
ing to have any claim to her, which continues only so long as he
lives. So we are freed from the law by the body of Christ, i. e.,
by his death. He was made under the law that he might redeem
them who were under the law ; he hath redeemed us from its
curse by being made a curse for us, he has taken away the hand
writing which was against us, nailing it to the cross. There is,
therefore, now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus,
because we are by this Gospel freed from the law and its condem
nation. Hence Paul teaches that if righteousness (that is, what
satisfies the demands of the law) could have come in any other
way, Christ is dead in vain. How exclusively this righteousness
of Christ was the ground of the apostle's personal confidence, is
plain from his pregnant declaration to the Philippians, that he
counted all things but dung, that he might win Christ, and be found
in him ; not having his own righteousness, but that which is through
the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith.
With this representation of the plan of salvation, Dr. Beman's
theory is utterly irreconcilable. According to his theory, the de
mands of the law have not been satisfied. The relation of the
sinner to the curse which this law pronounces against the trans
gressor, is" legally — not evangelically — just the same that it was
without an atonement " The law has the same demand upon
him, and utters the same denunciation of wrath against him. The
law or justice, that is distributive justice, as expressed in the law,
has received no satisfaction at all." — P. 133. What then has
Christ's atonement done for us ? He has simply opened the way
for pardon. " All that the atonement has done for the sinner,"
says Dr. Beman, " is to place him within the reach of pardon." —
P. 137. " The way is now open. Mercy can now operate. The
door is open." — P. 106. The atonement " was required and made
in order to open a consistent way for the publication of pardon, or
for the exercise of grace to sinners." — P. 124.
This theory directly contradicts the apostle's doctrine ; 1. Be
cause he teaches that Christ was made under the law for the pur
pose of redeeming them that are under the law, and that he was
made a curse for us. We are therefore delivered from the law,
as a covenant of works, and are not subject to its demands and its
curse when united to him. 2. Because it virtually denies that
Christ wrought out any righteousness which is the ground of our
justification. He merely makes pardon possible, whereas Paul
says that by his obedience we are made righteous, that we become
the righteousness of God in him. On this new theory, the lan
guage of the apostle, when he speaks of not having his own right
eousness, but the righteousness which is by faith of Jesus Christ,
is unintelligible. 3. It destroys the very nature of justification,
which is an act of God's free grace, wherein he pardoneth all our

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 331
sins and accepteth us as righteous in his sight only for the right
eousness of Christ, imputed unto us and received by faith alone."
But according to this theory there is no such thing as justification ;
we are merely pardoned. In scripture, however, and in all lan
guages, the ideas of pardon and justification are distinct and in a
measure opposite.* If we are justified, we are declared righteous.
That is, it is declared that, as concerns us, on some ground or for
some reason, the law is satisfied ; and that reason Paul says must
either be our own righteousness, or the righteousness of Christ.
Dr. Beman's theory admits of no such idea of justification. The
sinner is merely forgiven, because the death of Christ prevents
such forgiveness doing any harm. This is not what the Bible
teaches when it speaks of our being made the righteousness of God
in Christ ; or of his imputing righteousness to us ; or of our re
ceiving the gift of righteousness. This is not what the convinced
sinner needs, to whom, not mere pardon, but justification on the
ground of a righteousness which, though not his own, is his, as
wrought out for him and bestowed by the free gift of God, is neces
sary to peace with God. — Rom. v. 1.
4. It destroys the nature of justifying faith and deranges the
whole plan of salvation. In accordance with the scriptures, faith
in Jesus Christ is, in our standards, declared to be a saving grace,
whereby we receive and rest upon him alone for salvation, as he
is offered to us in the Gospel. This is perfectly natural and intelli
gible, if Christ is our righteousness. If his work of obedience and
death is the sole ground of justification before God, then we under
stand what the Bible means by believing upon Christ, putting our
trust in him, being found in him ; then the phrase, faith of Christ,
which so often occurs as expressing the idea of a faith of which
he is the object, has its appropriate meaning. Then too we under
stand what is meant by coming to Christ, receiving Christ, putting
on Christ being in Christ. Upon Dr. Beman's theory, however,
all this is well nigh unintelligible. We admit that a vague sense
may be put on these expressions on any theory of the atonement,
even that of the Socinians. If the death of Christ is necessary to
salvation, either, as they say, by revealing the love of God, or as
Dr. Beman says, by revealing his regard for law, then to believe
in Christ, or to receive Christ, might be said to mean, to believe
the truth that without the revelation made by his death, God would
not forgive sin. But how far is this from being the full and natural
import of the terms I Who would ever express mere acquies
cence in the fact that Christ has made salvation possible, by saying,
" I would be found in him not having mine own righteousness, but
the righteousness which is by faith of Jesus Christ 1" The fact is,
the Socinian view is in some respects much easier reconciled with
scripture than that of Dr. Beman. The passage just quoted, for
* " The word StKaiovv," says De Wette, " means not merely negatively to pardon ;
but also affirmatively to declare righteous."

332 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
example, might have this meaning, viz., we must have, not the moral
excellence which the law can give, but that inward righteousness
of which faith in Christ is the source. This would have some
plausibility, but what "the righteousness which is by faith of
Jesus Christ" can mean, as opposed to our own righteousness, on
Dr. Beman's ground, it is hard to conceive.
Again : according to the Bible and the common doctrine of the
church, when a sinner is convinced of his sin and misery, of his
entire unworthiness in the sight of God, he is to be directed to re
nounce all dependence upon himself and to believe in Christ, that
is, to place all his confidence in him. But if Christ has only made
salvation possible, if he has merely brought the sinner within the
reach of mercy, this is a most unnatural direction. What has the
sinner to come to Christ for ? Why should he be directed to re
ceive or submit to the righteousness of God ? Christ has nothing
to do for him. He has made salvation possible, and his work is
done ; what the sinner has to do is to submit to God. The way
is open, let him lay aside his rebellion, and begin to love and
serve his Maker. Such are the directions, which this theory would
lead its advocates to give to those who are convinced of their sin
and danger. This is not a mere imagination ; such are the direc
tions, commonly and characteristically given by those who adopt
Dr. Beman's view of the atonement. Christ disappears in a great
measure from his own Gospel. You may take up volume after
volume of their sermons, and you will find excellent discourses
upon sin, obligation, moral government, regeneration, divine sove
reignty, &c, but the cross is comparatively kept out of view.
Christ has no immediate work in the sinner's salvation ; and ac
cordingly the common directions to those who ask, what they
must do to be saved, are, submit to God, choose him and his service,
or something of similar import. To such an extreme has this been
carried, by some whose logical consistency has overcome the influ
ence of scriptural language and traditionary instruction, that they
have not hesitated to say that the command, Believe in Christ, is
obsolete. It was the proper test of submission in the apostolic age,
but in our day, when all men recognise Christ as the Messiah, it is
altogether inappropriate. We doubt not that thousands who agree
substantially with Dr. Beman, would be shocked at this language ;
nevertheless it is the legitimate consequence of his theory. If the
atonement is a mere governmental display, a mere symbolical
method of instruction, then the command to believe in "Christ, to
come to him, to trust in him and his righteousness, is not the lan
guage in which sinners should be addressed". It does not inform
them of the specific thing which they must do in order to be saved.
Christ has opened the door, their business is now immediately with
God. Again : can any reader of the Bible, can any Christian at least,
doubt that union with Christ was to the apostles one of the most
important and dearest of all the doctrines of the Gospel ; a doc-

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 333
trine which lay at the root of all the other doctrines of redemption,
the foundation of their hopes, the source of their spiritual life.
But according to the theory that Christ's death is a mere symboli
cal method of instruction, an expression of a great truth, that it
merely opens the way for mercy, what can union with Christ
mean ? In what sense are we in him ? how are we his members?
How is it that we die, that we live, that we are to rise from the
dead in virtue of that union ? What is meant by living by faith
of which he is the object ? The fact is, this theory changes the
whole nature of the Gospel ; everything is altered ; the nature of
faith, the nature of justification, the mode of access to God, our
relation to Christ, the inward exercises of communion with him,
so that the Christian feels disposed to say with Mary, " They have
taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him."
We do not believe there is truth enough in this theory to sustain
the life of religion in any man's heart. We have no idea that
Dr. Beman, Dr. Cox, or any good man really lives by it. The
truth, as it is practically embraced and appropriated by the soul
under the influence of the Holy Spirit, is the truth in the form in
which it is presented in the Bible, and not as expressed in abstract
propositions. It is therefore very possible for a man to adopt
theoretically such an abstract statement of a scriptural doctrine,
as really denies its nature and destroys its power, and yet that
same man may receive the truth for his own salvation as it is re
vealed in the Bible. We see daily instances of this in the case of
Arminians, who professedly reject doctrines, which are really in
cluded in every prayer they utter. In like manner we believe that
many who profess to adopt the theory, that the death of Christ
merely opens the way for mercy, that it is only the symbolical ex
pression of a moral truth, deny that theory in every act of faith
they exercise in Jesus Christ. Still the theory is none the less
false and dangerous. It has its effect, and just so far as it ope
rates, it tends to destroy all true religion. Its tendency, especially
in private Christians, is counteracted by reading the scriptures and
by the teaching of the Spirit. But the evil of the constant incul
cation of error and mirepresentation of truth, cannot easily be
exaggerated. The particular error concerning the nature of the
atonement inculcated in this book, has, we believe, done more to
corrupt religion, and to promote Socinianism, than any other of
the vaunted improvements of American theology, which, after all,
are but feeble reproductions of the rejected errors of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.
The doctrine of atonement for which we contend as the dis
tinguishing and essential doctrine of the Gospel, is, 1. That sin for its
own sake deserves the wrath and curse of God. 2. That God is
just, immutably determined, from the excellence of his nature, to pun
ish sin. 3. That out of his sovereign and infinite love, in order to
redeem us from the law, that is, from its demands and curse, he sent
his own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, who in his own person

334 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
fulfilled those demands, and endured that curse in our stead. That
his righteousness, or merit, thus wrought out, is imputed to every
one that believes, to his justification before God. This is the doc
trine of the church catholic, overlaid, corrupted and made of none
effect, in the church of Rome ; disembarrassed, reproduced, and
exhibited as the doctrine of the Reformation ; in manifold forms
since opposed or rejected, but ever virtually embraced and trusted
in by every sincere child of God.
What then are the objections to this great doctrine ? The first ob
jection urged by Dr. Beman is, that it involves " a transfer of moral
character between Christ and those for whom he died. Christ could
not be punished on legal principles, until he was guilty in the eye of
the law ; and his people could not be justified on legal principles, till
its penalty was literally inflicted. This transfer of character, so as to
render Jesus Christ the sinner, and the soul for whom he died, inno
cent, appears to us without foundation in reason and scripture." The
objection then is, that the doctrine that Christ endured the punish
ment of our sins, and that we are justified by the imputation of his
righteousness, involves such a transfer of moral character as to ren
der Jesus Christ a sinner, and those for whom he died innocent. This
objection is directed, not against this or that individual writer, but
against whole bodies and classes of men, for Dr. Beman over and
over asserts that there are but two views of the atonement, the one
against which he brings this and other objections, and his own
governmental theory. We have already shown that the former
is the common doctrine of all the churches of the Reformation.
It is against them, therefore, this objection is brought. Our first
remark on it is, that it is the old, often repeated, and often refuted
slander of Socinians and Papists, the latter corrupting and denying
the doctrine of their own church. Our second remark is, that it
is a gross, shocking, and, we are constrained in conscience to add,
wicked misrepresentation. Dr. Beman betrays his want of faith
in the truth of the accusation, though he makes it against hun
dreds and thousands of his brethren, by saying that a doctrine
which represents Jesus Christ as a sinner, " appears to us without
foundation in reason and scripture !" Shocking blasphemy appears
to us without foundation ! What man who believed what he said
could utter such language ? Is this the way in which a doctrine
which represents the Son of God a sinner, is to be spoken of? No,
Dr. Beman knew full well, that the doctrine he writes against, in
cludes no such blasphemy. He cannot be so grossly ignorant as
not to know that the distinction between the imputation and the
infusion of sin and righteousness, is one for which the churches of
the Reformation contended as for their life ; and that the distinc
tion is plain, intelligible, scriptural, and unavoidable — one which he
and all other men do make, and must make. When the prophet says,
" the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," does Dr. Beman
pretend to believe, that he means that the moral character of the
father shall not be transferred to the son? that the sin of the one

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 335
shall not be infused into the other ? Why then does he pretend to
believe (for we hope it is mere pretence), that when we say, our
sins were laid on Christ, we teach that our moral character was
so transferred to him as to render him a sinner ? Our third remark
is, that the objection is glaringly unjust. We say, in the very lan
guage of scriptures, that Christ bore our sins. We tell in what
sense we understand that language, viz., that it means, not that
Christ was rendered in a moral character a sinner, which is blas
phemy, but that he bore the punishment of our sins, which is the
universally admitted meaning of the scriptural phrase. We say
further, that by punishment we mean sufferings judicially inflicted
as a satisfaction to justice. These things are so plain, they have
been so often repeated, they so evidently do not involve the shock
ing doctrine charged on those who use this language, that we can
have little respect for the man who can gravely and tamely repeat
the charge, to the prejudice of the truth, and to the wounding of
his brethren.
Dr. Beman's second objection is, that the system he opposes de
stroys " all mercy in God the Father, in the salvation of sinners,
because it represents God as totally disinclined to the exercise of
compassion, till every jot and tittle of the legal curse was inflicted.
On the same principle, grace or pardon in the release of the sinner
from future punishment would be out of the question ; for what
grace, or pardon, or favour, can there be in the discharge of a
debtor whose demand (debt ?) has been cancelled to the uttermost
farthing?" — P. 122. This objection is the staple of his book. On
page 100 he represents us as teaching that " the Son of God en
dured the exact amount of suffering due, on legal principles, to sin
ners." On page 107, he says, " The amount of Christ's sufferings
must consequently be the same as the aggregate sufferings included
in the eternal condemnation of all those who are saved by his
merit  The agonies which he suffered were equal to
the endless misery of all .those who will be saved by his interpo
sition in their behalf." On page 146, he says, "If one soul were
to be saved by the atonement, Christ must sustain an amount of
' suffering equal to that involved in the eternal condemnation of that
one soul ; and if a thousand were to be saved a thousand times
that amount, and in the same proportion for any greater number
who are to be rescued from perdition and exalted to glory. To
this scheme there are insurmountable objections." True enough,
but who hold that scheme ? Dr. Beman attributes it to all who
believe in the atonement, and do not adopt his scheme, for he says
there are but two. This doctrine, that the sufferings of Christ
amounted to the aggregate sufferings of those who are to be saved,
that he endured just so much for so many, is not found in any con
fession of the Protestant churches, nor in the writings of any
standard theologian, nor in the recognized authorities of any church
of which we have any knowledge. The whole objection is a gross

336 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
and inexcusable misrepresentation.* In a more moderate form it
was brought forward by the Socinians, and repelled by the writers
of that and subsequent ages. De Moor is generally recognised as
the theologian of most authority among the churches of Holland,
and Turrettin is admitted to be one of the strictest of the Geneva
school, and they both answer this calumny, by denying that, ac
cording to their doctrine, there is any necessity for the assumption
that Christ's sufferings were equal to the sufferings of all his peo
ple. Thus Turrettin, after quoting at length the objection from
Socinus, answers it," 1. By showing that the scriptures teach
that the one death of Christ was a satisfaction for all ; that as by
the one sin of Adam many were made sinners, so by the righteous
ness of Christ many are made righteous. 2. By insisting on the
distinction between pecuniary and penal satisfaction. A piece
of money in the hand of a king is of no more value than in the
hands of a peasant, but the life of a king is of more value than
that of a peasant, and one commander is often exchanged for many
soldiers. 3. He says the adversaries forget that Christ is God,
and therefore though his sufferings could not be infinite, as they were
endured by his finite nature, they were of infinite value in virtue
of the infinite dignity of his person. Sin, he says, is an infinite
evil, because committed against an infinite God, through the act of
a finite nature. So the sufferings of Christ, though endured in his
human nature, are of infinite value from the dignity of his person, f
Dr. Beman, under this head, frequently objects that we degrade
the atonement into a mere commercial transaction, a payment of a
debt, which, from the nature of the case, excludes the idea of
free remission. Our first remark on this objection is, that the
scriptures use this same figure, and therefore it is right it should
be used. When it is said, Christ purchased the church with his
own blood, that we are redeemed not with corruptible things as
silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, such lan
guage means something. In every metaphor there is a point of
comparison ; the essential idea involved in the figure must be
found in the subject to be illustrated. To purchase is to acquire,
and to acquire by giving or doing something which secures a title to
the thing acquired. When it is said that Christ purchased the
church, it is certainly meant that he acquired it, that it is his, and
that by his death he has secured a title, to it, founded in the justice
and promise of God. This does not make redemption a commer
cial transaction, nor imply that there are not essential points of
diversity between acquiring by money and acquiring by blood.
Hence our second remark is, that if Dr. Beman will take up any
* There was a little anonymous work called Gethsemane, republished some years
ago in this country, which taught this quid pro quo system of the atonement. But
we do not know a single man, now of our church, who adopted the sentiments of
that work.
t See the fourth vol. of his works, the treatise De Satisfactione Christi, -p. 289.
The same answer to the same objection may be seen in De Moor, vol. iii., p. 1030.

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 337
elementary work on theology, he will find the distinction between
pecuniary and penal satisfaction clearly pointed out, and the satis
faction of Christ shown to be of the latter, and not of the former
kind. 1. In the one, the demand is upon the thing due, in the other
case it is upon the person of the criminal. Hence, 2. The creditor
is bound to accept the payment of the debt, no matter when or by
whom ¦ offered ; whereas, in the case of a crime or sin, the sove
reign is bound neither to provide a substitute nor to accept of one
when offered. If he does either, it is a matter of grace. 3. Hence
penal satisfaction does not ipso facto liberate ; the acceptance is a
matter of arrangement or covenant, and the terms of that covenant
must depend on the will of the parties. Dr. Beman lapsed into
an important truth, when he said, " Christ suffered by covenant." —
P. 98. What that covenant is, we learn from scripture, and from
the manner in which it is executed. The Bible teaches that, agree
ably to that covenant, the merits of Christ do not avail to the "benefit
of his people immediately ; his children remain under condemna
tion as well as others until they believe ; and when they do believe
they receive but the first fruits of their inheritance, they are but
imperfectly sanctified, and are still subject to many evils, but being
in a justified state their sufferings are chastisements and not punish
ments, that is, they are designed' for their own improvement, and
not to satisfy justice.
The satisfaction of Christ, therefore, being for sin and by suffer
ing, is expressly and formally declared not to be of the nature of
pecuniary satisfaction. The grace of the Gospel is thereby not
obscured but rendered the more conspicuous. God is not rendered
merciful by the atonement (as we be slanderously reported, as
some affirm that we say), on the contrary, the atonement flows
from his infinite love. Dr. Beman writes as a Tritheist, or as
against Tritheists, when he speaks of the work of the Son render
ing the Father gracious, and attributes that representation to us.
The Lord our God is one God. It was his infinite love devised
the plan of redemption, and it was so devised, that the exercise of
love should be perfectly consistent with holiness, in order that God
might be just in justifying sinners. Surely then our doctrine does
not obscure the grace of the Gospel, at least as to the origin of the
plan of mercy. But it is further objected that if Christ rendered
a complete satisfaction to divine justice, then pardon becomes a
matter of justice and not of grace. Justice to whom ? certainly
not to the ungodly, the unrighteous, the utterly undeserving, and
hell-deserving sinner. If Christ suffered by covenant, and fulfilled
all the conditions of that covenant, then he acquired a right to its
promises. If he purchased his church he has a right to it. If it
was promised that for his obedience to death, he should see of the
travail of his soul and be satisfied, then he, having done all that
was required of him, has a right to the promised reward. But
what right have we ? None in the world ; we are poor, and blind,
and miserable, having nothing, meriting nothing, our only hope is
22

338 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
that we shall be treated, not according to our deserts, but accord
ing to thejnerits of another.
The objection sounds strange to our ears, coming from such a
quarter, that we destroy the grace of the Gospel. What is salva
tion by grace, if it is not that God of his mere good pleasure pro-
vided redemption ; that he determines of his own will who shall be
partakers of its benefits ; that those who are brought to repentance
and faith, are not only justified avowedly on the ground of a right
eousness which is not their own, but are made to feel and acknow
ledge as the very condition of their acceptance, their own ill-de
sert and misery ; and that they not only owe everything to Christ,
but possess everything simply in virtue of their union with him,
which union is kept up only by a self-renouncing, self-emptying
faith ? The feeblest infant resting on its mother's bosom, a new
born lamb carried in the shepherd's arms, might with as much
plausibility be suspected of doubting the love that sustains them,
as the believer in Christ's having purchased the church with his
own blood, of doubting the entire gratuitousness of his own sal
vation. It would be easy to retort, and show that it is Dr. Beman's doc
trine that destroys the grace of salvation. If Christ only makes
pardon possible, if the possibility of forgiveness is all we owe to him,
to whom or what do we owe heaven ? Is it to ourselves, as some
of the advocates of his doctrine teach ? This is the natural an
swer. Christ having made pardon possible, then God deals with
men according to their works. Whatever answer Dr. Beman
himself would give to the above question, it must, from the nature
of his system, be tame compared with the answer which flows
from the doctrine that we owe the blessed Redeemer, not the pos
sibility of pardon merely, but justification, adoption, sanctification,
the resurrection of the body, and life everlasting. These things
and all the blessedness they include or suppose, are not merely
rendered possible, but actually secured and given for Christ's sake
alone ; and hence the spirits of the just made perfect, whose robes
have been washed and made white in the blood of the Lamb, would
drown in their thanksgiving to Him that has cleansed them from
all sin, the whispered acknowledgments of those who have-nothing
for which to give thanks but the possibility of pardon.
These objections which Dr. Beman urges in various forms
throughout his book are all old, and have been answered a hundred
times. There is indeed one objection which is certainly American.
It seems there was no economy in the atonement. It saved nothing,
and gained nothing. The atonement, it is said, is " the grand de
vice of heaven for preventing misery and promoting happiness." —
P. 108. And it is triumphantly urged (through some eight pages),
that if Christ suffered as much as the redeemed would have en
dured there is no gain of happiness. It is " a mere quid-pro-quo
transaction." — P. 111. We have already shown that no church,
or class of men, hold that the blessed Redeemer endured as much

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 339
suffering as the redeemed would have endured. It is a mere mis
representation. But dismissing that point, the objection itself is
unworthy of a being gifted with a moral sense. Would it be
nothing that unnumbered millions are saved from sin and made
perfect in holiness ? Supposing there was no absolute gain as to
the amount of misery prevented, that Christ had in a few years
suffered all that finite beings through eternity could endure, still
would the vast accession to the holy inhabitants of heaven be
nothing ? Does not the Bible say that he gave himself for his
church, to purify and cleanse it ? that the promotion of the holiness
was the design of his death ? Has it come to this, that the theory
which makes happiness the end of the creation, must represent
holiness as nothing, not worth giving thanks for, if gained at the
least expense of happiness ? This gross, epicurean view of the
sublime and awful mystery of redemption, is a disgrace to the age
and country that gave it birth.
We have thus endeavoured to show that the theory of atone
ment advocated by Dr. Beman is founded on the false assumption
that the punishment of sin is for the prevention of crime, and not
on account of its own intrinsic ill-desert ; that it of necessity in
volves a denial of the justice of God, and makes mere happiness
the end of creation ; that it is destitute of any semblance or pre
tence of support from the scriptures ; that it is just as arbitrary,
and as much a philosophical speculation, as the Socinian theory ;
the latter asserting that the design of Christ's death was to display
the love of God, and thus lead men to repentance, and the former,
that it was intended to express his regard for his law, and thus act
as a motive to obedience. We further endeavoured to prove that
the theory is in direct conflict with the Bible. The scriptures
teach, in every possible way, that as man was under a law or cove
nant which requires perfect obedience and threatens death in case
of transgression, the Son of God was born of a woman and made
under that law, fulfilling its conditions of perfect obedience and
sustaining its curse for man's redemption ; and that his righteous
ness is freely imputed to all those who receive and rest upon it by
faith. In denying this doctrine, which is the common faith of
Christendom, Dr. Beman's theory involves the denial of justifica
tion, reducing it to mere pardon ; destroys the true doctrine of
justifying faith ; overlooks the union between Christ and his peo
ple ; tends to banish Christ from view, and to vitiate the very
source of all evangelical religion.
We showed that his objections to this doctrine, with one melan
choly exception, were the oft repeated and oft refuted calumnies
of Socinians ; that the common doctrine does not involve the
transfer of moral character or represent Christ as a sinner ; that
so far from obscuring the grace of the Gospel, or teaching that the
atonement is the cause of the love of God, it represents it as flow
ing from that love, and presents in the clearest possible light the
gratuitous nature of salvation. It is of grace that a Saviour was

340 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
provided ; of grace that the benefits of his death are conferred on
one rather than another. And though we rejoice to know that he
has acquired a right to his church, having bought it with his own
blood, yet his people know, feel, and acknowledge that to them
everything is of grace, — their vocation, justification, and final salva
tion. This is Christianity, a religion of which Christ is the Alpha
and Omega, the first and the last, the author and the finisher, not
the mere cause of the possibility of pardon.
Our discussion of the all-important question respecting the na
ture of the atonement has run out to so great a length that we
cannot claim much room for the consideration of its extent. Dr.
Beman writes on this whole subject, very much as a man might be
expected to write against Calvinism, who got his views of that
system from the furious harangues of itinerant Methodist preachers.
He quotes no authorities, establishes no assertions, but coolly goes
on attributing just what opinions come into his head to those against
whom he writes. Had he taken up any one author, or class of
authors, cited from their writings their own exhibitions of doctrine,
and proceeded to examine them, his readers would know what
credit to give to his statements. He however has preferred to
state in general terms that there are but two views of the atone
ment, his own and another. That other he then most grievously
misrepresents. He attributes to all who reject his doctrine opi
nions which not one in a million of them ever entertained. As far
as relates to the nature of the atonement, these misrepresentations
have already been pointed out. He commences and continues his
discussion concerning its extent on the same plan. He assumes
that the question relates to the limitation in the very nature of the
work of Christ. " If," he says, "the atonement is to be considered
as a literal payment of a debt, or, in other words, if it consisted in
suffering the exact penalty of the law in the room of those who
will be saved, it is manifest that it must be limited in its extent
In this case it would be a provision which must be regulated ac
cording to the principles of commutative justice. If one soul were
to be saved, " then Christ must suffer so much, if a thousand, then
a thousand times as much," &c. — P. 145. The opposite doctrine,
which he adopts, necessarily leads to the conclusion " that an
atonement sufficient for one, is sufficient for all ;" of course those
who reject his view, are made to hold an insufficient atonement. —
P. 147. So Dr. Cox, in his introductory chapter, speaks of " the
limitation of the nature" of the atonement, and represents those
whom he opposes as holding that it is as " limited in its nature as
in its application."— Pp. 16, 17. If these gentlemen would take
the trouble to read a little on this subject they would find that this
is all a mistake. They are merely beating the air. Those who
deny that Christ died for Judas as much as for Paul, for the non-
elect as much as for the elect, and who maintain that he died
strictly and properly only for his own people, do not hold that there
is any limitation in the nature of the atonement. Thev teach as

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 341
fully as any men, that " an atonement sufficient for one is sufficient
for all." It is a simple question relating to the design, and not to the
nature of Christ's work. That work, as far as we know or believe,
would have been the same had God purposed to save but one soul
or the souls of all mankind. We hold that the atonement as to its
value is infinite, and as to its nature as much adapted to one man
as to another, to all as to one. The whole question is, for what
purpose did he die ? What was the design which God intended to
accomplish by his mission and death ? That this is the true state
of the question is obvious from the fact that the Reformed and
Lutherans do not differ at all as to the nature of Christ's satis
faction, though they do differ as to its design. Lutherans, as they
deny the doctrine of election, deny that the satisfaction of Christ
had special reference to the elect, though they are even more strict
than the Reformed in their views of the vicarious nature of the
atonement, i. e., of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his
obedienee to us. Accordingly, in all the early defences of Calvin
ists, their arguments on the necessity and on the truth or nature of
the atonement, are directed against Socinians, and not against
either Romanists or Lutherans. But when the question is discussed,
" For whom did Christ die ?" they address their arguments against
the latter. Turrettin, for example, in the statement of this ques
tion, says, " It is not a question concerning the value and sufficiency
of Christ's death, whether it is not in itself sufficient for the salva
tion of all men. That is on both sides admitted. His death being
of infinite value, would have been most amply sufficient for the
redemption of all men, if God had seen fit to extend it to all.
Hence the common distinction made by the fathers, and retained
by many theologians, Christ died sufficiently for all, efficaciously
for the elect, is perfectly true if understood of the worth of Christ's
death, but not so accurate if understood of his purpose and design
in dying. The question, therefore, properly relates to the purpose
of the Father in giving his Son, and the intention of the Son in
laying down his life. Did the Father destine his Son for all and
every man, and did the Son deliver himself to death with the inten
tion of substituting himself in the place of all and every one, in
order to make satisfaction and procure salvation for them ? Or,
did Christ give himself for the elect alone, who were given to him
by the Father, and whose head he was to be ? The heart of the
question, therefore, comes to this, not what is the nature or efficacy
of the death of Christ, but what was the design of the Father in
giving him up, and the intention of Christ in dying."*
The simple statement of our doctrine, therefore, answers two
thirds of Dr. Beman's objections against it This is not a state
ment got up for the occasion, but made a century and a half before
he was born. There is one view in whieh the question concerning
the extent of the atonement is indeed intimately connected with
* Turrettin, vol. ii., p. 498.

342 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
its nature. If any man holds the doctrine that the atonement was
nothing more than a symbolical expression of a truth, and " merely
opened the door of mercy," there is of course an end to all ques
tion as to its design. If that be its nature, it can have no more
reference to the saved than to the lost. And it is probably in order
to get rid of all difficulty as to the extent of the atonement, that
many have been led to adopt the above mentioned most unscrip-
tural and dangerous view of its nature. But if the true doctrine
concerning the nature of the satisfaction is retained, as it was by
the Lutherans, and even in a great measure by the early Remon
strants, at least by Grotius, the question as to its extent resolves
itself into a question concerning the purposes of God. It might
seem as if this were an entirely useless question. The purposes
of God are not the rule of our duty, and whatever God may de
sign to do, we are to act in accordance with his 'preceptive will.
Still there is a right and a wrong in every question, and what is
wrong in relation to one point, must tend to produce erroneous
views with regard to others.
Dr. Cox intimates with some truth that the difference of opinion
on this point has its origin in, or at least implies a difference of view
as to the order of the divine purposes. — P. 18. As in fact, how
ever, there is no order of succession in the purposes of God, but
simply in our mode of conceiving them, all his decrees being
comprehended in one eternal purpose, any question about the order
of those decrees must be a question relating to our own thoughts.
Those thoughts, however, may be confused, contradictory, or lead
to conclusions in conflict with revealed facts. Even this question,
therefore, is not without its importance. If the purposes of God
are all one, any mode of conceiving them which prevents their
being reduced to unity ; which supposes either a change or uncer
tainty in the divine plan, must be erroneous. As it is involved in
our idea of God as the intelligent ruler of the universe, that he had
a design in the creation and redemption of man, all classes of the
ologians form some theory (if that word may be used) of the plan
adopted for the accomplishment of that design. According to one
system, God purposed to create man, to permit the fall, to provide
salvation for all, to give all sufficient grace, to elect to life those
who improve this grace. This is the scheme of the Remonstrants,
and of those generally who reject the doctrines of election and
efficacious grace. According to another system, God purposed to
create man, to permit the fall, to provide for the salvation of all ;
but, foreseeing that none would accept of that salvation, he chose
some to everlasting life, and determined, by his effectual grace, to
give them faith and repentance. This is the scheme proposed by
Amyraud, Testard, Camero, and other French theologians of the
seventeenth century. According to others, God purposed to create
man, to permit the fall, to choose from the mass of fallen men an
innumerable multitude as vessels of mercy, to send his Son for
their redemption, and with him to give them everything necessary

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 343
for their salvation. This was the common doctrine of all the Re
formed churches, from which the two former systems were depart
ures. The common New School system, adopted in this country,
lies between the Arminian and the French scheme, containing more
truth than the former, and less than the latter.
The question, which of these views of the whole plan of God's
dealings with men is the most correct, must be determined, 1. By
ascertaining which is most consistent with itself; which best admits
of being reduced to one simple purpose. It would not be difficult to
show that the two former include contradictions, and involve the as
cription of conflicting purposes to God. 2. By ascertaining which
is most in harmony with the admitted character of God, as infinite,
independent, and self-sufficient, of whom, and through whom, and
to whom are all things. 3. By ascertaining which is most consistent
with revealed facts. The first, or Arminian scheme, breaks down
entirely by coming in conflict with the clearly revealed truth of
God's sovereignty in election, and of conversion by his mighty
power, and not by an influence common to all men. Our present
business, however, is with the two latter schemes, so far as they
relate to the design of Christ's death. Was the Son of God sent
into the world, as Dr. Beman says, merely to make the salvation
of all men possible, or actually to save all whom God had given
him? Before attempting to answer this question, it is proper to remark
that Dr. Beman and those who adopt his theory, seem constantly dis
posed to forget that Salvation is by Grace. If it is of grace, then
it is a matter of grace that God provided salvation at all for guilty
men. If this is not so, the gift of Christ, the influences of the Holy
Spirit, and every other gift requisite for our salvation, are mere
matters of justice, which it would have been unrighteous to with
hold. No man can believe that, however, without contradicting
every page of the Bible, and the testimony of every true Christian.
2. But if God was not bound to save any, he is at liberty to save
whom he pleases. If he need not provide salvation for any, there
could be no injustice in providing it for some and not for others. If
salvation is of grace, it is of grace that one and not another is
saved. And to complain that the mission of Christ was not de
signed to save all, or even that it did not open the door of mercy
for all, if sueh were actually the case, would be to complain of the
gratuitous nature of salvation. And, 3. If salvation is by grace,
then those who are saved, are freely called, justified and glorified.
The ground of their acceptance is not to be found in them, but in
the good pleasure of God. This is the plain doctrine of the Bible,
to which we must submit ; and it is so clearly revealed, and so es
sential to the very nature of the Gospel, that those who are not
willing to be saved by grace, cannot be saved at all.
There is therefore no preliminary presumption against the doc
trine that the death of Christ had not an equal reference to all men,
but had a special relation to his own people. The presumption is

344 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
all the other way. As the whole plan of salvation is, according
to the apostle, arranged with a view " to show the exceeding riches
of the grace of God, by his kindness towards us," that view of
the economy of redemption, which renders the grace of God the
most conspicuous, is the most in harmony with its grand design.
What God's actual purpose was in the mission of his Son we can
only learn from his own declarations. He reveals his designs to
us partly by their execution, and partly by the annunciation of
them in his word. What God does, is the clearest revelation of
what he intended to do. Hence, if the satisfaction of Christ actu
ally saves all men, it was certainly designed to save all men ; but
if it saves only a part of the human race, it was certainly designed
only for a part. It cannot be questioned that Christ came to save
men from their sins, and if we ask, Who he intended to save ? we
can get no better answer than by learning whom he does in fact
save. If the end of Christ's mission was salvation, it is not con
ceivable that he died equally for all, unless he purposed to save all.
Dr. Beman, however, denies that the design of his mission was
salvation, it was merely to make salvation possible.
In assuming this ground, he is guilty of the same one-sidedness,
the same contracted view, which he exhibits in his doctrine con
cerning the nature of the atonement. It is conceded that the work
of Christ does lay the foundation for the offer of salvation to all
men. Dr. Beman hence concludes that this was its only end ; that
it merely opens the way for the general offer of pardon. His theo
ry is designed to account for one fact, and leaves all the other re
vealed facts out of view, and unexplained. The Bible teaches,
however, a great deal more in relation to this subject, than that
one fact. It teaches, 1. That Christ came in execution of a pur
pose ; that he suffered, as Dr. Beman expresses it, by covenant,
and ratified that covenant with his own blood. 2. That his mis
sion was the result and expression of the highest conceivable love.
3. That it not merely removes obstacles out of the way, but actu
ally secures the salvation of his people. 4. That it lays the founda
tion for a free, full, and unrestrained offer of salvation to all men.
5. That it renders just the condemnation of those who reject him
as their Saviour ; that rejection being righteously the special ground
of their condemnation.
Dr. Beman's theory accords only with the last two facts just
mentioned. It will account for the general offer of the Gospel, and
for the condemnation of those who reject it, but it is inconsistent
with all the otJrfer facts above stated, which are not less clearly re
vealed, and not less important. It overlooks, in the first place, the
fact that Christ came into the world and accomplished the work of
redemption, in execution of the covenant of grace. The use of
such words as covenant, is often convenient, and sometimes una
voidable, as a concise method of expressing several related truths.
Wherever there is a promise by one person to another, suspended
upon the performanee of a condition, there is a covenant. As,

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 345
therefore, the scriptures expressly speak of a promise made to the
Son, suspended upon the condition of his incarnation, obedience,
and death, they teach that there was a covenant of grace. The
promise made to the Redeemer was, that he should see the travail
of his soul ; that he should have the heathen for his inheritance,
and the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession ; that those
whom the Father had given him should come unto, him ; that they
should all be taught of God, receive the Spirit, and be raised up
the last day ; that He should be the first-born among many breth
ren, and be highly exalted as the head of his people, and far above
all principalities and powers. It is further expressly taught that
he secured all these inestimable blessings by his obedience unto
death. Because he thus humbled himself, God has highly exalted
him ; on account of the suffering of death, he was crowned with
glory and honour ; because he made his soul an offering for sin,
therefore God hath divided to him his portion. If these things are
so, if Christ had the attainment of these blessings, which involve
the salvation of his people, in view in coming into the world ; if
the accomplishment of this work was the object of his mission,
then it is a contradiction in terms, to say that, as far as the purpose
of God and his own intention are concerned, he had not a special
reference to his own people and to their salvation in his death.
Their salvation was the reward promised, when it was said, " he
shall see his seed," and it was for that recompense he died. Dr.
Beman's theory denies all this. It assumes that his death, his whole
work, had no reference to one class of men more than to another,
to the saved more than to the lost. It simply made the pardon of
all men possible. This is of course a denial of what Dr. Beman
himself, in an unguarded hour, admitted, viz., that Christ suffered
by covenant. What covenant? The scriptures make mention of
no other covenant in connection with the Redeemer's death than
that which included the promise of his people to him as a reward.
and which was ratified in his blood. Here then is one plain, im
portant, revealed fact, which Dr. Beman's theory overlooks and
contradicts. If Christ in his death had regard to the recompense
of reward, and if that reward included the holiness and salvation
of his people, then, beyond contradiction, his satisfaction had a spe
cial reference to them.
In the second place, his theory contradicts the plainly revealed
fact, that the mission and death of Christ are the expressions of the
highest conceivable love. According to Dr. Beman, they are the
expression of mere general benevolence. It is admitted that love
was the motive which led to the gift of the Son of God. If that
love was general benevolence to all men, then he died for all ; if it
was special love to his own people, then he died for them. That
there is such special love in God, is involved in the doctrine of elec
tion. According to that doctrine, God, of his mere good pleasure,
before the foundation of the world, chose some to everlasting life,
and, for infinitely wise and holy reasons, left others to perish in their

346 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
sins. To say that the infinite love which led to the mission of
Chris,t was a benevolence which had equal regard to these two
classes, is to deny the doctrine of election. That doctrine, in its
very nature, supposes a difference in the regard had for the vessels
of mercy and the vessels of wrath ; for those in whom God pur
posed to display the riches of his grace, and those on whom he de
signed to show his wrath, and make his power known. In teach
ing this doctrine, therefore, the scriptures teach, that besides the
benevolence with which God regards all men, there is a higher,
special, mysterious, unspeakable love, which he has to his own
children ; and to this love they refer the incarnation and death of
the Son of God. The scriptures are too explicit and too full on
this latter point to allow of its being questioned. Greater love, said
Christ himself, hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life
for his friends. Paul prays that the Ephesians may be strengthen
ed by the Holy Spirit, to be able to comprehend what is the
breadth, and length, and depth, and height, and to know the love
of Christ which passes knowledge. Hereby perceive we the love
of God, because he laid down his life for us. In this we perceive
the love of God towards us, because that God sent his only begot
ten Son into the world that we might live through him. He that
spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall
he not with him freely give us all things ? In these and in various
similar passages, it is distinctly asserted that the love which led to
the gift of Christ was not general benevolence, consistent with the
eternal reprobation of its objects, but the highest conceivable love,
that would spare nothing to secure the salvation of those on whom
it rested. Again, it is with equal explicitness and frequency asserted, love
to his people was the motive of the Son of God in laying down his
life. " For their sakes," said the Redeemer, " I sanctify myself."
" I am the good shepherd, the good shepherd giveth his life for his
sheep." "I lay down my life for my sheep." " Christ loved the
church, and gave himself for it." Do not these passages assert
that love for his church, his friends, his sheep, was the motive of
Christ in dying ? When the scriptures divide men into classes, the
sheep and the goats, the church and those who are not the church,
and say that love to his sheep, love to his church, led the Saviour
to lay down his life, they expressly assert that it was a peculiar
love for them, and not a general benevolence including them and
all others alike, that was the motive of Christ in laying down his
life. Let it be remembered that this whole question relates, not to
| the incidental effects of Christ's death, but to his intention in dying.
j The passages above quoted, and the scriptures generally, do then
teach that, besides his general benevolence for men, God has a spe
cial love for his own people, and that that special love, for his own,
for his friends, for his sheep, led the Saviour to give himself up to
death. If this is so, it overturns Dr. Beman's theory, which is in
direct conflict with this plain and precious truth. It is not that be-

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 347
nevolence which consists with eternal reprobation, i. e., with the
eternal purpose to leave men to suffer the just recompense of their
sins, that led the Father to give up the Son, and the Son to assume
our nature and die upon the cross. Those who admit this, admit
all the limitation of the atonement for which we contend ; a limi
tation not as to its nature or value, but as to the purpose of God
and intention of Christ. Besides, does it not involve a contradic
tion, to say that love to those whom God purposed, for wise rea
sons, not to save, was his motive in providing salvation? Our Sa
viour tea'ches that the knowledge of the Gospel aggravates the
guilt, and consequently the misery, of those who reject it ; then
certainly, love to them was not the motive which led either to the
adoption or the proclamation of the scheme of redemption. The
fact is, this doctrine that Christ died as much for Judas as for Paul,
is inconsistent with the doctrine of election ; and the two have never
for any length of time been held together. Those theologians in
the church of Rome, who remained faithful to the doctrine of elec
tion, also held that the death of Christ had special reference to his
own people. The Lutherans, when they rejected the one doctrine,
rejected also the other. So did the Arminians. A few French
divines endeavoured, by reversing the natural order of the decrees,
for a time to unite the two ; but the attempt failed. Both doctrines
were soon rejected. The sovereignty of God, election, special
love as the motive of redemption, and consequently a special refer
ence to the elect, in the death of Christ, are joined together in the
scriptures, and they cannot long be separated in the faith of God's
people. Another revealed fact which Dr. Beman's theory overlooks and
contradicts, is, that Christ's death not only removes obstacles out of
the way of the exercise of mercy, but actually secures the salva
tion of his people. It has been repeatedly shown that Dr. Beman
constantly asserts that the only effect of the atonement is to bring
the sinner within the reach of mercy, it merely makes pardon pos
sible. This is the only effect claimed for it, and all that can be at
tributed to it on his theory. This, however, is in direct conflict
with the scriptures, because they teach that the death of Christ
renders the salvation of his own people certain. This follows from
what has already been said. If Christ suffered by covenant ; if that
covenant promised to him his people as his reward and inheritance,
on condition of his obedience and death, then assuredly when he
performed that condition the salvation of all whom the Father had
given to him was rendered absolutely certain. Hence, it is said
that he purchased his church, that is, acquired a right to it. He
gave himself for his church, that he might purify and cleanse it.
He came into the world to save his people from their sins. He
gave himself for our sins, that he might redeem us from this
present evil world ; or, as elsewhere said, to purify a peculiar peo
ple unto himself. These and similar declarations teach that the
design of Christ's death was actually to save his people. They

348 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
are, therefore, so many direct contradictions of the doctrine, that
he merely opened the door of mercy. To make salvation possi
ble, is not to save ; to make holiness possible, is not to purify ; to
open the door, is not to bring us near to God.
The scriptures also ascribe effects to the death of Christ, irre-
concileable with the idea that it is a mere governmental display.
We are justified by his blood, we thereby obtain remission of sins,
we have peace with God, we are delivered from the wrath to come,
and obtain eternal redemption. It is contrary to all scriptural
usage to bring down all these and similar declarations to mean no
thing more than that these blessings are rendered attainable by the
work of Christ. This is not what the words mean. To say that
we are justified, or reconciled, or cleansed, is not to say that the
obstacles in the way of obtaining the blessings mentioned are mere
ly removed. It is to say that his blood secures those blessings ;
and secures them in the time and way that God has appointed.
No instance can be produced in which a sacrifice, offered and ac
cepted, is said to propitiate God and be the ground of pardon,
when nothing more is meant than that the sacrifice renders pardon
possible. The meaning uniformly is, that it secures and renders it
certain. The very acceptance of it is the established way of pro
mising forgiveness to those in whose behalf the sacrifice was offer
ed. Dr. Beman's theory, therefore, in attributing so little to the
death of Christ, contradicts the established meaning of scriptural
phrases ; and is inconsistent with the clearly revealed fact that His
death makes salvation not only possible, but certain.
It is further revealed that there is an intimate connection between
the death of Christ and the gift of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit
was promised to Christ, to be given to his people. The apostle
Peter says, He having received the promise of the Holy Ghost,
hath shed forth this, which ye both see and hear. Acts ii. 33. In
Tit. iii. 5, 6, God is said to shed on us abundantly the Holy Ghost,
through Jesus Christ our Lord. All spiritual blessings are said to
be given to us in Christ Jesus, Ep. i. 3 ; that is, on account of our
union with him, a union eternal in the purpose of God, and actual
when we believe. This union existing in the divine purpose, this
covenant union is represented as the ground of the gift of regene
ration. In Ep. ii. 5, 6, we are said to be quickened with Christ, to
be raised up in him. This can only mean that there is a union be
tween Christ and- his people, which secures to them that influence
by which they are raised from spiritual death. If so, then in the
covenant to ratify which Christ died, it was promised that the Holy
Spirit should be given to his people, and to secure that promise was
one design of his death. And consequently, all for whom he died
must receive that Spirit, whose influences were secured by his
death. He is, therefore, said to have redeemed us from the curse
of the law, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit, Gal.
iii. 13, 14. It obviously contradicts this important truth, to teach
that Christ's death had as much reference to one man as another,

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 349
or that it merely renders mercy possible. If Christ suffered by co
venant, and if that covenant included the promise of the Holy Spi
rit, to teach, renew, and sanctify his people, then it cannot be de
nied that those thus taught, renewed, and sanctified, are those for
whom he died.
Dr. Beman's theory, therefore, which denies that the death of
Christ had a special reference to his own people, is inconsistent
with the plainly revealed facts: 1. That he died in execution of a
covenant in which his people were promised to him as his reward,
to secure which reward is declared to be his specific and imme
diate design in laying down his life. 2. That the motive which
led to the gift of the Son, and of the Son in dying, was not gene
ral benevolence, but the highest conceivable love, love for his
sheep and for his friends. 3. That the design of his death was
not simply to remove obstacles out of the way of mercy, but ac
tually to secure the salvation of those given to him by the Father ;
and that it does in fact secure for them the gift of the Holy Ghost,
and consequently justification and eternal life. In other words,
God, having out of his mere good pleasure elected some to ever
lasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace to deliver them out
of the estate of sin and misery, and to bring them into an estate of
salvation by a Redeemer. The only Redeemer of God's elect is
the Lord Jesus Christ, who, being the eternal Son of God, became
man, was made under the law, satisfied by his obedience and death
all its demands, and thus fulfilled the conditions of that covenant
on which the salvation of his people was suspended, and thereby
acquired a right to them as his stipulated reward. Such was the
specific design and certain effect of his death. This is the plain doc
trine of our standards, and, as we fully believe, of the word of God.
It will, however, doubtless be asked, admitting that our doctrine
of the atonement does accord with the facts above mentioned, can
it be reconciled with the no less certian facts that the Gospel is to
be freely offered to all men, and that those who reject it are justly
condemned for their unbelief? If it cannot, it must be defective.
On this score, however, we feel no difficulty.
Our doctrine is, that the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to secure the
salvation of his people, and with a specific view to that end, ful
filled the conditions of the law or covenant under which they and
all mankind were placed. Those conditions were, perfect obe
dience and satisfaction to divine justice, by bearing the penalty
threatened against sin. Christ's righteousness, therefore, consists
in his obedience and death. That righteousness is precisely what
the law demands of every sinner, in order to his justification before
God. It is, therefore, in its nature adapted to all sinners who are
under that law. Its nature is not altered by the fact that it was
wrought out for a portion only of such sinners, or that it is secured
to them by the covenant between the Father and the Son. What
is necessary for the salvation of one man, is necessary for the sal
vation of another, and of all. The righteousness of Christ, there-

350 BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT.
fore, consisting- in the obedience and death demanded by the law
under which all men are placed, is adapted to all men. It is also
of infinite value, being the righteousness of the eternal Son of God,
and therefore sufficient for all. On these two grounds, its adapta
tion to all and its sufficiency for all, rests the offer made in the
Gospel to all. With this its design we have nothing to do ; who
are to be saved by it we do not know. It is of such a nature and
value, that whosoever accepts of it shall be saved. If one of the
non-elect should believe (though the hypothesis is on various ac
counts unreasonable), to him that righteousness would be imputed
to his salvation. And if one of the elect should not believe, or
having believed should apostatize, he would certainly perish.
These suppositions are made simply to show that, according to our
doctrine, the reason why any man perishes is not that there is no
righteousness provided suitable and adequate to his case, or that it
is not freely offered to all that hear the Gospel, but simply because
he wilfully rejects the proffered salvation. Our doctrine, there
fore, provides for the universal offer of the Gospel, and for the
righteous condemnation of unbelievers, as thoroughly as Dr. Be
man's. It opens the door for mercy, as far as legal obstructions
are concerned, as fully as his ; while it meets all the other revealed
facts of the case. It is not a theory for one fact. It includes
them all ; the fact that Christ died by covenant for his own people,
that love for his own sheep led him to lay down his life, that his
death renders their salvation absolutely certain, that it opens the
way for the offer of salvation to all men, and shows the justice of
the condemnation of unbelief. No man perishes for the want of
an atonement, is the doctrine of the Synod of Dort ; it is also
our doctrine.
Dr. Cox is pleased to call us " restrictionists." A most inap
propriate designation. There is more saving truth in the parings
of our doctrine than in his whole theory. Our doctrine contains
all the modicum of truth there is in his, and it contains unspeakably
more. His own theory is the most restricted, jejune, meager, and
lifeless, that has ever been propounded. It provides but for one
fact ; it teaches a possible salvation, while it leaves out the very
soul of the doctrine. It vitiates the essential nature of the atone
ment, makes it a mere governmental display, a symbolical method
of instruction, in order to do what was better done without any
such corruption. While we teach, that Christ, by really obeying
the law, and really bearing its penalty in the place of his people,
and according to the stipulations of the covenant of grace, secured
the salvation of all whom the Father had given him, and at the
same time throws open the door of mercy to all who choose to
enter it ; we retain the life-giving doctrine of Christ's union with
his own people, his obeying and dying in their stead, of his bearing
our sins, and of our becoming the righteousness of God in him ;
of the necessity of entire self-renunciation and of simple reliance
on his righteousness, on the indwelling of his Spirit, and on his

BEMAN ON THE ATONEMENT. 351
strength for our salvation ; while we impose no restriction on the
glorious Gospel of the grace of God.
Long as this discussion has become, we have touched only what
appeared to us the most important points of the controversy, and
must leave others unnoticed. We trust we have said enough to
show that there is no necessity for surrendering the common faith
of Christendom, as to the nature of the atonement, for the misera
ble theory propounded by Dr. Beman. We cannot close this arti
cle without a single remark concerning his book itself. It is a
small volume, sold at a moderate price, and intended for general cir
culation. It is written in a calm and confident spirit, but without
force, discrimination, or learning. It is the very book to do harm.
It presents its readers the choice between two doctrines ; the one no
man can adopt, the other is hardly worth accepting. So far as
this book is concerned, the atonement must be rejected either as
incredible or as worthless. He represents the one doctrine, as
teaching that Christ became personally and morally a sinner, that
he suffered just what in kind and degree all his people throughout
eternity would have endured, and that they by his righteousness
became morally innocent. This view of the atonement no man
can believe and be a Christian. His own doctrine makes the
atonement a mere symbolical method of instruction, and reduces
the whole work of Christ in this matter to making pardon possible.
This again is a doctrine which we see not how any man can prac
tically believe and be a Christian. The book in itself is of little
consequence. But from its gross and yet confident misrepresenta
tion of the truth, it has more of the power due to falsehood than
any book of the kind we know.

ESSAY XV.
SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION.*

By absolution is meant the authoritative forgiveness of sins ; by
sacerdotal absolution, the exercise of this official power by the
Christian ministry, considered as a priesthood. The doctrine of
sacerdotal absolution, therefore, comprehends two dogmas ; first,
that Christian ministers are priests, and then, that as priests, they
possess this power of forgiving sins. Now these two propositions
are not only distinguishable, but distinct ; they do not involve each
other ; the truth of the one does not necessarily imply the truth of
the other. It is perfectly conceivable that the ministry might have
the power claimed without being priests ; and on the other hand,
that they might be priests without having the power. This will
be seen more clearly in the sequel. For the present it will be suf
ficient to observe, that the two doctrines, though distinct, are near
of kin and congenial, that they are commonly held by the same
persons, that they are usually discussed together, and in particular
that they are so discussed in the pamphlet now before us.
This publication has just come into our hands, and of its author
we know nothing ; nor should we consider any notice of it needful
or expedient, if we did not wish to make it the occasion of express
ing our own views upon the subject, — a wish arising from our view
of its importance, with respect not only to its comprehensive
nature and its many points of contact with the entire system of
opinion in relation to the church, but also to its practical bearing on
the method of redemption, and the answer to the question, What
shall I do to be saved? To make Mr. Curtis's discourse the occa
sion for considering this subject, and to let his argument give shape
and colour to our own, we are the more disposed, because it seems
to be a fair and not discreditable exhibition of the high episcopa
lian doctrine now in vogue, and because it is a thing which can be
handled without tongs or even gloves, being not ill-written nor
devoid of talent, and as moderate in tone and temper as it is ex
travagant in its conclusions and assumptions. We shall, of course,
* Published in 1845, in review of " Sacerdotal Absolution : a Sermon preached
before the Convention of the Diocese of North Carolina, 1843." By the Rev. M. A.
Curtis, Rector of St. Matthew's Church, Hillsborough, N. C.

SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION. 353
not confine ourselves throughout to the reasonings and statements
of this writer, but shall pay him the compliment of making' his
discourse the text and starting-point of ours, first presenting the
subject as it appears in his pages, and then as it appears to us, be
ginning with his argument and ending with our own.
In executing the former part of this plan, we shall try first to
ascertain distinctly what the preacher's doctrine is, and then show
how he attempts to prove it and to repel objections. It will be ne
cessary to state his doctrine negatively as well as positively, in
justice to him, that he may not be supposed to hold opinions which
he expressly disavows, and in justice to ourselves, that we may not
be supposed to combat doctrines which we heartily believe.
We begin, then, by negatively stating that the absolution which
the author claims is not a mere ecclesiastical absolution, having
reference to ecclesiastical offences and ecclesiastical penalties, and
affecting only the ecclesiastical relations of the subject, or his
standing before the church ; but an absolution having reference to
sin in general, to the sinner's standing in the sight of God, his spir
itual condition, and his ultimate salvation. Again : the absolution
which the author argues for, is not a mere declarative absolution,
setting forth the conditions on which God will forgive sin ; nor a
hypothetical absolution, declaring sin forgiven, on the supposition
of the sinner's repentance ; nor an optative or intercessory absolu
tion, expressing a desire that his sins may be forgiven ; but an au
thoritative, efficacious absolution, as effective of its purpose as if ad
ministered by the independent and supreme power, without any in
termediate human agency. With respect to the " formal character
of the act of absolution," the author does indeed adopt, or at least
quote, a classification of the learned Bingham, which establishes
the fourfold distinction of sacramental absolution, declaratory ab
solution, precatory absolution, and judicial absolution. It is clear,
however, that the first and last of these, except so far as the out
ward form and circumstances are concerned, are one and the same
thing, and that the other two are no absolution at all, according to
the author's judgment, that is to say, no such absolution as would
satisfy the conditions of his argument, or be considered by him wor
thy of the ministry. The whole drift of his reasoning is to show that
an efficacious absolution, as described above, is a necessary function
of the Christian ministry, not indeed in virtue of any intrinsic inde
pendent power, but of a special delegated power, just as real and
effective as it could be if inherent or original.
In proof of this doctrine the author appeals briefly to tradition,
and at more length to the scriptures. His traditional argument is
drawn from the alleged fact, that the doctrine has been uniformly
held by the Holy Catholic Church, and as a distinct fact, or included
in the first, that the Reformers held it, and the first Reformed
Churches ; while, on the other hand, it has been rejected only by
latitudinarians, who are bent on reducing the ministry to the lowest
23

354 SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION.
point of inefficiency, and are utterly unable to agree as to the
meaning of the scriptures on this subject.
Having, by this historical presumption, created a prejudice in
favour of his doctrine, which we admit to be fair enough, so far as
the alleged facts are substantiated, he adduces his argument from
scripture, founded on the following three passages :
" Whosesoever sins "ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosesoever
sins ye retain, they are retained." — John xx. 23.
" Verily I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in
heaven ; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven." —
Matt, xviii. 18.
" And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever
thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose
on earth, shall be loosed in heaven." — Matt. xvi. 19.
With respect to the interpretation of these passages, it will only
be necessary here to state, that the author denies the second and
third to be exegetical of the first, and contends that it is exegetical
of them. In other words, instead of arguing that because the
figurative terms in Matthew may be descriptive of a mere eccle
siastical absolution, therefore the literal terms in John must be
limited and understood accordingly, he argues that, because the
passage in John contains a literal grant of power to forgive sins,
the metaphors in Matthew must be interpreted to signify the same
thing. As to the metaphors themselves, he adopts the opinion of
Calixtus, that the shutting and opening of heaven implied in the
grant of the keys, and the binding and loosing expressly mentioned
in both cases, have reference alike to the bondage of sin, and con
vey the same idea that is literally expressed in John, viz., the
remission or non-remission of sin, in the uniform sense of that
phrase in the New Testament, which could not be departed from
without the risk of dangerous errors.
Besides this argument derived from the express declarations of our
Saviour, there is another, upon which the author seems to lay great
stress, drawn from the nature of the ministerial office. The argu
ment, in its most general form, is this, that the ministry without
this power is worthless, or at least without " special and positive
value," and productive only of " incidental benefit, such as might
ensue from the sober action of any man whatever, and not of an
appointed and certain efficacy." To teach the truth, to preach
Christ, to invite men to him, to administer the ordinances, to exer
cise discipline, to feed the sheep and lambs of Christ's flock, seem
to go for nothing with the author, unless accompanied by the
power of life and death, salvation and perdition, to give dignity
and efficacy to the office.
This view of the ministry is so remote from that contained in
the New Testament, and so far from naturally springing out of
the idea of a ministry, that it might well appear inexplicable, were
it not clear that the author, in thus judging, has constantly before

SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION. 355
him a standard of comparison afforded by another ministry, — that
of the Old Testament, the Levitical priesthood. It is not only
implied but expressed in his reasonings, that such a power of absolu
tion as he claims is needed to put the Christian ministry upon a level
with the Jewish. Hence his argument may be more specifically
stated in this form, that the Christian ministry is a priesthood, and
must therefore have this power, without which it cannot be a
priesthood, nor compete in point of dignity and efficacy with that
of the Mosaic law. The premises in this ratiocination are inva
riably assumed as too unquestionable to require or admit of proof.
Combining this 'argument, founded on the nature of the ministerial
office, with that derived from the express declarations of the scrip
ture, we may thus reduce them to a single proposition : the scrip
tures (in the passages already quoted) recognise the power of
efficacious absolution as a sacerdotal function of the Christian
ministry. Having thus established his main doctrine by an appeal both to
tradition and to scripture, and in the latter both directly from express
declarations, and indirectly from the nature of the ministerial office,
he proceeds to consider the objections which may be alleged
against the doctrine. Of these he enumerates three, which he is
pleased to call " popular objections." The first is, that the doctrine
is unscriptural ; the second, that it is dishonouring to God, as an
encroachment upon his prerogative ; the third, that it is practically
incompatible with human fallibility and weakness.
The first objection he disposes of by saying that it cannot be
discussed apart from the other two ; such is their mutual depen
dence that they must stand or fall together ; if the doctrine is scrip
tural, it cannot be either unworthy of God or impossible to man ;
if, on the other hand, either of these allegations is well founded, it
cannot be scriptural. It is no doubt true that the inconsistency of
this opinion of the word of God cannot be urged as a specific
objection against it, simply because it involves the whole matter in
dispute, and either includes all other objections, or renders them
unnecessary. To say that it is contrary to scripture is to say that
it is false, which cannot of course be urged as a separate argument
to prove it false. It was not, however, altogether fair in Mr. Curtis
to present this as a sample of the objections urged against his doc
trine, and of the ease with which he can dispose of them. We
may let him try his hand upon some others by and by ; but in the
meantime we are willing to make this stipulation, that if the doc
trine can be proved from scripture, the other two objections shall!
go for nothing, but if not, its interference with the divine preroga
tive and its incompatibility with human weakness, shall be held to
aggravate its false pretensions and to give it a character of moral
as well as intellectual obliquity.
The author's answer to the second and third of these " popular
objections " is, that they are founded on a misconception of his
doctrine, as asserting an original, inherent power, in the ministry,

356 SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION.
whereas it asserts only a derivative and delegated power, or a spe
cial human agency and mediation, constituted by divine appoint
ment, in accordance with the general analogy of God's dispensa
tions, which the. author illustrates by a great variety of scripture
instances. Among these are the communication of the Holy Ghost
to Joshua by the imposition of the hands of Moses ; the necessity
of circumcision and sacrifices under the Old Testament ; the mis
sion of Peter and John to " confirm " the Samaritan converts after
Philip had baptized them ; the washing away of Paul's sins by his
baptism at the hands of Ananias ; the cure of Naaman the Syrian
by washing in the Jordan; the forgiveness of sins at the interces
sion of Abraham and Hezekiah ; Christ's promise to be present
whenever two or three of his apostles were assembled ; and the
promise of healing to the sick, as an effect of prayer and unction
by the elders of the church.
These cases are adduced to prove not merely that God uses
human agency in eases where he might dispense with it, but also
that he thus employs a special " mediation," as the preacher calls
it, where we should least expect it, and where reason can afford
no explanation of it. This proposition there was no need of prov
ing, since nobody disputes it What the author ought to have
established is not the general fact that God does specially appoint
certain media or channels for the communication of his graee, but
the specific fact, that the ministry is so appointed for the purpose
of communicating pardon to sinners. He seems to have been
conscious of his inability to do this, and has consequently confused
the subject by recurring to Bingham's fourfold division, and arrang
ing the scriptural examples just referred to, under those heads ; a
course which answers very well until he comes to judicial absolu
tion, where, instead of citing even one case, he contents himself
with telling what the power is, and asserting that it must be in the
ministry, and showing its tremendous consequences. This we
regard as a tacit but significant concession of the fact that there is
no recorded instance of the actual exercise of the power which the
author claims for Christian ministers.
We believe we have now noticed all the author's arguments, ex
cept those by which he undertakes to show that the power of re
mission granted by our Saviour was not an extraordinary or tem
porary one. These it will be sufficient to have named, as we
have no intention to assume that ground of opposition to the doc
trine. We may say, however, that to us the author's account of
the miraculous powers of the first Christian ministers does not
appear consistent with itself, since he sometimes speaks of them as
being merely higher degrees of the same power which the ministry
now exercises, and sometimes as so totally distinct that their coin
cidence was wholly fortuitous.
Having seen how triumphantly the author disposes of the "popu
lar objections" to his doctrine, we are sorry to be under the neces
sity of .bringing forward a few others which he has overlooked,

SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION. 357
either because he never heard of them, or because he regarded
them as too unpopular. In doing this we waive entirely the three
objections which he has discussed, until the others are disposed of,
and agree that if the latter are untenable the former may be
thrown away, provided always, that in case of a contrary result,
our argument shall have the benefit of these subsidiary reasons to
corroborate and perfect it.
In order to preclude misapprehension, let us state again the doc
trine which we understand the author to maintain, viz., that the
scriptures recognise a power of authoritative efficacious absolution
or forgiveness of sins, as an essential function of the Christian
priesthood. I. Our first objection to this doctrine is, that the power contended
for is not a sacerdotal power at all. We prove it, first, by the
scriptural definition of a priest, as one " ordained for men in things
pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for
sin."— ^Heb. v. 1 . This includes mediation and atonement, but not
absolution or forgiveness. We prove it, next, from the Levitical
practice. The Old Testament priests did not forgive sin, they
simply made atonement for it. We prove it, thirdly, from the
priesthood of Christ, who is nowhere represented as forgiving sin
in his sacerdotal character. We prove it, lastly, from the nature
of the case. The two functions of atonement and forgiveness are
not only distinct, but, in a certain sense, incompatible. Christ him
self acts as Lord when he forgives. Pardon is always an exercise
of sovereignty, inherent or derivative. Upon these four reasons,
drawn from the definition of a priest, the Levitical practice, the
priesthood of Christ, and the very nature of the power claimed,
we rest our first objection to the doctrine of " sacerdotal absolu
tion," viz., that it is not a sacerdotal function.
II. Our second objection to the doctrine is, that the Christian
ministry is not a priesthood.
1. They are not priests, first, because they are never so de
scribed in scripture, as they must have been if this were their true
character, the rather as the writers of the New Testament had
never known a religion, true or false, without a priesthood, were
perfectly familiar with the names and functions of the Jewish
hierarchy, and had the most exalted notions of the Christian minis
try, as the most honourable office in the world, for which no man
is sufficient, and of which no man is worthy. That the name
should never be applied is wholly inexplicable on the supposition
of a Christian priesthood. The solitary figurative phrase which
is alleged in opposition to this statement,* and in which the official
title is not used, but only a derivative or cognate verb, can no more
prove that Paul was a literal priest, than it can prove that the Gen-
* " That I should be the minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, ministering
(\cpovpyovvra) the Gospel of God, that the offering up {xpoa<popd) of the Gentiles might
be acceptable," &c. — Rom. xv. 16,

358 SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION.
tiles were a literal sacrifice, or that the parallel passages in Phi-
lippians and Timothy* can prove that Paul was a literal libation.
2. They are not priests, secondly, because no priestly function
is ascribed to them. The essential functions of a priesthood, as
appears from the inspired definition above quoted, from the Leviti
cal practice, and from the analogy of Christ's sacerdotal office, are
mediation and atonement ; exclusive mediation between parties
who are otherwise mutually inaccessible, and real atonement by
the presentation of an expiatory sacrifice. Such mediation and
such atonement the New Testament never ascribes to Christian
ministers. To assert that the essential function of a priesthood
is " ministerial intervention for the pardon of sin," is either saying
nothing that is definite and to the purpose, or saying too much, to
wit, that women and laymen who baptize for the remission of sins,
and all who teach men how to obtain pardon, are, by reason of
this ministerial intervention, ipso facto priests ; or it is saying in
ambiguous and doubtful terms what we have just said plainly, to
wit, that the very idea of a priest involves that of exclusive and
necessary mediation, a kind of " ministerial intervention" of which
the New Testament knows nothing.
3. They are not priests, thirdly, because the scriptures repre
sent Christ as the only priest of his people, who by the one offering
up of himself has perfectly and for ever answered all the ends of
the old priesthood. Having then such a High Priest, Jesus the
Son of God, we may come with boldness to the throne of grace.
And he not only has performed the work of a priest, but he is ever
present in that character. There were many priests of old, be
cause they could not continue by reason of death ; but Christ is a
perpetual priest because he ever lives. They had successors be
cause they were mortal men. He has no successor because he is
partaker of an endless life. The apostle argues that if Christ were
on earth he could not be a priest, that is, a priest of the old cove
nant, because the office was preoccupied by others, whose priest
hood must either supersede his or be superseded by it. If, then,
there could not be two priesthoods under the old covenant, neither
can there be two priesthoods under the new. If his priesthood,
then, was incompatible with that of others, that of others must now
be incompatible with his. It follows, therefore, either that the
Christian ministry is not a priesthood, or that Christ is not the
great High Priest of our profession.
4. They are not priests under Christ, and in a sense compatible
with his high-priesthood, as the priests of old were, because these
were types of Christ, as a high priest yet to come and only par
tially revealed, whereas now the revelation is complete, and Christ
is not only come but is still present ; so that the supposition of a
continued priesthood now, confounds the old with the new cove-
* " Yea and if I be offered (oxivSopaO upon the sacrifice and service of your faith."
Phil. ii. 17. " For I am now ready to be offered (fiSri oxivSopat)." — 2 Tim. iv. 6.

SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION. 359
nant, the future with the past, and makes the type as necessary
after as before the appearance of the antitype,1 which is absurd. It
might as well be said that there must still be John the Baptists to
be Christ's forerunners, or that the dawn of day can be continued
after the rising of the sun. It is no reply, then, to the foregoing
argument derived from Christ's exclusive priesthood, to allege that
there can just as well be priests now as before his advent, since
his advent is the very thing which has removed the necessity or
rather destroyed the possibility of any priesthood but the highest.
For the very reason that before Christ came there was a priest
hood to prefigure him and represent him, it follows that there can
not be a priesthood now when there is nothing to prefigure, and
when the object represented is, and for ever will be, personally
present. 5. They are not priests, in the sense contended for, and as suc
cessors to the ancient priests, because the functions claimed for
Christian ministers are wholly different from those of the Levitical
priesthood, whose sacerdotal acts were not designed to secure the
pardon of sin in the sight of God, it being impossible that the blood
of bulls and of goats should take away sin, but had relation to the
external theocracy, and were intended to secure the remission of
its penalties, and the restoration of the offender to its privileges,
so that they might have their full effect and yet leave the relation
of the offerer to God entirely unchanged. The way in which
these ends were answered was indeed designed to typify the me
thod of atonement, but so was the lifting up of the serpent in the
wilderness, the slaying of the passover, and other rites which had
not the nature of sin-offerings. If, then, Christian ministers are
indeed the successors of the ancient priesthood, they should claim
no more than the power to secure ecclesiastical remissions and
advantages ; whereas the advocates of this succession claim to do,
not what the ancient priests did, but the very thing which Christ
does, and are, therefore, at the same time, perverters of the priest
hood of Aaron and usurpers of the priesthood of Christ.
6. They are not priests in the sense of human mediators specially
appointed to bring men to Christ, as Christ brings men to God, be
cause the scriptures, while they constantly and clearly teach that we
must come to God through the mediation of Christ, teach no less con
stantly and clearly that we may come to Christ without any media
tion at all. This distinction cannot be unmeaning or fortuitous, and
is itself decisive of the question. The argument, however, is not
merely negative but positive. Not only are the scriptures silent as to
the necessity of any such " ministerial intervention," as a means of
access to the benefits of Christ's death, but they hold forth the free-
ness of immediate access to the Saviour without any intervention,
as one of the great distinctive doctrines of the Gospel. To cite the
proofs of this position in detail, would be to quote all those scriptures
in which Christ is represented as having died for the very purpose
of bringing us to God, and as being the only mediator between

360 SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION.
God and man. That another mediation is required to make this
mediation available, is a priori so improbable, and so destructive
of the very end for which the greater mediation is expressly said
to be intended, namely, direct and free access to God, that it can
not be rendered even credible, much less proved true, by anything
short of explicit declarations of the word of God, which are not
only altogether wanting, but in place of which we have innumera
ble invitations and commands to come at once to Christ. In the
face of all this to assert, as a point of Gospel doctrine, that no one
comes to Christ but through his ministers, seems as extravagant as
it would be to assert, as a fact of Gospel history, that Christ never
wrought a miracle of healing until his followers had wrought one
first. Alas, how many who have tried the effect of " ministerial inter
vention" for themselves or others, might say with the father of the
lunatic, " I brought him to thy disciples and they could not cure
him !" And the terms, if not the meaning, of our Lord's reprov
ing answer would be equally appropriate, " O faithless and per
verse generation, how long shall I be with you ? how long shall I
suffer you ? bring him hither to me." The parallel must not in
deed be carried further ; for the reason why the Christian priest
hood cannot forgive sin is not the want of faith, but of authority
and power. Let the illustration serve, however, to throw light
upon the contrast between pardon as obtained by " ministerial in
tervention," and pardon as immediately bestowed by Christ. Un
less the offers of the Gospel are entirely unmeaning, the Christian
ministry is not, in this or any other sense, a priesthood.
7. They are not priests, finally, because the scriptures declare
them to be something altogether different. The simple fact that
they are not described as priests, would be sufficient of itself, even
if no description had been given of their true official character ;
but the conclusion is immeasurably strengthened' by the frequent
and uniform representation of the ministry as messengers, heralds
of salvation, teachers, watchmen, rulers, overseers, shepherds.
" Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me ? Feed my sheep." " Si
mon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me ? Feed my lambs." " Christ
sent me not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel." " Who is Paul,
and who is Apollos, but ministers, by whom ye believed, even as
the Lord gave to every man?" " So then neither is he that plant-
eth anything, neither he that watereth, but God that giveth the in
crease." " Let a man so account of us as ministers of Christ, and
stewards of the mysteries of God (i. e., dispensers of divine truth").
" We preach not ourselves, but Jesus Christ the Lord, and our
selves your servants for Jesus' sake." Not only is all this no de
scription of a priesthood ; but that an office thus described, again
and again, and in every variety of metaphorical and literal expres
sion, should be after all a priesthood, is, if not impossible, beyond
belief. And we are not surprised that most of those who hold the
doctrine, found it not on scripture, but tradition, or, in other words,
believe that Christian ministers are priests, because they say so.

SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION. 361
On all these grounds, then, that the scriptures nowhere give the
name of priest, or ascribe any sacerdotal function to the ministry ;
that Christ is represented as the one only priest of the new cove
nant, of whom the ancient priests were types, no longer needed or
admissible; that the functions of these ancient priests were wholly
different from those now exercised or claimed by Christian minis
ters ; that any mediation between Christ and sinners is not only-
unknown, but directly contradictory to scripture ; and that the mi
nistry is there represented under characters the most remote from
that of priests, if not wholly inconsistent with it ; we are justified
in urging, as a second objection to the doctrine of Sacerdotal Ab
solution, that the Christian ministry is not a priesthood.
III. Our third objection is, that the grant of the power of remis
sion was not made to the ministry. We find the grant in the same
three passages to which Mr. Curtis has appealed, and we agree
with him in thinking that they all express the same idea under dif
ferent forms. But we differ from him as to the persons to whom
the grant of power is addressed. This is often a difficult question
to determine in our Lord's addresses, as the word disciples, which
is generally used, has both a narrower and a wider meaning, some
times denoting all Christ's followers, and sometimes the apostles
only, so that the objects of address can often be determined only
by the context and the analogy of scripture. In the case before
us, the parallel passages must of course be suffered to explain each
other, not only in relation to the nature of the grant, but also to
the persons upon whom it was bestowed. The one recorded in
the sixteenth of Matthew, taken by itself, would seem to show that
the power in question was conferred on Peter and his personal
successors ; but this conclusion is rejected equally by Mr. Curtis
and ourselves, not only on the ground that such pre-eminence is
nowhere else ascribed to Peter, and that no such peculiar power
was ever claimed or exercised by him ; but also on the ground that
in the eighteenth of Matthew a like grant is made to the " disci
ples" generally. And that this does not mean the apostles merely,
we infer from a comparison of John xx. 23 with Luke xxiv. 33,
which shows that our Lord's words recorded in the former place,
were addressed to " the eleven and them that were with them."
This is our first reason for believing that the power of remission
granted by our Saviour was not granted to the apostles or to mi
nisters exclusively, but to disciples or believers generally.
2. A second reason for this same conclusion may be drawn from
the connexion in which the words appealed to stand in the eight
eenth chapter of Matthew, which contains one continuous discourse,
all the parts of which are intimately connected. Our Lord first
teaches the necessity of conversion in order to enter the kingdom
of heaven ; then the sin of offending those who believe on him ;
then the method of dealing with offenders, first in private, then be
fore two or three witnesses, and then before the church ; which is
followed directly by the assurance that their decisions would be

362 SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION.
ratified in heaven, an assurance founded on the promise that where
two or three are gathered together in the Saviour's name, he is in
the midst of them. Peter then asked how often they were to for
give private and personal offences, to which Christ replies, that
there can be no limit to the duty of forgiveness ; and then shows
by a parable the obligation resting upon those whom God had for
given to forgive their brethren. Now, to make any one part of this
conversation have respect to the apostles, while the rest relates to
Christians generally, is altogether arbitrary, and may as easily be
denied as affirmed. Unless the necessity of conversion, the duty
of avoiding offences, and of private dealing with offenders, are
all peculiar to the apostles, why should the promise of Christ's pre
sence, and of ratification to the judgment passed, be limited to them ?
The command is to " tell it to the church," and the promise must
be likewise to the church. That the formal exercise of the power
granted is to be by officers, may be true enough ; but this much is
plain, that whatever power is here bestowed, is not bestowed upon
the ministry, but on the church.
3. A third reason for denying that the power of remission is
granted to the ministry exclusively, may be derived from the con
nexion which the scriptures recognise, and which all interpreters
indeed admit, between this power and the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
We learn from the New Testament that to every man was given
the manifestation of the Spirit, to one the word of wisdom, to ano
ther the word of knowledge, to another faith, to another the gifts
of healing, to another the working of miracles, to another prophe
cy, to another the discerning of spirits, to another the gift of tongues,
to another the interpretation of tongues. All these wrought the
self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he would. The
Spirit descended not only on apostles, not only on Jews, but on
Gentiles, as when Peter preached in the house of Cornelius. Even
the power to confer miraculous gifts was not peculiar to the apos
tles, as we learn from the case of Ananias, by whose agency such
gifts were bestowed on Paul himself. Still less reason is there for
assuming that the ordinary and abiding presence of the Holy Ghost
is confined to the rulers of the church. They who claim it must
either adduce a special promise, or show that a general promise is
fulfilled in them alone, by proving their exclusive possession of those
" fruits of the Spirit " by which alone the presence of the Spirit
can be known. If the power of remission now in question is con
nected with the gift of the Spirit, and arises from his presence,
then the power must belong to all those in whom the Spirit dwells,
or in other words, it does not belong to the ministry, as such, but
to the church at large.
4. The same thing may be argued from the practice of the apos
tolic age, so far as it is left on record. On the one hand, we find
no case where a power of remission is said to have been exercised
by the apostles, or by other ministers, suo jure. We never read
of men confessing their sins to them and receiving absolution or

SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION. 363
forgiveness at their hands. On the other hand, there are unambi
guous traces of a power residing in the church collectively to judge
its members and to try the spirits even of those who taught and
governed it. These negative and positive considerations, though
they may not be sufficient to establish a disputed fact, strongly cor
roborate the inference already drawn from the terms and context
of the passages in which the power is granted, and from its con
nexion with the gift and promise of the Holy Spirit, that the power
of remitting sins, whatever it may be, is not a peculiar function of
the Christian ministry.
I V . Our fourth objection to the doctrine is, that the power of ab
solute effectual forgiveness is not bestowed at all. 1. The admit
ted fact, that pardon is an act of sovereignty, and that none can,
in the strict sense of the word, forgive, except the person against
whom the offence is committed, cannot, as we have already con
ceded, be alleged in opposition to an express delegation of the
power, or a special designation of the ministry as the only medium
through which it will be exercised. But does it not create a strong
presumption against the fact of such delegation and appointment,
and enhance the necessity of positive explicit proof, in order to es
tablish it ? In this sense only do we here adduce one of Mr. Cur-
tis's three " popular objections," not to disprove his doctrine, but
to show how indispensable, and yet how hard it is for him to prove
it. And this presumption, far from being weakened, is corroborat
ed by the analogies of other special agencies or mediations, which
he cites, but which, as we have seen, including instances of every
other " mediation " but the one in question, raise the presumption
almost to a certainty, that this awful prerogative of the divine sove
reignty, if not incommunicable in its nature, has at least never been
communicated to mere creatures.
2. Even supposing that our Saviour's words apparently admitted
of no other explanation than the one assumed in the adverse argu
ment, the consideration just presented would require us to seek ano
ther sense before we acquiesced in one so much at variance with
all our preconceptions of the nature of the pardoning power, and
its relation to the sovereignty of God. In point of fact, however,
this is not the only sense which our Lord's expressions naturally
bear. It is only by insulating this one declaration that such an ex
position of it seems to become necessary. That the power to remit
sins may mean something less than the power absolutely and au
thoritatively to pardon them, is conceded by Mr. Curtis and " the
learned Bingham," when they speak of declarative and precatory
absolution as included in this grant. If a declaration of the terms
of pardon, and if prayer for pardon, are a part of the meaning of
" remission," there is no absurdity, although there may be error, in
assuming these to be the whole. If our Saviour's declaration con
veys to those whom he addressed the power of absolution, and if
absolution means (as Bingham says it means) declarative and pre
catory absolution, and if we are satisfied with this sense, and refuse

364 SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION.
to look for any other, how does Mr. Curtis convince us of our error?
By adducing arguments from other quarters, from the nature of the
ministry, the Jewish priesthood, and the analogy of God's dispen
sations ;*not by insisting that the words themselves can only mean
authoritative efficacious absolution, which would be directly con
tradictory to what he says about the other and inferior kinds.
What we allege is, not that the words cannot mean forgiveness in
the highest sense, but that they need not be so understood, if any
good cause can be shown for giving them another explanation.
3. It is plain from the connexion in which these words of Christ
are found, that the power bestowed is twofold, that of authoritative
teaching and that of authoritative judgment. By virtue of the for
mer, the church was to act as a witness of the truth, that is, simply
to proclaim the doctrines which she had received from Christ ; by
virtue of the latter, to apply these doctrines to the case of indivi
duals, to bind and loose, to open and shut, to receive into the church
and to exclude from it. In the discharge of both these functions
she was to be under the control and guidance of the Holy Spirit,
as well as regulated by the written word, so that nothing at vari
ance with this standard should be received even upon her authori
ty. This intimate connexion between the powers of teaching and
of judgment, and the common dependence of both upon the Spirit
and the word of God, make it the more improbable that the one
was designed to be more authoritative or effectual than the other,
and furnish a strong reason for believing that the power of remis
sion which Christ gave to his disciples was power to declare the
conditions on which God would pardon sin, and, in accordance with
this declaration, to receive or exclude men from communion.
4. This conclusion is confirmed by the actual practice of the
apostolic church. The sense in which Christ's words were under
stood by his disciples, is determined by the way in which they acted
on them. If they believed themselves to be invested, either indi
vidually or collectively, with power absolutely to forgive sins, as
the only appointed channels of communication between the souls
of sinners and the mercy of God or the merits of Christ, we might'
expect to find them claiming this authority in words, or at least
exerting it in act. Instead of this, we find them simply preaching
the doctrine of repentance for the remission of sins. The constant
burden of their preaching is, that faith in Christ is of itself sufficient
to secure forgiveness, not at the hands of men, as "mediating
agents," or in any other character, but at the hands of God, to
whom the power and the act of pardon are always and immedi
ately ascribed. That a power, which is now claimed as essential
to the dignity and value of a ministry, as well as one expressly
granted by the Saviour, should be thus omitted, both in word and
deed, by those who first received it, or at least by the inspired his
torians of the acts of the apostles, is to us inexplicable, nay incre
dible, and added to the previous considerations, seems to show that
Christ's words, in the passages appealed to, not only may but must

SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION. 365
refer to something very different. On these grounds, therefore, we
would rest our fourth objection to the doctrine of Sacerdotal Ab
solution, viz., that no such power as the one contended for has ever
been conferred by Christ at all.
V. Our fifth objection to the doctrine is that, as a theory, it is
part and parcel of a system of falsehood, from which it cannot be
detached without gross inconsistency and arbitrary violence.
Among the unscriptural and dangerous doctrines which it presup
poses, or to which it leads, is the doctrine that the apostles were
the original recipients of the Holy Ghost, whom they alone had the
power to communicate by the imposition of hands ; that they trans
mitted this power to their episcopal successors ; that in every ordi
nation by a bishop, sanctifying grace and supernatural power are
imparted ; that all who are thus ordained priests have power to
make the sacraments effectual means of communicating the bene
fits of redemption, the power, as even Protestants express it, of
making the body and blood of Christ; that in the eucharist the sa
crifice of Christ is really repeated, or at least so commemorated as
to secure the pardon of sin ; that it is only by participation in the
sacraments, thus administered, that men can be sanctified or saved.
With the priestly power to forgive sins is connected, on the one
hand, the necessity of specific confession, and on the other, the in
fallibility of the church ; with that, the denial of the right of pri
vate judgment ; and with that, the necessity of persecution. To
one who goes the whole length of these errors, their connexion and
agreement can but serve to strengthen his convictions : but to those
who shrink from any of them, it ought to be a serious considera
tion, that they stand in the closest logical relation to the plausible
and cherished dogma of Sacerdotal Absolution.
VI. Our sixth objection to the doctrine is, that it is practically a
subversion of the Gospel, a substitution of human mediation for the
mediation of Christ, and an exaltation of the priest into the place
of God. It is easily said that the power arrogated by the clergy
is derivative and delegated, that it is God who pardons, and Christ
who makes the throne of grace accessible, just as it may be said
and is said, that the Papist who adores an image uses it only as a
help to his devotion while he worships God. The profession may
in either case be honest, but in neither case can it avail to change
the practical result, to wit, that God is neglected or forgotten in the
idol or the priest. Instead of that dependence on the Spirit and
the Word, which form an indispensable condition of Christ's pro
mise to his people, the clergy are invested with authority, first, to
decide what is scripture ; then, to determine what the scripture
means ; and then, what is to be believed as matter of faith, though
not contained in scripture ; while at the same time they alone have
power to forgive the sins of men. This practical restriction of the
power to determine what is sin and to forgive sin, in the hands of
a certain class of ministers, as such, without regard to their cha
racter and standing before God, is the sum, essence, and soul of

366 SACERDOTAL ABSOLUTION.
Antichrist ; the constituent principle of that very power which has
debauched and enslaved the world ; of the power which sits in the
temple of God, claiming to be God ; the mystery of iniquity, sus
tained by the working of Satan with all power, the power of the
sword, the power of learning, the power of superstition, the power
of an evil conscience, the power of lying wonders, a power which
has held and will hold the world in subjection, till the Lord shall
consume it with the Spirit of his mouth, and destroy it by the
brightness of his coming. The Gospel thus preached is " another
Gospel," and the doctrine, which tends to such a practical result, is
and must be false.
To such of our readers as are satisfied by these or any other
arguments, that forgiveness of sins is not a sacerdotal function, that
the Christian ministry is not a priesthood, that the power of remis
sion was not given to the ministry, that the power of absolute ef-.
fectual remission was not given at all, that the contrary hypothesis
is one link in a chain of fearful errors, and practically tends to the
subversion of the Gospel, we may now say what we waived our
right to say before, to wit, that the doctrine of Sacerdotal Absolu
tion is unscriptural, dishonouring to God, and incompatible with
human fallibility and weakness.
In the course of our argument, and at its close, the question na
turally presents itself, what is the church to which the power of
remission has been granted, how does it act, how can it be con
sulted, what relation has it to the Christian ministry ? These are
inquiries of the highest moment, and the answer to them is really
involved in the preceding argument ; but a direct and full so
lution is not necessary to the negative conclusions which we have
endeavoured to establish, and may be better given in another place.

ESSAY XVI.
REGENERATION.*

Voltaire, in one of his historical works, sneeringly inquires,
" How were the priests employed while the Saracens were deso
lating the fairest portion of their church ?" " Disputing," he an
swers, " whether Christ has one will or two!" It will be well, if
the theologians of the nineteenth century do not furnish occasion
to some future infidel historian for a similar taunting remark.
There is scarcely any subject in the history of the church which
is more humiliating than that of theological discussions of this na
ture. The_evil appears to have arisen early, for Paul, in his Epis
tles to Timothy, repeatedly and earnestly exhorts him " not to strive
about words to no profit," but to avoid " foolish questions which
gender strifes." Yet not a century has passed from that day to
this, which has not been disturbed and disgraced by disputes fairly
within the apostle's description. That there are serious evils at
tending controversies of this character, no one will deny. They
bring discredit on religion ; they alienate brethren who should live
together in love ; they call off the attention from the practical du
ties of benevolence and piety ; and they are, from their nature,
destructive of the spirit of true religion. These disputes, in nine
cases out of ten, turn, not on the correct exposition of the Bible,
but on the decision of some point in mental or moral science.
Philosophy, instead of being the handmaid of religion, has become
the mistress of theology. This is a fact deeply to be lamented.
The subjects, we admit, are so nearly allied that they cannot be
kept entirely distinct ; still, theology might have, and ought to have,
much less of a philosophical, and more of an exegetical, character
than it has commonly assumed. The predominance of the former
over the latter element in theology, has been unquestionably one
of the most prolific sources of evil to the church. What is Pela
gianism, Arminianism, or almost any other ism, but a particular
system of religious philosophy ? And what are the questions
* Published in 1830, in Review of " Regeneration and the Manner of its Occur
rence. A Sermon from John v. 24. Preached at the opening of the Synod of New
York, in the Rutgers' Street Church, on Tuesday evening, Oct. 20, 1829. By Samuel
H. Cox, D. D., Pastor of the Laight Street Presbyterian Church."

368 regeneration.
which no,w alienate and divide Christians in this country, but ques
tions in mental or moral science ? If a man tells you his theory
of virtue, you need ask no questions about his theology. Hence
it is that these diversities of opinion are in a great measure con
fined to professed theologians, clergymen or laymen. The views
which ordinary Christians, under the guidance of common sense
and sanctified feeling, take of divine truth, are in all ages and
countries very nearly the same. Nor does it seem to us correct
to say, that common sense is nothing more than the popularized
results of philosophical speculations, because we find it the same
in countries where entirely different systems of philosophy have
for ages prevailed. Look at Germany and England for an illus
tration. The philosophical theologians of these countries differ
toto coelo in their views. They have hardly a single principle in
common. But how is it with common Christians ? They are as
much united in opinion as they are in feeling. And why ? Be
cause their opinions are formed from the Bible, under the guidance
of the Spirit, and the influence of those essential and consequently
universal principles of our nature which it has been the grand re
sult of philosophy to sophisticate and pervert. Is all philosophy
then to be proscribed ? By no means. The very statements we
have made demonstrate its importance. If a man's speculative
opinions do thus influence his views of religious truth and duty, it
is a matter of unspeakable moment that these opinions should be
correct. And, in a multitude of cases, the only means of prevent
ing the evils which flow from erroneous principles is to show the
fallacy of the principles themselves. Besides, all truth is harmo
nious, whether taught in the word of God or learned from the con
stitution of our own nature, and in itself there can be no subject
more worthy of accurate knowledge than that mysterious and im
mortal principle which was created in the image of God. All this
we cheerfully admit. At the same time the undeniable fact, that
systems of philosophy have been as changeable as the wind ; that
each in its turn has been presented, urged and adopted with the
utmost confidence ; and each in its measure perverted the simple
truths of the Bible, should teach us to be modest : it should teach
us to separate the human from the divine element in our theology,
and to be careful not to clothe the figments of our own minds with
the awful authority of God, and denounce our brethren for not be
lieving him when they do not agree with us. It should teach us,
too, not to ascribe to men opinions which, according to our notions,
may be inferred from the principles which they avow. This is an
impropriety of very frequent occurrence, and of which we think
we have great reason to complain in the sermon before us. To
state what appears to us to be fair deductions from principles as
sumed, as arguments against them, is one thing ; but to charge
those who hold these principles with holding our deductions, is a
very different affair.
With regard to the author of this sermon, we can truly say

regeneration. 369
that we entertain for him the highest respect. We love his honesty.
We admire the frankness and decision with which he always avows
his opinions. We rejoice to see that there is little of that evil
spirit in the discourse which so often converts investigations of
truth into angry disputations. But while we give Dr. Cox full
credit for sincerity, and acquit him of entertaining any bad feelings
towards his brethren, we still think that he is chargeable with
grossly misrepresenting their opinions, and holding them up to a
contempt and reprobation due only to his acknowledged carica
ture. We refer specially to page 6 of the Introduction, where,
after stating that there are certain dogmas, " some of them not
proved, or even suspected by those who employ them," which
have a tendency " to solace the sinner in his distance from Christ,"
and " excuse his disobedience to the Gospel, and which ought to
be rejected as false and ruinous," he gives the following specifi
cations :

" A man has no ability to do his duty.
" Where the means of grace are purely and abundantly vouchsafed, by the
sovereign goodness of Providence, a man can do nothing for, but can only coun
teract, his own salvation ; having no ability, even if he had the inclination, to be
lieve the Gospel and be saved.
" The wickedness of men consists in physical defect or disorganization of the
faculties of the soul, so that total depravity and physical depravity are nearly sy
nonymous, and both equally true.
" Regeneration is the implantation of a certain kind of 'principle of holiness,'
which is incapable of definition or demonstration, and has no connexion with
human consciousness ; which precedes all active mental holiness, and is antecedent
also to all ' the fruit of the Spirit,' as specified in the New Testament, in the sus-
ception and sustentation of which, the Creator is sole as well as sovereign agent ;
man no agent at all, but only a passive receiver, an unconscious subject of the
mysterious gratuity ; and which is the happy contrary of a principle of sin, which
is concreated with us, and is the permanent fund of all our depravity, in which
also we are passive — though quite active in exercising all the wickedness which
flows (full copiously) from such an inserted fountain, and which has its residence
and location somewhere in the texture of the soul, which is itself a very wicked
thing somehow physiologically, in the very nature of it, antecedent to any agency
at all of ours. ,
" Regeneration consists in some secret physical motion on the soul, which re
stores its dislocated powers, and cures the connatural diseases of its texture ; since
the work of the Creator, as such, is not ' good,' but lays the foundation in the
very entity of the soul for all its overt wickedness, and for the necessity of re
generation. " The soul is passive, entirely passive, and God the sole agent of regeneration.
"The means of grace, and the Gospel itself, are in no sense moral causes of
regeneration ; since their important use is merely to illustrate the strength of an
invincible depravity, to make the sinner worse and worse, till he is physically re
generated, and then to signalize the prodigious efforts and labours of Omnipotence,
in this department of constant miracle-working : — as if there were no considera
ble difference between dividing the Red Sea symbolically by the rod of Moses,
and conciliating the human mind by the revealed glories of the everlasting Gospel !
" It is wrong to require a sinner in the name of God to repent immediately, and
believe the Gospel, and to urge him to this as the only way of salvation.
" The offer of salvation is not made to every hearer ; or, if it be, to accept it is
impracticable, and to require this of the sinner, wanton and absurd.
24

370 regeneration.
" If there is a universal offer in the Gospel, it is founded — not on the atonement
of Jesus Christ at all, but only on the ministerial commission ; or on human ig
norance of who the elect aje ; or it has no moral foundation ; or it is only man's
offer, and not God's ; or it is a matter of mere sovereignty, and so insoluble ; or
it is an offer in form, and in fact no offer or overture at all : and this, although
there is no salvation known to the Gospel but that of our Lord Jesus Christ as an
atoning Saviour.— Prov. i. 20— -33 ; Luke xiv. 24 ; Acts iv. 12, xiii. 26, 46."
The doctor then says, " if I have caricatured these dogmas, I
have done so intentionally ; but only by representing them as they
are, and making the reality govern the appearance." It is not
probable that Dr. Cox, in writing these paragraphs, had any one
class of theologians exclusively in his eye ; because some of " these
dogmas" are inconsistent with each other. We have no doubt, how
ever, that most of what is here stated, was intended as an exhibition
of the doctrines of the old Calvinists (sit venia verbo). Our reason
for thinking so is, that we are accustomed to see such, and even still
more gross misrepresentations of these doctrines, though, we ac
knowledge, not often from such men as Dr. Cox. It is, however,
notorious that this class of theologians are constantly represented
as maintaining that " man has no ability, even if he had the incli
nation, to believe the Gospel and be saved," — that man's depravity
" is a physical defect" — that regeneration is " a physical change,"
&c. Representations have been made of these doctrines which
we had supposed no man, who felt the obligation " of interpreting
language in conformity with the known and declared nature of
the thing described," could ever allow himself to make. Belong
ing as we do to the class, which for the sake of convenience and
distinction we have called old Calvinists, we feel ourselves ag
grieved by such representations, and called upon to show that no
such doctrines can be fairly imputed to the elder Calvinists. It
will not be expected that in a single article we should go over the
formidable list presented by Dr. Cox. We shall, for the present at
least, confine ourselves to the doctrine of this sermon, and show
that the old standard Calvinistic authors expressly disclaim the
opinions here imputed to them, and that they are not fairly dedu-
cible from any of the principles which they avow. Should we
entirely fail as to the second point, it would still be very unjust to
charge men with holding doctrines which they constantly disclaim,
because we consider them as flowing from their principles.
The two main points of Dr. Cox's sermon are, first, that regene
ration is a moral, in distinction from a physical change ; and se
condly, that it occurs in a manner perfectly accordant with the
active powers of the soul. We use the word physical, not as sy
nonymous with natural, but in the sense in which it is used in this
sermon, implying something referring to the substance or essence.
By physical regeneration in this sense, is intended a change in the
essence or essential properties of the soul, or, in the language of
Dr. Cox, an influence by which " the connatural diseases in the
texture of the soul are healed." Our object is to show that Dr.

regeneration. 371
Cox has misrepresented the views of his brethren on this subject ;
that they hold to no change in the substance .of the soul nor in any
of its essentia] properties, but uniformly teach that the change is a
moral one, and takes place in a manner perfectly congruous to the
nature of a rational and active being. We appeal to the language
and doctrines of all the old Calvinistic divines, in support of this
assertion. Charnock, in his discourse on regeneration, contained in Vol. II.
of the folio edition of his works, proposes in the first place to state
in reference to the nature of this change, what it is not. On page
72, he says, " It is not a removal or taking away of the old sub
stance or faculties of the soul. Some thought that the substance
of Adam's soul was corrupted when he sinned, therefore suppose
the substance of his soul to be altered when he is renewed. Sin
took not away the essence but the rectitude ; the new creation
therefore gives not a new faculty but a new quality." Who the
" some" were, to whom Charnock refers as holding that the sub
stance of Adam's soul was corrupted by the fall, we know not ;
all we know is that such is not the doctrine of any respectable
body of Calvinists, nor of any standard writer on the subject.
The only man of whom we have heard who taught this doctrine,
was Flaccius Illyricus, Professor at Jena, and a pupil of Luther ;
but we know, too, that his opinions on this subject were condemned,
almost without a dissenting voice, by the reformed theologians of
Germany and England.
On the 73d page, Charnock says expressly, " the essence and
faculties remain the same." " The passions and affections are the
same as to the substance and nature of the acts ; but the difference
lies in the objects." " When a man loves God, or fears God, or
loves man, or fears man, it is the same act of love and the same
act of fear ; there are the same motions of the soul, the same sub
stantial acts simply considered," &c. " This new creation is not a
destruction of the substance of the soul, but there is the same phy
sical being, and the same faculties in all, and nothing is changed in
its substance as it respects the nature of man." — P. 85. We have
here a most explicit disavowal of the doctrine of physical regene
ration in the sense in which Dr. Cox represents the old Calvinists
as holding it.
As to the manner in which this work is effected, he remarks, in the
first place, that " it is a secret work, and therefore difficult to ex
plain." " Yet, secondly, this is evident, that it is rational, that is,
congruous to the essential nature of man. God does not deal with
us as beasts, or as creatures destitute of sense, but as creatures of
an intelligent order. Who is there that believes in Christ, as heavy
things fall to the earth, or as beasts run at the beck of their sen
sual appetites without rule or reason?" — P. 217. "God that re
quires of us a reasonable service, would work upon us by a reason
able operation. God therefore works by the way of a spiritual

372

REGENERATION.

illumination of the understanding, in propounding the creature's
happiness ,by arguments and reasons ; and in the way of a spiritual
impression on the will, moving it sweetly to embrace that happi
ness, and the means to it which he doth propose ; and indeed with
out this work preceding, the motion of the will could never be
regular."— P. 218.
In speaking more particularly of the direct operation of the Holy
Spirit on the will, his first proposition is, that there is such an influ
ence ; second, that " this work, though immediate, is not compul
sive. It is a contradiction for the will to be moved unwillingly :
any force upon it destroys its nature. It is not forced because it is
according to reason, and the natural motion of the creature ; the
understanding proposing and the will embracing ; the understand
ing going before with light, the will following after with love."
"The will being a rational faculty cannot be wrought upon but
rationally."— P. 221.
The instrumentality of the truth in regeneration is strongly as
serted by all old Calvinists. Charnock says, "that to make an
alteration in us according to our nature of understanding, will and
affections, it is necessary there should be some declaration of things
under those considerations of true, good and delightful, in the
highest manner, to make a choice change in every faculty of the
soul ; and without this a man cannot be changed as a rational
creature," &c. — P. 233. " The word operates, first, objectively,
as it is a declaration of the will of God, and presenting the objects
of all holy acts ; and secondly it has an active force. It is opera
tive in the hand of God for sanctification." " The Spirit doth so
edge the word that it cuts to the quick, discerns the very thoughts,
insinuates into the depths of the heart," &c. — P. 235. " To con-
elude, the promise in the word breeds principles in the heart suita
ble to itself; it shows God a father and raises up principles of
love and reverence ; it shows Christ a Mediator, and raises up
faith and desire. Christ in the word conceives Christ hi the heart,
Christ in the word the beginning of grace, conceives Christ in the
heart the hope of glory." — P. 236. The use of the word in rege
neration is surely according to this view something more than " the
rod of Moses stretched out over the Red Sea." We presume,
however, that the paragraph in which Dr. Cox denounces the opi
nion that the means of grace have no tendency to produce holiness,
was designed for a different quarter. Old Calvinists have generally
been charged with laying too much stress on the use of means.
Charnock was by no means singular in the views here expressed.
Living as he did in the days of the Puritan ascendency in England,
the companion of Owen, Goodwin, Burgess, Bates, and many others
of the same class, he was united with them in opinion as well as
in labours.
Owen, in his work on the Spirit, when speaking of regeneration,
lays down the following proposition (page 270 of the folio edition).

REGENERATION. 373
" In whom or towards whomsoever the Holy Spirit puts forth his
power, or the acts of his grace for their regeneration, it removes all
obstacles, overcomes all opposition, and infallibly produces the effect
intended." But how is this done ? Is it by changing the substance
of the soul or violating any of the laws of its being ? The words
which immediately follow, and which are intended to explain this ge
neral proposition, contain the answer. " The power which the Holy
Spirit puts forth in our regeneration, is such in its actings or exercise,
as our minds, wills and affections are suited to be wrought upon, and
to be affected by, according to their natures and natural operations.
He doth neither act in them any otherwise than they themselves
are meet to be moved and to move, to be acted and to act, accord
ing to their own nature, power and ability. He draws us with the
cords of a man, and the work itself is expressed by a persuading;
' God persuade Japhet ; I will allure her into the wilderness and
speak comfortably :' for, as it is certainly effectual, so it carries no
more repugnancy to our faculties than a prevalent persuasion
doth." One can hardly imagine how men who use such language
can be charged with holding a "physical regeneration," by which
" the connatural diseases of the texture of the soul " are cured. Owen
proceeds to say, secondly, that the Holy Spirit " doth not in our
regeneration possess the mind with any enthusiastical impressions ;
but he works in the minds of men on and by their own natural
actings, through an immediate influence and impression of his pow
er. ' Create in me a clean heart, O God.' He worketh to will
and to do. Thirdly, he therefore offers no violence or compulsion
to the will. This that faculty is not naturally capable to give ad
mission unto. If it be compelled it is destroyed." And again on
the next page, " the Holy Spirit, who in his power and operation is
more intimate, as it were, unto the principles of our souls than they
are to themselves, doth, with the preservation and in the exercise
of the liberty of our wills, effectually work our regeneration and
conversion unto God. This is the substance of what we have to
plead for in this cause, and which declares the nature of this work
of regeneration, as it is an inward spiritual work."
Bates's view of the manner in which this change is effected, is the
same with that of Owen. In the fourth volume of his works (octavo
edition), page 140, he says, "the effectual operation of grace does not
violate the native freedom of the will, but is congruous to it. God's
drawing is by teaching : ' every one who hath heard and learned
of the father cometh unto me.' When the author of the Gospel is
a teacher of it, the most stupid and obstinate sinners shall be con
vinced and obedient"" Again: "God draws sinners to himself
' with the cords of a man,' in a rational way, without violence to
their faculties, and fastens them by the bonds of love." In another
place, Vol. II., page 298, he says, " the Holy Spirit does not work
grace in us, as the sun forms gold in the earth, without any sense
in ourselves of his operations : but we feel them in all our faculties

374 REGENERATION.
congruously to their nature, enlightening the mind, exciting the
conscience, turning the will, and purifying the affections."
The opinions of the reformed, or Calvinistic divines of Germany
and Holland, were the same on these points as those of the Calvin
ists of England. Turrettin, Theol. Elenct. loc. 15,quaest 4, § 15,
says, " Gratiae efficacis motio non est simpliciter physica, quia
agitur de facultate morali, quae congruenter naturae suae moveri
debet; nee simpliciter ethica, quasi Deus objective solum ageret et
leni suasione uteretur, quod pertendebant Pelagiani : sed superna-
turalis est et divina, quae transcendit omnia haec genera." " Po-
tens est, ne sit frustranea ; sua vis est, ne sit coacta. Vis est sum
ma et inexpugnabilis ut vincatur naturae corruptio et summa bene
agendi impotentia ac male agendi necessitas : sed arnica tamen et
grata, qualis naturam intelligentem et rationalem decet."
The Synod of Dort, in order to prevent any misapprehension
of their views of efficacious grace, as though it were inconsistent
in its operation with the rational and moral powers of our nature,
say in reference to the fourth article in dispute between them and
the Remonstrants, " Sicuti vero per lapsum homo non desiit esse
homo, intellectu et voluntate praeditus, nee peccatum, quod univer
sum genus humanum pervasit, naturam generis humani sustulit,
sed depravavit et spiritualiter occidit : ita etiam haec divina rege-
nerationis gratia, non agit in hominibus tanquam truncis et stipiti-
bus, nee voluntatem ejusque proprietates tollit, aut invitam violen-
ter cogit, sed spiritualiter, sanat, corrigit, suaviter simul et potenter
flectit: ut ubi antea plene dominabatur carnis rebellio et resistentia
nunc regnare incipiat prompta ac sincera spiritus obedientia ; in
quo vera et spiritualis nostrae voluntatis libertas consistit."
Spanheim, in his Elench. Controv. cum August. Confess. Theol.
Oper. tom. iii., col. 909, after stating how nearly the views of the
Lutheran divines coincided with those of Calvinists on this subject,
says that the difference which did exist seemed to result from a
misapprehension of the Calvinistic doctrine. Supponunt precario,
he says, 1. ''Nos velle per gratiam insuperabilem, motionem coac-
tam, violentam, qualis trunci, lapidis. &c. 2. Negare nos resisti-
bilitatem gratiae respectu naturae corruptae, et carnis Deo inimi-
cae, qua sane quantum in se est nimis resistit."
Stapfer, in his Institut Theol. Polem., cap. iii., § 136, maintains
in unison with the common mode of speaking among Calvinists of
his day, that there was in regeneration a divine illumination of the
understanding, and a divine influence on the will. What he intend
ed by these expressions he carefully explains. " Per illuminatio-
nem autem intelligimus convictionem supernaturalem veritatum
revelatarum, et nexus illarum distinctam repraesentationem." And
this, he says, though certainly producing conviction, offers no more
violence to the mind than the demonstration of a proposition in
geometry. " Neque magis (are his words), hominis libertati obes-
se potest, ac illi aliquid derogatur, si sole post tenebras redeunte
objecta circumjacentia ipsi clare repraesentantur, aut si de veritate

REGENERATION. 375
geometrica per illius demonstrationem convincitur." With regard
to the influence which operates on the will, he says, " Pono ita
agit, ut homo in determinatione sua liber maneat, neque obtorto
quasi collo et invitus trahitur ; facit ut homo volens agat. Veri-
tatem tam clare mentibus ingerit, ut non possint non assentiri, et
tanta motiva voluntati suggerit, ut non possit nolle, sed fertur:
Pellexisti me Jehova, et pellectus sum, fortior fuisti me, et praeva-
luisti." — Jer. xx. 7.
This he asserts, over and over, is the true Calvinistic doctrine.
This he does, not only in his chapters on Pelagianism and Armini
anism, where he is answering precisely the same objection, which
(and it is one of the wonders of the age) Calvinists are now
urging against Calvinism, viz., that efficacious grace, as explained
by them, is inconsistent with the nature of man as a rational and
responsible creature ; but also in his chapter De Consensu et Dis-
sensu Protestantium, and in his preliminary statement of the gene
ral truths of theology.
We fear that we have already exhausted the patience of our
readers, in proving a point concerning which every one acquainted
with Calvinistic writers must have been satisfied before we began.
We hope however that our labour will not be regarded as alto
gether unnecessary ; because when an imputation comes from a
source in every way so respectable, and in fact so highly respect
ed, the inference will be, that in sober truth old Calvinists do hold,
that the texture of the soul is diseased; that its substance is
changed in regeneration ; that some unknown violence to its facul
ties is suffered under the Spirit's influence. It is proper, therefore,
that it should be shown, that the direct reverse of all this is dis
tinctly declared by them to be their opinion ; that they profess to
believe regeneration to be a moral and not a physical change ; and
that it takes place without any violence being done to the soul or
any of its laws. Our readers, too, will be led, we trust, to think
with us, that there should be something more than mere inferential
reasoning, to justify ascribing to men a set of opinions which they
constantly and earnestly disclaim.
We are perfectly willing to admit that old Calvinists, when
treating on the subject of regeneration, often speak of a direct and
physical influence of the Spirit on the soul. But in what sense ?
In the sense in which Dr. Cox represents them as holding physical
regeneration ? Far from it. He says that physical regeneration
and physical depravity stand together. He thus uses the word
as qualifying the effect produced. They use it to qualify the influ
ence exerted in producing the effect. But what do they mean
when they speak of a physical influence being exerted on the soul
in regeneration ? They mean precisely what we suppose Dr. Cox
means, when he speaks of " the agency of the Spirit, apart from
the power of the truth, which is his instrument." — P. 27. They
mean to assert that regeneration is not effected by mere moral sua
sion ; that there is something more than the simple presentation of

376 REGENERATION.
truth and urging of motives. The idea of Calvinists uniformly
was, that the truth, however clearly presented or forcibly urged,
would never produce its full effect without a special influence of
the Holy Spirit. This influence they maintained was supernatural,
that is, above the mere moral power of the truth, and such as in
fallibly to secure the result, and yet, to use their own illustration,
did the soul no more violence than demonstration does the intellect,
or persuasion the heart. This opinion is not confined to any one
class of Calvinists : as far as we know it is common to them all.
We understand Dr. Cox as teaching the same doctrine. In fact we
know no Calvinist who denies it. The author of the review, in
the last number of the Christian Spectator, of the strictures of Dr.
Tyler on some previous articles in that work, says, " We have
never called in question the doctrine of an immediate or direct
agency of the Spirit on the soul in regeneration." This is all the
old Calvinists intended by physical influence. That this assertion
is correct is evident from the fact that they taught, as we have seen
above, that this influence is perfectly "congruous" to the nature of
the soul, doing it no more violence than, in the language of Owen,
" an effectual persuasion doth ;" and that it produces no physical
change in the substance of the soul or any of its faculties. Unless,
therefore, we mean to interpret their language, not according to
their clear and often repeated statements of their meaning, but ac
cording to the sense which a particular expression has attained
among ourselves, we must admit that no part of the proof of the
charge which we are considering can be made to rest on the oc
currence of the phrase, " physical influence," in their writings. But
there is still further evidence that our assertion on this subject is
correct, which is derived from the fact, that it is in controversy
with those who taught that there was no influence beyond " moral
suasion " and " common grace " exerted in regeneration, that the
older writers maintained what they sometimes called a physical in
fluence of the Spirit*
Turretin, in the passage quoted above, describing the nature of
the influence exerted in regeneration, says that it is not merely a
moral influence, such as the Pelagians contended for, but superna
tural and divine ; and immediately adds, " aliquid de ethico et phy-
sico participat," where it is plain that it is in opposition to the Pe
lagian doctrine that he uses this expression ; precisely as Dr. Cox
would do the words, direct and immediate. When the Remon
strants arose, they objected strongly to the modes of expression
which had become common among the Reformed theologians on
the subject of efficacious grace. This led to a more precise state
ment of what their real doctrines were on this subject, and they
uniformly repelled the imputations of their opponents that they

* This expression, however, is by no means so common as that of " direct and imme
diate influence," and is so carefully guarded as to prevent any justifiable mistake as to
its meaning.

