>Y^LE«¥MMEISSflTrY-

Gift of
NEW HAVEN PUBLIC LIBRARY
1929

Studies in Theology.

PROLEGOMENA,

PHILOSOPHIC BASIS OF THEOLOGY ;
OR,
RATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS FAITH.

REV. RANDOLPH S. FOSTER, D.D., LL.D.,
'It
A BISHOP OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH.

npcos to ;*£&

5>J

NEW YORK: HUNT & EATON.
CINCINNATI : CRANSTON 6» STOWE.
1880,

Copyright, 1889, by
HUNT & EATON,
New York.

n
v./

CONTENTS.

SEC. PAGE
I. Am, Scope, and Method Proposed  5
The Spirit of Inquiry  25
II. Truth  41
III. Differentia of Idea and Concept  57
IV. Knowledge  74
V. Belief Distinguished from Knowledge  88
VT. Conditions of Knowing.  123
VII. Of Beliefs  184
Sources of Theological Truth  246
Function of Reason in Matters of Revelation  264
Theology Not a Completed Science  292
Appendix A  332
B  334
C  338
D  340

"Omnia autem probate; quod bonum est tenete." — Paul.
"Die Wahrheit ist in Gott; uns bleibt das Forschen." — Von Muller.
"O Truth, Truth! thou knowest how the inward marrow of my soul
longeth after thee." — Augustine.
"Whatever is against right reason, that no faith can oblige us to be
lieve. For though reason is not the positive and affirmative measure of
our faith, and our faith is larger than reason, and takes something into
her heart that reason can never take into her eye ; yet in all our creeds
there can be nothing against reason." — Jeremy Taylor.
"He who begins by loving Christianity better than truth will proceed
by loving his own sect better than Christianity, and end in loving himself
better than all." — Coleridge.

PREFACE

In this book-making age one must be careful to select his
reading. There is a plethora on all subjects. Only those of
the best class on a given topic should be selected, always pro
viding that a just representation of divergent views is fairly
met, so as to put the mind in the best posture for a final
judgment. Whether any book will be helpful to the student will de
pend on several things : the book itself, its adaptation to the
needs and capabilities of the reader, and the manner and spirit
of the reading. Reading may be, and often is, a mere physi
cal exercise in which the zero of mentality is used ; or it
may be both a highly intellectual and ethical exercise, in which
the higher and highest attributes of the whole mental and
spiritual nature are employed. In the former case, of course,
no appreciable advantage can possibly result — no increase of
knowledge or cultus of any kind : whatever the book, the
reader will rise from its perusal essentially the same he was
before. In the latter case, if the book is worthy of the read
ing, the exercise cannot fail to enhance the personal values of
the reader both as to improvement of faculty and increase of
knowledge. Time is too precious to be wasted on any discussion, or in the
reading merely of any book, that is wanting in respect of
intrinsic merit. If weak or frivolous or commonplace, the
reading cannot bnt impair vigor and faculty. If false or
dubious, it will inevitably misdirect energy and mislead the

ii Pkeface.
life. If indelicate or inelegant merely, it will debauch both
the intellectual taste and the moral sense. It is only as it
is elevated in tone and theme, careful and painstaking in its
research, cultured and pure in its style, correct and true in
its teaching, weighty and important in its subject-matter, and
fully abreast of the last results of educated thought and scien
tific research that it can impart strength, grace, and nobility to
the reader. Any book that is less than helpful to these ends
is hurtful.For the best results it is indispensable that there should be
affinity between the book and the reader — if possible, a friendly
sympathy between the author and the 6tudent. The want of
this will pretty surely be fatal. It is not necessary that there
should be perfect accord, in the mind of the student, with either
the reasonings or the conclusions he finds. With robust,
healthy, and honest natures there will always be more or less
disagreement, and the friendly collision will tend to elicit
clearer and fuller knowledge. But in order to this there must
be friendliness and appreciation — a sort of kinship of noble
natures. If one will receive the highest good or help from
another respect is indispensable, but in no case should the
reader give himself up wholly to the author. However de
lighted with the trend and manner of the discussion, or with
the style, spirit, and general form of the reasonings and con
clusions, the reader will fail of greatest good if he fail to main
tain his own individuality. He must both think and inwardly
digest for himself.
Great truths are never mastered without earnest endeavor,
nor can they be received and passed along without reciprocal
earnestness and endeavor on the part of those who receive them.
The reader must work with the author with cordial heartiness,
and coming thus under the spell of his inspiration, and enter
ing into his strivings, he will be likely to improve upon and

Pkefack. iii
surpass him. Thus co-working he will find the best and deep
est meanings. It is a profitable experience for any mind to
feel the throb of a kindred mind. Life propagates life. A
book whose mental throbbings are not felt, whatever truth it
may have, is too nearly dead to quicken other minds, and can
be read with but little profit. Mental quickening is the great
end to be achieved. The book that has value in it is the
book that awakens thought, and creates in the mind thirst for
deeper knowledge. The truth itself which is communicated
may be of the greatest possible value, but the nearest equiva
lent to the truth imparted, or perhaps that which is better,
will be the mental quickening which attends it. The great
thing to be acquired is thirst for knowledge. When fully
aroused the mind will find truth for itself.
The author seeks to put himself in communication, not sim
ply with the eye, but with the mind, and also, if possible, with
the heart and conscience of the reader. He does not aim to
do his thinking for him, but rather to lead him to think for
himself on the greatest themes. He does not assume the
role of a dogmatist, but that rather of a fellow-student and
associate inquirer — that of a truth-seeker. He would asso
ciate himself with kindred minds in the pursuit. He seeks
such to enter into the fellowship of his thought-life, hoping to
inspire them to push inquiry and investigation into regions
beyond. His chief aim is to inspire noble minds to the loft
iest exercise of their powers in the search for truth. If he
shall contribute something to guide some struggling mind, or
to help some troubled inquirer in any measure, he will have
reached his highest ambition.
The mental poverty of the majority of people arises from
the utter absence of all mental life, seen in nothing more than
in the books they read and the aimlessness of their readings.
Most reading is done without the idea of any real profit, or

IV

Peeface.

that there is any thing to be gained — simply for passing enter
tainment. Most books propose no valuable end, and those
which do aim at something often have nothing to give but
inane common places that really signify nothing. They are
read without aim, or any more worthy aim than the occupancy
of the moment, or, something still worse, the unwholesome
excitement which their fiction or narrative produces. It is
hopeless, perhaps, to expect any thing better than this of the
masses who live but a vegetative existence, or who are too busy
about practical matters and the struggle for existence to give
time to any solid mental exercise. The intervals of business
pursuits naturally find the mind relaxed, and leave it in too
enfeebled a condition to attempt robust and sustained effort of
any kind.
Books which deal with great questions in the nature of the
case must be confined to a comparatively limited circle of ec
lectic readers, who constitute the van of the great movement
of progress. But even such gifted souls do not always read
wisely or well, either as to the choice of their reading or the
manner of it. There is immense waste in what seems to be
real work by ill doing what might and ought to be well
done. " Studies in Theology," the running title of a series of vol
umes of which this is the first, is the outcome of fifty years
of earnest endeavor to master theological science. The outcome
is far from satisfactory to us, but the belief that it will be of
some advantage to those who are to carry forward the investi
gation in the future is deemed a sufficient reason for giving
permanent form to the thoughts herein expressed, and to the
reasonings and conclusions which are contained in the treatises
which follow.
The subjects discussed are the most difficult and obscure in
theological science, as they are also the most fundamental.

Preface. v
The titles of the series are as follows : present volume, " Basis
of Theological Science ; or, Principles Underlying Religious
Faith ; " then, in the order named, " Theism in Nature," or
"Cosmic Theism," "The Divine Book," "Biblical Theism,"
" Scope and Plan of Creation," " Primitive Man, or Man in
his First Estate," " Man in Sin, or the Fact and Doctrine of
Human Sin," " Man Under Redemption, or the Fact and Doc
trine of Atonement in Christ," "Man a Spiritual Being,"
" The Man of the Resurrection Age," " Immortal Destiny."
It will be observed that all the great theological issues, and
philosophical as well, of our disturbed and earnestly inquisitive
age emerge in this series of discussions. They are perplexing
problems with which we have long wrestled as earnestly as ever
ancient athlete wrestled for the victor's wreath. They are the
subjects with which the men of the coming age will continue
to wrestle. The final result involves the deepest interests of
the world.
The present volume, as indicated, involves the preliminary
questions and principles which underlie all systems of thought.
It begins with a discussion of the question, " What is truth ? "
Not what is true, but what is the precise idea which the
term expresses ? The discussion of this point, it is believed,
places the reader in an advantageous position for the investi
gation of the more practical question which is the usual start
ing-point of discussion — is a given proposition, doctrine, theory,
or teaching true ? Having in the mind a clear idea of what
is implied in the term, we are prepared for the right direction
of the reasonings and for the application of tests.
Truth is treated under several aspects : as truth of being,
which makes the term the equivalent of reality, or objective
truth ; truth of idea, which denotes the correspondence be
tween the idea which the mind has in any given case and the
reality itself, which we denominate subjective truth ; truth of

vi • Preface.
sign, which denotes the adequacy of any symbol to convey the
idea which one mind entertains to another mind, or to convey
the idea of any reality.
The discussion next considers the term knowledge— what it
is to know, the condition of knowing, criteria of knowledge;
the real contents of human knowledge, and the limitations of
the knowable. We beg close and thoughtful attention to this
part of the general discussion.
Then follows the differentiation between knowledge and be
lief, and also the differentiation between kinds or grades of
beliefs. To this part of the discussion also we solicit the special
attention alike ©f Christian believers, theologians, and those
who repudiate faith.
The function ©f reason with respect to matters of faith is
carefully considered, and, it is hoped, so put as to aid in the
solution of the great problem, " Have we a divine religion,"
and have we the right to employ our reason in interpreting and
understanding it ?
Theology, throughout this treatise, is regarded, as like every
other science, amenable to the law of reason — namely, that its
facts and conclusions must always have- for their support the
adequate reason, or otherwise be rejected as furnishing no basis
for faith. It differs from natural sciences' only as its subjects
differ, and as its methods and proofs vary, not at all as to the
law of the sufficient reason. A thing is known by perceiving it.
The sufficient reason for affirming its existence is the percep
tion. A feeling is known by experiencing it. The sufficient
reason for affirming its existence is the consciousness of it.
An idea is known by consciousness. The sufficient reason for
affirming its accordance with truth is the proof, derived
from whatever source, which compels the mind to affirm that
accordance. It is the doctrine of the present treatise that theology is a

Preface. viji-
progressive science. Its sources and principles are eternal, and
forever the same, but the human mind is progressive. New
knowledges emerge ; the sum of human experience increases ;
by more careful observation new facts and laws are discovered ;
the result is a deeper and truer insight. Just as in every
other department of human research improved facilities bring
improved results, so in theology like causes will secure like
advance. We know more to-day than our fathers did a thou
sand, or even a hundred, years ago. We have truer beliefs
than they had. The sciences, theology among the rest, take
on truer forms along with the advance of the age : some things
are left behind, some things are added. Truth is eternal, but
the view we acquire of it is variable, and may constantly, and
to the finite must, be forever enlarging and improving. Let
us rejoice that it is so.
If the reader should find in these pages — as he will — some
phases of thought and some forms of statement a little out of
the ordinary line, it is our hope that he will not take needless
alarm, nor hastily conclude that something serious is out of
joint because of the novelty. Read and consider. The slightly
varying putting may be helpful. Where any thing appears
out of the ordinary course scrutinize it carefully. If after
giving it careful attention you shall feel called to doubt or re
ject it, the study leading to that result may have been most
useful and helpful. There are minds that always see danger
in a phrase or sentence which suggests a new idea, and which
discover fatal error in divergence from platitudes. It is not
the wisest nor safest type of mind certainly. Receive nothing
on mere statement. Reject nothing simply because it differs
from your accustomed thought or formularies. Keep an open
door. Be fair. Use your mind. Think for yourself. Resolve
to accept nothing but the truth. Be alert. Read and digest.
The utmost advantages to be derived from general progress

viii Preface.
come only to those who are at the pains to seize them with
the utmost freedom and use them with the utmost diligence.
If we will, the light may flood the universe and no ray pene
trate the dungeon of our minds. If we will, we may share
in the beauty and comfort of the advancing day. It will be
as we will.
We covet the attention of the coming men — the young.
The clock strikes the age of ages. The battles of to-day usher
the millennium. Ideas lead on the advancing hosts. Truth is
the glorious goal. It is a privilege to live in such a time.
Come with us to a survey of the field and choose the banner
under which you shall enlist. Who knows, possibly to you is
reserved the honor of leading the victorious column. Gird
yourselves and " quit you like men."

STUDIES IN THEOLOGY.

PROLEGOMENA.

SECTION I.-AIM, SCOPE, AND METHOD PROPOSED.
THE present volume is the first of a series of monographs on
important theological questions, and stands in Place ana pur-
essential relations to the entire series. It is properly volume.
prolegomena — an introductory study to the study of the sub
jects themselveB, in which principles and presuppositions, which
are governing in subsequent discussions, are propounded and
established. The series takes the general title of " Studies in Theology,"
rather than the more assumptive form of " Treatises in Theol
ogy : " not as implying uncertainty or tentativeness, Reasonsforthe
, . f. , , * ,. , runnlngtltleof
but rather to indicate that the matters discussed are tne series.
treated as any other subjects about which the mind inquires, in
which critical examination takes the place of dogmatic state
ment. The subjects are regarded not as mere matters of faith,
or as standing in authority alone, but as matters of rational
inquiry, amenable to the common law of the sufficient reason.
The series of monographs covers almost the entire field of the
ological thought usually comprised in works on " systematic the
ology ;" but, not assuming that style, the writer feels permitted
to omit any references to some phases of Christian doctrine of

6 Studies in Theology.
interest only or chiefly to sectaries, and others which are so plain,
and universally accepted in substantially the same essential forms,
as to require no special attention, which yet would demand full
object ot the expression in a treatise on systematic theology. The
work- object is really to confine the range of discussion to
fundamental questions and points which are in dispute between
earnest thinkers, and which, from their intrinsic obscurity, need
a somewhat more scientific statement, and in some cases a modi
fied expression — the deepest questions which underlie the whole
structure of religious and philosophical thought, and, this side
of these, questions touching the grounds and some of the more
accurate meanings and interpretations of Christian faith.
The author declares himself free from any purpose to make
a mere creed pronunciamento, or to be bound or limited by a
creed, and especially by popular and traditional interpretations
of any particular creed view of Christian doctrine. The dis
cussions have absolutely no other inspiration than the simple
desire to arrive at the best conception and expression of truth
and the removal of hinderances and obstructions from the path
of honest and earnest inquiry. This statement is not intended
to convey the idea that the author is a disbeliever in creeds, or
that he is without a creed, or that he holds his creed loosely.
Every honest, intelligent man has a creed. The views advo
cated in these monographs are in essence the creed we hold on
the subjects treated, but they are not put forth as exponential
of any extant creed, or for the defense or furtherance of any
sect-statement or theory of doctrine; no authorized standards
are acknowledged ; there is no effort or desire to placate tradi
tion ; authorities are not evoked or recognized as determining
questions in dispute ; the questions are put upon their merits,
and the simple and only aim is to find what conclusion un-
trammeled reason arrives at. The right of doubt, dissent, and
antagonism is fully and cordially recognized, and as far as pos-

Prolegomena. 7
sible self-represented, and always treated with respect when
couched in terms of thought. Narrowness, cant, bigotry, intol
erance, find no place in these pages, whether patemized by
religion or irreligion.
As Introductory the following pages are concerned with pre
liminary matters, such as: the proper spirit of inquiry; the
end or aim of inquiry; right method; what is truth; what
is knowledge ; grounds of knowledge ; limits of the knowable 5
what is belief ; laws which ought to determine beliefs ; differ
entiations of essence and grounds of knowledge and belief;
authority of belief as a rule of action ; sources of truth in mat
ters, of faith; absolute right and duty of mind to demand and
have a reason ; authority of human masters and of an assumed
revelation ; right of reason to test and examine and so to reject
or accept ; reason final umpire ; personal responsibility for
opinions and more stable forms of governing beliefs.
The subjects to be discussed are not new. Some of them de
scend to us as heir-looms from the remotest antiquity, others are
comparatively ancient, none of them are recent. In some form
they have engaged the thought of ages, but they are ever
changing. Chased out of one form they have appeared in an
other. Essentially the same, each generation presents them in a
somewhat new phase.
Our own age has given them greater prominence than any
preceding. The last decade has been prolific of treatises of
ripe and varied learning, and of great value. Scholarship was
never so busy, thought never so active, and the demand never
60 great as at the present moment. The liberation of mind,
evoked from the germ of Protestantism, which is now practically
universal and inextinguishable, has relegated all questions to
re-examination. The new age of science, of the same paternity,
has poured such a flood of light that discussion is irrepressible.
The interests are, however, so vast and the field of research so

8 Studies in Theology.
extended, and there are so many new phases of thought and
vastnessoitue new modifying environments constantly emerging,
subject. ^^ Q0 investigation, however complete at one time
and in some aspects, suffices permanently, or even for the pres
ent does away with the occasion for further statement. And
if nothing new be added as to the substance of truth, it some-
continued de- times happens that a slightly different putting is
mand lor re- , , „ , . , , . . . , j .1
statement. helpful :— the angle of vision is changed ; there is a
slight variation of the refraction ; and so the object stands in a
somewhat different, and to some minds improved, light. The
ablest mind, after the most painstaking research, fails to per
ceive all the sides and bearings of any subject of thought,
especially of subjects so involved and intricate as those deep
questions which arise in theology : — there are some points left
in shadow ; some aspects of the problem are overlooked ; some
unobserved obscurity remains ; the setting is not absolutely com
plete. That it is so is the inevitability of the finite, and fur
nishes the reason for re-examination and restatement. The
ever-flowing and ever-growing river of thought, as it traces its
course down the ages, touched and modified by varying human
experiences and observations, will perpetually create for itself
new channels and new banks as it works its way to the meas
ureless and infinite ocean of truth.
In some points the writer will be found to differ, not, it is
The writer dtf- believed, with substantial or essential orthodoxy, or
fers in some J '
points. the commonly accepted doctrinal conclusions held by
evangelical Christians as taught by the earlier and the more
recent theologians and expounders, but still, in somewhat im
portant phases, as bearing on some matters of dogma, but more
especially on formal expression and interpretation. Any de
parture from the popular and traditional expression, however
small or non-essential, will be scrutinized. This is as it should
be. There are dangers which vigilant conservatism should

Introductory. 9
guard against ; but there is also a certain liberty which should
not be interfered with. Changes of time and envi- conservatism
ronment, with some actual progress in thought, ere- mended.
ate a demand and furnish the means for some improvement of
view and construction.
It is important to keep alive the spirit of earnest investiga
tion, and to encourage scholarly effort in the endeavor to reach
the highest ideal both of truth and expression. As somemoamca-
. . , . , ,.,.., , tions to be ex-
m tlie past, surrenders and modifications have been pected.
required which did great violence to strong traditional prefer
ences, but which were greatly to the advantage of truth, so we
may expect that similar demands will continue to occur in the fut
ure. Any error or dangerous defection will always The proper
remedyagainst
find its proper check, not in the demand for fixed- error.
ness, but in the enlightened and sufficient answer. What is
wanted in these times of earnest thinking and improved scien
tific research, as well as of that loose and hasty generalization
which on occasion threatens to uproot things most sacred and
venerable, is earnest and patient study, and the charity which
never faileth. If we should avoid giving the reins to advent
urous rashness, we must also be careful not to permit them to
be wrested by inexperience and ignorance.
The two errors to be avoided are, slavish adherence to inher
ited traditions, merely on the ground of their wide Two error8 to
prevalence and long continuance, or because they beaTOMed-
seem plausible and are agreeable to our feelings ; and, a blind
haste to change from established formularies simply from the
desire of novelty, or on any other ground than that of con
vincing argument.
The principle to be adopted is, that we allow the largest lib
erty of investigation, and admit unreservedly and thankfully
any new light that may be furnished from whatever quarter,
whether as the outcome of our own diligent research or of the

10 Studies in Theology.
examination of others. The gravity of the subjects and the
intrinsic importance of the doctrines of which we treat, impose
upon us the duty that we make ourselves intelligible, and that
we furnish adequate reasons for the acceptance of our teachings.
Nothing could be more fatal to the claims of religion than
a fatal mis- an attempt to shelter them behind mere traditions
,a"' or mere authority, however high or venerable, when
either its facts or the reasonableness of its doctrines are called
in question. We need to keep forever in mind that we can ar-
can only claim r<>gate to ourselves personally only the position of
equal rights. equais in j^y controversy. We must not fall into
the mistake of supposing that the divine authority of our sacred
books is established merely by our affirmation or belief of it,
or that any such authority attaches to us or our opinions. This
is a common fallacy which we must be careful to avoid. We
need to keep constantly in recollection that our creed-formularies
are only human, and, therefore, always possibly imperfect.
However they may contain essential truth, we cannot assume
The fathers safely that they will admit of no change. The far
not infallible. therg were ^ fc^^ rpj^ hag beeQ advance<
There is room for improvement. There will be modifications.
More and more every increment of Christian teaching will be
searched. We must have the wisdom to discern between the
shell and the kernel, and to avoid the mistake of periling the
latter by attempting to give permanence to the former. The
past is full of suggestions on this line which we may profitably
study. We have entered on a time of manifold peril, which makes
Atimeof peru. a demand for ™e and skillful, as well as profoundly
honest, investigation. The best brain and the best
heart of Christendom is, and will be, needed to guide and pilot
through the breakers, so as to avoid the dangers which threat
en us on every side. It is no time for the shallow and inexperi-

Introductory. 11
enced to stand at the helm ; no time for the clamor of igno
rance and sciolism to dictate measures of defense Need of sM1_
or advance, or to determine doctrines or methods. lul guWes-
Calmness, moderation, laborious research, candid treatment of
questions, and brave and honest devotion to truth, are the
need of the hour ; bigotry, narrowness, and shallowness, its
greatest peril.
We must recognize the fact that there are honest doubters
with respect to the most sacred verities, and a still Honest douM.
greater number who differ with us on minor ques- ers"
tions, and that in many instances they give proof of as much
sincerity and love of truth as we can properly arrogate to our
selves. Many of the most scholarly and truth-loving go even
to the verge of skepticism. We must not be guilty of the folly
of underrating either their loyalty or intellectual ability. We
ODly shame the principles we profess if we permit such to ex
cel us in the manly virtues of patient industry and the honest
and brave avowal of their convictions, or if we seek to shelter
our weakness behind unfriendly and unchristian epithets.
There are those who, by their manifest disloyalty to truth,
and their evil animus against all that is holy and noble, and
especially against Christianity, as such, deserve no Assailants who
. may be unno-
respectful attention, and therefore no attention at ticed.
all. Their vituperation may well be left to perish by neglect.
To mention their names, even, is to give them the undeserved
prominence which they covet. Let us not imagine that the
similar vice of mere denunciation, when practiced by us, de
serves, -or will meet with, a dissimilar fate. The great mass
of thinkers who are leading the advance movements of the
mind of the race to-day are not of this description. They are
learned men. They are lovers of truth. They General wor-
J . tMness of
mean to do honest work for humanity. Many of scholars.
them are not Christians, some are even disbelievers in revela-

12 Studies in Theology.
tion, and a few are bewildered about the deeper questions.
Let us not permit honest infidels to put us to shame. Our
only hope of counter-working their influence is in
Our only hope. .... . .
fair and honorable treatment, and m making it ap
pear that we have the truth in the matters in dispute. Any
want of appreciation, or any evasion or subterfuge, will infal
libly react upon us, and upon the doctrines which we hold
sacred, while manly candor will gain from opponents similar
treatment, and from all others confidence and esteem. The
quality of the respective combatants signifies something ; but
after all it is a question of truth, and the reasons are the de
termining factors. Mere superiority of character, or learning,
or social influence, however deserving of consideration, will
weigh nothing against the sufficient reason, on which side so
ever it may be.
Let us settle it once for all, that in determining what is true,
any man's opinions or more stable beliefs as such merely, are
not to be accounted as of decisive evidential value, and the
same is true of the opinions and beliefs of any number or any
quality of men. If the holder of the opinion be a man of high
repute for learning and sound judgment, that circumstance may
give, and ought to give, a certain weight to his belief, on the
subsumed ground that such a man must have good reasons
for the holding of it ; but after all, the reason of it must be
that which determines its quality, and not the fact of his hold
ing it. There is no prima-facie evidence that it is true because
he holds it. There is more probability that an opinion held by
such a man is according to truth, than there would be if he
were of an opposite character. The probability increases if
men of such character in large numbers come to substantially
the same conclusions ; and that circumstance gives them a cer
tain dignity, and should predispose us to accept them as correct.
The ground of probability is the assumption that there must

Introductory. 13
be reasons for such unanimity of such minds, or for the opin
ions which they hold. The reasons, however, after all, will be
the determinative factors. What the inquirer after truth, there
fore, has the right to demand, is not who holds any opinion
in dispute, but the reason why he holds it. If that be adequate,
it matters nothing who holds it, or who doubts it, it must be
accepted ; and if it be inadequate, it must be rejected or held
in abeyance, no matter who stands sponsor for it. High author
ities give such respectability to opinions as to entitle them to
candid and careful examination and favorable consideration —
nothing more. The reasons in the case must finally determine.
We fully recognize the fact that the Christian system is still
on trial, and in a certain sense will be so permanently, or until
all mind, if that time shall ever come, becomes Christianity
rationally and unchangeably convinced of its truth. stm 0Q tnal-
It is perfectly obvious that the momentous debate is not closed,
and that it never can be by a mere dictum of authority. Doubt
still hangs heavy over the field in the judgment of many sin
cere inquirers, and may yet for a long time to come. The
great mass of minds are not yet informed of the reasons ; and
until they are, the verdict in their case cannot be rendered.
That the Christian cause will win we do not doubt, both be
cause we unwaveringly believe that there are ample and con
vincing reasons, and because we have the sure word of promise;
but its friends cannot safely rest, or assume the victory won.
The greatest peril to truth is not in the strength of its adver
saries, though that is not contemptible, or in the insufficiency
of its supports, so much as in the weakness of its friends, or
their failure to do the earnest work which the situation de
mands. We must keep in mind that the environments of New environ-
to-day are new. All systems stand now, as never ments-
before, face to face. New factors are in the field. Dissent is

14 Studies in Theology.
popular. There is haste and rashness in the air. There is
danger of confusion and panic and temporizing policies and
experiments. Let the Christian camp hold steady and make
no haste. We may be calm, but must be vigilant. The sifting
process will winnow the chaff and separate the wheat, and the
great cause will stand more firmly for the temporary strain.
In all the following discussions we write from the Christian
christian stand-point — the stand-point of faith — but we do so
stand-point, vvith the recognition of the unchangeable right of
the reason to question and even doubt ; and we claim no more
honesty or love of truth than we freely accord to others who
furnish the same proof of loyalty that we do. We attach
no importance to any position simply because we hold it, or
because many others agree with us, or because it is called
Christian, or because those who refuse it are called infidels, or
atheists, or agnostics, or skeptics of any kind ; but all impor
tance to the question Is it true ? and to the grounds of reason
Truth is truth. which determine the conclusion. Truth is truth,
no matter who holds or doubts it ; and that which
is not true is worthless, no matter who stands sponsor for it.
Belief is better than disbelief only when truth is with it.
Belief ana Doubt is better than faith when faith can be shown
doubt. to be misleading, or mere credulity.
Christianity, by its assault on all other systems — by setting
Christianity's itself up as an exclusive system, by appealing to
er systems. reason, and by awakening the spirit of inquiry and
free discussion — has made itself amenable to the same tests
Hew to the which it imposes. It claims the right to dominate
same tests. tne f ^ 0f tfle worl(J on t}je g0]e g].ouruJ tnat ft
is true. It must both furnish evidence and answer objec
tions. Having opened the way to progress, and created a
cannot can a new era of flight an(i discovery, it must not, to
protect itself, call a halt or find fault with the bearings of

Introductory. 15
newly discovered truths on its own dogmas. If they cannot
stand the light they must consent to perish with the common
rubbish of other fables and superstitions which it has refuted
and demolished.
Another has well said : " Our duty is to make our faith cred
ible to living minds ; reasonable first to our own Mugt make our
reason, and then to the reasons we seek to persuade. laifh creaiMe-
No man or Church has any right to ask men to beheve what
they cannot rationally conceive, or what contradicts ascertained
and certain truths. If the truths of religion are eternal, they
must be in harmony with the no less eternal truths of nature
and mind, and this harmony it is the business of the rehgious
teacher to prove. Faith could not have lived so long as it has
done had its fundamental truths stood in manifest contradiction
to reason. It has lived because it has been necessary to rea
son, its complement, not its contradiction. The former relig
ious teachers of the past eras showed their respect for reason by
doing their best to answer the doubts it started : that is, to make
their faith seem agreeable to reason. Had they not done so,
their faith had died. Authority cannot keep alive impotence of
what the intellect dooms to death. To be authori- autnority-
tative, authority must be rational ; and an age of faith simply
means an age when faith satisfies reason. And what has ever
been necessary to religion is the prominent religious necessity
of to-day. If religion is to live, it must live in harmony with
living thought, and win over it a rational authority. Only as
its teachers speak to the new spirit in language it cannot
refuse to hear, shall they preserve for posterity the old faith,
transmitting it not only unimpoverished, but improved and
enriched." . . .
" The men who would teach man must respect him, speak
to him as to a rational being who, whether he questions or
accepts the faith, only exercises the inalienable rights of his

16 Studies in Theology.
reason. Ours is in a high degree a reverent age, and much
Ours a rever- of its dollDt haS COme' n0t fr0m itS dislike' but ?r0m
ent age. jove 0f truth. It is not always the men that love her
best that find her most easily. Our foremost thinkers are men
of most noble spirit, honest alike in intellect and conscience,
anxious to find and follow the truth. If they doubt what is to
many as sure as it is holy, they do it through loyalty to what
is held to be true. It ought to be remembered that if faith
has its rights, so has the intellect, and those who require man
to believe ought to present their truths in forms that shall com-
,. mand his belief. A living religion can never so re-
A living relig- ° a
ion cannot re- pose on tbe past as to be satisfied with its actual and
pose on the r x
past. achieved history ; it must be ambitious to live a vig
orous and progressive life. It is not enough that the Christian
faith has done well ; it ought to show that it is doing, and can
do, still better. The old and feeble Hve by retrospect, the
strong and active live by deed and endeavor. A living may
be thought better than a reasoning Christianity, but in these
days the life is impossible without the reason. We have no
right to ask men to spare our faith for its past services ; but
the best right to require their belief of it, if it can be proved
to be the highest truth for the intellect, the surest light for the
conscience, the purest life and love for the heart." *
It is assumed in all discussion that there is a realm of truth,
There is a which means simply that there is a realm of reality,
realm of truth. an(j that it is possible to men, by the right use of
their faculties, to find out, at least to some degree, what that
reality is and what it is not — what may be predicated of it and
what may not. To determine that has been the effort of the ages,
and is the struggle of to-day ; and, if we may prophesy, will
continue to be the endeavor for all time — may we not say to
all eternity ? Every inquiry that will aid to the discovery is
* Fairbairn, " The City of God," pp. 5, 6.

Introductory. 17
legitimate, and every inquirer who is successful at any point
in bringing into light any part of the field is help- A11 lmluiryle_
ful to all the rest. Truth is a unit, and in its &ama-te-
wholeness is a perfect and beautiful and beneficent harmony.
No one increment is inimical to any other one part,
or irreconcilable with the whole. Truttl a unlt
The pursuit of truth, in the effort to acquire knowledge of
all reality to the extent to which such, knowledge The pursuitot
is attainable, has been regarded by the wise and truth'
good of all ages as the noblest employment of the faculties of
man. Thus it is that he, at the same time, attains his own
highest personal perfection of power and character, and most
completely subjugates all environments in nature, and all
possibilities of every kind,, to his present use and permanent
advancement; thus, also, he most honors and best qualifies
himself to serve the great Being whose image he alone, of
all terrestrial creatures, is permitted to bear. To this end his
faculties were bestowed. By this means only can the true
ends of his existence be realized. To him permanent error
is deformity, and avoidable ignorance is sin.
The capacity to acquire knowledge, and the importance of
its attainment to personal worthiness and enlarged Tne duty or
usefulness and happiness, make its pursuit not only ^i"11111!?-
the noblest occupation, but the highest privilege and most ab
solute and immutable duty. Among all the other duties aris
ing from our complex and multiform relations, whether to our
Creator or our fellows, there is not one of which this is not a
complement. It heightens and gives dignity, significance, and
completeness to all the rest. Knowledge imparts worthiness
to love, dignity to integrity, grace to honor, beauty to meek
ness, comeliness to faith, and sheen and glory to all the vir
tues ; it honors worship, adorns faith, and enriches the every
day conduct of hfe with the beauty of wisdom and consistency ;

18 Studies in Theology.
it gives weight and force to the influence of example and char
acter. He who enlarges the sphere of knowledge by a better ap-
Eniargement prehension of truth and a clearer statement of it,
Stag!6 8ea or corrects error, or removes doubt or uncer
tainty by making more plain what was obscure, or in any
way, on any subject, and especially the important problems of
life, contributes to the cure of ignorance and establishment
of truth, helps forward the race, and is a true benefactor of
mankind. The good he does adds to the real wealth of the
world and is immortal. Progress toward the ideal is simply
progress in the knowledge and practical application of the
truth. Truth is the great evangel — the struggle of the ages has
been to acquire it. Our Lord assumed to himself no higher
title than that he was the Truth. It is the mighty lever by
which the world is to be lifted into its millennium of peace and
blessedness. No difference what goes if truth comes. Blessed
Blessedness of are they who unveil the mysteries of nature and
truth. put the race in possession of her hidden wonders,
every opened secret of which is a revelation of the Infinite
Author and a ministry of beneficence to her children ! Blessed
are they who guide to the discovery of those ineffable laws
which underlie and pervade the universal system, putting us in
possession of the philosophy of all material and mental move
ment ! Thrice blessed those who unfold the deeper moral sig
nificance of our human life, and aid to clearer apprehension of
the divine thought and purpose concerning our own spiritual
duty and destiny ; who purge religion of superstition, and the
holy doctrines of revelation of the imperfect meanings which
incompetence and human rashness have woven about them,
and lift into clearer light those majestic truths which alone
can ultimately bring us to our highest destiny. Blessed are all

Introductory. 19
the workers in all fields who hasten the millennium of the hal
lowed reign of Him who is the Truth !
It is the exclusive aim of these studies to aid in setting the
right direction to the pursuit of knowledge, or, broader still,
where knowledge is unattainable, to point out the grounds of
rational belief, and the right method to its attainment.
The one thing sought is truth. It matters nothing what
it is, or what surrenders it requires, the truth is r^th the one
better than any error can be, and is that which tbiDg'
we have a right to demand and have, and, therefore, the dis
placement of any error by the truth is a real gain to human
welfare, and should be welcome to all. The known wnifui sup-
and willful support or perpetuation of an error is a a sin.
crime against humanity ; and unwillingness to know the truth,
or a disposition to obstruct the fullest and freest discussion in
order to it, nnder any pretense whatever, is treason to right.
The knowledge of truth is not desirable or obligatory merely,
or even chiefly, as knowledge. Knowledge is an Knowledge
dpsirj-t V*1p jm a
end, and a worthy end in itself, but in itself it is not means.
a consummate end, but a means to a higher end. Knowledge
itself imparts dignity and self-respect to the mind; there is
thus in it, simply as a possession, a certain element of worth
and worthiness ; but its chief value is in tbe fact that we are
enabled by it to build our character and life according to the
truth, and enter into the eternal life and fellowship of the
truth, and of Him who is the sole source and fountain of truth.
Error is never to be defended or tolerated as such; and
truth must be followed wherever it leads, at the Error never to
sacrifice of all things; but to determine what is be <Jeten<ied-
truth and what error, the mind must be absolutely free and
unembarrassed in the investigation. Error itself is less an evil
than enslavement or intolerance.
Every truth is a mine of wealth, either as contributing to

20 Studies in Theology.
the conditions of material welfare, which to all other creatures
Each truth 1m- is ^ie 0I1ty ^0rm °^ good> but to man *^e lowest
portant. form ; or to his intellectual or moral welfare,
which is greater and greatest in kind and duration. A great
master has well said : " Possession of truth, by which is meant
Truth condu- simP^e accuracy of knowledge and of inference, is
cive to welfare, necessarily conducive to the happiness of the human
race. This is an assertion scarcely requiring, in the present
day, to be either emphasized or illustrated. That mankind are
deeply concerned, not only in clearly understanding the prop
erties of the material world and of their own physical consti
tution, but also in having an accurate acquaintance with the
operations of the human mind, the consequences of human
actions, the results of social regulations, the effects of political
institutions, the relations in which they themselves stand to
other beings, and their real position in the universe, is a
proposition so undeniable when clearly expressed, as barely to
escape the character of a truism.
" What is the interest of one is the interest of all. No class
interest of one can be benefited at the expense of humanity, or
the interest of ¦*¦ •"
aii. by the ignorance of another class, without ultimate
injury to itself. The truth which lifts one would, in like
manner, lift all; and, lifting all, lift each higher; and the
error which is injurious to one, has in it the essence of injury
to every other one. The universal diffusion of truth and the
universal correction of error is the least result to be aimed at
by men. It was once supposed that a dogma might be advan
tageous and even necessary to society, to morality, and to polit
ical institutions, although it were false ; and that it ought in
this case to be strenuously supported and shielded from scrutiny,
even by those who were aware of its character. With such a
notion there could not co-exist any conscious obligation, or
any inducement but sheer curiosity to enter upon the search

Introductory. 21
after truth and faithfully pursue it. On the contrary, it un
avoidably led to the employment of fallacious arguments, hol
low pretexts, disingenuous connivances, and violent oppression,
in order to maintain the authority of established doctrines. It
could not fail to be fruitful in falsehood, hypocrisy, and des
potic intolerance. ' It seems,' says Dr. Whately, ' to B|Snop Wnate.
have been a settled conviction of most of tliose who Ih'ewritingsrf
had the sincerest desire of attaining truth them- St-Pau1-"
selves, that to the mass of mankind truth was in many points
inexpedient and unfit to be communicated ; that however de
sirable it might be for the leading personages in the world to
be instructed in the true nature of things, there were many
popular delusions which were essential to the well-being of
society.' The same policy of a double doctrine
was inculcated by Macchiavelli, and was,indeed, long
acted upon in Europe prior to the Reformation. It has been
well characterized by Mr. Stewart as the policy of DUgai<j stew-
enlightening the few and hoodwinking the many. art'
H similar views are yet occasionally entertained among the ig
norant and half-informed, they are seldom avowed. Even the
hardly less revolting, but certainly less consistent principle of
more recent times, maintained by many of the early teachers
of the Christian Church, that a true doctrine may be rightly
supported by false representations and by what are called pious
frauds, is discarded professedly, if not always really, by every
party, every sect, and every individual, with the slightest pre
tension to a name in philosophy or literature, or even to a
respectable standing in society. ' Nothing,' it has been well
remarked, ' can be more irrational in the pretended
children of light, than to enlist themselves under
the banner of truth, and yet rest their hopes on an alliance
with delusion.'
" There is happily a growing disposition in the world, among

22 Studies in Theology.
the intelligent part of it at least, to prize truth of doctrine
a growing de- an^ veracity of statement ; to look with disdain on
sire for truth. ari artificej disingenuity, and disguise, both in spec
ulation and practice ; to regard the business of life no longer as
an affair which demands unremitted intrigue and perpetual de
ceit ; to consider the great interests of humanity as not requir
ing to be supported by ignorance, hypocrisy, and superstition ;
to believe that the suppression and concealment of facts and
arguments can be of service except to a few at the expense of
the many ; and that it is for the benefit of mankind, as well as
essential to their progress in all which is virtuous and high-
minded, that every important question should be fully and
boldly examined. The state of feeling on the part of men of
cultivated mind seems highly favorable to an impartial discus
sion of the conduct which we ought to observe, or, in other
words, the moral sentiment we ought to cherish in relation to
the pursuit of truth." *
Valuable as truth is, it is not of easy discovery. Like costly
Truth not of gems? it often lies concealed in unfrequented places,
easy discovery. and ^ attained only after expensive and laborious
search. Perhaps the greatest difficulties of all are subjective ;
and moral, even more than intellectual. Together with a na
tive and genuine thirst after truth, and with a high sense of
its value, and with a corresponding disgust of ignorance, there
may be found, strange though the paradox be, co-existing
extreme opposition to the acceptance of particular truths —
an utter repugnance to them, because they differ from our
present opinion, and require us to surrender plans and methods
of life. It will require little short of a miracle to win for them
fair play or just treatment. The mind hardens against them,
and imposes unjust tests; making it almost impossible for them
to gain the courtesy of respectful attention. Prejudice, vicious
* Bailey, " Essay on the Pursuit of Truth."

Introductory. 23
habits of thought, pride of opinion, ignorance, suspicion, big
otry, blind following of party leaders, and such SubJectlTe ^
things, either benumb the faculties or sharpen them flcultles-
in ingenious methods of defending and extending what would,
with a very little unprejudiced examination, be seen to be er
rors. They are as fatal to truth as gangrene is to life. An eye
so inflamed as not to be able to endure the light is not more
unfitted for clear vision than is such a mind for the perception
of truth. Where there are no such subjective difficulties there
are often manifold obscurities in the truth itself, Difficulties in
. ... the obstruction
which no perfection of the instrument can overcome, of truth itself.
And this is equally true of objects in the physical and metaphys
ical realms. The most important truths often lie concealed un
der impenetrable mists and superincumbent rubbish of error.
No amount of genius can lift the veil of mystery. And when
this is not so, the warp and woof are so intricate and tangled as
to make it a matter of great difficulty to so lay the strands that
they may be conveniently traced and easily used. To analyze
material nature to its constituents — to know the pos- Materiai nat-
sibilities, conditions, and laws of their multiform ure-
unions — to find their potencies and uses — to be able to trace their
history from the primal movement through all their vicissitudes
and combinations — to so exhaustively master the material prob
lems as to account for the whole of cosmic phenomena, what
an endless undertaking ! Yet this is but the smallest part of
the problem. To press beyond the physical into the arcana
of the metaphysical, the realm of essential life, of thought, of
power, of cause — the infinite and eternal — the ideas Tne metaphys-
of being and becoming, of freedom, of responsibil- lcalrealm-
fty — to find the truth in these deeper and more hidden funda-
menta of reality, so as to be able to say, this is truth— to have
power to eliminate the fables and dreams, or even to deter
mine where the known ends and the unknown begins, — these,

24 Studies in Theology.
and many more such tasks, make the difficulty of the problem
of knowledge.
To add to the perplexity, the illusions of sense are scarcely
,,, , , less than those of the fancy, while the reason is
Illusions of •"
sense. 0ften tricky and unreliable, the will feeble, and
conscience obscure. Withal, we begin at zero of faculty, of
experience, of ideas, and the minimum, in its
y' weaknesses and Umitations, of even a sensory sys
tem. For a considerable period of life we grope with the
imbecility of infancy, amid things which amuse but do not
instruct us; during which period even the consciousness is
obscure, and the whole realm of mentality is shrouded in a
kind of nimbus, or penumbra of half-shadow and half-light,
and for the earlier period of which the most important hemi
sphere of reality is shut away entirely from our apprehension.
When finally we come into the use of our powers more per
fectly, they are "so taxed with demands from the material side
of our nature, which has become already imperious, that they
move tardily and unskillf uUy in the pursuit of the more noble
but more obscure realities which belong to the metaphysical
6ide of our being — the spiritual, ethical, and mental problems.
Many truths it is impossible ever to know completely ; life
Many truths is too short and finite powers too small to enable us
impossible to ¦..„.,
know. to master the infinite problem. Many have such
obscure bearings on ends of practical value, and are so seem
ingly unimportant — many are so aside from our individual pur
suits, so condemnatory of our practices, so hostile to such a life
as we propose to live, so reproving and restraining — that we
either weary of the hopeless task and utterly abandon the pur
suit, or conduct it so feebly, so reluctantly, so undecidedly, that
only failure can result. To complete the picture of discourage
ment, so much doubt is thrown over the whole results of in
vestigation, that uncertainty ends in despair. What one builds

Introductory. 25
up another tears down ; the theory of to-day vanishes away to
make place for the theory of to-morrow. Is it any wonder if
we should be ready to say, Wherefore seek to catch the pro
tean, ever-vanishing phantom-— the ignis-fatuus, " which leads
only to bewilder, and dazzles only to blind."
But, despite all difficulties and discouragements, truth is
real. There is a realm of reality, and we can know Despite dita-
r ., . . . . . " . .. cultles truth Is
ot it ; and, m part, with ever-increasing measure and real.
certainty we can know it. It is for us ; it is our heritage and
life ; we must have it if we would attain to the dignity of in
structed and developed manhood. To stop short in ignorance
and curable error is at once unworthy and criminal; and to
cherish delusions after we are forced to suspect them is disloy
alty to the dearest interests of humanity, and at once debasing
to both the mental powers and the moral nature.
THE SPIRIT OP INQUIRY.
What is the use of our faculties by which we may attain a
concept that will correspond with reality — by which R1 . t use of
we may certainly know or rationally assume that tne faculties.
we have the truth in any case — and by which we may, with the
greatest facility, widen and extend our possessions of truth in
most essential directions ? *
There is a difference in the value of truths ; there is a dif
ference in the means and methods of pursuit ; but, in all cases
there are certain subjective conditions indispensable to success
— conditions of the mind itself as to its aims and the manner
of using its faculties, and conditions of its relations to the ob-
* By " correspond with reality," we do not mean likeness of the concept and the
reality, in a strict sense, but rather, the concept which the reality produces in the
mind whenever the two are brought into perfect relations to each other, and so
the concept which shows what the reality must be to thought. All that we can
know of it is, how it appears in our thought, and that it is real outside of our
thought. 3

26 Studies in Theology.
jects concerning which it conducts its inquiries, in the absence
of which the most favoring circumstances will be of no avail.
What are these conditions ? The mind must have an in-
„ „ „ tense desire for truth. This first. Doubtless
Subjective u
conditions. many objects will come within the range of obser
vation, without either desire or intention on our part, in such
manner as to force themselves on our cognition. They will
compel us to know them. The enforced concept will represent
the reality despite us. This is so, substantially, of all our invol
untary perceptions and intuitions of the common and surface
objectives of thought ; but it is never so of the internal consti
tution and philosophy even of common things, much less of
underlying principles, causes, and ends of being. These must
be studied and tested in the light of observed facts. They do
not force themselves into the mind, nor do they come even by
invitation, but are drawn in by a kind of violence. They will
be sure to elude us if they be not earnestly sought. To know
them in any degree, the desire of them must be masterful
Truthanobject among the loves. The truth, as truth, must be
of desire. the supreme object of desire. This implies more
than a mental judgment that the truth is good, and to be
accepted. It must be coveted. There must be a willingness
to sell all to buy it. We shall find that our affections are pre-
engaged by and debauched with error. A mob of idols dese
crates the temple of our thought — fancies, untested ideas,
Hereditary traditional opinions and beliefs — a fell brood —
opinions and
beliefs. the idols of Bacon : "Idola tribus," " idola fori?
"idola theatri," "idola specus." They hold possession of the
mind. They are standards by which, if not guarded, it tries
all things. They open and close the doors of admission and
rejection. Nothing but supreme love of truth will be able to
break their usurped power ; it alone will demand that even these
favorites of the affections be questioned— suspected. So much

Introductory. 27
gained they will, proving to be unworthy, soon be ejected. A
question becomes to error what aqua regia, "ni-
tro-muriatic acid," is to gold — a solvent and a test. tlonea-
Once give truth, as truth, the supreme place in the affections —
absolute regency — and it must be, in most cases, only a ques
tion of time as to its mastery of the thought.
Its effect will be to awaken doubt, or, if not doubt, careful
inquiry, the true starting-point of all knowledge.
When the quality of truth is made, by the mind,
the test of all conclusions — when it will resolutely think of
nothing but that, accept nothing but that — it must acquire the
habits of suspicion and vigilance which characterize a dealer
in precious gems. It will demand that each specimen be scru
tinized without favor. Only after that is done will it be set as
a real gem. If it fail to bear the test it will be cast away
without regret. Are cherished ideas, beliefs, prejudices to be
abandoned, and others, despised, odious, hateful, to be accepted
in their place : the former, endeared by the most precious
memories, associated with the holiest affections, in- „ , . t. ,
3 ' Hold on the ax-
vested with all that is sacred in religion, interpene- £eotlons-
trating our very hopes, wrought almost into the very texture
of the soul itself — the latter objects only of disfavor or disgust ?
Nothing but supreme love of truth, and confidence in its
excellence, can supply the motive to such a sacrifice.
But greater even than these strains on the affections will be
the strain on selfishness, and some more amiable qualities, in
the direction of supposed worthy personal interests. We come
to the study not alone pledged in our affections, but committed
in many other ways. To pride of opinion and disposition to
maintain it, right or wrong, we add a kind of feeling of fealty
to ideas themselves, and loyalty to the party we have espoused.
To change is to lose caste, lose place, lose self-respect, to part
hands with friends, and enter upon new and untried associa-

28 Studies in Theology.
tions. So beleaguered, independent, honest inquiry will be im
possible, except as truth rises to such supremacy in our thought
as to make all sacrifice easy. Supreme love of truth will render
us willing to have our most cherished beliefs critically exam
ined, and disputed with all possible strength. No truth can
stand in full strength until it has had the friendly service of
challenge. We especially thank all men who sincerely and hon
estly call in question accepted doctrines, making it necessary
for their real reasons to be found and published. Accuracy will
be reached only by the interaction of attack and defense.
Love of truth, as truth, then, is the great subjective con
dition of its attainment. To this must be added faculty,
opportunity, right method, diligence. Faculty is
Loveof truth. rl , ¦" ° . .,, , ., f.
an endowment, but will admit ot improvement; op
portunity, under high inspirations, the mind will create ; right
method must be learned by practice ; diligence is subject to
the will.
After all, we must keep in mind that truth is infinite, while
our faculties are finite. We cannot know all. Uncertainty
must still hang around the dim and distant horizon
Truth infinite. . . . ... . T
of thought in many directions. Of the limited
range of objects which we endeavor to conceive, it is important
that we should conceive clearly, not confusedly or uncertainly.
There is endless mischief in the habit of dwelling among half-
thoughts, a medley of obscure images of what are supposed to
be truths. Whatever is accepted as true should lie in the mind
as clear cut and sharply defined as a perfect new coin — a con
fused or blurred concept is not true to reality.
Too much cannot be said or felt in condemnation of a su
perficial habit of mind. To accept a thing as true without
supernciainab- examination, or without attaching importance to
it of mind. tlie matter whether it be true or not, is a grave
fault ; in fact, treason to the spirit of truth ; hatching a brood

Introductory. 29
of errors, leaving an habitual uncertainty of mind as to the
truth or falsehood of its ideas, begetting an unstable and fluc
tuating state, and sapping the integrity of the mental proc
esses. Many things may be passed by as indifferent or un
questionable ; but nothing of significance which is disputed
ought to be admitted into the thought as true or false without
examination. In matters that have any importance the duty
is, that the examination should be thorough and Examination
perfectly honest. If a false idea of reality is error, tnorousn-
and in important cases may be fatal, so also is a false idea of
what is unreal. To conceive of the unreal as real is, in effect,
the same as to conceive of the real as unreal. And the habit
of passing concepts along without examination leaves all in
absolute uncertainty.
If a superficial habit of mind is evil, much more is an insin
cere habit. To antagonize, for any purpose, what we know or
believe to be true, or to defend what we know or inslnoere habit
believe to be false— to pretend to know what we do tobeavoidea-
not know, or believe what we do not believe — to persist in an
avowal of knowledge or belief against evidence, or to refuse to
weigh and consider evidence — to avoid proof, or with intention
exaggerate or overstate it — to resort to sophistical reasonings
by assuming false premises or drawing false conclusions, sim
ply to achieve victory over a weak adversary, or to foist upon
any mind an error, — all such insincerities impair the integrity
of the mind, and undermine faith in its conclusions.
If a man affirms that to be which is, he affirms the truth.
In such a case, if he knows that of which he affirms, he has the
truth in knowledge. If he affirms on rational
n* 17 1 i Has the truth.
grounds, and the fact is as he affirms, he has the truth
in rational belief. If he affirms what he really believes, and
the truth is as affirmed, but without a knowledge of the rational
grounds of belief, he has the truth in unreasoned belief. If he

30 Studies in Theology.
affirms what he conjectures merely, but the affirmation is ac
cording to the truth, he nevertheless has the truth. In either
case the truth is in his thought. If he govern himself accord
ing to the knowledge, the rational belief, the irrational behef,
or the mere conjecture, in either case he governs himself ac
cording to the truth, and in the result has the practical benefits,
in whole or in part, of the possession of the truth. But if he
only believes when he might and ought to know that which
Mere belief, he affirms, he is guilty of a misuse of his faculties.
when knowl- . , . nl
edge is attain- If he believe, however implicitly, irrationally, what
avoided. he ought to believe with reason, he is guilty in the
same manner ; and if he content himself with conjecture when
knowledge or rational belief is within his reach, he outrages
the law of rational being. Any mind capable of reflection ex
periences a sense of unworthiness and degradation in a purely
voluntary or traditional or hereditary faith, and must always
be subject to a feeling of uncertainty and a tendency to doubt,
and hence be subject to instability and change; which weaken
and finally destroy all mental and moral integrity.
A man stands at a point where his road divides. On one
branch is located the point to which he wishes to go, but on
which he does not know. He has no means of adequate in
formation in his reach. So far as he can determine, take which
road he may, he may be in error. He cannot attain to rational
Duty when belief. Knowledge is out of the question. If he
knowledge is o -1
impossible. remain he must perish. He reasons thus, " There is.
an equal chance that taking to the right I may be saved." Pro
ceeding on the mere conjecture, he reaches the point of desti
nation which he desired. Practically his conjecture answered
the same end as knowledge. But suppose now that at the point
where he made the election there was in his reach some infor
mation—not perfectly definite, but sufficient to make a prob
able clew— who would say that he acted rationally in proceed-

Introductory. 31
ing upon mere conjecture? Or if by possibility he might
actually have known which of the two was the right road,
who will say that he acted rationally in electing either on un
certainty ?
While loyalty to truth requires that it should be diligently
sought, and that the mind should embrace and hold firmly those
ideas which to it seem to have the support of adequate proof,
we must constantly keep in recollection, that in matters of be
lief all the evidence may not be in at any given ah evidence
. i.i-ii ¦-,-, P08slbly not
time. New integers may be introduced that will present.
change the conclusion. What is really known is final; no
circumstances can ever change it from reality to non-reality,
or from knowledge into non-knowledge ; but what is most in
tensely believed may possibly, with added facts or change of
environments, be found erroneous, and pass into either doubt
or disbelief. The discovery of truth is progressive, and the
proof of to-day sets in a new light the proof of yesterday, and
demands a modification of the conclusion. This does not mean
that no belief is true, or that every belief may, under change
of circumstance, be found false ; but rather, that by possibility
any given belief may be modified. If the belief have truth,
as it may have, counter proof will not take the truth out of it,
or be able to shake it. But if it be inadequate — not exactly ac
cording to the truth — new circumstances may discover that fact.
The true position of mind with regard to all beliefs is, that having
accepted them upon what seems to be adequate rea- Eignt p0Siti0n
sons, they are to be held firmly, and not to be driven ^Jregardto
by every wind of doctrine ; but, at the same time, beUefs'
candid attention must be given to any alleged new light or fact
or principle ; and when, if ever, it becomes clear that the new
light furnished requires a change, that the mind be ready to act
accordingly. This is but dealing fairly with our faculties and
with the claims of truth. That which will give the greatest

32 Studies in Theology.
stability to our beliefs, is to insist that they be always the result
of, or in accordance with, the highest reason.
There are peculiar besetments and embarrassments to a
peculiar beset- Christian teacher or even student merely. The
ious teachers, sacredness with which he invests the subjects of
his thought tends to restrain the freedom of mvestigation
which should always be maintained. He hardly knows how
far it is safe and wise to push his inquiries or assert his
personal convictions on points already supposed to be estab
lished. He is in danger in two opposite directions, and the
sense of danger has a tendency to bewilder him, repress his per
sonal liberty, and induce him to accept conclusions rather than
to investigate them. The conscientious dread of unsettling
his own faith and the faith of others becomes a kind of night
mare to his faculties. To maintain liberty, and use it as not
abusing it — how far to push investigation and what value to at
tach to personal convictions — are delicate problems which every
conscientious student and teacher must encounter. The only
safe rule is absolute loyalty to truth, and sacred reverence for
personal conviction. It is fortunate for truth, perhaps, that
there are disenthralled minds. Error, often shielded by rever
ence, would never let go its hold but for the untempered blow
of the cold and unsympathizing critic. We must often thank
our enemies for the good service of breaking our shackles. It
may be even doubtful whether Christianity owes most to its
friends or to its enemies for the clearer light in which it stands
to-day. If the result of earnest investigation and honest loyalty to
to change be- truth induces a change of convictions, there is no
lief when truth
requires. way but to accept it at whatever sacrifice. No
debauchment is more to be deprecated than that of professing
and teaching that which is no longer believed.
It is indispensable that the theologian should deal fairly with

Introductory. 33
modern thought in its bearings on faith. It has an audience,
and must be treated with respect. It is not a mere Must deal fair-
. ly with modern
passing phase of transient speculation. It deals thought.
with the weightiest problems in a manly, intelligent, and ear
nest spirit. It has truth and knows it.
"How ought the representatives of faith to behave in its
presence ? How can they best be faithful to the proper meth-
trust they have received from the past and hold for
the future? How vindicate their principles and positions
against so formidable an antagonist? These questions concern
not merely the continuance of the Christian Church, but the
very being of the Christian faith.
" One thing is evident, thought must be met by thought ;
reason alone can encounter and conquer reason. Tnougnt met
The days when authority was stronger than argu- bytnou8M-
ment have passed, and knowledge can never be as merciless to
it as it was once to knowledge. Faith is confronted by tend
encies that have the spirit, the methods, and the consciousness
of science, and it must be as they are if it is to prevail. When
an antagonist is neither simply sentimental nor esthetic nor
moral, but in the highest degree rational, he must be met by
reason if he is to be met at all. And the reason that meets him
must be the spokesman of a system as comprehensive as his
own ; must espouse principles higher, more evident, and rational
than their antithesis. The thinker, when he needs to be an
swered, must be answered by thought, not by being prayed at
or preached at ; not by a command to believe, or an exhortation
to repentance, or an admonition that broadly hints that a place
too hot to be comfortable is prepared for him ; but (to use Cud-
worth's fine phrase) by an ' intellectual system of the universe,'
— a system that shall show not only that the religious idea can be
expanded into an intellectual theory of things, but that it is
the theory that can give the best reason for the existence alike

34 Studies in Theology.
of itself and the universe. In short, if religion is to conquer
modern thought, it must not fear to face and attempt its prob
lems ; must, without shrinking, challenge a comparison of their
respective solutions, and do so in the spirit that appeals to rea
son, prepared to abide its decisions. In essaying this task faith
is doing no new thing. It has done it before, and can do it
again, certain that its continuing to do so is a necessary condi
tion of its continued life. Yet the new work is not a repeti
tion of the old. Human thought is ever progressing, is ever
changing — ' widens with the process of the suns.' Our religious
Religious be- beliefs can never be dissociated from our concep-
TOUnt°ofnew tions of the universe; and as the latter grow larger
light. an(j truer, the former must be transfigured, that they
may live and shine in the new light. Hence it is not by affirm
ing the faith in the forms fixed by the past that living thought
is to be penetrated and possessed by religion, but by carrying
the religious idea into regions that thought explores, proving
its right to live there — its claim to be the only rational inter
preter of the universe. To do so, it must work along the hnes
and possess the characteristics of modern thought ; in a degree,
too, that will compel the confession that, while ancient as faith,
it is as thought as modern as living mind.
" Our religious thinkers, then, if they would be equal to the
needs of the day, must not fear to formulate anew the truths of
faith, to deepen and broaden the basis of religion, and to build
from the sheer rock upward. Conservative religious thought
is, as to its own claims, too simply assertive, and in its attitude
to the men and systems it opposes too purely critical ; progress
ive religious thought, on the contrary, is too fluid, too much
penetrated by sentiment, too little possessed by reason, more
receptive than creative in its spirit. Neither is quite satisfactory
either in character or conduct. To defend our own positions by
criticism of our assailants is certainly neither a brave nor a sure

Introductory. 35
method of achieving a victory. Criticism may be a greater serv
ice than disservice to an enemy; may help him to improve his
position, while it does nothing to mend our own. His weak
places ought to be confronted by our strong, and the thought
spent in discovering where he can be assailed might be still better
spent in making ourselves proof against his assaults. And an
attitude too receptive is as bad as an attitude too critical. The
religious man ought to be a creative thinker, not allowing his
idea to be modified from without, but causing it to develop from
within — using it to interpret nature and man, not merely per
mitting it to be interpreted by aliases in heart and speech. . . .
The thought that is to hve, must be thought in earnest about
the roots and reality of things, resolved to get face to face with
them, to see them clearly, and to speak plainly and strongly
what it has seen." *
Prejudices against religion in general arise, to some extent,
from the character of religious teachers. Taking the Grounds of
world at large, it must be admitted that it is not of ^^t'reiig-
a high type. The Mohammedan fakir, the Rom- lon-
ish priest, the average teacher of religion the world through,
would not be selected as a typical man or safe guide in the
questions which perplex great and honest minds. This fact,
and the other kindred fact, that the most absurd superstitions
and revolting dogmas have been persistently put forward in
the name of religion, only to be displaced by ages of struggle
and resistance, even to blood, constitutes one of the most for
midable difficulties which enlightened Christian teachers have
to overcome. The offense has been so great that we may well
be patient under the opposition which has grown in our path.
To offset it we have an array of glorious names who have re
deemed the cause from utter defeat and disgrace, and by such
the future of Christianity is to be assured.
* Fairbairn, pp. 24-26.

36 Studies in Theology.
Protestant Christianity has no reason to blush for its defend-
protestant ers- There are and will be many narrow and un
real to*** n° learned teachers, who, while good and true, are not
wush. the most competent expounders. Such are and will
be pertinacious of traditions and of the "mint, anise, and
cummin" of established customs and meaningless phrases;
but candor requires the confession that even such maintain,
as a rule, a high character for purity and moral integrity ; but
the faith is maintained by a race of conscientious scholars of
large and liberal culture, the peers of the most scholarly men
of this or any age. Of their purity and devotion to truth they
give abundant and constant proof in the holiness of their lives,
in their tireless labors, and in their freedom from mere pas
sion and prejudice. They are the custodians and ministers of
a divine treasure of the most weighty and momentous truths —
truths which lift and ennoble humanity, which inspire hope and
courage, which regenerate and save, which build the most noble
civilizations, the divinest types of manhood and womanhood,
without which the race could have no guarantee of preserva
tion from absolute ruin. Of this history furnishes the complete
demonstration, and the present condition of the world is its
monumental proof.
In the name of all that is prized and worth preserving to
aii friends of our children and to generations unborn, between
truth should be ... T i ¦
united. those inquirers mutually seeking to enthrone truth,
there should be loyal love and generous co-operation. None
have what the others do not need ; none can reach the highest
goal if the others be repressed.
" The theologian, as distinguished from the mere traditional
Theologian dogmatist, is a man of science, and the sciences form
fromdog8^ a sisterhood that may know emulation, but ought
never to know either jealousy or dislike. The dis
tinguished president of the British Association says : ' To

Introductory. 37
science we owe our idea of progress.' He is mistaken, unless
theology is the science he means. The idea of The ldea 0(
progress in nature, in man, and in history, has creSoftne6
been the direct creation of theology. That fact ology-
in the history of thought is open to no manner of doubt. The
ology, too, was the first to formulate a theory of Tneo]ogy ^t
development; to attempt to interpret nature and theor^of1 d a
man as a growth, though a growth that expressed Tel°Pment-
the unfolding of a purpose, the action of a living will. She
was the mother of all our modern sciences ; made the minds
that created alike the methods and the passion for the inter
pretation of nature. What created these created all they have
achieved. Analyze as we may the mental dynamic forces
in science, and we find them to be creations of religion,
generated, as it were, out of her very bosom. Zeal for truth is
the child of zeal for God ; the modern enthusiasm for knowl
edge was begotten by the spirit of worship, the spirit that
labored to read and know the mind of the Maker through the
things he had made. The man who studies with deepest rev
erence studies with most success. Reverence can be only
where love of truth is. . . .
" But theology has not only contributed to science the idea
of progress, and the mental habits and the energies that have
worked it ; she has, also, proved the reality and vigor of her
life by the progress she has made. Within the past fifty years
she has enlarged her own province and methods. Theology
has her comparative sciences ; to her ancient domain there has
now been added that field of wonders termed the science of
religion. No religion is indifferent to her ; she seeks to know
all — the place each holds in history, its meaning, the work it
has done, the way and degree in which it has contributed to
the progress, the civilization, 'and the happiness of man. Then
she has become more historical ; knows better how to handle her

38 Studies in Theology.
sacred books, how to get at the essence and truths of religion,
how to interpret, on the one hand, the religious contents of the
spirit of man, and on the other religion to man's spirit. Then,
too, theology has enlarged all her conceptions; her idea of
God is nobler, her idea of man is worthier; her outlook is
broader; her spirit is sweeter and safer; her notion of the
creative method, the divine order and way of government, of
the relations of God, man, and the universe has grown at once
richer and more comprehensive. . . . We speak of the science,
not of the multitudes who follow it. All multitudes are of the
mixed order. Even the army that marches under the banner of
the associated sciences is not all vanguard. Behind it is the vast
main body — always critical, often jealous, and even distrustful
of the brilliant leaders — while in the rear loiter a host of strag
glers whose voices now and then reach us as over the space of
many years. Progress is never equal, least of all in knowledge ;
but we measure it from the foot-prints of the foremost, not
from the trail of the last laggard wayfarer.
" But while we thus maintain that theology is a science that
science helpful ^as weU an(l variously served her sister sciences, we
to theology. no jegg cor(jiaiiy confess that these have splendidly
enlarged and enriched her province. The sciences that are
perfecting our ideas of the universe have exalted our idea of
God. He has been enrobed in other and grander attributes
since they extended the horizon of human thought into a
boundless and peopled immensity — into a busy and immeasur
able past. Our notion of the creative process has become
truer and sublimer since geology carried us back into its vast
successive periods, and showed us the slow and progressive
method of the Creator, who fashions worlds as it were by nat
ure without the aid of a miracle, and advances by impercepti
ble gradations from the meanest beginnings toward the noblest
ends. Our conception of the creative action has become clearer

Introductory. 39
and more real since we believed in the conservation of energy,
the correlation and conversion of the physical forces, and so
were enabled to conceive the causal energy in nature as a unity,
indestructible, incapable of increase or decrease, every-where
active, ever changing its form, yet never beginning and never
ceasing to be. Then, too, the ideas of order and law in nature
have made us more conscious of the unities that govern the
divine action, that bind into harmony the will and method
and end of God. A creation without order means that there
is no ordering creator. But since science has revealed law
every-where, molding the tear or the dew-drop as it molds the
star ; active in the great forces that guide the rivers, roll the
seas, and shape the mountains, as well as in the apparently tinier
forces that gather or disperse the fleecy clouds and regulate the
growth or decay of the smallest flower, man has got the idea of
an ordered nature, animated with a great thought and guided
by a great purpose. And the unity of nature suggests the higher
unity of its Author. The universal reign of law lifts us to the
conception of the law-giving and law-abiding God.
" But while we acknowledge that science has been helpful
to our religious ideas — specifically to our conception of God — we
must distinctly mark its limits. It has, indeed, done much to
ennoble the mind, gladden the life, and meliorate the suffer
ings of men. Science has almost infinitely enlarged science helpful
» ^ ° in certain di-
our command over the resources of nature and the rections.
pernicious and salutary agencies that sleep within and around
us. But see how much lies beyond its province. Man has no
bler instincts and impulses that impel him to seek the true, to
admire the lovely, to worship the good, to feel after and find
the Infinite Perfection, in which the true and right and beau
tiful blend into a divine and personal unity. Man has deep
moral convictions of rights that are his due, of duties that he
owes, of an eternal law he is bound to discover and obey. Man

40 Studies in Theology.
has sad and remorseful experiences, the sense of unfulfilled
duties, of wasted hours, of sorrows that have turned the antici
pated joys of his life into utter miseries, of mean and unmanly
sins against conscience and heart, against man and God, of
losses unredeemed by gain, of the lonely anguish that comes in
the hour of bereavement and throws across the life a shadow
that no sunshine can pierce. And out of these mingling in
stincts and impulses, convictions and experiences, rise man's
manifold needs ; those cravings after rest, those gropings after a
string to hold and trust, those cries for pardon, those unutter
able groanings after light shed from a divine face upon his
gloom, in which lie at once the greatness and the misery of man.
Moments come to the spirit of man when these needs are para
mount, and it feels as if nature and her laws were engines to
crush the human heart by which we live. And in these su
preme moments whither does man turn ? To science ? Does
not her talk, then, of nature and law and force and invariable
sequence, seem like the sardonic prattle of a tempter persuading
to belief in a religion of absolute despair ? These are the
hours, known to many a spirit, when the soul breaks through
the thin veil of words woven by the spell of man, and seeks to
stand face to face with the eternal Father." *
It may, and perhaps ought to, be admitted that students in
other departments of research are less liable to be trammeled
by traditions ; that they have greater freedom and a more tol
erant constituency ; that they are not so bound by pledges to a
guild or sect ; but it must be admitted, also, that there are off
sets to these favoring circumstances. Without impeaching
their loyalty to truth, it cannot be doubted that this greater lib
erty opens them to the undue influence of novelty, hasty gen
eralizations, and glittering theories. History is replete with
illustrations. If more free, it cannot be pretended that they
* Fairbairn, " The City of God," pp. 38-42.

Introductory. 41
are more conscientious or under motives of equal sacredness.
Within their own proper lines they are worthy of all honor ;
beyond these they have not been found to be safe guides.
It is for the theologian to make all possible use of the re
sults of research, giving honor where honor is due, and cor
dial encouragement to every effort to widen the field of knowl
edge in every direction, assured that all advance in truth will
be helpful to the great truth committed to him. Given loyalty,
let there be no stint of liberty. All honest research leads in
the same direction, and at the last will infallibly come to the
same goal. There are shoals and counter-currents, but the river
will find the sea. SECTION II.-TRUTH.
What is that impalpable something which we call truth?
What is knowledge? What are the limits of the know-
able ? What are the grounds of knowledge ? May the mind
rationally affirm of the unknown ? May it affirm of the un
knowable ? What is the difference between knowing Trutn what
and comprehending? What is mystery ? What is etc-?
the function of reason with regard to the mysterious ? What
is behef ? Wherein does belief differ from knowledge or know
ing? May truth be an inclusion of belief? May belief ever
dominate the mind with the same authority as knowledge?
What are the grounds of belief ? What is determinative of the
value of beliefs ? Have we control over our beliefs ? Is there
ethical responsibility for beliefs ? What is the proper attitude
of the mind with respect to its beliefs ? What are the distinc
tions between faith and belief ? These are some of the questions
which we propose to discuss in these prolegomena, as supply
ing a fit and needed introduction to the discussion of matters
pertaining to Christian faith hereafter to be considered.
To those who are familiar with the history and literature of

42 Studies in Theology.
the many-faced controversies which have been carried on for
ages about the subjects to be treated, nothing need be said of
the pertinence and importance of these points. The infinite
confusion and irrelevant and angry logomachy which
Logomachy. . . , .
to such an extent have characterized theological
and speculative discussions and debates, take their rise here.
If we could but clear this part of the field of confusion, and
come to perfect harmony and agreement as to the meanings of
terms, we should go far to clear up many questions of doubt
and disagreement.
What is truth f It is not meant: to raise the question here
Truth deflni- wna* things are true, or what among all our think-
uon of. ingS ig j.ruej jjUt this, rather : What do we mean by
the term truth? If truth be viewed as a concrete some
thing, what is that something ? If it be viewed as a quahty,
what is the quality ? When we affirm that a given object of
thought is true, what do we mean by the affirmation ? When
we affirm that the thought itself is true, what do we mean by
the affirmation ? It is obvious that the affirmations are differ*
ent, and that the objects about which we affirm are different
There are two different things affirmed of, and each is declared
by the mind to be true. Do we in the one case mean any
thing different from what we do in the other? Obviously,,
yes.. In the first case we mean that the object of thought has
the reality of existence — it- is. Truth, is the equivalent of
Truth equiva- reality. It means that and nothing else ; nothing
lent of reality. more> nothing less. In the other case, it means
that the thought we have of the object is not simply a real
thought, but that it is a thought which, represents the object
ive reality : that is, that there is an agreement between the
Truth subject- thought which we have of the object and the object
lve' itself. In the former case the term truth is a
predicate of the object of thought, and means simply that it

What is Truth? 43
has the reahty of existence. In the latter case, the term is a
predication of the thought I have of the object, and means not
simply that I do in fact have the thought, but that in the
thought which I have, and which is purely subjective, there is
a perfect correspondence to a reality which is objective. The
truth of the thought is not simply the equivalent of its exist
ence, but more than that, the equivalent of its existence and
also the existence or reality of its object, and still further, the
adequacy of the thought to the object which is given in it.
It is impossible to affirm non-existence directly. To affirm
non-existence there must be in the mind itself, in Cannot afflrm
the form of a thought, something of which the af- n0Q-exl3teilce-
firmation is made. It cannot affirm that the thought is not,
for to affirm that, the thought must exist. It can only predi
cate non-existence, or unreality, of an object which is in its
thought, and the form of the affirmation must be that there is
no reality corresponding with the concept — the concept is void
in reality. The same is true of existence ; the mind can form
no concept of pure existence. It can only affirm existence of
that which, as reality, emerges in its thought ; it must be the
existence of some object of which it has some conception. Its
affirmation must be in form that which is in my thought, or of
which I think — has real existence — is real.
The mind has power to form images or concepts which do
not correspond with any reality ; as of a living horse Tne mlnd cau
made of gold, which can both run and fly ; and any of^n-'existent
number of similar unrealities: but it knows that tMnss-
such concepts have no reality corresponding with them, and its
affirmation is, these things are not ; the concept is, but the
object has no reality of existence. Thus it appears that a con
cept, to be true, or for the mind to be able to predicate truth
of any given image, or concept, or thought, it must be able
to affirm not only the reality of the image, or concept, or

44 Studies in Theology.
thought, but also the real existence of the object which is con
ceived. Fleming, in his " Vocabulary of Philosophy," says : " Truth
Truth - how has been distinguished, according as it respects be-
aistinguished. ^^ \QOWier}ge} an(j speech, into Veritas entis, Veritas
cogn-itionis, et Veritas signi." By others, truth has been distin
guished as entitative, objective, and formal, the truth of signs
being included under the last.
Of Veritas entis, which he classifies as transcendental or met-
aphysical, or ontological truth, he says : " The pil
lar and ground of all truth is in truth of being —
that truth of integrity by which a thing is what it is; by
which it has identity, its own nature and properties, and has
not merely the appearance but the reality of being. Thus
gold has truth of being ; that is, is real gold, when it has not
only the appearance but all the properties belonging to that
metal. Philosophy is the knowledge of being, and if there
were no real being — that is, if truth could not be predi
cated of things — there could be no knowledge. But things
exist independently of being known. They do not exist because
they are known, nor simply as they are known. But they are
known because they are, and as they are when known fully."
Thus it appears that truth, as predicated of things, is the simple
equivalent of reality. That which is has truth of being ; that
The quality of which is not has no truth of being. Whatever
of any kind will allow of the predicate,- it is, it
exists, must have the quality of reality, which is truth of
being. " The words reality and existence have many meanings.
In daily life we say of thoughts and feelings that they exist, and
a logician would say upon occasion that they all have the corn-
Extent of the mon predicate of being. So, also, we speak of
term being, existing laws and relations as real, in distinction
from others which, as imaginary, are unreal. In one sense

What is Truth ? 45
every object of thought, so far as thought, exists; in another
sense only things exist. In one sense reality applies to laws,
relations, or events; in another sense it applies only to, things
— events which occur, in distinction from fancied events, which
do not occur. A law or event may be real, but never in the
sense in which a thing is real. Thus it appears that there
may be different kinds of being or reahty. There may be a
being or reality of feelings, thoughts, relations, and events, as
well as of things. It is important to keep this distinction in
mind, and to remember the kind of reality which is possible to
a given object of thought. The reality of feeling is in being
felt ; that of thought, in being thought ; that of an event, in
its oncomings ; that of law, in its ruling." *
Thus it appears that truth, as reality, is as wide as substance
or entities, relations, feelings, thoughts, laws, actions, events,
or whatever besides will allow of the predicate it is, or has
been, or will be. These constitute the world of reality as
objects of thought. Truth cannot be predicated of the unreal
— the absolutely non-existent. The truth, with respect to
concepts which do not represent reality, is simply Concepts false.
that the concept is false, since there is nothing to
which it corresponds. To affirm that the concept is false is not
to affirm its non-existence, for it does exist, and has truth of
being in it ; but, while it has truth of being in it, it is a false
concept, for the reason that there is no reality in the object of
which it is or purports to be a concept ; and since truth can
only be predicated of a concept when it represents a reality, it
must be affirmed to be a false concept.
The pursuit of truth is, simply, the mind seeking to know
reahty. When the knowledge is attained it is called truth of
knowledge, or Veritas cognitionis. " Truth, as predicated of
knowledge, consists in the conformity of our ideas with the re
* Bowne's " Studies in Theism."

46 Studies in Theology.
ality of the objects known ; for as knowledge is the knowledge
of something — that is, when a thing is conceived as it is — that
knowledge is formally true. To know that fire is hot is true
knowledge. Objective truth is the conformity of the
thing or object known with true knowledge. But
there seems to be but little difference whether we say that truth
consists in the conformity of the formal conception to the
thing known or conceived of, or in the conformity of the
thing as it is to true knowledge." * Truth of knowledge de-
Truth in n- n°tes a quality of the concept which the mind
^p'- forms of reality, and may be properly distin
guished as subjective truth, in distinction from reahty itself,
which may be denoted objective truth, or as truth in idea in
distinction from truth of being. When an object of thought
is conceived to be as it is in reality — that is, when the content
of the thought precisely accords with or expresses the content
of the object, no more and no less — we have the truth. In
this sense truth is an inherence of thought, and is subjective.
Truth, as a possession of the mind, thus consists in the exact
correspondence of its concept with objective reality. Thus in
truth of knowledge we still have in view reality — reality is its
essence and ground ; and there is no truth of knowledge, or
truth in the idea of the mind, without a reality of which it is
simply a subjective image, representation, consciousness, or in
tuition. There is often a discrepancy between the concept and the
reality ; the concept is less or more ; there is agreement in
some respects and disagreement in other respects, or there is
Error of con- no agreement at all. The result is either a mix-
<*&¦ ture of truth and error, or no truth at all in the
concept. It is safe to admit that most of our human concepts
are defective, in one way or another, with regard to most of the
* Fleming, p. S33.

What is Truth ? 47
objects of our thought. Under the most favoring circum
stances yet existing we attain to the knowledge of but parts of
truth. This is especially so with regard to the deep and
obscure things of the spiritual world. It was an apostle who
said, " We see through a glass, darkly — now I know in part."
If this was the consciousness of one of the greatest minds when
lifted above its natural power by a peculiar endowment of in
spiration, what must be true of ordinary mind in its common
states ? The best that can be said is, we, for the most part, live
among the imperfect images of half-truths. In cases where
there is radical discrepancy between the concept and reahty
we have no substance of truth whatever, but only a marred
and broken fragment of a defective image.
" The term truth is used in different applications and mean
ings. It is used thus to denote, 1. As truth of object, the
unity of congruous parts ; 2. As truth of percep- VarletT of
tion, the agreement between the subjective appre- trutn-
hension and the apprehended object ; 3. As truth of thought,
the identification of subject and attribute in an object of ap
prehension ; or, 4. Truth of representation, the agreement be
tween the idea in the mind or the object of that idea and the
embodiment of it in internal or external form." *
To truth of being and truth of knowledge, Veritas entis et
Veritas cognitionis, must be added Veritas signi, or truth of
sign. " The truth of the sign consists in its ade-
n 7 i . . -n , -re Truthofsign.
quateness or conformity to the thing signified, it
falsity in those things which imitate another consists not in so
far as they imitate, but in so far as they cannot imitate or
represent it adequately or fully, so the truth of a representa
tion or sign consists in being adequate to the thing signified.
The truth and adequacy of signs belongs to enunciation in
logic." f
* Day, " Outlines of Ontology and Science," p. 86. -f Fleming, p. 533.

48 Studies in Theology.
When words or other signs are employed to set forth either
thoughts or things, they have truth in them, just in the degree
in which their real import and understood meaning corresponds
to or correctly sets forth the thing signified ; and they convey
the truth to other minds, which is their intent in the degree in
which their real import is apprehended. The sign may be
exactly the appropriate one, as employed and understood by
the user ; but if it be not accurately apprehended, or if it have
a different meaning to the mind receiving it from that which
it has to the mind using it, it does not convey the truth. That
signs may answer the end of transferring the truth from one
mind to another there must be perfect accord as to contents of
the sign.
Herein appears the office of symbols or symbolism in gen-
offlce of sym- era^' an<^ *^e laws regulating their use. Language
boiism. jg the divinely constituted organ and symbol of
thought, created for its expression and conveyance. When we
say that language is the divinely constituted organ or symbol
of thoughts, we do not mean that words are creations of God,
but that the power to invent language for the expression of
thought was a peculiar endowment conferred upon man in his
creation. Words are bodies of which thoughts or meanings
are souls. Thoughts born in the mind clothe themselves in
these vocal or written forms, and so are transmitted from one
mind to another. As acquaintance with facts and things en
larges language grows, and when the facts or things are not
present, the vocal or written symbol represents them and
creates the concept in the mind which their presence would
produce. Every new fact or thing or idea which arises in the
mind by perception or reflection, or any mental thought, is im
mediately formulated by the mind in a word invented for that
purpose, or in a peculiar combination of words already existing
designed to express its mental form. To get the meaning of

What is Truth ? 49
words and sentences is the aim and result of study. When a
number of minds come to common understanding of meanings,
the sounds or written characters serve as modes of communica
tion, and reproduce in each several mind the same concept in
the same manner as the object would were it present to each
mind. It must appear that, in order to accuracy of thought,
there must be precise agreement as to the significance and
content of the sign, whether written or spoken. An unknown
language conveys no idea. A partially known or imperfectly
understood language produces confusion of thought. The
word may be properly pronounced or written, but the idea is
not transmitted — it is a body without a soul, or with a soul
which does not belong to it.
The question is sometimes mooted whether mental processes,
that is, processes of thought, the formation of ideas and concepts,
and the exercise of reflection and reasoning, are possible without
language. It is certain that objects perceived can be thought
without formulating the concept in a name. Two such objects
can be thought together and compared, so as to perceive the
difference without naming either, or inventing a word to ex
press comparison and difference. But the mind, by a natural
instinct, clothes its thoughts in language, and in no other way
can it communicate itself. The language is the sign which ex
presses and carries the thought — the postman connecting sepa
rate points and bringing them into relations. Language may
be either signs by motions, sounds, or characters, but in every
case it must possess agreed meanings, and the communication,
to be accurate, must employ the signs according to a fixed
standard. " Independent of the truth which consists in the conformity
of thoughts to things, called scientific, or right think- Moral trutn_
ing, and that which lies in the correspondence of truffioflntent-
words with thoughts, called moral when coupled with moral

50 Studies in Theology.
purpose, but truth of sign when simple accuracy of represen
tation is meant, there is a truth called logical, depending on
the self- consistency of thoughts themselves. Thought is value
less except so far as it leads to correct knowledge of things ; a
higher truth than the moral, in subservience to which alone the
logical is desirable. The reason that we sedulously avoid the
purely logical error of holding two contradictory propositions,
is, that we beheve one of them to be a fair representation of
facts, so that in adopting the other we should admit a falsehood,
which is always abhorrent to the mind. If we call
Logical truth. , . . . . . .
the logical truth subjective, as consisting m the due
direction of the thinking subject, we may call this higher met
aphysical truth objective, because it depends on our thoughts
fairly representing the objects that give rise to them.
Truth, in the strict logical sense, apphes to propositions, and
to nothing else ; and consists in the conformity of the declara
tion made to the actual state of the case ; agreeably to Aldrich's
definition of ' a true ' proposition, vera est quae quod res est
dicit." " Veritas est adcequaiio intellectus et rei, secundum quod
intellectus dicit esse quod est; vel non esse quod non est." *
These definitions do not make account of truth as an ethical
quality. That in every case relates to intention.
Its antithesis is falsehood, or the use of false signs
with an intention to deceive and with a purpose not to convey
truth. It pertains to the department of ethics, rather than that
of correct thinking. It denotes the moral state of the subject,
and, in that respect alone, differs from error. It is departure
from the truth not in concept, but in the sign employed, with
purpose to misrepresent and deceive. The effect of falsehood
upon character is different from error of statement arising
from misconception, but in both cases and alike, the truth is
* Thompson, " Outlines of Laws of Thought," sec. 81, 82.

What is Truth ? 51
misrepresented, and the quality of truth is absent. A lie de
ceives with intention, an error deceives without intention.
The moral law imputes guilt to the voluntary falsification of
the truth, or any intentional use of symbols for the purpose of
deception. Error may exist without guilt, and may, in some
cases, be the inevitable outcome of thought. The moral law
demands the diligent and honest use of the faculties for the
attainment of truth, and failure of such use may involve guilt,
and be the sure cause of evil ; but where the faculties have been
so employed, and because of their weakness or inadequate con
ditions, the judgment is at fault and error is the outcome, there
can be no imputation of crime — the error must be accounted
misfortune rather than crime.
It appears from the foregoing statements that non-truth, in
the first case, is the equivalent of non-reality — shams, Trutn ulya_
illusions, that which is not, as truth is the equiva- lent t0 reality-
lent of that which is. Truth as reality cannot be a quality of
non-existence, for of it there can be no predication, except
that it is not — has no reality, no truth of being. That which
once existed, but does not now exist — or that which may exist
in the future, but does not at present exist — has now no truth
of being or reahty. To affirm truth of existence of such
concept of at present non-existing things, the affirmation to
make it correspond with exact truth, must be coupled with a
statement which shows that at present they are not existent,
but that they were, or will be at a future time.
Science is employed about truth of being ; it seeks to ascer
tain just what is in the single realm of things, and its function
is faithfully to report and properly to classify what is found to
exist. It furnishes to the mind the knowledge of reality of a
definite kind. It is true science when it gives reality. Prop
erly, science can only deal with the known and with things as
known. Its function is exhausted with the statement and

52 Studies in Theology.
classification of known facts of being and relation. It ceases
to be science when it becomes speculation.
In the second case, the opposite of truth is error, misjudg-
The opposite ot ment, inadequate or false conception — it consists in
truth is error, imputing reality where it does not exist — in hav
ing a concept, which is supposed to correspond with reahty;
but which, in fact, does not, and which, therefore, repre
sents nothing that is and is void of truth. There may be a
reality, which the concept is supposed to represent, but it is a
misrepresenting concept of the reality, and so represents noth
ing. Ideas about reahty, but which are not according to
reality, are not true, or have not the quality of truth in
them, as there is no reality corresponding with them. There
may be reality something like them, but if it is mere resem
blance it lacks truth, for truth is as the reahty — is either
the reality, which is objective truth, or conceptual agreement
with the reality, which is subjective truth, or is the right ex
pression to represent the reahty precisely as it is, which is truth
of sign.
In the third case, the opposite of truth is the inadequacy of
opposite of the sign or symbol employed to represent the re-
truth is made- . f
quacyof sign, ality either of the concept or the object. There is
a reality both objective and subjective — an object and a con
cept — and possibly the concept is both adequate and true, and
the correspondence between object and concept, perfect and
complete, but the verbal expression is inaccurate and misleading.
If reality can only represent itself in thought, so no sign that
may be employed can do more than represent what the thought
is in communicating truth to other minds. The improper sign
only conveys error. The sign is an invention of the mind for
the purpose of revealing its inner thought to some other mind,
in the same way that an external object discloses itself to it, by
producing a corresponding concept. To make the communi-

What is Truth ? 53
cated concept represent the object, the sign must be adequate
to convey it and not some other. Things are God's signs of
his thoughts. They, by representing themselves in our con
cept, put us in communication with his thoughts. Words and
other invented symbols body our thoughts and convey them
to other minds. As in things there is a true expression of the
divine thought, and as by rightly conceiving them we rightly
interpret his thoughts, so it is necessary that the inventions
we employ should accurately represent our thoughts ; and the
recipient mind, rightly understanding the sign, should thus be
able to interpret our thoughts.
In the search for truth to which this discussion is devoted,
it is truth in the second sense which will be constantly in view —
Veritas eognitionis — the truth of knowledge, or the Truth of con-
cept the object
truth of mental concepts. But as every true con- of search.
cept is a concept of that which is, and not that which is not,
to determine the truth of the concept the reality must be
sought and found — must be known. And as no concept can
be correctly represented or expressed by the mind perceiving
it, without the use of the appropriate and adequate sign, we
must necessarily have a vigilant and constant reference to the
three forms of truth, Veritas entis, or reality — that which is ;
Veritas eognitionis — that which is cognized or conceived, and
the correspondence of the two ; and Veritas signi — the adequate
sign, embodying and conveying the true concept of the reality ;
and so reality shall be transmuted into thought, and truth shall
become the circulating medium between minds. For conve
nience we shall call Veritas eognitionis subjective truth, in
contradistinction to Veritas entis, which we shall denote ob
jective truth ; the first as marking an internal fact, the second
objective reality, or all objectivity which the mind contem
plates and makes the ground of the mental concept. The end
of the investigation is to find what is true in the concepts, or

54 Studies in Theology.
rather, how far and in what respects they correspond with real
ity, and to correct or reject them in the matters wherein they
do not conform to reality. Agreement between the subjective
and objective is the ultimatum of all mental operation. When
we attain that we reach truth, and not until that can we rest.
It is inevitable to mind that it should form concepts both of
itself and of other beings — that it should take note of acts and
. . changes within and without itself— that it should'
Concepts of in- o
numerable sub- ve interested to find out the cause and reason of ex-
Jects Inevitable
to mind. istence and change — that it should desire certain
objects and propose certain ends — and especially that it should
be interested in the matters of its own origin, its responsibility,
and its destiny — whether death ends all, or only introduces it
to another state of existence — and whether or not the deeds of
this temporary life affect the conditions of the state to which
it advances ; — these grave problems arise early in every con
sciousness, and haunt it during its existence, or until complete
knowledge resolves every doubt.
In this statement it is postulated that mind is, and that there is
a realm of reality or of existence objective to it; in the language
Mind is postu- °^ ^e schools, that there are the ego and non-ego.
lated. This must be assumed: can it be disputed? As
to the mind itself, obviously it is impossible to call in question
its existence ; for to dispute it is to affirm it. The affirmative
of its non-existence by itself necessitates the thing denied ; for
how can a non-existent affirm ? Can that which is not, perform
an act of affirmation? Can a pure nothing know itself, or
predicate of its existence and self-knowledge ?
It must be conceded that the self, in knowing itself, affirms
to itself not only its own existence but the existence of some
thing objective to itself, which it invariably and inevitably
posits as reality; for it only knows itself in knowing some
thing external to itself. It is no more certain of its own

What is Truth ? 55
existence than it is of the reality of the object by the knowl
edge of which it knows itself. It may be affirmed Mmdknowsits
that the object whose existence it predicates is sim- own existence.
ply a creation of its own imagination ; but this is an hypoth
esis which it rejects, and which it finds impossible to accept.
Whether it think of itself and its conscious power and activity,
or of externality and its phenomena, it finds itself under a
strict necessity to impute actual existence in both cases.
Bearing in mind, then, that the one and sole object of our
pursuit is the attainment of truth and its enforcement upon our
fellow-men, it is important that, as far as possible, we free our
selves from passion and prejudice. With this divine cynosure
forever shining upon our path, as the pole-star guides the
mariner, we shall be led to the haven we seek. Any lower
aim, or any other guide or lesser light, will not fail to confuse
and bewilder, and finally leave us in the Serbonian bog * of
doubt and error, whose poisonous exhalations engender stagna
tion and death. It will be necessary that we inform ourselves
of the researches of others, and that we examine their facts
and conclusions. They will be found to differ with us, some
slightly, some with the width of the antipodes. But it is with
their facts and conclusions and processes that we are concerned,
and in no sense with their personality. We make no advance
by evasion, misrepresentation, characterization, epithets, intim
idations, or effusions of temper and spleen. These create a tem
porary whirl and tumult, but in the end accomplish no good ;
they may win the admiration of superficial minds, but can con
tribute nothing to the victories of truth, while they may greatly
militate against them.
Ephemeral successes are not successes. That only is success
which wins ground that will be permanently held by the intel
ligence and conscience of mankind. All else will be torn down
* The Serbonis Locus of the ancients.

56 Studies tn Theology.
and scattered as the chaff, as the race progresses to its destiny.
Truth inherits the ages, and has in it the dower of immortality.
Its conquests are slowly won, but its reign is eternal.
Note. — As a rule all discussion should be, as nearly as possi
ble, impersonal ; that is, it should to the smallest possible de
gree make reference to names, confining itself to the question
at issue, on the simple matter of what is to be received as truth
or what is to be rejected as error. When personal reference is
deemed necessary the cause of truth is best served by allowing
the writer to represent his own thought, as much as possible,
in his own language ; and, unless he may be referred to in
terms of respect, no characterization should be resorted to,
except that which his own utterance furnishes. The introduc
tion of personalities in any form is calculated to excite preju
dice, interject confusion, and breeds an animus unfavorable to
the discovery of truth. Personalities are the resort of insin
cere and low minds, and appeal, not to the intelligence, but to
ignorance and unregulated passion. Reproach, ridicule, and
banter, and arts designed to excite odium against one whose
opinions we seek to refute, are never resorted to by truth-
seekers, but are staple methods with mere partisans and igno
ramuses who cater to those of their own class.
When opinions are to be assailed, or controversies about
facts arise, or doctrines or theories are called in question, the
utmost care should be employed to present the issue fairly and
meet it honorably, never appealing to the odium theologicum,
or mere bruta fulmena. The effective bolt with which to
shatter error, and the successful plea for the establishment of
truth, will always be impersonal — argument, pure and simple.
Let the argument be valorous, luminous, trenchant, but the
spirit Christian and the terms free from color of spleen or
passion. Even when a writer lays himself open to ridicule or
rebuke— or a sentiment, or theory, or position, because of its

What is Truth? 57
absurdity or malignity, merits severity of denunciation or mer
ciless criticism — it is better to hide the culprit, if he be such, or
the person whose ignorance or misjudgment is exposed, that the
mind may dwell simply on the issue itself. The departure from
this rule should be rare and exceptional indeed. The convincing
argument loses half its value and force if couched in terms which,
exciting passion, obscure the question or matter in dispute.
SECTION III -DIFFERENTIA OF IDEA AND CONCEPT.
In the preceding discussion, in defining subjective truth as
the exact correspondence between the objective reahty and
the subjective concept or thought of it, we assumed four
things : (a) the existence of objective reality ; (b) the existence
of the ego ; (c) the existence of the concept ; (d) an exact
correspondence between the concept and the objective real.
The grounds of these assumptions will emerge as we proceed.
We return now to examine more carefully the term concept.
We have employed it, in a broad sense, as the Tne concept-
equivalent of the terms idea, notion, thought, or what?
what we think. A more accurate analysis and differentiation
of the terms will be given as the discussion advances. In gen
eral, we mean by the concept the thought-form which reality
takes in the mind, or how we think it.
How do we become possessed of the concept, or how does
reality, which is external and objective, pass over into the mind
and assume a subjective thought-form ?
This is an old question, to which no satisfactory answer has
ever been given. It lies, perhaps, beyond any solution, among
the things unknown, and, for the present, unknowable ; but the
faqt itself, that reality does emerge in thought, is indisputable,
and the process and conditions are, for the most part, not
obscure. The facts involved are these : (a) there is an external con-

58 Studies in Theology.
crete universe ; (5) there are minds ; (c) the external concrete
does become an objective of thought by or to mind or minds.
The arranged conditions are these : (a) a deft, highly sensi
tive, marvelously complex organism is provided. It is a part
of the external concrete of things ; but it is an organic unit
composed of hving tissue — is a thing of life. In the external
organism is found an inner organism, or special system, of
more delicate mold, the tissues of which are infinitely sensitive
— so delicately impressible as to respond to the slightest exter
nal impingement. A ripple of light, or wavelet of shadow, or
impalpable odor even, cannot cross its disk without leaving its
condition of traces. Though shrined with infinite care to pro-
the concept, or , • -, ci .,t
arrangements tect it from the violence oi rude contact, it lies
for its produc- „ ... ... . .
tion. open, in five disks or foci, to receive impressions
from without, and transmit them, by a unique telegraphy, to a
common center, where the precise effect of impingement is
registered with the rapidity of thought, and more than photo
graphic accuracy. The external foci, which open outward to
the universe, as the free avenues of approach and contact, are
called the five senses. The inreaching nerves of sensation are
the ducts of the impression, and the convoluted brain is the of
fice of delivery and register. The impalpable, all-surrounding
ether is the freighted highway along which impinging forces
travel. Thus the objective universe plays a perpetual tune on
this more delicate than aeolian instrument.
In this infinitely delicate organism a mind is posited. What
is the mind ? It is not the impressible nerve, which
Mind, what? ... .
receives the impression : it is not the convoluted
brain, in which the impression is reported : it is not a part, or
resultant, of the organism : it is not a mere congeries of ideas :
it is not a minutest material atom : but it is a something which
has in it the deepest reahty of existence. More attenuate than
ether, more versatile and alert than electricity, it is yet more

Differentia of Idea and Concept. 59
solid and indestructible than granite or gold. Shrining itself
in the innermost core of the nerves of sensation, it feels the
slightest change produced by impingement upon them, and, by
a mysterious power, transmutes the sensation into thought, and
sends the concrete back into idea. Not apprehensible or de-
scribable under terms of matter, it is a supersensible being,
which thinks and feels and wills — an intellect, a sensibility,
a volitional agent, immortal and indestructible.
The synthesis of itself with the object, reveals in conscious
ness simply the mind as cognizing and the object as cognized.
Could it go no further, we should have nothing in thought, or
possible to thought, but the self-conscious ego and the individ
ualized object at any time present with it. But this we do not
find to be the case. On the contrary, we find that when the
object is removed, so as no longer to be present in Ego and non-
. „ . , . ego in the con-
Sensation or as affecting the sensory organism, the cept.
mind has power still to retain the thought-image, or concept
which its presence produced — the object is gone, but the con
cept remains. We find, further, that after the concept has
been displaced, and the mind has become occupied by some
other object, or a series of objects, it has a power by which,
without restoring the object, it can restore the thought-image,
or concept, and thus retain its hold on concepts and objects
after they have once been present ; so that a greater or less
multitude of these become, the permanent possession of the
mind. But were this all, the mind would still compass nothing but
itself in synthesis with a given number of objects, which have
been successively introduced to it by impingement on the sen
sory organism in which it is posited. By its power ciu^pf; re-
to restore the vanished object, or concept, it would th^obiecT11^
indeed, in a manner seem to deliver itself from the aDSent-
bondage of sensation, but it would still be so enslaved that it

60 Studies in Theology.
could not transcend in thought what had been given in sensa
tion and sensational consciousness — itself and the given num
ber of objects. The limit of its power would be to cognize
itself plus a series of objects transferred to it as pictured im
ages. But this we find is not the case. The mind discloses a
much larger power than this. To the power to restore these
concepts without the medium of the sensory instrument, it adds
the power to hold them as objects of study, to reflect upon
them, and compare them and classify them, and note the differ
ence between them.
From the objects themselves, as compared, classified, and
judged of, certain relations are seen to arise in the mind not
given in the individualized sensations or concepts arising with
the sensations ; by which they pass out of severalty into a co
herent whole or generalized unity — they are not atoms, but a
system. If the mental process started by sensation, could go no fur
ther than to reveal the object of sensation, or restore it when
absent, or hold it under attention and classify it among other
sensations, the mind would be hmited to external material
things and mere residuata of experience and commerce with
material things. It could not rise into the apprehension of the
supersensible. But, in point of fact, starting on this low plane, the mind is
The mind found to be possessed of a power to reach a much
reaches the su- . x
persensibie. higher range of ideas and realities. It begins in
the dust, though not of the dust ; but it does not stay there.
In a brief time it becomes aware of a new class of objects
which are not given iu sensation or discoverable by sense proc
esses. These new discoveries take their place in the mind,
not as pictured images of external objects, but as ideas of su
persensible realities discovered to the reason itself without
mediation of sense.

Differentia of Idea and Concept. 61
Succession in thoughts, or in the appearance and disappear
ance of objects of sense, involves time and evolves Meag of time
the idea of it, and gives it a place among the fixed space' p°wer-
ideas ; form and severalty of external objects elicits the idea of
space, which also becomes a fixed idea ; change and motion,
together with self-consciousness, give rise to the idea of power
and cause ; adaptation to ends, and consciousness, give rise to
the idea of a presiding intelligence as the ground of the uni
verse ; so ultimately mind rises to the supersensible, and stores
itself with ideas of these great realities.
Contemplating the concrete material universe, ministered to
the mind by sensation, it thinks it under categories of form, size,
color, space relations, solidity, density, fluidity, taste, odor, res
onance : these subjective concepts represent to it how the mind
/ . . tniDte exter-
the objective reahty, and suggest to it other super- naiiy.
sensible realities. When, turning from these external object
ives, it contemplates itself, it has the idea of the reality of its
own being ; but it finds itself incapable of thinking itself un
der any of these categories of form, color, space, density, odor,
taste, or any sensible qualities ; and simply conceives itself as
a being possessing powers of intelligence, feeling, will — a being
with faculties.
But it cannot stop with these ideas of the self and concrete
not-self. It discovers, in things, evidence of realities which
transcend both the self and the external concrete, and which
are not expressed in the categories which exhaust them. Its
search into itself, and the external objects which become known
to it, discovers the fact that they are finite, de- Theideaofthe
, . .... infinite — how
pendent, temporary. It discerns that that which is reached.
finite, dependent, temporary, must have an infinite, independ
ent, eternal ground. It thus rises to the idea of eternal cause.
And now emerges a new discovery ; namely, that idea ante
dates all finite reality. In tracing the history of the human

62 Studies in Theology.
idea, we found that concrete reality is antecedent to the con
cept ; and its synthesis with mind, the ground of the concept.
The world of human concepts is offspring of the world of real
ities, and a transcript of them in thought.
But now, when we turn to the world of realities, to examine
them, we find that the case is reversed : the realities are tran
scripts of pre-existing ideas — the idea is older than the reality.
ideas before -^-s we Push investigation, we discover that the con-
thmgs. crete universe falls within the limits of time — that
once it was non-existent. But we know that had there been
no reality or being of any kind, then no being could ever have
existed, as that would involve the coming of all reahty from
the empty womb of nothing, in contradiction of the axiom
intuitively perceived to be a necessary truth, ex nihilo nihil fit,
or, more generally formulated, there can be no effect without a
cause. But now, when continuing the investigation, we pass out
beyond all objective reality — that is, all dependent being, or
being originating in time, and come to that antecedent, inde-
dependent, eternal reality, the then only form of being, we are
compelled to conceive it as possessing the idea of the as yet
non-existing universe, as it is impossible it should give con-
creteness to ideas which it did not possess. Thus idea in its
original form is seen to be, not a concept of reahty propagated
by it in mind, but, on the contrary, it is found to be the eternal
mold into which reality is cast. The created objective is simply
the expression or evolved concrete realization of pre-existing
uncreated thought. The universe of real things is made after
the image or pattern of invisible things — eternal ideas. It is
that which makes the universe intelligible, or translatable into
thought. The unmeaning cannot be explained. That which
does not express thought cannot be put in the terms of thought.
An illustration may help us. The mind of man has faculty

Differentia of Idea and Concept. 63
not simply to observe existing things, but, in a certain sense, it
has power to create things after a pattern of its own thought,
and thus falls into analogy of the primitive creative act. The
idea becomes, in this case, antecedent to reality, and illustration of
the reality expresses the idea. When such a crea- ai idea.
tion has taken place, another human mind, coming into con
tact with the reality so created, not only discovers its existence,
but is able to detect the meaning of its several parts, and so to
return it to its original thought-form, or find the antecedent
idea after the pattern of which it was made. Understanding
the product, it finds that which antedated it — the archetypal
idea. All things that are intelligible emanate from intelli
gence, and have for their root an idea. Take for an illustra
tive case the invention of the steam-engine. The fact in the
case is, that up to a fixed date no such thing as a steam-engine
had any existence, either as an objective thing or an archetypal
idea — it was wholly non-existent. A mind was existent, and
the elements out of which the engine was to be made into
objective reality also existed. Now, how did the non-existing
engine find its way into being ? The case is an experimental
one. We know how it was, and do not have to depend on
the uncertainties of speculation. The already existing mind
exerted its intelligence, and formed an idea of certain modifi
cations and combinations of known existing materials, and of
results of power which would be made possible thereby. There
was no pattern to follow, there was nothing from which to
take the idea ; it was not a concept of any objective thing
propagated in the mind in any way : it was a pure product of
the mind, and its first form was that of an idea or pure thought.
The idea became a pattern or archetype. The next step was
to exert force on material, and put the idea in concrete reality.
The completed machine was the exact picture of the arche
typal idea, and it was impossible that it should ever have come

64 Studies in Theology.
into this state of concrete reahty except as the image of the
idea ; that is, it was a strict necessity that the idea should have
antecedent existence. The proof is, that mind must necessarily
exist in order to the idea, and that the idea must exist in order
to the machine. The completed machine is brought into rela
tions to another mind than that of the inventor. In this
mind there exists no such idea as is shrined in the machine,
and out of which it was born. What now is the process by
which this new mind acts, and what is the result ? It is certain
that it does not go through the same process as the first mind
did — a process of creation of the abstract idea. It sees the
machine — the concrete reality. Its reason takes the reality and
forms a picture of it to itself, which is the thought-image of it,
and so it returns by the operation of this faculty, or power of
reason, to the image which was in the mind of the creator as
an idea. The two minds have the machine in thought-form,
but in one the idea existed antecedently to the machine,
as an archetypal idea, and as the pattern after which it was
made ; in the other it exists in the same thought-form, but as
propagated in it by the machine, and an exact thought-image
of it.
When we say the concept is propagated in the beholding
mind by the external concrete, we do not mean to imply that
Meaning of the mind is inactive, and a mere passive recipient of
gatton. the image of the reality, as a mirror is ; but this —
that the object when presented to the mind in sensation becomes
the occasion or ground of a mental act by which is formed a
concept of the reality ; or the mind, so placed by a law of its
own, thinks the reahty ; and the idea or thought is said to be
propagated because it could not be produced by the mind
out of such relations. The object plus the mind, and plus the
mind's knowledge of itself as acting, are the conditions, sine
qua non, for the existence of the concept.

Differentia of Idea and Concept. 65
We have discriminated between archetypal ideas and con
cepts ; but there is still a further discrimination to Discrimination
be made, between ideas and archetypal ideas, and cept!dandCarI
ideas and concepts, for the further clearing of the olietyPal ldea-
subject. The terms all represent certain acts of the mind — purely
mental forms — and are of one genus, but are differentiable.
The general term thought includes them all. The archetypal
thought is that which antedates the concrete reality, and is the
pattern after which the concrete is fashioned ; the concept is
the reproduced idea as a thought corresponding with the con
crete reahty, or is the reality returned to thought-form. But
the mind is found to possess ideas which have no concrete real
ity answering to them, and which are, nevertheless, ideas of
reality, or may be. There are realities that are not concrete.
When the mind is drawn to the contemplation of these, it forms
to itself defined but unpicturable thoughts. In this case, as in
the case of concepts, the idea may or may not conform to the
truth, but in either case it exists as an idea. The mind has the
idea of truth, of right, of law, of the infinite. They are not
picturable, and differ from the concept, which is propagated by
contact with concrete reality. We employ the term concept as
the equivalent of our thoughts about reality, whether concrete
or abstract — all forms of mental affirmation. Whenever the
mind performs an intellection it fonns an idea or concept or
thought of some kind concerning some object. The idea may
be of some concrete reality, or mere reality of thought.
I subjoin a few definitions, which will suffice to indicate how
the matter has been treated in philosophical speculation by the
best minds : " By conception is meant the simple view we have
of the objects which are presented to our mind ; as when, for
instance, we think of the sun, the earth, a tree, a circle, a
square, thought, being, without forming any determinate judg-

66 Studies in Theology.
ment concerning them ; and the form through which we con
sider these things is called an idea." *
A conception is something derived from observation ; not so
ideas, which meet with nothing exactly answering to them
within the range of our experience. Thus, ideas are d priori,
conceptions are d posteriori / and it is only by means of the
former that the latter are really possible. For the bare fact,
taken by itself, falls short of the conception, which may be de
scribed as the synthesis of the fact and the idea. Thus we
have an idea of the universe, under which its different phe
nomena fall into place, and from which they take their mean
ing ; we have an idea of God, as Creator, from which we de
rive the power of conceiving that the impressions produced
upon our minds, through the senses, result from really existing
things ; we have an idea of the soul, which enables us to real
ize our own personal identity, by suggesting that a feeling,
conceiving, thinking subject exists as a substratum of every
sensation, conception, thought, f
" Every conception," says Coleridge, " has its sole reality in
its being referable to a thing, or class of things, of which, or
of the common character of which, it is a reflection. An idea
is a power, dvvafiig voepd, which constitutes its own reality, and
is, in order of thought, necessarily antecedent to the things in
which it is more or less adequately realized, while a conception
is as necessarily posterior." £
Conception is used to signify —
1. The power or faculty of conceiving, as when Mr. Stewart
says : " Under the article of conception I shall confine myself
to that faculty whose province it is to enable us to form a no
tion of our past sensations, or of the objects of sense that we
have formerly perceived."
* Port Eoyal Logic. f Chretien, " Essay on Logical Method," p. 137.
t "Notes on English Divines," 12mo, 1853, vol. i, p. 21.

Differentia of Idea and Concept. 67
2. The act or operation of this power or faculty. " Concep
tion," says Sir John Stoddart, " which is derived from con and
capio, expresses the action by which I take up together a por
tion of our sensations, as it were water in some vessel adapted
to contain a certain quantity." *
" Conception is the act by which we comprehend, by means
of a general notion, as distinguished both from the perception
of a present, and the imagination of an absent, individual." f
3. The result of the operation of this power or faculty ; as
when Dr. Whewell says : " Our conceptions are that, in the
mind, which we denote by our general terms ; as, a triangle, a
square number, a force." $
These attempts at definition show how easy it is to confuse
things that in themselves seem plain and simple, and how im
portant it is to aim at more definite meanings of terms em
ployed technically. We have seen that there are three general
distinctions in the term idea : first, the distinction of the arche
typal idea, or the thought which antedates the concrete, and
into which it is run, and of which it is the expression ; second,
the idea which the mind has of concrete reality when brought
into relation with it ; third, the idea which the mind creates to
itself of reality which does not take concrete mold. These
three forms we reduce to the one term, conceptions or concepts,
by which we mean the thought-forms which exist in the mind,
however occasioned. These forms, when propagated by con
tact with the concrete, are picture images which represent the
reality in thought ; and they are still picture images when, by
a power of the mind, they are restored when the concrete is
absent. When they respect realities which are not concrete, as
of love, truth, doubt, law, power, and all such things, they are
* " Universal Grammar," in "Encyclopedia Metropolitana."
f " North British Eeview," No. 27, p. 45.
i Preface to the " Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," p. 13.