REGENERATION. 377
taught that this influence was inconsistent with the rational nature
of the soul. They very unwillingly used even the word irresisti
ble, which they said was no word of their selection, but was put
upon them by the Jesuits and Remonstrants. It afterwards indeed
became very common ; but they tell us they intended by it nothing
more than certainly efficacious. Stapfer, cap. 17, p. 540, says, in
answer to such objections, that when the Reformed speak of irre
sistible grace, " hoc volunt, ita efficaciter divinam gratiam operari,
ut hominis resistentiam infallibiliter superet, ut suasio ipsius tantae
sit efficaciae ut homo non possit non velle summaque spontanei-
tate sequi." The necessity or certainty as to the result for which
they contended, was none other than that for which President Ed
wards and all other Calvinists contend, and which is inconsistent
with no other theory of liberty than that of indifference. If any
man would candidly compare one passage with another in the writ
ings of old Calvinists, and interpret their language agreeably to the
fair rules of construction, there could be no doubt as to their
meaning, by physical influence, what Dr. Cox, we presume, means
by " an influence apart from the truth." Charnock, in speaking on
this subject, says, in the general, that the work is secret,. yet " congru
ous to the essential nature of the soul." He then states more par
ticularly, first, that there is " an immediate and supernatural work
on the will :" as synonymous with this expression he on the next
page uses the words " physical operation." His second proposition
is, that " this work, though immediate, is not compulsive and by
force." " The will being a rational faculty cannot be wrought upon
but rationally," is one of his assertions, in explanation of his idea
of this immediate influence. " God, who knows how to make a
will with a principle of freedom, knows how to work upon the
will, without intrenching upon or altering the essential privilege he
bestowed upon it," is another. His third position is, that this im
mediate work " is free and gentle." " A constraint, not by force,
but love." " It is sweet and alluring : the Spirit of grace is called
the oil of gladness; it is a ready and delightful motion which it
causes in the will ; it is a sweet efficacy, and an efficacious sweet
ness." Is this " to paralyze the soul, or to strike it through with a
moral panic?" Surely Dr. Cox will regret having made such a re
presentation of the views of men whose opinions as to the nature
of divine influence do not differ one tittle from his own. " At what
time," Charnock goes on to say, " God doth savingly work upon
the will, to draw the soul from sin and the world to himself, it doth
with the greatest willingness, freedom, and delight, follow after
God, turn to him, close with him, and cleave to him, with all the
heart, and with purpose never to depart from him — Cant. i. 4.
Draw me, and we will run after thee : drawing signifies the effica
cious power of grace ; running signifies the delightful motion of
grace : the will is drawn, as if it would not come ; it comes, as if
it were not drawn. His grace is so sweet and so strong, that he
neither wrongs the liberty of his creature, nor doth prejudice his

378 REGENERATION.
absolute power. As God moves necessary causes, necessarily ;
contingent causes, contingently ; so he moves free agents freely,
without offering violence to their natures. The Spirit glides into
the heart by sweet illapses of grace, and victoriously allures the
soul. — Hos. ii. 14. I will allure her, and speak to her heart; not
by crossing, but changing the inclination, by the all conquering and
alluring charms of love," &c, 222. The fourth proposition is, that
this influence is " insuperably victorious," or, in other words, irre
sistible. In what sense is it irresistible ? Let the following expla
nation from Charnock in this immediate connexion answer, and
prevent those brethren reproaching us for a word, who agree with
us as to the thing intended. " As the demonstration of the Spirit
is clear and undeniable, so the power of the Spirit is sweet and ir
resistible ; both are joined, 1 Cor. ii. 4. An inexpressible sweetness
allures the soul, and an unconquerable power draws the soul ; there
are clear demonstrations, charming persuasions, and invincible effi
cacy combined in the work. He leaves not the will in indifference.
(This is what they were arguing against.) If God were the author
of faith only by putting the will into indifference, though it be de
termined by its own proper liberty, why may not he also be said
to be the author of unbelief, if by the same liberty of indifference
it be determined to reject the Gospel ?" " This irresistibleness
takes not away the liberty of the will. Our Saviour's obedience
was free and voluntary, yet necessary and irresistible." " Is God
not freely and voluntarily good, yet necessarily so ? He cannot be
otherwise than good ; he will not be otherwise than good. So the
will is irresistibly drawn, and yet doth freely come to its own hap
piness." It is perfectly evident, therefore, that nothing more was
intended by this expression than what President Edwards and all
other Calvinists contend for, viz., moral or philosophical necessity.
Now, when it is remembered that all the expressions which we have
quoted, and much more of the same import, are used in explana
tion of the nature of that divine influence by which regeneration
is effected, we think that our readers will feel that the strongest
possible evidence should be required to sustain the charge against
those who use them, of holding doctrines utterly inconsistent with
their most clearly expressed opinions. We think that any candid
man will acknowledge, who should take the trouble to read the
writings of the older Calvinists, that they held no other doctrines
on the subject of divine influence than such as are common among
all classes of opposers of Arminianism. Their " supernatural " or
" physical " influence meant nothing more than what is now intend
ed by " a direct and immediate influence." Owen, whose language
on this subject is as strong as that of any writer with whom we
are acquainted, states clearly, as we have already seen, his belief
that the influence for which he contended is perfectly " congruous"
to the nature of the soul. He tells us also, page 257, that it is
against the Pelagian theory that he is arguing when he maintains
that moral suasion alone does not effect our regeneration, but that

REGENERATION. 379
there is a direct agency of the Spirit in the work, which is such
" as our minds, wills, and affections, are suited to be wrought upon
and affected by, according to their natures and natural operations."
But if old Calvinists held such opinions (and they hold them
still) on " the nature of regeneration and the mode of its occur
rence," where is the difference between them and Dr. Cox ? None
in the world, as far as these general statements go. His general
propositions, that regeneration is a moral, and not a physical change,
and that it takes place in a manner accordant to the nature of the
soul, are as orthodox as Owen or Charnock could wish them. We
take it for granted, however, that Dr. Cox would think we had
treated him rather unhandsomely thus to convict him of old ortho
doxy. We proceed, therefore, to state where the difference really
lies. It is simply this. All the old Calvinists, and the great major
ity, we hope and believe, of the new school also, hold that the
result of the Holy Spirit's operation on the soul is a holy principle
or disposition ; Dr. Cox says, if we understand him, that the result
is a holy act. This is the whole ground of debate, and to lookers
on it may appear rather too narrow to be worth disputing about.
Dr. Cox, however, seems to think that this is a subject of vital im
portance, affecting deeply our views of the whole system of divine
truth, and our manner of preaching ; involving the high questions
of the grounds of man's accountability, the nature of sin and holi
ness, and of human liberty. And here we are sorry to say we
agree with him. We are afraid that this is a turning point. We
do not see how it is possible to hold together the tattered shreds of
Calvinism, if this ground be assumed. Is Calvinism, then, a mere
metaphysical system ? We think not. But there are some meta
physical opinions utterly inconsistent with it ; that indifference is
necessary to the freedom of the will is one, and that morality con
sists in acts only, we fear, is another.
All the ground that we have for supposing that Dr. Cox holds
this latter opinion, is found in the pamphlet under review. And
even here it is not distinctly asserted ; but it seems to be constantly
implied, and to be the foundation of all that is peculiar in the ser
mon or introduction. The principle assumed is, that there is no
thing in the soul but its substance, with its essential attributes, and
its acts. Therefore, if regeneration be not a change in its acts, it
must be a change in the substance. If sin be not an act, then it is
substance, " an entity," " a disease of the texture of the soul." This,
we take it, is the ground of the imputation that Calvinists believe
in physical depravity and physical regeneration ; for if this princi
ple be not assumed, there is not even the slender and insufficient
ground of these doctrines being deducible, in the author's opinion,
from Calvinistic principles, to justify the charge. Besides, every
one knows that this is the ground on which this charge has been
made before, in a manner far more offensive and unfair than Dr.
Cox is capable of making it. It is on this ground, also, we pre
sume, that Dr. Cox maintains that the soul is as active in regenera-

380 REGENERATION.
tion, as in repentance or the exercise of faith. And it is on this
ground, we suppose, that he ridicules the idea of regeneration being
the production of a holy principle in th® soul, " the happy contra
ry," as he calls it, " of a principle of sin, which is concreated with
us." This view of the doctrine of regeneration (that it is the pro
duction of a holy principle), he says, can " command the confidence
of no well disciplined mind " (rather a bold assertion by the way),
and then adds, " By holy principle / mean love to God, and not
anything antecedent to it ; and by love to God, I mean loving him ;
and in that the subject is active."
Dr. Cox, we believe, pins his faith to no man's sleeve, and is the
follower of no party. His opinions are his own ; but what they
are we pretend not to know, further than they are developed in
this discourse. He has here brought forward the charge against
many of his brethren, whom he loves, and who love him, of be
lieving in physical depravity and physical regeneration. On what
grounds he rests the charge we have no means of ascertaining, but
from the opinions advanced in this discourse. We are anxious to
show, that, as far as old Calvinists are concerned, the imputation is
unfounded. And we think that we have shown, to the satisfaction
of every candid reader, that these doctrines are constantly and ex
plicitly disclaimed by this class of theologians. When it is assert
ed, therefore, in the face of such positive declarations to the con
trary, that they do entertain these opinions, it can only be on the
ground that they are fair inferences from the principles which
they avow. This, though a very improper ground for a direct
imputation, is all, we are persuaded, that can exist. How Dr.
Cbx would endeavour to make it appear that these are fair infer
ences we do not know, and therefore do not wish to be considered,
in our further remarks on this subject, as having reference to Dr.
Cox's theological opinions any further than they are distinctly
avowed in this sermon. Our object is simply this : to endeavour
to show that the Calvinistic doctrine, that regeneration consists in
the production of a holy habit or principle in the soul, fitting and
disposing it to holy acts, is not liable to the charge here advanced.
It will not be necessary to take up much time or space in prov
ing that the doctrine of regeneration, as just stated, is that which
is held by old Calvinists. Charnock, page 85, vol. ii., says, " This
new creation consists in gracious qualities and habits which beau
tify and dispose the soul to act righteously and holily." Owen
says the new creation is " an habitual holy principle wrought in
us by God, and bearing his image," or, as in the next sentence, " a
divine supernatural principle, of spiritual actions and operations,"
We prefer, however, referring to the statements of a few of the
theologians of our own country, some of whom do not belong to
the class which, for the sake of convenience, we have called old
Calvinists. President Edwards not only admits that moral princi
ples or habits may and must exist in the soul prior (in the order of
nature) to moral action, but his whole system of practical theology,

REGENERATION. 381
as it seems to us, rests on this foundation. The great fundamental
principle of his work on the affections is this : — All gracious or
spiritual affections presuppose and arise from spiritual views of
divine truth. These views the natural man neither has, nor can
have, while he remains such. Hence arises the necessity of such
a change being wrought in the state of the soul, that it can per
ceive the real beauty and excellence of divine things. This change
consists in imparting to the soul what he calls " a new sense," or a
new taste, or relish, or principle, adapted to the perception and love
of spiritual excellence. Were we to attempt to exhibit all the evi
dence which might be adduced in proof of the fact that his views
were such as we have represented, we should be obliged to quote
a great part of the work just mentioned. We refer the reader
especially to what he says on the first and fourth signs of gracious
affections. With regard to the nature of regeneration, we quote
only a single passage. After having stated" that the exercises of
the true Christian are specifically different from those of unsancti-
fied men, he infers that if the exercises are different, the principle
whence they proceed must be different, or there must be, " as it
were, a new spiritual sense, or a principle of new kind of percep
tion or spiritual sensation." And he hence explains why it is that
" the work of the Spirit of God in regeneration is often, in scrip
ture, compared to giving a new sense, giving eyes to see, and ears
to hear, unstopping the ears of the deaf, and opening the eyes of
them that were born blind, and turning them from darkness unto
light." The nature of this " new sense" he thus explains.
" This new sense, and the new dispositions that attend it, are no
new faculties, but are new principles of nature. I use the word
principles, for want of a word of a more determinate signification*
By a principle of nature, in this place, I mean that foundation
which is laid in nature, either old or new, for any particular kind
or manner of exercise of the faculties of the soul ; or a natural
habit, or foundation for action, giving a person ability and disposi
tion to exert the faculties in exercises of such a certain kind ; so
that to exert the faculties in that kind of exercises, may be said to
be his nature. So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of
understanding, but it is a new foundation laid in the nature of the
soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of under
standing. So that new holy disposition of the heart that attends
this new sense, is not a new faculty of the will, but a foundation
laid in the nature of the soul for a new kind of exercises of the
same faculty of will. The Spirit of God, in all his operations on
the minds of natural men, only moves, impresses, assists, improves,
or some way acts upon natural principles, but gives no new spi
ritual principles."*
We have never met with a stronger or more formal statement

1787.

Treatise concerning Religious Affections, pp. 231, 232. Elizabethtown edition,
7.

382 REGENERATION.
of the doctrine which we are endeavouring to support, than is
found in this passage. And it should be considered that this is not
a passing remark on the part of President Edwards, or the state
ment of an isolated opinion, but it is a fundamental principle of
his whole theology, as we understand it. Take this away, and his
whole theory of original righteousness, original sin, of the nature
of holiness, and the nature of sin, and of the liberty of the will,
go with it. Whether his views on these subjects are correct, al
though the main question, is one thing, but that he really enter
tained the opinion here so clearly expressed, we wonder that any
man should ever have doubted. We trust that respect for the
memory of President Edwards, and the obligation " to interpret
language according to the known and declared nature of the thing
described," will prevent any one saying, that he believed that " this
new sense'' is an entity, or " this foundation" for moral exercises
is " something inserted in the soul," " an agent within an agent,"
&c, &c.
Dr. Bellamy seems to teach the same doctrines as President Ed
wards with regard to spiritual blindness, the necessity of divine
illumination prior to the exercise of any holy affections, and the
nature of regeneration. In the second volume of his works, page
502, he says, " In regeneration there is a new, divine, and holy
taste begotten in the heart, by the immediate influences of the
Holy Spirit." And on the opposite page, " The idea of a natural
beauty supposes an internal sense, implanted by our Creator, by
which the mind is capacitated to discern such kind of beauty."
" And that the idea of spiritual beauty supposes an internal spiritual
sense, communicated to the soul by the Spirit of God in the work of
the new creation, is clearly illustrated and proved by a late divine,
whose praise is in all the churches." He here refers his readers
to Edwards on Religious Affections.
Dr. Dwight taught the same doctrine, and that clearly and de
finitely. In his discourse on the nature of regeneration,* he says,
" This change of heart consists in a relish for spiritual objects,
communicated to it by the power of the Holy Ghost." That
" this relish" was antecedent, according to his view, to all holy
acts, there can be no doubt, because he expressly asserts it, and
because his arguments go to prove it. What he calls " a relish for
spiritual objects," he elsewhere calls a holy disposition, and refers
to the case of Adam for an illustration of its nature. " When
God created Adam," he remarks, " there was a period of his exist
ence after he began to be, antecedent to that in which he exercised
the first volition. Every man who believes the mind to be some
thing besides ideas and exercises, and does not admit the doctrine
of casualty, will acknowledge that in this period the mind of Adam
was in such a state, that he was prepense to the exercise of virtu
ous volitions rather than that of sinful ones. This state of mind
* Works, vol. ii., p. 418.

REGENERATION. 383
has been commonly styled disposition, temper, inclination, heart,
&c. In the scriptures it usually bears the last of these names. I
shall take the liberty to call it disposition. This disposition in
Adam was the cause whence his virtuous volitions proceeded ; the
reason why they were virtuous and not sinful. Of the metaphy
sical nature of this cause I am ignorant ; but its existence is, in my
view, certainly proved by its effects." Again, on the same page,
" In regeneration, the very same thing is done by the Spirit of God
for the soul, which was done for Adam by the same Divine Agent
at his creation. The soul of Adam was created with a relish for
spiritual objects. The soul of every man who becomes a Chris
tian is renewed by the communication of the same relish. In Adam
this disposition produced virtuous volitions. In every child of
Adam, who becomes the subject of virtue, it produces the same
effects." The same idea is expressed, if possible, even more for
mally in the same volume, page 451, where, among other things
equally explicit, he says that by this disposition he intends " the
cause, which in the mind of man produces all virtuous affections
and volitions." The same doctrine is repeatedly taught in other
passages of his works, as in the sermons on the Probation of Man,
vol. i., 394, on the Fall, 410, 413, on Depravity as derived from
Adam, &c.
From various passages which occur in the pamphlet of Dr. Ty
ler, already mentioned, we infer that he holds the same doctrine.
The same principle (that moral disposition may exist antecedently
to all moral acts) is also frequently and clearly asserted by Dr.
Woods of Andover, in his controversy with Dr. Ware. We refer
to the opinions of these distinguished men, to show how united
Calvinists, old and new, are in their views on this point, and that if
the charge of believing in physical depravity and physical regene-;
ration be sustained, it lies on almost the whole Calvinistic world.
Still the main question recurs — is the charge well founded ?
The main principle, as before stated, which is assumed by those
who make this charge is, that we can only regard the soul as to its
substance on the one hand, and its actions on the other. If, there
fore, there be any change wrought in the soul other than of its
acts, it must be a physical change. And if any tendency, either
to sin or holiness, exist prior to choice, it is a positive existence, a
real entity. Thus the charge of physical depravity and physical
regeneration is fairly made out. We are constrained to confess,
that if the premises are correct, the conclusions, revolting as they
are, and affecting, as they do, the fair names of so large a portion
of the Christian church, are valid. The principle itself, however,
we believe to be a gratuitous assumption. It is inconsistent with
the common, and as we believe, correct idea of habits, both con
natural and acquired. The word habit (habitus) was used by the
old writers precisely in the same sense as " principle " by President
Edwards, as explained above, or disposition, as used and explained
by President Dwight. That there are such habits or dispositions

384 REGENERATION.
which can be resolved neither into " essential attributes " nor " acts,"
we maintain to be the common judgment of mankind. Let us
take for illustration an instance of an acquired habit of the lowest
kind, the skill of an artist. He has a soul with the same essential
attributes as other men ; his body is composed of the same mate
rials ; and the same law regulates the obedience of his muscular
actions to his mind. By constant practice he has acquired what
is usually denominated skill ; an ability to go through the pro
cesses of his art, with greater facility, exactness and success than
ordinary men. Take this man while asleep or engaged in any in
different occupation, you have a soul and body not differing in any
of their essential attributes from those of other men. Still there
is a difference. What is it ? Must it be either " a real existence,
an entity," an act or nothing ? It cannot be " an entity," for it is
acquired, and it will hardly be maintained that a man can acquire
a new essential attribute. Neither is it an act, for the man has
his skill when it is not exercised. Yet there is certainly " some
thing," which is the ground of certainty, that when called to go
through the peculiar business of his art, he will do it with an ease
and rapidity impossible for common men. It is as impossible not
to admit that this ground or reason exists, in order to account for
the effect, as it is not to admit the existence of the soul to account
for its exercises. By constant practice, a state of mind and body
has been produced adapted to secure these results, and which ac
counts for their character. But this is the definition of principle
or habit as given above. A single circumstance is here wanting
which is found in other " habits," and that is, there is not the ten
dency or proneness to those particular acts to which this state of
^mind is adapted. This difference, however, arises not from any
difference in the " habits " themselves, but from the nature of the
faculties in which, so to speak, they inhere. A principle in the
will (in its largest sense, including all the active powers), is not
only a state of mind adapted to certain acts, but prone to produce
them. This is not the case, at least to the same degree, with in
tellectual habits. Both classes, however, come within the defini
tion given by President Edwards and Dr. Dwight, — " a state of
mind," or " foundation for any particular kind of exercise of the
faculties of the soul." The same remarks may be made with
regard to habits of a more purely intellectual character. A man,
by devoting himself to any particular pursuit, gradually acquires
a facility in putting forth the mental exercises which it requires.
This implies no change of essence in the soul ; and it is not merely
an act, which is the result of this practice. The result, whatever
it is, is an attribute of the man under all circumstances, and not
merely when engaged in the exercises whence the habit was
acquired. But to come nearer to the case in hand. We say a man has a
malignant disposition, or an amiable disposition. What is to be

REGENERATION. 385
understood by these expressions ? Is it merely that he often in
dulges malignant or amiable feelings ? or is it not rather that there
is an habitual proneness or tendency to their indulgence ? Surely
the latter. But, if so, the principle stated above, that we can
regard the soul only as to its substance or its actions, cannot be
correct. For the result of a repetition of acts of the same kind
is an abiding tendency, which is itself neither an act (eminent or
imminent) nor an "entity." Here, then, is the soul with its essen
tial attributes — an habitual tendency to certain exercises, and the
exercises themselves. The tendency is not an act, nor an active
state of the feelings in question ; for it would be a contradiction
to say that a man whose heart was glowing with parental affec
tion, or filled for the time with any other amiable feeling, had at
the same moment the malignant feelings in an active state, al
though there might exist the greatest proneness to their exercise.
We have seen no analysis of such dispositions which satisfies us
that they can be reduced to acts. For it is essential to the nature
of an act that it should be a matter of consciousness. This is
true of those which are imminent acts of the will, or ultimate
choices (by which a fixed state of the affections is meant to be ex
pressed), as well as of all others. But a disposition or principle,
as explained above, is not a matter of consciousness. A man may
be aware that he has a certain disposition, as he is aware of the
existence of his soul, from the consciousness of its acts, but the
disposition itself is not a subject of direct consciousness. It exists
when the man is asleep or in a swoon, and unconscious of any
thing. Neither can these habits be with any propriety called a
choice, or permanent affection. For in many cases they are a
mere proneness to acts which have their foundation in a constitu
tional principle of the mind. Our object at present is merely to
show, that we must admit that there are mental habits which can
not be resolved either into essential attributes of the soul, fixed
preferences, or subordinate acts ; and consequently, that those
who believe in dispositions, prior to all acts, do not necessarily
maintain that such dispositions are of the essence of the soul itself.
If it be within the compass of the divine power to produce in us
that, which by constant exercise we can produce in ourselves, then
a holy prihciple or habit may be the result of the Spirit's influence
in regeneration, without any physical change having been wrought.
But it is not only objected, that regeneration is a physical change,
if anything beyond a change in the exercises of the soul is effected ;
but it is said, that the thing contended for is utterly unintelligible, in
capable of definition or explanation. We are ready to acknow
ledge that it admits of no other explanation than that which is derived
from stating its effects, and referring to cases of an analogous kind.
There is in all men a social principle, as it is called, which is some
thing else than a desire to live in society, because it is connatural,
as may be inferred from its universality ; there is a tendency in all
men to love their children, which is something besides loving them ;
25

386 REGENERATION.
there is a tendency in man also to sympathize in the sufferings of
others, &c. It may be said these are all constitutional tendencies
implanted in our nature. This is very true ; but does saying this
enable us to understand their nature ? May it not be objected to
those who employ this language, You are using words without
meaning ; what do you know of a social principle distinct from
the actual desire to live in society, or prior to its exercise ? What
idea can you form of a principle of self-love, excepting actually
loving one's self? Are we then to deny that there are any such
original propensities or tendencies as these implanted in our nature,
because we cannot directly conceive of them ? Yet Dr. Cox says,
in reference to this subject, " By holy principle, / mean love to
God, and by love to God I mean actually loving him." On the
same principle, he might deny the existence of any of the original
dispositions or tendencies of the soul. For they are as incapable
of being defined, as the holy principle which is produced in rege
neration. The soul itself is in the same predicament. We know
nothing of it but from our consciousness of its acts. And if the
objection which we are now considering be valid against the ex»
istence of principles prior to acts, then it is valid against the ex
istence of the soul. We are conscious only of its exercises ; and
therefore some philosophers and theologians tell us, we are not
authorized to go any further. The existence of a substance apart
from the exercises is not necessary to account for their existence,
-and therefore is a gratuitous assumption. An assumption, too, of
the being of something which we are incapable of defining, ex
plaining, or even conceiving. The reply which Dr. Cox would
make to this reasoning, is probably the same that we should be
disposed to make to his objection against the existence of holy
-principles prior to holy acts. For the mind as instinctively seeks a
reason for the choice which the soul makes in loving God, as it does
for the various ideas and exercises of which it is constantly con
scious. And we should probably be as little satisfied with the
reasons which Dr. Cox could assign to account for this choice,
as he would be with those of the defenders of the exercise scheme
to account for these exercises without resorting to a thinking sub
stance. If he were to say, that the effect is produced by the Holy
Spirit, we should answer that this can only be done in one of three
ways that we can conceive of. First, either by his direct agency
producing the choice, in which case it would be no act of ours ;
or, secondly, by addressing such motives to our constitutional and
natural principle of self-love as should induce us to make the
choice, in which case there would be no morality in the act ; or,
thirdly, by producing such a relish for the divine character, that
the soul as spontaneously and immediately embraces Gol as its
portion, as it rejoices in the perception of beauty. The thing con
tended for is not more unintelligible than a hundred things of like
nature. Taste is the ready perception and quick feeling of natu
ral beauty. That is, these are its effects. But no one can directly

REGENERATION. 387
conceive of it, as it is an attribute of the mind, either original or
acquired. It is absolutely certain, however, that the man who
does thus readily perceive and feel the beauty of natural objects,
has a quality of mind which a clown does not possess. And we
should be astonished to hear any one maintain that there was no
such thing as taste, but the exercise. " By taste I mean the love
of beauty, and by love of beauty t mean actually loving it, and
that is an act and not a principle." But why does one man see
and feel a beauty in certain objects, when others do not ? Is there
no difference between the clown and the most refined votary in
the arts, but in their acts ? Is any man satisfied by being told that
one loves them, and the other does not ; that it is in vain to ask
why ; the fact is enough, and the fact is all ; there is no difference
in the state of their minds antecedent to their acts ; there can be
no such thing as a principle of taste, or sense of beauty, distinct
from the actual love of beauty ? We are disposed to think that
no man can believe this : that the constitution of" our nature forces
us to admit, that if one man, under all circumstances, and at all
times, manifests this quick sensibility to natural beauty, and another
does not, there is some difference between the two besides their
acts ; that there is some reason why, when standing before the
same picture, one is filled with pleasure, and the other is utterly
insensible. We cannot help believing that one has taste (a quality,
principle, or " inward sense ") which the other does not possess.
It matters not what it may be called- It is the ground or reason
of the diversity of their exercises, which lies back of the exercises
themselves, and must be assumed to account for the difference of
their nature. Now, there is moral, as well as natural beauty, and
it is no more unintelligible that there should be a " sense," or taste,
for the one than for the other. The perfect character of God,
when exhibited to different men, produces delight and desire in
some, repugnance in others. We instinctively ask why ? Why
do some perceive and delight in his moral beauty, while others do
not ? The answer, some love, and others do not, is no answer at
all. It is merely saying the same thing, in other words. There
must be some reason why one perceives this kind of beauty, to
which others are blind ; why one is filled with love the moment
it is presented, and the other with repugnance. And this reason
must lie back of the mere exercise of this affection, must be some
thing besides the act itself, and such as shall account for its nature.
It may be said, however, that the cases are not analogous: that
the emotion excited by beauty is involuntary, while moral objects
address themselves to the voluntary affections ; and that it is admit
ted, that there is not only "something" back of each exercise of
love, but we are told distinctly what it is, viz., the soul with its
essential attributes, its ultimate or supreme choice, or dominant
affection, and the object in view of the mind. Accordingly, it is
easily accounted for, that when the character of God is presented,
one man is filled with love, another with repugnance. The reason

388 REGENERATION.
of the difference in these acts does indeed lie back of the acts
themselves ; for it is found in the ultimate or supreme choice of
the different individuals. But how is this to be accounted for ?
If there is no necessity for accounting for the particular character
of the first or ultimate choice (if so it must needs be called), there
is no need of accounting for the others. The difficulty is not at
all met by this statement. It is only pushed back, from the sec
ondary and subordinate, to the primary and dominant preference.
There it returns. The question still is, why does the soul of one
man make this supreme choice of God, or, in other words, love
him, while another sets his affections on the world ? There is pre
cisely the same necessity for assuming some ground or reason for
the nature of the first choice, as for any acts subordinate and sub
sequent to it. Let us suppose two individuals called into exist
ence, in the full maturity of their faculties ; each has a soul with
the same constitutional powers, or essential attributes ; the one is
filled with delight the moment the character of God is presented,
and the other is not ; or the one loves his Maker as soon as the
idea of his excellence is presented, the other does not. According
to this theory, there is no reason for this difference. There is
nothing back of the first act of choice that is not common to both.
If instead of two individuals, we suppose two millions, one portion
having their affections spontaneously called forth on their first view
of their Maker, the other unaffected ; we have only a greater number
of effects without a cause, but the case is the same. It will not do to
answer, that the choice is made under the influence of the desire
of happiness, for this being common to all, is no reason for the dif
ference of the result, which is the very thing to be accounted for.
To say that the choice is made under the influence of the desire
of happiness, is only to say, that when the character of God is
presented it gives pleasure. But the same character is presented
in both cases, the same desire exists in both, yet in one it gives
pleasure, is an object of desire ; in the other not. This is the fact
which is left entirely unaccounted for on the theory in question,
and for which the mind as instinctively seeks a question, as it does
for any other effect. To account for the difference from the nature
of agency, is to assume the liberty of indifference. For if the
choice be made prior to the rising of desire towards the object,
then it is made in indifference, and is of no moral character. If
the desire rise, it is love ; which is the very thing to be accounted
for. We are at a loss to see how this theory is to be reconciled
with the Calvinists' doctrine on the will, which is not peculiar to
Edwards, but constituted the great dividing line between Calvin
ists and Arminians from the beginning. We feel, therefore, a ne
cessity for assuming that there is " something " back of the first
moral act, besides the soul and its essential attributes, which will
account for the nature of that act, which constitutes the reason
why, in the case supposed, the soul of the one individual rose im
mediately to God, and the other did not ; and the " something "

REGENERATION. 389
assumed in this case is no more indefinite and undefineable, than
the constitutional propensity to live in society, to love our chil
dren, or the mental quality called taste, all which are assumed
from a necessity not more imperious than that which requires a
holy principle to account for the delight experienced in view of
the character of God. And if our Maker can endow us not only
with the general susceptibility of love, but also with a specific
disposition to love our children ; if he can give us a discernment
and susceptibility of natural beauty, he may give us a taste for
spiritual loveliness. And if that taste, by reason of sin, is vitiated
and perverted, he may restore it by the influences of his Spirit
in Regeneration. Neither, therefore, the objection, that what is
not an act, must be an essential attribute ; nor the unintelligible
nature of a " principle of nature," is, in our view, any valid objec
tion to the common doctrine on regeneration.
There is a third objection, however, to this doctrine, and that is,
that it renders the sinner excusable, because it makes regeneration
to consist in something else than the sinner's own act. This objec
tion, as it seems to us, can only be valid on one or the other of two
grounds : the first is, that the common doctrine supposes sin to be
a physical defect, and regeneration a physical change ; and the se
cond is, that a man is responsible solely for his acts, or that there
can be no moral principle anterior to moral action. With regard
to the first, it is enough to say, that no physical change, according
to the constant declaration of Calvinistic writers, is held to take
place in regeneration, and that no such change is implied in the
production of a holy principle, as we have already endeavoured to
show. The second ground is inconsistent with the common notions of
men on the nature of virtue, and, if true, would render the com
mencement of holiness or regeneration impossible. It is according
to the universal feeling and judgment of men, that the moral cha
racter of an act depends upon the motive with which it is done.
This is so obviously true that Reid and Stewart, and almost all
other advocates of the liberty of indifference, readily admit it. And
so do the advocates of the theory on which this objection is found
ed, with regard to all moral acts, excepting the first. All acts of
choice, to be holy, must proceed from a holy motive, excepting the
first holy choice which constitutes regeneration ; that may be made
from the mere desire of happiness or self-love. We confess that
this strikes us as very "much like a relinquishment of the whole
system. For how is it conceivable that anything should be essen
tial to the very nature of one act as holy, that is not necessary to
another ? Is not this saying that that on which the very nature of
a thing depends may be absent, and yet the thing remain the same ?
Is it not saying that that which makes an act what it is, and gives
it its character, may be wanting or altered, and yet the character
of the act be unaffected ? It is the motive which gives the moral
character to the act. If the motive is good, the act is good ; if the

390 REGENERATION.
motive is bad, the act is bad ; if the motive is indifferent, so is the
act. The act has no character apart from the motive. This, it
seems, is admitted with regard to all moral acts excepting the first.
But the first act of a holy kind is an act of obedience, as well as
all subsequent acts of the same kind. How then is it conceivable
that the first act of obedience performed from the mere desire of
happiness or self-love can' be holy, when no other act of the same
kind, and performed from the same motive, either is or can be ?
How does its being first alter its very nature ? It is still nothing-
more than an act done for self-gratification, and cannot be a holy
act. It is said we must admit this, from the necessity of the case,.
or acknowledge that there can be holiness before moral action.
We prefer admitting the latter, and believing that " God created?
man upright," and not that he made himself so. That there was a
disposition, or relish, or taste for holiness, before there was any holy
act, which to us is far more reasonable than that an act is holy fee-
cause the first of a series, which, if performed from the same mo
tive at a different point of the line, would have a different charac
ter. The grand objection, we know, that is made to all this is, that
holy beings have fallen, which it is maintained would be impossible
if the ground here assumed is con-ect. If the character of an act
depends on its motive, a sinful act cannot be performed by a being-
in whom sin does not already exist ; and, consequently, neither the
fallen angels, nor Adam, could ever have apostatized. We think,
however, that there is a broad difference between the commence
ment of holiness and the commencement of sin, and that more is
necessary for the former than for the latter. An act of obedience,
if it is performed under the mere impulse of self-love, is virtually
no act of obedience. It is not performed with any intention to obey,
for that is holy, and cannot, according to the theory, precede the
act. But an act of disobedience performed from the desire of hap
piness is rebellion. The cases are surely widely different. If to
please myself I do what God commands, it is not holiness ; but if
to please myself I do what he forbids, it is sin. Besides, no crea
ture is immutable. Though created holy, the taste for holy enjoy
ments may be overcome by a temptation sufficiently insidious and
powerful, and a selfish motive or feeling excited in the mind. Nei
ther is a sinful character immutable. By the power of the Holy
Spirit the truth may be so clearly presented, and so effectually ap
plied, as to produce that change which is called regeneration;
that is, as to call into existence a taste for holiness, so that it is
chosen for its own sake, and not merely as a means of happiness.
It is evident, therefore, that the theory which denies the possibi
lity of moral distinctions being carried back of acts of choice,
forces its advocates to adopt the opinion that the first holy act is
specifically different from all others. That Adam was not created
holy, but by choosing God, made himself holy, and that this choice,
though made with no holy motive or intention, but merely from a
desire of happiness, has a moral character. This we think not only

REGENERATION. 391
contradictory to the express declaration of scripture, which says
that man was created in the image of his Maker (which includes
his moral as well as his natural image, as we are taught in the New
Testament), but is inconsistent with the very first principles of mo
rals, as it teaches that an act performed without any good inten
tion or motive, is yet holy. It seems to us liable, also, to this fur
ther objection, that it represents man's obligation to love God, to
rest upon the fact that it will promote his happiness. This is in
volved in the principle, that the choice made from this motive is a
good choice ; for it can only be good, as it is in obedience to a mo
ral obligation. If the obligation fulfilled is to God, then to fulfil it
must be the motive. If the motive which prompts the choice have
reference to himself, then the only obligation which he fulfils, is to
himself. It is a wise decision, but it is no holy act. If it be said
that the excellence of the choice lies in the nature of the object
chosen, it is giving up the question. For if the excellence of the
object be the ground of the choice, it can act as a motive only by
exciting a desire for it as excellent, which must needs be a holy
desire, and if this determines the choice, then the man is holy be
fore he chooses God as his portion, and the choice is the result, and
not the cause of his holiness. Or, if we call the desire itself the
choice (which is an incorrect use of terms), still the case is the
same. For the best definition that can be given of a holy being
is, that holy objects excite in him desire as soon as they are pre
sented. If Adam, therefore, was filled with desire and pleasure, as
soon as his mind rested on the character of God, then he was cre
ated holy. As we remarked above, this theory, that the first moral
act is not performed from a holy motive, but from the constitution
al desire of happiness, is not only inconsistent with the nature of a
holy act, but affords no relief in the case. For the difficulty still
remains, why the character of God should appear desirable to one
being, and not to another, if both are called into existence in puris
naturalibus. That Adam was created holy, that is, with a holy disposition,
which existed prior to his first holy act, though necessarily destruc
tive of the very first principle of the theory referred to, has been
considered as a fixed point among Calvinists. We have already
seen that Dr. Dwight did not think it necessary to prove it. Be
cause, he says, "every man who believes the mind to be something
more than ideas and exercises, and does not admit the doctrine of
casualty, will acknowledge" it. President Edwards, in his work
on original sin, has a whole chapter, in which he endeavours to
prove that our first parents were created in righteousness, or, as he
expresses it, " with holy principles and dispositions." The grand-
objection against this doctrine, he says, is this : " that it is utterly in
consistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated.
with any person ; because, if so, it must be by an act of God's abso
lute power, without our knowledge or concurrence ; and that mo
ral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent of the

392 REGENERATION.
moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holiness : that
a necessary holiness is no holiness ;" and he quotes from Dr. Tay
lor, of Norwich, the words, " Adam must exist, he must be created,
yea, he must exercise thought and reflection before he was right
eous." To this he replies, " In the first place, I think it a contra
diction to the nature of things, as judged of by the common sense
of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of the minds of men in
all ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtu
ous, but the good choice itself, from which that effect proceeds ;
yea, and not only so, but also the antecedent good disposition, tem
per, or affection of mind from whence proceeds that good choice,
is virtuous. This is the general notion, not that principles derive
their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness
from the principles whence they proceed ; and so that the act of
choosing that which is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds
from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind ; which sup
poses, that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous
act of choice ; and that, therefore, it is not necessary that there
should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any
virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of
a good disposition of heart, what signifies that choice? There
can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice
which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love,
ambition, or some animal appetite." — P. 140. If there was a holy
disposition before there was " thought, reflection, or choice," Ed
wards most assuredly carried moral distinctions back of moral acts.
That by so doing he carried them into the " essential attributes of
the soul," is an assertion founded on the assumption that what is
not an act must be an essential attribute, which we believe few are
prepared to admit. God has created man with various susceptibi
lities, dispositions or tendencies of mind towards objects without
himself; these tendencies are not necessarily " real existences, en
tities," or essential attributes, for tendencies or habits may, as be
fore remarked, be acquired, as the skill of an artist, or a proneness
to any particular mental exercise. They may result from the re
lative state of all the essential attributes, and yet be no "part of the
soul " themselves. Their nature, however, is confessedly as incon
ceivable as the nature of the soul, and no more so ; and they are
as necessarily assumed to account for the results which meet our
view, as the soul or any of its attributes. If a million of intelligent
beings, the first moment they think of the character of God, are
filled with desire and delight, it is as evident that they were created
with a proneness or disposition to take pleasure in holiness, as it is
that the hearts of mothers have an innate tendency to love their
children, because they glow with delight the first moment they are
given to them. Nothing, we think, but the most determined adher
ence to a speculative opinion, can prevent any man acknowledging
that it is as possible for the mind to be created with this "instinc
tive " love of holiness, as with a disposition for any other specific

REGENERATION. 393
class of objects. And we think, too, that the vast body of men
will agree with President Edwards in thinking that " such a dispo
sition's being natural, or from a kind of instinct, implanted in the
mind in its creation," is no objection to its being of a virtuous or
moral character. Does the maternal instinct cease to be amiable,
because it is natural ? Does a disposition to kindness and gentle
ness lose its character by being innate ? Are not the instinctive
love of justice, abhorrence of cruelty, admiration of what is noble,
which God has implanted in our nature, objects of approbation ?
If our feelings and the general sense of mankind answer these
questions in the affirmative, they as certainly will decide that an
innate disposition to love God, existing in the mind of Adam at the
moment of his creation, does not lose its moral character by being
innate. The common feelings and judgment of men, therefore, do
carry moral distinctions back of acts of choice, and must do so
unless we deny that virtue ever can commence, for " there can,
according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which
proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love."
If this be so, the very foundation of the objection that the com
mon doctrine of regeneration destroys the responsibility of the
sinner is taken away. This responsibility rests upon the fact, that
he stands in the relation of a rational and moral creature to God.
He has all the attributes of a moral agent — understanding, con
science, and will. He has unimpaired the liberty of acting accord
ing to his own inclinations. His mind is not subject to any law of
causation, which determines his acts independently of himself.
Motives, as external to the mind, have no influence, but as the mind
itself, according to the laws of all rational creation, is affected by
them and voluntarily admits their influence, and yields to it. The
responsibility of man, therefore, resting on the immutable obliga
tions which bind him to love and obey God, and on the possession
of all the attributes of moral agency, is not destroyed by his moral
depravity, of which the want of a disposition to holiness is an in
tegral part. He does not love God, not because there is any phy
sical defect in his constitution, but because his moral taste is per
verted by reason of sin. He is so corrupt that even infinite
loveliness appears hateful to him. There can, in the nature of
ings, be no reason why an intelligent and moral being should be
olind to moral excellence, excepting moral corruption. And if this
be an excuse, then the more depraved, the less he is to blame.
How he became thus depraved is another question, — but it has
nothing to do with the point before us, which is, the nature of the
inability which it involves to love God. He may have been born
so, or he may have made himself so. It makes no difference as to
this point. So long as this depravity is his own, his own moral
character, it can furnish no excuse or palliation for not complying
with the great command of the law and Gospel. An object
worthy of all affection is presented to his view, viz., the divine
character ; he is capable of intellectually apprehending this object.

394 REGENERATION.
If blind to its loveliness it is, in his own judgment and that of all
men, his sin ; it is the very height of corruption to view as un
lovely what is the perfection of moral beauty. That men do la
bour under this moral blindness, is one of the most frequently
asserted doctrines of the scriptures. " The natural man receiveth
not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto
him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually dis
cerned." " These things," says our Saviour, " will they do unto
y,ou, because they have not known the Father nor me." " To know
God is eternal life." We are said to be saved through knowledge.
The Gospel is " hid to them that are lost." Their eyes are blinded.
Light has shined into the hearts of those that believe. The saints
of old prayed to have their minds illuminated ; and Paul intercedes
for his fellow Christians earnestly and frequently for this blessing,
as the only possible means of their sanctification. This is so plain,
that President Edwards, in speaking on this subject, says, " There
is such a thing, if the scriptures are of any use to teach us any
thing, as a spiritual, supernatural understanding of divine things
that are peculiar to the saints, and which those who are not saints
know nothing of." — P. 298, On the Affections. The cause of this
blindness is sin, and therefore it is inexcusable. But if it exists,
there is an evident necessity for such a change in the soul, that it
shall be brought to see this beauty of holiness, and from the con
stitution of our nature, this change must precede the exercise of
Sove. For how can we love that which we do not see. The
affections must have an object, and that object must be apprehend
ed in its true nature, in order to be truly loved. It is obvious,
therefore, that regeneration, to be of a moral character at all, must
consist in such a change as brings the soul into a state to see and
love the beauty of holiness. It matters not what the change be
called — a " spiritual sense," or " a taste," or " disposition ;" it is as
necessary as that an object should be seen in order to be loved.
Now it is evident that all this must be denied by those who
make regeneration to consist in the " act of loving God," who deny
that there is any change prior in the order of nature to the exer
cise of love. For if the sinner is blind to God's loveliness, it is
absolutely impossible that he should love it, until he is brought to
see it. It may be said, that this is to render the sinner's case ab
solutely hopeless. So it is. And they do but delude and mock
him, who represent it otherwise. It is thus the Bible represents it.
It tells him that the natural man cannot know the things of the
Spirit of God. And it is moreover necessary, that the sinner
should be brought to feel that his case, as far as he himself is con
cerned, is absolutely hopeless ; that he may be brought to fall, with
his blind and wicked heart, at the feet of sovereign mercy, and
cry, Lord save me I or I perish. But does this make the sinner
excusable? not unless his sin is his excuse. It is this, and this
alone, which prevents his perception of the loveliness of God, and,
therefore, the more complete his blindness, the greater his loath-

REGENERATION. 395
someness and guilt. The two sentiments of complete helplessness,
and of entire blame-worthiness, are perfectly consistent, and are
ever united in Christian experience. The believer feels them every
day. He knows that it is his duty, at once, to love God as purely,
and fervently, and constantly, as do the saints made perfect. Yet
he feels that no mere efforts of his own, no use of means, no pre
sentation of motives, no summoning of his powers, will ever ena
ble him to raise his carnal heart to heaven. Does this free him
from a sense of guilt ? No. He covers his face with both his
hands, and bows down in the dust, and cries, Behold, I am vile.
Have mercy on me, O Lord, and create within me a clean heart.
That the denial of the sinner's blindness to the holiness of God,
is involved in the theory of regeneration under consideration, is
perfectly evident and is not, we presume, denied. If the mere
choice of God, as the supreme portion of the soul, is regeneration,
and the performance of this act constitutes the change, then of
course no previous change is admitted to be necessary to enable
him to make the choice ; no opening of his eyes to see the moral
excellence of the object he is to choose, no production of any
sense of its loveliness ; the choice itself is all that is demanded ;
and for this, everything is present that the act requires — the ob
ject, the capacity of viewing it in its true moral excellence, and
the motive whence the choice is to proceed. For he need not
choose God from any holy motive or intention (which would be to
make holiness precede moral action), the simple desire of happi
ness is all that is required. The character of this first act does
not depend on its motive. It is holy, though performed merely
from the desire of self-gratification. This is a conclusion from
which our minds instinctively revolt, and which, Edwards says, is
contrary to the natural notions of men. It is, however, a conclu
sion which is legitimate and acknowledged, and being, in our view,
a complete reductio ad absurdum, the system is fairly, in our hum
ble apprehension, felo de se.
Dr. Cox asks whether it is not " intrinsically absurd," that a man
should be regenerated before he does his duty ? We think the
absurdity is all the other way, that he should do his duty without
being regenerated. That he should love God without having any
proper perception of his character ; or that an unholy soul should
have this perception of the beauty of holiness. It appears to us
a contradiction in terms to say, that a holy object can be viewed
as excellent and desirable by a carnal mind ; for a holy mind is
best defined by saying, that it perceives and relishes the beauty of
holiness. It is inconceivable to us, therefore, that any sinner should
love God, without this previous change, except on one or the other of
these two grounds ; that all his acts are created in him, and he is
really no agent at all, or that an act proceeding from mere self-
love is holy. Both which contradict what to us are primary prin
ciples or intuitive truths. But how is it that regeneration precedes
the exercise of love ? As the opening of the eyes precedes sight ;

396 REGENERATION.
as a sense of the beautiful precedes the emotion of beauty ; as the
maternal instinct precedes maternal love. As it is impossible for
a man to have his eyes open in the daytime without seeing, so it
is impossible for a man to be regenerated without delighting in
God. Yet opening the eyes is not seeing, nor is regeneration de
lighting in God. What the metaphysical nature of this change is,
no one can tell. All the soul can say is, Whereas I was blind,
now I see. What once appeared repulsive and " foolishness," now
appears supremely desirable and excellent. What once excited
enmity, now calls forth love. What once was irksome and diffi
cult, is now easy and delightful. To say that these exercises them
selves constitute the change, and the whole change, is to say that
a wicked man is suddenly transformed in all his views, feelings,
and conduct, without any reason for it. And to refer all to the
immediate operations of the Spirit, is to make man a machine, or
mere instrument, on which a mysterious hand plays what tune it
pleases, to the delight or torment of the conscious but passive subject.
There is still another point. Dr. Cox speaks of this " certain
kind of principle," as " a mysterious gratuity," with which the
receiver has nothing to do. A something inserted in the soul in
some magic manner to influence his exercises, but which forms no
part of his character. We are persuaded that a fundamental dif
ference, as to the nature of agency and human liberty, lies at the
foundation of all such objections. We are as yet only fighting in
the dark. The real turning point is yet in the background. We
do not mean that it is intentionally kept there, but that these objec
tions have not even the semblance of force, if (what is yet con
sidered common ground) the Calvinistic theory of the will is re
tained. Was it a mere " mysterious gratuity," without moral
character for him, that Adam was created in the image of God
" with holy principles and dispositions ?" Were these not volun
tary principles ? Was he not free in all his exercises of love de
termined by them ? A disposition is not the less voluntary because
it is innate. The affections are all voluntary, although concreated
with us. Is a man less free in loving himself because self-love is
a constitutional propensity ? Does a mother love her child against
her will, because she acts agreeably to her nature? Does not the
disposition so to do enter into her character ? If this be true with
regard even to constitutional propensities, it is still more obviously
true with respect to moral disposition, whether originally implanted
or restored in regeneration. There is a continual play upon the
double sense of the word voluntary. When the faculties of the
soul are reduced to understanding and will, it is evident that the
latter includes all the affections. In this sense, all liking or dis
liking, desiring or being averse to, &c, are voluntary, or acts of
the will. But when we speak of the understanding, will, and af
fections, the word " will" includes much less. It is the power of the
soul to come to a determination, to fix its choice on some object of
desire. These two meanings are distinct, though they may relate

REGENERATION. 397
only to different states of the same faculty. In the latter sense,
will and desire are not always coincident. A man may desire
money and not will to take it, or make it an object of pursuit ; he
may not fix his choice upon it. The will' is here determined by
some other desire of greater force ; desire of doing right, for ex
ample. When we speak of a volition, of a choice, of a decision
or determination of the will, the word "will" is used in the restricted
sense. A man may have many objects of desire before his mind ;
the decision which the will makes among them, or its selection, is
its choice. There are a thousand things capable of ministering to
our happiness ; ri'ches, honour, sensual pleasure, the service of
God; the selection which the soul makes, is made by the will in
the narrower sense. This is a voluntary act, in one sense of the
term. But in another, the desire itself which the soul has for these
objects, and not merely its decision or choice, is a voluntary act. For,
according to Edwards, " all choosing, refusing, approving, disap
proving, liking, disliking, directing, commanding, inclining, or be
ing averse, a being pleased, or displeased with," are acts of the
will. In this sense, all the affections, and all desires, are voluntary
exercises, whether constitutional or not, and not merely the deci
sions to which they lead. Hence self-love, the love of children,
the love of society, the desire of esteem, are all voluntary, although
all springing from native tendencies of the mind.
This distinction between these different senses of the word will,
although frequently made, and formally stated, is yet, time after
time, lost sight of in discussions of this nature ; which gives rise
to endless confusion. The word is often used in one sense in the
premises of an argument, and in the other in the conclusion. How
often is it said that a man can love God if he will ? What does
this mean ? If will be here used in its narrower sense, this is not
true. The affections no more obey a determination of the mind,
than the emotions do. A man can no more will to love, to hate,
to be. pleased or displeased, than he can will to be joyful or sorrow
ful, gay or sad, or even hot or cold at any given moment. But if
the word be taken in its larger sense, as including the affections,
then the proposition is identical ; it is saying, a man can love God
if he does love God. And when Dr. Cox says there are some
men who teach that a man has no ability to believe, even if he has
the inclination ; the very statement is absurd. For if the mind
is inclined to embrace the truth in its real character, it does believe.
Although the advocates of the theory, that morality attaches
only to acts of choice, lay down as the foundation of their doc
trine Edwards's definition of the will as given above, yet it is plain
that in a multitude of cases they confine acts of choice to acts of
the will in the restricted sense. Thus the desire of money becomes
avarice, they say, only when the will comes in and decides on
money as the main object of pursuit. Self-esteem is not pride,
until the will decides on preferring our own claims unduly. In
all such cases it is the will, as the faculty of decision between dif-

398 REGENERATION.
ferent objects of desire, that is intended. It is to acts of the will
in this restricted sense, and to the states of mind thence resulting,
and not to voluntary acts in the broad sense of President Edwards,
that morality is made to attach. Hence, in the case of Adam, the
desire excited by a view of the divine affections, has no moral
character. That belongs only to the act of the will which fixes
on God as the chief good. And the first holy act of a new-born
soul is not the desire which rises in view of the Divine Being, but
the act of the will by which he is chosen as a portion. Hence, in
the distinction between constitutional and voluntary propensities,
the social affections, the love of children, desire of esteem, &c,
are referred to the former class, and are not considered as volun
tary. Yet, in the broad sense of the word will, assumed as the
foundation of the theory, according to which, all " inclining or be
ing averse," all " being pleased or displeased with," are acts of the
will, they are as truly voluntary as the others. Now, when it is
asserted that no disposition is of a moral character, except so far
as it depends on choice or preference, and that all morality lies in
the will, the whole meaning turns on the sense in which the word
will is taken. If taken^in its broader sense, this would be admitted ;
if in the restricted sense, we should deny it altogether. Those
who make the assertion, doubtless take it in the latter ; for they
say that all that precedes the decision of the soul, its fixing on
some object of desire as its chief portion, is neither sinful nor holy;
that holiness consists in the selection of God, and sin in the choice
of the world, and that there is nothing sinful nor holy but these
primary or ultimate choices, and the subordinate acts resulting
from them. But it is clear that the term voluntary applies not
only to such acts of choice, but to all exercises of the affections
or desires preliminary thereto. No one would say that the dispo
sition to love ourselves, or our children, depends on choice ; and
yet these dispositions are properly and truly voluntary. We can
not love otherwise than voluntarily. When, therefore, these gen
tlemen use the word voluntary, it is in reference to acts of the will
in the restricted sense, excluding the spontaneous exercises of the
native propensities of our nature. They of course deny that Adam
was created holy. The spontaneous rising of desire in his mind
to God was neither holy nor unholy. His moral character com
menced with the first act of choice, that is, with his selection of
God from among the various sources of happiness as his chief
good. Here lies one great point of difference between them and
common Calvinists. President Edwards maintains clearly that
Adam was holy before this act of choice, yea, before he exercised
" thought or reflection." And he says, that it is according to our
natural notions of things that there could be no virtue in this
choice, unless it was determined by a virtuous disposition. The
common judgment of men is, that moral character belongs to the
desire of moral objects. The morality lies in its nature, inde
pendently of its origin. Its being from " a kind of instinct," does
not destroy its moral character. The desire of holiness is holy,

REGENERATION. 399
no matter how it rises in the mind. If this be so, a similar ten
dency of mind and a similar desire, if produced in our mind by
the power of the spirit in regeneration, is not " something inserted
in the soul" without influence on our character. It constitutes us
holy, as truly as Adam was holy at his first creation, though much
of sin may yet remain. It is indeed " a mysterious gratuity ;" the
scriptures call it grace ; but it is still ours, from its nature, volun
tary and active. It is an inclination of the heart, and, as Dr. Bel
lamy remarks, an " involuntary inclination of the heart is a con
tradiction in terms." He uses the word voluntary in its larger
sense, as Edwards does, and not merely in that which applies to a
decision or selection from among different objects of desire. With
him all spontaneous exercises of the mind are voluntary ; self-love,
the love of children, and all other similar affections. A disposition
therefore to these, or any other exercises, existing prior to the ex
ercises, in his view, does not destroy their character as voluntary,
nor their morality, if they have reference to moral objects ; this
depends upon their nature, not their origin.
We have already remarked that the opposite system destroys
the moral character of the first act (in reference to moral objects)
in Adam, and in regeneration. We are ready to admit, that as the
desire of a holy object is from its nature holy, so the choice of such
an object as holy, is from its nature good. But it is inconceivable
that holiness, as such, can be chosen without a previous apprehen
sion of its real excellence, and desire for it as such ; for the choice
is but the determination of the desire. If, therefore, moral charac
ter be denied to the antecedent desire, the choice loses its moral
character also. It cannot be confined to the act of choice, for
there can, in fact, be no choice of a holy object as such, but from
a desire for it in its true character, and this is a holy desire, and
precedes the choice. If self-love be only so far the motive to this
choice, that it " prompts to the choice, but not determines it," what,
we ask, does determine it ? There are but two answers to this
question. The one is, that the will determines itself, i. e., the choice
is made in indifference, and has clearly no moral character ; or it
is determined by a desire of the object as such (not mere desire of
happiness, for that only prompts the choice, not determines it), and
then the whole theory is relinquished, for here is the desire of a holy
object, not merely as a means of happiness, but for the object as
holy, which must needs be a holy desire, and being antecedent to
the choice, would be, according to the theory, anterior to the com
mencement of holiness.
The truth is, that this whole system is a forced and unnatural
union between Arminian philosophy and Calvinistic facts ; a union
which can neither be peaceful nor lasting. Nor is this the first time
that it has been attempted. The favourite principle of the oppo
sers of the doctrines which are now called Calvinistic, in all ages,
has been, that moral character can only belong to acts of choice ;
and, of course, that no such thing as original righteousness or ori-

400 REGENERATION.
ginal sin is possible or conceivable ; that any other influence in re
generation than that of moral suasion, by which one man is led to
make a good choice, which another man, under the same influence,
might refuse to make, is inconsistent with moral agency; that
doctrines of election and perseverance of the saints, presupposing
that of efficacious grace, must necessarily be untrue. The first
departures from these doctrines have commenced by adopting the
main principle, and endeavouring to reconcile it, as far as possible,
with the facts involved in the doctrines themselves ; viz., that all
men do sin, with absolute certainty, the moment they become moral
agents ; that the influence of the Spirit is infallibly efficacious : and
that all whom God has chosen certainly believe and attain eternal
life. But less than a generation has commonly been sufficient to
break the connexion, and leave the philosophical principle undis
puted master of the field.
That this principle is inconsistent with the doctrine of original
righteousness, is formally admitted. That it involves the denial of
original sin, as this doctrine has been commonly held among Cal
vinists, is equally clear. According to the prevalent doctrine on
this subject, original sin consists, first, in the imputation of Adam's
sin. This, it seems, has been long exploded. Secondly, in the want
of original righteousness. This is gone too, for there never was any
such thing. And thirdly, in the corruption of nature, that is, a ten
dency to do what God has prohibited, existing prior to all acts of
choice, and independently of them ; and now this is gone. There
is no such tendency to sin, as can be considered a moral disposi
tion. Although this article has already swollen far beyond our expec
tations, we cannot pass this subject without a single remark on the
charge of physical depravity. The futility and unfairness of the
same charge, as it regards the subject of regeneration, we have en
deavoured to expose above. As this rests on precisely the same
grounds, it must stand or fall with the other. If there may be mo
ral principles prior to moral acts (as we think must be assumed, in
the case of Adam, or make the commencement of holiness impos
sible), then there is not a shadow of ground for this charge. Nor
is it the Calvinistic doctrine, that there is a specific propensity to
sin (analogous to the holy disposition implanted in the heart of
Adam), connatural with the soul of man. None such need be as
sumed, and none such is believed to exist. The mere absence of
a native tendency to God leaves the soul in moral confusion and
ruin. There is no positive infusion of wickedness. The essential
attributes and constitutional propensities are there, and nothing
more. But they are there without a principle of moral order and
subordination. There is no presiding spirit to turn them to the
service of God. The result of this absence is all manner of evil,
and a tendency to all this evil lies in this very state of the soul,
and exists prior to any of its moral acts. Does the withholding
this predisposition to holiness, from a being to whom all the essen-

REGENERATION. 401
tial attributes of his nature are left unimpaired, make God the au
thor of sin ? then must he be accused of being the author of all sin
that results from the abandonment of the reprobate, and of all that
by the utmost exertion of his power he could prevent. Nor is it
more difficult to reconcile this fact (that God should withhold from
the fallen race of man those communications which resulted in the
innate tendency to holiness, which filled the soul of Adam) with
the divine justice and goodness, than it is the admitted fact that he
has brought, and is still bringing, the countless millions of the hu
man family into existence under circumstances so unfavourable,
that all, without exception, incur the penalty of eternal death at the
first moment of moral agency. And that moment arriving, too, at
the first dawn of intellect, and when the first faint flushes of moral
feeling rise in the soul. If this be no penalty, we know not what
is. " To be placed under a law," says Coleridge (Aids to Reflec
tion, p. 168), "the difficulty of obeying, and the consequences of
not obeying which, are both infinite, and to have momently to strug
gle with this difficulty, and to live in momently hazard of these
consequences — if this be no punishment ! — words have no corres
pondence with thoughts, and thoughts are but shadows of each
other, shadows that own no substance for their anti-type. Of such
an outrage on common sense, Taylor (Bishop Jeremy) was inca
pable. He himself calls it a penalty ; he admits that in effect it is
a punishment." It is a penalty, too* according to this theory, with
out transgression ; a punishment without a crime. We cannot see,
therefore, that anything is gained by the new theory over the old
doctrine, which represents our race as having enjoyed a full and
fair and favourable probation in their first parent, and as being re
garded and treated as an apostate race on account of his rebellion ;
so that the withholding those divine communications which result
ed in the first man, in the moral image of his Maker, is a penal evil,
from which, it is true, utter ruin results, but it is the ruin, not of in
nocent, but of fallen human beings. This doctrine involves no
mysterious confusion of the identity of the race with that of Adam,
and no transfer of moral character from him to us. His act was
personally his own, and only his ; it is ours only on the represen
tative principle, which is recognised not only by Dr. Hopkins and
his followers distinctly, but by Arminians and Pelagians,* and is so
clearly taught by the fact, that the race fell when Adam fell, that
it is admitted in reality even by those who formally deny it.
But to return to our subject. This theory not only overthrows
the doctrines which we have just mentioned, but it throws the
Spirit's influences almost entirely out of view. We are not speak
ing of the opinions of its advocates, but of the tendency of the
theory. According to their views, regeneration consists in the
choice of God as the supreme portion of the soul. This requires
that the soul should view him as supremely desirable. This the
* See Whitby on Romans, v. 12.
26

402 REGENERATION.
sinner is, not only naturally, but morally, able to do ; for his cor
ruption does not blind him to the excellence of holiness, or its
adaptedness to promote his happiness. To secure this happiness
is the only impulse or motive necessary to make this choice, and
he is urged to make it, assured that if he will summon all his pow
ers to the effort, the result, by the grace of God, may follow. We
think the grace of God acts a part scarcely more conspicuous in
all this scheme, than it does in the enumeration of the titles of an
European monarch. There is no blindness to the excellence of
the object of choice to be removed, no holy motive is necessary
for the grand decision ; all that is required is a practical convic
tion that it will be for the sinner's interests. Firmly as these
brethren may believe in the necessity of the Spirit's interference,
it is evident that necessity is left out of view almost entirely in
their theory. Accordingly, when they come to describe the pro
cess of this great change, the sinner is the only agent brought to
view ; he is to consider, ponder and decide, for all which he abso
lutely needs no assistance, though it may be graciously afforded.
This mode of representation stands in strong contrast with the
language of scripture in those passages in which we are said " to
be born of the Spirit," " to be created anew in Christ Jesus," to
experience the workings " of the exceeding greatness of the power
of God," and many others of a similar character.
As to the point which Dr. Cox thinks so " intrinsically absurd,"
and about which he says so much, whether man is passive in re
generation, it will be seen that, for its own sake, it does not merit
a moment's discussion. It depends entirely on the previous ques
tion. If regeneration be that act of the soul by which it chooses
God for its portion, there is an end of all debate on the subject.
For no one will maintain that the soul is passive in acting. But
if there be any change in the moral state of the soul, prior to its
turning unto God, then it is proper to say, that the soul is passive
as to that particular point. That is, that the Holy Spirit is the
author, and the soul the subject of the change. For all that is
meant by the soul's being passive, is, that it is not the agent of the
change in question. Its immediate and delightful turning unto God
is its own act, the state of mind which leads to this act is produced
directly by the spirit of God. The whole question is, whether any
such anterior change is necessary. Whether a soul polluted and
degraded by sin, or in scripture language, carnal, needs any
change in its moral taste before it can behold the loveliness of the
divine character. For that this view must precede the exercise of
affection, we presume will not be denied. If this point be decided,
the propriety of using the word passive to denote that the soul is
the subject and not the agent of the change in question, need not
give us much trouble. Sure it is that this change is in scripture
always referred to the Holy Spirit. It is the soul that repents,
believes, hopes and fears, but it is the Holy Spirit that regenerates.
He is the author of our faith and repentance by inducing us to act,

REGENERATION. 403
but no man regenerates himself. The soul, though essentially
active, is still capable of being acted upon. It receives impres
sions from sensible objects, from other spirits and from the Holy
Ghost. In every sensation, there is an impression made by some '
external object, and the immediate knowledge which the mind
takes of the impression. As to the first point, it is passive, or the
subject ; as to the second, it is active, or the agent. These two
are indeed inseparably connected, and so are regeneration and
conversion. It is even allowable to say that the mind is passive
considered as the recipient of any impression, no matter how com
municated. Coleridge says, " In attention, we keep the mind
passive ; in thought, we rouse it into activity. In the former, we
submit to an impression, we keep the mind steady in order to re
ceive the stamp." — P. 252. Whether this is technically " wretched,
philosophically wrong, and theologically false," or not, we do not
pretend to say. All that we say is, that it is perfectly intelligible
and perfectly according to established usage, to speak of the mind
as passive, when considered as the subject of an impression. And
if the Holy Spirit does make such an impression on the mind, or
exert such an influence as induces it immediately to turn to God,
then it is correct to say that it is passive in regeneration, though
active in conversion. However, this is a very subordinate point ;
the main question is, whether there is not a holy " relish," taste, or
principle produced in the soul prior, in the order of nature, to any
holy act of the soul itself. If Dr. Cox can show this to be " intrin
sically absurd," we shall give up the question of " passivity," with
out a moment's demur. To relinquish the other point, however,
will cost us a painful struggle. It will be the giving up the main
point in debate between the friends and opposers of the doctrines
of grace from Augustine to the present day. It will be the renun
ciation, not only of a favourite principle of old Calvinists, but of
one of the fundamental principles of the theology of Edwards, Bel
lamy, Dwight, and, as we believe, of the great body of the New
England clergy. It will be the renunciation of what Calvinists,
old and new, have believed to be the scriptural doctrine of original
righteousness, original sin and efficacious grace. It will be the
rejection of that whole system of mingled sovereignty and love
which has been the foundation, for ages, of so many hopes and of
so much blessedness to the people of God. And all for what ?
Because it has been discovered, that what is not an act is an entity ;
that to suppose the existence of moral disposition prior to moral
action, is making morality a substance. As we are incapable of
seeing the truth of these axioms, and believe their assumption to
be encumbered with all the difficulties above referred to, we are
not disposed to renounce, on their behalf, doctrines which have for
ages been held dear by the best portion of the Christian church.
Dr. Cox demands what has been the moral history of these doc
trines ? It would require more time and space than we can now
command fully to answer this question. Not to enter on question-

404 REGENERATION.
able ground, however, we would refer him for an answer to the
history of the reformation. These doctrines were held sacred by
all those men who were God's great instruments in that blessed
work, and are incorporated in the confessions of all the reformed
churches. We would point him to the history of the English Pu
ritans and Nonconformists ; to the Puritans of New England, from
the time of their landing down to a late period in their history, and
to the present opinions of the great body of their descendants.
We would refer him to any age or any church, peculiarly distin
guished for genuine piety. For there is scarcely one of the doc
trines which he has empaled in his introduction (with the exception
of the mere extent of the atonement, a point of very subordinate
importance to that of its nature), which does not enter into the faith
of the great body of evangelical Christians. We have no doubt
that Dr. Cox believes these doctrines. What we lament is, that
he should have " caricatured" the manner in which the vast major
ity of those who hold them have been accustomed to represent
them, and that he should even seem to advocate a principle which
we fear is subversive of them all.

ESSAY XVII.
SANCTIFICATION.*

This judicious and excellent treatise presents, in a small compass,
the substance of the modern controversy on the doctrine of entire
sanctification in the present life. The author's statements are
calm and clear, his method logical, his arguments conclusive, and
his style simple and dignified. Though it is not long since we
called the attention of our readers to this subject, especially in the
form in which it is presented by the Oberlin professors, we think
they will not regard the following pages as misapplied, when they
consider how ceaseless are the efforts of the advocates of error to
propagate a doctrine which the history of the church teaches us
seldom fails to become, in one form or other, an apology for sin.
The notion of the actual attainment, in some instances, of perfect
virtue in this life, is so gratifying to numan pride, that we need not
wonder at its adoption by some in nearly every age of the world.
Contrary as it is to scripture and experience, it is too deeply radi
cated in man's selfishness, not to find apologists and advocates
among the conceited, the enthusiastic, and such as are unaccustomed
to an impartial scrutiny of their own hearts. It flatters exceed
ingly all those pretensions to superior sanctity which are disjoined
from humility, penitence, and ardent aspirations after entire assimi
lation to the perfection of the divine moral character. In most of
the false religions of the earth, the doctrine of human perfection,
manifested in at least some peculiarly favoured instances, has, if we
mistake not, formed an essential article of belief; and in all coun
tries, perhaps, individuals have been found, possessing an exemp
tion from the common frailties of their race. A kind of perfection
has been 'claimed for Greek and Roman sages, for Hindoo devotees,
for Mahommedan saints ; and even for the savage warrior, smiling
in death at the impotent efforts of his enemies to extract from his
agonized nature the shriek, or the groan of suffering. That Pan
theism, which is the philosophical basis of most of the popular sys-
* Published in 1842, in review of " The Scriptural Doctrine of Sanctification
stated and defended against the error of Perfectionism. By W. D. Snodgrass, D.D."
Philadelphia.

406 sanctification.
terns of idolatry, assumes as a fundamental position, such a union
of man to the Deity, as constitutes the leading principle of modern
perfectionism, in its purest and most sublimated form. Hence
originates the deification of men, as well as the divine worship
paid to stocks, stones, rivers, mountains, wind, and all the inferior
parts of the creation ; Pantheism (elevating a creature of yesterday
to the rank of a divinity), which is supposed by many to have been
of more ancient date than the universal deluge,* was maintained
in all the following ages till the time of Christ, and was not en
tirely relinquished even by some of his professed disciples. Hold
ing such a principle, they were prepared to adopt other opinions
equally preposterous and unchristian. To this, perhaps, should be
attributed, in part, at least, the antinomianism and perfectionism
of some of the heretics in the apostolic age — so the Nicolaitans
and Simohians — who maintained that they were released from
all obligation to the law, and that none of their actions, however
contrary to the letter of the precept, were really opposed to the
divine will and worthy of punishment : and how could they, who
were parts of God, or rather identical with him, commit sin?
" The Gnostics of the first and second centuries, and the Manicha-
eans of the third, believed human souls to be particles of the celes
tial light, of the same essential nature with God himself, and no
otherwise corrupt or corruptible, than by being combined with
sinful matter. The new Platonists of Egypt held substantially the ,
same opinions. Hieronymus, in the preface to his dialogues
against Pelagius, says that Manichaeus, Precillian, Evagrinus, Hy-
perborius, Flavinian, Origen, and the Menalians of Syria, were
Perfectionists."f The brethren and sisters of the Free Spirit, in
the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, held that all things
flowed by emanation from God ; that rational souls were portions
of the divine essence ; that the universe was God ; and that by the
power of contemplation, they were united to the Deity, and ac
quired hereby a glorious and sublime liberty, both from sinful lusts,
and the common instinct of nature. J " In the latter part of the
seventeenth century, the disciples of Michael de Molinos in Spain,
France, and Italy, were Perfectionists."^ It is worthy of remark,
that in none of all these, during so many successive centuries, do
we trace any evidence of the belief of the direct agency of the
Holy Spirit on the heart, turning its affections to God, and securing
the perfection of its obedience. For the most part, they asserted,
that regeneration and complete deliverance from sin could be
effected by contemplation, and the soul thus be so identified with
God as to constitute them not two things united, but one being ;
and in this way, they explained the indwelling and controlling
agency of the Most High in man. Of the reality and presence o£
* See the Princeton Review, vol. xiii., p. 539.
t Literary and Theological Review, vol. iii., p. 28.
t Buck's Theological Diet and Mosheim..
§ Lit. and Theological Review, ut aupra.

sanctification. .407
native moral corruption, as maintained by consistent Calvinists,
they seem to have had no conception.* Pelagius and Coelestius,
in the fourth century, who denied the innate sinfulness of the hu
man heart, and the consequent necessity of efficacious grace in its
renewal, maintained, with entire systematic consistency, that men
might live without sin during the whole period of their life ; that
some had actually so lived for so many years, and that others,
restored by repentance after transgression, had subsequently con
tinued perfect in holiness to the close of their days.f The primi
tive Quakers, the French Prophets, the Shakers, Jemima Wilkin
son, Joanna Southcott, and the great body of Mystics in every
communion, held to perfection in this life, as the attainment of the
privileged few ; and the advocates of this doctrine have usually
represented the denial of it as involving great licentiousness, and a
state of utter spiritual bondage. The views of the famous John
Wesley, the father of Arminian Methodism, are well known to the
reading part of the religious community. He affirmed, as Whit
field asserts, " that no Baptist or Presbyterian writer, whom he had
ever read, knew anything of the liberties of Christ ;" to which state
ment Whitfield replied, in his own pointed and emphatical manner
— " What ! neither Bunyan, Henry, Flavel, Halyburton, nor any
of the New England and Scotch Divines ? See, dear sir, what
narrow-spiritedness and want of charity arise from your princi
ples ; and then do not say aught against election any more, on
account of its being destructive of meekness and love. I know
you think meanly of Abraham, though he was eminently called
the friend of God, and I believe also of David, the man after God's
own heart."J Wesley gives us an account of the steps by which
he was led, during a course of many years, to embrace what he
calls the doctrine of " Christian perfection," which, as he explains
it, though it includes the idea of freedom from sin, implies neither
perfection in knowledge nor infallibility, nor security against tempta
tions and infirmities.^ According to the system of the Romish
ehurch, good men may not only attain to perfection, but perform,
moreover, works of supererogation, serving as a fund of merit, for
the advantage of believers of inferior spiritual attainments.
It is not till lately that Perfectionism has been professed within
the pale of Congregational and Presbyterian churches. By our
fathers it was accounted heresy, inconsistent with the express tes
timony of the scriptures, contradictory to Christian experience,
and subversive of the entire scheme of the Gospel. But, in conse
quence of certain Pelagian speculations concerning moral agency,
* Lit. and The. Review, vol. iii., p. 28.
t Lit. and The. Review, vol. iii., p. 29, where we have in a note a curious speci
men of the arguments of Coelestius on this subject. Also Wigger's Hist, of Augus-
tinism and Pelagianism.
J Gillies's Life of Whitfield, New Haven edition, 1812, p. 256.
§ Wesley's Plain Account of Christian Perfection, New York edition, 1837, pp. 3,
18, et passim. 4-

408 sanctification.
human ability, and the divine influence in sanctification — errors
that have become extensively popular — individuals, once reputed
most zealous for revivals of religion, have been led to join Pelagius
and other kindred spirits, in their views of the attainableness of
perfection in the present life. Such, as we believe, is the philo
sophical origin of Perfectionism, as held by the professors at Ober-
lin and their theological friends.
That we may not misrepresent the meaning of those to whom
we refer, we will state their doctrine of perfection in their own
language. " What is perfection in holiness ? In answer to this
inquiry I would remark," says Mr. Mahan,* " that perfection in
holiness implies a, full and perfect discharge of our entire duty, of
all existing obligations in respect to God and all other beings. It
is perfect obedience to the moral law." With respect to the at
tainableness of perfection in this life, the same writer says, " We
have evidence just as conclusive, that perfect and perpetual holi
ness is promised to Christians, as we have that it is required of
them." " We have the same evidence from scripture, that all
Christians may, and that some of them will, attain to a state of
entire sanctification in this life, that they will attain to that state in
heaven." " There is positive evidence that some of them did
attain to this state." Mr. Finney affirms, and in this, we suppose,
he expresses the opinion of his associates at Oberlin, that sinless
perfection for the time being, is implied in the lowest degree of
true piety. "It seems to be a very general opinion," says he,
" that there is such a thing as imperfect obedience to God, i. e.
as it respects one and the same act ; but I cannot see how an im
perfect obedience, relating to one and the same act, can be possible.
Imperfect obedience ! What can be meant by this, but disobedi
ent obedience ! a sinful holiness ! Now, to decide the character
of any act, we are to bring it into the light of the law of God ; if
agreeable to this law, it is obedience — it is right — wholly right.
If it is in any respect different from what the law of God requires,
it is wrong — wholly wrong."f Here we have the doctrine that
all Christians are sometimes perfect, or are perfect so far as they
have any true holiness ; and it is a very natural inference from
such premises, that believers may attain to a confirmed state of
perfection in the present life. This conclusion is adopted by Mr.
Finney, as well as Mr. Mahan.
To disprove the perfectionism taught in the above extracts, or
to show that none of the saints are entirely free from sin in the
present life, will be our object in this essay.
We shall begin with noticing the principal arguments, which are
commonly adduced by perfectionists of different descriptions, in
support of their views of this subject. We shall next exhibit direct
evidence of the sinful imperfection of the heart of the saints, in this
life ; and lastly, we shall show the great practical importance of
* Christian Perfection, pp. 4, 27,.38. f Oberlin Evangelist, vol. 1.

sanctification. 409
the doctrine for which we contend, in opposition to the error
which it controverts.
The arguments of the perfectionists are first to be considered.
The command of God requires perfection, is one of their argu
ments. Answer. It is doubtless true, that the Most High does
command us to be perfect ; and to enjoin anything less than per
fection, would be inconsistent with his own purity, and those eter
nal principles of rectitude, according to which he governs the
universe. The law expresses his feelings towards moral objects ;
but it leaves wholly undetermined the question, whether his ra
tional creatures will acknowledge, or reject his authority. His
command, in any instance, neither supposes that it will be obeyed,
nor implies any insincerity in him, provided he foresees that it will
not be obeyed. The contrary supposition would be incompatible
with some of the most undeniable facts of revealed religion. Does
the divine command to be perfect, prove that some may, or will
obey this righteous precept ? Then, for the same reason, the di
vine prohibition of all sin in mankind equally proves that some of
them may pass through a long life without a single act of trans
gression. It is by no means certain, therefore, that all the human
race are or have been sinners : and, of course, the doctrine of uni
versal depravity, unequivocally and frequently as it is taught in the
scriptures, may be false. It is as easy^to imagine that some never
sin, as that they become perfectly holy after they have acquired a
sinful character. The opinion of Pelagius with regard to this sub
ject was, therefore, more specious and more logical than is the
notion of those who make God's requirement of perfect sanctifica
tion an argument that some are perfectly sanctified in this life ;
while, with strange inconsistency, they assert the universal moral
depravity, anterior to conversion, of such of mankind as have suf
ficient knowledge to be moral agents. Besides, entire holiness is
plainly obligatory on all rational creatures ; and no strength of
depraved affection or hopelessness of condition can release any
from the demands of the law of God. On this principle, the devils,
in their place of torment, are bound to love their Maker, and yield
themselves implicitly to his authority. To say they are not thus
bound, is to take their part against their Maker, and pronounce
them entirely excusable and innocent in their present rebellion,
rage and blasphemy. But does it follow, because they are under
law, that they will, therefore, ever return to their duty? The Bi
ble, on the other hand, assures us, that their misery, and conse
quently, their enmity to God, will be without end.
The command of God, it is alleged, implies our ability to obey ;
and it is reasonable to suppose that where ability exists, it will
sometimes at least manifest itself by obedience. This argument
has been strongly urged, both to account for the existence of sin
(for where there is ability to obey, there is also supposed to be
ability to disobey, or " the power of contrary choice "), and to show
the practicability of obedience, in the highest degree, to all the di-

410 SANCTIFICATION.
vine requisitions. " Were it not," says Mr. Finney,* " that there
is a sense in which a man's heart may be better than his head, I
should feel bound to maintain, that persons holding this sentiment,
that man is unable to obey God without the Spirit's agency, were
no Christians at all — obligation is only commensurate with ability."
Again he says,f. " Certain it is that men are able to resist the ut
most influence that the truth can exert upon them, and, therefore,
have ability to defeat the wisest, most benevolent, and most power
ful exertions which the Holy Spirit can make to effect their sancti
fication." Mr. Mahan says,J " I infer that a state of perfect holi
ness is attainable in this life, from the commands of scripture, ad
dressed to Christians under the new covenant." The philosophy,
from which perfection is thus inferred, had been previously assert
ed by certain divines of celebrity in Connecticut. In proof of this,
the reader is referred to two or three citations from the Christian
Spectator, formerly published at New-Haven. " Free moral agents
can do wrong under all possible preventing influence."^ " We
know that a moral system necessarily implies the existence of free
agents, with the power to act in despite of all opposing power.
This fact sets human reason at defiance, in every attempt to prove
that some of these agents will not use that power, and actuaUy
sin."|| Again : " God not only prefers on the whole that his crea
tures should for ever perform their duties rather than neglect them,
but purposes on his part to do all in his power to promote this very
object of his kingdom."!! In all these statements, the implication is
clear, that men are, of course, able to do whatever God requires of
them ; and that the mind is in reality self-moved in all its moral
exercises. We readily admit that men have the requisite faculties to obey
God ; in other words, that they are moral agents. And this is often
what is meant by natural ability. We admit, also, that the inabi
lity of sinners is a moral inability, inasmuch as it relates to moral
objects, arises from moral causes, and is removed by a moral
change. The possession, however, of natural ability, in the sense
just stated, does not establish the conclusion contended for in the
preceding argument. Because men or devils have the requisite
intellectual or physical faculties to serve their Creator, does it cer
tainly follow that they will serve him ? As it regards moral abili
ty, it is absurd to imagine that the rule of duty is to be measured
by this. On this supposition there is really no rule of right except
the inclinations of creatures ; or, guilt is diminished in proportion
to the stubbornness and virulence of the principle of evil to be
overcome ; which is but saying, in other language, that the more
sinful, the more bent on rebellion any one is, the less is he to blame
for his disobedience. Mankind by nature, then, are perfectly inno-
* Lectures on Revivals of Religion, p, 17.
f Oberlin Evangelist, Lect. 21, p. 193. i Christian Perfection, p. 28.
§ Christian Spectator, 1830, p. 563. || Ibid., 1831, p. 6] 7. H Ibid., 1832, p. 660.

SANCTIFICATION. 411
cent in hating God, and in rejecting the manifold overtures of the
Gospel ; for it is clear from this inspired volume, that they are
" dead in trespasses and sins." Their disinclination to obedience
is affirmed to be so great that it can be overcome by nothing less
than the direct exertion of Almighty power. " No man," says
Christ, " can come unto me, except the Father who hath sent me
draw him." Accordingly, the commencement of holiness in the
sinner's heart is again and again described by such phrases as indi
cate the highest manifestation of the immediate and creative agen
cy of God. It is the donation of a new heart — a second birth — a
new creation — a resurrection from the dead. These figures, strong
as they are, are doubtless used with the utmost propriety, as most
happily expressive of the inveteracy of the evil disposition to be
vanquished, of the sinner's moral helplessness, and of his absolute
dependence on sovereign grace. The continuance of believers in
obedience is also constantly ascribed to the same power by which
they were originally renewed after the image of God. " Without
me," says Jesus Christ, " you can do nothing." " Ye have not cho
sen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained you, that ye should
go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain." Here
we learn that the growth of the fruit in the first instance, and its
permanency afterwards, are both owing to the choice, purpose, and
effectual agency of the Redeemer. "We are not sufficient of our
selves," says Paul, " to think anything as of ourselves ; but our suf
ficiency is of God." " Being confident of this very thing, that he
which hath begun a good work in God, will perform (finish) it until
the day of Jesus Christ." The good work here intended is doubt
less, as appears from the connexion, the implantation of holiness in
the heart by the efficacious grace of God. " Who are kept," says
Peter, " by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation."
From these passages, and, indeed, from the whole tenor of the Bi
ble, it is evident that, whatever may be men's natural power, or
freedom as moral agents, their depraved propensities present as ef
fectual an obstacle to obedience, as the want of liberty itself would
do. At the same time, they are constantly blamed for that disin
clination, or moral inability, which, but for the interposition of om
nipotent grace, insures their destruction. They have ruined them
selves ; and their only hope is in the mercy and unconquerable
might of their injured Creator, who may justly leave them to perish
in their perverseness. There is no reason, then, for the conclusion,
that because men have the natural ability, they will, therefore, obey
the law of God, any more than there is ground for arguing with
Pelagius, that a portion of the human race will live without sin,
from the commencement of their existence till death ; and, conse
quently, that for them, no repentance, no pardon, no Saviour, will
be necessary ; or, than there is ground for inferring with Univer-
salists, the future probable, if not certain return of devils and the
spirits of lost men in hell, to their duty and to happiness. The ar
gument from ability, therefore, in this instance, is of too wide a

412 SANCTIFICATION.
sweep in its general application, to be admitted as of any force ;
for it manifestly goes to undermine the whole Gospel, and over
throw all the revealed principles of the moral government of God.
Another argument, connected with the foregoing, in favour of
Perfectionism, is founded in an erroneous philosophy concerning the
nature of sin. This affirms, that those propensities which we can
not overcome by the force of our own sovereign determination, are
merely constitutional susceptibilities, or physical attributes, having
no moral character, the extirpation, or extinguishment of which is,
consequently, not necessary to sinless perfection. Thus it has been
argued, that the most selfish innate desires and passions are in them
selves innocent, being nothing more than incentives or occasions to
sin, which must be expected to continue after the heart has become
completely sanctified.
This summary method of disposing of the subject must doubt
less be very gratifying to those who choose rather to find an apo
logy for their sins, than to confess and mourn over them before
God. Where there is no sin, there is surely no occasion for godly
sorrow on account of sin. Let the standard of duty be low enough,
and it will be easy to show that perfection belongs to many men,
or to all men, or even to the inhabitants of hell themselves. Sup
pose, for example, that malice, hatred of God, enmity to creatures,
and furious blasphemy, under circumstances of hopeless suffering,
are not criminal ; and it will follow, incontrovertibly, that these
feelings and acts are perfectly innocent in Satan and his hosts, in
their present state of misery. God cannot, therefore, with pro
priety, punish them for their present irreconcileable malignity, and
that conduct which flows spontaneously from their hearts. In this
view of the subject, the devils are as truly perfect now as they
were when they existed enthroned seraphs in the heavenly para
dise. Their condition has, indeed, been changed ; but, then, the
divine law has been altered to suit their new condition. To bring
this reasoning to bear on the case before us — if the natural passions
of anger, revenge, covetousness, pride, and ambition, be not in
themselves wrong, and if nothing but strong resolutions against sin,
a resistance of our evil propensities, a devout and moral life, and
reliance on the grace of Christ, be needful to constitute a sinless
character, then we admit that many of the human race have attain
ed to perfection in this life. Yea, verily, according to this philoso
phy, sinless perfection is consistent with an eternal war in the
breast between principle and passion ; and, as there is reason to
suppose that the physical attributes of the soul will continue after
death, it is next to certain that the saints in glory will be obliged
to maintain an unceasing conflict with such innocent things as their
love of self-indulgence, their fondness for distinction and power,
and their constitutional susceptibility to resentment and revenge.
Deny the principle of concupiscence to be sinful, and what hinders
its existence, its disquieting irruptions, its violent onsets even within
the walls of New Jerusalem ?

SANCTIFICATION. 413
This philosophy requires an exposition of the law entirely con
trary to the scripture's. The sacred volume condemns the first
risings of inordinate desire, and, of course, all vicious tendencies
to transgression in the soul. " Whoso hateth his brother is a
murderer." " Whosoever looketh upon a woman to lust after her,
hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." It re
quires us, not merely to choose and strive after, but to possess and
exercise right affections and passions ; to love God and our neigh
bour ; to feel kindly even to our enemies. " Thou shalt not covet,"
is one of its express prohibitions. Yet coveting may exist, when
from the restraints of conscience and fear there is no effort, no
purpose to obtain the desired object. The affection is wrong and
is forbidden, though it lead to no correspondent external acts, or
conscious determinative volition of the mind.
It was an apprehension of the spirituality of the law which con
vinced the Pharisee, Saul of Tarsus, of the exceeding corruption
of his heart, and destroyed all his self-righteous hopes. " I had
not known sin but by the law ; for I had not known lust" (concu
piscence), that is, I had not known that it was sin, " except the law
had said, thou shalt not covet." " For I was alive without" (a just
apprehension and sense of) " the law once ; but when the com
mandment came" (with a clear view of its spiritual requirements
¦and immutable obligation), " sin revived, and I died." Thus plain
it is, that whether we call the principle of concupiscence constitu
tional or not, it is still sinful in the eye of the law. Words may
create confusion in the mind, but they do not change the nature of
things. So long as the Christian is agitated, in any degree, by
excessive or ill-directed desires, he is deficient in his obedience,
and therefore continues to be a transgressor.
Changing his ground, the advocate of the doctrine of perfection
in this life sometimes asserts, that though Christians cannot accom
plish their own sanctification, and ought not to attempt it, yet if
they cast themselves upon Christ for this boon it will be bestowed
upon them. Instead of working themselves, they must come to
Christ to work in them, both to will and to do, and he will make
them perfect. This notion, too, is affirmed by the very men who
contend, when it suits their purpose, that sinners have perfect
ability to change their own hearts, and believers perfect ability to
do all that is required of them. " I am willing to proclaim it to
the world," says Mr. Mahan,* " that I now look to the very God
of peace to sanctify me wholly." " I have for ever given up all
idea of resisting temptation, subduing any lust, appetite, or pro
pensity, or of acceptably performing any service for Christ, by
the mere force of my own resolutions. If any propensities which
lead to sin are sacrificed, I know it must be done by an indwelling
Christ." " If you will cease from all efforts of your own, and
bring your sins, and sorrows, and cares, and propensities, which
* Christian Perfection, pp. 189, 190, 191.

414 SANCTIFICATION.
lead to sin, to Christ, and cast them all upon him — if, with implicit
faith, you will hang your whole being upon him, and make it the
great object of life to know him, for the purpose of receiving and
reflecting his image — you will find that all the exceeding great and
precious promises of his word are, in your own blissful experience,
a living reality." " You shall have a perpetual and joyful victory."
" Everywhere, and under all circumstances, your peace in Christ
shall be as a river."
From these and other similar passages in the writings of the
new Perfectionists, it would seem that Christians have nothing to
do but to lie passively in the hands of Christ, and " roll the respon
sibility" of their sanctification upon him. What mean, then, the
numerous scriptural inculcations upon believers to strive, to run,
to wrestle, to fight, to put on the whole armour of God ? It is
manifest from the inspired volume that we are to come to Christ,
not for the purpose of saving ourselves the trouble of a personal
warfare, but that we may engage in such a warfare with good
motives, with becoming zeal, with persevering energy, and with
success. The effect of faith is not drowsiness, but vigilance : not
self-satisfied repose, but self-distrust ; not slothfulness, but untiring
activity. When Christ works in us, both to will and to do, of his
own good pleasure, it is that sustained, quickened by his power,
we may work out our own salvation with fear and trembling. The
present is not the first time in which Pelagian self-sufficiency and
Antinomian indolence have been found co-inhabitants of the same
dwelling, interchangeably occupying one another's places, and
adopting one another's phraseology. But how are these apparent
contradictions to be reconciled ? They cannot be ; yet, after all,
it is not intended by the writers to whom we refer, to ascribe all
holiness to divine agency. Their meaning appears to be, that
Christ will sanctify us wholly, if we look to him for such a bless
ing ; yet there is no provision in their system to secure the act of
looking itself. Man begins to turn, and God completes the sancti
fication of man. Hence it is affirmed, that, notwithstanding the
promises of the new covenant, insuring perfection in this life, com
paratively few of the saints do ever become perfect on this side of
the grave.
The fact that the saints are, in scripture, sometimes said to be
perfect, has been alleged as another argument in favour of Per
fectionism. We answer, that the word perfection is used in different senses.
It is sometimes employed to express advancement and maturity in
the Christian character and in knowledge, as distinguished from
the comparatively low conceptions, weakness, and inconsistencies
of mere infants in the divine life. " We speak wisdom among
them that are perfect," that is, the thoroughly instructed. " Let
us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded." It is some
times used to denote evangelical uprightness, or sincere piety, in
distinction from an empty profession of godliness. In this sense

SANCTIFICATION. 415
of the word, perfection belongs to all real saints. Thus the Psalm
ist says, " Mark the perfect man, and behold the upright, for the
end of that man is peace." Here perfect and upright, agreeably
to a well-known rule of Hebrew construction, are evidently sy
nonymous terms. A perfect man, in this place, then, is a man who
is sincere in his religious profession, a real friend of God, and an
heir of heaven. The wicked are said to " shoot in secret at the
perfect," that is, at the regenerated children of God. " For the
upright," says Solomon, " shall dwell in the land, and the perfect
shall remain in it." In this passage, too, the terms uprightness and
perfection have the same meaning. Noah is said to have been a
perfect man ; yet the phrase is immediately explained as signify
ing the reality of his piety, or his humble walk with God. That
he was not without the remains of moral corruption, is manifest
from a subsequent instance of intoxication with which he is charged
in the scriptures. Job is also affirmed to be a perfect man. But
that it was not intended to assert his freedom from sin, is apparent
from his conduct, which is recorded, for he afterwards cursed the
day of his birth. He, also, himself confessed his want of sinless
perfection. " If I justify myself, mine own mouth shall condemn
me : if I say I am perfect, it shall also prove me perverse." " If I
wash myself with snow-water, and make my hands never so clean,
yet shalt thou plunge me in the ditch, and mine own clothes shall
abhor me." " Behold I am vile ; what shall I answer thee ? I
will lay mine hand upon my mouth." In the same sense we are
to understand the phrase as used by Hezekiah, when he says, " Re
member now, how I have walked before thee in truth, and with a
perfect," that is, with a sincere " heart." That sinless perfection was
not intended, seems evident from what the scriptures tell us con
cerning his conduct soon after the prayer in which these words
are contained. " But Hezekiah rendered not again according to
the benefit done unto him, for his heart was lifted up : therefore
wrath was upon him, and upon Judah and Jerusalem. Notwith
standing, Hezekiah humbled himself for the pride of his heart."
Most clearly, therefore, though he was perfect in the sense of sin
cere, or truly pious, he was yet far from being sinless. Of several
of the kings of Judah, it is said that their heart was perfect with
the Lord, yet actions are attributed to them utterly inconsistent
with the supposition that they were exempt from all sinful defects.
The obvious meaning of the phrase as applied to those good men
is, that they were sincere believers, and maintained by their exam
ple and public acts, the doctrines, institutions, and laws of true re
ligion in their dominions. It is affirmed of Zacharias and Elizabeth,
that " they were both righteous before God, walking in all the
commandments and ordinances of the Lord blameless." In this pas
sage, it is plainly the design of the inspired writer to teach us that
Zacharias and Elizabeth were eminent saints, maintaining an ex
ample of impartial and universal obedience. That he did not
mean to attribute to them sinless obedience is manifest, because in

416 SANCTIFICATION.
the context Zacharias is charged with criminal unbelief, for which
he was punished with the temporary loss of the powersof speech.
What ! a perfectly holy man subject himself to the divine displea
sure, and struck dumb for his distrust of God's word ! Paul calls
upon those whom he had addressed as perfect, to be followers of
him, Phil. iii. 15, 17; yet, in the same connexion he says, "Not as
though I had already attained, either were already perfect." It is
certain, therefore, that, in the one instance, the word has a different
meaning from what it has in the other ; for it is absurd to suppose
that a wise and humble man, who confessed himself to be still im
perfect, would exhort those whom he regarded as sinless, to look
to him as an example. Some have understood by the perfect,
whom Paul addressed, full grown men in Christian knowledge, in
distinction from children. Accordingly, Beza translates the pas
sage, " quotquot itaque adulti sumus, hoc sentiamus."
One of the arguments of Mr. Mahan, on which he strongly in
sists, is expressed in the following terms. " The Bible positively
affirms, that provision is made in the Gospel for the attainment of
a state of perfection, and that to make such provision is one of the
great objects of Christ's redemption."*
This language is ambiguous in several respects. It may mean,
that God has revealed it as his determination, that his people, or
some of them, shall become perfect in the present world ; and, in
this sense, it is but an assumption of the doctrine to be proved.
It may mean that God's plan includes the complete sanctification
of his children, at some future period of their existence ; a fact
which no one questions, and which proves nothing with respect to
the subject in dispute. God has also made provision for the deli
verance of his people from sickness, pain and all afflictions, and
for the enjoyment of the Redeemer's presence in glory ; but this
purpose concerning the elect, is not accomplished till they are
released from the present world by death. Does Mr. Mahan
mean, that nothing hinders the perfect obedience of Christians but
their own culpable abuse, or disregard of their privileges ? Very
well ; and it may with equal truth be said, that nothing different
from this, hinders the perfect obedience of impenitent sinners.
Does he mean merely that believers might be perfect but for their
own fault ? It is also true, as the apostle assures us, that the very
heathen are without excuse ; and the damned themselves are doubt
less inexcusably criminal for their present rebellion. Does he mean,
that the atonement secures the perfect holiness of Christians in the
present life ? This is simply a begging of the question ; and it is
moreover contradicted by fact ; since the great body of believers
are, by the acknowledgment of Mr. Mahan himself, far from per
fect holiness. Does he mean that the Spirit of God is able and
gracious enough to make them perfect ? So the Spirit of God is
able and gracious enough to make the whole world perfect, and
' Christian Perfection, p. 20.

SANCTIFICATION. 417
even to exclude all sin from the universe. But his power and mercy
are ever regulated, in their exercise, by his wisdom and his supreme
regard to the interests of universal being. The only question, in
reference to this subject, is, what is God's revealed purpose ? Has,
he anywhere told us that his people, or a part of them, will become
perfectly holy during their abode in this world ? If not, the removal
of external obstacles" to their perfection no more proves that they
will be perfect, than God's readiness to receive every true penitent
justifies the conclusion, that all mankind will repent and cordially
embrace the overtures of the Gospel. The loose manner in which
Mr. Mahan expresses himself, makes it difficult to say what he
does mean, except that he intends to assert that God has done or
will do something that renders it certain a part of his people will
grow to a state of perfection, before they exchange earth for
heaven. Excellent, therefore, as Dr. Woods's discussion of this
subject mainly is, we cannot agree with him in saying, that " de
vout Christians and orthodox divines have in all ages maintained
the same .doctrines " with Mr. Mahan, concerning " the provisions
of the Gospel." We must know what Mr. Mahan means by the
provisions of the Gospel, before we can say anything like this.
In all " the practical writings of Calvin, Flavel, Owen, Bunyan,
Watts, Doddridge, President Davies, and Good," not a sentence
can be found which implies that God has, in such a sense, made
provision for the complete sanctification of his children while they
" abide in the flesh," that his plan includes this result of his admir
nistration towards them ; and if Mr. Mahan does not mean so
much as this, he means nothing to his purpose.
Mr. Mahan also affirms that " perfection in holiness is promised
to the Christian in the new covenant under which he is placed."*
If it be true that God has promised that his people shall become
perfect in this life, the question is settled. But what are the proofs
adduced of this fact ? Why, he cites a number of passages, which,
if they are at all relevant to his design, prove that all Christians
become completely holy at the moment of their regeneration.
The promises he mentions belong to all under the new covenant
These are contained in such passages as Jer. xxxi. 31-34, and
Heb. viii. 8-11 ; Deut. xxx. 10; Jer. i. 20 ; Ezek. xxxvi. 25-27;
Isaiah lix. 21, and Luke i. 74, 75, &c. God circumcises the
hearts of all his people; he puts his law in their inward parts;
he takes away the stony heart out of their flesh ; and he causes
them to walk in his statutes. But does Mr. Mahan believe (as he
should, in order to be consistent with himself) that all the elect
are completely sanctified, at the very instant of their conversion,?
So far from it he says, " the great men of the church are slumber
ing in Antinomian death, or struggling in legal bondage, with
barely enough of the evangelical spirit to keep the pulse of spirit
ual life faintly beating."f But does Mr. Mahan beheve that the
* Christian Perfection, p. 22. r lb., pp. 100, 101.
27

418 SANCTIFICATION.
promises of the new covenant have failed with respect to " the
great mass of the church ?" How, then, can he argue from these
promises, that any part of the church will be completely sanctified
in this life ? Again, he says, " from the evangelical simplicity of
their first love, they (i. e., the great mass of Christians) fall into a
state of legal bondage, and after a fruitless struggle of vain reso
lutions with the world, the flesh and the devil, they appear to
descend into a kind of Aptinomian death." " The spirit of Anti
nomian slumber prevails, and death, not a present Christ, is looked
for as the great deliverer from bondage." What does this mean ?
Has God forgotten his covenant ? Or is it simply conditional ?
But a conditional covenant, from its very nature, does not insure
the compliance of a single individual with its proposals. The
truth, however, is, that the promises enumerated by Mr. Mahan,
have their incipient fulfilment here, and will be accomplished, in
the broadest extent of their meaning, hereafter. God, therefore,
is faithful, though it remain true, that none are entirely free from
sin on this side of heaven.
Some have insisted on those texts, in which God promises to
cleanse his people from all sin, as an evidence that they may attain
to perfection in this life.
In some instances, to be cleansed from sin, is equivalent to pardon,
or gratuitous justification. Thus, in Ps. Ii. : " Wash me thoroughly
from mine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin ;" that is, save me
from the deserved consequences of my disobedience. Again, in
allusion to ceremonial purification, which represented atoning
blood, David says in the same psalm, " purge me with hyssop, and
I shall be clean, wash me and I shall be whiter than snow." Thus,
in Jer. xxxiii. 8 : " And I will cleanse them from all their iniquity,
whereby they have sinned against me." That this refers to justi
fying grace, rather than sanctification, seems evident from what
immediately follows — " and I will pardon all their iniquities, where
by they have sinned, and whereby they have transgressed against
me." Thus, also, in 1 John i. 7, 8, " The blood of Jesus Christ,
his Son, cleanseth us from all sin," that is, obtaineth our pardon ;
for it is not the atonement, but a direct divine influence, which
removes the power and pollution of sin. Again : " If we confess
our sins he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse
us from all unrighteousness." Here, to forgive sins, and to cleanse
from all unrighteousness, appear to be equivalent phrases. In the
sense of pardon, or free justification, all believers are cleansed
from sin, since they are all acquitted, and viewed and treated- as
perfectly righteous, for the Redeemer's sake.
Where deliverance from the dominion of sin is promised, refe
rence is in part had to what takes place in this world, but, more
especially, to the future perfection of the heavenly state. The
purifying process begins in the new birth, and is gradually carried
forward in sanctification, till the work is completed in glory. But
how does the promise of future entire emancipation from the thral-

SANCTIFICATION. 419
dom of sin, prove that this blessing will be obtained immediately, or
during the*brief Jerm of our earthly existence ? It is also promised
to believers, that they shall be delivered from all sorrow, that they
shall vanquish completely death and hell, and shall live and reign
with Christ ; and it might as well be argued, that these promises will
have their full accomplishment here, as those which relate to the en
tire purgation of the saints from their moral defilement. The truth
is, God's faithfulness peculiarly appears in sustaining his people,
amidst the temptations and difficulties connected with a state of
sinful imperfection, till death is swallowed up in victory. Every
good thing which the Lord has spoken will be shortly accomplish
ed ; and is his veracity to be distrusted, because he does not give
to his children in this world, the perfect rest and triumph of heaven ?
Was God unfaithful to his ancient saints, because he did not send
them the promised Messiah in the time of Moses ? I may remark
in general, that if we regard not the scope of a passage, nor the
peculiar import of scriptural phrases, nor the analogy of the faith,
we may, from insulated texts, deduce doctrines as preposterous as
any that were ever advanced by the greatest heretics. Thus from
the passage, " Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin
of the world," we might argue, in opposition to the repeated decla
rations and general tenor of the scriptures, that Christ sanctifies
or pardons and saves the whole human race. Whereas, the truth
intended to be taught in these words, is the reality and universal
extent of the atonement of Christ.
" I argue," says Mr. Mahan,* " that perfection in holiness is at
tainable in this life, and that the sacred writers intended to teach
the doctrine, from the fact, that inspired men made the attainment
of this particular state the subject of definite, fervent, and constant
prayer." So we have examples of inspired men, praying for the purity
and blessedness of the heavenly state. But do beiievers, while
sojourning on earth, ever literally become companions of the glo
rified? Paul was continually pressing toward the mark, for the
prize' of the high' calling of God in Christ Jesus ; the acquisition
of this prize was the object of his most earnest labours, of his most
fervent prayers ; and Mr. Mahan supposesf that the " mark " at
which the apostle so strenuously aimed was the " resurrection of
the dead." But was Paul actually raised from the dead, during
the period of his abode in this world? Or,. does it follow, because
he continued to sigh and groan, being burdened, that he did not
pray in faith for a glorious resurrection? Christ taught his disci
ples to pray, " Thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it
is in heaven." This prayer was offered by the apostles, and has
been offered by the most devoted Christians, in all later ages ; yet
to this day, much the greater part of mankind continue the slaves
of sin, and ignorant of the way of salvation by the Mediator. Are
* Christian Perfection, p. 34. t 0>., p. 60.

420 SANCTIFICATION.
we to conclude, therefore, that this prayer has been so long, and
by such multitudes of the excellent of the earth, offered in vain ?
Perfectionists have urged the prayer of Christ, recorded in John
xvii. 21, 23, as a proof of their doctrine, "That they all may be
one ; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may
be one in us : that the world may believe that thou hast sent me."
" I in them, and thou in me, that they may be perfect in one."
" The union here prayed for," says Mr. Mahan, "is a union of perfect
love." " We must admit that this love, and consequent union, will
exist among believers, or maintain, 1st, That Christ prayed for
that which he requires us to believe that it is not for the glory of
God to bestow on his children. 2d, That the world are never to
believe in Christ."*
That this prayer was offered in behalf of all God's children,
cannot admit of a doubt. But if it was offered for all, it has been
answered in part at least, with respect to all, since the supplica
tions of the Son are ever prevalent with the Father. However
imperfect Christians may be, they are all united to their head by
a living faith, they all have essentially the same views of the Gos
pel ; they approve of one another's character, and rejoice in the
prosperity of the kingdom, of which they are all subjects ; they all
hate sin, and love the same divine objects ; they have all been
washed in the same blood, have been renewed by the same spirit,
have become partakers of the same hope, and have been made heirs
of the same salvation. The union among believers, as it is far
more pure and sacred than that which subsists among worldly
men, is destined to grow in strength, while all earthly friendships
decay, and to endure for ever. Nor, apparently defective as it is,
has it been wholly ineffectual in carrying a conviction to the un
godly of the divine reality and power of the Gospel. In conse
quence of the example of Christians, notwithstanding the many
inconsistencies with which it has been marred, the "world" have
been constrained to admit the divine mission and character of the
Redeemer. But Mr. Mahan seems to suppose that this prayer is
not answered at all, except with regard to those who become per
fectly sanctified in the present life. What must be the inference ?
Plainly this — that, with respect to the great body of Christians hith
erto, during their mortal pilgrimage, the prayer of the Saviour has
been followed by no correspondent effect. According to Mr. Ma-
han's interpretation, therefore, Christ has failed to secure the object
which he sought ; for this writer supposes that comparatively few
of the saints have attained to that perfection, which their master
prayed they should possess. But if the prayer has failed of an
answer till now, with respect to millions of Christians, what evi
dence is there that it will not equally fail in all future ages of time?
It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude, not that the great interces
sor has prayed in vain, but that the Perfectionists have misappre-
* Christian Perfection, p. 33.

SANCFIFICATION. 421
hended and misinterpreted his prayer. Our Lord said, " I pray
not thou shouldst take them out of the world, but that thou shouldst
keep them from the evil." The word evil may be understood to
include both sin and suffering, as well as the temptations and buf-
fetings of Satan. If, therefore, we forget facts, and the general
testimony of the scriptures, in our exposition of particular texts,
we may infer from this last cited passage, that all real believers
have done with conflicts, and enjoy perfect freedom from afflictions
and sorrows.
Mr. Mahan thinks that Paul's proposing himself as an example
to other Christians, " shows that he had arrived to a state of entire
sanctification."* Paul does not propose himself as a perfect example. He was
worthy of imitation in many respects ; and so are many other
good men, who would be the last persons on earth to claim the
character of entire obedience. That Paul was imperfect, and that
after all his attainments he felt himself to be so, will fully appear
in the sequel. As for the passages which Mr. Mahan cites to
prove the perfection of Paul's obedience, they assert nothing more
than the sincerity of his faith, the eminency of his self-denial, and
his fidelity as an apostle and minister of Christ. When he declared
that he was pure of the blood of all men, he referred merely to
the clearness and fulness with which he had preached the Gospel.
But can none, save one who is perfectly holy, declare to his hear
ers all the counsel of God ?
Some have considered 1 John iii. 9, as proving that saints may
be entirely free from sin in this life. " Whosoever is born of God
doth not commit sin ; for his seed remaineth in him, and he cannot
sin, because he is born of God."
It is the opinion of some writers that the apostle here refers to
the sin of total and final apostasy, against which all true Christians
are secured by the power and presence of God. The connexion,
however, seems to warrant the conclusion, that John's object is to
exhibit one of the distinguishing evidences of true religion, which
is obedience. Some in the primitive church were Antinomians,
supposing, with many modern Perfectionists, that Christians were
freed from the rule of duty, and were at liberty to live according
to their inclinations. To meet this impious dogma, as well as ex
cite believers to the diligent pursuit of holiness, the sacred writer
affirms that regeneration implies the implantation of a virtuous
" seed," or " principle," which, by its own proper tendency, prompts
to all the works of faith and labours of love. The real Christian,
therefore, cannot be the committer or doer of sin, in such a sense
as implies an habitually and totally depraved character. He longs
for perfect holiness, and assiduously strives to keep all the com
mandments of God. In other words, he is habitually a new man,
both in his heart and in the overt actions of his life. The con-
* Christian Perfection, p. 39.