68 Studies in Theology.
ideas of realities which, nevertheless, do exist, but which, not
having form or color, cannot be imaged. These include all
notions, ideas, thoughts, and predicates of whatever kind, the
material of which is not given in sensation, but which, nev
ertheless, may have been started by sensation, and, possibly,
never could have arisen had no outward sensation been expe
rienced. Sensation is the antecedent ground of human intel
lection. In a certain sense, there is no resemblance between an idea
and a thing — a concrete object and the concept of
biance between ft. They are, indeed, utter opposites. One is mate-
an Idea and a J ' ' x x
thing. riai5 the other immaterial. One a thing, the other
a thought. And yet, as the mirror reflects the image of the ob
ject before it, so the mind in thought creates the image of the
object. The image on the mirror we behold, and see the corre
spondence between object and image. The image in the mind
it beholds, and sees the correspondence between the object and
image. In what way the image is transferred in the first case
we understand ; in the second we do not. The concept is,
without doubt, the image of the concrete reality. Touch and
sight agree in their report. There is an external object, and,
for all purposes, the concept represents it — it is simply the
mind seeing the object, or, in the case of touch, feeling its
form. There is no more difficulty in the supposition of a real
material object and its exact image in the thought, than there
is in accounting for the thought itself. There is no ground
for inferring that the object has not external existence inde
pendently of the concept, or for inferring that it is not pre
cisely what thought represents it to be, a thing, in the common-
sense meaning of the term. There is, on the contrary, every
reason for asserting that it is precisely what thought declares
it to be.
Things do not exist independently of all mind, but they are

Differentia of Idea and Concept. 69
separable reahties from any mind. They are a product of
mind, but they are not ideas of mind. The pat- Things not in
tern of them existed in idea when as yet they were mind.
not. Power made them to be real objective things after the
idea. The finite mind has power to cognize them as objec
tive realities, which, as such, existed before they were cognized,
and would continue to exist if all finite mind were obliterated.
The historic order is : first, an eternal mind, the one only
reality, holding in idea a universe not yet existing ; second, a
creative act, by which a universe of objective, concrete being
was fashioned after the pattern of antecedent ideas. Subse
quent to that creative act there were and are two kinds of being
— one, the uncreated, independent, which anterior to the crea
tion was the only being ; the other, a created form of being,
which, prior to the creative act, had no existence except as a
thought, but which, by the creative act, became a reality and not
a thought ; third, created mind — a real being or beings intro
duced into existence long posterior to the creation of things,
which, by a power invested in it, is able to see the antecedent
things as they are in reality — things expressing ideas. The
three kinds of being are distinct and real, and sep- Historic order
° . . of idea and the
arable in thought : the first, eternal, spiritual ; the concrete.
second, temporal, material ; the third, temporal, spiritual : the
second and third dependent on and caused by the first ; the
second in no sense dependent on or caused by the third ; the
third not caused by the second, but served by it ; the first and
third of the same nature, but differenced as infinite and finite ;
the second wholly differentiable in nature from the first and
third. In the first, idea is archetypal ; in the second, idea is
concrete ; in the third, idea is derivative.
In the second, the individualized parts are individualized
exponents of thoughts ; the whole, is the separable thoughts
wrought into rational and coherent discourse. The third, de-

70 Studies in Theology.
tects the thought expressed in the second, and reads the mean
ing intended to be expressed by the first.
According to the view we take, the universe of objective
reality is not a mere mass of unintelligible being evolved by
power of some kind, or existing in some way, but it is an intel
ligible organic unity, every part of which has meaning, and
the whole of which is an expression of ineffable wisdom —
Materiality not a mass of embodied concrete thought. In its cause
bie mass. it originally existed in idea. Power lifted it into
concrete reality, after the pattern of archetypal ideas. The
things so created express the thought of the creator. To
understand them, is to translate them back into the thought-
pattern, or to have the idea which was in the mind that pro
duced them, or to find the meaning in them which the creator
designed to express, and so to come into communion with the
eternal thought.
Would the external concrete of things exist were there no
finite created mind to perceive them ? or is the act of the cre
ated perceiving mind an essential part of the ground of their
existence ?
There can be no rational doubt that the universe exists inde
pendently of finite mind. The sole cause of its existence is in
the eternal, not in the temporal. It is a possible and probable
fact, that it would not have been created had there not been a
purpose to create mind ; but, it was created before mind, and has
universe not a completed existence of its own. The parts of
dependent on , x
unite mM. the universe have functions among themselves.
Were there no finite mind to be served by it, it would still exist.
Gravitation would continue to bind the spheres together if all
created mind were obliterated, as it did ages before there were
created minds. Chemistry performs its miracles irrespective
of created minds. Vegetation blooms where no created mind
beholds it. All the processes of nature were carried forward

Differentia of Idea and Concept. 71
through geological seons before finite mind knew them, and
would go forward if finite mind were now wholly eliminated.
As we have reason to believe that there is a correspondence
between the concrete external objective reality and the ante
cedent archetypal idea in the original creation, precisely as we
find in the case of subsidiary creations or inventions — and, as we
have reason to beheve that the concept which is produced in,
or by, the observing mind, when brought into relations of the
concrete reahty, corresponds with the reahty, and so with the
archetypal idea before it was put in the concrete in the case
of original creations, just as is the case in subsidiary human
creations — so, further, we have reason to believe that the con
crete not merely represents the antecedent archetypal idea,
but something deeper still in the mind which possessed it,
namely, a purpose which gave birth to the expression — the
proper end or aim of the expression. In the case of the
human invention, the concrete is designed not simply to embody
the archetypal idea, but to serve an end, either of satisfying
the love of the beautiful, as in the case of idealized creations of
art, or the useful, as in the case of machinery. The mind, by
an inherent law, discovers in the end served what the moving
purpose was. We detect the same facts pervading the older
original creation, and have reason to believe an end of beauty
or usefulness the ground or moving cause there, also. The
concrete is overspread with beauty as well as utility, and utility
as well as beauty. It is a just inference, and the only rational
one, that the creative mind feels the emotion of beauty, or
sense of the beautiful, and is actuated by the desire of the use
ful ; and creation exists to give expression to both the beautiful
and good, the deeper ground of archetypal ideas. The arche
typal ideas and the concrete creation thus express both the per
fection of the reason and the moral nature of the creator. He
is seen to be not only an intellect, with ideas ; but a will, with

72 Studies in Theology.
creative energy ; and a nature actuated by affections moving
him to the realization of the beautiful and good.
In the further discussion we are to consider the veraciousness
of our thoughts, and the laws and limitations of knowing and
beheving. The object of the present chapter has been to find
out in what way we become possessed of them. We do have
thoughts, ideas, notions, concepts ; we have endeavored to show
how they arise. The question of their value remains to be
discussed. We have found that, to begin with, the mind is void of
Mind is a mere thought — a mere tabula rasa. It has power to
tabula rasa. tMnk> In thought it is self-conscious, or self-know
ing. It does not come into self-consciousness until thought
takes place. Thought implies an object. The object must in
some way impinge upon the mind to become an object of
thought or for thought. The universe of concrete things and
supersensible realities are objects for thought when the mind is
brought into relations with them, not before. They can be
thought — but to be thought they must in some way pass into
the mind, or impinge upon it ; in no other way can it think
them. When objects are thus brought into relation with mind,
it casts them in thought-form. To it they are what it thinks
them. In themselves they are what they are. The thought-
form of reality is not an accident. The mind has its laws. It
must think under these laws. It feels a sensation. It can
not think the sensation as something different from what it
is. It cannot think itself as not having it. It cannot think
itself as not the subject of the sensation. It cannot think there
is no objective ground of it. It cannot change the sensation
into something else. The law is a universal law of all mind,
in similar circumstances. The sensation emerges in thought-
form under a law. It is this, not that, in thought or for
thought. A tree is a tree, a triangle is a triangle. The tree

Differentia of Idea and Concept. 73
cannot emerge as something else, the triangle as a square or
circle. Under strict and invariable laws mind, as such, acts.
All minds act under the same laws. Sensation mediates the
same thought-form to all minds in similar circumstances. For
thought the material concrete universe is the same to all minds.
The sun is the sun, the earth the earth. Each individualized
object emerges in every mind upon which it impinges, in the
same thought-form. The mind goes forth among the infinite
complex of things, and stores itself with thoughts of them. It
then classifies them according to some scientific basis, or
according to certain differences and resemblances which it
notes. It retains the thought of them when they cease to
be present in sensation, with greater or less vividness. The
general agreement of all minds with respect to these object
ives enables them to compare these retained thought-forms,
and to communicate them by symbols which they invent for
that purpose. The universe is the same for all, just in the
degree in which it is thought or observed.
These thought-forms, the mind constantly affirms, have
answering objective realities ; that is, there is such a universe,
apart from the thought of it. No form of idealism ^ unlversei
makes any permanent headway against this convic- j}^ bought6
tion. But with that question at present we are not 0l "•
concerned. The one point we have in view is this : to indi
cate that mind is a being, which, by a process of sensations
which it refers to external objective impingement, possesses
itself of thought-forms of what it assumes to be a real uni-
verse, and that these thought-forms arise under fixed laws, and
are invariably the same in similar circumstances. Whether or
not there are external objects, for the present is matter of no
concern to us. Minds inhabit a universe, and one that is the
same to all, whether it be a mere ideal or an actual external
universe. So much is admitted. The mind is formed to
6

74 Studies ln Theology.
have ideas of things not given in sensation, but which are
supersensible. These are not first in the time-order of their
appearance, but emerge early in the mental life — as 'ideas of
love, truth, power, cause, time, space, existence. These the
mind, by a law of reason, detects as not less real than the ex
ternal objectives of its thought.
SECTION IV- KNOWLEDGE.
The words knowledge and belief, and the phrases, I know, I
whatisknowi- beheve, I think so, it is my opinion, I conjecture, I
e6ge? imagine, I fancy, are in common use among all
Englfsh-speaking people ; and their equivalents are, or have
been, in use in all other languages, hving and dead.
Precisely what is the force of meaning in these terms and
phrases, and so what is the exact difference between them, is
an important question to one who seeks to determine accurately
the measure and kind of affirmation they imply. They all af
firm something with respect to some proposition or thing. In
many minds, without doubt, their meanings run close together,
and become indiscriminate and confused ; and especially this is
so of all those which follow after the first term or phrase.
Howdetennine How shall we determine which of our concepts
knoTiedges are knowledges, which beliefs, and which mere un-
and beliefs? founded fancies ?
There are certain particulars in which they all agree. They
alike imply the presence in the mind of defined conceptions.
They each and severally imply a degree of conviction that the
concept represents some truth. They each express an affirming
act or state of the mind with respect to the concept, or the ob
ject which it represents.
Wherein do they differ ? It is usual to answer simply in
this respect : that one term, the first in the series, expresses ab
solute certainty of the truth of the affirmation; the other

What is Knowledge ? 75
terms express a variable degree of uncertainty. It cannot be
doubted that in ordinary this is the actual differentiation. But
since the act of belief may include absolute certainty, to the
exclusion of all doubt, as it often does, and the term knowl
edge can rise no higher in this respect, the mere feeling of
certainty cannot, after all, be the adequate discrimination or
differentiation, for both include it. There must be some still
deeper ground.
What is that deeper ground ? It often occurs that what we
think we know, as well as what we believe without any con
scious doubt (and there is no doubt below conscious- jg certainty
ness), turns out not to be true. We evidently did not kn°wiedge?
know in the case ; we certainly did believe, in the very strongest
sense of the term, or in the highest degree. The falsity of
the conviction determines the absence of knowledge, but does
not change the fact of behef. Certainty did not denote knowl
edge. We must find some other ground or condition to denote
knowing or knowledge. It is not the equivalent of the most
absolute certainty. Knowledge does include certainty, but cer
tainty does not imply, and is not the equivalent of, knowledge.
When we affirm knowledge of a thing, we do not, then, mean
simply that we have a subjective feeling of certainty, but, fur
ther, that we are in such relations to the reality that it is im
possible that it should turn out contrary to our subjective cer
tainty. The truth of the concept is a necessary concomitant of
the knowing act. A belief may be contrary to the truth, but
knowledge cannot be.
To determine when we have knowledge, we must go beyond
mere subjective certainty, therefore, to the conditions under
which that certainty takes possession of us, and the conditions
determine whether or not it is knowledge.
When we define knowledge, or knowing, to be that state or
act of the mind arising from its relation to an object, in which

76 Studies in Theology.
it determines that a thing is as it appears to it to be, and may
not by possibility be different, its own act being necessitated from
its own nature and relations to the object, this is not, as is some
times assumed, limiting knowledge, or the power of knowing
to necessary truths. There are necessary truths, and they may
Knowledge not be known as such. In such case the mind stands in
essary truth.60" such relations to necessary truths as necessitates it to
affirm, not only that they are truths, but necessary truths. There
are things which are just as true as necessary truths, but they
might not have been true ; there was no necessity that they
should exist : the very opposite might have been true. But
when the mind knows these unnecessary truths to be true, they
are discovered to be as really true as if it had forever been
impossible they should be otherwise : and the mind, in given
relations, is as much necessitated to affirm their truth, with the
certainty that it cannot now be otherwise, as it would be if it
discovered that they themselves were what they are by an eter
nal necessity. When the act of knowing takes place, that
which is known is, and it is now impossible that it should not
be. It might not have been — but when it is, it is impossible
that it should not be ; for that would be the contradiction of
affirming that that which is, possibly is not. This is not the
same as affirming that whatever is could not have been other
wise ; but, being, it cannot not be ; and being known to be, it
cannot not be, or be different. What has been and what is, is
now fixed by eternal necessity as having been or being. A
thing once known to be, becomes an eternalized fact, and it
now never can be, that it was not. The thing may pass away,
but it can never cease to be true that it was as known. What
will be will be, though there is no present causal necessity that
it should be.
" Necessary truths are such as are known independently of
inductive proof. They are, therefore, either self-evident propo-

What is Knowledge? 77
sitions or deduced from self-evident propositions." * " Neces
sary truths are those by which we not only learn that NecesSary
the proposition is true, but see that it must be true ; tTutbs' what!
in which the negative is not only false, but impossible ; in
which we cannot, even by an effort of the imagination or in
supposition, conceive the reverse of what is asserted. The re
lations of numbers are examples of such truths. Two and
three make five. We cannot conceive it to be otherwise.
" A necessary truth, or law of reason, is a truth or law the
opposite of which is inconceivable, contradictory, nonsensical,
impossible ; more shortly, it is a truth in the fixing of which
nature had only one alternative, be it positive or negative.
Nature might have fixed that the sun should go round the
earth, instead of the earth round the sun ; at least we see noth
ing in that supposition which is contradictory and absurd.
Either alternative was equally possible. But nature could not
have fixed that two straight lines should, in any circumstance,
inclose a space, for this involves a contradiction." f
" Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence
to reason, we may conceive to be otherwise. If I Contingent
say, ' Socrates was a philosopher,' I assert a propo- trutns' what?
sition which is true, but need not have been so. There are
truths of reason and truths of fact. Truths of reason are neces
sary, and their contradictory is impossible ; those of fact are
contingent, and their opposite possible. When a truth is neces
sary, you can find the reason by analysis, resolving it into ideas
and truths more simple, till you come to what is primitive." \
Knowing is not the same as, or the equivalent of, not doubt
ing, since we are conscious often of being in a state of non-
doubt about a point which turns out to be otherwise. It is not
simply, therefore, certainty that the thing is, as assumed, but
* Whately, " Logic, Appendix.''
f Kidd, " Principles of Reasoning." J Leibnitz.

78 Studies in Theology.
certainty arising from the relations of the mind to the object ;
in other words, it is a certainty which cannot be reversed or
viewed by the mind as possible to be changed into uncertainty.
It is the mind seeing, not surmising, not inferring, not be
lieving. The mind may be so related to a fact or thing which is per
fectly contingent, that is, whose existence was at one time not
at all necessary, but which has become reality, as to know its
reality, or the truth that it is, as fully as it knows necessary
truths. In the one case it sees that the thing is necessarily
true, and was and will be so found ; in the other case it knows
that the fact or thing is, and affirms, with no difference of ne
cessity, as to its own law of action, and is no more capable of
taking a different view, or being made to doubt, in the one
case than in the other. I know that I exist, and that the world
exists, as surely as I know that a part is less than the whole.
The one characteristic of knowledge holds in all knowing — it
is simply the mind seeing its object in such manner that doubt
is impossible. It cannot be said to know any thing of which
it is possible to bring it to feel that it may be otherwise.
That admitted possibility would show that it only believed,
and did not know.
" Knowledge is the perception of truth. Whatever the
mind perceives, whether intuitively or discursively, to be true,
Hodge's deflm- that it knows. We have immediate knowledge of
tion of knowl- ...» „ . ,
edge. all the facts of consciousness; and with regard to
other matters, some we can demonstrate, some we can prove
analogically, some we must admit or involve ourselves in con
tradictions and absurdities. Whatever process the mind may
institute, if it arrives at a clear perception that a thing is, then
that thing is an object of knowledge. It is thus we know the
objects with which heaven and earth are crowded. It is thus
we know our fellow-men. With regard to any thing without

What is Knowledge? 79
us, when our ideas or convictions concerning it correspond to
what the thing really is, then we know it.* How do we know
that our dearest friend has a soul, and that that soul has intelli
gence, moral excellence, and power? We cannot see or feel it.
We cannot form a mental image of it. It is mysterious and
incomprehensible, yet we know that it is, and what it is, just as
certainly as we know that we ourselves are, and what we are.
In the same way we know that God is, and what he is. We
know that he is a spirit, that he has intelligence, moral excel
lence, and power to an infinite degree. We know that he can
love, pity, and pardon — that he can hear and answer prayer.
We know God in the same sense, and just as certainly, as we
know our father or mother. And no man can take this knowl
edge from us, or persuade us that it is not knowledge, but a
mere irrational belief." f
We cannot but think that this definition of the great doctor
is open to serious objections. While we do not doubt that the
matters herein said to be known are in themselves true, the
account given of the knowing act is inconsequent, and contrary
to reality.
How do we differentiate beheving from knowing ? We know
the difference. Any intelligent child knows the difference, but
it might be difficult for many, with trained minds, to express it,
and still more difficult to fix a precise point of demarcation, so
as to say, this is knowledge, this is belief.
As indicated already, there are several words that represent
states or acts of mind which have traces of resemblance, but
which are distinct — knowledge, behef, opinion, conjecture,
* A thing might correspond with our concept of it, and yet it might not be
knowledge. The correspondence does not alone determine that it is a knowl
edge. It must be a correspondence arising under right conditions, or otherwise it
may be the mere accident of a conjecture.
+ Hodge's "Systematic Theology," vol. i, p. 360.

80 Studies ln Theology.
fancy. The extremes are wide apart and easy to be distin
guished, but there is a certain confluence of idea throughout.
There are some things in common : in each of these states, and
Things in com- alike, the mind has an object of thought; in each,
»nf wand t^e mind affirms definitely of the object ; in each, the
believing. mind is more or less confident that its affirmation is
true. These are points of resemblance. There is one point of
identity — it is the same mind employed in all the cases.
Wherein, then, is the difference ? (a.) It is not in the fact that
the object is more clearly before the mind in the one case than
the other. There is no doubt that matters of belief are gener
ally more indistinct than matters of knowledge; but this is not
necessarily so. A proposition may be as unequivocal as any re
ality, (b.) It is not in the fact that the mind is more conscious
of doubt or uncertainty in the one case than in the other. There
is no question that doubt and uncertainty more or less attaches
to beliefs, and that they neither can nor do exist with regard
to knowledges ; but a belief may and often does exclude all
doubt, (c.) It is not in the fact that what is known is true,
and what is believed is not true. It is a fact that, what is
believed is not always true, and what is known always is ; but,
since some things believed are true, the difference is not in
that which may be, and sometimes is, common to both states.
id.) It does not consist in that, what is known is important, and
what is believed is not important. The difference is found
in the following points: 1.) The mind is differently related
to the objects of knowledge and belief. This difference
of relation makes knowledge *a necessary fact in one case,
and impossible in another, and belief possible in one case and
Difference be- not iQ another. 2.) Things known are necessarily
ingllndSv- true as known; things believed may not be true.
ing. 3^ Things known cannot be doubted; things be
heved may be brought into doubt. 4.) Knowledge cannot be

What is Knowledge ? 81
changed into belief ; belief may pass into knowledge. 5.) There
is no difference in the certainty which attends knowledge;
there is a difference in the certainty which attends behef.
I introduce here several definitions from high authorities,
that we may see the term in every possible angle of vision. It
is important not simply to know the difference between know
ing and believing, in a general way, but to find the precise
boundary — the point where one begins and the other ends.
Day, in his " Outlines of Ontological Science," says : " Grada
tions of knowledge * are measured off in the relative strength
of conviction or the knowing act when the judgment is sub
stantial and not empty form, and when its supports are true
and real. These degrees of conviction shade into one another,
and allow no determinate line of separation. The lowest of
these grades is conjecture, or guess, f Here the judgment has
just passed out of the realm of doubt, and taken into itself a
measure of real hfe, while at the same time it rests on solid,
not illusory, grounds.
"A higher degree is opinion or belief. The conviction of
the judgment here is weak because of the insufficiency of the
hght. The grounds are real, but not adequate to the firmest
assurance." % This is a statement of belief, but not of knowl
edge." A still higher degree is certainty of knowledge. Here
the judgment moves forth in fullness of light on substantial
grounds, and, therefore, attains the strength of unfailing as
surance." This is knowledge.
" Knowledge," says Locke, " is the perception of the connec
tion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of
* There are no gradations of knowledge. What is known is known. All
knowledge has all that constitutes knowing — no knowledge has anything more.
f What confusion of thought is implied in a statement which makes mere guess
a grade of knowledge.
% Day's " Outlines of Ontological Science," p. 56.

82 Studies in Theology.
our ideas. Where this perception is, there is knowledge ; and
where it is not, then, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, we
always come short of knowledge ; * and in chapter xiv he says,
" The mind has two faculties conversant about truth and false
hood : First, Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives and is
undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any
ideas ; second, Judgment, which is the putting ideas together or
separating them from one another, in the mind, when their cer
tain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed
to be so." Knowledge is here opposed to opinion. But judg
ment is the faculty by which we attain to certainty as well as to
opinion. " And," says Dr. E,eid,f " I know no authority, be
sides that of Mr. Locke, for calling knowledge a faculty, any
more than for calhng opinion a faculty."
"Knowledge implies three things: 1. Firm Behef ; % 2. Of
what is true; 3. On sufficient grounds. If any one, for exam
ple, is in doubt respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he
cannot be said to know the proposition proved by it ; if, again,
he is fully convinced of any thing that is not true, he is mistaken
in supposing himself to know it ; lastly, if two persons are
each fully confident, one, that the moon is inhabited, and the
other that it is not (though one of these opinions must be true),
neither of them could properly be said to know the truth,
since he cannot have sufficient proof of it." § Knowledge
supposes three terms : a being who knows, an object known,
and a relation determined between the knowing being and the
known object. This relation properly constitutes knowledge.
But this relation may not be exact — not in conformity with
* Locke's " Essay on the Human Understanding," book iv, chap. i.
f " Intellectual Powers," Essay iv, chap. iii.
X Knowledge excludes belief. What is known by the mind cannot be reduced
to any kind of belief.
§ Whately, " Logic," book iv, chap, ii, sec. 2.

What is Knowledge ? 83
the nature of things ; knowledge is not truth. Knowledge is a
subjective conception — a relative state of the human mind ; it
resides in the relation, essentially ideal, of our thought and its
object. Truth, on the contrary, is the reality itself, the reality
ontological and absolute, considered in their absolute relations
with intelligence, and independent of our personal conception.
Truth has its source in God ; knowledge proceeds from man.
Knowledge is true and perfect from the moment that our con
ception is really conformable to that which is — from the mo
ment that our thought has seized the reality. And, in this
view, truth may be defined to be the conformity of our thought
with the nature of its object.
" But truth is not yet certitude. It may exist in itself without
being acquired by the human mind, without existing actually
for us. It does not become certain to us till we have acquired
it by the employment of method. Certitude is thus truth
brought methodically to the human intelligence — that is, con
ducted from principle to principle to a point which is evident
of itself. If such a point exist, it is plain that we can attain to
all the truths which attach themselves to it directly or indi
rectly ; and that we may have of these truths, however remote,
a certainty as complete as that of the point of departure."
"Certitude, then, in its last analysis, is the. relation of truth
to knowledge, the relation of man to God, of ontology to psy
chology. When the human intelligence, making its spring,
has seized divine truth in identifying itself with the reality, it
ought then, in order to finish its work, to return upon itself,
to individualize the truth in us ; and from this individualiza
tion results the certitude which becomes, in some sort, per
sonal as knowledge, all the while preserving the impersonal
nature of truth."
" Certitude, then, reposes upon two points of support, the
one subjective — man or the human consciousness — the other

84 Studies in Theology.
objective and absolute — the Supreme Being. God and con
sciousness are the two arbiters of certitude." *
" The schoolmen divided all human knowledge into two spe
cies, cognitio intuitwa and cognitio abstraetwa. By intuitive
knowledge they signified that which we gain by an immediate
presentation of the real individual object; by abstractive, that
which we gain and hold through the medium of a general
term ; the one being, in modern language, a perception, the
other a concept." f
Leibnitz took a distinction between knowledge as intuitive
or symbolical. When I behold a triangle actually delineated,
and think of it as a figure with three sides and three angles,
etc., according to the idea of it in my mind, my knowledge is
mtuitwe. But when I use the word triangle, and know what
it means without explicating all that is contained in the idea of
it, my knowledge is blind or symbolical. %
"A thing is known immediately or proximately when we
cognize it in itself; mediately or remotely when we cognize
it in or through something numerically different from itself.
Immediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself,
involves the fact of its existence ; mediate cognition, thus the
knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself,
involves only the possibility of its existence.
" An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is
itself presented to observation, may be called a presentalive ;
and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed by
the mind face to face, may be called an intuitive cognition.
A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up
or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be
called a representative cognition.
* Tiberghien, " Essai des Connais. Hum.,'' p. 34.
f Morell, " Psychology," p. 158.
X Leibnitz, "DeCognitione,"etc.; Wolf, "Psychology Empirical," sec. 286, 289.

What is Knowledge? 85
" A thing known is an object of knowledge.
" In a presentative or immediate cognition, there is one sole
object, the thing immediately known and the thing existing be
ing one and the same. In a representative or mediate cognition
there may be discriminated two objects — the thing immediately
known and the thing existing being numerically different.
" A thing known in itself is the (sole) presentative or intui
tive object of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a presentative
or intuitive knowledge. A thing known in and through some
thing else is the primary, mediate, remote, real, existent, or
represented object of (mediate) knowledge — objective quod;
and a thing through which something else is known, is the sec
ondary, immediate, proximate, ideal, vicarious, or representa
tive object of (mediate) knowledge — objectum quo or per quod.
The former may likewise be styled objeetum entitatioum." *
Knowledge, in respect of the mode in which it is obtained,
is intuitive or discursive; intuitive when things are seen in
themselves by the mind, or when objects are so clearly exhib
ited that there is no need of reasoning to perceive them, as a
whole is greater than any of its parts ; discursive, when objects
are perceived by means of reasoning, as, the sum of the angles
of a triangle is equal to two right angles. In respect of its
strength, knowledge is certain ox probable. If we attend to the
degrees or ends of knowledge, it is either science, or art, or
experience, or opinion, or belief.
" Knowledge is not a couch whereon to rest a searching and
restless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind
to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state
for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding
ground for strife and contention, or a shop for profit or sale,
but a rich store-house for the glory of the Creator and the
relief of man's estate." f
* Sir W. Hamilton, " Eeid's Works," note B, sec. 1. \ Bacon.

86 Studies in Theology.
" Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagree
ment of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the
intervention of any other ; and this, I think, we may call intui
tive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of prov
ing or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth the
light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the mind per
ceives, that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle,
that three are more than two, and equal to one and two." *
" What we know or comprehend as soon as we perceive or
attend to it, we are said to know by intuition ; things that we
know by intuition cannot be made more certain by arguments
than they are at first. We know by intuition that all the
parts of a thing together are equal to the whole of it. Axioms
are propositions known by intuition." f
"Intuition has been applied by Dr. Beattie and others, not
only to the power by which we perceive the truth of the
axioms of geometry, but to that by which we recognize the
authority of the fundamental laws of belief, when we hear
them enunciated in language. My only objection to this use
of the word is, that it is a departure from common practice,
according to which, if I be not mistaken, the proper objects of
intuition are propositions analogous to the axioms prefixed to
Euchd's Elements. In some other respects this innovation
might, perhaps, be regarded as an improvement on the very
limited and imperfect vocabulary of which we are able to avail
ourselves in our present discussions." \
" Intuition is properly attributed, and should be carefully
restricted, to those instinctive faculties and impulses, external
and internal, which act instantaneously and irresistibly, which
were given by nature as the first inlets of all knowledge, and
* Locke, " Essay on the Human Understanding," book iv, chap. ii.
f Taylor, " Elements of Thought."
X Stewart, "Elements," part ii, chap, i, sec. 2.

What is Knowledge? 87
which we have called the Primary Principles, while self-evi
dence may be justly and properly attributed to axioms, as the
Secondary Principles of truth." *
On the difference between knowledge as intuitive, imme
diate, or presentative, and as mediate or representative, see Sir
W. Hamilton, "Eeid's Works," note B.
" Intuition is used in the extent of the German auschauung,
to include all the products of the perceptive (external or inter
nal) and imaginative faculties ; every act of consciousness, in
short, of which the immediate object is an individual thing,
state, or act of mind, presented under the condition of dis
tinct existence in space or time." f
" Besides its original and proper meaning (as a visual per
ception), it has been employed to denote a kind of apprehension
and a kind of judgment. Under the former head it has been
used to denote, 1. A perception of the actual and present, in
opposition to the abstractive knowledge which we have of the
possible in imagination and of the past in memory. 2. An
immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, in contrast to a
representative, vicarious, or mediate apprehension of it, in or
through something else. (Hence by Fichte, Schelling, and
others intuition is employed to designate the cognition, as op
posed to the conception, of the absolute.) 3. The knowledge
which we can adequately represent in imagination, in contra
distinction to the ' symbolical ' knowledge which we cannot
image, but only think or conceive, through and under a sign
or word. (Hence, probably, Kant's application of the terms to
the forms of the sensibility, the imaginations of time and space,
in contrast to the forms or categories of the understanding.)
4. Perception proper (the objective) in contrast to sensation
proper (the subjective), in our sensitive consciousness. 5. The
* Tatham, " Chart and Scale of Truth," chap, vii, sec. 1.
f Mansel, " Prolegom. Logic," p. 9.

88 Studies in Theology.
simple apprehension of a notion, in contradistinction to the
complex apprehension of the terms of a proposition.
" Under the latter head it has only a- single signification,
namely, to denote the immediate affirmative by the intellect ;
the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject- in what
are called self-evident propositions." *
SECTION V.-BELIEF DISTINGUISHED FROM KNOWLEDGE.
" Belief, assent, conviction, are words which I do not think
admit of logical definition, because the operation of mind sig
nified by them is perfectly simple and of its own kind. Be
lief must have an object ; for he who believes must believe
something, and that which he believes is the object of his
belief. Belief is always expressed in language by a proposi
tion wherein something is affirmed or denied. Belief admits
of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assur
ance. There are many operations of mind of which it is an
essential ingredient, as consciousness, perception, remembrance.
We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of be
lief. What this evidence is, is more easily felt than described.
The common occasions of life lead us to distinguish evidence
into different kinds ; such as the evidence of sense, of memory,
of consciousness, of testimony, of axioms, and of reasoning. I
am not able to find any common nature to which they may all
be reduced. They seem to me to agree only in this, that they
are all fitted by nature to produce belief in the human mind." f
" St. Austin accurately says, ' We know what rests upon rea
son ; we believe what rests upon authority.' But reason itself
must rest at last upon authority ; for the original data of rea
son do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted by
reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data
* Sir W. Hamilton, "Reid's Works," note A, sec. 5, p. 759.
t Reid, " Intell. Powers," Essay ii, chap, xx, and " Inquiry," chap, xx, sec. 5.

What is Belief? 89
are, therefore, in rigid propriety, beliefs or trusts. Thus it is
that in the last resort we must, perforce, philosophically admit
that belief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason
the ultimate ground of belief. We are compelled to surrender
the proud intellige ut credos of Abelard, to content ourselves
with the humble crede ut intelUgas of Anselm." *
" To believe is to admit a thing as true, on grounds sufficient,
subjectively ; insufficient, objectively." f
" The word beheving has been variously and loosely em
ployed. It is frequently used to denote states of consciousness
which have already their separate and appropriate appellations.
Thus it is sometimes said, ' I beheve in my own existence and
the existence of an external world ; I believe in the facts of
nature, the axioms of geometry, the affections of my own
mind,' as well as ' I believe in the testimony of witnesses, or in
the evidence of historical documents.' "
" Setting aside the loose application of the term, I propose
to confine it, first, to the effect on the mind of the premises in
what is termed probable reasoning, or what I have named con
tingent reasoning — in a word, the premises of all reasoning but
that which is demonstrative ; and, secondly, to the state of hold
ing true when that state, far from being the effect of any prem
ises discerned by the mind, is dissevered from all evidence." %
" I propose to restrict the term belief to the assent to propo
sitions, and demarcate it from those inferences which are made
in the presence of objects, and have reference to them. I
would say, we believe in the proposition ' fire burns,' but know
the fact that the paper about to be thrust into the flames will
ignite." §
* Sir William Hamilton, " Reid's Works," note A, sec. 5.
f Kant, " Crit. de la Bois. Prat," p. 11.
X Bailey, " Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," p. 75.
§ Lewes, "Biograph. Hist, of Philosophy," p. 492.

90 Studies in Theology.
" Man knows some things and is ignorant of many things,
while he is in doubt as to other things. Doubt is that state of
mind in which we hesitate as to two contradictory conclusions
— having no preponderance of evidence in favor of either.
Philosophical doubt has been distinguished as provisional
or definitive. Definitive doubt is skepticism. Provisional,
methodical doubt, is a voluntary suspending of our judgment
for a time, in order to come to a more clear and sure conclu
sion. This was first given as a rule in philosophical method
by Descartes, who tells us that he began by doubting every
thing, discharging his mind of all preconceived ideas, and ad
mitting none as clear and true till he had subjected them to a
rigorous examination.
" Doubt is some degree of belief, along with the conscious
ness of ignorance, in regard to a proposition. Absolute disbe
lief implies knowledge ; it is the knowledge that such or such
a thing is not true. If the mind admits a proposition with
out any desire for knowledge concerning it, this is credulity.
If it is open to receive the proposition, but feels ignorance
concerning it, this is doubt. In proportion as knowledge in
creases doubt diminishes, and belief or disbelief strengthens." *
" The essential idea of opinion 6eems to be, that it is a mat
ter about which doubt can reasonably exist — as to which two
persons can, without absurdity, think differently. . . . Any
proposition, the contrary of which can be maintained with
probability, is matter of opinion." f
" According to the last of these definitions, matter of opin
ion is opposed, not to matter of fact, but to matter of cer
tainty. Thus the death of Charles I. is a, fact — his authorship
of Icon Basilike an opinion. It is also used, however, to de
note knowledge acquired by inference, as opposed to that ac-
* Taylor, " Elements of Thought."
t Sir G. C. Lewis, " Essay on Opinion," pp. 1, 4.

DIFFERENTIA OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 9J
quired by perception. Thus, that the moon gives light is
matter of fact ; that it is inhabited or uninhabited is matter of
opinion. " It has been proposed to discard from philosophical use
these ambiguous expressions, and to divide knowledge, accord
ing to its sources, into matter of perception and matter of in
ference ; and, as a cross division as to our conviction, into
matter of certainty and matter of doubt." *
" Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment
in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively
valid), has the three following degrees : opinion, belief, and
knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment,
subjectively as well as objectively. Belief \s subjectively suf
ficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient.
Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient.
Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) ; ob
jective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all)." f
" What is the real distinction between knowledge on the
one hand, and opinions, assumption, and beliefs on the other ?
Opinions, beliefs, etc., we answer, may and do change their
character. An individual may hold one opinion on a given sub
ject at one time and the opposite at another. Science may
forever displace from the sphere of thought and belief an opin
ion which was once universally held as valid. Real knowledge,
on the other hand, never changes. When you know an object,
your apprehension of it, just so far as you do know it, becomes
permanently fixed. Any change, enlargement excepted, would
imply that the object was not known." %
"Knowledge implies a subject knowing and a reality
known (objective or subjective). The knowledge is the rela-
* "Edinburgh Review," April, 1850, p. 811.
f Meiklejohn, " Translation of Critique of Pure Reason," p. 498.
X Mahan, "Ingham Lectures," pp. Ill, 112.

92 Studies in Theology.
tion between them. Both a subject knowing and a reality
known are essential to knowledge ; if either is wanting
knowledge is impossible. This is the first law of thought.
"Knowledge is always the knowledge of reahty. This is
of its essence ; if it is not the knowledge of reality, it is not
knowledge. The validity or reality of knowledge is essential
to the idea of knowledge. Knowledge is the intellectual equiv
alent of some reality.
" The act of the mind in knowing is a primitive act incapa
ble of analytical definition. It cannot be explained any more
than light can be illuminated. It is the inexplicable act by
which the mind takes up a reality into itself as an intuition,
an apprehension, an idea in some intellectual equivalent, and
knows it. We can declare the conditions, physiological or oth
ers, under which knowledge arises ; we can analyze the process
by which the mind attains it. But the mental act itself, by
which an object external and unknown suddenly stands clear
and definite within the intelligence, remains a mystery. And
all physiological facts as to its connection with molecular ac
tion of the brain leave it as mysterious as ever.
" What knowledge is, is known in the act of knowing, and
known only in the act of knowing. That it is knowledge is
known also in the act of knowing. My certainty of a reality
is simply my consciousness of knowing, which, whether at
tended to or not, is essential in every act of knowledge. ' I
know that I know,' means no more than I know. Otherwise
every act of knowledge would be conditioned on an act preced
ing, and knowledge would fail in a vain regression along an
infinite series." *
If there is a radical difference between knowing and believ
ing, there is also a difference in qualities of belief. In its high
est form belief is inferior to knowledge ; but there is a quality
* Harris, " Philosophical Basis of Theism," p. 10.

Differentia of Knowledge and Belief. 93
of behef which rises to the dignity of knowledge in respect of
authority. Belief is that state or act of the mind which arises when it
stands in such relations to objects as, while inadequate to pro
duce knowledge, are adequate to create a conviction that the
reality is this or that, and to compel the mind so to affirm.
The affirmation is made with the consciousness that it is be
yond what is known, but not without a degree of evidence that
it is true. The evidence, while not of the kind which eventu
ates in knowing, may be of such quality as to com
pel the mind to affirm in a certain way. The af
firmation, necessitated by the laws of the mind, may or may
not be according to reality.
" Belief is the determination of the mind to accept, as actual
fact or as actual existence, on the grounds of probable evidence,
whatever the compulsory reason has declared to be possible ;
that is, has shown to be non-contradictory." *
The mind has no such relation to the object as to enable it
to predicate with absolute certainty, but it has such relations
that it cannot be true to its rational nature without affirming
that the reality seems to be this or that, and, to its thinking,
the truth is this or that. The conviction arising, while it ex
cludes doubt and may compel the affirmation, yet may not be
according to truth. There is no possibility of knowing that a
behef is true which does not lift it out of the categories of be
hef into those of knowledge. In the matters of behef reached
by the most rational processes, that is, by the best use of the
reason, the mind does not come into direct relations to the
object, as in knowing, but only into direct relations with some
other things which point to the reality of the matters of belief.
In order to rational belief, the matter to be believed must be
apprehended in thought, and there must be some other known
* Ferrier, " Institutes of Metaphysics," p. 318.

94 Studies in Theology.
or assumed known realities which point to the unknown object
which is matter of belief. Evidence, to be of any value, must
be known, and the inference logical. Thus in rational belief
the mind feels outward from some known reahty or realities to
some unknown reality. It is known that the known reahties
indicate something — the mind sees that they do not stand
alone — there are inevitable imphcations, but what, cannot be
known, but by a process the mind construes them, and posits
their existence as matter of belief. They may be so, or pos
sibly not. The affirmation of them is rational belief, which is
only saying that they seem legitimate, and the mind, acting ac
cording to its rational law, is compelled to affirm them.
An object is before the mind — a thing, a principle, or a fact —
a mental process of inquiry is immediately awakened as to the
what, the when, the where, the whence, the why, the how. If
these can be determined in such form as to content the mind,
an assured belief ensues ; if not, doubt remains. The mind may
not be able to reach knowledge ; but, from known facts, it can
reach what seems to be a reasonable inference with greater or
less assurance of its probable correctness — this is belief. Say
the object is a tree, the problem is its species, its habitat, its his
tory, its uses, its nature, its availability for art or medicine or
food or ornament or something of the kind ; the inquiry may
result in knowledge, or mere belief, or doubt ; so of any reahty.
Thus all reality that may come before the mind, after being
known in part, may suggest questions which may either be
brought within the domain of enlarged knowledge, or, if not,
may lead to rational beliefs, or may be beyond the boundaries
both of knowledge and rational belief, and stand as mere
vague conjectures, or as a terra incognita, over whose bosom of
obscurity not even a conjecture ventures a flight.
Among the reasoned beliefs, that is, such as stand in proof,
ought to be classed all that have proof, even though they may

Differentia of Knowledge and Belief. 95
not have been apprehended by individual minds. Ignorance
in individual cases ought not to work discredit to - ,, .
o Reasoned be-
truth itself. All truths for which proof has been Uefs-
found and alleged, whatever the prevailing ignorance con
cerning them, deserve to stand among rational beliefs. They
are such beliefs as have proof for their support, and the proof
has been apprehended and the rational induction has been
made. Should the proofs be destroyed so as to be irrecoverable,
the truth would have to be relegated to the inferior class of
unsupported conjectures.
There are beliefs that are not of this high kind ; they do not
arise under any such conditions ; the reason is not a factor of
them ; they may be just as strong or much stronger, unreasoned
and they may be true ; but they are held upon en- beuefs.
tirely different grounds. There may be the same, or even more,
proof in the case, but the proof has never been considered. In
the former case the behef results from a rational process — the
examination of certain facts which are before the mind. In
the other, it is an imbibed idea, for the grounds of which the
mind gives no account to itself, and for which there may be no
real grounds, or no such discoverable grounds, as that it would
act irrationally not to have the belief. In each case, the lower
form, as much as the higher, there is belief, but the difference
in the grounds carries a difference into the quality and value of
the act. The truth may be in the lower as in the higher form,
but this circumstance does not give to it the same worthiness,
or rational or moral significance, as it would possess if the
grounds or reasons of it were apprehended. But this is not
saying that the ultimate value of a belief depends exclusively
on the rationality of the process by which it has been reached.
This wonld not follow. The ultimate value depends on its
conformity to truth, and its possible verification by rational
processes, more than upon the question whether the mind

96 Studies in Theology.
holding it has reached it through those processes. It must be
susceptible of proof to give it worthiness, but it may be
imbibed without the process of proof. Its contents are the
same in either case, and its real grounds the same, but one
mind has it as a reasoned truth, and the other as an unreasoned
truth. Its beneficial influences may be substantially the same
in one case as the other.
Among the unreasoned beliefs, as to the individual mind,
are all such as are inherited, as rest on traditions, as are
accepted on authority without examining the vahdity of the
authority, and all others the proof of which has not passed
before the individual mind. Among the unreasoned beliefs,
in general, are all such as have no ground of proof, whatever,
that can be alleged by any mind. These, of course, are ground
less, and entitled to no consideration.
There has been a long and wordy controversy among the
philosophers on the point whether knowledge is precedent to
belief, or otherwise. Some taking ground with Abelard, "m-
telligo ut credos; " others with Anselm, " credo ut intelligas."
It is not an unimportant point.
A strict analysis of the operations of the mind will show the
order of mental movement to be, first, a knowing, then a believ
ing. Before there can be belief with respect to an object of
Does knowi- thought, it must be known to exist in thought ; if the
edge antedate ....
belief? object is a thing it must be known to exist as a thing.
A presupposition and concomitant of every belief is knowing in
some form — either knowledge of the subject or object, or both.
If all knowing rested on belief, knowing, in the ultimate, would
be nothing different from belief, for if belief must precede
knowing, and be the ground, wherein does knowing rise
higher than beheving, or in any sense differ from it? In a
given case knowledge is asserted, as, for instance, that I exist ;
what belief lies back of the knowing, and is ground of it ? Is

Knowledge the Ground of Belief. 97
it belief that consciousness cannot be deceived or deceive us ?
Then, to formulate according to the facts, I must state that I
believe that I exist, for the reason that I beheve that conscious
ness does not deceive me. Then I do not know that I exist,
or, knowing is only another name for believing. But what
about consciousness itself? Do I only believe that there is
such a thing as consciousness ? Do I only believe that I think,
feel, will ? Do I only believe that I, who think, feel, believe,
am a real being ?
The foundation of the superstructure of thought is knowl
edge — a knowing mind, knowing itself to be, knowing its own
thoughts, feelings, volitions, and knowing other beings, facts,
and first truths. On these, and out of the materials furnished
by them, the mind constructs the fabric of many-sided specula
tions and beliefs. These primary data of knowledge are all
that give any substantial basis of value to our beliefs. The
theory which builds the structure of thought on the quicksands
of mere belief is pure agnosticism. The order is not from be
hef to knowledge, but from knowledge to belief. We know
some things, and from this starting-point come, by a process of
reasoning, to beheve much that we do not know.
This is the view of Dr. McCosh. He says : " According to
this account we are said to know ourselves, and the objects pre
sented to the senses, and the representations (always, however,
as presentations) in the mind, but to believe in objects which
we have seen in time past, but which are not now present, and
in objects which we have never seen, and even especially in
objects which we can never know, such as an Infinite God.
The mind seems to begin not with faith, but with cognition.
It sets out with the knowledge of an external object presented
to it, and with a knowledge of self contemplating that object.
I cannot, then, agree with those who maintain that faith — I
mean natural faith (belief) — must precede knowledge. I hold

98 Studies in Theology.
that knowledge, psychologically considered, appears first, and
then faith. But around our original cognitions there grows
and clusters a body of prime beliefs which go out far beyond
our personal knowledge. Knowledge is, after all, the root;
but from this stalk and mere earthly grounds there spring
beliefs which mount, in living power and in lovely form and
color, toward the sky." *
Dr. Mark Hopkins says: "'All knowledge,' says Calder-
wood, ' rests on faith.' In the very exercise of its power of
knowledge the mind rests on the belief that our sense and con
sciousness are trustworthy, and not deceptive, witnesses. In
contemplating and comparing objects all knowledge is accepted
and arranged on the conviction that a thing cannot be and not
be at the same time. Through all the varieties of thought, feel
ing, and volition we beheve in our own identity.
" In these passages we have the four words, to which I call
your attention : knowledge, belief, faith, consciousness. And
first of the first three. In the passage quoted we have faith
identified with behef, as is constantly done by Hamilton,
Mansel, and others of that school. They identify faith with
belief, and their knowledge is made to rest upon it. But to
one using terms in their ordinary sense, what can be more con
fusing than this? By all ordinary usage knowledge is a
stronger word than belief, and yet the stronger is made to rest
on the weaker. I know what happened yesterday ; I yet do
not know that I am the same person to-day that I was yester
day. . . . Again, it is said by Dr. Calderwood, that ' the prov
ince of faith is much more extensive than that of knowledge.
. . . Behef affords a foundation for knowledge, and at the
same time stretches far beyond it.' In its ordinary sense be
lief does indeed stretch far beyond knowledge, but only as it
gathers a shade of uncertainty, whereas, as used by Dr. Calder-
* The " Intuitions of the Mind," pp. 198, 199.

Knowledge the Ground of Belief. 99
wood, belief can stretch far beyond knowledge only as it is
more certain. With this view of Dr. Calderwood many philos
ophers coincide. Sir Wm. Hamilton says : " In the order of
nature belief always precedes knowledge. Professor Christlieb
says : " All knowledge is, in the last instance, conditioned by
faith, and faith (that is, an act of belief) is the preliminary and
the medium of every act of intelligence.' ... It is by the
direct testimony of our own minds that we are convinced of
the fact that we exist, think, walk, and dream, and this fact
neither needs nor is capable of proof. We merely believe it.
The certainty of our thinking depends simply on an act of
belief." " ' Now it seems to me,' says Dr. Hopkins, ' that in all this
these great men have greatly perplexed a simple subject. For
what is it ? I agree with President Porter, that to know is
to be certain of something. I stick a stake there. I insist
upon it that we must have certainty to begin with, or we can
never have a right to begin. If, therefore, to know is to be
certain, then whatever gives us certainty gives us knowledge,
and nothing else does. We know only so far as we are certain.
So far as we are certain we know. That there are different
modes of attaining certainty I agree. We may be certain of
our personal identity, or that a thing cannot be and not be at the
same time, by the necessary action of our faculties. Than this
no certainty can be greater. . . . There may also be certainty
through the senses and through the operation of the under
standing; but however it may come, I hold that certainty
reached by a rational being in any way constitutes knowledge,
and that any faith or belief or conviction short of certainty is
not knowledge. In the operations of the intellect I admit of
no mysticism. The result of these operations, whether neces
sary or under the control of the will, I divide into two classes.
Of some I am certain, and in that certainty is knowledge. Of

100 Studies in Theology.
others I am not certain, and then I have belief, or opinion with
its varying shades. If I am certain, I am bound, as a rational
being, to know the grounds of that certainty, and I may not rest
and say I am certain till the ground is sufficient. If I hold
an opinion I am bound to know the ground of this opinion or
behef." *
It is obvious in this entire section that in the mind of Dr.
Hopkins, as also in the minds of Drs. Porter and Calderwood,
and, indeed, almost all writers on the subject, there is needless
confusion on the distinction between knowledge and belief,
growing out of a false definition of knowledge either implied
or expressed. There is a difference recognized, and in part
pointed out, but a fundamental mistake in the definition of
knowledge introduces confusion. That mistake is this, defin
ing knowledge to be certainty. Now, if certainty means a feel
ing of certainty in the mind — that is, a feeling of absolute
assurance that the thing is as predicated, that state of mind
often exists when the predication turns out false, and thus
demonstrates that there was not knowledge in the case, but only
a belief which had in it no doubt, for if there had been knowl
edge there could not have been mistake. Knowledge precludes
error. Where error begins knowledge ends. Knowledge,
then, is not simple certainty, but it is certainty because of cog
nition, that is, because the mind stands in such relation to the
object as to see its reality, and not simply the ground for
believing there is a reality. Calderwood evidently confounds
belief of some kind with knowledge. Believing and know
ing are two wholly distinct acts of the mind. They are not
only not identical, but they are not similar — they cannot
co-exist in the same predicate. What is believed is not known,
and what is known is not believed. Knowledge describes an
act of the mind standing in one relation to the object known,
* Hopkins, " Idea of Mind," pp. 34-36.

Knowing and Believing. 101
in which belief is not a possible act ; and believing, describes an
act of the mind when standing in a relation to the object which
precludes knowledge. To mark the distinction between know
ing and believing, it is absolutely necessary not simply to note
divers degrees of certainty, but diverse relations between sub
ject and object. The appropriate feeling, and the inevitable
feeling for knowledge, is a feeling of certainty, as well as a fact
of certainty ; but to make it denote knowledge, the feeling
must be produced by a certain relation of subject and object,
and this relation must be taken into the definition or differen
tiation between knowing and believing. The feeling of cer
tainty is appropriate also to some beliefs ; but however strong
it may be, the circumstances mark it as belief and not knowl
edge. Things believed may be as true as things known ; and
there may be such apparent truth, that the feeling that they
are true will be as positive as if they were known ; but the
feehng in this case may be a delusion, while in the case of
knowledge it cannot be a delusion. It is important clearly to
determine what things are known and what believed ; and in
doing so, it is indispensable to note the circumstances in which
the mind stands with relation to objects.
We have endeavored to point out the cases in which the
mind knows whereof it predicates, and does not merely believe.
The circumstances which determine the predicate to be knowl
edge make it impossible that it should take the form of belief,
and conversely. When Sir William Hamilton says, " in order
of nature belief always precedes knowledge," he not only con
tradicts truth, but contradicts the principles of his own phi
losophy. Evidently Calderwood displaces knowledge entirely,
since he reduces primary cognition, and consciousness itself, to
a mere belief. To him things which are perceived to be neces
sary truths are mere beliefs. What place, then, can the word
knowledge have ?

102 Studies in Theology.
Let us lay it down as a principle from which we can never
budge, which the mind must forever maintain, and without
which it is impossible to determine the value of proof and of
predicate alike — that there is a fundamental difference between
knowing and believing, so that one act precludes the other.
Things known must be as known. Things believed may be
as believed. The assurance of the mind in matters of belief
may vary from guess to absolute certainty of feeling. Know
ing is always superior to believing, and must, when it takes
place, correct and vanquish belief. No one can believe ad
versely to his knowledge — he may believe beyond it.
But when it is said that knowledge antedates belief, and is
necessary as grounds of it, the statement needs to be carefully
guarded. The first act of the mind is one of knowing, beliefs come
afterward. A consciousness is felt, a fact is perceived, an
object is presented : in each case the mind knows, even though
it be not able as yet to formulate the sentence, I know. In
Beliefs follow process of time it begins to inquire and speculate
knowledge. aDout these matters of knowledge, and of the what
and why ; it has passed from the realm of the known into that
of the unknown, both as to subject and object. Henceforth its
predications become beliefs, and cease to be knowledges. They
may possibly, indeed, be raised into knowledges by change of
circumstances, but in most cases remain, and must remain, mere
beliefs, based on rational grounds or resting on mere conjecture.
If it should be said that in such cases as we have designated
knowledges, there is a subsumed belief in the faculties, we must
deny. No such mental process takes place. The truth of the fac
ulties is implied, but the mind does not raise the question at all
as to whether the faculties are to be credited — does not reason it
out and reach the conclusion that they are. The idea of doubt has
not entered yet. The whole act is one of assumed knowledge,

Knowledge Antedates Belief. 103
and we cannot doubt of real knowledge, proceeding on the un
questioned validity or unimagined invalidity of the faculties.
And what is thus primarily known, can never be relegated to
doubt or mere belief. It was knowledge at first, it remains
knowledge forever. Those convictions only are susceptible of
change from certainty to doubt which were hastily classed as
knowledges, but which, in fact, were not. The state is one of
real cognition, and the mind proceeds upon that unquestioned
primary fact. No subsequent inquiry ever changes or modifies
that state in any respect, and no subsequent so-called knowl
edge ever rises into a new or different kind of cognition. The
only modification which takes place is to relegate some things
supposed to be included in the knowing, but which, in fact,
were not, and to open up matters beyond not included in
knowledge, but arising out of knowledge as matters of specu
lation — of possible doubt or uncertainty, or rational belief.
After speculation has been introduced, and by various proc
esses the mind reaches the conclusion that certain Knowledge
it • i • -i i i -i goes before
things which are consciously not known, neverthe- belief.
less ought to be believed, this does not at all awaken doubt, or
reduce to mere .beliefs its antecedent knowledges. They stand
intact, not now as inferences from the reliability of the faculties,
but as immediate cognitions or deliverances which will admit of
no possibility of doubt, and which will acquire no support from
belief in the faculties, but all support in the simple use of
the faculties. In fact, there is no better distinction between
knowledge and belief than to say that knowledge is that state
or exercise of the mind in which the faculties act directly on
their objects, perceiving or being conscious of them as real ;
while belief is that act of the faculties, resulting from their
unquestioned validity, which conceives or accepts that as true
which is brought before them mediately or inferentially,
and which always and necessarily presupposes knowledge as its

104 Studies in Theology.
antecedent and ground. That back-lying known is not an in
ference, and never can take on it for a moment, in the mind's
consciousness, the quality of uncertainty. It lies there clean-
cut as a verity, and on it rises the whole superstructure of
thought; a superstructure made up of falsehood and truth,
imaginations and beliefs, strangely built together, and always
open to question and doubt, and subject to modification and
change. That, in all cases, which is made matter of question
what is ques- and review, and which will admit of change, is not
known. n° what is known, but that which is inferred. A
supposed knowledge is sometimes re-examined, to ascertain
whether it was indeed such, and when found to be a hasty
judgment, on inadequate grounds, is discarded. Be-examination
discloses to the mind what is known, and often shows that
some things supposed to be known are not. It is of vast mo
ment that utmost exactness should be observed in determining
precisely what is known. This will point out just what may
be questioned, and simplify the matter to be investigated.
Perfect knowledge implies the knowledge of all truth ; that
is, of all reality exhaustively. Such knowledge is strictly in
finite, and can never be possible except to the Infinite himself,
with whom there can be no increase. Infinite knowledge pre
cludes the possibility of a state of belief; for, where all is known,
there can be nothing remaining to be subject of belief. As
the Infinite cannot be properly said to believe any thing, since
he knows all things, so a finite-knower cannot be properly said
to believe what he really knows. Knowledge in the one case,
aii knowledge as *n tne °tner> so far as it exists, precludes belief.
identical. Imperfect knowledge is either the knowledge of only
some things or parts of things. Such is our knowledge, limited
and local, as to time and place and degree. It begins at zero, and
may increase indefinitely. It may be knowledge of being as real,
and yet not be knowledge of precisely what it is historically or

Finite Knowledge Limited. 105
scientifically. We may know things of it to-morrow which we
do not and cannot know to-day. But so far forth as it is
knowledge, it is the same in the finite as in the Infinite, and
the same forever, since in both cases it is simple knowledge.
One finite has more knowledge than another ; his knowledge
includes a larger extent of reality, spreads over greater spaces of
being, and penetrates more profoundly ; he has existed longer,
has had a wider field of observation, has possessed better pow
ers, has given closer attention. There are all grades of knowl
edge, from that of the merest beginner to that of the most
exalted intelligence. But what is known by the merest tyro is
in nothing different from the same thing as known
by the most advanced knower. It is knowledge in identical! e B6
both cases alike, and is identical in all minds.
The fact that one mind has acquired the power to define
what it means by knowledge, while another cannot so define,
does not imply that the knowledge of the one differs from the
knowledge of the other, but simply that one has power to
explain more than the other of mental states and acts. In
knowing, each performs precisely the same act, but one can
give a more intelligent account of the act than the other.
As knowledge with the finite is more or less limited, and may
increase indefinitely under suitable conditions, belief may often
become a necessity where knowledge does not exist, and where,
for the present, it is impossible it should exist. The truth is
forever the same, whether known or unknown, beheved or un-
believed, and it is infinite.
Belief is the necessity of the finite — he must believe, and
the large part of his conduct must spring from and be Belief neces-
° r ,r sary to tne
grounded on belief. This opens the door to uncer- unite.
tainty, error, and doubt. Error is never a predicate of what we
know, but of what we do not know, and yet of what from our
nature and circumstances we are compelled to predicate. There

106 Studies in Theology.
may be error with respect to things about which we have some
knowledge, but it will be error not in what is known, but in re
spect to that of the thing which is not included in the knowledge.
Consciousness includes what the self is, and what its present
act is. Here it is impossible that there should be error. But
there is much with respect to the self and its acts which is not
given in consciousness, and which is not matter of knowledge.
This opens the door to speculation, belief, doubt, and possible
No error with error. Possible error begins not with respect to
respect to the .
known. what is known. That the sell should not be, or that
the act should not be as given in consciousness, is impossible.
But what the self is, and how it acts, and innumerable other
matters with respect to it, are not given in consciousness, but
are left to the speculative reason, and any conclusions reached
can never rise above beliefs, and will always admit of possible
error, and must remain subject to challenge and re-examination
until a point is gained where the speculative reason finds per
fect content, and beliefs become unchangeably fixed.
Now if we can find the circumstances or conditions under
which knowledge arises, then we find a clew which will enable
us to determine absolutely which of our concepts are knowl
edges, and which, being matters of knowledge, are not only
matters of certainty to us, but must be matters of truth abso
lutely. To know is to possess truth. The circumstances de
termine between states and acts of knowing and states and acts
of beheving, rather than any general feeling of certainty which
may exist in the mind. We may thus find an absolute ground
of distinction between all knowing and believing, and in this
way only.
circumstances What, then, are those definite and precise circum-
mmf whafte stances> or relations of subject and object, under
knowledge. which knowing takes place, and which preclude
mere belief ? There is no more important point than this in

Knowledge. 107
fixing the distinction between knowing and beheving : it is in
fact the governing thing. I introduce here an extensive quo
tation from Ferrier's " Institutes of Metaphysics," which will
commend itself.
He, in a series of propositions, presents the subject in a
lucid form. N
Proposition 1. "Along with whatever any intelligence knows,
it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some
cognition of itself."
Proposition 2. " The object of knowledge, whatever it may
be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually
regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object
with the addition of one's self — object, plus subject — thing or
thought mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of
every object of cognition."
Demonstration. " It has been already established as the condi
tion of all knowledge, that a thing can be known only provided
the intelligence which apprehends it knows itself at the same
time. But, if a thing can be known only provided one's self be
known along with it, it follows that the thing (or thought) and
one's self together must, in every case, be the object, the true and
complete object ; in other words, it follows that that which we
know, always is and must be object plus subject — object cum
aliis — thing or thought with one addition to it, which addition
is the me. Self, therefore, is an integral and essential part of
every cognition. Or, again. Suppose a case in which a thing
or a thought is apprehended without the me being appre
hended with it. This would contradict proposition 1, which
has fixed the knowledge of self as the condition of all knowl
edge." Proposition 3. " The objective part of the object of knowl
edge, though distinguishable, is not separable in cognition from
the subjective part, or the ego ; but the objective part and the

108 Studies in Theology.
subjective part do together constitute the unit, or minimum of
knowledge." Demonstration. " If the objective part of knowledge were
separable in cognition from the ego, or subjective part, it
could be apprehended without the ego being apprehended
along with it. But this has been proved by proposition 2 to
be impossible ; ergo, . . .
"Again, the unit or minimum of cognition is such an amount
of knowledge that, if any constituent part of it be left out of
account, the whole cognition of necessity disappears. But the
objective plus the subjective constitutes such a unit or mini
mum ; because if the objective part be entirely removed from
the object of our knowledge, and if the mind be left with
no thing or thought before it, it can have no cognition ; so if
the subjective part in itself be entirely removed from the
mind's observation, the cognition equally disappears to what
ever extent we may suppose the mere objective part of the
presentation to be still before us. All cognizance of it is im
possible without the plus me: proposition 1."
Proposition 4. " Matter per se, the whole material universe
by itself, is of necessity unknowable absolutely."
Demonstration. " The whole material universe by itself, or
per se, is a mere collection of objects without a subject or
self; but it was proved that the only objects which can possi
bly be known are objects plus a subject, or self ; ergo, . . .
"Again : object plus a subject is the minimum scibile, per
se. But the whole material universe, per se, being a mere col
lection of objects without a subject, is less than the minimum
scibile, per se; ergo, ..."
Proposition 5. "All the qualities of matter by themselves are
of necessity absolutely unknowable."
Demonstration. "The qualities of matter by themselves,
equally with matter itself, are objective presentment without

Knowledge. 109
a subject. But it has been proved that no objective can be
known without a subjective known along with it ; ergo," . . .
Proposition 6. " Every cognition must contain an element
common to all cognitions and an element (or elements) peculiar
to itself; in other words, every cognition must have a part
which is unchangeable, necessary, and universal (the same in
all), and a part which is changeable, contingent, and particular
(different in all) ; and there can be no knowledge of the un
changeable, necessary, and universal part, exclusive of the
changeable, contingent, and particular part ; or of the change
able, contingent, and particular part, exclusive of the unchange
able, necessary, and universal part ; that is to say, neither of
these parts, by itself, can constitute a cognition ; but all knowl
edge is necessarily a synthesis of both factors."
Demonstration. " If every cognition did not contain an ele
ment common to all cognitions, there could be no unity in cog
nitions ; they could not be classed together. But they are
classed together ; they all rank as cognitions ; ergo, every cog
nition must contain an element to all cognitions. Again, if
every cognition did not contain an element (or elements) pecul
iar to itself, there could be no diversity in cognitions ; they
could not be distinct from each other. But they are distinct
from each other; they rank not simply as cognitions, but
as different cognitions ; ergo, thus the constitution of every
cognition involves an unchangeable, necessary, and universal
part — a part which is the same in all — a changeable, contin
gent, and particular part — a part which is different in all ; and
there can be no knowledge of either of these parts by itself or
exclusive of the other part ; but all knowledge is necessarily a
synthesis of both factors."
Proposition 7. " The ego (or mind) is known as the element
common to all cognitions, matter is known as the element
pecuhar to some cognitions. In other words, we know our-

110 Studies in Theology.
selves as the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part of our
cognitions, while we know matter, in all its varieties, as the
changeable, contingent, and particular in some of our cogni
tions ; or, expressed in the technical language of logic, the ego is
the known summum genus, the known genuine part of all cog
nitions, matter is the known differential part of some cognitions."
Demonstration. " It is a necessary truth of reason that the ego
must be known (that is, must be known to itself) whenever it
knows any thing at all : in other words, no cognition in which
one does not apprehend one's self is possible. Therefore the ego,
or one's self, is known as the element common to all cognitions ;
that is, the summum genus of cognition. Again, it is not a
necessary truth of reason that matter must be known whenever
any thing at all is known ; in other words, cognitions in which
no other material element is apprehended are, if not actual,
possible and conceivable. No contradiction is involved in that
supposition, and, therefore, matter is not known as the element
common to all cognition, but only as the element peculiar to
some cognitions ; that is, the differential part of some cogni
tions. And hence the ego is the unchangeable, necessary, and
universal element of cognition, while matter is only a portion
(not the whole) of the changeable, contingent, and particular
part of some cognitions."
Proposition 8. " The ego cannot be known to be material ;
that is to say, there is a necessary law of reason which pre
vents it from being apprehended by the senses."
Demonstration. " The ego is known as that which is com
mon to all cognitions, and matter is known as that which is
peculiar to some cognitions. But that which is known as com
mon to all cognitions cannot be known as that which is peculiar
to some cognitions, without supposing that a thing can be
known to be different from what it is known to be ; the con
tradictory ; ergo," . . .

Knowledge. Ill
Again: "Matter, in its various forms, is known as the
changeable, contingent, and particular element of cognition.
Therefore if the ego could be known to be material, it would
be known as the changeable, contingent, and particular element
of cognition. But the ego is known to be the unchangeable,
necessary, and universal element of cognition ; ergo," . . .
Once more : " The universal element of cognition is known
as such, precisely because it is known as not the particular ele
ment ; and conversely, the particular element is known as such,
precisely because it is known as not the universal element;
ergo, the ego, which is known as the universal element, and
matter which is known as the particular element, cannot either
of them be known to be the other of them; and, therefore,
the ego cannot be known to be material ; or, in other words,
that part of every object of cognition which is usually called
the subject, or one's self, cannot be known to be of the same
nature with the part of every object of cognition, which is
usually called the object."
Proposition 9. " The ego, or self, per se, is, of itself, abso
lutely unknowable. By itself — that is, purely in an undeter-
minate state, or separated from all things, and divested of all
thoughts — it is no possible object of cognition. It can know
itself only in some particular state, or in union with some
non-ego ; that is, with some element contradistinguished from
itself." Demonstration. " The ego is the element common to all cog
nition — the universal constituent of knowledge. But every
cognition must contain a particular or peculiar, as well as com
mon or universal, part; and there can be no knowledge of
either of these parts by itself, or prescinded from the other
part; ergo, there can be no knowledge of the ego, or self,
per se, or in a purely indeterminate state, or separated from all
things, and divested of all thoughts. It can know itself only

112 Studies in Theology.
in some particular state, or in union with some non-ego ; that
is, with some element contradistinguished from itself."
Proposition 10. " Mere objects of sense can never be objects
of cognition ; in other words, whatever has place in the intel
lect (whatever is known) must contain an element which has
had no place in the senses ; or, otherwise expressed, the senses,
by themselves, are not competent to place any knowable or in
telligible thing before the mind."
Demonstration. " The ego must form a part of every object
of cognition, but the ego cannot be apprehended by the senses ;
ergo," . . .
Proposition 11. " That alone can be represented in thought
which can be presented in knowledge ; in other words, it is
impossible to think what it is impossible to know ; or, more
explicitly, it is impossible to think that of which knowledge
has supplied, and can supply, no sort of type."
Demonstration. " Representation is the iteration in thought
of what was formerly presented in knowledge. It is, there
fore, a contradiction to suppose that what never was and never
can be known, can be represented in thought. Repetition
necessarily implies a foregone lesson. Therefore, that alone
can be represented in thought which has been presented in
knowledge ; in other words, it is impossible to think what it is
impossible to know ; it is impossible to think that of which
knowledge has supplied, and can supply, no sort of type."
Proposition 12. " The material universe, per se, and all its
qualities, per se, are not only absolutely unknowable, they are
also absolutely unthinkable."
Demonstration. " The material universe and its qualities, per
se, cannot be known or presented to the mind. But what can
not be known or presented to the mind cannot be represented
by the mind ; ergo," . . .
Proposition 13. " The only independent universe which any

Knowledge. 113
mind or ego can think of, is the universe in synthesis with
Borne other mind or ego."
Demonstration. " Objects plus a subject, or self, is the only
universe which can be known. The only universe which can
be thought is the universe which can be known ; ergo, con
sequently, whenever any mind or ego thinks of the universe as
independent of itself, it must still think of it as made up of
object plus subject. Therefore, the only independent universe
which any mind can think, is the universe in synthesis with
some other mind or subject."
Proposition 14. "There is no mere phenomenal in cogni
tion ; in other words, the phenomenal, by itself, is absolutely
unknowable and inconceivable."
Demonstration. " The first premise fixes the definition
of phenomenon. Whatever can be known or conceived
only when something else is known or conceived along
with it, is a phenomenon, or the phenomenal. But whatever
can only be so known or conceived cannot be known or
conceived by itself ; ergo, there is no mere phenomenal in
cognition." The end of our search is truth. The implications are, that
we who search for truth are ; that truth is ; that it is possible
to us to find truth. Truth, in this statement, stands for reality.
The attainment of truth stands for knowledge. Knowledge
implies a knower. There can be no search without a knower
who prosecutes it. There can be no attainment without the
object to be attained — no knowledge of truth without a knower,
and without the object known — subject and object in synthesis
are in the knowing. Take the object away, and there is nothing
to be known, and knowledge necessarily does not exist. Take
subject away, and knowledge is impossible. In knowledge,
therefore, the object exists for the subject, and together with
it, and the subject for the object, and together with it. Know-

114 Studies in Theology.
ing imphes the strict co-existence of subject and object, and
their synthesis.
It is a legitimate question, Are the reahties which may be
Knowledge not known purely subjective, or may they be exter-
Iimlted to the . , -, .j. i -, -,
subject. nal to the subject also; and 11 external, how do
they become known as such? Can knowledge transcend the
knower ?
The knowledge the subject has of itself is strictly a knowl
edge of its existence, of its states, of its modes of activity, of
its power to act in certain ways, and be acted on in some man
ner. This knowledge is self-knowledge, named consciousness.
It is strictly limited to the subject, and cannot go beyond it,
so as to be knowledge of something external to the self. If there
be any thing external to the self — any thing having existence
apart from the self, consciousness includes the concept of that,
but does not give knowledge of it ; that is derived from an
other faculty. What, then, is the precise knowledge given in
consciousness or self-knowledge ? To this we answer, in con
sciousness we detect (a) the knowledge that the ego is a real
being. The thing given is not simply certain states, and a con
geries of acts, but behind these, the knowledge that it is I who
act — the consciousness that I exist, (b) In consciousness is
what is given given the knowledge of certain feelings which I
in conscious- .
ness. experience and certain powers or faculties which I
possess ; the power to think, to remember, to perceive, to will ;
the feelings of sensations and emotions, (c) In consciousness is
given, what each particular feeling is which I at any time
experience, and what each particular act is which I perform,
whether it be a thought, or memory, or volition, or perception.
Thus I know all that passes within the realm of the ego.
Knowing these, I exhaust the known contents of the ego — I
have so much of truth. There is much of the ego unknown,
but so much is known. How it is that I exist, or use these

Knowledge. 115
powers which I possess, or experience the feelings which I
find myself having, I do not know ; but that I am, and that
I do possess these powers, and perform these acts, and have
these feelings, I know in consciousness.
But in all this I do not transcend the ego. I am strictly
taking note of what pertains to and passes within the
one being that I am ; that there is any other being does not
yet appear. What I know is myself, and yet in this knowl
edge of the self I am conscious of a knowledge of other beings,
but am not conscious of them. Consciousness seems to go
beyond the me, and I am compelled to affirm that I do know
other beings and realities outside of myself. Is this a delusion ?
I have stated, that among the powers which consciousness
discloses in me, that is, which I know myself to possess, is a power
which I name the perceptive faculty. What is that, and what
does it give ? When I say, I feel, I know what that is which
that term describes, that is, what is given in con- ™, . , _
' ' o What is given
sciousness under that name. I know the act or state In perception.
to be strictly subjective. The same is true when I say I think,
and yet again when I say I remember, or I will. I know my
self as alone involved in these states and acts. In all this
nothing emerges as external to the Self ; the object of knowl
edge so far as given in consciousness is completely exhausted
in the subjective contents of the knower. It is simply himself
that feels, that thinks, that wills, that exists, that is conscious.
But now, when I predicate of this Self that it is conscious of
an act of perceiving, what do I mean by this ? Perceives
what ? That he perceives he knows — it is an act of which he
is conscious. He knows that he does perceive simply in know
ing himself, or in consciousness. Now, what is given in that
consciousness of the perceiving act? We answer, simply the
self act of perception. But what is perception ? To be a per
ception there must be a something to be perceived. That which

116 Studies in Theology.
is perceived is not the mind itself, nor can it be an idea which
is in the mind, but it is an object known to be external to the
mind and object of its action. H this be not so, there is no
evidence whatever of the existence of any thing but the mind
itself. This the mind is conscious of inabihty to assert or to
believe. The mind knows when itself is object, and in the
case of perception it intuitively knows that it is not the object,
but that it acts on an external object. The word perception is
without meaning, if we assume the non-existence of the object :
to the question, Perceives what? we are compelled to say, Per
ceives nothing ; but this is to take all meaning out of the term ;
and to contradict consciousness itself, since the conscious act is
that of perceiving something. Thus while the external world
cannot be properly said to be matter of consciousness, since
consciousness is simply the note the mind takes of itself in all
its modes of action — the external world emerges in conscious
knowledge, as something which is perceived by the mind as
external and transcendental — it is the thing known. That
which is known is strictly an object which exists exterior to the
perceiving mind, but which emerges in the mind as a concept,
noted by consciousness. The concept is the immediate object
of consciousness, but the mind intuitively knows that it, the
concept, has a real object. For the mind, the object, is that
which gives birth to the concept, and the concept is what the
thing is in thought. The object is not created by the mind,
but the thought of it is.*
Suppose the mind did not exist, would the object exist, or
does it come into existence along with the thought of it ? We
are compelled to believe that the thing exists without the
thought of it, since if it did not, it would become non-existent
as soon as the thought of it was displaced by some other thought
* See Wight's "Hamilton," p. 113; also Harris's "Philosophical Basis of Be
lief," p. 88, and through the chapter.

Knowledge. 117
of some other thing, and the universe would be resolved into a
mere dance of coming and vanishing shadows of non-reality; and
so there would be no coherent universe at all, if this were so.
It is to no purpose to say that objects are nothing to us ex
cept as they emerge in knowledge. They are, indeed, nothing
in knowledge until they are known, but they are not in fact
nothings. They exist for knowledge, that they may become
known, and they exist without respect to our knowledge of
them. It is to no purpose to say that their existence cannot be
proved until they are known. It remains true that they could
never be known, if they did not exist in order that they might
be known. There is, therefore, an external universe waiting
the action of mind to emerge in thought, and become trans
muted into knowledge.
The truth is, that antecedent to the universe, which is external
to us, there existed an eternal Mind. The external universe is
a reality, by Him created, and which might have existed for
ever as product of his power and as embodying his thought, had
no other mind ever existed. It wonld, in that case, have been
as real as it now is, and would have been differentiable from its
Maker as an effect is differentiable from its cause. It con
tinues and abides, independently of any created mind. Created
mind finds it in existence, and when created mind appears, it
cognizes its existence, and the permanently and antecedently
real is again transmuted into thought. The external, which
came out of mind at first, returns into mind, not by losing its
real existence, but by becoming known as real ; that is, as
having real existence both before, concurrently with, and sub
sequent to, the thought or concept of it.
Underlying all predicates as most primitive and absolute
foundation, on which the whole structure, both of affirmation
and doubt reposes, is the fact of consciousness. No mental

118 Studies in Theology.
movement of any kind is possible without it. The validity of
its deliverances must be assumed, as matter of absolute knowl
edge, and not merely of belief. Wherever there is conscious
ness there is necessarily a being acting, and knowing himself as
acting. That is consciousness. The conscious subject affirms
in consciousness, I am, and I am in this or that state of activity,
or I have power to put myself into this or that state of activity
— or to be affected in this or that manner. It is impossible to
introduce doubt in the subject as to its existence, for to doubt
is to affirm its existence as doubter. It is impossible to intro
duce doubt as to its activity, for to doubt is a form of its
activity, and implies a knowledge of that of which doubt is
affirmed as a real object of thought.
The conscious subject emerges as an object of knowledge
only as active ; that is, the mind has knowledge of its own
existence only as it is made aware of itself as acting. " The
ego, or self, or mind, per se, is, of necessity, absolutely unknow
able. By itself — that is, in a purely undeterminate state, or
separated from all things, and divested of all thoughts — it is no
possible object of cognition. It can know itself only in some
particular state, or in union with some non-ego ; that is, with
some element contradistinguished from itself." * " The ego is
the element to all cognition — the universal constituent of all
knowledge." f " Just as proposition 1 of the foregoing series
declares that the mind can be cognizant of something else only
when it knows itself, so proposition 9 affirms that it can know
itself only when it is cognizant of something else." % Thus it
appears that in every knowledge there must be a co-existence of
the self and not-self as objects. In every conscious act the self
emerges as an object of de facto knowledge. It has no power
to make itself a direct object of knowledge, but can only
* Proposition IX, " Institutes of Metaphysics," Ferrier, p. 241.
t Ibid., p. 141. X Ibid., p. 142.

Knowledge. 119
acquire that knowledge by a movement which it discerns in
itself, and which discloses itself to itself. There is no deliver
ance in consciousness as to the essence or substance of the con
scious subject, but only that it has being, and exerts itself in a
given manner. It thinks, it feels, it wills — it is.
Consciousness gives nothing except as to the subject itself.
It is strictly and absolutely limited to the subject. If there
is any other being, it makes no deliverance with respect to it
except that it perceives it. It is conscious of the object of
thought, but consciousness cannot determine that the object is
a thing external to itself — it is conscious of it as it appears
in thought. That there is an external reality represented is
not a matter of consciousness.
It follows, that if the self-conscious subject has no power to
transcend consciousness, the universe must be reduced to the ego,
so far as can be known. But this the mind, the self-conscious
subject, as we have seen, is consciously incapable of affirming. It
persistently refuses to limit its idea of existence to itself, and
can, by no strategy of logic, be reduced to that conclusion. It
can give no satisfactory explanation to itself, how it is that it
transcends itself, so as to cognize other objects external to
itself ; but no more can it explain its own internal processes,
or its consciousness of them ; and the certainty in the former
case is no less assured than in the latter. It does cognize ex
ternality, and it gives to the conscious act by which it makes
the cognition, or which is the cognition, the name perception.
The perception is its own act, and the perception becomes
matter of cognition by self-consciousness ; thus self-conscious
ness becomes the ground of the knowing, but the knowledge
given is of an external object. The external object is not
itself a datum of consciousness, but the perception or knowledge
of it is.
From these two sources — internal perception or self-conscious-

120 Studies in Theology.
ness, and external perception, or the cognition of objects other
than the self — by direct and reflective processes we build up all
mental predications of the self and of the not-self, with greater
or less assurance of the reality of what we affirm. The certi
tude of our own existence in self-consciousness is absolute. The
certitude of externality in perception is also absolute. Though
alike inexplicable, neither can be shaken.
Subject and object exist independently of each other, but in
the act of cognition the subject must stand in certain relation
to the object. The object would exist in its exact identity un
changed if the subject were obliterated, or if it never had
existed. The subject does not give existence to the object.
The subject also would exist, if the object were annihilated.
We cannot progress a single step without these postulates. To
go at all in any coherent or intelligible movement, we are
under the necessity of admitting the veraciousness of conscious
ness as to the subjective reality and state, and the veracious
ness of perception as to external reality, and resulting from
their conjoint testimony, the reality of both subject and object,
and their absolute independence and otherness.
But in this statement we do not mean that there is, or could
be, any reality of objectivity wholly independent of any know
ing subject. The object we are constrained to believe, in
every case, imphes a knowing and infinite causal subject. The
external is concrete expression of a real subjective. This will
appear in future stages of the discussion on which we now
enter. But precisely what we mean at present is to assert,
that our human consciousness, which is the most primitive and
absolute of all our knowledges, and the permanent quantity in
all, posits (a) our own existence as the knowing subject; and
(b) the reality of the object known as a consciously perceived
object; and (c) in cases where the object is a real external, not
only posits the difference between the knowing ego and the

Knowledge. 121
known non-ego, but that neither is dependent on the other ;
that is, that the knowing ego would still exist if the particular
non-ego were eradicated from existence, or if it had never ex
isted ; and the known non-ego would lose none of its existence
if the ego were blotted out of existence. The two come into
inseparable relations in the knowing act, but they are not de
pendent on the knowing act for their existence. The equiva
lent of all which is, in the best-known and most primitive of
all knowledges — that which is given in consciousness — there is
integral and co-existent therein the knowledge of, and there
fore the reality of, the subjective and objective, the ego and
the non-ego, the self and objectives to self. While the non-ego
itself is not matter of consciousness, the knowledge self and not-
t ii . i seU known In
oi it is. In self-knowledge, or consciousness, the consciousness.
external appears as a concept, but the concept is known to
represent a real object, so that in consciously knowing the con
cept as a subjective fact, the object of which it is a concept is
known to have real existence, and to be what the concept rep
resents it to be. The consciousness in the case is that of a
perception, or of a perceiving act, which is purely subjective,
and is given as such subjectively — is of and by the mind, and
is so known to be, in knowing the mind or self, but the ob
ject of perception is intuitively known to be real and external
by the faculty of reason. The object is as certainly known by
the intelligence or faculty of reason as the subject is by self-
consciousness, and it is as impossible to throw doubt or dis
credit on the one knowledge as the other. In the knowledge
there is a strict synthesis of subject and object ; the former as
matter of consciousness, the latter as matter of perception.
The consciousness is of the conjoint-knowing act, inclusive of
both subject and object, and of their otherness and severalty.
The contents of these two — subject and object — are the sum
of all reality, and in their reality constitute the subjects of all

122 Studies in Theology.
thought and inquiry. To know them in their relations to each
other, and inter-relations with all other realities, and in their
respective attributes and modes, is to know reality, which is to
sum of aii re- possess truth. It thus appears that the world of ex-
aUty- ternal reality is the equivalent, not simply of mate
rial objectivity, but also of all reality of every kind — thoughts,
feelings, ideas, all processes, and every thing that can be an
object of thought, or with respect to which it can be truth
fully affirmed it is or has been. Thus mind or subject as
knower, and that which is external to the knower, comprises all
reahty, and makes up the whole sphere of thought and inquiry.
Of course our inquiry relates to finite knowing, or, more
properly, human knowing — what and how can we know ?
Upon this point we cannot do better than to give the results
of Sir William Hamilton's investigations. In treating this
very point he says : " We are endowed by our Creator with
certain faculties of observation, which enable us to become
aware of certain appearances or phenomena. These faculties
may be stated as two — sense, or external perception, and self-
consciousness, or internal perception ; and these faculties sev
erally afford us the knowledge of a different series of
phenomena. Through our senses we apprehend what exists
or what occurs in the external or material world ; by our self-
consciousness, what is or what occurs in the inward world, or
world of thought."
To exercise the function of external perception, the mind
must be brought into relations with external objects. These
relations are brought about by means of a sensorium, or organ
ism, in which the mind is mysteriously posited. How it is that
the sensorium mediates between the mind and externality is
unknown, but that it is the instrument of sensations is known.
Through it objects are presented to the mind, itself among
them as the knower. The effect produced in the mind is sensa-

Conditions of Knowledge. 123
tion, the act of the mind is perception or cognition of the
object. Thus the external universe becomes known under
forms of phenomena. -That which is known is, that the object
exists under certain forms or appearances.
SECTION VI.-CONDITIONS OF KNOWING.
What are the conditions of knowing? One fundamental
and necessary condition underlies all knowing — is postulated in
it, whether finite or infinite. There must be a knowing sub
ject, and there must be a correlate something to be known ; that
is, there must exist subject and object. The knower may be
both subject and object, and so in his own existence furnish the
necessary condition of knowing ; but the subject cannot become
object until it has become such by impingement of some object
external to itself. Thus the subject, to be object of knowledge,
or to furnish the conditions of knowing, must first be corre
lated with some other object. Both subject and of gub46Ct and
object must have reality of existence. The subject ob;|ect-
must be a real being, and, as such, must possess the power
of knowing. The object must possess the reality of being,
or must be some existing state or act, or relation of some
being, or some possibility of being. There may be both
subject and object, and the subject may not know the object :
there is the being who possesses the power to know, and
there is the object which might be known, but there is in the
case no knowing — subject and object not being in suitable
relations. Relation of subject and object is, therefore, a
necessary condition of knowing. There must be interaction
between the subject and object; or rather, action of the ob
ject awakening a responsive action in the subject ; that is,
subject and object must, in the fact, be in such relations of
co-existence as to act upon each other. Knowing is impossible,
except in such a case. It is a possible conception that there

124 Studies in Theology.
should be a being who possesses power to know, and a universe
of objective reality which might be known; and yet, the
knower, in posse, in reality, have no knowledge whatever — not
even of himself. The knowledge of self, or the subject-object,
closely as the object lies to the subject, is only possible when or
after the subject is acted upon. Knowledge is a reaction of
the subject upon the object, or responsively to it, and in the
reaction it comes to know itself as acting. Consciousness is
nothing other than the knowledge the subject thus has of itself
in its activities.
Knowing is a purely subjective act, beginning and ending in
the mind itself, as well as an act of the mind ; but an act
elicited by impingement of some kind upon the mind. Any
reality, whether of the self or of the not-self, may be an object
of knowledge, or may occasion a knowing, under suitable con-
Tne sphere of ditions. The sphere of possible knowledge is co-
possible knowl- . . .
edge. extensive with reality ; and the measure oi actual
knowing will be determined by the measure of reality which
is brought into suitable relations to the knowing subject.
All newly-made mind exists without knowledge, and might
so exist forever were not the conditions of knowing supphed.
Thus we find three primary conditions to all knowing — (a) a
mind, (b) an object external to mind, (<s) and suitable relations
between them. What these relations are will be considered.
If this position be true, knowing is not concreated with mind,
and not a necessary, but a contingent, incident of its existence.
But, since mind possesses power to know, and attains to no
proper existence — that is, answers no proper end of mind with
out the exercise of its integrant faculties — we have no reason
to suppose that any mind does exist for any length of time
without knowing in some degree. The questions are, under
what conditions does it know, and what does it know ?
Any attempt to define what knowing is, or how it is possible,

Conditions of Knowledge. 125
or by what means and under what conditions it comes, contra
dicts the idea that knowledge is concreated, and proves that exist
ence void of knowledge logically goes before knowing, and must
be actual in the finite before any act of knowing can take place.
" Consciousness," Sir William Hamilton says, " is co-extensive
with all our faculties of knowledge, these faculties being only
special modifications under which consciousness is manifested. It
being therefore understood that consciousness is not a special
faculty of knowledge, but the general faculty out of which the
special faculties of knowledge are evolved, I proceed to the
evolution. " In the first place, as we are endowed with a faculty of cog
nition, or consciousness in general, and since it can- ConsoiousIiegg
not be maintained that we have always possessed comni"n to a11
that which we now possess, it will be admitted that cises-
we must have a faculty of acquiring knowledge. But this ac
quisition of knowledge can only be accomplished by the im
mediate presentation of a new object of consciousness ; in other
words, by the reception of a new object within the sphere of
our cognition. We have thus a faculty which may be called
the acquisitive, or presentative, or receptive.
"Now, new or adventitious knowledge may be either of
things external or things internal ; in other words, either of the
phenomena of the non-ego, or of the phenomena of the ego ;
and this distinction of objects will determine a subdivision of
this — the acquisitive faculty. If the object of knowledge be ex
ternal, the faculty receptive or presentative of the qualities of
such object, will be a consciousness of the non-ego.* This has
* The doctrine herein laid down by Hamilton, that consciousness extends to the
non-ego, has not been accepted, and we think cannot be. The consciousness in
the case is, the consciousness of an act of perception performed by the mind. The
mind is conscious of the knowledge that the object perceived is real, but it is also
conscious that it knows the object by perceiving it, and not by being conscious of
it. Perception is cognition.

126 Studies in Theology.
obtained the name of external perception, or of perception sim
ply. If, on the other hand, the object be internal, the faculty re
ceptive or presentative of the qualities of such subject-object,
will be a consciousness of the ego. This faculty obtains the
name of internal or reflex perception, or of self-consciousness." *
We know, then, what is external to us, within the sphere of
sense-perception, by perceiving it, and what we know of it is,
that it is ; and, that it is external and of the not-self ; and we
know what is internal to us, within the sphere of self-conscious
ness, and what we know of it is, that the self is real, and that it
acts in a certain way ; that is, we know the ego as existing, and
as active, and what its precise activity is, and the non-ego as
existing, and as object of self -activity. By this we do not mean
The not -sen *na* *ne min<l a* once an(l invariably makes these
the" tbknoewing distinctions to itself, or even that it is able to do
aot- so. To formulate its knowledge may require time,
experience, and acquired skill, but these are de facto elements
in all knowing. Whatever obscurity may arise when we
attempt explanations of the how of these knowledges, there
can be no sustained doubt that we do know and do not merely
believe. No possible facts or arguments can divest the mind
of the complete and absolute certainty of the existence and
otherness of the subject and object. Externahty, or, in the
significant language of Sir William and the schools, the non-
ego, furnishes the primary object of knowledge. The ego
is the knower; but it does not become possessed of knowl
edge — does not exert its power of knowing, though it possesses
it — until objectivity impinges upon it. Thus being awakened
to activity by external impingement, it comes to know itself,
along with externality — becomes subject-object when it grasps
the external object. External reality is the condition of internal
activity, and internal activity is the condition of self-knowledge.
* Metaphysics.

Conditions of Knowledge. 127
External reality, in certain relations to the mind, becomes an
occasion of its activity, and were it not thus awakened it would
never know itself, but so moved, it knows both itself and that
which moves it. Both the external and internal are conditions
sine qua non, therefore, to knowledge ; take either reality away
and knowledge is impossible. The mind exists as potential — as
having power — and under suitable conditions it puts forth its
power, and, once awakened, has the conditions of permanent
activity in itself.
There can be no reasonable doubt that were a mind, after
some experience in objective perception, shut Mlnd . M te
away from all real being but itself, it might, though sole ob:Ieot-
greatly limited in the extent of its actual or possible knowl
edges, be eternally active and conscious, with itself as sole
object — sole subject and object.
These are ascertained characteristics of the human mind ; all of
whose knowledge is derived and conditional. The Difference be-
raw material of knowledge is not created by the and infinite.
mind itself, but is given in the form of sensation awakened
in the mind by externality, and resulting in the perceiving act,
by which the external cause becomes known as existing. It
cannot be so of the infinite, whose knowledge is necessary and
unconditional. Intuition is synonymous with immediate knowing — the mind
seeing the object of its thought without distorting media — -
standing face to face with reality. It is purely a mental act ; it
is knowing. It is an important question, under what conditions
it takes place, and what are the objects it is exercised upon,
and what determines it to be an intuition ? There intuition com-
, mon to all
is a wide-spread idea that intuition is hmited to the knowledge.
narrow circle of necessary truths — axioms — pure intellections,
whose truth lies in the very structure of thought — without the
admission of which thought cannot move at all. This hmita-

128 Studies tn Theology.
tion removes it from the realm of facts and experience entirely ;
these are relegated to perception and consciousness, as they are
internal or external, and perception and consciousness are sup
posed to be something different from intuition. In fact, both
what is perceived and what is matter of consciousness are simple
cognitions or intuitions. All knowledge is, in the last resort,
intuition. A certain haze of doubt is thrown over knowledge
by perception, as if it were not possible to bring it within the
sphere of direct cognition, in the degree that necessary truths
are — that is, things perceived are not so well-known to be true
as the intuition of pure reason. Is this a just use of the term
under the definition given, that intuition is immediate knowing ?
Has the mind no other immediate cognitions than axioms ?
Are not the objects of intuition — rather, any and all objects
which in given relations are immediately cognized — absolutely
certain and real ? Does not the mind thus intuit itself in con
sciousness ? does it not thus intuit the external world in nor
mal perception ? Does it not thus intuit the ethical distinctions
of right and wrong ? When the moral faculty, the conscience,
furnishes the condition — that is, when its problems are brought
before the mind — is there not an intuition of them? Does
not the external world become a condition of intuition, when
placed in right relations to the mind, in the same manner
that an axiom does when the attention, or thought, is di
rected to it? If, as a purely mental fact, the mind intuits
that every effect must have a cause — that contradictories
cannot both be true — does it not likewise intuit, that there
is an external world, and also an internal world, differentiable
from it? Does it have any more immediate cognition of the
former facts than the latter, so as to justify the discrimination,
that one set is better or more directly known than the other.
In the one case, internal perception or consciousness presents
the object to the mind; in the second case, external perception

Conditions of Knowledge. 129
presents the object; in the third case, the pure reason presents
the object : but is not the act of cognition immediate on the
presentation of the object in each case alike ? In one case, the
mind is its own object, not as mind but as mind acting. The
intuition is of itself acting, and of the kind of act it is perform
ing it cannot be convicted of mistake. In the second case,
the external world is the object, as something existing external
to the mind. Again, it cannot be convicted of mistake. In the
third case, the object of intuition is a law of thought, or neces
sary truth. Is the cognition any more absolute in this last
case than in the other two, or is it only a difference in the
objects? There is, indeed, no necessity that the given mind
should be, or that the external world should be, while necessity
underlies the axiom ; but is the necessary truth any more clear
ly or directly perceived to be a truth, than the existence of the
contingent faets is seen to be a truth ? Is there any difference
in the certainty of the facts, or the unalterable certainty of the
mind with respect to them, and the certainty felt with respect
to necessary truths ? Does not the mind in each case intuitively
know the reality of the object presented ? Observe, we hmit
the intuition to the fact of a mental world, or the reality of
mind and its states of consciousness, and to the fact of an ex
ternal world differentiable from the mind itself ; and to the
truths which are discovered to the reason as necessary. We do
not extend it to the speculative questions which emerge — the
what, why, and how — which must be determined by processes
of inquiry and examination.
We turn the question to the moral realm. Does any thing
here emerge in intuition ? if so, what ?
Consciousness is in every case a feeling ; that is, the mind has
no consciousness that is not felt. No object im- consciousness
pinges on the mind or appears within it, or move- a feelln«-
ment is made by it which reports itself in consciousness, that

130 Studies in Theology.
is not felt. The feeling may be so dim and obscure as to re
quire an effort to discern it, or so pronounced as to shake the
whole internal nature as an earthquake — may touch it as with
the breath of an impalpable ether, or so as to agitate it as with
the rush of a tempest — but in either case it is a feeling.
Whether it be a thought, or a volition, or an emotion, or a sen
sation, it is a feehng of the mind as acted upon or as acting.
The knowing in the consciousness is a knowing of the subject
feehng and the object felt as real; what emerges in the feel
ing and in the knowing is the mind itself, and the object, what
ever that may be. If the object be the mind itself, in some
form of purely subjective activity, it feels itself acting, feels the
movement of its power — as thinking, as wilhng, as loving, or
whatever the act may be — a fancy merely stirs it. There is no
thought in consciousness that is not felt, no volition, no emo
tion. Thus sensitivity is an ultimate of mind, and invariably
constant in all its consciousness. The purest intellection, as
that a triangle is a figure with three sides, is felt, not as an
emotion of joy or grief, or a resolute act of will, or as a vivid
imagination, or strong perception, or great thought, is felt ;
but still it is felt, and could not else report itself as present in
consciousness. On the sensitive disk of mind no dim shadow
falls that does not thus move it — its very life is feeling.
Whatever passes under our sense-perception, we know in the
exact degree in which it passes under our perception, and not
further. Each object perceived suggests much with respect to
itself which is not perceived — awakens speculation and inquiry.
These added concepts may be true or not. They are imme-
Perception a lately known as existing concepts, but the reality
knowing. 0f -^g^ they are predicates is not known, as to
their real nature, but only inferred. The phenomena are
known. The speculative reason deals with the nature and the
ground of them. Intuition determines that there is a subject

Conditions of Knowledge. 131
or ground of them. Closer attention and more careful analysis
may bring the reality more completely within the scope of
knowledge, or it may be impossible that it should be so brought.
What we do know is, the existence of the object, and that it
affects us in a certain manner; but beyond the fact of its exist
ence, and the appearance it has to our minds, and certain essen
tial qualities intuitively cognized, we know nothing until pro
tracted observation, experience, attention, or scientific inquiry
conducts us into deeper discovery of the laws or modes of its
existence and hidden parts of its being. The unknown of it
remains greater than the known ; and what is supposed to be
known is not unfrequently illusion ; but there is something
known. To distinguish between the known and illusion — be
tween what is actually given in perception and what is hastily
supposed to be given, is the function of reason, and is achieved
by patient investigation.
Our knowledge of externality, given in sense-perception, is
limited to objects actually perceived. By this faculty we
do not know of any externality except what is perceived —
that there is any thing else — any thing beyond. Confined
simply to sense, the horizon which limits it contains all that is
known. But while perception makes deliverance with respect
to what lies within its sphere only, it gives not Perceptioniim-
, ¦" ° ited to what Is
simply externality and existence, and appearance, present.
but it adds otherness, or difference between objects ; discloses
them as many, not one ; as separable in thought and fact. But
the known otherness and difference between objects after all,
it must be admitted, is simply difference of phenomena, so far
as perception is concerned. Whether the ground of phe
nomena is one or many, perception cannot decide. It is con
ceivable that the sole cause of all phenomena is simple spiritual
energy. This is held by some of the ablest thinkers ; but while
difficult of disproof, it is evidently not true.

132 Studies in Theology.
But this is not all that we know of externality, though
perception gives us no more. There must be, therefore,
some other faculty, which makes known something of exter
nality to us not given in sense, but conditioned upon sense.
First, external perception must present the object, then another
faculty of the mind adds to our knowledge of that which is pre
sented. We perceive a surface — we know that there is a reverse
side, which we do not perceive. The knowledge is not a deliv-
erauce of sense, but it is an intuition or a deliverance of reason,
which is no less a knowledge.*
Consciousness [conscientia, joint knowledge), a knowledge of
one thing in connection or relation with another.
Sir William Hamilton has remarked that " the Greek has no
* Our knowledge of things consists, (1) in the certainty that they exist, and,
(2) that they have certain attributes or ways of working, and certain relations among
themselves. When we reach any such certainty about a thing, we have a knowl
edge of the thing to that extent. This knowledge may be more or less, but its
extent is indifferent to the definition. It is conceivable that other beings should
have deeper insight into the nature of things than we have ; but in $uch case
their knowledge would not be more real, but more exhaustive, than ours. But
even their knowledge would come under the same definition — the certainty that
things exist and have certain properties and powers. A large part of the skeptic's
argument consists in referring to the vastness of the unknown in comparison
with the known. He points, out that we do not know the inner nature of things,
nor how things are made. We grant all this, but insist that we know sundry
truths about things after they are made. The scientist does not pretend to know
how the elements are made, but he claims to know something about their ways
of working. Our knowledge of the soul does not consist in any insight into the
soul's being, but only in the certainty that souls exist, and have peculiar assign
able powers. Neither science nor philosophy has, or is likely to have, any recipe
for creation. The utmost the finite can ever hope to do, is, not to create things,
but to understand them after they are created. When reality has been compre
hended under the forms of thought, science and phUosophy have finished their
work ; and the result we call knowledge, as far as it goes. If this is not knowl
edge, what is? References to the mystery of being, and the vastuess of the
unknown, are quite irrelevant in discussing the reality of knowledge. — Bourne.

Conditions of Knowledge. 133
word for consciousness," and that " Tertulhan is the only ancient
who uses the word conscientia in a psychological sense, corre
sponding with our consciousness." *
The meaning of a word is sometimes best attained by means
of the word opposed to it. Unconsciousness — that is, the lack
or absence of consciousness — denotes the suspension of all our
faculties. Consciousness, then, is the state in which we are
when all or any of our faculties are in exercise. It is the con
dition, or accompaniment, of every mental operation. The
scholastic definition was, perceptio qua mens de presenti suo
statu admonetur.
" Consciousness is the necessary knowledge which the mind
has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows.
In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows that it ex
periences them. In willing or exercising acts of causality, it
knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is the common,
universal, and spontaneous consciousness." . . . "By con
sciousness, more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the
power and act of self -recognition ; not', if you please, the mind
knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions, but the mind
knowing itself in these." f
Mr. Locke has said, " It is altogether as intelligible to say
that a body is extended without parts, as that any thing thinks
without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so.
They who talk in this way may, with as much reason, say that
a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it ;
whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking con
sists in being conscious that one thinks." %
" We not only feel, but we know that we feel ; we not only
act, but we know that we act ; we not only think, but we know
* "Discussions," p. 110, note. Reid's Works, p. 7T5.
f Tappan, " Doctrine of the Will, by an Appeal to Consciousness," chap, ii, sec. 1.
X Locke, " Essay on Human Understanding," book ii, chap. i.

134 Studies in Theology.
that we think : to think, without knowing that we think, is as
if we should not think ; and the pecuhar quality, the funda
mental attribute of thought, is to have a consciousness of itself.
Consciousness is this interior light which illuminates every thing
that takes place in the soul ; consciousness is the accompaniment
of all our faculties ; and is, so to speak, their echo." *
That consciousness is not a particular faculty of the mind,
but the universal condition of intelligence, the fundamental
form of all the modes of our thinking activity, and not a
special mode of that activity, is strenuously maintained by
Amadee Jacques, f and also by two American writers, Mr.
Bowen \ and Mr. Tappan. This view is in accordance with
the saying of Aristotle, ovk eanv alaBrfaic aloOrjoewg — there is
not a feeling of a feeling ; and that of the schoolmen, "Non
sentimus, nisi sentiamus nos sentire, non intelligimus, nisi
intelligamus nos intelldgere." " No man," said Dr. Reid, " can
perceive an object without being conscious that he perceives it.
No man can think without being conscious that he thinks."
And as on the one hand we cannot think or feel without being
conscious, so on the other hand we cannot be conscious with
out thinking or feeling. This would be, if possible, to be con
scious of nothing, to have a consciousness which was no con
sciousness, or consciousness without an object. "Annihilate
the object of any mental operation, and you annihilate the
operation ; annihilate the consciousness of the object, and you
annihilate the operation."
This view of consciousness, as the common condition under
which all our faculties are brought into operation, or of con
sidering these faculties and their operations as so many modifi
cations of consciousness, has of late been generally adopted ; so
* Cousin, " History of Modern Philosophy," vol. i, pp. 274, 275.
f " Manuel de Philosophie, Partie Psychologique."
X " Critical Essays," p. 181.

Conditions of Knowledge. 135
much so, that psychology, or the science of mind, has been de
nominated an inquiry into the facts of consciousness. All that
we can truly learn of mind must be learned by attending to
the various ways in which it becomes conscious. None of the
phenomena of consciousness can be called in question. They
may be more or less clear, more or less complete ; but they
either are or are not.
Instead of regarding consciousness as the common condition
or accompaniment of every mental operation, Royer Collard
and Adolphe Darnier among the French, and Reid and Stewart
among the Scotch philosophers, have been represented as hold
ing the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty, having
for its objects the operations of our other faculties. " Con
sciousness," says Dr. Reid, " is a word used by philosophers to
signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present
thoughts and purposes, and in general, of all the present opera
tions of our minds. Whence we may observe that conscious
ness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things
past, which sometimes is done in popular discourse, is to con
found consciousness with memory ; and all such confusion of
words ought to be avoided in philosophical discourse. It is
hkewise to be observed that consciousness is only of things in
the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, " I
am conscious of the table which is before me." I perceive it, I
see it, but do not say, I am conscious of it. As that conscious
ness by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own
minds is a different power from that by which we perceive ex
ternal objects; and as these different powers have different
names in our language, and I believe in all languages, a phi
losopher ought carefully to preserve this distinction, and never
confound things so different in their nature."*
In this passage Dr. Reid speaks of consciousness, properly
* "Intellectual Powers," Essay i, chap. i. See, also, Essay vi, chap. v.

136 Studies tn Theology.
so-called, as that consciousness which is distinct from the con
sciousness by which we perceive external objects — as if per
ception were another kind or mode of consciousness. Whether
all his language be quite consistent with the opinion that all
our faculties are just so many different modes of our becom
ing conscious, may be doubted. But there is no doubt that by
consciousness he meant especially attention to the operations
of our own minds, or reflection ; while by observation he
meant attention to external things. This language has been
interpreted as favorable to the opinion that consciousness is a
separate faculty. Tet he has not distinctly separated it from
reflection, except by saying that consciousness accompanies all
the operations of mind. Now reflection does not. It is a
voluntary act — an energetic attention to the facts of con
sciousness. But consciousness may be either spontaneous or
reflective. " This word denotes the immediate knowledge which the
mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and in general, of all
its present operations." *
Mr. Stewart has enumerated consciousness as one of our
intellectual powers, co-ordinate with perception, memory,
judgment, etc. But consciousness is not confined to the opera
tion of the intellectual powers. It accompanies the develop
ment of the feelings and the determination of the will. And
the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty is not only
founded on a false analysis, but is an opinion which, if prose
cuted to its results, would overthrow the doctrine of imme
diate knowledge in perception — a doctrine which Stewart and
Reid upheld as the true and only barrier against the skepti
cism of Hume. " Once admit, that after I have perceived an
object I need another power, termed consciousness, by which I
become cognizant of the perception, and by the medium of
* " Outlines of Moral Philosophy," part i, sec. i.

Consciousness and Feeling. 137
which the knowledge involved in perception is made clear to
the thinking self, and the plea of common sense against skepti
cism is cut off. ... I am conscious of self and perceive the
not-self; my knowledge of both in the act of perception is
equally direct and immediate. On the other hand, to make
consciousness a peculiar faculty, by which we are simply cog
nizant of our own mental operations, is virtually to deny the
immediacy of our knowledge of an external world." *
"We may give consciousness a separate name and place,
without meaning to degrade it to the level of the other facul
ties. In some respects it is superior to them all, having in it
more of the essence of the soul, and being exercised whenever
the soul is intelligently exercised." f
" Feeling and sensation are equivalent terms, the one being
merely the translation of the other ; but feeling and conscious
ness are not equivalent, for we are conscious that we feel, but
we do not feel that we are conscious. Consciousness is involved
in all mental operations, active or passive ; but these are not,
therefore, kinds or parts of consciousness. Life is involved in
every operation, voluntary or involuntary, of our bodily system ;
but movement or action is not, therefore, a species of life.
Consciousness is mental life," J or a modus vivendi of mind.
Again, whatever passes through self -consciousness — and con
sciousness pervades every form and increment of mental activ
ity — we know at the time, that is when it is a fact of conscious
ness, that it is such a fact, whether it be a feeling, volition,
cognition, memory, or imagination ; and we also know the
self, as so affected or acting. We thus know the existence of
self, as differenced from externality or objectivity, and the
* Morell, " History of Speculative Philosophy," vol. ii, p. 13.
f McCosh, " Method of Divine Government," p. 533. Fifth edition. See Fearn,
Essay on Consciousness."
X " Agonistes; or, Philosophical Strictures," p. 363.
10

138 Studies in Theology.
entire history of its activity currently with it. We do not
infer it ; we know it. Furthermore we know, that while the
stream of consciousness is a flow — is successive consciousnesses
of successive activities ceaselessly changing, coming and vanish
ing — the conscious self is permanent and abiding. That it is the
The self giv- same self who has been subject of all the experiences
nent. which it remembers, and of multitudes of conscious
nesses which are not recalled, is not a belief, which may or may
not be true ; it is a knowledge, which, like any other knowledge
the mind possesses, without being able to explain or prove, it is
changelessly certain is true. As it knows self in its thought,
feehng, volition, as thinker, feeler, wilier, it knows self as iden
tical in all the succession. It also knows succession — the non
co-existence of its experiences : that they are different : that
they have an order of time : that they come and go : that they
are many, while it is one : that thus, while there is an ever-
changing consciousness, denoting the actual flow of experience
and mutability or changefulness of activity, the subject itself
changes not, or remains identical.
We venture to say further, that if consciousness discloses a
. ,. _, . * subject and its forms of activitv — otherness and dif-
A beginning to J "
the self. ference in its experiences, as successive, and its own
self-abidingness — it also discloses the fact of a beginning to the
subject : that is, makes known to itself that there was a time
when it began to be ; that there was a time when it did not exist.
There may be a question whether self-consciousness includes
past existence, and especially whether it makes deliverance as
to the fact that that past existence had a beginning. The self-
conscious subject knows himself in the self-conscious state as
now existing. Perhaps it would be more strictly accurate to
say that its present consciousness includes the memory of former
conscious states, and thus memory rather than consciousness
gives knowledge of a past with its current experiences. The

Consciousness and Feeling. 139
past is not present in fact, and as consciousness is confined to
the present, it cannot strictly be said to include that which once
was present, but is not now present. The memory of the past
is now present in the consciousness, and through it we con
sciously retain hold on the past.
But even memory does not reach the fact of a beginning to
the self-conscious subject. It would not be strictly correct to
say that we are conscious of remembering a period when our
existence emerged or began. We have no such memory. We
have no such consciousness. All that can be said is that there
is a point beyond which memory does not reach.
To determine that we did not then exist we must appeal to
some other source of knowledge. By observation we know
that human life here begins in infancy. That there was a prior
stage of existence has been fancied, but of it there is no proof,
as memory treasures no reminiscences of it, and as no other
proof of any kind can be adduced in its support. We are con
scious of the uneradicable belief that in that blank beyond the
reach of memory and antedating natural birth we did not exist.
The proof is negative rather than positive. The total absence
of all remembered consciousness or experience, and the obser
vation of the fact of a beginning to all human life in infancy
furnish the stable ground of conviction that our existence
began when we were born into this world.
In addition to these knowledges, which come to us by
external perception of external being, and by m^uu,,,^
internal perception of internal being and activ- by the reason.
ity, there are certain other deliverances not of internal
or external perception but of the reason which we know
to be true, and do not merely believe. They are truths
which do not pertain to objects of sense-perception, and which
do not pertain to the essence or activity of the knower,
or to the realm of existences as being at all, and yet are

140 Studies in Theology.
known as necessary truths of thought. They are called ab
stract truths, intuitive truths, truths of the reason, necessary
Truths of rea- truths, truths underlying existence and determina-
aon- tive of existence and thought— axioms ; truths seen
in their own light — self-evident. Many things, without doubt,
are unreflectingly put in this class which do not belong to it,
and in every case great care should be taken to not extend
the class unwarrantably; but there are such direct knowl
edges. Such are the following: Every effect must have
a cause ; every whole must be the equivalent of its parts ;
absolute space has no bounds ; duration is infinite ; form is es
sential to matter ; that which has form is finite ; all number is
finite ; no number of finites can make an infinite ; a straight
line is the shortest distance between two points ; the parts are
equal to the whole ; a circle is a line every point of which is
equidistant from its center ; a sphere is a surface every point
of which is equidistant from the center ; extension is a prop
erty of matter ; form, place, and limitation are inseparable from
matter; moral character is non-transferable; there are no
proxies in morals ; sin cannot be imputed where it does not
exist, without falsity or injustice; there can be no responsi
bility where there has not been ability ; freedom is essential to
moral agency ; law implies a lawgiver ; where there is no law
there can be no transgression. These and many more are ax
iomatic truths ; intuitively known by the mind to be truths.
They are known to be necessary ; that is, the opposite is seen to
be impossible and unthinkable. They furnish the basis of all
reasoning, but need not themselves be proved, nor can they ever
be doubted. These knowledges are characterized by universal
ity, necessity, the unthinkability of the opposite. They furnish
the laws of thought and conditions of all ratiocination.*
Added to these are other knowledges, as conclusions reached
* See Appendix : Note B.

The Intuitive Reason. 141
by demonstrative reasoning — truths disclosed or ascertained
by the discursive faculty. Such are the truths
. _, , What is known
reached through axioms, in geometry and mathe- by demonstra-
matics, and pure and mixed truth reached by
logic. The process begins with knowledges, however de
rived, whether of the self or not-self, or necessary abstract
truths of reason. These are used as premises, and by means
of them, in the third or tenth term, a previously unknown
truth becomes evolved as necessarily sequent. The truth of
the premises as conjoined includes the truth of the conclu
sion ; the demonstration reveals it. The ground of Truths of dem.
knowledge differs from all the above, in that onstratlon-
the truth ascertained is not given in (a) sense or external
perception, or (b) in self -consciousness or internal perception,
as a mere act or state of the mind, or (c) in intuitive reason,
but is reached by an exercise of the reasoning faculty, and
in such way that it never could be reached except by con
necting it with and deducing it from two or more antecedent
knowledges, neither of which separately contains it, but joint
ly do, and when viewed, jointly discover it. The result, when
reached, is not a belief, it is a knowledge. The premises
which, as stated, are known to be true, bring the conclusion into
such relations to the mind that its truth becomes an object of
immediate cognition and necessity. The certainty in the prem
ises carries up to inevitability in the conclusion. The conclusion
is not discoverable, or does not become a knowledge alone ; it
cannot be seen apart ; but when ushered by valid premises it
cannot be hid — its truth, in fact, is an intuition. The reason
directly cognizes it, not simply as a probable inference but
absolutely an inevitable truth. A=H : but H=B, therefore,
A=B. If the first and second be allowed, the third cannot be
denied. If the first and second be known, they are no sooner
seen together than the third is also seen as a necessary truth ;

142 Studies in Theology.
but the third never could be known if either the first or second
were unknown. From this principle it becomes possible for
knowledge to extend beyond personal, external, or internal
perception or original intuitions of reason.
Demonsteation (demonstro, to point out, to cause to see). —
In old English writers this word was used to signify the
pointing out, the connection between a conclusion and its
premises, or that of a phenomenon with its assorted cause. It
now denotes a necessary consequence, and is synonymous with
proof from first principles. To draw out a particular truth
from a general truth in which it is inclosed, is deduction ;
from a necessary and universal truth to draw consequences
which necessarily follow, is demonstration. To connect a
truth with a first principle, to show that it is this principle ap
plied or realized in a particular case, is to demonstrate. The
result is science, knowledge, certainty. Those general truths
arrived at by induction in the sciences of observation, are cer
tain knowledge. But, it is knowledge which is not definite or
complete. It may admit of increase or modification by new
discoveries, but the knowledge which demonstration gives is
fixed and unalterable.
"A demonstration is a reasoning consisting of one or more
arguments, by which some proposition brought into question
is evidently shown to be contained in some other proposition
assumed, whose truth and certainty being evident and acknowl
edged, the proposition in question must also be admitted as
certain. " Demonstration is direct or indirect. Direct demonstration
is descending — when starting from a general truth we come to
a particular conclusion, which we must affirm or deny ; or
ascending — when starting from the subject and its attributes,
we arrive by degrees at a general principle, with which we
connect the proposition in question. But these are deductive,

Demonstrative Reasoning. 143
because they connect a particular truth with a general princi
ple. Indirect demonstration is where we admit hypothetically
a proposition contradictory of that which we wish to demon
strate, and show that this admission leads to absurdity ; that is,
an impossibility or a contradiction. This is demonstratio per
impossible; or reductio ad absurdum. It should only be
employed when direct demonstration is unattainable.
"Demonstration was divided by ancient writers into two
kinds : one kind they called demonstration on ; the other dem
onstration dion.
" The demonstration 6i6n, or argument from cause to effect,
is most commonly employed in anticipating future events.
When, for example, we argue that at a certain time the tides
will be unusually high, because of its being the day following
the new or the full moon, it is because we know that that con
dition of the moon is in some way connected, as a cause, with
an unusually high rising of the tides as its effect, and can argue,
therefore, that it will produce what is called spring tides.
" On the other hand, the demonstration, on, or argument
from effect to cause, is more applicable, naturally, to past
events, and to the explanation of the phenomena which they
exhibit as effect. Thus the presence of poison in the bodies of
those whose death has been unaccountably sudden, is frequently
proved in this way by the phenomena which such bodies pre
sent, and which involve the presence of poison as their
cause." * The theory of demonstration is to be found in the
" Organon of Aristotle," " since whose time," says Kant,
" Logic, as to its foundation, has gained nothing."*
Testimony may also thus become the mediator of knowledge
to us. That is, from evidence we may deduce an what is known
absolute knowledge, when the evidence involves bTtesamony-
an intuition. We know intuitively that a mass of evidence
* Karslake, "Aids to Logic," voL ii, p. 46.

144 Studies in Theology.
may exist which cannot be false, and, therefore, what is in
cluded in the testimony is directly seen by the mind as inevi
tably true. It, in fact, becomes transformed into a necessary
truth, or rather, a perceived necessity that it should be true.
Testimony may be either human witnessing to a fact, or facts
Knowledge themselves supporting other facts. The fossils in
mony. the earth bring to us absolute knowledge of the
high antiquity, gradual growth, and pre-Adamic life of the
world ; the exhumed ruins of Nineveh brings us absolute
knowledge of a long-since extinct civilization. Present known
facts bring us face to face with long vanished facts, under
the intuition that effects must have a cause. Thus the sphere
of knowledge is pushed beyond our personal experience in
time and space. We know that the ocean must have a farther
shore, though we- have not seen it; that our race had an
cestors, though they were removed before we were born ;
that the pyramids of Egypt were built, though we did not
witness it. Thus knowledge of facts may extend beyond sense-
observation. But this does not alter the law, that knowl
edge is that state of mind which results from direct, face-to-
face contact of subject and object of knowledge. In all these
and similar cases there is a present fact before the mind, which
is known ; and the fact is intuitively known to require another
fact. That other fact becomes object of intuitive knowledge.
The obverse involves the reverse. The knowledge of this is
the knowledge of that.
In effect this seems to imply that knowledge may be mediate
or result from testimony, and so contradicts the position already
established, that all knowledge is immediate or intuitive ; but in
fact this is not so. The knowledge is in this, as in every case,
immediate. The fact testified to is mediated ; that is, it is
not itself before the mind directly, and so itself is not matter
of knowledge in the same way as if it were seen, but the tes-

Knowledge by Testimony. 145
timony is immediately vis d vis with the mind — it is known
and it is of such a kind that it is intuitively known that it must
be true. Whether the subject-matter of testimony be true
or not, the mind ordinarily is not in condition to know, and
the result can rise no higher than a variable degree of belief
or doubt, and that will be the condition in which the mind
is left ; but while this is the ordinary fact of testimony, a
form of testimony may exist out of which absolute knowledge
may emerge, and yet the knowledge will be intuitive or imme
diate. When a large number of minds declare that, of personal
knowledge, there is such a city as London, the mass Testimony a
of concurrent testimony may be such in circum- knowledge.
stance that the mind, while having no personal knowledge by
actual perception of the existence of such a city, nevertheless
may know that it does exist, not only in the sense of being
absolutely certain, but in the deeper sense of seeing that it
must be so. How does mere testimony bring it into such a
state ? In this way : (a) it directly knows the testimony — its
mass and circumstances ; (5) it intuitively or immediately
knows or sees, by a law of reason, or through the reason, in
the same manner in which it sees, that the whole cannot be
greater than the sum of its parts, or any other axiom, that such
concurrence of testimony is impossible under the circum
stances without, or in the absence of, the truth or reality of the
subject-matter of it. This is an intuition, and the intuition
includes the reality of the subject-matter as really as if it were
matter of personal cognition direct. The testimony is lifted out
of mere probable proof to intuitive evidence. What the mind
knows in the case is the testimony, and the absolute necessity
that the testimony should be true. In this knowing it knows the
existence of such a city as London, though it never personally saw
it with the outer eye. A sensible object, not given in sense
or by sense, is declared to the reason, or by the reason is seen

146 Studies ln Theology.
to exist, and, in a sense the knowledge takes rank with self-
evident or necessary truths, discerned by the intuitive reason.
Sequences which flow from premises take on them the precise
quality of the premises. If the sequence is known to be the only
and sole sequence possible, and the premises are known to be
absolutely true, the sequence becomes also an absolute knowledge.
If there is uncertainty, or absence of knowledge in the premises,
or if there are possible alternatives in the sequence, knowledge
does not and cannot exist. The result can carry no higher than
belief. On these principles repose the validity of all demon
strations and logical conclusions. Demonstration is simply a
process by which a given sequence is known to flow inevitably
from premises known to be true. In the outcome the mind
sees that the conclusion has in it the same degree of truth
which it sees to inhere in the premises. A thing not given in
sense may be as really known to exist as if seen, if the prem
ises necessitate the conclusion of its existence. It would be
an inexcusable affectation for any person of ordinary intelli
gence and ordinary opportunities of information, to say that he
did not know whether or not there is such a city as London,
though he never personally saw it.
We do not doubt, however, that despite the fact that knowl
edge may thus be derived to the mind through a given form
of testimony, on fundamental grounds the distinction should
be maintained that classifies all our ideas derived through tes
timony as beliefs — noting the possible exceptions. The dis
tinction is scientific and convenient, as denoting a broad mar
gin of difference in the grounds of knowledge and belief.
Let us not fall into the mistake, that what is known by
another is known by ourselves. The same statement or fact
may be labeled a knowledge, or a belief, or a conjecture merely,
and will be either as the personal mind stands related to it.
One knows a fact, or an experience. To him they will forever

Knowledge by Memory. 147
be knowledges, but to any other mind, not so related, they can
never be more than beliefs on testimony, unless the ^^ la knowl_
testimony is such as that the mind intuitively cog- ^hMiwe8 0nly
nizes its necessary truth. tnow'
Finally, the mind is conscious of knowing some past conscious
nesses and some past perceptions. That which was a whatistooim
present experience or conscious act or affection a mo- by memory-
ment or a day ago, or in some cases a year or years ago, remains
so vividly permanent in the consciousness, that it cannot be
reduced to a mere behef. With regard to most memories,
except in a very general way, this cannot be said. They fade
out ; the minute and sharp lines become obscure and partially
obliterated ; and, except in the most general manner, it is impos
sible to restore them. They remain in the mind a confused
blending of a half -knowledge and half -belief . How it is that the
object is held we do not know; but we do know that it is so held;
6ome part, in some way, still hngers in the direct gaze of the
mind like an object of perception in perspective. It recedes
and grows dim, but is not wholly lost. With regard to the
great mass of objects which have been in our minds as tran
sient events, in some form of knowing, now that they no
longer exist, except iu a treasured idea or memory, we are not
quite able to identify as knowledges. We have an indistinct
recollection that the facts were thus or so, but we find our
selves not able to affirm that they were certainly so, and are
compelled to say they seem to have been this or that. The
past does not wholly vanish, it keeps along with us in unbroken
continuity, and scenes of fifty years ago are present to-day —
some with the vividness of assured reahty and others in the
nimbus of indefiniteness and uncertainty.
This brings into view one of the most interesting psycholog
ical facts of our strangely complex and mysterious nature, by
which we are enabled to grow and increase in knowledge.