422 SANCTIFICATION.
nexion, both preceding and following the text, accords with this
interpretation. The 10th verse is, " In this the children of God
are manifested, and the children of the devil : whosoever doeth
not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his bro
ther." Such are the scope and design of the passage. The other
interpretation is moreover attended with difficulties not easy to be
removed. 1. It overthrows a leading doctrine of the greater part of the
Perfectionists (who are Arminians), concerning the defectibility of
the saints. Here we learn that regeneration includes the idea of
permanency or certain perseverance in obedience, " His seed re-
maineth in him." Most surely then, Wesleyans and other Armi
nian Perfectionists ought not to cite this passage as an evidence of
their doctrine ; since if it proves anything in their favour, it proves
too much for their cause.
2. Admit the interpretation of the Perfectionists, and it will fol
low that none but the perfectly holy had been born of God, or are
real Christians. The language of the apostle is very explicit:
" Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin." If by not
committing sin here, be intended absolute perfection, then the
smallest sin, either external or internal, is enough to demonstrate
a professor of religion to be a hypocrite. On this ground, there
fore, the difference between saints and sinners must be, not in the
nature of some or all of their exercises, but the perfection of the
former and the' imperfection of the latter. The last part of the
text is, if possible, stronger than the first ; " He cannot sin, because
he is born of God." If the meaning be, he cannot sin at all, then
of course no one who does sin at all, has within him the smallest
spark of true religion.
3. The interpretation adopted by the Perfectionists, makes John
contradict himself in this very epistle ; for he does expressly affirm
that none of the children of men in this world are entirely free
from sin. In chap. i. ver. 8, he tells us, " If we say that we have
no sin" (as some pretended that all their actions as believers were
pure), "we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." In the
language of the New Testament, the affirmation that the truth is
not in one, seems to be the same as saying that he is not a real
Christian. Paul speaks of men of " corrupt minds, and destitute
of the truth," that is, devoid of the Christian spirit, or of evangeli
cal piety. John, in the second chapter of this epistle, uses the same
phrase. " He that saith I know him, and keepeth not his com
mandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him." Elsewhere the
same apostle speaks of the truth as being in Christians, as dwelling
in them ; and them he represents as walkers in the truth. Thus
he teaches us that the boast of perfection indicates not superior
sanctity, but gross self-ignorance, or intentional falsehood, and a
destitution of the genuine traits of the Christian character. In
chap. iii. ver. 3, he says, " and every one that hath this hope in
him purifieth himself even as he is pure." Macknight has the fol-

SANCTIFICATION. 423
lowing note on this passage. " The apostle, as Beza observes,
doth not say, hath purified himself, but purified himself ; to show
that it is a good man's constant study to purify himself, because no
man in this life can attain to perfect purity. By this text, there
fore, as well as by 1 John i. 8, those fanatics are condemned who
imagine they are able to- live without sin." From the foregoing
passages, it is apparent that John taught a very different doctrine
from that of sinless perfection in this life. And is it credible that
he has been guilty of gross self-contradiction in the course of a
single brief letter ?
It may be said in favour of the doctrine of perfection of the
saints in this life, that it is honourable to Christ, and implied in his
all-sufficiency as the Saviour of his people. Will he not, it may
be asked, be all to his people that they need or desire ?
We answer, that he will be all to them that he has promised, but
that he will do nothing for them contrary to his own express de
clarations and the wisdom of his general counsels. We are ill
qualified to judge what, except so far as he has revealed his pur
pose in his word, it is wisest and best for him to do. There are
some things which he will not do for his people. He will not, for
example, make them all of gigantic stature and Herculean strength ;
nor render them immortal upon the earth, nor cause them to live
to the age of Methuselah, nor raise them at once in intellect and
knowledge to an equality with the angels, nor free them, while
they continue here, from the universally experienced pains and ills
of this mortal existence. To expect from him such achievements,
betrays either infidelity or the utmost extravagance of enthusiasm.
That he will ultimately accomplish the entire sanctification of his
people is certain : this they are bound to believe ; but to look to
him without any warrant from his word, for such a manifestation
of his grace in this world, betokens rather weakness and presump
tion than suitable confidence in his faithfulness and power. When
he assures us that he will do for us whatever we ask, it is with the
express or implied condition, that our petitions are in accordance
with his purposes as made known in the scriptures. Has he ever
told us in the Bible, that he will, if we ask him, purify us from all
sin in the present world ? If not, it seems opinionated pride and
ignorance, rather than eminent faith and holiness, to expect him,
out of a regard to our wishes, thus to turn aside from the course
of his ordinary gracious operations. Besides, so long as we con
tinue here, we must come to him as needy, as empty, as sinners.
But these are not the characteristics of such as are completely
sanctified. They have as truly entered into their rest as any of
the saints with Christ in Paradise.
" But some have professed to be perfectly holy."
Such were not the saints, of whom we have an account in the
scriptures. These all confessed their continual proneness to sin ;
and depended all their life long on the resources of rich, free,
superabounding grace. Some, indeed, have claimed perfection ;

424 SANCTIFICATION.
but they resembled the Pharisee who thanked the Lord for his
moral superiority over other men, much more nearly than the con
trite Publican, who smote upon his breast, saying, " God be merci
ful to me a sinner." The church of Rome, too, has claimed infal
libility. A man's favourable opinion of himself is but a poor
argument to show that he is either good or great. " He that
trusteth in his own heart is a fool." " There is," says Solomon.
" a generation that are pure in their own eyes, and yet are not
washed from their filthiness." It is the self-righteous hypocrite
who cries, " stand by thyself, come not near to me, for I am holier
than thou." " These," says God, " are a smoke in my nose, a fire
that burneth all the day." Many poor enthusiasts have believed
themselves inspired, and capable of working miracles ; and some
have affirmed their possession of attributes strictly superhuman
and divine. Are the Behmenites, the French prophets, the disci
ples of Ann Lee, and the Mormons, then, to be acknowledged as
the divinely illuminated messengers of God? "Not he that com-
mendeth himself is approved, but whom the Lord commendeth."
When a man professes an eminence in holiness, surpassing that
ascribed to any of the scripture saints, he is for that reason to be
distrusted ; and if he boasts of a perfection which the Bible denies
to pertain to any of the human race in this world, he is to be at
once regarded, without the trouble of further examination, either
as a deceiver, or the subject of a morbid fanaticism. It is not for
a moment to be deemed possible, — whatever may be his professed
experimental knowledge of religion, or his zeal, or the apparent
blamelessness of his life, — ,that he is in the right, in opposition to
the explicit declaration of the scriptures. " Let God be true, but
every man a liar." " To the law and to the testimony ; if they
speak not according to the word, it is because there is no light in
them." At all events, if one come to us with a professedly new
revelation, he is not worthy of attention from us, until we find him
performing works which are plainly and incontestably miraculous.
It is, moreover, said by Perfectionists, that the common ortho
dox doctrine on this subject is discouraging, and leads to licentious
ness. The same objection has been made to the doctrines of entire
depravity, regeneration by effectual grace, election, justification by-
faith alone, the atonement of Christ, and indeed the whole scheme
of evangelical truth contained in the Bible. Infidels, too, have
professed to reject the sacred volume, on the ground of the al
leged evil tendency of many of its narratives, precepts, and exhi
bitions of divine character. Does it follow then, that the influence
of the doctrines of grace is bad, or that the Bible does not give us
the most just and consistent view of God ? Certainly not.
He who needs the expectation of perfect holiness in this life to
stimulate his efforts in religion, is yet a stranger to the ingenuous
nature of that faith which is the fruit of divine grace. The true
Christian loves holiness, and will, therefore, strive to make ad-

SANCTIFICATION. 425
vances in the divine life. Did Baxter, Brainerd, Martyn, and Pay-
son, labour any the less diligently for Christ, because they did not
expect perfect rest on this side of heaven ? Has any advocate of
Perfectionism ever surpassed those holy men in watchfulness, in
fervent prayers, in the most self-denying sacrifices, and in unwea
ried attention to all the demands of duty ? The common doctrine
concerning the imperfection of the heart of the saints in this world,
is adapted to produce and strengthen some very important branches
of the Christian character — particularly humility, a great fear of
sin, watchfulness against temptation, and habitual active depend
ence on the teaching and power of the Holy Spirit." " O," says
the believer, convinced of this truth, " how potent must be my
corruptions ; and how hopeless, but for Almighty grace, my state I"
It teaches, in the most impressive manner, the unwearied faithful
ness of the Redeemer, who, inconstant and unworthy as they all
are, will never leave one of his ransomed people to perish. How
sweet, how tender the gratitude, which such a view of his unceas
ing care cannot fail to inspire I The doctrine, at the same time,
serves to wean the believer from the world, where he is ever to
bear the burthen of sin, and dispose him to seek with the most in
tense desires for the freedom, rest, and blessedness of heaven. It
helps to make welcome the grave and eternity. To one who
knows the evils of his heart, it is fitted, when clearly understood,
to impart a hope which would be otherwise impossible ; since it
assures him that the struggles he feels within him have been com
mon to others, who now love and adore in the unclouded vision of
the Lamb. He is, therefore, animated to press forward in his holy
warfare, till he shall drop all the sorrows of his mortal state, and
lay down his arms at the side of the grave.
We now proceed to state the more direct evidence of the sinful
imperfection of all the saints in this life.
1. Tlie first argument is derived from the direct testimony of the
Bible. Not a single text can be adduced, which, properly understood,
attributes perfection to good men in this life. On the contrary, the
criminal imperfection of them all is most plainly asserted. Wit
ness Eccl. vii. 20 : " For there is not a just man upon earth that
doeth good and sinneth not." It is as evident from this passage
that no one on earth is perfectly holy, as that any are imperfect.
Prov. xx. 9 : " Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am
pure from my sin ?" Mr. Mahan suggests that reference is here
had to a man's past life The language, however, supposes present
imperfection. Should one say, " I have made my heart clean,"
the words would imply, not that his heart had always been clean
(for that which has never been impure, needs no cleansing), but
that he had accomplished his perfect sanctification. To say " I
am pure from any sin," is equivalent to saying, " I am free from
that depravity which was once my character." The passage, then,
• strongly denies the sinless perfection of any of the human race, in

426 SANCTIFICATION.
this world. 1 Kings viii. 46 : " There is no man that sinneth not."
Mr. Mahan contends that this means simply, that every man is
peccable, or liable to sin. If so, the passage supposes that all men
here are in a very different state from that of the angels and saints
in heaven, who are in no danger of apostatizing from God. Is it
not natural, then, to conclude, that there is in the hearts of the saints
here, something which peculiarly exposes them to sin ? And what
can this be but a sinful propensity ? Mr. Wesley disposes of the
passage in a different manner. " Doubtless," says he, " thus it was
in the days of Solomon : yea, and from Solomon to Christ, there
was no man that sinned not." But he supposes that the declara
tion is . not applicable to the times of the Gospel. With such as
have a suitable reverence for the scriptures, this method of explain-
ing away the text requires no comment. " What," says Eliphaz,
the Temanite, " is man that he should be clean, and he which is
born of a woman that he should be righteous ?" " If I say I am
perfect " (or sinless), remarks Job, "it shall also prove me perverse."
" How does this declaration," asks Mr. Mahan, " which Job applies
to himself and to no other person, prove that all other saints, and
Christians even, are imperfect ?" It is sufficient to reply, that Job
was one of the best men of his own or any other age ; that he is
celebrated as such in the book of Ezekiel, and that he is proposed
to Christians in the New Testament as a model of distinguished
patience. " And the Lord said unto Satan, hast thou considered
my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect
and an upright man ?" And is it not evidence of perverseness in
men of far inferior moral attainments, to boast of their perfection ?
" Who," says the Psalmist, " can understand his errors ? Cleanse
thou me from secret faults." Here it is intimated that all have
errors or faults, from which they need to be purified by the grace
of God. The New Testament is no less explicit on this subject
than the Old. We need not here adduce the passages already
quoted from the first epistle of John, as they must be fresh in the
reader's remembrance. James iii. 2 : " For in many things we of
fend all," or are all offended. We can see nothing in the connexion,
or in the nature of the thing, which limits this declaration to any
particular description of men. The apostle evidently includes
himself and his fellow Christians.
2. Many of the exhortations addressed to Christians, and the
prayers offered in their behalf, imply that they are not at present
completely sanctified. They are required to make advancement
in piety. " To grow in grace." But where one is perfect in holi
ness, he can "grow in grace " only by an increase of his natural
capacity. His whole duty is done ; and can he do more than his
duty ? " Giving all diligence, add to your faith, virtue, and to vir
tue, knowledge, and to knowledge, temperance, and to temperance,
patience, and to patience, godliness, and to godliness, brotherly
kindness, and to brotherly kindness, charity." Could such an ex
hortation, with any propriety, be addressed to one whose obedience,'

SANCTIFICATION. 427
according to his capacity, was as perfect as that of Gabriel ? A
large portion of the precepts written to Christians in the New Tes
tament, import the necessity of improvement, of progress in the
divine life. " Now our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and God, even
our Father, comfort your hearts, and stablish you in every good
word and work." Would this be a suitable prayer in behalf of
those already stablished in perfect goodness ? " We pray exceed
ingly that we might see your face, and might perfect that which is
lacking in your faith." " The Lord make you to increase and
abound in love." " The God of peace sanctify you wholly."
" Now the God of peace make you perfect in every good work to
do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight."
The prayer for perfect sanctification supposes that the blessing has
not already been obtained ; as the prayer that sinners may be re
generated, assumes, that they are yet in an unrenewed state. The
foregoing passages may serve as a specimen of the prayers of in
spired men in behalf of their brethren ; and, while they prove the
moral imperfection of those for whom they were presented, they
give us no reason to conclude that a full answer to them was ob
tained on this side of the tomb. To infer the contrary would be
as unreasonable as to infer that a sincere prayer for the deliverance
of believers from all evil, must secure its object perfectly in the
present world.
3. It is the duty of all men daily to ask of God the forgiveness
of their sins. This is evident from the form of prayer which our
Lord taught his disciples, which is given as a general guide to our
daily devotions, and which contains in substance the petitions need
ful for Christians during their whole life. That the prayer, as it
respects the subjects which it brings into view, whether the precise
form be adopted or not, is designed for daily use, is manifest from
one of its petitions. " Give us this day our daily bread." It is
then added, " and forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those
who trespass against us." We shall all, therefore, need daily to
pray for pardoning mercy. But the daily need of forgiveness
supposes the daily commission of sins to be forgiven. The daily
prayer implies daily confession of sin. And does Christ require
us to confess offences of which we are not guilty 1 The insertion
of this petition among the rest was doubtless intended to remind
us of the sinful imperfection of all our services in the present
world. Mr. Mahan's evasion of this argument, that it involves the
supposition that " the kingdom of God will never come," and that
" the Christian will never be in a state in this life in which he will
not be subject to injuries from others," is rather confirmatory, than
subversive, of the inference I have maintained. Mr. Mahan vir
tually allows, then, that so long as Christians are " subject to inju
ries from others," this prayer is suitable for all believers. And are
they not still " subject to injuries ?" The prayer, therefore, is with
propriety used by Christians at this day; and it remains to be

428 SANCTIFICATION.
proved, that it will cease to be appropriate to their circumstances
so long as the sun and the moon endure.
4. The same doctrine is evident from the history which the Holy
Ghost has given us in the scriptures, of the most eminent saints in
ancient times. Noah was once intoxicated; Abraham practised
dissimulation concerning his wife ; Isaac indulged sinful partiality
towards Esau ; Jacob sometimes indulged criminal distrust ; Lot
was shamefully overcome by temptation ; Moses spoke unadvisedly
with his lips ; Aaron was too accommodating to the sinful wishes
of his countrymen, and formed an image for idolatrous worship ;
David committed crimes for which his holy soul was afterwards
humbled in the dust; Solomon's old age was disgraced by his idola
tries ; Job and Jeremiah impatiently cursed the day of their birth.
Shall I speak of the faults of Eli, and Samuel, and Jehoshaphat, and
Asa, and Hezekiah, and Josiah ? Unpleasant as the recollection
of their failings is, it may be profitable to impress upon us the ne
cessity of continual vigilance and prayer. It is important to ob
serve, that to those holy men, the remembrance of their sins was
grievous, and the burden of them was intolerable.
Let us look now at the saints of whom we have an account in
the New Testament. Not one of them is presented to us with a
faultless character. In the little family of Christ we observe the
spirit of worldly ambition. We hear the disciples inquiring among
themselves, who shall be greatest ? they were warm in dispute ;
and carry their mutual complaints to their meek and compassionate
Lord. Who can think of the confidence of Peter, and his subse
quent lapse, though so soon followed by his repentance, without
exclaiming, " what are the holiest men, unaided and unsustained by
the grace of God !" Much as Peter's character afterwards was
improved, his sanctification was still imperfect. " But when Peter,"
who was in that instance too much actuated by motives of carnal
policy, " was come to Antioch, I," says Paul, " withstood him to
the face, because he was to be blamed." Thus, weak in himself,
and liable to transgress, was that great apostle, whose very name
denotes firmness and constancy. James, and the gentle, affection
ate John, actuated by a spirit of revenge, would fain have com
manded fire to come down from heaven and consume the Samari
tans, who refused to receive their master. Yet Mr. Mahan thinks
that John became perfectly holy in this life. Because John was
conscious of the sincerity of his obedience, it is inferred that he
was free from sin. Paul and Barnabas contended and divided,
with a spirit of acrimony, ill-befitting their eminent meekness, self-
denial, and devotion to the cause of the Redeemer. Yet, in Mr.
Mahan's view, it is at least " doubtful " whether Paul, in that in
stance, deviated in the smallest degree from perfect holiness. The
same writer makes the apostle attest his own perfection in a num
ber of passages, which simply assert the reality of his faith and
piety, though he expressly says, " Not as though I had already at
tained, either were already perfect ; brethren, I count not myself

SANCTIFICATION. 429
to have apprehended : but this one thing I do, forgetting those
things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things
which are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high
calling of God in Jesus Christ." In the apostolical epistles to the
churches, faults are specified and reproved, which render it cer
tain that the religion of the primitive Christians was by no means
such as dreaming. Perfectionists claim for themselves. Thus do
Bible facts on this subject explain and establish the Bible doctrine.
5. The most holy men mentioned in scripture have confessed,
and that in their best frames, their remaining sinfulness. " Against
thee, thee only," says David, " have I sinned." " Mine iniquities
have gone over my head ; as an heavy burden, they are too heavy
for me." " Behold I am evil," says Job, " what shall I answer
thee ?" Nehemiah and Daniel include themselves in their confes
sions of the sins of their people. Paul again and again renounces
all dependence on his own righteousness, and casts himself, without
reserve, on the atonement and perfect obedience of the Saviour.
These were among the best men that ever lived ; and if they felt
themselves to be still imperfect, is it not evident that others who
regard themselves as purified from all sin, are miserably deceived?
6. The warfare which, the scriptures teach us, exists through
life in the bosoms of good men, implies the imperfection of their
obedience, or the continuance of evil principles, however mortified
and weakened, in their hearts. It is nowhere intimated that any
of the saints have arrived at such a state that they have nothing
more to do in opposing sin in their hearts. On the contrary, they
are all exhorted to continual watchfulness and diligence, lest they
be overcome by temptation. " Be sober, be vigilant." It is clear
ly implied in many exhortations, that Christians will be obliged to
fight the good fight of faith till they die. Is it not plain from this,
that there will always be sin in them to resist? Would it not be
absurd to direct men to fight an enemy already completely van
quished and destroyed ? To evade this argument, shall we be told
of innocent susceptibilities to sin, which render perpetual resistance
necessary ? On this principle, as we have already observed, there
must be an inward warfare in heaven ; since men carry with them
'their innocent mental susceptibilities into the regions of endless
purity. But is there any warfare in that world ? Were the saints
here perfectly holy, we see no reason why they should be any
more troubled with internal conflicts than are the glorified spirits
in heaven.
According to the more common interpretation of orthodox di
vines, the apostle, in Rom. vii., is describing his own experience,
and that of every believer in this world. In that chapter he speaks
of sin dwelling in him ; of willing what he could not perform ; of find
ing a law, that when he would do good, evil was present with him ;
of delighting in the law of God, after the inward man, and yet see
ing another law in his members warring against the law of his
mind, and bringing him into captivity to the law of sin in his mem-

430

SANCTIFICATION.

bers ; and he adds the pathetic exclamation, " O wretched man
that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death ?"
He speaks as if two distinct persons within him were contending
for the mastery ; and he rests all his hope of the final victory of
the good principle over its opposite, on the mere grace of the Re
deemer. " I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then
with the mind, I myself serve the law of God,, but with the flesh
the law of sin." No real difficulty exists from the connexion, in
supposing this passage to be descriptive of the Christian experience
of Paul himself, and of other true saints. It has been appropriated
by the best of men, as most happily expressive of their own views
of themselves ; while most of the opponents in modern times of its
application to true Christians, have also had Arminian or Pelagian
notions of the great doctrines of grace. The orthodox interpreta
tion is the most natural, and such as the plain, unlettered Christian,
who had no system to support, would be most likely to adopt.
Some of the phrases employed express a state of feeling which is
never found in a totally depraved sinner. Can such an one truly
say, that he allows not the evil which he commits, that he hates
what he does, and that he delights in the law of God after the in
ward man ? The Psalmist represents it as one of the characteris
tics of a good man, that "his delight is in the law of the Lord."
" 0 Lord, how love I thy law !" " Delight thyself also in the
Lord, and he .shall give thee the desires of thy heart." As for the
confession, " I am carnal, sold under sin," it merely expressed the
strong sense which Paul had of the power of indwelling sin, as it
was manifested in the effects which he noticed in the following
connexion. In Gal. v. 17, the apostle speaks of an inward spiritual conflict
as common to Christians. " The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and
the spirit against the flesh : and these are contrary the one to the
other, so that ye cannot do the things that ye would." By the
flesh here, as is evident from what follows, is intended the corrupt
nature, or sinful disposition of mankind. This flesh is affirmed to
exist in Christians, and to counteract the impulses of their new or
spiritual nature. The combatants being thus in the field, the con
test can never be intermitted, till the foe is finally routed and de
stroyed. 7. The temper, represented in the scriptures as necessary to ac
ceptable prayer, implies, on the part of the offerers, the conscious
ness of remaining sin. None are permitted to mention their own
goodness as the meritorious ground of acceptance. Humility and
penitence are indispensable to a right approach to the throne of
grace. We read of one who. without any confession of sin, boast
ed before God of his good deeds ; but we are assured by the su
preme judge, that this man found no favour with his Maker. Ob
serve Daniel's prayer. After confessing his own sin, as well as the
sin of his people, he said, " We do not present our supplications
before thee for our righteousness, but for thy great mercies. O

SANCTIFICATION. 431
Lord, hear ; O Lord, forgive ; 0 Lord, hearken and do ; defer not,
for thine own sake, O my God ; for thy city and thy people are
called by thy name." Observe the prayer of the Psalmist. " Enter
not into judgment with thy servant ; for in thy sight shall no man
living be justified." Observe the prayer of Isaiah. " Behold thou
art wroth, for we have sinned ; in thy ways is continuance, and
we shall be saved. For we are all as an unclean thing, and all
our righteousnesses are as filthy rags ; and we all do fade as a leaf ;
and our iniquities, like the wind, have taken us away. And there
is none that calleth upon thy name, that stirreth up himself to take
hold of thee ; for thou hast hid thy face from us, and hast consumed
us, because of our iniquities. But now, O Lord, thou art our
Father ; we are the clay, and thou our potter ; and we all are the
work of thy hand. Be not wroth very sore, O Lord, neither re
member iniquity for ever ; behold, see, we beseech thee, we are all
thy people." Here we see the church relinquishing all confidence
in herself, in her strength, in her goodness, taking to herself ever
lasting shame, and reposing all her hope in the sovereign mercy
and gracious covenant of her God. In the spirit of this passage,
Jeremiah prays, " Though our iniquities testify against us, do thou
it for thy name's sake," Of that penitent submission which pros
trates the pride of the heart, and all the powers of the soul before
the divine Majesty, we are most impressively taught the necessity
in the parable of the Publican and Pharisee. He whose prayer
was graciously accepted, had no good actions to enumerate, no
apology to offer for his transgressions. His only plea was mercy,
through the great propitiation provided for the guilty and the lost.
The Pharisee, on the other hand, seemed to regard himself as per
fect. See the repenting Prodigal. He tells of no good that he has
done. He speaks not even of his compunction, his sorrow, his long
and painful journey, to regain the parental mansion, and sue for an
abused parent's love. No, with shame and weeping, he cries,
" Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee, and am not
worthy to be called thy son." The current language of the Bible
accords with these examples. The Lord fills the poor with good
things, but he sends the rich empty away. " He will regard the
prayer of the destitute ; he will not despise their prayer." But
what have such promises to do with those who believe that they
have already attained to perfection 1 Are they poor, destitute in
their own eyes ? What, they who have only to be thankful for the
forgiveness of what is past, and to be satisfied with their present
purity and worthiness ? This is pharisaism, this is arrogance, in
deed, if anything can deserve the name. " Thou sayest, I am rich,
and increased with goods, and have need of nothing, and knowest
not that thou art wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and
naked." 8. The same doctrme is confirmed by the testimony of those in
later times, who have given the best evidence of eminent meek
ness, humility, and a disinterested consecration of themselves to

432 SANCTIFICATION.
the service and cause of God. In the confessions and writings of
the great Augustine, the power of indwelling sin is acknowledged
with a strength and pungency of expression, which proves the
depth of his conviction, and the intenseness of his penitential sor
row. The ardent and intrepid Luther is full of this most humiliat
ing subject, that he may drive the church from every other refuge
to the atoning sacrifice and the immaculate righteousness of her
Redeemer. Baxter, Owen, Flavel, Charnock, Bates, Howe, Bun-
yan, and a host of their godly contemporaries, unite in their ac
knowledgments of the exceeding potency of remaining sin in the
hearts of the best of God's people. Who has not observed the
strong language of Edwards, Brainerd, and Payson, as they con
fessed and mourned over the sins that were mixed with, and de
filed, their holiest services ? John Newton, Winter, Scott, Martyn,
and indeed most of those who have seemed eminently spiritual,
have been full and constant in expressing their conviction of the
criminal imperfection of their best works, the strength of their in
nate corruptions, and their entire dependence on the power and
sovereign grace of God to direct and uphold them. And if these
were not real saints, who, in modern times, are entitled to the ap
pellation ? Are they, who profess to depend on their good life for
acceptance with God, while they oppose, calumniate, and hold up to
ridicule the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel ? Are those zealots,
proud, censorious, and dogmatical, who boast of their perfect de
liverance from sin ? " By their fruits ye shall know them ; do
men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles ?"
On this subject the great and good Wilberforce says : " To put
the question concerning the natural depravity of man to the se
verest test ; take the best of the human species, the watchful, dili
gent,, self-denying Christian, and let him decide the controversy,
and that, not by inferences drawn from the practices of a thought
less and dissolute world, but by an appeal to his personal expe
rience ; go with him to his closet, ask him his opinion of the cor
ruption of the heart, and he will tell you that he is deeply sensible
of its power, for that he has learned it from much self-examination
and long acquaintance with the workings of his own mind. He
will tell you, that every day strengthens this conviction ; yea, that
hourly he sees fresh reason to deplore his want of simplicity in
intention, his infirmity of purpose, his low views, his selfish un
worthy desires, his backwardness to set about his duty,'his languor
and coldness in performing it ; that he finds himself obliged con
tinually to confess that he feels within him two opposite principles,
and that he cannot do the things that he would. He cries out in
the language of the excellent Hooker, ' the little fruit which we
have in holiness, it is, God knoweth, corrupt and unsound ; we put
no confidence at all in it, we challenge nothing in the world for it,
we dare not call God to reckoning, as if we had him in our debt
books ; our continual suit to him is, and must be, to bear with our
infirmities, and pardon our offences.' "

SANCTIFICATION. 433
9. The Bible teaches us to look for the accomplishment of our
perfect conformity to God, as a part of that peculiar and glorious
reward which is reserved for a future life. " I shall be satisfied,
when I awake with thy likeness." " It doth not yet appear what
we shall be ; but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be
like him ; for we shall see him as he is." Is not the implication
clear and unanswerable, that our moral assimilation to Christ will
not be completed till we awake in eternity, and behold him in his
unveiled glory ? But, according to the scheme of the Perfection
ists, that which makes Heaven most attractive to the pious heart,
may be fully enjoyed upon earth ; we may be as sinless, and, ac
cording to our capacity, as much conformed to the Redeemer here
as are any of the saints in his immediate presence before the throne.
Why then should Christians so eagerly, as the Bible represents
them do, fix the eyes of their faith and desire on the celestial
Paradise ? Why do they so joyfully anticipate the second coming
of their victorious Prince and deliverer ? We are assured, that
" the spirits of just men made perfect" are collected together in
" the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem." Why are
we not told that their dwelling-place is upon earth, as well as in
the distant country beyond the tomb ?
10. God deals with the best of his people here, as in a state of
imperfection. They are subject to the discipline of affliction. The
voice of divine providence, as well as of the word to them, is,
" arise ye, for this is not your rest ; for it is polluted." It is plainly
a doctrine of scripture, that mankind suffer only because they are
sinners. Sickness, pain, disappointments, and the other calamities
of life, are, in innumerabble passages, represented as divine judg
ments, or expressions of God's righteous displeasure against the
wickedness of the world. " When thou with rebukes dosfcopgrect
man for iniquity, thou makest his beauty to consume away^ike a
moth." " There is no soundness in my flesh, because of thine an
ger ; neither is there any rest in my bones, because of my sin."
" For we are consumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath are we
troubled." " Wherefore doth a living man complain, a man for
the punishment of his sins ?" Our blessed Lord was exposed to
suffering, in the capacity of our substitute. Had he not acted in
this character, his life would have been as happy, as it was inno
cent and holy. " The Lord laid upon him the iniquity of us all ;"
and, therefore, he was bruised, tortured, and put to death upon
the accursed tree. His was a peculiar case, unparalleled in the
history of our world ; the result of an expedient of the divine
government to save the guilty, in consistency with the demands of
righteousness, and the maintenance of the honor of God. The
sufferings of no other person are strictly vicarious, or avail to the
removal of the divine anger against transgressors.
With respect to Christians, however distinguished by their at
tainments in piety, afflictions are affirmed to be fatherly chastise
ments, and proofs of the paternal faithfulness of their covenant
28

434 SANCTIFICATION.
God. " If his children forsake my law, and walk not in my judg
ments ; if they break my statutes, and keep not my command
ments ; then will I visit their transgression with the rod, and their
iniquity with stripes. Nevertheless, my loving-kindness will I not
utterly take from him, nor suffer my faithfulness to fail." From
this passage it is plain that believers are never visited with the
•' rod," and with " stripes," except on account of their " transgres
sion" and their " iniquity." " Whom the Lord loveth he chasten-
eth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. If ye endure
chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons ; for what son is he
whom the father chasteneth not ? But if ye be without chastise
ment, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards and not
sons." None of God's children then, in this world, can wholly
escape chastisement ; and the reason is, they all need correction.
" As many as I love," said Christ, " I rebuke and chasten." He
told his disciples, that " in the world" they should have tribula
tion." " We must," said Paul, " through much tribulation enter
into the kingdom of God." " For we that are in this tabernacle
do groan, being burdened." " For they verily for a few days
chastened us, after their own pleasure : but he for our profit, that
we might be partakers of his holiness." The plain doctrine of the
apostle here is, that after believers have become fully partakers of
the divine holiness, the end designed to be answered by God's
chastisement will have been accomplished. The undeniable infer
ence, therefore, is, that then their sufferings will cease. And this
is what we should have reason to expect. Is it credible that a
wise and merciful parent will inflict needless pain on his own chil
dren ? Mr. Mahan himself virtually admits the force of this rea
soning. " The rod," he says, " properly applied, brings the child
into a state in which the rod is no more needed. So of the rod in
the hand%f oumkowjj. heavenly Father. Its object is to render us
partakers of his holiness. Till this end is accomplished, the rod
will be used. When this end is accomplished, it will no longer be
needed."* But we have already seen that all God's people here
are, to a greater or less degree, the subjects of affliction. Will
Mr. Mahan pretend, that they who claim to be perfect, are less
liable than other professors of religion to the common natural evils
of this life ? If not, their claim, according to the principle allowed
by himself, can have no good foundation.
Will it be said, that believers suffer according to general laws ?
Be it so ; but by whom, I ask, were those general laws established,
and were they not formed by their author, in view of all the wants
which would ever take place under their operation ? Besides, who
does not know that the scriptures, in numerous instances, ascribe
all the calamities which befal creatures, to the sovereign appoint
ment and direct agency of that being, on whom are dependent all
the laws of nature, and all the results to which they give birth ?
* Christian Perfection, p. 66.

SANCTIFICATION. 435
A few passages to this effect have already been quoted. It is ap
parent from these, and many other texts, that the hand of God is
as much to be acknowledged in the evils we suffer, as in those
events that are strictly miraculous, and which occur without the
intervention of means or second causes. Since, then, affliction is
ordained on account of sin, the perfectly obedient ought to be as
exempt from affliction as are any of the saints in heaven. Every be
reavement, therefore, that the Perfectionist sustains, every pain he
feels, demonstrates the falseness of his creed. Were he what he
professes to be, this poor, dying world would be a most unsuitable
residence for him ; and he would, without doubt, ascend at once
to join his kindred in the skies, and swell the shouts of their praise.
The entire system of divine providence here proceeds upon the
assumption, that the whole human race are so depraved as to need
perpetual restraints, and the intermingling of painful inflictions
with the attractive influences of mercy.
We have now to show the great practical importance of correct
views of this subject.
Some have said, that, if the doctrine we have maintained be true,
it is not worthy of being contended for, especially at the risk of
peace ; and it has been sometimes intimated, that the contrary
scheme, though erroneous, may excite Christians more powerfully
than the truth would do, to the indefatigable pursuit of holiness.
This notion directly contradicts the Bible. There we learn, that
believers are sanctified through the truth ; and we are urged to
" buy the truth and sell it not." No portion of revealed truth can
be of little consequence ; since we are told, on the best authority,
that " all scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable."
The common doctrine here defended, therefore, provided that it be
scriptural, cannot be of small importance, in its relation to truth
and duty. Nor has it been received as of small importance, by
either its enlightened friends, or its enemies. Great stress was laid
upon it by Augustine and the reformers ; and it has been deemed
of vital moment, by the most distinguished later theologians in our
own country, and in Europe. While it has been held by the or
thodox, it has been strongly opposed by the wildest and most
erratic of the opposers of evangelical doctrines. This fact indi
cates clearly the tendency of the different schemes on this subject.
In every well-instructed and well-balanced mind, the scriptural'
doctrine of the imperfection of good men in this life stands not as an
isolated truth, but as an inseparable part of a system of religious
belief, experience and practice.
The Perfectionist, if consistent with himself, must have different
apprehensions of God, from those which are possessed by the ad
vocates of orthodoxy. Where is the Perfectionist who has clear
and correct views of the universality, definiteness, and immutabi
lity of the divine purposes ? Can an instance be found of such an
one, who does not confound the decrees of God with his com
mands ; thus virtually undermining the stability of the divine go-

436 SANCTIFICATION.
vernment, and taking away the foundation of our confidence, in
the ultimate prevalence of truth and holiness over error and wick
edness ? Besides, as holiness is the same in all beings, he, who
regards himself as perfectly sanctified, must believe that he is, in
proportion to his capacity, as pure and as good as his Creator.
How far below the representations of the Bible must be such a
man's views of the righteousness and moral glory of the adorable
Supreme ?
Perfectionism explains away, or virtually repeals God's holy and
unchangeable law. In some instances, its advocates directly af
firm, that the obligations of the law have been abrogated, with
respect to all believers ; and that Christ has so fulfilled its demands,
that his people are not, in any sense, answerable for their delin
quencies. They are said to cease from their works, and to " roll
the responsibility of their future and eternal obedience upon the
everlasting arm."* In order to maintain the dogma of personal
perfection, it is necessary to make it consist in something far short
of the consummate virtue required in the word of God. Hence
real sins are called weaknesses, frailties, or innocent constitutional
temptations. Concupiscence is reduced to the blameless, though,
when they become excessive, somewhat dangerous cravings of
physical appetite. Supreme self-love is declared to be an essential
characteristic of intelligent moral agency, against which there is
no law ; which is the spring of all virtue as well as of vice, and
to which no more blame can be attached than to the pulsations of
the heart, or the vibrations of a pendulum. Affections, as such,
have no character; they are but the innocent susceptibilities of
our nature, and their most violent workings are innocent, except
so far as they are produced or modified by a previous deliberate
act of the will. In all other cases, they are passive emotions, like
the involuntary impressions made upon the brain by the bodily
senses. It follows, on this principle, that love to God and hatred
of him, are equally indifferent things ; and that they become praise
worthy or criminal, solely in consequence of their connection with
some previous purpose of the mind. It must hence be inferred,
that when God commands us to love him, he does not mean what
he says ; but that he is to be understood as simply requiring us to
do what we can to approve of his character, and yield obedience
to his commands. Thus his law, in his high and spiritual import,
is frittered down to an accommodation to the taste, or moral ina
bility of mankind. Observe the language of Mr. Finney. " It is
objected," says he, " that this doctrine lowers the standard of holi
ness to a level with our own experience. It is not denied that in
some instances this may have been true. Nor can it be denied,
that the standard of Christian perfection has been elevated much
above the demands of the law in its application to human beings
in our present state of existence. It seems to have been forgotten,
* Literary and Theological Review, vol. L, p. 558.

SANCTIFICATION. 437
that the inquiry is, what does the law demand ; not of angels, and
what would be entire sanctification in them ; nor of Adam, pre
viously to the fall, when his powers of body and mind were all in
a state of perfect health ; not what will the law demand of us in
a future state of existence ; not what the law may demand of the
church in some future period of its history on earth, when the
human constitution, by the universal prevalence of correct and
thorough temperance principles, may have acquired its pristine
health and powers ; but the question is, what does the law of God
require of Christians of the present generation ; of Christians in
all respects in our circumstances, with all the ignorance and
debility of body and mind which have resulted from intemperance
and the abuse of the human constitution through so many gene
rations ?"
" The law levels its claims to us as we are, and a just exposition
of it, as I have already said, under all the present circumstances
of our being, is indispensable to a right apprehension of what con
stitutes entire sanctification."*
Perfectionism often and directly leads to the most gross, palpa
ble and blasphemous forms of Antinomianism. It has been con
joined with the horrible notion, that to the Christian all actions are
alike ; that sin in his case ceases to be sin ; that his doings, how
ever perverse, are not his own, but are the works of Jesus Christ
himself, whose will impels his perfect ones in all they think, say and
do. Hence some of the Perfectionists have talked of themselves
as divine ; as incarnations of the Deity, possessing at once the
righteousness, strength and infallibility of the Redeemer. By
many, the utility and necessity of all divine ordinances are denied,
as fit only for the uninstructed and carnal, who have not yet en
tered into their rest. In the writings of even the more sober Per
fectionists of this day, expressions are found which seem to contain
the germ of these extravagant and impious pretensions.
It is scarcely needful to remark, that the belief in Perfectionism
cannot stand in connexion with clear scriptural apprehensions of
the total moral corruption of unregenerate men. Hence, what
ever words the defenders of this scheme have used, they have
universally, so far as we know, denied the essential difference, as
it respects the spring and nature of their exercises, between saints
and impenitent sinners. The governing motive, namely, self-love,
or the desire of happiness, however it may vary in its results, is
represented to be the same in both classes, or, at the most, any
change effected in this respect, is to be attributed simply to the
operation of principles, which, though stimulated perhaps by a
divine influence, are yet common to both. With such philosophy,
to speak of any as totally depraved, is to use words without mean
ing ; or to adopt a phraseology, fitted to bewilder and mislead
those who are incapable of reducing doctrines to their legitimate
* Oberlin Evangelist, vol. ii., p. 50.

438 SANCTIFICATION.
and primary elements. The history of Perfectionism shows, in
deed, that most of its advocates have renounced the use of evan
gelical language on this subject ; and have maintained, either that
men are naturally no more inclined to evil than good, or that a
portion of the divine moral image has been imparted to the whole
human race.
Perfectionism has been commonly, as it is naturally, connected
with a want of reverence for the Bible. Mr. Wesley reproves
those, who infer from the conduct of the apostles, that some are
entirely free from sin in this life, in the following terms : " Will
you argue thus, if two of the apostles once committed sin, then all
other Christians, in all ages, do and must commit sin as long as
they live ? Nay, God forbid that we should thus speak." Again :
" What if the holiest of the ancient Jews did sometimes commit
sin ? We cannot infer from hence that all Christians do and must
commit sin as long as they live."* Thus scripture examples are
made to prove nothing against the doctrine of perfection. Mr.
Mahan contends that the passages in the Old Testament, which
assert the imperfection of good men, ought not to be adduced as
evidence that none under the Gospel are perfectly holy. His
words are, " Whatever is said of the character of saints, under the
old dispensation, cannot be applied to Christians under the new,
unless such application was manifestly intended by the sacred writ
er." Speaking of the declaration in Eccl. viii. 20 he says, " It
was made with reference to men in the state then present, and not
with reference to their condition under an entirely new dispensa
tion."! Thus easily does he dispose of passages which contra
dict his view. Many have supposed the prophets and primi
tive Christians to have been unenlightened and carnal, compared
with themselves. Many Perfectionists have substituted impulses,
or the inward light, for the teaching of the word ; and have
spoken in disparaging terms of the latter, as compared with the
internal illumination, of which they boast. In exemplification of
this remark, we might refer the reader to the votaries of ancient
Quakerism, Shakerism, and Mystics and Quietists of every de
scription. And no wonder, that they who are perfect, undervalue
that volume which condemns their creed, and which was written
by men who confessed themselves to be sinners. What ! the per
fect condescend to be taught by those who are imperfect I It is
absurd in the extreme. Besides, it is natural to suppose, that they
who are perfectly holy, should read the word of God, rather on
the tablet of their own minds, than on the perishing pages of a
book, printed by human hands. It has accordingly been no un
common occurrence, for those who imagined themselves to have
attained to the highest degree of sanctification, to abandon the
reading of the scriptures, and trust to the supposed illapses and
* Wesley's Plain Account of Christian Perfection, pp. 19, 20.
t Mahan on Christian Perfection, p. 67.

SANCTIFICATION. 439
movings of the Spirit within them. And what is this but a spe
cies of infidelity, under the guise of a superior sanctity and devo
tion ? " Search the scriptures," says Jesus Christ, " for in them ye
think ye have eternal • life ; and they are they which testify of
me." We see, then, why it is, that Perfectionism has so generally led
to the wildest enthusiasm. Notwithstanding the warnings of some
of its more intelligent and sober champions,* it has been very ex
tensively connected with confidence in impressions, visions, and
unaccountable voices, to the practical rejection of that word of
truth, light and power, which speaks from heaven. Many of its
disciples have professed to be literally inspired ; and with the pre
text of obeying divine instruction, have committed the most dis
graceful excesses.
It is also the parent and the offspring of monkish austerities, in
asmuch as it readily and almost necessarily attributes the source of
sin to the body, or the animal appetites, which, though not wrong
in themselves, will yet become the certain occasion of transgres
sion, unless they be kept in subjection by the strictest regimen,
and a kind of unceasing penance. Most of the Romish recluses,
who inflicted the severest castigation upon themselves, and endea
voured to drive out sin by voluntary hunger, cold and nakedness,
professed by these means to be seeking, or actually enjoying the
blessing of unstained purity, and unalloyed communion with God.
Some of the Protestant preachers and believers of the doctrine in
our own country, seem to be verging towards the same super
stition ; and to imagine that such abstinence and dietetics as they
inculcate, connected with a general reception of their creed, would,
in the course of a few generations, almost entirely extirpate sin
and its consequences from our world. What less can Mr. Finney
mean when he says, " Is it not true, my brethren, that the mind is,
in this state of existence, dependent upon the physical organization
for all its developments — and that every transgression of physical
law tends strongly to a violation of moral law?" Again : " I am
now fully convinced, that the flesh has more to do with the back
sliding of the church, than either the world or the devil. Every
man has a body, and every man's body, in this age of the world,
is more or less impaired by intemperance of one kind or another.
Almost every person, whether he is aware of it or not, is in a
greater or less degree a dyspeptic, and suffering under some form
of disease arising out of intemperance. And I would humbly ask,
is it understood and proclaimed by ministers, that a person can no
more expect healthy manifestations of mind in a fit of dyspepsia
than in a fit of intoxication ? Is it understood and preached to the
* Wesley's Plain Account, pp. 119, 120, where are some sound and important re
marks on this subject. The Oberlin professors have written against some of these
extravagances, yet they maintain opinions which lead t« the most pernicious enthu
siasm, and their paper, it is said, is read and admired by some of the most fanatical of
the Perfectionists in the western country.

440 SANCTIFICATION.
church, that every violation of the physical laws of the body, as
certainly and as necessarily prevents healthy and holy develop
ments, in proportion to the extent of the infraction of physical law,
as does the use of alcohol ? I am convinced that the temperance
reformation has just begun, and that the total abstinence principle,
in regard to a great many other subjects besides alcohol, must pre
vail before the church can prosper to any considerable extent"*
To such an absurd extreme does this leader of Perfectionism carry
his notions respecting the connexion between the body and the
soul ; and so clearly does he lay down principles of temperance,
which are rather Pythagorean, Gnostical, or Papal, than conform
able to the precepts and maxims of pure Christianity.-
Correct views of this subject are important, on account of their
necessary connexion with the great system of truth and duty re
vealed in the scriptures. A number of errors springing from
Perfectionism, as the waters from a fountain, have already been
noticed. As a general fact, the Perfectionist is a Pelagian in his
views of native depravity, decrees, election, the divine agency in
regeneration, and gratuitous justification ; and he denounces the
doctrines of Paul, according to their plain import, as they are
taught in his epistles to the Romans and the Ephesians, as injurious
to the interests of holiness, and in the highest degree dishonourable
to God. Experience has proved that Perfectionism peculiarly pre
pares the ground, where it is cultivated and flourishes, for an abun
dant crop of infidelity, and the most odious forms of delusion and
imposture. As to the practical fruits of this error, may we not be permitted
to ask, without subjecting ourselves to the imputation of uncharita-
bleness, do we not see enough of them at Oberlin itself, represented
by its admirers as the very focus of all moral light and of holi
ness, to justify the severest crimination? What mean the constant
denunciations against the church, against orthodox and faithful
ministers, and against all who dare to resist the dangerous innova
tions which go forth, like swarms of locusts, from that seat of su
perficial learning, and of bold, reckless speculation ? What mean
the complaints which we hear from the West of the disorganizing
spirit and conduct of the students and preachers from that semi
nary ; the divisions they have created, and sought to create, in
once powerful churches; and the resolutions condemnatory of
their proceedings adopted by ecclesiastical bodies formerly be
lieved to be sufficiently favourable to the extraordinary opinions
and measures, which have characterized the theological revolution
of the last fifteen or twenty years ? What mean the violent acts
of some of the professedly perfect ones, blindfolding, menacing,
and unmercifully beating a youthful offender, accused of attempting
to corrupt one of the female members of the school ; and that, after
* Oberlin Evangelist, as qrtoted in the April number of the Princeton Review pp
243, 244.

SANCTIFICATION. 441
they had themselves deceived him, and seduced his mind by a
feigned correspondence, and other acts of dissimulation, not un
worthy of the disciples of Loyola ? What mean the published apolo
gies for those disgraceful acts, under the eye, and with the sanction
of the fathers of the heresy? What mean the apparent conceit,
arrogance, dogmatism, and radicalism of not a few of the ill-
instructed young men who are sent out from Oberlin to preach
down dead professors of religion, and dead ministers, and ortho
dox creeds and catechisms, and to proselyte the world to the kind
of sanctity taught by the faculty of that institution ? But we for
bear. It is, we are persuaded, but to know Oberlin thoroughly, to
be convinced of the utter falseness of all its pretensions to uncom
mon spiritual mortification and holiness. Perfectionism, indeed,
can never bear a rigid and impartial scrutiny, as to its visible ef
fects, any more than as to the radical principles which produce
them. Its grapes, however beautiful in the eye of the distant or
cursory spectator, are still the grapes of Sodom ; and its clusters
are the clusters of Gomorrah. In proportion to the developments
which are made, new evidence is afforded that this heresy, how
ever diversified or modified by circumstances, is everywhere the
same in its essential features, and in its tendency ; arrayed alike
against evangelical doctrine and order ; fostering fanaticism and
spiritual pride ; and, whether it nominally acknowledge or reject
the ordinances of the Gospel, taking away the grounds which sup
port them, and robbing them of the salutary influence, which in
their legitimate use, they are adapted and designed to exert.
It is time to draw these extended remarks to a close.
Reader ! the progress of this doctrine, the indifference of many
professedly evangelical men with regard to its diffusion, and the
disposition manifested by not a few to apologise for its propaga
tion, are indications most unpropitious to the cause of humble,
meek, spiritual Christianity. Perfectionism, with whatever pro
fessions " of love, tenderness, and devotion," it may be accom
panied, is not the progeny of light, but of darkness ; and as truly
as Universalism or Socinianism, it should be viewed and treated
by ministers and churches as a fundamental error. Tending as it
does to sap the foundations of all true religion and genuine moral
ity, apostasy to it should be regarded as an evidence either of a
peculiar species of monomania, a profound ignorance of the mean
ing of the terms employed, or of the want of that humility, with
out which all pretensions to piety are vain.
Be jealous of any system of mental philosophy, the principles of
which naturally lead to the adoption of this great error, so con
trary to the word of God, and the conscious experience of the
most eminent believers. It is worthy of very serious inquiry (if
indeed there be any room to doubt on the subject), whether some
modern speculations concerning moral agency, and the divine in
fluence in the production of holiness, have not contributed largely

442 SANCTIFICATION.
to the existence and progress of the peculiar form of this error,
which has within the last few years swept like a simoom over
some of the fairest portions of our Zion. Guard with constant
vigilance the citadel of truth at its very vestibule.
Christian reader ! " Be not carried about with divers and strange
doctrines ; for it is a good thing that the heart be established with
grace, not with meats which have not profited them that have been
occupied therein."
This subject urges upon you most impressively the duty of an
humble walk with God. Is it true, that sin mixes with and pol
lutes all your doings — your most disinterested charities, your ho
liest prayers, your most grateful praises ? Is it true, that you will
daily, hourly, every moment, need a fresh pardon, and the aid of
all-conquering grace, till your feet shall stand on the shores of the
celestial Canaan, with the harp of God in your hand and the
wreath of immortality encircling your brows ? The dust then
surely becomes you. There lie and confess your sins, and ac
knowledge the justice of your condemnation, and weep with in
genuous sorrow, and beg for mercy.
Unite with fervent prayer, untiring watchfulness, and diligence.
To this your innumerable inward foes, ever ready for the assault,
seem continually, vehemently, irresistibly, to urge you. In such a
situation, can you sleep? Awake, for the powers of hell are near,
and are eagerly pressing on to circumvent and destroy you.
" Wherefore, take unto you the whole armour of God, that you
may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to
stand." Let not the reality of your continual imperfection be your ex
cuse ; but rather let it excite you to more ardent exertions to reach
the crown of life.
Be satisfied with nothing less than perpetual progress in holiness.
You have but commenced the war ; there remaineth yet much
land to be possessed ; go on from victory to victory, till not an inch
of the promised territory shall continue in possession of the ene
mies of your Lord.
Persevere for a few days, and you will gain the perfect purity
and bliss after which your glowing heart aspires. No sound of
clashing arms, no opposing hosts, are in heaven. Its quietude is
never invaded by anxiety or fear. Its holiness is untarnished as
its pure light, and enduring as its years. Triumphant termination
of conflicts and of wars ! Hasten, then, blessed day, so long de
sired by the holy creation.
Adore the grace and faithfulness of your redeeming God. He
has not only forgiven the sins of your unregenerate days, but he
has borne with your renewed provocations since your conversion
— your ingratitude, your coldness, your worldliness, your self-seek
ing, your manifold abuses of his love. Nor will he leave unfinished
the work which he has begun. He will guide you by his counsel,

SANCTIFICATION. 443
and afterwards receive you to glory. Thus will he keep, bless,
save, all the armies of the ransomed, to the praise of his glorious
grace for ever. What patience, what condescension, what unfaint-
ing, boundless love ! " 0 that men would praise the Lord for his
goodness, for his wonderful works to the children of men."

ESSAY XVIII.
TRANSUBSTANTIATION,*

The title in the margin would seem to import that the Catechism
brought into view, is the work of the Council of Trent ; we are in
formed in the preface by the editor, that this is not the fact ; but it
has received this denomination] from the circumstance that the
fathers of this synod made a decree, that such a work should be pre-
pared,and appointed the persons who were judged fit to undertake
it. A translation of this decree is prefixed to the volume now
under review, in the following words :
" That the faithful may approach the sacraments with greater reverence and
devotion, the Holy Synod commands all bishops not only to explain in a manner
accommodated to the capacity of the receivers, the nature and use of the sacra
ments, when they are to be administered by themselves ; but also to see that every
pastor piously and prudently do the same, in the vernacular language, should it be
necessary and convenient. This exposition is to accord with a form prescribed
by the Holy Synod for the administration of the sacraments, in a Catechism,
which bishops will take care lo have faithfully translated into the vernacular lan
guage, and expounded lo the people by all pastors."
The execution of this work, under the superintendence of the
archbishop of Milan, was committed to four persons, three of whom
were of the episcopal order. When completed it was presented
to Pius the Fifth, and by him handed over for revisal to a congre
gation, over which presided Cardinal Sirtet, who is here character
ised as " profound and judicious." The style, we are informed, was
retouched by the learned Manutius ; or, according to others, re
ceived its last improvement from the classic pen of Bogianus ; and
was speedily translated into the languages of Italy, France, Ger
many, and Poland. It is a book, undoubtedly, on which great
pains were bestowed ; and it has ever been in high esteem with the
Romanists of every class. Whether the English translation here
* Published in 1834, in review of " The Catechism of the Council of Trent. Pub
lished by command of Pope Pius the Fifth ; translated into English, by the Rev. J.
Donovan, Professor, &c, Royal College, Maynooth."

TEANSUBSTANTIATION. 445
presented to the public has been faithfully made from the original,
we have no opportunity of judging, as we have not been able to
lay our hands upon the original work. The only circumstance
which has excited a suspicion that some things have been omitted,
is, that a citation which we have met with in a late author, cannot
be found in this volume. This may, however, be a mere mistake ;
we mean not to bring any charge of unfaithfulness against the edi
tor. Upon a careful perusal of this Catechism, candour constrains
us to acknowledge that it contains more evangelical truth than we
had expected to find ; but at the same time it contains the errors of
Popery, exhibited without disguise. Our object, in this review, is
not to travel over the whole ground of controversy, which would
require volumes, instead of a few pages, but to confine our atten
tion to a single point, namely, the doctrine of transubstantiation.
On many other points, it is a matter of uncertainty, or at least of dis
putation, what the Romanists really do hold ; but here they avow
their belief, and profess to hold all that their opponents have ever
charged upon them. Here, then, the parties are fairly at issue ; and
as this doctrine is considered by them to be fundamental, and as
this single error deeply affects their whole system, it will probably
answer a better purpose to assault this stronghold, than to run over
the long list of errors which have been charged upon that degene
rate church. If we should succeed in demolishing this single error,
it would go far towards the subversion of their whole system.
Our object is to treat this subject calmly and dispassionately, with
out having recourse to ridicule, sarcasm, or declamation ; and
much less to abusive epithets. We are of opinion that a contro
versy with Roman Catholics, as with all other persons, should be
conducted with a spirit of meekness and benevolence. Truth
needs no poisoned weapons for her defence ; truth deprecates such
weapons, because they can be successfully wielded by the advo
cates of error. We feel ourselves bound, however, to strip this
monstrous error bare, and hold it up to the view of all reasonable
and impartial men as an absurdity which never had among men a
parallel. But while we shall endeavour to exhibit this incredible
dogma in it's true features of deformity, we will carefully avoid
using any arguments or illustrations which appear to us fallacious
or sophistical. What we principally fear is, that most of our read
ers will think that we use too many arguments, and dwell too long
in the refutation of an opinion which needs only to be distinctly
proposed to be rejected as an incredible thing. But let it be con
sidered that this error has struck its roots very deep, and is sup
ported by all the influence of superstition, and by the authority of
a power supposed to be infallible. We intend to make no appeal
to those termed fathers ; not because we believe that a fair con
struction of all that they have written would be unfavourable to
our cause, but because we view them to be erring and fallible
men like ourselves, to whose opinions we are under no obligation
to submit. Our appeal is to reason and scripture ; and in the

446 TEANSUBSTANTIATION.
light of these, we hope to make it appear, that the doctrine of
transubstantiation involves so many gross absurdities, that in order
to believe it, a man must first take leave of his reason and common
sense. But let us hear from their own authorized formularies, what their
doctrine is. In the Catechism now under review, we have the fol
lowing explanation :
" The Eucharist becomes a sacrament by the sole consecration of the elements.
In the material elements of which the other sacraments are composed, no change
takes place ; in baptism, for instance, the water, in confirmation the chrism, lose
not in their administration the nature of water and oil, but in the eucharist, that
which before consecration was bread and wine, became after consecration really
and substantially the body and blood of our Lord." — P. 197.
Again :
" The Catholic church firmly believes, and openly professes, that in this sacra
ment, the words of consecration accomplish three things ; First, that the true and
real body of Christ, the same that was born of the Virgin, and is now seated at the
right hand of the Father in heaven, is rendered present in the holy eucharist.
Secondly, that however repugnant it may appear to the dictates of the senses, no
substance of the elements remains in the sacrament. Thirdly, a natural conse
quence from the two preceding, and one which the words of consecration also ex
press, that the accidents which present themselves to the eyes, or other senses,
exist in a wonderful and ineffable manner, without a subject. The accidents of
bread and wine we see, but they inhere in no substance, and exist independent of
any. The substance of the bread and wine is so changed into the body and
blood of our Lord, that they altogether cease to be the substance of bread and
wine."— P. 207.
The decree of the Council of Trent, on this subject, is in the fol
lowing words :
" Since Christ our Redeemer has said, that that was truly his own body which
he offered under the appearance of bread, it has, therefore, always been believed
in the church of God, and it is now again declared by this holy Council, that by
the consecration of the bread and wine, there is effected a conversion of the whole
substance of the bread into the substance of Christ our Lord, and the whole sub
stance of the wine into the substance of his blood, which conversion is fitly
termed by the holy Catholic church, transubstantiation." — Con. Tred. Sess.,
xiii., c. iv.
Again :
" If any one shall deny, that in the most holy sacrament of the eucharist, there
are entertained truly, really, and substantially, the body and blood, together with
the soul and divinity, of our Lord Jesus Christ ; or say that he is in it only as a
sign or figure, or by his influence, let him be anathema.
" If any one shall say, that in the adorable sacrament of the eucharist, the sub
stance of the bread and wine remains, together with the body and blood of our
Lord Jesus Christ [referring to the consubstantiation of the Lutherans], and shall
deny the wonderful and singular conversion of the whole substance of the bread
into his body, and the whole substance of wine into his blood, the appearance only
of bread and wine remaining, which conversion the Catholic church most properly
calls transubstantiation, let him be anathema.

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 447
" If any one shall deny that in the adorable sacrament of the eucharist, a sepa
ration being made, the whole Christ is contained in each element or species, in the
separate parts of each element or species, let him be anathema.
" This conversion, then, is so effectuated, that the whole substance of the bread
and wine is changed, by the power of God, into the whole substance of the body
of Christ, and the whole substance of the wine, into the whole substance of his
blood, and this without any change in our Lord himself; he is neither begotten, nor
changed, nor increased, but remains entirely and substantially the same." — Cat.
Con. Trent., p. 215.
Again:
" Our Lord is not in the sacrament as in a place. The substance of bread is
changed into the substance of Christ, not into magnitude or quality." "As then
the body of our Lord succeeds to the substance, the body of our Lord is contain
ed whole and entire, under the least particle of the bread."
" We have already proved that the body and blood of our Lord are really and
truly contained in the sacrament, therefore, contrary to the physical laws, sub
sist of themselves, inhering in no subject."
The doctrine of the Romanists by which the laity are restricted,
in the participation of the eucharist, to one kind, is also distinctly
stated in the Catechism of the Council of Trent.
" The law of the church restricts its administration under both kinds to any but
the officiating priest, unless by special permission of the church. Christ, it is
true, as has been explained by the Council of Trent, instituted and administered
to his apostles, at his last supper, this great sacrament under both kinds, but it
does not follow of necessity that by doing so he established a law rendering its ad
ministration to the faithful under both kinds imperative."
The reasons assigned for this departure from the example of our
Saviour in the original institutions are, 1. That the scriptures often
speak of it under one kind. 2. This practice is necessary to avoid
accident or indignity. 3. By this means it may always be in
readiness for the sick. 4. There are many who cannot bear the
taste or smell of wine. 5. In many places wine is extremely
scarce. 6. Finally and chiefly, it was so ordered to crush the he
resy, which denied that Christ, whole and entire, is contained under
either species.
The doctrine of the sacrifice and adoration of the mass, is also
explicitly declared.
" The difference between the eucharist as a sacrament and sacrifice, is very
great ; and is two-fold. As a sacrament, it is perfected by consecration ; as a sa
crifice, all its efficacy consists in the oblation. When deposited in a tabernacle
or borne to the sick, it is a sacrament, not a sacrifice. As a sacrament, it is to
the worthy receiver a source of merit ; as a sacrifice, it is not only a source of
merit, but of satisfaction. It is never offered to any but God." — P. 231.
We have now seen what is the avowed doctrine of the Roman
ists, respecting the eucharist ; in other cases they often complain
that their opinions are misrepresented by Protestant writers ; but,
on this point, there is no such charge. They explicitly profess their

448 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
belief in all that has ever been attributed to them. This is one
reason why we have selected this particular dogma for the subject
of our argument : there is here a fair issue joined, and there is no
medium between the absolute truth and falsehood of the opinion
which they hold. In the consecration of the bread and wine in
the eucharist, these material substances are actually and really,
by a stupendous miracle, converted into the flesh and blood of
Christ ; so that they are no longer bread and wine ; although
the sensible properties of bread and wine remain, yet these acci
dents exist without a subject : for what is eaten or drunk is truly
the body of Christ, and the substance of the bread and wine no
longer exists. This is the doctrine, concerning the meaning of
which there is no dispute : nor concerning the name, for the Coun
cil of Trent has declared that it is " properly and fitly " called
" transubstantiation." We now beg the earnest and impartial attention of our readers
to the following observations.
1. It cannot be denied that there is something very extraordina
ry in the doctrine of the Romanists. There is nothing in the Bible
which has the least analogy to it. In all other cases when mira
cles were wrought, the appeal was made to the senses of the peo
ple: but here we are called upon to believe that a miracle is
wrought, when the testimony of the senses is in direct opposition
to the fact. A piece of bread, made out of wheaten flour, lies
upon the table. It is admitted that it is what it appears to be,
bread, and nothing else. But as soon as the priest pronounces the
words " hoc est corpus meum " — this is my body, we are told that
the bread is changed, or transubstantiated, into the body of Christ:
but after the pronunciation of these words, the substance on the
table remains the same, so far as our senses can judge. The ap
pearance is the same to the sight ; the weight is the same, if it be
tried in a balance ; all the chemical properties will be found the
same upon analysis ; the feeling is the same when handled ; and
the smell is the same. It is admitted that there is no sensible
change ; no change of any kind, which we can discern. Now, we
say that there is nothing analogous to this in all the hundred of mi
racles recorded in the Bible. And before it is received as a fact,
there must be strong evidence, indeed, if any evidence can be suf
ficient to produce a rational faith, in direct contradiction to the tes
timony of all the senses.
2. But, if there is such a change of the bread and wine into the
flesh and blood of Christ, why are the properties of the bread and
wine left to impose on our senses ? What reason can be assigned
why the evidence of the miracle, as in all other cases, is not made
manifest? The only reason which we have ever heard assigned
for this very extraordinary and unique case, is, that it serves to in
crease the mystery of the sacrament, and renders the faith which
receives the truth, more mysterious. This, however, is an expla
nation which receives not the least countenance from scripture.

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 449
God never, in any other recorded case, dealt thus with his people ;
but where he works a miracle, he makes it evident to the senses of"
all who are his witnesses ; and why is there a departure from this
rule, here ? If, on the third day after the crucifixion, the body of
Christ had remained in the tomb, an apparently lifeless corpse, and
the disciples had been informed that, notwithstanding this appear
ance of death, he was alive and had left the tomb, as he had pre
dicted, it would be an analogous case. But if we were obliged to
resort to such an invisible miracle ; and not only invisible, but ab
solutely contradicted by the senses of all, what a triumph would
have been afforded to the enemies of Christ I and what a theme for
ridicule and triumph I If such had been the case in regard to the
resurrection of Christ, his religion ^vould never have survived a
single year ; yet it might be said that the mystery would have been
greater, and our faith more meritorious. It is a false principle, that
God creates mysteries to astound his creatures with their incom
prehensible nature, where there is no need of them. All the mys
teries of revelation arise from the nature of the subject, or rather
from the limited capacity of the human intellect. If a miracle is
wrought, why should it not appear to be what it really is ? If that
bread is no longer bread, but flesh, why does it not appear to be
flesh ? This change of substance, while the properties or accidents
remain, has too much the appearance of deception. It is unworthy
of the God of truth thus to deal with his creatures. He gave us
our senses, and so formed us, that we cannot but credit their testi
mony ; and to suppose that he would place us in circumstances in
which we are required to believe that their information is false, is
to subject his creatures to a dilemma in which they must either act
absurdly or wickedly. If we believe our own senses, we must be
of opinion that that substance on the table is still bread ; but ac
cording to the religion of Romanists, thus to believe is a damnable
sin ; for this which appears to be bread, is really the flesh of Christ.
And why, we ask again, are we subjected to this great difficulty ?
Why does not the element manifest its true nature by its proper
ties ? Why does not the miracle appear evidently, as in all other
cases ? To these inquiries no satisfactory answer has been given,
or can be given.
3. This is not all. The thing proposed to our faith seems to
be impossible. Different collections of material elements, forming
bodies of various kinds, are distinguished from each other by their
properties. Flesh has properties which make it flesh ; and the
same is true of bread. Now to assert that flesh has lost all the
properties which constituted it flesh, and possesses all the proper
ties which belong to bread, and yet remains flesh and not bread, is
a contradiction. It is a thing impossible. It is the same as to
say, it ceases to be flesh, and yet is flesh. It has all that which
constitutes bread, and yet is not bread. The notion of properties
subsisting without a subject, is repugnant to common sense, and
involves a manifest contradiction. What is a property or acci-
29

450 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
dent ? It is that which inheres in some subject, and by which it
is what it is ; but to talk of properties without a subject, is abso
lute nonsense. It is an absurdity which never could have gained
footing, except in the dark ages, and under the influence of the
false philosophy of the schoolmen. We know nothing of essence
or substance but by its properties, and when we perceive them to
exist, we are, from the constitution of our nature, obliged to be
lieve that the substance is what these properties manifest it to be.
But here it will be asked, do you deny the power of the Almighty
to uphold accidents where there is no subject ? We answer, that
God is not honoured by attributing to him absurdities and contra
dictions. Omnipotence can perform whatever is an object of
power; but to cause the same. thing to be and not to be, at the
same time, is not a possible or conceivable thing ; so, to create or
uphold properties or accidents without a substance to which they
belong, is impossible, because it involves a contradiction, as will
appear whenever we attentively consider the import of the terms.
For what is a property or accident ? A property, as the word
imports, is that which belongs to something ; but if it belongs to
nothing, it is no property ; and the same is true of every other
term by which qualities are expressed. The very idea of their
self-existence without a subject, is contradictory. This block is
extended, inert and divisible into parts : these are some of its pro
perties, but can there be such properties created without a subject ;
or where the substance is changed, is it possible that the proper
ties can remain unchanged ? We feel mortified to be under the
necessity of arguing such a plain matter of common sense ; but
our adversaries are pertinacious in regard to this very point ; for
unless they can maintain themselves here, the whole fabric of tran
substantiation must fall. We must be indulged, therefore, in some
further illustrations. Matter and spirit are believed to be essenti
ally distinct, because their invariable properties are not only dis
tinct but incompatible. God could easily change one substance
into another, and give to matter the properties of spirit ; but to
make no change in the properties of matter, and yet to make it
spirit, is impossible, because it attributes to the same substance
qualities manifestly incompatible. If this doctrine, however, be
true, the substance of a stone might be changed into an intelligent
mind, and yet the inertness, solidity, and extension of the stone
remain as before. Here is a dark heavy piece of ore ; now, as God
can create worlds without any pre-existing material, so he could
change this opaque body into a sun or star ; but suppose the ques
tion to be, can God transubstantiate this substance into a bright
luminous body, and without sensible weight, while it continued to
possess all its former properties, of being opaque, heavy, &c. ?
Every man of common sense would say, it is impossible for this to
be, because it involves a contradiction. But what if it were made
an article of faith, that this lumpish stone was now changed into a
brilliant star, although, to our senses, it still had all the p roperties

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 451
«
of stone ? Would not every man say, it is absurd to require us to
believe in such a proposition ? He would say, I am sure it is not
so, for I see it to be the very same it was before you say the
change in its substance took place. He takes it in his hand, and
says, that which I thus handle cannot be a star ; a star is a body
of vast magnitude, but this is so small that I can grasp it in my
hand ; a star is a beautiful, luminous body, but this is a dark and
unsightly lump of ore. To which, upon the principles of our op
ponents, it might be replied, you must not, in this case, trust your
senses ; God is able to change the substance of this stone into a
star, and yet all the accidents of the stone may remain as before ;
and as his word declares that such a change has occurred, you
must, on pain of damnation, believe the divine declaration. This
is as precisely analogous to the case of transubstantiation, as any
thing we can imagine. It would not be more unreasonable to
insist (nor half as much so), that the stone which you hold in your
hand is a brilliant star of the first magnitude, as to believe, that
the small wafer of bread which the priest puts in your mouth, is
the whole body of Christ ; and not merely his flesh and blood, but
his " soul and divinity." It would be in vain to allege, that a
small lump of matter could not be a star, because the properties
of the stone might be said to remain, while the substance was
changed ; and although to our senses it appeared to be nothing but
a stone, yet, under these sensible properties, there lay concealed
the substance of a brilliant star. For thus they pertinaciously
insist, that although this wafer has, after consecration, all the pro
perties of bread, and this liquid in the chalice has all the sensible
properties of wine, which it ever had ; yet, by the exertion of
divine power, a great miracle is wrought every time the eucharist
is celebrated, and the bread and wine are converted into the flesh
and blood of the Lord Jesus Christ. True, it is admitted, that we
perceive nothing of flesh ; but we must believe that our senses de
ceive us, and that that which, to our sight and taste and touch and
smell, seems to be a thin cake of wheaten bread, is really the flesh
and blood of the Son of God.
4. The very action which this doctrine of transubstantiation
supposes to be performed by every believing communicant, is one
which is shocking to all the unadulterated feelings of human na
ture. The idea of feasting on human flesh is so abhorrent to our
nature, that most people think they would rather perish with hun
ger, than preserve life by such unnatural food. This natural ab
horrence of devouring our own species has for a long time ren
dered the world exceedingly incredulous about the existence of
cannibalism. To the disgrace of our kind, the proof of the fact has
become now too strong to admit of any further doubt ; but still,
when we read the narrative of the shocking feasts of the NewZea-
landers, it thrills us with horror, and our blood seems to be curdled
in our veins. Now, to suppose that God would ordain, that the
flesh and blood assumed by his own eternal Son, should be eaten

452 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
and drunk daily, and that too as a part of our most solemn wor
ship, is a thing so incredible in itself, that we doubt whether any
evidence that can be conceived is sufficient to render it so proba
ble, that, in opposition to this strong instinctive or natural aversion,
we should receive it as a truth, and as an essential part of the ser
vice which God requires. It is true, our Lord spoke familiarly to
the Jews about eating his flesh and drinking his blood, and de
clared such a manducation of his body as essential to eternal life ;
but he could not have been here speaking of the eucharist, of which
sacrament no intimation had yet been given. And surely Christ could
not have discoursed to the Jews about an ordinance of which
they could not have had the least idea. His words did, however,
contain a prediction of the violent death which he knew he should
die, and by which his body would be broken, and his blood' poured
out. As the Jews called for a sign from heaven, and referred to
the bread which their fathers received in the wilderness, Christ
took occasion to let them know, that the manna, concerning which
they spoke, was a lively type of himself; that he was the true
bread which came down from heaven ; and to teach the necessity
of faith in himself, he insists on the necessity of eating his flesh
and drinking his blood, in order to eternal life. As the manna
kept the people alive only by being eaten, so a participation, by
faith, of his atonement, was necessary to the salvation of men.
Often Christ discoursed to the Jews, who were malignantly watch
ing him, in a highly figurative manner ; sometimes, that he might
lead them on to a conclusion by which they condemned themselves ;
and at other times in just judgment for their perverseness, " that
hearing they might hear and not understand, and seeing they
might see and not perceive." The Jews had no idea of what
Christ meant by eating his flesh and drinking his blood ;. and some
of them understood his words literally ; but they were not agreed
in their interpretations of them, for it is written, " The Jews there
fore strove among themselves saying, how can this man give us
his flesh to eat ?" Our Lord, knowing their true character, gave
them no further explanation, but extended his former declaration,
" Verily, verily, I say unto you, except ye eat the flesh of the Son
of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth
my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life ; and I will raise
him up at the last day." When, however, he perceived that they
were offended with what he had said, as entertaining some gross
and carnal idea of his doctrine, to leave them without excuse, he
intimated to them with sufficient plainness, that his language was
not to be interpreted according to the literal meaning. " It is,"
said he, " the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing ;
the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life."
Now after this lucid exposition of the general import of this dis
course, for any now to insist upon a literal interpretation, of eating
the flesh and drinking the blood of the Son of man, is to be more
blind than the unbelieving Jews ; for it is not probable that any of

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 453
them were so stupid as to suppose, that Christ meant nothing more
by these expressions than a natural manducation of his flesh and
blood ; for they knew the law well enough to understand, that all
drinking of blood was forbidden, and the reason of the prohibition
would apply to human blood with tenfold force. It would be just
as reasonable to suppose, because Christ calls himself a shep
herd, and speaks of his sheep of different folds, that he actually
was engaged in tending a flock of sheep ; yea, that he promised
to sheep literally, a kingdom. Or, that he was really a door, or a
vine ; or that the Holy Spirit, whom he promised to believers, was
" a well of water." There would be more excuse for having re
course to these words, to prove the fact that Christ's body must
be eaten and his blood drunk, if he had not precluded every gloss
of the kind, by asserting that " the flesh profiteth nothing." As
much as to say, if you could literally become partakers of my
flesh, that could not profit you ; and again, " The words I speak
unto you, they are spirit, and they are life." What can this mean,
but this, that his words were to be interpreted spiritually ; and
that under the figure of eating his flesh and blood, he had repre
sented spiritual blessings, connected with eternal life, which would
be procured by his death and sufferings, and be made to nourish
unto eternal life all who would believe in his name ?
5. " The flesh profiteth nothing." There is much in these words
deserving our attention ; and which has a direct bearing on this
subject. The eating of any flesh can have no effect to invigorate
the spiritual life of the soul. Christ's body, although perfectly free
from all the defilements of sin, consisted of particles of matter,
otherwise it would not have been a body ; and his body was de
rived from his mother by the power of the Holy Ghost, by whose
operation it was produced, otherwise it would not have been a
human body. Some heretics of old, and some enthusiasts of mo
dern times, imagined that Christ did not receive his body from his
mother, but that the matter of which it consisted was celestial, and
passed through the womb of Mary, as water through a tube ; but
all such opinions have ever been rejected by every branch of the
catholic church, and by the Romanists as well as others. Now,
the body of Christ being material, his flesh formed and configurated
like the flesh of other human bodies, and his blood also material
and of the same qualities as the blood of other men, except that
his whole body was uncontaminated with the stain of original or
actual sin ; it plainly follows that, however the flesh of such a body
might, upon the principles of nutrition, invigorate or sustain the
life of the body, it could not possibly, by being carnally eaten, pro
mote the health and purity of the immortal soul. If a man should
eat nothing else but the flesh of Christ, and drink nothing else but
his blood all his life, it would never improve the moral qualities of
the immortal soul. The argument which our Lord uses so forci
bly, to prove that that which enters into a man's stomach cannot
defile his soul, is founded on the same principle as the one which

454 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
we are now using. Material causes cannot directly affect the
mind, either to purify or defile it. We cannot see, therefore, that
the mere eating of the flesh of Christ's body, and drinking his ma
terial blood, could in itself, ex opere operato, have any more effect
to produce or increase spiritual life, than the flesh and blood of any
other person. We do not deny, however, that God can institute a
connexion between external acts and the communication of his
grace ; and if he had made eating Christ's flesh a means of grace,
or the channel through which he communicated spiritual life, this
act would stand precisely on the same footing with other ordi
nances ; the efficacy of which depends, not on the act performed,
but on the blessing of God, which can give efficacy to that which
has none in itself. But is it probable, is it credible, that God
would ever institute such an ordinance as this, by which we are
bound, on the pain of the loss of salvation, to devour the flesh of
the Son of God ?
6. Another view of this subject, connected with what has been
said, is, if the bread is converted into the flesh of Christ, and is
eaten, and enters through the oesophagus into the stomach, and is
there subjected to the process of digestion, it is a matter of real
and serious difficulty to know what becomes of it. By a miracle
it may immediately be carried away before the process of diges
tion commences, but then it may be asked, what good is effected
by eating it ? Or it may be digested like other food, and assimi
lated into the body of the participant ; but then the body of every
believing communicant would contain as a constituent part of it
self the whole body and blood ; yea, the soul and-divinity of the
Son of God. This would be incorporating Christ with his disci
ples, not by a spiritual and mystical union, but by a gross corporeal
and physical union. The remaining alternative, which is, that the
body of Christ received into the stomach turns, with other parts of
unassimilated food, to corruption, presents an idea so gross, and
indeed blasphemous, that we are sure no one would ever think of
entertaining it. Now, it may be said in reply, that this is curiously
to pry into mysteries which are inscrutable, and that all observa
tions of the kind here made are impious. If so, the whole blame
must rest on the doctrine of transubstantiation ; for this alone lays
the foundation of such remarks. The consequence is inevitable
and undeniable, that if the real fleshly body of Christ is taken into
the stomach by eating, it must be disposed of in some way. Let
the Romanist tell us how — or we will give him a choice of every
conceivable hypothesis. Is there anything profane in drawing
from an asserted fact, consequences so palpable ? We say again,
if there is, the fault is not in the inference, but in the principle
from which it is derived.
We are aware that the advocate of transubstantiation will an
swer to all these reasonings, that the doctrine is explicitly taught
in the Gospel, and what God has said must be true, however much
it may be opposed to our sense and reason. It is, however, a rea-

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 455
sonable inquiry, whether the ground assumed for the proof of tran
substantiation does not go far to destroy all external evidence of
divine revelation. This view of the subject is so forcibly given
by Archbishop Tillotson, in his admirable sermon " On Transub
stantiation," that we will cite a few paragraphs on this point.
1. " I shall only ask," says the venerable prelate, " whether any
man has, or ever had, greater evidence of the truth of any divine
revelation, than every man hath of the falsehood of transubstan
tiation ? Infidelity were hardly possible to men, if all men had
the same evidence for the Christian religion which they have
against transubstantiation; that is, the clear and irresistible evi
dence of sense. He that can once be brought to contradict or deny
his senses, is at an end of certainty ; for what can a man be certain
of, if he be not certain of what he sees ? In some circumstances
our senses may deceive us, but no faculty deceives us so little, and
so seldom ; and when our senses do deceive us, even that error is
not to be corrected without the help of our senses.
2. " Supposing this doctrine had been delivered in scripture, in
the very same words that it is decreed in the Council of Trent, by
what clearer evidence, or stronger argument, could any man prove
to me that such words were in the Bible, than I can prove to him
that bread and wine are bread and wine still ? He could but
appeal to my eyes, to prove such words to be in the Bible ; and,
with the same reason and justice, might I appeal to several of his
senses to prove to him that the bread and wine, after consecration,
are bread and wine still.
3. " Whether it be reasonable to imagine that God should make
that a part of the Christian religion, which shakes the main exter
nal evidence and confirmation of the whole ? I mean the miracles
which were wrought by our Saviour, and his apostles, the assur
ance whereof did at the first depend on the certainty of sense.
For, if the senses of those who say they saw them, were deceived,
then there might be no miracles wrought ; and, consequently, it
may justly be doubted whether that kind of confirmation which
God hath given to the Christian religion, would be strong enough
to prove it, supposing transubstantiation to be a part of it ; because
every man hath as great evidence that transubstantiation is false,
as he hath that the Christian religion is true. Suppose, then, tran
substantiation to be a part of the Christian religion, it must have
the same confirmation with the whole, and that is miracles ; but of
all doctrines in the world, it is peculiarly incapable of being proved
by a miracle. For if a miracle were wrought for the proof of it,
the very same assurance that any man hath of the truth of the
miracle, he hath of the falsehood of the doctrine ; that is, the clear
evidences of his senses. For that there is a miracle wrought to
prove that what he sees in the sacrament, is not bread, but the body
of Christ, there is only the evidence of sense ; and there is the
very same evidence to prove, that what he sees in the sacrament
is not the body of Christ, but bread. So that there would arise a

456 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
new controversy, whether a man should rather believe in his senses
giving testimony against the doctrine of transubstantiation, or bear
ing witness to a miracle wrought to confirm that doctrine, there
being the very same evidence against the truth of the doctrine,
which there is for the truth of the miracle."
But let us come now to the examination of the scriptural evi
dence, on which this doctrine is supposed to be founded ; and it is
all included in one short sentence ; the words of Christ, where he
says, " this is my body." Other texts, indeed, are brought in as
auxiliaries, but the stress is laid upon this simple declaration. If
this can be set aside, all the others will fall of course. Now, let it
be well observed, that our Lord says not a word about the tran
substantiation of the bread. He never intimates that he was
about to work a stupendous miracle, by changing the bread into
his own body, of which we might have expeeted that he would
have given some more explicit information. But having taken the
Jewish passover with his disciples, after this supper was ended,
he took in his hand a piece of the unleavened cake or loaf, which
was used on this occasion, and said, " this," that is, this bread, " is
my body ;" and having broken it and blessed it, he gave it to his
disciples and said, " take, eat, this is my body ; and he took the
cup and gave thanks, and gave it to them and said, drink ye all of
it ; for this is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for
many for the remission of sins." By Luke it is added after the
words, " this is my body," " which is given for you, this do in
remembrance of me." Likewise, also, the cup after supper, say
ing, " this cup is the New Testament in my blood, which is shed
for you." The account of this transaction, as revealed to Paul,
and by him delivered to the Corinthian church, accords fully with
the narrative of the evangelists, " That the Lord Jesus, the same
night in which he was betrayed, took bread, and when he had
given thanks, he brake it, and said, this is my body, which is
broken for you ; this do in remembrance of me. After the same
manner, also, he took the cup when he had supped, saying, this
cup is the New Testament in my blood ; this do ye as oft as ye
drink it, in remembrance of me." It is undeniable, from all these
accounts, that Christ does call the bread his body, and the wine his
blood ; the only question is, in what sense are these words to be
understood, literally or figuratively ? Did the Lord Jesus intend
that his disciples should believe that the piece of bread contained
literally his own flesh and blood ? It is admitted, that when he
took it up, it was nothing else but bread ; but it is alleged, that at
the instant when he said, " this is my body," the substance was
changed, and it was no longer bread, but the flesh of our Lord.
Now, the mode of speaking by no means corresponds with this
idea. " This is my body," does not convey the meaning, that now
I change, or transubstantiate this bread into my body. But pass
ing this, we would remark, that if the bread was thus converted
into the body of Christ ; and if, as the Catechism teaches, the

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 457
whole body and blood was contained in this one piece of bread,
then there existed at one and the same time two complete bodies
of Christ ; the one the visible living body, for no one will pretend
that this did not continue still to be the body of Christ after the
consecration. Here then is mystery upon mystery ; one Christ
stands, or sits, with a complete living body at the table, and holds
in his hand another complete body of Christ ; and when the wine
was changed also, as each of the species contains the whole body
complete, there must have been three complete bodies of Christ,
two of which were eaten by the disciples, but the living visible
body was not eaten ; and if Christ partook of the elements which
he distributed, as seems to be reasonable to suppose, then he ate
his own body, and drank his own blood. We resolved, on enter
ing on this subject, to avoid all ridicule ; and yet we are apprehen
sive that the bare statement of these things presents a case so
truly ludicrous, that we shall be accused of resorting to this un
suitable weapon. We must, however, for the sake of truth,
exhibit the doctrine of transubstantiation with all its legitimate
absurdities. If some of these are monstrous or ludicrous, it is not
our fault ; the blame lies with the doctrine itself, as was before said.
But if these words, " this is my body," must be taken literally,
to signify the flesh of Christ, surely, all the other expressions in the
same passage, and in relation to the same sacrement, must be
interpreted in the same way. Then, when Christ says " this cup,"
or chalice, as they prefer to call it, " is the New Testament," or
New Covenant, " in my blood," we should understand that the
vessel in his hand, which contained the wine, was " a testament,"
or covenant. This, however, is so manifestly absurd, that all will
be ready to say, that he meant the wine in the cup, and not the
vessel ; but even here we have an expression which cannot be
taken literally ; the wine, before or after consecration, can no more
be a testament or covenant, than the chalice can be such. Our
only reason for bringing forward these absurd interpretations, is
to show to what consequences the principle of interpretation which
Romanists wish to establish, will lead, even in the explication of
the same passage. But this is not the whole, nor the chief objec
tion to this interpretation. Our Lord says, " this is my body which
is broken for you — this is my blood which is shed for you." Now,
if the word " body " must mean Christ's real flesh, then it must be
admitted that the word " broken " must also be so taken ; and it
will follow, that Christ's body was already crucified, and his blood
poured out for the remission of sins. In fact, therefore, his body
was broken and slain before he was fastened to the cross. As the
eucharist is a real sacrifice, and there could be no sacrifice with
out the death of the victim, it is clear that Christ must have been
put to death at this time ; and his words, taken literally, express
this fact ; for he says, " this is my body which is broken for you —
this is my blood which is shed for you." But he was still alive,
and his visible and animated body was not broken, and his blood

458 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
was not yet shed ; therefore his body was at the same time dead
and alive, or rather, that body now produced from the bread was
a dead and broken body ; while the former body was alive and
sound. But perhaps this idea of a plurality of bodies will be re
jected, as no legitimate consequence from the doctrine of transub
stantiation ; and it will be alleged, that when the bread and wine
are converted into the body and blood of Christ, they are not
formed into a separate body, but changed into the same identical
body, which before existed, and was born of the Virgin Mary. We
are perfectly willing, so far as our argument is concerned, that this
should be considered the hypothesis of the advocates of this doc
trine. Let it be remembered, then, that at the moment when the
change took place in the bread and wine, the body of Christ ex
isted, complete in all its parts ; then if these elements were trans
muted into the already existing body, it must have been by substi
tution or addition, that is, the former body must have been removed
or annihilated, and this new body, recently formed, must have
assumed its place ; or the former body continuing to exist without
change, the new body must have been added to it. The idea of the
annihilation or removal of the body, before existing, will be ad
mitted by none ; therefore, the alternative must be adopted. The
bread and wine, then, when transubstantiated, passed into the living
body of Christ, and became identified with it. To his body received
at his incarnation, then, there was now added another recently
formed of the bread and wine in the sacrament. But if his original
body was perfect in all its parts, where was there room for such
an addition ; or what conceivable benefit could arise from such an
increase ? When this change took place, either the weight of
Christ's body, and the quantity of his blood was increased, or it
was not. If the former, what special purpose could such an en
largement answer ? It could certainly add nothing to the efficacy
of his sacrifice ; but if the body of Christ was not increased in
bulk or weight, by this change, how can it be supposed that any
addition of a corporeal kind was made to it ? There is here ano
ther difficulty. The disciples ate the bread which had just been
converted into the body of Christ ; but if it had immediately be
come a constituent part of Christ's living body, how could they eat
it ? Did they eat the living flesh of Christ's" body, and drink the
warm blood which was then flowing through his arteries and
veins ? But this is not all ; it is asserted in the Catechism now
under review, that the body of Christ, of which believers partake
in the eucharist, is " the same that was born of the Virgin." Now
to us this appears to be a palpable absurdity, a contradiction as
clear as can be expressed in words. It is to assert, that that which
was not a fact is made to be a fact ; that a substance which was
ent rely distinct and separate from the Virgin Mary, was that very
body which' was born of her. The bread and wine before conse
cration, no one will pretend, was the body of Mary ; when the
substance of the bread and wine is changed into the body and

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 459
blood of Christ, that act of power by which it is changed, cannot
possibly make this to be the identical body born of the Virgin. It
would be just as reasonable to assert that God, by an act of omni
potence, coula make the child just born to be Adam the first of
men. Such suppositions are a disgrace to rational beings ; the ten
dency of them is to obscure and unsettle all our firmest and clearest
perceptions of truth. According to this philosophy, God might
cause that which does exist, never to have existed ; and the being
which may be brought into existence hereafter, to have had an
existence from the beginning of the world. It is only necessary
to state such monstrous absurdities ; their falsehood cannot be
rendered more evident by reasoning ; for there is nothing with
which we can compare them, which could render their falsehood
more manifest. To make a substance which, it is acknowledged,
formed no part of the body born of the Virgin Mary, to be that
identical body, is certainly one of the greatest absurdities of the
doctrine of transubstantiation, so fruitful of absurdities ; and it is
not an inference of ours, but is explicitly avowed in this authorized
formulary. Having exhibited some of the difficulties and absurdities of the
doctrine of transubstantiation, by considering the circumstances
which attended the first institution of the sacrament, these will not
be diminished by extending our views to the celebration of the
eucharist by the priests of the Romish church. Here we find the
doctrine of the mass, with all the superstitions anl idolatries which
accompany it.
The doctrine of the catechism of the Council of Trent, as it is
called, not only asserts that the body of Christ in the eucharist is
the same as that which was born of the Virgin, but the same as
that now glorified in heaven. The apostle Paul, indeed, declares
that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven."
Christ's body, before entering into heaven, underwent a glorious
transformation, to fit it for the heavenly state. There it appears
now resplendent with ineffable glory. It is no longer a body of
gross particles of flesh and blood, for such a body, though suited to
his condition and work upon earth, would be entirely incongruous
with the heavenly state. Now that celestial and glorious body is
complete, and can neither receive any addition nor diminution. Al
though, then, bread and wine may by Omnipotence be changed into
flesh and blood, and this flesh and blood may be received into the
mouths and stomachs of communicants ; yet it cannot be that this
flesh and blood should be the identical body of Christ, which is
now enthroned in glory. It cannot be, that that heavenly body
should be eaten every time the eucharist is celebrated. The idea
is so shocking, as well as absurd, that we know not how it could
ever have been received by any man in his senses. If the merit
of faith rises in proportion to the difficulty and impossibility of the
thing to be believed, then is there nothing more meritorious than
the faith of Roman Catholics on this point. A hundred thousand

460 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
priests throughout the world often celebrate the eucharist at the
same hour. In every one of these instances, if the priest only
have a right intention, the body of Christ, even his body now glo
rified in heaven, is produced by the repetition of the form of con
secration, " this is my body." Now how this glorified body of the
Saviour can be present in a hundred thousand different places at
one and the same time, and yet remain complete and unmutilated
on the throne of glory in heaven, is a thing not easy to be believed.
The Lutherans who adopted the opinion that there was no change
of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, yet main
tained that the real body and blood of Christ were present with
these elements, and were received by every communicant, whether
in the exercise of faith or not. And when urged in controversy
with the reformed, with the consequence, that this rendered it ne
cessary that the body of Christ should exist everywhere, they ad
mitted the inference, and held the ubiquity of Christ's body ; but
this was to attribute to a finite and created nature one of the attri
butes of Deity ; therefore, they adopted the absurd opinion that, in
consequence of the hypostatical union, divine attributes were actu
ally communicated to the human nature of Christ. But another
stubborn difficulty attended this hypothesis. It is the property of
all bodies to exclude all other bodies from the space which they
occupy ; hence, if ubiquity be ascribed to Christ's body, it will ex
clude all other bodies from the universe. There was no method
of obviating this objection, but by giving a new definition of a
body ; and here was opened a field for abstruse speculation which
occupied the learning and labours of men of the first order of in
tellect ; and when they had completed their theory, it was impos
sible to say what was essential to body, or in what respect they
who held a bodily presence of Christ differed from those who
maintained that he was really but spiritually present.
How far the Lutherans still adhere to the old doctrine, we can
not certainly say, but we are inclined to believe, that the doctrine
of consubstantiation, or impanation, as some of their theologians
choose to express it, is not at present held with a very firm grasp
by the existing Lutheran church ; and yet they will not be forward
to renounce a dogma to which Luther clung with invincible perti
nacity, and which was originally the only point of distinction be
tween the followers of the German and" Swiss reformer. The
doctrine of the ubiquity, or omnipresence of Christ's body, seems
to follow as certainly from the Roman Catholic as the Lutheran
doctrine ; but, as far as we know, this consequence has never been
admitted by Popish writers ; they have even impugned with se
verity the absurd doctrine of ubiquity. They resort to another
principle of explanation, which is, that Christ by his divine power
can render his body present whenever and wherever the eucharist
is celebrated ; but, while they shun one absurdity, they fall into
another fully as incredible. For though they do not believe in the
omnipresence of the body of Christ, yet they are forced to admit

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 461
that it may exist in many different and distant places at one and
the same time. It exists in heaven and upon earth at once, and in
as many places on earth as the mass is celebrated. It becomes
necessary, therefore, for them as well as the Lutherans to resort to
subtle and abstruse definitions and distinctions, in regard to matter
and space, to free their doctrine from absurdity ; and just so far as
they succeed in clearing away the difficulties from the subject, it
is by removing the idea of the palpable presence of solid resisting
matter, and giving such views as render it difficult to understand
what they mean by bodily presence ; or to see how it differs from
the real, spiritual presence maintained by Calvin and his followers.
The doctrine of transubstantiation, absurd as it is, is not in itself
so dangerous and impious as the sacrifice of the mass which natu
rally comes out of it. The inference is fairly deduced that if the
bread and wine, after consecration, be the real body and blood
of Christ ; and if his soul and divinity, as they teach, be also pre
sent in these elements ; then are they proper objects of worship.
Accordingly, they are elevated in imitation of Christ's being lifted
up on the cross, and they are carried in procession that all the
people may worship them. But if this be the real body of Christ,
broken for us, then as often as it is created it may be offered as an
expiatory sacrifice to God for the living and the dead ; and as this
oblation of Christ is the most important part of the whole transac
tion, it is often repeated when there is no participation of the con
secrated elements by the people ; and thus private masses are
encouraged and performed, especially for the relief of those who
are supposed to be suffering the pains of purgatory.
That we may exhibit fairly this doctrine of the mass, we will
give some account of it from works of acknowledged authority
among the Romanists. Dr. Challoner, in his Catholic Christian
Instructed, p. 74, c. vi., asks :
" What do you mean by the mass ?" and among other things answers, " The
mass consists in the consecration of the bread and wine into the body and blood
of Christ, and the offering up of the same body and blood to God by the ministry
of the priests, for a perpetual memorial of Christ's sacrifice upon the cross, and
a continuation of the same to the end of the world.
' ' Is the mass properly a sacrifice ? Yes, it is.
" What do you mean by a sacrifice ? A sacrifice, properly so called, is an
oblation or offering of some sensible thing, made to God by a lawful minister.
" How then is the mass a sacrifice ? Because it is an oblation of the body and
blood of Jesus Christ, offered, under the outward and sensible signs of bread and
wine, to God, by the ministry of the priests of the church, lawfully consecrated
and empowered by Christ ; and this oblation is accompanied with a real change
and destruction of the bread and wine, by the conversion of them into the body
and blood of Christ, &c.
" Is the sacrifice of the cross and that of the eucharist the same sacrifice, or
two distinct sacrifices ?
" It is the same sacrifice : because the victim is the self-same Jesus Christ ; it
was He that offered himself upon the cross ; it is He that offers himself upon the
altar. The only difference is in the manner of the offering ; because, in the sa
crifice of the cross, Christ really died, and therefore that was a bloody sacrifice ;

462 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
in the sacrifice of the altar he only dies mystically, inasmuch as his death is re
presented in the consecrating apart the bread and wine, to denote the shedding of
his sacred blood from his body, at the time of his death."
Now this whole doctrine of the mass is without the slightest
evidence from the New Testament. There is, in fact, under this
dispensation no other priest but .Christ: no other is ever men
tioned ; and the ministers, teachers, and governors of the church
are not invested with any sacerdotal office.
This notion of a repeated oblation of the body and blood of
Christ is not only unauthorized by scripture, but is in direct vio
lation of what Paul testifies in the epistle to the Hebrews, " For
by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified."
" Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high-priest
entereth into the holy place every year with blood of others ; for
then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world ;
but now once in the end of the world, hath he appeared to put
away sin by the sacrifice of himself." " Who needeth not daily,
as those high priests to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins, and
then for the people's ; for this he did once, when he offered up him
self." " So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many."
" By the which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the
body of Jesus Christ once for all."
Now what Dr. Challoner says, in answer to the arguments of
such texts, is nothing to the purpose. He alleges that Christ's of
fering on the cross is not injured by his prayers and intercessions
continually offered up ; which is true, but wide of the mark. ' It
furnishes no proof that there was need for his body and blood to
be offered up often. Again : he says, " Though the price of our
redemption was to be paid but once, yet the fruit of it was to be
daily applied to our souls, by those means of grace which Christ
has left in his church, that is, by his sacraments and sacrifice."
All this is very correct, except the "last word, which stands directly
opposed to all Paul's declarations, that the offering of Christ was
made but once. The application of the merits of Christ's sacri
fice does not require that it should be continually renewed. This
renders his sacrifice on the cross insufficient, like the sacrifice of
the priests under the Levitical law ; for if the one sacrifice was
complete and satisfactory, why repeat the oblation continually ?
He speaks of this, as an " unbloody sacrifice ;" but how is it un
bloody, when the real blood of Christ is on the altar, as much as it
was on the cross ? This doctrine of the mass is, therefore, unscrip-
tural, and highly derogatory to the one sacrifice of Christ ; be
sides which the scriptures of the New Testament acknowledge no
other ; for if other expiatory oblations are requisite, call them
bloody or unbloody, then was this offering of Christ imperfect.
All that this author says in favour of such a repetition of the sacri
fice of Christ is irrelevant ; and, if admitted, does not prove the
ruth of the doctrine which he maintains.
t

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 463
The doctrine of the mass, as laid down in the Catechism under
review, is,
" That the holy sacrifice of the mass is not only a sacrifice of praise and
thanksgiving, or a commemoration of the sacrifice of the cross ; but also a sacri
fice of propitiation, by which God is appeased and rendered propitious."
" If, therefore, with pure hearts and a lively faith, and with a sincere sor
row for past transgressions, we offer in sacrifice this most holy victim, we shall,
no doubt, receive from the Lord, ' mercy and grace' in seasonable aid. So ac
ceptable to God is the sweet odour of this sacrifice, that through its oblation he
pardons our sins, bestowing on us the gifts of grace and repentance." " Its bene
fits extend not only to the communicant, but also to all the faithful, whether liv
ing or numbered among those who have died in the Lord."
Transubstantiation is not merely chargeable with bringing
Christianity into disgrace by its palpable absurdities, but has given
rise to gross idolatry. No sooner has the officiating priest pro
nounced the words of consecration over the bread, than it be
comes, as the body of Christ, an object of worship, just as truly
as if Christ should descend from heaven and appear before us in
all the glory of his exaltation. But here we are met by a perplex
ing difficulty, which no ingenuity can resolve. It is admitted that
no change takes place in the bread unless the priest consecrates
with a right intention, and unless he is a regularly ordained minis
ter. Before the people worship the host, as it is called, there should
be some method of ascertaining whether indeed the bread had
been actually converted into the body and blood of Christ ; for if,
on either of the accounts mentioned, the transubstantiation should
not have taken place, they are offering their supreme worship to a
piece of bread. As we cannot know the hearts of priests,- and as
we cannot tell there may not have been some canonical defect in
their succession or inordination, we never, in any case, can be sure
that we are not guilty of idolatry. Nothing can be learned from
an examination of the elements ; for these remain the same, so far
as our senses can judge, whether the miraculous conversion takes
place or not. The wafer, as soon as consecrated, becomes a pro
per object of worship ; and, as has been before mentioned, is
carried about with much pomp and ceremony, elevated on high,
that all the people may get a sight of it, and join in the worship ;
and, in countries completely under Popish dominion, all are forced
to kneel down in token of adoration, as the pageant passes.
Moreover, the consecrated wafer, whether used or not, is the
real body of Christ, and may be laid up in a pyxis or box, to be
adored, or to be eaten, as the case may be. Now suppose it should
become mouldy, or should be devoured by mice, or worms, what
are we to think ? Or suppose before consecration arsenic should
accidentally, or by design, be mixed with the flour of which the
bread is made, and should, be consecrated as a constituent part of
the bread, does that also become a part of the body of our Lord ?
Or would this bread, after being changed into the flesh and blood
of the Lord Jesus, affect the health of the communicant? If it be
said, that the accidents or sensible qualities do not belong to the

464 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
body of Christ, then is there no use in eating the bread or drinking
the wine ; for in the process of manducation or digestion, nothing
else but these accidents or sensible qualities comes at all in contact
with the body. We cannot feel, or taste, or chew, or swallow, that
which has no solidity, no taste, no material quality whatever. If
then these sensible properties are not the properties of the body
of Christ, then the communicant cannot be said to eat his flesh and
drink his blood ; for that which he sees is no visible part of the
body of Christ, that which he feels is no palpable part of that body ;
so, likewise, that which he tastes and smells is not Christ's body :
for these sensible qualities exist without any subject. But as eat
ing and drinking are corporeal acts, they can only be exercised on
that which has material qualities ; that is, the food which is eaten
must have some solidity or extension, for if these accidents are
taken away from a substance, it can no more be eaten than an im
material spirit can be eaten. Upon the admitted theory of the
Roman Catholic, Christ's body, after all, is not eaten ; but only
those properties, which, though real, have no subsistence. In fact,
the partaker of the eucharist, according to the hypothesis of Ro
manists, cannot be said to eat the bread or the body of Christ ; for
he cannot properly be said to eat mere accidents or qualities, with
out a substance ; nor is it possible to conceive that a body which
has no material qualities can be eaten.
Mr. M'Gavin, in his " Protestant," tells a pleasant, and not inap
propriate story.
" A Protestant lady entered the matrimonial state with a Ro
man Catholic gentleman, on condition he should never use any at
tempts to induce her to embrace his religion. He employed the
Romish priest, however, who often visited the family, to use his in
fluence to instil his notions into her mind ; but she remained un
moved, particularly on the doctrine of transubstantiation. At
length the husband fell ill, and during his affliction was recom
mended by the priest to receive the holy sacrament. The wife
was requested to prepare the bread and wine for the solemnity ;
she did so, and on presenting them to the priest, said, ' This, sir,
you wish me to understand, will be changed into the real body and
blood of Christ, after you have consecrated them.' ' Most certain
ly,' he replied. ' Then, sir,' she rejoined, ' it will not be possible
for them to do any harm to the worthy partakers ; for, says our
Lord, " my flesh is meat indeed and my blood is drink indeed,"
and, " he that eateth me shall live by me.'" ' Assuredly,' answered
the priest, ' they can do no harm to the worthy receivers, but must
communicate good.' The ceremony was proceeded in, and the
bread and wine were consecrated ; the priest was about to take
and eat the bread ; but the lady begged pardon for interrupting
him and said, ' I mixed a little arsenic with the bread, sir, but as it
is now changed into the real body of Christ, it cannot of course do
you any harm.' The faith of the priest was not strong enough to
induce him to eat it. Confused, ashamed, and irritated, he left the

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 465
house, and never more ventured to enforce on the lady the absurd
doctrine of transubstantiation.' Whether this anecdote be literally
true," says Mr. M'Gavin, " is of little importance to the argument.
It may be said very fairly to put any Papist to the test as to his
belief of transubstantiation. If the priest's pronouncing the words
of consecration should have the power of expelling the arsenic, as
well as the flour and water, from the consecrated wafer, I will ac
knowledge a miracle."
We presume that the advocates of transubstantiation would say,
in reply to the above, that notwithstanding that the substance of
the bread is changed into the real body of Christ, the accidents or
sensible properties remain precisely what they were before con
secration ; and, therefore, the wafer not only retains the appear
ance, smell, and taste of bread, but also the nourishing qualities of
wheaten bread. And so of the wine ; no one, we presume, would
pretend that a large quantity of strong wine, after consecration,
would not intoxicate. Its being mixed with water, is doubtless in
tended to guard against any effect of this kind. And so they would ad
mit, we suppose, that arsenic in the wafer would retain its poisonous
quality ; and, therefore, if a priest, or any other communicant,
should be actually deprived of life by such a wafer, it would not
prove that the substance is not converted into the body of Christ.
We do not know how else this case could be disposed of. But
still the explanation does not remove the difficulty. We would
like to see a logical answer to the following plain syllogism :
That which has no substance cannot injure any one :
But the transubstantiated bread has no substance as bread,
Therefore, the bread when consecrated, though filled with arsenic, cannot
hurt any one.
Or the following,
Mere accidents or properties which have no substance, cannot operate
efficiently on the body,
But the sensible qualities of the bread, after consecration, exist without any
subject. Ergo.
Now the only possible escape from this conclusion must be by
denying that these accidents of bread and wine can affect the body,
which they will not assert ; or that that which has no existence as
a body, can, nevertheless, operate as a body, and produce effects
on the body to nourish, to intoxicate, or to pain. Let the Romanist
extricate himself if he can from this dilemma. To us it appears
impossible. And this comes of holding that accidents may exist
without a subject.
Now, after an impartial view of all the difficulties and absurdi
ties which cluster round this strange doctrine, we cannot but won
der that multitudes should be found to hold to it, or think that they
believe it ; for we are fully persuaded, that in most cases the true
nature of the proposition to be believed is not brought distinctly
30

466 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
before the mind. The imagination, under the influence of su
perstitious dread, overpowers the dictates of reason, and, in
deed, all nice scrutiny into the subject is discouraged and for
bidden ; and even the priests are cautioned against attempts at
explanation. The language of the Catechism under review is, " to
explain this mystery in a proper manner is extremely difficult.
On the manner of this admirable conversion, the pastor, however,
will endeavour to instruct those who are more advanced in the
knowledge and contemplation of divine things : those who are yet
weak may, it were to be apprehended, be overwhelmed by its
greatness. This conversion is so effectuated, that the whole sub
stance of the bread and wine is changed by the power of God, into
the whole substance of the body of Christ, and this without any
change in our Lord himself." No wonder that apprehensions
should be entertained that such a doctrine might overwhelm the
mind of the noviciate. Bread and wine are changed into the real
body of Christ, and yet his body undergoes no change whatever I
Again : " But according to the admonition so frequently repeated
by the Holy Fathers, the faithful are to be admonished against the
danger of gratifying a prurient curiosity, by searching into the
manner in which this change is effected. It mocks the power of
conception, nor can we find any example of it in natural transmu
tations, nor even in the wide range of creation. The change itself
is the object, not of our comprehension, but of our humble faith ;
and the manner of the change forbids the temerity of a too curious
inquiry. The same salutary caution should be observed by the
pastor, with regard to the mysterious manner in which the body of
our Lord is contained whole and entire under every particle of the
bread. Such inscrutable mysteries should scarcely ever become
matter of disquisition." (Pp. 215, 216.) No wonder that they
discourage all disquisition on such a subject. The last sentence
quoted sets all reason and common sense at defiance. Suppose a
loaf of bread to be consecrated ; and we know that such a loaf is
capable of a continued division until the parts become too small for
the cognizance of our senses, and too numerous for arithmetical
notation, then what is it that the Romanist believes ? That every
one of these particles is the whole body of Jesus Christ I On the
absurdity of thus multiplying the body of Christ, we have remark
ed before ; we now bring up the subject to show the folly of in
sisting on a literal interpretation of the words of Christ, when
every difficulty is avoided by interpreting them figuratively ; for
which we have hundreds of analogous cases in the holy scriptures,
which abound in bold and striking figures, which, if they should all
be taken literally, would turn the Bible into a jargon of nonsense ;
and we have shown that, in this very passage, we are forced to
adopt this mode of interpretation.
And after all, what is the benefit expected from this doctrine 1
Material flesh and blood cannot affect the soul ; but truly, accord
ing to the hypothesis of the Romanists, it is only the essence or

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 467
hidden substance of Christ's body which is present ; the gross sen
sible qualities of flesh and blood are not there ; now in what re
spect does such a presence of the body differ from a spiritual pre
sence ; and such an eating of the body from a spiritual eating ?
And as to the daily mass or oblation, it can do no good — the sa
crifice of Christ once offered on the cross, is ever before the throne,
and needs no new oblation. All we need is, that the exalted Sa
viour and Prince of life should, on the ground of it, intercede for
us ; and that we should exercise a lively faith in the efficacy of his
atonement, to aid us in which the eucharist is an appointed and
powerful means.
Almost the only reply to which Romanists resort in their at
tempt to obviate the objections which Protestants make to the
doctrine of transubstantiation, is to adduce the doctrines of the
Trinity and incarnation, as equally contrary to our reason, and
equally incomprehensible. But truly there is scarcely any analogy
between the cases. There are, in these doctrines of scripture, we
acknowledge, high mysteries, which greatly transcend our powers
of comprehension ; but there is nothing which contradicts our
senses, or is repugnant to the plain dictates of reason, If this
could be proved, which we are aware has often been attempted by
rationalists, we should feel constrained to give up these doctrines
as untenable ; or rather to give up the scriptures in which they are
so plainly revealed. But as Archbishop Tillotson has handled this
subject very perspicuously, we beg leave here to conclude this re
view, by citing a few passages from his discourse " concerning the
unity of the divine nature."
" Before I leave this argument, I cannot but take notice of one thing which
they of the church of Rome are perpetually objecting to us upon this occasion.
And it is this, that by the same reason that we believe the doctrine of the trinity,
we may and must receive that of transubstantiation. God forbid : because of all
the doctrines that ever were in any religion, this of transubstantiation is certainly
the most abominably absurd.
" However, this objection plainly shows how fondly and obstinately they are
addicted to their own errors, how misshapen and monstrous soever ; insomuch,
that rather than the dictates of their church, how absurd soever, should be called
in question, they will question the truth even of Christianity itself ; and if we will
not take in transubstantiation, and admit it to be a necessary article of the Chris
tian faith, they grow so sullen and desperate that they matter not what becomes
of all the rest. And rather than not have their will of us in that which is contro
verted, they will give us that which by their own confession is an undoubted ar
ticle of the Christian faith, and not controverted on either side ; except only by
the Socinians, who yet are hearty enemies to transubstantiation, and have ex
posed the absurdity of it with great advantage.
" But I shall endeavour to return a more particular answer to this objection,
and such a one as I hope will satisfy every considerate and unprejudiced mind,
that after all this confidence and swaggering of theirs, there is by no means equal
reason either for the receiving or for the rejecting of these two doctrines of the
trinity and transubstantiation.
" 1st. There is not equal reason for the belief of these two doctrines. This
objection, if it be of any force, must suppose that there is equal evidence and
proof from scripture for these two doctrines. But this we utterly deny, and with

468 TRANSUBSTANTIATION.
great reason ; because it is no more evident from the words of scripture, that the
sacramental bread is substantially changed into Christ's natural body by virtue of
those words, ' This is my body,'' than it is, that Christ is substantially changed
into a natural vine by virtue of those words, I am the true vine, John xv. 1 ; or
than the rock in the wilderness, of which the Israelites drank, was substantially
changed into the person of Christ, because it is expressly said, ' that rock was
Christ;' or than that the Christian church is substantially changed into the na
tural body of Christ, because it is in express terms said of the church that it is
his body.— Eph. i. 23.
" But besides this, several of their most learned writers have freely acknow
ledged that transubstantiation can neither be directly proved, nor necessarily con
cluded from scripture. But this the writers of the Christian churcli did never ac
knowledge concerning the trinity, and the divinity of Christ ; but have always
appealed to the clear and undeniable testimonies of scripture for the proof of these
doctrines. And then the whole force of the objection amounts to this, that if I
am bound to believe what I am sure God says, though I cannot comprehend it ;
then I am bound by the same reason to believe the greatest absurdity in the
world, though I have no manner of assurance of any divine revelation concerning
it. And if this be their meaning, though we understand not transubstantiation,
yet we very well understand what they would have, but cannot grant it ; because
there is not equal reason to believe two things, for one of which there is good
proof, and for the other no proof at all.
" 2d. Neither is there equal reason for the rejecting of these two doctrines.
This the objection supposes, which yet cannot be supposed but upon one or both
of these two grounds : Either because these two doctrines are equally incompre
hensible, or because they are equally loaded with absurdities and contradictions.
" The first is no good ground of rejecting any doctrine, merely because it is in
comprehensible, as I have abundantly showed already. But besides this, there is
a wide difference between plain matters of sense, and mysteries concerning God ;
and it does by no means follow, that, if a man do once deny anything concerning God
which he cannot comprehend, he hath no reason afterwards to believe what he
himself sees. This is a most unreasonable and destructive way of arguing, be
cause it strikes at the foundation of all certainty, and sets every man at liberty to
deny the most plain and evident truths of Christianity, if he may not be humoured
in having the absurdest things in the world admitted for true. The next step
will be to persuade us, that we may as well deny the being of God because his
nature is incomprehensible by our reason, as deny transubstantiation because it
evidently contradicts our senses.
" 2d. Nor are these two doctrines loaded with the like absurdities and contra
dictions : so far from this, that the doctrine of the trinity, as it is delivered in the
scriptures, and hath already been explained, hath no absurdity or contradiction
either involved in it, or necessarily consequent upon it. But the doctrine of tran
substantiation is big with all imaginable absurdity and contradiction. And their
own schoolmen have sufficiently exposed it ; especially Scotus, and he designed
to do so, as any man that attentively reads him may plainly discover : for in his
disputation about it, he treats this doctrine with the greatest contempt, as a new
invention of the Council of Lateran under Pope Innocent III. To the decree of
which council concerning it, he seems to pay a formal submission, but really de
rides it as contrary to the common sense and reason of mankind, and not at all
supported by scripture ; as any one may easily discern that will carefully consi
der his manner of handling it, and the result of his whole disputation about it.
" And now suppose there were some appearance of absurdity and contradic
tion in the doctrine of the trinity as it is delivered in scripture, must we therefore
believe a doctrine which is not at all revealed in scripture, and which hath cer
tainly in it all the absurdities in the world, and all the contradictions to sense and
reason ; and which once admitted, doth at once destroy all certainty ? Yes, say
they, why not ? since we of the church of Rome are satisfied that this doctrine is
revealed in scripture ; or if it be not, is defined by the church, which is every
whit as good. But is this equal, to demand of us the belief of a thing which hath

TRANSUBSTANTIATION. 469
always been controverted, not only between us and them, but even among them
selves, at least till the Council of Trent ? And this upon such unreasonable
terms, that we must either yield this point to them or else renounce a doctrine
agreed on both sides to be revealed in scripture.
" To show the unreasonableness of this proceeding, let us suppose a priest of
the church of Rome pressing a Jew or Turk to the belief of transubstantiation,
and because one kindness deserves another, the Jew or Turk should demand of
him the belief of all the fables in the Talmud, or in the Alcoran ; since none of
these, nor indeed all of them together, are near so absurd as transubstantiation :
Would not this be much more reasonable and equal than what they demand of
us ? Since no absurdity, how monstrous and big soever, can be thought of,
which may not enter into an understanding in which a breach hath been already
made, wide enough to admit transubstantiation. The priests of Baal did not half
so much deserve to be exposed by the prophet for their superstition and folly, as
the priests of the church of Rome do for this senseless and stupid doctrine of
theirs with a hard name. I shall only add this one thing more, that if this doc
trine were possible to be true, and clearly proved to be so, yet it would be evi
dently useless and to no purpose. For it pretends to change the substance of one
thing into the substance of another thing that is already, and before this change
is pretended to be made. But to what purpose ? Not to make the body of
Christ, for that was already in being, and the substance of the bread is lost, no
thing of it remaineth but accidents, which are good for nothing, and indeed are no
thing when the substance is destroyed."

ESSAY XIX.
SUNDAY MAILS.*

We have frequently been struck, in reading the numbers of the
National Gazette, with the justness and weight of its editorial re
marks on the responsibility of the conductors of the periodical
press. And we have often sympathized with its accomplished edi
tor, on observing the severity with which he has been treated by
party prints, for endeavouring to conduct a paper on national
principles, abstaining equally from indiscriminate commendation
and abuse. We readily yield the tribute which is due to him,
for the elevated stand which he has proposed to himself, and think
that, as far as politics are concerned, it has been successfully main
tained. As it is universally understood that the editorial depart
ments of the Gazette and of the American Quarterly Review are
filled by the same individual, we had hoped that the modera
tion and fairness which mark the political character of the former,
would also have been impressed on the pages of the latter. We
entertained this hope with the greater confidence, from the convic
tion that the editor had too much discernment not to be aware that
a responsibility peculiarly serious rests upon the individual who
undertakes to conduct an American Review, which aspires, in its
measure, at once to form and represent American sentiments and
opinions. In despite of our sectional partialities, we are constrain
ed to admit, that in respect to candour and fairness, whenever re
ligion has been concerned, it has fallen far below its great eastern
compeer. In the very first number of the work there was an ar
ticle, which, from the levity and injustice with which the character
of several of the most distinguished of the American clergy was
treated, we considered of unpropitious omen. This, however, it
seems, was but a premonition of the spirit afterwards to be exhi
bited. We question whether the pages of the respectable periodi
cal literature of this country can furnish an instance of a more
uncandid assault on the character and opinions of a large part of
the Christian community, than the recent article on Sunday Mails
in the American Quarterly Review. We cannot but regard the
* Published in 1831, in reference to an article on this subject in the American
Quarterly Review.