148 Studies in Theology.
We live but an instant at a time ; that is, we can never have an
' actual possession of more than a moment of existence, so brief
that it vanishes, as soon as we can think it — before we can
formulate the idea— now. If what the now gives us were
wholly withdrawn from us when the moment vanishes, we
should never be able to hold in our knowledge more than the
passing consciousness. But we are so mercifully and myste
riously constituted, that, standing or floating on that sharper-
than-a-needle point, we are able to look through or back over
our life-time, and see much of it as. we see illuminated points of
a landscape, and almost the whole of the kaleidoscopic expe
riences, as we see the general surface of river, plain, and hill,
in the region through which we travel. Thus it is that we live
How we in- over our past happiness or sorrow, and thus it will be
crease in i-niii i i • • j.
knowledge. that forever we shall hold together the integrity oi
our entire life in its order of successiye experiences, and retain
and .increase the stores of our knowledge. A moment repro
duces a life-time, and hands it on to the next and the next,
with the increase to all eternity. This source of increase makes
the difference in the stature of a child on earth and a man in
heaven — of the wealth of the experience of one day, and the
experiences of countless millions of years. It is thus that it is
possible for us to approximate, without the possibility of reach
ing, the Infinite in knowledge and blessedness. Standing on
some high Alps in the far-removed ages of the future, with
myriads of millenniads at our feet, we may have the wealth
of all the experiences, studies, growths of a life-time focused
in a single gaze — nay, may have it permanent and perpetual.
That this is not a mere dream, but the outcome of a law of our
mental life, is not only possible, but most probable, if not a
matter of knowledge, as will appear in future discussions.
It is important that we should be able, among our concepts,
to fix their relative dignity : to distinguish which of them are

Beliefs — Conjectures. 149
knowledges, which rational beliefs, which merely imbibed opin
ions, imaginations, conjectures, dreams. These terms Eelatlve meai_
indicate differentiable states, but they are not always ty of collcePt3-
discriminated. The unskilled often take the merest conject
ures for knowledges. In one respect all the states indicated
resemble : they each exist in the mind in the form of notions
or concepts. They may also each represent a reality. Even a
dream or imagination may -be true. But there is a vast differ
ence in the value of these concepts. In the case
~ , . . .... Knowledges.
of knowledges, there is an ascertained reality corre
sponding with the concept. In the case of rational behefs,
there are evidences to warrant the belief of reality.
In the case of conjectures, imaginations, dreams,
there may or might be corresponding realities, but there is no
evidence whatever that there are such. In the first Conjectures.
case the concept is true ; in the second, there is reason
to believe it is true ; in the third, it may be true ; but there is
no known evidence for believing it to be so. In the first case,
the mind acts according to its nature in affirming that it cer
tainly has the truth and knows it ; in the second, it Mind acts ac-
acts according to its nature in believing that it has cording to its
....... ,. . nature.
the truth ; in the third, it acts according to its
nature in withholding belief for the want of evidence. In the
first case, it does not believe, but knows ; in the second case, it
does not know, but believes ; in the third case, it neither
knows nor intelligently believes, nor has the right to affirm ;
but may disbelieve. What is known cannot be disbelieved :
what is matter of belief might, in a given case, become matter
of disbelief, or might become matter of knowledge ; might be
raised or lowered in its dignity and value, in some cases, but
possibly not in all. What is mere matter of conjecture
might, under change of circumstances, become matter of
belief, or even, under changed conditions and relations of

150 Studies in Theology.
subject and object, might become matter of knowledge ; that
is, when truth is as the conjecture, and when the changed
circumstances of the mind convert the conjecture into
a cognized reality. Since there is this difference in the
value of concepts, it must be important, to a truth-seeker, to
be able clearly to distinguish between them, and not only be
able to distinguish, but, in fact, always to distinguish between
them. The habit of making the distinction will be of great
service. It will enable us to set aside certain of our concepts,
importance of as never to De questioned, namely, our knowledges.
discriminating These are final : the truth cannot contradict them.
the quality of
an idea. It is only necessary that we certainly know in the
case ; but in order to do that, we must be able to decide that
we do know, and what knowledge is.
This habit will enable us, also, to class certain of our con
cepts as rational beliefs, that is, as beliefs that have been
carefully formed, by an examination of all the evidence in
our reach, and so to be held firmly as true, subject only to re
vision and change, if we should find new and determining
facts to the contrary. This will give us a body of beliefs
which will be abiding, and furnish the ruling ideas of our life.
It will enable us, further, to classify certain of our ideas as
mere opinions, or conjectures, which we may not insist upon as
fixed beliefs. These will be subject to revision, if the occasion
should exist for attaching to them any practical value. Only
narrow and ignorant minds attach any importance to these,
and such often regard the merest dreams as absolute truths.
We have thus found five definitive fields of possible knowl
edge — five cases in which our concepts may be differentiated
as cognitions, as distinguished from a much larger class which
must forever stand in the mind as beliefs or mere fancies only.
These are : (1) External perceptions, in which the object stands
out before the mind as real, and as characterized by certain

Soueoes of Knowledges. 151
phenomena mediated to us through a sensory system in forms
of sensation, but given to us, in a way that we cannot explain,
as knowledges, and not as conjectures or mere beliefs. (2) In
ternal perceptions, or self-consciousness, in which the mind
stands as an object of vision to itself, in the present form of
its activity. This, again, must forever rank as purest knowl
edge, and can never be made to take on the form g^^g ot
of belief. (3) Direct perceptions of the reason, or knowledges.
intuitions, in which the mind gazes immediately on necessary
truths, and knows them as such, and which can never be re
duced to beliefs. (4) Demonstrated ^ruths of mathematics and
logic, which, though not directly cognized apart from premises,
are, nevertheless, seen by the mind to be certain and the neces
sary outcomes of thought when correlated with premises. (5) A
limited number and kind of memories, in which the past still
6tands in the present and perfect view of the mind, as when
the past was itself present.*
All possible forms of knowledge will group under some
one or more of these five forms, and each form is a direct
seeing or intuition. We have not included testimony as a sixth
6ource of knowledge, inasmuch as when it becomes such it in
volves an intuition or direct cognition of the reason.
The brood of thoughts or ideas or concepts which find their
way into our minds in some other way, and under some other
conditions, can be known as existing in consciousness, but those
special objects of which they are concepts can come into no
other relation to us than that of behef, or some form of doubt
or disbelief.
It will be observed that in all these cases the mind stands
" vis-a-vis " — face to face — with the object of its knowledge :
there is direct relation between subject and object; nothing
intervenes as mediator. Knowledge is that state or act of the
* See Murphy, " Phil. Basis of Belief," Appendix : Note B.

152 Studies in Theology.
mind which results from the mind directly looking on the
object. It is always intuitive. It will admit of no doubt. It
will render no reason. Its simple answer is: "There are
things which seem to me true, which I believe; these I
know." These are knowledges, and these only. Beyond these
we know nothing. The fundamental characteristic of knowl
edge is, that it is that act or state of the mind which results
when an object, be it internal or external, material or meta
physical, passes immediately before it, and becomes object
of its direct gaze. All things known by us are, or have been,
thus immediate to our contact ; when we come to apply the
principle, we will discover that the class of our concepts which
are entitled to be called knowledges is exceedingly limited.*
If it should be said, as it is, that the mind only knows its
own states and acts, and cannot transcend itself so as to know
other beings external to itself, we answer, that in knowing itself
it knows that it perceives other objects. It cannot explain how
it does it, but it knows that it does it. This is the testimony
of its self -consciousness. No pressure Can enforce retraction.
Mind tran- The only account it can give of the object is, that it
scends itself. jg 0f tke not.Self5 and real, and is known to it under
forms of phenomena or appearance. Knowledge includes sub
ject and object. It is not knowledge if either is wanting. The
object in knowledge is not some state of the subject, unless the
subject be the object ; but the state of the subject is the know
ing ; and the knowing is comprehensive of subject and object.
When the subject is subject-object, the knowing is of itself as
being and of its states or acts; but when the object is some
material thing, as in perception, though the knowing subject
may become co-object in the self -consciousness which attends
the knowing act, it is not the object perceived ; the perceived
object in being perceived is known, as distinct from the subject-
* See Appendix: Note C.

Knowledge by Perception. 153
object, and the knowledge of it is knowledge of itself and not
simply of the concept which is formed of it.*
In perception there are two forms of mental action which are
radically different : {a) The self-conscious act of Two act3 ,
cognition of the self as having a perception, or of PeroePtion-
the perceiving act, which is wholly subjective ; (b) the act of
perceiving, which the mind knows is its own act, but which it
also knows has a real object as its ground which is external to
itself. It does not perceive the perception. It is conscious of
it. It is not conscious of the object, it perceives it. It intui
tively knows that there could be no perception without an ob
ject to be perceived, as it knows there could be no consciousness
of a perception without a perception and a conscious subject.
It knows the object in perception as directly as it knows the
perception in consciousness — in other words, the knowledge
which issues is of subject and object both — of subject as con
scious of the perception or perceiving act, and of object as
that which is perceived, and without which there could be no
perception, and so, in the case, no consciousness, f
All knowing, by whatsoever mind and under whatsoever
form, is the same ; that is, the knowing act is one A1I knowledge
and the same kind of an act, but each knowing is ldentical-
the distinct act of an individual mind.
If all that is known by all minds could become knowledge
for each, much that is now mere belief would be transformed
into knowledge ; but this cannot be. Each mind must begin
at zero, and work up its own capital ; and life is so short and
limited that no individual can gain much knowledge. Facilities
for the intercommunication of mind have now so increased, and
so many methods for treasuring up the thoughts and achieve
ments of men have been invented, that each generation comes

11

*See Ferrier's "Institutes of Metaphysics."
f See Hamilton's "Philosophy," pp. 173, 174.

154 Studies in Theology.
upon the stage of life with greatly improved advantages, and
the sum of general knowledge is rapidly increasing. But
while the attainment of knowledge is more easy, and the enjoy
ments of the results of knowledge are more accessible and
universal, it still remains that each man must acquire knowl
edge for himself, and atom by atom. He cannot inherit it.
Knowledge is neither connate, inheritable, transferable, nor
Knowledge not communicable. Truth may be communicated, but
transferable, fa ^e recipient mind it must emerge as belief, not
as knowledge. To know it as truth there must be some other
relation to it than that which the communication creates. So
long as the statement of another is the sole ground, it can have
no other effect than to procure such a degree of behef as the
assumed intelligence and veracity of the author warrants. It
may range from zero to entire confidence, but it will only be
behef. Testimony is a ground of knowledge, and can become
such only when it is of such kind as to involve an intuition
that its contents must be true. In that case the subject-matter,
though given in the form of testimony, becomes, in fact, a
direct cognition. One mind may put another mind in the
way of knowing, and so may help it to knowledge by pointing
out what is true, and aiding it to come into such relations to
the truth that it will not be dependent upon the statement
alone, but will come to know for itself.
Individual experiences can never be matter of knowledge to
any person except the person who has the experience. Thus
the knowledge of each mind is knowledge for itself — a treasure
which it can neither alienate nor divide with others. The ut
most the knowing mind can do is to express its knowledge
to others, and so put them in possession of the truth it con
tains, to be held by them as a verity of belief, or to indicate
how it may become a knowledge to them, or how they may
attain a like knowledge. Some things can never emerge as

Knowledge Always Personal. 155
knowledge in any other mind than the mind in which they are
a private and inseparable personal possession.
As knowledge always implies the truth or reality of what is
known, whatever has been known by any one mind is proved
to be true, though it should forever elude the knowledge of
every other mind in the universe. Having been known once,
its truth is determined and is indestructible. It is not the fact
that it has been known that makes it true, but being known it
cannot but be true. What is real is real, whether known or
not ; but knowledge cannot exist without the reahty of that
which is known, and so knowledge is the indestructible proof
of reality to the knowing mind.
The actual knowledge possessed by men is greater than that
of any individual : it comprises all the knowledge Knowledge of
of all the men that ever lived. There is thus a sort SSwSS
of solidarity of all the knowledge of the race, which toowins-
passes over as an inheritance to the individuals, and we speak
of it as that which is known, and by any easy fallacy conceive
ourselves as knowing it. For practical purposes the language
is accurate enough, but it is not strictly true. Things experi
enced, observed, and wrought out by others, so as to be knowl
edges to them, pass by uncontradicted report into the currency
of the world's thought, and become a common possession of
assured truth. No one doubts — all assert that these are things
well and universally known ; but, in point of fact, they are
simply heirlooms of belief, resting on no other foundation than
the accredited report of written history, or on common unchal
lenged tradition. He would be accounted eccentric or mad
who should attempt to dispute them.
For accuracy of thought it must remain that there is a
fundamental difference between knowing and believing, and
that difference does not consist in the simple matter of the
mind's certainty in one case and non-certainty in the other,

156 Studies in Theology.
but in the certainty or non-certainty plus the circumstances
or relations of the mind to objects which give rise to its
feeling of certainty or uncertainty. Whatever is mediated to
it by another, or by something else than its own senses or con
sciousness, or intuitive reason, or demonstration, or memory,
or some other form of evidence which necessitates certainty,
must stand simply as belief, or so-called knowledge by report.
What is given in internal perception, or self -consciousness ?
Internal per- ^ SiveS ^e Sel^ aS real> aQ<* certam f°rms of its
ception. activity as feelings : (a) sensations derived through
the body, either as it is affected within itself by the processes
of life and action going on in its own members and compo
nents, or as it is affected by other material objects; (5) emo
tions which are purely subjective ; (c) passions and appetites,
which are mixed, resulting from the relations of the self to the
body ; (d) intellections, as thoughts, ideas, reasonings, mem
ories, and all properly mental acts ; (e) volitions, motives, pur
poses, determinations, choices, executive acts. These conscious
ness gives as of the self. The self is thus known as real, as one,
and as active. This is all that is given in self -consciousness,
or internal perception. It does not tell what the self is, but
that it is and what it does. It knows nothing of how it acts,
or how it is acted upon. It forms no image of the self, knows
nothing of its whence or why, or of how it carries forward its
processes. Its sole posita or data is the self under forms of
activity, and as possessing powers to act.
The personal being is not a mere intellect with power to
The personal know and believe. In self-knowledge he knows
being notmere . ,.,,..
intellect. himself as having these powers; but additionally,
he knows himself as having feelings, and a power of volition,
and as free. He knows himself, therefore, as a complex indi
vidualized unit, in which are synthetized intelligence, feeling,
will. These are separable in thought, but one in his unitary

Mind Ethical. 157
being ground. He it is that knows. He it is that feels. He
it is that wills. It is a one-self that exists in all these divers
states. Personality is a triformed unity.
The mind has a moral constitution — is a moral being : that
is, in its nature it is ethical. It does not exist without the
ethical sense. Its modus vivendi is ethical. It Mind has a
¦ i t • -i moral consti-
spontaneously makes ethical distinctions, and feels tution.
the imperation of ethical obligations. Thus its very existence
involves the fact of moral law and the reality of a moral realm.
It is so sensitively constituted that a thought, or motive, or act
of a certain kind starts moral feehng, that is, a feeling of ap
proval or disapproval, of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.
It tries itself not merely by the standard of right reason as to
the accuracy of its conclusions, but also by the standard of
right feehng, motive, and conduct. This moral constitution
it knows is inherent, and of its very nature in knowing itself.
How it came by it it does not know in self-consciousness,
but it knows that it is a fact, just as it knows that it performs
rational acts.
The feeling that an act is right or wrong, or the feeling of an
impulse to worship, or the feeling of pain or pleasure The feelings,
. ... f . i a ground of
at the contemplation ot an act — the impulses or knowledge.
promptings or reproaches of conscience — are not the equivalents
of knowledge, but they are included in self-knowledge, and they
are the grounds of knowledge, as we shall see, of an objective
law and authority. The self -knowing gives no more than their
existence. They themselves furnish data for further knowing
by rational induction. They are known to exist. When they
arise in the mind they presuppose a ground. That ground is
the fact of a fundamental moral nature. The mind sponta
neously cognizes, so soon as moral feeling takes place, the idea
of right and wrong. In beholding certain acts feeling of a
certain kind is awakened, and through the feeling it immedi-

158 Studies in Theology.
ately cognizes that they are right or wrong, as it cognizes
axioms. A feeling is concomitant or invariably synthetizes
with the cognition of right and wrong. That we are so con
stituted as to experience these feelings is a fact of our moral
nature, which points to the reality of the moral quality of
the objects which awaken them. The knowing of the act, if
external, is by perception or information; or in the case of
internal acts, as thoughts, motives, malign or benign feelings,
by internal perception or self-consciousness. The feeling which
arises with the cognition is one of approval or aversion. The
feeling denotes the moral quality of the act. Through it the
intelligence attains the idea of right or wrong, and cognizes
the act as of either this or that quality. It is this co-existence of
feehng and intelligence which constitutes the basis of the moral
nature, and makes man a moral being. There can be no moral
nature, not even in God, without feeling. The act of the reason
in assigning moral quality when such feehngs appear is intui
tive. By this we do not mean that the reason discerns no other
ground for the idea of right and wrong, and no other ground
for classifying the given act as this or that, but the feeling
which spontaneously emerges on beholding it ; but it detects
in the feeling its own essential moral nature, and the ground
for condemning or approving its acts of a certain kind. On
examination of the circumstances of the case the mind may
change its spontaneous verdict, and with that change the
feeling itself will change ; but this does not prove that there is
not a moral nature and moral standard in the mind, but only
that the case is not properly apprehended. The knowledge is
at fault, not the feeling. That there is such a moral constitu
tion in the mind, in its very nature, is matter of universal
consciousness. The presence in every mind of the feeling of
oughtness and ought-not-ness, and the verdict of the reason
that these feelings are proper, is in absolute proof. The sense

Relations of Knowledge and Feeling. 159
of guilt, ill-desert, shame, worthiness of punishment, which
universally attends certain acts and even thoughts, and the
converse, are in proof.
There is a reality of right and wrong, and the mind intui
tively cognizes the fact, and in knowing itself it ^^^^ rlgnt
knows this, as a primary datum of consciousness. andwrons-
There is a standard which determines what is right and
wrong, and the mind intuitively discerns the fact, for without
this the idea could not exist, and the feehng could not arise.
The defects of the understanding and the circumstances under
which it renders its verdict, and the susceptibility of the
feelings to be indurated or even totally obscured, are such
that the judgment is often inaccurate. But these do not alter
the verdict of reason and consciousness alike, that man is a
moral being in the constitution of his personahty. He knows
this. In every feeling there is knowledge. In every knowledge
there is feeling. In every volition there is both feehng
and knowledge. Feeling cannot exist without being known.
Knowledge cannot exist without being felt. Yolition proper
cannot exist without a feeling of motive to it and a feeling of
it. It cannot be exerted without both a feeling and a knowl
edge of it. The mind neither acts nor suffers without con
sciousness or self-knowing. Though knowledge and feeling
are always synthetized they are not the same ; inseparable,
they are not identical. Feeling is not knowing. Knowing is
not feeling. Yolition proper is never without feeling and
knowing, but is neither feeling nor knowing. Feehng and
knowing may exist without volitional exercise.
Feehng is of divers kinds. Knowing and willing are simple
acts. All knowing is identical in kind and degree, but of di
vers objects and sources. All willing is identical in kind.
There are moral, spiritual, and physical feelings.

160 Studies in Theology.
What relation has feeling to knowledge f
One class of feelings is called sensations, another class appe
tites or passions, another emotions, another affections.
The feehng of sensation is derived through the organism,
and comprises all the affections produced in the mind through
the five senses — the sense of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and
touch. Impingement of some kind on the nerve organ reports
itself in the mind, and becomes sensation or feeling, which
feeling becomes occasion of cognition, or a knowing act, not
of itself alone, but of the object which awakens it. The sensa
tion is not knowledge, but it cannot exist without being
known. It is thus a condition, or invariable concomitant, of
certain kinds of knowledge. All sensation becomes ground of
knowledge, not of itself alone, but of something external to
the mind ; the organism as affected, and generally of something
still more external, which affects the organism. Through sen
sations, and the organism which mediates them, the mind finds
its approaches to the external world, and becomes cognizant,
not of itself alone, but of the organism and of the external
world — the non-ego. Thus the sensory organism, while itself
not a knowing subject, by its intimate relations to the mind
becomes, through its nerve-excitation, the occasion of an act of
cognition, in which the mind knows itself as knower, and the
external world as excitant.
The passions are of the soul, and their action is from within,
passions of the but, like the sensations, they are conditioned physio-
soui. logically, and their gratification is mediated through
the organism. What are known as the " lusts of the flesh," or
earthly side of our nature, are really of the soul. They effect,
or originate, the mysterious excitations of the body which per
tain to its preservation and the propagation of the species.
The organism is made for them, even as it is made for sensa
tion from the external world. The perception of the external

Passions Subjective. 161
world is conditioned on the organism ; so here, the preservation
of the body and propagation of the species are conditioned on
the organism ; but both effects would fail were it not for the
perceptive power of the mind in the first case, and its subject
ive passions in the second. They cannot be felt without
being known, and known as subjective, but as related to the
organism. Their presence awakens desire, distress, or subject
ive feeling of some kind. Knowledge of them is the invari
able and necessary concomitant of their existence.
The passions are more subjective than the sensations. They
are of the mind, or spring from the mind itself, Passions more
and act directly on the organism, while sensations sensations.
arise from external impingement. In sensations the external
world is given to the mind through the sensorium. In the
passions the mind goes outward, seeks and excites the organ
ism, and originates conditions in it for their own gratification.
The passions are the most intimate nexus between the personal
soul and the external world. The organism is the necessary
medium of the knowledge of externality in the one case, and
the necessary medium of the gratification of the passions or
animal desires in the other case. The arrangement in the or
ganism for sensation is instrumental to knowledge, both of the
subject and object, and is minister to mind. The implanted
passion in the mind acts on the organism, exciting it and mov
ing it to seek gratification. The needs of the organism for
its preservation excite desire for food or craving in the mind
to appease the pain which hunger creates and for the pleasing
sensation of taste. The need is of the organism. The pain
and pleasure are of the soul. Thus the soul's craving for the
kind of good which the organism ministers becomes the means
of preserving it from waste and destruction. The relation is
intimate and necessary.
The sexual passion is subjective — an implanted affection

162 Studies in Theology.
which has for its object the propagation of the species. Its
only means of gratification is the organism, and its only func-
im lanted at **on ^e propagation of the species. It is, there-
tection. forej pr0perly conditioned on the organism, and
exists only for time ; and as it finds the conditions of its excita
tion in the body it probably disappears with the body.
As of close kin to the passions must be classed all sexual
attractions and loves running throughout all the realm of
animal life. They are not rational, but instinctive.
There is a human affection, or love of man for his fellows,
which is of an entirely different kind, not having physiological
grounds alone, but additionally moral and purely subjective
grounds. The moral affections are subsequent to the natural
and instinctive, and possibly rise out of them, but are not
modifications of them, and greatly transcend them in worthi
ness. Though the passions are subjective, they would probably
not exist were there no bodily conditions for their play and
gratification. Thus the arrangements for the feehngs, which are classed as
sensations and passions, are with reference to the present
order, and involve physiological conditions ; while the feehngs
of benevolence and friendship, and all the higher impulses of
love for humanity and moral worthiness, wherever found,
are permanent and inhere in the moral nature.
The mental, moral, and spiritual emotions are still another
Moral emo- c*ass °^ feelings. They, like the rest, exist only
tions- as they are known. They are purely subjective.
They are the pleasures and pains which attend knowing ;
which attend all normal mental acts; which attend external
acts that are conceived to be good or bad; they are feel
ings to which we give the names of joy, hope, love, fear,
sorrow, benevolence, malevolence, worship. The occasions of
them are certain things apprehended by the mind as obliga-

Moeal and Spieitual Emotions. 163
tory, as right or wrong, as becoming or unbecoming, as worthy
or unworthy, as working evil or good. They are the bases of
religion and morality.
The process of sensation we found to be the excitation of a
sensory nerve of the physical organism by impingement of a ma
terial object, which sensation is taken up by the mind in percep
tion, and is transformed into a thought-image of the impinging
object, and issues in a cognition of it.
We discover, upon careful study, another sensory system
— shall we call it a spiritual sensorium ? — a something which is
sensitive to moral impingement — sometimes called conscience,
the moral sense, the spiritual ego.
The process is this : As in perception there is an object and
answering organ, so here there is an object and answering organ.
In the first case the organ is a material nerve. In this it is
a spiritual nerve. In the first, the order is material impinge
ment on the receptive nerve of sensation, which is taken up in
perception and transmuted into a concept or thought of the im
pinging reality. The perception is cognition, the direct seeing
of the mind, the bringing of subject and object into synthesis
or concreteness or unity. In the second, the order is the im
pingement of a moral fact on the more delicate How mora]
moral nerve or sensitive soul, awakening a feeling emotions arise.
of pain or pleasure, approval or disapproval, or the appropriate
affection or emotion. The process here is either the percep
tion of some external act or the self-consciousness of some
thought or motive or purpose or feeling purely subjective.
Whichever it may be, it awakens the appropriate moral emo
tion. If it is an act of one kind, it excites the spontaneous
emotion of satisfaction. If an act of another kind, it results in
a recoil of feeling. If, instead of an act, it is a mere thought
or motive or purpose or desire, the sensitive soul experiences
the same spontaneous appropriate affection— is moved with a

164 Studies in Theology.
sensation of pleasure or pain. The affection is taken up by the
reason or intelligence, and the object awakening it is cognized
as right or wrong. It is the moral sensibility which reports it
in feehng ; the reason which determines its reality and quality.
The moral fact thus emerges in effect on sensibility, and the
moral law is discerned and apphed by the reason or conscience.
As in sensation the external object is disclosed to the mind in
Feelings ground perception, and the realitv becomes known, so here,
of moral distinc- 7 , , ' ,...,. , , „
tions. m the feehng or moral sensibility, the moral fact
and its moral quahty become disclosed, and the reality becomes
known. As the mind can only reach outward to external reality
through sensation, so it can only reach the idea of moral quality
through the feelings produced in the sensitive soul by the moral
facts which impinge on it. Mere reason, separate from moral
feeling, cannot give the idea — cannot reach it — of right and
wrong. In order that the quality of Tightness or wrongness
may inhere in an act, it must be associated with a feeling, or have
a feeling associated with it, or have a normal tendency to pro
duce a feeling. We cannot predicate right or wrong of a mere
mistake of the judgment, or an external act that is without
motive of any kind, or an emotion that is purely involuntary.
The quality arises with an act of the will and the motive
thereto. It is the presence of these that makes the ethical
element, and superinduces the moral sensation. The effect is
not simply a rational idea of the quality of the act, but a feeling
awakened in the soul. Thus moral feeling both precedes and
follows all moral action, and it is such because of these.
By external consciousness, or sense-perception, we acquire
the knowledge of those objects which are perceived, and of
those alone. If there are other objects of the same kind,
but which do not fall within sense-perception, we do not, by-
means of it, know of their existence. The external universe is
limited to those objects which we perceive, so far as we know,

What is Given in Perception. 165
by perception. If it is more extended, that fact can only become
known to us through some other faculty, or by enlarging the
sphere of perception, or by gaining knowledge of similar kind
from others who have acquired it in the same way ; and then it
will become object of perception, and the knowledge of it thus
gained will still limit it to what is perceived. But of the
objects perceived what do we know ? In general we know
(a) that they are external to the self, (b) that they are real,
(c) that they take on a certain appearance, (d) that among these
phenomena some are fixed and others variable, (e) that they
are diverse, (f) that they sustain spacial relations to each
other. This is all that is given by perception. It gives us no
knowledge of whence they are, how they are, why they are.
They are as perceived at any given moment ; perception gives
that, and no more. When we say perception gives the object,
we can mean nothing else than this, that perception is a know
ing of the object. There could be no perception without an
object to be perceived, and there is no perception without a
knowing of the object. To find just that which is perceived
is to find just that which is known of externality by sense-
perception. The limit of the known, by means of external perception, is
the hmit of what has come under observation of Limits of the
all mind by means of the senses. No single mind perception.
has mastered the indefinable sum, but aggregate mind has.
The limit of the knowable by man, through perception, is the
material universe so far as it can by any means be brought
under sense observation. Scientific research is constantly
widening the field in every direction. The earth and the
heavens — organic and inorganic nature — are yielding up their
long-hidden secrets with each rising and setting sun. New
facts and new laws are rewarding the patient industry of
toilful students. Obscurity and mystery are being cleared up.

166 Studies in Theology.
They have already made the stones and the stars preach a new
gospel. All honor to the indefatigable workers.
Thus far we have regarded perception as it respects material
objects, simply as observed to exist. If we would know more of
them, there is no other means of knowing but by perception.
Sense furnishes us the only approach ; but we may vastly in
crease our knowledge by increasing our perception. The ana
lytic processes of science do no more than widen the sphere
of perception, and make the knowledge more accurate. From
knowing the complex, we come to know the components;
we pass from the individual to the class ; we detect qualities,
habits, what we call laws, histories, forces, ends. These are
all simple perceptions, or intuitions which rise out of them.
The result is more accurate and extended observation, merely,
of things and laws. All external perception is by impingement
on the organism and through sensation, and thus Enlarging the
-i-in ii ¦,. /. sphere of per-
can only take place when there are relations of con- ception.
tact between the object and the organism : out of these rela
tions there is no possibility of sensation or perception, and no
knowledge of externality ; in them the subject and object are
joined together and comprised in our knowing.
Do we, then, know nothing of externality — nothing of the
material universe, except that which we individually perceive ?
We answer, nothing more is given in perception. If any thing
further is known, it must be in some other way, through some
other organ of knowledge. What is given by sight? That
which is seen. Certainly no more. What in hearing ? What
is heard. Certainly no more. What in touch? What is
touched. Certainly no more. What in smell? What is
smelled — the odor. Certainly nothing more. What in taste ?
What is tasted. Certainly no more. Then, so far as ex
ternal perception gives knowledge, these are the limits. Ii
there is more known and knowable of externality, it must

Knowledge by Perception. 167
become known through some other medium than personal
perception. But there is more known. When a surface is perceived an
object is given to the mind by perception. It may More is known
t. . i . -, ,, . -, j of externality
be given as solid or fluid, as round or square, as than is given m
white or black, or in any of the qualities which p6™*11011-
emerge in sensation. So much is given in perception. But
the mind intuitively knows that there must be an obverse
side to the surface. This is not given in perception. A stick
is given in perception, but the ends are not seen, or but one
end; the mind intuitively knows that if there is one end
there must be two, and either that there must be two ends
or no end. It knows that of two perceived hnes, which are
parallel and straight, they cannot inclose a space. It knows
that two material bodies cannot occupy the same space at
the same time. It knows that a body of water with one
shore must have a farther shore, though not perceived. It
knows that a perfect sphere has a common center for every
point on its surface. It knows that the radii of a sphere point
in every direction.
Thus, while it appears that external material being can only
come into cognition through sensation and perception, some
things may be known of it which are not matters of percep
tion, but intuitions made possible by, and growing out of,
perceptions. We have named as sources of knowledge memory and testi
mony. But the things which are known by memory are the
things which we have experienced, and which, therefore, do
not transcend what has been matter of self-consciousness, or the
self and its states and acts, inclusive of its thoughts, its feel
ings, and its volitions, and the objects at any time had in percep
tion, and its acquired learnings through perception and the rea
son ; the sum of what it at any time has known, or such parts of

168 Studies ln Theology.
the sum as it retains. This last includes what it gains as knowl
edge by means of testimony, which delivers to it what has been
known by others by the same process of observation and expe
rience. Such knowledge includes the knowledge of things and
events. As yet, nothing has come into the contents of knowledge
but the self, and the: objects and events ministered to it by
sensation and the like experiences of others made over to it as
acquired learning — all lying within the hmits of material
objectivity and the mind itself, together with other minds.
Were the mind limited to what is thus given, it would forever
be shut into the narrow sphere of cognition of itself, together
with like minds, and the objects and events which have been
observed and experienced ; and its future possible growth would
forever be hmited to this sphere — forever possibly enlarging,
but forever confined within its; own subjective states and the
material objectives about it, and the events in the on-going of
things — self, things, events, tendencies, laws, relations, forces —
the swelling tide of the on-going of man and things. This
is the theory of Positivism advocated by Auguste Comte,
Spencer, Mill, and others.
Of the system of things and of the mind, neither self -con
sciousness nor sense perception gives any other information
than that they are as found. Among the observed facts are
forces and modes of operation, which make known to the
reason another fact, namely, that there has been an indefinitely
long on-going of things. For an indefinite period of the past,
things have been going on about as they are now going for
ward. Geology reveals ages of immeasurable length during
which the course of events has been uniform. History recites
the story of man for centuries, but far back on the rims of the
receding horizon it becomes lost in the mists of tradition. Of
the origin of the system neither self-consciousness nor sense

Internal and External Perception. 169
perception gives any account. What matter is, whence it
came, whether it is eternal, what mind is in essence, whence
it came, how it performs its functions, how wide the universe
extends, how long it has been unfolding, whether other worlds
are inhabited by living beings and are observed and studied by
minds similiar to our own, and all such questions, have no
answer from self-consciousness or sense perception. Neither
gives any account of any other kind of being or beings than the
self and other selves with which it has come in contact, and
the objects and events it has learned of by observation and
experience and report.
The synthesis of external perception with internal percep
tion gives intuitive knowledge of subject and object More known
& . ° , , , tnan ls s1™11
as perceived. From these sources no other knowl- by internal and
edge is given. If there be any thing else, any other ception.
reality, it must be arrived at by some other power of the mind,
or some other mode of cognition. But as in every act of cog
nition the mind is conscious of itself as the knowing subject,
self-consciousness must be synthetic with any other power or
act or knowing. The knowledge of the self pervades all
knowing. All knowing is in self-consciousness, but it is not a
product of self-consciousness. The object known is not the
self, though it cannot be knower without knowing the self.
Save we a power of knowing other realities than the self,
and realities given to the self in external perception ?
If to this question we were compelled to give a negative
answer, the limits of the known and knowable would be the
self and its activities, and the external universe lying within
the sphere of perception. That there is any other reality could
only be matter of imagination, or, at most, of inference. Are
we shut up to this conclusion ? Have we no means of tran
scending self and the material world? Are there no super
sensible realities ? Or, if there be such, are we, by the limit-
12 ' J

170 Studies in Theology.
ations of our powers, shut away from the possible knowledge
of them, or even rational belief of them ? To these questions
Positivism returns a very confident answer, destructive alike of
faith and hope. What are the facts ?
We have found that there are other sources of knowledge.
other sources It remains that we find their contents and deter-
of knowledge. mine fl^p ]imits, and thus see what they bring, or
may bring, within the range of cognition.
The intuitive reason is the name given to the power of the
intuitive rea- mxn^ hy which it cognizes realities not given, and
son, what? n0£ p0gSi|3je t0 be given, in or by sensation, because
not of the sensible world. This power cognizes universal,
necessary, conditioning truths and laws. Self-consciousness
knows of and reveals the action of such a power ; but it is the
reason which cognizes the transcendental realities. They are
not of the self, but known by the self. They are, if the self
were not. They are not in the possession of self-consciousness
until the intuitive reason has cognized them.
Intuitive reason gives us a fixed number of axioms — necessary
truths, self-evidencing. It gives us the ideas of infinite space
and infinite duration or eternity ; the idea of causation — and so
of eternal being, fountain of causation. So soon as we are
brought into perceptive life, and become aware of the succes
sion of events and spacial limitations of objects, and commence
a reflective life, these realities emerge as a necessity of thought.
We see that they not only are but must be.
Commerce with nature, and self-consciousness, push us out
beyond self and the fleeting objects about us to the all-
embracing infinite — not perceived by sense, but necessitated
by that which is perceived. That becomes a cognition no less
than these. It is a gift of reason itself, not of sense. It is
not the self. It is not the fleeting pageant which reports
itself in sensation ; not the limited in time or space ; but

Power and Force. 171
that which lies behind all time and antedates all succession,
and that which includes all limits and is itself unlimited.
How do we arrive at this knowledge ? We have said by the
intuitive reason, that is, by direct seeing of the reason. But
when and under what condition does this direct seeing take
place ? And how do we know that there is such a seeing ? We
answer :
The mind knows that there is a reality of force in the uni
verse. How does it arrive at that knowledge ? It The reality o£
is certain that it is not given in external percep- loroe-
tion : not seen, not touched, not heard, not tasted, not smelled ;
no sense delivers it.
It is also certain that it is not given by self-consciousness, as
a property of the mind which cognizes it. Not given either
in internal or external perception, it is yet known to be a
reahty, pervading all being. How is it seen ? Perception
gives us the motion of bodies — their change of place in space.
Careful observation gives us the knowledge of changes which
go on in bodies — integrations and disintegrations. The mind
intuitively knows that for such changes there must be a cause.
It gives to that discovered reality the name force. Force not
given in perception is intuitively seen by the mind How foroe to
to be a necessary reality to account for the changes taown-
which are perceived. Experiment enables the mind to know
how to command and use these unseen agents. Can any one
doubt that we know of their existence ? The sensation of
pressure on the organism is referred by the mind in which it
reports itself to something which produces it, but the some
thing which produces it is not itself perceived, but cognized as
ground of the impression. The forces which work the changes
in nature are wholly obscure, known only by their perceived
effects. But in the effects they are given to the intuitive rea
son as necessary grounds.

172 Studies in Theology.
The mind knows that there is such a thing as personal
personal power, analogous to but differing from impersonal
power. forces. It knows of power otherwise than through
perception, that is, power is not itself an object of sense. It
knows it in self -consciousness and by observed effects which
it is consciously able to produce and which it knows itself as
producing. When it seeks to find what it is that it is con
scious of, it discovers that it is a something by which it can
produce certain changes volitionally. It puts forth its inherent
power simply by an exercise of volition. It does not know
how it works changes, but it knows that it possesses such a
power and that it does work such results.
The mind is rational. It knows that it puts forth that in
conceivable mystery of energy to effect changes for a purpose.
It works to a preconceived end. The change it produces rep
resents a rational idea. The will and the reason are thus seen
to be concrete or synthetized in the effect. When it effects a
change of any kind it knows that it proposed the change, that
it was conscious of power to effect it, that it exerted energy to
that end. Thus it becomes cognizant of personal power.
With these knowledges of agency, personal and impersonal,
productive of changes, arises the intuition that every trans
formation or change requires an agent, personal or impersonal,
to effect it. The presence of the effect discovers the agent,
without which it could not take place. The great law of cause
and effect emerges in cognition, as a universal and necessary
constant in every effect. There can be no effect, no change, with
out an agent adequate to its production. It is an intuition of
reason — self-evident. The mind knows this to be a reality with
the same certainty and necessity with which it knows its own
existence in knowing its thoughts and acts. It is, in fact, the
6ame law. This forthputting of a thought requiring a thinking
agent is but another putting of the law, every effect requires a

Cause and Effect. 173
cause. The thought might as well exist without a mind to
think it as any change take place without an agent to produce it.
The intuitive reason knows that back of all change there is
a Being in whom is underived existence. For the ultimate
Cause of being and change must himself, or itself, whatever it
may prove to be, be underived and necessarily eternal. The
mind thus rises through the derived to the Eternal Underived
being-ground of all that appears in perception and self-con
sciousness in the realm of finite existence.
What is known of cause ?
1. Every effect necessitates the existence of a cause, and not
merely the conviction of it.
2. Every thing in the effect necessitates an adequate ground
in the cause.
3. Cause must have being-ground; that is, were there no
being there could be no cause.
4. Causation necessitates being antecedent to causation.
5. Ultimate or primary causal being is necessarily unorigi-
nated, and consequently eternal.
6. In the unoriginated eternal must inhere all the causal
ground of all other existence, and from him must emanate all
possibilities of change.
7. Primary causation requires not only antecedent existence
but the antecedent existence of a free cause.
8. No causal act can be eternal, though the being-ground or
agent must be.
9. Ultimate cause or causal being is known only by effects,
and never in itself directly.
10. The aggregate of effects in the completed cosmos and in
its ongoing are sources of actual insight into the nature and
character of the efficient agent.
What is known of effects ?
1. Every effect is originated, and every origination is an effect.

174 Studies tn Theology.
2. No effect can be eternal, but all effects must be in time.
3. Every effect has being-ground.
4. Every effect refers to some being-ground other than itself ;
that is, no effect is its own cause.
5. There can be nothing in effect not derived from cause.
6. Effects might not be — that is, there is nothing in the
nature of any effect which requires that it should exist, and
there is nothing in the nature of original cause which requires
it to produce any effect.
What is known of cause and effect synthetized ?
1. Cause and effect are not identical.
2. The cause exists antecedent to the effect. It is a quibble
to say there is no cause until there is an effect. The effect can
not exist without the cause whose being antedates its existence.
3. Effects do not inhere in the being or essence of their
causes, but their possibility does.
4. The cause is not in the effect essentially, but efficiently.
The supersensible world matter of knowledge.
Is the supersensible world matter of knowledge, or is it
wholly matter of belief or inference merely, resting on or de
duced from knowledge? The matter of this question is of
prime importance.
It is common with a class of thinkers to hmit knowledge to
sensible objects, and to decry all thought about the super
sensible as mere bootless speculation. Theology is excluded, as
a science, on this ground, and is reduced to the category of a
mere inference.
We assert, on the contrary, that the supersensible world is
supersensible matter of absolute knowledge, and of the highest
wond known, and most indisputable knowledge. By the super
sensible world we mean a world which transcends the senses,
and which is not given in sensation. We assert that we do
know of the existence of such a world, and of many facts of it,

Supersensible World. 175
and do not merely infer it. It is ground of science, and
must be classed as the other sciences as known reality, and
dealt with as such. Let us see if we can verify this statement
and fix its limits.
The mind knows itself. This is its first and highest knowl
edge. It has no knowledge that does not include this self-
knowledge. In every knowing act it knows itself as the
knower. It knows itself as a real being. It cannot predicate
knowledge of any other being or thing without predicating
reality of itself.
Now this knowing self is supersensible. It is, and it has
the power to go among sensible things and know them, but
it is not itself an object of sense perception. In knowing
itself, then, it knows a supersensible being. As its knowing of
this supersensible is integral in every knowledge of every
other being, it is the most universal, immediate, and constant
of all its knowledges. Its reahty is the most fundamental and
certain of all other realities known to it, or by it.
What does it know about itself ? Its knowledge is not lim
ited to the bare knowledge that it exists. In know- gel( superaen.
ing that it exists, it knows that it is a knowing be- sme-
ing. It knows that it has differentiable existence from other
objects of its knowledge; that it is unlike them in every
respect ; that it has an individualized identity. It knows that
it thinks, reasons, feels, wills, remembers, knows, believes,
hopes, fears, loves, hates, and that these are constants, or essen
tial inclusions of its being and activity. Of the reality of its
existence, and of these faculties, powers, modes of action, and
susceptibilities, it knows absolutely. The external and sen
sible world is not more real, and the qualities and relations of
material things are not more clearly apprehended as objects
of knowledge. In the former case doubt is possible; in the
latter, to doubt is to assert the existence of the doubter, and

176 Studies in Theology.
so is a direct contradiction or absurdity. We do, then, know
the supersensible world as real, and we do know its essential
characteristics in self-knowing.
Do we know any thing more of the supersensible world?
If not, then for aught that we know it is hmited to the self.
The issue is pure egoism. This has been assumed.
To this question, we answer, We know the existence of other
beings like ourselves, who belong to the supersensible world — a
vast and innumerable community of such beings. That we
know them as real beings, and do not merely believe that there
are such, is absolutely certain. The knowledge is not given
in sensation, for they are supersensible.
How do we come at the knowledge. In two ways : {a) We
perceive forms about us in the external world that resemble
the forms in which we live. So much is given in perception.
This in itself awakens in us the idea that the beings themselves
resemble us in all respects ; but were we shut up to this percep
tion, we could not say that we know that they are like us in
respect of our supersensible nature; we might believe or as
sume it. But as we observe these forms we find them doing
those acts which we ourselves do, and which in us are caused
by the supersensible ego. In their acts we detect an ego like
other being ourselves. We know intuitively that such acts
supersensibly , , . .
known. must spring from a thinking being, and express
the same attributes which are in us, and which constitute us
what we are. We know, and do not merely believe, that
there is a mind behind them. Observe that in all this they,
the personal thinking agents, do not emerge as objects of
sense : they do not reveal any quality of objects of sense :
they simply manifest themselves to our inteUigence through
perception, as energizing in objects of sense revealing their
thought and will and feeling, which are supersensible. We
find thus, by actual knowledge, that we are surrounded by super-

Supersensible World. 177
sensible beings. But were this our only knowledge of them
we should find the isolation extremely painful and unsatisfac
tory, the communion would be cold and distant, (b) But we are
not thus Hmited. Mind seeks mind. By a law which we detect
in us we are impelled to fellowship. The result is that those
beings which belong to the supersensible world have created
means for close and intimate intercommunication, by means of
which they hold converse. They declare to each other that they
do exist, and find, upon inquiry and comparison, that they are
kindred, having exactest similarity. They exchange thoughts,
reveal to each other their individual feehngs and experiences,
become interested in each other's histories, exchange reminis
cences, aid each other in solving perplexing riddles, form close
and undying attachments. This converse is carried on through
external and sensible signs, but the beings who carry it on,
themselves elude sense. We thus absolutely know of a widely
extended supersensible world, and we know that it has laws . of
intercommunication ; that it has a common life and nature ; that
it is bound together by common sympathies ; that the individ
ual beings of it do not exist in isolation, but that they form
communities, and propagate thoughts and feelings between
themselves, and so influence each other for weal or woe ; are a
commonwealth bound together by indissoluble interests, are
capable of affecting each other beneficiently or disastrously, and
of awakening in each other grief, pain, sorrow, or joy, and
happiness; of tempting each other to evil, or strengthening
each other in virtue.
Thus we have found that in point of fact we do know of a
supersensible world. What we know is that it comprises real
beings; that these beings are individualized and distinguish
able ; that their attributes are attributes of intelligence — power
to know, power to think, power to feel, power to act volition-
ally, power to feel the obligation of law, power to discern be-

178 Studies in Theology.
tween right and wrong, and things of kindred import. We
know that there are such beings. We know that we are of this
order. We know that there are innumerable multitudes of just
such beings as we are. We know that there is a law of com
munity and sympathy among them by which they come into
contact and influence each other in various ways for good or evil.
We know that there is one Being in this supersensible realm
The infinite who is not of our race, but whom we dimly resem-
supersensible .... -i-i-ii • i
known. ble ; who is eternal, and by whom we exist ; who
also is the author of the material and sensible universe about
us. This we know in the intuition of the law of cause and
effect. Thus far it is absolutely certain we are capable of
knowing — we do know. We know this Being as the cause of
all the system of effects which we perceive about us. The
knowledge is intuitive, and is expressed in the maxim that
every effect must have a cause. We know that established
order necessitates thought and energy. We know that the
Being who is cause is a being of thought and power — that the
thought and energy pervasive of the perceived system are the
thought and energy of a personal being ; that, therefore, the
fountain of the universe is a person. We know that this
primal causative Being is eternal and unoriginated. Thus
much we know of the supersensible world. These are not
mere matters of conjecture or faith, they are the staples of all
knowledge. Is this all that we know of the supersensible world ? Do we
know of the existence of any other beings in it, or of it, than
those who are of our race, and that one Being who is cause of
all ? and do we know any other facts of it than those which we
find in us, and in that one Being whom we discern as primal
cause ?
To this we answer, As to supersensible beings, this is
probably the limit of our knowledge, but it is not all that we

Criteria of Knowledge. 179
know of the supersensible world. What remains falls largely-
but not entirely, within the realms of belief, as questions
with respect to the final cause of creation ; the fact and na
ture of moral government ; the real nature, source, and fact of
moral law ; the divine method of disposing of moral questions
and moral beings; the fact and outcome of Providence in
the administration of the system; man's sin and its conse
quences ; possibility of salvation and its methods ; the immor
tality of the soul and its ultimate destiny ; these and all the spe
cial doctrines of the Christian religion belong to the realm of
faith, and are to be discussed and settled as matters of belief.
This does not imply that they are left in doubt and uncertainty ;
but that such certainty must be the certainty of belief, not
knowledge. Conclusions must be reasoned, or given by revela
tion from God himself ; and, whether reasoned or revealed,
they must, for the present, stand in the categories of beliefs,
and the law determining them is the law governing rational
conclusions — the law of proof, not of intuition.
Criteria of knowledge.
1. Simplicity and self-evidence, or immediacy.* Knowledge
is irreducible to any thing else, being a primitive,
J ° .. ° r Simplicity.
original act of the mind. ISlo reason can be as
signed for it — it is simple knowing. It is impossible to in
duce the mind to allege any ground for the knowing other
than that it knows that it knows, which is simply saying it
knows. It does not know because it feels that it knows. It
feels that it knows, as the result of knowing ; feeling is discern
ible in the act, but is not ground of it, or in any sense proof
of it. It will admit of no proof.
2. When the mind knows, it is impossible to think, or be
lieve, or feel, that it does not know ; the opposite is the con
tradictory, and is unthinkable. That which it knows might
* See Harris's First Law, p. 51 ; also, Second Law, " Incomprehensibility," p. 60.

180 Studies in Theology.
have been otherwise, in the case of contingent realities, and
the mind knows that such might have been the
Contradictory. , . ,, ..,.,..
case ; but now that it knows the reality it is im
possible that it is not as it knows it. The opposite, or con
tradictory of what is known, is impossible. This includes the
third law of Harris, who says, " The third criterion of knowl
edge is its persistence in face of all efforts of reflective thought
to disprove it. By this persistence, in face of all objective
ratiocination and all reflective thought upon it, the mind
ascertains that it is impossible to think the contrary, and that
it stands impregnable, in its clearness and evidence, as of
knowledge.* 3. Necessity. This, in one case, is simply the reverse of the
above law, but in another it is a different and
broader canon. In the latter case the reality itself
is a necessity, known or unknown. It must be. The knowing
in the case is not simply that it is ; and knowing that it is, the
opposite is unthinkable and impossible — the contradictory ; but
more, it not only is, but it was forever impossible that it should
not be. It is, and it is known to be a strict necessity that it
should be. That it ever was not, or might not have been, is
the known impossible.
4. Self-consistency and consistency with all knowledge.
seif-consist- Knowledge is the knowledge of that which is.
ency. That which is cannot be self-contradictory, that is,
it cannot be and not be. No more can the knowledge be self-
contradictory or self-subversive. All reality is consistent with
each reality — so every knowledge must be uncontradicted by,
or consistent with, every other knowledge. If one assumed
knowledge be inconsistent with another assumed knowledge,
?See " Philosophical Basis of Belief," p. 29, and in connection read his chapter
on Criteria of Knowledge. See also Hamilton, Wright's edition, pp. 47, 48, and
read the entire chapter.

Conditions of Knowledge. 181
either one or the other, or both, must lack the quality of truth,
and, lacking that, cannot be knowledge.
Each knowledge must be consistent with every knowledge.
The consistency may not be readily adduced, but it must be
actual. If inconsistency is known, it is known that one of the
contradictories cannot be a knowledge. If one of the contra
dictories is known to be true, the other is intuitively known
to be false if so be the contradiction is discovered. If it is im
possible to reconcile two or more propositions, and neither of
them is known to be true, the mind is reduced to the necessity
of discarding them entirely or of relegating them to mere be
liefs or disbeliefs, making the one displace the other, according
to the probable evidence adducible.
These criteria apply to all knowledge, derivative no less than
primitive, of contingent no less than necessary truths. Intui
tion and self-evidence are the universal constants and essential
constituents of all knowledge. When they are wanting there
is not, and cannot be, knowledge. They are usually adduced as
applicable to what are called primary cognitions, or truths of
the reason ; but the limitation is unwarranted, and vitiates all
other knowledge. Is a knowledge derived by a process of
demonstration ? — these criteria attend every stage of the proc
ess. The premises must be marked by all these signs; but
not less must the conclusion. Is a knowledge derived from
testimony? The same necessity exists — that is, the testimony
must be such that the mind intuitively knows it to be impos
sible it should not be true. . It must be such as to establish the
fact in such manner that the opposite is the contradictory.
Each stage of the process stands in self -evidencing light. The
absence of the condition is destructive of knowledge, and issues
in contradiction or carries only to belief. The same is true of
knowledge given in self -consciousness, perception, and memory.
In each case the cognition is direct.

182 Studies in Theology.
We have found a definite sphere for knowledge, but an
expanding one, yet limited ; its contents in part are subject to
volition, its limitations are determined by necessity. We have
found a similarly definite sphere for beliefs which are in part
subject to volition, in part not; which may be narrowed or
broadened, but which has rational limitations.
Within the sphere of the known we have found included
both the sensible and supersensible.
Let us now return and resolutely endeavor to ascertain pre-
what we cisely what in this sphere is known, and what is
know. knowable to us, keeping in mind precisely what we
mean by knowing or knowledge. And, for greater definite-
ness, let us note clearly what is unknown and unknowable.
This will leave the field clear for the discussion of the question,
What should be believed ?
Among the things known, we have found that in the fact of
knowing the mind knows itself. This is the primary, universal,
and necessary constant of all knowing. Now, what precisely
does the mind know of itself ? The mind, in every act of which
it is conscious, knows itself (a) as existing, that is, as possessing
the quality of real individualized being ; (5) what its act or
state is, whether it be some mode of thought, or emotion, or
volition ; (c) that it possesses certain faculties, and that its
powers are limited ; (d) that it is not an object of sense percep
tion ; (e) that it is identical from day to day. Comprehensively
this is all that the mind knows with respect to itself.
We know objects external to the self by perception when in
suitable relations to them.
We know things and events of the past by memory.
We know things and events by testimony.
We know some necessary truths.
We know demonstrated truths.
These include the sum of our knowledges.

Conditions of Knowledge. 183
From the foregoing it is obvious that there are limits to our
power to know, or to the knowable ; and also that there is a
sphere of rational belief — a realm of known reality — respect
ing which much will appear as matter of belief in the rea
son beyond that which is known, but which the mind will
find itself compelled to view as no less real than that which it
knows to be real. To differentiate between these and their
respective metes and bounds is a primary want in seeking the
truth. There is a habit of recent date, of assuming that the know-
able is limited to the sensible, and also that what is not known,
or cannot be reduced to the category of knowledge, is not
rationally believable, and should, therefore, at once be relegated
to the non-existent, and counted out from the list of subjects
about which rational beings should inquire or concern them
selves — but it is impossible to rest in such conclusions.
If it were true, there could be no science, since science is a
collected and systematized knowledge of things as they exist, not
in sense merely, but in memory and reason also. To exist at
all, science must transcend perception, and predicate of that
which exists on other grounds than that of mere perception.
We know more of things than we can at any moment per
ceive, but perception gives us, as such, only what we do per
ceive at any moment. That added knowledge must depend
on some other faculty, or must be relegated as mere matter of
belief, and so ceases to be science. We know more of reality
than was ever given in the individual perception, or else reality
is known by us only as we have perceived, or narrower yet,
as we do now perceive it. This would reduce all knowing to
that which is, at the moment, within the sphere of sensation.
There could thus be no science of the universe. If to predicate
of reality beyond sensation be unwarrantable, science becomes
impossible.

184 Studies in Theology.
SECTION VII.-OF BELIEFS.
The mind utterly refuses to stop with the known. Among
its knowledges is the knowledge that the field of truth is much
broader than its knowledge of truth, stretching away immeas
urably beyond it in every direction. It cannot refrain from
attempting to penetrate this vast realm. Proceeding from the
known, it infers what may be or what is probable of the
unknown. Thus a vast brood of concepts find their way into
the mind. It is not known that they are accurate copies of
the truth. They are not knowledges. If the reasoning be
clear, and the conclusion logical, we feel a variable amount of
conviction that the reality corresponds with the concept. We
grade the probability that we have the substantial truth from
certainty to zero. If the case is one of great obscurity, and
the steps of the process indistinct, not much value can be at
tached to the conclusion ; but if there is good evidence that the
premises are correct, and if the conclusion is clearly deducible,
there is but little difference between the tenacity with which the
mind holds it and a clear and positive knowledge.
Besides those concepts that spring from the operations of
reason, there are, as we have seen, others, whieh are propagated
in us by other minds. These are of great multitude and
variety. They are of things which they claim to have known —
personal experiences and observations, or conclusions which
they have reached, or opinions which they hold. They are re
cited to us orally or in books. They are speculative, philo
sophic, scientific, historic. They purport to be truths. They
may be so, but to us, because of their source, they can only
exist as opinions or beliefs. The difference in their origin
carries a difference in their kind.
The term belief includes properly only and all those states
of mind below knowing, varying from a feeling of absolute

Of Beliefs. 185
certainty down to zero, or down to where actual doubt begins,
which in some form affirms a supposed reality of objects of
thought. While the ground of knowledge is the direct seeing
of the mind, the ground of behef is some form of probable
evidence, or is a mere spontaneous conjecture.
The mind knows that it believes, but cannot believe that it
knows. This marks a fundamental distinction between the two
states. When the mind has a belief, or is in a state of belief
with regard to a fact or proposition, it knows itself to be in a
believing state. So much is known ; but the reality or truth
of the subject-matter believed is not known. In the case of
rational beliefs the mind knows why it believes as well as
what, and ought to be able to assign the grounds ; but this is
not always the case. Many strong beliefs have no assignable
ground, and the mind can give no account of them further than
that it has them.
The proper foundation or condition of belief is, (1) the ab
sence of knowledge ; for where knowledge is, the grounds of
belief are excluded; knowledge cuts away the possibility of
behef : (2) some assignable reason why a fact or proposition
should be supposed to be true ; and the worthiness or validity of
the belief is always proportional to the assignable reasons for it.
Facts concerning Belief.
1. No mind can believe the contradictory of that which it
knows to be true, if the contradictory is perceived.
2. No mind can believe the contradictory of that which it
believes to be true, if the contradictory is perceived.
3. No mind can believe that which it believes impossible.
4. No mind can believe that which it knows — knowledge
excludes belief.
5. No mind can believe that which is unintelligible, unthink
able — that which it cannot formulate into a thought.
6. The mind may believe that which is incomprehensible ;
13

186 Studies in Theology.
that is, it may believe that the exact contents of which it can
not understand and the how of which it cannot comprehend.
7. The mind may believe that which is false.
8. The mind may believe without assignable grounds for
behef, but not rationally.
9. The mind may believe a proposition though there is seem
ing proof to the contrary which it is unable to answer, or the
fallacy of which it cannot detect.
10. The mind may believe contradictories without perceiv
ing that they are such ; in this way the absurd and impossible
are often matters of belief by the ignorant, and even by the
learned. 11. The mere fact of belief proves nothing as to the truth of
what is believed.
12. The mind must have beliefs — it cannot exist without
them. 13. That which is believed may be true though knowledge
that it is so may be impossible.
14. The mind may be compelled to believe in a given way ;
that is, with the light it has it cannot believe the opposite nor
help to believe what is propounded.
15. Those things ought not to be believed which are incon
sistent with themselves, or which are in contradiction with
other beliefs or knowledges.
16. Nothing should be believed for which there is no ade
quate proof — proof which so constrains the reason that it is
irrational to withhold faith.
17. Any thing possible should be believed on adequate proof.
Conditions unfavorable to the attainment of correct beliefs.
1. The mental habit of credulity is unfavorable.
2. The habit of irrational doubt is unfavorable.
3. The habit of indifference and inattention is unfavorable.
4. Undeveloped intelligence is unfavorable.

Of Beliefs. 187
5. The moral condition of ready and persistent partisanship
is unfavorable. 6. The habit of insincerity and debativeness is unfavorable.
7. The debauchment of conscience, and prevailing irrever
ence and wickedness are unfavorable.
8. Slavish submission to authority, and a superstitious frame
of mind are unfavorable.
Conditions favorable to the attainment of correct Beliefs.
1. Supreme love of truth.
2. A mind honest, alert, and free.
3. Capacity and opportunity.
4. Moral integrity.
5. Spiritualized affections, or affections guarded and purified
from low, lustful, and sinful imaginings and indulgences.
6. The habit of discriminating between reasoned and un
reasoned beliefs, and the determination to have an adequate
reason for believing.
A little reflection will convince us how much of our staple
common thought is unreasoned belief — assumption. Most Miefg
If we think of nature, we never think of doubting unreasoned.
its permanence. The sun will rise and go to its setting at the
appointed time. The seasons will continue their accustomed
round. The laws of to-day will rule to-morrow. All things
will remain as they were from the beginning. We are uni
versally absolutely certain of these things, or to the exclusion
of all doubt concerning them. Yet it were madness to assert
that any man knows concerning them, or that in most instances
they are conclusions reasoned out. We simply believe in the
permanence of nature, and on no other ground than that the
order is uniform — seems to be established. Neither the common
nor scientific mind can assign any other reason. No other is
necessary to win our unwavering belief. If the belief should
be challenged, no ground can be assigned for the challenge.

188 Studies in Theology.
It suffices that we see no reason for supposing the contrary,
and we hold to the behef.
In this faith we carry on all the processes of life — plant,
sow, build, form business plans for the future. Did we not act
on this faith we should lapse into barbarism ; in fact, could not
live at all. The necessities of our being are such that we must
in faith provide for to-morrow. " We must live by faith," or
in refusing so to do, must perish.
If we turn from nature to events we find the same thing.
We really know but few events in the on-going of the world —
simply those that have fallen under our personal observation
and experience, limited to a brief period and narrow space.
Yet we believe the story of the past as recited in history,
and the reports of current events, oral or written. Only a few
can assign any other reason for the belief, except that the story
has been written and that the rumors are extant. We accept
the voice of history and pass it on to future generations. We
accredit the current rumor and fashion our politics and finan
cial plans upon it. The cablegram announces that an earth
quake has shaken Ischia and swallowed up thousands of people,
or that the English gun-boats have bombarded Alexandria and
captured the city. We believe it, and the whole world keeps on
believing it, if it remains uncontradicted. We do not question
the truthfulness of Csesar's Commentaries, or of the Greek his
tory by Herodotus, or of the English of Macaulay.
We beheve in men, institutions, laws, science, religion.
Often deceived, we keep on believing, because on the whole we
find the habit of belief better, more satisfactory, than doubt,
and because we cannot help but believe or disbeheve.
Thus mind, thrust into existence with powers of intelligence,
Mind is prac- enters at once on its proper life. It begins by know-
ticai. ing its surroundings. Its spontaneous forthputting
is a kind of knowing — small, to be sure, but still a knowing.

Of Beliefs. 189
It apprehends things, and objectifies them. Instinctively it
adjusts itself to the realities about it. The objects it beholds
awaken desires in it. It is moved or attracted by them ; not
as one material atom acts upon another, but by the mysterious
spell of feeling. It responds by an act of will. It vohtionally
moves toward the object of desire, seeks it, appropriates it.
Thus its modus vivendi is initiated and established, and it sets
up housekeeping in the universe. At first all its movements
are spontaneous, instinctive, practical to the mere ends of ex
istence. As yet it asks no questions. It does not properly
think or reflect or know, but it feels and acts and lives, accord
ing to a theory without theorizing. It lives according to the
law of intelligence without being self-consciously intelligent.
Later, its moral nature manifests itself, and its self-conscious,
reflective, free, responsible, rational hfe begins. Here, in these
archaic moral elements, rudimental, unreasoned, spontaneous
beliefs take their rise — beliefs which have their genesis in the
moral affections and inchoate reason ; or it may be, in some
super-reason, some original spiritual instinct.
As the mind thrust into external conditions finds itself
invested with a nature which acts rationally or intelligently
before it acts consciously, or carries on any processes of reason
with relation to itself or objects about it, — as it is practical
and conforms its act to the fit and proper theory before it
intelligently thinks what is proper, or before even it has the
idea of the proper and fit, — so, also, in this inchoate moral
realm it finds itself acting on principles which involve the
deepest moral problems, and believing things implicitly of the
origin of which beliefs it can give no account, which yet rule it
with undisputed authority, and which the after hfe of rational
reflection and inquiry can never dethrone. Thus out of the
very constitution of the mind, its modus vivendi, knowledges and
beliefs spring as soon as mental and moral conditions exist ; and

190 Studies in Theology.
these intelligent and moral forthputtings in the sub-rational and
sub-moral inchoate state are generally found to be in accord
with the highest rational and moral principles, when these are
ascertained by reasoning, or determined by developed intelli
gence. These fundamental beliefs and cognitions, not even yet
known by the mind to be such, are in the line of all sane and
normal movement when the mind comes to its highest condition
of self-conscious rationality and sense of ethical responsibility.*
Since those ideas only are valuable which are true, it becomes
an important question — the most important possible— How can
we sort this mass, retaining the true and discarding the false ?
Of course we must at once discard the third class, but what of
the second ? The first we cannot discard if we would. Shall we
banish from our thoughts every thing but knowledges — every
Knowledge too thing but our knowledges? How narrow would
narrow. become the world in which we live ! We must ex
clude, substantially, all past facts; we must absolutely shut out
the future; we must abandon reasoning; we must not plant
nor build ; we must not have confidence in our fellows ; we
must not act on information of any kind; we must have no
hope ; we must neither eat nor drink, nor go nor stay. We
can hardly live upon this diet. The thing is impossible.
What, then, shall we do ? We must believe. The field of
knowledge we own is too narrow for grazing-ground for our
faculties. The attempt to confine them within such hmits
terminates in asphyxia — death. As well undertake to nourish
the body on the north wind as sustain thought on such fare !
All the past is full of truth — the wide abysses of the universe are
full of truth — eternity to come is full of truth — truth is infi
nite; we must seek it out. We must take things on credit
when we cannot master them by absolute knowledge. We
must believe in our own faculties — in the permanence of
* See Appendix. Note D.

Of Beliefs. 191
nature — that the earth will still bring seed-time and harvest —
that right will be rewarded — that evil will be reproved — that
God is God — that man is immortal. It is as impossible for
man to live, and retain sanity of faculties, and avoid searching
into these things or having a behef about them, as it is for the
processes of life to be carried on after the blood has ceased its
circulation and the heart its motion.
" Only that is properly said to be known, the evidence or nat
ure of which compels acceptance. Very little, however, of our
so-called knowledge has such a degree of certainty. Rational
principles, and the facts of consciousness and immediate percep
tion, are all that can claim to be strictly knowledge. Still it does
not follow that all else is delusion ; for, though not strictly cer
tain, it may be rationally probable, and thus a subject for ra
tional behef. By rational belief, then, we mean the acceptance
of any thing on grounds which, while they render it probable,
do not strictly compel its admission as a necessary truth. They
justify the mind in accepting it, but do not exclude We muat aiCt
the possibihty of the opposite. We believe that the on beUefs'
present laws of nature will be valid to-morrow, but we do not
know it. It is conceivable that some change might occur in the
nature of things which would reverse all the present orders of
co-existence and sequence. The assumption of the uniformity
of nature is necessary to enable us to advance a step beyond our
experience, whether in space or time ; but this assumption is
no necessity of thought. The mind finds no difficulty in the
conception that all the laws with which we are acquainted may
be hmited both in space and time. The physicist believes that
material things are composed of ultimate atoms, but he does
not know it. The entire structure of scientific theory is
equally a matter of belief. Theories are never facts of obser
vation, but inferences ; and they never rise to the rank of
certainty. Probability is more than the guide of daily life ;

192 Studies in Theology.
it is also the guide of science and reason itself. Were the
natural sciences restricted to what is truly known, they would
shrivel up to a handful of unrelated facts, of much value for
practice, but of httle or none for intelligence.
" A belief, to be rational, must have rational grounds. When
held without grounds, it may be either a spontaneous judg
ment, instinctive impulse, volitional faith or fancy, notion or
whim ; when held on irrational grounds, it is a prejudice or
superstition. But the grounds of belief may be manifold.
They may be such as appeal only to the passionless understand
ing, and hence such as any one with common sense would recog
nize. The mathematical doctrine of probabihties is a great
illustration. Such grounds of behef are elementary, and call
no elements of character into play. They admit of calculation,
and result in substantial harmony of opinion. But the grounds
of belief may also be such as appeal not only to the under
standing, but also to the esthetic and moral and religious nature.
As such, they are no less rational than the former, though their
validity would not be recognized by any in whom the esthetic
and rehgious elements were lacking. All beliefs into which
sentiment of any kind enters are of this class, whether it be of
patriotism, or of duty, or of love, or of art, or of religion. We
may say, then, with sufficient accuracy for our purpose, that the
grounds of behef may be objective and subjective. The former
are the facts of sense perception ; the latter are the manifold
facts of feeling and instinct : the longing for the true, the
beautiful, and the good ; the sense of dependence and moral
obligation, the desire to worship, and the fervors of religious
aspiration. Belief, on such grounds, might be defined as the
acceptance of something for reasons subjectively sufficient
but objectively insufficient. In every such case, the develop
ment of the subject determines, to a great extent, the cred
ibility of the fact. Belief on objective grounds is entirely

Of Beliefs. 193
simple; behef on subjective grounds demands some further
explanation. " When we speak of believing on subjective grounds, the first
impression is that we are advocating mere credulity; indeed,
credulity consists in taking our feelings and impressions for
arguments. This is plausible only when abstractly stated, or
when, by feelings, whims are meant. For feeling also is a fact;
it is the product of the universe, and must have some relation
to it. It must further be borne in mind that when the grounds
of behef are objective, they are seldom capable of formal state
ment. Just as we recognize a face with perfect certainty,
though we might be unable to describe a single feature in
detail, so in daily hfe we discern a belief or a course of action
to be rational, even while it would be impossible to formulate
the real grounds of our opinion. If we attempt it, we find that
our statements do not state, but rather misstate, our reasons.
This is characteristic of daily life. We constantly believe and
act upon impressions which we could not put into words with
out seeming ridiculous, and which we could not ignore without
being irrational. The merchant, or captain, knows well that
one course is better than another, but he would often be sadly
puzzled to justify his opinion by any thing but the favorable
result. Such action and judgment partake of the nature of
instinct. They are the total outcome of our past experience ;
and although the reasoning element has almost entirely disap
peared, they are, in general, far more trustworthy than our
labored calculations. The reasons for trusting or distrusting
persons, also, are seldom susceptible of formulation ; and that,
even, in cases where the greatest interests are concerned. This
is especially the case with personal influence. An impression
is made upon us, and we are stirred and molded by something
which we feel but cannot tell. In short, the great bulk of
human belief and action rests upon grounds which admit of no

194 Studies in Theology.
satisfactory statement; yet we cannot disallow such grounds
of belief and action without declaring hfe to be illogical and
irrational. But in that case* the practical man could retort
upon the theorist, that unless he is able to do better, perhaps
the mistake is with him. As a rule, no one is more helpless, or
more stupidly absurd in dealing with reahty than the fanatical
logician. As long as this is so, common sense will be more
concerned to have its beliefs in harmony with reahty, as tested
by results, than to have them in harmony with formal logic.
Experience tends to issue in instinctive action and judgment,
and of such action results are the great test. We conclude,
then, that it is no objection to a belief that its grounds do not
admit of satisfactory formal statement, provided always that it
works well." *
We have now found the exact meanings of the terms knowl
edge and belief, and their differentiation. We have found the
conditions under which they respectively arise in the mind —
that when certain relations exist between subject and object
they, one or the other, inevitably issue. Out of right con
ditions knowledge is impossible. Out of suitable conditions
for correct behef erroneous belief may arise. Knowledge ia
not wholly subject to volition. In some circumstances the
mind may be necessitated to have some knowledges without
any exercise of volition or choice ; but, also, it has the power
to seek knowledge and put itself in conditions to know what
otherwise it might forever remain ignorant of, were there no
exercise of will. It does not necessarily know all that it has
power to know. Its enforced knowledge is extremely small.
Its possible knowledge is indefinitely large. The same is true
of beliefs. Belief is sometimes involuntary. From the nature
of mind it may find itself in conditions in which it is com
pelled to beheve, and may believe under compulsion what is
* See Appendix : Note B.

Of Beliefs. 195
not true, because, while unable not to withhold either belief
or disbelief, it may not have the means of knowing exactly
what it ought to beheve. But its beliefs are, also, in part un
der the control of the will. It has power to correct and
broaden or narrow its beliefs, and to put itself in conditions
which will affect its beliefs. Enforced knowledge is not
affected by character ; that is, the knowledge will be the same
whether the character be good or bad. Enforced beliefs, that
is, beliefs which we find ourselves unable to resist, may be de
termined by character. The rule, " as a man thinketh so is
he," may be reversed, " as a man is so he thinketh."
Are we responsible for our knowledges and beliefs f Are
they m any sense under our control f
The answer to the second question determines the answer to
the first. It is impossible that we should be responsible for
what is inevitable. This we hold to be an axiom. Our re
sponsibility will be in the measure in which it is possible, under
the circumstances of the case, to improve our knowl- Responsibility
edges and rectify our beliefs. The law does not so for beUef-
much respect what we know or what we believe, as it does our
use of the faculties and the opportunities we possess. If we might
know, and do not because of culpable delinquency, we cannot
be excused. If we retain in our beliefs or disbeliefs errors
which there is abundance of accessible proof to rectify, and we
make no suitable effort to make the correction, our ignorance
and error become our own fault, and for any evil that results
to ourselves or others we must be held to a just account.
A belief, in itself, does not imply simply as existing the truth
of what is believed, nor, indeed, that it rests on any evidence
whatever. It does imply that the person holding it supposes
it to be true. That which is known is true necessarily. That
which is believed may be either true or false, so far as belief
determines.

196 Studies in Theology.
The probability that a belief is true may be strong in the
Belief acquires ™W °f the faCt th&t {t iS & ^^ °f h°QeSt' ^
value from the tuous, and intelligent persons. If the most learned
persons who ' D x
hold it. and excellent hold it, the probability is heightened.
If it is accepted by the wisest and best, after the most search
ing examination, with the best advantages for conducting the
inquiry, the probability attains a strength of presumption
which only universality and inevitability could increase. But
ultimately its value depends on its truth, and the determination
of its veraciousness, or truth of contents, on evidence, and not
on the beliefs or disbeliefs of any number or kind of men.
There are concepts of the mind which fall below beliefs,
which have no root or leverage of any kind except the accident
of their existence — mere vagaries, fancies, conjectures, chaotic
reveries, dreams, exhalations from stagnant pools of aimless
thought, which have no value or significance whatever, who
ever may hold them. They have no assignable value that we
should sift them. As the sun of knowledge rises they vanish
away, or evidence appears either to dissipate or sustain them.
All that is necessary to disperse or estabhsh them is, that the
fallow and marshy acres of mind which breed them should be
drained and plowed. Advancing civilization and culture will
clear the atmosphere of them, and create conditions in which
their recurrence will be impossible, or change them to rational
inference. The proof which issues in knowledge is immediate, and is
what is known f°UI1<i xXx the object itself. An object perceived is
needs no proof. ^s oym proof . g0 0f any gelf-consciousness of state
or act ; there is no proof of a feeling but the feeling, of a
thought but the thought, et al. So of a truth demonstrated ;
the demonstration is the proof. So of an intuition; the
thing intuited is self-evident, and admits of no other proof.
These proofs issue in knowledge, and can never be degraded

Of Beliefs. 197
to mere beliefs, or be made matter of argument or probable
proof. All matters of personal experience are of this kind.
The proof is the experience. The result is so far knowledge.
Proof is the only rational ground for belief. This gives
rise, at once, to the question, What is proof ? There are several
terms which have the same general import : proof, evidence,
testimony, demonstration, argument, inference, deduction, in
duction, experiment, observation. The general signification of
proof is a process by which the mind arrives at truth. Proof
is an assignable reason for a conclusion, or is such evidence as
leads to a conclusion ; it may be demonstration, testimony,
inference, deduction, induction, experience, experiment, anal
ogy, and may issue either in knowledge or belief. Adequate
proof establishes the conclusion, that is, rationally Prool the only
convinces the mind of its truth, removes all doubt. j^^j,,,. be_
Less proof produces the conviction that the conclu- liet'
sion is more probable than any other. That which does not
admit of demonstration, and so may not issue in knowledge,
but which does not involve absurdity or contradiction, is pos
sible, and may admit of proof which will satisfy the mind of
its truth. " As demonstration is the showing the agreement
or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more
proofs which have a constant, immutable, and visible connection
one with another, so probability is nothing but the appearance
of such an agreement or disagreement by the intervention of
proofs whose connection is not constant and immutable, or
at least is not perceived to be so, but appears for the most
part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the
proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. . . .
The entertainment the mind gives this sort of proposition is
called belief, assent, or opinion, which is the admitting or receiv
ing any proposition as true upon arguments or proofs that are
*See Appendix: Note P.

198 Studies ln Theology.
found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain
knowledge that it is so. And herein hes the difference between
probability and certainty, faith and knowledge ; that in all the
parts of knowledge there is intuition ; each immediate idea,
each step, has its visible and certain connection ; in belief, not
so. That which makes us believe is something extraneous to the
thing we believe, something not evidently joined on both sides
to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagree
ment of, those ideas that are under consideration. The grounds
of probability are, first, the conformity of any thing with our
own knowledge, observation, and experience. Second, the tes
timony of others, touching their observation and experience." *
"The word probable does not imply any deficiency in the
probable evi- P1"00^ DUt OIUy marks the particular nature of that
dence. proof as contradistinguished from another species
of evidence. It is opposed, not to what is certain, but to what
admits of being demonstrated after the manner of the mathe
matician. This differs widely from the meaning annexed to the
same word in popular discourse ; according to which, whatever
event is said to be probable is understood to be expected with
some degree of doubt. But though, in philosophical language,
the epithet probable be applied to events which are acknowl
edged to be certain, it is applied to events which are called
probable by the vulgar. The philosophical meaning of the
word, therefore, is more comprehensive than the popular ; the
former denoting that particular species of evidence which con
tingent truths admit ; the latter being confined to such degrees
of this evidence as fall short of the highest. These different
degrees of probability the philosophers consider as a series
beginning with low possibility, and terminating in that appre
hended infallibility with which the phrase moral certainty is
* Locke, "Essay on Human Understanding," hook iv, chap. 15. Reid, "Intel-
bctual Powers," Essay vii, chap. 1.

Of Beliefs. 199
synonymous. To this last term of the series the word probable
is, in its ordinary acceptation, palpably inapplicable." *
" Evidence, another word for proof, e video, to see and make
see. Evidence signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear,
or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either
on the one side or the other." \
" Evidence is the ground or reason of knowledge or belief.
It is the light by which the mind apprehends things presented
to it. Fulgor quidam mentis assonsam sapiens. In an act
of knowledge there is the object or thing known, and the sub
ject or person knowing. Between the faculties of the person
knowing, and the qualities of the thing known, there is some
proportion or relation. The qualities manifest themselves to
the faculties, and the result is knowledge ; or the thing is made
evident, that is, not only exists, but is revealed as existing.
" There are as many kinds of evidence as there are persons or
faculties by which we attain to truth. But, according as truth
may be attained more or less directly, evidence is distinguished
into intuition and induction. Intuitive evidence comprehends
all first truths or principles of common sense ; as, every change
implies the operation of a cause — axioms in science ; as things
equal to the same thing are equal to each other, and the evi
dence of consciousness, whether by sense, or memory, or
thought, as we touch, or remember, or know, or feel any thing.
Evidence of this kind arises directly from the presence or
contemplation of the object, and gives knowledge without any
effort on our part.
"Inductive evidence is distinguished as demonstrative and
probable. Demonstrative evidence rests upon axi- Inducttve eTl.
oms, or first truths, and from which, by ratiocina- dence-
tion, we attain to other truths. It is scientific, and leads to
* Stewart, "Elements," part ii, chap. 2, sec. 4.
f Blackstone's " Commentaries," hook iii, chap. 23.

200 Studies in Theology.
certainty. It admits of no degrees, and it is impossible to
conceive the contrary of the truth which is established.
" Probable evidence has reference, not to necessary but con
tingent truths. It admits of degrees, and is derived from
various sources ; the principal are the following, namely, expe
rience, analogy, testimony." *
It is this latter kind of evidence which determines rational
beliefs in contradistinction from other forms, of evidence which
issue in knowledge-
Theology treats, to a large extent — almost exclusively — of
Theology treats matters of faith,, but they are subjects about which
of matters of , .
faith. we are compelled to have ideas and entertain be
liefs. We can no more escape them in our rational mental
life than we can get rid of thoughts of existence and of the
objective world about us. They spring unbidden, and by
no process can be banished from our consciousness. Their
reality we cannot permanently doubt, strive as we may, and
exigencies inevitably arise in our earthly life which make it
impossible that we should think them unimportant. Shad
ows, dreams, mere ghosts of disturbed fancy we may call
them, and seek with scorn and self-chiding to drive them
away, but, firm as the solid globe, they will still maintain
their place. The stars rooted in the changeless heavens do not
more assert their reality from age to age than do these object
ives of faith — the unseen realities of the spiritual world. As
the sane eye is met by the one when it opens in the hght, the
sane mind is met by the other when it awakes to reason and
reflection. Call them chimeras, delusions, heir-looms of super
stition and ignorance. There is that in mind as mind which
discredits the suggestion. If we determine to shake them off,
reason will still hold us to the examination. The hidden magnet
attracts us, and we have no power to break the connection or
* PIeming'3 " Vocabulaire de Phil.," art. de Evidence, pp. 171, 173.

Of Beliefs. 201
insulate our consciousness from its mysterious spell. The gen
erations of humanity bear unbroken testimony to this truth.
Does it count for nothing ? As well deny reality to objects of
vision. We can no more rationally ignore the one than the
other. Nature avenges herself for neglect and ignorance of the
one as of the other.
The facts and laws of the material world are real. They
sustain such relations to our faculties that we may, by patient
study, come to know them. It is important to our present
welfare that we should gain as complete knowledge of them as
possible. They are found, as far as they have been explored,
to contain rich sources of physical comfort and enjoyment for
us of which ignorance deprives us, and they are sure to avenge
themselves for neglect. They exist, whether we will be at the
pains to find them out or not, and do not fail to go to their
end, even if by reason of our non-observance they should
destroy us.
The same is true of the spiritual realm. The laws and
facts there are as profoundly and uneradicably real as in the
physical, and, as we shall be able to find, immeasurably more
significant. If neglect in the former case issues in retributive
consequences, no less certain, and incalculably more dreadful,
will be the Nemesis in the latter.
There are two questions, as we have seen, which we need
to consider, each suggestive of another: What ^ato^t^
do we know? What do we believe? These two tobeUeve?
give rise to others : What may we know ? What ought
we to believe? That there are things which, from the
nature of the case, cannot become matters of knowledge,
but "which ought to be matters of belief, we cannot doubt.
Oughtness implies obhgation, and involves ethical elements.
What ought to be is possible, and when the ought is neg
lected guilt is incurred. There is no real oughtness that
14

202 Studies ln Theology.
does not involve these consequences. But if ever there was
a case when the ought is imperative, it is here. The obliga
tion to right actions, or affections, or volitions, or motives,
involves the antecedent obhgation to determine, as much as we
may, what are right actions, affections, volitions, motives — that
is, to find the underlying law. How can any act, in the mat
ter of it, be right, if the behef which inspires and determines
it is wrong ? How can the stream be pure, if the fountain it
self be corrupt? First, the tree must be made good if we
would have the fruit good. If it is a sin to abuse and prosti
tute the body, is it less a sin to misuse the soul ? The facul
ties were given for use, and to use them to their end is duty.
But what is their end if it be not to find truth, that we may
fashion ourselves and our hves according to the truth ? If the
very powers which were intended for good are prostituted to
evil, how great is the evil ! If an error in belief conduct to an
error in practice, whereby we ourselves are ruined, and whereby
harm comes to others, can it be a matter of indifference what
our beliefs are? Every character and life is determined by
some governing idea or ideas. Whether it will be good or
bad, holy or sinful, a fountain of life or death, depends upon
these. These governing ideas are self-superinduced, in part
at least. They come from the use or misuse of the faculties.
To this extent we must be responsible for them. If, through
neglect, present disaster ensue, we may be certain that the
retributive catastrophe will be greater still.
We are not unmindful that beliefs and governing ideas are
Beliefs not un- not completely under our control. We have no
deroureontroi. <jirect will power over them. We have no such
freedom that we can, by a mere act of choice, believe or
disbelieve. Hence we have located responsibility for our
beliefs back of them, in the antecedent use of our faculties.
Our guilt or innocence with respect to them will arise from

Of Beliefs. 203
the manner in which we used our faculties in forming
them. We are not unmindful, either, that we may be so circum
stanced, either by limitation of faculty or untoward Eight ideas
surroundings, that right governing ideas may be siwe.
impossible to us. Christian beliefs cannot be obligatory on
persons who never heard of them. Impossibilities cannot be
required under a just government. Evils in character or prac
tice resulting from absolutely unavoidable misjudgments can
not be ground of just condemnation, any more than the com
plexion of the skin or height of stature. i
But these are not exceptions to the principle herein declared,
namely, that we are in all circumstances required to Duty 0l m_
seek right beliefs by the best possible use of our v^iy-
faculties ; and if, through any neglect of this duty, we come
under the governance of false ideas, for any evil that may
ensue to ourselves or others we are responsible. The prin
ciple shows that the duty of seeking right beliefs is among the
most august and solemn that is imposed upon us, whether we
contemplate it in the light of present or future sequences.
Success in the pursuit of truth is not what is required of us,
important as it is. Unchosen conditions may prevent that.
Providential allotments may make it impossible. Failure may
be no sin. What is required is, in our circumstances, the hon
est and industrious effort. Important as truth is, its possession
cannot be so important as the love of it, the desire for it, and
the pursuit which springs therefrom. Great as are the evils
which flow from failure to attain it, they cannot be comparable
to the disasters which must overtake the willful and wicked
neglect of means to gain it.
However circumstanced, some light will find its way into every
honest mind. The full truth may not be gained, but a truth
will spring up even in the greatest darkness. Underlying all

204 Studies in Theology.
the rubbish of error and misbelief will be found some eternal
verities, and many honest truth-seekers from the east and the
west and the north and the south will come up to sit down
with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of God.
Nor should we be discouraged if, after all, we cannot be cer
tain that what we suppose to be true is really so. Some of our
conclusions will be true, some not. Some of our beliefs will
change, some will pass away. Better faculty and better con
ditions will improve us. But this does not change the obliga
tion that we should continue to seek, or the responsibility in
the use of our faculties with respect to our present behefs.
In matters presented to us for our acceptance or rejection,
what, then, is the right use of our faculties f
To the question, Shall we accept or reject ? this answer springs
spontaneously and intuitively: If the matter be true, we ought to
accept it ; if false, we ought to reject it. We have no power to
reverse that answer. The mind is so constituted that it cannot
revoke it. The one business, then, imposed upon us is to deter
mine the point, Is it true or false ? Suppose the matter is of such
a kind that we cannot absolutely know which ; are we, then, ex
cused ? Let the question be, Is man immortal, and will he be re
quired to answer for his deeds in this life, and will they be deter
minative of destiny in the life to come ? Suppose it is impos
sible for him absolutely to know what the answer is ? Shall he,
therefore, dismiss the question ? In point of fact, either he is
immortal or not, and the destiny beyond will be affected or not by
the deeds done here. His incapacity of knowledge in the prem
ises will not change the result. Suppose, in point of fact, the
true answer should be in the affirmative — he is immortal, and
must answer, and his future destiny will turn on his deeds; it
must, then, in that case, be very important that he should act
with reference to it, and, as he cannot have absolute knowledge,
he must act on behef. But if he must act on belief if he act

Of Beliefs. 205
rationally, there must be some grounds for belief other than
mere caprice. What shall determine his belief ?
When a matter is presented to the mind for its decision, it
must be one which can either be known by the Mugt act on
right use of the faculties, or one which will furnish Proba°mty-
adequate grounds of belief or rejection — grounds which enable
the mind to say this or that is probably true ; and, to be true
to itself, it must act on the answer precisely as if it were an
absolute knowledge. Rational belief dominates, in its sphere,
with the same right and imperativeness- over the actions of a
rational being as absolute knowledge does. But, to do so, it
must be rational belief — belief reached by the proper use of
the faculties. Then the proper use of the faculties will lead
to belief or disbelief.
For every thing which ought to be believed, there exists
evidence which may be discovered, and which, when discovered,
if the mind be in a normal condition — if it be not abusive of
itself — will induce belief, or enable it to believe. We say, if
the mind be in a normal condition, that is, be not biased by
prejudice, or overslaughed with ignorance, or iinbruted by vice.
The condition, then, of obtaining a right belief, is the protec
tion of the mind from abuse, and the proper exercise of its
faculties in collecting and examining evidence. This is really
the sum of duty with relation to belief.
Proceeding, now, upon the supposition that the mind is a
mind fairly equipped with faculty — that it is Must define the
J ^ rr , , . . matter of in-
honest in the pursuit of truth — that it is protected quiry.
from the enslavements of passion or prejudice — that it is
alert and diligent, what is the right method? That is, how
shall it proceed so as most certainly to reach the truth in'
its beliefs ? It must clearly define to itself the matter about
which it inquires. That must always be the primal move
ment. If the subject be not distinct, the action with regard

206 Studies in Theology.
to it will be confused and unsatisfactory. The question
being distinctly put, the next movement must be to obtain
all the information possible in the premises, from all sources
— every witness within reach must be interrogated. Due
care and industry must be exercised to find and exhaust the
witnesses. None must be left out because of prejudice, or
slurred because of bad repute. The information being gath
ered, it must then be examined and weighed ; two things quite
dissimilar. The examination will regard its reliability — is the
thing alleged credible ? This being determined, it must then
be weighed as to its bearing on the point in hand — to what
conclusion does it point ? Finally, all possible information be
ing gathered, examined, and weighed, each part by itself, if it
point conjointly one way, the conclusion is plain, belief be
comes unavoidable; if it seems to conflict, the conclusion
becomes more difficult, and the belief less assured ; but it does
not free us from the obligation to decide one way or the other,
or for the present withhold a conclusion until we shall have
more light. This, indeed, we must inevitably do. Indecision
involves action, and action which may be fatal. Honest de
cision, in such a case, may, because of our limited faculty, be
in error, for we are fallible; but the error, however un
fortunate, cannot be fatal, since it does not involve moral
fault. The process, in cases where there seems to be conflicting
where there eyidence or lack of information on which to act,
Sctin^ ev! is Plain' Kl'st> the efEort must be t0 determine
idence. whether there is real conflict, or only a seeming,
and whether it affects the question in hand. If only seeming,
it has no weight. If real, then the question is, Which of the
conflicting sides is entitled to prevail ? This can only be ra
tionally decided by a searching examination into their respect
ive signs of truth, and the preponderance of evidence in sup-

Of Beliefs. 207
port of the one or the other. If the conflict is between two or
more specific evidences, or what seem to be proofs bearing on
the case, and there is no means of deciding between them, then
the decision of the general question, What must I believe in
the case ? must result in a suspension of judgment, or in acting
on that view of the case which, on the whole, is safest, or which
seems most conducive to welfare. The mind must accept this
as the wisest practical rule of action. Truth is truth, and it is
reasonable to suppose that in any case where it is of practical
moment, it will be possible to find better evidence in its sup
port than can be arrayed against it.
Does all this involve labor ? Unquestionably it does. But it
is labor from which we cannot escape but at the price of sacri
ficing the truth. There is no other way by which we can come
at it. If it has value, we must pay the price. Over against
every truth is an error ; ay, a multitude of errors, for truth is
exact, and error multiform. To go to the exact mark amid
so many decoys, implies a rigorous use of faculty. The most
dangerous counterfeit is that which has the nearest resem
blance to the real ; but, though it be a facsimile, if it be a
counterfeit, it is worthless, and if it pass over our counter we
are damaged — may be ruined. To prevent the catastrophe,
there is but one way. We must make ourselves able to detect
the counterfeit. We must not, by neglect or inattention, be
liable to have the false passed upon us for the true — paste
for diamond. There are diamonds ; we must be able to know
them from worthless imitations, if we deal in diamonds. Every
man is a merchantman of the most precious of all diamonds,
whether he will or not. He must buy or sell the truth at a
high or low price.
Passing by all matters which fall within the sphere of exper
imental and exact sciences, which, therefore, have their estab
hshed tests, and are reducible within the categories of knowl-

208 Studies ln Theology.
edge, we confine our attention to rules which ought to be gov
erning in matters of behef— criteria of belief.
Experimental science is confined to physics ; as astronomy,
province of which treats of magnitudes, motions, distances, and
science. harmonies of the heavenly bodies : geology, which
treats of the elements composing the earth's crust, agencies of
change operative therein; changes that have occurred along
the ages of its history, as recorded in its strata, its antiq
uity, the orders of Hfe that have successively inhabited it;
science educes the facts, and declares them : chemistry, which
treats of the constituent elements of things, their differences,
their affinities, their uses, their compounds, the laws which
determine them or their habits ; science discovers and makes
them known : physiology, biology, magnetism, light, heat, elec
tricity, and all other sciences which relate to the physical uni
verse, or which have simply to do with the facts and phenom
ena of physical existence — with respect to all these the function
of science is to find them out, and make them known as to
their facts and laws. Science does not, of right, treat or predi
cate of mere matters of belief : it states what is, not what may
be or ought to be.
Mathematical science treats of numbers, proportion, and fig
ures in the abstract, and enunciates and demonstrates, not what
is true in the concrete — truth of things — but what must be true
for ever in thought. Logic is to propositions what mathe
matics is to numbers and figures, but it determines nothing of
the truth or content of propositions, but only shows that certain
predicates necessitate others.
Passing these all by, we come to discuss questions which fall
without their limits, and which may not, like them, be tested
by experiment or established by demonstration; questions
which, from their nature and ours, must be submitted to other
kinds of tests, and be established by other kinds of evidence.

Of Beliefs. 209
Not like physics, the questions relate to a supersensible uni
verse ; not like mathematics and logic, they relate Questions of
to actual beings and realities. They are as much !jju*u o™1**
questions of fact as are questions in physics, and sclence-
are greatly more important ; and they involve as real truth as
is found in mathematics. The difference is in the mode of
coming at the truth, and in the kind of proof, and in the
nature of the conclusion, all of which differences arise from the
differences in the subjects themselves.
In admitting that the questions cannot be brought within the
tests which are applied to questions of physics, or pure science,
we do not mean that they have no tests, or that the tests are
less rigorous or less convincing, but only that they are different.
In placing them in the categories of beliefs, not knowledges,
we do not mean that there is less of ascertained truth in them,
but only that we stand in different relations to the truth, in the
former case having it immediately under the gaze of the mind,
in the latter case having the adequate evidence before the
mind, but not the thing itself.
Before passing away from this point, it ought to be noted
that to most of us, and in largely the greater science, with
most, mere be-
number of cases, matters of science are mere uef.
matters of belief. The proofs to us are not the scientific
proofs. We have never wrought out the problems of as
tronomy; we have not mastered the facts of chemistry or
geology. We beheve on the testimony of others, and the
truth contained in our behef is precisely the same as we
should have if we had wrought the problems for ourselves.
As to contents of truth, the knowledge has no advantage over
the belief. The only difference is in our relations to the truth,
or our manner of coming at it. The practical scientist, by
actual experiment, finds the truth; we believe that he does,
and avail ourselves of the benefit of his labor. It would not be

210 Studies in Theology.
perfectly candid if we did not add, that there is this difference
between the case now supposed and the case of doctrines which
are properly called doctrines of belief. Beliefs of the kind just
mentioned are susceptible of becoming knowledges, and we rest
in them, believing that we could so transform them ; while
beliefs of the other kind, from our relations to the subject, can
never, while our present condition remains, be any thing else
than beliefs.
With respect to all beliefs, this may be laid down as a maxim :
a maxim with No belief has any right to exist which is not sup-
respect to all . .
beliefs. ported by evidence sufficient to convince the reason
that the matter of it is absolutely or probably true. If there
be no such evidence, the belief is groundless, and its existence
is an impertinence. But this does not imply that each mind
should search the evidence before it believes. That might be
impossible. Each mind has the right of search, and cannot be
required to believe without the proof; but any mind may
forego the right in certain cases, and believe on the assumption
that adequate evidence exists. This must practically be the
fact with the mass of men, whose pursuits forbid them to make
the requisite examination for themselves. So circumstanced, it
is their best wisdom to accept the common faith of the wise
and good about them, and not set up standards of their own.
It must remain for the learned few, whose tastes and facilities
enable them to prosecute the pursuit of knowledge, and whose
undivided time can be given to it, to extend the areas of
knowledge, and purge and purify the realms of behef. On
them must devolve the labor and responsibility of searching
into truth, and of relegating the absurd and false to oblivion.
A single mind may discover and furnish the evidence for all ;
or one may expose an error that has enslaved the race. Who
ever has it in his power to contribute a grain to the sum of
human knowledge, or strip the disguises from a single misbe-

Of Beliefs. 211
lief, owes it to the race to do so. Meantime, while the work
progresses, the beliefs which descend as heir-looms to us must
continue to hold their place, and of right, until something bet
ter is furnished in their stead. Some will abide because they
are true, and time will only add strength to their evidence :
others will vanish as forgotten dreams, because discovered to
be baseless and false.
Of this we may be certain, that intellectual forces are at
work which will constantly and greatly, to the incalculable wel
fare of the race, widen the fields of knowledge, and, by sifting
out the false and groundless, and elucidating the true and de
serving in matters of behef, will give solidity and power to the
whole structure of thought. Nothing will perish that ought
to remain. God and humanity have too much interest in truth
to permit any part of it to die.
If, as already stated, " it is a maxim of reason that no belief
has a right to exist which is not supported by A maxIm ot
adequate evidence," it is no less a maxim of reason reason-
that every belief which is supported by adequate evidence has
indefeasible right of existence.
What is excluded and included by this double-faceted maxim ?
Obviously it excludes from belief all impossible What to ex,
things, all contradictory things, for of such there can cludea-
be no proof. The area of behef, that is, of the rationally be
lievable, is within the possible and non-contradictory. It also
excludes all things that contradict, not that are beyond, our
personal knowledge, whether it be intuitive or experimental
knowledge — a knowledge delivered to us by external or inter
nal perception or by the discursive reason. No proof can rise
above these, so as to imperate belief in the contradictory prop
osition. What we know, we cannot believe the opposite of
without doing violence to the constitution of the mind itself ;
indeed, if the contradiction is discovered, the mind is incapable

212 Studies in Theology.
of perpetrating upon itself such violence. The priestly fable,
that the consecrated wafer is transformed into the very body
and blood of our Saviour, is a dogma which no one can ra
tionally receive. No miracle recorded in the New or Old Testa
ment contains any such difficulty. It is directly contradictive
of the verdict of our senses, and has no other foundation than
that of the dictum of a fallible man like ourselves. A proposi
tion that should require us to believe that an effect exists with
out a cause, or that the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts, or that right and wrong are identical, or that what we see
we do not see, or what we feel we do not feel, or any such thing,
can only meet with the prompt and inevitable rejection of the
mind, and can, under no circumstances, be an object of belief.
Does it exclude, also, the mysterious and incomprehensible ?
Mysterious and So it has been sometimes thought, but assuredly
incomprehen- ...„,,
sibie may be without reason, in the last analysis it will be
ni3itt6r of t)6—
lief. ' found that there are incomprehensible facets to
every object of knowledge or thought. Mystery is not pe
culiar to any class of objects. Existence is a mystery. We
can neither comprehend nor define it. There is as real mys
tery in an atom as there is in God. We behold changes ;
who can comprehend cause, which produces them ? Belief,
like knowledge, has to do wholly and solely with facts —
facts of being, facts of power, facts of change, and not with
the ultimate how of the facts. It accepts, but does not explain.
When it is shown that a thing is inexplicable, unconstruable,
it makes nothing against the reality of it, and nothing against
the belief of it. Our own being is of this kind, and all of
our composite powers and activities. Nothing is more obscure
than the ego itself. To believe rationally, it is not necessary
that we should be able to explain or comprehend what we
believe, but only that there should be adequate evidence that
the fact is as we predicate of it.

Of Beliefs. 213
Does the maxim exclude supernatural or extra-natural things
— miracles ? It has been so asserted, but without „ho „„_ f
3 The supernat-
warrant of reason. If by miracle be meant some ura! mal ?*
* matter of be-
act of God within or upon the system called nature, Uef-
by which a fact is brought about which would not occur but by
his immediate agency — some fact not provided for in the or
der of nature, or within the reach of its established laws — there
can be shown no reason why such a fact is not possible, nor
why, if it should occur, we might not have evidence which
would warrant the behef of it. It is not prima-facie that
God, who originally created nature, and from whom alone it
receives all its orderly movement, has not power to restrain or
reverse its method, or do something in it which was not pro
vided for in its orderly operations or original constitution. It
is not prima-facie that occasion might not arise, in carrying
forward his administration, for such an exercise of his power.
No reason can be alleged in proof that such a procedure is
improbable. No proof can be adduced that such an event has
not occurred. Proof is possible that it has. And on adequate
proof, belief would be rational. The theory of Mr. Hume,
whereby he attempts to show that the occurrence of a miracle
could not be established by human testimony, will be examined
at the proper place.*
Does the maxim exclude belief in the supersensible world,
that is, in the fact of spiritual existences and supersensible
. may be matter
the laws governing them ? So some seem to lm- of belief.
agine, but without proof of any kind. That there may be
beings and orders not cognizable by sense is what no one
can dispute. That if there are such, our faculties are such
that evidence could not in some way be furnished to us can
not be shown. If adequate proof should be, or has been, given,
it is rational to believe. There is nothing in the nature of
*See the discussion in volume on "Christian Evidences."

214 Studies in Theology.
the case to make behef irrational. There is no more hinder-
ance to the idea of a supersensible universe than there is
to a physical. The last analysis may show that the proof is
more complete in the former case than in the latter. What
sense has been able to penetrate the arcana of thought, or lay
its measuring line on the factor of volitions ? Who by search
ing has been able to find God, and bring him forth from his
concealment, that he might be gazed on by the eye or touched
by the most sensitive nerve ? But are these inscrutable fac
tors destitute of any means whereby to discover the fact of
their existence ?
Is the idea that intercommunication has been opened
with the spiritual world so prima facie irrational that it
should be denied a fair hearing ? Is it prima facie that he
that made the mind, and opened to it the gate-ways of
knowledge, whereby it becomes conversant with gross and
mean and perishable things, has barred his own entrance so
effectually that he can in no way communicate to it knowl
edge of himself — no thought, or feeling, or purpose of his
with respect to it ? Or is it prima facie that if he should
desire to make such a communication, he is impotent as to
means of authenticating his own message ? If none of these
things are imaginable, and surely they are not, then he may
communicate, and there may be such evidence of the fact as
to furnish adequate grounds of rational belief. Within the
realm of the possible every thing is believable which has the
support of adequate proof, and nothing ought to be believed
which has not.
It is not proof that any thing is believable simply because,
PossibUity not or ^or the reason that, it is possible. There are
grounfoTbet manv possibles that are not, and never will be,
UeI- actual. But while possibility, standing alone, is
inadequate ground of belief ; the bare possibility that a thing

Of Beliefs. 215
may be true, may, in certain cases, furnish adequate reason
for a careful examination, and especially when there Possibility a
rpfLSon for fix™
is the shghtest shade of probability ; and if it be a amination.
matter which, if true, would greatly affect our personal interest,
or the welfare of any of our fellow-creatures, that circumstance
makes careful inquiry an absolute duty.
It is not adequate proof that a thing is true, or worthy of
belief, simply that many believe and declare it, or That many be-
i .ii i i .iiii. i Ueve' not afle-
that it has been long and widely believed ; many <mate ground.
great errors have prevailed over whole nations for ages : nor
that it is sacred and holy in its teachings ; nor that multitudes
have been found willing to sacrifice their lives for it ; nor that
it has temples and altars built to it. There are superstitions
supported by all these signs. More lives have been sacrificed,
more money spent, more blind and utter zeal given, to propa
gate the delusions of false religion, than have been consecrated
to the inculcation of the true. In all systems of error, inter-
blending with all superstitions, underlying all fables and tra
ditions, all through the every-day thought and consciousness
of the world wherever mind is, there are glintings of divine
and supersensible realities, but the power is wanting to disen
tangle the truth from the fable.
That and that only is worthy of belief which may be sup
ported by proof that demands from reason its assent. The
proof may be gathered from our own consciousness; may
spring from our moral nature ; may hang out from every atom
or blaze in every star ; may come from lives or words or deeds
of men ; may be unearthed from geological archives, or ex
humed from buried memorials of past ages ; may be matter of
personal experience or induction of individual reason: come
whence it may, it must be adequate proof to support what is
propounded as matter of belief, or the thing is not worthy of
behef. Adequate proof is that kind and amount of proof

216 Studies in Theology.
which convinces, or is sufficient to convince, unprejudiced
Adeouateproof reason °f the truth of that which is propounded
—what? for its acceptance. Each mind must have the right
to judge of it for itself. If it accept the judgment of others,
it can only do so on the assumption that such judgment is
supported by evidence ; but on whatever pretense the belief
rests, it can have no right to exist except as there is proof
adequate to support it.
Every thing that is proposed to the mind: for acceptance as
sumes a propositional form ; it is a this or that — a predication ;
and when apprehended, is or may be challenged, and can acquire
no right to acceptance except as it furnishes such evidences
as will induce the conviction that it is true. The proof may,
in fact, be inadequate, as it often is, and the superinduced behef
may be strong, but it is a belief which has no right to exist,
and a better understanding of its false or insufficient grounds
would at once overthrow it. It acquires no rightful status, and
must ultimately perish. But the matter of belief that arises on
adequate evidence cannot be overthrown, even if the behef is
surrendered. It has truth for its matter, and truth adequately
supported can withstand any assault — cannot be disproved. It
will become more and more lustrous the better it is understood.
The more strict and rigorous its examination, the more search
ing the criticism of its grounds, the more light thrown upon it
from every side, the securer will become its hold. Error only
need fear the light.
These predications are made of honest and candid mind.
Prejudice and passion may offer an effectual bar to the right
operation of reason, and blind the mind to the most convincing
evidence ; but the maxim will stand firm forever, that that which
is not supported by adequate evidence has no right to be believed,
and that that which is, has indefeasible right of acceptance,
and for its acceptance or non-acceptance we are responsible.

Of Beliefs. 217
What constitutes adequate evidence, and the kind of evidence
suitable in support of any given fact, must be determined by
the nature of the fact itself. All truths are not susceptible of
the same kind of proof — not amenable to the same law. A
geometrical theorem must appeal to the laws of geometry;
a question in psychology must interrogate consciousness ; an
hypothesis in physics must be committed to the processes of
scientific experiment ; an ultimate postulate to intuition ; an his
torical deliverance to historical tests ; a matter of sense perception
to the senses ; a fact of personal experience to self- Diversity of
consciousness ; a conclusion of reason to the law of pro01,
induction or deduction ; a moral problem to moral law ; a ques
tion of religion to the nature of the soul and deliverances of
revelation. No one of these can be required to answer to the
law of proof required by any other. To attempt to try a moral
problem by mathematical or scientific tests is as manifestly
absurd as would be the attempt to apply a measuring line to
thoughts, or to weigh feelings in a balance, or to subject mo
tives to a microscope, or to paint volitions on a canvas. The
realms are totally different, and can be brought under no com
mon measures. Each should be required to answer to its own
peculiar laws of verification. The mathematician will not be
asked to prove his thesis by relating his experience ; the theolo
gian will not be expected to establish his conclusions by applying
" the single rule of three," or by a process in algebraic equations.
The matter before the mind in all the stages of its investiga
tions is simply, What is truth ? The problem may respect as
tronomy, geology, psychology, ethics, religion, any thing in the
range of possible queries. In each case the mind has the right
to demand that the predication, whatever it may be, shall have
that kind of support that will render it deserving of credence,
and only that. It wiU not demand of a witness of a fact
which transpired before bis eyes, whether he understands the
15

218 Studies in Theology.
process by which Newton estabhshed the law of gravitation,
or whether he can do a sum in differential calculus. It will
not, for the proof that prayer is a duty, that sin is punishable,
that God is just, that man is immortal, demand that the proof
shall be ocular. When the appropriate and adequate proof is
given in any case the mind will not be slow to see it, and to feel
its convincing force, always providing it be unprejudiced and
simply intent on the truth.
What we have aimed at, in these prolegomena, has been to
define clearly what is meant by the term truth ; to explain the
difference between knowledge and behef, or knowing and be
lieving ; to indicate the respective grounds and conditions of
each ; to distinguish the kinds of belief, and their respective
values ; to point out our responsibility for beliefs ; to declare
the nature and function of proof, and so to furnish criteria,
by which to test the authority and veraciousness of our re
ligious ideas. Further than this, it has been our desire to
stimulate to the pursuit of truth, to develop an earnest spirit
of inquiry, and to point out the proper method and spirit of
conducting investigations into matters of faith.
It has appeared that the scope of our knowledges is exceed
ingly limited, and that most of our ruling ideas must for this life
be mere beliefs — hence that the greatest importance attaches
to the formation of beliefs. If the conclusions reached prove to
be true, then the industrious and earnest use of our faculties in
the examination of the beliefs we may entertain, and the cordial
recognition of any helps that may be furnished us from any
source for the most thorough examination, even though they
require us to modify and change, or even to surrender or reject,
the most cherished and hitherto most undoubted views, and to
accept others, become not merely proper but absolutely ob-
Hgatory. This is no more true with respect to common things
than it is with respect to those beliefs which we nominate

Of Beliefs. 219
sacred and religious. Indeed, as these are the more important,
we should be even more anxious that any errors we may have
unwittingly fallen into concerning these should be pointed out
and corrected. But if it be a duty to be ready to receive any
new light, and even more than that, to be constantly seeking
it, and, when it shall be gained, to be unwilling to modify
our beliefs if required, it is certainly not less a duty, and a
comely and rational procedure, that we hold our beliefs with
unyielding tenacity, and determine that they shall not be
wrenched from us except by the most convincing proof.
Belief is too sacred a thing to be held lightly. It is one of the
high prerogatives of an intelligent being, only inferior to
knowledge itself, which, like the truth which it is supposed to
contain, cannot be surrendered at the bidding of mere caprice,
or cupidity, or dictation, without moral culpability and intel
lectual debasement. To form a belief hastily, to hold it dis
honestly, to be indifferent whether it be according to truth, and
to change it on any other than rational grounds, are signs of
mental weakness if not of want of moral integrity, from which
every worthy and noble instinct must shrink.
In connection with this thought of the sacredness of beliefs,
and the high duty of honesty and carefulness in Responsibility
. ... i of men °I let-
the matter of their formation and continuance, there tera.
are two things which deserve more than the passing notice
which we can bestow upon them here ; the first has relation
to the responsibility of men of letters as to their own beliefs,
and the manner in which they influence the beliefs and result
ing habits of the people.
If there be responsibility commensurate with their opportu
nities, on their individual and private account, for the conclu
sions which they reach ; if error, resulting from the misuse of
their powers and abuse of their special facility, even when re
tained in strict privacy, involve guilt, how much more must

220 Studies in Theology.
this be so when they add to this the utterance of opinions,
false because hastily formed, or conceived in egotism or preju
dice ; and thus, by their reputed learning, mislead those who
look up to them for guidance, or unconsciously come tinder
their influence.
The masses of men have neither time nor tastes for intel-
Themassesde- Actual pursuits. If many of them have the tastes
pendent. an(j the natural powers which, under favorable cir
cumstances, would lead to eminence, they have not the oppor
tunity. Whether poor or rich, the business and labor of life
devolve upon them. These, in order to success, require con
centrated energy. To a large extent their one book must be
their ledger. In any event, the practical fact is and will be so.
Such force of thought as they have must be given to their art
or cahing, leaving no time for any thing else, or so exhausting
them and benumbing their faculties as to other things that they
cannot successfully become their own teachers and guides.
They have soul hunger, and must have beliefs, and, recog
nizing their own inabihty and want of opportunity to investi
gate for themselves, they naturally and wisely take their opin
ions on all subjects, whether consciously or not, to a large
extent from those who acquire the reputation of authorities.
What else can they do ? Ha man acquires great fame, and
especially if he have fame for learning, he will have a great
unquestioning following. This it is which makes his respon
sibility for the publication or mere declaration of his opinions
grave in a high degree.
It often happens that scholars are too busy in their particu-
Duty of schoi- x&r Pursuits, and so of professional and Hterary men,
ariy men. to gjve attention to subjects outside of their depart
ments — indeed, this limitation is almost a necessity to success.
The field has become so wide that specialism furnishes the
only chance for eminence. But it also not unfrequently

Of Beliefs. 221
happens that these same specialists assume to be author
ities outside of their lines, and in matters to which they
have given no attention, and the undiscerning mass do not
discriminate between them and those well qualified to decide
such matters. Their influence is as great where it ought to
be zero, as where it deserves to be of the first rank. There
is no escape from this. Ought it not to teach such the need of
carefulness in the matter of their influence, lest, while benefit
ing society in their proper sphere, and by their real contribu
tions to human knowledge and culture, they inflict upon it seri
ous injury in its most vital interests outside of their proper
sphere. If there are truths of the most vital importance,
which affect the deepest welfare of society, how careful they
should be lest their influence be cast against these ! That such
are the truths of rehgion it is hardly possible any informed
and thoughtful person should doubt. Is it just to themselves,
is it just to society, that they should, for any reason, permit
their influence to go against these truths by allowing them
selves to be rated as unbelievers, or showing themselves to be
indifferent ? Especially, is it becoming such to array themselves
against religion and the Christian Church without being at the
pains to inform themselves in the premises ? The flippant and
irreverent manner in which these great interests are often
treated constitutes one of the saddest chapters of reckless
indiscretion. If the welfare of the world is promoted by every
advance in useful learning, as it is, those favored men, who in
the order of God are permitted to enjoy the ability and oppor
tunity to make the largest contributions, and so to win for
themselves the admiration and gratitude of mankind, will, in the
end, prove to be but sorry benefactors if their learning and in
fluence weaken and destroy greater interests than they subserve.
Would they not greatly add to their just fame and personal
worth and happiness, and at the same time augment the general

222 Studies in Theology.
good of their fellow-men, if they universally laid the weight
of their great influence on the altar of morality, virtue, and
religion, as many of their most illustrious peers have done ?
When they look at the world as it is, and reflect on the serious
aspects of human life as they know them, can they reconcile it
to themselves that there should be any question where they
stand ? Or, rather, can they willingly consent to stand in the
ranks of scorners and revilers of sacred things ? More yet, can
they desire to have their influence, leading and conspicuous as
it is, enlisted in the unjust and cruel assaults made upon ven
erable and holy institutions and truths which have made them
all they are, and which they cannot fail to know are indispensa
ble to the conservation and progress of human welfare ? Can
they believe that by sapping the foundations of Christianity, if
that were in their power, or diminishing its hold on the public.
conscience, as these are often able to do, they will not be com
mitting a blunder simply, but an enormous wrong, against the
present and future generations of men ? If there are super
stitious and religious errors to be corrected, can they imagine
that there are no great and sacred verities to be preserved
and defended? In the brave fight which has been waged
by Christianity against sin and ignorance, and with so much
success, for centuries, do they see nothing to commend ? Are
they ready now to join their blows with the low and vulgar
and godless to strike it down? Can they suppose, that in
weakening the influence of its teaching and spirit they will
be doing that which will bring about a better and more benefi
cent state of society ?
That which decency demands is, that so great a question as
that of the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, and especially
the truth or falsity of the Christian system, should be reverently
and carefully examined, and supported if found worthy of sup
port. Christianity seeks no immunity from the most searching

Of Beliefs. 223
criticism, but it has a right to feel the cruelty of reckless
assault, and most of all the cruelty of impediments put in the
way of its great work of advancing human weKare by those
who, from the benefits they have received from it, ought to be
its truest and ablest supporters.
There is a wide-spread popular mistake, both among behevers
and unbelievers, as to the real grounds of faith. It j^, ^m^
is supposed to rest simply on a dictum without au- 0l Mtn-
thentication — a book is to be accepted and its contents believed
without question. On this ground Christians are set down as
credulous dupes. It is accounted a sufficient reason for rejec
tion that the system is called a system of faith. Nothing could
be more unjust. Christianity rests upon no such foundation.
It acknowledges amenability to the common laws of behef. It
is to be accepted and its contents believed on proof.
To begin : the question of its veraciousness, it acknowl
edges, is an open and preliminary question with every mind
that chooses to make it so. It rests its claim for acceptance
npon its abihty to furnish adequate proof, and its readiness to
do so whenever demanded. Its vouchers are ample and within
reach of every honest inquirer. So far as it is a system of
doctrines, the proof it furnishes is, " Thus saith the Lord."
This is considered final, but it holds itself answerable to fur
ther show that, while some of its doctrines thus supported are
above reason, as source, none of them are adverse to reason.
To the question, How is it known that God has given Chris
tianity sanction? it holds itself ready to furnish abundant
answer and proof, and recognizes the right of reason to decide.
So far as it is an experience, it claims to be within the reach
of every man in Christendom for himself.
There is no more justice in charging that Christianity rests
on credulity than there would be in making the same charge
against any experimental science. The proof it furnishes is

224 Studies in Theology.
different, but not less conclusive. The proof is precisely the
kind which the subject demands and which the reason has a
right to ask. It is a Christian idea, and so recognized, that
there can be no possible obligation to believe where there is not
convincing evidence within the reach of the mind.
There is, then, no other ground for faith in Christian dogmas
but that they are true, and shown to be true by a quality and
quantity of evidence which shall be, or ought to be, convincing
to honest reason. The common law regulating beliefs governs
here as in every other case. The ground of behef in any
contents of the Scriptures is not that it is in the Scriptures,
but it is in the evidence that the Scriptures are the word of
God. Take that evidence away, and the Scriptures are of no
more authority than any uninspired book. The ground of
belief in any words spoken by the Lord Jesus is not in the
fact that he spake them, but in the evidence he furnished
that he is a messenger from God, or the incarnation of God.
Take that evidence away and his words have no more author
ity, no juster ground to command belief, than those of any
other good man. The only defense Jesus ever made of him
self was in the recognition of this principle. John v, 30-47,
inclusive. If, then, the Holy Scriptures are authoritative in
matters of Christian faith, it is on no other ground than
that they are the word of God. The sole authority they have
rests upon the evidence of that fact. The evidence must be
adequate to establish that or the book becomes unauthoritative.
If there are spiritual truths which, like other truths, come to
The science of verification by inquiry and the use of the appropriate
faith has its , . „ , . , . , f
propermethod. means, and if they are important, the mind ought not
only to search for them, but to search in the right way. Every
science has its proper method. Christian science is no excep
tion. Here, as elsewhere, the powers must be trained, and sub
ject and object be put in right relations before truth can be

Of Beliefs. 225
discovered. The fact that there is a spiritual world — that we
move amid great unseen realities — forces itself upon us, to
say the least, as highly probable if less than absolutely certain.
It is sufficiently certain to justify the most earnest effort of
every mind to find out what may be discovered about it. If
something like the Christian scheme should be true — and no
man can say that it is not, and millions of the purest and
most thorough minds that have ever adorned the race assert
after careful investigation, and on personal knowledge, that it is,
— it makes a case of the greatest possible urgency that it should
be scrupulously examined by every man for himself. It can
not be rational to put it aside with indifference, nor yet to rely
on false methods of inquiry. If it should be that there is
a great God, and that we are his immortal and accountable
children, and that what Christians believe is true, that the
Bible, that most wonderful book, is a revelation from him, by
obedience to which our final destiny is to be determined, the
bare possibUity that it may be so must, to men of reason,
appear a sufficient ground for the most candid and earnest
examination. The least thing that prudence dictates is, that so
much be granted to the subject. The tremendous possibihties
in the case are not pleaded as an argument for its unreasoning
acceptance, but only as a reason for such an examination as
will enable the mind to decide, as it should do, in a case where
there is so much possible interest involved.
In order to such a decision, it is obvious not only that
the subject should be examined, but that the right method be
observed. There can be no doubt of the fact that the state of
the affections has much to do with moral and spiritual percep
tions. Reason, no less than revelation, declares that the natural
man discerneth not the things of the Spirit — that spiritual
things " are spiritually discerned." When the life is wholly
given to material pursuits, and the powers of the mind are

226 Studies in Theology.
constantly and absorbingly employed about material interests,
spiritual truths must be at great disadvantage.
The widely prevaihng ignorance of spiritual things is not
more on account of their intrinsic obscurity than it is on
account of the almost utter neglect of culture in that direction.
What might properly be called the faith faculty, or the organ
of spiritual perception, is dim-sighted or wholly bhnd from
disuse. It requires but suitable effort to bring to vivid realiza
tion spiritual realities. "Faith is the substance of things
hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."
No one has dealt fairly with his spiritual nature nntil he has
given it such care as to put it in fair relations to the truths of
the spiritual world. He must feel the greatness and pre
eminence of his wants in this direction, and honestly seek to
satisfy them. This is so of all truth. It must be earnestly
sought, or can never be gained. The telescope reveals the
stars only when turned in the right direction. A clarified
conscience, pure affections, and an honest mind, turned with
longings toward the invisible spiritual heavens, will not fail to
bring out the star gems of spiritual truth and reality.
Belief and faith are sometimes used interchangeably, as if
Belief and faith they were synonymous terms, and much confusion
to be discriml-
nated. arises from the misuse, lhey have common ele
ments, but they have also differences. The differences are
essential. In philosophical usage they are identical. But faith
is technical as a term in theological science, and properly
belongs to it. Not to recognize it is to introduce needless con
fusion both of language and thought. Theologians are not
always careful to note the distinction. There is faith simply
as belief. There is the faith, by which is meant the body of
religious beliefs, or, more technically, the coherent verities of
revelation constituting the whole substance of Christian beliefs
— " the faith delivered to the saints." In this sense, the codi-

Of Beliefs. 227
fied belief of a Church, in its creed, is called its faith. The
term also denotes a Christian grace or virtue.
Belief is the acceptance by the mind of a proposition as
true when its truth is not matter of knowledge. Were the
truth known, it could not be believed, as knowledge precludes
belief. It is a state of mind superinduced by evidence of some
kind, either perceived or assumed. It is not properly a voli
tional act or subject of command. It is subject to the will only
so far as the will may be active in furnishing the conditions
of its existence, or in withholding them. Under suitable condi
tions it must necessarily exist. As the suitable conditions may in
given cases be, subject to the will — may be voluntarily procured
or prevented — unbelief or misbelief, as result of antecedent vol
untary neglect or perverseness, may be ground of guilt. The
right posture of the mind with relation to matters of belief is
not indifference of will, but a settled volitional state or purpose
to create suitable conditions by gathering all possible light, and
giving the faculties fair play in ascertaining and determining
the probable truth in the case without passion or prejudice.
The same law rules, whether the matter of inquiry be sacred
or secular. Belief in this sense is not faith technically as a
Christian grace, and is wholly destitute of ethical virtue. If
the mind do no violence to itself, it will believe any truth
which is brought before it with the same facility and necessity
as that with which the eye will see when it is placed in right
relations to the objects of vision ; and, as the eye will not see
out of proper relations, so the mind will not believe according
to the truth when it is not supplied with suitable conditions of
faculty and environment. As the eye may be closed against
the light, and the possibility of vision be cut off — or as it may
be placed in a colored or insufficient light, and so see things
obscurely or in distortion — so the mind may refuse or distort
existing facts, and plunge itself into false conclusions of ab- •

228 Studies in Theology.
surdity, delusion, doubt, disbehef. Disbelief and belief are
the reverse sides of the same mental act. To believe a propo
sition is simply to affirm its probable truth. To disbelieve it
is to affirm the probable truth of its opposite, or its probable
untruth. Faith, in the technical sense, is both a mental and moral
Faithasatech- exercise. It is a free voluntary act, with a
nicai term. concomitant affectional element. It is a proper
subject of command. It originates in the moral nature
under mental conditions. The mental condition is a behef
grounded in evidence. The moral act is trust in a being,
issuing in the commitment of the soul to him and a loyal
and loving acceptance of his guidance, and in loving obe
dience to his will and command. The mental act is the
apprehension of a person, implicit belief in his existence
and trustworthiness, that he is able to effect some desirable
good to the soul, and will, when trusted, do so. These
are doctrinal predicates which are bases of faith, but not
faith — mental states ensuing upon apprehended evidence.
They imply only such concurrent volition as is involved
in attending to determining reasons or proofs. In order
to the faith-act, these mental acts must awaken dormant
affections in the moral nature — a sense of sin and desire after
deliverance from its guilt and peril. These conditions being
wrought, the faith-act becomes a voluntary performance or
exercise, not induced without help, but still free and personal
— an act of the soul whereby it grasps the hand of proffered
help, and puts itself in possession of salvation. It is thus
more than belief, more than desire, more than hope. It must
have a person for its object, and is loving trust in him. Its
very essence is this consummate act, the free, cordial, loving
obedience of the heart, possible only under given conditions.
" I regard it," says Dr. Hopkins, " as specially unfortunate

Of Beliefs. 229
that faith, a term so central and vital in our religion, should be
used in senses so different from that in which it is used in the
Scriptures. And this is the more disastrous because the term
seems, often at least, to be used in this way with an entire un
consciousness that there is any difference. Thus Sir William
Hamilton, after saying that faith is the organ by which we ap
prehend what is beyond our knowledge, adds: 'In this all
divines and philosophers worthy of the name are found to coin
cide.' In his chapter on the province of faith Dr. Calderwood
says : ' It is necessary to premise that in treating at present of
the province of faith, I refer exclusively to the exercise of faith
which is found in the consciousness of our primary or funda
mental beliefs. Such beliefs,' he adds, ' if they have any value
at all, are nothing less than the foundation and guaranty of all
our thoughts.' Here Dr. Calderwood identifies faith with be
liefs, and makes it consist of those primary beliefs that are
given by what Hamilton calls the regulative faculty. True, he
says : ' Faith may also find exercise in connection with the
facts of experience, or with inferences drawn from these.' But
this is not true of faith, except as the meaning of the word is
changed, and of that he gives no intimation. The faith that
finds exercise in connection with the facts of experience is
wholly a different thing under the same name, and neither is
at all the faith of the Bible. How wholly the faith now spoken
of differs from that of the Bible will be readily seen if we
compare the two. The one is involuntary and necessary, the
other voluntary and may be commanded. ' Have faith in God.'
One admits of no degrees ; the other does. ' Lord, increase our
faith.' One belongs to all men ; the other does not. ' All men
have not faith.' One implies no previous belief; the other
does. In the one there is no element of confidence in a per
son; in the other there is, and the faith cannot be rational
unless the confidence be well founded. The faith of the Bible

230 Studies in Theology.
always rests on a person as its object or ground, and has in it a
voluntary element. It manifests itself in belief, in obedience,
and in commitment ; in believing what a person says because
he says it, in doing what he commands because he commands
it, and in committing to him without reserve all that he offers
himself to us for.
" Here we have constantly trust in a person and the voluntary
element. How different all this from any primitive and nec
essary belief that is part of our nature I need not say. The
two are, indeed, in different spheres. . . . We thus see that
the faith of the Bible is a principle wholly rational and prac
tical. It is no nondescript ' organ ' by which we apprehend
what is beyond our knowledge. Nor is it a principle by which
we apprehend the invisible." *
The function of theological science is to ascertain and for-
Function of mulate truth of the supersensible universe, espe-
theological sci- . ,, , . , , . , _., . ,
ence. cially truths enunciated m the Christian system,
and to educe the grounds or evidence which shall convince
the mind that the educed doctrines are true. As a science
its function ends here. It has performed its work. It has
given the truth. The theologian has nothing more properly
belonging to him as a scientist. But he aims all the time
at a greater result than this, but a result altogether beyond
him — the salvation of those to whom he gives the truth.
He may convince and instruct, but he has no more that he
can do. The divine Spirit, accompanying the truth, delivers
it with power in the consciousness. Its office is ended until
the recipient becomes more than a mere recipient. Salva
tion, which is the true end sought, is conditioned, not upon the
adequacy of the argument which is addressed to his reason
or conscience, but upon that personal act of submission and
trust which he voluntarily renders. The theologian simply
* Hopkins, pages 37-89.