SUNDAY MAILS. 471
publication of that piece as a high offence against the professed
principles of the work, and a flagrant breach of the confidence re
posed in its conductors. The public, unquestionably, have a right
to expect that works of this character should not avail themselves
of the power lent to them for other purposes, to disseminate princi
ples which the mild and venerable Bishop White pronounced anti-
christian in their character, and licentious in their tendency. It is
no justification of this course to state, there is a portion of pro
fessed Christians who agree with the leading doctrine of the article
in question ; for the Review professes not to be the virulent and
party advocate of any set of opinions ; much less does it claim the
right of insulting, in behalf of an inconsiderable minority, the faith
of nine-tenths of the Christian community of the country. The
public, indeed, do not presume to pry into the private belief of its
Editor, nor of any of its conductors ; but in consenting to admit
the work into their families, to operate on the opinions and charac
ter of their children, they surely have the right to expect that it
should be kept free from decidedly anti-christian sentiments. It
may well be that some of the contributors to that Review have no
faith in Christianity at all, no regard for its institutions, nor respect
enough for its worship to induce them to pass the threshold of a
church once in twenty years. But would such persons be author
ized to avail themselves of the access afforded them, under the
name and sanction of American reviewers, into hundreds of Chris
tian families, to attack the authority of our religion, or to asperse
its doctrines and institutions ? Assuredly not. And yet they might
with too much truth affirm, that many of their readers coincide
with their views. Or were they to appear as the open advocates
of Unitarianism, the same justification might be offered. In either
case, however, it is acknowledged that they would violate their
contract with the public, by appearing in a different light from that
in which their prospectus and general object present them. We
are utterly at a loss to discern how they can justify themselves for
having, in the article under review, assailed opinions which they
know to be held sacred by a large portion of the community. Let
it be borne in mind that we are not objecting to a consideration of
the expediency or inexpediency of carrying the mail on Sunday ;
nor even to a discussion of the grounds on which the religious ob
servance of that day is obligatory on Christians ; but to the avowal
and laboured support of the doctrine that the Sabbath was not ori
ginally a day devoted to the exercises of religion, and that it is
now most appropriately kept by festivity and amusement. It is this
doctrine which we affirm is abhorrent to the feelings of nine-tenths
of the serious part of the public.
The reviewer asserts, " that the true construction of the Mosaic
law is, that it (the Sabbath) should be kept as a day of festivity and
gladness, and not by gloomy lectures and religious worship." — P.
178. In reference to the meaning of the phrase, " to keep it holy,"
he says : " It is asserted, on the other hand, that we are command-

472 SUNDAY MAILS.
ed to abstain, not only from labour, but from our usual amusements,
from festivity, from social intercourse, such as is allowable on every
other day, and that we should devote the Sunday to the solemn
offices of religion, to the worship of God, public and private. We
deny that such is the meaning of the commandment, but the re
verse." — P. 180. '' In short," as he quotes from some " learned au
thor," " the Sabbath was celebrated, at first, like other festivals,
with feasting, dancing, and other holiday recreations." — P. 182.
To our apprehension, these assertions carry the mark of absurd
ity on the very face of them. They represent the Sabbath as
standing in a predicament occupied by no other religious institution
in the world, ancient or modern. They exhibit it as being at utter
variance with the whole system of which it is a part. The injunc
tions of every religion are certainly to be understood in a manner
congruous to its own nature. The festivals of the heathen were
thus in keeping with their religion. Those in honour of Ceres,
Bacchus, or Venus, were attended by rites adapted to the charac
ter of the imaginary power to which they were consecrated. But
the reviewer's position requires us either to suppose that the Sab
bath had nothing in common with the system with which it was so
intimately connected, or to renounce our whole belief as to the na
ture of that system. It is so evident that where a festival is en
joined, the manner of its observance must be adapted to the reli
gion to which it belongs, that the very same formula of words must
have very different meanings, under different circumstances. When
we are told that a day was kept among the heathen as a time of
joy and gladness, in honour of their gods, we take it for granted
that the nature of that joy, and the mode of its expression, was de
termined by the nature of their mythology. And when in the
Bible we are commanded to rejoice, to sing, to make the Sabbath
a delight, we know just as surely that the joy, singing, and delight,
are to be of a spiritual character, adapted to the religion of the
Bible. If the Lord's day is to be observed, as we shall show is the
faith of the whole Christian world, in commemoration of the re
surrection of Christ, and of the pardon, purity, and eternal life
thereby secured, it is self-evident that its appropriate celebration is
not by worldly singing, dancing, and festivity, but by sincere
thankfulness for these blessings, and joy adapted to their nature.
Any man, therefore, who believes the Bible to contain a revelation'
of the true religion, and who entertains any correct idea of what
religion is, must feel that the reviewer's assertions are in themselves
incredible. If the object for which any festival was instituted, determines its
nature, and the manner of its observance, then it scarcely needs
an argument to prove that the Sabbath is to be religiously celebrat
ed. It was instituted to keep in mind the creation of the world.
The great source of idolatry was ignorance of the origin of thino-s.
To preserve, therefore, the knowledge of the fact that God called
the universe into existence, and, as the Creator, was the only proper

SUNDAY MAILS. 473
object of worship, was the most effectual means of preserving the
true religion. That this was its object is expressly and repeatedly
asserted. Thus in Ex. xx. 2, " Remember the Sabbath day to
keep it holy ; for in six days the Lord made the heavens and the
earth, and all that in them is, and rested on the seventh day ; where
fore the Lord blessed the seventh day and sanctified it." This as
suredly means, that the end for which the day was to be observed
was to commemorate this event. When the Hebrews were com
manded " on the first month on the fourteenth day of the month,"
to keep the Passover, " for in this self-same day have I brought
your armies out of the land of Egypt : therefore shall ye observe
this day in your generations by an ordinance for ever," it is evident
that the object of the feast was to keep in mind this merciful deliv
erance. And it is not less evident that when they were com
manded to sanctify the seventh day, because God rested on that
day, it was in commemoration of that event the day was to be
celebrated. This is so often recognised as the end of the Sabbath,
that it is not denied by any one, as far as we are aware, who has
any pretension to knowledge on the subject. It is so obvious, that
Rosenmuller remarks on this passage, that God appointed the Israel
ites to be thereby witnesses to all nations, that their God was the
Creator of all things. " Volebat septimae diei feriis memoriam cre-
ationis mundi conservari, et Israelitas ea re testatos omnibus genti-
bus facere, ab ipsis coli id numen, quod omnia creavit." It was
hence a common saying among the ancient Rabbins, that " He who
violates the Sabbath denies the creation." Selden de Jure Natu-
rali et Gentium, lib. iii., p. 333. But if this was the object of the
institution, how was it to be attained ? The end to be answered
was purely a religious one, the preservation of correct ideas of
God ; and will any one in his senses maintain that this was to be
done by festivity and dancing? Can any one believe that God
ever enjoined for such an end such means as these ? But if the
day was to be spent in the worship of this God, we can readily
conceive how it should answer the end of its institution. Besides,
if, as our Reviewer maintains, the object of the Sabbath was to
give leisure for mere amusement, would, even under the Mosaic
law, the penalty of death have been inflicted for its violation ?
This is impossible. But if its object was to secure, in that age of '
idolatry, a weekly recognition of God as the only true God, the
creator of heaven and earth, we see how a deliberate profanation
of the day might be viewed as a denial of the truth it was intended
to commemorate, and consequently a rejection of the fundamental
principle of the Jewish economy, which, under the theocracy, was
an act of rebellion as well as of impiety.
It is in no measure inconsistent with the grand primary object of
the Sabbath, that in Deuteronomy the Jews are commanded to ob
serve it, and to allow their servants the necessary cessation from
labour, because they themselves had been bondsmen in Egypt.
It has always been admitted, that a secondary object of the institu-

474 SUNDAY MAILS.
tion was the refreshment of all labourers among men and the lower
animals. The passage referred to, enjoins on the Hebrews a strict
observance of this part of the command, from a recollection of
their former hardships. This, therefore, is presented, not as the
principal object of the institution, but a motive to obedience ; and
it is one of constant recurrence in the law of Moses. Thou shalt
not oppress a stranger, because thou wast a stranger in the land
of Egypt. All duties of this class are enforced by this same touch
ing consideration that God intended the Sabbath should be a day
of rest, therefore, to all men and beasts, is perfectly consistent with
its being properly and primarily a religious institution, intended to
commemorate the creation of the world. Hence, Selden, p. 332,
says, " That the Hebrews when interrogated concerning the rea
son of keeping the Sabbath, might answer, because in six days
God made heaven and earth. But the seventh they acknowledged
to be rnv tov Kocpov yevi8\tov hpipav, Diem mundi natalem, and rnv ioprtiv toB
Ko<rpov ytviawv, Festum natalibus mundi sacratum, as Philo denominates
the Sabbath." And this he asserts was its great design.
It is clear, therefore, from the very intention of the Sabbath and
from the nature of the religious system of which it was a part, that
the Reviewer's doctrine as to the manner of its observance is in
credible and derogatory to the religion of the Bible. Let us, how
ever, hear his arguments in its support. They consist in the asser
tions that the phrase " To keep it holy," does not mean to separate
it to religion ; and that the amplification of the law does not war
rant that construction here. " The literal or proper signification of
the word holy" he says, "as we shall show, carries no such mean
ing ; and in the context or amplification of the law, we find not a
word to warrant this construction." P. 180. Instead of redeeming
his pledge, and proving that the word holy has not the significa
tion usually assigned to it, he only supports his own assertion,
which he of course could not expect to be of much weight on such
matters, by the assertion of some other " learned author," " that the
word kadash or keep holy, does not always signify to separate a
thing to religion, as sanctificare does in Latin, but is taken for
any separation whatever, from a common to a peculiar use, espe
cially when that use is instituted of God." Now these two asser
tions are very wide apart. The difference between saying a word
" has no such meaning," and that it has not always that meaning,
is immense. In the one case nothing short of an absolute neces
sity, necessitas loci, can authorize its being so interpreted in any
given passage : whereas in the other, the strongest reasons should
be present to justify a departure from what, by the assertion itself,
is admitted to be its ordinary meaning. The Reviewer's zeal,
therefore, has carried him much too far. The argument resolves
itself into two parts, the first relating to the proper signification of
the word kadash, and the second to its meaning in this particular
command. It. so happens, that this word and its derivatives are among the

SUNDAY MAILS. 475
most frequently recurring in the Hebrew scriptures, and of course
in the indefinite variety of their applications cannot have always
precisely the same sense. All that is necessary to our purpose is,
to show that its proper and dominant meaning is, to separate to a
sacred use. And this, we presume, the Reviewer's author would
not venture to deny. Let us for a moment appeal to authority on
this point. Gesenius, in the last edition of his Hebrew Lexicon,
tells us that in Pie! (the form in question) it means 1. To sanctify
(heiligen), to consecrate, as any one to the priesthood, an altar, and
especially an offering, Deo consecrare. 2. To esteem holy. 3.
Declare holy. 4. To perform something holy ; and 5, to separate
as holy. There is not one of the numerous passages cited under
these several heads in which the idea of separation to a sacred
use is not included in the meaning of the word. Eichhorn, in his
edition of Simonis's Lexicon, says, that it means ab usu et statu com-
muni ad peculiarem et sacrum separare. Rosenm tiller on Gen. ii.
3, defines it, sanctificare, in usum sanctum segregare ut et Graeci
exponunt, dipop^uv. In Ex. xx. 8, the words which we render " Re
member the Sabbath day and keep it holy," he translates and ex
plains thus, " Memor esto diei sabbathi, ut eum sacrum habeas, i. e.,
soli Deo dictatum, sive sepositum; hoc die Deum sancte colas." We
have selected these three, from the multitude of lexicographers and
commentators whose authority might be adduced, not only because
they are among the most distinguished Hebraists of modern days,
but because they can be as little suspected of reverence for the
Sabbath as the Reviewer himself. This is a subject, however, on
which we need rest on no man's authority. Every one who is able
to read his Bible knows, as well as the greatest Hebraist can tell
him, what the meaning of the word is. He knows that throughout
the scriptures, the word holy is predominantly used to express one
or the other of these two ideas, morally pure, as when God is called
holy, and when we are commanded to be so, or separated to a sa
cred use. It is in this latter sense that the Hebrews are called a
holy people ; that the priests and Levites are called holy ; that any
place, as the tabernacle, the temple, Jerusalem, Palestine, is called
holy ; that the altar, candlestick, and all sacred utensils are called
holy ; and that the festivals are so denominated. In short, any
person, place, thing, or portion of time, devoted to sacred purposes,
is called holy, and this is the only proper word for expressing this
idea. This use of the term occurs not once, nor twice, nor a hun
dred, but literally thousands of times, so that it is really idle to
waste words on such a subject. The Reviewer never made a
more adventurous assertion, than when he affirmed that this was
not the proper meaning of the word.
But it is said the amplification of the command gives no war
rant for this construction. To this we reply, that the proper and
dominant use of the words is warrant enough. If the context
presents nothing inconsistent with this sense, we are not authorised
to depart from it. That there is no such inconsistency is perfectly

476 SUNDAY MAILS.
obvious. The command is, Thou shalt devote the Sabbath to the
service of God ; and the amplification is, In it thou shalt do no
work. Is there any inconsistency here ? But the Reviewer
seems to suppose that the command to keep the Sabbath holy is
explained by what follows, so that the whole sanctification con
sisted in omitting all servile labour. But this is not exactly so.
The reason why such labour was to be omitted was, that the day
was holy, i. e., consecrated unto God.» This is constantly stated
as the reason. " Six days may work be done, but the seventh is
the Sabbath of rest holy unto the Lord." — Ex. xxxi. 15. There is
therefore nothing in the context to warrant a departure from the
ordinary signification of the word, which is so uniformly preserved
in all such connexions, that the utmost violence must be done to
all just rules of interpretation, to make the command mean any
thing else than what it has usually been supposed to mean.
This interpretation is confirmed by all the notices of the Sab
bath which we find in other parts of the scriptures. We are told
that on that day the usual sacrifices were doubled. A great part
of the ancient worship consisted in presenting these offerings, which
were necessarily attended with confession, thanksgiving, and prayer.
By this institution alone, the religious character of the day is dis
tinctly marked. In Levit xxiii. we have an account of all those
feasts on which it was the duty of the people to assemble for wor
ship. Among these the Sabbath is included. " The seventh day
is the Sabbath of rest, an holy convocation." In c. xvi. 2, it is
said, " Ye shall keep my Sabbaths and reverence my sanctuary,"
which implies that the day was to be observed religiously, from
the connexion here expressed between the observance of the Sab
bath and the duties of worship. All those numerous passages in
which the object of the sanctification of the seventh day is stated
to be, that they might know that Jehovah was their God, prove
the same thing. Thus Ezekiel says : " Hallow my Sabbaths, that
ye may know that I am the Lord thy God." Isaiah, in predicting
a happy state of the church, says, " It shall come to pass, that from
one new moon to another, and from one Sabbath to another, shall
all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord." — Is. xvi. 23.
Does not this imply that divine worship was the appropriate duty
of the day ? Again, Isaiah lviii. 13, it is said, " If thou turn away
thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy
day ; and call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord honour
able ; and shalt honour him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding
thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words, then," &c. Does
this look like a description of a day devoted to festivity and danc
ing ? Even Gesenius tells us that it means that all worldly busi
ness was to be omitted, and the day consecrated to devotion.
" Wenn du den Sabbath nicht durch Umherlaufen zu weltlichen
Geschaften entweihst, sondern daheim der Andacht weihst." — See
Com. on Isaiah. It would, however, be almost an endless business

SUNDAY MAILS. 477
to gather up all the intimations contained in the old Testament, of
the religious character of the Sabbath.
When we come to the New Testament, we find still clearer evi
dence of this fact. Everywhere it is said that the Sabbath was
the day on which the people met in the synagogues for worship.
Here the scriptures were read, prayer was made, and religious
instruction communicated. This, it is asserted, was not a recent
custom, but " Moses hath," it is said, " of old times in every city
them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every Sabbath
day." The Reviewer, it is presumed, will admit that long con
tinued practice under a law is the best rule for its exposition. We
have, however, still further testimony to the point in hand. Philo,
the most learned of the Alexandrian Jews of the time of Christ,
says, De vita Mosis, p. 602, " The day of the creation having
sunk into oblivion was thus restored of God, and is to be observed
by pious contemplations of divine things, and of the works of na
ture, and by no means in sloth, luxury, or amusement." In his
Tract, de Cherubim, he draws a contrast between the manner in
which the heathen festivals devoted to amusement and vice were
observed, and those of the Hebrews. Josephus, the most distin
guished of the Jews of Palestine, of nearly the same age, in his
work Contra Apion, lib. iii., says, " This day, as the memorial of
the creation, is to be piously celebrated, and was instituted of God
that the law might be publicly read to the people and made known
to all."
The assertion, therefore, of the Reviewer and his author, that
the Sabbath was originally and properly observed as a day of
dancing and festivity, is not only entirely gratuitous, but is contra
dicted by all the evidence of which the case admits. The mean
ing of the command is as plain as words can make it, that the day
should be consecrated to religious worship. This interpretation is
confirmed by the object of the institution, by the nature of the
system of which it is a part, by the indubitable declarations of the
ancient prophets, by the practice and testimony of the Jews in the
time of Christ, and the opinions of their learned men to the present
day. And this, as we have seen, is the conclusion to which not
only devout Christians, but civilians, historians, and infidel antiqua
rians and commentators, have arrived. The learned Selden, who
was no clergyman, speaking of the celebration of this day, says,
p. 316, "Quae (i. e. celebratio Sabbathi) in opere et laboribus,
cultus causa, abstinendo, lege legenda, audienda, ac sacrificiis sin-
gularibus, maxime cernebatur."
We deem it hardly necessary to attempt to show, that among
Christians, the first day of the week was observed as a day for
religious worship, and not for recreation and amusement. In the
New Testament, they are said to have met together " to break
bread," that is, to celebrate the Lord's supper, and to hear the
word. As the Christian Fathers universally say that the day was
kept in commemoration of Christ's resurrection and the blessings

478 SUNDAY MAILS.
thereby secured, it is evident from this consideration alone, that it
was a religious observance : that the joy to be indulged was such
as flowed from the contemplation of these blessings, and the exer
cises of the day such as should fit us to appreciate and enjoy them.
Our limits do not permit us to make numerous quotations in sup
port of this assertion. The testimony of Barnabas, Ignatius, Jus
tin Martyr, Athanasius, Tertullian, and many others, may be found
in Bingham's Origines Ecclesiasticae, vol. ix., c. ii., or August's
Denkwiirdigkeiten der Christ. Archaelogie, in several parts of the
work, particularly the introduction to the first vol., and vol. iii., p.
345, and onward. Even the heathen knew enough of Christianity
to know that it was a religion, and its festivals religious observ
ances. Pliny, in his celebrated letter to Trajan, says, " Christianos
stato die ante lucem solitos convenire carmenque Christo quasi
Deo dicere secum invicem, seque sacramento obstringere non in
scelus aliquod, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committe-
rent, ne fidem fallerent."
Gregory Nazian. Orat. 38, in exhorting Christians to observe
their sacred days aright, says, that it must not be done in a worldly
manner, by adorning their houses, or gratifying the senses, by feast
ing, or any kind of amusement. These things, he tells them, should
be left to the heathen. " But we," he adds, " who worship the
word, should find our only pleasure in the scriptures and the divine
law, and in narrating the events which the feast commemorates."
Under Constantine, the first Christian emperor, laws were made
respecting the proper observance of the Lord's day, and repeated
with more particularity under Theodosius ; not commanding the
people to spend the day in amusement, but forbidding public shows
and recreations. " Dominico, qui septimanae totius primus est, —
omni theatrorum atque circensium voluptate, per universas urbes
earundem populis denegata, totae Christianorum ac fidelium men-
tes Dei cultibus occupantur." — Cod. Theod., xv,, tit. 5. Such ordi
nances were frequently repeated, prohibiting all the usual business
of life on that day, and all worldly amusements. They are cited
here as indisputable evidence of the opinion of the early Chris
tians, that the Lord's day was to be devoted exclusively to reli
gious purposes. To give one testimony more. Ephrem, the
Syrian, in his discourse De diebus festis, says, " Festivitates Do-
minicas honorare studiose contendite, celebrantes eas non pane-
gyrice sed divine ; non mundane, sed spiritualiter ; non instar
Gentilium sed Christianorum. Quare non portarum frontes coro-
nemus ; non choreas ducamus; non chorum exornemus ; non tibiis
et citharis auditum effaeminemus, non mollibus vestibus induamur,
nee cingulis undique auro radian tibus cingamur ; non commessa-
tionibus et ebrietatibus dediti simus, verum ista relinquamus eis quo
rum Deus venter est, et gloria in confusione ipsorum."
August, in his remarks on the festivals of the early Christians,
says, " The main idea and object of the holy days and feasts, was
to keep vividly in mind the principal benefits of Christianity, and

SUNDAY MAILS. 479
the person of the Redeemer, to promote gratitude to God, and the
exercise of the Christian virtues. It was common to prepare for
these festivals by fastings, but the festivals themselves were re
garded as days of rejoicing ; in which the Christian, undisturbed
by any of his ordinary employments, should devote himself to
contemplations and exercises of piety. So far, however, were
these festivals from being days of worldly pleasure, or similar to
the holidays of the heathen, that from the moment Christianity be
came the religion of the state, the church felt that she had no
more urgent duty to perform, than to employ her power in pro
tecting the sacred days and usages, and to secure the prohibition
of all public amusements by which the sacredness of divine wor
ship might be invaded." — Denkwiirdigkeiten, vol. p. 97. This is
the testimony of a historian and antiquarian, not a " Sabbatarian,"
or a " terrorist," but of a German rationalist, respecting the usage,
not of a set of gloomy puritans, but of the early Christian church
in general, and of that Catholic church which boasts of being in
fallible. With regard to the opinions of the several denominations of
Christians on this subject, little need be said. It is so universally
known that the Church of England is one of the strictest of Pro
testant churches in her doctrines respecting the Sabbath, we shall
give but a single extract from her book of Homilies, " So if we be
the children of our Heavenly Father, we must be careful to keep
the Christian Sabbath day, which is Sunday, not only for that it is
God's commandment, but also to declare ourselves to be loving
children in following the example of our gracious Lord and Father.
Some use all days alike. The other sort worse ; for although
they will not labour nor travail on the Sunday, yet they will not rest
in holiness as God commands them, but they rest in ungodliness and
filthiness, prancing in their pride," &c, &c. Volumes might be filled
with quotations from her most illustrious sons to the same amount.
That her children in this country have not forsaken her doctrines, on
this subject, we need no other proof than the " Three Letters address
ed to the editor of the American Quarterly Review," by the venera
ble Bishop of Pennsylvania. Standing as he does at the head of
the Episcopal Church in the United States, his ready appearance
to vindicate the Lord's Day from the unworthy attack of the Re
viewer, entitles him to the grateful acknowledgments of all the
Christians in the country. That the Congregationalists and Pres
byterians regard the Sabbath as a day that should be devoted to
religion, no one would thank us for proving. The same is true
with regard to the Methodists and Baptists. The Catholics are as
strict, in doctrine, in this respect, as the Protestants. They hold
that the scriptures teach that the feasts and usages of the Old Tes
tament were not repealed, but merely spiritualized, under the new
dispensation, and that this was especially the case with the Sab
bath ; which the ancient church merely transferred from the
seventh to the first day of the week, in commemoration of the Sa-

480 SUNDAY MAILS.
viour's resurrection. This is the Catholic doctrine, as defended by
Bellarmin in his work, " Adversus hujis temporis haereticos ;" i. e.,
the Protestants ; by Durand, " Rationale divinorum officiorum ;"
by Gretser, and all their leading writers.* The last named author,
in his work " De festis Christianorum," lib. i., contends that the
Christian festivals are not matters of mere external order and dis
cipline. " Festa Christianorum non solum ratione ordinis et disci-
plinae, sed etiam ratione mysterii celebrari : et esse hos dies festos
aliis sanctiores et sacratiores et partem quandam divini cultus."
And the council of Trent enjoins that these festivals should be ob
served, not as days of amusement, but " in a truly religious and
devotional manner."
The Reviewer, therefore, in denying that " the Sunday is to be
devoted to the solemn offices of religion," and in asserting that it
is appropriately a day of recreation and amusement, has not as
sailed an opinion of this or that particular sect, but of the whole
Christian church. If this is not to be considered as a breach of
contract with the public, we know not what can be. Surely no one
doctrine of our religion, nor that religion itself, can be considered
safe from his assaults, if this be deemed a justifiable aggression.
We, of course, do not complain of him, nor of any other man, for
publishing his opinions, but we do complain that he should make a
Literary Review the vehicle of such doctrines. Believing, as
Christians almost universally, at least in this country, do, that the
religious observance of the Lord's day is one of the most essential
means of sustaining the cause of religion and good morals, it is as
much a matter of surprise as regret, that the enlightened conduc
tors of the American Quarterly, for the sake of gratifying an un
worthy clique against the religious public, should allow themselves
to be betrayed into so serious an attack on such an institution. No
one appears to have a quicker or more just perception of the indi
cations of coming evil, in this country, than the editor of that Re
view. He mourns over the unbridled licentiousness of the press ;
he is startled at the idea of universal equal education ; he regards
with little complacency the annual importation of thousands of un
educated foreigners, to control our elections, and vitiate our popu
lation ; and he would be the last man in the world to maintain,
that a popular government, founded on ignorance and vice, was
either possible or desirable^ He seems even less disposed than his
neighbours, to rejoice in the progress of freedom, where he sus
pects the requisite intelligence and virtue do not exist. Recogniz
ing, as he does, that good morals are the only stable support of
free institutions, and the only effectual bulwark of social order and
domestic happiness, why is it he so pertinaciously attacks an insti
tution, without which public virtue assuredly never can be main
tained ? We use the word pertinaciously, because the article in
See Augusti, vol. i., p. 32.

SUNDAY MAILS. 481
his Review, is not the only effusion on this subject, which has ap
peared under his auspices. His paper has been repeatedly made
the vehicle of nearly the same sentiments ; culling, from sources
the most heterogeneous, matter suited to his purpose ; pardoning
even the radicalism of the Morning Chronicle, in behalf of its lati-
tudinarianism on religion. As the friends of good morals and de
corous discussion, we are very far from being insensible to the me
rits of the National Gazette.. We cheerfully acknowledge that it
is often the able advocate of the cause of virtue, and the temper
ate and dignified rebuker of corrupting publications. This, how
ever, only increases our regret that it should manifest such hostility
to an institution, which, as a means of promoting public virtue,
stands, in our view, pre-eminent and unapproachable. Whether this
opinion be correct or not, it is entertained by so large a portion of
the community, that it is entitled to respectful consideration, and
is, we think, capable of being clearly established.
Neither the editor nor the reviewer will deny that some religion
is essential to man ; that, by the constitution of our nature, men are
as necessarily religious as they are moral or intellectual beings.
This is proved by universal experience, and according to Cicero,
Tusc. I. " Omni in re consensio omnium gentium, lex naturae pu-
tanda est." As all nations have had some religion, we must admit
that it is a law of our nature, that men should have some method
of expressing the feelings which arise from their consciousness of
relation to a superior being. All history teaches us that the forms
in which these feelings express themselves, depend on the light
communicated to the understanding. If men are taught that they
are in the hands of numerous and conflicting powers, some intent
on good, others on evil, we see them tossed and agitated with con
stant fears, busying themselves with all possible devices to obtain
favour or impunity. There is no more melancholy spectacle than
men thus struggling under the pressure of distorted notions of the
objects of worship ; notions which pervert the finest constituents of
their nature, and impress their own deformed image on the soul.
It is a fact established by experience, and one easily accounted for,
that men are always conformed in their internal character to their
religion ; not to the religion which they may profess, but to that
system of religious opinions which they really entertain. The most
important feature of human character, therefore, depends on cor
rect knowledge of God. How is this to be obtained ? . Arguing
either from the Bible, which the reviewer does not profess to reject,
or from experience, it is clear, that it never has been, and cannot
be secured by the unaided reason of man. The cause of this lies,
as the apostle informs us, not in the inadequacy of the revelation
which the works of God and our own constitution make of the di
vine character, but in the moral state of the human soul, which
blinds it to these manifestations of divine excellence, and disinclines
it to the purity of truth. So that although knowing God, men glo
rify him not as God, neither are thankful, but become vain in their
31

482 SUNDAY MAILS.
imaginations, and their foolish heart is darkened, professing them
selves to be wise, they become fools, and change the image of the
incorruptible God into an image made like unto corruptible man,
and to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things. This is
the history of man in all ages and countries, and under all diversi
ties of culture, where the light of revelation has not been enjoyed.
We might as well expect the productions of the vegetable world
to unfold in all their variety of beauty, in utter seclusion from the
sun, as that the religious feelings of men should be developed in
conformity with truth, where the rays of divine knowledge never
visit the mind.
Experience teaches us another lesson with equal clearness and
fullness, that there can be no adequate culture of our moral nature
under the influence of a corrupt system of religion. The apparent
exceptions to this remark are few, and they are but apparent. Its
correctness as the statement of a general fact cannot be denied.
If these two points, resting on the testimony of indisputable facts,
be admitted, the necessity of correct knowledge to the existence of
true religion, and the necessity of religion to good morals, then it
is clear, that to secure for society correct religious knowledge is
essential to preserve it from the equal horrors of superstition and
immorality. The insufficiency of mere speculative knowledge or
general illumination to accomplish this object is evident, not only
from the limited sphere of its action, but from its want of adapta
tion to the end. Only a few, comparatively, can ever be made the
subjects of this high intellectual culture, and if they could, there is
nothing in the mere knowledge of facts unconnected with religion,
to call forth and form any man's religious or moral feelings. These
are still left to be moulded by notions which enter by chance and
gain a lodgment in the mind. If surrounded by a society in which
correct ideas on these subjects abound, he may imbibe a portion of
these, and thus, in a measure, be preserved from the evils resulting
from that neglect of religion in which he glories. And this, it may
be remarked, is the security of our modern infidels, or we. should
see them, after the manner of better men of old, suspending
their most important movements on the flight of birds, and quaking
at a raven's croak.
If religious knowledge is thus essential to form the character of
men, how is it to be communicated ? It does not come by imme
diate revelation from the omnipresent and all pervading Spirit of
God : and although traced in lines of light and beauty on his works,
these have never been read with sufficient clearness to enlighten
the understanding or impress the heart. But God has communi
cated it to us by those " holy men of old who spake as they were
moved by the Holy Ghost." But even this clear and sufficient
revelation of God and our duty, which happily in this country may
be in every man's hands, is silent. It arrests* no man's attention, it
utters no remonstrance when neglected, and never was designed to
supersede a more direct and impressive mode of instruction. We

SUNDAY MAILS. 483
are told that " it hath pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching,
to save them that believe." And it is written, that when Christ as
cended up on high, " he gave some pastors and some teachers" for
the very purpose of diffusing this knowledge and securing its effects.
It is, therefore, by divine appointment that religious knowledge
should be communicated by living teachers. But waving this con
sideration, how in point of fact is it communicated ? Can it be de
nied that, in this and every other country, the great majority of
men derive their knowledge on religion mainly from the ministra
tions of its public teachers ? Most men are so occupied with the
concerns of life, that they entirely neglect the attainment of any
regular or adequate religious knowledge by their own exertions.
Were it not for what they learn from the " gloomy lectures" of the
Sabbath, they would remain as ignorant as the heathen of God
and a future state. So long as a large portion of society observe
this day, and gather enough of knowledge to imbue the common
fund with correct ideas, the evils may not be so apparent. But let
us look at places where the reviewer's plan is fully carried out,
where religious instruction from the pulpit is utterly neglected, and
the Lord's day devoted to amusement, and we will find the most
deplorable ignorance on all religious subjects. It matters not
whether such communities be found on our own western frontiers,
among the polished circles of Paris, or the profligate population of
London. We of course speak of general facts. Individual excep
tions, to which the mind is apt to advert, and which, to be pro
perly estimated, must be viewed in all their circumstances, dis
prove nothing on this subject. It is capable of being clearly
proved as a matter of fact, that the public teaching of the Sabbath
is a great source of religious knowledge to the mass of the com
munity, and consequently if this be neglected, and men spend the
day appropriated for this purpose in festivity or idleness, ignorance
the most destructive to their best feelings and interests must be the
result. The diffusion of religious knowledge, however, is not the only
good resulting from a proper observance of the Sabbath. It is a
day appointed not only to learn our duty towards God, but to per
form it ; to call off the mind from the objects which necessity
forces upon it during the week, and place it in the presence of God ;
to awaken from their torpor those feelings of adoration, gratitude
and confidence, which the divine greatness and goodness should
excite. The regular return of this day is as healthful to society
as the showers which soften, fertilize, and beautify the earth, bring
ing with them the influence of heaven. The good derived from
such seasons of devotion is not confined to the hour spent within
the church. The feelings there excited are strengthened by the
exercise : their permanent influence over the mind is increased.
The whole man is refined and elevated, and he goes forth into the
world better fortified against its temptations, and better fitted to
diffuse a healthful tone into public sentiment and feeling. These

484 SUNDAY MAILS.
stated periods of public worship, therefore, are the great means of
keeping alive a sense of religion among men, of maintaining the
consciousness of their relation to the infinite God, and thus pre
venting them from sinking down into the mere intellectual or
sensual animal. If the observance of the Sabbath be the great
means of preserving religious feeling in the community, the ques
tion comes to this, whether it is desirable that this feeling should
be maintained ; whether, if all sense of the infinite and eternal, all
connection with the pure and the holy, every bond with the invisi
ble and future world were destroyed, men would be either better
or happier ? Could civilized society exist were this once effected ?
We think not. The restraints, which regard for reputation, a sense
of honour, or desire of influence, exercise over men, derive their
principal force from the general tone of society, which would,
under such circumstances, be entirely vitiated. The reviewer,
however, would join beyond doubt in praising religion in the general,
and repeat the common-places as to its necessity and excellence,
while he laboriously advocates a course which would more effectu
ally banish it from Christendom than any other he could devise.
Voltaire is said to have vowed the destruction of Christianity,
and tried long and hard to effect his object, but gave it up in des
pair, saying, it was impossible as long as people would assemble
every week for religious worship. And this is true. For every
religion must have some means whereby to sustain itself, and bring
its influence to bear on those wfio profess it. Paganism has its
rites and its priests ; Mahomedanism has its mosques, its public
prayers, its sacred day and its Koran, their civil and religious code ;
and Christianity has its Sabbaths, on which to exhibit its claims,
and urge its duties and promises. We have seen that, in point of
fact, it is mainly through this instrumentality its influence is ex
erted. What then is the desecration of this day, but the destruc
tion of its power 1 And what is an exhortation to men to spend
the day in idleness and amusement, but an' exhortation to emanci
pate themselves from its sacred influences 1
It is not, however, merely as a means of sustaining religion, that
this day is of such incalculable importance ; its proper observance
is the only security of public morals. This assertion is not founded
exclusively on the assumption, however correct, that religion is
necessary to virtue. The subject may be viewed in another light.
Every one knows that the moral sense acts under the guidance of
the understanding. It is not the power of deciding infallibly on
what is right or wrong, but it is the feeling of approbation or dis
approbation which rises in the mind on the view of actions which
it has been taught, either from the constitution of its nature, or by
education, to consider good or bad. The class of actions respect
ing which information is derived from the first of these sources, as
all other intuitive truths, is very small ; and, therefore, although
conscience be as much an original constituent of our nature as
reason, it as much needs culture and correct information to secure

SUNDAY MAILS. 485
its proper exercise. Hence, the only possible way to preserve
men from all the evils of a perverted or hardened moral sense, is
to have a correct rule of duty presented to them ; as the only way
to save men from intellectual aberrations, is the exhibition of truth
and its evidences. That Christianity- contains the purest system
of moral truth ever presented to the world, is admitted, except by
infidels of the very lowest class. It is one great object of the ex
ercises of the Sabbath, to exhibit this rule of duty ; to bring the
people to understand its requisitions, and feel their obligation. And
such is the constitution of our nature, that moral truth contains its
own evidence. The ground of the assent which we yield to it, is
its congruity with the internal law of our nature. Hence this
knowledge does not rest in the understanding, but is imbibed and
becomes an active principle. It makes men better as well as
wiser. It might easily be proved, that the services of the Lord's
day are the great source of information and culture of a moral
kind to the people. It is here as with religious knowledge, com
paratively few read or study for themselves. If the Sabbath,
therefore, be devoted to amusement, the people will assuredly grow
up in ignorance. Let it be remembered, that ignorance here is
error. A man whose moral sense is unenlightened, has not the re
straints nor the incentives necessary to virtue. What a society
must become, where the moral sense is thus degraded, every man
can conceive. Men may be virtuous though they know nothing
of science or history, but ignorance of duty is inseparable from
vice. Virtue cannot exist under it, for virtue is the conformity of
heart and life to moral truth. It is, therefore, the height of incon
sistency for a man to be constantly repeating the truism, that virtue
is essential to the well-being of society, and yet labour to destroy
the great sourceof that knowledge, without which virtue cannot exist.
The advantages of a religious observance of the Lord's day,
already referred to, are "sufficient to entitle it to the respect and
reverence of all good men. There are others scarcely less impor
tant, on which our limits will not permit us to dwell. The regular
congregation of friends and neighbours on that day in the place of
worship, to mingle their feelings before the throne of God, tends to
unite them in the purest and strongest bands. The differences
arising from wealth and other adventitious circumstances here
disappear. The high are humbled without being depressed ; the
low are exalted without being elated. The chord, which vibrates
in one breast, is felt in all the others, awaking the consciousness of
community of origin and of nature. They learn that God has
made of one flesh all the dwellers upon earth ; that he has breathed
one spirit bearing his own image into them ; placed all under the
same benevolent laws ; offers the same glorious immortality to all,
and has thus bound them together as one great brotherhood. It
is hence obvious, that of all institutions, this is the most directly
efficacious in promoting peace, charity, justice, sympathy, and all
other amiable feelings. Experience teaches us, that of all men,

486 SUNDAY MAILS.
those are most sincerely attached who are accustomed to worship
together. The exercises of the Sabbath, moreover, are among the most
efficient means of intellectual culture. The mass of men employed
in mechanical occupations have few subjects on which their minds
can be exercised. Their employments present little or nothing to
enlarge or vary their thoughts. For reading they have little time
and less inclination. It is principally from attendance on church,
where other subjects are presented; where new and elevating
ideas are exhibited ; where their attention is excited and minds
tasked, that their intellectual powers receive their chief develop
ment. It is the grand desideratum in education, to devise means
to call forth the powers of the mind in due proportion, without
perverting or injuring its moral sensibilities. With this view, en
lightened men have laboured to bring down the abstract principles
of science to the level of the labouring classes. But these subjects
are not sufficiently exciting to arouse general attention. It must
be admitted that there is nothing so well adapted to the purpose,
as moral and religious truth. As objects of intellectual knowledge,
they are the most expanding which the mind can apprehend, while
their influence on all the feelings is correcting and purifying. A
community in whose education these truths are made mainly instru
mental, will be, of all others, the most adequately cultivated ; their
intellectual faculties most fully developed, and their moral princi
ples the most correctly formed. In support of this assertion, we
may again appeal to experience. It is a fact familiar to all whose
attention has been turned to the subject, that even illiterate and
feeble minded men, when brought to take an interest in religious
truth, have exhibited a surprising increase in mental strength.
The contrast between Pagan and Christian countries, in respect to
mental improvement, is, in no small degree, owing to the same
cause. The truths of Christianity cannot enter the mind without en
larging it. To the same source may, in a great measure, be traced
the striking difference between the common people in Catholic and
Protestant countries. The religious services of the former consist,
almost exclusively, in exercises of devotion. And even their wor
ship, conducted in an unknown language; is but imperfectly com
prehended. No distinct objects of mental apprehension are pre.
sented,and consequently their minds are but little exercised, although
devout feeling may be excited. Hence the religion of the Catho
lics is, with the common people, so much a matter of feeling and
so little of principle. And hence the glaring inconsistency, so°often
to be found among them, between their open immorality and aus
tere devotion ; bandits and prostitutes being habitually religious.
In Protestant countries, a great part of the duties of the Sabbath
is the communication of knowledge. The scriptures are uniformly
read, and discourses delivered by educated men.
Another advantage of the religious observation of the Lord's
day is, that it tends to promote genuine liberty. This necessarily

SUNDAY MAILS. 487
results from what we have already said. If it is the means of
enlightening the minds of men, it disenthrals them from the yoke of
superstition and the bondage of the priests. If it is the means of
teaching them their essential equality before God, it destroys the
very foundation of tyranny. In making them feel that they have
a common origin and -a common destiny, it teaches the high they
have no right to oppress the low, and the low they are entitled to
be recognised as brethren. Hence Christians are the only freemen
on the face of the globe. The rise of this religion was the era of
civil liberty. And it has only been where Christianity has been
obscured, and its truths prevented from entering the minds of the
people, that they have ever been reduced to bondage. The men
to whom the world is principally indebted for civil liberty, were
men most deeply Christian. The principles of our religion are
thus directly favourable to freedom, and they are essential to its
preservation. Anything, therefore, which diminishes their force
on the public mind, is so much done to destroy that cause to which
we are so loud in our profession of attachment. We do not now
insist on the acknowledged necessity of virtue to freedom, of reli
gion to virtue, of knowledge to religion, and of a regular system
of instruction to bring this knowledge to bear on the minds of the
people. These, however, are obvious truths, and they go to show
how intimately the happiness and liberty, the knowledge and virtue
of men, are connected with the proper observance of the Sabbath.
There is still one other view, and one which confers on this in
stitution its chief value in the eyes of Christians. The Bible tells
us that men are sinners ; that the wages of sin is death ; that Jesus
Christ came into the world to deliver men from the consequences
of their apostasy ; that the Gospel is the proclamation of God's
readiness to pardon and accept them on the terms which it pre
scribes ; the Sabbath is the day appointed for making known these
offers of mercy and for urging their acceptance. Thousands thus
hear these offers, who would never hear them in any other way.
And of the millions who accept them, few would do so, were it
not for their being thus constantly presented and urged. Here, to
those who believe the Bible, opens a prospect which earth and its
interests cannot bound. It is not the welfare, nor even the virtue
of men here, that is alone concerned ; it is their everlasting wel
fare and virtue in the world to come, which the Christian sees are
intimately connected with the proper observance of this day. He
cannot shut his eyes to the evidence of the fact, that it is through
the regular preaching of the Gospel men are usually brought to
accept of its offers, and become fitted for death and eternity. To
his view, therefore, the importance of the Sabbath is beyond all
estimate. And he cannot but regard any attempt to lessen its in
fluence, or to lead men to neglect its duties, as directed not only
against all that is desirable in human character in this world, but
against their well-being in the world to come. Infidels may sneer
at all this. But truth is indestructible by ridicule. And he must

488

SUNDAY MAILS.

be weak indeed, who suffers the light estimation of others to affect
his reverence for an institution, while all the evidence of its value
remains untouched.
We feel persuaded we have not over rated the importance of
the Sabbath. The experience of communities and nations bears
out our statements. Those sections of our own country where
the day is best observed, are distinguished by superior intelli
gence, piety, good morals and social order. Those nations which
are remarkable for a regard to the Sabbath, take the lead in the
world in general cultivation, in sound religion, in activity and
energy of character, in internal stability and order, and in external
respect and power. These are the nations which have been the
mothers and guardians of civil and religious liberty, and are now
doing almost all that is done in the diffusion of knowledge and
piety through the world. Such is the position occupied by Great
Britain and these United States — two countries distinguished
throughout Christendom for their regard for the Sabbath, as they
are distinguished throughout the world for their internal prosperity
and their diffusive and benign influence. That this favourable
distinction will not long survive their regard for the Sabbath, we
as firmly believe, as that religion and virtue are essential to the
well-being of society.
We come now to inquire, What obligations are Christians under
to observe this day? And here we would remark, that if what we
have already said be correct, the obligation must be of the highest
moral character. If the religious observance of the Lord's day be
the means of diffusing religious knowledge, of exciting and sustain
ing religious feeling and moral principle in the community ; if it
tends to refine the character and promote all the social virtues ; if
it is the highest means to multitudes of intellectual culture ; if it
raises men to a sense of their own dignity, while it depresses their
false pride and arrogant claims ; and, finally, if it is the grand
means of leading them to the attainment of eternal life, then is
every man bound to promote this observance by all those obliga
tions which bind him to promote the temporal and eternal interests
of his fellow men. Then, too, it is obvious, that all efforts, whe
ther by argument or ridicule, to lessen its influence, is so much
done to render men wicked and miserable, both in this life and
that which is to come. We feel almost as though it were super
fluous to inquire, whether God has added to an obligation so obvi
ous and so imperious, that of a positive command. Had no such
precepts as " Thou shalt not kill," or " Thou shalt not commit
adultery," been recorded in the scriptures, the obligation would be
complete from the nature and consequences of the acts themselves.
In like manner, though we were unable to prove that God had
commanded us to keep holy one day in the seven, we think the
obligation would still be binding, after a custom so salutary had
once been introduced. There is, however, from the obvious ten
dency of this observance to promote the best interests of society,

SUNDAY MAILS. 489
a strong presumption that God has enjoined it. We know that
the object of the religion which he has revealed is to promote the
purity and happiness of men. And if there is an institution, which
is essential to the preservation and influence of this religion, it is
surely to be presumed that it is of divine appointment. That the
observance of a day on which the rites of this religion should be
celebrated, its truths and claims presented, is of primary impor
tance, we think can hardly be denied. How is any system of
truth to be received and obeyed, unless presented to the mind ?
And how is this to be done, unless time be appropriated for the
purpose ? Will men of themselves, and each one for himself, go
to the silent record, and ascertain and receive all that God has en
joined and promised ? Surely no other religion was ever thus
left without any means of accomplishing its object. Besides, if it
be a dictate of reason that we should worship God, if this is to be
done in our social, as well as individual capacity, and if this union
of men to make their joint homage to their Maker be, in like man
ner, a dictate of nature, then it is to be presumed, that in a re
vealed religion, which enforces all other duties which the law of
our nature enjoins, this duty of public worship is commanded.
And as it is a duty which must be often repeated, it is also to be
presumed, that its stated discharge would be insisted upon, and
time allotted for the purpose. Nothing, surely, can be more obvi
ous than that if this were not the case, the duty itself would be in
a great measure neglected. The evident importance, therefore,
of the appointment of a day for religious purposes, in order to
enable the religion of the Bible to accomplish the purposes for
which it was revealed, and to secure the stated discharge of one
of the plainest of moral obligations, creates at least a presumption
that the true religion is not the only religion without its sacred days.
In turning to the scriptures, we find almost on the first page, in the
very history of the creation, it is recorded, that in six days God made
heaven and earth, that he rested on the seventh day, " Therefore
the Lord blessed the seventh day and sanctified it." The mean
ing of this passage admits of no dispute. When God is said to
bless anything, it implies that he favourably distinguishes it, in
some way or other. The seventh day was thus distinguished by
being sanctified, or set apart for a sacred use. That this is the
meaning of the term we have already proved. If, then, from the
very creation of the world God commanded men to consecrate
one day in seven to his service, we may fairly conclude that this
is a duty of universal and perpetual obligation. The way in
which the force of this passage is commonly evaded, is not by de
nying its obvious import, but by assuming it to be a prolepsis, or
anticipation of an event which occurred upwards of two thousand
years afterward. According to this idea, Moses does not mean to
state that God did then sanctify the seventh day, but merely that
his having rested on the seventh day was the reason why, in after
ages, he selected that day as the Sabbath. The objections to this

490 SUNDAY MAILS.
assumption, however, appear to us decisive. In the first place, it
takes for granted, without the least evidence, that the book of
Genesis was not written until after the giving of the law on Mount
Sinai. Whereas, the probability is entirely on the side of its hav
ing been written at an earlier period. But secondly, it does evi
dent violence to the context. This verse is obviously a part of a
regular narrative of consecutive events. Let any unprejudiced
man read the passage and decide for himself. " And on the se
venth day God ended his work which he had made ; and he rested
on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God
blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because that in it he had
rested from all his work." Is not this a regular narrative of facts ?
God created all things in six days, he rested on the seventh, and
blessed the seventh day and sanctified it. There is not the slight
est intimation that the latter verse refers 'to an event, which did
not take place for ages after those recorded in the two immedi
ately preceding. Those who make so violent an assumption, are
surely bound to produce the strongest reasons in its justification.
In favour of taking the passage in its obvious sense, it may be
urged, that there are many important arguments in favour of the
ante-Mosaic origin of the Sabbath. The day was appointed in
commemoration of the creation. Its grand design was to preserve
the knowledge of the true God as the creator of the world. The
necessity or ground of the institution, therefore, existed from the
beginning. There is in this consideration alone, a strong pre
sumptive proof of its having been appointed at the time specified
in Genesis ii. 3. Besides, we know that a large portion of the
laws of Moses did not originate with him. The rites and usages
of the Hebrews, from the earliest times, were incorporated into
his code. Circumcision, sacrifices, the distinction between clean
and unclean animals, the right of divorce, the duties of the avenger
of blood, the obligation of a brother to marry the widow of his
deceased brother, and many other cases of this kind, might be
cited. It was the object of Moses, under divine direction, to em
body in one code all the traditionary knowledge and laws of his
people, and to institute such new regulations as should most effec
tually preserve them distinct from other nations, and prepare them
and the world for the coming of Christ. With regard to the laws,
and especially the festivals, which originated with him, it is to be
observed, that they arose out of the existing state of the people, or
were intended to keep in mind some recent event in their history.
This was the case with the Passover, Feast of Tabernacles, &c.
When, therefore, there is an institution, which betrays no such
local origin, and is designed to commemorate no such recent
event, the presumption is strongly in favour of its being one of the
traditionary usages which make up so large a part of his laws.
This is the case with the Sabbath. This command is not enforced,
as the others are, by considerations drawn from their immediate
history ; but they are commanded to rest on the seventh day be
cause God rested on that day and sanctified it.

SUNDAY MAILS. 491
The very form in which the command is given, favours the idea
of the previous observance of the day. Remember the Sabbath
day to keep it holy. This mode of expression is not used in refer
ence to feasts which he had but just established. It is nowhere
said, remember the Passover, or any other festival. Besides, there
is positive evidence of the Sabbath before the solemn enactment of
the law on Mount Sinai. This did not occur until the third month
after the departure out of Egypt. Yet we find that in the second
month, when in the wilderness of Sin, being pressed for food, the
people were supplied by manna from heaven. This perishable
article they were commanded to gather from day to day, and not
to attempt to preserve it over the twenty-four hours. But on the
sixth day, Ex. xvi. 22, the people, of their own accord, gathered a
double portion. The rulers came and told Moses, apparently de
sirous to know whether the manna would keep, or whether they
might not expect the usual supply on the following day. Moses
told them, the people were right, that as the morrow was the Sab
bath, no manna would be given, but the double portion gathered
on the sixth day would remain sweet over the seventh. Had the
people acted under the direction of Moses in this business, the
rulers could not have been ignorant of it, and would not have gone
to him for instruction.
There is another remark applicable to many of the laws of
Moses ; in frequent instances something is commanded, but the
manner of the performance or details of the duty are not specified.
This is the case, however, only where the thing prescribed was
already familiar, and usage had fixed the mode in which it was to
be done. Thus, in regard to the Sabbath, we find merely the
general directions, that the day was to be consecrated to God ; all
labour intermitted, the sacrifices doubled, and a holy convocation
held. But what particular things were prohibited or enjoined, we
find nowhere minutely stated. With respect, however, to those
feasts which were unquestionably instituted by Moses, we find the
greatest particularity as to the prescriptions. Whence this differ
ence ? Does it not arise from the fact, that the Sabbath was one
of those usages with which the people were familiar, and therefore
did not need such particular instructions ?
A sto'ng confirmation of this view is derived from the division
of time into portions of seven days. It is mentioned in the account
of the deluge ; in the history of Jacob ; it is found among all an
cient nations, the Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Asiatics, and even
among the American Indians. Whatever was the origin of this
division, it is evident that it must have been very ancient. There
are three methods of accounting for it. The first is, that it arose
from dividing the months into four portions. This is very im
probable, because seven is not the fourth, either of twenty-nine
and a half days, the real length of a lunar month, or of thirty days,
which was the number assigned as early as the flood. v The other
method is that which Selden and many others have adopted.

492 SUNDAY MAILS.
They suppose, the names of the seven planets being given to the
days of the week determined their number. To this supposition it
may be objected, that the division existed at a period anterior to
any indications of much astronomical knowledge, and that affixing
the names of the planets to certain days, was evidently subsequent
to the introduction of idolatry, and belief of the influence of the
stars over the affairs of men. Of the latter, especially, we have
no evidence as early as the times of Noah. Besides, had this been
the true origin of the division of time into weeks, we should expect
that the names of the planets would have been given in their natu
ral order, instead of succeeding each other in a manner perfectly
arbitrary. The various ingenious answers which have been given
to this difficulty, all suppose such a degree of refinement in the
mode of proceeding, as could only belong to an age far more
recent than that in which the computation by weeks is known to
have existed.* The third method is by far the most satisfactory.
It supposes the division to have existed from the beginning, and to
have arisen from the fact recorded by Moses, that God created all
things in six days and rested on the seventh. We know that some
obscure knowledge of the creation, deluge, and dispersion, has been
preserved among all nations. And, therefore, it is not surprising
that so convenient a distribution of time, although arbitrary, has
passed from one nation to another. If God did from the creation
set apart the seventh day to himself, we need no other reason to
account for the origin and prevalence of this mode of computation.
This fact, too, best accounts for the sacredness attributed among
almost all ancient nations, to the number seven. This was every
where a sacred nnmber. The manner in which the ancients speak
of this number and of the seventh day, is sufficiently remarkable,
and has led many learned men, as Theophilus of Antioch, and
Clemens of Alexandria, among the ancients ; and Grotius, Huet,
Budes, and many others among the moderns, to suppose that this
day was held sacred by all antiquity. The passages cited on this
subject may be seen in Selden, lib. iii., c. 16 — 19, together with his
answers to the arguments derived from them. Admitting all that
he says, it is at least clear that this number was considered sacred
throughout the ancient world.
We say, then, the plain meaning of the narrative in Gen. ii. ;
the very reason and nature of the institution ; the manner in which
the law in Exodus is expressed ; the observance of the day before
that law was given ; the fact that Moses, as a general rule, adopt
ed the jus consuetudinarium of his people ; the division of time
into weeks, long before him ; the diffusion of this mode of compu
tation over the world, and the universal sacredness attached to the
number seven, are arguments for the institution of the Sabbath
from the creation, which we are unable to resist.
The most obvious objection to this opinion, is the absence of
* See, on this subject, Selden de Jure Nat. et Gen., lib. iii.

SUNDAY MAILS. 493
positive evidence of the religious observance of the seventh day
by the Patriarchs. To this it may be replied, there is not such
absolute want of evidence on this point, as is often asserted. In
the history of Cain and Abel it is said, "at the end of days" (as
the Hebrew phrase should be rendered) they brought their re
spective offerings unto God. We cannot decide, with certainty,
what this expression means ; but, taken in connexion with the
statement immediately preceding, that God had set apart to reli
gion the seventh day, which was the close of a regular period, the
probability is, that by the " end of days" we are to understand the
end of the week, or Sabbath. Besides, the fact already noticed,
that Noah and the immediate ancestors of the Hebrews divided
their time into weeks, renders it probable there was some regular
observance of the seventh day. But admitting all the objection
assumes, that there is no evidence of the religious observance of
the Sabbath anterior to Moses, we remark, this is no decisive proof
that it was not in fact observed ; and if it were, its non-observance
would be no decisive argument against its original appointment.
In support of the former of these assertions, that silence is no
decisive proof of non-observance, it should be remembered the
narrative is very short, and goes but little into detail. The history
of two thousand five hundred years is comprised in a few pages.
This circumstance alone almost invalidates the objection. But
the argument would prove too much. From the time of Joshua
to that of David, a period of five or six hundred years, 'there is
little or nothing said of the Sabbath. Are we hence to infer that
it was not at all observed during this period ? certainly not. This
is equally true of a great majority of the laws of Moses ; their
faithful observance cannot be historically proved, and yet we should
not be authorized to conclude from the mere silence of the record
that they were entirely neglected. As to the second point, that
non-observance is no decisive argument against the original ap
pointment of the Sabbath, the case is still clearer. As just re
marked, although we know that the Hebrew polity was arranged
by Moses, as described in the Pentateuch, yet there are many of
his laws of which there is no evidence, for ages, of their being
actually obeyed. The objection under consideration, as applied
to the Sabbath, would require us to believe that Moses never en
joined any of these laws. We may take a still stronger case. We
know from the highest authority, that God in instituting marriage
ordained that a man should have but one wife. Yet the patriarchs
were polygamists ; and even after Moses, a plurality of wives was
cpnsidered lawful among the Hebrews. This, of course, cannot
be considered as any proof that God had not at the beginning
given a clear intimation of his will on this subject. How, then,
can it be inferred from the fact the Sabbath was neglected, even if
the fact be admitted, that it was not commanded at the time of the
creation ? The inference is obviously unauthorised ; and yet this is
the main ground on which the advocates of the Mosaic origin of this

494 SUNDAY MAILS.
institution, rest their cause, and endeavour to invalidate the plain
testimony in Gen. ii. 3.
Another argument is, that the Sabbath was a Jewish institution,
having a local origin and design ; that is, designed to commemo
rate an event in which they alone were interested. In proof of
which they appeal to such passages as Exodus xxxi. 13, and
others, in which the Sabbath is said to be a sign between God and
his ancient people ; and to those in which Moses is said to have
given them the Sabbath, as in Nehemiah ix. 13, 14. From the
former class it is inferred that if the Sabbath was a sign between
God and the Jews, it must be peculiar to them and instituted for
them. But this inference is unsound. Anythmg, in the language
of the scriptures, is called a sign which was selected by God to be
a memorial of any truth, or confirmation of any promise. It mat
ters not whether the thing selected be ordinary or extraordinary
in its character ; whether it was previously familiar, or originated
for the occasion. Thus, God tells Noah the rainbow should be a
sign between him and the earth that the flood never should return.
This does not prove that the bow of heaven had never previously
been seen ; it only declares that it was selected as the memorial of
God's gracious determination. In like manner, though the Sabbath
had long been familiar to the Hebrews, God might have chosen
that observance as a standing memorial of the fact, that the true
God was their God. And it is evident that the selection was, of
all others, the most appropriate ; for the object of the original in
stitution of the Sabbath was to keep in mind that God was the
creator of the world, and therefore it was in perfect unison with
this design, that God said to the Jews, " keep my Sabbaths" for a
sign that your God is the true God. As to those passages in which
Moses is said to have given them the Sabbath, the argument is
still less conclusive. For Nehemiah, in the passage referred to,
says : " Thou gavest them right judgments and true laws, good
statutes and commandments, and madest known unto them thy
holy Sabbath, by the hand of Moses thy servant." Were all these
right judgments and good statutes, said to be given by Moses, un
known before his time ? The reverse is notoriously the case. Christ
even says, " Moses gave unto you circumcision," though it was of
the fathers, and customary long before Moses was born. Such
passages no more prove that the Sabbath was instituted by Moses,
than they prove that the Hebrews were ignorant of the many
moral precepts which he gave them, or of the multitude of usages
which he adopted and enforced. The argument from Deut. v. 15,
in which the Jews were commanded to keep the Sabbath, because
God had delivered them from the land of Egypt, has already been an
swered. They were to keep it, not in commemoration of that event,
but they were to give this opportunity for rest to all their servants,
because God had thus interposed to give them rest. The remem
brance of their former sufferings should make them kind. These
are the objections to the belief that God " sanctified the seventh

SUNDAY MAILS. 495
day" from the beginning. That they are of little force, we think
must be admitted. And, therefore, all the direct evidence in favour
of the early origin of the institution, which we have adduced, re
mains unimpaired. But Dr. Paley himself says, "If the divine
command was actually delivered at the creation, it was addressed,
no doubt, to the whole human species alike, and continues, unless
repealed by some subsequent revelation, binding upon all who
come to the knowledge of it." — Moral Philosophy, p. 247. That
it was thus delivered, we think we have proved ; that it has been
subsequently repealed, it becomes those who deny its continued
obligation clearly to establish. The necessity of an express re
peal is the stronger, because the principle that a command is to be
considered binding as long as the ground or reason of it remains,
applies here in its full force. All moral precepts are immutable,
because the ground on which they rest is immutable. The com
mands, " Thou shalt not kill," '' Honour thy father and thy mother,"
arising out of the unchanging relations of society, must remain in
force as long as these relations subsist. And the command to
love God must be binding as lojig as rational creatures are in be
ing. We have seen that the design of the Sabbath was to secure
the continued worship of the true God, and must therefore be
binding as long as this obligation continues, unless it be shown
that the command has been repealed, and other means appointed
for securing this great end.
The arguments of those who assert that the law of the Sabbath
is no longer obligatory, are either derived from the general princi
ple that all Jewish laws, as such, are repealed, or from some spe
cific declarations of the New Testament writers. The principal
dependence is placed on the assumption that the Sabbath was pe
culiarly a Jewish institution, and therefore ceased to be obligatory,
when the law of Moses was abrogated. That this assumption is
unauthorised, we have already endeavoured to prove. A precept
having been adopted and incorporated with the Hebrew laws, did
not take it out of the class to which it originally belonged, or
alter its relation to other nations. This is confessedly the case
with all moral precepts which were in force before the law of
Moses enacted them, and which continue after that law, as such,
ceases to be binding. And this is also true of every law the ground
or reason of which continues. The remark, therefore, of Dr. Pa-
ley, which the Reviewer quotes, " If the law of the Sabbath be
binding, it is binding as to the day, its duties and its penalty," is
evidently unfounded. Shall we say that the command, " Thou
shalt not commit adultery," if binding at all, must be binding as to
its penalty as well as its precept ; and that every adulterer must
be punished with death ? Surely not. Whatever was purely
Jewish fell when that system fell; whatever was of prior obliga
tion remains, unless positively repealed. It is precisely on this
ground Christians place the law of the Sabbath. Everything as to
duties or penalties which were attached to it, and which had a

496 SUNDAY MAILS.
peculiar reference to the circumstances of the Hebrews, or which
arose out of them, is no longer obligatory on us. Hence we are
not bound to offer sacrifices on that day as they were, nor are we
exposed to the punishment which they incurred, for every violation
of a fundamental principle of their theocratical system. Further
than this, it is evident, the abrogation of the Mosaic law cannot
affect the law of the Sabbath ; its original claims remain unaffect
ed. The very position which this command occupies in the Mo
saic institutions, shows that it was not considered as one of those
positive or ceremonial enactments, which were to remain only
until the Messiah appeared. It is presented in the midst of
moral precepts of confessedly permanent obligation ; it was in
scribed on the tables of stone ; it followed immediately those pre
cepts which refer to our duty to God as enjoining the means by which
the love, obedience and worship which belong to him were to be
secured and preserved. It is thus custos primae tabulae. If the
Sabbath, therefore, be not a peculiarly Jewish institution, the re
peal of the Jewish law does not impair our obligation to observe it.
There are, however, some passages in the New Testament which
are appealed to as proving that the observance of a day devoted
to religion is no longer obligatory. There are only two of much
importance. The one is Colossians ii. 10. " Let no man there
fore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a festival
iv pcpd loprris, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath days." In ex
plaining any passage of this kind, we must of course bear in mind
the circumstances of the persons to whom it was addressed. Al
most all the early Christian churches were composed of converts
both from the Jews and heathen. The former were, naturally, so
much attached to their own law, that it was with difficulty they
could be brought to relinquish its observance. Hence, in all the
churches founded by the Apostles, there was continual difficulty on
this subject. Judaizing teachers abounded everywhere, who in
sisted on the necessity of conforming to the Mosaic institutions.
Paul occupies a large share of his several epistles in counteracting
these men. He exhorts .Christians to stand fast in the liberty
wherewith Christ had made them free ; severely reproves those
who suffered themselves to be led into the observance of Jewish
rites ; and bids them, as in this passage to the Colossians, not to let
any man presume to condemn them for not keeping the law of
Moses. That this is the simple and full meaning of the passage is
evident, because this was the very subject of controversy at Co-
losse, and because the things here specified, meats, drinks and fes
tivals, were all of them prescriptions of that law. It is clear,
therefore, from this passage, that the Sabbath, as a Jewish festival,
was no more binding than the feast of the new moon, or the dis
tinction between clean and unclean meats. But this is saying
nothing more than all Christians admit; that the law of Moses, as
such, is no longer obligatory. By the Sabbaths here mentioned
(although that term is often used generally for all solemn feasts),

SUNDAY MAILS. 497
is meant the seventh day of every week. The observance of this
day no one holds to be binding. The name Sabbath was distinct
ively applied to that day. Hence the early Christian fathers ear
nestly dehort their hearers from keeping the Sabbath ; insist upon
it, that it is no longer obligatory ; while they urge upon them the
religious observance of the Lord's day. Thus Ignatius' Epis. ad
Magnes., c. ix. 10, says : It is altogether unfit for Christians to live
as do the Jews, and, therefore, they should not keep the Sabbath
(priKirt o-afiPari^ovTcs) but live in accordance with the Lord's day. This
is their constant language. Are we to infer from this that they
felt themselves free from all obligation to devote one day in seven
to God's service, while they were urging, in the same breath, the
observance of such a day ? Clearly not. Therefore, while the pas
sage before us is a warrant for Christians not to keep the seventh
day, which was the Sabbath, it affords no evidence that the great
obligation to devote one day in seven to God has been repealed.
The other passage is one of similar import in Rom. xiv. 1, 2, 3.
" Him that is weak in the faith receive, but not to doubtful disputa
tions. For one believeth that he may eat all things ; another, who
is weak, eateth herbs. One man esteemeth one day above another ;
another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully per
suaded in his own mind." To what days does the apostle here
refer ? Clearly to the festivals of the old dispensation. The Jew
ish converts thought they ought to observe them ; the Gentiles
thought they ought not. Paul tells them it was a matter of in
difference, that every man should be fully settled in his own
mind, and act accordingly, and not condemn those who acted
differently. The reviewer has too much knowledge of the rules
of construction, to suppose that this passage is to be taken out
of its connexion, and assumed to mean all that the words themselves
will possibly bear. This case is precisely parallel with the decla
ration of Christ, " I say unto you swear not at all," i. e., take no
such oaths as were the subject of discourse. That judicial oaths
were not intended is plain, because Christ himself afterwards took
such an oath, and so did his disciples. If a fair construction of
the Saviour's command frees it from the objection of condemning
what he sanctioned by his own example, we cannot refuse to see,
that when Paul tells the Roman Christians the observance or non-
observance of particular days was a matter of indifference, he
meant the declaration to be applied to the subject of discourse, and
that he had no reference to a precept which had been in force from
the creation of the world. That he had no such reference is still
clearer, from the fact that we find him, and the Christians whom
he instructed, actually distinguishing one day from another, by
consecrating the Lord's day to religious services. There is the
same evidence, therefore, that Paul did not mean to declare the
weekly observance of a day for the worship of God a matter of
indifference, as there is that Christ did not mean to condemn judi
cial oaths, when he said, " Swear not at all."
32

498 SUNDAY MAILS.
The obligation, therefore, to devote one day in seven to the ser
vice of our Maker, has not been repealed in the New Testament.
The observance of the seventh day, or " Sabbath," has been abo
lished. As the keeping of that day was in commemoration of the
first creation, it was evidently proper when the second or moral
creation was effected by Christ, that the latter event should be
the particular object of commemoration. Do we, then, actually
find the inspired founders of our religion, and the churches under
their immediate direction, neglecting the Jewish Sabbath, conse
crating the first day of the week to divine worship ? This ques
tion even Dr. Paley answers in the affirmative. Our Saviour rose
from the dead on that day, and twice met his assembled apos
tles on " the first day of the week." This would in itself be of
little consequence were these two instances of religious convo
cation not the first of a series continuing unbroken throughout
every age and section of the church. An observance thus com
menced, and thus continued, we cannot but consider as an au
thoritative declaration that the great command to devote one day
in seven to God was recognised by Christ and his apostles as
still obligatory on Christians. We accordingly find in the New
Testament, that the churches of the apostolic age did observe
the first day of the week. In Acts xx. 7, it is recorded that when
Paul was at Troas, " On the first day of the week, when the disci
ples came together to break bread, Paul preached to them."
Here then are the Christians of Asia Minor observing this day,
under the direction of the apostle. In the first epistle to the Corin
thians, xvi. 1, Paul says, "As I have given order to the churches in
Galatia, so also do ye. Upon the first day of the week let every
one lay by him in store," &c. In this passage, it is clearly inti
mated, that both in Galatia and Corinth, churches founded by the
apostle, the first day of the week was the day of religious con
vocation. In Rev. i. 10, St. John says, " I was in the Spirit on
the Lord's day." By this expression, the prevalent one in the
early ages for the first day of the week, there can be no rea
sonable doubt that Sunday is intended. The phrase itself would
seem to imply that the day was consecrated to divine service, as
in the expressions, the Lord's supper, the Lord's house, this idea
is conveyed. That this day was religiously observed by the early Christians,
admits of the most satisfactory proof. Our limits do not allow us
here to adduce the evidence of this fact in detail ; we must therefore
again refer the reader to the works mentioned in a former part of
this article. We shall cite only one or two passages. Barnabas,
one of the apostolic fathers, argues that even in the Old Testament,
God had expressed his dissatisfaction with the Jewish Sabbath, and
by the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple, proved that a new
order of things was introduced, therefore he says, " we observe
the eighth day, on which Jesus having arisen from the dead ascend
ed up to heaven." — C. 15. Justin Martyr, Apo. ii., p. 99, says,
" We all meet together on Sunday, on which God having changed

SUNDAY MAILS. 499
darkness and matter, created the world, and on this day Je
sus Christ our Saviour arose from the dead." Dionysius of
Corinth, speaking of the first day of the week, says, " To-day we
observe the Lord's holy day." — See Eusebius, lib. iv., c. 23. Ori
gen, Horn., vii. in Exod., says, " That manna was rained down from
heaven on the Lord's day, and not on the Sabbath, to show the
Jews that even then the Lord's day was preferred before it."
Tertullian and John of Damascus both argue at length against
the observance of the Sabbath, and declare that Christians conse
crate the first day of the week to God. The law of the Sabbath
they say, Christ in part repealed (i. e., as to the day, &c), and in
part spiritualized. " We then," adds the latter, " celebrate the per
fect rest of the human race, that is, the day of the resurrection, on
which the Lord Jesus, the author of life and salvation, has intro
duced us into the inheritance," &c. — De Fide Orth., lib. iv., c. 24.
Athanasius, Opera, tom. i., p. 1060, says, " Formerly among the
ancients the Sabbath was honourable, but the Lord transferred the
Sabbath to the Lord's day." And soon after adds, " We therefore
honour the Lord's day on account of the resurrection." It was a
common slander against the early Christians, often repelled by the
fathers, that they worshipped the sun because they kept Sunday
holy : which Tertullian says they did, " alia longe ratione quam de
religione solis." In allusion to the consecration of this day among
the heathen to the sun, Ambrose, Serm. 62, says, " Dominica nobis
venerabilis, atque solennis, quod in ea Salvator velut sol oriens dis-
cussis inferorum tenebris luce resurrectionis emicuit : ac propterea
ipsa dies ab hominibus saeculi Dies solis vocatur, quod ortus earn
Sol justitiae Christus illuminet." The first day of the week was
often called Dies panis, because the Lord's supper was celebrated
on every return of it. It was also called the " Queen of days,"
Pao-aivaa rav npepav. " Let every Christian," says Ignatius, " keep the
Lord's day, the resurrection day, the queen, the chief of all days."
The most common, and the most appropriate appellation was the
Lord's day. This expression, as used with emphasis by the an
cients, imports, says August, vol. iii., p. 351, "the day appointed
in place of the Sabbath by Christ, the founder of the new cove
nant, and ' Lord of the Sabbath,' on which men could as well wor
ship God as on the seventh day, which Jewish superstition had
desecrated ; and on which men should joyfully call to mind the
resurrection of Christ and the out-pouring of the Holy Spirit."
This day, according to the institutions of the early church, was to
be a day of religious joy and thanksgiving. No fasting was ever
allowed on Sunday, for this was considered tantamount to a denial
of the resurrection of Christ ; all prayers were to be offered up in
a standing posture ; all public and private business was to be sus
pended ; all games forbidden ; religious assemblies, even in times
of persecution, frequented ; and even the previous evening was to
be spent religiously as a preparation for its sacred duties.
If, then, from the creation of the world, God commanded men

500 SUNDAY MAILS.
to devote one day in seven to his worship ; if this command was
introduced into the decalogue and enforced upon the Old Testa
ment church with peculiar strictness ; if Christ and his Apostles,
the churches founded and instructed by their care, and Christians
in all ages, have continued to recognise this command ; and if the
institution be as important for the preservation of religion and good
morals as we have endeavoured to show ; then it is evident, that
the neglect or desecration of this day is the violation of one of the
strongest of our obligations, and destructive to the best interests of
society. We have now seen that, according to the opinion of the Chris
tian church in all ages and among all important denominations, the
Lord's day ought to be devoted to rest and the worship of God.
This rest is not to be absolute, for that some works are lawful on
this day, has never been questioned. Even the superstitious Jews
admitted this, and, after one sad lesson, determined to defend
themselves at least on the Sabbath. Our Saviour clearly lays
down the principle on which we are to decide such cases of ex
ception, when he says, " The Sabbath was made for man, and not
man for the Sabbath," and again, " God will have mercy and not
sacrifice." The principle contained in these declarations, and
which he applies himself in several instances, is, that when two
obligations interfere, the stronger destroys the weaker. This is an
universal principle in morals. As a general duty, children are
bound to obey their parents, but when this obedience would inter
fere with their duty to God, the obligation ceases ; so that it is no
violation of filial duty to refuse to obey a parent, who requires
what God forbids. In like manner our Saviour teaches us the ob
ligation to rest on the Sabbath ceases, when a higher obligation
requires us to labour. The priests in the temple profaned the
Sabbath, and were blameless. Every man might loose his ox and
lead him away to watering. It is on this principle that Christ vin
dicates himself for having healed the sick, and his disciples for
plucking ears of corn and eating them. This latitude of interpre
tation the nature of the law requires ; so that we are not allowed,
but bound to perform works of necessity and mercy. In deciding
on the cases which come under either of these classes of exception,
every man must judge for himself, and on his own responsibility.
The petitioners to Congress against carrying the mail on Sunday,
never pretended to assume any other ground. They merely pre
sented themselves at the bar of that body to say that, in their judg
ment, carrying the mail was not a work of necessity, and, there
fore, did not come within the exception. When the Reviewer,
therefore, himself takes this ground, and presses it with so much
coarseness on the attention of the petitioners, he gives himself much
gratuitous trouble. They are as well aware as he can be, that the
whole question is one of construction ; that the point at issue is,
whether the carrying the mail on Sunday is a work of so much
consequence, that we are freed from the obligation to devote that

SUNDAY MAILS. 501
day to the service of God, in order to effect it. The petitioners
think not ; and, in our estimation, for very sufficient reasons.
They take it for granted, that the pressure of the necessity must
be proportionate to the extent of the interference with the" object
of the day. Although rescuing an ox might be a sufficient reason
why his owner should devote the requisite time and labour, it
would be a very poor reason why a whole neighbourhood should
neglect the religious duty of the day. Due attention to this prin
ciple would have led the Reviewer to see there was little force or
propriety in most of his caustic arguments ad hominem, on this
subject. The degree of attention which Christians devote to the
decency and comfort of domestic arrangements, involves so slight
an interference witht he duties of the Sabbath, as to be fully justi
fiable on their own principles. To justify a work, however, which
gives constant employment to thousands in a manner entirely in
compatible with its religious observance, and which leads to the
partial employment of many millions more, must require a neces
sity pressing in the extreme. The petitioners do not believe that
any such necessity exists for carrying the mail on Sunday ; on the
contrary, they believe that incalculably more harm than good re
sults from it. Those who entertain this opinion amount to some
millions, unquestionably, in this country — men who belong to the
best educated, the most moral, and in every respect most estima
ble classes of society. It is not in the power of any man, by scoffs
and ridicule, to render the opinion of such a body of men unworthy
of respect ; and every such attempt must recoil on its author.
The petitioners are confirmed in their opinion that no such ne
cessity exists, as can authorize this extensive and demoralizing dis
regard of the Sabbath, by the fact that, in the earlier periods of
our national existence, the post-offices were closed, and the mail
was but partially carried on Sunday, and yet no dreadful incon
venience resulted. They know too, that in the immense commer
cial metropolis of England, no mail departs or is distributed on
Sunday. Such facts speak louder than theories or mere prognos
tications. They observe, moreover, that our government is very
inconsistent in this respect. They see that all our legislative and
judicial proceedings are suspended on the Sabbath throughout the
whole country ; and they cannot doubt that this is done at an
immense sacrifice of time and money to the community. Thou
sands are kept waiting the proceedings of these bodies ; are pre
vented receiving what in justice belongs to them ; prisoners are
detained in vile durance, and the whole march of business is ar
rested. They cannot perceive why it is, if in the opinion of the
community, and of the government too, all these inconveniences
are to be cheerfully endured, rather than interfere with the day de
voted to religion, the evil arising from stopping the mail on that
day, should be regarded as enough to justify a total disregard of
it. They believe the inconvenience, in the former case, is much
greater than it could be in the latter. They, therefore, beg their

502 SUNDAY MAILS.
representatives to be consistent, and to extend the respect they so
properly pay to the Sabbath in all other departments of the gov
ernment, to that of the post-office. In answer to this reasonable
request, to their utter amazement, they are met on the one hand,
with grave arguments to show that Congress have not the constitu
tional power to do, in regard to the mail, what they do in regard
to every branch of the government ; and on the other, still more
to their surprise, they are overwhelmed with injurious reflections
on their motives, general defamation of their character, and insult
ing ridicule and taunts. With regard to this latter course, we shall
say but little. The former, alone, deserves consideration.
It has, indeed, somewhat ungenerously perhaps, occurred to us,
that it was not possible for such men as the chairman of the com
mittee of Congress, and the reputed author of the article in the
American Quarterly Review, either to blind themselves, or hope
to blind others by the sophistry employed on this subject. We
find, however, the editor of the Review, in a recent number of the
National Gazette, gravely recommends the said article, though he
gives up its theology, to the serious attention of members of Con
gress, as a decisive argument on the question. We are free to
confess that we are entirely incapable of discovering either the
force or consistency of the Reviewer's arguments. On page 189,
he says, " The man, or set of men, who say that I shall not ride or
walk or sail into the country, because he adjudges these things to
be breaches of the law, having thus determined what I shall not
do, will next say what I shall do, will „ direct that I shall go to
church, and then that I shall go to his church, &c. If the point
now disputed be carried or yielded, the progress of the same
power to the point suggested, will have no new principle or impedi
ment to overcome in its way. Everything is gained over any
rights of conscience and religious freedom when a single point
is carried against them." The argument here is, that it is in
consistent with religious freedom for the government to un
dertake to decide that the Reviewer shall not receive his letters or
papers on Sunday, because if this be allowed, it may order him to
go to church, decide for him what church, &c. That there is a
fallacy somewhere in this argument, is evident. The government,
as well state as general, does undertake to tell that gentleman that
he shall not hold a court, if a judge ; or plead a cause, if a lawyer ;
or prosecute a suit, if a client, on that day. However inconvenient
the delay, he must wait. The government, moreover, does tell
merchants and tradesmen, they shall not buy nor sell on Sunday ;
that their stores must be closed on that day. Where, then, is the
difference between these cases ? Why may not the government
as well tell the people that it will not allow its post-masters to dis
tribute letters, as forbid its judges to administer the law on Sun
day? Where is the difference in principle? We cannot perceive
any. And what is more to the point, the Reviewer cannot. He
entirely abandons the ground here assumed, of a constitutional

SUNDAY MAILS. 503
difficulty, in his answer to the North American Review. " It is
true," he says, :' that the other offices of government do generally
suspend their operations on Sunday ; and that the post-office does
not. We have suggested the reason, which we shall show is the
true one, and is wholly independent of any supposed religious ob
ligation, or imperative command of Him, who should be obeyed in
all things. [A declaration contradicted in the next sentence.]
The difference of practice in these branches is founded on the
difference of their duties, which allows of the permitted or pre-
scibed rest from labour in the one case, and does not allow it in
the other." " Sunday is observed as a day of rest and worship,
unless some public or private necessity or utility warrants a dis
pensation ; and the dispensation must be commensurate with the
necessity or utility which demands it." — Pp. 190 and 191. The
Reviewer has here strangely forgotten himself. This is the whole
doctrine of the " terrorists ;" the length and breadth of Calvinistic
rigour on the subject. There is not a man amongst us, who goes
one jot beyond this ; Sunday is to be observed as a day of rest
and worship, unless necessity or utility warrants a dispensation.
Has any man ever maintained that God requires us to rest on the
Sabbath, when necessity requires us to labour ? The Reviewer,
therefore, in acknowledging (what, indeed, he could not deny) that
the government does respect Sunday as a day of rest and worship,
whenever it can do so, has entirely given up the ground that there
is any constitutional difficulty in the case. He admits that no new
principle is to be recognised, but that the whole question is,
whether a principle already acknowledged shall be applied to a
specified case. In doing this, he acknowledges that all the abuse
which he and others have heaped upon the petitioners for applying
for an unconstitutional exercise of power, is utterly unfounded. The
principle which he admits is properly recognised by the govern
ment, has been acted upon since its formation. It has been adopted by
every State in the Union, and by every incorporated town which has
made any municipal laws to regulate the observance of the Lord's
day. Unless the Reviewer will maintain that government from
the first, has been trampling on the rights of conscience and reli
gious liberty, he must retract his censures, and admit the futility
of his own arguments and those of the chairman of the post-office
committee. How this latter gentleman, with any seriousness,
could ask, as an argument on this subject, how government was to
accommodate all classes of the community, Jews, Mahometans,
seventh day Baptists, &c. ? we are at a loss to conceive. Why
does he not wonder how all these classes are suited at present
with government respecting Sunday, as our Reviewer tells him it
very properly does, in every branch excepting the post-office ?
Can he not see that if they would have any ground of complaint if
the latter department was closed on that day, they have the same
ground already ? The truth is, however, they would have no
reason to complain in either case, as we shall presently show.

504 SUNDAY MAILS.
We are equally at a loss to imagine how a gentleman of any dis
crimination could ask, " Why the petitioners have confined their
prayer to the mail ; why they have not requested that government
should be required to suspend all its executive functions on that
day ; why they have not required that our ships of war should not
sail ; that our armies should not march ; that the officers of justice
should not seize the suspected or guard the convicted ?" The pe
titioners will allow our Reviewer to answer him. Sunday is to be
observed as a day of rest and worship, unless necessity warrants
a dispensation. Consequently, to ask why the petitioners think
one thing is necessary, when they don't think another so, is not a
very pungent question. It might as well be asked, why they
think it wrong to work on Sunday, if they think it right to take a
cup of water ? Yet this is what the Reviewer calls a cogent ap
peal ! He somewhere remarks, that " honest and sincere men be
come so absorbed and infatuated with their own notions," as to
lose all power of discrimination. If he wishes the benefit of this
remark, we must in courtesy grant it.
The truth is, the grand mistake of the chairman and the reviewer
in all their arguments on this subject is, they think themselves
heathen, whereas, they are Christians; members of a Christian
community, and bound to act accordingly. If they consider this
a misfortune, they can only help the matter by making the majori
ty of the same mind. But as long as the great mass of the people
profess the Christian religion, so long must government respect that
religion. Our legislature, and every other governing body, are
under a two-fold obligation as it regards religion. They are them
selves bound as individuals and as legislators, to act in accordance
with the great principles of moral and religious obligation. This
is a duty they owe to God. And they are, moreover, obliged to
respect the religion of those for whom they legislate. They have
no right to order the violation, on their part, of any of its precepts.
This latter obligation is irrespective of the nature of that religion.
The British government in India has never pretended to the right,
nor would they dare to assume it, of requiring the Hindoos to act
contrary to their faith. And the Emperor Nicholas is obliged to
accommodate his laws to his Mohammedan subjects, as far as they
are concerned. From the fact that our constitution has wisely
placed religion beyond its jurisdiction, it has been strangely inferred
that those who act under it, are authorized to legislate as though
the people had no religion. This is the fallacy of all the reviewer's
arguments on this point. The people, in reserving the care of this
subject to themselves, never intended thereby to authorize the go
vernment in making laws for them, to trample on their religious
opinions. All they desire, and all the petitioners desire, is, that
Congress would let the matter alone. As they have no right
to pass any law in support of religion, so they are not authorized
to make any which interferes with it. If it be proper for them to
pass a law which requires thousands to disregard the Sabbaths or

SUNDAY MAILS. 505
submit to certain disabilities, it is competent to them to pass an act
which visits with similar pains any man who goes to church. So
long as it cannot be denied that Congress legislates for a Christian
people, any law which requires the violation of the Christian reli
gion is oppressive and unjust. But it is asked what government
is to do when the people are of different religions ? We answer,
the principles which should regulate the movements of government
in such cases, are perfectly obvious. In the first place, it should
interfere as little as possible with the opinions of any party. It
should pass no law, except in cases of necessity, which requires the
violation of the precepts of any form of religion its citizens may
adopt. Secondly, as it is clearly impossible to avoid this evil en
tirely, where there are Atheists, Deists, Christians, and Jews, living
together, that course must be pursued which will produce the least
injustice. In a Jewish country, the Jews are to be principally re
garded, and in a Christian country, Christians. The plain princi
ple is, that the religion of the country is to be respected. By reli
gion of the country is meant, not an established religion, but that
which the mass of the people profess. Unless this be regarded,
intolerable oppression must be the result. Acting on the principle
assumed by the chairman and the reviewer, that the government
are to pay as little regard to Christianity as to Judaism, that is, to
the interests of thirteen millions, as those of a few hundred, would
only multiply the evil an hundred fold. It would disfranchise all
the sincere Christians in the land, without the least benefit to the
Jews. But the fact is, no government could exist which acted on
this principle. Our own has always been wise enough to know
that they were legislating for Christians, and to act accordingly.
They, therefore, have, in practice and by laws, recognised Christi
anity, and disregarded Judaism. They have acknowledged a God,
and a future state of retribution, to the confusion of the Atheist and
the Universalist. These " theological points " the government
takes for granted as embraced in the religion of the people, and
proceeds upon them as settled. The principle of the chairman is
completely and radically revolutionary. It would change the
whole practice of the government, and overturn it from its very
foundations. Let Congress once announce to the people that they
are to be treated as Atheists ; that their most sacred rights and
opinions are to be trampled in the dust ; and our government is at
an end. This recurrence to first principles, in matters of govern
ment, and pushing them, even when correct, to extremes, is of all
courses the most dangerous, and yet one of the most common
with men of ardent and inconsiderate minds. Because a man's
religious opinions are sacred, and the rights of conscience inviola
ble, it is inferred that the government can pay no regard to Jews,
Turks, Christians, or Infidels, but drive on blindfold, careless
whether its laws clash with the opinions of the hundred or the
million. Yet, acting on this plan would be absurd and impossible.
The same is true with regard to the liberty of the press, the invio-

506 SUNDAY MAILS.
lability of property, and other essential or conventional rights.
They are of necessity limited and restricted, when men live in so
ciety ; and pressing any of them to extremes would ruin any com
munity in the world.
Setting aside, therefore, the obligation which Congress, as Chris
tians, are themselves under to obey the precepts of Christianity, it
is obvious that as long as they are the legislators of the Christian
people, they have no right to pass a law which requires the viola
tion of any of its commands. This, in the judgment of the peti
tioners, they have done ; and of this they complain. Is it a crime,
then, to represent to Congress, that by any law of theirs they en
croach upon the rights of their constituents, that they require of
them what their religion forbids ? The reviewer, however, tells
us that this is not the case ; that every man is free to act as he
pleases. " He is not called upon to do what he thinks wrong ; nor
is he prohibited from doing what he thinks right." " No one re
quires him to depart a jot from his principles, or to violate his sense
of duty." The law does not force him to be a mail contractor, nor
a postmaster ; neither does it require him to get his letters or papers
on Sunday. This is all true. Let us apply this principle to other
cases. Suppose a law passed ordering both houses of Congress to
sit on Sunday ; the president, heads of departments, all clerks and
minor officers, all judges from the highest to the lowest, to disre
gard the Sabbath ; and then Congress to tell their Christian con
stituents that they need not act against their conscience ; the law
does not require any man to be either a senator or a representa
tive ; nor does it force him to accept of any office, from the presi
dent to a tide-waiter. If any of them have a cause pending in
court, they need not prosecute it on Sunday ; should it happen to
be called up, they can easily submit to be non-suited. A lawyer
need not take a case likely to come to trial on that day. All tha
such persons have to do is to renounce all places of honour, power
or profit : submit to be defrauded at every turn, and allow those
" less scrupulous " to govern them. Strange liberty and equality,
this, in a Christian country I This course, which would disfran
chise millions of the people ; which would visit religious opinions
with civil pains and penalties the most disgraceful ; which would
be a test-act of infidelity, according to the principles of the review
er, is true liberty, good enough, at least, for petitioners. We rather
suspect those same Calvinists whom the reviewer beards so unce
remoniously, would find such a law as hard to bear as they did the
stamp-act of old. That such enactments are in fact test-acts, needs
no proof. Any law which prevents access to office to men of a
certain creed, is a religious test. Our reviewer might have com
forted the Irish Catholics, as he now consoles American Christians,
by telling them they were " not required to do what they thought
wrong, nor prohibited from doing what they thought right." What
could they wish more ? They need not take the offensive oath ;
all they had to do was to stay out of parliament, and let the less

SUNDAY MAILS. 507
scrupulous manage matters for them. Strange doctrine for free
men ! Strange instructions for an American Congress ! It is un
deniable, that the post-office law, as far as it goes, is a law of pro
scription, a religious test administered to every servant of the de
partment. So far, therefore, is the assertion, that the petitioners
apply for a law to deprive any man of a right, from being correct,
that their application is only for the repeal of an act which deprives
a large body of our fellow-citizens of their rights. But the re
viewer tells us he has a right to have his letters on Sunday, and
therefore a law forbidding him to get them is injurious and oppres
sive. If he has this right, it is more than any other man in the
land has. Who gave him the right in a Christian country, to re
quire the government, or any individual, to wait on him on Sunday ?
Must other people violate their sense of duty for his accommoda
tion ? Has he a right to have a cause tried on Sunday ? Can he
force Congress to receive a petition or perform any of its functions,
on that day, in his behalf? If not, whence does he get the right
to make government carry letters for him, or to employ persons to
deliver them on Sunday ? No such right exists.
The fact is, the reviewer knows, as well as we do, that all his
arguments on this head are not worth a straw. He cannot help
knowing it ; because he himself has placed the whole subject on
its proper basis. He tells us that Sunday, in this country, is to be
respected by the people and government, as a day devoted to rest
and worship, except when public or private necessity forbids.
And, consequently, the whole question about the mail is, whether
this necessity exists. If this be once made out, there is not a
Christian in the land who would utter a syllable of objection. As
this, according to his own showing, is the real point at issue, he
must be able to see, that all arguments to prove that granting the
prayer of the petitioners would be an interference with the rights
of conscience, and requires an unconstitutional exercise of power,
are in direct contradiction to his own doctrine, and bear with all
their force on the practice of government in all the other depart
ments. He must see, too, that if his principles were applied to
the other branches of the State, the result would be a most odious
proscription and tyranny, a test-act more offensive than has ever
yet disgraced a Christian country.
We have dwelt on this subject much longer than we at first in
tended. It is, however, one of incalculable importance. Did the
petitioners not believe that the Sabbath was divinely appointed, as
the great means of preserving religion and good morals, that its
influence was essential to the well-being of society, Congress
would never have heard one word of remonstrance or complaint.
No selfish motive can, with the least semblance of truth, be im
puted to them. If stopping the mail on Sunday would occasion
all the inconvenience which is predicted, they would bear their full
share of the burden. Seeking such an object as the best interests
of their country, by means obviously just and proper, is surely not

508 SUNDAY MAILS.
a crime of sufficient magnitude to justify the amount of vulgar
abuse which has been heaped upon them. So long as this was
confined to papers confessedly hostile to all religion, and to many
of the most sacred institutions of society, it was not a matter of
suprise. Nor did we wonder that the chairman of the committee
of Congress should allow himself to stray from the real point in
hand, into a disquisition on the diversity of religious creeds, and
the value of religious liberty. Such things are common in reports.
But that a work, of the standing of the American Quarterly Re
view, should present its readers, not with a fair discussion of the
question at issue, but with an article in which the religious princi
ples of a large part of the community are ridiculed, their motives
vilified, and their general character defamed, is a matter of un-
mingled regret. It would seem as though, by a strange mishap,
some stray sheets from pens under the influence of a nameless
female, had found their way into the mahogany escritoir of the
unsuspecting editor. The tone of a book cannot be quoted. A
specimen we are bound to give, to justify a charge so serious, and
so derogatory to the respectability of the work. On page 186, the
following passage occurs : " It is your man-gods, who make such
laws, and impiously assume the power to condemn and inflict awful
penalties upon those they shall adjudge to violate them ; while with a
most impudent self-complacency, they find an expiatory apology for
their own deviations. The stern and cruel severity with which these
self-righteous expounders of the law visit its utmost rigours upon
all who dissent from their opinions, warrants us in probing their
pretensions to the quick ; and in searching their lives to see if the
fruit shows the tree to be better than those they would cut down
and cast into the fire. Admitting that there are pure and bright
examples of a good life among the terrorists — not, however, more
or better than are found among their opponents — if we look at
them individually, we shall see them, generally, as devoted to
worldly wealth and enjoyments ; as solicitous for distinction and
influence ; as easily and happily puffed with pride and conceit ;
and as mere creatures of flesh, as those they pity or spurn, be
cause, forsooth, their pretensions to sanctity are not so lofty — or
their notions of Christianity so mysterious as their own ; nor their
observances and deportment squared by the rule they have adopted.
They are as impatient of injuries ; as vindictive in their passions ;
as unforgiving in their temper ; as sordid and penurious ; as keen,
close and avaricious in their dealings ; as hard creditors ; as in
flexible and unpitying in exacting their rights. But all this offends
no law of the land, and is not forbidden by the Decalogue, as they
interpret it ; but to step into a steamboat on Sunday ! that is the
fatal sin, and must be expiated by eternal torments. The religion
of such men is satisfied by a hard and austere observance of the
Sabbath, which happens to fall in with their taste ; by professing
a belief in certain sectarian tenets, which they do not understand ;
with occasional ostentatious donations to institutions which flatter

SUNDAY MAILS. 509
their vanity by adulatory resolutions, and give them importance by
a pompous publication of their piety and generosity."* Such lan
guage the petitioners may well pity, and will, doubtless, readily for
give; more readily, we trust, than the reviewer can forgive him
self, or regain his self-respect. On page 190, he says, " Assuredly,
a Calvinist would hold it to be a much more important service to
religion, to prohibit all men from an attendance on an Unitarian or
Catholic church, than to stop the mails and steamboats on Sunday ;
and, therefore, in his own principles of duty, he would not only be
willing, but bound to prevent it, if he could. And he refrains
from the attempt, only because there is a stronger power over him ;
but if he can hoodwink or break that power in the one case, there
is no security in it for any other ; and we shall hold all these rights,
not on guarantee of the Constitution, but at the discretion of legis
latures, to be acted upon by popular feeling and interests." This
is a bold assertion, not with that boldness which is required to
meet danger with unconcern, but that which enables a man calmly
to contradict truth and history to the face. There are several mil
lions of Calvinists in this country, and the assertion is not true of any
one of them, we verily believe. Before the reviewer can prove
that Calvinists are particularly inclined to tyranny, he must blot
out all the record of the past. They have, notoriously, been the
staunch advocates and champions of liberty. The Calvinist Hamp
den was pleading and dying for the liberty of. the world, while the
infidel Hobbes was writing and raving for passive obedience.
The liberty secured by Calvinists has given birth to all the world
now enjoys. Calvinistsf gave the world the Reformation, and
England her constitution. They have ever been in advance of the
rest of the world in the principles of toleration. Do Unitarians
suffer from Calvinists here, in the nineteenth century, what Calvin
ists are now suffering from Unitarians in Switzerland ? Take
them, age for age, with others, and for the solitary victim to their
bigotry you will find hecatombs of martyrs. No man, with the
light of history before his eyes, would hesitate to prefer leaving
life, honour, or property, in the hands of the strictest Calvinists of
the age, rather than in the power of those " less scrupulous " per
sonages, whom the reviewer has taken under his especial favour.
* The committee of the House of Representatives, speaking of these same persons,
' say, " It is believed, that the history of legislation in this country affords no instance
in which a stronger expression has been made, if regard be had to the numbers,
wealth, or the intelligence of the petitioners."
f In the sense of the reviewer.

ESSAY XX.
BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT *

During the years 1800, 1801, 1802, and 1803, a revival of reli
gion occurred in the southern and western sections of Kentucky,
or what is generally known as the Green River country. The
principal instruments were the Rev. Messrs. M'Gready, Hodge,
Rankin, and M'Gee. The first named individual was in the van.
He was a devout, evangelical, powerful preacher ; a pupil of Dr.
M'Millan, lately deceased. These men, let it be recollected, were
the original leaders and abettors of the subsequent irregularities
and disorders of the Cumberland Presbytery, which will be no
ticed hereafter. Previous to this revival of religion, Kentucky, and
all this western region, was in a state of great coldness and declen
sion. The country was new, and a heterogeneous mass from all
quarters had pressed into it. Presbyterians, both clergy and peo
ple, were very formal. Sacramental services were very long, and
often irksome, and apparently unedifying, or rather uninteresting,
to the large mass of attendants. Communicants were heads of
families generally ; rarely was there to be seen a young person at
the Lord's table. The services were conducted on the plan sug
gested in our Directory for Worship, chap, viii., sec. 6. The Sab
bath was occupied in preaching, fencing, and serving the tables, as
it was called, from five to eight hours. The communion was held
twice in the year in those churches which had stated pastors or
supplies, and in many churches only once in the year. Such
was the state of things when the revival commenced, which was .
some time in the year 1799, in the region before mentioned. The
population there was sparse at that time, and widely scattered.
The work, at first, was no doubt a glorious work of the Spirit of
God. The calls for ministerial labour were so great and extensive,
that it was impossible for the few clergymen, recently settled there,
to supply the demand. This circumstance suggested the idea of
protracted meetings ; that the ministers might have the opportuni-
* The article here reprinted was originally in the form of a letter, from one who
was well acquainted with the facts detailed. These are highly instructive, and ought
to be recorded and remembered for the benefit of the coming generation.

BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT. 511
ty of meeting people at one time and one place. There were then
no missionaries to go from place to place, and preach to the scat
tered population. And, inasmuch as no neighbourhood had a popu
lation sufficient to support so many people as assembled on those
occasions, this gave rise to the plan of camp-meetings. A grove
was selected ; " a pulpit of wood," or, as we generally term it, a
stand, for the clergy, was erected. The multitude who intended
to be stationary, located themselves, with their wagons, carriages,
or tents, in such places around the stand as their fancy or conve
nience dictated. The assembly was often so great that secondary
stands were erected : the congregation divided, so that three or four
preachers were discoursing at the same time, in different parts of
the grove. Here was the commencement of disorder and confu
sion. The sermon had scarcely commenced, when some one or
more would become the subject of bodily exercise. This was
commonly called the falling exercise ; or, as it was often said, such
and such an one was " struck down." We cannot better describe this
exercise than Dr. M'Millan has done, in his letter to President Car-
nahan. " It was no unusual thing to see a person so entirely de
prived of bodily strength, that they would fall from their feet, or
off their feet, and be as unable to help themselves as a new-born
child. We have seen some lie in this condition for hours, who yet
said that they could hear everything that was spoken, and felt their
minds more composed, and more capable of attending to divine
things, than when their bodies were not thus affected. As far as we
could observe, the bodily exercise never preceded, but always fol
lowed, upon the mind's being deeply impressed with a sense of
some divine truth." Another fac simile, if we may so call it, you
may find in Mr. Gulick's letter, written on the Island of Kauai. See
Miss. Herald, vol. xxix., p. 404. " Some were seized with a kind
of convulsive trembling; and in a few cases, overcome by their
feelings, they fell prostrate on their faces, and lay for a length of
time weeping in a most affecting manner. And what, in our esti
mation at least, renders this work the more remarkable is, that
many of these very persons who now felt so deeply, have, for
years, been in the habit of hearing the most solemn and alarming
truths in the Bible without the least apparent emotion. But now,
without any special cause of excitement or alarm from us, they are
thus deeply affected." But now, as we conceive, commenced the
principal mischievous measure. When any one would become the
subject of this bodily exercise, immediately a group would collect
around, and commence singing, and then praying, and then exhort
ing. Many instances of this kind obtained in different parts of the
congregation all at the same time. Hence it happened, that,
throughout the assembly, as far as the eye could reach from the
stand, there was a continual commotion and confused noise of
preaching, exhorting, singing, praying, and shouting, going on at
the same instant. Many, from curiosity or anxiety, were seen con
tinually running from one group to another ; so that the multitude

512 BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT.
was in a perpetual state of commotion and agitation. This scene
of things continued day and night, with little or no abatement.
The ministry rather yielded up the reins to the multitude, who,
being carried away with such a state of things, considered the pul
pit of little account, if any at all. Indeed, preaching, especially of
the didactic character, was considered a great hindrance to the pro
gress of the revival. This sentiment was not confined exclusively
to the populace, for some of the leading and most popular preach
ers gave way to the opinion that such kind of preaching was rather
an interruption to the great work that was then going on. Hence,
the most zealous, arrogant, and enthusiastic of the laity, finding the
ministry ready to surrender their posts, very naturally took the
whole management of the service out of their hands, and controlled
it at pleasure. Moreover, if a minister, however evangelical in
faith and practice, did not come " fully up to the mark," i. e., if he
expressed any disapprobation, ministered any caution, attempted to
correct any extravagances, he was not only set down immediately
as being hostile to the revival, but even interrupted and prevented
from proceeding in his discourse, by some of the multitude, who
commenced singing, or praying, or exhorting, or shouting, which
ever was, at the time, found most convenient, by the leaders of such
disorder. It was, ultimately, out of this hot-bed of wild enthusiasm
and disorder that there sprung up that fruitful crop of heresy and
schism that afterwards assumed the shape, as well as the name, of
New Lights, Schismatics, Marshallites, Unitarians, and Shakers.
By these heresies the Synod of Kentucky was deprived of eight
members, viz : Marshall and Thompson (who afterwards recanted
their errors and returned), Stone, Dunlavy, M'Namer, Huston,
Rankin, and Bowman. All these, except Stone and Bowman, be
came Shakers. For a particular account and description of bodily
exercises, as they were perpetuated and fostered among the New
Lights, after they became a separate and distinct body, being ex
cluded from our church, we refer to the " Evangelical Record,"
p. 217, written by M'Namer, while one of that party, or perhaps
after he turned Shaker. The description is indeed ludicrous, but
so far as our knowledge and observation extended at the time, we
cannot detect anything incorrect in the statement. We do not con
sider it exaggerated or too highly colored. As to these extrava
gances, the Presbyterian church by this time began to pause, and
look on these scenes, as they were fully acted out by the New
Lights, with a degree of wonder and disgust. Still there was
enough, and more than enough, among ourselves, to make us blush,
on a review, and excite in us a desire to hide our mother's naked
ness if we could. The work was conducted by Bishop and M'Chord.
We return to the revival scenes.
We have seen the origin of camp -meetings, which have so much
importance now attached to them. They originated in the Presbyte
rian church from necessity ; and this necessity, perhaps, at the time,
justified the measure. And so long as they were confined to the

BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT. 513
circumstances which seemed to call for them, were extensively ac
commodating, and thought to be highly beneficial. The meetings,
at first, were awfully solemn ; and no doubt much good was done.
But when they were extended, and adopted in the more populous
parts of the; country, where they were attended by thousands and
tens of thousands, induced by every motive good or bad, together
with the lax and irregular management of them, they exhibited too
much the appearance of disorder and confusion, which baffled and
defied all description. It is proper to remark, however, that the
form and arrangements of camp-meetings now, differ very much
from those in former days. Then, the people came together with
out any shelter but their wagons and their tents, erected where con
venience or fancy might dictate. They brought provisions for them
selves and horses, and whatever else was thought necessary to
their continuance on the ground for many days. Now, the plan
of temporary buildings of small log huts, in regular order, around
the stand, and the space where the congregation is to assemble, is
adopted. Order and solemnity generally prevail, and are carefully
inculcated and constantly maintained. Formerly, as we have seen,
it was entirely the reverse. As for the comparative good or evil
attending camp-meetings, we have nothing to say, as my acquaint
ance with such meetings is very limited. They appear to be
lauded or condemned, according to the opinions and prejudices of
their advocates or opponents.
We confess ourselves much at a loss to know the proper shape and
size of the subject now before us ; how far the plan of this history
should extend ; what to set down, and what to omit. To descend
to particulars and minute circumstances, would not be agreeable
to the feelings of some yet living ; nor do we know that it would be
edifying. We will state a few facts and anecdotes, connected with
the subject before us. The writer was licensed to preach in April,
1803 ; both before and after which, he witnessed many things, the
detail of which would make a little volume. The largest meeting he
attended was in June, 1801, atCaneridge, Bourbon county, where B.
W. Stone was then pastor. The exercises, as well as the encamp
ment, were such as are described above. Many appeared to
be deeply affected ; and many had fallen down. There was much
singing, praying, exhorting, &c, at tents, at the meeting-house, and
every place where small groups were assembled around one or
more of the persons who were "struck down." Subsequently,
during the years 1802 — 3, we witnessed many cases of bodily exer
cise, the most of which, we have reason to believe, were entirely
involuntary; while some others, we thought, were the reverse, i. e.,
either the persons conceited, or fancied themselves under exercise ;
or desired to be, and therefore sought for it, and yielded to the first
impulse, which might, however, have been successfully resisted.
Many persons, within my knowledge, became hopefully pious, the
most of whom continue unto the present, and many have fallen
asleep in Jesus. The number of apostasies was much fewer than
33

514 BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT.
might be supposed. Indeed, when we look back on those times, we
greatly wonder that there were not ten for one. The Presbyterian
church suffered greatly, lost many members, more ministers, pro-
portionably, than others : but she continued unconsumed, and was
much better prepared, by practical knowledge, and dear-bought
experience, for the next revival than she was before. But to our
narrative. A contemporary brother minister, by our request, has given us,
in substance, the following facts. The first personal knowledge
he had of any of the subjects of the revival was in the winter of
1800 — 1, near the borders of the State of Tennessee. Shortly
after the people began to assemble, two or three persons appeared
to swoon away, and after lying fifteen or twenty minutes, appeared
to be wholly convulsed, some more than others. His attention
was particularly called to a young female, who, after some time
lying apparently motionless, began to move her lips. On a near
approach, he found himself the subject of her prayer ; from which
it appeared that she was under the impression that he had come a
considerable distance, and from a cold region, to see the great
work that was going on in that place. And she prayed fervently
that he might not be disappointed. When she recovered, and re
sumed her usual posture, and state of mind, there was great solicitude
manifested by her minister, and others, to know the result of her
exercise, what she had seen, &c. She informed them that she had
seen that they were to have a glorious meeting that day, and the
minister (Mr. Rankin) said he had no doubt of it. In that same
place, there were others who saw, during their exercises, as they
expressed themselves, certain persons (who were yet unconverted),
in the act of preaching, and a very great work going on under their
ministry ; and they appeared to expect it with as much certainty
as if it had been revealed to them from heaven. At that time and
place, there was a considerable mixture of wheat and chaff. On
the one hand, there was manifestly an anxious disposition to con
verse on religious subjects, particularly about the experience and
exercises of the heart ; a close attention to the preaching of the
word, with apparent desire to profit thereby. There appeared
among many a docile temper, a spirit of inquiry, with fervent
prayer and cautious zeal. On the other hand, there was a prevailing
sentiment, that the subjects of the revival had more than common
attainments in evangelical knowledge and piety ; that the millen
nium was just at hand, even at the door ; of which fact these extra
ordinary exercises were certain precursors and evidences. These
and such like extravagant notions were, of course, attended by an
arrogant boldness and self-importance, which did not savour of the
religion and spirit of Christ. Social meetings catechetical instruc
tion, &c, were almost, if not altogether neglected. As before in
timated, the intervals between sermons were occupied by the
multitude in various exercises. The ministers took, comparatively,
but little interest in conducting the worship, except in the time of

BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT. 515
preaching, which occupied but a small portion of the twenty-four
hours. The rest of the time was spent as before described, sing
ing with great fervour and animation, shaking hands all through
the crowd, praying by fifties and hundreds all at the same moment.
Such scenes we have often witnessed. Young converts were often
seen passing through the assembly, and on the outskirts thereof,
exhorting sinners, in a very lofty tone, and peremptory manner, to
fly from the wrath to come. Others would pray for hours together,
until they were exhausted ; and when they could stand up no
longer, they would sit down, or recline on some other person, and
then pray, or exhort, until completely exhausted ; so that nature
could exert itself no further. These exercises were greatly ap
plauded, and highly approved, as being not only certain evidences
of the gracious state of the individuals themselves, but, likewise,
as eminently useful and instrumental in furthering the revival.
When some of the elder brethren were inquired of about the expe
diency and propriety of correcting some extravagancies which
appeared wild and visionary, their reply was, in substance, that
they knew these things were not right ; but should they interfere
by attempting to rectify them at that time, it might interrupt, if not
stop, the revival altogether. Here the ministry, however good the
intention, was much at fault. The surrendering up the control
and management of the religious exercises into the hands of mere
novices, or such as were unskilful and inexperienced, was the very
inlet or gateway to those errors and extravagancies that soon fol
lowed. There was, if we mistake not, one general, prevailing, pro
minent feature attending this revival everywhere ; it was the
strange, mistaken disposition, in a very large portion of the people,
to undervalue the public means of religion, and, in the place thereof,
to promote a kind of tumultuous exercise, in which themselves
could take an active part, if not become the principal leaders.
Hence, some of these would-be-leaders have been known to lie
down and sleep in the time of preaching, and during some of the
most serious and solemn addresses, and as soon as the sermon was
over, suddenly rise to their feet, and sing, and shake hands, and
pray, and exhort, with all the apparent energy of a saint or mes
senger from heaven. The wild fanatical notions of some were
manifested by their believing themselves under obligation to go,
acqording to certain impressions, which they considered to be from
heaven ; namely, that they must go to certain places, and say and
do certain things, and that it must be done and said at a certain
time, &c. Many such things as these, which would be tedious
and unnecessary to detail here, obtained and prevailed in this
revival. We proceed to relate a case or two, respecting the exercise called
the "jerks." This succeeded some time after the falling exercise,
and, I believe, had its origin in East Tennessee ; at least it was, to
use a commercial phrase, first imported into Kentucky from that
quarter. It affected the good and the bad, the aged and the

516 BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT.
young. It was entirely involuntary, dreaded and hated, and even
cursed by some ; while it was desired, and courted, and highly
prized by others. It came on something like the hiccough, without
any premonitory symptom, and left the subject equally without any
sensible effect. During its prevalence, we made several experi
ments; being inexperienced in the ministry, we knew not what
to do with it. While preaching, we have, after a smooth and
gentle course of expression, suddenly changed our voice, and
language, expressing something awful and alarming, and, in
stantly, some dozen or twenty persons, or more, would, simul
taneously, be jerked forward, where they were sitting, with a
suppressed noise, once or twice, somewhat like the barking of
a dog. And so it would either continue or abate according
to the tenor or strain of my discourse. The strong sympathy,
and intimate correspondence between the mind and body, was
fully manifested, by this experiment producing the exhibition
Which immediately followed. The first subject of this exercise
that attracted our attention, was the pious wife of one of our
elders. She was affected by this operation very gently, she felt
no pain whatever, but rather the reverse — a pleasing sensation
— could give no satisfactory account of its operation. She went
to the country village, on a public day, to do a little shopping ; we
accompanied her on our way home. She was entirely free from
any operation of the jerks. We therefore determined to try
an experiment, conversed freely and somewhat jocularly with her
on secular matters, to divert her mind as far off in that direction as
we thought necessary, and then immediately changed the subject to
that of a very serious and solemn character. We are certain, not
two minutes had elapsed, before she was considerably affected with
this exercise. Her body, from the saddle and upwards, appeared
to pitch forward half way to the horse's neck, six or eight times in a
minute. We were fully satisfied she could not prevent it. Our mind
became, some time after, greatly perplexed about this exercise. We
could not encourage it, and yet, being a young minister, we were
afraid to say anything against it publicly, as it had many friends
and advocates. At length it was found to be detrimental in various
ways ; besides interrupting public worship, it deterred many from
attending altogether, being impressed with the belief that it was
"catching." But it was not confined to the public assembly ; it
invaded the private and domestic circle, while engaged in domestic
business, or travelling on the road. The same individual was fre
quently the subject of it, young and old, male and female, refined
and unrefined, the pious and the wicked, were alike under its ope
ration. Take another singular case, stated to us by Mr. M'Gready. A
young man, son of an elder, to avoid attending a camp-meeting in
the neighbourhood with the family, feigned himself sick. On the
morning of the Sabbath, he continued in bed, until the family had
all started for the meeting ; he being left alone, except a few small

BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT. 517
blacks. When thus alone, he congratulated himself on his success,
by the deception he had practised on his parents. He raised up
his head, and looking all around his room, smiled at the adventure ;
but lest it might not be complete, lest some one might have occa
sion to linger or return, and so he be detected, he resumed his clini
cal position, covering over his head, and in a short time directed
his thoughts towards the camp ground. He fancied the multitude
assembling, the services commenced, the bodily exercises, as he
had seen them, now in operation. He fancied a certain female
now in full exercise ; " now she's at it, now she's at it." In a mo
ment he was taken with the same exercise (the jerks), was hurled
out of his bed, and jerked hither and thither, all around the room,
up against the wall, and in every fashion. He had never been
affected by bodily exercise before, but now found himself perfectly
unmanageable. He had heard it said, and indeed witnessed the
fact, that praying would cause the jerks to cease. He tried it ; the
desired effect followed immediately. He felt no more the effects
of the exercise than a person does after the hiccough. He sup
posed it all a dream, a mere conceit, illusion or something of the
kind, resumed his bed, commenced his pranks again, and again was
the scene acted over, only a little worse. The same remedy was
resorted to, and he again became in statu quo. He arose, dressed
himself, sauntered about awhile, wanted some employment to pass
the time away, bethought himself of' a dog-skin in the vat, that
needed unhairing, drew it out, laid it on the beam, rolled up his
sleeves, grasped the graining knife, lifted it up to make the first
scrape, when lo, it was instantaneously flirted out of his grasp, and
he was jerked back, over logs, against the fence, up and down, un
til he resorted to his old remedy and again obtained relief. Feel
ing as before, perfectly free from any sensible or evil effects, as
strong, and resolute, and determined, and reckless as ever, he ven
tured again. He assumed his instrument, and resumed his posture
over the subject of his intended operation, when immediately, be
fore] he could make one stroke, the whole scene, only if possible
tenfold worse, was acted over again ; it was much more severe,
and greatly protracted. The usual remedy, at first, failed ; he be
came alarmed, thought the Lord was now about to kill him, be
came deeply convicted of his great folly and wickedness ; became
composed again in body, but now greatly agitated and concerned
in mind ; called a little black, pointed him to the dog-skin, which
he was afraid now to approach, directed where to lay it away, re
turned to his room weeping and crying to God for mercy, and in
this condition was found on the return of the family. He shortly
afterward obtained a good hope through grace, applied for the privi
leges of the church, gave this relation of facts to the session, was
received, and in the judgment of Christian charity, gave satisfac
tory evidence by a scriptural experience, and godly living, that he
was a renewed man and redeemed sinner saved by grace.
We shall add only one case more. One evening we rode

518 BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT.
six miles up Green river, and preached at a Mr. M'Whorter's,
in a Baptist settlement. The house was crowded. The people
were attentive, until we had finished the discourse and had prayed,
and were about to sing the last hymn, but were forestalled by an
enthusiastic kind of man, who started a song with a lively tune.
Several young women began to jerk backwards and forwards.
The seats were immediately removed, to afford room and prevent
them from being hurt. One young woman had what we would call
the whirling exercise. She went round like a top, we think at least
fifty times in a minute, and continued, without intermission, for at
least an hour. It exceeded by far, anything of the kind we had ever
witnessed. We were told she had had the jerks nearly three years.
She did not appear exhausted ; complained of pain or distress if the
bystanders did not continue singing. We became perfectly tired, our
preaching seemed to be all gone, and to have been rather in the
way, from what took place afterwards. We remonstrated with some
of them, and cautioned them. Thus you see this exercise con
tinued, more or less, in one or another place for a long time. It,
however, in the general, gradually disappeared, especially from
the Presbyterian church ; and thus afforded us a very happy relief.
We were heartily glad when it was entirely gone. After all these
novelties left us, the church, like one enfeebled and exhausted, sank
down into formality and apathy. After she had passed through
the fire, she came forth more refined as to doctrine and sound
ness in the faith. For nearly twenty years afterwards was she
without a revival. But blessed be God, she has recovered, and
her borders have been greatly enlarged, and her stakes strength
ened ; and we trust in God she will never see and feel such another
shock. In her wisdom and experience, we believe such things will
never find favour and encouragement again.
The Cumberland business was the last difficulty we had to
struggle with. The original Cumberland Presbytery was one
of our own, formed by the Synod from Transylvania Presbytery,
and shortly after dissolved, being incapable of transacting business.
M'Gready and Hodge acknowledged and renounced their ecclesi
astical aberrations ; Rankin turned Shaker ; M'Gee and M'Adam
were under citation, but never appeared. The whole business
was finished by the Assembly in 1809, and in February, 1810,
the present Cumberland formed themselves into a separate
body. By a subsequent Assembly they have been recognised
as other denominations, such as Methodists, Baptists, &c. Some
of their ministers are more violent against us than the Metho
dists. Their preachers are generally illiterate, and a little more
than semi-Arminian. They have carried off, by their zeal and
name, many members of our church, where we had no ministry.
A friend in whom we can confide lately informed us, that they are
very friendly in Missouri ; co-operate with us heartily in the Chris
tian enterprises of the day ; boldly and successfully combat here
sy ; and appear to manifest great anxiety and desire to become,

BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT. 519
in some way, united with us. But this cannot be, from their pre
sent aspect as a body. Their literary character, as well as orthodox
standard, is too low and uncertain. Should it become expedient
to branch out, in extending the history of the revival (as we wrote
of this before), it will be necessary to trace, first, the New Lights,
the sphere of whose operations was in the eastern section of Ken
tucky, by Marshall, Stone, &c. The Rev. W. L. M'Calla collected
materials for their history before- he left Kentucky, but I know not
what he did with them. Out of these heretics soon sprung the
Shakers, whose history is familiar. The Cumberland is a distinct
branch altogether, gradually rising and growing out of the disorders
which obtained in the Green River country, or further down in Ken
tucky, and in West Tennessee, called Cumberland, we suppose, from
the river of that name, running by Nashville. This accounts for
the name " Cumberland Presbytery," at first given- to that section
of our Synod, and subsequently adopted by the present Cumber-
lands, as they are generally called. In their worship, they are
considered more noisy and disorderly than the Methodists. In
short, to use a homely phrase, they have Presbyterian warp, but
Methodist filling. THE JERKS.
As the facts in relation to these bodily agitations are somewhat
remarkable, we deem it expedient to make some addition to what
is stated above, by our worthy correspondent.
The phenomenon of swooning, or suddenly falling or sinking
down, under religious exercises, has not been uncommon in times
of great excitement, and under very impassioned preaching. Such
occurrences were very frequent under the ministry of Whitefield
and Wesley ; and in this country, during the great revivals which
took place under the preaching of Whitefield, the Tennents, Blairs,
&c, such appearances were of frequent occurrence. The same
was remarkably the fact at Cambuslang and Kilsyth in Scotland,
during the extraordinary religious excitement which took place in
those towns, early in the last century. We have also witnessed
such effects on the body, as occurring very commonly, in the
meetings of the Methodists and Baptists in the south and west. In
the cases which have fallen under our observation, the effect on
the body was entirely involuntary. Sometimes it was preceded
by a universal trembling of the whole frame ; but, at other times,
the falling was as sudden as if the person had been struck with
lightning. In some cases, there followed a convulsive motion
of the limbs ; but most frequently the patient lay motionless, as if
in a swoon. And the only remarkable difference between these
paroxysms and those of common syncope is that, in the former,
the person is not unconscious of what is said and done in his
presence. But the bodily agitation called the jerks is a very different affec-

520 BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT.
tion ; and the only appearance known to us which bears a resem
blance to it is the jumping exercise in Wales, of which Dr. Hay-
garth has given an account in his treatise " On the Effect of the
Imagination in the cure of bodily diseases." The same facts are
referred to in Sidney's Life of Rowland Hill. This extraordinary
nervous agitation commenced, as stated by our correspondent, in
East Tennessee, at a sacramental meeting ; and we have been
informed, that on that day several hundreds of persons, of all ages
and sexes, were seized with this involuntary motion. It was at
first almost uniformly confined to the arms, and the motion pro
ceeded downwards from the elbow, causing the arm to move with
a sudden jerk or quick convulsive motion, and these jerks suc
ceeded each other after short intervals. For some time no reli
gious meeting was held, in which this novel involuntary exercise
was not exhibited by more or less of the audience in that part of
the country where they originated. And, generally, all those who
,had once been the subjects of it, continued to be frequently affected,
and not only at meeting, but at home, and sometimes when entirely
alone. After the commencement of the jerks, they spread rapidly
in all directions. Persons drawn by curiosity to visit the congre
gations where they existed, were often seized, and when they re
turned home, they would communicate them to the people there.
But, in some instances, they occurred in remote valleys of the
mountains, where the people had no opportunity of communication
with the infected. In East Tennessee and the south-western part
of Virginia, their prevalence was the greatest ; and in this region,
persons of all descriptions were seized, from the aged, grey-headed
preacher, down to children of eight or ten years of age. Soon,
however, the " exercise " began to assume a variety of appear
ances. While the jerks' in the arms continued to be the most
common form, in many cases the joint of the neck was the seat of
the convulsive motion, and was thrown back and forward to an
extent, and with a celerity, which no one could imitate, and which
to the spectator was most alarming. Another common exercise
was dancing, which was performed by a gentle and not ungrace
ful motion, but with little variety in the steps. During the admin
istration of the Lord's Supper, in the presence of the Synod of
Virginia, we witnessed a young woman performing this exercise
for the space of twenty minutes or half an hour. The pew in
which she was sitting was cleared, and she danced from one end
to the other ; her eyes were shut, and her countenance calm.
When the dancing terminated, she fell, and seemed to be agitated
with more violent motions. We saw another who had what was
termed " the jumping exercise ;" which resembled that of the
jumpers in Wales. It was truly wonderful to observe the violence
of the impetus with which she was borne upwards from the ground:
it required the united strength of three or four of her companions
to confine her down. None of these varieties, however, were half
so terrible to the spectator, as that which affected the joint of the

BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT. 521
neck. In this, it appeared as if the neck must be broken; and
while the bosom heaved in an extraordinary manner, the counte
nance was distorted in a disgusting way.
Besides the " exercises " already mentioned, there were some of
the most curious and ludicrous kind. In one, the affected barked
like a dog ; in another, they boxed with fists clenched, striking at
every body or thing near to them. The running exercise was also
one of the varieties, in which the person was impelled to run with
amazing swiftness. There were many other singular motions in
imitation of persons playing on the violin, or sewing with a needle,
&c, &c.
The most remarkable circumstance in relation to these various
exercises was, that a person affected with a peculiar species of the
jerks, coming into a congregation where that had not been experi
enced, would commonly communicate it to those who had been
affected with exercises of a different kind. Thus, a lady from
Tennessee, who brought into a certain part of Virginia the barking
exercise, immediately was imitated by certain of those affected
with the jerks, who had never seen anything of this sort before.
These nervous agitations were at first received as something su
pernatural, intended to arrest the attention of the careless multi
tude, and were therefore encouraged and sustained by many of the
pious ; but after a while they became troublesome. The noise
made by these convulsive motions in the pews was such, that the
preacher could not be composedly heard ; and in several of the
exercises the affected person needed the attention of more than one
assistant. Besides, nervous agitation or falling was so easily
brought on by the least mental excitement, even at home, that
many who were the subjects of the jerks became weary of it ;
and, in some cases, avoided serious and exciting thoughts, lest
they should produce this effect. It is remarkable, however, that
they all united in their testimony, that in the most violent and con
vulsive agitations, as when the head would rapidly strike the
breast and back alternately, no pain was experienced ; and some
asserted, that when one arm only was affected with the jerks, it
felt more comfortable than the other, through the whole day. Per
haps this was imagination. In some places the persons affected
were not permitted to come to the church, on account of the noise
and disturbance produced. The subjects were generally pious, or
seriously affected with religion, but not universally. There were
cases in which careless persons, and those who continued to be
such, were seized. The dread of the jerks was great in many,
both religious and careless, and, upon the whole, the effect pro
duced by them was very unfavourable to the advancement of reli
gion. All, however, were not of this opinion. Some who had
much experience of them, continued to speak favourably of their
effects. We have the pleasure of annexing to our account, the statement
of an intelligent and respectable physician, who appears to have

522 BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT.
paid much attention to subjects of this kind. The opinion of such
men is valuable, as they are better acquainted with the physiology
of man than other persons.
The Jerks. — " This affection I have repeatedly witnessed in the
State of Illinois in the years 1822-3-4. The persons subject to it
were principally females in the humbler walks of life, natives of
North Carolina and Tennessee. Young females (say from thirteen
to thirty years old) of sanguine and nervous temperament were
more addicted to it than others. It is equally prevalent among
Methodists and Cumberland Presbyterians. Their discourses are
generally passionate addresses, first to the fears, and secondly to
the sympathies of their hearers. At the conclusion of these ad
dresses, hymns are sung with great animation, the leaders passing
through the congregation shaking their hands. The jerks or falling
generally commence at the conclusion of the sermon and increase
during the singing. Different persons are variously affected :
some rise to their feet and spin round like a top, while others
dance till they fall down exhausted. Some throw back their heads
with convulsive laughter, while others, drowned in tears, break
forth in sighs and lamentations. Some fall from their seats in a
state of insensibility, and lie for hours without consciousness, while
others are affected with violent convulsions resembling epilepsy.
Those habituated to the affection are generally attacked under the
circumstances above detailed, but I have seen some persons who
had become so irritable that the least mental- excitement would
produce the paroxysm. Others appeared to be affected from sym
pathy. 1 have seen several young women of the same neigbour-
hood, who were always attacked at seeing one of their number
with the paroxysm. I have seen others who would be instantly
attacked on seeing any person with the affection without having
any previous mental excitement. During the convulsive paroxysm,
recollection and sensation are but little impaired ; after continuing
a certain period, the person generally falls into a state of stupor
very much resembling that subsequent to epilepsy. Yet the ani
mal functions are. not much impaired, The pulse is natural. The
temperature that of health throughout the paroxysm : after it has
subsided, there is soreness of the muscles and a slight dull pain of
the head, which soon pass away.
" From the sex of those most subject to the affection, the time of
life when they are most susceptible of it, the condition they occupy
in society, the causes which excite it into action, and the effect
produced by the paroxysm, I was led to the conclusion that it was
a nervous disease brought on by continual mental excitement,
and protracted by habit, that after it has once become habitual
from long continued mental excitement, sympathy will be suffi
cient to call it into action without mental excitement.
"Many of the subjects of this affection were addicted to hys-

BODILY EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENT. 523
terics ; and all, persons easily affected by anything exciting the
natural sympathies.
" I have omitted to mention one fact I have often witnessed, viz :
that restraint often prevents the paroxysm. For example : persons
always attacked by this affection in churches where it is encou
raged, will be perfectly calm in other churches where it is dis
couraged, however affecting may be the service, and however
great the mental excitement. Some of them have told me that
such was the fact, and as these were the more intelligent of those
addicted to such affections, I doubt not the truth of what they
said." Reflections. — 1. The first reflection which is suggested by the
preceding accounts is, that the physiology of the human system is
very imperfectly understood.
2. The second is, that an irregular action of the nervous sys
tem produces often very astonishing appearances.
3. Religious excitement carried to excess is a dangerous thing.
Enthusiasm is the counterfeit of true religion, and is a species of
insanity. 4. In revivals of religion, badly regulated, there may be much
extravagance, and yet the work in the main may be genuine.
The wise will discriminate, and not approve or condemn in the
lump. 5. Pious men and women are imperfect in knowledge, and often
form erroneous opinions which lead them astray. Bodily affec
tions, however, are no evidence of error or enthusiasm.
6. Such bodily affections as are described in the foregoing nar
ratives, are no doubt real nervous diseases, which do not destroy
the general health.
7. All such things tend to the discredit of religion, and should
be prevented or discouraged.

ESSAY XXI.

the

HISTORY OF THEOLOGY,
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
BY PROFESSOR THOLUCK OF HALLE.*

Human knowledge is derived from reflection and experience.
The latter supplies the materials, which the former arranges and
systematises. The first step, therefore, in the acquisition of know
ledge, is the collection of facts. But, as our personal experience is so
limited, we must avail ourselves of the experience of others, and
as far as possible of that of the whole race to which we belong.
And although much of this experience may not be immediately ap
plicable to ourselves, it will, in general, be found available to our
purposes, as all men are but one family. It is thus the great ob
ject of history to enlarge and perfect our personal experience by
that of our fellow men. Even profane history furnishes us with an
abundance of facts, illustrative of the nature of man and his rela
tion to God, and from the history of the church we can .learn with
much greater clearness these interesting truths. As in the lives
of individuals there are periods in which they can learn more of
themselves and their relation to God, than in others ; so in the his
tory of the church there are periods -peculiarly rich in instruction.
Such, for example, as the commencement of the Christian era, the
time of the Reformation, and the age in which we live. From the
intimate connexion of events, however, it is difficult to fix with
precision the limits of such periods. The development is not con
fined to one insulated point : although its progress and character
* This essay is a translation made at Halle, in 1827, from a manuscript copy of a
course of lectures delivered by the author, when connected with the university of
Berlin. Any abruptness or want of connexion in the sentences, which may in some
instances be observable, will easily be excused, if it is remembered that these lec
tures were not intended for the press, and that the manuscript which the translator
has used, is a transcript of notes taken in the lecture room. It is probable that the
lectures themselves were never written out in full. — As Dr. Tholuck has had the
kindness to read the translation, however, il is presumed that nothing essential has
been omitted.

THOLUCK S HISTORY OF THEOLOGY. 525
are -more obvious in some portions of the period than in others.
When, therefore, we wish to treat of important portions of ecclesias
tical history, we cannot confine our attention to these portions
themselves, but must review those which preceded them and trace
the causes of the events which we wish to record, and mark their
effect upon following generations. With respect to the history of
our own times we can only review the past, and endeavour to as
certain the causes of the events which we now behold ; their con
sequences we must leave to others to examine.
It is the object of the present course of lectures, to examine the
causes which have produced the present state of religion and theo
logy. This examination will teach us what great lesson God
would have us learn from the present state of the church. For it
is clear from the review of the whole course of ecclesiastical his
tory, that it is the object of divine wisdom to make every age in
culcate some great moral or religious truth. God allows the Gos
pel to come into conflict with all the diversified forms of human
folly and sin, to teach us that it contains the remedy for every
possible form of error and evil, and to make this very conflict the
means of rendering more and more perfect the manner of con
ceiving and presenting its doctrines. In the first ages, the Chris
tian faith, having not yet insinuated itself into the feelings and
modes of thinking of the early Christians, we see the constant
struggle between the free grace of the Gospel and the disposition
to depend upon legal observances. In the second period, we see
the Gospel in conflict with various philosophical systems, some
irreconcilably opposed to it, others attempting an amalgamation
with it, but none of them effecting the purpose of rendering theo
logy at once biblical and philosophical. In the middle ages we
see the corrupted faith and imperfect philosophy of the earlier
periods degenerating into superstition, equally destructive of
genuine faith and true philosophy. In the time of the Reformation,
religion and knowledge appear anew. The doctrines which dis
tinguish this period were truly evangelical, and the theological
systems, biblical, but not entirely free from the fetters of the old
philosophy. To this succeeded the period of strenuous orthodoxy,
and vital piety again declined, leaving nothing but the mere form
of biblical knowledge ; and even this, being destitute of the vital
principle, was less perfect than it was among the reformers. The
period of pietism followed — and orthodoxy was again imbued
with life and restored to the form in which it was held by the re
formers, but not improved. The next period was that of the
theoretical and practical infidelity, and piety again declined in the
Protestant church. Within the last ten years it has been again
revived — and made to rest upon the leading doctrines of the Bible.
Theology is pervaded by a spirit of true religion, and is so ad
vanced, that it has nothing to fear from its opposers.
Through the experience of all past centuries, therefore, the pre
sent age may derive much important instruction, and the almost

526 tholuck's history of theology
universal declension of the period of scepticism now passing away,
has led theologians more carefully to examine what doctrines can
best be made the foundation of a theological system, and are most
essential to vital piety ; and to endeavour so to construct their
systems as to render them proof against all objections. To teach
this lesson appears to be the object of the age in which we live.

I. — conflict between orthodoxy and pietism.
Section I. — The declension of vital piety into mere speculative
orthodoxy. — Period of formal orthodoxy.
As we have already remarked, in order to explain the present
state of religion and theology, we must direct our attention to the
preceding period of scepticism ; for the extent to which infidelity
was then carried, has produced the reaction which we now wit
ness. But the period of scepticism cannot be properly understood
without previously attending to that of pietism and orthodoxy,
which in some measure led to this infidelity. Partly in that pie
tism undervalued the defence of religion by human learning ; and
partly from the defective manner in which theology, as a science,
was presented to the public. The theology or formal orthodoxy
of this period may be traced to the Reformers. It was indeed the
object of these great men to restore the pure doctrines of the
Bible, and to reduce them to a regular system ; but there were
many circumstances in the age in which they lived, which pre
vented them from fully effecting this object. We do not see many
in this period, who seem to have been led to the renunciation of
the Catholic faith, from the inward experience of religion. Those
who had this experience, were the real authors of all that was ac
complished in this eventful era. Yet there were many who re
nounced the Catholic errors upon nothing more than speculative
conviction ; others sought only the liberty of opinion and of worship ;
others were influenced by political motives ; others were carried
along by the general movement, without knowing why or whither.
And here lies the principal reason, that the Protestant church at
this time was far from effecting the general diffusion of true reli
gion. The Reformers laboured indeed assiduously, and in various
ways, to purge the church of the evils arising from this source ;
Luther by making provision for the education of children and
servants ; Melancthon by turning his attention to the schools and
universities; Calvin by the strict church discipline which he esta
blished in Geneva — a model of ecclesiastical polity.
Their object, however, was not attained ; partly on account of
the unsettled state of things produced by the wars of that period,
and partly on account of the numerous controversies in which the
Reformers and their successors were engaged amongst each other.

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 527
In the war which arose out of the league of Schmalcald, Melanc
thon was obliged to flee to Brunswick, and afterwards to Magde
burg ; Bucerus to England ; Chytraeus to Tubingen and Heidel
berg. In this unsettled state, it is evident the interests of the
church must have materially suffered. But further than this, in the
time of Luther, the violent contest between the Lutherans and Re
formed had already commenced. Through this controversy the
parties were more and more separated, and the study of theology
greatly injured, 'by being directed almost exclusively to the sub
jects in debate. Besides this, many parties arose, in the bosom of
the Lutheran church itself, which estranged the feelings of its
members from each other, and fixed their attention upon matters
of minor importance. Melancthon especially appears to have felt
how seriously these controversies interfered with the advancement
of religion. It is known that he was accustomed to write in the
Albums of his friends, A contentioso theologo libera nos, bone Deus !
A paper was found among his effects after his death, stating he
was glad to leave the world, to be beyond the reach of the rabies
theologorum. Under these circumstances it is clear that neither
theological knowledge nor true piety could flourish ; and this was
at once manifested by the character of the works published at this
period. The reformers had clearly taught, that the exposition of the
scriptures was the foundation of all theological knowledge. But this
principle was less and less practically regarded by their followers,
especially in the Lutheran church, where the whole activity of the
learned was expended in polemics. Exegesis and Dogmatic were
extended no further than the defence of the symbolical books, and
were not scientifically studied for their own sake. Exegesis par
ticularly sank into neglect. In the beginning of the 17th century,
few if any lectures were read upon this subject in the German
universities. Spener obtained a command from the elector of
Saxony, that exegetical lectures should be read in Leipzig ; but
when Carpzov commenced reading in obedience to this order, he
was obliged to desist after the very first lecture, for want of
hearers. Spener says, he knew theologians who had been six
vears at the university, without receiving the least instruction up
on this subject. The exegetical books of this period contained
nothing more than the application of the formularies of the church
to the explication of particular passages of the sacred scriptures.
This was, indeed, not always the case, but the exceptions were
few. The Dogmatic was as much confined to the path marked
out by the symbolical books as the exegesis. Melancthon's loci
theologici were thrown aside, and Hutter's loci communes, filled
with scholastic disputations, were adopted in their place. Eccle
siastical history was a defence of Protestantism, and an account of
the controversies between the Calvinists and Lutherans. This de
partment was almost entirely neglected in the 17th century in all
the universities, of which Spener loudly complained. The evils

528 tholuck's history of theology
of the prevalent system were peculiarly manifested in the prac
tical part of ministerial duties, and operated most injuriously on
the piety of the common people. Even in the sermons of Luther
there is by far too much of a polemical character, which, although
it admits of apology, cannot be entirely justified. But in his ser
mons there was always a general practical tendency, which be
came less and less characteristic of those of his followers. The
sermons of the 17th century were generally directed against here
tics, and to the inculcation of a dry system of morals, although
the form of orthodox}- was strictly adhered to. The manner of
preaching was equally forced, delighting in uninteresting gram
matical remarks, or childish playing upon words. The pastor
Jacob Andriae published a volume of sermons in four parts, 1568.
The first part was devoted to the papistical controversy, the
second against the disciples of Zwingie, the third against the fol
lowers of Schwenkfeld,* and the fourth against the Anabaptists.
Artomedes in Koeningsberg published eight sermons, in 1598, on
the Lord's Supper, filled with the bitterest revilings against the Cal
vinists. One of these sermons begins thus, " Against the Holy Sup
per, two bands of the devil are contending, the idolatrous Papists
and the concerted Calvinists. Even the poor heathen Ovid was a
better theologian than our Calvinists." As an example of the
tasteless manner of sermonizing in this period, we refer to a dis
course of Hermann, a preacher in Brieg. in Silesia, upon Zacheus.
His text was, " He was small in person." He divided his sermon
in the following manner:— 1st, that little word he teaches us, per-
sonae qualitatem ; 2d, the little word was, vitae fravilitatem ; 3d,
small, staturae parvitatem. To the exegetical part of the sermon,
followed the practical part, which was commonly equally insipid.
Thus the application made by Hermann of the text, just mentioned
was : 1st, that Zacheus was informator de varietate operum Dei ; 2,
consolator parvorum ; 3, adhortator ut defectum nostrum virtute
compensemus. In the polemical discourses the application con
sisted in the direction of the subject to particular heretics.
Spener also complains greatly of the manner of studying pur
sued in the Gymnasia. In his Piis Desideriis, and in his preface to
Dannhauer's Hodogetic, he says, that in the schools Latin alone is
studied ; Greek is almost neglected, and Hebrew entirely so. The
students proceed to the university without any proper idea of what
theology is, which they regard as a mere task for the memory.
Prayer, meditation, and a holy walk and conversation are regarded
as of little consequence. With respect to the several departments
of the course of study, he says, " the philosophy is nothing more
than dull scholastic formularies, and yet to this branch the great
est portion of time is devoted. Philology is almost unknown ;
* Schwenkfeld was a Silecian nobleman, born in 1490, who separated from the
Lutheran church and founded a distinct sect, distinguished by many mystical doc
trines. — (Tr.)

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 529
many theologians cannot read the Greek Testament. Thetik, or
Dogmatic in its most restricted sense, is regarded as the most im
portant branch of theology ; the quotation of scripture passages
in support of doctrines is little resorted to. Exegesis is only
studied after the student has become a preacher, and even then no
further than to enable him to make out the exposition of his text.
Polemics are regarded as second only to thetik in importance,
although it is difficult to be ever refuting errors when we ourselves
know not the truth. And if the necessity of this branch be ad
mitted, it does not follow that every preacher should be a polemic.
Ethics are not taught at all. Homiletics consist merely in scho
lastic rules for the logical construction of a sermon.
Thomasius, a learned professor of philosophy, published, in 1686,
a work entitled, " Free ideas, pleasant and serious, on all kinds of
new books ;" in which he gives the following description of a can
didate of theology. " He has studied two years the Aristotelian
philosophy, devoted a third to positive theology, the fourth to
scholastic theology, and the fifth to polemic theology. He has
held a long disputation on the importance of metaphysics in refut
ing heretics, is able to prepare a well-wrought sermon, with the
help of philosophy, logical arrangement, and a concordance, and
prepare a refutation of that ' devilish' book of Riehard Simon, the
' Critical History of the Old Testament,' and is all the while an
utter stranger to practical theology."
The better part of the theologians describe also in dark colours
the state of the laity. Thomas Gerhard, a learned and pious the
ologian, says, " even the most constant attendants in church are
very immoral in their lives ; yet, if any one questions their Chris
tian character they are ready to commenee a legal prosecution
against him. Whoever becomes a real Christian is stigmatized as
a Pharisee,* Weigelian, or Rosicrucian." External religion, or
the observance of the rites of the church, was greatly overvalued,
and even the Lord's Supper was greatly abused. One of the
friends of Spener, H. Mueller, complains particularly of what he
calls the four dumb idols of the church; the baptismal font, the
pulpit, the confessional, and the altar.
Section II. — The First Controversy against Formal Orthodoxy,
occasioned by the Revival of Vital Piety, through the instrumen
tality of John Arndt.
In the period of which we have been speaking, many voices
were heard lamenting over the fall of the church. But these com
plaints were generally made so eautiously, and were attended with
so little exertion to correct the evil, that they produced little effect
The first impression of importance was produced by John Arndt,
* Val. Weigel was a preacher in Tschopau, born 1533. His writings speak much
of the " inward light," and' anointing, which he made the great source of religious.
knowledge : his views of the Trinity, and. many other important doctrines, are also.
peculiar. — (Tr.)
34.

530 THOLUCK's HISTORY OF THEOLOGY
who died May 6th, 1621. He was pious from his youth. During
his stay at the university, he manifested peculiar fondness for exe
getical studies, which was then generally the result of real religion.
In Helmstadt he privately interpreted the Epistle to the Romans.
As soon as he entered upon his office as a clergyman, he began to
preach in a biblical manner, especially upon the doctrine of regene
ration. This was an exceedingly unpleasant subject to the ortho
dox, who were accustomed to explain it as nothing more than bap
tism. Arndt possessed the same mildness and modesty which
adorned the character of Spener, connected with more energy of
mind. Neither his excellence nor his vigilance were, however,
able to prevent the attacks of his enemies, in which character the
orthodox very soon appeared. They complained that he required
of men angelic perfection ; they accused him of being an alchy-
mist, and accounted for his liberality by saying that he had dis
covered the philosopher's stone, and could therefore well afford to
dispense his ill-gotten gold. The preachers in Brunswick publicly
warned their hearers against the poison he was disseminating.
After the publication of his book upon true religion, the opposition
became more violent. (This work has been translated into a
greater number of languages than any other human production,
with the exception of Thomas a Kempis's Imitation of Christ.)
The pulpits in every part of Germany resounded with denuncia
tions against him and his doctrines. He was pronounced ajian-
gerous heretic by John Cordinus, a preacher in Dantzig. His
opposers ridiculed his sermons and writings, and were not ashamed
to call this distinguished servant of God, " an ignorant ass." Lu
cas Osiander wrote, in 1623, a long work against him, entitled,
" Theological Reflections and well-intended Christian Admoni
tions." The author accuses Arndt of five distinct and inconsistent
heresies ; making him a follower of the Pope, of Calvin, of Fla-
cius, of Schwenkfeld and Weigel. He goes so far as to say, that
he had blasphemed the Holy Ghost, in ascribing the work of the
devil to God. Tiburtius Rango also wrote a book against him,
entitled, "Christian Prudence, or the Method of treating Errorists
and Heretics."
Arndt's work, however, awakened among all classes throughout
Germany a spirit of anxious inquiry, and many were found willing
to rank themselves among the friends of the author. Among these
were two distinguished men, the Superintendant Scriver,who died
in Magdeburg, 1601, and H. Mueller, who died in Rostock, 1676.
The most important of his followers was Spener, who was princi
pally indebted to his writings for his knowledge of vital piety.
Section III. — Spener and his Labours.
Spener was born in Alsace in 1635. His parents were pious,
and early devoted their son to the sacred ministry. He spent
much of his time in reading the Bible, Arndt's " True Religion," and

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 531
a few devotional books in English. Spener pursued his theologi
cal studies in Strasburg, where he enjoyed the instructions ot
two distinguished theologians, Danhauer and Sebastian Schmidt.
He afterwards studied Hebrew and the Oriental languages with
Buxtorf, in Basle, and was appointed preacher in Strasburg in
1663. In 1666 he received a call to become senior pastor in the
city of Frankfort-on-the-Main. This call he referred to the ma
gistrates of Strasburg, who decided that he ought to accept it.
The first remarkable effect of his labours, which he witnessed, was
in 1669. At this time he preached a sermon upon the righteous
ness of the Pharisees, and that of the true children of God, which
produced a powerful impression upon the whole city. Many who
had been merely formally orthodox were brought to the true love
of Christ, while others declared they would never enter the church
again. Spener now appointed those meetings for social worship
which, on account of the attention which they excited and the
controversy to which they gave rise, deserve to be particularly
noticed. These meetings, which at a later period he held in his
own house, were of a conversational character, in which he spoke
to the persons present on the state of religion in their own hearts,
questioned them in reference to the exercises of the Sabbath, and
endeavoured to ascertain how far his public discourses had been
understood. As these meetings were very soon attacked, Spener
appealed to the symbolical books and the articles of Schmalcald.
In the third part of the 4th article it is said, " Brotherly conver
sation among the members of the church on the word of God, is
an important means of Christian edification." The theological
faculties of the several universities, to whom a reference upon this
subject had been made, returned answers merely requiring that
nothing should be undertaken in those meetings against the evan
gelical church. The answer from the university of Kiel was pe
culiarly favourable. Benedict Carpzov, in Leipzig, afterwards
Spener's greatest enemy, early declared himself in their favour.
He says in his work, " Select Moral Sentences," " No one can tell
how useful these meetings may be, especially when the people
have an opportunity of conversing with their pastor, for it is cer
tain that many will learn in an hour thus spent more than they
would from ten sermons." After some time many of the most re
spectable inhabitants requested that these meetings should be held
in the church. This was accordingly done ; but Spener com
plains, that from this time the blessing which had attended them
ceased : the people were not disposed to converse freely in so pub
lic and solemn a place.
The next important effort of Spener in the promotion of piety,
was the publication of his Pia Desideria, which fell like a spark
of fire upon a parched field. If ever a work was written with
moderation, humility, and love, so as completely to close the mouths
of opposers, it was this. That the so called orthodox became so
violent against such a work, is one of the most melancholy exhibi-

532 tholuck's history of theology
tions of the character of this period. In this book Spener says,
that those in authority appeared in general to know nothing of real
religion, and that they seldom did more than endeavour to maintain the
form of orthodoxy ; that frequently truly pious persons were per
secuted ; that a reformation among the clergy was absolutely ne
cessary ; that, as the case then stood, a man could hardly with a
safe conscience enter the ministry ; that religion was a mere form ;
that many of the clergy were openly irregular in their lives ; that
he who required that Christians should walk agreeably to their
professions was denounced as a Papist or Quaker ; that a most in
ordinate degree of importance was placed upon learning ; that the
clergy were regarded as a priesthood and differed little in their
conduct from the Catholic priesthood, and that there was no pater
nal connexion between them and the laity. All this Spener said,
not in a tone of reproach but of lamentation, and hence it sunk
deeply into many hearts. He received innumerable letters filled
with expressions of gratitude for benefit derived from his work.
Many theologians also at the universities, and among others, Carp-
zov, expressed their approval of this publication. From this
time all eyes in Germany were directed towards Spener, and, as
might be expected, many opponents took the field against him, who
accused him of holding anti-lutheran and heretical principles.
Dilefeld, Diaconus in Nordhausen, wrote a work against him in
1697, entitled, " Theosophia Horbio-Speneriana." The passage in
Spener's book which gave most offence was the declaration that
there could be no true knowledge of divine truth without regene
ration. Dilefeld maintained the contrary, and asserted that Spe
ner's doctrine led to mysticism. Spener defended his opinions in
the book, "General Theology," in which he makes the experience
of practical religion the foundation of all true theological know
ledge. Gradually the good work which he had effected in Frankfort
began to decline ; tares became mingled with the wheat, which
gave occasion to the good to be evil spoken of. At this period
Spener was visited with a sickness which confined him seven
months, and led him to a more thorough knowledge of his own
heart, and of divine truth. In 1686 he was called as court preacher
and member of the Upper Consistory to Dresden. The decision
respecting this call he submitted to the magistrates, who were very
desirous of retaining him in Frankfort ; but having consulted with
several of the clergy whose opinions were in favour of his accept
ance, they decided accordingly, and Spener proceeded to Dresden.
In his first discourse he brought forward what was then the most
important subject, the difference between a dead and living faith.
Within three weeks after his arrival many were aroused from their
former security. Even the Elector, who was openly immoral,
although strenuous in his orthodoxy, was much affected by his
preaching. Spener was entirely free from the pride which distin
guished the clergy of this period, and which led them either to a

in the eighteenth CENTURY. 533
vain display of their learning, or an exclusive association with the
higher ranks of society. They were ashamed to condescend to
the humble duties of catechetical instruction. Spener immediately
undertook this labour, and saw it crowned with the most obvious
blessing. Many of the clergy ridiculed him on this account, and
said that the Elector had got a schoolmaster instead of a court
preacher. Through his influence, however, this mode of instruc
tion was introduced throughout Saxony. He also induced the
Elector to order that exegetical lectures should be read in the uni
versities. In these and various other ways the changes which he
effected were very considerable. In Dresden he had many friends
warmly attached to him ; but the Elector became gradually discon
tented with his earnest preaching, and threatened not to attend his
church ; a threat he finally executed. Spener at this time took a
step for which he would have been entirely inadequate, if it were
not for the assistance of the Spirit of God. He was by nature
exceedingly timid and bashful, but the grace of God made him
bold ; and it is the tendency of all minds, whatever may be their
natural temperament, to come up to the same standard when influ
enced by this grace. He undertook to address a serious remon
strance to the Elector upon his mode of life. The Elector was at
this period entirely estranged from him, and never attended his
preaching. In 1691 Spener was called to Berlin, as member of
the Upper-Consistory and provost of the church of St. Nicholas.
As the Elector was desirous to be freed from him, Spener accepted
the call. The opposition to him in Saxony, supported by the
Prince, was becoming every day more violent. Carpzov wrote
two treatises against him, and excited all the clergy to withstand
his efforts. The enmity of Carpzov arose partly from envy of the
station which Spener occupied, and partly from his disapprobation
of the changes which he had introduced. The labours also of
Spener were producing an effect in Leipzig with which Carpzov
was by no means pleased. Franke, Anton, and Schade, who were
private teachers attached to the university, began to hold meetings
for the practical exposition of the Bible, which Carpzov did not
approve. Spener's influence in Berlin was still greater than that which he
had attained in Saxony. The Elector of Brandenburg, although a
rough man, was very favourable to the promotion of religion, and
was himself easily impressed by the truth. Spener's most impor
tant service was giving a proper direction to the infant university
of Halle. Until this period, the Prussian youth frequented princi
pally the university of Wittenberg, where they were filled with a
bitter spirit of opposition to the reformed. The Elector, who was
exceedingly opposed to controversy about unessential points, was
very desirous that the two communions should live in peace. To
promote this object, he wished to found a university within his
own territories, and furnish it with professors of a better spirit.
Halle was at this time a military academy for noblemen, where

534 tholuck's history of theology
Thomasius, distinguished by his bold and independent spirit of
investigation, executed the office of a teacher. Here the Elector
determined to found his university. In the selection of the profes
sors, he submitted principally to the direction of Spener, prescrib
ing only that they should not be polemics. The providence of
God so directed the efforts of Spener, that he succeeded in obtaining
pious men to fill these important offices. Breithaupt, senior pastor
in Frankfort, and Francke, professor of the oriental languages, and
pastor of the Glaucha church in Halle, were particularly distin
guished for their religious zeal. In 1694, the university was, fully
organized. Spener wrote many devotional books, excited those in authority
to improve the school and church system, received students into
his own house, gave regular biblical instructions, and exerted his
influence to have proper persons appointed to office. The only
trial connected with his situation in Berlin, was the desire of a part
of his congregation to separate from his charge. This arose prin
cipally from the influence of Dr. Schade, the second preacher in
the same church. He was greatly distressed at seeing the num
bers who came to the communion, without appearing to be really
Christians. His anxiety upon this subject was such, that, days
before the administration of the ordinance, his peace was entirely
destroyed, and he would spend the night in weeping and prayer.
Spener in vain endeavoured to compose his mind, and remove his
difficulties. He very unexpectedly published a most intemperate
book upon the subject, in which he called the confessional " the
seat of Satan," and " the pit of hell." Many theologians espoused
his cause ; he was however displaced, and Spener was obliged to
join in the effort to effect his removal. Spener died in 1705, February
5th. The evening before his death he caused the prayer of our
Saviour, in the twenty-fifth chapter of John, to be read to him.
He had never preached upon this passage of scripture, as he said
he could not understand it, and that its contents could not be com
prehended in this world. But now, said he, I am going where all
will be explained.
Spener was not distinguished for his natural endowments. He
had acquired considerable information, particularly of a historical
kind, as is evinced by his work on Heraldry ; but still he was not
preeminent for learning. He was, however, possessed of a clear
judgment, by which he discriminated in every department what
was of most value, and took an impartial view of every subject
He had none of that force of character which distinguished other
reformers. Not impelled' by the ardour of his own feelings, he
could, perhaps, the more purely act under the influence of an im
pulse which came from a purer source: and that he was thus
influenced from above, is evident from his great and effectual exer
tions, notwithstanding the natural softness of his character. This
mildness was, in his situation, of peculiar importance, as the ortho
dox, from their superior numbers and power, would have been able

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 535
effectually to suppress a more virulent opponent. But as it was,
all who were not entirely devoted to the opposite party, and espe
cially the Elector, were disposed to espouse his cause. Spener never
permitted himself to think that he was acting the part of a reformer.
He says, in his " Answers to Cases of Conscience," " I never
dreamt of the folly of undertaking a reformation. I am too sensi
ble of my own weakness, and that I have neither the wisdom nor
power requisite for such a work. I content myself with exciting
those to effect the reformation whom God has called to the work."
And in another place he says, " I find a great deficiency in learn
ing, and other qualifications in myself, of which I have abundant
reason to be conscious, in the discharge of the ordinary duties of
my office ; so that I am often ashamed of my inability to give even
advice. What should I then do, if I should undertake so great a
work ? Especially am I deficient in faith, which, alas ! is so weak,
as to be hardly sufficient, even in matters of small moment, to over
come my natural timidity, much less to make me equal to enter
prises which would require the spirit of a hero ; when the Lord
will restore his church to its proper state, he will choose far differ
ent men than such as I am."
The enemies of Spener opposed him with unexampled virulence.
The most important work written against him was, " The Unani
mous Judgment of the University of Wittenberg," 1698 ; or, with
the fuller title, " Christian-Lutheran Doctrines according to the
Word of God, and the Symbolical Books in opposition to Dr. Spe
ner ; by the Theologians of Wittenberg." In this book, two
hundred and sixty-four heretical expressions are ascribed to Spener ;
such for example, " that believers are free from all human author
ity ; that in a future world we shall be able perfectly to under
stand the nature of God ; that withdrawing from the world pro
motes peace of mind ; that a holy life is necessary to entitle a man
to be called a Christian ; that we can learn much from the Papists
and Quakers ; that all baptized persons are not regenerated."
The great ground of objection was, that Christians were partakers
of salvation even in this world. After his death, the expression of
disapprobation became still more general, and it was a matter of
dispute in the universities, whether it was proper to say, Beatus
Spener. Professor Fecht, of Rostock, published a book, " De Be-
atitudine Mortuorum in Domino," of which he devotes the 34th
section to the inquiry, whether this blessedness can be predicated of
Spener, and decides Quod Non.
The influence and example of Spener called forth the exertions
of many others. Prayer-meetings were established in various
places. Spener had particularly opposed the ambition of the Lu
theran clergy, and defended the rights of the laity, and exhorted
them to apply to the holy scriptures for instruction. This gave
rise to the formation of many private religious meetings, which
must be taken into view, in order to form a proper idea of the his
tory of this period. Such meetings were instituted in Augsburg,

536 tholuck's history of theology
Essen and Darmstadt, after Spener had introduced them in Frank
fort ; when he removed to Saxony, they were introduced there
also, although with much opposition. In 1686, certain private
teachers in Leipzig, as before-mentioned, formed a society for read
ing the scriptures, and for promoting the study of the original
languages of the Bible. In this society, the most distinguished
members were August. H. Francke, John C. Schade, Paul Anton,
Gottfried Arnold. In 1686, Franke visited Dresden, and continued
there some time with Spener, from whom he received a strong
desire to engage in the work of promoting true religion among the
people. On his return to Leipzig, he established a biblical lecture
for the students. Schade and others followed his example. These
meetings were continued several months, without exciting any
attention. But Francke was at last accused of having said that
men might be perfect in this world ; that philosophy was of little
use, and that it was unnecessary to contend against heretics. The
students shared in these reproaches, and it was said that they so
far undervalued the instructions of their professors, that they burnt
the notes they had taken from their lectures. Yet, among the
learned men of the university, there were some who endeavoured
to counteract this opposition, and who maintained that the term
Pietism, which had been given in derision, would, in its best sense,
be applied to Francke and his associates ; of this number was Fel
ler, the professor of eloquence ; his poem, entitled, " The Pietist,"
which gives a correct exhibition of the spirit of this period, is well
known. The name Pietist, from this time, became general in its
application to the friends of true religion. In opposition to this
name, the adversaries of Spener assumed that of Orthodox. The
attention of the court in Dresden was soon attracted to the contro
versy, and issued in 1689, an order to institute an investigation
into what was called " the New Sect." Francke and Schade were
called to undergo an examination, and many witnesses were sum
moned against them. Nothing, however, was testified to their dis
advantage. The university, therefore, informed the court that
nothing improper had there occurred. Thomasius was particularly
active in the defence of Francke. Nevertheless, Francke was for
bidden to continue his lectures, and, in 1690, was called away from
Leipzig upon private business. Schade was still permitted to
pursue his course of biblical instructions, which were attended by
about a hundred hearers. Some of the citizens wished to attend
these lectures, but as they were intended only for the students, and
as disorder might arise from their attendance, Schade discouraged
it. The citizens, therefore, formed a society for themselves, in
which it must be acknowledged that much that was irrregular
occurred, and gave rise to a new alarm. In 1690, therefore, all
such meetings were forbidden. The university of Wittenberg
united with that of Leipzig, in sending a petition'to the elector for
the entire suppression of pietism. In consequence of this petition,
rules and regulations were adopted worthy of a popish hierarchy.

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 537
All was now suppressed ; the pietistical students were obliged to
relinquish their stipendia, and were given to understand, that those
who attended any meetings for devotional purposes, should receive
no appointment to any office. The testimonials for good conduct,
due to them from the universities, were also withheld. But in order
not to be unjust to the opposite party, we ought to inquire whether
much which was really fanatical had not occurred in the meet
ings complained of. This is in itself not improbable ; but if any
thing of this kind had really taken place, we should expect that
some distinct statement of the fact would appear in the official
records of the investigations which were instituted by the public
authorities. But these records contain no allegations against the
pietists of this nature ; they contain no charges which are not
either evidently founded upon perversions, or for preaching what
we believe to be purely evangelical. A student by the name of
Lange is particularly mentioned, to whom the pulpit was for some
time forbidden. In hopes of his reformation he was again per
mitted to preach, and selected for his text Romans viii. 3. In his
sermon, he said " that a penitent heart will perceive a light in
itself, by which it will be led to acknowledge Jesus as its greatest
good in heaven and earth, and burn and beat with love." For
such fanatical expressions as these, the pulpit was again forbidden.
It was particularly objected to the pietistical students, that they
presented themselves as models of Christian character, which was
regarded as a great breach of modesty. Christianity was then
considered as something merely speculative, not to be applied to
the character and conduct of every individual. This controversy
gave rise to many publications. In 1691, Benedict Carpzov pub
lished a treatise, in which he styled the defence of Francke, " a
sinful book." In another treatise, published in 1695, he went so far
as to call Spener " procellam ecclesiae," " turbinem religionis,"
" tempestatem pacis," and even " a disciple of Spinoza."
Beyond the limits of Saxony, we also find that strenuous oppo
sition was made to the religious movement of the day. In Erfurdt,
the elector of Mayence forbade, under a penalty of a fine of a
hundred dollars, every meeting for prayer and reading the Bible.
The professor Manjus, in Giessen, had been accustomed to hold
such meetings with some of the students, for which he was so seri
ously attacked by his colleagues that he was obliged to claim the
protection of the magistrates. In Jena, professor Sagittarius un
dertook the defence of Francke, and said that pietism was nothing
more than vital Christianity ; on which account the elector, John
George III., wrote to the duke of Weimar that he had a disorderly
professor of theology, whom he ought to visit with merited pun
ishment. In Wolfenbuttel several preachers had united to read the
Bible ; the duke sent them word that if they did not discontinue
their meeting they should be deposed. But in Hamburg, more
than in any other place, was the violence of this opposition to true
religion manifested. (We mention particular cases, in order to give

538 tholuck's history of theology
a more impressive exhibition of the spirit of this period.) The
author of the opposition in Hamburg was the learned John F.
Meyer, who had been, at an earlier period, a professor of theology
in Wittenberg, whence he removed to Hamburg, and from thence
to Griefswalder, where he died. He, as many other of the ortho
dox, praised Spener, as long as they themselves were left undis
turbed. But wheil Spener, in virtue of his office, as counsellor in
the Upper-Consistory at Dresden, admonished him on account of
the inconsistency of his life with his orthodox principles, the hatred
of this wrathful and arrogant man became unspeakably violent
against him. It was natural, therefore, that he should oppose him
self to the efforts made by Spener and his friends. In Hamburg
there were two or three ministers more or less favourable to piet
ism — Horbius, brother-in-law to Spener, Winkelman, the learned
editor of the Koran, and Winkler. When Meyer perceived that
they were inclined to Spener's principles his enmity arose against
them, which he endeavoured to vent in the following manner. He
drew up an agreement or declaration, to be signed by the preach
ers in Hamburg, containing a condemnation of all lax theology ; a
profession of adherence to the standards of the church; a rejec
tion of the doctrine of the millennium in all its forms, and a con
demnation of the works of Jacob Boehme. (Spener did not utterly
proscribe the writings of Boehme, and with regard to the millen
nium, he only wished to exclude the grosser and more worldly
ideas often connected with the doctrine.) Horbius would not sub
scribe this declaration, for, although he said he considered the
doctrine of the millennium an error, he was not prepared to con
demn all who adopted it. The dispute arising from this source
widened the breach between the parties. An innocent circum
stance contributed to increase the difficulty. Poiret, a mystic of
the Netherlands, had written a little^work upon the education of
children, called " The Wisdom of the Just." This book, with the
exception of a few mystical expressions, is throughout evangelical.
Horbius presented it as a new year's gift to the parents in his con
gregation. Meyer immediately published the following little work
against him : " A Hastily Composed Warning for the City of Ham
burg, founded upon the Word of God." He represented the book
distributed by Horbius, as containing seven distinct heresies — So
cinianism, Arminianism, Quakerism, Schwenkfeldianism, Weigeli-
anism, Popery, and Petersenism. He complained, that not content
with recommending the Lord's Prayer as useful for children, the
author had attached the following remarks to the recommendation.
First, that God must be praised in the heart ; second, that the heart
must testify its sincerity by obedience ; third, that the grace of
God must nourish the soul ; fourth, must free us from past sins ;
fifth, and preserve us from sinning in future. The blinded zealot
then exclaims, that it was degrading the word of God, and a ca
lumny against it, to attach such conditions to its use. His pharisai-
cal pride and want of charity induced him to endeavour to have

in the eighteenth century. 539
Horbius immediately displaced. The magistrates, wishing to assist
the latter out of the difficulty, advised him to give them an expla
nation. He accordingly declared his entire satisfaction with the
doctrines of the symbolical books, and promised he would not
recommend the work of Poiret any further, but would advise those
to whom he had given it, to discontinue using it. This was far
from satisfying Meyer. He informed the magistrates that he felt
in conscience bound to preach against Horbius, as an arch-deceiver
and fanatic. He called the three clergymen mentioned above,
" lying prophets, and priests of Baal." The people took part with
the orthodox, who made the way to heaven as easy as the catho
lics. They surrounded Horbius, when coming out of church,
shouting Quaker, fanatic, enthusiast, and endeavoured to overturn
his carriage, and assailed him with abusive language. Meyer
preached against him, and endeavoured to present him in a ridicu
lous light to the people. The innocent Horbius was at length
obliged, as a criminal, to fly by night from the orthodox Lutheran
city of Hamburg. It is worthy of remark, that the Reformed never
went to such extremes ; they retained more piety and more learn
ing than the Lutherans.
Section IV. — The Struggle of Piety against the Orthodox, pro
ceeding from the University of Halle.
We have already described the low state of learning at this time
in the universities. The state of religion was not more favourable.
It was rare to meet with any who connected prayer with their
studies, or who read the Bible with any proper feeling of their need
of its precious doctrines. Heinrich Mueller, of Rostock, in a letter
written in 1695, says, " We wish to heal Babel ; oh that she was
willing to be healed I The physician must proceed from the uni
versities, but, alas ! how many universities are Babels themselves,
and are not willing to be healed. When I think of the dreadful
state of these institutions, my heart sinks within me." In Giessen,
John G. Arnold was professor of Ecclesiastical History. He ear
nestly desired to promote the revival of true religion. But the
rough, unbridled and worldly-minded temper of the students affect
ed him so much, that he said he could no longer bear to look on
hundreds of the future shepherds of souls, who had never felt the
least concern for their own. He therefore resigned his office, a
step which cannot be justified, since what is impossible with man
is possible with God; and a favourable change very soon actually
took place.
When this melancholy state both of religion and learning was
thus widely extended, God erected, through the agency of Spener,
an altar in Halle for true theological knowledge, not mere empty
trifling speculations on the form of doctrines. Three men were
called to this university from whom this new spirit proceeded ;
Francke, Breithaupt, and Anton.

540 tholuck's history of theology
A Brief View of the History of A. H. Francke.
He was born in 1663, in Lubeck ; as early as his tenth year he
had serious religious impressions. When a child he used to pray
that God would place him in that situation in which he could be
most entirely devoted to his service. In 1679 he went to the uni
versity of Keil, where he enjoyed the society of professor Korthold.
In 1682 he went to Hamburg, in order to study Hebrew with the
famous proselyte Edzardi. In 1684 he proceeded to the university
of Leipzig, and united himself with those private teachers of theo
logy who felt as he did on the subject of religion. But at this time
he knew nothing of the essence of real Christianity. He has left
us a history of his religious experience, which is published in the
work edited by Knapp and Niemeyer, " Institutions of Francke,"
vol. ii., p. 420. He gives the following narrative of his feelings.
He says his attention was first particularly arrested by reflecting
upon the nature of theology. It occurred to him that there should
be a coincidence between the feelings and objects of the theolo
gians of the present time and those of the apostles. But when he
compared his feelings and objects with those of the first servants
of Christ, he discovered that they were entirely different, that he
was actuated only by a desire of worldly honour and learning. He
determined, therefore, to follow more faithfully the example of the
apostles. During this period he appeared to himself as a child en
deavouring to contend with a giant. Having torn himself from all
the pleasures of the world, he went to Luneburg. Here, after a
few weeks, he was invited to preach upon John xx. 31 : " These
things are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the
Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his
name." By meditating on the passage, he found that although he
did not doubt the truths of the Gospel, he did not believe them with
his whole heart. This produced a struggle which became con
stantly more and more distressing, until at length he was brought
to question not only the divinity of Christ, but the very existence
of God. His peace was effectually destroyed, and he determined
not to preach in the state of mind in which he then was. In the
greatest agony he uttered the prayer, " If there be a God and Sa
viour let him manifest his existence, that I may be delivered from
this misery which I cannot longer sustain." After this prayer he
experienced such a peace of mind, and so much joy, that all his
doubts vanished, and he preached with a conviction of the truth to
which he had before been a stranger. After obtaining this living
faith in Christ, he visited Dresden, and after remaining there two
months with Spener, he went to Leipzig and commenced his lec
tures upon the Bible. When the difficulties arose there he removed
to Erfurdt, and became the pastor of one of the congregations of
that city. He proceeded upon the principles of Spener, and insti
tuted religious meetings among his people. This occasioned a per
secution from his colleagues and the magistrates, and he was or-

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 541
dered to leave the town within two days. It was a remarkable in
terposition of Providence, that upon the very day upon which he
received this command, and knew not where to go, he received the
invitation of Spener to join him in Berlin. He went, and took up
his abode in Spener's house, and in a few days was appointed to his
station in Halle.
Paul Anton, the second theologian mentioned above, was one of
those who had visited Spener in Frankfort, and there received his
first serious impressions. In Leipzig, whither he afterwards went,
he took part in the biblical lectures. From Leipzig he was called
to Eisenach, as court preacher, and afterwards to Halle, as pro
fessor and consistorial counsellor. Breithaupt also first received;
his impressions from Spener in Frankfort. In Erfurdt he was a
colleague of Francke ; and formed an intimate friendship with him.
These three men formed the theological faculty in Halle until 1709.
In this year two others were added to their number, of the same
sentiments, although perhaps less zealous and less distinguished for
talents. These were John H. Michaelis and Joachim Lange. The
course pursued by this faculty, both in reference to the mode of
teaching and their manner of acting towards the students, was dif
ferent from that adopted by any other. In both these respects they
followed the views of Spener, notwithstanding the outcry of the
theologians of Saxony. We shall attend to their plans in reference
to learning, and then to the practical part of their labours. The
divine blessing, notwithstanding all opposition, manifestly attended
their efforts. The desire of such a mode of instruction as they
adopted, was so generally felt, that notwithstanding the great fame
of the university of Wittenberg, the number of students received
at Halle from 1694 to 1724 amounted to 6,032.
The chief object of Franke's attention was exegesis and herme-
neutics. In almost all his lectures he referred to these subjects. As
early as the year 1693 he published his "Manuductio ad lectionem
Scripturae Sacrae;" a work which has been often reprinted. In
1695 he commenced his "Observationes Biblicae," which were con
tinued for a series of years. In this work he displayed the great
est boldness in exhibiting and correcting the errors of the Lutheran
interpretations. It was furiously attacked by Dr. Meyer, in a book
entitled, " On the work of A. H. Francke, that attempt of the Devil
still further to injure the everywhere persecuted church." Francke,
however, was not deterred from continuing his work. His princi
ples of interpretation were adopted and cultivated by others, espe
cially by his pupil, J. J. Rambach, in his " Institutiones Sacrae Her-
meneuticae." Francke also raised the miserably degraded and ne
glected study of the oriental languages. He-founded the Collegium
Orientale, in which the more advanced students had an opportunity
of exercising themselves in these languages.
Breithaupt was engaged in the Dogmatic. He published two
systems, one larger and the other smaller, upon an entirely different
plan from the scholastic method of Hutter's text book. These

542 tholuck's history of theology
works, and Freylinghausen's " Foundation of Theology," had great
influence in promoting the study of the Bible.
Ethical study was entirely neglected by the orthodox. The school
of Calixt pursued this subject in a very unprofitable manner,
considering it as distinct from Dogmatic, with which it is as
intimately connected as the effect with the cause, or the blossoms
with the tree. The theologians of Halle proceeded upon the prin
ciple that all Christian virtues are the result of living faith in God,
and thus took the proper ground for viewing the whole subject.
They were particularly led to the investigation of the dSUfopa or
things indifferent. The orthodox had permitted Ethics to sink
*to the mez-e heathenish form of rules of duty. They confined
their attention to gross and open sins, paying little regard to those
which consist in a state of mind not conformed to the Gospel
standard. They were thus led to maintain that many things in the
Christian life were perfectly indifferent, and did not come within
the view of a teacher of morals. In this class they included all
the common occupations of life, eating, drinking, playing, dancing.
The school of Spener, on the other hand, taught that nothing was
indifferent ; that the most common things may assume a moral
character, their being good or evil depending on the state of mind
in which they are performed.
Paul Anton read upon Polemics, which was then considered too
important a subject to admit of its being excluded from a regular
course. He, however, in a beautiful and useful manner, endeav
oured to show how even heresy arose from the corrupt fountain
of the heart. He said we must regard those who have departed
from the faith as diseased, and ourselves as labouring under- a dif
ferent form of the same great malady. When we endeavour to
correct the errors of men as diseases, we shall do it after the true
Christian manner.
Ecclesiastical history was at this period neglected, although
Spener and- Francke had very correct views of its importance.
The efforts of this school in regard to Homiletics are peculiarly
worthy of attention. The perverted method of preaching of the
17th century had become more fixed and reduced to rule in the
beginning of the eighteenth. The text was first grammatically,
historically and polemically explained, and then in a five-fold man
ner practically applied. This five-fold application, however, among
the orthodox, was generally nothing more than so many attacks
upon the followers of Spener. The preacher indulged in'the most
silly metaphors and triflings, and dissipated the whole power of
the discourse in a multitude of subtle divisions. Carpzov, in his
Homiletics, gives a hundred different methods of arranging the body
of a sermon. Some of these methods have particular names, as
the Koenigsberg method, the Leipzig method, &c. The preach
ers became emulous to present the greatest possible variety in the
manner of discussing the same text. The most skilful made out to
give sixty distinct methods. Spener endeavoured to oppose this

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 543
kind of trifling, but his own manner of preaching was dry. The
efforts of Francke and Freylinghausen were more successful. They
recalled the principles ,of Luther, particularly such as that con
tained in the following passage : " When I preach in Wittenberg I
descend from my elevation. I do not regard the doctors and teach
ers who may happen to be present, who cannot amount to more
than forty, but the young people, the children and servants ; it is to
them I address myself, and regulate my discourse according to
their wants. If the others do not like it, the door is always open."
Francke referred to these and similar expressions in his Paraenetic
lectures, and expresses himself in the following excellent manner :
" We should not be orators, but fathers. Preachers should be like
those trees, which, although fully grown, spread out their branches
and let them droop upon the ground, that those who cannot ascend
them, may yet reach their fruit. It is a peculiarly injurious princi
ple, that we must accommodate ourselves to our learned hearers.
When our Saviour had the Pharisees before him, he had also
learned auditors, but he addressed them in the simplest manner
possible." We must also notice the lectures to which we have just referred.
These Paraenetic lectures were devoted to the discussion of the
difficulties and aids for the study of theology ; Francke commenced
them in 1693. At first he had very few hearers, but the number
rapidly increased, and at last, upon the hour in which he read all
the other professors omitted their lectures. In the preface to the
second part of these lectures, he says, that he had never seen so
visible a blessing attending any of his university labours, as these
discourses ; because in them he could be more pointed and per
sonal. He had no fixed plan, but selected whatever subject ap
peared best adapted to the state of students. He sometimes dis
cussed the character of particular books, or single passages of
them ; at others, the subjects were more practical, as the difference
between a mere knowledge of the doctrines of salvation and a
living faith in them, the fear of men, the nature of conversion, &c,
&c. He published two volumes of these lectures in 1726-7, and
his son published the remainder in five parts in 1736. Francke
held also devotional meetings on the Sabbath afternoon, in which
he delivered discourses upon the duties of ministers as servants of
the church. He preached in rotation with the other professors in
the university church, and regularly for one of the congregations
in the town. He held prayer meetings in the orphan-house on
Wednesdays and Saturdays, the great object of which, he said, was
to guard the students against permitting their studies to turn their
hearts from the " one thing needful." Besides these various efforts
to promote religion, the professors had weekly meetings which the
students were at liberty to attend, and consult their teachers as
fathers upon any subject on which they wished advice, such as
the means of their support, difficulties in their studies, the state of
their hearts, &c. The professors also united for prayer and mu-

544 tholuck's history of theology
tual counsel, that they might so regulate their conduct as to be
come models for their students.
Various institutions were founded in order to increase the salu
tary influence exerted by the university. Such was the orphan-
house, with its various schools, which Francke designed as a nur
sery of true piety, and a means of supporting the students, by
affording them an opportunity of acting as teachers. The number
of scholars increased so much in this establishment, that two thou
sand received instruction, six hundred were supported, and a hun
dred and thirty students of the university employed in teaching.
Connected with the orphan-house was an extensive book-store, de
signed principally to circulate pious books at the lowest possible
prices. The profits were all devoted to the institution. Besides
this was the Bible institution, founded by the Baron of Canstein for
the same purpose. This institution has printed and circulated
1,700,000 copies of the scriptures, and 900,000 copies of the New
Testament. Books were also printed in the Ethnish, Lettish, Rus
sian, and Malabar languages. A missionary institution was also
founded with a particular reference to the Malabar coast, and at
a later period a missionary society for the Jews. Through the
information circulated by these institutions, and the residence of
missionaries in Halle, the desire of promoting the spread of the
Gospel was greatly increased among the students. Francke lived
to see the fruit of his labours. He says, in reference to this sub
ject, that he had enjoyed the happiness to see, in a threefold respect,
the effect of his efforts. First, in the real conversion of many of
the students, who gave up the riches and honours of the world,
and who were little disturbed even by its contempt. Second, that
the students in their intercourse with each other, manifested a holy
Christian love in submitting to each other, and living for their mu
tual advantage. Third, that in their walk and conversation they
were an example to the inhabitants of the town, many of whom
by their means were brought to the knowledge of true religion.
And besides this, that after leaving the university, many of them
had the happiness of producing revivals in their congregations ;
that those who had been fellow students united themselves when
in office to work conjointly in doing good ; and that, by their
means, many formal preachers were aroused from their slumbers.
Francke, however, complained towards the close of his life, that the
good work appeared to be declining. In one of his lectures in
1709, he remarks, how different the students then were from what
they had been some years previous. " By this time " (about the
middle of August this lecture was delivered), he says, "the seed
sown in the spring began to make the fields green. For after the
students who entered the university at Easter, had been here a
quarter of a year, their hearts began to be affected, and they would
come to us to declare the effect the truth had produced upon their
hearts." After the death of Francke, his influence was long con
tinued, partly by the institutions which he had founded, and partly

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 545
by the men who had more or less imbibed his spirit ; among these
were Benedict Michaelis, Gottlieb Francke, the younger Freyling-
hausen, the elder Knapp, Callenberg, and Siegmund Baumgarten.
It may also be said that Francke's influence was perpetuated by the
Moravians, as it was from him and Spener that Zinzendorf de
rived the idea of founding this society.
Section V. — The Fanaticism which connected itself with this
Revival.
In great revivals of religion, it is almost always the case that
perversions and abuses occur. The truth is always attended by
error. Two kinds of errors are in such seasons peculiarly com
mon, Fanaticism and Hypocrisy. Fanaticism proceeds from a
pure excitement which gradually comes under the dominion of the
imagination. The njost beneficial truths are then caricatured, and
if the heart be not sanctified, it avails itself of the truths thus de
formed, to cover and justify its evils. It also often happens, that
unconverted men, coming in contact with the truth, are deeply
affected by it, but not being willing to give up their former opi
nions and modes of thinking, endeavour to unite them with the
Gospel, and are thus led into various fanatic errors.
In the time of Spener the excitement was almost universal ; the
greater perhaps, on account of the preceding coldness. When
Spener said the laity were the " Christian Priesthood," and should
be allowed greater influence in the church, a real and genuine
anxiety about divine things was excited, which, in some instances,
was perverted. This perversion was partly intellectual and partly
practical. The first indication of a fanatical spirit was the ap
pearance, in various places, of persons pretending to be inspired
and to be illuminated with a better and more perfect knowledge
of divine truth than that contained in the Bible. The first exam
ples of this kind occurred in Halberstadt and Quedlinburg. Cir
cumstances similar to those which have more recently been
ascribed to animal magnetism, are said to have attended the exer
cises of these people. Many young clergymen and others visited
the persons thus affected, as though these were the most decisive
and conspicuous examples of the influence of the Holy Spirit.
Spener manifested upon this occasion his usual moderation. He
advised that no notice should be taken of these people, and that no
attempt should be made to put them down by authority. He said
he would not undertake to say that it was the work of the Spirit,
nor was he prepared to pronounce it the work of the flesh. The
most injurious consequence was, that many distinguished men, by
their writings, turned the public attention in this direction, instead
of leading the people to attend to their own hearts. Such, for ex
ample, was Dr. Petersen, a man of distinguished talents, who had
studied theology, and became professor of Eloquence in Rostock.
He not only read the works of Spener, but those of Ichtel, Jacob
35

546 tholuck's history of theology
Boehme and Breckling, which gave him a tendency to fanaticism.
Spener had adopted in its purer form the doctrine of the Millen
nium, and comforted himself with contemplating the period when
the kingdom of God would be purified from every evil. Petersen
seized upon this idea, and carried it to an extravagant length, teach
ing the doctrine of the dxoKardo-Taois, or final restoration of all things.
His wife also, who shared in his fanatical principles, gave herself
out for a prophetess, and published several books. Others of these
pretended inspired persons spoke of the kingdom of a thousand
years, which Petersen appealed to, as a proof that the doctrine
must be true. He had many other peculiar opinions, as, for ex
ample, that the Son of God before his incarnation assumed a
body of light — a nature between God and man. He was at last
deprived of his office, and removed to the neighbourhood of Mag
deburg, and died 1727.
Another distinguished man of this class was Gottfried Arnold,
the ecclesiastical historian. He was mentioned above as taking
part in the Biblical lectures in Leipzig. He had been led by
Spener into the right way. He amassed a great store of learning,
as is evinced by his works. He was appointed professor in Gies-
sen, and, as already related, resigned his office on account of the
character of the students. In 1707, he became a preacher in Ber-
leberg, and died in 1714. His influence, through his writings, was
remarkably great. He wrote, among others, the following works :
" The first Love, or Description of the early Christians," a book
still of much value ; " Martyrology, or History of the first Mar
tyrs." "The History of the Church and of Heresy," 2 vols. 4to.
A learned work, but too much a defence of these heresies. " Ho
milies of St. Macarius," " The Secrets of Divine Wisdom," " The
Lives of the Patriarchs," " History and Description of Mystical
Theology." He always insisted upon the conversion of the heart,
as the principal point in religion, but lost sight of the doctrine of
Redemption, and embraced more and more an ascetic system, re
commending celibacy and retiring from the world.
John Conrad Dippel. This extraordinary man studied theology,
and was at first strenuously orthodox. He early turned his atten
tion to mystical subjects, as Alchymy and Chiromancy. Through
the writings of Spener he became acquainted with true religion,
but embraced the doctrines without feeling their power. He at
last became an unbeliever and devoted to superstition, giving
himself up to alchemy, exorcism, and the art of finding hidden
treasures. He not only denied the Trinity, but the personality of
God, and was greatly instrumental in scattering the seeds of infi
delity and scepticism. He appears gradually to have embraced
an obscure system of Pantheism. The principal objects of his
hostility were the doctrines of the Trinity and Justification, with
regard to both of which, however, he retained the usual expres
sions, employing them in an entirely different sense from that com
monly attached to them. i

IN the eighteenth century. 547
Ernest Christian Hochmann, another of the fanatics of this pe
riod, seems to have had much more serious feeling than the one
last mentioned. In 1699 he published a circular letter to the Jews,
exhorting them to repentance. He travelled about with a great
deal of pomp, professing to exercise magical arts. He was put
into prison, and when liberated resided principally in the district
of Hanover. In a confession of faith, which he published, he ex
plained the Trinity as three different names of the Deity ; declared
Baptism and the Lord's Supper unnecessary symbols, and that men
must be perfect. The principal seat of fanaticism, at this time, was
in Berleberg and Schwarzenau, in the territory of Count Casimir
of Wittgenstein, who invited the fanatics to fix their residences in
these places. Dippel was in connexion with this society in the lat
ter part of his life, and thence spread abroad his doctrines. Ano
ther was John H. Haug, of Strasburg. He was particularly
remarkable for his knowledge of the oriental languages. Dr. Carl,
a man of considerable learning, also belongs to this class ; and,
lastly, Frederick Rock, a shoemaker, who was by no means an or
dinary man. He was the chief of the inspired who formed them
selves into a distinct sect. The works of these fanatics which
produced the greatest effect were the two following : the first, the
Berleberg Bible, a translation of the scriptures and remarks, by
Haug, in seven folio volumes. This work manifests no little talent
and learning, but the interpretations are generally made upon very
false principles, and the remarks are filled with the doctrines of the
Mystics. The second work was the Spiritual Fama, a periodical
work, principally under the direction of Dr. Carl. Its object was
to communicate all the new occurrences in the kingdom of God,
which it presented in a form best adapted to affect the imagination,
making everything a wonder.
This fanaticism was most extravagant in two sects, one of which
derived its name from a woman called Ursula Maria Butler, and
her daughter. This sect was distinguished by many mystical doc
trines, as the necessity of separating the soul from the influence of
everything external, withdrawing from the world, the indifference
of outward actions if the heart was turned to God, &c. The lat
ter principle, as might be expected, led to the greatest licentious
ness, and the sect sunk into the worse form of Carpocratian doc
trine. Their chief seat was in Paderborn in Westphalia. Their
founder was publicly executed in 1705. The other sect was that
of Ronsdorf in the duchy of Berge. Its founder was Elias Eller,
a riband-weaver. This man began his course by devoting him
self to the study of the Apocalypse. His wife seconded all' his
views. They published an explication of some of the predic
tions of this book, making themselves the principal personages
alluded to in the prophecy. They said that the new kingdom of
God was at hand, that the New Jerusalem was to be founded at
Ronsdorf, and that they were appointed to be the leaders. These
pretensions they endeavoured to support by various artifices, and

548 tholuck's history of theology
succeeded in bringing many persons under their influence. Eller
appealed particularly to the prosperous state of the congregation in
their external affairs. The town, enjoying the favour of the Prus
sian government, rapidly increased in business and population.
Eller was proclaimed burgomaster, and made the representative
of the Reformed in the province of Cleve and Berge. By this
means he obtained an influence with the government, which ena
bled him to come out with boldness, and add fraud to his fanaticism.
He now declared himself the vicar of Jesus Christ, to his congre
gation ; when he went out he caused the cry to be made before
him, " Hosanna to him who comes in the name of the Lord." He
had two velvet thrones, for himself and wife, erected in the church
over the seat of the magistrates. He commanded the people to
pray to God, in his name, if they wished their prayers to be heard.
His children, he said, were to rule in the kingdom of God, and he
required them to be worshipped. In secret he gave himself up to
intemperance and vice. There were two clergymen belonging to
the village at this time ; the one whose name was Wulfing was of
a hypocritical disposition, and co-operated fully with Eller in all
his views. All that he publicly preached he told the people pri
vately was meant to apply to Eller. The other preacher was
Schleiermacher. He was at first blinded by this deceiver, and
dared not oppose him. But his eyes were gradually opened, and
upon a certain Sabbath he preached a sermon upon the words,
" Thou art weighed in the balances and found wanting." This ser
mon set everything into commotion. Eller, however, .had art
enough to make it believed that the preacher was bewitched, and
the tyranny was such that no one dared to apply to him for the
discharge of any of his ministerial functions. He was at last at
tacked in his house, plundered, and driven with his family out of
the town. This brought the whole nest of iniquity to light" Eller
died, however, before anything could be undertaken against him,
in 1750 ; Wulfing was deposed, and died in misery, although with
hypocritical joy and satisfaction.
Section VI. — The Spirit of Legal Righteousness and Hypocrisy
which connected itself with this Revival.
Hypocrisy is a pretending to something we do not possess. It
may arise either from design or from self-deception. The former
adopts the form of external sanctity to obtain certain ends, and is
only found where religion is respected. The latter may exist
among formal as well as real Christians. Among the former it
occurs when persons who have no real experience of religion in
their own hearts, being brought into contact with real Christians,
adopt their language, which they use in a very different sense, and
yet imagine themselves to feel all that this language is intended
to express. Among real Christians it exists when they continue
he observance of forms, or the use of expressions, which are no

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 549
longer expressive of the real state of their feelings. Both kinds of
hypocrisy are often found in connexion with true revivals of reli
gion; and it argues great ignorance of the subject, when on this
account such revivals are condemned as evil. In the period of
which we are speaking, intentional hypocrisy occurred most fre
quently at the courts of those Princes who were favourable to
piety. Of this number was Henry II. of Reuss, the Count of
Stolberg-Wernegeroda, Duke Ernest of Saalfeld, Prince Augustus
of Mecklenburg, and the king of Denmark. Not only clergymen,
but also laymen, found that they could more easily obtain advance
ment in these courts when they adopted the language of Christians.
Under these circumstances, it is not wonderful that many would
adopt this language without any real piety. This was particularly
the case at the court of Wernegeroda: the Count was no sooner
dead than the whole court assumed a different tone. The same
was also the case in that of the Duke qf Saalfeld. Semler says,
that his father, who was a preacher at this court, was at first not
inclined to accommodate himself to its religious tone, but when he
was to be sent to the university in order to secure a stipend for
him, his father saw fit to adopt the prevalent phraseology. Even
in the university at Halle, there was a temptation to the same evil.
Whenever the students wished to obtain places in the gift of the
professors, they adopted the language which they knew would
most effectually recommend them.
Secondly, the hypocrisy arising from self-deception. Instances
of this kind of deception may be remarked in the history of the
university of Halle, both among the professors and students. Of
this, the otherwise highly respectable Professor Baumgarten appears
to have been an example. This man, who appeared to live a pious
life, seems yet not to have had that decided experience of religion
which distinguished his colleagues. Study seems to have rendered
him cold and indifferent to more vital subjects ; yet he adopted the
pious languages and usages of those around him. In the latter
part of his life, however, he departed considerably from both.
With respect to the students, it is clear from the lives of Michaelis,
Semler, and Noesselt, that they used the expressions most expres
sive of religious experience," when possessing nothing more than a
general respect for the subject. It seems, also, that the terms, con
verted, regenerated, and the like, were often applied to those who
were merely moral and respectful in their deportment.
In every considerable revival the excitement assumes something
of a peculiar individual character. The character of the revival
produced by Spener may be viewed in a three-fold light. First, in
reference to the language and modes of expression adopted. These
were throughout biblical, and adapted to. the age. Among the Mo
ravians as among the Catholics, this was not so much the case, as
their language is, more mystical, and more accommodated to
the New Platonic Philosophy. Secondly, in reference to the means
of edification. These consisted principally in meetings for reading

550 tholuck's history of theology
the scriptures, prayer, and singing ; making the Bible a constant
companion and adviser ;, regular family worship, and frequent at
tendance upon church. All this is according to the scriptures.
Among the Moravians, as in the class-meetings of the Methodists,
there were departures from the examples set us in the Bible ; but
it must be remarked, that on account of the change of circum
stances, it is not to be expected that everything of this nature can
always be regulated precisely according to the scripture model.
Thirdly, in reference to the form which the spirit of Christian en
terprise assumed. This was marked negatively by the rejection of
all amusements, expensive either of time or money ; by an anxious
desire to prevent learning gaining an ascendency over piety in the
hearts of the students, and by discountenancing everything incon
sistent with the greatest simplicity and moderation in all the habits
of life. Positively, by a constant desire to win souls to Jesus Christ,
zeal to promote the Gospel among the Jews and heathens, and the
erection of benevolent and pious institutions.
It will be instructive to examine how far in all these three re
spects perversions and abuses occurred. First, in regard to the
language. Francke and Spener are by no means chargeable with
laying upon this point too much importance. They freely acknow
ledged what was good in the writings of the mystics, although the
language in which it was conveyed was entirely different from that
which they had adopted. But the followers of these good men are
in many cases open to the accusation of having had a partial and
exclusive fondness for their own peculiar phraseology. Gotthilf,
Francke, and Bogatzky, are marked examples of this. They reject
ed too freely the language of the Moravians, and condemned un
necessarily many expressions of the orthodox school, which they
said sounded too morally. The same was the case with the language
of the mystics. From this arose, among other Christians, a great
dislike to what was called the Halle phraseology. In regard to the
means of edification, it cannot be denied that there were many
abuses. Too much stress was laid upon private meetings for de
votion, and upon always mingling religion in common conversation,
which gave rise to a great deal of hypocrisy. In Halle it was
often the case that from the desire of bringing young men just ar
rived at the university to the knowledge of religion, they were
called upon to attend all the devotional meetings. Too much
nourishment produced satiety. Many who attended these exercises
had no real love to religion, and were, therefore, rather repulsed
than attracted by this frequency. This excess of meetings was pe
culiarly great upon the Sabbath. There was a devotional meeting
in the morning for the citizens, another in the afternoon in the
houses of the professors, and in the evening in private families, be
sides three regular services in the church. The spirit of devotion
could not easily be sustained through all this. The exegetical lec
tures also were always more or less practical and devotional. The
students found it difficult to pursue their studies, and if they omit-

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 551
ted any of the meetings, with a view of gaining more time for this
purpose, they were looked upon with an evil eye. In some places
it was carried so far, that threats and stratagems were employed to
secure the attendance of the young people. Semler says that when
he was a student in the Gymnasium in Saalfeld, he was induced by
threats and cunning to attend these meetings, and as soon as he
had done so, congratulations were sent to his father upon his con
version. The duty of prayer also was often made too mechanical.
The orthodox party were accustomed to written forms, but the
Halle school recommended extempore prayer. This was soon
abused, and the ability to make a long extempore prayer was re
garded as the best evidence of piety. The Duke of Coburg made
the boys in the Gymnasium pray before him, one after another, to
see which of them were really converted and worthy of receiving
a stipend for the university. We may also under this head speak
of a perversion in reference to the character of the inward religious
exercises, which arose out of the doctrines of Spener and Francke.
These good men had opposed the view taken of the doctrine of
atonement by the orthodox, which allowed a man to live as he
pleased, and yet hope for its benefits. In Halle, this doctrine and
that of the law were united, but without the legal spirit which after
wards gradually arose. When the mode of teaching theology
adopted the strict logical form, the religious feelings were also made
a matter of rule, and the law became more and more predominant.
Whilst this legal spirit was gradually gaining the ascendency in
Halle, the Moravians pursued a different course, recommending a
simple and exclusive regard to the great doctrines of the cross by
which the feelings were continually cherished ; in Halle the great
motive to everything was duty, and those who partook most of the.
evil of which we are speaking, came at last to consider mere ex
ternal piety the fulfilling of the commands of the Gospel. With
the Moravians, on the other hand, a personal intercourse with the
Saviour was required, Christ was to be regarded as the friend of
the soul, love to him was to be the source of all duties. This sys
tem was doubtless more conducive to real heartfelt piety.
Abuses also arose out of the principles adopted with regard to
external conduct. It might be expected, from what has been said
of the desire of the Halle professors to render learning subordinate to
piety, that learning would sink into disrespect. This, however, at
least with them, was not the case. They were really learned men,
but the connexion which they affected between learning and reli
gion was not intimate ; they were learned and pious, but their re
ligion (so to speak) was not learned. There was a difference in
their character, also, in this respect ; some of them, as Baumgarten,
were devoted almost exclusively to learning, whilst others, who
partook more of the spirit of Spener, laid upon it less importance.
Had they succeeded in making their religion more scientific, it is
probable that Semler would not have taken the course which he
afterwards pursued. The principles of the Halle teachers, re--

552 tholuck's history of theology
specting worldly amusements, were, that a Christian who was
really desirous of devoting himself to the service of God, could
have no time for these amusements ; that the command, be not con
formed to the world, which should regulate all the conduct of the
Christian, was inconsistent with their enjoyment, and that every
thing should be performed with prayer and joyful confidence in
God. These principles are purely evangelical, and by no means
lead to the universal condemnation of every enjoyment. By the
followers of Spener and Francke, they were carried too far, and
perverted. On the one hand these amusements were regarded
as more dangerous than they really were, and on the other, neglect
ing them was made a merit of. What Francke had recommended
upon evangelical principles, became a legal yoke. Many were
excluded from the Lord's Supper, if detected in playing cards or
dancing. The Count Henry of Reuss commanded all the preachers
within his territories to act upon this principle ; on the other hand,
the orthodox carried their boldness in regard to these subjects to
a great length. An orthodox preacher published a form of prayer,
for card-players, to teach them to pray for success. The Swiss
Mystic, Nicholas von der Fliihe, expressed himself in the follow
ing excellent manner upon this subject, when a gay vain young
man, gaudily dressed, came to him and asked him how he liked
him. The wise man answered him, " Is your heart good, so are
your clothes good ; but if your heart were good you would not
wear such clothes." The moderation in the use and enjoyment of
the things of this world, recommended by the Pietists, was not
monkish, but evangelical. The elder Knapp was a beautiful ex
ample of this Gospel simplicity. Noesselt, in his life, says of him
?with propriety, " Vita ejus erat commentatio aeternitatis." Of abuse
in this respect we have nothing to remark.
We have said, that the spirit of Christian enterprise was also
marked by an earnest desire to bring others to the knowledge of
Christ, not only nominal Christians, but also the heathen. This
desire the Moravians richly inherited. In the second generation
we notice a two-fold perversion of this feeling. We find, in regard
to many, it ceased to be a real inward desire, but was regarded as
a mere duty ; and that they thought they had fulfilled this duty, as
far as nominal Christians were concerned, when they had merely
introduced religious conversation. And secondly, we remark in
many a spirit of self-sufficiency which led them to forget that
they could only point out the way ; and the Gospel was often urged
so unseasonably upon careless persons, as to drive them further
than ever from religion. In conducting the missionary establish
ments we have nothing in the way of abuse to remark, excepting
that some of the latter missionaries renounced the faith and be
came deists. It was fi-om these establishments that the distin
guished Ziegenbalg and Schwarz proceeded, who laboured with
such success among the heathen. The Jewish institution, con
ducted by Professor Callenberg, produced the celebrated mis-

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 553
sionary Stephen Schulze, a man of distinguished talents and learn
ing, uniting zeal and great self-denial. He rejected every offer of
professional preferment, and restricted himself to the life of a me
chanic, that he might preach the Gospel to the Jews. His work,
entitled, " The Leadings of God through Europe, Asia, and Africa,"
contains the results of his observations, made during bis twenty
years' travelling through these countries, and is replete with in
teresting information. Another manifest action of the spirit of re
ligious activity, which we mentioned, was the erection of orphan
houses and asylums for the poor. The Orphan House in Halle
was conducted by the elder Freylinghausen and the elder Knapp.
Many similar establishments were formed in various parts of Ger
many, where the students of Halle were settled. No abuse arose
from this source.
We close this review with a few reflections, which are natu
rally suggested by the history we have given. The view we have
taken of this period, teaches us how the various systems of the
ology may become hostile to vital piety, not merely unbelief in its
diversified forms, but orthodoxy itself and supranaturalism, which
assumes a position of hostility whenever it is nothing more than
mere speculative knowledge. Of this truth this period affords us
remarkable examples. It teaches us further, that the revival of
religion and the outpouring of the spirit, as in the days of the
apostles, is possible in our times, if Christianity be only properly
exhibited in the life and from the pulpit. And it teaches us also, how
great may be the influence of a few pious men. The Halle school
spread its doctrines to Sweden, Denmark, and even to Greece. And,
finally, in comparing the revival of this period with that which
exists in our own days, we may remark some points in which the
latter has an advantage over the former. It is more guarded from
the perversions which usually attend seasons of religious excite
ment. Religion is now less restrained, and therefore more va
riously developed, and is more intimately connected with learning,
so that we may hope to see theology as a science so regularly
constructed and guarded, as to preserve it from those attacks which
proved fatal to the former systems. It is at the same time true,
that these advantages may easily be perverted ; an event which
can be prevented only by our laying to heart the great lesson
taught us' by the period under review, which is, that a proper
knowledge of the truths of Christianity cannot be obtained without
a sanctified state of the feelings, an experience of their vital influ
ence upon our own hearts. The perversion to which we are
most exposed is, that the knowledge of religion will come to be re
garded as a mere affair of the intellect, that the truths through which
men are to be sanctified and saved will be calmly discussed, as a
source of intellectual enjoyment, without being brought into the
heart, or made to operate upon the life.

554 tholuck's history of theology
II. — history of the conflict between faith and infidelity.
Section I. — Introductory Remarks on Faith and Infidelity.
We introduce these remarks with an expression of Goethe,
which, if he himself did not fully understand, becomes so much
the more important for those who have learned from personal ex
perience, what faith and infidelity really are. In his " West Oest-
licher Divan," page 224, he says, that " the great and deepest
theme of the history of the world and of man, is the conflict be
tween faith and unbelief." Those who can fully comprehend these
words, will feel their truth. Man finds himself in this world on an
isolated point, he knows not whence he comes nor whither he
goes : he knows nothing but the spot upon which he awoke, and
upon which he is soon to close his eyes for ever. Were he not by
faith able to rise above himself and this dreary life, he would have
nothing to do, but with high-minded calmness to resign all hope of
attaining the end to which his nature prompts him to aspire. As
the world and God, time and eternity, annihilation and salvation,
are the great conflicting points upon which human life turns, the
ground and centre of the conflict lies in the struggle between faith
and unbelief. The contemplation of this struggle, therefore, must
either have the tendency to bring us to a more elevated conscious
ness of the high destiny to which God has called us, or to the ex
pectation of that bottomless abyss of unconscious existence which
is the result of all logical infidelity. Infidelity, in its widest sense,
is a disposition which leads us to admit nothing as true which is
not the result of our own reasonings or deduction: — faith,- on the
other hand, is that disposition which, influenced either by an out
ward or inward necessity, admits as true what is not merely by
logieal inference rendered certain. The great question here pre
sents itself, What is the result to which we are led when we logi
cally pursue the path of scepticism ? that is, when we are deter
mined to form a logical system respecting human and divine things
with no other guide than speculation. There is something in the
heart of man which leads him to believe, whether he wishes it or
not. But there is also something in the fallen nature of man which
prompts to scepticism. And as the evil in our nature (until restored
by Christ) prevails over the good, the tendency to unbelief is more
powerful than the tendency to faith. Yet the disposition to faith
constantly opposes itself to the contrary disposition. Hence it is
that very few pursue their scepticism to its legitimate results, and'
that there are so few thorough systems of infidelity in the world.
For the -biblical Christian, however, it must ever appear safer and
better that the system should be carried out, instead of being
checked in its course, and moulded into a form which floats be
tween heaven and earth, and can justify itself neither at the tribu
nal of philosophy, nor that of the Bible. Superficial men content
themselves with such a system, which satisfies their more common

in the eighteenth century. 555
feelings, but which lulls them into a dangerous security. A system
which is throughout consequent, and is prepared to win or lose all,
is more worthy of respect, and at the same time safer, as it affords
more hope of return, since the necessity of having something to
believe is too deeply seated in the human heart to permit us to rest
satisfied with the terrible results of consequent scepticism. Schel-
ling, therefore (see the preface to the first volume of his philoso
phical works), has reason to reproach those with cowardice who,
having raised themselves above external things and committed
themselves to the guidance of speculation, shrink back from the
legitimate consequences of such a course. From what has been
said, it is evident that there are various grades of sceptical philo
sophy, from that which has most thoroughly followed out its prin
ciples, to that which is most inconsequent and nearest allied to faith.
We can, however, distinguish these systems into two classes, the
consequent and inconsequent : the former is Pantheism in its diver
sified forms, the latter is Deism.
Pantheistical System.
We have proposed the question, What is the result of all logical
speculation when we have resolved to follow no other guide ?
The speculation which proceeds by deduction must commence
with some first principles or intuitive truths which are supplied by
our own consciousness. The point from which it starts is the con
sciousness of existence. But this is not a consciousness of inde
pendent existence, but of an existence depending and grounded
upon something else. Hence the speculator in the consciousness
of his own existence is, at the same time, conscious of the exist
ence of an original existence (TJrseyn) upon which his own is
founded. First, from this consciousness — the consciousness of per
sonal existence, including that of the original existence, proceeds
the speculation or argument; for to this point all is assumed as in
tuitively true. As soon as the argumentation is commenced, a
dilemma presents itself, which, according as the one or the other
side is assumed, decides upon all divine and human things. This
dilemma is as follows : first, my being presents itself as a person,
that is, as possessed of self-efficiency; for if it be a person it is
self-active, having no other ground of its actions than itself : but,
secondly, I am conscious that my being and actions are dependent
and restricted, that the remote ground of my activity is not in my
self, but in the original existence. How can these things be recon
ciled ? If there be an original existence, unlimited and independ
ent, which conditions all other existences, there can be no agent
out of him which has in itself the last ground of its actions. For
if the original existence is the necessary condition of the actions
of other existences, it is the only agent.
Since this original existence is active, and in so far as it is the
condition of other existences, it is not a mere lifeless substratum,

556 tholuck's history of theology
but is the living active principle in all that is : — and all independ
ent active existence out of the original existence is an impossi
bility. On the other hand, when I assume as incontrovertible that
my individual personal existence, if I regard every individual as a
being which has in itself the last ground of its actions, is self-
efficient, then the original existence is not unrestricted, since the
individual efficients necessarily limit and restrict the efficiency of
the original existence, each after its own way conditioning its ac
tivity. Hence it appears, that the speculator is encountered at
the very outset by the riddle of individual personality. If he will
neither renounce this personality, nor the illimitableness of God's
efficiency, he must either consent to hold both sides of a contra
diction, or turn believer, that is, receive something as true which
is not the result of speculation or argumentative deduction ; but
this is inconsistent with the goal which he has placed before him
self. The consequent speculator therefore adopts the following
course, as he cannot solve the riddle which every man carries in
his own bosom — the consciousness of personality, and the illimita
ble nature of God ; he denies human personality, and presents the
following view of the subject. Since God cannot be unlimited, if
the personality of men be considered real, this personality can only
be apparent. The original unlimited existence which pervades the
universe strives through its own activity to become objective to
itself, that is, to arrive at self-consciousness ; the infinite becomes
objective to itself when it reveals itself in the finite, and when this
finite revelation is conscious of its unity with the infinite. Hence,
from the stone to the angel, individuality is merely apparent,
being nothing more than the various modifications of the infi
nite first principle. Human individuals realize to the greatest
perfection the effort of the infinite principle to come to a conscious
ness of itself; because men, through the faculty of thought, feel
ing, or imagination, clearly conceive themselves as manifestations
of the infinite. This is the manner in which the consequent specu
lation endeavours to destroy all individual personality. With the
rejection of the personality of the finite existences is necessarily
connected the rejection of the personality of the infinite. For as
the infinite unlimited God arrives at self-consciousness only through
the creation of the finite individual, so it is clear, that if we in any
sense ascribe personality to him, it can be only the apparent per
sonality which belongs to the finite individual, — this is his life.
Other consequences, equally shocking, flow from these principles.
If God be the only and universal agent in all being, then is good
and evil equally the act of God, and the objective difference be
tween good and evil falls to the ground. The view presented of
this subject is as follows : since the infinite remains inactive, hav
ing no self-manifestation, excepting so far as it is manifested in the
finite, it follows necessarily that God is limited in the world, that is,
is but imperfectly developed. But this limitation is not in itself
evil, lying in the very necessity of the infinite, and in the infinite

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 557
nothing necessary can be evil. Hence all evil which is but im
perfect development is incipient good, for every limitation in the
finite by virtue of its unity with the infinite is virtually removed.
If evil be only limitation, it is only negation, and is necessary to
the exciting of" life, or effort at developing, since if there were no
limitation there could be no progressive pervading of the limited,
and all would remain dead. The individual must acknowledge the
evil in itself so far, that it must endeavour to remove the limitation,
that is, endeavour to render the pervading of the finite by the in
finite perfect, but this limitation (evil) is in itself necessary, since
without it there could be no development of life.
This system with its consequences presents undoubtedly a series
of regular logical deductions, but it contradicts so entirely the
deepest feelings, nay, the very nature of the soul, that only a few
at any period have been able to embrace it in all its results. Yet
even among the ancients we find regularly constructed pantheisti
cal systems, partly ideal and partly materialistical. The most im
posing is that of Xenophanes, and that of the later Platonists. We
find also among the heathen some who, although they admitted
the truth of these systems, felt their annihilating effect on human
life. There is a remarkable passage in the Historia Naturalis of
Pliny, lib. ii. cap. 7, where he says — " There is so muchun certain
in human life, that among all uncertainties, that which is most cer
tain is, that there is nothing certain, and that there is nothing more
miserable than the thing called man. In all his misery his
greatest consolation is, that God is not Almighty, since he cannot
deprive, himself of life, which is the greatest good in this wretched
state." This system has also in later times appeared in various
forms. When speculation became more thorough and consequent,
Pantheism appeared under two shapes, as idealism and material
ism. The latter, denying the existence of spirit, refers everything
to matter and its laws. This system was principally defended by
the French academicians at the close of the last century. The
grossest work on this subject is " L'homme Machine ;" and the
boldest defender of the system the infamous La Mettrie, court
physician, and afterwards court-fool to Frederick the Great. The
principal forms of the ideal Pantheism are Spinozism and the
nature-philosophy. By Spinoza the system is but imperfectly pre
sented ; the nature-philosophers are more thorough and definite.
The coarsest advocate of these doctrines is Goerres. In his My
thology of Asia he speaks with the greatest boldness of the per
sonality, divinity, and morality of the earth.
The other kind of infidelity of which we spoke, was the incon
sequent or Deism.
The deist assumes the existence of the moral law in the breast
of man, the existence of personal deity, and of course the doctrine
of providence, a future state of rewards and punishment, and im
mortality. This system is found in antiquity, although held with a
very unstable hand, as by Cicero, who properly was a deist ;

558 THOLUCK S HISTORY OF THEOLOGY
with more precision and beauty by Pindar, Socrates, and Plu
tarch, who presented the truth in a manner more analogous to
Christian deism. It may be asked in what way the heathen at
tained this knowledge ? We may say that the necessity of such
truths lies so deep in the human heart, that a thorough examina
tion of the human soul must have led to their discovery and adop
tion. But it is very doubtful whether the fallen nature of man
would ever have arrived at this knowledge, if it had not been aid
ed by tradition and history. It is far more probable, from a re
view of the whole history of the human mind, that although this
necessity really exists, man would never, unassisted, have attained
to the discovery of these truths. At least the three distinguished
men just mentioned are far from founding their opinions merely
upon speculation ; they appeal to tradition, — to the fathers — to
earlier revelations of God, which had gradually become corrupted.
In modern times deism has assumed a more perfect and better sus
tained form, and endeavoured to found its claims upon the general
reason of man. It maintains that human reason is necessarily led
to the above-mentioned truths by mere speculation. If this sys
tem did not oppose itself to divine revelation it would be liable to
only one objection. It is perfectly correct in saying that the ne
cessities of the human heart lead to the adoption of these truths,
and that when these necessities are not suppressed, the feelings of
every man will urge their admission. But deism denies the influ
ence of history upon itself. Were it not for what it derives from
history it would be nothing, it is ungrateful to Christianity to
which it is indebted for all its clearness and stability. It presents
itself in opposition to revelation, and pretends to be a system
which can justify itself as such at the bar of truth, and to which
philosophy lends its sanction; whereas the doctrines of revelation
are opposed to reason, and are to be rejected as doctrines to which
philosophy does not conduct. As soon as deism takes this ground
it presents itself as a system of philosophy. It will only admit
what is within the reach of human reason, what it can by argu
ment establish. In this light it is a system utterly unsatisfactory.
We have already seen, that when human reason will admit no
thing but what it can comprehend, it is led at the very first step to
a riddle which it cannot solve. That speculation, if it will be
worthy of the name, is necessarily led to deny the personality and
liberty of man ; but this deism, as admitting rewards and punish
ments, cannot do. If therefore it be not blind, it must admit that in
reference to all its leading doctrines it stands upon the ground of
faith, that it can neither render these doctrines comprehensible, nor
support them by logical argument. It must admit that it adopts
what it cannot defend at the tribunal of speculation, the personali
ty and liberty of man. The deist believes these truths merely
upon the ground of experience, and can neither explain nor prove
them. But if he is obliged in reference to his most important
truths to rely upon experience, and merely believes them, he can

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 559
no longer object to the believer in the Bible. If he, in reference to
other facts, appeals also to experience, and receives truths which
he cannot explain and cannot by speculation support, but which
he has experienced in his own heart ; the consequence of this is,
that we are brought to admit that argument is not the only way for
attaining a knowledge of the truth. Hence the great Hamann re
marks profoundly and truly, in his correspondence with Jacobi,
page 19, — "I have repeated it to satiety that it is with the philoso
phers as with the Jews, neither know what either the law or rea
son is. Reason, as the law, is given for the knowledge of sin and
ignorance, and not of grace and truth. The latter must be re
vealed ; they can neither be found out by speculation nor received
from others, nor inherited." — In other words, the object of philo
sophising can only be to show that we are thus led to conclusions
which pointedly contradict our nature and consciousness, that we
are brought into dilemmas which involve us in inextricable contra
dictions. Speculation thus brings us to a sense of our ignorance
and helplessness, and we are forced to seek some other way for
arriving at a knowledge of divine things. This other way is his
tory. In the external history the ti-uths of God are communicated
as facts, in the history of the heart the truth has the testimony of
experience, and thus we are brought to believe in revelation.
Section II. — Infidelity in the Romish Church.
Since the existence of Christianity, there has always been infi
delity in the world, which the most vigorous church discipline is
insufficient to suppress. As the necessities of the human heart
will ever have a tendency to lead men to faith, pride will as con
stantly lead to infidelity. We have no accurate knowledge of the
extent of infidelity in the Romish Church, where it must lie con
cealed ; but we can designate two forms in which it has displayed
itself. A spirit of profound speculation led to mysticism, and
through mysticism to pantheism ; the spirit of frivolous indifference
led to the reiection of the superstitions and the doctrines of
the church. To the former class belong John Scotus Erigena,
Almarich of Bena, and Dinant in the beginning of the thirteenth
century. On the other hand, those who rejected what was super
stitious, threw away also what was true. Of this we have early
examples, as Simon of Tournay, 1200, Professor of Paris. Of the
same class was the Emperor Frederick I. and the disciples of the
Arabian philosopher Averroes. These latter held private meet
ings, in which they ridiculed the truths of the Bible. Infidelity
greatly increased at the time of the restoration of letters. In this
period many learned men appeared who were either deists or athe
ists, as for example, the famous Angelus Politianus, who said, " I
have once read the New Testament, sed nunquam tempus pejus
collocavi;" and the Cardinal Bembo, who, when he found that
the learned Sadoletus was engaged in a commentary on the Ro-

560 tholuck's history of theology
mans, said to him, " Mitte tales nugas, non enim decent virum
gravem." Other examples may be seen in the letters of Marsilius
Ficinus, who was a disciple of the New Platonic philosophy, which
led to his embracing Christianity.
Section III. — Of the Infidelity which manifested itself at the time
of the Reformation.
The Reformation excited an universal spirit of investigation.
Among those who came under the influence of this spirit were
many, whose religious feelings were very weak, and who were
thus soon led astray ; such as Valentin Gentilis, Servetus, John
Campanus, and others. To this class also belong the Socinians,
who formed a system essentially different from that of the Gospel.
Of many we know nothing, as at this period it was dangerous to
declare such sentiments. Yet in the south of France we find that
a regular society of deists was formed, and that many denied even
the immortality of the soul. See on this subject the Institutions
Chr6tiennes of Viret, 1563. These cases, however, are compara
tively few; the mass of the Protestants adhered to the faith of the
Bible. The first indication of anything like general infidelity
manifested itself in England in the middle of the seventeenth cen
tury, and far more clearly in the middle of the eighteenth century.
From thence it spread to France ; even Voltaire availed himself of
the English writers, to find objections against Christianity. Eng
land and France united to spread the influence to Germany, and
Germany spread it to Sweden, Denmark and Russia.
Section IV. — Infidelity in the Protestant Church in England.
We must for a moment attend to the circumstances under which
it arose, and the situation of the English church in the latter half
of the seventeenth century, This period is one of the most im
portant in the whole course of ecclesiastical history. It is a re
markable fact, that in so small a portion of Christendom, and in so
limited a period, such various forms of opinions arose. This pe
riod has never been sufficiently studied ; we find here all the doc
trines which have ever appeared in the Christian church. On the
one hand, the greatest latitudinarianism in theory and practice ;
on the other, the most bigoted adherence to the Catholic church
— the greatest looseness and the most ascetic strictness — separa
tists and independents who would recognise no church, and those
who advocated the strictest alliance between the church and state
— profound and learned theologians, theosophers, and mystics,
who rejected all theology — the warmest and most active practical
Christians who scattered blessings around them — and little nar
row sects who gave themselves up to every irregularity.
Amidst such discordant elements it is not wonderful that those
who sought the truth, without having any deep feeling on the

in the eighteenth century. 561
subject, should be led into infidelity. In no country was the Re
formation so much affected by external circumstances as in Eng
land. This arose partly from the tyrannical authority with which
the houses of Tudor and Stuart forced their opinions upon the
people, and partly from the fact that many who wished to promote
the Reformation knew so little of the religion of the heart. Hence,
w-hen the government changed their opinion, there was a similar
change effected in the church — the parties became violent in their
hostility to each other, and forgot to govern their proceedings by
the rule of the Gospel. Under Elizabeth the parties became more
distinct, and separated themselves into the three principal classes,
Catholics, Episcopalians, and Puritans. The Episcopalians re
quired the government of the church by bishops — regarded the
king as the head of the church — and wished to retain many of the
Catholic ceremonies. The Puritans borrowed their principles from
the strict Geneva system. They demanded the entire rejection of
everything which could call the Popish church to mind — that the
church should be disconnected from the state, — that it should be
governed by Presbyters — that the pastors should be chosen by the
congregations — that a strict church discipline should be introduced,
&c. In many respects they were more ascetic than evangelical,
demanding too much external exhibition of piety. As under
Mary when the Catholics gained the ascendency — thousands of
Protestants bled upon the scaffold, or were left to languish in
prison — while the churches were possessed by Catholic clergymen ;
so under Elizabeth the Episcopal party commenced a similar
course of tyranny. Every citizen was obliged to attend church
at- least once a month upon the pain of imprisonment. Under
Cromwell the Puritans obtained the reins — all worldly amusements
were forbidden — the theatres were abolished — the Episcopal ritual
was curtailed — in the court and army prayer meetings were intro
duced, &c. This period of Cromwell's ascendency presents a
remarkable spectacle. Cromwell himself manifests in life, such a
mixture of religion and hypocrisy, that it is difficult to form a clear
idea of his character. It seems clear that this remarkable man
had experienced the grace of God upon his heart. He was in his
early youth immoral — reformed, and led a pious life — he connected
himself with the Puritans — studied diligently the Bible — avoided
everything which could give offence, and distinguished himself by
his benevolence. When the war broke out, he appeared in public
life. As a Puritan, he felt called upon to make war upon the king
and the Episcopal church. After the execution of the king he be
came Protector. During this period the form of religion was
spread among the people to an unexampled degree — in most cases,
however, it. was merely form. The soldiers held prayer meetings
with Cromwell : when the army took the field, it was always
amidst the singing of hymns; and* the commanders excited the
soldiers by repeating passages from the Bible. Every irregularity
was severely punished — every soldier carried his Bible with him.
36

562 tholuck's history of theology
The Episcopal party was given to licentiousness ; out of hatred
to the Puritans they sung immoral songs in entering battle ; inde
cent plays were everywhere acted, and immodest books circulated.
In reference to Cromwell himself, it is true, that after his entrance
upon public life, he showed himself very ambitious, but that he
was cruel cannot be said. And it should be recollected that his
party, feeling themselves bound to act according to the examples
given in the Old Testament, acted from a sense of duty " in root
ing out the Canaanites," as they expressed it. It is common to
ascribe the king's death to Cromwell, but this is not correct, the
real author of the king's death was Ireton. Even the enemies of
Cromwell bear testimony to the goodness of his life — the court
physician of Charles I. and II. says, that " in the court of Crom
well no immoral person was endured." And the venerable Bax
ter says, " that until he attained to honour, he possessed the pure
fear of God." Many of his expressions also are still preserved,
which seem to prove his knowledge of religion. But as true piety
among the Puritans was mingled with so many serious errors —
piety itself soon sunk into suspicion. Immediately after this puri
tanical period, one of an entirely different character was intro
duced. When Cromwell was removed from the stage, his strict
laws ceased to operate ; and the restoration of Charles II. pro
duced a complete change. Charles was a frivolous, licentious
man — of religion he had nothing but superstitious fear, which led
to his turning Catholic ; a fact which he was afraid to avow, but
which became known after his death. After that, around Crom
well, men had collected who had the Bible ever in their hands
and in their mouths, and the voice of prayer had been heard upon
every hand — of a sudden, we find a very different race figuring
upon the stage. The licentious part of the nobility formed the
court of Charles II. — plays, the most of them immoral, and all
similar amusements were again introduced. Connected with this,
many were secretly inclined to the Catholic faith. The principal
personages at the court of Charles, were the Duke of Buckingham,
and the profligate earl of Rochester ; the latter, indeed, was con
verted upon his death-bed, and died a Christian.
It was under these circumstances, that the various sects which
mark the history of England in this period made their appearance.
An account of many of them may be seen in the work of William
Boehme, " Eight Books, upon the Reformation of the Church in
England." Altona, 1734. The principal of these are the follow
ing : 1. The Familists, who maintained that, in order to present
Christianity an its proper light, all Christians should be reduced to
one family : they opposed themselves to all church forms. 2. The
Ranters. 3. Antinomians. 4. Muggletonians. 5. Seekers. The
Baptists and Quakers also arose in this period. There was also a
sect, who professed to be the* followers of Jacob Boehme, whose
leader was Pordage, a physician ; and the Angel Brothers, or Phila-
delphians, who also adopted the mystical doctrines of Boehme —

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 563
their leader was Johanna Leade. Besides this, there were the
Latitudinarians, many of whom embraced Platonic principles and
sought to establish Christianity upon this basis. To this class be
longs the celebrated Cudworth, whose work, the " Intellectual Sys
tem," is a treasury of various erudition. The Deists also made their
appearance in this age — of this latter class the first and the most
respectable was Lord Herbert, who died 1648. His most impor
tant works are : " De Veritate, prout distinguitur a Revelatione, a
verisimili, a possibili et a falsa," and " De Religione Gentilium."
Lord Herbert is acknowledged to have been a man of no common
talents — he has a great resemblance to our philosopher Jacobi, and
was indeed the Jacobi of his age. He possessed, what was not
then very common, an honest heart, and sought the truth with
much earnestness. He seems to have been led to his deistical prin
ciples by the bitter contentions of the various sects — the arrogance
of the Puritans and the haughtiness of the Catholic and Episcopal
clergy. This first excited his doubts upon the subject of Revela
tion, and he investigated the subject in a manner which showed he
was desirous of arriving at some firm foundation. He wished, in
the first place, to ascertain the principle of truth in man — and found,
upon reflecting upon the nature of the understanding, that it could
be no sure means of attaining a knowledge of divine things ; since
it was so apt to draw false conclusions, and was so easily blinded
by the corrupt state of the feelings. He hence assumed as the
ground of truth, what he called instinct. There is, he said, a cer
tain instinct in man, which testifies to the truth of certain things,
about which it is useless any further to reason. Such truths are :
1. the existence of God ; 2. that man is dependent on God, and is
bound to reverence him ; 3. that piety is the harmony of all the
human faculties ; 4. that there is an essential difference between
good and evil ; and 5. there is a future state of rewards and pun
ishments. These principles, he said, include all religion; that this
is the fact, he maintained was not only proved by instinct, but by
the consensus gentium. In so far as Lord Herbert acknowledges
these doctrines, he suffered himself to be led by that deeply seated
feeling of the human heart, which testifies to their truth. He over
looked, however, the fact, that this feeling is never developed with
out historical influence ; or, in other words, that these truths are
never discovered or acknowledged beyond the influence of Chris
tianity. He also overlooked the fact, that these doctrines are
empty and powerless, as soon as they are conceived in any other
manner than that in which they are presented in the Christian re
ligion. God is only for men a living God, when, according to the
Gospel, he is regarded as the author of a plan of salvation ;
and when he has historically (not merely through the under
standing) revealed himself to his creatures The difference be
tween good and evil cannot be effectively known, when man is
not, agreeably to the Christian system, regarded as fallen: and
piety, in the proper sense of the term, is only possible, when men

564 tholuck's history of theology
without self-righteousness are willing to be saved by grace, Lord
Herbert, therefore, should have acknowledged that his five truths
would remain pure abstractions, unless more definitely presented,
and confirmed by a revelation, — and this would have led him back
to Christianity, to which he was really indebted for these five doc
trines. Charles Blount, who died 1697, was one of Lord Herbert's fol
lowers. He professed himself a deist, and yet acknowledged that
deism could have no authority over men, if it did not rest upon an
historical basis in Christianity. He at first directed his attacks
against particular points in the Christian religion, upon historical
and critical principles, endeavouring particularly to render the au
thority of the four Evangelists suspicious. He maintained there
was but little difference between the history of Christ and that of
Apollonius of Tyana.
The most important deistical writer of this period was John
Toland, who, while he brought many acute historical and critical
objections against Christianity, was led by his speculating turn of
mind to Pantheism. Toland was born in 1671 of Catholic parents.
He seems early to have imbibed an abhorrence of the superstitions
of the Catholic church, and soon joined the sect of the Puritans.
He went to Holland to pursue his studies, under the celebrated
Arminians, Limborch and Clericus. The spirit of inquiry was
here awaked in his mind, which does not appear to have been of
the purest character ; he, as the French deists, was mainly influ
enced by vanity. When he returned to England he appeared as
the defender of deism, and endeavoured in public societies, coffee
houses and other places of general resort, to make proselytes to
his opinions. In his 20th year he published his' work against the
Lutfieran Clergy, under the title, " The Tribe of Judah." We see
that the corruption of the clergy was one of the causes which led
to his hostility to Christianity. His principal work, which, both
from its contents and influence, is deserving of attention, is " Chris
tianity without Mystery," which he published in 1696. This book
is written with a great deal of talent, as is confessed by Leibnitz,
who wrote a refutation of it. The modern rationalists are neither
so acute nor so original. He attacked few particular points, but
rather wished to establish general principles. In the Introduction
he speaks of the excommunicating and persecuting spirit of the
clergy. If, says he, you are opposed to the Catholics, and yet dif
fer in the smallest point from the Lutherans, the latter condemn
you ; if you are against the Lutherans, and yet differ from the
Catholics, the Catholics condemn you ; if you are equally indiffer
ent to both, you are sure to be condemned by both. His manner
of reasoning is as follows : He first defines what he means by Rea
son ; he understands by it in its wider sense, the understanding, in
a more restricted sense, the power of judgment and deduction.
He then presents the position, that there can be nothing in Reve
lation contrary to Reason, which he thus proves : Reason is as much

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 565
from God as the Revelation can be, — if the one contradicts the
other, God contradicts himself. He maintains also that it is not
proper to say, that Reason has been corrupted by the fall, since by
the fall we have not lost the power to judge and draw inferences.
In this respect reason is not corrupted ; it is only so far corrupted
as it is blinded by our evil feelings. This reasoning is true or
false just as it is explained and applied. If what we decide to be
contrary to our reason, falls completely within the reach of our
understanding, so that it can be fully comprehended and the con
trariety clearly made out, then it is impossible that a revelation can
teach it. It cannot be said in a revelation that Jericho is only a
day's journey, and yet a thousand miles from Jerusalem. But a
revelation may contain what it is impossible for us to reconcile with
our reason and what apparently contradicts it; as for example, the
personality of man and the absoluteness of God, or the free agency
of man and the agency and government of God; the understanding
would decide that one or the other must be given up, yet both are
facts which rest upon our own consciousness and experience. The
whole difficulty is, that the subject lies beyond our reach, the under
standing is not competent to its comprehension. The distinction
therefore between what is contrary to reason and what is above it,
although it has been much controverted, is perfectly just. When
I say that certain truths are above reason, I mean that they
lie in a region for which the understanding has no organ. But if I
say that a thing is contrary to reason, I acknowledge the under
standing as competent to judge of the subject, or in other words
as having an organ therefor.
Toland's second position, that a revelation can contain no contra
dictions, rests upon the same ground ; if the subject falls within the
reach of the understanding and the contradiction be clear, a reve
lation cannot communicate it. What is a contradiction in this
sense, is a non-ens, a nothing. But care must be taken to observe
whether the subject be not presented with conditions, which re
move it beyond the limits of our experience.
His third position is, that it is a perversion of ideas to say that,
what cannot be believed upon grounds furnished by reason, must
be believed because it is revealed. He maintained that the revela
tion contains nothing but the objects of faith ; believing them de
pends upon the gi-ounds which reason can present in their support.
The matter is thus, The first point to be ascertained is, whether
what presents itself as a revelation, be really from God : is that
ascertained, the revelation is not only the object but* the ground of
faith, since anything being revealed is obviously the best possible
ground for believing it. This work of Toland excited great atten
tion, it was read in England, France, and Germany. No less than
fifty refutations of it were published, the best is that by Leibnitz,
" Annotatiunculae subitanae ad Tolandi Librum," 1701 ; and the
interesting work by the same author, " Discours sur la conformity
de la Raison et de la Foi." Toland continued his efforts to promote

566 tholuck's history of theology
his doctrines, and published several other not unimportant works.
The most interesting is his last, in which he acknowledges himself
a Pantheist. The title is " Pantheistcon, sive formula celebrandae
sodalitatis Socraticae," 1720. In this book he presented the pan
theistical doctrines in the form of the English Liturgy. An alter
nate chant is thus given, between a moderator and chorus. '' Mode
rator — Profanum arcete vulgus. Chorus — Clusa tutaque sunt
omnia. Moderator — In mundo, omnia sunt unum, unumque est
omne in omnibus. Chorus — Quod omne in omnibus Deus est,
aeternus et immensus, neque genitus neque interiturus."
The next deistical author whom we shall mention, is the well-
known philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, who died 1679. His philo
sophical system is an entirely peculiar exhibition of the human
mind, with which his religious opinions are only partially connect
ed. He maintained that God and the angels were not spirits, and
denied the liberty of man. He acknowledged a revelation, and
made the well-grounded distinction of a two-fold criterion of a
communication from God, the one for those to whom the revelation
was immediately made, and the other for those to whom it was by
these messengers of God communicated. He maintained, as a
main point, that a revelation must teach fidelity to the king, which,
in the time of the Jewish theocracy, was God. At present, mo-
narchs are the representatives of Christ, and that those who com
municate a revelation must perform miracles. The scriptures are
the conclusion of all revelation, and are the representatives of all
the prophets. He was moderate and proper in all he said in refer
ence to the relation between reason and revelation. Reason, he
said, was not opposed to the Bible, but it must be humble, /and not
presume to penetrate too far. The expression, " to bring every
thought into subjection to the obedience of Christ," does not mean
that we must renounce the use of reason, but that we must be obe
dient, and not assume authority. The mysteries of faith, he said,
might be compared to medicines, which must be taken just as they
are, and after they have mingled themselves in the system manifest
their power. He also directed his investigations to the criticism
and language of the scriptures. Here, however, he is often per
fectly arbitrary ; he denied the authenticity of the Pentateuch, of
Joshua, Judges, and Samuel ; and endeavoured to justify his
doubts, by remarks which were not altogether destitute of founda
tion. His materialism led him into very gross ideas of the doc
trine of inspiration, and that respecting the angels. Denying the
existence of spirit, he made the angels nothing more than fine
aetherial beings, yet maintained that in all probability they never
appeared to men, considering all accounts of their appearance
founded upon deceptions of the imagination. Inspiration, he said,
could be nothing else than the infusion of a kind of subtle air ;
when spoken of in reference to the Bible, it must mean a mode of
communication analogous to breathing into. The idea of the king
dom of God is not metaphorical, according to his doctrine, neither

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 567
is this an invisible kingdom, but kings are the representatives of
God, until the coming of Christ. They were also to be regarded
as lords of our faith, and authoritative interpreters of scripture.
Miracles, he said, Were natural events, designed to answer some
important purpose. Of the doctrine of redemption he gave much
the same representation as that presented by Grotius. God is a
moral governor, men cannot make satisfaction for sins, God can
set what price he sees fit for our redemption ; under the Old Testa
ment lie sets sacrifices, under the New, Christ and his death.
Christians, as the subjects of this king, must cordially submit to this
arrangement. Hobbes, properly speaking, made no proselytes, but
his materialism produced for a time considerable effect, the doctrine
of human liberty and the existence of spirits were rendered doubt
ful in the minds of many, and even a species of atheism became to
a certain extent prevalent.
Lord Shaftesbury died in 1773. This man was a fine
writer and a polished man of the world ; and his manner of rea
soning was such as common men of the world usually adopted.
Through his talents and popular style of argument, he attained
considerable influence ; his writings in twenty years passed through
seven editions. They were, as might be expected, principally
read by persons of rank; in 1760-80 they were also much circu
lated in France and Germany. The character of what he has
written upon the subject of religion is such as might be expected
from a worldly man, who feared to acknowledge the solemn truths
of the Bible, and who wished to reduce theology to the level of all
other sciences. His principal works are his "Characteristics," 3 vols.,
"Miscellaneous Treatises," and " The Moralist." In the first mention
ed work there is a treatise on fanaticism, in which his religious views
are principally presented. The following circumstance gave oc
casion to this discourse. There were a number of enthusiasts who
went to England from the continent to claim the protection of the
government under the persecutions to which they were exposed.
They were subject to bodily agitations and ecstasies. The people
turned them into ridicule, and made puppets which imitated their
motions. Shaftesbury embraced this occasion to publish his gene-
i-al principle, that ridicule is the best test of truth; what is really
holy and reverend remains such, however much it may be derided ;
but what cannot stand this test can be neither holy nor reverend.
This is a principle which to a certain extent is true. Ridicule
cannot destroy the respect of a pious man for the truth, but its in
fluence upon worldly men may be entirely different. He appealed
to the example of Socrates, and said that the greatest service ever
rendered that philosopher, was the ridicule of Aristophanes ; which
only drove away what was extravagant, whilst what was truly ex
cellent will remain to be held in admiration by all generations. He
also maintained that man would never arrive at the truth if he gave
way to melancholy; ihat cheerfulness was necessary for the dis
covery and perception of the truth. It was, therefore, a great per-

568 tholuck's history of theology
version to consider that as truth, which was declared upon a death
bed to be such, wher^the patient was surrounded by so many cir
cumstances adapted to render him sorrowful. Hence he contend
ed against all abstruse doctrines, maintaining that plain honest mo
rality and belief in God was all that men need. Revelation and
inspiration are merely fanaticism. Their advocates indeed say that
the former is a real influence of God upon the soul, the latter false and
pretended, but the expression of both, he said, was so much the same
that to make the distinction was no easy task. Philosophical spe
culation, to be properly directed, must always be connected with
wit, which produces the greatest excitement. In his miscellaneous
works he speaks of revealed religion. He lamented that the Jew
ish religion was so melancholy. David, particularly, was a great hy
pochondriac, yet he loved dancing and m'usic, and introduced them
into the service of religion. The Old Testament, too, contains
many pleasant stories, such as that of Jonah. He was even pro
fane enough to apply his witticisms to Jesus Christ. On the whole,
he thought the heathen religion entitled to the praise of being the
most cheerful. It is easy to see that such frivolity might produce
considerable effect upon a certain class of men who desire nothing
more than to rid themselves of the serious and threatening doc
trines of religion.
Anthony Collins, who died 1729, was a man of exemplary life,
and distinguished by many estimable qualities. His writings,
which are distinguished by great acuteness, contain much which
modern rationalists have brought forward as new ; whole sections
may be found translated in the modern dogmatical works — " Priest
craft in Perfection," " An Essay on Freethinking," and " The
Grounds and Reasons of Christianity," are his principal works. In
the second work he says, nothing can be true which cannot stand
the test of free investigation ; the truth must be impregnable, and
that it is only when every man is allowed freely to present his
opinions, that we can hope to arrive at the truth, as every man
views the subject through a different glass. Scepticism can only
be effectually controverted, when allowed to present all its objec
tions. In the " Grounds and Reasons," he presents many weighty
and important thoughts ; his attack was directed to the point in
which Christianity is most assailable, although he did not make the
most of its advantages. His object was to prove that Christianity
was founded upon Judaism. This, those who admit the Jewish
revelation would of course allow, since Judaism is represented as
preparation for Christianity, the Jewish theocracy containing, in
external rites, what is more explicitly taught in the New Testa
ment Hence those who cannot believe in the Old Testament,
must reject the New, if Christianity bo nothing but reformed Juda
ism. Collins however wished to prove that, admitting the author
ity of the Old Testament, Christianity must be given up, as it
rested upon a wrong interpretation and application of the Old
Testament prophecies. The predictions of a Messiah cannot be

in the eighteenth century. 569
made to refer to Jesus Christ, of whose life no historical circum
stance is clearly foretold. The prophecies, commonly explained
of Christ, really refer to other persons, as Isaiah liii. to Jeremiah;
Daniel ix. 4 to the high priest Onias. With regard to miracles, he
maintained they could never be produced as evidences of the truth
of doctrines, such external facts and doctrines were of an entirely
different nature, and it was therefore a ptTo/Wj e\s axxo yevos when we
would argue from one to the other ; an objection which Lessing
has presented more fully. There is something of truth in this
argument, at least, we may admit that the defence of Christianity
was, at this time, rested too exclusively upon miracles and prophe
cies. Collins, however, was entirely wrong in the manner in which
he argued, about the prophecies of the Old Testament, requiring
all the distinctness and precision of historical narration. But it
seems to lie in the very nature of prophecy, that it should be less
plain than history, and it therefore cannot be expected that when
God communicated the knowledge of the future, he should make
it as clear as the present or the past. He was also arbitrary in
his interpretation of those predictions in which the greatest par
ticularity is to be found, as Isaiah liii., and Micah iv. With regard
to miracles it may be admitted, that they cannot be produced as
evidence of doctrines which contain contradictions ; but they prove
that they who perform them, stand in more immediate connexion
with God, and when they are at the same time teachers, their
miracles are evidence of the truth of what they communicate.
Thomas Wollaston died 1733. He was a professor in the uni
versity of Cambridge, though subsequently displaced from his
office. From reading the works of Origen he was led to adopt
the opinion, that the miracles of the New Testament were not
facts, but merely a symbolical method of teaching some particular
truth. This was not in itself absolutely inconsistent with faith in
the Gospel ; but it led him to endeavour to discover historical ob
jections to the account of the miracles ; and these objections were
employed by others to discredit everything of a miraculous cha
racter in the Bible.
Thomas Morgan, who died in 1743, is distinguished as being the
most accurate among the English deists, in the historical and cri
tical objections which he advanced against Christianity. His
objections are directed against many particular passages, and he
has, in many points, anticipated the infidels of France and Germany.
What he says also of a doctrinal character is not deficient in acute-
ness, and all his writings are marked by great frankness and open
ness. He appears to have been led to his sceptical views by the
doctrine then prevalent in the church of England, that Christianity
was susceptible of demonstration, an opinion which, in our own
and in every age, has led to error. He did not recollect, that in
so far as revelation supposes the existence of faith, it can only
through experience be felt to be true, that its best evidence must
be sought in the experience of the heart. Morgan, in his search

570 tholuck's history of theology
for truth, was led fromone sect to another ; he was a Presbyterian
preacher, then Arian, then Socinian, then Quaker, then Deist. He
called himself a moral philosopher. His attacks were principally
directed against Judaism, which he said was full of deceit and
fanaticism, containing very injurious representations of God.
Christianity, he said, was nothing more than sublimated Judaism,
containing indeed many excellent moral precepts ; but if we com
pare the incredible portions with those worthy of credit, the former
will be found greatly to predominate. Miracles he said were fool
ish. His investigation of the account of the resuri-ection of Christ
is distinguished by extraordinary acuteness. He maintained also
that the apostles differed in their doctrines from each other. He
was not only open in avowing his opinions, but also offensive, as
when he says, that if God condemns all those who cannot believe
the miraculous accounts contained in the Bible, he must adopt the
prayer, Oh God ! why hast thou not created me as stupid as other
people, that I also might believe and be saved. And in another
place, he says, that revealed religion is a serpent in the bosom of
man, which poisons his whole nature.
Infidelity assumed a bolder form, in the celebrated Lord Boling-
broke, secretary of state under Queen Aime. His life, which was
that of a libertine, is an index to his doctrines. He boasted that
he had tasted every pleasure it was possible for him to enjoy ; and
died as he had lived, cursing religion and those around him. He
first published his " Letters on the Study and Utility of History,"
which is in many respects a valuable work. In his third letter, he
speaks particularly against the Jewish history, and asserted it was
a blasphemy against God, to say that he had inspired the Old Tes
tament. The Pentateuch is as much a romance as Don Quixote,
and every page of the Old Testament is full of the most palpable
errors. He committed the great mistake, in opposition to his own
better knowledge as a historian, of regarding and treating Moses
and Aaron precisely as though they had lived and acted under the
same circumstances with men of his own time. In his " Essays
and Fragments," he attacked Christianity from various sides. He
made a distinction between Christianity as taught by Paul, and as
taught by Christ himself. Many of the doctrines he said were
nonsensical ; and the doctrine of Redemption, which was the main
point in Christianity, was a heathen doctrine. Christ and his
apostles were all fanatics. He also attacked the law of marriage,
as allowing but one wife, and not admitting divorce. He seems,
on the whole, to have approached very near to materialistical athe
ism, denying the moral attributes of God, and admitting only his
wisdom and power.
We must also mention a tradesman, Thomas Chubb, who entered
the lists against Christianity. He was a tallow-chandler, but early
obtained considerable knowledge. His writings are far from being
unworthy of notice : he attacked many points with adroitness and
talent. He agrees most with Morgan, excepting that he more ex-

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 571
plicitly opposed the morality of the New Testament. He accuses
Christianity of favouring fanaticism, and of not inculcating patriot
ism. He questioned the doctrines of Providence and a future state
of retribution. He proceeded at last from deism to materialism.
It is, from his example, obvious to what deism leads when it is not
checked by a strong sense of morality.
Most of the writers hitherto mentioned, directed their attacks
principally against the doctrines, rather than the practical part of
Christianity. One of the English deists wrote a work, however,
in which he endeavoured to turn the practical part of our religion
into ridicule ; this was Berhard Mandeville, a man of French de
scent, who died in London, after a dissolute life, in 1733. He
represented the morality of the New Testament as so strict that,
if followed out, it would necessarily lead to the destruction of the
state. The great defect of the Christian system was that it con
demned pride and ambition, which were far more powerful motives
to good than religion. In his " Fable of the Bees," he represents a
community of bees, which, although abounding in vices, continued
to flourish ; for vice itself, to continue, must have some regard to
the interests of the community. The bees suddenly took the
notion to bring about a high state of virtue in order to arrive at a
still more prosperous condition. The gods heard their prayer, but
the state soon went to pieces. The soldiers were disbanded be
cause there was no war, the lawyers were idle because thare was
no contention, refinement and learning disappeared because there
was no ambition." He hence drew the conclusion that vice is
absolutely essential to the good of the state ; all that is requisite is
to keep it within certain bounds.
The writers hitherto mentioned, attacked Christianity in detail,
or endeavoured to establish some few general principles, without
attempting to erect a regular system of Deism. This was first
effected by Matthew Tindal, in his " Christianity as old as the Crea
tion," published in 1760 ; a work which has been called the Deisti-
cal Bible. Tindal was employed in the service of James IL, and
became on this account a Catholic. Under William III. he turned
Protestant, apparently from conviction. He appears, in general,
to have been honest and sincere in his opinions, and in his opposi
tion to Christianity. The contents and arrangement of his work
are the following: Man needs no outward positive revelation, but
if such should be given him, it can contain nothing but what he has
already in his own reason (an idea presented by Kant and Fichte
in a different form). It can contain nothing but a moral system,
whatever else it may communicate must be regarded merely as
symbols. He maintained that God could not wish that men should
ever be without religion, or possess only such as was inadequate.
If, therefore, we will not charge God with injustice, we must admit
that man has had, from the beginning, a religion sufficient for his
purpose. The revelation, which is original and universal, consists
in two truths : first, the existence of God ; and second, that we are