Of Beliefs. 231
aims at the systematic development of that body of truth which
has God for its object, and his method of operation in the con
duct of the universe as a sovereign, particularly his dealings
with man as a responsible being, as these are revealed in the
Holy Scriptures, in the external world, and in the spiritual
consciousness of man.
To a soul attuned and in perfect harmony with spiritual
things, lifted into the serene region of a perfect faith, the
unseen becomes manifest. From this high point vision is
proof. The soul's eye is open. But it would be a disastrous
mistake to imagine that in this region lie the original tests of
theological science. These are proofs to the believing, vouch
safed to faith. But how are they attained ? By faith. True,
but what antedated faith ? The conditions of faith. Faith
does not begin but ends the proof. Christian dogmatics be
gins where every other science does. It addresses its deliver
ance to the cold intellect — to a mind whose spiritual receptiv
ity even is at zero — whose spiritual eye has not been opened ; it
may be to an unbelieving and prejudiced, and certainly to a mind
clouded by sin. To such a mind it cannot condition its proofs
upon already existing faith. There is no faith, and any initial
movement must be outside of faith. The science begins by
announcing certain fundamental spiritual verities. The dead
soul, having no consciousness of the truth delivered, is in the
state of the cold intellect when any proposition is laid before
it. Its first movement is to demand proof. The science, there
fore, must start, if not from the stand-point of doubt, yet in
the recognition of doubt and of the need of verification ; must
presuppose all its propositions challenged, and must address
itself to the removal of the inevitable query and uncertainty
which overhangs, if not the writer himself, yet the non-believ
ing but honest inquirer. There is a difference in the degree of
doubt which may exist. In some it may be not simply uncer-

232 Studies in Theology.
tainty, but absolute disbelief, and the science must wrestle with
both. If the mind were already in a high spiritual condition,
spiritual verities would be at once discerned upon their presen
tation ; but this is not its state ; contrariwise, it is dead. The
grounds of spiritual faith (which is nothing other than a loving
trust and obedience) must be laid in a process of proof that
shall produce the assent of the intellect, and awaken desire in
the heart — a sense of need. This is a requirement of the
science, and places it in line with every science, as a believing
grounded on rational evidence.
The frequently quoted saying {credo ut intelUgens, or cre-
dendo seiro) is true when properly understood, but it is a blun
der when improperly construed. Evidence first verifies to rea
son certain spiritual truths which, when accepted and acted on,
become verified in consciousness, and this second verification
becomes the ground of more perfect insight. The second and
deeper verification follows spiritual trust. Faith is thus the
organ of knowledge, but it does not antecede rational non-
doubt. Rational non-doubt is always anteceded by doubt, or,
if not doubt, a sense of the need of evidence, which is trans
formed into non-doubt by apprehension of proof. Thus, as in
every other science, doubt or uncertainty, removed by proof, is
the starting-point; belief resulting from proof — intellectual
assent, enforced on adequate grounds, or for which there are
adequate grounds, is the second stage, or indeed the outcome in
mere matters of rational belief: while in relation to these spir
itual verities the outcome is a verification by means of anteced
ent faith or trust, not simple assent, to the spiritual conscious
ness — a knowing, a discerning. This state of faith, as spiritual
sight, is essential to a true spiritual science. The inquirer who
remains without this faith, influence, and faculty, can never
understand fully the science of divine things ; but no more can
he be excused, since, simply as an inteUect, he may acquire such

Of Beliefs. 233
knowledge of divine things as will enable him to attain the
deeper knowledge if he will. The truth of which, he is con
vinced in his reason, may, by being acted on, lead to the deeper
insight which springs from faith.
The true starting-point of dogmatics is an inquiry into the
truth of the dogma, inasmuch as we cannot be required to
accept any dogma or dogmata without evidence. There mustj
indeed, be a certain amount of presupposition that it is or may be
true, since otherwise it can gain no footing for a fair hearing.
It must be examined as a belief, which presupposes grounds,
and the examination must be of the adequacy of the grounds,
in order that the outcome may be belief.
If we have postulated correctly as to the sources of theolog
ical beliefs, we are prepared now to consider the right method
of procedure to be observed in deriving them. Every science
has its method, and, to be correct, it must be determined by
the nature of the science itself. There must be a starting
point and an outcome. We have seen that Christian dogmat
ics is a science of beliefs in supersensible verities, determinable
by several sources of origin and proof. They are beliefs
evolved in a definite way by perfectly definite causes, and also
beliefs verified by definitive proofs. In Christian dogmatics a
bibhcal, an historical, an empirical, an intuitive, a rational and
scientific element are most clearly united and related. It has
been generally assumed that, unlike philosophy, which starts
with doubt, dogmatics starts with faith. It is the science of faith,
and must be construed from the stand-point of faith. There
can be no doubt that the verities of faith come to fullest reve
lation only through faith, and only to faith. Faith, in its
truest moment, is not simply intellectual assent. It implies a
certain receptive condition of the spiritual nature, an openness
of the whole mind toward the spiritual world, by which spir
itual realities are seen. It is a peculiar discerning faculty,
16

234 Studies in Theology.
without which it is impossible to attain clear vision of spiritual
things. A science of the invisible cannot be attained without
it. A bhnd man cannot evolve or possess a competent idea of
color. There is no mind that has not spiritual faculty, but if
it be weak, or undeveloped, it cannot be f ully adequate to the
clear knowledge of spiritual verities. But while active, living
faith is the condition of clear and full views in spiritual truth,
we are not to imagine that these verities are not amenable to
the common law of verification. The faith organ may, indeed,
and unquestionably does, in proportion as it is strong, furnish
unique verifications ; but it would be a great injustice to limit
the verifications to this organ. Spiritual problems are ad
dressed to the mind in the same way in which natural prob
lems are.
The starting point of all theological inquiry, since the
science is, properly speaking, the science of God, must be
inquiry respecting God, and primarily respecting the existence
of God. His existence is the underlying postulate. This may
be assumed as an ultimate truth of faith. But it may well be
doubted whether perfect content can ever be reached in this
way, however unwavering the behef. The mind will demand
the ground, and until made secure of this will feel a sense of
weakness in every subsequent stage of its investigations.
That the postulate is ordinarily unquestioned is doubtless true.
This does not alter the fact that, in the last result, scientific
method requires that it should be made good. And if the
science cannot verify here it can verify nowhere ; it is not a
science ; from first to last it is a tissue of assumptious, unwar
ranted beliefs. At this initial stage the Bible, which becomes
of such supreme authority in all subsequent stages, is of no direct
avail. Its deliverances settle nothing on the point. Until
this is secured the Bible itself is an impertinence, and can
acquire no standing iu court. It acquires all its authority on

Of Beliefs. 235
the postulate that it is the word of God. But the postulate
assumes that He is. It does not and cannot prove it. Two
things must antedate its authority, and give it all its potency.
It must be shown that God is, and that it is his spoken word.
The primary source of theological truth must be outside the
Bible, in order that the Bible may become a source. The
sources of evidence of divine existence must be either the mind
itself, intuitions of him, or his works, as media through which
he makes known his existence, or both. That is, from the con
stitution of the mind, it must be able intuitively to cognize
him as it cognizes itself, or the external world, or axioms, which
is proof so conclusive that none other can be demanded ; or it
must find in the constitution of the universe evidences of his
existence so conclusive that it is incapable of doubt. This
discussion lies at the door of all theological speculation, and of
all religious faith, as a scientific requirement, however it may
be in the fact. Rising on this ground it becomes a science, on
any other it may be a truth, but it has no foundation but as
sumption. As scientific method requires the investigation to begin with
the question of divine existence, and to be concluded by the
mind itself in the normal use of its faculties, deducing its
proofs from its own intuitions and experiences, and by the
exercise of its reasoning powers on evidences furnished by the
external world in its order and history, so it must shut the
mind up to these sources for all further information with
respect to his character and further purposes unless it can be
shown that he has made other deliverances on these points.
The postulate that such further deliverances have been made
is one which must be proved before it can be admitted. It
has no sufficient standing ground in mere faith. It is wholly
indirect and worthless until the mind is furnished with ade
quate evidence of its truth. This, then, in a true scientific

236 Studies in Theology.
method, becomes the second matter for inquiry. The new
authority, being established by consent of reason, acquires a
right to be heard. It may now lead in the subsequent investi
gations, and, conjointly with the others, build up a true
theological system. The new cannot contradict the old, but
may greatly enlarge the areas of knowledge and abundantly
elucidate what was already given, inasmuch as a revelation
may evolve, and to be such, must evolve, what was not pre
viously given. Furthermore, the revelation may open up en
tirely new sources of experimental proof touching all preceding
deliverances, by transforming the attested idea into an actual
personal experience, which will demonstrate in consciousness
that which was before a mere idea of the reason. The revela
tion, say, announces a scheme of mercy and pardon ; as an idea
it stands attested simply by evidence which establishes the
revelation itself as a truth of reason. We say as a truth of
reason, not as being discovered by reason, but as being discov
ered to reason, in the evidence which establishes the revelation
itself. Now, taking advantage of the revealed truth, a mind
places itself, or is placed, under the operation of the principle
of grace, and comes into a conscious experience of pardon, and
becomes spiritually quickened and saved. It must be obvious
that something is added by the conscious experience to the
evidence which previously existed. And if the new conscious
ness which has arisen within it be attended with a marked
quickening and increase of power to the faculty of spiritual
perception, together with the new fact before it, the evidence
and contents of previous deliverances may be greatly increased.
That this is so is the unanimous testimony of aU spiritually-
minded men until now. And this testimony must be taken into
the account in any scientific treatment of the problem of the
spiritual world. It comes into the problem as the testimony of
the wisest and best of men in vast numbers, without a dissentient

Of Beliefs. 237
voice, on a matter of fact. It stands to the problem very much
as an experiment does to a theory in science. Those who have
not the experience may decline to accept it as proof, but so
can the unreasoning clown refuse to accept the experiment of
the scientist. Can he do so reasonably ? We have, then, as
the sources of theological truth, primarily, the mind, and the
external universe, and the history of events ; secondly, the Bible,
a revelation from God, and human experience, translating the
revealed idea into a conscious knowledge; and the scientific
method requires of us to determine the conjoint contents of
these sources and the validity of their deliverances. As these
sources are neither contemporaneous nor conterminous, so they
are not co-ordinate ; but neither has power to contradict or
override the other. They must, as emanating from the same
source, be harmonious, and must be used as helping and estab-
Hshing one another.
The Bible stands in the middle, and is wider than both
the others in its deliverances ; and as its function is specifically
to make deliverances of the facts and laws of the spiritual
world beyond those deliverances made to us by the external
world, to aid and transcend them, and to produce effects in
our consciousness with respect to the spiritual world which
otherwise we could not reach, it must always be supreme as, if
not the only or most primitive source of spiritual truth, still the
widest and most perfect, and also most authoritative, especially
as for its contents, by supposition, we have a direct " thus saith
the Lord," and not merely a conclusion of our fallible reason on
matters of observation or experience. While it cannot contra
dict or annul, it may correct and enlarge our knowledge.
How shall conformity of beliefs to the truth and reality of
things be secured? This, strange to say, is one of the real
questions. With regard to questions of science, or questions of fact, in

238 Studies in Theology.
the common affairs of life, it is well understood that truth is
acquired by free and untrammeled investigation; the mind
is applied to the subject, and the conclusion is reached by the
diligent and proper use of the faculties. Any thing that pre
vents this, or any other method that may be adopted, issues in
error. The end of the use of the faculties is the procurement
of proof, or the putting itself in possession of all the facts which
bear on the case, and the formation of a conclusion according
to the evidence. The common intelligence indorses this as the
right method. Adequate proof, and conclusions according to
the proof, are good forever and for all minds, unless new facts
should be discovered which might affect the conclusion. These
would then have to be taken into the account and the conclu
sion formed accordingly ; or, in case it should be found that
the conclusion was not according to the facts, that discovery
would require a change. Any conclusions not reached in this
way can have no force with rational beings.
Now, is there any other principle in matters of religious faith ?
If so, what? The subject-matter is different, and the mind
stands in different relations to it ; but does this change the
method of procedure? What is the function of the mind in
the case ? If it is a matter in common affairs to be established
by testimony we call for witnesses, we examine their testi
mony, we apply the criteria by which to determine whether
the testimony is credible or not. Can we proceed in any other
way in establishing the facts of religion ? If it is a matter
which allows of practical demonstration or experiment, we
rely on the testimony of those who have made the experiment,
or we apply the practical test. Is there any other method for
ascertaining the truth in matters of religious experience ? Must
we not here, as there, depend on the testimony of witnesses
who profess the experience, apply the common tests for proof
of this kind, or practically demonstrate the truth for ourselves ?

Of Beliefs. 239
What can be established by testimony must be tried by testi
mony. What wUl allow of experiment must be determined
by experiment. If it is a matter of intuition, the intuition wants
no other proof. It apphes here as every-where else. Thus, all
the way round, the verities of faith are amenable to the same
laws of proof which apply to all other questions. The mind de
mands the appropriate kind and adequate amount of proof, and
has the same function to beheve or refute on the same prin
ciples here as anywhere else. There is but one law — belief
should in all matters be determined by proof, and conformed
to the evidence in the case.
If now we turn to the question, What ought I to believe
with regard to the Christian system ; or, more generally still,
with regard to spiritual things ? the maxim emerges as in every
other case, " Believe that which is established by adequate
proof." Will any one pretend that the maxim does not apply
in this case as in every other ? Must I, in relation to ordinary
objects and affairs, require the sufficient reason or the adequate
grounds for belief before granting it, and may I in this case
dispense with this precaution, and believe, without the adequate
reason, whatever may suggest itself or be suggested ? Some
thing is to be believed. Say it is this proposition : " There is
one true and living God, and the Bible is a revelation from
him." May I ask why am I to believe this proposition, or
must I believe it without asking any question or demanding
any proof? Or let it be any one of the following proposi
tions : Man is an immortal spirit ; man is a fallen being ; man
is responsible for his acts ; man is a free moral agent ; man
may be lost forever ; Jesus Christ is the Saviour of men — he
died for all, or he died for the elect only ; man must be born
again; or any other proposition relating to matters of Chris
tian faith. Am I at liberty to ask the grounds on which I am
to believe these things, or must I blindly accept them ? There

240 Studies in Theology.
is an impression, not without grounds, that some Chris
tians think it a sin to doubt, or call in question, or demand
proof ; but the charge is groundless as against theology itself.
We must distinguish between the exercise of that right which
any mind has to ask to be informed of the grounds of belief,
and to exercise prudent and reasonable precautions even, and
that blaspheming infidelity which simply rejects and derides.
We must remember, too, that if it is possible to be over-cau
tious, it is not less possible to be over-credulous. The danger
is here rather than there.
If the foregoing reasonings and conclusions are correct as to
the laws which ought to govern in the formation of beliefs,
and if for the now, and. possibly permanently, matters of the
gravest moment may, from the nature and limitations of human
intelligence, remain matters of behef merely, then to ignore
credulity and these laws by either a headlong credulity or incre-
auCkedldanger- dulity, the one no less than the other, is, at the same
ous- time, the height of irrationality and a criminal
recklessness of the gravest interests.
The boastful, unreasoning infidel and the superstitious dupe
are of the same class, with this difference : that the former acts
no less than the latter in defiance of reason, but, arrogating to
himself superior wisdom, becomes the greater fool, since he
runs a greater hazard.
The better way, and only wise one in all matters of belief, is
to put honor on the reason, and, aUowing it full and fair play, to
follow it imphcitly whithersoever it leads, allowing no make
weight to either prejudice or passion.
As when a man looks outward upon the world of material
things and events he immediately forms conjectures and beliefs
about them which improved information and reflection will
modify, and as such crude conjectures and spontaneous beliefs
do not cast doubt or discredit on the reahty itself of external

Of Beliefs. 241
nature, and as it is the function of scientific method not to dismiss
the subject from thought as simply a mass of delusions, spiritual and
but rather to awaken reflection about it and subject auke™' require
it to a more careful scrutiny ; so, in regard to the scrutlny*
matters of the spiritual world, there are crude impressions and
hasty behefs which will not bear the test of criticism, but will on
examination pass away entirely or become greatly different from
their first imperfect form ; and in this case no more than in the
other should these facts reflect discredit on the subject itself,
or banish it as an idle and empty delusion, but simply subject it
to more careful scrutiny. The facts will show that, while con
fessedly the spiritual realm is much more obscure to human
faculties than are the gross material forms and substances about
us, spontaneous and unreasoned beliefs are as uniformly incor
rect in the one department as the other. The spontaneous
beliefs that thus spring up indicate not a total delusion with
respect to their objects, but rather a ground of reality in
them ; but a reality imperfectly understood, and which, there
fore, requires reflection and a more thorough examination.
The fact that behefs are generally held in ignorance makes
nothing against the possibility of right thinking with respect to
them, or of finally reaching a right conclusion. What scien
tific doctrines are intelligently understood by the masses ? Is
there one in a thousand that can correctly state one in a hun
dred of them ? But who thinks of making the prevailing ig
norance a reason for rejecting them, or heaping odium upon
them ? Why shall we make an exception against spiritual
problems ? Simply the 6ame kind of brave and honest work is
demanded here as there, with promise of like results. Crude
conjectures will give way, unable to endure the rigors of criti
cism ; hasty and ill-judged opinions will disappear and sponta
neous beliefs will be modified. The methods and tests must,
from the difference in the subjects, be different, but with the

242 Studies in Theology.
same painstaking we have a right to expect that here, as there,
the truth will emerge.
The history of theological science, or speculation, if any prefer
to so call it, is pregnant of suggestion, admonition, and instruc-
History of the- tion. It clearly reveals where are the hidings of
ive. °" its strength, and also where are the lurking places
of its weakness. It emphasizes the importance of right method.
It iHustrates the evil of crude, hasty, and unreasoning interpre
tations. It shows the folly and emptiness of mere dogmatism,
or dependence on traditions, or authority, or popular supersti
tions; the disastrousness of attempting to impose fables and
whimseys of human invention for sacred and reverend verities.
It demonstrates that neither cunning nor priestcraft, nor yet
even honest but ignorant assumption, however they may pre
vail with ages of ignorance, can hold power and influence in an
age of enlightenment. It establishes the fact that ideas can only
acquire permanence by the inherent quality of truth ; and that,
possessing that, they have the guarantee of ultimate triumph,
however criticised, resisted, maligned.
It is obvious, on the slightest reflection, that whether or not
right beliefs are possible on obscure spiritual problems, there is'
no natural momentum of the human mind, or supernatural guid
ance perceived or unperceived attending it, which by unstudied
movement will bring it to such a result. Here it is true, with
the greatest possible emphasis, that " strait is the gate, and
narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be
that find it ;" and " wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that
leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in
thereat." The principles laid down in the preceding pages clearly
Evil of igno- Pomt out an evil which parents most of the errors
ranee. an(j absurdities of belief into which men have
fallen. If the evil could be cured, the great mass of supersti-

Of Beliefs. 243
tions and misbehefs and disbehefs which distress and disas
trously affect the world would to a large extent disappear, and
we should have substantial truth in all matters that affect
human interests. The errors remaining could at most only
relate to non-essential matters of speculation, without seriously
affecting the practical interests of existence and life. In time
general harmony would prevail, and universal human society
would become regulated by laws and customs promotive of
peace and welfare — the millennium predicted in the holy
revelation, and the outcome of enlightened reason. To this
end, let us hope, the upheavals and reconstructions going
forward to-day ultimately tend, however for the present they
seem to portend the destruction of much that we most highly
prize. The evil referred to is ignorance, and that stupid mental and
moral condition which is both effect and cause of ignorance.
Right beliefs are impossible to an ignorant and Right belief
. 1.11 i . -ii i Impossible to
stupid mind : indeed any thing entitled to the ignorance.
name of a behef is impossible to such a mind. There are
prejudices, baseless assumptions, irrational conjectures, mimic
ries of thought called beliefs ; but belief implies some exercise
of reason. Ignorance is irrational.
The great part of the world lies in absolute ignorance,
and in a state of mental stupidity in which the rational pow
ers are practically dormant. Take the world at large : the
degree in which the proper mental and moral powers which
distinguish the human from the brute life are developed
is frightfully smaU. Even in the most enlightened states
the masses are practically in a condition of intellectual
torpor, with intelligence at zero. Education is prevalence of
the only remedy. Ignorance, from sources either 1Knorance-
within or without, must be displaced by knowledge, and the
mental powers must be so trained as to put miud in possession

244 Studies in Theology.
of itself before rational beliefs can be attained and harmonizing
truth become the possession of mankind.
The process of education, by which this result is to be
reached, all experience shows must be double — including the
Education the impartation of knowledge by those who possess
remedy. ft to those who do not, and by this means the
creation in the ignorant of such a desire for knowledge as
will lead them to seek it ; and then, together with this, the
skillful training of their powers, so that they will become suc
cessful truth seekers for themselves. There is no other way
by which the evil of ignorance can be removed from the world,
and rational beliefs take the place of mere prejudices, supersti
tions, and absurdities.
I do not forget that educated minds frequently become the
most dangerous enginery of error ; that therefore mere mental
development is not a guaranty against error ; nor do I forget
that very untrained mind, mind under the sway of ignorance
most dense on many lines, nevertheless often attains to most
rational beliefs and positive knowledge in matters of the pro-
foundest and obscurest truths ; nor do I fail to recognize the
fact that there is a moral eye — the conscience — which often aids
in the discernment of the deepest truths where the eye of
reason is dim-sighted, and the whole horizon of intelligence is
wrapped in dense clouds of ignorance and the mind benumbed
with torpor : nevertheless, it remains true that ignorance is the
mother of superstition, out of whose fecund womb issue most
of the deadly errors which destroy the race. It is impossible
that ignorance, left to itself, should breed any thing else but
error; and it is inevitable that, furnishing the conditions of easy
deception which it does, it should not, in addition to its own
delusions, become the ready prey of every fraud and imposition
it meets : when, if the time shall ever come, that mind gets
possession of itself, acquires knowledge of its rights, learns

Of Beliefs. 245
how to handle its powers, broadens its acquaintance with the
universe, becomes aware of the laws which ought to determine
its beliefs, credulous superstition and unreasoning infidelity
will perish together, and truth will assert its imperial and
eternal sway.
Granted a supernatural revelation containing complete full
ness of information, and couched in the plainest possible terms,
still, to banish error, the revelation must be known and the
faculties must be trained to grasp its meanings. It can never
become a revelation to either the ignorant or stupid in any
such way as to put truth or consistency into what they call
their beliefs. What signifies the belief of any man, or any
number of millions of men, with or without a revelation, in
heathendom or Christendom, if the belief simply represents
ignorance and moral torpor — the blind gropings of mind not
in possession of itself ? The spontaneous growths of ignorance
are and forever must be a luxurious crop of errors, misconcep
tions, and absurdities, which can only be exterminated from
mind by putting it in possession of itself and pouring into it
the light of knowledge.
Corollary 1. Behef, merely as such, determines nothing as to
the truth of what is believed.
Corollary 2. Any belief intelligently formed and rationally
held is entitled to respectful consideration, and deserves to be
affirmed and insisted upon with pertinacity in the ratio of its
importance. Corollary 3. All beliefs should be regarded as open to exam
ination and subject to modification.
Corollary 4. The contents of a belief may be as absolutely
true as the contents of any knowledge, and its subject-matter
of equal practical importance, even if it should remain forever
impossible to bring it to absolute verification.
Corollary 5. It does not detract from the value or in any

246 Studies in Theology.
way make against the validity of a proposition, doctrine, or
teaching, that because of the limitations of the human mind it
cannot be matter of knowledge, or must of necessity remain
matter of belief, provided, as a belief, it exists under the highest
imperative of reason. SOURCES OP THEOLOGICAL TRUTH.
Having in the foregoing pages defined what we mean by the
terms " truth," " knowledge," " behef," and especially having
pointed out the differentia of knowledges and beliefs, and the
laws which are determinative in the formation of beliefs, we
Application of come now to apply these laws and principles to
cipies. questions in theology, or, broadly, questions which
relate to the supersensible world. It has been already stated
that theology as a science or question in theology forms no ex
ception to strict amenability to the common laws governing in
all matters of knowledge and belief, and that they can claim
no exemption from the common tests.
What are the sources of theological truth ?
Theological truth is truth with respect to God — his existence,
character, and relations to the universe and matters involved
in these. The subject opens up the whole question whether
there is or not any basis of truth in theology, and if so, what
sources of the- the truth is. The sources of light on the entire
oiogicai truth, glltjject are the system of nature, including the ma
terial frame of things, with the forces and laws discoverable
therein, the constitution of the mind itself both as to its moral
and reasoning consciousness, the actual history of events as it
has become known to man in the ordering and ongoing of the
universe, the struggles and movements of human thought
across the ages, and the holy Bible, a book which claims to
have emanated from God as a revelation, containing an account
of his creative acts and authorship of the universe, his doings

Sources of Theological Tkuth. 247
and purposes with respeet to man, and a statement of doctrines
concerning himself, and the principles and outcome of his ad
ministration over moral beings in general and the human race
in particular.
The primary and most fundamental question in theology is,
also, the most fundamental question in the whole realm of
thought, which emerges in all departments of seien- prlmary ques-
tific research and philosophical discourse as inevi- tlon"
tably as in theology itself ; it is the question of divine existence
— the question of questions, which underlies all mental move
ment. The sources of light upon this point, the very corner-stone
of the whole subject, are almost entirely and absolutely extra-
biblical. The question itself must be settled by the reason
from other grounds before the question of a revelation can be
mooted. The older revelation, nature, inclusive of man, must
furnish the sole proof here, and the Verdict of reason is the
court of final resort.
The Bible becomes available on this question, not as an au
thority, but only as a witness, and as furnishing clews. If so
be reason can be convinced that the Bible contains Blble avalIa.
utterances which are true, and which require an ble'
infinite mind to make them, whether utterances of word or
work, as in prophecy and miracle, then it becomes a witness to
divine existence in the same manner in which nature does, and
the same facts prove to reason that it is a newer revelation ; so
it becomes a source, and possibly a supreme source, of light on
spiritual problems, and in the last analysis may rise, as is
claimed by Christians, to the position of absolute and final au
thority : but all this depends on the answer which reason makes
to the proofs furnished, so that reason is ultimate umpire in
the whole case.
In assuming that the Bible is a source of light on theological

248 Studies tn Theology.
questions, it is implied that it is in fact what it purports to be,
a deliverance of God. It is admitted that that is an open
question, which must be settled as a fact to the content of
reason before it can become of any value whatever. Should
reason be compelled, from the evidence in the case, to admit its
claim, then it becomes at once of supreme authority in the
premises ; but to acquire such a controlling position aU reasona
ble doubt must be removed.
Whatever is clearly deducible from any one of these sources
becomes entitled to equal credence and respect to that which is
accorded to either of the other sources, and needs not the sup
port of any other, nor can be discredited by any other.
God, in the system of nature, in the constitution of the
mind, in the providential administration of the universe, and
in his inspired word of revelation, if there be any such word,
ah sources of must be in perfect accord with himself. He can
truth harmo- , .....
mous. say nothing in the one which is inharmonious with
what he declares in either of the others. They are but media
of manifestation of truth in severalty, in which it appears with
greater or less distinctness, but with no possible contradictori-
ness or difference of imperativeness.
Whatever the source of the truth, the agent in its cognition
in all departments is the mind itself in the normal exercise of
Mind the agent its rational faculties. There is, and can be, no truth
in cognition. f()r ^ min(j wMch ^ m{nd doeg nofc itgelf fin(j t&
be a truth. But in this statement we do not mean that the
mind is sole and unaided discoverer of truth, or that it is in no
need of help or may not be helped.
Nothing is more certain than that many truths must forever
remain unknown to it, if it be left to mere nature and provi
dential movements therein, and to the operation of its unaided
faculties ; and, possibly, the most important truths of all. It
may be found by reason that a word-revelation to help is pos-

Soueces of Theological Teuth. 249
sible, is important, is absolutely necessary, and has been
given to supplement aU other sources of truth. If it should
be found that such a revelation has been given, its
contents must accord with other deliverances from the same
source, though transcending them. There could be no other
ground for a revelation than some absolute need arising from
the obscurity or paucity of other and older deliv- Revelation a
erances, and the inadequacy of reason left to itself. nee(t
If, indeed, the mind might be able to reach aU needed truth,
but with great difficulty and uncertainty, merely by the Hght of
nature, still it might be desirable and important that it come
at it with greater ease, and have it, when ascertained, clothed
with higher sanctions than individual reason could impart ;
but, even in that case, the conclusion must so come as to
commend itself to the individual reason that is to receive it.
It could only thus become authoritative. It is the verdict of
the individual reason that makes it authoritative ; or rather, that
enables the mind to recognize its authority and at the same
time not repudiate itself.
The human mind has great facility of belief, as we have
seen, often jumping at conclusions without any grounds what
ever ; but such unreasoned judgments, however strong, signify
nothing as to the truth of their contents. Theological ideas
which have this irrational paternity, like similar ideas on
other subjects, can have no weight, even though they be true.
They are not product of mind, and have no significance for
mind. The truths they contain, even though divinely enun
ciated, become known to be truths through the reason, and
only then acquire any rightful authority. The proof fur
nished must be clear and conclusive.
The question of divine existence having been determined by
the reason affirmatively, from the evidence deducible from aU
sources — that is, it having been determined by the reason that
17

250 Studies in Theology.
there must be an eternal extra-mundane and ultra-mundane
world-ground as cause — a causa causarum — it immediately
becomes a question what kind of being is he ? Is he personal
or impersonal ? What is his character ?
On this point nature, including the moral and reasoning
consciousness of man — that is, including the human mind —
again becomes oldest and primary source of light. But the
The soui made- ray *nat comes to unaided reason from nature upon
quate alone. ^-g p0mt jg g0 <Jim, and in some aspects so utterly
absent, that reason finds herself bewildered, and declares that
the Hght is not sufficient to enable her to render a satisfactory
verdict. Impelled by a desire to know, and by a moral con
sciousness of need, she interrogates external nature, she inter
rogates her own nature, she interrogates history and experience,
but finds the problem too deep and obscure for her. There is
a dim light on some parts of the problem — she " sees men as
trees walking," but it is wholly inadequate to her wants.
It is at this point where revelation enters the field and be-
The point comes a helper, pouring new light on the perplex-
where revela- . , . _T . , .
Hon enters, ing problem. But it acquires, and must acquire,
its authority wholly upon the antecedent verdict of reason,
rendered on the ground of adequate proof that it is a revela
tion from God himself. Until that verdict has been rendered,
and the grounds of it declared to be sufficient, it can acquire
no standing as an umpire. When it is rendered it becomes
supreme, but still through the reason.
The mystical theory, adopted by many honest minds, makes
The mystical the subjective consciousness the source and test of
theory. truth, especially in spiritual matters. It assumes
that there is an inner Hght which is adequate to discern truth
and detect error, to which all spiritual problems must be sub
mitted. This is a highly exaggerated and misleading view, pregnant

Soueoes of Theological Truth. 251
with delusions and errors. There is a spiritual condition which
is helpful to the right understanding of spiritual truth — a pre
paredness of mind for the right discussion of the problems,
but there is no other organ for the discovery or reception of
truth but the reason. Even when the Holy Spirit reveals truth
to the soul, it must be according to a rational method ; that is,
the mind must, even in that case, be enabled to rationally dis
cern what is communicated, whence it comes, and that it is not
in contradiction of reason. A mere subjective feeling proves
nothing but that there is a moral nature which can feel and
does feel in a given way in the presence of certain facts, and
that in these feelings there is indication of truth which should
be examined. Feeling does not discern the grounds of its own
existence. To be of any value as to its source or meaning the
reason demands that it, the reason, shall be enlightened by
other evidence than the mere fact of its existence as to what it
means. Conscience has been aptly styled " the eye of the moral
nature," because it seems to perceive truth. For the same
reason it has been called " the moral nerve," be
cause it responds to supersensible realities with
feehng ; so it has been termed " the moral reason," because it
seems to intuit moral distinctions. All this is supposed by the
mystic to imply that conscience is a cognizing faculty, and so
it is made the organ of the soul by which or to which or in
which God is directly known and his will directly perceived.
It is, according to the mystic, the center and core of spiritual
cognitions. There is a semblance of truth in this, but a semblance which
conceals a misleading error. In the last analysis, it is found
that that within us which we call conscience is sim- AsemDianceof
ply a feehng, or a something which feels, in the trutl1'
presence of some kind of acts or proposed actions, which we

252 Studies in Theology.
have differentiated as moral — that is, which we view as right or
wrong. The act on which the feehng arises is taken up and
differentiated by the reason or intelligence, and the appropriate
response of feeling ensues. If the differentiation had been oth
erwise, the feehng would have been otherwise. This wen-
known fact accounts for direct contradictions in conscience,
one seeing and feeling a thing to be right which another sees
to be wrong. The erring faculty is the reason, the response
of feeling is invariably the appropriate one to the judgment or
mental act which preceded.
The conscience knows nothing, beheves nothing, discerns
nothing ; it simply feels in harmony with knowledge, belief,
conscience not or inchoate acts of reason or intelligence. But
cognitive. -while conscience is not a cognitive faculty, it is a
feeling which reveals a nature — the uneradicable moral nature
Of the soul. It does not discern a law even ; but it reveals to
reason the fact that there is a law forever present in the soul.
It knows nothing of God, or right, or wrong, or reward,
or retribution ; but it is proof to the reason that there is a
God, an eternal law, and a certainty of rewards and punish
ments. It is a moral phenomenon which declares to reason
that there is an eternal power over or in the universe, which
makes for righteousness. No verdict of reason is more dis
cernible or more certain than that which makes the moral feel
ing, called conscience, a proof of moral law, and so of an ever-
present law-giver. The moral nature thus becomes, as we shall see
in future discussions, a ground of rational faith in the verities of
the supersensible world, but itself knows nothing of the reality
of that world. Whatever is in accord with the moral nature,
Reason ac- or in discord with it, appears in and as feeling of
counts for the , .
feeling. approval or disapproval, and thus proclaims that
there is such a nature, and lays the ground for inferring a
Cause who himself is moral.

Sources of Theological Truth. 253
We take issue with Dr. Hodge, as we understand him, when
he says : *
" It is conceded that nothing contrary to reason can be true.
But it is no less important to remember that noth- Dr- Hodge on
ing contrary to our moral nature can be true. It is con8Clenoe-
also to be admitted that conscience is much less Hable to err
than reason ; and when they come into conflict, real or appar
ent, our moral nature is the stronger, and will assert its author
ity in spite of aU we can do. It is rightfully supreme in the
soul, although, with the reason and the will, it is in absolute
subjection to God, who is infinite reason and infinite moral
excellence." With the first part of this statement we are in perfect accord,
" that nothing contrary to reason can be true ;" and also, " that
nothing contrary to the moral nature can be true ;" for this
would be to make the author of reason and of the moral nature
to contradict himself, or to set truth over against itself ; but
with the other part of the statement, namely, " that conscience
is much less Hable to err than reason," we join issue as a mis
leading statement. It implies that conscience is cognitive.
This, we must think, is not true. This seems further to be his
notion in the words " when they come into conflict, real or ap
parent, our moral nature is the stronger, and will assert its au
thority in spite of aU we can do." This certainly means that
the moral nature, which he makes synonymous with conscience,
collides with reason as a cognitive faculty, and is the superior
and overrides it — its decisions are more reliable. This, to our
mind, is not the proper putting of the case ; conscience never
takes one view and reason another ; they do not thus conflict
in the same realm, and one triumph over the other ; each is
supreme in its place, and the function of each is distinct and
different from that of the other. The moral nature rests on the
* "Systematic Theology," p. 7, 1 4, vol. i.

254 Studies in Theology.
rational, and is so attuned to it and dependent on it that its very
existence presupposes it, and is impossible without it. There
is no moral nature that does not possess reason as its condition
ing ground. The soul is first rational, then moral : the cogni
tive power antecedes the conscience function, or the moral
nature and action, as feehng. The soul is a unit ; first it knows,
then it feels. It becomes moral, or, if we will, a conscience,
when it is brought into certain relations to law and action
under law or supposed law. Let us see how this is. To make
this discoveiy we must posit certain things ; namely, {a) the in
finite Creator originates a soul with powers to know and with
powers to do certain things. Among the "things which it has
power to do are some things which its Maker approves — wishes
it to do, and other things which he disapproves — wishes it not
to do. (5) He so constitutes this soul that when placed in the
presence of these possible actions — that is, moral actions, ac
tions which are right or wrong — on discerning their quahty by
the law which is present to the reason, or in some way is made
known to it, the soul immediately and invariably feels an obli
gation to the class of actions which its Maker wishes it to do ;
and vice versa. After it has performed an act which it feels
to be wrong it feels remorse. The antecedent discerning act of
the reason and the subsequent act of feeling, as described, are
both requisite to the constituting the soul a moral being ; but
to do that it is necessary, still further, that it should act in
freedom and not in necessity.
The first forth-putting is of the cognitive power, or the
action of the soul as a rational being. It discerns an act to be
done. It sees in the proposed action the quality of Tightness,
it feels the obligation, it comes under pressure ; this is called
conscience. It is a feehng springing in the soul on the ground
of a previous cognition.
Now if it should be said that the discerning of the quahty of

Sources of Theological Tbuth. 255
the proposed action is by some other faculty than reason, that
would make two different cognitive powers — one, that which is
exercised in common knowledges, and one, that which is exer
cised on questions of right and wrong ; and this latter kind, or
special power, is cognitive conscience. Nothing could be more
confusing, or, as we think, more contrary to the reality.
When a moral act is proposed to a consciously free being
which perceives itself to be under law, it asks itself, Is this
proposed act right or wrong? or affirms to itself, It is right
or wrong. It does this in the normal and spontaneous exer- '
cise of its rational nature ; that is, it compares the act with
a law, and the feeling rises spontaneously which is appro
priate to its perceived quality. It matters nothing that the'
process is not always consciously discerned ; it nevertheless
takes place. There is no evidence whatever of a cognitive
act outside of the ordinary exercises of the reason — the whole
intelhgence. The reason intuitively discerns the moral qual
ity of free acts, or that they have a moral quality ; whether
such moral quality is adjudged to be right or wrong will
depend on training and knowledge, or belief of some law or
supposed law ; not on a pecuhar faculty by which the moral
quahty is discerned. There may be moral acts which the rea
son spontaneously adjudges to be wrong because of a recoil of
the sensibilities in view of them. The recoil may be sole
ground of the decision, while itself is not a cognitive act at
aU. The moral nature recoils because the intelligence sees in
the act hurt or injury, and nature shudders at hurt or injury
of any kind ; and the intuitive reason decides that that which
hurts or injures is wrong. Should it become known to the
reason that harm or injury was not intended, but rather that
the pain was inflicted for the sake of some good, that discov
ered fact would change the verdict of reason, and moral dis
approbation would immediately turn to approbation.

256 Studies in Theology.
The moral sensibiHties or feehngs which are experienced by
every human being in the presence of certain motives, pur-
•rhe soui moral P°ses, feelings, acts, show that the soul itself is
in its nature. moral in itg nature— that is, that it is naturally
fitted to receive such impressions and experience such sensi
biHties just as much as the optic nerve shows that it was con
stituted for vision ; and these instinctive manifestations become
the occasion of moral judgments, or judgments of the reason
on moral questions — questions of right and wrong. Thus the
moral nature becomes a source of light on moral questions, at
the same time that it is not a special cognitive faculty. Its
phenomena point to law, to a lawgiver, and to the character
of the lawgiver; and the moral feelings become armed with
potency to enforce as weU as indicate law, and are the means
of showing the character of the lawgiver. They are rectoral,
or proclaim the sovereign, and they constitute a part of the
means by which he maintains moral government. Reason dis
cerns in the state of moral sensibility the signs of good or bad
character: and sovereignty, by means of the sensibiHty, re
wards virtue and punishes vice. Moral penalties and rewards
are thus meted out through the moral sensibilities; or con
science approves or disapproves by the appropriate sign. The
moral nature itself, in its experiences, is thus God's instrument
for showing his approval of the right and disapproval of the
wrong, so emphasizing his law, and making reason certain that
it is his law.
Thus external nature, God's oldest revelation, in manners
which will be pointed out furnishes to reason the evidence of
his existence and somewhat of his character; then internal
nature, or the moral and reasoning consciousness, the soul, poure
further Hght on the more obscure attributes of his character.
The external universe furnishes its light by means of sensational
perceptions, which are taken up by the reason and traced to

Sources of Theological Truth. 257
their ultimate source, or the world ground — God as cause:
then the soul, in its internal constitution, reveals further the
moral character of the eternal cause of itself and all other
things : then the actual history of his providential administra
tion in the governance of the world, and especially in the affairs
of men, throws still additional light upon our path: finally,
revelations come to our help and supplement all the rest, to
enable us to know the whole mind of God. These will be
examined and unfolded as we progress in these investigations.
The Bible occupies so conspicuous a place as final authority
on all religious and theological problems, that we must dwell
more at length to point out the relation of reason to it.
The Bible is a book which, even if there be evidence that it
was inspired by God, we cannot forget was delivered to men,
and to men of like passions with ourselves, and that in the
scanty and uncertain and mutable terms of human language ; and
which, though at first authorized, has encountered the perils of
transmission over ages of change and revolution, through chan
nels not simply uninspired but tinctured with bigotry, intol
erance, and ignorance, until it reaches us in a strange and alien
dialect, while the languages in which it was at first Tne BibIe a
communicated have disappeared, and the races to 80urceoItrutn-
whom it was given have perished from the land, and the cus
toms and manner of thought current among them anciently
are but imperfectly known. While it may appear that the
evidences are abundant that it was a perfect revelation orig
inally, and that it has undergone no substantial change, it
must be obvious that its exact meaning and spirit may not
be so clear as to be easily reached in every case, but possibly
may invest some utterances in great obscurity, if not absolute
uncertainty. In seeking to ascertain its contents, we must not forget, also,
that we have other communications from the same Author no

258. Studies in Theology.
less authoritative, if clearly understood, and even more surely his
The book must than any particular word can be. Whatever proof
be accredited. there ig that tJle g^g jg of Q.^ there jg certainly
greater proof that the universe is from him, and that we our
selves are his handiwork. These are older and more unques
tionable expressions of his being and character, though they
may be and are more obscure ; and though on some points they
may be and are entirely silent, when their meaning is plain and
unmistakable they must be admitted as interpretative of the
meaning of the newer revelation, and any seeming contradic
tion of them must awaken doubt. No authority, by the later
revelation, can be acquired from any proof which sustains it,
which will give it such precedence over the others as to enable
it to stand in a case of absolute, or even highly probable, contra
diction of them. What is true to the faculties, as they are
employed about the study of these, will not be surrendered as
untrue because of the apparent teaching of this. They are the
same faculties which are employed in each case ; and what they
are constrained to admit as true here will not allow of a contra
diction there. The book must be interpreted in harmony with
other sources of knowledge, or it cannot stand in reason, and if
not in reason, not in intelhgent faith.
As the authority of the book must be accredited to the
faculties, so must its contents. This is often disputed, as it is
The contents also often asserted in a false sense. The Bible has
of revelation to . . .
be accredited, to do with the faculties. In this respect it does not
differ from other sources of knowledge. Some truths are con
veyed through material nature ; some, through the mental con
stitution ; some, through revelation. They are not the same
truths. Sensation gives one set, the reflective consciousness
another, revelation another, but in each case the reason must
apprehend them and be convinced of them before they can be
accepted ; and, when apprehended, and sustained by adequate

Sources of Theological Truth. 259
proof, they must be accepted. The mind rightfully tries them
whether they come from this or that source, and accepts or
rejects them as they are convincing or not to the reason.
The Bible has no special or exceptional advantages here. It
brings to the mind truths which are not given in nature or
consciousness, or from any other source, and truths which are
even too great for its faculties fully to comprehend, as also do
nature and consciousness ; but these can only become truths to
its conviction — can only dominate its faith — as they are proven
to the reason. The faculties must try them. This does not
mean that when a truth is stated in the Bible it must have ad
ditional proof, the Bible itself having been proved to be from
God ; but this : that the statement must not contradict some
other statement from the same Author made in another equally
authoritative form.
Though stated in the Bible, if they contradict some other
and better known truth, the Bible has no such authority as to
give them a possible place in the convictions of the mind al
ready possessed of the contradictory knowledge. Should such
a contradiction be found — a hypothesis which we do not believe
likely ever to become a fact — there is nothing left to the mind
but to declare that truth is one : it will so declare. These
facts must be kept in mind in promulgating theological sys
tems or opinions. No doctrine or fact which con- Passagespossi-
bly to be sur-
tradicts the knowledges of men can become matter rendered.
of rational belief. The thing is impossible. Should a doctrine
seem to be taught in a word-statement in disharmony with ex
isting knowledges, the interpretation of the passage would
have to be changed, or the passage itself would inevitably have
to be surrendered as uninspired, or as having originally con
tained an idea which in some way has become obscured, or
which the language as now apprehended fails to convey. Such
a case might occur in the history of a written revelation without

260 Studies in Theology.
in the least impairing its validity. Such a case has occurred in
the Mosaic account of creation. The apparent meaning, or
what was long believed to be the meanmg, has been of neces
sity surrendered, and the whole section has been saved by
clothing it with a new and perfectly just interpretation in
harmony with the facts as found in the older record. And
what has occurred in that case must occur whenever a similar
need shall arise ; and whenever it shall occur, it will only prove
that a fallible interpretation of an infallible revelation, how
ever plausible, must be abandoned.
It is important to keep in remembrance, further, that all the
parts of the Bible are not in the same degree inspired ; and
though we may not select the ipsissima verba of the Holy
Biwe not all Spirit in every case, we may be able to know suffi-
spired. ciently the substance of the revelation, so that what
may be established thereupon shall be authoritative, and of ob
ligation to faith. There is a certain liberty, however, which
must be allowed to the faculties or they will utterly refuse to act.
It will not be difficult to perceive the Hmitations imposed upon
a just interpretation of the letter. While there is abundant
evidence that the Bible is characteristically a divinely-inspired
book, it would be the height of absurdity to suppose it inspired
in every word. Nor does this affect the truth of any word ;
the uninspired parts may be as true as the inspired parts.
It is possible to push the doctrine of inspiration too far — so
Truth not to be far that it will not endure the strain. It is never
overstated. wig0 to overstate a truth. The portions of the
Bible which contain revelations, doctrinal or ethical, may justly
assume, on the evidence furnished, to be divinely inspired—
for the substance of them the authoritative deliverances of the
Holy Ghost, certainly in a manner and degree not necessary,
and, so far as appears, not claimed, for the historical parts and
especially for the mere drapery of the narrative and incidental

Sources of Theological Truth. 261
portions. A truth is a truth, no matter how arrived at. Inspi
ration emphasizes, but does not increase, the value of truth, and
ought to be claimed only when it is needed for the discovery
of a truth or for giving special authentication and emphasis to
it ; beyond that there is no apparent need of it.
But if too much claim for inspiration may be set up, there is
special danger of insisting on interpretations as if
they were inspired also. The cause of truth is are "ot m-
"' _ r spired.
never the gainer by such extreme measures.
The utmost that ought to be claimed for the holy book is,
that it is a faithful history of what it gives an account of:
therefore that it is equally true in the inspired and utm0st claim
uninspired parts, the guaranty for the whole being Ior the b00l£'
divine superintendence; and that the doctrinal, prophetical,
and ethical parts being by the authorization and inspiration of
the Holy Ghost, they are not only true but divinely delivered.
This is broad enough to answer all the demands of the case, and
is defensible. The attempt to go further does not strengthen,
but weakens the whole theory of inspiration.
It is a just question, allowing the Bible to be a revelation,
what are the grounds and limits of the authority of revelation
over matters of religious faith ? May its dictum ever be called
in question ? Are there other co-determinatives Grounds and
i.o llmlts of au-
which may be of equal or even paramount authority ? thonty.
As authoritative, does it set aside or vacate the function or
supremacy of reason ? Do its deliverances do away with the
need or propriety of further inquiry ? May the mind have
grounds for beliefs which, though they should vacate some
teaching of apparent revelation, would still hold? These
are important questions which will inevitably arise in the
prosecution of religious inquiries. Where there are two or
many standards there must be one of final resort in cases of
collision or the mind must exercise liberty of choice between

262 Studies in Theology.
them; that is, it must have the right and responsibility of
passing upon the value of the whole evidence which is to
determine its faith. That such is the right of mind in every
case there can be no question. Revelation is sometimes
put forward as if it were the sole source of religious ideas
and knowledges. This is not true : there are more primitive
sources. There are controlling evidences on many points out
side of its deliverances. It does not override or retire them ;
nor would it be possible so to do without changing the constitu
tion of the mind itself. What, then, is the precise function of
revelation in matters of religious faith ?
By revelation we mean, in this discussion, the sacred Script
ures of the Old and New Testaments as received by Christians.
We use the word revelation in its accepted sense, to denote a
communication or dehverance from God. And our question is,
What authority should it have, as such, over the faith of men ?
To have any authority at all, it must be obvious that it must first
be accepted as a revelation. This is that which alone gives it
any value. But to acquire this value, it must first be placed
before the bar of the mind, and be required to furnish ade
quate evidence that it is such ; that is, it acquires its authority
solely by an act of the mind, which it is henceforth to dom
inate, in imputing to it the quality of a revelation. It holds
rightful empire over the mind precisely in the degree in which
it is able to furnish the evidence that it is a revelation ; and it
has no other right to supremacy but that which arises from the
adequacy of proof that it is such, and of that the mind itself is
sole umpire.
If a deliverance from God, and so evidenced as to be accepted
by the mind to which it is addressed, it then acquires authority
Ground of au- over faith by the subsumed premise that God is a
thonty. q0(j 0£ truth. The logical formula is complete.
God is a God of invariable truth. This is his word. It must

Sources of Theological Truth. 263
be truth. The value of the conclusion depends wholly upon
the utter truth of the premises. But even now the value of
the conclusion must depend further on the precise contents of
the minor premise. It may mean more or less. If it should
be that all the words in the several books, in the form in which
they come to us, are the ipsissima verba of the Holy Ghost
with the meaning unchanged, and if we could be entirely sure
that we understand the words precisely as they were intended
to mean, we should then have a complete authority for faith
which would preclude the necessity for further search or the
possibility of doubt — the highest possible evidence of the
truth. But if there is a possibihty that some words possibilities of
have changed their meaning, or that some are added, onanKe-
or that some were human addenda, or that some were used in
accommodation to the habitual thought and state of intelli
gence at the time, or that some might mean this or that, all of
which are possible, and some of which are even not improb
able if not highly probable suppositions, then, in construing
the revelation, we should be under the necessity of giving due
weight to them, and must call to our assistance other sources of
evidence. Some things we intuitively know must be true, and
others we know cannot be true ; the evidence in the case is
paramount. No proof could be furnished competent to show
that any deHverance which should contradict them The reason
is a deliverance from God. As, for example, sin is some cases.
personal and untransferable ; perfect justice cannot punish the
innocent as guilty. Some things we know by experience and
observation, and some by scientific induction. The evidence
in either case is irresistible. Some predications the constitution
of the mind renders impossible. These well-known facts can
not be ignored in determining the measure of authority a ver
bal revelation shall have over matters of faith. In reaching
beliefs they must be recognized and influential. To set them

264 Studies in Theology.
aside, or silence them in the interests of some supposed author
ity, is only to introduce schism into the mind, and to elevate
to supremacy a dictum which antagonizes both intuitions and
experience. This can never be required, and under no circum
stances should be allowed. The claims of revelation are not
advanced or strengthened by such assumptions. Revelation
cannot be elevated at the expense of reason, upon the au
thority of which it acquires its ascendancy. It comes to us,
not to vacate the use of our faculties, or to contradict them
and abolish their verdicts, but to supplement and aid them by
furnishing new facts for their consideration. To that which
we already know it adds much that we could not else know,
but it contradicts nothing, it must contradict nothing, that we
do know. FUNCTION OF REASON TN MATTERS OF REVELATION.
" Christians, in repudiating Rationalism in all its forms, do
not reject the service of reason in matters of religion. They
Dr. Hodge on acknowledge its high prerogatives, and the respon
se function of ......,,.,. .
reason. sibility involved in their exercise.
" In the first place, reason is necessarily presupposed in every
revelation. Revelation is the communication of truth to the
mind. But the communication of truth supposes the capacity
to receive it. Revelation cannot be made to brutes or to idiots.
Truths, to be received as objects of faith, must be intellectually
apprehended. A proposition to which we attach no meaning,
however important the truth it may contain, cannot be an
object of faith. If it be affirmed that the soul is immortal, or
that God is a spirit, unless we know the meaning of the words
nothing is communicated to the mind, and the mind can affirm
or deny nothing on the subject. In other words, knowledge is
essential to faith. In believing we affirm the truth of the
proposition believed. But we can affirm nothing of that of

Sources of Theological Truth. 265
which we know nothing. The first and indispensable office of
reason, therefore, in matters of faith, is the cognition or intel
hgent apprehension of the truths proposed for our reception.
This is what theologians are accustomed to call the usus wga-
nicus, seu, instrumentalis, rationis. About this there can be
no dispute.
" It is important, however, to bear in mind the difference
between knowing and understanding, or comprehending. A
child knows what the words 'God is a spirit' mean: no
created being can comprehend the Almighty to perfection.
We must know the plan of salvation, but no one can compre
hend its mysteries. This distinction is recognized in every
department. Men know unspeakably more than they under
stand. We know that plants grow ; that the will controls the
voluntary muscles ; that Jesus Christ is God and man in two
distinct natures and one person forever ; but here, as every
where, we are surrounded by the incomprehensible. We can
rationally believe that a thing is, without knowing how or why
it is. It is enough for the true dignity of man as a rational
creature that he is not called upon by his Creator to believe
without knowledge, to receive as true propositions which carry
no meaning to the mind. This would be not only irrational but
impossible. "In the second place, it is the prerogative of reason to
judge of the credibility of a revelation. The word ' credible ' is
sometimes popularly used to mean easy of belief, probable. In
its proper sense it is antithetical to incredible. The incredible
is that which cannot be believed, the credible is that which
can be believed. Nothing is incredible but the impossible.*
What may be may be rationally beheved.
"A thing may be strange, unaccountable, uninteHigible, and
* This statement is not strictly true. If there is evidence that a proposition ia
not true, however the thing might be possible, it is incredible to reason.
18

266 Studies in Theology*
yet perfectly credible. What is strange or unaccountable to
one mind may be perfectly familiar and plain to another. For
the most limited intellect or experience to make itself the stand
ard of the possible and true would be as absurd as a man's
making his visible horizon the limits of space. Unless a man is
wilhng to believe the incomprehensible he can believe nothing,
and must dwell forever in utter darkness. The most. skeptical
form of modern philosophy, which reduces faith and knowledge
to a minimum, teaches that the incomprehensible is all we know ;
jiamely, that force is, and that it is persistent. It must be
unreasonable, therefore, to urge as an objection to Christianity
that it demands faith in the incomprehensible.
" The impossible cannot be believed. . . . God can no more
require us to believe what is absurd than to do what is wrong.
That reason has the prerogative of the judicium contradiclio-
nis is plain, in the first place, from the very nature of the case.
Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is trne.
But it is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that
to be true which it sees cannot by possibility be true. This
would be to affirm and deny, to beheve and disbelieve, at
the same time. ... As it is impossible that God should
contradict himself, so it is impossible that he should, by an
external revelation, declare that to be true which, from a
law of our nature, he has rendered it impossible we should
believe. "This prerogative of reason is constantly recognized in
Scripture. The ultimate ground of faith and knowledge is,
confidence in God. We can neither believe nor know any
thing unless we confide in those laws of belief which God has
implanted in our nature. If we can be required to believe
what contradicts those laws, then the foundations are broken
up. All distinction between truth and falsehood, between
right and wrong, would disappear.