572 tholuck's history of theology
created, not for God's sake but our own. This latter truth is
adapted to fill us with gratitude to God, and lead us to follow his
benevolent example (a bold conclusion). If it be asked how we
are to attain the happiness which God has led us to desire ? I an
swer, that the happiness of every being consists in its perfection —
man is perfect when he lives a*ccording to the dictates of reason.
If a revelation be communicated, it is impossible that it should de
mand more than this, since it would be unreasonable and cruel in
God to demand more than was requisite to our perfection. If,
then, we admit that there is a law written upon the heart of man
worthy of confidence, we must either acknowledge that nothing
can be revealed not contained in this law, or maintain that God is
mutable, and increasing in knowledge. Upon the same ground
that the Christian regards the Gospel as the most perfect revela
tion, must the Deist regard the religion of reason, which men have
always possessed, in the same light. But how can the Deist prove
the existence of such a perfect law in the heart of man, when the
whole ancient world is filled with superstition and idolatry, and
when this religion of reason is to be found nowhere in existence 1
The Deist borrows all this from Christianity, and cheats his own
soul in thus taking what in itself is meager and impotent, and
leaving all from which it can derive life and power. If a revela
tion, asks Tindal, sfiould contain new doctrines, how could we have
any certainty of their truth ? To be of use they must be ascer
tained as the two original truths mentioned above, but this is im
possible when the revelation is external, made in a strange language
admitting of so many different interpretations, and filled with ob
scurities. Besides these a priori principles, Tindal, in the latter
part of his work, attacked Christianity more in detail. He endea
voured to show that the principal personages of the Bible, par
ticularly those mentioned in the Old Testament, are unworthy of
respect ; that many of the doctrines and expressions of the Bible
(for example, that God hardens the heart) lead to the grossest
errors. This work was extensively circulated both in England and
Germany, as it was at once logically and mildly written. There
appeared a hundred and six refutations of it.
After all these works had been written and published, the tend
ency to Deism was deeply and widely spread among the people ;
in the church it could not be openly acknowledged, although it
was secretly entertained. In Scotland, where the discipline was
severe, preachers had in many places their private meetings for
discussing deistical opinions. The orthodox theologians dfd not
take the proper course in defending religion, and therefore only
increased the evil. They either strongly insisted upon the church
doctrines, and required a forced acceptance of them, or they en
deavoured to effect a reconciliation by softening down the doc
trines of the Bible, until little was left worth contending for. This
was the case with Teller and Spalding. Lessing compared this
class of theologians to a master of a house who kept railing at a

in the eighteenth century. 573
set of thieves, and yet threw out to them all his goods, which they
had nothing to do but to carry away.
We have yet to mention one other opposer of Christianity nearer
to our own times, a man distinguished for his talents, and interest
ing to us, as having given occasion to the philosophy of Kant.
This is David Hume, equally celebrated as a historian and phi
losopher. He was first intended for the law ; but devoted himself
to philosophy and belles lettres. In 1763 he was secretary of the
English legation in Paris. From 1769 he lived independently, and
died in 1776. The most worthy of attention, in a theological
view, of his writings, are his " Essays," in four volumes. Of these
two particularly are deserving of remark, that on the Natural His
tory of Religion, and that on Miracles. Besides these his " Dia
logues on Natural Religion," which is. perhaps, the most able work
ever written on the side of deism.
In his " Essay on the Natural History of Religion," the leading
idea is that the foundation of all religion must be sought in man
himself, and that the result of a careful examination of the subject
is, that the essence of religion consists in the admission of God
and morality. On these points all nations are agreed, but in re
spect to the attributes of God and other doctrines, they differ. In
the Essay on Miracles he presents the following views, which
were afterwards widely adopted in Germany. " All faith," he says,
" rests upon experience or testimony. The former of these is far
surer than the latter, especially when one contradicts the other.
With respect to the miracles of the New Testament, the case is
thus : certain persons assert that about eighteen centuries ago
these miracles occurred. It may be admitted that nothing can be
urged against the credibility of these witnesses. But my own ex
perience gives me no knowledge of the. existence of miracles. I
see cause and effect so connected, that within the range of my ex
perience no miracles have occurred, and the experience of 4000
years teaches me the same. It is impossible, therefore, that the
testimony of these good people can stand against my experience
and that of 4000 years." We remark merely on the form of this
argument. That miracles do not occur every day and come under
the experience of every man, lies in the very idea of a miracle,
for in the biblical sense, they are events which only occur when
God has a particular purpose to answer for the benefit of men.
Hence no one can demand that miracles should constantly take
place. In regard to the experience of 4000 years, it is no way
opposed to admission of miracles, for in this period multitudes have
testified to their occurrence. The only question is, whether the
testimony of such persons is historically true. In this objection of
Hume, however, there is some truth ; that is, that the mind can
not by the testimony of any number of credible witnesses, be ab
solutely necessitated to believe that a miracle has actually occurred.
A certain disposition or state of feeling is necessary to lead us to
place our faith in such testimony. But this is not only true in re-

574 tholuck's history of theology
lation to historical testimony in favour of miracles, but to all his
torical testimony, and even in reference to our own experience of
external events. For if we had the positive testimony of our senses,
in favour of a supernatural event, and yet had no disposition to be
lieve it, it would fail to command our faith. Hence Voltaire de- _
clares, that if in clear daylight in the view of thousands, and in his
own sight, a miracle should occur, he would still be more inclined
to doubt the soundness of his senses, than to admit its reality.
When the state of the mind is once fixed it cannot be changed by
such external occurrences. Hence, in the scriptures, faith is re
presented as a virtue. The most important work of Hume, is his
" Dialogues on Natural Religion ;" they contain many remarks which
later Deists have overlooked. His object is to controvert all those
who profess to be able, by argument, to establish any religious
doctrine whatever — Deists as well as Christians. Under the de-
istical dogmatists he understood, those who maintained that the
principles of Natural Religion were susceptible of proof. Under
the Christian, those who founded their doctrines upon a sense of
guilt and the longing after divine communication implanted in our
nature. He endeavoured to show, that neither could defend their
principles. His conclusion is, that all doctrines on divine things
are doubtful ; the divine existence may indeed be admitted, but we
cannot show how far it is analogous to our own. Providence and
immortality can neither be proved nor believed. (What remains of
the idea of God after this, is empty ; and it is indifferent on these
principles whether there be a God or not.) Against the deistical
dogmatists he objected, that they argued from the order and ar
rangement of the world for an intelligent author. A conclusion
from effect to cause is just. But in arguments of this kind, when
we draw the conclusion of the existence of similar causes, the ef
fects must be similar. But in the comparison of the world with a
piece of human mechanism, the difference of the things compared
is immense. When we dive into the depths of nature we find so
much that is wonderful and unaccountable, that we can no longer
compare the world with anything which is the result of human art.
The difference is so great, that we should be led to conclude, that
the world owed its existence to an author entirely different from
the author of any piece of human ingenuity. It niay be admitted
that the work of God, as to quantity, may be compared to that of
man, but not as to quality. In the world we find no dead mecha
nism, but an ever-living, creating power — so that a man deeply
initiated into the mysteries of nature, must admit that the world is
more like a plant or an animal, than a watch or a loom. If this
be true, and we argue for like causes from like effects, we should
arrive at the conclusion that the author of the world is an infinite
vegetative power. If it be said that this gives no explanation of
the intelligence and design manifested by this productive power, it
may be answered that when you demand of me, whence from all
eternity the intelligence of this productive power is derived, I can

IN the eighteenth century. 575
demand of you whence comes from eternity the intelligence of God
as a personal being. It is more natural to rest satisfied with the
first conclusion, and admit the intelligence of the world, than to
assume the existence of a personal being. In this way Hume
showed that speculation, instead of leading to Theism, leads to
Pantheism. Against the believing theologian who takes part in the dia
logue, and who rejoices over the refutation of the deist, Hume
says, you see that on the ground of speculation deism is utterly
incapable of proof, but maintains that a sense of our miseries must
lead us to admit a divine revelation. Here" the Deist denies the
greatness of human misery, and endeavours in his way to disprove
the necessity of a revelation. But Hume admits that the amount
of human misery is indeed immense. Think of the outward
afflictions of poverty, sickness, and misfortunes of every kind. Of
the inward sorrows of grief, care, and remorse. Think not only
of the miseries of man, but of the destruction carried on in the
animal and vegetable world. We see everywhere, a war of all
against all. If we suppose a heavenly Being alighted on our
world, shown our prisons filled with criminals, hospitals crowded
with sick, fields of battle strewn with slain, the sea covered with
wrecks, whole regions wasted by disease and famine, who should
demand where was all our boasted happiness, and we should show
him our societies, theatres, masquerades, &c, would he not mourn
fully smile, and say we were only showing him the other side of
our miseries. All this, says Hume, cannot be denied, but the dif
ficulty is to reconcile all this with the belief in the existence of an
Almighty and merciful God. If he be good and Almighty, what
prevents his changing this miserable state of his creatures ? Verily,
he exclaims, the mechanism has much in its favour, and still more
the opinion, that if there be a God, he has no perception of either
good or evil. Even in this reasoning of Hume there is truth, in so
far as that it is impossible to prove the mercy and love of God
from the present state of the world, and it requires no little faith to
retain, amidst all the sorrows and trials of the present life, our con
fidence in a benevolent Providence. It is on this account that faith
is represented in the scriptures as something so great, and noble,
and difficult ; and he who has gone through the mazes of specu
lation will learn to estimate its excellence.
Section V. — Infidelity in France.
It is exceedingly interesting to remark, how the diversity of
national character has modified the various systems of Infidelity.
The Englishman is in his whole disposition practical ; with this dis
position is connected a desire of certainty and a high appreciation
of what is morally good. Hence we remark among the English
deists a desire to arrive at some fixed and stable truths, and an
avoiding of useless speculations which lead to no solid results,

576 tholuck's history of theology
connected with a dread of consequences dangerous to morals.
We observe, however, a deficiency in depth of speculation, which
prevented their arriving at the result of all logical scepticism.
The Germans have not the practical disposition of the English.
In them feeling and speculation predominate over the will. Hence
they seek less in their systems what is useful, not forming their
theories to use them, or apply them to common life, but for the
sake of having them. The German, as the Englishman, seeks for
the truth, for something positive and sure, but this arises in the
former not so much from a practical disposition, as the desire to
have a well constructed theory. Infidelity in Germany, therefore,
has always endeavoured to form itself into a system: and hence,
whilst it has deviated more from what is morally and practically
important, it has been more logical and consequent among the
English : the Germans have carried both the truth and the false
hood further. Among the French we see much less a desire to
arrive at any certain and positive results than among either of the
other nations. They permitted themselves to be more influenced
by transient circumstances ; and were superficial or profound
without stopping to consider the consequences. French infidelity
never endeavoured to form a system which presented itself as
truth. It was more desirous to destroy than to build up for itself.
Most of the French Deists had indeed something of a materialis-
tical system, but they did not always bring it forward, and seemed
only intent upon destroying the public confidence in existing insti
tutions and received doctrines. We shall therefore have little to
say of French systems, but shall regulate our remarks according
to the importance of the several works.
At the close of the 17th and commencement of the 18th centu
ries, many irreligious books had been brought into circulation, but
these, on account of the strict censorship at that time exercised
over the press in France, were generally printed in Holland. The
most important work was " Bayle's Historical and Critical Diction
ary." Bayle was an original thinker, as acute on philosophical as
he was critical on historical subjects. He attacked the received
doctrines of Christianity, and raised doubts upon many historical
points, which, till then, had not been questioned upon the continent.
His scepticism upon the more thinking class of the public produced
considerable effect, so that many persons of distinction applied to
Leibnitz to refute his objections. The first completely deistical
work proceeded from a female, which is much more systematical
than most that followed it. Mary Huber, who died in Lvons,
in 1759, is the name of the author. In her early life she mani
fested a strong tendency to inward religion, and formed an ac
quaintance with the writings of the mystics. It was through their
influence apparently, that she was led to an indifference respecting
the doctrines of Christianity, and to make everything to turn on
the question, whether the soul was in connection with God, and
fulfilled his commands. The title of her work, which, although

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 577
not distinguished for acuteness, is more methodical than other
French works of the kind, is, "Letters diverses sur la Religion es-
sentielle a l'homme, distingue de ce qui n'est qu'accessive." This
lady also made herself remarkable by holding religious deistical
meetings. The men who had the most decisive and extensive influence in
promoting deistical principles not only in France, but also in Ger
many and Russia, were Voltaire and Rousseau ; two very different
men ; each having his distinct public upon which he operated to
the injury of religion. Voltaire was born in 1694. He manifested,
as early as his sixteenth year, by the publication of his GCdipus,
his hatred against the hierarchy. In various other poetical and
prose works he gave full play to his satire against the Catholic
church, which naturally raised him a great many enemies. In
1725, in consequence of some private disputes, he left France and
went over to England. Hei'e he collected the weapons which he af
terwards directed against Christianity, principally from the writings
of Morgan and Tindal. In 1748, he went to the court of Stanislaus
the deposed king of Poland, and in 1750 was invited to Berlin, by
Frederick the Great. After his removal to Berlin, the admira
tion entertained for him throughout Europe became extravagantly
great ; as he was looked upon not merely as a writer of distin
guished talents, but as the bosom friend of Frederick. His splendid
course here, however, was soon ended. Through various in
stances of misconduct he ruined his character, and lost the confi
dence of his patron, who could no longer remain blind to his
avarice and ambition. He got involved in controversy with
Maupertuis, the president of the Berlin Society, whom he consi
dered as his rival, and whom he endeavoured, by all manner of
cabals, to displace. Neglecting the frequent commands of the
king to put an end to these attempts, and publishing a scandalous
satire against Maupertuis, which was burnt by the common hang
man, he was compelled to leave the country. The circumstances
connected with his departure were still more dishonourable. The
king had entrusted him with many of his manuscripts which Vol
taire carried off with him ; probably with a view of selling them at
an enormous price to some bookseller. He was, however, pursued
and arrested at Frankfort, and not only forced to restore the manu
scripts he had purloined, but deprived of the order by which he
had been decorated by the king. After this he determined to
settle in Geneva. Here he wished to introduce a company of
players ; but as the severe laws introduced by Calvin against
theatres were still in force, he was unable to effect his purpose.
To remain without a play-house was to him intolerable ; he
therefore removed to the little state of Gex, and purchased an
estate, and gratified his pride by appearing as lord of the manor.
He built a church here with the inscription " Deo Voltaire." In
his old age, he could not resist the impulse of his vanity, to present
himself to the admiration of the public in Paris. His reception
37

578 tholuck's history of theology
was attended by every circumstance of the most extravagant
flattery, and he seems literally to have lost his life through the
quantity of incense burnt in his praise: a mode of adulation little
suited to his weak nerves, and which is thought to have occasioned
the illness of which he died in 1778. What Voltaire has written
against religion can appear in its proper light only when viewed
in connexion with his character. Very few authors have con
trived so completely to tarnish their reputation. In Berlin he
manifested the most inordinate ambition, which sought by every
device to attain its object. Every one who was not a servile flat
terer was in his eyes condemned. With this was connected the
most Insatiable avarice, which led to every form of dishonesty.
He endeavoured, upon false representations of his poverty, to
secure grants of money from the king ; he sold his manuscripts
over and over to booksellers, was involved in a lawsuit with
some Jews, whom he attempted to defraud of a large sum. His
licentiousness poisons all his writings, but is particularly mani
fested in his Maid of Orleans. He was, besides all this, a hypo
crite ; as soon as he was brought into any danger for his opinions,
he professed implicit faith in all the doctrines of the Catholic church.
He was accustomed to conclude all discussions on this subject
with the expression, As I confess my ignorance, I submit myself
entirely to the holy church. In Tournay he subscribed a Catholic
confession of Faith, and afterwards published his " Questions sur
l'Encyclopedie," in which the Christian religion is violently at
tacked. In such a character it is evident there could be no
honest search after the truth. In regard to philosophy, he was a
sceptic. In his work " Sur le Philosophe Ignorant," he declares
himself doubtful of the truth of deism. Providence and immor
tality he denied ; the soul is material, thought mechanical. He
acknowledged a God, but one who had nothing to do with the
world. He recommended the argument, ab utili et a tuto, saying,
it could do no harm if any one chose to believe in a God, and it
was, at least good for the police. His attacks on revelations are
mere rhapsodies. He takes up a particular doctrine, a historical
fact, a passage of scripture, or a portion of ecclesiastical history,
and endeavours to present it in the most ridiculous light possible.
He not only perverts facts, and makes false quotations, but brings
forward passages as contained in the Bible, which are nowhere to
be found in it. Having quoted a passage as from the Prophet
Habakkuk, a pedantic German scholar once waited on him, and
after many apologies for presuming to question the correctness of
his quotation, said, he was obliged to confess that, notwithstand
ing all his diligence in searching the original and ancient versions,
he was unable to find the passage referred to : Voltaire contented
himself with the reply, " Monsieur Abakuk est capable de tout."
Citing only the Vulgate, he is often led into mistakes, yet his wor
shippers received without questioning everything he said. The
morality of Epictetus and Cicero, he maintains, is absolument la

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 579
meme with the Christian. He wrote against the Pentateuch
without knowing what it was, for he speaks of le livre de Moyse
et Josua et la reste du Pentateuque I Ninus and Belus, he main
tains, could never have existed, as Asiatic names could never end
in us ! Messiah is a Hebrew word, which in Greek is expressed
by " Kdopcvos :" what he meant to say is not easy to divine. He
often asserted that before the time of Theodosius no respectable
heathen became a Christian. He maintained also, that the fabu
lous Jewish book, Toldoth Jeshu, was an authentic source of
information respecting Christ and his apostles. His principal writ
ings directed against religion, are his Candide, L'Evangile de
Jour, and Les Questions sur l'Encyclopedie. The first is a
Romance, which contains the history of a man driven about by all
manner of misfortunes, and in which the author endeavours to
show that the sources of consolation commonly applied to in afflic
tion are vain and ridiculous. The object of the work is to ridicule
the doctrine of a Providence. The writings of Voltaire have been
spread even to Siberia, where, it is said, they are still much read
by persons of property. The Governor of Siberia replied to some
one, who urged him to take these books out of the hands of the
people, that " to us it is not commanded to root out the tares, but
to sow the wheat." *
Jean Jacques Rousseau was born in Geneva, 1712. After a dis
turbed and unsettled life he died in 1778. Rousseau had as little
of system in his infidelity as Voltaire. In the latter, scepticism
was the result of vanity and frivolity ; in the former, of a morbid
sensibility, which through vanity degenerated into mere caprice.
The leading features of his character were sentimentality and ca
pricious vanity. The former was deeply seated in his nature, and
the circumstances in which he was thrown served to increase it.
His education was effeminate, and his youth devoted to reading
novels. A particular circumstance excited in him a love of para
dox which fed his vanity. The academy of Dijon proposed the
question, whether science and civilisation were serviceable to
morality and human happiness. Rousseau, who determined to
write on the question, first intended to give an affirmative answer,
but a friend suggesting that he could never distinguish himself by
such an every day reply, decided him to take the opposite side.
This paradoxical turn his vanity led him to retain, and prompted
him to advance new and peculiar views both in religion and poli
tics. In the latter he became an advocate for liberty and equality,
and in his work " Sur le Contrat Social," published the doctrine
that the authority of rulers rests only upon the consent of the peo
ple. In religion this bent of mind should have led him to come
out as the decided enemy of all positive doctrines, but here his
sensibility stood in his way, and he felt so much what was elevated
in Christianity, that he declared, such was the power and sublimi
ty of the scriptures, that God only could be their author. But, on
the other hand, while he allowed that the feelings led to such a

580 THOLUCK's HISTORY OF THEOLOGY
conclusion, he maintained that the understanding could not admit
a revelation ; and that there were so many contradictions, so much
that was incredible in the Bible, as to render the idea that they
had been immediately communicated from God inadmissible. He
called his, therefore, an involuntary scepticism. Yet in general he
speaks with great reverence of the Bible and of Christ, extolling
particularly his mildness and humility. Even if any one, he said,
could live and die as Christ did, he could not do it with the same
humility. He instituted a comparison between Christ and Leoni-
das, Epaminondas and Socrates, and adds that if Socrates lived
and died like a wise man, Christ lived and died like a God. He
maintained that in every religion, we could only admit for truth
what had in its favour the testimony of our own .hearts. In his
" Lettres de la Montagne," he denied, that miracles could be ad
vanced as a proof of Christianity, and says, that Christ himself ap
pealed to his doctrines and not to his. miracles, in support of his
claims. His principal work is the one on Education, four vols. In
this work a confession of faith is put into the mouth of a vicar,
which expresses Rousseau's own views. His influence was
equally injurious with that of Voltaire. The vulgarity of the lat
ter could not affect persons of feeling and worth, but the influence
of Rousseau extended over those who had some regard for reli
gion and morality. He presented his doubts in a way which was
best adapted to give them effect on such individuals ; constantly
professing his willingness to believe if the difficulties could only be
taken out of the way. The source of Rousseau's infidelity is
clearly to be learned from his character, as he has himself drawn
it in his Confessions. It is plain that vanity and pride were so pre
dominant in him, that his better feelings could exert but little influ
ence. It is useful to compare the Confessions of Rousseau with
those of Augustin, as the one teaches us the state of mind which is
suited to the discovery of the truth, and the other that which is in
consistent with its perception.
The writings of these two men had so filled France with infi
delity, that even during their lives numerous authors appeared
who went further than their masters. It became the fashion in
the higher circles to ridicule religion, and it was considered a
mark of bon ton to laugh at the priests as blockheads and de
ceivers ; and, unfortunately, everything found objectionable in the
Catholic system was referred to Christianity itself. The infidel
party soon felt themselves strong enough to attempt to operate
upon a larger scale. This was undertaken in a work designed to
throw light upon every department of knowledge — the " Encyclo
pedic Universelle, ou Dictionnaire Universale des Sciences, des
Arts, et des Metiers ;" an edition of 2000 copies of this was
greedily bought up in a single year. The editors were D'Alem-
bert and Diderot ; both atheistical sceptics. The former seemed
rather inclined to conceal his atheism, and said he merely wished
to ascertain the truth and present a fair view of both sides of the

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 581
question. But the arguments for the truth were stated in the
weakest manner possible, those against it in the strongest.
Diderot was more open. In his " Pensees Philosophiques," he en
deavoured to show, that belief in God's existence was not only
feebly supported, but altogether unnecessary, and that it was bet
ter not to trouble ourselves about it. He said the same respecting
the immortality of the soul, and even of moral truths. The influ
ence of this man was very considerable ; and when called to the
court of Catherine II. of Russia, he succeeded in poisoning the
higher ranks of society with his opinions. He was active in
making proselytes, endeavouring to convince those around him
how unhappy the belief in God made man, by keeping him in con
stant fear of his justice. He did not fully present his system, but
materialism lay at its foundation.
Many other works appeared in this period which spoke out with
out the least reserve. Julian de la Mettrie, a physician, who spent
the latter part of his life as wit in the court of Frederick II., was
one of those who were the most gross in his materialism. See his
" L'Homme Machine,"and " Traites de la Vie Heureuse." In the lat
ter (Amsterdam edition, vol. i., p. 46), he says, " L'univers ne sera
jamais heureux a moins qu'il ne soit athee :" — but if atheism could be
once fully propagated, religion would be destroyed root and branch ;
nature then inoculated as with a holy principle, would maintain its
rights and its purity. Deaf to every other voice, the peaceful mor
tal would follow no other rule than the dictates of his own nature.
This man died as he had lived, like a brute ; he killed himself by
eating immoderately of a preparation of mushrooms. Frederick
II., who had so honoured him when alive, had a very sarcastic epi
taph inscribed upon his tomb. The influence of these and other
works of a similar character, was to produce throughout France,
not only an indifference to religion, but also to morality. The poi
son descended from the higher to the lower classes, and its progress
was far more rapid than in Germany. The result and the acme
of these doctrines are presented in the French Revolution. The
rapid progress of infidelity at this period is not, howevei*, to be
exclusively attributed to the influence of these writings. Many
other causes combined to produce this effect ; one of the most im
portant of these was the general immorality which prevailed at the
court of Louis XV., and the priesthood endeavouring to uphold
religion by mere external means. The political state of France
also was such ; there were so many impositions and irregularities,
that the people became far more interested in politics than in reli
gion. Even before decided hostility was declared against religion,
the services of the church had sunk into general contempt. The
open war against all that is holy commenced in 1793. Christiani
ty was then even in externals disregarded, the Sabbath was abo
lished, marriage and baptism, as merely civil affairs, were bi-ought
under the cognizance of the magistrates. The storm broke out,
particularly in the month of November, when the government de-

582 tholuck's history of theology
termined to plunder the churches to replenish the exhausted re
sources of the state. This step was in many places hailed with
the greatest applause. At this time many of the clergy came for
ward, and solemnly renounced at once religion and their offices.
The Bishop of Paris, Gobet, appeared before the bar of the na
tional convention, with the clergy of his diocese, and made the fol
lowing declaration : " I have, as long as I possessed any influence,
used it to promote the love of liberty and equality. The revolu-
lution is approaching its conclusion with rapid strides; nothing can
now exist but liberty and equality. May my example serve to
confirm the authority of these two goddesses. Long live liberty
and equality !"
The president of the convention replied, " The confession, citi
zen, which you have made, proves that philosophy has made the
greatest advances. It is the more worthy of praise as you are the
Bishop of the capital, as thus Paris has the triumph of being the
first proclaimer of reason." He then saluted him with the kiss of
brotherhood, and presented him the Jacobin cap. Julien, a Pro
testant minister from Toulouse, then rose and said, " How gloiious
is it to make such a declaration under the auspices of reason, phi
losophy, and the constitution ! I have, for twenty years, been
clothed with the office of a Protestant minister ;,but I now declare
that I will no longer retain it. Henceforth, the laws shall be my
temple — liberty my God — my country my worship — the constitu
tion my Gospel." Amidst this despicable insanity, it is delightful
to hear the voice of truth, which was yet strong and bold enough
to make itself heard. Gregoire, Bishop of Blois, arose in his place
and spoke with much effect, until he was forcibly driven from the
tribune. " I rise," he said, " because I had a very indistinct idea
of what had happened before my arrival. I hear men speak of
sacrifices for the country ; to these I am accustomed. Of proofs
of devotion to the country; these have I given. Is the question of
income? I resign it to you. Is the question of religion ? That is
beyond your power. I hear much about fanaticism and supersti
tion ; these have I ever opposed. But if the words be explained,
it will be seen that religion itself is intended. As for me, I have
received my office neither from you nor from the people : I consent
ed to bear the burden of a bishoprick, I was urged to accept it,
and now I am' urged to lay it aside : — but I bid you defiance ; I
will remain a bishop and scatter blessings around me." The tumult
became so great that he was obliged to desist ; and, although he
appealed to the liberty of worship which had been established, he
was hurled from the tribune, but was happy enough to escape the
fury of the mob. The conduct of the capital was a signal for the
provinces ; congratulations were received from all quarters, from
clergymen, who hastened to resign their offices, and pray to be re
garded as citizens, and taken into political employment Something
was now to be placed in the room of discarded Christianity ; and
the convention determined to establish the worship of Reason. A

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 583
representative of Reason was accordingly selected (her character
may be easily imagined) — the cap of liberty was placed upon her
head, a blue mantle was thrown over her shoulder, and her arm
rested upon a spear. Thus arrayed, she was introduced, amidst
the shouts of the people, into the hall of the convention, and placed
opposite the president, who addressed her in the following terms :
" Fanaticism is at last departed, and has left its place to reason, jus
tice, and truth. The feeble eyes of superstition could no longer en
dure the light of the present illumination. We have brought to-day
an offering into the temple of reason, not to a soulless idol, but to a
woman, who is a master-piece of nature. This holy image has in
flamed all our hearts ; but one wish, but one prayer, is now heard ;
no longer any priest, and no longer any other Gods than those
which nature gives us." After this, the goddess was placed upon
the seat of the president, and received from the secretary the usual
salutation, amidst the shouts of the Jacobins. The crowd thence
proceeded to the church of St. Denis, which was desecrated with
songs to liberty and nature. The church received the name of
" Temple de la Raison." The rage against religion became now
more open and furious ; the clergy were forced to give up their
offices ; and if they refused, were sent out of the country. The
inscription " Temple de la Raison" was affixed to the churches,
and •' La mort est un sommeil eternel " to the cemeteries in various
places throughout the country. It is not, therefore, to be wondered
at, that many Christians in Germany should think that this was the
predicted period of Antichrist ; for in no period of history wasthe
insane opposition to religion carried to such extravagant lengths.
From this time one enormity and murderous outrage followed ano
ther, until the bloody Robespierre stepped forward as the advocate
of relig'on. In the beginning of the year 1794 he proposed to the
convention to acknowledge a Supreme Being, and the immortality
of the soul ; and to appoint festivals in honour of this Being. The
convention agreed to the proposition, and made the proclamation,
" Le peuple Fran§ais reconnoit des aujourd'hui un etre supreme et
1'immortalite de 1'ame ;" which was posted upon the churches.
Thirty-six festivals were appointed, which were little else than
days devoted to amusement. Among these were the following :
the festival of the Supreme Being — of rights and of nature — of the
human race — of the hatred of tyrants, &c. On the first celebra
tion of the first mentioned festival, which occurred in the spring,
Robespierre delivered an inflated discourse in honour of the Su
preme Being, and a hymn was sung, in which the following pas
sage occurs : " To thee, from whom the free Frenchman has de
rived his existence, does he lift up his voice, proud, if he must obey
a king, to have thee for a sovereign." It is the common opinion
that this despot acted the part of a hypocrite in all this business,
merely to gain credit with those who still retained some little re
gard for religion. But it is more probable that he acted from a
species of conviction, and had some feeling on the subject. It is

584 tholuck's history of theology
possible that he wished in this way to quiet his conscience, which
must constantly have upbraided him for the multitude of his bloody
crimes ; and it is known that in the latter part of his life he was
tormented by remorse, until his ignominious execution closed his
career. This deistical worship obtained no consistency, the festi
vals were merely a kind of theatrical exhibitions. In 1797 the
Catholic religion was again introduced, on the condition that the
priests should be dependent on the state, and not on the pope.
Many, however, who had imbibed the principles of Rousseau, and
had some regard for religion, were unfavourable to the restoration
of the Catholic worship. They formed themselves, therefore, into
a distinct society, and assumed the name Theophilanthropists.
Their main principles were, love to God and man, and belief in the
immortality of the soul. The directory favoured their object, in
order to have something to oppose the Catholics. Their religious
service consisted in moral discourses — singing hymns, mostly bor
rowed from the Psalms ; and certain symbolical ceremonies, such
as crowning with wreaths of flowers, presenting fruit on wooden
dishes, &c. In 1798 they had ten churches in their possession, and
in most of the cities of the provinces there were societies formed
after the model of that existing in Paris. In 1799 the society was
in the most flourishing state, but the people found the service so
diy and uninteresting that in 1802 it was almost dissolved. The
consuls took from them their church, and they soon entirely disap
peared. The deistical worship established in London, by Williams,
shared a similar fate. Frederick II. discovered his penetration,
when he replied to the Marquis d'Argenson, who wished to esta
blish a worship of the same kind in Potsdam, " that he must take
subscriptions for ten years." The Catholic religion regained its
ascendency : Bonaparte concluded a concordat with the Pope ;
and this fanaticism of infidelity passed away as a meteor. The
seeds of infidelity doubtless still remain ; but many of the greatest
zealots against religion, as it is proved by decisive examples, were
really converted. Of this number was Julien, the Protestant mi
nister who publicly renounced religion, but, before his death, he re
turned to the faith of the Bible.
Section VI. — History of Infidelity in Germany.
The character of infidelity in Germany, and the manner of its
development, is, in a three- fold respect, different from that which
it assumed in other countries. In the first place, it was much
more consequent ; and hence, the German infidels proceeded more
and more to Pantheism, which is the logical result of sceptical
speculation. 2. It displayed itself more gradually, and advanced more order
ly, step by step, and hence took a deeper hold on the very life of
the people. In no country has infidelity pervaded every "depart
ment of society, as in some portions of Germany.
3. In other lands the clergy stood as watchmen and guardians

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 585
against the attacks of scepticism ; as was the case particularly in
Protestant England, where the clergy were found faithful to their
trust. But Germany saw, what never had been seen before, that
those who were appointed to teach and defend the truths of reve
lation, should step forward to oppose them. On the same grounds,
and, in part, with the same tendency, as Lucian and Celsus, from
among the heathen, attacked Christianity, did many of the German
theologians array themselves against the religion of which they
were the servants. Most of this class sought, through a regular
analysis of the general truths, or ideas of religion, by scientific in
vestigation, to prove the falsity of the doctrines of the Bible. It
is clear, that in proportion as this disposition prevailed among the
clergy, must infidelity extend and deepen itself in the hearts of
the people. Various circumstances conspired to favour the spread
of this sceptical spirit among the German theologians. Of this
nature we may notice the following as among the most important:
1. Many circumstances connected with the reign of Frederick
II. ; as the residence of so many gay despisers of religion at his
court, who extended their influence over most persons of rank in
the country ; the great liberty of opinion which Frederick admit
ted, to an extent which had never before been allowed.
2. The extended admiration of French literature, which pro
duced at this period little else than works ridiculing religion. For
even those which did not expressly treat of the subject, yet had a
tincture of the reigning spirit. We must mention also the love of
the English literature, particularly at the close of the last century.
Most of the freethinking works were translated into German ; and
although the refutations of these works were also translated, as
translating was the order of the day, yet, as the Chancellor Pfaff,
of Tubingen, remarked, " these refutations were not of such value
as to compensate for the evil."
3. The influence of a literary periodical work, established in
Berlin, conducted by Nicolai, which systematically recommended
all works written in opposition to religion, and neglected or con
demned those in its favour. This work was commenced in 1765,
and increased to 118 volumes. The influence of this work was
far greater than any such review could have at present.
4. The influence of the philosophy of Wolf, out of which the
Popular Philosophy arose. Wolf's philosophy contained a princi
ple which operated fatally, not only against revelation, but against
inward piety. It. pretended to be able to demonstrate the truths
of revelation in a mathematical manner upon principles of reason,
which subjected these truths to the spirit of speculation. It made
also the broadest distinction between natural and revealed religion.
It did not indeed deny the latter, but it accustomed the people to
consider them as different ; and as the truths of natural religion
were represented as so firmly grounded, many were induced to
embrace them as sufficient. It operated also against Christianity,
by its cold syllogistical method of reasoning, which tended to de-

586 tholuck's history of theology
stroy everything that was vital, not merely the religion of the
heart, but every finer feeling which was not satisfied with dull ab
stract forms. It was from this system, as before remarked, the
Popular Philosophy arose, which undertook to prove, on the prin
ciples of Reason, the truths of Natural Religion. Without resting
satisfied with the views proposed by Wolf, it turns them all to its
advantage. To this school belong Jerusalem, Garve, Reimarus,
Eberhardt, Moses Mendelssohn, &c. The worst thing about this
system was that it laid claim to the name of philosophy, when it
was, in fact, nothing more than a set of arbitrary opinions. Its
defenders, who were but weak thinkers, stood in breathless amaze
ment when Kant and others appeared upon the field. Thus Ja
cobi, in his latter years, said, when the works of Hegel appeared,
that he had been able to understand all other philosophical works,
but these were too abstruse for him : and Mendelssohn could not
understand Jacobi, nor Garve, Mendelssohn.
The opposition among the theologians to the truths of revelation
was at first by no means decided ; as a first step we must regard
the influence of some theological writers who were not themselves
enemies of these truths, but prepared the way for their rejection,
and, without intending it, forged weapons for those who should
come after them. The occasion of this lay in the degraded state
of theology in the beginning of the 18th century. Such men as
Calvin, Melancthon, Chytraeus and many others, were profoundly
learned, and knew how to employ their learning in the service of
theology without weakening their faith in the doctrines of the Bi
ble : their erudition enlarged their views without injuring either
their faith or piety. But the situation of theology, especially in the
Lutheran church, at the period referred to, was exceedingly low ;
it consisted in little more than establishing and illustrating the doc
trines of the church ; all the main ideas in the several departments
rested upon tradition ; the study of theology was a work of memo
ry ; few giving themselves the trouble to examine how far the
doctrines they had received from their fathers agreed with the
sacred scriptures. Learning,properly speaking, was not wanting,
for such men as Calov and Carpzov among the orthodox, and Ram-
bach and Buddeus among the Pietists, may be compared with any
of the learned men of the present day, and even excelled them ;
it was not learning, therefore, but a scientific spirit that was want
ing. The situation of profane literature was much the same, for
here also was wanting an independent self- formed character : what
was received was transmitted. But about the middle of the pre
ceding century, a new spirit was introduced into this department.
In philosophy, Wolf and his disciples excited a new and lively in
terest, which rapidly spread itself over Germany, and at the same
time introduced an entirely different method of treating the sub
ject. In history a new era was formed by Thomasius, and the
various translations of English historical works increased the in
terest which he had excited. In philology a new school was

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 587
formed by Ernest, Reiske and others, who adopted a method much
superior to that pursued by the philologians of Holland. As all
these departments are more or less connected with theology, it
could not fail that the impulse should be communicated to it. Se
veral distinguished men appeared at this period, as Baumgarten in
Halle, Ernesti in Leipzig, and John David Michaelis in Gottingen,
who pursued with ardour the study of profane literature, and en
deavoured to effect a connexion between this literature and the
ology, and to enrich the latter with the results of the former, and
this was the first step to neology.
It is an interesting and important question, whether this connex
ion of profane .literature with theology has a necessary tendency
to neology. That in the Lutheran church it obviously had this
tendency, cannot be denied. And something of the same kind
may be seen in the Reformed Church, especially among the Armi
nians. But, on the other hand, history shows that this is not neces
sarily the case. Calvin, Melancthon, Chytraeus, and Bucerus were
profoundly versed in these studies, without manifesting the least
tendency to infidelity. Hence it appears that it depends upon the
manner of treating the subject, and the way in which profane and
sacred literature are united. There is in theology a two-fold ele
ment, the one human, the other supernatural ; by the one it is con
nected with every department of human knowledge, and hence an
accurate acquaintance with human science must have a salutary
influence upon the study of theology. On the other hand, there
is something supernatural, which is to be found in no human sci
ence ; and which no human science can either explain or illus
trate. If, therefore, the theologian does not know this, by his own
living experience ; if he be not connected by faith with the invisi
ble world, with him the study of profane literature and its connex
ion with theology must prove injurious. If a theologian be with
out faith and without profane literature, as was the case with many
of the orthodox party in the Lutheran church, he will deliver
Christianity to his successors as he found it, without understanding
it himself but a means of blessing to those who did, as actually oc
curred among the orthodox. But were he better acquainted with
profane literature, he would be led, while he retained the earthly
part of theology, to endeavour to explain what was supernatural
by his profane science ; placing human and profane ideas in the
place of the divine, and thus his knowledge would prove destruc
tive. This remark is particularly illustrated by the history of
Semler. Those, therefore, who, in the period of which we speak,
first connected the study of profane literature with theology, and
introduced a scientific spirit into this department, although not
avowed enemies to what was supernatural in Christianity, yet
knew it not in its depths, and thus worked without intending it, to
remove the very essence of the system.
Baumgarten in Halle, who died in 1757, was the first who raised
a third party in the Lutheran church. He was sincerely subject

588 tholuck's history of theology
to the truths of Christianity, but inordinate in his love of human
learning, which produced an injurious effect upon his theological
views. He operated upon his students and his contemporaries in
giving a new tendency to their minds, partly by the introduction of
various English theological works, which were of a superficial cha
racter, and were more or less deistical. He also introduced many
English historical works, especially the " Universal History," by
Guthrie and Gray, which excited a desire for the study of profane
literature among the theologians of Halle, and partly also by
adopting the logical demonstrative method of Wolf, insisting upon
the most accurate division and subdivision of every subject ; a me
thod which he did not confine to the dogmatic, but» applied also to
exegesis. He exhorted his students to throw off the trammels of
tradition and apply their own understandings. Connected with
this, however, he chilled their hearts, and softened down the genu
ine Christian doctrines. It is indeed impossible to present these
doctrines in such strict logical forms ; divine things are in them
selves simple, but they cannot by speculation and subtle logic be
placed in the light, and every effort to express these peculiar ideas
in precise forms stifles their spirit. Many of the students of Baum
garten were led by his method to a cold, intellectual, but lost the
inward, knowledge.
The influence of John August Ernesti was far more extensive.
He was made professor of Leipzig in 1759. Ernesti was a man
of profound and extensive learning ; he retained his faith in the
divine truths, and was very cautious in all his undertakings. He
had already made himself so extensively known by his philological
works, that those which he published upon theology excited the
greater attention, and students flocked from all quarters to attend
his lectures. His principal object was to make his philosophical
knowledge useful in exegesis, and he applied the same rules to the
interpretation of the sacred scriptures which he had applied to the
classics. His most important work is his " Institutio Interprets
Novi Testament ;" the shortest and most useful compend of Her-
meneutics. Before the time of Ernesti, the department of sacred
philology had long lain fallow. He was joined in these labours by
his colleague, Professor Fischer, who, however, went much fur
ther. Fischer was the first to apply the new philology to the Lexi
cography of the New Testament, in his work, " De Vitiis Lexico-
rum Nov. Testam." It was already clearly manifested in these
works, particularly those of Fischer, how much evil results from
the unenlightened connexion of profane literature with theology.
The peculiar Christian ideas were brought more or less to the
standard of mere deistical notions ; thus dvaXcwnvis was made to
mean, emendatio per Religionem Christianam, the doctrine of the
Holy Spirit was reduced to the notion of praiseworthy qualities,
obtained by divine assistance. It is easy to see how these ideas
lead to neology. Regeneration was with many, merely a recep
tion into a religious community. The phrase " are one," (as used by

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 589
Christ iii reference to himself and the Father) was explained of a
unity of feeling and will.
John David Michaelis, who was the third learned man to whom
reference has been made, was appointed Professor in Gottingen
in 1745, and died in 179.1. He was the son of the excellent J. P.
Michaelis, of Halle, where he was educated in the society of the
pious professors of the University. But (to use his own words)
he was too light-minded to give himself up to the pietistical spirit
which then reigned in Halle. In Gottingen he freed himself from
his early trammels both in respect to doctrine and practice. The
principal objects of his attention were, profane history, geography,
antiquities, and the oriental languages. He seems not to have had
so much religion as Baumgarten or Ernesti, and therefore his man
ner of treating theology was much more injurious. He did not,
indeed, deny any essential doctrines, but softened them down, made
what was internal merely external, much to the detriment of what
constitutes the essence of Christianity. Thus to make the opposi
tion between xvcvpa and oap% nothing more than the opposition be
tween reason and sensuality, must necessarily be destructive in its
operation, for if this be all, the Christian religion does not differ
from the philosophy of Plato. The grounds also upon which he
rested the authority of Christianity were superficial ; he said that
were it not for the miracles and prophecies he would not believe
in the scriptures, and that he had often read the Bible, but never
found the testimonium spiritus sancti. In his writings we remark
a great want of delicacy, which was still more observable in lec
tures which were sometimes disgraced by downright obscenities.
The influence and mode of operation of these three men may be
best learnt from the following works : that of Baumgarten, from
the autobiography of Semler ; that of Ernesti (and also Fischer)
from the autobiography of Bahrdt ; that of Michaelis from his
own life, and the autobiography of John von Miiller, who speaks
of the, exceedingly improper manner of his lecturing.
Until this period the basis of Christianity had not been attacked,
the main doctrines yet stood firm, although doubts had been here
and there excited. The method of treating these subjects was very
arbitrary ; the manner in which the church had presented the lead
ing doctrines was laid aside ; many of the passages before relied
upon in their support were rejected, and the manner of proving
them was changed ; the arguments being drawn from general de
istical principles or profane literature. The most important prac
tical doctrines also were so much explained away, as to lose their
nature. The students of these men came out in a spirit essentially
different from that of their teachers. Semler was the pupil of
Baumgarten, Morus of Ernesti, Koppe and Eichhorn of Michaelis,
and by them neology was established. Among these founders of
neology, the most important, and its real author, is Semler, an ori
ginal thinker, which is what we rarely meet with among the neolo
gists. Semler had been brought up in Halle in contact with vital

590 tholuck's HISTORY OF theology
piety, where he received impressions, which he could never en
tirely obliterate, and which in his old age revived. Possessed of a
very sanguine temperament, and, as he complains himself, light-
minded, he renounced entirely the party of the Pietists, who, it
must be admitted, were deficient in learning, and defective in the
manner in which they defended their doctrines ; and connected
himself with Baumgarten. It was not the personal character of
Baumgarten, which was dry and logical, which formed the attrac
tion for Semler, but his great learning and his fine library to which
he gave his friend free access. Semler, under these circumstances,
acquired extensive erudition, and as his master had freed himself
from the form at least in which the church presented the Christian
doctrines, Semler went further and adopted opinions entirely new.
Baumgarten, perceiving the creative talents of this sanguine man,
said to him : " Theology stands in need of a new reformation, I am
too old to undertake the business ; this you must do," and this he
did. Semler was first Professor of History in Altdorf, and was
thence called as professor of theology to Halle in 1752. With re
gard to the powers of his mind, it may be said, that they were on
the one hand very great, and on the other, very deficient. He had
an astonishing memory, and was able at any time to recall what
he had ever learnt. His mind was also acute, when the field of
investigation was small, and his imagination active and vivid,
which led him easily to form new combinations. But he was de
ficient in all the qualifications of a philosopher, as well dialectical
as contemplative, and hence he never formed any system, although
he produced a multitude of new thoughts which he neither ex
panded nor arranged, but cast them out in the greatest disorder.
His works are on this account very difficult to read, there is no
connexion in the ideas and no logical arrangement. He retained,
in all his investigations, the fear of God, which, joined with his
want of a philosophical spirit, prevented him from seeing whither
the principles he adopted naturally led ; and when he saw in
others the consequences of the course upon which he had entered,
he sincerely repented that he had gone so far. This led to the
firm opposition which he made to Bahrdt, whose conduct gave
him real distress. In his latter days, Semler- wished to remedy
the evils he had occasioned, and published some very singular
views by which he endeavoured to reconcile scepticism and ad
herence to the doctrines of the church. He said there was a pub
lic and private religion for the theologian ; in public he was not au
thorized to reject any received doctrine, but in private he might
believe what he pleased. And when the preacher spoke of the
" Son of God," it was no harm if one part of his audience regard
ed him as really God, another as merely a man, and the third en
tertained the Arian • doctrine, all this was consistent with unity.
The revolution which Semler produced, was principally by his
exegesis. Ernesti had recommended the principle that the" lan
guage and history of the particular period, in which the several

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 591
sacred books were written, should be applied to their explication.
This principle is unquestionably correct, but improperly applied
leads to decided neology. Semler acted upon this principle, and was
for explaining everything from the circumstances of that age, and
reducing the general notions of the Bible to more precise ideas.
In this way the leading doctrines of the scriptures were brought
down to mere temporary ideas ; and the spirit of the Bible, which
should ever attend and give it life, was lost, and it became a book
for the age in which in was written. Sapf and xvcvpa he explained
from the peculiar opinions of that period ; oapl was the narrow
notion of the Jews respecting Christianity, against which Paul
wrote and contended ; xvcvpa was a free and liberal idea of Chris
tianity. On this pzinciple he divided the books of the New Testament
into those in which the o-upf predominated, and those in which the
xvcvpa prevailed. The Gospels were written for the aapKiKoi ; Paul's
Epistles for the yvivartKoi ; the Catholic Epistles, too, united both
parties, and the Apocalypse for the Fanatics. In this way he must
necessarily lose the proper view of the Bible. In the Epistle to
the Romans he overlooked what is the main point in the whole
discussion, justification by grace, in opposition to that by works ;
according to him, Paul's object was to combat the narrow views
of the Jews, who believed that they alone could be saved ; where
as, Paul wished to extend salvation to the heathen as well as the
Jews. It is plain that if these principles of Semler, when applied
to the New Testament, were so injurious, they must be much more
so when applied to the Old. If the Old Testament is to be ex
plained according to the views entertained of it in the age in which
it was written, then it must lose its important meaning. Semler
did not hesitate to say, therefore, that it was useless for Christians:
that Jesus laid, stress upon it merely because the Jews thought that
they had eternal life therein ; but Paul has directly attacked it.
Only such parts which, on account of their moral excellence, were
still valuable, could be of any use to Christians of the present day.
Semler was thus brought by his historical criticism to precisely the
same results as the Popular Philosophy. Semler was particularly
learned in the patristical and ecclesiastical history ; and most of
his writings refer to these departments. His scepticism and want
of religious experience are here also clearly displayed. In the his
tory of the Christian doctrines, he could not distinguish the true
from the false ; and thought everything was full of contradictions,
because he was not able to see the ground of coincidence. His
want of religious feeling led him also to condemn Augustin and
justify Pelagius, and his view on this subject became every day
more general.
There arose a man by the side of Semler, in Halle, who not
only united the various scattered neological doubts which he had
cast out, but connected with them many of his own arbitrary yet
destructive doctrines. A man who attacked not only the doctrines

592 tholuck's history of theology
of the church, but those of the Bible, and whose life was as inju
rious as his writings. This was the famous Dr. Bahrdt. His father,
a professor of theology at Leipzig, was a strictly orthodox man.
The son manifested from the first, a great degree of light-minded
ness, which his father did not properly attempt to correct. He
rather sought to conceal, than eradicate the faults of his son. His
education, therefore, produced a very bad effect upon his mind ;
observing on the one hand such strict orthodox principles, and on
the other such a laxity of practice, he got the idea that orthodoxy
was altogether an affair of the head, and that the heart was go
verned by entirely different principles. He was early Privat Docent
and preacher in Leipzig ; but his gross misconduct and licentious
ness forced him to resign his office to avoid deposition. He re
tired to Erfurdt, where he was made professor, and continued his
abandoned mode of life ; thence he removed to Giessen, and from
thence to Maschlintz, to an institution of Herr von Salis. Thence
he went to Tiirkheim, in the territory of the Count of Leiningen,
where he was made General Superintendent. It was here he pub
lished his New Testament, under the title, " Newest Revelation of
God," 1779. In his translation he endeavoured to give a new-
fashioned dress to everything, and introduced all the personages
speaking and acting, as though they had been Saxons or Prussians
living in the year 1779. In his interpretations, whatever was most
perverse and unnatural, was sure to be adopted as true. This
book produced such a sensation that an imperial order was issued
from Vienna condemning the work, and urging that the author
should be displaced. The Count of Leiningen consented, and
Bahrdt was obliged to remove. He went now to the land of illu
mination, to Prussia, and applied to the minister, Von Zedlitz, for
employment, who was very willing to secure him a situation.
Bahrdt came to Halle, and would probably have been made a pro
fessor, had not the faculty objected. Semler was particularly ac
tive in this affair, making the manner of Bahrdt's life the ground of
his opposition to his appointment. The minister, therefore, only
allowed him to read lectures in the Philosophical Faculty. He ac
cordingly announced that he would lecture on rhetoric and decla
mation ; but let it privately be known, that he really meant to read
on pastoral theology. It is said that 900 persons were assembled
in the great auditorium of the university to hear him. His manner
was that of a charlatan ; he endeavoured to show how the feelings
of an audience could be excited, and sought to make the manner of
preaching usually adopted ridiculous. These lectures, however,
did not bring him in enough money, which was his principal object.
The poor man, therefore, proposed to read a course of lectures on
morals, which citizens as well as students might attend. He suc
ceeded in obtaining a considerable number of hearers — students,
citizens, and officers ; and endeavoured to exercise his theatrical
talents upon this mixed audience. But he soon found this activity
too troublesome and too little productive, and, therefore, retired to

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 593
a farm in the neighbourhood of Halle, and opened a coffee-house,
" a course," he said, " his health demanded." Before his death he
was cast into prison in Magdeburg, on account of a comedy which
he wrote against the government. He sought by all manner of lies
to avoid arrest, but in vain, and died in 1792. With regard to the
views of this man we may say, as we said regarding those of Vol
taire, that his character renders them undeserving of regard. Even
his own description of himself is sufficient to show that he was
destitute of principle ; but this was made still more apparent by
the publication of a collection of his letters. All kinds of deceit
were to him equal if he could but gain money. His talents were
such as, had they been turned to a good account, might have been
made really serviceable ; he had particularly the talent of writing
in a clear and easy style, and a creative fancy. His views gradu
ally formed themselves ; he said that when he came to Halle he
had renounced all doctrines contrary to reason, excepting those of
inspiration and of divine influence. How he came to discover that
these also were unreasonable, he thus describes : " The historical
arguments of Semler, and the philosophical reasoning of Eberhardt,
had made a great impression on me ; it only failed to bring my
feelings to reject these doctrines : this was effected by my being
laughed at for holding them ; this touched my pride, and I let them
go as contrary to reason." He still retained the doctrine of God's
existence, and the immortal soul. The contents of his writings,
so far as they are his own, are of a romantic, extravagant charac
ter ; he endeavours in every way to represent everything of a mi
raculous nature recorded in the Bible, as mere natural occurrences.
His works, however, from the novel-like style in which they were
written, were extensively circulated and read.
The university-theologians of this period, after Semler came
out, divided themselves into three classes : some few remained
orthodox ; others sought to retain the form of the Bible doctrines,
but soften down the leading ideas, representing them as unimpor
tant, and turning their chief attention upon the moral portions of the
scriptures ; some rejected particular doctrines of the Bible : few new
ideas were advanced by either party. Of those who belonged to
the second class, we may mention the following as the most dis
tinguished. Noesselt, in Halle, died 1807. He had formed him
self principally upon the writings of the English theologians, and
hence received the tendency not to attack openly the doctrines of
Christianity, but rather to present them in a softer light. In the
early part of his life he had defended these doctrines in his Apolo-
gie, but as his faith grew weaker, in the last edition he only pub
lished the first part of the work, which contains the general defence
of Christianity, feeling no longer any disposition to undertake the
defence of the several doctrines.
Morus, successor to Ernesti, in Leipzig, from the year 1775, died
1792. He also never decidedly attacked the Christian doctrines ;
but he endeavoured to show that it was very difficult to establish
38

594 tholuck's history of theology
the details of any of these doctrines upon a sure basis ; and that,
therefore, we need only hold to that which promotes moral im
provement Many of his students, however, rejected the doctrines
themselves of their own accord.
Of those belonging to the third class are : 1. Eichhorn, in Got
tingen. He published his " Introduction to the Old Testament,"
1780 ; his " Universal Library for Biblical Literature," 1787 ; his
" Introduction to the New Testament," 1804. He carried the prin
ciples of Semler fully out, and renounced entirely the orthodox
faith. He treated Judaism as a mere human institution, which
was no more under the direction of Providence than all other
religions are. Christianity also was a mere local appearance, and
all the distinguishing Christian ideas were explained away. He
particularly manifested his bold and reckless criticism in his work
on the Old Testament.
2. Steinbart, of the University of Frankfort on the Oder, died
1809. He published a work against what he called the " Language
of the Schools," by which, however, he understood the doctrines
respecting faith, good works, conversion, <fcc. His principal work
is his " System of Pui-e Philosophy and Happiness," 1768. He
proceeds upon the plan to which we alluded when speaking of the
English theologians, of attempting to reconcile Christianity and
natural religion. It is hardly necessary to say that this was to be
effected by bringing the former down to the standard of the latter.
He first advanced the idea, in Germany, that there is nothing in
Christianity above the reach of reason. In this work Christ is
represented as a mere man ; the doctrines of original sin and atone
ment as the vain notions of Augustine.
3. The Abbot Henke, of the University of Helmstadt. He ob
tained extensive influence, as well by the periodical works which
he conducted as by his " Ecclesiastical History." The titles of
the former are, " Magazine for Religion and Philosophy," 1793 —
1802. " Magazine for Exegesis and Ecclesiastical History," six
volumes. " Archives of Modern Ecclesiastical History," and
" Eusebea." 4. Gabler, who was a pupil of Eichhorn, was at first settled in
Altdorf, and afterwards in Jena. His influence was principally
maintained by his " New Theological Journal," 1798 — 1801.
5. Paulus, in Heidelberg, whose " Commentary on the New Tes
tament" has been circulated in two large editions. The evil which
this work has produced has not arisen so much from the exposi
tions which he gives, for these are so forced and unnatural that
every one can see they are false, as from the low spirit which
reigns throughout the work ; by which everything exalted and
divine is reduced to the level of every day occurrences. Paulus
published his " Memorabilia," from 1787 — 1796.
Besides these learned men, belonging to the universities, many
pastors took part in the work of reforming theology, and obtained
an extensive influence. There were particularly many preachers

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 595
and philosophers in Berlin, whose efficiency in this enterprise de
serves remark. Berlin was at this time the chief seat of the popu
lar philosophe-rs, Mendelssohn, Engel, Sulzer, Nicolai, and others,
whose works were everywhere read and admired ; these men
stood in an intimate connexion with the then famous preachers
Spalding and Teller. There was, indeed, a secret society formed
in Berlin, of which not only these philosophers, but also several
preachers were members. It was called the " Society for Light
and Illumination," although it had another name taken from the
day of the week on which it held its meetings. The author of this
society was the librarian, Biester, whose object was to introduce a
new system of religion. Their proceedings, however, were kept
in profound secresy. Spalding and Teller conducted themselves
with great caution and prudence ; they wished gradually to pros
trate all the positive doctrines of religion, and, therefore, those who
came out too boldly, and pushed on the work too rapidly, were
checked and kept within more moderate bounds. They endea
voured to effect their object by making morality the great point,
and representing the positive doctrines as of less importance.
They substituted new ideas, general Deistical notions, in the place
of the true biblical ideas, extracting the nerve and essence of the
latter. Thus Spalding, opposing the doctrine of immediate divine
influence, exchanged the important doctrine of the operations of
the Holy Spirit for the dry notion of moral effort for improve
ment, under the aid of God's providence. He and Teller both
opposed the use of what they called the figurative language of the
east, and, therefore, proposed to substitute for regeneration, the
purpose of leading a new life ; for sanctification, reformation ; for
being filled with the Holy Spirit, to live reasonably, &c. Spald
ing's influence, through his works, " Worth of the Feelings in
Religion," and the " Usefulness of the Office of a Minister," was
very great.
Teller's Dictionary of the New Testament, which has passed
through six editions, contains everywhere these mere moral ideas
in the place of the true Christian doctrines. Christianity was to
be more and more explained away until it ceased to be a
doctrinal system altogether, and became a mere code of morals ;
men should constantly become more intellectual in their reli
gion, a course in which they could not advance too far, but
should not advance too rapidly. We have yet to mention
two other clergymen, viz., Loeffler, from the year 1785, gene
ral superintendent in Gotha. He published the work of Sou-
veren on the Platonism of the Fathers, and in the discourse which
he affixed to it opposed the doctrines of the Deity of Christ, and
the atonement ; and Basedow, a zealot in the cause of illumination.
He adopted a system of education which was a flat imitation of
that proposed by Rousseau. He did not wish to be regarded as a
decided enemy of the positive doctrines of Christianity, but as
only desiring to render them agreeable to sceptics. He found
thirty-two errors in Christianity, such as the doctrine of the Tri-

596 tholuck's history of theology
nity; the influences of the Holy Spirit, the two-fold nature of
Christ, &c, &c.
The Wolfenbiittel Fragmentist. There was for a long time a
debate who the author of this work really was ; but Samuel Reima-
rus, professor in Hamburg, acknowledging himself as the author,
on his death-bed, has set the matter at rest. He sent the several
papers to Lessing, by whom they were published. The first Frag
ment was on the Toleration of Deists ; then followed five on the
Old Testament, then those on the Resurrection of Christ, the possi
bility of a Revelation, and the most shameful of all, that on the
object ofOhrist and his apostles. The author says, Christ wishes
to establish an earthly kingdom, but failing in his enterprise made
the despairing exclamation on the cross. Everything which this
author wrote is marked by the most decided spirit of infidelity,
which he feared, however, fully to declare. His arguments, there
fore, are not those of a calm investigator but of a passionate enemy.
He was entirely deficient in the true historical spirit, though in
other respects not wanting in talents. Riem, a preacher in Berlin
in 1782 : he died in Paris, 1795, on the theatre of the revolution.
He was a fanatical enemy of revealed religion, which he mani
fested in an open and profane manner in his " Religion of the
Children of Light," Berlin, 1789, and in his " Christ and Reason,"
Brunswick, 1792.
Among all these authors, with the exception of Semler, there is
not one who produced anything new ; we have now, however, to
mention two men, who, in connexion with Semler, hold the most
important rank in the history of this period. The first of these is
Lessing, born 1729. He was originally designed by his father for
theology, and for this purpose was sent to Leipzig, to pursue his
studies; but taking no interest in the lectures there delivered, he
devoted himself to belles lettres. He lived privately in Berlin
until 1769, then acted as director of the theatre for some time in
Hamburg, and thence removed to Wolfenbiittel as librarian. Theo
logy was not his profession, but his attention was directed to va
rious subjects, and among others to this. He examined the various
systems both of philosophy and theology, but his mind found con
tentment nowhere : the doctrines of Spinoza were most to his taste.
He was far too sceptical to' admit of his believing in revelation,
and too much devoted to pleasure to be capable of a moral inves
tigation : a life of pleasure, he said, was better than a holy end.
Yet he had too much head and too much heart, not to see and
feel that real practical Christianity was far more worthy of re
spect and far more elevating than the neological systems. Al
though he had no experience, he was able to respect it, which
gives importance to what he says. His most important works
are, 1, the "Wolfenbiittel Fragmentist," of which he was the pub
lisher. His object was to perplex and drive into a corner the or
thodox theologians, who were proud of their systems. But he said
he should be sorry to have thought that he had published this

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 597
work out of.enmity to Christianity. The learned theologian might
be troubled by it, but not the Christian ; the former might be per
plexed in seeing his props of Christianity thus shattered, but what
has the Christian to do with the hypothesis and the arguments of
the theologian ? the Christianity in which he feels himself so happy
is still there.
2. His smaller theological discourses contained in the seventh
volume of his works. In one of these he defends deism in the fol
lowing manner : —
The Christian religion, he said, was the religion which Christ
possessed, and this every man should endeavour to attain, although
it is difficult to state precisely what it is. He assumed a natural
religion, in the same sense in which we speak of natural rights, but
when men come together they must endeavour to agree upon cer
tain points, and thus arises a positive religion in the same way as
positive rights. His discourse also on the Moravians is worthy of
remark, in which the warm piety of this sect is cordially approved
and defended against the objections of the orthodox. Also his dis
course, " Christianity and Reason," in which Christianity is ex
plained by Pantheism.
3. " His work on the Education of the Human Race." This,
although a small work, is rich in matter. It admits of a two-fold
interpretation in one view it seems to be a refutation of neology,
but in another it is an attack on all revealed religion, and an apolo
gy for Pantheism.
It was then common to urge against Judaism these two objec
tions : first, that it was too particular and confined ; and secondly,
that it did not contain the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.
These objections Lessing answers in a masterly manner, although
not altogether on principles which a Christian can adopt. "Juda
ism," he says, "is to be justified on the ground of God's condescen
sion to human weakness. If God wished to lead men in the way
of truth, it was necessary that he should place them under a course
of education which implies gradual instruction ; and it was always
necessary that this course should be restricted to a single and se
cluded people that the difference between them and others might be
apparent. He further remarks, that if Christianity contains the
results to which reason leads, it is no proof that it is not a revela
tion ; as in the arithmetic for children, the result is stated before
the investigation commences. Under these views, however, lies
hid a Pantheistical system. The " Collection of Frederick
Schlegel" contains " Lessing's Thoughts and Opinions ;" Leipzig,
1804, three vols. From this work we give the following leading
ideas : He endeavours to show that it was by no means to the ad
vantage of Christianity, that the popular philosophers had reduced
it down to the standard of natural religion, in order to make it ac
ceptable to sceptics. " Formerly," as he remarks, " there was a
distinction between theology and philosophy, and each could pur
sue their course undisturbed : but the philosophers break down the

598 tholuck's history of theology
separating wall; and, under pretence of making. us reasonable
Christians, make us unreasonable philosophers." Leibnitz, he says,
was of the opinion, that only to believe Christianity on the ground
of reason, was not to believe it at all ; and that the only book
which, in the proper sense of the words, ever has been or ever can
be, written on the truths of the Bible, is the Bible itself. Lessing,
therefore, properly remarks, that it is the province of reason to de
cide whether the Bible be a revelation or not ; but if this be settled
in the affirmative, its containing things which we cannot under
stand, is rather a proof for, than against it. Another of his re
marks, equally well founded, is, that faith in the truths of revela
tion is not to be obtained by the separate examination of the several
distinct points, historical and doctrinal ; that no one ever would
become a believer in Christianity, if he endeavoured to make every
fact and every doctrine certain beyond dispute, before he adopted
it as a revelation. So far from this, they only can admit the seve
ral points to whom the holy contents of the entire Gospel has com
mended itself as truth which sheds light upon all the particulars.
In this he agrees with Lord Bacon, who compares the defenders
of Christianity who act upon the principle referred to, to those who
place a candle in every corner of a large hall, instead of hanging
a large chandelier in the middle of it, which would shed its light to
the darkest recesses. Lessing expresses the same idea in another
form, when he compares the Christian to the confident victor, who,
disregarding the frontier fortifications of a land, seizes hold of the
country itself; while the theologian is like a timid soldier who
wastes his strength in the boundary, and never sees the land.
The other individual whom we mentioned as ranking with Sem
ler was Herder, born in Morungen, in East Prussia, 1741. Herder
was educated under the care of Christian parents, and by a pious
clergyman, whose name was Trescho. The impressions made by
his early education he never lost ; he always endeavoured to
defend what had, in his youth, appeared to him as true and holy.
As imagination and feeling were the leading characteristics of his
mind, his views of Christianity were rather of a sentimental cast,
his knowledge of it was not deep and practical. The austerity of
his teacher conspired to render the manner in which he regarded
the subject unpleasant to Herder's feelings. In his attendance on
the university, he devoted himself particularly to classical litera
ture and belles lettres, with which he connected the study of the
ology. When we consider the effect of these studies, in connexion
with what we have said of his disposition and his early education,
we shall be able to explain his future course. His early impres
sions determined him from the first to appear as the defender of
Christianity, which he really wished to be. But as he was not
fully acquainted with what practical Christianity really was, and
as he had received a prejudice against austerity, and as the belles
lettres had fastened on his affections, his defence never proceeded
upon the principles on which our religion either can or should be

IN the eighteenth CENTURY. 599
defended. He did not represent Christianity as the only means of
salvation for men sunk in sin and misery ; not as the narrow path
in which men must walk to secure eternal life ; but he endeavoured
to recommend it for its beauty and amiability ; to present the
scriptures in an attractive light as " belles lettres " productions ; to
recommend the sacred personages of the Bible for their moral
loveliness. Such a justification as this can never be of much avail.
Amidst all the temptations of life, and the difficulties with which
our faith is assaulted, we must have some better foundation than
this. And Herder is himself an example how little a faith, resting
on such grounds, can affect the life.
He was called, as general superintendent, to Weimar, where he
was brought into connexion with the first authors of Germany, and
he himself praised and caressed as one of her best poets. The
various temptations to vanity and worldly enjoyments, by which
he was surrounded, he was unable to withstand. He endeavoured
to become less and less offensive to the world, whilst he retained
his character as defender of Christianity. But, though apparently
its defender, he gradually relinquished all its doctrines, by repre
senting all definite ideas upon them as doubtful. Everything was
merged in a magic obscurity, over which he could poeticise at
pleasure ; but he left his readers entirely at a loss to determine
what was to be retained and what rejected. Hence Garve said,
" his writings were like a distant cloud, of which no man could tell
whether it was merely a cloud, or a city involved in obscurity yet
filled with inhabitants." In his early writings there is much that
is useful, with good feeling, and many correct views. To this
class belongs his "Oldest Records of the Human Race," his " Let
ters on the Study of Theology," and his " Remarks on the New
Testament, from a newly opened Oriental Source." His later
works, on "The Redeemer," and " The Resurrection of Christ,"
have more or less of the character of obscurity of which we have
spoken ; in reality they are neological. Of his " Ideas on the Phi
losophy of the History of Man," John von Miiller says, " I find
everything there but Christ, and what is the history of the world
without Christ ?"
Section VII. — On the Influence of the New Philosophy.
The philosophy which prevailed, until the latter half of the last
century, had pretended to be able to present a regular mathemati
cal demonstration on all the subjects of which it treated. This
philosophy of Wolf, although professing to defend Christianity, had
been the means of exciting in many minds the spirit of scepticism.
Many profound thinkers, striving in a wrong way to attain a
knowledge of the truth, were at last brought to the conviction that
this knowledge was unattainable. Besides this, Wolf had sepa
rated so completely natural and revealed religion, that many of

600 tholuck's history of theology
the advocates of his system contented themselves with the former ;
and this gave rise to what is called the popular philosophy.
In the former part of the latter half of the eighteenth century,
therefore, the philosophers were divided into those who thought
they could demonstrate all the truths of natural and revealed reli
gion, and those who had separated some few leading doctrines,
which they thought were alone susceptible of demonstration.
But a great revolution was at hand ; the philosophy of Kant ap
peared in decided opposition to everything which had previously
passed under that name. Kant was excited, by the scepticism of
Hume, to investigate the ability of the human powers to attain to
a knowledge of invisible things. This was something new, for the
German philosophers had been accustomed to speculate, with.m- c
quiring whether reason was adequate to the discovery of the truth.
The result of Kant's investigations was, that man was entirely
incompetent to the task of attaining to a knowledge of invisible
things, and that the demonstrations of Wolf amounted to nothing.
He was not, however, willing entirely to give up metaphysics, and
as he could not found a system on demonstration, he attempted to
erect one on postulates of practical reason. The hinge upon which
his system turns, is the categorical imperative in man ; that is, the
consciousness that we should be and do what the moral law re
quires. This categorical imperative cannot be denied, as every
man carries it in his own bosom. But if this be not self-contra
dictory, impelling us to an object which does not exist or which
cannot be attained, there must be a metaphysics which contains
these three truths, the existence of God, the liberty of man, and
the immortality of the soul. For if this imperative be not deceit
ful, man must have the power of realizing the object to which it
impels, and this is his liberty. But the excellence to which it
urges us is in this world never fully attained ; there must, therefore,
be a future state in which it may be completely realized. There
must also be a governor who has this excellence in himself, and
who can distribute rewards in proportion to virtue, hence a God.
Within these limits, and to explain and illustrate these three truths,
Kant confined the whole of metaphysics. With regard to this
system it may be remarked, that its negative part contains more
truth than its positive portion. He is right in denying the possi
bility of reason attaining a knowledge of the infinite ; that there is
a gulf here over which no bridge can be built, it must be leapt.
He should, therefore, have been led to acknowledge a revelation,
which the Christians of that day expected he would do. How
this necessarily follows from his principles, is proved in a work
entitled " Immanuel, a book for Jews and Christians," written by
a distinguished statesman. In reference to the positive part, what
is new therein is not true, and what is true is not new. The truth
is that the moral feelings of man will, amidst all his doubts, urge
him to believe in another world ; but the peculiar form in which
Kant sought to present this subject is false. His argument is, that

IN the eighteenth century. 601
if this imperative be not self-contradictory there must be a God,
human liberty, and immortality ; but this imperative is not false,
therefore these three truths must be admitted. But in this argu
ment there is a petitio principii. It takes for granted that the
world is created and exists for a definite object. But this the most
consequent philosophical systems deny. They say the idea of an
object is a gross anthropomorphism ; that he who proposes an end
to himself must employ means to attain that end ; but this implies
that the end cannot be immediately attained, and, therefore, that
the being who proposes to himself an end or object must be im
perfect; in the world, therefore, no such striving after an end can
be admitted, but the working of an absolute necessity. When
Kant, therefore, takes for granted that the world has an object, he
assumes, what was to be proved, the existence of an intelligent
personal Deity. The form of his argument is hence false. It may
further be remarked that, according to Kant's system, these three
important doctrines are made very subordinate, in that they are ad
mitted, not on the ground of their own evidence, but upon the
ground of this categorical imperative. In this view man becomes
a law to himself. God only distributes the amount of happiness
which has been merited. Holiness is also presented in a very
subordinate light, because, according to this manner of conceiving
of it, it must receive its happiness from without, which is a false
idea of the subject, against which even Socrates had opposed him
self; this is the most deficient point in the system. With regard
to the effects produced by the philosophy of Kant, it may be re
marked, that they were both salutary and injurious. It prostrated
the pride of those who pretended to be able to demonstrate every
thing, and it aroused the mind from the drowsiness which had been
produced by the popular philosophy. Its evil effects were, that a
cold frigid spirit was thrown over its advocates, who employed
themselves about dry morality and barren intellect, rejecting all
deep feeling as fanaticism ; even prayer itself was rejected. Hence
all the sciences to which this philosophy extended its influence lost
their vitality, and assumed a pedantic, scholastic, schoolmaster-like
aspect. This was especially the case with theology and history.
They were only estimated so far as they solved the problem of
the Kantish morals ; what was individual and characteristic was
not regarded. Christ himself was estimated only for having taught
a system of morals analogous to those of Kant. This philosophy
spread itself more rapidly than any had ever done before it.
Among the theologians its defenders were Staiidlin, Schmidt, and
Tieftrunk, although the former at last gave it up. Even those who
did not formally adopt the system, were obliged to conform them
selves to it, as was the case with the popular philosophers in Berlin,
Nicolai, Garve, and Mendelssohn ; they complained much, that the
new philosophy had occasioned so much trouble and difficulty, where
everything was quite clear before. Reinhard, although he did not
embrace the system of Kant, allowed himself to be so far influ-

602 tholuck's history of theology
enced by it as to introduce many of his principles in his system of
morals. All men, however, of much feeling opposed a philosophy
which was so dry and scholastic ; of this number were particu
larly Hamann and Herder — see Kant's " Religion within the limits
of Pure Reason," and Tieftrunk's " Censure of the doctrines of the
Protestant Church."
Another crisis in the history of philosophy was at hand. The
system which Kant had erected, was destroyed by one of his own
pupils (Fichte). Fichte followed a different path from that pur
sued by his predecessor. Kant had shown that man was not able
to attain to a distinct knowledge of sensible things, that the predi
cates which we attribute to things arise only from the categories
of our own minds, but what it is without us, which occasions the
perception of these attributes or predicates, we cannot know ; it is
an unknown power, X. But Fichte proposed the question, that if
we know nothing of the essence of things, if they be an unknown
X, and their predicates categories of our own minds, what evi
dence have we that the things themselves exist ? what are they ?
and how can they come in contact with our minds 1 His conclu
sion is, that the external world, the X of Kant, has no existence ;
the qualities alone exist, and these merely as laws of the human
mind. The material world is nothing, there is nothing out of our
selves, it is only from the laws of the mind that the world appears
to exist. We thus attain an object which all philosophy aims at,
the removal of the difference between matter and spirit, as in this
view there is no such thing as matter. Fichte's view of the hu
man soul was the following : God the infinite ens comes to existens,
in that he exists in the activity of finite thinking spirits ; the activity
or thinking of these finite thinking principles is the existence of
the infinite ens. Whence come then the external appearances?
If the finite thinking principle was confined entirely within itself, it
would merge in the infinite, and become nothing. That this prin
ciple should have reality and life, it is necessary that it should have
an object within itself; hence the infinite thinking principle when
it comes to existence in the finite, places at the same time with the
finite thinking principle a limitation ; therefore this limitation is the
apparently existing material world ; and hence with every ego
there is placed a non ego. The activity and life of every finite
thinking principle of every ego consists in breaking through this
limitation. This occurs in a two-fold manner, first, when the hu
man spirit pervades and thinks through the objects opposed to it,
so that they pass over into the spirit and become one with it, and
secondly, when the thinking principle raises itself above all laws of
the. non ego, and lives free according to its own laws. This sys
tem of Fichte was more consequent than that of Kant, but it failed
to solve the problem, the removal of the difference of matter and
spirit ; dualism remains in this system as well as in the other.
The problem is indeed apparently solved by denying the existence
of matter, but the opposition is only removed to the mind itself,

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 603
where a limitation is placed. This philosophy is in one view a
very active living one, but its life is only abstract, as it concerns
itself only with abstract thinking, and neglects every other depart
ment and faculty of the soul. Its influence was so far beneficial,
as it excited in many a great degree of mental activity, and in
others produced great moral strictness. The evils which it pro
duced were also great All the material sciences were despised,
and importance attributed only to abstract speculations. A degree
of freedom also was ascribed to men which belongs only to God,
which excited the greatest self-sufficiency. The most important
works on this system are Fichte's " Appeal to the public on the
charge made against him of Atheism," Jena, 1801. " Instructions
for a Happy Life," Berlin, 1806. In these writings, this philoso
phy came into more immediate contact with religion ; see also, " An
exhibition of the true character of the nature-philosophy for the
improvement of the doctrines of Fichte," Tubingen, 1806.
Schelling> followed Fichte. He proposed for his object the actual
removing of all opposition between matter and spirit ; according
to his system, an existence is ascribed as much to the material
as the immaterial world ; the former being only a different mode
of expression or manifestation. The spirit which thinks through
these material objects, frees them from their bonds by freeing the
spirit which is in them. In so far, however, as the laws of matter
are the expressions of the spirit, the latter only finds itself again
when it thinks through the matter and appropriates it to itself.
The only object, therefore, of speculation on the external world is
to come to a full knowledge or consciousness of ourselves ; that is,
to find without us what we have in ourselves. According to these
views, God cannot be regarded as a mere l», since this would be
lifeless. If God be living he must have an opposition in himself,
the removal of which is his life ; hence the unity of God has ever
manifested itself in multitude and variety. The spirit manifested
itself in matter, that the variety may reach the unity, and matter
be freed and raised to spirit. This is the eternal activity of God.
The whole business of philosophy is concerned with this point, the
coming of God to self-consciousness.
This philosophy had the effect of spreading through Germany
an element different from any which had previously prevailed. It
produced a deep feeling, and consciousness of a living and infinite
principle in the world and in men, in nature and in spirit. It de
stroyed the lifeless idea of a God, who stood behind the world
without having any real unity with it. It aroused meh to strive
after knowledge, in a deeper and more effectual manner, because
it did not employ itself with abstract speculations, but with intui
tive views ; in this respect it greatly exceeded the popular philoso
phy, or that of Wolf or Kant. Its influence on theology therefore
was very great ; whilst the popular philosophy and that of Kant
sought to expunge everything above the reach of reason, that of
Schelling again awakened the feelings for the infinite. Schelling's

604 tholuck's history of theology
philosophical works were published together in 1809, including the
Treatise on Human Liberty ; see also Bruns on the Principle of
Divine and Human things, Berlin, 1802 ; Philosophy and Religion,
Tubingen, 1804 ; a monument to the work of Jacobi on Divine
things, Tubingen, 1812 ; Controversial works on this subject —
Susskind's Examination of the Doctrine of Schelling respecting
God, the Creation and Liberty, 1812 ; Jacobi on Divine things and
their Revelation, 1811.
These two philosophers were opposed by a man whose influ
ence was not only great during his life but continues to the present
time. This was Frederick Henry Jacobi. He opposed the specu
lations of Kant as well as those of Fichte and Schelling ; he ad
mitted with regard to the latter two, that they were consequent,
as well as Spinoza, but the result he could not embrace. He could
not prevail on himself to renounce his faith in human liberty, a
personal God, personal immortality, and the objective nature of
evil. He, therefore, opposed to these systems, the inward conscious
ness we have of divine things, and maintained it was impossible,
by speculation, to arrive at a knowledge of these subjects ; there
must be an immediate and intuitive knowledge of them, whether
this intuitive perception be called reason or consciousness. This
intuitive feeling teaches us that there is a God, who stands as thou
before our ego — something different from man. It teaches also
the liberty of man; personal immortality and the objective nature
of evil. Whilst Jacobi presented these views, he appeared at the
same time in hostility against revealed religion. He said that his
torical experience was as much mediate as speculation, and, there
fore, history was as unfit as speculation to afford a true knowledge
of divine things. Man cannot believe in an eternal free God, by
merely hearing a relation concerning him ; the ground of this
must, therefore, lie, in the soul itself. These views are principally
expressed in the introduction to his work on divine things, in which
he appears as the opponent of Claudius.
Jacobi overlooked two important points : first, he did not con
sider that it might be asked him, where faith in his four doctrines
is to be found beyond the limits of Christianity 1 The whole east
is destitute of it — the western philosophy knows as little about it ;
only weak echoings of this truth are anywhere to be heard. Only
a few individuals among the most cultivated of mankind, have had
an indistinct knowledge of them in any period of the world. Ja
cobi himself borrowed them from historical Christianity, though
he was ungrateful enough to deny his obligation. He cannot ex
press himself upon this subject, except in terms borrowed from the
Bible. It cannot, indeed, be said, that we believe these truths
merely because they have been historically communicated to us,
but because we are related to God ; and this relation, even in our
present fallen state, is not entirely destroyed, although the fall has
blinded and obscured our knowledge : tradition alone, therefore,

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 605
is not the foundation of our faith, but this feeling of our relation
to God. We find nowhere beyond the influence of the Gospel,
the humble temper of a servant represented as the ideal of mora
lity. We find no such character as that of the humble Redeemer ;
we never meet the idea that true greatness consists in povertv of
spirit. However strongly a man may believe on the ground of
his own consciousness, yet he must admit if God had not revealed
himself we should never have arrived at a knowledge of true hap
piness, and that a revelation was necessary to render these doc
trines definite and secure. But Christianity contains something
more than these four truths of Jacobi ; it contains the plan of re
demption ; a knowledge of the purposes of God cannot be obtain
ed by intuition, yet here is faith essential. Even admitting, there
fore, the possibility of learning the truths referred to, from a differ
ent, source, it does not destroy the necessity of a historical revela
tion. See the works of Jacobi published by Fleischer, particularly
the second volume of his work on " Divine Things."
After philosophy, in connexion with various other causes, had
exercised such an influence on theology, a theological system was
formed as the result of all these efforts at illumination. To this
system the name of rationalism has been given ; a name first ap
plied by Reinhard. The system is, in fact, the same which was
previously called deism. This system not only sought to obtain
stability for itself, but appeared in decided hostility to Christianity.
As to its tenability, it may be remarked, that the rationalist must
either undertake to support his doctrines on the ground of reason
and argument, or found them upon feeling. If he takes the first
course, he must do it after the method of the philosophy of Wolf;
for that alone undertakes to establish in a demonstrative way the
doctrines of God, freedom and immortality. But the weakness of
this philosophy has long since been proved. If the rationalist gives
this up, he must place himself on the foundation of feeling, on the
principle of Jacobi ; and this is the fact with the most of them.
When he takes this ground he loses all right to contend against a
believer in the Bible. For he can no longer demand of him, that
doctrines which are beyond the reach of reason, should be reduced
to its standard and justified before its tribunal. The rationalist
must acknowledge that he cannot do this for his own doctrines of
the personality of God, human liberty, &e. With the same wea
pons, therefore, with which he contends against the believer he is
attacked by the Pantheist, against whom he cannot maintain his
ground. The Pantheist declares his proofs mere subjective decep
tion, and his doctrines anthropomorphic views. The believer in
the Bible can also object to the rationalist, that his deistical doc
trines are drawn from Christianity, although deprived of their glo
ry and power. And further, that his system, excluding the ideas
of a revelation, divine government, and redemption, presents a
problem which does not admit of a solution. The idea of God
which rationalism contains, is borrowed from the Bible; but if God

606 tholuck's history of theology
really possesses all the attributes here ascribed to him, it would ap
pear necessary that so wise and good a Being should have a nearer
relation to his creatures, and give them some surer guide in refer
ence to divine things than human reason, which teaches so many
various and inconsistent doctrines, and which, beyond the limits of
Christianity, has never yet presented the idea of God which Chris
tian deism contains. The rationalist acknowledges the objective
nature of morality ; but for his certainty on this point he is indebt
ed to revelation, and yet arbitrarily rejects the doctrines of the fall
and of redemption through Jesus Christ. In this way he is led into
another difficulty. Whence is evil 1 the rationalist is obliged to
refer it to God, that through the struggle between good and evil
the former might be promoted. Whilst the denier of a revelation
makes God the author of evil, he gives no explanation of the man
ner in which evil can be rooted out of the heart of man. His
blindness on this point arises from his having no deep and proper
knowledge of good or evil. The positive part of rationalism thus
consisting of Christian doctrines deprived of their glory and con
sistency, is equally unsatisfactory for the human heart and human
understanding, particularly in reference to the doctrine of evil.
The rationalist undertakes, however, to prove, not only that
Christianity is improbable, but that it is contrary to reason, and en
tirely inadmissible. In this effort its weakness is most clearly ex
posed. It proceeds from the principle that God never works with
out the intervention of secondary causes, and therefore an imme
diate revelation is impossible. Revelation can only be mediate,
and consist in a development of what already lies in the nature of
man. Hence arises the distinction between naturalism and super-
naturalism ; the former regarding every religious communication
as mediate, consisting in the development of what is in man, the
latter maintaining an immediate communication of divine truth, not
derived from the human mind itself. The rationalist assumes that
God, at the beginning, formed the world as a machine, with whose
powers, having once set them in motion, he never interferes. This
view is in the first place false, but admitting its correctness, the
conclusion drawn from it by the rationalist is by no means neces
sary. For, granting that God does not interfere with the world, it
does not follow that he cannot and will not. At most, the impro
bability, but not the impossibility, of an immediate revelation fol
lows from this view.
But the view. itself is false ; God is not a machinist, who, having
finished his work, retires behind : the life in the universe cannot be
regarded as absolutely distinct from the life of God. God conti
nues and supports the world by a continual creation, for such in
fact is preservation. The life of the world is the breath of Jeho
vah ; its active powers, the working of its omnipresence; the laws
of nature are not therefore fixed once and for ever. Augustine
says, Lex naturae est voluntas Dei, et miraculum non fit contra na
turam, sed contra quam est nota natura. The laws of nature are

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 60'/
mere abstractions, which men make from the usual operations of
God. It can, therefore, by no means be said, that his unusual ope
rations, as in immediate revelations and miracles, are violations of
the laws of nature. There is no essential difference between im
mediate and mediate operations ; it is merely the difference between
unusual and usual. And if God would reveal himself as a living
and personal Being, these extraordinary operations of his power
are essential, as they contain the proof that nature is not a piece of
dead mechanism.
But the rationalist also endeavours to show the improbability of
a revelation upon moral principles He says it would prove that
God had made man imperfect, if later communications and revela
tions were necessary. But in this objection it is overlooked that
man is not now, as he was originally created. In his primitive
state, an immediate revelation might not have been necessary, but
in his fallen state the case is essentially different. The rationalist
further demands, why was the revelation not made immediately
after the fall, before so many genei-ations had passed away ? To
this we may answer, that God appears to have determined to con
duct and educate the whole race as an individual, and in the idea
of education lies that of gradual progress.
Finally, it is objected that the revelation is not universal. In an
swer to this we may say, that the difficulty presses the deist as
much as the Christian, because it affects the doctrine of providence.
The deist makes religion and refinement the greatest blessings of
men ; but why has God left so many ages and nations destitute of
these blessings? If the deist must confess his ignorance upon this
point, why may not the Christian ? Besides this, Christians them
selves are to blame, that the revelation has not been more exten
sively spread ; why have they only within a few years awaked to
the importance of this work? And why do the rationalists, of ail
others, take the least interest in it ? It may further be remarked,
that the New Testament does not teach that those who have never
heard the Gospel are (on this account) to be condemned. The
apostle says that God winked at the times of ignorance, that those
who sin without law shall be judged without law. And it may be
hoped, as Christ is the only means of salvation, that those who
have not heard the Gospel here, may hear it hereafter. Peter says
that the Saviour communicated the knowledge of his redemption
to those who had died before his appearance.
See in answer to Roehr's Letters on Rationalism, Zoellich's Let
ters on Supranaturalism, 1821 ; and see Tittmann on Naturalismus,
Supernaturalismus, and Atheismus; Leipzig, 1816.
Bockshammer's Revelation and Theology, Stuttgart, 1820.

ESSAY XXII.
TRANSCENDENTALISM *

It is, we think, undeniable, that since the death of Doctor Tho
mas Brown of Edinburgh, metaphysical research has been at a
stand in Great Britain. In the southern part of the island this had
been the case for a much longer period, but the sharp and scepti
cal enterprise of the Scotch kept philosophical debate in motion
for a time, so that a sect was formed, and we speak as familiarly
of the Scotch school as we do of the Pythagorean or the Eleatic.
But that line seems to have reached its term, and the few who
publish at this time are either the lowliest compilers from Stewart
and Brown, or, as is more frequently the case, such as have gone off
in a direction altogether different, in search of a profounder philo
sophy. Of the latter sort there are some among ourselves, and we
have it now in view to point out some of the causes which may
account for the essays to introduce a modified transcendentalism
In America, the earliest school of metaphysics was founded by
tlie followers of Locke ; and, with the clew of this great inquirer
in his hand, Jonathan Edwards ventured into a labyrinth from
which no English theologian had ever come out safe. By the just
influence of his eminently patient, and discriminating, and conclu
sive research, this greatest of modern Christian metaphysicians put
his contemporaries and their descendants upon a sort of discourse
which will perhaps characterise New England Calvinism as long
as there is a fibre of it left. In speaking of Edwards, we distinctly
avow our conviction that he stands immeasurably above many who
have followed in his steps, and attempted his methods. If the spe
cies of reasoning which he introduced into American theology is
susceptible of easy abuse, and if, in fact, it has been abused to
* Published in 1839, in review of the following works : —
1. " Elements of Psychology, included in a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay
on the Human Understanding, with Additional Pieces. By Victor Cousin, Peer of
France, Member of the Royal Council of Public Instruction, Member of the Insti
tute, and Professor of the History of Ancient Philosophy in the Faculty of Litera
ture. Translated from the French, with an Introduction and Notes, by the Rev C.
S. Henry, D. D."
2. " Introduction to the History of Philosophy. By Victor Cousin, Professor of
Philosophy of the Faculty of Literature at Paris. Translated from the French, by
Henning Gottfried Linberg."
3. " An Address delivered before the Senior Class in Divinity College, Cambridge,
Sunday, 15th July, 1838. By Ralph Waldo Emerson."

transcendentalism. 609
disastrous ends, we rejoice to acquit this great and holy man of
willingly giving origin to the evil. And in what we shall curso
rily remark concerning New England theology, we explicitly pre
mise that we do not intend our Congregational brethren indiscrimi
nately, but a defined portion of them, well known for many years
as daring speculators. The theology of this school has always
been in a high degree metaphysical ; but the metaphysics is of a
hyperborean sort, exceedingly cold and fruitless. In the conduct
of a feeble or even an ordinary mind, the wire-drawing processes
of New England theologizing become jejune and revolting. Taught
to consider mere ratiocination as the grand and almost sole func
tion of the human mind, the school-boy, the youth, and the pro
fessor, pen in hand, go on, day after day, in spinning out a thread
of attenuated reasoning, often ingenious, and sometimes legiti
mately deduced, but in a majority of instances a concatenation of
unimportant propositions. It has too often been forgotten by the
disciples of this school, that a man may search in useless mines,
and that it is not everything that is worth being proved. Hence
the barrenness and frigidity of the sermons which were heard from
the pulpits of New England during the latter half of the last cen
tury. Many of these, and many of the dissertations and treatises
which poured from the press, were proofs of remarkable subtilty
and patience of investigation, and showed how easy it is to draw
forth an endless line from the stores of a single mind. For, in this
operation, it was remarkable that the preacher or philosopher re
lied almost exclusively on his own stores. There was little con
tinued unfolding of scriptural argument, and little citation of the
great reasonings of ancient or modern philosophy. Each meta
physician spun by himself and from his own bowels. The web of
philosophical argument was dashed with no strong woof from
natural science, embroidered with no flowers of literature. Where
this metaphysics was plied by a strong hand, as was that of Presi
dent Edwards, it was noble indeed; deriving strength and honour
from its very independence and self-sufficiency. In the hands of
his son, Dr. Edwards, there were equal patience, equal exactness,
equal subtilty, but no new results : still there were undeniable
marks of genius ; as there were also in the controversy which
then began to be waged among the dwindled progeny of the giants,
on the great questions of liberty and necessity, moral agency, and
the nature of virtue.
But when the same products were sought in a colder climate,
and from the hands of common and unrefined men ; when every
schoolmaster or parish clergyman found himself under a necessity
of arguing upon the nature of the soul, the nature of virtue, and
the nature of agency ; when with some this became the great
matter of education, to the neglect of all science and beautiful let
ters, then the consequences were disastrous ; and a winter reigned
in the theologv of the land, second only to that of the scholastic
39

610 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
age, and like that dispersed only by the return of the sun of vital
religion. In the hands of a subtle errorist, such as Emmons, these meta
physical researches led to gross absurdities, some of which still
survive. We believe a few of the elder and less sophisticated
preachers of New England are to this day teaching, and that their
staring auditors are to this day trying to believe, that the soul is a
series of exercises ; that God is the author of sin ; and that in
order to escape damnation, one must be willing to be damned.
Others, running away with an error less innocent because lying
nearer the source of moral reasoning, and less alarming in its
guise, reasoned themselves and their hearers into the opinion, that
all sin is selfishness, and that all holiness is the love of being in
general. Taking the premises of the great Edwards, they de
duced a system of false theology, which under its first phase as
Hopkinsianism, and under its second phase as Taylorism, has been
to our church the fons et origo malorum, and which, in union with
the Epicureanism of the Paley school, has assumed the name of
Calvinism to betray it to its enemies.
It is only great wisdom which can avoid one extreme without
rushing to the other. The golden mean, so much ridiculed by
zealots, is precisely that which imbecility could never maintain. In
philosophy, as well as in common life and religion, we find indi
viduals and bodies of men acting on the fallacy that the reverse of
wrong, as such, is right. Human nature could not be expected to
endure such a metaphysics as that of New England. It was not
merely that it was false, and that it set itself up against our con
sciousness and our constitutional principle of self-love ; but it was
cheerless, it was arctic, it was intolerable : a man might as well
carry frozen mercury in his bosom, as this in his soul. In a word,
it had nothing cordial in it, and it left the heart in collapse. If it
had remained in the cells of speculative adepts it might have been
tolerated ; but it was carried into the pulpit, and doled forth
to a hungry people under the species of bread and wine. No
wonder nature revolted against such a dynasty. No wonder that,
in disgust at such a pabulum, men cast about for a substitute, and
sought it in tame Arminianism or genteel Deism.
The calculating people of our country, in certain portions of it,
have long been enamoured of a system of ethics which is reduci
ble to the rules of loss and gain. It is much more level to the
apprehensions of such to say that two and two make four, or that
prodigality makes poor, or that doing good makes profit, or that
gain is godliness, or that virtue is utility, than to plead for an im
perative law of conscience, or for an eternal distinction between
right and wrong. The former systems came home to the business
and bosoms of the calculator. Though he had learned to speak
evil of Epicurus, yet he clasped Paley to his bosom ; and as all
men admitted that this philosopher and divine was a mighty rea-
soner, and a fascinating writer, so the calculator went further, and

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 611
adopted his ethical heresy as the basis of all morals. Some, who
could not take the system in its gross form, received it under that
modification, which appears in the theology of President Dwight.
Long, therefore, before the mask was completely cast away by
Bentham, Mill, and the Utilitarians of England, there were hun
dreds of young men who had imbibed the quintessence of the poi
son through their college text-books, or through the introduction
of the same principles into the received authorities of law-schools
and courts of justice. We think it possible to show, that the pre
valence of this degrading view of the nature of holiness, namely,
the view which allows to virtue no essence but its tendency to
happiness, has directly led to a laxity in private morals, to a sub
tlety of covert dishonesty, to an easy construction of church sym
bols and of other contracts, and to that measurement of all things
divine and human by the scale of profit, which is falsely charged
upon our whole nation by our foreign enemies. We think it pos
sible to show that such is the tendency of Utilitarianism. And
such being its tendency, we should despair of ever seeing any re
turn from this garden of Hesperides, with its golden apples, were
it not for a safe-guard in the human soul itself, placed there by all-
wise Providence. For the system runs counter to nature. Reason
about it as you will, the soul cannot let so monstrous an error lie
next to itself; the heart will throb forth its innate tendency, and
conscience will assert its prerogative. Nor will men believe con
cerning virtue, any more than concerning truth, that it has no
foundation but its tendency to happiness ; even though such ten
dency be as justly predicable of the one as of the other. The
very consideration of what is involved in the monosyllable ought,
is sufficient to bring before any man's consciousness the sense of a
distinction between virtue and utility, between that which it is
prudent to do, and that which it is right to do. In process of time,.
as more adventurous and reckless minds sailed out further upon
this sea of thought, especially when some theologians went so
boldly to work as to declare, that, in turning to God, we regard
the Supreme Being in no other light than as an infinite occasion of
personal happiness to ourselves ; when this began to be vented,
thoughtful men were taken aback. They queried whither they
were going. They remembered that their religious emotions had
included other elements. They reconsidered the grounds of the
adhesion they had given in to Paley, to Epicurus, and to self.
They paused in their rapid career and looked at the system of
general consequences. And in a good number of instances, they
were ashamed of the way in which they had been trepanned out
of their original ideas, and sought for something to put in the
place of the idol they were indignantly throwing down. We know
such men ; we know that they will read these pages ; men who
have gone down after their guides into the vaults of the earth-
born philosophy, hoping to see treasures, and gain rest to the crav
ings of their importunate inquiring, but who have come up again

612 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
lamenting their error, and mortified that they had been abused.
These things we have said concerning the Utilitarian ethics, now
prevailing under different forms in America, and chiefly in the
Northern and Eastern States, as furnishing an additional reason
for the eager search that undeniably exists, after a more spiritual,
elevating, and moral philosophy.
In tracing the irresistible progress of thought and opinion, as it
regards philosophy, we have seen two sources of that dissatisfac
tion which, for several years, has prevailed with respect to hitherto
reigning metaphysics ; namely, a disrelish for the coldness, heart-
lessness, and fruitlessness of the New England methods, and a
dread of the doctrine of Utilitarianism. It might have been happy
for us, if the proposal for a change had come ab intra, if one of
our own productive minds had been led to forsake the beaten track,
and point out a higher path. But such has not been the case. It
has so happened, that no great native philosophical leader has as
yet arisen to draw away one scholar from the common routine.
This has been very unfortunate. If we are to make experiment of
a new system, we would fain have it fully and fairly before our
eyes, which can never be the case so long as we receive owr phi-
losophemata by a double transportation, from Germany via France,
in parcels to suit the importers ; as fast as the French forwarding
philosopher gets it from Germany, and as fast as the American
consignee can get it from France. There is a great inconvenience
in the reception of philosophical theories by instalments ; and if
our cisatlantic metaphysicians import the German article, we are
sometimes forced to wait until they have learned the language well
enough to hold a decent colloquy in it. Such, however, is pre
cisely the disadvantage under which the young philosophers of
America now labour. We hear much of German philosophy, and
of the revelations which have been made to its adepts ; much very
adroit use of certain disparaging terms, easily learned by heart,
and applied to the old system, as " flat," " unspiritual," " empirical,"
and " sensuous ;" we hear much of the progress made in ontologi-
cal and psychological discovery, in the foreign universities. But,
if we hear truth, the hierophants of the new system among us are
not so much more intimate with the source of this great light than
some of their silent readers, as to give them any exclusive right
to speak ex cathedra about transcendental points. Some of them
are busily learning French, in order to read in that language any
rifacimento of Teutonic metaphysics which may come into their
hands. Some are learning German ; others have actually learnt
it. He who cannot do either, strives to gather into one the Sibyl
line oracles and abortive scraps of the gifted but indolent Cole
ridge, and his gaping imitators ; or in default of all this, sits at the
urn of dilute wisdom, and sips the thrice-drawn infusion of English
from French, and French from German.
It might have been happy for us, we say, if the reformation in
our philosophy had some root of its own in our own soil. But

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 613
what is this vaunted German philosophy, of which our young men
have learned the jargon? We shall endeavour to give an intelligi
ble answer to so reasonable an inquiry. In attempting to offer a
few satisfactory paragraphs on this, it is far from our purpose to
profess to be adepts. We have seen a little, heard a little, and
read a little respecting it. We have, even, during the last fifteen
years, turned over one or two volumes of German metaphysics,
and understood, perhaps, almost as much as some who have be
come masters ; yet we disclaim a full comprehension of the seve
ral systems. The Anglo-Saxon dummheit, with which Germans
charge the English, reigns, we fear, in us, after an inveterate sort.
We have tried the experiment, and proved ourselves unable to see
in a fog. Our night-glasses do not reach the transcendental. In
a word, we are born without the Anschauungsvermbgen : and this
defeet, we are persuaded, will " stick to our last sand." We once
said to a German friend, speaking of Schleiermacher, " But we do
not understand his book." " Understand it ! " cried the other, with
amazement, " what then, but do you not feel it ? " We deem our
selves competent, nevertheless, to give the plain reader some
notices of the progress of transcendental philosophy.
The German philosophers whose names are most frequently
heard in this country, and who indeed mark the regular succession of
masters, are Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. It would be easy
to multiply names, but these are the men who have carried for
ward the torch, from hand to hand. Though there were German
metaphysicians before Kant, it is needless to name them, as he
borrowed nothing from them, and certainly has the merit of stand
ing forth to propagate a system altogether underived from his
countrymen. Perhaps the best way to put our readers in posses
sion of the peculiar tenets of Kant, would be to direct them to an
able syllabus of his system, by Professor Stapfer, translated for
the Biblical Repertory for the year 1828. But to maintain the
connexion of our remarks, we shall furnish further information ;
and if we enter somewhat more into detail here than in what fol
lows, it is because the transition to Kant, from his predecessors, is
more abrupt than from this philosopher to any who succeeded him.
In order to get a glimpse of what he taught, we must, as far as
possible, lay aside all the prepossessions of the British school. We
must not only cease to attribute all our knowledge to sensation
and reflection, as our fathers were taught to, do, but we must lay
aside, as unsatisfactory, all the explanations of Reid and his follow
ers respecting first truths and intuitive principles. We must no
longer regard philosophy as a science of' observation and induc
tion, and must dismiss all our juvenile objection to a purely a priori
scheme of metaphysics. It is the first purpose of Kant, in his
own terms, to inquire "how synthetical judgments a priori are
possible, with respect to objects of experience ;" as, for example,
how the idea of necessary causal connexion arises, when it is con
ceded that nothing is given by experience but the mere succession

614 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
of events.* Indeed, it was Hume's speculations on cause and
effect which, as Kant tells us, first " broke his dogmatic slumbers."
Proceeding from this to all the other instances in which we arrive
at absolute, necessary, universal, or intuitive truths, he proves that
these are not the result of experience. No induction, however
broad, can ever produce the irresistible conviction with which we
yield ourselves to the belief of necessary truth. " Experience (and
this is the concession of Reid himself) gives us no information of
what is necessary, or of what ought to exist."f In such proposi
tions as the following : "A straight line is the shortest between two
points : There is a God : The soul is immortal," &c, there is an
amalgamation (synthesis) of a subject with an attribute, which is
furnished neither by the idea of the subject, nor by experience.
These synthetical judgments therefore are a priori, or independent
of experience ; that is, there is something in them beyond what ex
perience gives. There is, therefore, a function of the soul prior to
all experience, and to investigate this function of the soul is the pur
pose of the Critique of Pure Reason. " Let us," says Stapfer, in
a happy illustration, " imagine a mirror endued with perception, or
sensible that external objects are reflected from its surface ; let us
suppose it reflecting on the phenomena which it offers to a specta
tor, and to itself. If it come to discover the properties which
render it capable of producing these phenomena, it would find itself
in possession of two kinds of ideas, perfectly distinct. It would
have a knowledge of the images which it reflects, and of the pro
perties which it must have possessed previous to the production of
these images. The former would be its a posteriori knowledge ;
whilst in saying to itself, " my surface is plain, it is polished, I am
impenetrable to the rays of light," it would show itself possessed
of a priori notion, since these properties, which it would recognize
as inherent in its structure, are more ancient than any image re
flected from its surface, and are the conditions to which are attached
the faculty of forming images, with which it would know itself en
dowed. Let us push this extravagant fiction a little further. Let
us imagine that the mirror represented to itself, that external
objects are entirely destitute of depth ; that they are all placed
upon the same plane ; that they traverse each other, as the images
do upon its surface, &c, and we shall have an example of objec
tive reality attributed to modifications purely subjective. And if
we can figure to ourselves the mirror as analysing and combining,
in various ways, the properties with which it perceived itself in
vested (but of which it should have contented itself to establish
the existence and examine the use) ; drawing from these combina
tions conclusions relative to the organization, design, and origin of
the objects which paint themselves on its surface ; founding, it may
be, entire systems upon the conjectures which the analysis of its
* Kritik d. reinen Vernunft. Leipzig, 1818, p. 15.
t Essay on the Active Powers. Edinb. quarto, 178S, p. 31, p. 279, also Intellectual
Powers, Essay vi., c. 6.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 615
properties might suggest, and which it might suppose itself capable
of applying to an use entirely estranged from their nature and de
sign ; we should have some idea of the grounds and tendency of
the reproaches which the author of the critical philosophy addresses
to human reason, when forgetting the veritable destination of its
laws, and of those of the other intellectual faculties ; a destination
which is limited to the acquisition and perfecting of experience, it
employs these laws to the investigation of objects beyond the do
main of experience, and assumes the right of affirming on their
existence, of examining their qualities, and determining their
relations to man."
Instead therefore of examining the nature of things, the objec
tive world without us, Kant set himself to scrutinize the micro
cosm, to learn the nature of the cognitive subject. In pursuing
this inquiry, he finds, not that the mind is moulded by its objects,
but that the objects are moulded by the mind. The external
world is in our thoughts, such as it is, simply because our
thoughts are necessarily such as they are. The moulds, so
to speak, are within us. We see things only under cer
tain conditions ; certain laws restrain and limit all our functions.
We conceive of a given event as occurring in time and in space ;
but this time and this space are not objective realities, existing
whether we think about them or not : they are the mere forms a
priori. Our minds refuse to conceive of sensible objects, except
under these forms. Time and space therefore are not the results
of experience, neither are they abstract ideas ; for all particular
times and spaces are possible, only by reason of this original con
stitution of the mind.*
According to this system, all that of which we can be cognizant
is either necessary or contingent. That which is necessary is a
priori, and belongs to the province of pure reason. That which
is contingent is a posteriori, and belongs to the province of experi
ence. The former he calls pure, the latter empirical ; and it is the
circle of knowledge contained in the former which constitutes the
far-famed Transcendental Philosophy, f
Every English and American reader must fail to penetrate even
the husk of German and mock-German philosophy, unless he has
accepted the distinction between the reason and the understanding.
We are not aware that the distinction ever obtained any footing
in our modern English science, until the time of Coleridge, who in
several of his works has striven pugnis et calcibus to instal it into
our philosophical terminology. " The understanding," says Kant,
" is the faculty judging according to sense." " Reason," says Cole
ridge, " is the power of universal and necessary convictions, the
source and substance of truths above sense, and having their evi
dence in themselves."J Resuming, then, the thread which we
* Kritik d. R. V., pp. 23—43. f Ibid., p. 19.
t Even in German, this distinction between Verstand and Vernunft was not al
ways recognised. See a philological analysis of the latter term in Herder's Meta-
kritik, vol. ii., p. 11. See Kritik d. R. V. Elementari., ii. Th., ii. Abth., i. Buch.

616 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
have dropped, the Prussian philosopher dissected the cognitive
subject or soul into three distinct faculties: viz. 1st. Sense, or
Sensibility. 2d. Understanding. 3d. Reason.
Sense receives and works up the multiform material, and brings
it to consciousness. This it accomplishes partly as a mere "recep
tivity," passively accepting sensations, and partly as an active
power of spontaneity. The understanding is a step higher than
sense. What sense has apprehended, the understanding takes up,
and by its synthetizing activity (die synthetisirende Thatigkeit),
presents under certain forms or conditions, which, by a term bor
rowed from logic, are called categories. These are twelve, classi
fied under the heads of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality.
Of Quantity: 1. Unity; 2. Plurality; 3. Totality. Of Quality:
4. Affirmation, or Reality ; 5. Negation, or Privation ; 6. Limita
tion. Of Relation: 7. Substance and Accident; 8. Cause and
Effect; 9. Action and Reaction. Of Modality: 10. Possibility
and Impossibility ; 11. Existence and Non-Existence ; 12. Neces
sity and Contingency.* Whatsoever now the understanding takes
cognizance of, it knows under some of these forms ; and every in
tellection receives the object as connected with at least four of
these categories at once, from the four different classes. Kant at
tributed to the understanding the function of reducing multiplicity
to unity. The result of this reduction to unity, in our conscious
ness, is a conception (Begriff). All possible conceptions are pro
duced under the twelve categories as their necessary forms.
These are therefore the conditions of all thought ; yet they afford
no knowledge of the objects per se ; and have not the slightest
significancy independent of time and space. Time and space are
the ways or forms under which objects are made sensible ; and the
categories are the ways or forms under which the same objects are
understood (begriffen).
The reason, finally, is the sublime of human spontaneity. It
takes cognizance of that which is self-evident, necessary, absolute,
infinite, eternal. Its objects are beyond the sphere, not merely of
time and space, but of all ratiocination : and it is among these ob
jects, " above the stir and smoke of this dim spot which men call
earth," that the transcendental philosophers have most successfully
expatiated. While the understanding is discursive, and collects
proof, and deduces judgments, referring to other faculties as its au
thority, the reason is self sufficient, intuitive, immediate and infalli
ble in all its dictates. In the pure reason, there reside, a priori,
three ideas, viz. 1. Of that which is absolute and of itself, whether
subjective or objective ; the former being the theme of psycholo
gy, the latter of ontology. 2. Of a supreme and independent real
cause of all that is ; namely, of God : this being the object of the
ology. 3. Of an absolute totality of all phenomena ; namely, the
universe, rd xiv ; being the object of cosmology.
* Kritik derreinen, v., p. 73 .

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 617
The eagerness of the philosophical public to discover how these
principles might legitimately affect the interests of ethics and the
ology, led Kant to publish, in 1787, his Critique of Practical Reason.
In this, as in several other similar works indicated in our volume
for 1828, he declared himself, to a certain extent ; still leaving it a
matter of dispute among his adherents whether he was a Deist or
a Christian. His adversaries assert that his argument for the being
of a God is inconsistent with his system, and unworthy of being
admitted ; and even his friends admit that he never gave his assent to
the supernatural origin of Christianity. Nothing, however, in the
whole system is more striking than the foundation which it gives
to morals ; for here, and nowhere else, Kant forsakes the character
of a mere critic, and lays down absolute and final dictates of rea
son. There is, he teaches, an original and invariable law, residing
in the depths of human- consciousness, and commanding what is
right. This he calls the categorical imperative. It urges
man to act virtuously, even at the expense of happiness. Trans
lated into words, it runs thus , " Act in such a manner, that the
maxim of your will may be valid in all circumstances, as a princi
ple of universal legislation."* Proceeding from this he builds his
natural theology on his ethics ; argues the necessity of another
life and an almightyand omniscient Judge. The three " postulates
of the Practical Reason," are God, freedom, and immortality, f
It is now, we believe, generally conceded, that these moral and
theological speculations are an after-thought, a supplement to the
main structure, and scarcely worthy of reverence for their consis
tency, however interesting as proofs of the strong leaning of their
author towards the faith of his childhood. It was the desire of
Kant to appear favourable to Christianity. At his day infidelity
had not grown so bold as it has since done ; and it is especially
worthy of consideration, that whenever Kant speaks of the Divine
Being, he distinctly conveys the idea of a personal God, objectively
existing, separate from nature, and independent of the cognizance
of finer spirits. J
It deserves to be noticed that Kant, in pursuance of his voca
tion as a critical rather than a constructive philosopher, did not at
tribute to reason those divine and active powers which later phi
losophers have assumed, and which are claimed for her by some
of our American imitators, who, we would gladly believe, are
* Handle so dass die Maxime deines Willes je'derzeit zugleich als Princip einer
allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten koenne. Kritik der Practischen Vernunft. 5te
Aufl. Leipz., 1818, p. 54.
t Kritik d. P. V. p. 213, ff.
J Those who choose to pursue this subject further will find satisfaction in the fol
lowing works, viz. Kant's Religion innerhalb der Ideen d. Menschl. Vernunft, 2te
Aufl. 1762, and the reply to it, by Sartorious. Die Religion ausserhalb der Grenzen
der blosen Vernunft, u. s. w. Marburg, 1822. In this work (p. 62), he quotes from
Vincent, the following observation, which is not here out of place : " Who can re
frain from a smile, at beholding Christ and his apostles brought into the train of phi
losophy, and made successively Wolfians, Crusians, Kantians, Fichteans, and Schel-
lingeans !"

618 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
ignorant of the apotheosis of reason which they thus subserve.
The genuine Kantians have always maintained that in what their
master delivered concerning the absolute and the infinite, he simply
meant to attribute to pure reason the power of directing the cog
nitive energy beyond its nearer objects, and to extend its research
indefinitely ; but by no means to challenge for this power the di
rect intuition of the absolute, as the veritable object of infallible
insight. The chief objection which was made to the Critique of Pure
Reason, and to the other works of the same author, was that they
were purposely obscure ; and it cannot be denied, that in addition
to the inherent intricacy of the subject, the reader is greatly per
plexed by a multiplicity of new-coined words, and still more by an
arbitrary wresting of familiar terms to meanings remote from their
common acceptation. It is partly for this reason, that Kant, like
another great innovator of the age, Jeremy Bentham, has been
best represented by the pens of his disciples ; and that aid which
Bentham owed to Dumont, was afforded to Kant by Schulze, a
chaplain of the king of Prussia.* This writer acknowledges, how
ever, that at the time when he wrote, that is in 1791, the dic
tion of his master still remained a hieroglyphic to the public, f In
1798, when Coleridge was in Germany, he heard much the same
statement from the venerable Klopstock. " He said the works of
Kant were to him utterly incomprehensible ; that he had often
been pestered by the Kantians, but was rarely in the practice of
arguing with them. His custom was to produce the book, open it,
and point to a passage, and beg they would explain it. This they
ordinarily attempted to do, by substituting their own ideas. I do
not want, I say, an explanation of your own ideas, but of the pas
sage which is before us. In this way I generally bring the dis
pute to an immediate conclusion/'^ Coleridge, however, declares
that in that very year almost all the professors in Germany were
either Kantians, or disciples of Fichte, whose system is built on
the Kantian ; and in the twelfth chapter of the work just cited, he
vindicates Kant from the charges of needless obscurity. At the
same time he tells us that the disciples, during their master's life
time, quarrelled about the meaning of his dicta, and that the old
philosopher used to reply to their appeals : " I meant what I said,
and at the age of near four score, I have something else and more
important to do, than to write a commentary on my own works."
In spite of this obscurity, however, the Critical Philosophy as
sumed the empire in the German universities ; but not without
opposition from the highest sources. The celebrated John George
Hamann uttered a touching caveat against the irreligious tendency
of Kant's system. He declared, in his letters to Jacobi, and else-
* Erlauterungen ueber des Herrn Professor Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft : von
Johann Schulze, u. s. w. Koenigsberg, 1791.
t Schulze, p. 6.
j Biographia Literaria, vol. ii., p. 160, N. Y. edition.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 619
where, that the new philosophy owed many of its deductions to a
mere play on words, and perplexed its readers in a maze of un
wonted expressions ; that the Kantian ™ iv was a mere conception,
of which the objective existence or non-existence could not be de
termined by reason. He warned the student of philosophy against
a system of delusion, in which man is made everything and God
is made nothing ; a warning infinitely more appropriate as applied
to the systems which have succeeded Kant, and which are prof
fered to the credulous complaisance of the American public* In
1799 the still more celebrated Herder entered the field as an an
tagonist, in his Metakritik.\ Like Hamann, he brings the charge of
perplexed language, and the misunderstanding and abuse of ab
stractions. He characterises the Critique of Pure Reason in gene
ral, as transcendental mist (transcendentalen Dunst), a fog of fine
spun verbiage (nebelichfes Wortgespinnst), calculated by means of
dialectical sorcery to confound the very implement of reason,
namely, language. The attention of the reader is the rather called
to this judgment, as it is common to attribute the obscurity of our
philosopher to some accidents of his vernacular tongue, rather
than to his own phraseology ; but here is the verdict of a German,
a scholar, a philosopher, and a pupil of his own. If space were
allowed, we might go much further, and dilate upon the denuncia
tion of the Kantian idealism, by a number of eminent men, such
as Garve, Eberhard, Tiedemann, Tittel, Nicolai, and Jacobi : of
whom the first two were formally answered by Kant, while the
last is the sole representative of a system which founds all philoso
phy in an affectionate religious faith, independent of revelation. J
But it is time we should leave Kant, and consider his great suc
cessor. John Theophilus Fichte, who was born in 1762, and died
in 1814, is thought by the initiated to have carried philosophy for
ward from its critical towards its scientific condition. He was fa
miliar with Kant, and wrote in his manner, so that his first impor
tant work, published in 1792, was attributed to the great master.
Kant had set out with a critical analysis of understanding, reason,
and judgment. Some of his followers, especially Reinhold, had
started with the phenomenon of consciousness. Fichte simplified
a step further, and began, not with a thing or a faculty, but an act.
Fichte, say his admirers, leaves us at the apex of the pyramid.^
True enough, but then the pyramid is upside down : the apex and
support being the monosyllable I. The notion of a thought which
is its own object, and the notion of I, are identical. The Ego looks
* Jacobi's Schriften, vol. i., 1781, pp. 371—390; vol. iv., p. 31. Goethe's Dich-
tung und Wahrheit ;. Werke, vol. xxvi.
f Verstand und Erfahrung: eine Metakritik zur Kritik d. r. Vernunft; von J. G.
Herder, Leipzig, 1799.
J See Jacobi von den Gottlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung, 2te Aufl. Leipzig,
1822; see also Rixner's Handbuch d. Geschichte d. Philosophie; Sulzbach, 1829,
vol. iii., § 143, 144.
§ See a similar«expression in Mr. Linberg's note to Cousin's Introduction, p. 455.

620 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
at itself; and thus we have the idea of Ego as knowing, and Ego
as known, the intelligent and the existent I. This Ego, absolute
and free, has regard to an object, or Non-Ego : it creates this Non-
Ego by its own activity : in a word, it creates objective nature.*
The whole of the Fichtean philosophy is a following out of this
track. It creates the world out of the mind's act ; and it regards
the outward universe as nothing but a limit of our being, on which
thought operates ; a limit, moreover, springing from the mind's cre
ative power.f In such a system as this, what place is found for the
Great Author of the universe ? Fichte replies, that the being of
the Godhead (which he holds to be identical with the active and
moral ordo mundi) is an object not of theoretical knowledge, but
of rational faith ; and that this faith is purely moral. On a certain
occasion, we are told by Madame de Stael, he said to his auditors
that in the following lecture he would proceed to create God ; an
expression in perfect harmony with his principle, but one which
gave just offence to the public. " According to Fichte," says
Cousin, in his Introduction to the History of Philosophy, " God is
nothing but the subject of thought conceived as absolute : he is
therefore still the I. But as it is repugnant to human thought, that
the I of man, which might indeed be transferred into nature, should
be imposed upon God, Fichte distinguished between a twofold I,
the one phenomenal, namely, the I which each of us represents ;
the other is itself the substance of the I, namely, God himself.
God is the absolute I."J Even Coleridge, who regarded Fichte as
giving the first idea of a system truly metaphysical, admits that it
" degenerated into a crude egoismus, a boastful and hyperstoic hos
tility to Nature, as lifeless, godless, and altogether unholy ; while
his religion consisted in the assumption of a mere ordo ordinans,
which we were permitted exoterice to call God."§
In a seeming ecstasy of admiration, the translator of Cousin's
Introduction says of this system : " Fichte has, in arriving at this
point, indeed reached the very summit of the pyramid of human
science ; and if the man lives, or has lived, who has as yet disco
vered a flaw in the chain of reasoning which leads to this point, I
am ignorant of the fact."|| It may be observed of many of the
* That our syntax, as well as our philosophy, is becoming a new affair, may be
seen from the following specimen of Dr. Henry's English : " The fundamental fact
of consciousness is a complex phenomenon, composed of three terms: first, the me
and the not me" &c. — Introduction, p. 20. Now, if we must have nonsense, we feel
that it is our privilege, as descendants of Englishmen, to have it in good grammar.
Apropos of this, we find some of our contemporaries quoting Plato in Cousin's ver
sion : surely our scholarship must be near its ebb ! If the Greek is absolutely unin
telligible, and if we have neither Sydenham nor Taylor, let us get a friend to English
it for us. It is quite in the style of the French pulpit, when we find Dr. Henry cit
ing the Vulgate (page 22). " It is the Logos, the Word of St. John, which ' light-
eth every man that cometh into the world :' ' illuminat omnem hominem venientem
in hunc mundum.' " The reader must be left to divine why Dr. Henry here quotes
Latin. t Biographie Universelle, vol. xiv., p. 486. Rixner, vol. iii., p. 337, ff.
j Linberg's Translation, p. 398.
§ Biographia Literaria, vol. i., p. 95.
|| Cousin's Introduction, by Linberg. Boston, 1832, p. .454-5.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 621
systems with which it is sought to render our youth gradually fa
miliar, that at the first approach they have a horrid aspect of athe
ism ; but that the adepts have the most ingenious method imagina
ble of correcting this impression. There is probably not a Pan
theist in America who will own the name ; nor is there a greater
certainty concerning things future, than that the free ingress of
transcendentalism will smooth the way for the denial of all that we
adore and love in the august idea of God. Fichte was at first re
puted to be an atheist ; and one of his works was instantly confis
cated with rigour throughout all Saxony. As is usual in such
cases, he and his abettors wrote appeals and apologies. Herder,
then vice-president of the Weimar consistory, took part against
him. All Germany rang with the quarrel. It was at this memo
rable crisis that Schelling arose in opposition to Fichte, in behalf
of a system still more transcendental ; of which more hereafter.
He became the fashionable philosopher of Jena, for there are
fashions in philosophy, especially in Germany. Poor Fichte fought
as he could, but the public having tasted a more intoxicating bever
age, could not return to the flatter metaphysics. Fichte is supposed
to have advanced in his later years to a more consistent idealism.
He always declared that the Kantians did not comprehend their
master's system : we believe as much ourselves : but he added, that
in the new system of idealism he was only giving consistent deve
lopment to the principles of Kant.
It was reserved for other hands to complete the structure ; or if
we acknowledge that the pyramid was now complete, it afforded a
test for the flight of more consistent, or more adventurous minds,
into the transcendental empyrean. It was Frederick William Jo
seph Schelling, who, to use the phrases of his admirers, brought
philosophy to its perfection, as the science of the Absolute. Kant
had scrutinized the cognitive subject, and determined, except in re
gard to the moral imperative, that absolute knowledge is unattain
able. Fichte followed him, and out of the productive Ego created
the objective world, still giving countenance, however, to the fig
ment of a seeming dualism, and discriminating between the thinker
and that which is thought. But Schelling, with a boldness une
qualled in every previous attempt, merged all in one, and declared
as the great discovery of the age, and first truth of absolute wis
dom, that subject and object are one, that the Ego and Non-Ego
are identical. Knowledge and Being are no longer different. His
system was, therefore, expressively called the system of identity, or
the philosophy of the absolute.*
Here, as in a former case, we ask what place is left for the Most
High ? Schelling is at no loss for an answer. God is in truth the
very object of all philosophy ; but it is God revealing himself in
the universe. The divine being, once hidden, has a perpetual ten
dency to self- revelation; a process of evolution which is for ever
* Rixner, vol. iii., § 167.

622 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
going onward, and producing the world, or nature. It is this de
velopment which we see and feel, and of which we are a part.
The universe, therefore, becomes as important a portion of the phi
losophy of Schelling, as that of the ancient Gnostics, or of Spi-
nosa.* We do not wish to be understood as comprehending this
profane modification of atheism, for we almost tremble while we
write ; we will not say the notions, but the expressions of men who
treat of the genesis of divinity as coolly as Hesiod of the birth of
gods : yet we will proceed. In the absolute philosophy, God is a
principle, not personal, but tending to personality, becoming per
sonal (eine werdende Personlichkeit) ; a tendency manifested in, and
producing, the phenomena of the universe. This eternal develop
ment is a mighty effort towards self-consciousness ; and the con
sciousness of human reason is indeed the consciousness of, God ; a
state in which the absolute spirit views itself. t
This, we need scarcely say, is a highly flattering illusion to the
soaring mind. The infinite chasm between heaven and earth is no
more. Human action is the action of the infinite. Man can know
the infinite by immediate insight, because he is himself infinite.
God is all things, and all things are God : we are ourselves in God
and God in us. And here the happy language of a writer in the
Edinburgh Review for 1829, whose article on Cousin is highly
praised and largely quoted by Dr. Henry, may be cited by us,
though with an intention very different from that of the latter. " In
this act of knowledge, which, after Fichte, Schelling calls the Intel
lectual Intuition, there exists no distinction of subject and object —
no contrast of knowledge and existence — all difference is lost in ab
solute indifference — all plurality in absolute unity. The intuition
itself — reason — and the absolute — are identical. The absolute
exists only as known by reason, and reason knows only as being
itself the absolute."J As a natural consequence, this direct cogni
tion of the absolute, the unconditioned, and the infinite, implies the
annihilation of consciousness ; for it is of the very essence of con
sciousness to conceive of the object of thought as separate from its
* In the new philosophy there is little reference had to the distinction between matter
and spirit; in this respect the grand error of the ancient Greeks reappears, and the
inevitable result is an inextricable tangle of physics with metaphysics. Material
images are always dangerous aids in the philosophy of the mind ; but the Germans
are so far from being aware of this, that a large part of their statements are merely
transformation of sensible images into expressions of pure thought. By running
away with analogies, a puerile imagination may see resemblances between material
and immaterial objects, which a puerile judgment may stamp as verities. Hence, in
the system of Schelling, galvanism, electricity, and magnetism, have place in the
very midst of psychology. Hence, in the system of Cousin, expansion and concen
tration become elements of menta] analysis. Hence, also, England being an island,
her philosophers cannot be transcendental. The ridiculous passage in which this
truly French statement is conveyed, is too striking to be omitted : " England, gentle
men," says M. Cousin, " is a very considerable island ; in England everything stops
at certain limits ; nothing is there developed on a great scale."— Introduction, p. 380.
f See Bretschneider, Ueber die Grundansichten der Theologischen Systeme der
Proff. Schleiermacher und Marheineke. Leipzig, 1828, p. 5.
t Edinburgh Review, Oct., 1829, Art. xi., p. 208.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 623
subject. It is a further consequence that there can be no personal
immortality of the soul ; "the hope of which he characterizes as a
vain solace (eitle Freude) :* in return for which fond illusion,
Schelling cheers us with an immortality in which the qualities of
the soul re-enter into the universal mass : " An immortality," says
Madame de Stael, " which terribly resembles death : since physical
death itself is nothing but universal nature reclaiming the gifts she
had made to the individual."!
Such is the philosophy which up to this very hour is taught in
several of the German universities by Protestant teachers of reli
gion, and to which, more alarming still, a goodly number among
our neophytes in metaphysics are endeavouring to attain. But M.
Cousin somewhat sneers at our apprehension of the " bugbear "
Pantheism, and we- may yet be called upon by American clergy
men to abandon all belief in a personal God, or any Deity but the
universe. It is very true, as we shall see, that M. Cousin does not
avow himself to be a disciple of Schelling. It is further true that
he diverges from him in important particulars, and earnestly,
though, as we think, vainly, endeavours to wrest his own system
into a conformity with revelation ; yet his whole scheme is a con
duit from the stream of German transcendentalism at the most cor
rupt part of its current ; and his works abound with expressions
which savour too strongly of doctrines more prononcees than those
which he has avowed. In the following sentences we know not to
what school he can allude, if not to that of Schelling, Oken, or He
gel :% " Fichte died in 1815, and even before his death, a new phi
losophy, unable to stop at the system of absolute subjectivity, and
the summit of the pyramid of the me, has re-descended to the
earth, and returned to nearer views of actual reality. The con
temporaneous German philosophy, which now exerts as great an
influence, and possesses as high an authority in Germany, as ever
did that of Kant or Fichte, bears the title of the philosophy of na
ture. The title alone indicates some return towards reality."§
We have sometimes been strongly tempted to suspect that many
of the enthusiastic admirers of Coleridge's prose works are entirely
unaware of the extremes to which their master's principle of phi
losophizing would legitimately lead them. None can be more open
than ourselves to impressions from the great genius and inimitable
diction of this philosopher and poet ; we have felt its fascinations,
and in hanging over his pages, and especially his noble denuncia
tions of the utilitarian ethics, we have almost forgotten how inde
terminate and fruitless are most of his reasonings, and how rotten
the foundation of his scheme. After our declaration that the sys
tem of Schelling is a system of Pantheism, or that sort of Atheism
which denies the personality of God, many will be f startled when
* Bretschneider, ubi supra, p. 12.
t De l'Allemagne, t. iii., p. 114, ed. Paris, 1814.
j Cousin's Introduction to Hist, of Philosophy, p. 427. Boston.
§ The title of one of Schelling's works, Ideen zur Naturphilosophie ; 1797.

624 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
we assure them that Coleridge maintained the great principles of
this very school. We disclaim indeed the intention of represent
ing this learned man as having coincided with the German Panthe
ist in all the remote consequences of his theory, however legitimate.
But that the system of Coleridge and the system of Schelling are
the same in their leading principles will be denied by no one who
is familiar with both. Nay, we have Coleridge himself making the
most ample avowal of this coincidence, for the purpose, as it should
seem, of escaping the charge of plagiarism from the German phi
losopher. Let us hear himself: "In Schelling's ' Natur-Philoso-
phie,' and the ' System des Transcendentalen Idealismus,' I first
found a genial coincidence with much that I had toiled out for my
self, and a powerful assistance in what I had yet to do." And then,
as if to account for the somewhat singular fact that the dissertation
in the " Biographie Litteraire," on the reciprocal relations of the
esse and the cogitare, is a literal translation from the Introduction
to a work of Schelling, he proceeds to say:* "We had studied in
the same school ; been disciplined by the same preparatory philo
sophy, namely, that of Kant ; we had both equal obligations to the
polar logic and dynamic philosophy of Giordano Bruno," &c, &c.
And again : " To me it will be happiness and honour enough, should
I succeed in rendering the system itself intelligible to my country
men, and in the application of it to the most awful of subjects for
the most important of purposes."! After reading these avowals,
and after having learned the ravages of this very philosophy among
the present generation of clergymen in Germany, we are heartily
thankful that Coleridge never summoned sufficient energy to give
us anything more than fragments; while we are filled with amaze
ment at the sight of Christian ministers among ourselves, men of
education and piety, either subscribing to statements which they
do not comprehend, or giving the weight of their authority to the
conclusions which by the best theologians even of Germany are
denounced as incompatible with the fundamentals, we say not of
Christianity, but of natural religion. Let our young metaphysi
cians learn from Coleridge and Cousin to tolerate and admire Schel
ling, and they will soon learn from Schelling himself that God is
everything.J * This seeming plagiarism is set in the best light of which the facts admit, in the
preface to the " Specimens of the Table Talk," New York, 1S35, p. 25, ff. But the
whole vindicatory argument is singular in the history of literary borrowing. See, on
the same topic, the British Magazine for January, 1835.
f Biographie Litteraire, vol. i., pp. 95, 97. The reader, in order to do justice, at
once, to us, in bringing so grave a charge, and to the memory of Coleridge, should
not fail to consult the work here cited. On page 169 will be found this pregnant de
claration : " We begin with the / know myself in order to end with the absolute I
am. We proceed from the self, in order to lose and find all self in God." See also
" The Friend,"-Essay xiii., p. 76, note; likewise p. 451, ed. Burlington, 1831 ; like
wise " Aids to Reflection," note 50, p. 2S4, ed. 1829.
% In all that we have written about Schelling, we have had reference to his pub
lished systems. What changes have taken place in his way of thinking within the
last ten years, we have not been in a situation to know. It is, however, said that he
has abandoned some of his anti-Christian notions.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 625'
We almost shrink from the attempt to conduct our readers any
lower down in the circling vaults of German wisdom ; we have not
yet reached the end, for in the lowest deep a lower deep still
opens wide, in the system of Hegel and his followers.* When we
speak of this professor, we shall not be scrupulous in distinguish
ing between his own opinions and those of his immediate and'
acknowledged followers ; and, this being premised, it may be said
that his was the system prevailing in Germany on the arrival of
the last steamer.
George Frederick William Hegel was born in 1770, and died'
within the last three or four years. He was professor, first at
Jena, and afterwards at Heidelberg and at Berlin ; in the last of
which chairs he succeeded Fichte, in 1818. His system purported
to be an improvement on that of Schelling. It is said by the
Hegelians, that in contradistinction from that of Fichte, which was-
a subjective idealism, and from that of Schelling, which was an
objective idealism, the scheme of Hegel takes the true position as
an absolute idealism.f Hegel, no less than Schelling, maintained
universal identity, or that ail things are the same : but while the
former postulated this as an intellectual intuition, the latter pro
ceeded to prove it by a scientific process.^ Both teach, but with
the same difference as to the origin of the dogma, that thought and
being are identical. In his earliest work, Hegel undertook to
show how the I, through manifold and multiform self-evolutions,
comes to, be, first, Consciousness, then Self-Consciousness, then Rea
son, and, finally, Self-Comprehending and Religious Spirit§
All philosophy, according to Hegel, is but an attempt to answer
a simple question, viz., Quid est ? And the answer to this involves
all Truth, all Reason: for whatever is, is Reason. All reality is
reasonable, all that is reasonable is real. Hence the only real ex
istence is the ideas of Reason. All reality (Wirklichkeit) being
thoroughly rational, is also divine ; yea, is God revealing himself
or developing himself. Nature is God coming to self-conscious
ness. || God reveals himself in creation, or in the universe, by a
series of eternal unfoldings, some in matter, some in mind ; and
thus the Deity is in a perpetual effort towards self-realization. If
The history of Physics is, therefore, the necessary career of divine
self-evolution ; indeed, God thinks worlds, just as the mind thinks
thoughts. In order to philosophize aright, we must lose our own person
ality in God, who is chiefly revealed in the acts of the human
mind. In the infinite developments of divinity, and the infinite
progress toward self-consciousness, the greatest success is reached
* lo sono al terzo cerchio della piova
Eterna, maladetta, fredda, e greve.
Dante, Inferno, Canto vi.
t Conversations-Lexikon, Art. Hegel.
JRixner, vol. iii., p. 437. Marheineke: Dogmatik, §§ 1 — 68.
§ Die Phaenomenologie des Geistes, Bamberg, 1807.
|| Baur : Christl. Gnosis, p. 672. If Rixner, p. 444.
40

626 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
in the exertions of human reason. In men's minds, therefore, is the
highest manifestation- of God. God recognises himself best in hu
man reason, which is a consciousness of God (Gottesbewusstseyn).
And it is by human reason that the world (hitherto without
thought, and so without existence, mere negation) comes into con
sciousness ; thus God is revealed in the world.*
God is the Idea of all Ideas, or the absolute Idea : hence our
ideal thought is divine thought, and this is no other than reason, t
" The doctrine of the being of God is no other than that of the
revelation of himself in the Idea of him." J " God exists only as
knowledge (Wissen) ; in this knowledge, and as such, he knows
himself, and it is this very knowledge which is his existence."^
We may therefore say with truth God exists as an Idea.||
After thus arriving at an ideal God, we learn that Philosophy
and Religion draw us away from our little selves, so that our sepa
rate consciousness is dissolved in that of God. Philosophy is Reli
gion ; and " true Religion frees man from all that is low, and from
himself, from clinging to I-hood (Ichheit) and subjectivity, and
helps him to life in God as the Truth, and thereby to true life."1f
In this oblation of personal identity, we must not claim property
even in our own thoughts. By a step beyond Emmonism, Hegel
teaches that it is God who thinks in us ; nay, that it is precisely
that which thinks in us, which is God. Marheineke himself mani
fests tokens of alarm, when he states this doctrine.** The pure
and primal substance manifests itself as the subject ; and " true
knowledge of the absolute is the absolute itself." There is but a
step to take, and we arrive at the tenet, that the universe and God
are one. ft The Hegelians attempt to distinguish this from the doc
trine of Spinosa, but their distinctions are inappreciable ; ' 'tis the
same rope at either end they twist :' their scheme is Pantheism.
And as God is revealed by all the phenomena of the world's his
tory, he is partly revealed by moral action, and consequently by
sin, no less than by holiness. Sin is, therefore, a part of the neces
sary evolution of the divine principle ; or rather, in any sense
* Marheineke, Dogmatik, § 229. ff. Bretschneider, u. a., p. 49.
t Bretschneider, u. s., p. 40.
X Marheineke, § 147, p. 87.
§ Marheineke, § 153, as cited by Bretschneider ; but in our edition, the third, these
words do not occur, but we read " Das Seyn Gottes also ist selbst noch etwas anders,
als dessen Bestimmtheit selber oder das Wissen." It will not seem" strange to any
one familiar with the present condition of philosophy, that we cite Marheineke as
an authentic expounder of Hegel ; it is just so to regard him, and we may presume
that those points of the system which are anti-christian will, to say the least, not be
exaggerated by a theological professor.
|| Marheineke, Dogmatik, § 174, apud Bretschneider's Grandansichten, p. 43.
IT Bretschneider, p. 45. Marheineke, p. 83. See also Hegel's Encyklopaedie, p. 593.
ff. Baur's Gnosis, p. 672.
** Dogmatik, p. 67.
ft Bretschneider, Grundansichten, p. 50. Rixner, himself a devotee to this German
Budhism, cites what follows: " The knowledge of the absolute identity of God and
the Universe (des Alls) is Reason : the crown and perfection of self-recognising and
self-comprehending Reason is philosophy."— Vol. iii., p. 392.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 627
which can affect the conscience, there is no evil in sin — there is no
sin. This is a part of the philosophy of Hegel, which has given
great pain to pious men in Germany, who have repeatedly com
plained of it as subverting the first principles of morality, not
merely in theory but in practice ; and begetting a fatalism which
threatens alike the foundations of religion and of state. A late
pantheistic poet teaches us, that all which we regard as sin, is ne
cessary, and therefore good, and may, to other intelligences, justly
appear most lovely !* But there are conclusions of the new philoso
phy still more surprising, for which our inchoate metaphysicians
should be getting ready. It is well said by an acute writer already
quoted, that when, according to the demands of Schelling, we anni
hilate first the object, and then the subject, the remainder is zero.f
Though Schelling is not known to have admitted this, his critics
were not slow to perceive it. Schulze, in particular, declared that,
according to his system, Everything is Nothing, and Nothing is
Everything ;% and Koppen called this the philosophy of Absolute
Nothing. It was reserved for Hegel to abandon all the scruples
of six thousand years, and publish the discovery — certainly the
most wonderful in the history of human research — that Something
and Nothing are the same ! In declaring it, he almost apologizes,
for he says, that this proposition appears so paradoxical, that it
may readily be supposed that it is not seriously maintained. § Yet
he is far from being ambiguous. Something and nothing are the
same. The Absolute of which so much is vaunted is nothing.||
But the conclusion which is, perhaps, already anticipated by the
reader's mind, and which leaves us incapacitated for comment, is
this — we shudder while we record it — that after the exhaustive
abstraction is carried to infinity in search of God, we arrive at
nothing. If God himself is nothing I
The German philosophy was first made known to the French
by the Allemagne of Madame de Stael. It attracted some attention
as an extravaganza of the German mind, but it made few prose
lytes until it was taken up by M. Cousin. It was in the year
1816 that he first commenced the importation of the German meta
physics. He had been at that time recently appointed assistant
Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Literature at Paris. He
continued to lecture until 1820, when he incurred the disapproba
tion of the French government, and his lectures were suspended.
In 1827, he was restored to the exercise of his functions as a Pro-

* Schefer.
t Edinb. Rev., Oct. 1829, p. 208.
X Schulze's Aphorismen, p. 141 of Rixner.
§ Hegel's Encyclopaedic, 3te Ausg., p. 103. « Seyn und Nichts ist dasselbe."
|| lb., p. 101.
IT lb., p. 102. ff. The same is expressly taught by Marheineke, Dogmatik, § 125,
and as our allegation is too important to be left without evidence, here are his words :
" In dieser Unbestimmtheit ist Gott das Gedankenlose, die noch in sich selbst behar-
rende, unmittelbare Einheit des Seyns und Nichtseyns und kann Alles, was von Gott
bejaht wird, ebenso sehr verneint werden."

628 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
fessor of the Faculty of Literature, and continued to lecture until
1832, when he was made a Peer of France.*
The principal original works which M. Cousin has published
are his Introduction to the History of Philosophy, comprising the
course of Lectures delivered by him in 1828 ; and the History of
Philosophy of the 18th Century, containing his Lectures for 1829.
His other contributions to philosophy have been given in the form
of prefaces and notes to various translations which he has pub
lished. The first of the above named works has been translated
for us by Mr. Linberg ; and Dr. Henry has translated and pub
lished, under the title of Elements of Psychology, that part of the
other which contains M. Cousin's criticisms upon the philosophy of
Locke. It would be difficult to define precisely how far the philosophi
cal system which Dr. Henry is seeking to domiciliate among us,
agrees with the mis-shapen phantasies which we have brought
before the notice of our readers. When language has ceased to
be the representative of ideas, it is not easy to tell what are in
tended to be equivalent forms of speech. M. Cousin, moreover,
professes to discard the phraseology of Kant, even where he
adopts his ideas, and deprives us thus far of the means of recogni
tion. But unhappily we do not find that the " way in which men
express themselves in France " is any more intelligible than the
dialect of " Konigsberg." Even Mr. Linberg, " the accomplished
translator " and admirer of Cousin, finds it difficult occasionally to
understand what M. Cousin precisely means.f and M. Cousin him
self now and then betrays ah obscure consciousness of having
" reached a height, where he is, as it were, out of sight of
land."J We are farther embarrassed in the interpretation of his system,
by the material consideration, that no full exposition of it has as
yet been given to the world. Though it is now twenty-three
years since he " first faltered the name of Eclecticism," and entered
upon the establishment of a new school in philosophy, we are still
left to gather its principles as they lie scattered in Fragments, Pre
faces, Programmes of Lectures, and Historical Criticisms. While
the system has only this fragmentary existence, it is too early to
pronounce of it, as Dr. Henry does, " that it is a distinct scientific
theory, having its method, its principle, and its consequences."§
* Dr. Henry, who seems anxious to give his readers an exalted idea of the philoso
phic temperament of M. Cousin, says, that "he rarely speaks in the Chamber of
Peers— that he takes part in the discussions of that body only where some question
relating to public instruction is before the Chamber ; or on extremely rare occasions,
when no good citizen should keep silence." Dr. Henry calculates rather largely upon
the ignorance of his readers as to the transactions and debates of the French Cham
ber of Peers. We need only refer, in illustration of the philosophic elevation of M.
Cousin, to one of the most disgraceful scenes that ever occurred in any legislative
body, in which this gentleman, in the course of a debate upon the question of Spanish
intervention, gave the lie direct to Count Mole, one of the ministry.
f Cousin's Introd., p. 450. J Cousin's Introd.,. p. 123.
§ Dr. Henry may have sources of information that are not open to the public. He-

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 629
We do not feel ourselves competent to decide upon the coherency
and completeness of a system of philosophy, which has as yet
received only a partial development " in its applications, by history
and criticism ;" nor are we willing to defer in this matter to the
judgment of Dr. Henry, unless some of the letters of M. Cousin
" to the present translator " contain a more full and systematic ex
position of the principles of eclecticism, than is to be found in his
published writings. There seems to be evidence that the trans
lator has gained light from some quarter during the interval be
tween the two editions of his work. In the first, when he had
received no letters from M. Cousin, he says, " we come now to an
important point — the fundamental peculiarity of M. Cousin's sys
tem ; this is the two-fold development of reason." He then pro
ceeds to explain the distinction between the spontaneous and re
flective reason, which he again tells us, " constitutes and deter
mines the peculiar system of M. Cousin."* But in his second
edition we are told that it is " M. Cousin's attempt to fix the infi
nite as a positive in knowledge, which constitutes the chief and
fundamental peculiarity of his system."! And again he says,
" the position taken by Cousin upon this subject (the positive idea
of the infinite) constitutes the chief pretension and systematic
peculiarity of his philosophy." J
The applications of M. Cousin's philosophy are to us, however,
more valuable than the scientific exposition of his principles. The
formulas of transcendentalism are in most cases, as Berkeley styled
the vanishing ratios of the modern mathematical analysis, " the
mere ghosts of departed quantities ;" but when the truths which
they are supposed to contain are applied to morals and religion,
they assume a more substantial form. Here at least we can try
the spirits by the test of what we already know to be true. Our
only elements for a judgment upon the trackless path of German
philosophy are afforded by its line of direction while within the
scope of our vision.
We class M. Cousin with the German school, because the chief
part of his philosophy, as far as he has developed it incidentally in
its applications to history and criticism, is evidently derived from
that source. In a passage already cited by us, he avows his sym
pathy with a particular contemporary school in Germany, in terms
which draw all regards to his personal friend Hegel, and to those
of his followers who have attempted to bridge over the gulf be
tween transcendental chaos and the world we live in ; and every
page of his works shows that he has been " plunged in the womb
has taken care not to leave his readers ignorant that he is in correspondence with M.
Cousin. It was hardly necessary to inform the public that he was " indebted to M.
Cousin himself for a copy" of the highly eulogistic memoir, from which he has com
piled his biographical notices of this philosopher.
* Elements of Psychology, 1st edition, pp. 21 and 22.
t Elements of Psychology, p. 31.
X Elements of Psychology, p. 110.

630 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
of unoriginal Night and Chaos wild." But mindful of the famous
saying of Fontenelle, he has opened just as many fingers of his
handful of truth as he finds convenient. He glories in the name
of Eclectic, and claims to be the founder of a new school which is
to comprehend and supersede all others. " Our philosophy," he
says, " is not a gloomy and fanatical philosophy, which being pre
possessed with a few exclusive ideas, undertakes to reform all
others upon the same model : it is a philosophy essentially optimis
tical, whose only end is to comprehend all, and which, therefore,
accepts and reconciles all."* It is a fundamental position with M.
Cousin that every form of belief that has existed contains within
it 'some truth, and he seems to be equally strong in the faith, that
in his philosophical alembic every creed will part with its error.
He finds in the 18th century four philosophical schools which he
designates as the Sensual, the Ideal, the Sceptical, and the Mysti
cal. Each of these schools has existed, and therefore truth is to
be found in each, and can only be entirely obtained by effecting a
composition between them all. But where are we to find the test
that will separate the elements of truth and error combined in each
of these systems ? And where the principle of unity which is to
group together the particular truths disengaged from each ? These
can only be found in a new system. But this system, according
to M. Cousin's reasoning, as it exists in common with many others,
can contain only a portion of truth, and the skimming process must
be applied to this in common with the rest. We see no end to
this method of exhaustions. M. Cousin's philosophy has in truth
no better claim to the name and character of eclectic than any
other system. It accepts what agrees with its own principles, and
rejects what does not, and this is precisely what every other sys
tem does.
If further evidence were wanting of the affectation and charla
tanry of this title, it might be abundantly found in the additional
reasons which M. Cousin assigns for assuming it. One of these is
that consciousness demands eclecticism. And the case is thus
made out. " Being, the me, and the not-me, are the three inde
structible elements of consciousness : not only do we find them in
the actual development of consciousness, but we find them in the
first facts of consciousness as in the last ; and so intimately are
they combined with each other, that if you destroy but one of these
three elements you destroy all the rest. There you behold eclec
ticism within the limits of consciousness, in its elements, which are
all equally real, but which, to form a psychological theory, need all
to be combined with each other.! Another reason is that " even
logic demands eclecticism," for all systems of logic turn either upon
the idea of cause, or that of substance ; and from the alternate
neglect of one or other of these ideas, we have the " two great
* Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 416. f Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 418.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 631
systems which, at the present day, are distinguished by the names
of theism and pantheism." Of these systems, the author adds, that
" both the one and the other are equally exclusive and false."*
Hence even logic demands eclecticism. But the most amusing ar
gument which M. Cousin urges in behalf of eclecticism is that
which he draws from the spirit and tendencies of the age. We
cannot follow him through it, as it is spread over seventeen octavo
pages. He rejects from consideration England and Scotland, on
the ground of their lack of philosophy, and pronounces Germany
and France to be the only two nations worthy of notice. He
passes in review the general state of philosophy and of society in
these two nations, declaims upon the French monarchy, the revo
lution, and the Charte! — and at length arrives at this conclusion ;
" If all around us is mixed, complex, and mingled, is it possible
that philosophy should be exempt from the influence of the general
spirit? I ask whether philosophy can avoid being eclectic when
all that is around it is so ; and whether, consequently, the philoso
phical reformation which I undertook in 1816, in spite of every
obstacle, does not necessarily proceed from the general movement
of society throughout Europe, and particularly in France? "J
There is something in all this that is either above or below our
comprehension. We can readily conceive that they who see and
feel its force, would find no impediment to glorying in the fancied
possession of the culled wisdom of all other sects?
Before dismissing this point, it is right that we should hear Dr.
Henry's account of the boastful title of the new school in philoso
phy. " Its eclectic character consists precisely in the pretension of
applying its own distinctive principles to the criticism of all other
systems, discriminating in each its part of truth and its part of
error — and combining the part of truth found in every partial, ex
clusive, and therefore erroneous system, into a higher, compre
hensive system."§ If we rightly apprehend the writer's meaning
here, it involves a- strange confusion of ideas. Eclecticism, he
maintains, is a distinct, scientific theory, possessing its own method
and principles, and of course reduced to a system. And yet its
method and principles are applied to all existing systems, to gather
from them the materials for a higher and comprehensive system,
which is to embrace the whole. The test to be applied, implies

* Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 419.
f The following passage, which occurs in this connexion, will give our readers
some idea of M. Cousin's method of applying his philosophy to history. " You
know that it is not the masses of population which appear upon fields of battle, but
the ideas, the causes for which they combat. Thus, at Leipzig and Waterloo, the
ideas which encountered each other were those of paternal monarchy and military
democracy. Which prevailed, gentlemen ? Neither the one, nor the other. Which
was the conqueror ? Which was the vanquished at Waterloo ? Gentlemen, none
was vanquished. No ! I protest that none was vanquished ; the only conquerors
were European Civilization, and the Charte." We assure our readers that this is a
fair average sample.
X Int. to Hist, of Phil., 440. § Elem. of Psychology, p. xxx.

632 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
the existence of a philosophical creed, and yet this creed is still to
be formed from the parts of truth extracted, by the application of
itself, to all others ! The system of M. Cousin has, in truth, no
more claim to the title of Eclectic, than any other that has ever
existed. It is quite as Procrustean in its character as others, stretch
ing or lopping off to suit its own dimensions, and differing from
them, in this respect, only in its catholic pretensions.
We cannot, for reasons already given, undertake to put our
readers in possession of M. Cousin's complete system. But one of
its chief peculiarities, in the judgment of Cousin himself, and of his
translator, is to be found in the distinction which he draws between
the spontaneous and the reflective reason, .and this we will endea
vour to explain. The fundamental fact of consciousness, accord
ing to M. Cousin, is a complex phenomenon, composed of three
terms, namely, the me, and the not me, limited, bounded, finite ;
then the idea of something different from these, of the infinite, of
unity, &c. ; and again the relation of the me and the not me, that
is, of the finite to the infinite, which contains and unfolds it ; these
are, therefore, the three terms of which the fundamental fact of
consciousness is composed. Every man who bends his thoughts
inwards, and penetrates only his own consciousness, will find there
each of these three elements. If one of these terms is given, the
others are given also, nor is it in the power of any man to deny
any one of them. Such is now the case, but was it always thus ?
The distinguishing characteristic of every phenomenon, as now
manifested in the consciousness, is the conviction of having tried
to deny its truth, and the discovery of an inability to do so. But
intelligence could not originally commence with such a denial,
seeing that every denial supposes an affirmation of denying. Nor
do we commence with reflection, since reflection supposes an ope
ration anterior to itself, and cannot add any terms to those which
are given by that operation. Reflection adds itself to that which
was, it throws light upon that which is, but it creates nothing.
There must have been, therefore, an instinctive development of
intelligence, a perception of truth prior to reflection, and independ
ent of the will, a pure affirmation not yet mingled with any nega
tion. This primitive intuition contains all that will, at a later
period, be contained in reflection : the me and the not me,* the
infinite and the finite, unity and variety, substance and phenome
non, are contained, though obscurely, in the first flashing forth of
spontaneity. This is the spontaneous reason as distinguished from
the reflective. The spontaneous reason seizes upon truth at first
* We quote M. Cousin's description of a man's finding himself. " We do not
commence with seeking ourselves, for this would imply that we already know that
we exist; but, on a certain day, at a certain hour, at a certain moment, — a moment,
solemn in existence !— without having sought ourselves, we find ourselves :— thought,
in its instinctive development, discloses to us that we are ; we affirm our existence
¦with profound assurance,— with an assurance unmingled with any negation what
ever." — Int. to Hist, of Phil., p. 164.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 633
sight ; comprehends and receives it, without asking why it does
so. It is independent of the will, and therefore impersonal. It
does not belong to us : though in us, it is not of us, it is not ours.
It is absolute, and gives pure truth, and in all men the same truth.
But in the reflective reason, our own voluntary activity is con
cerned, and here is found the source of difference and error.*
Such is, substantially, M. Cousin's account of the distinction be
tween the spontaneous and the reflective reason. He claims it as
a discovery of his own, which he lighted upon " in the recesses of
consciousness, and at a depth to which Kant did not penetrate."
Kant paused at the apparent relativeness and subjectivity of the
laws of thought, but by diving deeper M. Cousin " detected and
unfolded the fact, instantaneous but real, of the spontaneous per
ception of truth — a perception which, not reflecting itself imme
diately, passes without notice in the interior consciousness, but is
the actual basis of that which, at a subsequent period, in a logical
form, and in the hands of reflection, becomes a necessary concep
tion.'' We can now show the reader the ground which M. Cousin's
philosophy affords him for a belief in the objective existence of the
world, and God. The system of Kant led to scepticism, inasmuch
as it taught that all the laws of thought are altogether subjective,
and the evil consequence was remedied only by assigning an illo
gical office to the practical reason. But M. Cousin has gained the
same end, and saved his logic. " All subjectivity expires in the
spontaneity of perception. Reason, it is true, becomes subjective
by its relation to the free and voluntary me, the seat and type of
all subjectivity ; but in itself it is impersonal ; it belongs to no one
individual rather than another, within the compass of humanity ;
it belongs not even to humanity itself." Reason, therefore, being
impersonal, it follows that it is absolute, and that the truths it gives
are absolute truths. Here is the only resting-place given us for
our belief in the objective existence of the finite or the infinite —
the spontaneity, hence the impersonality, and hence the absolute
character of reason. He who does not " possess the strength to
penetrate deeply into the recesses of his own mind, to pierce
through reflection (we know not with what instrument), in order to
arrive at the basis of all reflection," or who, when he has arrived
at this deep place, is not fortunate enough to find there " a pure
affirmation, not yet mingled with any negation, and containing in
it all that has subsequently been given by reflection," has no proper
evidence for the spontaneity of reason upon which this solution of
the problem of the objective rests. It is to this pure affirmation,
sometimes represented as " so pure that it escapes notice," so bright
* The preceding account of the two-fold development of reason is drawn chiefly
from the sixth Lecture of the Introduction to the History of Philosophy : it is, per
haps, a work of supererogation to say that it is given in the author's own phraseology,
though abridged, since we are sure our readers will acquit us of the ability to con-
'struct it ourselves.

634 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
that we cannot see it, that the appeal is made in proof of what is
styled the spontaneous reason. We must, therefore, find this
" pure affirmation " in our consciousness, or must admit, in defer
ence to M. Cousin's logic, that it exists there, though so brightly
that we cannot see it, before we can believe in any objective ex
istence. That is, unless we have strength enough to make the
discovery in the recesses of our own minds, a task to which M.
Cousin acknowledges that but few men are equal, we must admit
that there exists in our consciousness something of which we are
nevertheless not conscious, in order to be satisfied of the objective
existence of either the world or God ; and we regard this as so
uncertain a path for arriving at certainty, that we believe few, on
this side of the Atlantic, will trust their feet in it :
Whom shall we find
Sufficient ? Who shall tempt with wandering feet
The dark unbottom'd infinite abyss,
And through the palpable obscure find out
His uncouth way ?
There are some other results of the non-subjectivity of the
spontaneous reason which are more startling. It is the pure affir
mation, the spontaneous perception of the reason, which gives us
the finite and the infinite. Whence comes this reason which en
lightens us, but does not belong to us ? " This principle," M. Cou
sin says, " is God, the first and last principle of all things." Hu
man reason therefore " becomes divine in its own eyes." " Reason
is literally a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation which
is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man on his
coming into the world. Reason is the necessary mediator between
God and man, the Logos of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made
flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God and the teacher of
man, divine and human at the same time." There is no hesitation
on the part of M. Cousin in drawing from this the conclusion that
" humanity is inspired, — the divine breath which is in it always
and everywhere reveals to it all truths under one form or another
according to the place and the time." " Every man thinks, every
man therefore thinks God, if we may so express it." " Every
where present, he (God) returns as it were to himself in the
consciousness of man, of which he indirectly constitutes the me
chanism and phenomenal triplicity by the reflection of his own
nature and of the substantial triplicity of which he is the absolute
identity."* In human reason there are found three ideas, a tripli
city in unity; the infinite, the finite, and the relation which subsists
between them ; — the passage from these ideas to God, says M.
Cousin, is not difficult, " for these ideas are God himself." We
earnestly call attention to this as one of the most hideous heads of
the pantheistical hydra. The dogmatic theologians of this sect
have put it in the place of the incarnation, and the poets of " Young
* Elem. of Psychol., p. 400. See Marheineke Dogm., §§ 229, ff. Bretschneider,
ubi supr., p. 49.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 635
Germany" are teaching the intoxicated youth to regard themselves
as sublime realizations of the divine reason. So Schefer, in his
passionate verses, designates man as the Son of God, as godlike,
nay, as the God-man ; and in a phrenzy of self-apotheosis pro
ceeds to call the human head the city of the gods !
But to resume our thread : as in human consciousness there are
found only two ideas and their connexion, forming three elements,
so in nature, two corresponding laws, and their connexion, govern
the material universe. We find in the world the same triplicity in
unity as in ourselves. " The world accordingly is of the same
stuff with ourselves, and nature is the sister of man." And here
we find in God, man, and the world, the triplicity in unity again,
which figures so largely in the Eclectic philosophy. The unity of
the three is not obscurely taught in the following passage. " The
interior movement of the energies of the world, in the necessary-
progress of their development from degree to degree, from king
dom to kingdom, produces that wondrous being whose fundamental
attribute is consciousness, and in this consciousness we have met
with precisely the same elements which, subject to different condi
tions, we had already found to exist in nature : — the same elements
which we had recognised in God himself."* M. Cousin has not
permitted the shadow of a doubt to rest upon the pantheistical
tendency of his philosophy. " God," he tells us, " is at once true
and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and al
ways cause, being substance only in so far as he is cause, and
cause only in. so far as he is substance, that is to say, befng absolute
cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, es
sence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre,
at the summit of being and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite
together, triple in a word, that is to say, at the same time with God,
nature, and humanity. In fact, if God be not everything, he is
nothing ; if he be absolutely indivisible in himself, he is inaccessible ;
and consequently he is incomprehensible, and his incomprehensi
bility is for us the same as his destruction."! M. Cousin has at
tempted to forestall the charge of pantheism, by pronouncing it
the bugbear of feeble imaginations. This is a very common, and
not a very creditable artifice. But we trust that there is, in our
country at least, enough of this feebleness of imagination to be
affrighted by the bugbear, and to shrink back with horror from
such a philosophical aliment as is offered by an infidel philosophy ;
and the more so when we see in every new arrival of European
journals, that there is scarcely a doctrine of orthodox Christianity
on which these harpies have not descended, claiming it as their
own, and so defiling it by impious misuse as to give us poison un
der the shape of food.
No sincere and earnest inquirer after truth, humble and reverent
in his self-distrust as he must needs be, can fail to take offence at
* Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 153. t Elem. of Psychol, p. 399.

636 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
the bold and confident tone in which M. Cousin settles all questions;
and especially will the pious mind recoil from his unhallowed in
trusions upon the nature and essence of the Deity. He professes
indeed to believe and teach the existence of God. He professes,
too, sad omen at the outset, thoroughly to comprehend his nature
and essence. He does not pretend to deny, he pleads guilty to, the
accusation of seeking " to penetrate into the depths of the Divine
Essence, which common opinion declares to be incomprehensi
ble."* " So little is God incomprehensible, that his nature is con
stituted by ideas — by those ideas whose nature it is to be intelligi
ble." " The measure of the comprehensibility of God is the
measure of human faith." They who falter and draw back from
this rushing in of fools where angels dare not tread, are reproached
with " pusillanimous mysticism." He admits that God " is incom
prehensible as a formula, and in the schools," but we should con
sider that " mysticism is the necessary form of all religion" — " the
symbolical and mystical form is inherent in religion" — and " to speak
plainly, the religious form and the philosophical form are different
from each other." Though religion, therefore, must of necessity
present truths under a mysterious and incomprehensible form, it is
the right of philosophy to penetrate this form, and disengage the
ideas ; it is its duty " to comprehend nothing, and to admit nothing
but in so far as it is true in itself, and in the form of ideas." God
exists only so far as we comprehend him. His nature is consti
tuted by ideas, and those ideas are wholly within the stretch and
compass of our reason. " I will speak," says our author, " plainly
and unequivocally upon this point. Mystery is a word which
belongs not to the vocabulary of philosophy, but to that of reli
gion."! * Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 132.
f Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 134. There is an admirable contrast between the
pert self-sufficiency of M. Cousin, and the humble truth-loving spirit of the illustri
ous Descartes, who is honoured and lauded as the author of the Psychological Me
thod, and the founder of the Ideal School of Philosophy. Cousin calls himself one
of the sons of Descartes. Degenerate son of a noble sire ! Compare the modest
caution of the one with the all-embracing arrogance of the other. " Quod ut satis
tuto et sine errandi periculo aggrediamur, ea nobis cautela est utendum, ut semper
quam maxime recordemur, et Deum auctorem rerum esse infinitum, et nos omnino
finitos. Ita si forte nobis Deus de se ipso, vel aliis aliquid revelet, quod naturales in-
genii nostri vires excedat, qualia jam sunt mysteria Incarnationis et Trinitatis, non
recusabimus ilia credere, quamvis non clare intelligamus ; nee ullo modo mirabimur
multa esse, turn in immensa ejus natura, turn etiam in rebus ab eo creatis, quae
captum nostrum excedant." — Princ. Phil., § xxv.
Another truly great man, of the same age, in urging the use of reason in theology,
addresses to those who employ this noble talent in all other matters, but hide it under
a bushel when they come to the study of God and of his word, the expostulation,
" Cave, cave, ne quondam a te rigide satis rationes exigantur tam male collocati tui
talenti." But he immediately adds, " Scio quam maxime, nee opus est ut monear
plurima esse, quae Deus in verbo suo nobis revelavit, captum nostrum infinities su
perantia, qualia sunt momentosissima fidei capita de S. S. Trinitate, de eterna gene
ratione filii, de ejus incarnatione, de resurrectione mortuorum, — haec sane credidi
credo, et per gratiam Dei semper credam, quia ea revelare mihi dignatus est."— Joh
Bernouilli, Opera, vol. i., p. 196.
We could quote much to the same effect from Leibnitz, to whom M. Cousin does

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 637
With this for his point of departure, it is not surprising that M.
Cousin should be led to reject entirely the God of the scriptures,
and substitute in his stead a shadowy abstraction. In place of the
mysterious and incomprehensible Jehovah, whose infinite perfec
tions will be the study and delight of an eternity, we have a God
whose nature and essence we can now, while seeing through a
glass darkly, thoroughly comprehend, and to whom faith is not
permitted to attribute anything of excellence or glory beyond
what the human intellect can clearly discern. In place of the God
of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, the God to whom his people,
in all ages, have fled for refuge, crying, do Thou deliver me and
save me, we are presented with a vague personification of abstract
principles, with a God who is described as the reason ; thought,
with its fundamental momenta ; space, time, and number ; the sub
stance of the me, or the free personality, and of the fatal not me
or nature ; who returns to himself in the consciousness of man ;
of whose divine essence all the momenta pass into the world, and
return into the consciousness of man ; who is everything, and it
might, with equal significancy, be added, nothing.
With this notion of God no one will contradict the position fre
quently assumed by M. Cousin, that Atheism is impossible. Who
can deny the existence of reason, of thought, of the world ? And
if he cannot deny these, he cannot deny God, for these are God.
It is substantially upon'this ground that M. Cousin rests the impos
sibility of Atheism-. " Every man believes in his own existence,
every man, therefore, believes in the existence of the world, and
God. Every man thinks ; every man, therefore, thinks God. Every
human proposition contains God ; every man who speaks, speaks
of God, and every word is an act of faith and a hymn. Every as
sertion, even though negative, is a judgment which contains the
idea of being, and consequently, God in his fullness."* To the
same effect we are told " that all thought implies a spontaneous
faith in God, and natural Atheism has no existence." Every man
who believes that he exists, believes all that is necessary. " If he
believes this, I am satisfied ; for if he believes that he exists, he
then believes that his thought, — that he believes his existence — is
worthy of faith ; he, therefore, places his faith in the principle of
his thought; — now, there is God."! Even the sceptic who doubts
everything, is not to be brought as an objection to this doctrine.
For does he deny that he denies ? Does he doubt that he doubts ?
If he only affirms that he doubts, in that affirmation there is in
cluded faith in himself and in God. Behold, then, all men con
verted into believers — respect humanity, for all its members ac
knowledge the same God ; — impute Atheism to no man, for every
homage " as the greatest authority among modern philosophers." These were men
who were seeking, with passionate earnestness, after truth : they were not founding
new schools in philosophy. They were men of large powers and large attainments,
and could afford to confess ignorance, where it is folly to be wise.
* Elem. of Psych., pp. 401, 402. j Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 174.

638 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
man speaks, and each word is an act of faith in God ; every man
believes in his own consciousness, and it is in human consciousness
that God returns to himself; "human consciousness is like the
divine essence which it manifests." Such is the practical conclu
sion of this philosophy. And we admit its justness ; it is logically
connected with the premises. With the notion of God given us
by M. Cousin, Atheism is indeed impossible. And so it is impos
sible under any scheme of idolatry which assumes an object in the
existence of which all men must of necessity believe, as its
God. The African, having established that his fetish is God, will
have no difficulty in proving that all men, or as many at least as
believe in the evidence of their senses, believe in God. Atheism
is a term that bears relation to the true God revealed in the Bible,
to the God that is found under the " venerable form of religion,"
and the philosophy that approaches this form to disengage the idea
of God, and change it to a new one, though it comes with many
expressions of " profound respect and veneration," and with all the
deferential and smirking politeness of a French petit maitre, is es
sentially atheistic in its character, and as such should be held in
equal abhorrence with the open and frontless denial of God. M.
Cousin, to do him justice, never fails in polite respect towards re
ligion ; he even refers, with evident approbation, to the pious po
liteness " of the octogenary author of the^Systeme du Monde (an
Atheist), who bowed and uncovered his head, whenever God was
named." But when a man robs us of our God, it is but little mat
ter whether he does it with an open and rude violence, or with a
smooth and complaisant legerdemain.
The idea of creation is of necessity modified by the idea of
God. What is it to create ? After stating and repudiating the
" vulgar definition, which is, to make something out of nothing,"
M. Cousin proceeds to seek the true conception of this act among the
facts of consciousness. " To create," he says, " is a thing
which it is not difficult to conceive, for it is a thing which
we do at every moment ; in fact we create whenever we perform
a free action. Here is the type of a creation. The divine crea
tion is the same in its nature. God, if he is a cause, can create ;
and if he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create ; and in cre
ating the universe he does not draw it forth from nothingness, but
from himself. God, therefore, creates ; he creates by virtue of his
creative power ; he draws forth the world, not from nothingness,
which is not, but from him who is absolute existence. An abso
lute creative force, which cannot but pass into act, being eminently
his characteristic, it follows, not that creation is possible, but that it
is necessary : it follows that God is creating without cessation and
infinitely, and that creation is inexhaustible, and sustains itself con
stantly."* M. Cousin, on one occasion, intimates that he knows
" he is speaking in 1828, and not in 1850," and we presume a de-
* Introd. to Hist, of Phil., pp. 136—142.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 639
cent regard for the prejudices of the age in which his lot is cast,
prevented him from stating an immediate inference from the prin
ciples here* laid down. If it be the most eminent characteristic of
God that he is an absolute creative force that cannot but pass into
act, we are driven to believe in the eternal creation of the world,
or rather in the eternal co-existence and oneness of God, and the
universe. The possibility of a creation, in the strict and proper
sense of the term, is denied by M. Cousin at the. outset. He says
that "Leucippus, Epicurus, Bayle, and Spinosa, and indeed all others
whose powers of thought are somewhat exercised, demonstrate,
that out of nothing, nothing can be drawn forth ; that out of no
thing, nothing can come forth ; whence it follows that creation is
impossible. Yet by pursuing a different route our investigations
arrive at this very different result, viz., that creation is, I do not
say, possible, but necessary." And what is this different route
which conducts from the same premises to so opposite a conclu
sion ? It is, as we have seen, by changing the meaning of the
word. It is by narrowing the term to signify only what we every
moment do, what every cause, now in action, does. By confound
ing creation with causation, and defining God to be a creative
force that could not but pass into act, either Leucippus or Spinosa
might have proved as clearly as M. Cousin has done, that creation,
so far from being impossible, is both possible and necessary. That
they did not arrive at this " different result," should be imputed
perhaps rather to their candour, than to their want of penetration.
If the maxim " nihil posse creari de nihilo" be received as uni
versally true, and applied in limitation of the divine power, as
well as human, creation is of course impossible. Creation is the
making of something out of nothing, and if this cannot be done
there can be no creation. We find matter now in existence. Un
less it had existed eternally, there was a time when it did not exist.
It must then have been formed either of something already exist
ing, which, by hypothesis, is not matter, that is, of spirit, or it must
have been formed of nothing. But matter cannot be a modified
form of spiritual existence, and according to M. Cousin, it cannot
be drawn forth from nothing. The only legitimate conclusion to
which we can arrive from these premises is, that matter does not
now exist, or that it has had an independent existence from eternity,
or that it is an emanation from the Deity. The latter opinion
seems to be the one held by M. Cousin. The material universe,
he teaches us, was not formed out of nothing ; — "God drew it forth
from himself; therefore, he creates with all the characteristics
which we have recognised in him, and which pass necessarily into
his creation."* We find, too, the following passage in his preface
to the second edition of the Philosophical Fragments, translated
by Dr. Henry, and appended to the Elements of Psychology.
" God exists for us only in the relation of cause ; without this,
* Introd., p. 142.

640 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
reason would not refer to him either humanity or the world. He
is absolute substance only inasmuch as he is absolute cause ; and
his essence consists precisely in his creative power."* M. Cousin's
theory of Cosmogony is now quite plain. The essence of God is
his creative power. He is an absolute force, subjected to a neces
sity of acting, and of developing in its effects those characteris
tics and those alone which are found in itself. God is made the
mere living force, the vis viva, of the universe, and all things are
but the radiations and effluxes of this primary and interior energy.
This is the theory taught, if we may credit the Hermetic Frag
ments, by the ancient Egyptians, and which is at this day held both
by the Brahmins and Buddhists of the East. Among all the an
cients, unless the Tuscans be an exception, the creation of some
thing out of nothing was held to be a palpable absurdity. It was
a common article in all the different creeds of Grecian and Roman
philosophy, that "gigni de nihilo nil, in nihilum nil posse revert."
This led to two different theories of the origin of the visible uni
verse, cither of them exclusive of a creation properly so called.
The one, that of most of the Greek schools, which taught the eter
nity, and independent existence of matter ; the other, that of the
oriental systems, which represented the universe as an emanation
from within the Deity, Thus in the Yajur Veid, as translated by
Du Perron, it is said : " The whole universe is the Creator, pro
ceeds from the Creator, exists in him, and returns to him. The
ignorant assert that the universe, in the beginning, did not exist in
its author, and that it was created out of nothing. Oh, ye whose
hearts are pure, how could something be made out of nothing?
This first Being alone, and without likeness, was the all in the be
ginning : he could multiply himself under different forms ; he cre
ated fire from his essence, which is light," &c. This doctrine was
early carried into Greece, and adopted by many of their philoso
phers. It is found in the Orphic remains, especially in the poem
de Mundo, as quoted by Aristotle and Proclus, in Aeschylus, and
in most of the Greek poets. It seems to have special affinities for
poetry. In modern times it has made its reappearance in the po
lished periods of Pope's Essay on Man, and it runs through the
wild and impious imaginations of Shelley.! Under the poetic dress
this system is more tolerable, because we can ordinarily make such
deductions for poetic imagery as will bring it within the compass
of truth. But when in the grave language of didactic philosophy
we are told that the very essence of God is his creative power ;
that he is a force that was compelled to act and to pass with all
his characteristics into the visible world ; and that nothino- now
exists which has not from eternity existed in God ; we are con-
* Elem. of Psych., p. 408.
f Wordsworth occasionally borders on the very extreme of poetic license upon
this subject. The philosophical principles of the Essay on Man were dictated by
Bolingbroke, and it is supposed that Pope was not himself sufficiently aware of their
tendency.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 641
cerned, we are alarmed. This necessary transfusion of God into
the universe destroys our very idea of God.* He is made the
substratum, the substance of all existence ; and we are only bub
bles thrown up upon the bosom of the mighty all, to reflect the
rainbow colours, in our brief phenomenal existence, and then be
absorbed again into the ocean from which we came.!
It will have been already anticipated from the exposition we
have given, that M. Cousin's philosophy makes sad havoc with
Christianity. He is indeed studiously polite to Christianity as well
as to natural religion. " He knows that he is speaking in 1828,
and riot in 1850." This knowledge it is, doubtless, that draws
forth his kind and forbearing indulgence towards Christianity, — his
patience, with its slowness of movement, — nay, his condescending
patronage. " Christianity is the philosophy of the people. He
who now addresses you sprang from the people, and from Chris
tianity ; and I trust you will always recognise this, in my profound
and tender respect for all that is of the people and of Christianity.
Philosophy is patient ; she knows what was the course of events
in former generations, and she is full of confidence in the future -T
happy in seeing the great bulk of mankind in the arms of Chris
tianity, she offers, with modest kindness, to assist her in ascending;
to a yet loftier elevation." J And again, he says, " I believe that in
Christianity all truths are contained ; but these eternal truths may
and ought to be approached, disengaged, and illustrated by philo
sophy. Truth has but one foundation ; but truth assumes two
forms, mystery and scientific exposition; I revere the one, I am
the organ and interpreter of the other."§ Infidelity has, in most
cases, assumed this guise of philosophical explanation of the truths
.of . Christianity. --. Hume proposed only to place faith upon its pro
per foundation ; and even Voltaire and the French Encyclopedists
professed to be rendering true service to Christianity, while they
were seeking to sap its foundations and overwhelm it with utter
ruin. But unless it be to blind the eyes, and evade the arm of the
ecclesiastical power, which in Catholic countries holds watch over
the press, we see not what good purpose can be effected by so thin
a disguise as that assumed by M. Cousin.|| He surely cannot ima-
* If La Place had only personified under the name of God, the forces with which
the attenuated matter of his nebular hypothesis was supposed to be endowed, he
might, with as much justice as M. Cousin, have escaped the imputation of atheism.
f The fittest symbolical form that has ever been given to this creed is that of an-
oriental sect, who represent the Deity as an immense spider seated at the centre of
the universe, and spinning forth all things from his own body.
X Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 57. § Ibid., p. 442.
|| Among those whom we look to as readers of such articles as this there are some
who are turning their steps to the enchanted ground of German literature, either in
its primitive or its secondary and Gallicized division. Let us, with all the earnest
ness of disinterested dread, caution the young American. Under the disguises of ro
mance and poesy, he will learn to tolerate the hell-born dogmas of the young Germa
ny; the mingled lust and blasphemy of Heine, Pllckler Muskau, and Schefer; or,,
if he wander in these domains as a theologian, the Iscariot Christianity of the disci
ples of Schelling, Hegel, and Daub. 41

642 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
gine that the most ordinary intelligence could fail to penetrate the
flimsy hypocrisy. He comes down from the heights of philosophy,
to meet Christianity in her helplessness and aid her in ascending to
a loftier elevation ! Though tolerant of her past slowness, yet
knowing that she must move more rapidly to meet the wants of
the future, he comes, with modest kindness, to disburden her of
her mysteries, and quicken her steps ! He presents himself as an
interpreter, in scientific exposition, of a revelation from God, and
the canon which he brings in his hand and openly exposes, is to
admit nothing which this revelation contains as truth, unless by fall
ing back upon our own pure reason we find it to be true in itself
and in the form of ideas I In his solution of the mystery of the
Incarnation, in which Reason is declared to be the Word made
flesh, we have both proof and warning of the kind of assistance
which Christianity may expect at his hands. All the sacred mys
teries of revelation dwindle, in like manner, under his profane
touch, into the stale truths of our own consciousness. Locke en
counters the sneers of M. Cousin because he had not discovered
this mode of making Christianity easy. Speaking of the appeals
made by Locke to Christianity, to revelation, and to faith, he says,
" By faith, however, and by revelation, he does not understand a
philosophical faith and revelation. This interpretation did not
exist in the age of Locke. He understands faith and revelation,
in the proper orthodox, theological sense."* If we have a just
idea of the temper of Locke, he would have scorned to avail him
self of this slippery and deceptive interpretation. It is an ungra
cious task to be alarmists, and we should shun the office if only
some specialties of this or that sect were at stake, and not, as we
believe, the very basis of all religion and morals. Socinianism is
evangelical when compared with the newest theology of Germany.
M. Cousin's patronage of Christianity becomes sometimes ludi
crous. He declares, with gravity, that " it is the best of all reli
gions, and it is the most accomplished of all." He assigns a reason
for its accomplishments. It is this, " that the Christian religion is
that which of all other religions came last ; and it is unreasonable
to suppose that the religion which came last should not be better
than all others, should not embrace and resume them all."! The
perfectibility of the human species is a cardinal doctrine with M.
Cousin. Humanity is ever in the right ; and its progress is stea
dily onward and upward. Each age is an improvement on its
predecessor, and every new system is superior to all that have
gone before it. The inferiority of Christianity will therefore be
demonstrated, should the general apostasy, which some predict,
take place after its universal prevalence.
We need not seek in the remote deductions and results of M.
Cousin's philosophy for evidence of its irreconcilable hostility to
Christianity. In its first principles it overthrows the foundation of
divine revelation. The spontaneous reason, we are told by M.
* Elem. of Psych., p. 213. f Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 339.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 643
Cousin, is God, and the truths given by it are " literally a revela
tion from God." And since this reason is found in all men, " hu
manity is inspired." The original fact of affirmation, which is found
by M. Cousin in human consciousness, beneath reflection, and
anterior to all negation, and upon which he relies for proof of the
existence of the spontaneous reason, " this fact it is, which the
human race have agreed to call inspiration." This inspiration is
attended always by enthusiasm. " It is the spirit of God with us :
it is immediate intuition as opposed to induction and demonstration:
it is the primitive spontaneity opposed to the ulterior development
of reflection."* As neither the senses nor the will are concerned
in this primitive act of pure apperception, we cannot refer it to
ourselves. Therefore, " when man is conscious of the wondrous
fact of inspiration and enthusiasm, feeling himself unable to refer it
to himself, he refers it to God ; and gives to this original and pure
affirmation the name of revelation. Is the human race wrong ?!
When man, conscious of his feeble intervention of the fact of inspi
ration, refers to God the truths which he has not made, and which
rule over him, does he deceive himself? No, certainly not ; for
what is God ? 1 have told you ; he is thought in itself, with its
fundamental momenta ; he is eternal reason, the substance and the
cause of the truths which man perceives. When man, therefore,
refers to God that truth which he cannot refer either to this world,
or to his own personality, he refers it to him to whom he ought to
refer it ; and this absolute affirmation of truth, without reflection, —
this inspiration, — enthusiasm, — is veritable revelation."J All men
are inspired, and all are inspired in an equal degree. This spon
taneity of reason, which is to all men a veritable revelation from
God, " does not admit of essential differences." It gives pure
truth, and in all men the same truth. " Everywhere, in its instinc
tive and spontaneous form, reason is equal to itself, in all the gene
rations of humanity, and in all the individuals of which these dif
ferent generations are composed."^ It is too plain for argument,
that these principles destroy all that is peculiar and valuable in the
sacred scriptures. The distinctive claim which they put forth, of
containing a revelation from God, is set aside by a similar claim
on behalf of every man. Humanity is inspired in all its members,
and revelations of truth are made to all men in nearly equal degree.
When holy men of God spake of old, as they were moved by the
Holy Ghost, they were but giving utterance to the visions of the
spontaneous reason, and the truths declared by Christ and his
apostles were from God only in the same sense in which all our
*Elem. of Psych., p. 301.
f The deification of collective humanity is regarded by many in Germany as the
regenerative principle of our age. The fashionable pantheism of Berlin teaches that
' whatever is (in politics) is right ;' a blessed creed for the courtiers of an absolute
monarch ; and which, when applied to morals, forbids us, as does a living poet, to
dim our mind's eye with any tears of penitence ; for all hatred is only love seen on
the wrong side !
X Introd. to Hist, of Phil, pp. 165, 16S . § Introd., p. 174.

644 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
own intuitions of truth are from God. The Koran is of equal au
thority with the Bible ; all pretended revelations have one and the
same authority, that is, the self-evidence of the truths which they
contain. The Gospel of Christ is thus stripped of its high prero
gative as a special message from God; and holy prophets and
apostles, nay, our Saviour, too, were deceived in supposing that
they had any other kind of communication with God than that
which every man enjoys. No special revelation could, according
to this philosophy, be accredited to the world. No messenger or
interpreter could be furnished for a divine mission among men.
The truths revealed to any man through the operations of his in
stinctive reason, and by him proclaimed to others, cannot be re
ceived except by such as find the same truths in their own spon
taneity of reason. And the only way, therefore, by which God
could make known his will, and give it authority among men,
would be by enlarging the spontaneous reason of every man. At
precisely this point the extremes of flat Rationalism and the phi
losophy of the Absolute come together. Their osculation is seen
in Strauss's " Life of Jesus," which has almost convulsed the reli
gious world in Germany. Marheineke and Rohr, like Herod and
Pilate, agree only when the Son of God is to be crucified. Would
to God that our fellow Christians in America, before abandoning
as shallow the philosophy of the great English fathers, would take
the trouble to examine the issues of the paths on which they are
entering ! Let us have any philosophy, however shallow, that
leaves us in quiet possession of the Gospel, rather than the dark
and hopeless bewilderment into which we are thrown by the deep
metaphysics of M. Cousin. We say to him and to Dr Henry, in
the language of Edmund Burke, " If our religious tenets should
ever want a further elucidation, we shall not call on infidelity to
explain them. We shall not light up our temple from that unhal
lowed fire. It will be illuminated with other lights. It will be
perfumed with other incense, than the infectious stuff which is im
ported by the smugglers of adulterated metaphysics."
They who are accustomed to look to the sanctions of religion
for the chief support of morality, will naturally surmise that M.
Cousin is not unduly strict in his ethical code. When God is
made to be thought, reason, space, time, and number, there is not
much room left for the commission of any serious offences against
him. If humanity is inspired, there is no reason to doubt that
humanity will always be in the right. We accordingly find, that
under the cheerful philosophy of M. Cousin, it is a crime to " blas
pheme humanity." Forms of government or of religion, which
have extensively prevailed, could not have subsisted without the
consent of humanity, and though it is our privilege to criticise, we
are taught that it would be wrong to condemn them. The spirit
of each particular age, the temper of each system of philosophy,
in short, everything which has existed through the occurrence of
humanity, is right ; " it has its apology in its existence." We are

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 645
warned not to " accuse humanity," by condemning religious or
political laws which have had the confidence and sympathy of the
masses of mankind. " To imprecate power (long and lasting
power); we are told, is to blaspheme humanity ; to bring accusa
tions against glory, is nothing less than to bring accusations
against humanity, by which it is decreed. What is glory, gentle
men ? It is the judgment of humanity upon its members ; and
humanity is always in the right."* No appeal can be taken from
the judgment of humanity, for "its judgment is infallible."!
We are led to a conclusion which M. Cousin does not scruple to
avow and apply, that success is the criterion of moral excellence.
He sets it down as " the peculiar characteristic of a great man,
that he succeeds." He proves that in every battle which has ever
taken place, " the vanquished party deserved to be vanquished —
that the victorious party was the better, the more moral party ;
and that, therefore, it was victorious.''^ This singular demonstra
tion may be summed up in a single sentence, which we extract : —
" Courage is a virtue which has a right to the recompense of vic
tory, — weakness is a vice, and, inasmuch as it is so, it is always
punished and beaten."§ Examination and reflection, we are told,
will convince us, in every case, that " the vanquished ought to
have been vanquished," and that our sympathy and applause
should be " on the side of the victor, for his is the better cause."
We have never seen the odious maxim, Whatever is, is right,
pressed to a more insane extent, than is given to it in M. Cousin's
philosophy. It is this abominable principle which breathes into
his system the cheerful inspiration upon which he so much loves
to dwell. We may, indeed, thus learn to be cheerful under any
aspect of affairs, we may bow the knee to any religion, we may
cordially embrace any form of government, we may shout in the
procession of any conqueror, we may rejoice with the successful
oppresser, and insult the oppressed with the truth that he deserves
to suffer, — but at what expense do we purchase this easy and
cheerful temper ! What a sacrifice of the tender charities of our
nature, what a dreadful perversion of truth and conscience does it
involve ! We must first learn to believe what M. Cousin indeed
distinctly teaches, that prudence, courage and strength, though
united with ambition, revenge, cruelty and rapacity, constitute a
moral excellence that deserves to triumph over imprudence and
weakness, though associated with the greatest mildness, forbear
ance, and benevolence. We would rather weep sometimes with
those that weep, than have our tears thus stayed.
There is to us a dark and dreary fatalism pervading M. Cousin's
system, of which symptoms have already appeared in the extracts
we have given. He does not indeed teach what is commonly
meant by fatalism. He is a strenuous advocate for the freedom
of the will, and talks much of our free personality. But then this
* Introd., p. 309. f Ibid., p. 310. J Ibid., p. 282. § Ibid., p. 283.

646 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
freedom itself is but one of the products of a deeper fatalism
which pervades the universe, and works out its results in
all things. The mechanical theory of the French atheists,
which was the product of the philosophy of sensation, and
the ideal theory of the Transcendentalists, arrive, in this respect,
though by different routes, at much the same conclusion. And
though each brings with it somewhat of the dust of the road by
which it has come, there is not much to choose between them.
The one is indeed more refined and spiritual than the other. We
hear less of the working and grinding of the machinery. It is an
abstract and ideal mechanism to which it subjects us, but still a
mechanism. All things are moved on by a resistless destiny. Even
God is represented as a creative force, which could not but pass
into act. And again, we are told, " God could not remain in a state
of absolute unity ; that absolute unity, that eternal substance, being
a creative force, could not but create.* Cousin teaches us that
every man who exists is but the exponent of some pre-existing ne
cessity ; that every book that is written is but the realization of an
idea that must needs take this form, and that everything which
occurs represents an idea which could not but be represented at
that precise time, and in that very manner. After a full exposi
tion of the a priori demand for Universal History, he concludes,
" hence the necessity of Bossuet." The idea had been ripening
for some time, and at length there was an imperative necessity for
it to put on a concrete form, and it immediately assumed it in the
person of the Bishop of Meaux. Nor is this all. It was not only
necessary that Bossuet should come into existence at this precise
moment, and that he should write a Universal History, but his
plan also was subject to necessity. After a full account of the a
priori urgency of an idea upon this subject, we are told, " hence,
gentlemen, the necessity of Bossuet's plan." We have then an
account of the necessity which called into being and set at work,
in their respective functions, Vico, Herder, Tenneman, and others.
It would seem as if there had been some difficulty in finding con
crete habitation for the abstract necessities of the Cartesian phi
losophy. Descartes himself was the product of a necessity which
grew out of the dependence and subjection of the scholastic sys
tems. It was necessary that there should be a revolution, in
which reason might shake off the shackles of authority and enter
upon the true method of philosophizing. And Descartes came to
represent this idea. But then Descartes was a gentleman and .a
soldier ; Malebranche was a monk, Berkeley an eminent bishop,
Spinosa a recluse, and Leibnitz a statesman. There was, there
fore, a necessity, in the Cartesian philosophy, for a great profes
sor : " this was the place and destiny of Wolf."!
* Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 303.
t Introd., p. 240. The inference is obvious : there still remained a necessity in the
philosophy of the age for a " peer of France." Quere : Does the same principle of
necessary emanation from the age and circumstances hold in the case of translations ?
Or could M. Cousin, by an inverse method, declare the horoscope of his admirers?

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 647
There is a wider domain and a stricter rule given by M. Cousin,
to this destiny, than is conceded by most even of fatalists. Not
only do alf men, and especially great men, represent ideas which
it was necessary should find their representation in them, but
" every place represents an idea." There is nothing in the world
which has not its necessity for existing, and which does not, there
fore, represent an idea. " Yes I gentlemen," says our author, "give
me the, map of any country, its configuration, its climate, its waters,
its winds, and the whole of its physical geography ; give me its
natural productions, its flora, its zoology, &c, and I pledge myself
to tell you, a priori, what will be the quality of man in that coun
try, and what part its inhabitants will act in history — not accident
ally, but necessarily, not at any particular epoch, but in all : — in
short — what idea he is called to represent." The philosophy which
denies that " all things hold and bind each other together," which
emancipates man in any degree from the laws of brass and iron,
which works so effectually upon him even through nature, that " the
existence of a particular country determines the existence of a par
ticular people," is branded as a " sentimental and pusillanimous spi
ritualism, which, though well enough adapted to the minds of chil
dren and women, would not be less fatal to science than material
ism itself."*
M. Cousin has a reason, aside from the principles of his philoso
phy, for being a fatalist. " All great men," he says, " have been
fatalists." And as he has provided the way, in all other respects,
for his being a great man, it would hardly answer for him to fail
here. " A great man," he informs us, " is a general idea, concen
trated in a strong individuality, so that its generality may appear
without suppressing his individuality." From this definition of a
great man he infers that no priest, prophet, or pontiff, can be great,
since their existence consists in their relation to the God whom
they announce : with them " God is everything, and man is nothing ;"
" sacerdotal castes destroy individuality, for in them nothing ap
pears but the name of the caste, and the name of the caste is the
name of its God." Therefore, it appears that no priest, and by pa
rity of reason, no religious man, in whom the idea of the infinite
prevails over the finite, and to whom " God is everything, and man
nothing," can be a great man. War and philosophy are the only
two lines of life which are favourable to the development of great
men. ", Who are they," he asks, " who have left the greatest names
among men ? They are those who have done their countrymen
the greatest good, who have served them most effectually ; that is,
who have made the greatest conquests, for the ideas which in their
century were called to dominion, and which then represented the
destinies of civilisation ; that is, who have gained the most battles."!
But M. Cousin is not a warrior, except in the bloodless conflict of
ideas, and it would not do to limit greatness to war. We have, in
* Introd., p. 242. t lb., p. 321.

648 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
consequence, another demonstration, concluding, " Therefore, the
great philosopher is, in his time and country, the ultimate perfec
tion of all other great men, and, together with the great captain, he
is the most complete representation of the people to whom he be
longs."* The way is therefore open to M. Cousin. But it is " the
peculiar mark of a great man that he succeeds." And M. Cousin
has succeeded: for the "name of eclecticism, whether chosen well
or ill, begins for some time since to be somewhat spread abroad,
and to resound in France and elsewhere."! Does not all the
world, too, know that M. Cousin has been made a peer of France ?
Without doubt he has succeeded. What is further necessary ?
Why, " all great men have in a greater or less degree been fatal
ists."! And he has given sufficient proof that he labours under no
lack of this qualification.
Let us again pause for a little season, and, looking back upon
our dreary way, take in at one retrospective survey so much of the
field as may include the German, the French, and the mongrel phi
losophies. They are districts of the same kingdom, alike in arro
gance, in nonsense, and in impiety.
Campbell has a chapter in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, intended
to point out the cause of the fact that nonsense so often escapes
being detected, both by the writer and by the reader ; but he did
not live to see what we have seen. Grosser absurdities than those
which may be selected from the German and the mock-German
metaphysics, we believe the world never beheld ; and these not in
scattered places, but for page after page, and chapter after chapter.
The Germans of the transcendental school complain that we of the
Anglo-Saxon race are dull, terrestrial, and shallow ; their defect is
equally unfortunate, for no one of them has the faculty for descry
ing an absurdity, as such. The grossest and most drivelling non
sense, which could be expressed in a jargon of words, would pro
bably to a transcendentalist exhibit nothing ridiculous, and perhaps
something august. Except the Philosophy of the Absolute, few
things can be imagined more ludicrously and disgustingly absurd,
than the revelations of Bohme, or Jacob Behmen, as we more fa
miliarly call him. Yet, these ravings of the inspired shoemaker
are regarded with " affectionate reverence,"§ not only by Schelling,
but by Coleridge ; and, more amazing still, have conduced in no
small degree to the introduction of the modern philosophy, as has
been proved and acknowledged. ||
In the land of their prevalence these systems have been frequent
ly compared to the dreams of the early Gnostics, and the resem
blance is too striking to escape any one versed in church history ;

Introd., p. 323. f lb., p. 414. J lb., p. 305
§ Thus Coleridge speaks of Jacob Behmen, Biogr. Liter., vol. i., p. 96 ; see aisi
p. 90. Baur's Gnosis, pp. 557—611. Heinroth : von d. Grundfejilern der Erzie

hung, 1828, p. 415.
We observe two new biographies of Jacob Bohme, among the latest German

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 649
as has been to our knowledge admitted by some of those concern
ed. The very name Gnosis reminds one of the claim to direct
knowledge of the absolute ; but the parallel may be carried out in
almost every particular of the two classes of opinion. This has
been done in a profound manner by the learned Baur, in his work
on the Gnosis of the Christian church. He has traced out at full
length the horrid pictures of the Valentinians and the Ophites ; of
Marcion and the admirers of the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies ; he
has set over against this the portraiture of Bohme, of Fichte, of
Schelling, and of Hegel ; and, comparing their respective linea
ments, has revealed a likeness as striking as it is frightful. This
he does moreover not as an enemy, but as an adoring devotee of
the new theogony. He shows the remarkable coincidence between
Schelling and Bdhme, and between both and the Gnostics : and he
makes the analogy no less apparent in the case of Hegel.* In all
these schemes, the initiated are invited to an esoteric vision of truth,
a Gnosis which the common herd cannot attain : in all, the promise
is, Your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing
good and evil. The conflicting sects agree in this, and in a conse
quent contempt for what they call popular, experimental, or empi
rical philosophy.! As there are certain limits to intellectual pow
ers, which the immortal Locke endeavoured to ascertain, and be
yond which we float in the region of midnight, so those who have
forgotten these cautions have in their most original speculations
only reproduced the delirium of other times, which in the cycle of
opinion has come back upon us " like a phantasma or a hideous
dream."J In the French imitation, no less than the German origi
nal, there is a perpetual self-delusion practised by the philosopher,
who plays with words as a child with lettered cards, and combines
what ought to be the symbols of thought, into expressions unmean
ing and se!f-contradictory.§ And as in this operation he cannot
* Die christliche Gnosis; oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer ge-
schichtlichen Entwickelung. Von Dr. Ferdinand Christian Baur. Tubingen, 1835.
In this elaborate work of Professor Baur, nearly two hundred pages are devoted to
the exhibition of the parallel between the modern seers and the frantic Ophites and
other transcendentalists of the primitive age. Let the reader suspend his judgment
until he shall have inquired into the justice of this comparison.
t Hegel gives himself great amusement at the English acceptation of the word
Philosophy. He alludes to Lord Brougham's having, in a speech in parliament, spo
ken of" the philosophical principles of free trade." He attributes a similar expres
sion to Canning; and gives the following as the title of a recent English book, viz.,
" The Art of Preserving the Hair, on Philosophical Principles." — Hegel's Encyklo-
paedie, pp. 11, 12.
X When we look at the prodigious speculations of the schoolmen, we find expres
sions highly transcendental. Even Hegel is shorn of his originality, and Pantheism
is^ -discovered among the lucubrations of the dark ages. Thus, Joannes Erigena says
of the divine nature : "Deus est omne quod vere est; quoniam ipse facit omnia, et
fit in omnibus ; omne enim quod intelligitur et sentitur, nihil aliud est, nisi non ap-
parentis apparitio, occulti manifestatio, negati affirmatio, etc." — De Divisione Na
turae, lib. ii., p. SO. Here we have Pantheism. Again, " Per nihilum ex quo om
nia creata esse scriptura dicit, intelligo ineflfabilem et incomprehensibilem divinae
naturae inaccessibilemque claritatem, omnibus intellectibus sive humanis sive ange-
licis inaccessibiliter incognitam." Lib. iii., p. 127, apud Rixner.vol. ii.,pp. 13 — 15.
§ " Little did Leibnitz, Wolf, &c , believe that the language of science would be-

650 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
but be aware that these expressions are the exponents of no con
ceptions of the intellect, he demands, as the only possible prop of
his system, a specific faculty for the absolute, the unconditioned,
and — may we not add — the absurd ! Thus Fichte asked of all
such as would aspire to his primary, free and creative act of the
Ich or Ego, a certain power called the Anschauungsvermogen.
It is the want of these optics, alas ! which spoils us for philoso
phers. Reinhold, who often combated, and sometimes rallied,
his old friend, avowed that he was utterly destitute of this sense ; a
misfortune, adds M. Degerando, common lo him with all the rest
of the world.* It is, however, the happy portion of the absolute
Philosophers, the Behmenites, the Gnostics, the Soofies, the Bud
dhists, and a few of the Americans.
It would afford a subject for many more pages than we can
allot to this whole discussion, to compare the new philosophy with
that of the oriental mystics. We look with amazement at the
exact reproduction of almost every eastern error in the musings
of Europe. It should seem that no form of profane absurdity can
ever finally die out of the world, until the great suggester of them
all shall be cast into hell. Pantheism has by some been regarded
as the mother of Polytheism ; but mother and daughter have loved
to dwell together, and the parent has in many cases survived the
child. This form of error prevails widely among the Soofies o'f
Persia, and the Buddhists of the remoter east, as well as in count
less minor sects in that nursery of
All monstrous, all prodigious things,
Abominable, inutterable, and worse
Than fables yet have feigned, or fear conceived,
Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimaeras dire.
Two valuable works of Tholuck relate to this subject : the one
being a treatise on the Pantheism of Persia,! the other an Antho
logy of Oriental Mystic Poems.J There is scarcely a page of
these volumes which does not show something to identify the an
cient and eastern with the modern Pantheism. The resemblance
is declared by the learned and pious author, who has a decided
leaning towards the mystical philosophy. Hegel himself cites this
Anthology, with acknowledgment of the same truth, compliment
ing Tholuck for his genial disposition towards profound philosophy,
and at the same time lamenting his still remaining prejudice and
narrowness. § Among these Mohammedan heretics, the Soofies,
we find the declaration that God is everything ; nihil esse praeter
come a witch-jargon (Hexensprache) which we should learn like parrots." —Herder
Metakritik, ii., 74.
* Life of Fichte, by M. Eyries.
f Ssufismus : sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica, etc. Frid. Aug. Deofidus
Tholuck. Berolini, 1821.
X Bluethensammlung aus der Morgenlandischen Mystik.u. s. w. von F. A. G. Tho
luck. Berlin, 1825.
§ Encyclopaedic, p. 592, note.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 651
Deum* We have also the mental gaze of intuition, the absolute
Anschauung.\ We have creation represented as a necessary
emanation from the divinity.J We have the absorption of all self
in God.§ We have, ever and anon, the same glorification of ni
hility, das Nichts ; || and, as' if no plague-spot of the pestiferous
philosophy should be wanting, we have complete Hegelianism in
the doctrine that sin is no evil, nay, from one sect of transcendental
Persians, that sin is even preferable to holiness.TT
Every reader of the common religious news is informed that
millions of the Indian and Indo-Chinese people are Pantheists.
Hegel dwells on this, and quotes the Bhagavad Gita, in which
Krishna is introduced thus speaking : " I am the breath which
dwells in the body of the living ; I am the beginning, and the midst
of the living, and also their end. I am, under the stars, the radiant
sun, under the lunar signs, the moon," &c, &c. He denies, how
ever, that in this there is proper Pantheism, as he also denies it of
his own system.** It would be difficult to deny it of the books of
the Vedam. " The school of Vedantam," say the Roman Catholic
missionaries in China, " has an authority superior to that of all
the others. It professes, as the fundamental principle of its doc
trine, the opinion of the simple unity of one existing essence, which
is nothing but the Ego, or soul. Nothing exists except this Ego
in its simple unity ; this essence is in some sort trine, by its exist
ence, by its infinite light and supreme joy ; all is here eternal, im
material infinite. But because the inner experience of the Ego is
not conformed to this beautiful idea, they admit another principle,
but purely negative [das Nichts], and which, consequently, has no
reality of being ; this is the Maya of the Ego, that is, the error.
The key for the deliverance of the soul is in these words, which
these false philosophers have to repeat incessantly, with a pride
beyond that of Lucifer : I am the Supreme Being, Aham ava param
Brahma."!! We could not ask a more lucid or comprehensive view
of the modern German system ; for even if the missionaries in
vented what they say, they have, in their invention, anticipated
* Ssufismus, p. 222.
t Bluthensammlung, p. 116. See also p. 198, where Tholuck says, "Here we
have in simple terms the results of the loftiest speculations of modern times. From
contrast and comparison the infinite can never be learned."
X Ssufismus, p. 173, ff.
§ lb., p. 64. " Dixit aliquando Bustami Deo : Quamdiu, mi Deus, inter Egoitatem
et Tuitatem me manere vis, remove Egoitatem et Tuitatem ut Ego nihil fiam." And
in the Bluthensammlung, Mewlana Dschelaleddin Rumi, a Persian poet, " follows
(says Tholuck) the pantheistic-mystic view, that all revelations in all religions are
alike true, as being different, gradual, evolutions of God," &c. — P. 69. So at pp. 87,
88, 89, are exhibitions of the blindest pantheistic fatalism.
|| Bliithens.,p. 66, note 1.
IT Bluthensammlung, p. 123, note 1, p. 134, note 1, where Tholuck controverts this
absurd doctrine with proper warmth.
** Hegel's Encyk., p. 586.
ff Choix des Lettres edifiantes, Paris, 1809, t iv., p. 246, ap. Tholuck's Ssufismus,
p. 214.

652 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
the grandest result of Schelling and Hegel.* And the Luciferian
pride engendered in the Chinese is precisely the temper which is
manifested by those of the Indo-Germanic school who have come
to the conclusion that God never arrives at so high a degree of
self-consciousness (to use their jargon) as in their own minds.
When applied to the doctrines of revealed Christianity, these dog
mas produce a portentous mixture. We then learn that the Mes
siah, or God-man, is self-developing humanity— the race at large.
On this topic many illustrations might be offered ; one of these,
from a popular poet of genius, we throw into the margin, as nei
ther caring nor daring to translate it : " but let him that readeth
understand."! So far as M. Cousin is concerned, we are ready to concede to
him the possession of learning and genius. But his philosophy, as
far as he has developed it, is to the last degree superficial and con
ceited. Making great pretensions to extraordinary profoundness,
it does in truth but skim the surface of things, and then fly off into
thin and unmeaning abstractions. The " witch jargon" which it
employs, when you have taken infinite pains to penetrate it in a
given case, is often found to contain only some old truth, swathed and
bandaged in this hieroglyphic dress. And one known truth thus
prepared, is then " made use of, to pass off a thousand nothings
with." There is not, and in consistency with the first principles
of this philosophy there cannot be, any attempt at ratiocination.
It is a string of assumptions, and of assertions of the most unqualir
fied and dogmatic kind. The reader cannot have failed to remark,
in the extracts we have given, the peculiar kind of generalization
in which M. Cousin habitually indulges. Because England is an
island, therefore everything in England stops short of its proper
development, and England can make no valuable contributions to
science. Because in religion, God is everything and man is no
thing, therefore no religious man can be a great man. Thus on
all occasions he takes but a single step from the narrowest possi
ble premises, from vague analogies, and sometimes from nothing
more solid than verbal puns, to the most wide and peremptory
* We should, perhaps, have said before, that Kant is altogether exempt from the
charge of Pantheism, representing God as " not by any means a blind, acting, eternal
JVature, the Root of all things, but a supreme Being, who by understanding and free
dom is the author of all things. — See Jacobi, u. s., p. 114.
f Drum bitf ich, vor der Hand den Prediger
Auf seinem Berge ungekrankt zu lassen,
Doch dass beschwor' ich, so gewiss das Alte
Der Alten nicht mehr neulebendig wird :
Der Mann, in welchem Gott war — Gott wird leben !—
Der Mann, wer er dereinst zu euch herabsteigt,
Und zweifach, dreifach, millionenfach
Bei euch als Mensch, als alle Menschen lebt :
Er wird nicht dreifach goldne Kronen tragen,
Er wird in's Knopflock keinen Orden knupfen,
Er wird der Herr von Bethlehem nicht heissen,
Er wird nicht weibesbaar im Kloster singen, u. s. w.
Laienbrevier von Leopold Schefer. Berlin, 1835.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 653
conclusions. A hundred times, in passing over his pages, we have
been constrained to ask, is this philosophy, or is it poetry ? It can
surely make no pretensions to the one, and it is but sorry stuff if
meant for the other.
But the philosophical defects of this system do not constitute its
chief point of repulsion. We have a wide charity for what seems
to us nonsense, and we can even extend an amiable and silent
tolerance to the pretensions of those who utter it, to be the depo
sitories of all wisdom. But when this nonsense begins to ape the
German impiety, when it openly professes to cast off all subordi
nation to religion, and prates in dogmatic superiority to divine re
velation, we cannot but lift up our solemn protest against it. It
has been made sufficiently evident that the philosophy of M. Cousin
removes the God of the Bible, and substitutes in his stead a philo
sophical abstraction ; that it rejects the scriptures, and thus robs
us of our dearest hopes ; and that, in common with other like sys
tems, it erects a false standard in morals, and confounds the dis
tinction between right and wrong. We cannot, therefore, behold
in silence the efforts which are making to introduce this system of
abominations among us.
It has already made some progress. The " Introduction to the
History of Philosophy" was translated and published in 1832, by
M. Linberg. The first edition of the " Elements of Psychology"
was published in 1834, and having been adopted, as the translator
informs us, " as a text-book in several of our most respectable col
leges and universities," a new edition is now issued which has been
expressly " prepared for the use of colleges." It might be well if
the names of these most respectable colleges and universities were
made known to the public. We should like to know which of our
public seminaries of education has so far distinguished itself in
point of science as to take, for its text-book on mental philosophy,
an immethodized set of criticisms upon Locke. The work of M.
Cousin does not pretend to the order, and method of a scientific
treatise; it only claims to be a criticism, upon the defects and er
rors of the sensual Philosophy; It formed a part of the author's
regular course of lectures upon the History of Philosophy of the
18th century. And has it really.come to this pass with any of our
most respectable colleges and universities, that they are using
fragments of historical treatises as text-books upon science ? Do
they also learn the Newtonian Philosophy from Clarke's criticisms
upon Rohault's Physics ? And is Varignon?s reply to Rolle their
text-book upon the Differential Calculus ?
But, for more urgent considerations than those of science, is it
important that these most respectable colleges and universities
should be known to the public. Most of the extracts which we
have given from M. Cousin have been taken from his Introduction
to the History of Philosophy, and yet it will be seen that some of
the worst of them have been furnished by what Dr. Henry has
dignified with the title of Elements of Psychology. And this

654 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
latter work implicitly contains them all, since it teaches, in their
application to criticism upon Locke, the same principles which, in
other modes of their application, yield the results which we have
exhibited. It should be known, therefore, what college or university
dares assume the responsibility of instilling the principles of this
book into the minds of the young men committed to its care.
Where are these literary institutions that are so ambitious to com
mence the work of flooding the land with German infidelity and
pantheism ? If they are willing to undertake the work, they will
doubtless, in a measure, succeed. There is something in this new
philosophy which will recommend it to many, and especially to
young men. It has the charm of novelty. It affects to be very
profound. It puts into the mouths of its disciples a peculiar lan
guage, and imparts to them a knowledge which none others can
attain. It gives them the privilege of despising all others, and
makes them incommensurable with any standard of criticism but
their own. If pursued and pressed by argument, they have but
to rail, as their master does, at " the paltry measure of Locke's
philosophy," and ridicule the bounded, insular character of all sci
ence except that in which they are adepts. It flatters the pride of
the youthful heart, it takes captive the imagination, and, a still
more dangerous recommendation, it tends to lighten and remove
the restraints of passion. It recognises no standard of right and
wrong but the reason of man, and permits no appeal from the de
cisions of humanity to the authority of the one living and true
God. While it retains the name of God, and does not therefore
at once startle and shock the feelings like open atheism, it teaches
its disciples to deify themselves and nature, and to look upon all
phenomena alike, whether of the material universe or of the mind
of man, as manifestations of the Deity. Every emotion of the
heart is an acting forth of God, and every indulgence of a passion,
however depraved, becomes an act of worship.* The man who
exercises in any way, according to his inspired impulses, his body
or his mind, even though God is not in all his thoughts, is really
rendering to Him as acceptable service, as if his heart were filled
with emotions of adoration and reverence. The forge of every
smithy, as Thomas Carlyle has taught us, is an altar, and the
smith, labouring in his vocation, is a priest offering sacrifice to
God. Such being the recommendations of this philosophy, it cannot
be doubted that it will find many willing disciples, some attracted
by one set of its charms, and some by another. If any of our
most respectable colleges have engaged in teaching it, they will
not find refractory pupils. But we warn them that when this
* See ample evidence of this base and diabolical tendency of the doctrine of Pan
theism, in an article in Professor Hengstenberg's Journal for November, 1836, en
titled, Bericht uber ein Pantheistisches Trifolium. For example, as we have said
elsewhere, we learn, that Schefer and his compeers teach " that sin is the hither
aspect of that which, on the other side of the heart, is entirely laudable."

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 655
system shall have worked out, as work it must, its pernicious and
loathso«ie results ; when our young men shall have been taught to
despise the wisdom of their elders, and renounce the reverence
and submission which the human intellect owes to God ; when, in
the pride and vainglory of their hearts, they shall make bold
question of the truths which their fathers have held most dear and
sacred ; when the Holy Bible shall be treated as the mere play
ground of antic and impious fancies, and an undisguised Pantheism
shall spread its poison through our literature ; then shall they who
have now stepped forth to introduce this philosophy among us, be
held to a heavy responsibility. Are these idle fears ? They are
at least real. We believe ; therefore do we speak. And we point
the incredulous to the gradations of folly and wickedness, through
which this same philosophy has led the German mind. If neither
the internal evidence of the system, nor the lights of ancient and
modern experience, are sufficient for conviction, we can only ap
peal to the verdict that time will give. In the meanwhile every
parent and guardian in the land has an interest in knowing which
of our colleges are making experiment of the effects of this philo
sophy upon the minds of the young men entrusted to their care.*
We have another alarming symptom of its progress among us,
in the Address delivered in July last, by the Rev. Ralph Waldo
Emerson, before the Senior Class in Divinity, at Harvard Univer
sity. This address is before us. We have read it, and we want
words with which to express our sense of the nonsense and im
piety which pervade it. It is a rhapsody, obviously in imitation
of Thomas Carlyle, and possessing as much of the vice of his
mannerism as the author could borrow, but without his genius.
The interest which it possesses for us arises from its contain
ing the application of the Transcendental Philosophy, in the
form of instruction to young men about to go forth as preachers
of Christianity. The principles upon which Mr. Emerson pro
ceeds, so far as he states them, are the same with those of M.
Cousin. We find the same conception of the Deity as the substra
tum of all things, the same attributes assigned to the reason, and
the same claim of inspiration for every man. But here we have
a somewhat more distinct avowal of the results to which these
principles lead, in their application to Christianity, than M. Cousin
* How the writers of " Young Germany "'regard the religious tendencies of their
coevals, may be gathered from the extravagant and wicked writings of Heine. After
saying, in his " Allemagne," that Pantheism was the ancient faith of the Teutons,
and that " man parts not willingly with what has been dear to his fathers," he says
(we ask that it may be duly noted), " Germany is at present the fertile soil of Pan
theism ; that is the religion of all our greatest thinkers, of all our best artists — and
Deism is already destroyed there in theory. You do not hear it spoken of— but every
one knows it. Pantheism is the public secret of Germany. We have in fact out
grown Deism." Again : " Deism is a good religion for slaves, for children, for Gene-
vese, for watch-makers."—" Pantheism is the hidden religion of Germany ; and this
result was well foreseen by those German writers who, fifty years ago, let loose such
a storm of fury against Spinosa."— See Quarterly Review, vol. Iv., for December,
1835, pp. 7, 8, 12.

656 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
has seen fit to give us. What we had charged upon the system,
before reading this pamphlet, as being fairly and logically»involved
in its premises, we have here found avowed by one of its own ad
vocates. Thus we have said that if the notion which it gives us
of God is correct, then he who is concerned in the production of
any phenomenon, who employs his agency in any manner, in kind
ling a fire or uttering a prayer, does thereby manifest the Deity,
and render to him religious worship. This consequence is frankly
avowed and taught by Mr. Emerson. Speaking of the " religious
sentiment," he says : " It is a mountain air. It is the embalmer of
the world. It is myrrh, and storax, and chlorine, and rosemary.
It makes the sky and the hills sublime, and the silent song of the
stars is it." And again, he tells us : " Always the seer is a sayer.
Somehow his dream is told. Somehow he publishes it with solemn
joy. Sometimes, with pencil on canvass, sometimes with chisel
on stone ; sometimes in towers and aisles of granite, his soul's
worship is builded." He even admonishes us that the time is com
ing when men shall be taught to believe in " the identity of the
law of gravitation, with purity of heart." To show that this tree
of knowledge resembles that in Eden in one respect, that it has a
tempter beside it, we have but to quote at random from Mr. Em
erson's Address. " Man is the wonder-worker. He is seen amid
miracles. The stationariness of religion ; the assumption that the
age of inspiration is past, that the Bible is closed ; the fear of de
grading the character of Jesus by representing him as a man,
indicate with sufficient clearness the falsehood of our theology. It
is the office of a true teacher to show us that God is, not was :
that he speaketh, not spake. The true Christianity — a faith like
Christ's in the infinitude of man — is lost. None believeth in the
soul, of man, but only in some man or person old and departed."
He complains > grievously of this want of faith in the infinitude of
the soul ; he cries out because " man is ashamed of himself, and
skulks and sneaks through the world :" and utters the pathetic
plaint, " In how many churches, and by how many prophets, tell
me, is man made sensible that he is an infinite soul ; that the earth
and the heavens are passing into his mind ; that he is drinking- for
ever the soul of God ?" Miracles, in the proper sense of the word,
are of course discarded. " The very word miracle, he tells us, as
pronounced by Christian churches, gives a false impression. It is
Monster ; it is not one with the blowing clover and the falling
rain." And when Christ spoke of miracles, it was only because he
knew " that man's life was a miracle, and all that man doth."
Jesus Christ is made the mere symbol of a man who had full faith
in the soul, who believed in the infinitude of our nature, and who
thus assists in admonishing us " that the gleams which flash across
our minds, are not ours, but God's." Any man may now become
Christ, for " a true conversion, a true Christ is now, as always, to
be made by the reception of beautiful sentiments."* There is not
* " Our world," says Lichtenberg, a witty German philosopher, " will yet grow
so refined, that it will be just as ridiculous to believe in a God, as now-a-days in

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 657
a single truth or sentiment in this whole Address that is borrowed
from the scriptures. And why should there be ? Mr. Emerson,
and all men, are as truly inspired as the penmen of the sacred
volume. Indeed he expressly warns the candidates for the minis
try, whom he was addressing, to look only into their own souls
for the truth. He has himself succeeded thus in discovering many
truths that are not to be found in the Bible ; as, for instance, " that
the gift of God to the soul is not a vaunting, overpowering, exclud
ing sanctity, but a sweet natural goodness like thine and mine, and
that thus invites thine and mine, to be, and to grow." The present
mode of interpreting Christianity, even under the form of Unitari-
anism,"he abhors as utterly repugnant to reason, and insufficient
for the wants of our nature ; he stigmatizes it as a historical tradi
tional Christianity, that has its origin in past revelations, instead of
placing its faith in new ones ; and " like the zodiac of Denderah,
and the astronomical monuments of the Hindoos, it is wholly insu
lated from anything now extant in the life and business of the peo
ple." He treats Christianity as a Mythos, like the creeds of Pagan
Greece and Rome, and does not even pay it sufficient respect under
this aspect to be at the trouble of interpreting for us more than a
few of the hidden meanings that lie concealed under its allegorical
forms. In 'a word, Mr. Emerson is an infidel philosopher, who
nevertheless makes use, in the esoteric sense of the new philoso
phy, of the terms and phrases consecrated to a religious use.* We
have at least to thank him, on behalf of those whose eyes might
not otherwise have been opened, for giving us so distinct and
ample an illustration of the kind of service which M. Cousin pro
fesses himself willing to render to Christianity by means of his
philosophy. We would call public attention to this Address, as
the first fruits of transcendentalism in our country. We hold it
up as a warning evidence of the nature of the tree which has pro
duced it.
We know not with what degree of favour Mr. Emerson's rhap
sody was received by those to whom it was addressed ; but we
are pleased to learn that it was offensive to the authorities of the
university. Professor Ware has since delivered and published a
Ghosts. And then after a while, the world will grow more refined still. And so it
will go on, with great rapidity, to the utmost summit of refinement. Having at
tained the pinnacle, the judgment of the wise will be reversed ; knowledge will
change itself for the last time. Then — and this will be the end — then shall we be
lieve in nothing but ghosts. We shall ourselves be like God. We shall know that
essence or existence is and can be nothing but — a phantom." — Vermischte Schriften,
b. 1, s. 166.
* It is within the compass of the transcendental philosophy to accommodate itself
to any form of religion, and appropriate its language. Schelling himself, and some
of his disciples, who had been educated in the Protestant faith, embraced, it is said,
the Romish religion, and formed within its pale, a sort of inner church, whose sym
bol and watchword was the name of the Virgin Mary. We have shown it among the
Ophites, the Soofies, and the Chinese. Mr. Bancroft has, with distinctness, laid it
open in the scheme of early Quakers (History, vol. ii., chap. 16), and it is now prof
fered to us by a clergyman of a church, to say the least, as httle tinctured with this
sort of poison as any in Christendom.
42

658 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
sermon, containing an earnest and strong defence of the personality
of the Deity.* In obvious allusion to Mr. Emerson, he thus ex
presses his opinion : " Strange as it may seem to Christian ears
that have been accustomed to far other expressions of the Divinity,
there have been those who maintain this idea ; who hold that the
principles which govern the universe are the Deity ; that power,
wisdom, veracity, justice, benevolence, are God ; that gravitation,
light, electricity, are God." We noticed too, some months since,
in one of our public papers, a severe rebuke of Mr. Emerson,
which was attributed to another of the Professors of the univer
sity-! This, then, cannot be one of" the most respectable colleges
and universities," which have adopted the Elements of Psychology
as their text-book on mental science. J
It is suited to excite a feeling of surprise, not unmingled with
sorrow, that a system of philosophy, which, in its immediate and
natural results, is indignantly repudiated by Unitarians, should be
urged upon us, with high praise of its merits, by an accredited
minister, and a Doctor in Divinity, of the Protestant Episcopal
Church. We are willing to believe that he knows not what he is
doing ; that fascinated by the first charms of the new philosophy,
or perchance dazzled by the brilliancy of a correspondence with a
Peer of France, and the great founder of Eclecticism, he is not
able to see the end from the beginning. But this excuse, the only
one that we can make for him, increases our apprehension. M.
Cousin informs him, in a letter which has been given in' several
different forms to the public, that he " shall watch with the live
liest interest, the progress of philosophy in America," and that in
one of the works which he intends yet to publish, he " will endea
vour to be useful to America." In the meantime, he says to Dr.
Henry, " it is with great pleasure that I see you resolved to esta
blish yourself in the State of New York, where public instruction
is so far advanced, but where philosophy is yet so very languish
ing : it will be your duty to re-animate it, to give it a strong im
pulse." Dr. Henry has taken care to inform the public that he has
been honoured with this commission from the great head of the
sect ; it has been published and re-published until the whole nation
have learned that he has been consecrated by no less a personage
* The Personality of the Deity. A Sermon, preached in the Chapel of Harvard
University, September 23, 1838. By Henry Ware, Jr., Professor of Pulpit Elo
quence and the Pastoral Care. Published at the request of the members of the
Divinity School. Boston : 1S38.
t A paragraph has fallen under our eye, while writing this, which informs us that
this same Mr. Emerson has received so much encouragement for what are softly
called " his daring and imaginative speculations," from the- people of Boston, that he
is now engaged in the delivery of a course of public Lectures upon them.
X Since the body of this article was completely written, we have received the
Christian Review, of Boston, in which there is a notice of the system of Cousin.
We are encouraged by these signs of healthful resistance, and corroborated in our
judgment, by finding that the author of this sound and conclusive review, who has
evidently seen the monster in its native German forests, recognises its tracks in the
attempts of M. Cousin.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 659
than M. Cousin, to the duty of re-animating our philosophy. Can
he now abandon this work, and leave the duty assigned him to be
performed by any meaner hand ? We fear not. We fear that if
any misgivings should cross his mind, they will give place to as
surance with the arrival of the next packet that shall bring a letter
and a presentation copy of some new work from M. Cousin, or
even at the very thought of such an arrival.
If our augury should prove right, we, too, will watch his la
bours. We read the Introduction to the " History of Philosophy,"
and the " Elements of Psychology," upon their first appearance, but
we kept silence because we did not wish in any degree to draw
public attention to them until evidence was afforded that they were
read. We now have this evidence, and have felt it our duty to be
no longer silent. But, having done so, we gladly desist from the
attempt to trace the pedigree or indicate the family traits of these
various systems. Be they Indian, Teutonic, or French, we regard
them alike with fear, as if some demon were bent on playing fan
tastic tricks with poor, proud, purblind man. We pretend not, as
we have said, to comprehend these dogmas. We know not what
they are : but we know what they are not. They are not the
truth of God ; nay, they gainsay that truth at every step. They
are, if anything can be, profane and vain babblings, and opposi
tions of science falsely so called.* So far as received, they rob
us of our most cherished hopes, and take away our God. No one
who has ever heard such avowals can forget the touching manner
in which pious as well as celebrated German scholars have some
times lamented their still lingering doubts as to the personality of
God. But while these systems rob us of our religious faith, they
despoil us of our reason. Let those who will rehearse to us the
empty babble about reason as a faculty of immediate insight of the
infinite ; we will trust no faculty which, like eastern princes,
mounts the throne over the corpses of its brethren. We cannot
sacrifice our understanding. If we are addressed by appeals to
consciousness, to intuition, we will try those appeals. If we are
addressed by reasoning, we will endeavour to go along with that
reasoning. But in what is thus offered, there is no ratiocination ;!
there is endless assertion, not merely of unproved, but of unrea
sonable, of contradictory, of absurd propositions. And if any,
overcome by the prestige of the new philosophy, as transatlantic, or
as new, are ready to repeat dogmas which neither they nor the
inventors of them can comprehend, and which approach the dia-
* The original is pregnant: ras 0cfl>'i\ovs xcvooiavias koI avriBleets riis \fievSavvpov
yvivceivs. f Bretschneider, though a German, seems to have felt this. " It would be unrea
sonable," says he of Schelling, "to demand a proof of such a system. For as to
prove, means but this — to deduce something true, from something else previously
known as true, there can here be no such thing as proof from higher principles, since
we seek theirs* truth (torn which all others are deduced." Bretsch. Grundasnicht,
p. 7.

660 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
lect of Bedlam, we crave to be exempt from the number, and will
contentedly abstain for life from " the high priori road." The
more we have looked at it, the more we have been convinced of
its emptiness and fatuity. It proves nothing ; it determines no
thing ; or where it seems to have results, they are hideous and
godless. Moreover, we think we speak the sentiment of a large
body of scholars in our country, when we say, that if we must
have a transatlantic philosophy, we desire to have it in its native
robustness and freshness. We do not wish to have it through the
medium of French declaimers, nor of the French language, than
which no tongue is less fit to convey the endless distinctions of the
German. We wish to have it before it has undergone two or three
transmutations ; not from subalterns, but from masters. We do
not wish to have a philosophy already effete, long since refuted
and heartily denounced by the best men in the country of its ori
gin ; and above all, we do not wish to have a philosophy which
shall conduct our young scholars into the high road to Atheism.
We learn with pain that among the Unitarians of Boston and its
vicinity, there are those who affect to embrace the pantheistic
creed. The time may not be far off, when some new Emerson
shall preach Pantheism under the banner of self-styled Calvinism ;
or when, with formularies as sound as those of Germany, some
author among ourselves may, like Dinter, address his reader
thus, 0 thou Son of God ! For the tendency of German philoso
phizing is towards impious temerity. We have long deplored the
spread of Socinianism, but there is no form of Socinianism, or of
rational Deism, which is not immeasurably to be preferred to the
German insanity. In fine, we cleave with more tenacity than
ever to the mode of philosophizing which has for several genera
tions prevailed among our British ancestors ; and especially to
that Oracle in which we read, what the investigation of this sub
ject has impressed on us with double force, that God will destroy
the wisdom of the wise, and bring to nothing the understanding of
the prudent; that the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and
that when men change the truth of God into a lie, he will give
them over to a reprobate mind.

Our readers are probably aware that the Unitarian clergymen
of Boston and its vicinity, priding themselves in the name of liberal
Christians, have never professed to agree entirely among them
selves in their doctrinal views.* Of late, however, a portion of
* The remaining portion of this essay originally appeared as a separate article, in
review of a work entitled, " A Discourse on the Latest Form of Infidelity, de
livered at the request of the Association of the Alumni of the Cambridge Theological
School, on the 19th of July, 1839, with notes. By Andrews Norton."
" A Letter to Mr. Andrews Norton, occasioned by his Discourse before the Asso-

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 661
their number have advanced sentiments which, in the appre
hension of the rest, exceed even the limits of the most liberal
Christianity. Hence Mr. Norton's Discourse on the Latest Form of
Infidelity. The pamphlets before us do not enable us to ascertain
precisely what this new form of infidelity is, nor how far it is em
braced by the Boston clergy. We know, indeed, that it has its
origin in German philosophy, and that the Rev. Mr. Emerson de
livered an address before the same association which listened to
Mr. Norton's discourse, which was a rhapsodical oration in favour
of Pantheism. We know, also, that that oration called forth an
earnest remonstrance and disclaimer from some of the friends and
officers of the Cambridge school of theology. The public papers
moreover informed us that Mr. Emerson delivered, with some ap
plause, a series of popular lectures on the new philosophy, to the
good people of Boston. We are, however, ignorant both as to the
number of those who embrace this new philosophy, and as to the
extent to which they carry it. ' It may be inferred from Mr. Nor
ton's discourse, that he considered his opponents as denying either
the possibility of a miracle, or the truth of the New Testament
history in reference to the miracles of Christ. Why else should
he make the truth of the evangelical history, and the absolute ne
cessity of a belief in miracles in order to faith in Christianity, the
burden of his discourse ? " The latest form of infidelity," he says,
" is distinguished by assuming a Christian name, while it strikes
directly at the root of faith in Christianity, and indirectly of all
religion, by denying the miracles attesting the divine mission of
Christ"* On another page, he says, " Christianity claims to reveal
facts, a knowledge of which is essential to the moral and spiritual
regeneration of men, and to offer in attestation of those facts, the
only satisfactory proof, the authority of God, evidenced by mira
culous displays of his power."! Again : " If it were not for the
abuse of language that has prevailed, it would be idle to say, in
denying the miracles of Christianity, the truth of Christianity is
denied. It has been vaguely alleged, that the internal evidences
of our religion are sufficient, and that the miraculous proof is not
wanted ; but this can be said by no one who understands what
Christianity is, and what its internal evidences are."J
These quotations are sufficient to exhibit the two prominent doc
trines of the discourse, viz., that miracles are the only satisfactory
evidence of a divine revelation ; and that the denial of the mira
cles of Christianity is a denial of Christianity itself. These doc
trines are not necessarily connected. For, although it is certain
that if the former is true, the latter must be true also ; it does not
follow that if the former is false, the latter must be false. It may
ciation of the Alumni of the Cambridge Theological School, on the 19th of July,
1S39. By an Alumnus of that School."
?Discourse, p. 11. t Ibid., p. 18. J Ibid., p. 21.

662 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
be incorrect, as it doubtless is, to make miracles the only satisfac
tory proof of Christianity, and yet it may be perfectly correct to
say that a denial of the miracles of Christ is a denial of the Gos
pel ; not because the only sufficient proof of the truth of the Gos
pel is denied, but because the miraculous character of the Gospel
enters into its very essence. The advent, the person, the resur
rection of Christ, were all miraculous. He cannot be believed
upon, without believing a miracle. Revelation is itself a miracle.
All the words of Christ suppose the truth of his miracles. They
can, therefore, no more be separated from his religion than the
warp and woof can be separated, and yet the cloth remain entire.
The apostle expressly teaches us, that if the resurrection of Christ
be denied, the whole Gospel is denied. While, therefore, we dis
sent from Mr. Norton as to his first proposition, we fully agree
with him as to the second.
The obvious objection to the doctrine, that miracles are the only
adequate proof of divine revelation, is, that the great majority of
Christians, who are incapable of examining the evidence on which
the miracles rest, are thus left without any sufficient ground of
faith. This objection does not escape Mr. Norton's attention. His
answer is the same as that given by Catholic priests and high
churchmen everywhere, viz., they must believe on trust, or as he
prefers to express it, on the testimony of those who are competent
to examine the evidence in question. As they are forced to be
lieve a thousand things, without personal examination, on the testi
mony of others, he thinks it not unreasonable that they should
receive their religion on the same terms. If they believe that the
earth turns round because astronomers tell them so, why may they
not believe that the Gospel is true because learned men vouch for
the fact ? It is hardly necessary to remark, that every Christian
knows that such is not the foundation of his faith : he has firmer
ground on which to rest the destiny of his soul. He does not be
lieve Grotius or Paley ; he believes God himself, speaking in his
word. The evidence of the truth is in the truth itself. The pro
position, that the whole is greater than a part, is believed for its
own sake. And to higher intellects, truths, at which we arrive by
a laborious process, appear in their own light, as axioms appear to
us. So also with regard to morals. There are some propositions
which every human being sees to be true, the moment they are
announced. There are others which must be proved to him. And
the higher the moral cultivation or purity of the soul is carried,
the wider is the range of this moral intuition. So also with regard
to religious truth. That God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, and un
changeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness,
and truth ; that he is not a Jupiter, or a Moloch, is believed with
an intimate conviction which no argument nor external evidence
can possibly produce. It is believed for its own sake. It cannot
be understood or perceived in its own nature without the persua-

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 663
sion of its truth rising in the mind. No man believes that malig
nity is wrong on external authority ; and no man believes that
God is good, because it can be logically demonstrated. The
ground of faith in moral truth, from the nature of the case, is the
perception of the nature of the truth believed. It is seen and felt
to be true. That one man does not see a proposition in morals to
be true, can have no effect upon him who does perceive it. And
the only way to produce conviction in the mind of him who doubts
or disbelieves, is to remove the darkness which prevents' the per
ception of the truth to be believed. If seen in its true nature, it is
believed ; just as beauty is believed as soon as seen. " Faith is no
work of reason, and therefore cannot be overthrown by it, since
believing no more arises from arguments than tasting or seeing."*
It is very true that the great majority of men have no such per
ception of the peculiar truths of the Gospel as produces this unwa
vering faith. The only belief that they have rests on tradition, or
prejudice, or, in the learned few, on the external evidences of the
Gospel. The reason of this fact, however, is not that the doctrines
in question do not contain the evidence of their own truth, but that
the minds of the majority of men are not in a state to perceive it.
What is the reason that savages do not perceive many things to be
wrong, the moral turpitude of which is to us a matter of intuition ?
The reason lies in the state of their minds. So, also, the " natural
man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are
foolishness unto him : neither can he know them, for they are spi
ritually discerned. But he that is spiritual discerneth all things."
The spiritual man, then (that is, the man under the influence of the
Spirit of God), discerns the excellence of the things of the Spirit ;
and he receives them because he does discern them. He sees the
excellence of the divine character ; the glory of God as it shines
in the face of Jesus Christ ; the perfection of the divine law ; the
accordance of the declarations of God with his own experience ;
the suitableness of the plan of salvation to his necessities, and to
the perfections of God. He feels the power which attends these
truths in his own soul, and his faith, therefore, rests not on the wis
dom of man, but on the power of God. It must be remembered
that the Bible is a whole. The believer sees these doctrines every
where, and he therefore believes the whole. One portion of
scripture supposes and confirms another. The authority of the
ancient prophets, of Christ, and of the apostles, is one and indivi
sible. As the prophets testified of Christ, so he testified of them.
As Christ testified to the apostles, so did they testify of him. The
object of the believer's faith, therefore, is the whole Bible. He
sees everywhere the same God, the same law, the same Saviour,

* Der Glaube ist kein Werk der Vernunft, kann also auch keinen Angriffen dersel-
ben unterliegen, weil Glauben so wenig durch Griinde geschieht, als Schmecken und
Sehen.

664 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
the same plan of redemption. He believes the whole, because it
is one glorious system of effulgent truth.
As this is the doctrine of the Bible on this subject, so it is also
the doctrine of the church. Were it our present object to establish
this point, the correctness of the above statement could be easily
proved. We cannot forbear, however, to quote the following beau
tiful passage from the Westminster Confession : " We may be
moved and induced," says that venerable symbol, " by the testimo
ny of the church, to an high and reverend esteem for the holy scrip
ture ; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doc
trine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope
of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery
which it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other
incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are ar
guments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word
of God ; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of
the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward
work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the truth in
our hearts."
Owen wrote a treatise on this subject which bears the impress
of his sound and vigorous understanding, as well as of his intimate
acquaintance with the nature of true religion.* In his Treatise on
the Reason of Faith, he says : " The formal reason of faith, divine
and supernatural, whereby we believe the scriptures to be the word
of God, in the way of duty, as it is required of us, is the authority
and veracity of God alone, evidencing themselves unto our minds
and consciences in and by the scripture itself. And herein con-
sisteth that divine testimony of the Holy Spirit, which, as it is a
testimony, gives our assent unto the scripture the general nature of
faith, and, as it is a divine testimony, gives it the especial nature of
faith divine and supernatural.
" This divine testimony given unto the divine original of the sa
cred scriptures, in and by itself, wherein our faith is ultimately re
solved, is evidenced and made known, as by the character of the
infinite perfections of the divine nature, which are in and upon it ;
so by the authority, power, and efficacy, over and upon the souls
and consciences of men, and the satisfactory excellence of the
truths contained therein, wherewith it is accompanied."
This view of the ground of faith is confirmed by the experience
and testimony of the people of God in all ages.
It is a monstrous idea that the thousands of illiterate saints who
have entered eternity in the full assurance of hope, had no better
foundation for their faith than the testimony of the learned to the
truth of the Bible. Let the advocates of such an opinion ask the
pious believer why he believes the word of God, and they will find
* See his work on the Divine Authority, Self-Evidencing Light and Power of the
Scriptures, with an answer to the inquiry, How we know the Scriptures to be the
word of God ?

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 665
he can give some better reason for the hope that is in him than the
faith or testimony of others. Let them try the resources of their
philosophy, empirical or transcendental, on a faith founded on the
testimony of the Holy Spirit, by and with the truth; let them. try
the effect of demonstrating that such and such doctrines cannot be
true ; they will assuredly meet with the simple answer, " One thing
I know, whereas I was blind, now I see."
It is by no means intended to undervalue the importance of the
external evidences of a divine revelation, whether derived from
miracles, prophecy, or any other source, but simply to protest
against the extreme doctrine of Mr. Norton's Discourse : that such
evidence is the only proof of a divine revelation, and that all who
cannot examine such evidence for themselves must take their reli
gion upon trust. The refutation of this doctrine occupies much
the larger portion of the Letter of the Alumnus of the Cambridge
Theological School, the title of which is given in this arti
cle. The argument of the Alumnus, as far as it is a refutation,
is perfectly successful. With his own doctrine we are as little sa
tisfied as with that of Mr. Norton. " The truths of Christianity,"
he tells us, " have always been addressed to the intuitive percep
tions of the common mind."* He quotes, with much commenda
tion, the following passage from Prof. Park, of And over : "The
argument from miracles is not the kind of proof to which the major
ity of cordial believers in the Bible are, at the present day, most
attached. They have neither the time nor the ability to form an
estimate of the historical evidence that favours or opposes the actual
occurrence of miracles. They know the Bible to be true, because
they feel it to be so. The excellence of its morality, like a mag
net, attracts their souls ; and sophistry, which they cannot refute,
will not weaken their faith, resulting, as it does, from the accord
ance of their higher nature with the spirit of the Bible." This
language, as coming from Professor Park, if it be anything more
than a specimen of the affectation of expressing a familiar truth
in a philosophical form, is something far worse. If this "higher
nature " of man, which thus accords with the spirit of the Bible, is
his renewed nature — his nature purified and enlightened by the
Holy Spirit — then we have a solemn truth disguised and bedecked
in order to gain favour with the world. But if this " higher na
ture " be the nature of man, in any of its aspects, as it exists before
regeneration, then is the language of Professor Park a treasonable
betrayal of the scriptural truth. The doctrines of depravity, and
of the necessity of divine influence, are virtually denied. " That
which is born of the flesh, is flesh ; unless a man be born of the
Spirit, he cannot see the kingdom of God ; the carnal mind is en
mity against God ; the natural man receiveth not the things of the
Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him ; we preach Christ
crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and the Greeks foolish-
* Letters, &c, p. 116.

666 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
ness, but unto them which are called (and to them only) Christ the
power of God, and the wisdom of God." To assert, therefore, the
accordance of the higher nature of unrenewed men with the spirit
of the Bible, is to contradict one of the primary doctrines of the
word of God. It contradicts, moreover, universal experience.
Does the character of God, as a being of inflexible justice and
perfect holiness ; do the doctrines of Christ crucified, of the cor
ruption of man, of the necessity of regeneration by the power of
the Holy Ghost, and of eternal retribution, commend themselves to
the hearts of unrenewed men ? Are they not, on the contrary,
rejected and blasphemed by those who delight to talk of the ac
cordance of their higher nature with the spirit of the Bible ?
If the passage on which we are commenting refers to nothing
more than the accordance between the ethics of the Bible and the
moral sense of men, and between its general representations of
God and human reason, it is still more objectionable. It supposes
that all that is peculiar to the Gospel, all that distinguishes it from
a system of natural religion, may be left out of view, and yet its
spirit, its essential part, remain. Is the spirit of a system which
makes Christ a mere man, which denies the apostasy of our race,
which rejects the doctrines of atonement and regeneration, the spi
rit of the Bible ? Then, indeed, has offence of the cross ceased.
In every view, therefore, which we are able to take of this lan
guage of Professor Park, it excites the strongest feelings of disap
probation. If he believes what all evangelical Christians have
ever believed on this subject, why use language to express that be
lief which those who deny the essential doctrines of the Gospel
seize upon with avidity, as expressing their own views ? On the
other hand, if he does not agree with evangelical Christians on
these points, why does he call himself by their name ? Why does
he march under their banner ? We sincerely believe that the cause
of Christ is in more danger from the treason of friends than from
the open opposition of foes. While the Infidels of Germany, and
the Unitarians of this country, are employing Christian language
to convey anti-Christian doctrines, professing Christians are using
the language of an infidel philosophy in treating of the mysteries of
God. Whether this results from mere vanity, or from secret unbe
lief, the result is the same. The truth is buried or betrayed.
Statements are made of Christian doctrine in a form which those
who deny the doctrine readily adopt. Thus common ground is
obtained, on which friends and foes of the Gospel can stand side
by side, in seeming concord. The distinction between truth and
error is done away, and Christians and infidels come to speak the
same language. A more effective device than this, to destroy the
power of the Gospel, cannot be conceived. The new philosophy
promises to be a universal solvent, reducing all forms of opinion
into vague formulas, into which every man may insinuate what
sense he pleases.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 667
While, therefore, we dissent from Mr. Norton's doctrine, that
miracles are the only adequate proof of a divine revelation and
that those who cannot examine that proof for themselves must
believe upon the testimony of others, we dissent no less earnestly
from the doctrine of his opponent, that Christianity is addressed to
the intuitive perceptions of the common mind ; that it is embraced
because of the accordance of its spirit with the higher nature of
man. We believe the external evidence of the Bible to be per
fectly conclusive ; we believe its internal evidence (that is, its
majesty, its purity, its consistency, its manifold perfections) to be
no less satisfactory ; but we believe also, that the ultimate founda
tion of the Christian's faith is the testimony of the Holy Spirit, by
and with the truth in our hearts.
Though the author of the Letter to Mr. Norton devotes most of
his attention to the refutation of the doctrine above stated, respect
ing miracles, the feature of the discourse which seems to have
given him and his friends the greatest umbrage, is its denuncia
tory character ; that is, its venturing to assert, that those who
deny the miracles of Christianity are infidels. This, it appears,
was considered singularly out of taste and incongruous, seeing the
Discourse was delivered before an association of liberal theologi
ans. Its members, it is said, " agree in the rejection of many arti
cles of faith which have usually been held sacred in the church ; a
traditional theology has taken no strong hold of their minds ; they
deem the simple truths of Christianity more important than the
mysteries that have been combined with them ; but the principle
of their union has never been made to consist in any speculative
belief; no test has been required as a condition of fellowship ; the
mere suggestion of such a course would be met only with a smile
of derision." The Association " is composed of the Alumni of a
theological school, which has always claimed the favour of the
community, on account of its freedom from an exclusive spirit ; its
confidence in the safety and utility of thorough inquiry in all mat
ters of faith ; its attachment to the principles of liberal theology ;
and its renunciation of the desire to impose articles of belief on the
minds of its pupils."* That the exclusive principle should be
adopted in a discourse before such an audience was not to be ex
pected. By this principle is meant, " the assumption of the right
for an individual, or for any body of individuals, to make their
own private opinions the measure of what is fundamental in the
Christian faith. As liberal Christians," it is said, " we have long
protested against this principle, as contrary to the very essence of
Protestantism. It was not because our exclusive brethren made a
belief in the Trinity a test of allegiance to Christ, that we accused
them of inconsistency with the liberty of the Gospel ; but because
they presumed to erect any standard whatever, according to
* Letter, &c, pp. 5 and 6.

668 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
which the faith of individuals should be made to conform to the
judgment of others. It was not any special application of the
principle that we objected to, but the principle itself; and, as
suredly, the exercise of this principle does not change its charac
ter, by reason of the source from which it proceeds."*
This strikes us as very good declamation, but very poor reason
ing. There may be just complaint about the application of the
exclusive principle ; but to complain of the principle is certainly
very unreasonable. The author of this Letter is just as exclusive
as Mr. Norton, and Mr. Norton as the Trinitarians. They draw
the line of exclusion at different places ; but all must draw it some
where. An infidel is a man who denies the truth of the Christian
religion. That religion is certainly something. Different men
may have different views of what it consists of, or what is essen
tial to it. But all must regard it as embracing some doctrines, or
it would cease to be a religion ; and, consequently, they must re
gard those who reject those doctrines as infidels, whether they say
so or not. This Alumnus would hardly call Mohammedans
Christians, though they reckon Abraham and Christ among the
prophets, and believe in God and the immortality of the soul.
Would he then call him a Christian who denies the divine mission
of Christ, the being of an intelligent God, and the existence of the
soul after death, merely because he lives in a Christian country,
and assumes the Christian name ? This would be to make libe
rality ridiculous. Yet such claimants of the Christian name are
beginning to abound. Mr. Norton, therefore, is not to be blamed,
even as " a liberal theologian," for the adoption of the exclusive
principle. He may have drawn the line in an inconvenient place ;
he may have violated the code of Unitarian etiquette, in making
a belief in miracles essential to a belief in Christianity, and thus
justly exposed himself to the charge of a breach of privilege ; but
he can hardly be blamed for making the belief of something neces
sary to entitle a man to the name of a Christian. We have no
doubt his real offence was in drawing the line of exclusion in such
a manner as to cast out of the pale of even liberal Christianity,
some who were not disposed to be thus publicly disowned. This
is, indeed, distinctly stated. " You declare," says the author
of the letter, to Mr. Norton, " that a certain kind of evidence, in
your view, establishes the truth of Christianity, and that he who
rests his faith on any other is an infidel, notwithstanding his earnest
and open professions to the contrary. You thus, in fact, denied
the name of Christian to not a few individuals in your audience,
although you avoid discussing the grounds by which their opinions
are supported. For it is perfectly well known, that many of our
most eminent clergymen — I will not refrain from speaking of them
as they deserve on account of my personal sympathy with their
•Letter, &c, pp. 23 and 24.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 669
views — repose their belief on a different foundation from that which
you approve as the only tenable one."* It is plain, therefore, that
the offensive exclusiveness of Mr. Norton's Discourse consisted in
denying the Christian name to those who deny the miracles of
Christ. It appears to us, however, that the writer of this letter does Mr.
Norton great injustice. He accuses him of confounding " two
propositions which are essentially distinct : a belief in a divine
revelation, and a belief in the miracles alleged in its support. You
utterly confound," it is said, " the divine origin of Christianity, and
a certain class^the proofs of its divine origin." — P. 34. Mr. Norton
does not confound these two things ; nor does he, as represented
by this writer, pronounce all those to be infidels whose faith rests
on any other foundation than miracles. He declares those to be
infidels who deny the miracles of the New Testament, but this is
a very different affair. Many who feel the force of other kinds of
evidence much more than that of miracles, and whose faith, there
fore, does not rest on that foundation, admit their truth. Mr. Nor
ton's doctrine is, that the miraculous accounts contained in the New
Testament are so interwoven with all the other portions of the
history, and enter so essentially into the nature of the whole sys
tem of Christianity, that they cannot be denied without denying
what is essential to the Christian religion. There is no confusion
here of the thing to be proved, and the proof itself. It is true, he
teaches that miracles are the only proof of a divine revelation.
But this is only one of his reasons for maintaining that the rejec
tion of the miracles of Christianity is a rejection of Christianity
itself. We believe this latter proposition, though we do not believe
the former. We believe that miracles are essential to Christianity,
though we do not believe that they are the only sufficient proof of
its divine origin.
The Alumnus, moreover, censures Mr. Norton severely, for call
ing Spinosa an Atheist and Pantheist. The propriety of this cen
sure depends on the sense given to the terms employed. An
Atheist is one who denies the existence of God. But what is God ?
If the term be so extended as to include even a blind vis formativa
operative through the universe, then there never was an Atheist.
But if the term is used in its true scriptural sense ; if it designates an
intelligent and moral being, distinct from his creatures, whose essence
is not their essence, whose acts are not their acts, and especially whose

* Letter, &c, p. 25. On a previous page, however, complaint is made against Mr.
Norton, for proposing to speak of prevailing opinions, and then opposing " the doc
trine of the impossibility of miracles," which, the writer says, " is not known to have
an advocate among our theologians." And on page 32, he says, though many excel
lent Christians doubt, " whether Jesus Christ performed the miracles ascribed to him
in the New Testament," he " cannot avoid the conclusion, that the miracles related
in the Gospels, were actually wrought by Jesus." The author, therefore, though he
belongs to the class whose faith does not rest on miracles, neither denies their possi
bility nor their actual occurrence.

670 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
consciousness is not their consciousness, then Spinosa was an Atheist.
He acknowledges no such being. The universe was God ; or
rather all creatures were but the phenomena of the only really
existing being. It may, indeed, seem incongruous to call a man
an Atheist, of whom it may with equal truth be said, that he be
lieved in nothing but God. But in the sense stated above, which
is a correct and acknowledged sense of the term, Spinosa was an
Atheist. " We come now," says the Alumnus, " to a still more extraordi
nary mistake, which arose probably from the habit, too prevalent
among us, of grouping together theologians who have scarcely
anything in common, but the language in which they write. You
class Schleiermacher with the modern German school, whose dis
ciples are called Rationalists or Naturalists." — P. 133. This, he
says, is as whimsical a mistake as if a foreigner were to describe
the celebrated Dr. Beecher as one of the most noted of the Unita
rian school, in New England. This mistake is not quite as whim
sical as the author supposes. The term Rationalist is, indeed, com
monly employed to designate those who, making reason the source
as well as the standard of religious truth, deny all divine revelation.
Have the Pietists, says Rohr, the superintendent of Weimar, yet
to learn that we admit no other revelation in Christ than such as
occurred in Socrates or Plato ? Of such Rationalists, who are in
Germany just what the Deists were in England, Schleiermacher,
and all the transcendental school, were the determined and contempt
uous opponents. In another sense, however, the term Rationalist is
applicable, and is in fact applied, to the Transcendentalists of the
highest grade. Under the head of the Mystisch-spekulative Ra-
tionalismus, Tholuck includes the gnosticism of the first centuries,
the Pantheists of the middle ages, and of modern Germany.* To
this class of mystical Rationalists, Schleiermacher undoubtedly
belonged. As, however, the term is generally applied to the de
istical opposers of a supernatural revelation, with whom he was
ever in controversy, it certainly produces confusion to call Schlei
ermacher himself a Rationalist. As to the question, whether he
was a Pantheist, as it is a matter about which his learned contem
poraries in his own country are at variance, we may stand in doubt.
Few unbiassed readers of his "Reden fiber die Religion," however,
could regard him in any other light, when those discourses were
written. They are, to be sure, a rhapsody, full of genius and feel
ing, but still a rhapsody, in which the meaning is a very secondary
concern, which the reader is not expected to understand, but
simply to feel. Such a book may betray a man's sentiments, but
is hardly fit to be cited in any doctrinal controversy. Schleierma
cher was a very extraordinary man. Though he placed far too
little stress on historical Christianity (i. e., on the religion of Christ,
considered as objective revelation, recorded in the New Testa-
* Tholuck's Glaubwurdigkeit der Evangel. Geschichte, &c.,ch. 1.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 671
ment), yet as he made Christ the centre of his mystical system,
exalting him as the perfect manifestation of God, he exerted an
extraordinary influence in breaking down the authority of those
deistical Rationalists, who were accustomed to speak of Christ as
altogether such an one as themselves. He was once a Moravian,
and there is reason to believe that the interior life of his soul ex
isted, after all, more under the form thus originally impressed upon
it, than under the influence of his subsequent speculations. It was
no uncommon thing for him to call upon his family to join with
him in singing some devout Moravian hymn of praise to Christ ;
and though his preaching was of a philosophical cast, yet the
hymns which he assigned were commonly expressive, in a high
degree, of a devotional feeling and correct sentiment.* Such a
worshipper of Christ ought not to be confounded with such heart
less Deists as Paulus, Wegscheider, and Rohr.
The Alumnus makes another objection to Mr. Norton's discourse,
the justice of which we admit. It does not fulfil the expectations
which the annunciation of his subject excites. It is not a discourse
on the latest form of infidelity ; it is a mere consideration of one
subordinate feature of that form, viz., the denial of the miracles of
the New Testament. And this feature is by no means character
istic of the system, as this denial was as formally made by Paulus
as it is now by Strauss, men who have scarcely any other opinion
in common. Mr. Norton's discourse gives us little insight into the
form which infidelity has recently assumed in Germany, and still
less into the nature of the opinions which have begun to prevail in
his own neighbourhood. According to the Alumnus, it is better
adapted to mislead than to inform the reader, as far as this latter
point is concerned. " You announce," says he to Mr. Norton, " as
the theme of your discourse, ' the characteristics of the times, and
some of those opinions now prevalent, which are at war with a
belief in Christianity.' This, certainly, was a judicious opening,
and I only speak the sentiments of your whole audience, when I
say that it was heard with universal pleasure. 'It at once brought
up a subject of the highest importance, of no small difficulty, and of
singular interest to our community at the present moment. It gave
promise that you would discuss the character and tendency of
opinions now prevalent in the midst of us ; that you would meet
some of the objections which have been advanced to popular the
ological ideas ; that you would come directly to the great questions
that are at issue between different portions of the audience which
you addressed. But, instead of this mode of proceeding, you
adopted one which could not have been expected from your state
ment of the subject, and which I conceive to have been singularly
irrelevant to the demands of your audience, and the nature of the
occasion. Instead of meeting, face to face, the opinions which
* It was his habit to have these hymns printed on slips of paper and distributed to
the people at the door of his church.

672 TRANSCENDENTALISM. . - -
have found favour with many of the theologians in this country,
which are publicly maintained from the pulpit and the press, in our
own immediate community, which form the cardinal points on
which speculation is divided among us, you appear studiously to
avoid all mention of them ; no one could infer from your remarks,
that any novel ideas had been broached in our theological world,
excepting such as can be traced back to the sceptical reasonings
of Spinosa and Hume, and a comparatively small class of the
modern theologians of Germany."* He then denies that the writ
ings of Spinosa, Hume, or of the German Rationalists (in the
limited sense of that term), were exerting any influence among the
theologians of Boston, and that the speculations which really pre
vailed, had a very different origin.
It is clear, from all this, that a serious and wide breach has oc
curred between different classes of the Unitarian divines in New
England, but the real character of the novel ideas cannot be learn
ed either from Mr. Norton's Discourse or from the letter of the
Alumnus. It is, indeed, sufficiently plain, from the manner in
which the latter speaks of pantheistic writers, that the new philo
sophy is the source of the difficulty. Speaking of the system of
Spinosa, which he admits to be pantheistic, in a philosophical
sense, inasmuch as it denies " real, substantial existence to finite
objects," he says, " no one who understands the subject, will accuse
this doctrine of an irreligious tendency. It is religious even to
mysticism ; on that account, as well as for certain philosophical
objections it labours under (the Bible, it seems, has nothing to do
with the question), I cannot adopt it as a theory of the universe;
but I trust I shall never cease to venerate the holy and exalted spi
rit of its author, who, in the meek simplicity of his life, the trans
parent beauty of his character, and the pure devotion with which
he wooed truth, even as a bride, stands almost ' alone, unapproach-
ed,' among men." — P. 126. Such language, in reference to a sys
tem which denies the existence of a personal God, the individuality
of the human soul, which necessarily obliterates all distinction be
tween right and wrong, betrays a singular perversion of ideas, and
an entire renunciation of all scriptural views of the nature of reli
gion. To call that obscure and mystic sentiment religion, which
arises from the contemplation of the incomprehensive and infinite,
is to change Christianity for Buddhism. The result, in fact, to
which the philosophy of the nineteenth century has brought its
votaries. In another place, however, he says of the leading school in mo
dern German theology, " that the impression of the powerful
genius of Schleiermacher is everywhere visible in its character ;
but it includes no servile disciples ; it combines men of free minds,
who respect each other's efforts, whatever may be their individual
conclusions ; and the central point at which they meet is the ac-
* Letter, &c., pp. 17, 18.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 673
knowledgment of the divine character of Christ, the divine origin
of his religion, and its adaptation to the world, when presented in
a form corresponding with its inherent spirit, and with the scientific
culture of the present age. There are few persons who would
venture to charge such a school with the promulgation of infi
delity ; there are many, I doubt not, who will welcome its princi
ples, as soon as they are understood, as the vital, profound, and en
nobling theology which they have earnestly sought for, but hitherto
sought in vain." — P. 146.
It is difficult to know how this paragraph is to be understood.
If restricted to a few of the personal friends and pupils of Schleier
macher, such as Liicke, Ullmann, Twesten, and a few others, the
description has some semblance of truth. But, in this case, it is
no longer the " leading school of modern German theology" that
the writer is describing. And if extended to the really dominant
school, the description is as foreign from the truth as can well be
imagined. ,
We have so lately been concerned with the nature of the
prevalent system of German theology and philosophy, that we
may well be excused from enlarging on it. here. As, however,
it is a subject of constantly increasing interest, it may not be
amiss to give a few additional proofs of the true character of
the latest form of infidelity. In doing this, we shall avail
ourselves of the authority of such men as Leo, Hengstenberg,
and Tholuck, men of the highest rank in their own country
for talents, learning, and integrity. We shall let them describe
this new form of philosophy which is turning the heads of our
American scholars, inflating some and dementing others ; and we
shall leave it to our transcendental countrymen, if they see cause,
to accuse these German scholars and Christians of ignorance and
misrepresentation. It is well known to all who have paid the least attention lo the
subject, that the prevalent system of philosophy in Germany is that
of Hegel ; and that this system has, to a remarkable degree, dif
fused itself among all classes of educated men. It is not confined
to recluse professors or speculative theologians, but finds its warm
est advocates among statesmen and men of the world. It has its
poets, its popular as well as its scientific journals. It is, in short,
the form in which the German mind now exists and exhibits itself
to surrounding nations, just as much as Deism or Atheism was
characteristic of France during the reign of terror. That a sys
tem thus widely diffused should present different phases might be
naturally anticipated. But it is still one system, called by one name,
and despite of occasional recriminations among its advocates, re
cognised by themselves as one whole. The general characteristic
of this school is pantheism. This, as we have quoted, is " the public
secret of Germany ;" and " we must," says Hengstenberg, " de
signedly close our own eyes on all that occurs around us, if we
43

674 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
would deny the truth of this assertion."* And on the following
page, he says, that though there are a few of the followers of He
gel who endeavour to reconcile his principles with Christianity,
yet these are spoken of with contempt by their associates, who, as
a body, are " with the clearest consciousness, and as consequently
as possible devoted to pantheism." They are, moreover, he adds,
hailed as brothers by the advocates of popular pantheism, who
denounce, under the name of pietism, at once Christianity, Juda
ism and Deism. This was written four years ago, a long period
in the history of modern philosophy, and since that time, the cha
racter of the school has developed itself with constantly increasing
clearness. In allusion to the French Chamber of Deputies, this school is
divided into two parts, the right and the left. The former teaches
the principles of the philosophy in an abstruse form, as a philoso
phy : the other gives them a more popular and intelligible form.
This latter division, again, is divided into the centre left and ex
treme left ; the one preserving some decorum and regard to pub
lic morals in their statements, and the other recklessly carrying
out their principles to the extreme of licentiousness. To the ex
treme left belong the class which is designated the " Young Ger
many," of which Heine is one of the most prominent leaders. This
class profess themselves the true disciples of the extreme right ;
the extreme right acknowledge their fellowship with the centre
left, and the centre left with the extreme left. The respectable
portion of the party of course express themselves with disappro
bation of the coarseness of some of their associates, but they
speak of them only as the unworthy advocates of truth. Thus says
Hengstenberg, " Prof. Vischer, one of the most gifted of the party,
expresses himself with an energy against the 'young Germans,'
which shows that his better feelings are not obliterated, and yet
acknowledges their principles with a decision and plainness which
prove how deep those principles enter into the very essence of
the system, so that the better portion of the party cannot, with
any consistency, reject them. In the Halle Jahrbuch, p. 1118,
he speaks of the Rehabilitationists! as the ' unworthy prophets of
what, in its properly understood principle, is perfectly true and
good.' He says, ' It is well, if in opposition to the morality of
Kant and Schiller, the rights of our sensual nature should, from
time to time, be boldly asserted.' He complains, p. 507, of the
pedantry of his country, where the want of chastity is placed on
a level with drunkenness, gluttony or theft, and so expresses him
self that every one sees that he considers incontinence a virtue
under certain circumstances, and conjugal fidelity a sin."J Though
* Kirchen-Zeitung, January, 1836, p. 19.
f The name assumed by those who plead for the rehabilitation of the flesh, i. e.,
for the restoration of the sensual part of our nature to its rights, of which Chris
tianity has so long deprived it.
X Preface to Kirchen-Zeitung, for 1839, p. 30.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 675
this dominant party, therefore, has its divisions, its outwardly de
cent, and its openly indecent members, it is one school, and is lia
ble to the general charges which have been brought against it as a
whole. It may well be supposed that a system so repugnant to every
principle of true religion and sound morals could not be openly
advocated, without exciting the most decided opposition. This
opposition has come from various quarters ; from professed philo
sophers and theologians, and from popular writers, who have at
tacked the system in a manner adapted to the common mind. Pro
fessor Leo, of Halle, has adopted this latter method of assault.
He is one of the most distinguished historians of Germany ; and,
until within a few years, himself belonged to the general class of
Rationalists. His history of the Jews was written in accordance
with the infidel opinions which he then entertained. Having, how
ever, become a Christian, he has publicly expressed his sorrow for
having given to the history just mentioned the character which it
now bears, and has, with great boldness and vigour, attacked the
writings of the leading German school in theology. This step has
excited a virulent controversy, and produced an excitement, par
ticularly at Halle, such as has not been known for many years.
Hengstenberg says, that Leo has not been sustained in this con
flict by the friends of truth, as he had a right to expect. " One
principal reason," he adds, " of this reserve, is no doubt, in many
cases, the reckless vulgarity of many of his opponents. When
they see what Leo has had to sustain, they tremble and exclaim,
Vestigia me terrent ! A decorous controversy with opponents who
have something to lose, they do not dread, but they are unwilling
to allow themselves to be covered with filth."* Hengstenberg,
however, is not the man to desert the truth or its advocates, let
what will happen. He stands like a rock, despite the violent as
sault of open enemies and the coolness of timid friends, the firmest
and the most efficient defender of Christianity in Germany.
Leo entitled his book against the latest form of infidelity, " He-
gelingen;" that is, Hegelians of the left, in allusion to the division
of the school into a right and left side. It is presumed he gave it
this title because it was intended to be a popular work, designed
to exhibit the principles of the school in a manner suited to the
apprehensions of the ordinary class of educated people. It was,
therefore, directed, not against that division of the school which
wrapped up its doctrines in the impenetrable folds of philosophical
language, but against that division which has spoken somewhat
more intelligibly.
With regard to the charges which Leo brings against this school,
Hengstenberg says, " No one at all familiar with the literature of
the day, needs evidence of their truth. Instead of doubting, he
may rather wonder that an abomination advocated for years past,.
* Kirchen-Zeitung, p. 21.

676 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
should now first, as though it were something new, be thus vehe
mently assaulted, and that the charges should be directed against
comparatively few and unimportant writers." This latter circum
stance, he adds, however, is accounted for, as Leo professed to
confine himself to the productions of the year preceding the pub
lication of his own book.
Leo's first charge is this : " This party denies the existence of a
personal God. They understand by God, an unconscious power
which pervades all persons, and which arrives at self-consciousness
only in the personality of men. That is, this party teaches athe
ism without reserve." With regard to this charge, Hengstenberg
remarks, " Whoever has read Strauss's Life of Jesus, and Vatke's
Biblical Theology, where Pantheism, which every Christian must
regard as only one form of Atheism, is clearly avowed, cannot
ask whether the party in general holds these doctrines, but simply
whether the particular persons mentioned by Leo belong, as to this
point, to the party. About this who can doubt, when he hears
Professor Michelet say, beside many other things of like import,
' God is the eternal movement of the universal principle, con
stantly manifesting itself in individual existences, and which has
no true objective existence but in these individuals, which pass
away again into the infinite.' [In other words, God is but the
name given to the ceaseless flow of being.] When he hears him
denouncing as unworthy of the name, ' the theistical Hegelians,
who believe in a personal God in another world V " — P. 22. " Pro
fessor Vischer," adds Hengstenberg, " is so far from being ashamed
of Pantheism, that he glories in his shame, and represents it as
the greatest honour of his friend Strauss, that he has ' logically
carried out the principle of the immanence of God in the world.'
That the professors Gans and Benary agree with him and with
Strauss, not only in general, but in this particular point, Michelet,
' certain of their assent,' has openly declared. According to Dr.
Kiihne, Hegel's God ' is not Jehovah,' he is ' the ever-streaming
immanence of spirit in matter.' To this representation Dr. Meyen
agrees, and says, ' I make no secret, that I belong to the extreme
left of Hegel's school. I agree with Strauss perfectly, and con
sider him (seine Tendenz) as in perfect harmony with Hegel.'
Another writer, the anonymous author of the book ' Leo vor Ge-
richt,' ridicules the charge of atheism as though it were a trifle.
He represents the public as saying to the charge, ' What does it
mean? Mr. Professor Leo is beyond our comprehension ; Wodan,
heathenism, Hegel's God, atheism ! ha I ha I ha I' "
That Tholuck looks on the doctrine of Strauss, with whom these
other writers profess agreement, and who is an avowed disciple of
Hegel, in the same light, is clear from his language in his Anzeiger,
for May, 1836 ; " Strauss," he says, " is a man who knows no other
God than him who, in the human race, is constantly becoming
man. He knows no Christ but the Jewish Rabbi who made his
confession of sin to John the Baptist, and no heaven but that

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 677
which speculative philosophy reveals for our enjoyment on the
little planet we now inhabit."
Nothing, however, can be plainer than Strauss's own language.
" As man, considered as a mere finite spirit, and restricted to him
self, has no reality ; so God, considered as an infinite spirit, restrict
ing himself to his infinity, has no reality. The infinite spirit has
reality only so far as he unites himself to finite spirits (or manifests
himself in them), and the finite spirit has reality only so far as he
sinks himself in the infinite."* How does this differ, except in the
jargon of terms, from le peuple-dieu, of Anacharsis Clootz, the
worthy forerunner of these modern atheists ?!
" If," says another writer in Hengstenberg's Journal, " mankind
is the incarnate Godhead, and beside this incarnate divine spirit
there is no God, then we have a most perfect atheism, which re
moves us from Christianity far beyond the limits of Mohammedan
ism, the heathenism of the Indians and Chinese, or of our pagan
ancestors." " Hegel and his school maintain that God is not an
individual person, as opposed to other individuals, since individu
ality is of necessity exclusive, limited, and finite. Since God is a
trinity, wherein the outwardness of number is merged in substan
tial unity, so God is a universal person ; because the comprehen
sion of individuals in unity is universality. This is what is meant
by the expression, ' God is personality itself.' The simple question,
whether they believe in the God whom Christians are bound to
honour and love," continues this writer, " is here complicated with
an obscure definition of the trinity, which no man can think re
moves the mystery of the subject by saying, Die Ausserlichtkeit
der Zahl zu einer substantiellen Einheit umgebogen ist (the out
wardness of number is merged in substantial unity). The charge
of denying the true God remains in full force, this justification of
themselves to the contrary notwithstanding." And on the follow
ing page, he adds, " that this school, to be honest, when asked,
' Do you deny God and Christianity ?' ought to answer, ' Certainly,
what you Christians of the old school call God and Christianity ;
we would teach you a better doctrine.' "J
We have seen how that portion of this dominant school, who
retain some respect for themselves and for the opinions of others,
veil their God-denying doctrines in philosophical formulas unintel
ligible to the common people, and mysterious and mystical to
themselves. Stripped of its verbjage, the doctrine is, that men are
God ; there is no other God than the ever-flowing race of man; or
that the universal principle arrives at self-consciousness only in the
human race, and therefore the highest state of God is man. The
extreme left of the school trouble themselves but little with words
* Leben Jesu, p. 730.
f " Je prechai hautement," said Clootz, in the French Convention, " qu'il n'y a
pas d'autre Dieu que la nature, d'autre souverain que le genre humain, le peuple-
dieu." — Thiers's Histoire de la Revolution Fran., vol. v., p. 197.
X Kirchen-Zeitung, February, 1839.

678 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
without meaning. They speak out boldly, so that all the world
may understand. " We are free," says Heine, " and need no thun
dering tyrant. We are of age, and need no fatherly care. We
are not the hand-work of any great mechanic. Theism is a reli
gion for slaves, for children, for Genevese, for watch-makers."
2. " Leo," says Hengstenberg, " charges this party with deny
ing the incarnation of God in Christ, and with turning the Gospel
into a mythology. If the previous charge is substantiated, this
requires no special proof. If the existence of God, in the Chris
tian sense of the terms, be denied, we must cease to speak of an
incarnation in the Christian sense of the word. The doctrine of
the immanence of God in the world, says Professor Vischer (Halle
Jahrbuch, s. 1102), forbids us to honour ' God in the letter, or in
single events, or individuals,' It regards, ' as a breach in the con
catenation of the universe, that an individual should be the Abso
lute.' According to this view, there is no other incarnation than
that which Professor Michelet, in harmony with the Chinese phi
losophers, teaches, that ' God must constantly appear here on
earth in a form which affects our senses (als sinnlicher), though
constantly changing that form (als ein sich aufgehebender und
aufgehobener), and in this statement, if I mistake not, the whole
school will recognise the eternal incarnation of God.' The Ab
solute attains consciousness in a series of individuals, no one of
which fully represents him, but each has significance only as a
member of the whole. This incarnation of God is eternal, but all
individuals are perishing and transitory ; the Absolute constantly
fashions for itself new individuals, and rejects the former as soon
as they have answered their end. These form the ' Golgotha of
the Absolute Spirit ;' they surround, like bloodless ghosts, the
throne of the monster that devours his own children ; that, void of
love, strides through ages, trampling and destroying all that lies in
his way." Such is the awful language in which Hengstenberg
describes the God of the Hegelians.
The incarnation of God, then, according to this school, did not
occur in Christ, but is constantly occurring in the endless succes
sion of the human race. Mankind is the Christ of the new sys
tem, and all the Gospel teaches of the Son of God is true only as
it is understood of mankind. Strauss teaches this doctrine with a
clearness very unusual in a philosopher. " The key," says he, " of
the whole doctrine of Christ, i| that the predicates which the
church has affirmed of Christ, as an individual, belong to an Idea,
to a real, not to a Kantian unreal idea. In an individual, in one
God-man, the attributes and functions which the church attributes
to Christ, are incompatible and contradictory ; in the idea of the
race they all unite. Mankind is the union of the two natures, the
incarnate God, the infinite revealed in the finite, and the finite con
scious of its infinity. The race is the child of the visible mother
and of the invisible Father, of the Spirit and of nature ; it is the
true worker of miracles, in so far as in course of its history, it

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 679
constantly attains more complete mastery over nature, which sinks
into the powerless material of human activity. It is sinless, so far
as the course of its development is blameless ; impurity cleaves
only to the individual, but in the race, and its history, it is removed.
The race dies, rises again, and ascends to heaven, in so far as by
the negation of its natural element (Natiirlichkeit) a higher spirit
ual life is produced, and as by the negation of its finitude as a per
sonal, national, worldly spirit, its unity with the infinite spirit of
heaven is manifested. By faith in this Christ is man justified be
fore God ; that is, by the awakening the idea of the nature of man
in him, especially as the negation of the natural element, which is
itself a negation of the spirit, and thus a negation of a negation is
the only way to true spiritual life for man, the individual becomes
a partaker of the theanthropical life of the race. This alone is the
real import of the doctrine of Christ ; that it appears connected
with the person and history of an individual, has only the subject
ive ground, that his personality and fate were the occasion of awa
kening this general truth in the consciousness of men, and that at
that period the culture of the world, and indeed the culture of the
mass at all periods, allowed of their contemplating the Idea of the
race, only in the concrete form of an individual."*
Tholuck, whose charity for philosophical aberrations is very
wide, remarks on this passage : " As the incarnation of God oc
curred not in an individual, but comes to pass only in the constant
progress of the race, so the individual, as a mere item of the race,
has fulfilled his destiny at the close of his earthly course, and the
race alone is immortal. It is not we that enter a future world,
the future world goes forward in this, the more the spirit becomes
aware of its infinitude, and by the power of reason gains the mas
tery over nature. This ideal perfection is to be attained, not in
heaven, but in the perfection of our political and social relations.
This system, therefore, comes to the same result with the materi
alism of the Encyclopedists, who mourned over mankind for hav
ing sacrificed the real pleasures of time for the visionary pleasures
of eternity, and the protracted enjoyments of life, for the momen
tary happiness of a peaceful death. It agrees, moreover, despite
of its intellectual pretensions, with the wishes of the materialistical
spirit of the age, which sets as the highest end of man, not the
blessings promised by the church, but according to the " Young
Germans," the refined pleasures of life, and according to politi
cians, the perfection of the state."
It is strange that men holding such views should trouble them
selves at all with the Gospel. As this system, however, has arisen
in a Christian country, there was but one of two things to do,
either to say that real Christianity means just what this system
teaches, or to explode the whole evangelical history. Some have
* Strauss's Leben Jesu, th ii., s. 734, quoted by Tholuck, in his Glaubwfirdigkeit,
&c, p. 19.

680 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
taken one course, and some the other, while some unite both.
That is, they reject the Gospel history as a history ; they represent
it as a mere mythology ; but as the ancient philosophers made the
mythology of the Greeks and Romans a series of allegories, con
taining important truths, so do these modern philosophers repre
sent the Gospels as a mere collection of fables, destitute in almost
every case of any foundation in fact, but still expressive of the
hidden mysteries of their system. It is by a mytho-symbolical
interpretation of this history that the truth must be sought. The
life of Jesus by Strauss is a laborious compilation of all the critical
objections against the New Testament history, which he first thus
endeavoured to overturn, and then to account for and explain as a
Christian mythology. " Had this book," says Hengstenberg,
" been published in England, it would have been forgotten in a
couple of months."* In Germany it has produced a sensation
almost without a parallel. It has become the rallying ground of
all the enemies of Christianity, open and secret, and the number
of its advocates and secret abettors is, therefore, exceedingly great
" The author," says Tholuck, " has uttered the sentence which so
few dared to utter ; ' The evangelical history is a fable.' He has
uttered it at a time when the deniers of the truth were filled with
spleen at the prospect of a constantly increasing faith in the Gospel.
With what joy then must this hypocritical and timid generation
hail a leader who gives himself to the sweat and dust of the battle,
while they hide behind the bushes, and rub their hands, and smile
in each other's faces I"!
3. Leo's third charge against this party is, that they deny the
immortality of the soul. " This point also needs no further proof,"
says Hengstenberg, " since the former have been proved. With
the personality of God falls of course that of man, which is the
necessary condition of an existence hereafter. To a pantheist
' the subject which would assert its individual personality, is evil
itself (Michelet). It is regarded as godless even to cherish the
desire of immortality. According to the doctrine of the eternal
incarnation of God, it must appear an intolerable assumption for
an individual to lay claim to that which belongs only to the race ;
he must freely and gladly cast himself beneath the wheels of the
idol car that he may make room for other incarnations of the
Spirit better adapted to the advancing age. The proofs, however,
of this particular charge are peculiarly abundant. Hegel himself,
who ought not to be represented as so different from the Hegelin-
gen, since the difference between them is merely formal and not
essential, involved himself in the logical denial of the immortality
of the soul. This has been fully proved with regard to him and
Dr. Marheineke, in a previous article in this journal (that is, the
Kirchen-Zeitung). It has also been demonstrated by Weise in
'Kirchen-Zeitung, Jan. 1, 1836, p. 35. f Glaubwiirdigkeit, p. 34.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 681
the work, " Die philosophische Geheimlehre von der Unsterblich-
keit," as far as Hegel is concerned ; and with Weise, Becker has
more recently signified his agreement. If this happens in the green
tree, what will become of the dry ?
" Richter came out with such a violent polemic against the doc
trine of immortality, that the party had to disavow him, for fear
of the public indignation. When, however, they thought it could
be done unnoticed or without danger, they acknowledged the same
doctrine. Michelet endeavours most earnestly to free Hegel's
system from the charge of countenancing the doctrine of the im
mortality of the soul, as from a reproach. He speaks out clear and
plain his own views in words which, according to him, Hegel him
self had spoken, ' Thought alone is eternal, and not the body and
what is connected with its individuality,' that is, the whole person
ality which, according to this system, depends entirely on the body
(Leiblichkeit)  Ruge (Hall. Jahrb., s. 1011) ridicules the
scruples of theologians as to whether ' Philosophy can make out
the immortality of the human soul ; whether it can justify the
gross doctrines of hell, of wailing and gnashing the teeth,' &c.
' Such vulgar craving,' he says, ' is beginning to mix itself with
purely philosophical and spiritual concerns, and threatens to merge
philosophy in its troubled element. The more this dogmatical
confusion arrogates to itself; the more this senseless justification
of the wretched errors of orthodoxy dishonours the free science of
philosophy, the more necessary will it be to cast out this dung-heap
of nonsense to the common mind (in das gemeine Bewusstseyn).
Meyen at first puts on the air of one who would acknowledge
the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. ' The Hegelians,' he
says, ' do indeed reject the sensual conceptions of immortality, but
they admit the doctrine as presented by Marheineke in his Theolo
gy.' The dishonest ambiguity of this sentence will not escape
notice. Dr. Marheineke denies the continued personal existence
of the soul after death, and attributes the belief of such a doctrine to
selfishness. ' Whoever,' continues Meyen, ' is so conversant as
Hegel with what is eternal in connexion with spirit, must admit
the eternity of the spirit.' Here again is intentional ambiguity.
The question concerning the continued personal existence of the
soul is silently changed for the question about the eternity of
spirit. A veil is thrown over the fact that Hegel, while he ad
mitted the latter, denied the former, as Michelet and others have-suf
ficiently shown. These preliminary remarks, transparent as they
are, were only intended to prevent his being quoted in proof of the
disbelief of immortality in the school to which he belongs. He
immediately comes out plainly with his own views and those of
his party, yet so as still to leave a door open behind him. ' What
though a Hegelian,' says he, ' did not believe in the immortality of
the soul in a Christian sense — let it be noticed that the words are
here so placed, that the uninformed should infer that the school, as
a whole, and its above mentioned leaders, do believe in immor-

682 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
tality in a Christian sense — what then ? If I resign myself to this,
am I thereby a different person, or is the world for me different ?
I would seek to acknowledge God in his works before, and I
would live as morally as ever.' At last, however, it becomes too
hot for him, even in these thin clothes, and he casts them off,
having -assumed them only for the sake of his brothers in Hegel,
who happen to be in office. ' Grass,' says he, ' is already growing
on the grave of Daub, is he, therefore, dead for his friends and for
the world ? his works, and hence also his spirit, live. Many winter
storms have already swept%over the graves of Hegel and of Goethe,
but does not their spirit still live among us ? It is, as Christ said.
where two of you are met together, there am I in the midst of
you.* Thus each continues to live according to his works. The
citizen in the remembrance of his family ; he who has distinguished
himself in the kingdom of the spirit, still lives in that kingdom, and
hence, he who has worked for eternity is immortal.' "
4. " Leo finally," says Hengstenberg, " accuses this school of
wishing to pass themselves for Christians, by means of disguising
their ungodly and abominable doctrines under a repulsive and un
intelligible phraseology. This is a heavy charge. Honesty and
candour have ever been the ornament of our national character.
They have ever been regarded as the innate virtues of a German.
Whoever undermines them is a disgrace to his country. Yet who
can say the charge is not well founded ? Several proofs of its
truth have been given in what has already been said. A state
ment, however, by Professor Vischer, in his character of Dr.
Strauss (Hall. Jahrb., s. Ill), is worthy of special attention.
' How firm his (Strauss's) conviction as to the main point even
* To this passage Hengstenberg has the following note : " We frequently meet', in
the writings of this school, with similar shameful profanations of the scriptures,
which are seldom quoted without some mutilation, which is characteristic of the
relation of the party to the word of God. These writers delight to transfer to Hegel
what the scriptures say of Christ. According to Bayrhofter (Halle Jahrb., s. 343),
Hegel ' is the absolute centre around which the present revolves.' His first disci
ples are compared with the apostles. ' Hinrich is the rock of terminology, the
strength and the support of the school' (Jahrb., s. 672). Leo, who has left the
party, is compared with Judas, and even designated as ' the fallen angel of specula
tion' (Hegel's doctrine concerning the State). The school, as a whole, is a copy of
the church of Christ. According to Bayrhoffer (Hegelings, s. 29), it should no longer
be called a school, but ' the congregation of the idea,' or ' the spiritual kingdom of
the idea.' Ruge applies the passage, ' The kingdom of heaven suffered violence,
and the violent take it by force,' to the popular exhibition of Hegel's philosophy by
Erdmann. The most shameful of these perversions, however, relate to the passages
concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost. Whoever comes out boldly against the
spirit of Hegel, or of his disciples, or of the time, or of hell, is declared guilty of the
sin against the Holy Spirit, or rather the Spirit (for the word holy they commonly
leave out, it savours too much of morality ; when it is inserted, it is only for the sake
of the allusion). ' The writings,' says Meyen, ' in which Leo has presented his new
opinions, blaspheme the Spirit — and hence God himself To which we answer:
Yes, your spirit and your God we wish to blaspheme, for blasphemy of him is the
praise of the God of heaven and of his Spirit  " We can hardly express the
admiration which we feel for Hengstenberg. No one who does not know how much
alone and aloft he stands, and how much he has had to endure for his uncompro
mising opposition to the enemies of God and religion, can appreciate the noble firm
ness and vigour of his character."

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 683
then was, is shown in a highly interesting correspondence between
him and one of his friends, communicated to me through the kind
ness of the latter, and which now lies before me. It is touching
to observe with what cheerful confidence in the saving power of
the truth he endeavours to remove the anxiety and scruples of his
friend, who felt pained by the chasm which his scientific convic
tions had made between him and his congregation ; how clearly
he shows that it is no dishonesty to speak the language of the ima
gination (der Vorstellung), to introduce unobserved into the figures
which alone float before the believer, the thoughts of the knower
(des Wissenden).' Here the zeal and skill with which Dr. Strauss
teaches his friend how to lie, and instructs him how to steal from
the congregation what they regard as the most precious treasure
(and what, for that very reason, it will be found impossible to rob
them of), are represented as a great merit, and the reader is ex
horted to allow himself to be affected by this proof of his amiable-
ness, and in the warmth of his sympathy to press his hand, and
exclaim, O how good you are I We, however, cannot regard such
conduct without the deepest moral abhorrence. The school en
deavour to justify this course, from the relation which Hegel has
established between conception and thought (Vorstellung* und
Begriff). But this justification is completely worthless. It is not
one whit better than the theories by which the robbers in Spain
justify their vocation. Evil is no better, but on the contrary
worse, and the more to be condemned when it is brought infor-
mam artis. The relation assumed by Hegel, between conception
and thought, would allow at most of a formal accommodation.
That yours is of that nature, you cannot assert  , 
If the difference between your thought (Begriff) and our concep
tion (Vorstellung) is merely formal, why do you rave with such
hatred against us ? Why do you say that ' Pietism is a disease
which corrupts the very life of the spirit ?' (Vischer, p. 526.)
How can the question be about a mere formal difference ? Our
Conception and your Thought are just as far apart as heaven and
hell. We confess God the Father the maker of heaven and earth,
and Jesus Christ his only begotten Son ; you deny both the Father
and the Son, and confess Antichrist, yea, would yourselves be his
members  "
Hengstenberg afterwards remarks, that it is almost incredible to
what an extent this deception and hypocrisy is carried. This
* This translation of the words Vorstellung and Begriff is no doubt inadequate
The technical terms of a system do not admit of adequate translation, because the
sense assigned to them in the system is arbitrary. The only method that can be
pursued in such cases, is to give their nearest corresponding words the same arbi
trary signification. Hegel calls that form of truth which is the object of absolute
knowledge, a pure thought, Begriff; and that form in which it is the object of faith
or feeling, Vorstellung. Or, the exercises of feeling, desire, will, &c, considered as
objects of attention, are Vorstellungen ; these it is the office of philosophy, by the
process of thinking, to turn into thoughts, Begriffe. And hence, he says, Vorstel
lungen can be regarded as the metaphors of Begriffe. See his Encyklopadie, p. 5.

684 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
course of conduct, however, though very characteristic of this
modern school, is an old device. The Rationalists, to go no further
back, were accustomed to speak of the Lamb of God, of the blood of
Christ, &c, with the avowed purpose that the people should attach
to these expressions their scriptural sense, while they employed
them in a very different one. How strange, too, it sounds to hear
this Alumnus of Cambridge speaking of " the divine character of
Christ," of "the cross of Christ as the hope of the world," and "of
the anointing of the Holy Ghost !" This community, we trust, is
not prepared to have such solemn words made playthings of. Let
philosophers and errorists, who deny the truths of the Bible, find
words for themselves, and not profane the words of God by making
them a vehicle for the denial of his truth. One of the most mon
strous examples of this perversion of scriptural language occurs in
a passage quoted above from Strauss. He, too, will have it that
man is justified by faith in Christ, because as God is incarnate in
the race, the race is Christ, and by faith in the race, or by coming
to a proper apprehension of his own nature, man reaches his high
est state of perfection. Mr. Bancroft, in his history, talks of men
being justified by faith, meaning thereby that they are justified by
their principles. And the Oxford divines teach that we are justi
fied by faith, since the Thirty -nine Articles say so, but then it is by
the faith of the church.*
" With this last charge, Leo," says Hengstenberg, " entered
upon the department of morals ; and we could wish that he had
dwelt longer on this part of the subject. It would then have been
shown, how this party are labouring to destroy all that Rational
ism has left of religion and morality. What their ethics are, may
be readily inferred from their religion. Where there is no personal
God, there is no law which men need fear to violate, as the ex
pression of his will. If the distinction between God and man is
removed, if man is set in the place of God, then nothing is more
natural than that men should, without reserve, and upon principle,
give themselves up to all their inclinations and lusts. To suppress
these desires, is to hinder the development of God ; if they do not
become God as developed, they do become the nascent God ; if
not good in themselves, they are relatively good as transition-points
* It should be here stated that Dr. Strauss, at the close of his " Life of Jesus," as
first printed, had freely admitted the incompatibility of his views with the exercise
of the ministry in the Christian church. This admission, in the last edition, he has
suppressed ; and in his letter to the authorities of Zurich, when appointed a profes
sor of theology in the university of that city, he says, he should not consider it a
difficult matter to quiet the apprehensions of those who feared that he would labour
to overthrow the Christian religion, that he would endeavour to sustain " the funda
mental truths of Christianity," and only try to free it " from human additions."
When it is considered that he regards as human additions almost everything that
the people of Zurich hold to be fundamental truths, there can be but one opinion of
the dishonesty of this statement. The reputation for candour, which he had gained
by his first admission, has been lost entirely by these subsequent proceedings. Our
readers are aware that the attempt to force Strauss on the people as a professor, led
to one of the most remarkable revolutions of our times. The people rose en masse
and overthrew the government.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 685
in the progress of development. It is not sin that is sinful, but
only impenitence, that is, cleaving to the relative good, which is
vulgarly called evil, as though it were the absolute good. These
painful results of the doctrine of this school are everywhere, with
the most logical consequence, avowed and brought to light. Ruge,
in a passage already quoted, attributes the question, whether phi
losophy has any ethics, to ' vulgar craving ' (gemeinen Bedurftig-
keit), as much as the question, whether it can vindicate the gross
doctrine of hell, &c. ; and insists that this whole ' dung-heap
should be cast out into the mire of the common mind.' In connec
tion with Leo, and the editor (Hengstenberg himself), Menzel is
designated as ' the incarnation of Protestant Jesuitism' (Meyen, p.
5), because he has appeared in defence of morality, now com
pletely antiquated, against the Young Germany. On every side,
efforts are made to represent him, before the whole nation, as a
marked man, on account of his conflict with that which the spirit
of the pit in our day says to the common man. ' Upon Wolfgang
Menzel,' says Meyen, ' judgment is already executed ; he lies like
a scurvy old dog on the foul straw which Herr von Cotta has in
compassion left him, and can seldom muster courage to yelp, that
all is over with his pitiful morality, which has gone to its rest.'*
The principles of the ' Young Germany ' have been advanced in
the Literary Magazine of Berlin with shameless effrontery, and
the infamous advocates of those principles defended, and the
sottish prudery of ' the grey heads of" the age,' who were disgusted
at their song : ' We lead a merry life,' has been turned into ridi
cule." Hengstenberg then introduces the passage from Professor
Vischer, quoted on a previous page, in which, while he condemns
these young Germans as unworthy prophets, he defends their
principles. This Pantheistic school, therefore, is as subversive of all morality
as it is of all religion. It does not admit the idea of sin. As there
is no God there is no law, and no transgression. Everything
actual is necessary. The progress of the race, the ever nascent
God, goes on by eternal undeviating laws, and all that occurs, in
fact, is the action of the only God of which this system knows.!
We do not think it right to stain our pages with the indecent rav
ings of those writers who, availing themselves of the principles of
the decent portion of the school, have applied them to the service
of sin. It is enough to show the nature of the system, that the
Pantheist " does not believe in the continued existence of the indi
vidual, in the reality of his freedom, in the deadly nature of sin,
and its opposition to God. Individuals are to him but the phantas-
* Wolfgang Menzel was the editor of a periodical, called the Morgen-Blatt, belong
ing to von Cotta, one of the principal booksellers of Germany. In that Journal,
Menzel attacked, with great manliness and effect, the libertine principles of Heine,
Gutzkow, and other writers of the extreme left of the Pantheistic school.
f Die Geschichte is der werdende Gott, und dies Werden Gottes geschicht nach
ewigen Gesetzen ; nirgends ein Sprung, liberal nur Entwickelung. Hengstenberg, in
Kirchen-Zeitung, January, 1836.

686 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
magoria of the spirit. Liberty is but the subtle moment of deter
mination. Sin is what a man, with his measure of knowledge and
power, cannot avoid : remorse is, therefore, a forbidden emotion
in his system."*
The most offensive aspect of this whole system is, that in deify
ing men, it deifies the worst passions of our nature. " This," says
a writer in Hengstenberg's Journal, "is the true, positive blas
phemy of God, — this veiled blasphemy — this diabolism of the de
ceitful angel of light — this speaking of reckless words, with which
the man of sin sets himself in the temple of God, showing himself
that he is God. The Atheist cannot blaspheme with such power
as this ; his blasphemy is negative ; he simply says there is no
God. It is only out of pantheism that a blasphemy can proceed,
so wild, of such inspired mockery, so devoutly godless, so despe
rate in its love of the world ; a blasphemy at once so seductive,
and so offensive, that it may well call for the destruction of the
world."! As an illustration, at once, of the confidence and character of
these modern pantheists, we shall give one more passage from
Strauss, the most prominent, and, perhaps, most respected writer
of the school : " This disposition is not a secret of the philosophers
only ; as an obscure instinct, it has become the universal spirit of
the age. It is acknowledged, that we no longer know how to
build churches. But on the other hand, from an impulse, which,
as a miasma, has spread, especially over all Germany, monuments
to great men and lofty spirits arise on every side. There is much
that is ridiculous mixed with this feeling ; but it has its serious as
pect, and is assuredly a sign of the times. The Evangelical
Church Journal (Hengstenberg's) has taken the right view of the
matter, when it pronounces accursed, as a new idolatry, the honour
paid to the man on the pillar in the Place Vendome, and to him of
the Weimar Olympus. In fact, they are Gods, before whom the
God of the Church Journal may well tremble ; or, in other words,
a heathenism which endangers its Christianity. If Heine has
compared the accounts of O'Meara, Antommarchi, and Las Cases,
with Matthew, Mark, and Luke, will not some one soon discover
in Bettina's Letters,J a new Gospel of John 1 A new Paganism,
or it may be, a new Catholicism, has come over Protestant Ger
many. Men are no longer satisfied with one incarnation of God:
they desire, after the manner of the Indians, a series of repeated
avatars. They wish to surround the solitary Jesus with a new
circle of saints, only these must not be taken from the church
alone ; but, as in the private chapel of the Emperor Alexander
Severus, the statue of Orpheus stood beside those of Christ and
of Abraham, so the tendency of the age is to honour the revela
tion of God in all the spirits which have wrought, with life and
* Kirchen-Zeitung, 1836, p. 571. t Ibid.
X An enthusiastic girl, who wrote a series of Letters to Goethe, filled with a sort
of raving Platonic love.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 687
creative power, on mankind. The only worship — we may de
plore it, or we may praise it, deny it we cannot — the only worship
which remains for the cultivated classes of this age, from the re
ligious declension of the last, is the worship of genius."*
Such, then, is the latest form of infidelity. It knows no intelli
gent or conscious God but man ; it admits no incarnation, but the
eternal incarnation of the universal spirit in the human race ; the
personality of men ceases with their present existence, they are
but momentary manifestations of the infinite and unending, there
is neither sin nor holiness; neither heaven nor hell. Such are the
results to which the proud philosophy of the nineteenth cen
tury has brought its followers. We have not drawn this picture.
We have purposely presented it as drawn by men, with regard to
whose opportunities and competency there can be no room for cavil.
It might be supposed, that a system so shocking as this, which destroys
all religion and all morality, could be adopted by none but the in
sane or the abandoned ; that it might be left as St. Simonianism,
Owenism, or Mormonism, to die of its own viciousness. This
supposition, however, overlooks the real nature of the system.
We have presented it in its offensive nakedness. It is not thus that
it addresses itself to the uninitiated or timid. What is more offen
sive than Romanism, when stripped of its disguises, yet what more
seductive in its bearing, for the vast majority of men ? There is
everything to facilitate the progress of this new philosophy. It
has a side for all classes of men. For the contemplative and the
sentimentally devout, it has its mysticism, its vagueness, its vast-
ness. It allows them to call wonder, a sense of the sublime or of
the beautiful, religion. For the poet, too, it has its enchantments,
as it gives consciousness and life to everything, and makes ali
things expressive of one infinite, endless mind. For the proud, no
Circe ever mingled half so intoxicating a cup. Ye shall be as
God, said the archtempter of our race : ye are God, is what he
now whispers into willing ears. For the vain and frivolous, it has
charms scarcely to be resisted. It gives them easy greatness.
They have only to talk of the I, and the not I (or, as they prefer
to have it, the me and the not me), and they are beyond the depth
of all ordinary men. And even then, they are, according to the
system, far greater than they can possibly think themselves to be.
For the sensual, it is a perfect heaven. It legitimates and digni
fies all enjoyments. It makes self-indulgence religion. It forbids
all remorse and all fear. That a system so manifold as this, which
* Vergangliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum. Selbst-gesprache Von Dr.
Strauss. In der Zeitschrift : Der Freihafen, Gallerie von Unterhaltungsbildern aus
den Kreisen der Literatur, Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft. Mit Beitriigen von Carus,
Gans, Kdnig, Mises, Barnhagen von Ense, dem Fiirsten von Piickler, Rosenkranz,
Strauss, Theodor Mundt, Kiihne, u. A. Drittes Heft. The names of the contributors
to this Journal, may give some idea of its character. Here we have Gans, Rosen
kranz, Strauss, prominent Hegelian philosophers or theologians, and the libertine
prince of Piickler.

688 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
has a chamber of imagery for every imagination, should find ad
vocates and friends on every hand, is not a matter of surprise.
There is still another circumstance which must be taken into con
sideration in accounting for the rapid progress of this new philoso
phy, and in speculating on its prospects. It has, in some of its
principles, a certain resemblance to the truth. The God of the
Bible is not the God of the Deist, of the rationalist, or of the
worldling, a God afar off, who has no oversight or direction of his
creatures. The world is not a machine wound up and left to itself.
The wonders of vegetable and animal life are not the result of the pro
perties of matter acting blindly and without guidance. The God of
the Bible is an everywhere present, and ever active God, in whom
we live and move and have our being ; it is his Spirit that causes the
grass to grow; it is he that fashions the curious mechanism of our
bodies, who numbers the hairs of our heads, and directs all our
goings. All the changes in nature are produced by his power, so
that everything we see is in truth a manifestation of God. But
then the Bible does not merge God in the world, or the world in
God. Though everywhere present in the world, God is not the
world ; but a Being of infinite intelligence, power, excellence and
blessedness, guiding and controlling his creatures, whose acts and
consciousness are their own and not his. The chasm which di
vides the pantheistic from the scriptural view of God is bottom
less, and the difference in the effects of the two views is infinite ;
it is all the difference between infinite good and infinite evil. If
there is anything impressed clearly on the Bible, it is the person
ality of God ; it is the ease and confidence with which his people
can say Thou, in calling on his name ; it is that he ever says I of
himself, and you, when addressing his creatures.
It is doubtless in a good degree owing to the deceptive show of
truth in this new system — to its pretending to bring back, if we
may reverently so speak, God to the world from which Deists and
Rationalists had so long banished him, that we are to attribute the
hold which it has taken of many of the better sort of minds ; and
it is to this that it owes its most alarming aspect ; since those er
rors are always the most dangerous which can put on the nearest
resemblance to truth. A conflict, therefore, is anticipated by the
Christians of Germany with this new form of infidelity, far more
lasting and deadly than any that has yet afflicted the church in that
country. If rationalism, so unattractive, so lifeless, made such in
roads upon the church, " What," say they, " may be expected from
Pantheism, a system so full of life, of feeling, of mysticism, of
poetry, whose disciples can, with a deceptive show, boast that they
are religious, that they are introducing a new, beautiful and
universal religion, and give themselves out as a new sort of Chris
tians ;" nay, who pretend at times to be real Christians, who say
they believe in the Trinity, in the incarnation, redemption, resur
rection, and all other doctrines of the Bible, that is, they express
some philosophical enigma under these terms ; or at times speak

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 689
of Christianity with affected respect, as good for the people in
their present state, professing with Cousin that " philosophy is pa
tient  happy in seeing the great bulk of mankind in the
arms of Christianity, she offers, with modest kindness, to assist her
in ascending to a yet loftier elevation."*
Strange, therefore, as it may seem, when we look at this system
in its true character, it undoubtedly has already prevailed to a'great
extent in Germany ; and is making some progress in France, Eng
land, and our own country. Its true nature is disguised in obscure
philosophical language, which many use without understanding,
until it comes at last to the expression of their real opinions. We
have evidence enough that this Pantheistic philosophy has set its
cloven foot in America. First we had a set of young men capti
vated by the genius and mysticism of Coleridge, republishing works
through which were scattered intimations more or less plain of the
denial of a personal God. This was the first step. In the writings
of Coleridge the general tone and impression was theistical. He
was an Englishman ; he had received too many of his modes of
thinking and of expressions from the Bible, to allow of his being
a Pantheist, except when musing. Next we had the writings of
Cousin, a man of different cast, with none of Coleridge's solemnity
or reverence. A Frenchman, on whose mind the Bible had left no
strong impress. Vain and presumptuous, and yet timid; intimating
more than he durst utter. As he has given the world nothing in
the form of a system, it is only by these occasional intimations that
his readers can judge how far he adopts the ideas of the German
school, whence all his opinions are borrowed. These intimations,
Tiowever, are sufficiently frequent and sufficiently clear to make it
plain that he is a denier of God and of the Gospel. He uses
almost the very language of the Hegelians in expressing his
views of the nature of God. " God exists as an idea," says the He
gelian ;! " these ideas," i. e., of the infinite, finite, and the rela
tion between them, " are God himself," says Cousin. J According
to the Hegelians, God arrives to consciousness in man ; and so
Cousin teaches, " God returns to himself in the consciousness of
man." The German school teaches that everything that exists is
God in a certain stage of development; so also Cousin, "God is
space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, prin
ciple, end, and centre, at the summit of being and at its lowest de
gree, infinite and finite together, triple in a word, that is to say, at
the same time God, nature, and humanity. In fact, if God is not
everything he is nothing."^ Surely there can be but one opinion
among Christians, about a system which admits of no God but
the universe, which allows no intelligence or consciousness to the
infinite Spirit, but that to which he attains in the human soul, which
* Cousin's Introd. to Hist, of Phil., p. 57. t Marheineke's Dogmatik, § 174.
X Elements of Psychology, p. 400. § Ibid., p. 399.
44

690 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
makes man the highest state of God. And we should think there
could be among the sane but one opinion of the men who, dressed
in gowns and bands, and ministering at God's altars, are endeavour
ing to introduce these blasphemous doctrines into our schools, col
leges and churches. " Ancient chronicles relate," says Leo, " that
there were watchtowers and castles for which no firm foundation
could be obtained, until (by the direction of the practitioners of the
black art) a child was built up in the walls. They made a little
chamber in the foundation, placed within it a table with sugar and
playthings, and while the poor, unconscious little victim was re
joicing over its toys, the grim masons built up the wall." This is
a fable ; or, if true, belongs to a pagan age, and every nerve with
in us trembles, when we think of" this abomination of heathenism.
But are not those who cut the people loose from the more than
thousand years' old foundation of their morality and faith, by teach
ing the rising generation that there is no personal God ; that the
history of his only begotten Son is a cunningly devised fable, which
does indeed, if properly understood, give a good philosophical
sense ; that all subjective consciousness and feeling end with death ;
that the greatest abominations that ever occurred were necessary,
and thus reasonable, and a conscious and wilful opposition to God
is alone evil ; are not these men the most cruel of masons, who im
mure the children of Germany in the walls of the tower of heathen
ideas, in the bastions and watchtowers of the devil, enticing them
within with the sugar toys of their vain philosophy, that they may
perish in the horrors of unsatisfied hunger and thirst after the word
of the Lord ?"*
Shocking as this whole system is, we doubt not it will, to a cer
tain extent, prevail even among us ; and God may bring good out of
the evil. " There are two people," says Hengstenberg, " in the
womb of this age, and only two. They will become constantly
more firmly and decidedly opposed, the one to the other. Unbelief
will more and more exclude what it still has of faith ; and faith,
what it has of unbelief. Unspeakable good will hence arise.
' And the Lord said unto Gideon, By the three hundred men that
lapped, will I save you, and deliver the Midianites into thy hand ;
and let all the other people go, every man unto his own place.' Had
the spirit of the times continued to make concessions, concessions
would have been constantly made to it., But now, since every
concession only renders it more importunate, those who are not
ready to give up everything, will more and more resist, and de
mand back again what they have already yielded. They began
by giving up the first chapter in Genesis as mythological, which
even well-meaning theologians, as Seiler and Muntinghe, thought
of little consequence. Soon, for the supposed greater honour of
the New Testament, they gave up the whole Old Testament his-
* Conclusion of his Hegelingen.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 691
tory as mythological. Scarcely was this point reached, when they
felt themselves under the necessity of giving up the first chapters of
Matthew and Luke, with the sincere assurance that these scruples
about the early history of Jesus did not at all endanger the re
maining portions of his life. Soon, however, besides the beginning,
they gave up the end, the account of the ascension of Christ, as
fabulous. Even here there was no rest. It was not long before
the first three Gospels were yielded to the enemy. They then re
tired on the Gospel of John, and loudly boasted that there they
were safe, not without some secret misgivings, however, that they
lived only by the forbearance of the foe. He has already appear
ed, and availed himself of the same weapons which had already
gained so many victories, and the Gospel of John is now no better
off than the rest. Now, at last, a stand must be taken ; a choice
must be made ; either men must give up everything, or they must
ascend to the point whence they first set out, and through the very
same stations through which they descended. To this they will
not be able, at once, to make up their minds ; they will at first be
lieve that they can escape at a cheaper rate ; but let them twist
and turn as they may, let them use what arts they please, the mat
ter can have no other issue."* This has a special reference to the
state of opinion in Germany. But it is not without its application
to us. There are those in our country, even among the orthodox,
who talk of a mythology of the Hebrews, and others among the
Unitarians, who give up not only the miracles of the Old Testa
ment, but those of the New. All such must either go on or go
back. Professor Norton cannot give up the first chapters of Mat
thew as fabulous, and call him an infidel who gives up the remain
der. This new philosophy will break up the old divisions. It will
carry some on to Atheism, and drive others back to the unmutilated
Bible. This is not the only effect which this new leaven may be expect
ed to produce. As in Germany it has operated to the destruction
of Rationalism, so here it may serve to bring Socinianism and
Taylorism into contempt. Even some Unitarian ministers at Bos
ton, we are told, have already discovered that " the religion of the
day seemed too cold, too lifeless, too mechanical, for many of their
flock."! " There are many, I doubt not," says this same authority,
" who will welcome its principles (i. e., the principles ' of the lead
ing school in modern German theology ') as soon as they are
understood, as the vital, profound, and ennobling theology, which
they have earnestly sought for, but hitherto sought in vain."J If
* Kirchen-Zeitung, January, 1836. We commend the above passage to the special
consideration of Professor Norton.
f Letter to Mr. Norton, p. 12.
X Ibid., p. 149. The above passage must not be understood as referring to the
principles of the school described in the preceding pages. The Alumnus seems to
think that the little set of Schleiermacher's pupils constitute the leading school in
Germany. In this, we think, he is greatly mistaken ; but we do not wish to be un
derstood to represent him as endorsing the doctrines of the Hegelians. He says he
is no Pantheist, though he thinks Pantheism very religious.

692 TRANSCENDENTALISM.
this is so, then farewell to Socinianism, and farewell to Taylorism.
If only for consistency's sake, those who, with this Alumnus, find
in the transcendentalism of Schleiermacher the true philosophy,
must feel or affect the contempt which he felt for the Rationalists
and Pelagians. The ground on which they stand, however, is too
narrow to afford them a footing. Schleiermacher gave up almost
everything, except the incarnation of God in Christ. This was
the centre of his system. Those whom he brought off from Ra
tionalism, have almost all gone on, with the Hegelians, to Atheism,
or turned back to the Bible. And so it will be here. Indeed, the
man who can see no harm in Pantheism, who thinks it a most reli
gious system, and venerates its advocates, as is the case with this
Alumnus, has but one step to take, and he is himself in the abyss.
We should not, therefore, be surprised to see, in the providence of
God, this new philosophy, which is in itself infinitely worse than
Socinianism or Deism, made the means of breaking up those dead
ening forms of error, and while it leads many to destruction, of
driving others back to the fountain of life.
Though, for the reasons stated above, we think it not unlikely
that this system will make a certain degree of progress in our
country, we have no fear of its ever prevailing either here or in
England, as it does in Germany. Apart from the power of true
religion, which is our only real safeguard against the most extra
vagant forms of error, there are two obstacles to the prevalence
of these doctrines among Englishmen or their descendants. They
do not suit our national character. A sanity of intellect, an inca
pacity to see wonders in nonsense, is the leading trait of the Eng
lish mind. The Germans can believe anything. Animal magnetism
is for them as one of the exact sciences. What suits the Germans,
therefore, does not suit us. Hence almost all those who, in Eng
land or in this country, have professed transcendentalism, have
made themselves ridiculous. If it were not for its exorbitant profane-
ness, what could be more ludicrous than Mr. Emerson's Address ?
He tells us that religious sentiment is myrrh, and storax, and chlo
rine, and rosemary ; that the time is coming when the law of gra
vitation and purity of heart will be seen to be identical, that man
has an infinite soul, &c. It will not cfo. Such men were never
made for transcendentahsts. This is not meant in disparagement of
those gentlemen. It is a real compliment to them, though not
exactly to their wisdom. Coleridge is the only Englishman whom
we know anything about, who took the system naturally. To him
it was truth ; he was a mystic ; he had faith in what he said, for
his words were to him the symbols of his own thoughts. It is
not so with others. They repeat a difficult lesson by rote, striving
hard all the while not to forget.
It is not, however, only or chiefly on this want of adaptation of
the German mysticism to the sane English mind, that we would
rely to counteract the new philosophy ; it is the influence of the
Bible on all our modes of thinking. We believe in God the Father,

TRANSCENDENTALISM. 693
the maker of heaven and earth. We must have a God who can
hear prayer. In Germany, the educated classes, little in the habit
of attending church, have for generations felt comparatively little
of the power of the Bible. There was no settled idea of a per
sonal God, such as is visible in every page of the scriptures, en
graven on their hearts. They were, therefore, prepared for specu
lations which destroyed his very nature, and were content with a
blind instinctive power, productive of all changes, and struggling
at last into intelligence in the human race. Such a God may do
for a people who have been first steeped in infidelity for genera
tions ; but not for those who have been taught, with their first
lispings, to say, Our Father who art in heaven. The grand danger
is, that this deadly poison will be introduced under false labels ;
that this Atheism, enveloped in the scarcely intelligible formulas of
the new philosophy, may be regarded as profound wisdom, and
thus pass from mouth to mouth without being understood, until it
becomes familiar and accredited. We feel it to be a solemn duty
to warn our readers, and in our measure, the public, against this
German Atheism, which the spirit of darkness is employing minis
ters of the Gospel to smuggle in among us under false pretences.
No one will deny that the Hegelian doctrines, as exhibited above,
are Atheism in its worst form ; and all who will read the works of
Cousin may soon satisfy themselves that his system, as far as he
has a system, is, as to the main point, identical with that of Hegel.

ESSAY XXIII.
ON CAUSE AND EFFECT.*

The late Dr. Brown, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the Uni
versity of Edinburgh, some years ago, published a book entitled
" Cause and Effect," in which he revived and defended the opinion
of Mr. Hume, on the subject of power. It is due, however, to the
ingenious author, to state that he distinctly disavowed Hume's
sceptical inferences from this doctrine.
The same opinions, and the same reasonings in support of them,
are exhibited in his lectures on the philosophy of the mind, a more
recent publication. And as the philosophy of Dr. Brown has
many admirers in this country, and has received unqualified re
commendations from high authority, it will not, we trust, appear
unreasonable or unnecessary, even at this late period, to bring his
theory to the test of a fair examination ; this is the object of the
present article.
The opinion of Dr. B., to which we have referred, is, that in phi
losophical accuracy there is no such thing as causation or power ;
that immediate invariable antecedence is all that properly enters
into the idea of a cause, and immediate invariable consequence
the true idea of effect ; and, accordingly, that power is nothing
else but the relation between an immediate invariable antecedent
and consequent. In plain English, his opinion is that there is no
such thing in nature as power : and that when we mean anything
more by this word, than merely to express the invariable antece
dence of one thing to another, we speak inaccurately and unphilo-
sophically. The words cause, causation, power, energy, efficacy,
&c, express nothing, according to his theory, that is intelligible, be
sides the mere relation of antecedence and sequence.
It is admitted, however, by Dr. B. that almost the whole human
race have annexed to these terms, or those which correspond with
them in their respective languages, ideas different from what he
considers correct. The structure of all languages furnishes irre
fragable proof of this fact. The notion of action, causation, ener
gy, &c, is so common among men, that children and savages
entertain it as familiarly as any others. It is an idea which is
contained in every active verb, and no man can divest himself of
* Published in 1829.

ON CAUSE AND EFFECT. 695
it or speak half a dozen sentences without using words which
plainly convey this meaning. This fact is so manifest, that the
ingenious author does not call it in question. He admits that the
opinion which he maintains is contrary " to the almost universal
sense of mankind." Now such a general consent is commonly,
and we think justly, considered as a strong proof that the idea or
sentiment, in which men so agree, is founded in nature, and ac
cordant with truth. It must be strong reasoning, indeed, which
shall demonstrate that an opinion entertained by men of all nations,
however different in language, in manners, in education, in govern
ment, and religion, is false. If this could be done, then all differ
ence between truth and prejudice would be obliterated. To estab
lish the certainty of the existence of power or causation, the
argument derived from universal consent appears to us to be irre
sistible ; for we cannot suppose that all men of all nations, from
early childhood to hoary age, could be led to adopt an opinion which
had no foundation, without admitting the absurd consequence, that
all men are so constituted that they are by necessity led to embrace
error instead of truth. And this supposition would not answer the
purpose of Dr. Brown, as it would render it impossible for him to
establish any opinion as true ; for that constitution of human na
ture which leads men invariably astray, in one case, ought to be
suspected in all. The true principles of philosophizing should have
led to a directly opposite course of reasoning. He should have
assumed the fact, that all men possessed of reason entertain from
their earliest years the opinion that there is such a thing as power
or causation ; and this idea being incorporated inseparably with
every language in the world, it is a just conclusion that this is one
of those common notices, or self-evident truths, which, from the
very constitution of our nature, we are under the necessity of re
ceiving. Let any man attempt to form a language from which all
idea of active energy or causation shall be excluded, and he will
soon find that this is no vulgar prejudice, but a fundamental truth;
an idea, which, if it were removed from the human mind, would
leave a vast chasm in all our reasonings and systems of truth, in
every branch of science. If a people should ever be discovered
who used a language which did not involve, in every sentence, the
conception of power and causation, this single fact would go fur
ther to prove them to be of another species, than all the diversities
which have hitherto been observed among the nations of the earth.
But let us see how Dr. B. disposes of this acknowledged fact, of
the almost universal existence of the idea of power. He attempts
to show that there are analogous cases in which prejudices have,
for a long time, had an almost universal prevalence. The instance
which he adduces, and to which he often recurs, is the notion of a
certain something existing with all bodies, which the schoolmen,
after Aristotle, called form, or substantial forms. This notion, it
may be admitted, was as extensive, and existed as long, as the
Aristotelian logic prevailed. But the case is nowise parallel to

696 ON CAUSE AND EFFECT.
the one under consideration. The opinion respecting substantial
forms belonged to'a peculiar system of philosophy, and as long as
that system maintained its ground would, of course,, be enter
tained ; but it was never the opinion of the great body of the peo
ple. The mass of mankind never heard of such an opinion ; and
even in those countries where it was held, it was merely the
opinion of the learned. The common people, then, knew as little
and believed as little about substantial forms as they do now. The
idea is not incorporated, as is the case in regard to power, with all
languages. It is not common to children and adults, savages and
philosophers. The case adduced, therefore, does not serve to ac
count for the fact of the universal consent of mankind in receiving
this opinion. But it is time to attend to the proofs which Dr. B.
offers in support of his theory ; and that we may do no injustice to
his meaning, we will give them in his own words : — The first is,
" That we have, in fact, no other idea in our mind, when we speak
of cause and effect, than an invariable antecedence and conse
quence." " Thus, when a spark falls on gunpowder and kindles
it into explosure, every one ascribes to the spark the power of en
kindling the inflammables. But let any one ask himself what it
is which he means by the term, and without contenting himself with
a few phrases which signify nothing, — reflect before he gives his
answer, and he will find that he means nothing more than this, in
all similar circumstances the explosion of gunpowder will be the
immediate consequence of the application of a spark. To take
an example more immediately connected with our own science, we
all know that as soon as any one in the usual circumstances of health
and freedom wills to move his arm the motion of his arm follows,
and we believe that in the same circumstances of health and free
dom, the motion of the arm will constantly follow the will to move
it. If we knew and believed nothing more than that the motion of
the arm would uniformly follow the will to move it, would our
knowledge of the phenomenon be less perfect ?" " Let us suppose
ourselves then to know all the antecedents and consequents in na
ture, and to believe, not merely that they have once or repeatedly
existed in connexion, but that they have uniformly done so, and
will continue for ever to recur in a similar series ; so that but for
the intervention of the divine will (which would be itself, in that
case, a new antecedent), it will be impossible for any of the ante
cedents to exist again without being immediately followed by its
original consequent"
Again : " To him who had previously kindled a fire, and placed
on it a vessel full of water, with a certainty that in that situation
the water would speedily become hot, what additional information
would be given by telling him that the fire had the power of
boiling water ?" " It is only by confounding casual with uniform
and invariable antecedence, that power can be conceived to be
something different from antecedence." " Such is the simple and,
as it appears to me, only intelligible view of power, as discovera-

ON CAUSE AND EFFECT. 697
ble in the successive phenomena of nature, and how very different
from this simple view is the common, or, I may almost say, the
universal notion of the agencies which are supposed to be con
cerned in the phenomena which are the objects of philosophical
inquiry." " To me it appears indeed so obvious a truth, that the
substances which exist in nature — the world, its living inhabitants
and their adorable Creator, are all the real existences in nature,
and that in the various changes which occur, there can as little
be any powers or susceptibilities different from the antecedents and
consequences themselves, as there can be forms differing from the
co-existing particles of matter which constitute them."
The author feeling, however, that it was incumbent on him to
account more fully for the fallacy which he supposes to exist
almost universally in regard to the nature of a cause, attributes it
to " abstraction aided and perpetuated by the use of language."
But the principal cause to which he ascribes this universal preju
dice is, " the imperfection of the senses." " We are frequently,"
he observes, " incapable of perceiving the immediate antecedent
to a consequent, and are, therefore, in danger of connecting it with
a wrong antecedent ; by this means we are led to inquire after the
true causes of things, that is, after their real and immediate ante
cedents." " As our senses are at present constituted, they are too
imperfect to enable us to distinguish all the elements that co-exist
in bodies ; and of elements which are themselves unknown to us,
the minute changes which take place in them must of course
be unknown." " And since it is only between immediate antece
dents and consequents that we suppose any permanent and inva
riable relation, we are, therefore, constantly on the watch to detect
in the more obvious changes that appear to us in nature some of
those minuter elementary changes which we suspect to intervene."
" He who for the first time listens to the delightful sound of a vio
lin, if he be ignorant of the theory of sound, will very naturally
suppose that the touch of the strings by the bow is the cause of
the melody which he hears. He learns, however, that this pri
mary impulse would be of little effect were it not for the vibrations
excited by the violin itself; and another discovery still more im
portant shows him that the vibration of the instrument would be
of no effect were it not for the elastic medium interposed between
his ear and it. It is no longer to the violin, therefore, that he looks
as the direct cause of the sensation of sound, but to the vibrating
air ; nor will even this be long considered as the cause, if he turns
his attention to the structure of the organ of hearing. He will
then trace effect after effect, through a long series of complex and
very wonderful parts, till he arrives at the auditory nerve, and the
whole mass of the brain." " The expectation of discovering some
thing intermediate and unknown between all known events is easily
convertible into the common notion of power, as a secret and in
visible tie."
In the conclusion of his lecture on Cause and Effect, Dr. fB.

698 ON CAUSE AND EFFECT.
inquires how this notion will correspond with our idea of the effi
ciency of the great Creator, in the production of the universe; and
seems to find no difficulty here. The divine will, he makes the
grand antecedent of those glorious effects which the universe dis
plays. " The power of God is not anything different from God ;
but is the Almighty himself willing whatever seems to him good."
" We do not see any third circumstance existing intermediately
and binding, as it were, the will of the omnipotent Creator to the
things which are to be ; we conceive only the divine will itself, as
if made visible to our imagination, and all nature at the very
moment rising around. It is evident, that in the case of the divine
agency, as well as in every other instance of causation, the intro
duction of any other circumstance as a bond of closer connexion,
would only furnish a new phenomenon to be itself connected."
" God speaks and it is done ; we imagine nothing intermediate."
Thus, we have endeavoured to present a fair view of Dr. Brown's
theory, and with the explanations and reasons by which he endea
vours to support it. We shall now make some remarks on the
several particulars which have been brought into view, intended
to show the unreasonableness and dangerous tendency of his
doctrine. 1. It will be admitted that Dr. Brown has been successful in
proving, by an elaborate analysis, in his treatise on Cause and
Effect, that we have no direct conceptions of anything else but the
antecedents and consequents, in those series of events which take
place within us, or without us. It is true, that in no case we are
able to form any distinct conception of the operation of any cause ;
we see the antecedent, and we see the consequent, but how the
latter is effected by the former we perceive not. If Dr. Brown
had contented himself with drawing the conclusion (which is the
only one that, from the premises, he had a right to draw), that we
are capable of forming no distinct idea of the nature of causation,
we should have acquiesced in his reasoning. But, are there not
many things which we certainly know to exist, of which our ideas
are merely relative ? This is true of every substance. We can
form a direct conception only of the properties, not of the sub
stance itself. We are, nevertheless, led by the constitution of our
nature to believe that there is a subject, or substratum, in which
these properties inhere, and to which they belong. The same may
be observed respecting dispositions or principles of action. Now,
our persuasion, that there is such a thing as causation, is as uniform
and as irresistible as the belief of material and immaterial sub
stances. It is one of the clearest and most universally experienced
convictions of the human understanding. We see an effect, and
immediately we believe that some sort of energy has been excited
in its production. A million of men will all have the same feeling
— there must be a cause. But Dr. Brown asserts that this idea of
efficiency or energy is a mere illusion, and that it is not necessary
to assign any other cause, than merely to ascertain what circum-

ON CAUSE AND EFFECT. 699
stance invariably precedes the event. Which shall we believe to
be correct, the million or the one ? i
2. There seems to be some inconsistency in Dr. Brown's state
ment of the facts connected with this subject. On the one hand
he admits that the common opinion, indeed, the almost universal
opinion of men, is different from what he believes to be the true
philosophical opinion ; and yet, he seems to say, that if we would
carefully attend to the conception which we have of power, we
should find that it includes nothing but simple antecedence. " Let
any one," says he in a passage already quoted, " ask himself what
it is which he means by the term, and he will find that he means
nothing more than that, in all similar circumstances, the explosion
of gunpowder will be the immediate and uniform consequence of
the application of a spark." From this it should seem, that after all,
the ideas of men respecting power are not so erroneous as has
been represented ; that when they think of a cause, they do, in fact,
think of nothing but an invariable immediate antecedent. If this
is correct, we cannot but think that the laborious investigation of
the author was useless. But how, in consistence with this, can it
be maintained that men are almost universally in a fallacy on this
point ? Indeed, if the theory of Dr. B. is correct, it will be found
extremely difficult to account for the origin of the notion of power
" or agency. How such a conception should enter the mind of man
is incomprehensible.3. Dr. Brown attributes this illusion of men to " abstraction,
aided and perpetuated by the use of language, and the unavoida
ble modes of grammatical construction." But how abstraction
should be the cause of error in men who are very little in the habit
of forming abstract ideas, and how it should produce a uniformly
erroneous effect in men of every nation and condition, is a problem
not easily solved. Neither is it manifest how this error could be
" aided and perpetuated by the use of language, and the unavoida
ble modes of grammatical construction." Language receives its
structure and its forms from ideas already existing, and from the
modes of thinking which are common to all men, or peculiar to
some one nation. It is certainly no very natural process to adopt
such modes of speech as have no modes of thought corresponding
with them ; and then, to suppose that these modes of speech should
generate the ideas which they represent. What the ingenious
author advances in illustration of his opinions on this point, is far
from possessing that clearness and precision which usually attend
him, in his attempts at elucidating an obscure subject.
4. But the principal reason assigned by Dr. Brown for the
general illusion on the subject of cause and effect, is " the imper
fection of our senses." How the ingenious author applies this to
the subject, we have already seen. But it amounts to no more
than this, that from our ignorance of the true nature of things we
are often led to ascribe effects to the wrong causes, and knowing
our liableness to error on this ground, when two things appear

700 ON CAUSE AND EFFECT.
related, as cause and effect, or as an immediate antecedent and
consequent, we suspect that they are not so related, but that there
is still something not discovered, which is intermediate, and thus,
by searching for these invisible, intermediate links in the concate
nation of events, we come, by association, to imagine a mysterious
connexion between the antecedents and consequents ; that is, we
come at length to suppose that one thing exerts an efficacy to pro
duce what follows. The analysis of the process of the mind in
seeking after the true causes of phenomena, given by the author,
may be admitted ; but it casts no light on the main point in ques
tion. As to the principle so universally received, that there must
be a cause for every effect, it has no dependence on our knowledge
of the true cause. Our conviction is equally firm, that there must
be an exertion of power, where an effect is produced, when we see
no cause, as when we certainly know what it is. We may be
lieve that, in most cases, we are ignorant of the real efficient
causes of events ; or we may be in doubt, of a number of apparent
causes, which is the real one ; but this has no effect on our con
viction, that there is a real efficient cause somewhere. Philo
sophers may dispute whether the effects, apparently produced by
the agency of material causes, are not rather to be attributed to
some spiritual agency, either of the first cause, operating through
all nature, or of subordinate agents under his control ; but they all
agree that these effects must have an adequate cause. When I
will to move my arm, it may be disputed whether the effect is pro
duced by my volition, or by some other cause acting harmoniously
with my will, but it can never be disputed that the motion of my
arm has a real, efficient cause, whatever it may be. So when I
observe that my thoughts follow each other in a certain order, and
that thoughts of a certain kind are invariably followed by certain
other thoughts, it may be matter of dispute whether the antecedent
thought or desire is the real cause of that which follows. The
affirmative, however probable, is not capable of demonstration ;
for it is possible that this effect may be produced by some supe
rior and invisible agent. But while, in all these cases, we may-
doubt about the real cause, even when we are certain of the imme
diate and invariable antecedent of one thing to another, yet we
never doubt whether there does not exist a cause of the effect pro
duced. This conviction is one which attends us everywhere, and
of which we can no more divest ourselves than of the conscious
ness of existence. It is one of those intuitive, self-evident truths,
which cannot be rendered clearer or more certain by any reason
ing. In fact, all reasoning is built upon it, as on its most solid
foundation ; and if it were possible to dislodge it from the minds
of men (which it is not), all reasoning and all human exertions
would cease.
5. But not to rest merely on the defensive, we would next re
mark that immediate, invariable antecedence does not, in many
cases, give us the idea of a cause. There are innumerable in-

ON CAUSE AND EFFECT. 701
stances of immediate invariable antecedence, in which we never
think of ascribing causation to the antecedents. From the moment
of our birth, the pulsations of the Heart succeed each other imme
diately and invariably, but we do not, therefore, consider one pul
sation as the true cause of the next succeeding one. One portion
of duration immediately and invariably succeeds another, but who
ever thought that one moment was the cause of the one following?
When the electricity of the clouds strikes an object, light is uni
formly emitted, but we do not consider light to be the cause of the
effects produced. We are accustomed to distinguish between a
sign and cause, although the former may be as immediate and
invariable as the latter.
6. According to Dr. Brown's theory, there is no need that there
should be any proportion between the cause and effect ; for if an
tecedence be all that is included in the idea of a cause, it is evi
dent that the most important event may be conceived to have, as
its antecedent, the most trivial thing in the universe. Thus the
*song of the sky-lark, if it only had immediate, invariable antece
dence, might be the cause of the rising of the sun ; and the chirp
ing of the sparrow, of the revolution of the planets.
7. Again, upon this theory, all reasoning from the nature of an
effect to the character of the cause, and from the nature of the
cause to the character of the effect, must be vain. For it matters
not what be the nature of the cause or effect, provided only there
be immediate invariable antecedence and consequence.
All arguments, therefore, for the existence of an intelligent first
cause, derived from a consideration of the appearances of design
in the universe, must, on this theory, be perfectly futile. All we
want, to account for anything, however great, or good, or wise, is,
that something, it matters not what, should precede it immediately,
and invariably. Indeed, we see not why nothing may not, upon
these principles, be the cause of all things, as well as a self-existent
Deity ; for as there is no efficiency or energy in a cause, all the
requisites of the most potent cause may be found in nothing, as
well as in something which has real existence. It is due to the
ingenious author to say, that he appears to entertain exalted con
ceptions of the great Creator, and rejects every idea of Atheism.
This, however, does not alter the nature and tendency of his the
ory, which must be judged on its own merits. When the author
speaks, as we have seen he does, of all things springing into exist
ence from the mere will of God, the sentiment is just and noble ;
but in this case we do not exclude the idea of energy, power, and
efficiency ; we conceive that God is so perfect that the mere act
of his will includes in it all energy. It is the supreme efficiency.
But if you view it merely as an antecedent, anything else conceiv
able might, be the cause of all things as well. Why must the di
vine will be the antecedent to the existence of the universe, if
there be no efficiency — if there be no such thing as real causation?
8. When the ingenious author makes the whole of a cause, in

702 ON CAUSE AND EFFECT.
every case, to consist in immediate and invariable antecedence, it
seems that all idea of contact, contiguity in place, or the immediate
presence of the antecedent with the consequent, is excluded. Con
nexion in time seems to be the only thing necessary, according to
this theory. Therefore, the causes of events may be at an infinite
distance. If an occurrence in the planet Saturn should uniformly
precede an event on this earth, it would therefore be its cause.
9. But again, an effect may have more invariable antecedents
than one ; and which then is the true cause ? According to the
theory under consideration, both. Thus we may have many
causes of the same effect, which would introduce perfect confusion
into every department of philosophy.
10. It does not appear, according to the theory under consider
ation, what we are to think of those things which occur very often,
as antecedents and consequents, and yet not invariably ; or rather
it does not appear, why these do not partake, in proportion to their
frequency of connexion, of the nature of cause and effect. Sup
pose one thing to precede another nine hundred and ninety-nine
times, and then fail once, and so on, why is this antecedence to be
excluded entirely from the class of causes ? We see no good rea
son for it. Indeed, it is not made evident by the author, why the
succession must be invariable, to constitute a cause. As antece- •
dence in time is the whole idea of power, it would seem to be
more reasonable to consider everything a cause when it happened
to precede another, whether its antecedence were invariable or
casual. 11. Moreover, if invariable attendance is necessary to constitute
a cause, then those effects which occur but once have no cause ;
and all effects, when they first existed, were without cause ; or
must have been so considered by an intelligent spectator. For al
though he might observe that something immediately preceded the
effect, it could not be known whether the connexion between the
antecedent and consequent was casual or invariable. And it is the
confounding these two things, to which Dr. Brown attributes a
great part of our errors on this subject. Indeed, if invariable as
well as immediate antecedence be necessary to the idea of a cause,
it is manifest that long experience was requisite, before men could
judge anything respecting cause and effect. And after all, our ob
servation is confined within so narrow bounds, that we are little
capable of determining whether the connexion of things which we
see in any case is absolutely invariable. And .what judgment
could we form, on these principles, of a miraculous event ? For
in this, the effect is contrary to those which usually follow from
such antecedents as we perceive to exist. If a miracle can occur
on Dr. Brown's principles, can it be of use to establish any doc
trine? Suppose a manifest miracle to occur before our eyes ; the
question will be, to what cause must it be attributed ? According to
the old doctrine of cause and effect, the answer is, to the power of
God, because nothing else can produce such a work. But if there

ON CAUSE AND EFFECT. 703
be no such thing as power, we can draw no such inference. As it
has no invariable antecedent, it can have no cause ; or as mere an
tecedence is the only idea of a cause, it may have been produced
by any cause, it matters not what, provided only it preceded the
miracle. And we come to the same conclusion, if an inquiry be
made respecting the cause of the existence of the world. The
event being single it could have no invariable antecedent ; but
supposing, as Dr. Brown evidently does, that there are some cases
in which mere antecedence is all that is necessary in a cause, the
other consequence presses upon us, that any preceding thing, or
even nothing, as was shown before, may be the cause of the uni
verse. It is in vain that the philosopher talks sublimely of the will
of God being the antecedent, for it is impossible for him to demon
strate upon his principles, that any such antecedent is necessary to
the existence of the universe. For if he should insist that no
other antecedent is adequate to such a work of magnificence, he
immediately abandons his main, and favourite principle, viz., that
mere antecedence is cause, and mere consequence effect. If the
wisdom and will of God, as the author everywhere admits, are
necessary, as the antecedent or cause of the universe, then there
must be something in a cause besides mere immediate invariable
antecedence. There must be something in the cause proportioned
to the effect produced. In short, where marks of intelligence are
manifest in the effect, there must be wisdom as well as power in
the cause. And this brings us back to the old common-sense doc
trine of cause and effect, in departing from which there is nothing
to be gained but much to be lost.
12. Finally, if power be nothing, and causation be mere antece
dence, we do not perceive how we shall be able to maintain the
accountableness of man, or any other moral agent, for his actions.
According to his theory, all actions are separate, independent
events, which have no relation whatever to one another, except
that of antecedence and consequence. We do not see, therefore,
on wha,t point we can fix man's responsibility. If we, this moment,
have a will to do a good action the next moment, and if that good
action should follow invariably this volition, still, according to the
theory, the volition had no influence in the production of the con
sequent good action. They are both links in a chain which cannot
be broken ; or rather fixed points in a succession, which have no
other dependence on one another, or relation to each other, than
this, that in the succession, certain points stand next in order to
certain other points. Thus necessity, in its most forbidding form,
is established ; and human power, liberty, and responsibility, are
subverted. We know, indeed, that Dr. Brown and his followers
do not admit these to be legitimate inferences from their doctrine,
and of course we do not charge such opinions upon them. But
as they appear to us to be just deductions, it is fair to bring them
forward as arguments against a system, which appears to us
fraught with danger to sound philosophy. Nothing has tended

704 ON CAUSE AND EFFECT.
so much to bring mental philosophy into disrepute, as the para
doxical and extravagant opinions of some ingenious men, who
in their reasonings have too much lost sight of first principles, and
have trusted too much to abstruse speculations. In no science are
sobriety of mind and soundness of judgment more requisite, than
in the philosophy of the mind.
It is a pleasing reflection, that such is our constitution, that opi
nions subversive of the first principles of truth can never prevail
to any great extent. Our safety from errors of the most enormous
kind consists in the impossibility of adopting them. Men may,
indeed, by pursuing a course of intricate and sophistical reason
ing, come to conclusions, which are repugnant to those truths
which are primary and self-evident ; and while the mind is intent
on its own reasoning, there may be an assent to these absurd con
clusions ; and in writing, and discourse, they may be defended with
much pertinacity and ingenuity, but in common life, where philoso
phical principles are lost sight of, the sceptic thinks, and believes, and
acts like other men. To common people, who are guided entirely
by plain, evident truth, these sceptical opinions of philosophers al
ways appear not only paradoxical, but nonsensical, and they feel
no inclination to adopt them ; so that there is no danger of their
spreading very extensively. But false opinions of this sort are
nevertheless attended with much injury. Young men, who have
learned that many opinions which they acquired in the nursery, or
in their narrow domestic circle, are mere prejudices of education,
are prone to suspect everything which they have been taught, and
have been accustomed to receive as true. When we perceive that
many notions which were long considered undoubted truths, are
proved by the light of philosophy to be altogether unfounded, we
naturally incline to be sceptical about everything. And this is not
all. When the darkness of ignorance and prejudice begins to be
scattered by the increasing lights of science and philosophy, pride
of learning is apt to spring up ; and a desire to appear superior to
the vulgar leads many to embrace and cherish opinions which dif
fer widely from the common belief. Because, in some things, they
have seen that vulgar opinions are false, they too hastily conclude
that the more any opinion differs from that commonly received, the
more certain it is ; and by professing it, that their superior wis
dom is rendered more manifest. Now, the theories of ingenious
sceptical philosophers find in such minds a soil in which they rea
dily take root. Thus, Hume by his metaphysical subtleties, the
tendency of which is often to render all things uncertain, has be
wildered and perverted the minds of many aspiring youth. And
although we would by no means put Dr. Brown in the same class
as Mr. Hume, for he appears always ingenuous, and friendly to
religion, yet we think it is manifest that he had been too conver
sant with Hume's philosophy. He was probably carried away,
before his judgment was mature, with admiration of the writings
of this fascinating sceptic. And while his good principles led him

ON CAUSE AND EFFECT. 705
to reject Hume's atheistical opinions, he endeavoured to retain and
support some of the most dangerous of his philosophical theories.
What will be the effect of the publication of Dr. Brown's philo
sophy, in this country, it is not easy to foretell. Attention to this
department of science is yet confined to a comparatively small
number, even of our reading population. But the taste for meta
physical inquiries is increasing, and no writer is likely to attract
more readers than Dr. Brown, as he contrives, by the peculiar
buoyancy of his mind, and by the elegance and frequency of his
classical allusions, to spread a charm over a subject, commonly
considered the least capable of beingrendered amusing. There is also
so much that is original and accurate, in his Lectures ; there are so
much distinct and perspicuous analysis, and so much elegant descrip
tion, and so much superiority to the authority and influence of for
mer systems, and of great names, that it is much to be regretted,
that in a few points of fundamental importance he has adopted and
inculcated opinions so absurd and dangerous. That his theories
have, in some instances, operated unfavourably on young men of
ardent minds, we know to be a fact : but in our opinion, the right
way to prevent the bad consequences of such books, is not to pro
hibit the reading of them, but to answer them, and to lead young
men to peruse them with caution, and at the proper time.

THE END.

CHEAP RELIGIOUS PUBLICATION SCHEME.

WORKS OF THE ENGLISH PURITAN DIVINES,
Beautifully printed in 12mo., and handsomely bound in cloth.
Each of the Volumes will contain about 350 pages, and one will be published every three months.
Subscribers to the first four Volumes will receive them for $1 50, payable in advance. The
price to Non-subscribers will be 50 cts. each volume.
The Volumes will be enriched with Biographical Sketches of the Authors, and Notices upon
the character of their works by the following and other distinguished writers : —

Rev. Hugh Campbell, London,
Rev. Jamis Hamilton, London,
Rev. J. Angell James, Birmingham,
Rev. T. W. Jenkyn, D.D., London,
Rev. W. Cunningham, D.D., Edinburgh,
Rev. R. W. Hamilton, LL.D., D.D., Leeds,

Rev. H. Cooke, D.D., LL.D., Belfast,
Rev. W. Urwick, D.D., Dublin,
Rev. W. Symington, D.D., Glasgow,
Rev. G. Redford, LL.D., Worcester,
Rev. W. H. Stowell, Rotherham,
Rev. John Harris, Cheshunt.

The design contemplated in the present Scheme is to bring within the reach of all classes
of the religious public the invaluable writings of the English Puritan Divines ; and
while the series will comprise works by well known authors, such as Howe, Baxter, Bunyan,
Charnock, &c, many others will be printed now in a great measure unknown. Every work will
be printed without abridgment.
The first Volume will consist of various Works from the Writings of John Bunyan, with Life
of the Author, by the Rev. James Hamilton, London.
A SPECIMEN VOLUME MAY BE SEEN IN A FEW DAYS
AT ALL THE BOOKSELLERS,
and Subscribers' names received. Any Bookseller who has not yet had a Specimen Volume,
will obtain one on application to the Publishers.
Ministers, Sabbath School Teachers, and others who take an interest in the circulation of
Religious Works, are respectfully requested to make known this
CHEAP RELIGIOUS PUBLICATION SCHEME,
which brings within the reach of every one a Series of Works, which for richness and, copious
ness in Scriptural and Practical Divinity stand unrivalled in the English Language. When
there are at work throughout the land so many influences which go far to shake_and unsettle the
principles of men, the revival of these works may contribute much to restore a more vigorous
and sound Christianity. There is, for example, a superstitious doting after the relics and sym
bols of ancient pietism, with its consecrated forms and ascetic life; and, where there is a better
religious spirit, there is often a vagueness in statements of religious doctrine and duty, character
ized by perverted or indefinite views of the Gospel system, and all equally opposed to the solid
theology, the manly devotion, and the active and healthy piety of our ancestors. It cannot be
doubted, that when error is so ingenious in its ways of perverting the public mind, one of the best
correctives and preservatives is to be found in the revival of the thoughts and spirit of those
times,— so memorable in their opposition to false doctrines and systems, and their advancement of
the cause of truth and godliness.
03= So Veil has this new undertaking been received in England, that before the first volume
was ready, the Publisher had obtained seventy thousand subscribers !
WILEY & PUTNAM, Publishers, 161 Broadway, N. Y.

WILEY AND PUTNAM'S ADVERTISEMENT.

JUNKIN, ON THE OATH.
The Oath a Divine Ordinance, and an Element of the Social Constitution :
its Origin, Nature, Ends, Efficacy, Lawfulness, Obligations, Interpreta
tion, Form and Abuses. By Rev. D. X. Junkin, A.M. One neat vol.,
12mo., well printed. Price 63 cents.
Contents.— Chap. 1. Introduction — the Importance of the Subject. 2. In
the Holy Scriptures only are found the Elementary Principles of Law, and
of Right Social Organization — The Provisions made in the Bible for Social
Government. 3. The Origin of Oaths — Is it Divine or Human ? 4. Nature,
End, and Efficacy of Oaths. 5. The Efficacy of the Oath, or how does it
accomplish its Ends .' 6. Lawfulness and Expediency of Oaths. 7. Objec
tions to the Lawfulness of Oaths Answered. 8. Obligation of the Oath. 9.
Different kinds of Oaths, and the Interpretation of them. 10. The Form of
the Oath. 11. The same Subject continued. 12. Abuses of the Oath. 13
To the Reader.
" This work is worthy of special notice for the importance of its subject,
the relevancy of its matter, and the closeness of its reasoning." — Church
man. " This title presents a wide field for discussion, but we think the reader
will not, after a perusal, be disposed to say that the promise is larger than
the performance. Indeed we regard the volume as not only containing
much valuable and curious matter, but as presenting a good specimen of
thorough discussion. Its views are well fortified and its conclusions highly
important, especially at a time when the nature and obligations of an oath
are so sadly misunderstood and disregarded. We wish every one who ad
ministers or takes an oath would read and inwardly digest its contents.
The work deserves and should meet with success." — Presbyterian.
" This is a most elaborate treatise."— Prot. Churchman.
" A calm and elaborate discussion of the origin, lawfulness and importance
of oaths, evidently the result of thoughtful inquiry and deep reverence for the
word of God. The author has exhibited learning, sound discretion, and a
thorough love of order and good government, and succeeded in placing his
subject in a light which will forcibly commend itself to the reader's con
science and understanding. If we had space, we would gladly set forth its
value by an analysis of the work ; but the reader will be surprised to find
that so much interest could be thrown into the subject. At a time like the
present, we are inclined to place a high estimate upon everything that
strengthens the sense of obligation, and establishes the foundations of civil
order and social security." — JV. Y. Evangelist.
" The very solemn and vast importance of the subject discussed in this
?olume commends it to attention. We agree with the author that ' the
oath' has been prostituted till it has lost much of its force, and that it has
far less weight on the consciences of men than it should have. He takes
ground that it is proper to make oath in courts of justice, and this position
he defends with ability and research. The treatise is well written and its
views entitled to serious consideration." — JV. Y. Observer.

xxvi WILEY AND PUTNAM'S ADVERTISEMENT.
XXVI.
SELECTIONS FROM TAYLOR, BARROW,
SOUTH, FULLER, &C.
By Basil Montagu. 50 cents.
" This is a very valuable book. The selections are made with such taste
that every page is precious. We thank the compiler for it, and the publish
ers for adding it to their series." — JV. Y. Observer.
" This is No. XXVI. of ' The Library of Choice Reading.' It consists of
some of the finest passages of the old authors, and is worthy of a place in
any library." — Christian Intelligencer.
"We cannot too highly recommend to our readers this excellent work.
It is composed of and entitled ' Selections from Taylor, Barrow, South,
Fuller,' &c. ; and this fact is sufficient to recommend it as being well writ
ten and as containing vast mines of thought." — Daily Globe.
" This book is a rich casket of perfect gems. We imported a copy for
our own library four years ago, and have read it and re-read many portions
of it with unmingled delight, and we hope with profit. That copy cost us
two dollars : but here is an edition equally good for fifty cents ; and more
truly valuable reading cannot be found in any book, of like compass, out of
the Bible, in the English language. Would that a copy of it might be
found in every family in the land." — American Citizen.
"The contents of this volume are thoroughly good, and will doubtless
create a desire in the minds of its readers to carry still further the acquaint
ance with these choice spirits of a noble age, which the work will open
The selection, made by Basil Montagu, a sound scholar and accomplished
writer, has long been regarded in England as admirable in every respect."
— .TV". Y. Courier.
" These fine selections from the best old English writers, will be read
with pleasure by all admirers of the good and the beautiful. The selections
from Taylor, especially, form edifying Sunday reading, and we shall
take the liberty of using much of them for that department of our paper."
— Saturday Emporium.
"Some of the choicest gems of the masler minds enumerated in the title-
page, are here brought together in the present collection in a readable form.
The subjects selected are of universal interest, and of course lree from sec
tarian topics." — Hunt's Magazine.
" The first sentence from Jeremy Taylor is the key to the volume. ' If
these little sparks of holy fire which I have heaped together do not give
life to your prepared and already enkindled spirit, yet they will sometimes
help to entertain a thought, to actuate a passion, to employ and hallow a
fancy.' Surely that must be a choice book which is drawn in rich ingots of
thought from the treasure-house of these Old Monarchs of English Litera
ture ! Every line is of pure gold, fraught either with the poetic fancy and
learned illustration of Jeremy Taylor — ' the Shakspeare of Divinity ;' the
English bluntness of the orator of the people, honest and reforming Lati
mer ; the sweetness and moderation of Bishop Hall : the sharp-heightened
eloquence of John Milton ; the closeness of Barton ; the purity and strength
of South ; the fantastic oratory of Sir Thomas Barrow ; the quaint wit of
Fuller ; the sonorous dignity of Bacon, and, among moderns, the tumultu
ous outpouring of the mind and heart of Edward Irving." — JV. Y. Morning.
JVews.

xxx WILEY AND PUTNAM'S ADVERTISEMENT.
XXXI. & XXXII.
PROVERBIAL PHILOSOPHY;
A Book of Thoughts and Arguments, originally treated. By Martin Faji-
qtjhab. Tupper. Two Parts, each 25 cents.
" Its sentiments are replete with wisdom, and are clothed with such
poetic beauty, and invested with such singular associations, as give the force
and freshness of new truths." — JV. Y. Evangelist.
" One of the most thoughtful, brilliant, and finished productions of the
age." — Banner of the Cross.
" A book of thoughts of peculiar brilliancy on subjects of general interest
to ail men ; easily understood, and repaying the reader on every page with
sentiments true to experience, and expressed often with surprising beauty."
— Presbyterian. "The article entitled 'The Dream of Ambition,' we think among the
most sublime productions of the age ; yet it does not stand out in any striking
or undue superiority to the rest of the book." — True Catholic.
" Many of the subjects are wrought in most exquisite style, .abounding in
beautiful imagery, and embodying profound and invaluable thought." — JV
Y. American.
" A book which, once dipt into, every intelligent person would wish to
preserve for the sake of dipping again a hundred times, and pondering on
the passages thrown forth by a singular mind for the world's consideration."
— JV. Y. Observer.
" We have, on a previous occasion, expressed our opinion of this work,
and have now only to add, that this is a very nicely printed and cheap
edition, as both volumes are sold at fifty cents." — Emporium.
" This is a series of compositions in the form of proverbs, upon the most
important elements of the human character and existence. It has a quaint,
grave tone, marked with originality, beauty, good feeling and elevated mo
rality." — JVew Bedford Mercury.
" This work could never have been produced but by an intellect of the
very highest order. Its most distinctive feature perhaps, is condensation.
The materials for a volume seem often to be brought within a single sentence.
We know of no book that is more suggestive than this — none which will
bear better to be read over and over again, while yet there will be other
treasures of beautiful and useful thought that remain to be explored. We
marvel to learn that the author is yet a very young man. There is a voice
in his soul that will make itself heard to the ends of the earth." — ilbany
Atlas. " A book rich in sweet wisdom and pure poetry, destined to take the verj
highest rank among the best class of English literature." — Mirror, 2d notice.
" Let every one read ' Proverbial Philosophy' for himself. It is a book
of wisdom — it is a book of the finest and most fervent piety — it is orthodox
in its faith — it abounds with the beauty and majesty of poetry — it is, in
fine, a book of Proverbial Philosophy, woven in the loom of its delectable
author, with a warp of unadulterated truth, and with the bright woof threads
of poetry." — U. 8. Gazette

WILEY AND PUTNAM'S ADVERTISEMENT,
DR. LYELL'S TRAVELS IN THE U. S.
TRAVELS IN NORTH AMERICA, IN THE YEARS 1841-2; WITH
GEOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE UNITED
STATES, CANADA, AND NOVA SCOTIA.
By Charles Lyell, Esq. F1R.S., Author of The Principles of Geology.
1 thick vol. 12mo., beautifully printed, with engravings and colored maps,
$1 75 ; or the same, bound in 2 vols., $2 00 ; also, a cheap edition with fata,
75 cents. *
"We heartily commend this work of Mr. Lyell's to our readers, and
assure them that its perusal will be an intellectual treat. His scientific
notes are of great value, and make us rather proud of our country."—
American Agriculturist.
" The production of a ripe scholar, and science is cosmopolite. The
work is full of shrewd and sensible observations." — JVew Orl. Bee.
" We indeed rejoice that so careful an observer of the phenomena of na
ture has given us such a mass of facts, all of which are well authenticated."
— Lutheran Observer.
"Full of interesting and valuable results." — Simms' Mo. Mag
" This book is the most sensible ever written on America by an English
man." — Graham's Magazine.
" The author is just the kind of traveller whose opinions we should re
spect. No one can read his work without being struck by the fairness of
spirit and the sincerity with which he writes." — Picayune".
" Mr. Lyell's book is quite a gem. We gather from every page of this
work, the most valuable information. His discussions throughout are ex
ceedingly learned." — True Sun.
" A most interesting work, and one of the highest practical value." —
Pittsburgh Chron.
" It contains a mass of information of a scientific character that renders it
most welcome to American readers." — Hartford Courant.
" This work will prove a most acceptable one to American readers as a
book of popular interest, and of useful scientific information." — JV. Y. JVews.
" It is a record of the observations of a most intelligent traveller and fas
cinating writer. . . . The author has the rare faculty of making his readers feel
as if they were his compagnons de voyage ; and everything that he relates
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grace and beauty and power with which he describes the scenes and places
that he witnessed and visited, have not been surpassed by any modern
traveller/' — Albany Argus.
" This is, indeed, a refreshing book. It is from the pen of a man of
known science ; but he is also a philosopher, and one who looks rather at
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but too frequently, alone delight to dwell." — Buffalo Pilot.
" Few books more really valuable have recently been issued from the
American press."— Buffalo Advertiser.
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work 'worthy of being extensively read." — Hunt's Magazine.
" We have read this book with great pleasure and instruction, .... and
can confidently recommend it." — JV. O. Delta.
" We must now leave this desirable and instructive publication to the
popularity it so well deserves, both from the scientific and the general
reader." — Anglo-American.

WILEY AND PUTNAM'S ADVERTISEMENT.

THE MYSTERIES OF TOBACCO.
1 he Mysteries of Tobacco. By Rev. Benj. I. Lane. With an Introduc
tory Letter addressed to the Hon. Quincy Adams, LL.D., by Rev. Sam.
H. Cox, D.D. One neat vol., 12mo., well printed. Price 37i cents.
Contents — Inscription and Introduction— Letter from the Hon. J. Q
Adams, LL.D. — Chap. 1. The Nature of Tobacco, 2. The Influence of
Tobacco upon the Body. 3. The Influence of Tobacco upon the Mind. 4.
The Influence of Tobacco on the Morals. 5. The Illusory Influence of To«
bacco 6. The Filthiness of Tobacco. 7. The Expensiveness of Tobacco
8. Supplementary Notes.
" This is a much needed book, and one which few reflecting men can
read without many painful emotions. If not consumers of the poisonous
weed themselves, they will be ready to weep over the Wide-spreading evils
which it occasions in the world ; and if they use it in any way, after reading
this work, they will, for the sake of health, decency, economy and temper
ance, be ready at once and for ever, to reject it The Introduction to this
volume by Dr. Cox, is replete with good sense and racy, sarcasm." — Chris
Han Intelligencer.
" This is a forcible exposition of the evils, improprieties and disgrace of the
use of tobacco, exceedingly well-timed, and done with all the cleanliness
and decency of style and allusion that the filthy subject admits of. The
author has gathered many facts, and presented cogent reasons against the
habit, which we should suppose could not be without their effect with every
civilized man that reads them. The introduction by Dr. Cox, is one of the
best things imaginable ; full of wit, sarcasm, anecdote and argument, and
surcharged with a righteous indignation against the abuse. It is so good
that we shall trespass so far on the copy-right as to transfer much of it to
our columns." — Evangelist.
" This is an able and well written essay against the filthy and disgusting use
of tobacco, showing its effects not only upon the physical powers, but on
the mental faculties. We hope it may be carefully read by all who are ad
dicted to this abominable practice." — Cincinnati Daily Enquirer.
" The author illustrates very forcibly the deleterious influence of tobacco
upon the body, the mind, and the morals ; nor does he fail to urge its ex
pensiveness as an argument for its disuse. Indulgence in the vicious habit
of smoking costs many a young man in our city the fifth part of his income ;
and besides involving him in pecuniary embarrassment, unfits him for that
vigorous exercise of mind and body which in every pursuit is essential to the
highest degree of success. The work is prefaced with a very interesting
introduction from Rev. Dr. Cox of Brooklyn."
" This is by far the most important work we have met with on the perni
cious habit of using tobacco : a single glance at the headings of the several
chapters, is sufficient to make the most inveterate user of the ' weed ' pause
in the midst of his fancied enjoyment, and consider whether he really gets
the ' quid pro quo ' for thus endangering body and mind, by continuing the
practice of what is made out to be an immoral, unhealthy, filthy and expen
sive habit. We recommend the perusal of the ' Mysteries of Tobacco' to
all who are addicted to the immoderate use of this powerful narcotic. Wi
ley & Putnam, 161 Broadway."— JV. Y. Albion.

ii H III
"Hli