Sources of Theological Teuth. 267
" In the third place, reason must judge of the evidence by
which a revelation is supported. On this point it may be re
marked that, as faith involves assent, and assent is conviction
produced by evidence, it follows that faith without evidence is
either irrational or impossible. This evidence must be appro
priate to the nature of the truth believed. Historical truth
requires historical evidence ; empirical truth, the testimony of
experience ; mathematical truth, mathematical evidence ; moral
truth, moral evidence ; and the things of the Spirit, the demon
stration of the Spirit. In many cases different kinds of evi
dence concur in support of the same truth. That Jesus is the
Christ, the Son of the living God, for instance, is sustained by
evidence historical, moral, and spiritual, so abundant that our
Lord says of those who reject it, that the wrath of God abideth
on them. Evidence must not only be appropriate but ade
quate ; that is, such as to command assent in every well-consti
tuted mind to which it is presented. As we cannot believe
without evidence,* and as that evidence must be appropriate
and adequate, it is clearly the prerogative of reason to judge of
these several points. This is plain from the nature of faith,
which is not a bhnd, irrational assent, but an intelligent recep
tion of the truth on adequate grounds. The Scriptures never
demand faith except on the ground of adequate evidence. ' If
I had not done among them,' says our Lord, ' the works which
none other man did, they had not had sin ; ' (John xv, 24 ;)
clearly recognizing the principle that faith cannot be required
without evidence. The apostle Paul proves that the heathen
are justly liable to condemnation for their idolatry and im
morality, because such a revelation of the true God and of the
moral law had been made to them as to leave them without
•This statement is not strictly true ; we do believe many things without sem
blance of evidence even, and all erroneous belief is without evidence in the proper
sense of the word. We cannot rationally believe without evidence.

268 Studies in Theology.
excuse. On the same principle the Bible regards unbelief as
sin, and the great sin for which men wiU be condemned at the
bar of God.
" Christians, therefore, concede to reason all the prerogatives
it can rightfully claim. God requires nothing irrational of his
rational creatures. He does not require faith without knowl
edge, nor faith in the impossible, nor faith without evidence.
Christianity is equally opposed to superstition and rationalism.
The one is faith without appropriate evidence ; the other re
fuses to believe what it does not understand, in despite of
evidence which should command belief." *
These judicious words give reason its right relation to mat
ters of faith ; and if the principles laid down are carefully ob
served, no dictum of faith will find itself in conflict with rea
son, and the objection to Christianity that it is mere matter of
faith will be void. If doctrines have been propagated in the
name of Christianity which are absurd, irrational, and impossi
ble, it has been because the system of Christian truth has been
misunderstood and revelation misinterpreted. That this has
been so many times, it is impossible to doubt, and nothing
short of a miracle could have made it otherwise. It is the
function of the enlightened theologian and pious critic to
educe that sublime faith from the written word which,
purged of all misconception and delivered from constructions
forced by the requirements of creeds born in times of igno
rance and under the influence of partisan wrangles, shall be
acceptable to advanced intelligence and unfettered reason ; a
faith developed in revelation, and supported by adequate
evidence. The final and supreme arbiter in every case as to what is
* " Systematic Theology," vol. i, pp. 49-55, et al. This quotation is a gleaning
and not the full text; but is correct in substance, and sufficiently complete to give
the author's exact meaning.

Sources of Theological Truth. 269
truth, is the mind itself. It may mistake, but it must abide
its own verdicts. It is its function to decide for Keason the
itself. The ground of the decision, when it acts m"1 arMter"
truly, according to its nature, must be satisfactory evidence. It
can never be required to act otherwise. It is sole and supreme
umpire. It must decide what to accept and what to reject. It is
responsible for the decision. There may be a case when it can
not decide which of several alternatives ought to be beheved —
that is, which is true. There may be no sufficient evidence in
its possession, and none within its reach by any search possible
to it. In that case it remains undecided. Thus it appears that
while it may, by the right use of its faculties, conclude from
evidence what should be believed or not believed in a given
case, and while it is itself alone responsible in that case for its
decision, there are cases which do not come within the range of
its faculties, with respect to which it has no power except by
self-abuse to have any belief, and with respect to which, there
fore, it has a responsibiHty to withhold faith. Non-faith is
then its true attitude ; not disbehef nor yet belief.
The evidences which shaU determine the mind's verdicts it
must weigh and examine,and then regulate its verdict exactly so
far as the evidence will enable it to do, according to Evidence to be
its value — believe jnst what it proves, nothing more, examlned-
nothing less. Its function is not exhausted in judging of evi
dence that may be at hand. It is under obligation to go forth
in the pursuit of truth. It must, therefore, seek for evidence
or Hght by which, if possible, to reach a right conclusion in all
cases in which there seems to be any practical interest involved.
Its responsibiHty is not simply to have the truth, but to have
the evidence that it has it, and on this ground alone to believe
it. As it must 6eek evidence, so it must determine what is
evidence. No other can relieve it of this function. It may
accept this or that, but it must determine which, and how

270 Studies in Theology.
much. Thus it is required by its own nature to govern its own
beliefs, and to answer for them. Some truths He close about
it. It perceives them with ease — the evidence is patent — its
conclusions are instantaneous. Others are removed, obscure,
difficult, but still within reach. They are such as require
study and careful examination ; they may be of great impor
tance. ResponsibiHty is in the ratio of their importance, not
of their obscurity, if the evidence which will make them clear
is possible. In every case the mind is factor of its own con
clusions — final and supreme arbiter.
This universal law is not reversed in matters of theological
belief. The reason is still supreme, the source of evidence
only is exceptional. A book is introduced as authoritatively
universal law dictating what the beliefs shall be. It purports to
mattereofttie- De a revelation — a thus saith the Lord. How far
oiogicai belief. hag the book the right to dommate beliefs in its
dicta ? Has the mind no function except to bow and implicitly
accept without question ? To this we must answer emphati
cally it has. Before the dicta can be received as truth, and
other tunc- m order that they may be so received, they must
tIons' undergo a process of investigation, and there must
be found evidences independent of the dicta themselves com
petent to estabhsh their truth. The claim of the book must be
tried. The order of proceeding, and the only right one, is, first, for the
mind clearly to understand what is set up. It must ask, What
is that which is claimed for the book ? Having got the sense
of the proposition, it must next ask the question, Is this true ?
It must then, in order to determine this point, clearly define to
itself the kind and amount of evidence necessary to warrant its
acceptance of the proposition, or requisite to make out the claim
set up. Having determined what kind and amount of evidence
is required in the case, or having attained a clear idea as to the

Sources of Theological Truth. 271
need, it must proceed with careful and painstaking search to
collect all the proofs. If no proof can be found, the claim
must be discarded at once. If some supposed proof is offered,
but if on examination it proves weak and insufficient, the free
mind must so declare. Until the adequate evidence can be
educed the claim set up can have no force. In a word, there
is nothing to make this question, or any other question of faithy
an exception to the common law governing the formation of
beliefs. The simple and only matters before the mind are,
what is the claim set up? what are the proofs alleged? do
they support the claim adequately ?
If we now suppose that the inquiry has been satisfactorily
conducted, and that the proof has been found adequate in the
judgment of impartial reason to establish the proposition that
the Bible is a revelation from God, what is the next step ? It is
imphed in the conclusion already reached, that the contents of
the book are true. The question of veracity could only be
raised upon one of two suppositions — either that the book
is not in aU its parts a revelation, or that it has in some way
been corrupted, either artfuUy or by the accidents incident to
communication originally from the divine mind to the human,
or in the transmission from generation to generation, in tran
scription, translation, or mutilation of manuscripts.
The initial question of the divine veracity cannot be raised
at aU. The mind, from its innermost nature, refuses to enter
tain a doubt here. It will not be put upon proof, for it sees the
truth directly in its own light. On the other points the mind wiU
entertain the question — will see it to be a real question — Is the
entire book a revelation, or does it contain a revelation ? The
proof must here again determine. Has it been Reason deter-
willfully or unintentionally corrupted ? The proof ^^ °J JJ|
must again be determinate. If now we suppose B1We"
these points to be settled on the simple principles of truth, and

272 Studies tn Theology.
not upon caprice or prejudice or authority, we are prepared
for the next step. If the conclusion is against the claim set
np, as to the original fact of a revelation, that at once dis
misses the case. The book being a fraud, or lacking evidence
that it is not fraud, ceases to be of any value. If the proof
shows serious corruptions the claim is injured, and the value
of the book as an authority impaired. If the claim is made
good, and corruptions are not proven, we have now, by the ap
proval of reason, an absolute authority to which we may apply
both as determinate source and standard of beHefs. The proc
ess by which we have reached this position is the plain and
simple process of rational investigation. The mind, in the
proper use of its faculties, has found an authoritative standard
for its rehgious beHefs in the word of God.
How now shaU it proceed ? Its next step is obvious, it must
find out what is contained in the word ; that is, what the word
Reason deter- says, and deeper yet, what the word means. The
ings. words themselves are simple objects of perception.
All that is necessary is to bring them under the eye and be
able to pronounce them. But the words have meanings.
They are visible signs of ideas. How shall these ideas be got
at, so that we may be assured that we have in our minds the
same ideas which were in the mind of the author ? We have
already determined by previous rational processes that the
ideas contained are true. This enables us to lay down these
rules of interpretation: First, that no idea can be contained
which is not according to truth, and hence, that no idea can be
contained which is contradictory of some known truth, or which
is contradictory in itself; no interpretation which would in
volve either of these consequences can be correct. Second,
ideas cannot be found in the book which are subversive and
contradictory of each other. These are necessary postulates,
and must be governing.

Sources of Theological Truth. 273
Hence, it appears that it is a function for the mind to
find out the meaning of the book under rules of rational in
terpretation. To do this it must depend on its own faculties,
unless it can be shown that it can come at meanings in some
other way. It must determine its own method, and to main
tain its rationality of proceeding, whatever the method chosen
is, it must be such as reason approves.
One question still remains — must the mind accept what it
finds contained in the book ? It would seem that it ought so
to do, and we must answer without hesitation if it May the reason
i , .11, reject or refuse
is a part of the revealed contents, yes, provided the contents.
meaning can be satisfactorily deduced ; but any answer in the
affirmative which demands the absolute submission of the mind
to every word in the Bible, without right of question as to
whether it is thereby right, or may be a corruption, must be
rejected for the following reason, that should there be a
contradiction found, it would be impossible that both members
should be received as true without mental desecration or ab
negation ; the same would be true if any thing is contained
contrary to weU-established knowledge. The mind must re
tain the indefeasible right to determine whether such a case
exists ; and in case it judges itself to have found such a case, to
reject so much of the record, since to accept it would, under
the circumstances, be for the mind to subvert itself.
In case of an absolute conflict between any assumed revelation
and the reason, faith in the revelation perishes, for the reason
that faith in a revelation stands in proof which the reason
admits is adequate ; but it is impossible for reason ^ cgse ot con_
to admit any proof as adequate to the establishment *™< ^ha* are
of that which is in absolute conflict with itself, for f^soni
that would be the equivalent of saying that there is adequate
proof of that which is in absolute contradiction of all proof,
or of the law of reason itself. When the proof is adequate,

274 Studies m Theology.
the reason, by its own law, bows and gives in its adher
ence. Thus the reason itself enters into faith, and faith be
comes rational. Reason bows to superior authority, and does
so as reason on the ground of apprehended proof. It could
not remain reason and withstand authority. It is impossible
that a real revelation should contain any statement or doctrine
against which any valid objection of reason can be aUeged ;
for, as revelation, it must be true, and nothing can be true
against which a valid objection can be alleged ; it is impossi
ble, therefore, that there should be real conflict. A true state
ment or doctrine may be falsely interpreted, and against such
a conception or interpretation there may be such objections of
reason that the interpretation, however justified, must be aban
doned, or the doctrine, as a revealed truth, be given up. The
mind, in such a case, will reason thus, (a) The proof is adequate
that this is a book containing divine revelations which are
necessarily true ; (J) the proof is positive that this statement, as
construed or interpreted, cannot be true ; (c) therefore either
the text has been misinterpreted or corrupted, or some clew to
the original meaning has been lost, or this particular passage
is not one of the contained revelations ; and it would not be
impossible, in the progress of ages, that this might arise in
various ways, nor would it ruinously affect the value of the
revelation if it should be shown in fact to have occurred.
This is not the rationalizing principle condemned above. It
is not condemning a text or an interpretation because it teaches
Not rationaiiz- son*e truth which is above reason, but because it
lnf?" teaches as truth that which reason, in its legitimate
exercise, determines cannot be a truth. But is it said that
this, after all, is making the reason the judge of what is true
or false, and so regulating faith by reason ? We answer, it is
not limiting faith to the comprehension of reason : it is pro
tecting faith from confiict with reason. It leaves to revelation

Sources of Theological Teuth. 275
its legitimate function, of making known truth to which un
aided reason could never attain. It leaves to reason its legiti
mate function of apprehending what is made known, and de
termining that it is proved ; or in case it is a contradiction of
truth, the Hberty of discarding it as untrue, or holding the false
interpretation in abeyance. This right it must forever have ;
or, when it is denied, it is assumed that the mind is under the
necessity of believing that to be true which, by a necessary law
of its own nature, it is compelled to believe is false. It is no
answer to say, in such a case, the testimony of God is to be
chosen rather than that of the fallible reason. The denial is, that
there is or can be any testimony of God in the case. The point
in issue is, can there be a testimony of God which contradicts
reason ? and this is denied. To assume that there may be is to
assume the very point in dispute. If it should be said it makes
the reason the judge of what God may or may not put in his
revelation, and so exalt reason above God, and give it the right
to impose Hmits upon him, we answer it imposes no other limit
upon him than that which we know he must impose upon him
self, namely, that the matter of his revelation shall be true.
This, reason can never allow is unwarranted assumption.
In postulating that reason has this right to determine
whether a given content can be admitted, we are only empha
sizing, in another form, what is implied in the common state
ment, that reason must determine whether we have a revela
tion ; for in so determining, it must determine that it contains
nothing false or contradictory of itself. Is it said that a truth
might be so obscure to the reason as to seem to be in conflict
with it, when in fact there is no conflict ; and for it to reject it,
because of the apparent conflict, would be rejecting the truth
on the very grounds laid down here? That such a case is pos
sible must be allowed. What then ? Is it the remedy for this
liabiHty, to require the mind, on authority of God, to beheve

276 Studies in Theology.
what the mind cannot believe by reason of a law which God
himself has put in it? How can it admit to itself the authority
of God for what it cannot help but beheve is not true ? Suppose
the assumed revelation should declare that three and seven are
twelve, or that it is perfectly just to punish one man for the
wrongdoings of another, or that holiness and sin are opposites
and yet identical, would it be the duty of reason to accept these
statements as true? The answer must be in the negative.
Why ? Simply because these things are known or decided by
a law of the reason to be not true.
There is a difference between the statement that the reason
tests and determines all matters of belief, and the statement
that it originates all matters of belief. The former
A difference. statement shows that the reason must pass upon the
adequacy of the proofs of a thing before it can be required to
be believed. The latter statement implies that the reason is
the discoverer of the thing. Rationalism refuses to accept any
thing as true which the mind is unable to discover by its own
unaided processes. Faith accepts any thing as true, the proofs
of which are adequate, though it may be something which the
mind, left to itself, never could have discovered. Rationalism
insists on explaining every thing according to the principles of
reason ; and what cannot thus be explained it rejects. Faith
accepts a truth on proof, though it may not be able to give the
rationale of it. Rationalism holds that the reason is adequate
to all the demands of existence. Faith holds that there are
important truths which the reason, unaided, cannot reach, and
that revelation is a necessity.
Faith admits the right of the reason to determine on the
proofs that are adequate to support a revelation, and to decide
what faith per- the question whether a revelation de facto exists ;
nuts to reason. an(j foj^g^ that it is the right of reason to deter
mine the meaning and contents of the revelation, but not its

Sources of Theological Truth. 277
right to reject contents on the ground that they transcend its
understanding, but only on the ground that they contradict
its knowledge. Faith imposes no obligation on reason to ac
cept what is contrary to reason, bnt it obhges reason to accept
on proof what is beyond or above its power of comprehending.
Faith places revelation above reason as an authority, but never
against reason, and never but by the approval of reason. Faith
accepts as true a world of things which He entirely beyond the
ken of reason, which reason never could have discovered, and
which, being discovered to it, it has no direct means of veri
fying, but it does not ask reason to accept these things by self-
stultification and without adequate proof in their support.
Faith is not a bhnd instinct set above reason, but it is behef
born of reason, or justified by reason.
We must be careful to make the distinction between com
prehending a thing and apprehending the proof of it. Our
beliefs are governed by proof, not by comprehen- Difference be-
sion. We are compelled to believe what we do not {^"d
and never may comprehend. The tree grows. We appreDeu<UIier-
know the fact, but we do not comprehend how it is. In order
to believe a fact or a proposition we must be able to apprehend
what the fact is or what the proposition predicates, but we are
not required to know the how or the why of the fact, or to
understand aU the implications of the proposition, or explain
how it can be true. Both belief and knowledge embrace
realities which transcend the understanding. The failure to
perceive so plain a principle as this, and withal a principle
the truth of which we are acting upon almost every moment
of our conscious existence, is the occasion of much of the vitu
peration against the Bible, and indeed against all matters of
religious belief; in fact against all matters of thought to a
greater or less extent, for there is nothing that we do perfectly
comprehend. The demand of reason is in perfect accord with

278 Studies in Theology.
the demand of faith, that we accept and act on matters which
transcend the power of reason to discover, but which are made
known to it by methods outside of its own unaided processes,
just as if they were within such processes, only requiring that
the discovered truths be attested by adequate evidence.
If this be called rationalism, it will be simply using a much-
abused word to bring into discredit an obvious truth, and to
force along under the odium theologium a most dangerous and
damaging principle. The same mind which at first admits, on
rational proof, a book to the rank of a revelation, and thus
by its act makes it an authority, cannot thereby deprive itself
of the right of rational inquiry, or the application of rational
principles in determining its meanings. Any truth, come from
what source it may, must, before it can be admitted to be a
truth, present itself in a form which to the mind will seem to
be true, to say the least possible ; otherwise the mind will be
required to believe that to be true which at the 6ame time it
believes to be impossible, or at least not to be true.
If it is wrong and absurd, on the one hand, to limit faith to
matters which unaided reason has the power of itself to dis
cover, or to those things which, when made known to it, it has
the power fully to comprehend as well as apprehend, which we
all perceive is so on the slightest reflection, it is certainly no
less absurd to accept among the things to be believed mere
whimsies and vagaries, or any thing or class of things which
do not come to us with such supports as justify reason in ac
cepting them.
More and more it becomes apparent that words are of su
preme importance in theological discussions. Exact definitions
importance ot would correct a vast amount of angry controversy
by showing substantial agreement where there is
supposed to be essential difference.
The two words revelation and inspiration furnish a case in

Sources of Theological Truth. 279
point. The misuse or confused and inexact use of these terms is
the occasion of frequent and ill-tempered disputation. Differentiation
The Bible is called a revelation, it is also said to be Nation"™
inspired. In many minds the two propositions are lnsPiratlon-
received as identical ; but they are not. On the contrary, they
are extremely different. If a man dissents from the inspira
tional character of the whole volume — that is, of each book,
and each word of each book — he is accused of surrendering or
attacking it as a revelation. But this is not true. False and
indefensible views of inspiration are propounded because they
are supposed to be necessary to the claim of the revelation.
That whieh is important is, that the Bible be true as a
whole and in every part. Untruth is the only thing that
can put it in peril. This is a most important prin- The Bible must
ciple. To its truthfulness it is not necessary that it be true"
should be inspired in every part, unless it can be shown that it
assumes that it is so inspired, or necessarily implies it. This
cannot be shown, nor is it in any way important to be assumed ;
while, on many accounts, and for truth's sake especially, it may
be important that it should not be assumed.
The fact that Christ himself, and the writers of the New
Testament, quote from the Old Testament, and even recognize
its authority, does not at all imply that they considered it in
spired in every word, but that they considered it true. The
truth of an utterance does not necessarily imply its inspiration.
The assumption of inspiration in given cases might weaken
the evidence of truthfulness rather than establish it. It is un
wise, and even absurd, to claim inspiration when inspiration is
unnecessary. Precisely what do we mean by revelation ? The etymology
of the word is undisputed. It is from re and velore — to take
away a veil. Revelatio, or revelation, is simply to disclose, to
manifest, to bring into view. The Bible is a revelation of

Studies in Theology.
God, simply so far as it is a self -manifestation of God, or so
far as it is a medium of God's disclosure of himself — of his
mind and will — to men. Such a self-manifestation or disclosure
of himself— his mind and will— may be by inspiration, or may
be simply in the recording of some fact which reveals him.
What do we mean by inspiration ? Here again the etymol
ogy is suggestive. It is from in and spirare, to inspire — in-
spiratio, inspiration. It means to inhale, or inbreathe, or in
fuse. As a theological term, it means an extraordinary or
extra-natural influence exerted by the Spirit of God on the
mind of man, by which feelings and thoughts are directly im
parted, or supersensible truths communicated.
Now, if God were limited to this method of revealing him
self to men, then revelation and inspiration would be synony-
Differentforms mous, but not otherwise. If there are other metb-
of revelation. odg posgible} then there migllt be a body of revek.
tions without any inspiration, or a body of revelations in other
methods, together with inspiration ; and whether in one way or
the other, the truth when known will be of the same authority
— since nothing can give truth any additional authority over
and above its truth.
Revelation usually is equivalent to manifestation in external
act, or by means of some external act or series of actions,
though it may be by a purely subjective influence. Creation
was a revelation of God. The established order of nature is a
revelation. Special acts of providential history are a revela
tion. The incarnation is a revelation. The miracles of the
Old and New Testament are revelations. Every event which
discovers the hand of God directly is a revelation. The Bible,
which contains a true account of God's doings in creation, in
providential history, in the incarnation, is a revelation. There is
no need that so much of the Bible should be an inspiration to
constitute it a revelation. All that is necessary to give it

Sources of Theological Truth. 281
such a character is, that it should be true in the same way
in which any other record is true. It would be a revelation
all the same if the simple story were recited, though no
inspiration were supposed. The revelation in such form
and in such cases is in the fact or facts. Wherefore the ne
cessity to claim any thing more for the records than sim
ply that they are true — a true and reliable account of God's
manifestation of himself — a revelation of the unseen and eter
nal power? If any should deem that it is necessary to its
authority that it should have been authorized and sanctioned
by God, this certainly does not clearly appear, since no other
authorization or sanction can surpass the truth itself; but if it
should be allowed, what more could be required than that a
true record be made ? Why suppose inspiration in simply re
cording facts ? May there not be much of the sacred writings,
such as historical records made by the witnesses and partici
pants, and the general framework of events, deriving their
value simply from their accuracy and truth, without claiming
for them the needless and embarrassing assumption that they
were dictated word for word by the Holy Spirit ? This does
not do away with inspiration, but simply limits it to where it is
needed. It leaves the Bible — God's revelation — intact, and
God's inspiration when inspiration is required. (See article
" Inspiration " in McCHntock and Strong's Cyclopaedia.)
Let us look at the case in a common-sense way, and see what
conclusion must force itself upon us either as necessary or the
most rational. Here is a book of so many pages, words, let
ters, and punctuation points. By all it is conceded that it was
written by a certain number of men at different periods of
time ; but a question is started as to whether the men wrote as
amanuenses or original authors. Now, if the book is true, it
can, in fact, make no difference as to its intrinsic value how that
question is answered, since the answer one way or another can
19

282 Studies in Theology.
put nothing in the book that was not there before and can
Different views make the truth no more than true — no more impoiv
and theories of . . „ . .
inspiration. tant. Still, as a question of tact, it remains, were
the writers amanuenses ? How shall we answer that question ?
Have they said any thing about it themselves? Does the
book contain the answer ? If tbe book be simply true, and if
it makes a deliverance on the point, that would settle the case.
Every thing would turn on the question of the truthfulness of
the book. Thus the question of truth of contents is again the
question of ultimate importance. There are three views com
peting for acceptance, one of which must be true.
The first view is, that the entire Bible, as originally given, was
inspired by the Holy Ghost in such manner that each word was
given to each writer, so that each word is the very word of God.
This is called the plenary verbal, or dictative inspiration theory.
The second view is, that the entire volume is inspired in
this sense : that the Holy Ghost guided to the selection of the
matter contained in it, and so superintended as to secure the
writer against any error in the statement, leaving him to select
lis own words or present the truth in his own style. This is
called the inspiration of suggestion and superintendence.
The third view is, that the writings are, to a large extent,
Truman records containing a veracious account of divine history
among men, with numerous inspired statements delivered from
time to time directly by the Holy Spirit to holy men of old,
and uttered directly by Christ himself when incarnate on the
earth, differing slightly from the second view, but agreeing
substantially therewith.
All the views agree in this, that the Bible is a revela'taon in
its substance, and that it is veracious in its statements ; tout they
differ in the matter of its inspiration, one part claiming that it
contains inspired revelations, the other contending that it is,
en bloc and entire, inspired. The supernatural element in the

Sources of Theological Truth. 283
first case is recognized as occasional, and the volume itself is
viewed as a record of the supernatural though not supematu
rally indited ; in the other case the supernatural element is
pervasive in its content, and every word is supposed to be
supematurally delivered.
Inspiration can only be needed for those special doctrines
and facts which could not be known in any other way, or were
not communicated by God in any other method, inspiration
T-, , . , ,-. . .... only needed in
Jb or 6uch portions of Scripture inspiration becomes certain cases.
legitimate, and so much of the volume may, with reason, claim
to be the ipsissima verba of the Holy Ghost. This view does
not take away an atom of authority from any part of the
Bible. The only authority it can by possibility have, in any
case, is in its truth. A statement, if true, is no more true
when inspired than uninspired. If not true, no assumed inspi
ration could give it any value. If known to be true without
inspiration the inspiration could give it no new quality of better
truth. But is it said that this view makes it impossible to
determine what is inspired and what is not? We reply in
two parts : first, suppose it does ; if the whole be true, it matters
nothing whether the truth is simply a recorded truth or an
inspired truth, since truth is the one thing of importance —
truth which reveals God ; but then, second, it is not true that
euch view would make the inspired part uncertain in any dam
aging sense. It is said, then, at least it makes it impossible
to know what part is true, since the uninspired portion may be
untrue. It is true that what is inspired must be true, and
proof of the inspiration of the whole would be proof of the
truth of the whole; but when inspiration is unnecessary it
might be unwise to assume it, even though it were a fact, as
adequate proof might be difficult or even impossible, and the
claim become rather a weakening than a strengthening of the
portion. The highest claim that fihould be made, or that needs

284 Studies in Theology.
to be made for any purpose, is that the contents of the book
are true, and that it is marked by a pervasive inspiration, and
so authoritatively sets forth the divine doctrines.
Dr. Pope, in his recent work on theology, has given a care
ful statement of the doctrine of inspiration, which we quote at
length :
" Inspiration," he says, " is a distinct element of the super
natural order of revealed truth — one of its laws and character-
Dr. pope on m- istic attributes. As such it simply means that the
spiration. sacre(j documents are worthy of the divine Author,
and that they are not unworthily described as God-breathed.
Strictly speaking, only the writers are inspired, but the last
word on the subject in the New Testament gives the epithet
to Scripture itself: Haaa ypacbrj deonvevarog. What we have
agreed to mean by inspiration is therefore the fact that God
has interfered to keep a continuous and abiding record of truth
in the world. This, throughout all the ages of the world's re
ligious history, has been the divine method of imparting and
preserving the knowledge of God among men. The beginning
of this interposition, so far as concerns the written documents,
is lost in the distance of ages ; but none of its fruits can be sup
posed to be lost. Inspiration is, in a certain sense, one with
revelation, as meaning the divine bestowment of knowledge
that could not otherwise be acquired. It does not, however,
entirely coincide with revelation ; being either less or more :
less, since much that has been revealed has not been transmit
ted ; more, since much is recorded and transmitted that was
not given by direct revelation. But, whatever may be its
limits, it indicates a specific intervention in human literature,
through which there has always been in course of production,
and has been finally produced, the permanent and authoritative
revelation of His mind and will to man. And this may fairly
be regarded as a credential of the whole system of revealed

Sources of Theological Truth. 285
truth ; it is worthy of the divine wisdom, and what might have
been, humanly speaking, expected, that He whose power has
been known in miracle, and his knowledge in prophecy, should
declare his wisdom and fidelity in giving revelation to man
kind, and in making it an abiding heritage. Now revelation
makes this its universal claim ; and appeals to the manifest evi
dences of the presence of God as its author and indwelling
spirit, in holy Scripture. Such is the overwhelming demon
stration of this, that the whole weight of the cause of Christi
anity might be made to rest upon it, if it be rightly stated and
exhibited. The entire scope and contents of the volume of
inspiration justify its pretension to have come direct from
heaven." *
" Inspiration, distinguished from revelation, as we have em
ployed the term, denotes the specific agency of the Holy Ghost
in the creation and construction of Holy Scripture ; this is the
biblical conventional use of the word which strictly limits its
meaning." f
" Scripture uses the terms interchangeably; or, rather, adopts
the same form of expression to exhibit the methods of both.
' God at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times
past unto the fathers by the prophets.' This includes at once
the revelation of all truth to the minds of the prophets, and
the inspiration by which they received and administered the
truth." %
" On the other hand, the Scripture authorizes the conven
tional phraseology which distinguishes between revelation of
truth and inspiration to record it. The Son, in the unity of
the Father and the Holy Spirit, is the Revealer. The Spirit,
in the unity of the Father and the Son, is the Inspirer. . . .
The disclosure of the mind of God to man is revelation when
viewed in relation to the truth unveiled, and inspiration when
* " Compendium of Christianity,'' voL i, pp. 92, 93. f Ibid., p. 156. X Ioid-

Studies in Theology.
viewed in relation to the methods of its impartation and trans
mission to posterity. And as revelation must, in its highest
meaning, be limited to the unfolding of the scheme of redemp
tion, so inspiration is limited to that one kind of contact or
intercourse between the Holy Spirit and the spirit in man
which produced the written word for all ages and genera
tions." *
Theology may be viewed as the science of dogmatics simply,
or as a higher science including the science of dogmatics. In
the former case, it would discuss simply the contents of the
Theology as Bible, and would content itself with finding these
dogmatics or .....
more. as subject - matter of faith : it would be purely
Christian, and find its entire root and substance in revelation,
and stand solely upon authority of revelation. In the latter, it
would go beyond revelation, and discuss the preconceptions of
revelation ; and would include these contents also as primary
subject-matter of belief. In the former case, the whole proof
would be deduced from the revelation : this would be sole
and sufficient and final. In the latter case, beginning outside
of revelation, sufficient proof would be extra the revelation
in part, and would construct the basis for admitting revela
tion. It would take its beginning from nature, and find its
complement in revelation. But coming to revelation it would
find in that complete and perfect system all its contents au
thoritatively delivered, with important additions, so that even
these would be taken up in the dogmatics. Nevertheless, it
wonld have been wiser to have grounded them upon other
proofs than the dogmatic statement, which, indeed, would be
no proof without the antecedent grounding, since the dogmatic
deliverance supposes that, and derives all its authority from
that. Many things which are put forward as matters of belief
on authority of dogma become authoritative as such because of
* "Compendium of Christianity," vol. i, p. 157.

Sources of Theological Truth. 287
these antecedent determinatives which are not at all derived
from nor estabhshed by dogmatics.
The primary ground of beHef in spiritual truth is not bib
Ucal, but extra-biblical; but upon these antecedent grounds
the Bible itself arises and becomes authoritative ultimateground of
and aU - embracing, so that there is no spiritual belief.
truth worthy of behef which it does not include, and which
may not be completely deduced by it or from it, while there
are many truths in its contents deducible from no other
source. "In Christian dogmatics, a biblical, an historical, and a
scientific element are most closely united. The first comes
naturally from the stand-point of dogmatics ; first in order,
the question of questions is, ' What does God's word teach us in
the holy Scriptures ? ' — ' Non nisi Dei htmme potest Deus
cognosci et coli ad salutem prouti neo sol a nobis videri ant
possideri potest nisi per proprium ipsims lumen ' (Maresius)^
Nothing may be accepted as a part of a Christian doctrine
which cannot be proved to rest really, whether koto, to pjjrow,
or at least Kara rrjv didvoiav, upon the word of revelation."*
This statement of Von Oosterzee is true ; Christian dogmatics
makes the Bible first, but it does so because the Bible has first
been authenticated.
It is not simply requisite that the Bible should speak, but
equally so that we should not mistake its meaning. We must
be able to synthetize a complete and perfect harmony B1We must ^
of its teaching. Each part can only be known by the uuderat00(1-
light of the whole. In opposition to atomic criticism, which
neglects the tree for particular branches, and the whole body
for its several limbs, we must unite and harmonize the whole.
" Dogmatic propositions are like the cross-beams of a roof, of
which the separate balks could be easily loosened, but which,
* Von Oosterzee, " Christian Dogmatics," vol. i, p. 62.

288 Studies in Theology.
when all are joined together, mutually support one another,
and as one vast structure defy the winds." — Von Oosterzee.
Many a truth or fact, in itself strange or offensive even, has a
very different character when it is considered as part of a well-
constructed whole.
Any given doctrine stands not alone. It is part of a system
of correlated doctrines, and must be construed in accordance
with the system, or so as to be harmonious with the whole.
The process is that of all science — an induction from all the
known facts.
They must be gathered with faithfulness, and the induction
must be such as will fairly flow from them without discrediting
other parts of the system. Truth cannot be discordant, and no
induction can stand at the expense of another equally sound.
How t» get at ^"° more can an induction from the facts and state-
the truth. ments of the revelation stand, at the sacrifice of
some other equally well or better known datum of conscious
ness, or sense-perception, or reason. The demands of the sys
tem must be its entire integrity. Until this is met it is not a
system, and must be reconstructed. The science must take in
and account for all the parts separately and collectively, and
must not collide with other knowledges.
We have spoken of theology as a system. This it undoubt
edly is. It is a unity composed of definitive parts in an exact
order of relation and harmony — as a tree is the composite
whole of root, trunk, branches, and foliage. Each part has
subject-matter of its own, but it also enters into and partakes
of the whole, and must be capable of being synthetized with
the whole in its definite place and order.
Employing the simile further for elucidation, we remark:
the tree of theology has for its root God. It is nothing with
out him. Right method requires that he should first be object
of inquiry. And the primary question is : Is there a God ? If

Sources of Theological Truth. 289
it is impossible to affirm the answer, it is impossible to pro
ceed ; there is an end of inquiry. As already said, the answer
here must be ante-biblical, and from extra-biblical sources. The
Bible itself assumes it, but frequently alludes to the extra-
biblical evidence on which it rests. Psa. xix ; Rom. i, 20. The
existence of God being ascertained, before further subjects are
introduced his nature and character must, at least in part, be1
determined by extra-biblical proof.
If, now, it can be shown that the Bible is a revelation from
God concerning himself, it becomes competent to introduce it,
and important to interrogate it. Its whole value will depend
on the completeness of the proof that it is of such an origin.
But the inquiry must stiU be concerning him, and the effort
must be to find any additional light touching his nature and
character until a definite and full idea is obtained. It will
involve a thorough examination touching his personahtyj his
attributes, mode of existence, and such other questions as
are personal to himself as set forth in the revelation. This
properly constitutes the first part of theology. The evidence
bearing on the subject, beginning outside of the Bible in its
progress includes it ; but whether from without or within, it
must converge to one point — be mutual and conclusive — to be
of any value. The origin, laws, and ordering of the universe are
involved in that discussion as furnishing proof of his existence,
and illustrations of his character and attributes.
The next object of theological inquiry is, man. The discus
sion involves the whole matter of his relations to God, and
Biblical predicates with respect thereto. Hence- MantQtheoio,
forth the Bible becomes, if not the exclusive, yet By-
the chief guide. But its deliverances are so far amenable to
reason that they must not be contradictory thereof, but help
ful and contentful thereto. This department of the system'
is in logical sequence, and is properly caHed anthropology. It

290 Studies in Theology.
treats of the origin and nature of man as a moral and respon
sible being — his primitive condition, his rupture with God, his
sinfulness, the nature and consequences of sin, and his undone
and ruined condition. Again, the chief source of light is the
Bible ; but its dehverances are amenable to reason in that they
may not be in conflict with any known principle or fact at any
point, or such that reason may not be constrained to admit as
possible; and further, such as all the known facts will cor
roborate. Then foUows in logical order the redemptive economy, with
its involvements, appropriately called soteriology — God's
method of saving men. The Bible, more than ever, is the
source of the entire discussion. It is a question as to what the
Bible teaches about the source, the necessity, the idea, the end
and effects of atonement ; the person, incarnation, ministry,
and priestly office of the Son of God ; salvation, its grounds,
means, and results, with all matters in the divine economy
which relate to this general subject.
Following this in natural order, and growing out of it logi
cally, comes the doctrine concerning the last things — death,
judgment, immortality, the final destiny of good and evil beings.
Here, again, the Bible furnishes the subject-matter of the
whole scheme of doctrine, and the single inquiry is, What does
it teach ? With regard to these two divisions we are especially
dependent on revelation.
Ecclesiology, or the constitution,, function, sacraments, or-
scope of the- dinances, and disciphne of the Church, completes
ol08y- the circle.
This plan exhausts all the demands and all the possibilities
of the science, and, properly treated, puts it in line as a science.
Its corner-stone — the doctrines concerning God — requires to be
laid in absolute proof, as it involves the whole system of
verities which is evolved from it. So far as the truth can be

Sources of Theological Truth. 291
derived from all sources, in our present state, it opens the
spiritual world and brings us into the fellowship of it.
There is a difference between the reason of a thing and
the reason for believing that it is. By the reason of a thing,
we mean the why it is. It is not necessary that we should
know the former in order to the latter. So, when „ „, „
' Reason of a
we predicate the absolute need that the mind should ^for beie£
have ground of faith in a given truth contentful to ms' aUIerent-
reason before it can exercise belief, it must not be supposed
that we mean that we must have a perfect understanding, of the
ground of the existence or complete contents of the thing
itself. This is not at all necessary, nor indeed is it possible in
many cases. The fact of an atonement may be believed with
out understanding the ground in the divine nature for it,, or
the occult reason for it ; but it cannot be rationally believed
without evidence of the fact which satisfies the reason that it is
a reality that there is an atonement ; nor on the other hand
can it be rationaUy believed, as a fact, in any form which con
tradicts other knowledges or beliefs which reason holds to be
true. The reason adequate for faith is not at all the reason
of the thing, that is, the ground or why of it, but the ground
or why we should beUeve it. " Two extremes must be
avoided — the exclusion of reason and the admission of nothing
but reason." — Pascal. The science of dogmatics carries us
beyond the possibility of independent reason in its disclosures,
by bringing to our knowledge facts which unaided reason is
impotent to reach, but it furnishes rational grounds for ad
mitting them as facts when made known. It aids, but does not
debase or vacate, the function of reason. Its subject-matter
belongs to the realm of faith ; but its entire contents stand
only in adequate proof.
When the doctrines of faith are embraced and acted upon
they verify themselves to consciousness. The believer finds not

292 Studies in Theology.
only external proof to move him to faith, but internal subjective
proof that that which is believed is truth and life. He is not,
indeed, able to comprehend the mysteries of the infinite prob
lem on which his faith acts, but he comes to assured grounds
of confidence in its utmost reality. Even as he knows himself
he knows God as a rational object of faith, and enters into his
fellowship; and by a vivid personal experience verifies the
dehverances of the revelation concerning himself. His 6in, his
salvation, and his hopes of immortal happiness through the
redemption that is in Christ, he finds no more room to doubt
than any other facts of his being or experience.
THEOLOGY NOT A COMPLETED SCIENCE.
Theology is not a completed science ; perhaps never will be.
It is the science of God, and especially of his administration
Theoio not over mora* beings, and is practically infinite ; and
completed. from the nature of the case will continue to open
new mysteries of wonder forever to sanctified intelligence.
Every new discovery will in some way illustrate some aspect of
it, and may modify some imperfect conception of it. All the
light has not been gained; and no theological Sorbonne is
authorized to close up the investigation. Revelation may
be closed and nature finished ; but has our science exhausted
either of them ? Is there no hope, not to say possibility, that
quickened mind and far-extending research in these fathomless
mines may yet bring us nearer to the great infinite, or in some
measure make more plain some elements of the manifold
obscurity ? The history of the science evinces abundant pos
sibilities of growth, and rebukes the presumption that would
fix it in the immovableness of a crystallized and changeless
thing. Progress in any department of knowledge, with
that increase of faculty which comes from use, will not fail
favorably to affect this with every other subject of thought.

Sources of Theological Truth. 293
Truth is one, and advance anywhere is advance in the whole
realm. " The belief in progress," says Yon Oosterzee, " is, in this
domain, as well as in every other, a need, a duty, and a blessing.
But it is important, in order that no one should be Von Ooster-
misled by great words, to ask as to this, In what p^?b£ ewpe£
sense, on what grounds, how far, and by what path ? feotlMUty-
" At the very outset we must distinguish sharply between
the perfectibility of the doctrine and that of Christian revela
tion. The doctrine of the objective perfectibility of Chris
tianity which, proclaimed in the early times by the Montanists
and afterward by some of the Mystics of the Middle Ages,
was enounced in the commencement of the preceding century
by a number of Rationalists, is, properly understood, nothing
else but a denial of the historical and supernatural character of
saving truth. The case is, however, different when we con
sider the proposition that dogmatics, as such, is capable of
perfection, and has a constant need for it. Truth is eternal,
but the insight into truth may be made clearer, extended, and
even in some respects changed. Thus far we can admit for
Christian dogma the attributes of perfectibility both in the
objective and subjective meaning.
" The ground for this proposition lies in the nature of
saving truth itself, which is not revealed in the form of an
accurately defined system, but rather in that of a principle of
living which is gradually showing itself more clearly. Hence
we find in holy Scripture so many exhortations to growth in
the knowledge of faith. In all ages there have been Christians
who, in consequence of painful deception, listen with mistrust
to the demand for progress and development in this domain.
Their dogmatizing, as far as we can speak of it, is nothing but
an endless repeating and reiterating of the faith which has
been once delivered. They are Hke the man who is always

294 Studies m Theology.
counting the coins which he has inherited, and is satisfied if
only the number remains undiminished, without troubling
D.imself about their intrinsic value. It is plain that such a
conservatism is devoid of all spirit; but it is also in conflict
with all Protestant principles. From the Romish stand-point
men must of necessity cling to a church doctrine which is
considered infallible ; but a true son of the Reformation, an ad
vocate of freedom of investigation, must, also, as such, believe
in the possibility of development. The * Not that I have
already attained ' is for him, even in a higher degree of the
knowledge of faith, the expression of a deep consciousness, and
at the same time of a grand want. At best dogmatics is the
expression of the consciousness of belief, as it has actually and
for the present moment developed itself, by the liglit of the
Gospel and in the bosom of the Church, to a defined and
clearly measurable height. We all stand on the shoulders of
our predecessors ; others will raise themselves on ours and
strive to see farther. We are ourselves constantly correcting
our conceptions, and show thus that our former ones did not
completely satisfy us. It is not, therefore, a real eulogium
when any one says of himself that his convictions during
twenty or thirty years have not changed in the slightest
degree. Though our knowledge through faith is the same as
before, yet a conscious faith, after such a lapse of time, will
know the same continually in another and better degree.
' Faith must be in every point entire and firm ; more finished,
but always susceptible of further development.' — Schaff.
" Besides, the whole history of dogmatics shows us not only
a restless striving after, but a constant though somewhat slow
approach to greater perfection. Even in the first apostles a
constant increase in Christian insight cannot be denied. Dur
ing the first four centuries we hear the Christian consciousness,
as to the person of the Redeemer, proclaiming truth constantly

Sources of Theological Truth. 295
with greater firmness and clearness. The sixteenth century
adds to the development of soteriology that which has not
been supplied by any one before ; perhaps the same may
hereafter be said on the subject of eschatology of the nine
teenth century. Every side of the truth, which is now better
understood than before, casts at the same time a light upon
other sides whieh are still in shadow. How could the perfect
ibility of dogmatics be still disputable, when the promise of
the Lord is understood, believed, and fulfilled? John xvi,
12-15. But to contemplate that fulfillment we must look back
not merely for years but for centuries, and never forget that
the patiens quia aeternus is of constant application to the
operation of the Spirit of truth in the Church.
" The distinction between evolution and revolution must by
no means be passed by, when the question is asked, How far
must this progress extend ? We must here look for amplifica
tion, and not for alteration. It occurs whenever that which is
virtually contained in principle in the word of truth is brought
gradually into light, just as in the growth of a child, who does
not get any new limbs, but sees those which it already has
slowly increase and strengthen. We see development in the
opening bud, which opens according to its nature ; it would be
degeneration if the rose-bush were to become gradually a
thorn. 'Ad profectumpertinet ui in semet ipsam unaquaeque
res amplificetur ; ad permutationem vero, ut aliquid exalio in
aliud transvertatur^ — Vicentius Lerinus. Christianity is an
historic religion, and where this is evident it can never be
welcomed as progress when this, its character, is first neutral
ized and then denied. Progress presupposes that we remain
on the path in which we have hitherto been, not that we all at
once choose an opposite one (metdbasis eis alio genos). Thus
dogmatics as a science is conservative as to its principles, pro
gressive as to its development.

296 Studies in Theology.
"After aU that has been said, it is not difficult to point out
the path by which we may approach always nearer to the idea
of the progressive character of dogmatics. We must welcome
it as progress when the chief subject-matter of the doctrine of
salvation is described with constantly increasing accuracy.
Dogmatics has to take account not merely with facts of the
Christian consciousness, but with the very deeds of God for
saving mankind (for example, revelation, incarnation, inspira
tion), the true conception of which must always remain defect
ive. Now the claim cannot be, that what has thus far been
only believed should henceforth be thoroughly known — in that
case we would no longer call dogmatics a science of faith ; but
that we conceive something, and that, as far as it is conceiv
able ; and also, that we know why we cannot go any further.
Our business is with a dogmatics freed from the dust but not
from the learning of the schools ; from the thorns, but not
from the sharp definitions of the old systems ; a scientific ex
position of faith, according to the golden words of Da Costa,
c in its essence the fruit of ages, in outward form of these our
days.' And that which is thus more accurately defined ought,
also, to be continually vindicated. The history of apologetics
has attested that the good cause has been defended more with
awkward weapons than with a faulty strategy ; such lessons
must not be lost on the dogmatics of the present time. It
advances when it looks more closely into the nature and
strength of its so-called proofs, which it not only counts, but
also weighs ; while, througli paying special heed to the histor
ical, it never loses sight of the psychological mode of argu
ment. Moreover, it must always ally itself more frankly with
each element of truth which it finds even beyond its own
proper bounds, and apply the ' all things are yours ' without any
fixed Hmits. Thus it acts by its own nature, so that its object
may be always developed more thoroughly and fundamentally.

Sources of Theological Truth. 297
That which really can be understood by faith it must not only
desire but also attempt to know, remembering that it has first
to do with the ita, but then, also, with the quare, of spiritual
matters. Not merely a deeper knowledge of each of the parts,
but, above all, a more accurate and thorough estimation of the
whole, is the boundless task to which the science has to devote
its powers. Finally, the more science is applied in various
ways the better it fulfills its duty. The light which rises on
her domains must also cast its beams over the surrounding
country. True theology will the more approach its ideal as it
more fully contributes to the solution of the various questions
of the day, and to the healing of the reigning diseases by set
ting forth and maintaining the eternal truth. So far each
period requires its own elaboration of the doctrine of faith,
and no single method can be said to be constantly adequate to
the changing wants of different centuries.
" Always perfectible, it is never perfect. To understand and
express thoroughly the truth we ought to be morally perfect,
since truth and life are one. Nevertheless, the object of dog
matics need not remain absolutely unattainable." *
It is not a matter to be regretted that dogmatics is being
more and more put to severe tests, both as to the general valid
ity of the science, and as to its particular contents. The
greater the strain the more certainly we shall get at the truth.
Doubtless some things will be eUminated as false which
have been made much of, and some things will rise into im
portance which have not been accounted of much. Science in
other departments wUl not fail to influence in this. The law
in the two rfealms is in no respect different. The science of
to-day has to do with the same facts as aforetime; it
does not make new facts, but it interprets the old and per
manent ones better. It creates no new facts, but it reaches
* Von Oosterzee, pp. 69, 10, 11.
80

298 Studies in Theology.
a better understanding of the old and abiding. It reads
the same old nature differently by unsealing and decipher
ing pages and chapters which were not opened before, but
which were always lying there and waiting to be interrogated
and examined. The discovery changes and modifies, but does
not abolish, the science. It denotes progress, and only encour
ages to new and more painstaking methods. What has to be
surrendered is not so much deplored as what is gained is re
joiced over. It must of necessity be the same in the theolog
ical domain. The same erring and fallible faculties have been
and are employed here as there, and not without abundant
proof and consciousness of their weakness and failures. With
improved conditions they will do better. More skill and larger
experience will bring out new results or improved results.
Thanks to all explorers, whether friends or foes, who furnish
lights by which we may be able to see better and further what
ever restatement may be necessitated. " Godspeed " to the
workers in all mines who bring us the precious nuggets —
ingots of truth ! They will take nothing from us, but only
enrich us by what they bring, and by the richer treasures they
will enable us to find.
In matters of spiritual truth, as in matters of general science,
there are no infallible human interpreters — no masters author-
No infallible ized to pronounce the final word — no ultimate
human guides
or tests. earthly tribunal having power to close the case.
The domain is before us — nature and revelation — full of ex-
hanstless riches, and we are permitted, commanded, to dig, to
assay. The only requisition put upon us is, that we should
observe the true finger-boards and follow their pointing ; that
we should not follow false methods, and should not permit
ourselves to be imposed upon by taking pyrites for gold, or,
what is even worse, attempt to put on the market the worth
less metal for the genuine. Observe these rules, and honest

Sources of Theological Truth. 299
research, aided by deeper learning, and not less earnest piety,
will purify our science, correct its hasty generalizations, its
inadequate formula, its fallacious assumptions, and present it
with new and more convincing attestations ; the pseudo and
degenerate progeny of crude and inconsequent reasonings will
vanish, leaving us the eternal and changeless as rewards of our
toil : if not the perfect now, the more and more perfect. The
individual errs, the particular school of thought errs ; it takes
humanity in its entirety to lead humanity. The river runs to
the sea despite the eddies.
Theological science has for its end truth with respect to the
spiritual world, but not this alone. It is a practical and not
merely a speculative science. It is not so much an MInd must be
end to the intellect as it is a necessity to the heart. theolo«lcai-
It includes a morality for the life as well as thought for the
reason. It springs from and answers the demand of the relig
ious nature of man. Were it merely a body of truth for the
speculative reason, without serving any practical end, it must
long ago have perished. But it is not more a truth for, than a
necessity to, the nature of man. It meets not simply a need
and demand of the inquisitive faculty in its search for truth,
and unappeasable hunger for truth ; this it does, but, more than
this, it ministers to the sensibilities, satisfies the affections, and
supplies moral needs in the practical struggles of life. In the
region of the moral and spiritual nature it finds its stronghold.
The truth it contains has not its highest value simply as truth ;
there could, indeed, be no value in it were it not true ; but being
true its greatest value consists in its practical relation to our
welfare, in guiding us to right living, and in supporting us with
its quickening and consoling helpfulness amid the emergencies,
and many times sharp trials, of the life of to-day and the
terrors of what seems impending in the life of to-morrow.
It is impossible to divest mind of theological thought with-

300 Studies in Theology.
out utterly defacing, and in fact obliterating, its faculties. Its
nature necessitates it. Consciousness itself might sooner be
extinguished than these uneradicable and inevitable cravings.
The religious nature, as much as reason itself, bears down
and overcomes all attempts at eradication. There in the
center of the soul, in the inappeasable cry of its affections,
in the very laws of its existence, it makes its home, and
maintains its seat, growing stronger amid the very ruin of
death, which seems to whelm all. The atheist finds no refuge
from it ; the bold offender against law, who, hardened by
crime, has wrecked his moral nature and debauched all his
nobler sensibilities, escapes not its avenging presence ; closer
than our shadow, like an appeaUng angel or some restless
Nemesis, it presses us all and always. If at any time we imag
ine it has been laid, at an unexpected turn it confronts us again.
The universe, in all its extent, furnishes no spot in which to
hide from its presence. We cannot escape it but by escape
from being itself, and even that door is closed against us. We
might in sheer madness plunge into non-existence, but we can
not ; an unseen hand holds us, and death refuses a shelter. We
must Hve, and we must encounter the thought of God wherever
we fly. He darts upon us from behind each atom. If we go for
ward we meet him, if we go backward he confronts us ; if wo
turn to the right hand or the left — ascend or go into the
fathomless abyss — there is no escape from him. It is as the
royal poet puts it : " Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, or
whither shaU I flee from thy presence ? If I ascend up into
heaven, thou art there : if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou
art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in
the uttermost parts of the sea ; even there shaU thy hand lead
me, and thy right hand shall hold me. If I say, Surely the
darkness shall cover me ; even the night shall be light about
me. Tea, the darkness hideth not from thee ; but the night

Sources of Theological Truth. 301
shineth as the day : the darkness and the Hght are both alike
to thee."
No man is a sufficiency for himself. All humanity combined
is not a sufficiency for the human soul. The entire universe of
things is not sufficient. His own assured immor- Man is not a
., . _, . _., .... sufficiency for
tality is not sufficient, lhe assured immortality, if himself.
that were possible, of all other souls is not sufficient. The
highest conceivable bliss, endlessly extended, but excluding
God, is not sufficient. He must have God. Being, however
invested, is a desert without him. He can construct no ideal
destiny that includes not despair, if God be left out. The vast
splendor is a mockery. He roams amid its magnificence,
gnawed with unappeased hunger, driven about from rim to
rim of its empty grandeur in quest of that which it is not, and
which it cannot give. Empty of God, it is no palace for him.
His very sin demands an altar of confession. His woe will
have an Ear into which it must pour its anguish. His helpless
ness creates an Omnipotence for its refuge. His
r ° Must have God.
incommunicable secrets are a burden he cannot bear
until he finds One who reads them. He will have God. It is
the deepest necessity his soul experiences. He might endure
exile from the society of his f ellowmen, might subsist in a dun
geon, might even cling to life though banished to some lonely
and desolate spot, where neither man nor beast would afford
him companionship — a gloom of solitude where he should
hear no voice — a very desert of death — alone, helpless, friend
less, joyless — he might endure all this, and yet live ; but he
must have God. In that desert he will build an altar. Out of
that awful silence he will send up a prayer. The necessity is
in the nature of man. Does it mean nothing? Suppose we
should so reason, can we escape it ? Our arguments will be
impotent. They cannot drown the cry !
What, then, is wisdom ? Is it not rather to seek to know him,

302 Studies in Theology.
whose being haunts us, as the necessity of our thought ? Shall
we not essay to find out what this mysterious presence is ?
There are two ways open to us : one is to attempt to construct
doubt, or, if this may not be, to ignore the inevitable instinct
as a matter of thought — leave it out of our rational investiga
tions, and leave ourselves to the unsatisfying influences of the
half-formed idea ; the other is, to take it up and endeavor to
ascertain its meaning. Which is the better? To a rational
being there can be but one^answer to the question. We must
follow the instinct. Have we ever known an instinct that
points not to a good ? Does all nature furnish a single exam
ple of an indiscreet original impulse ? Does it mislead the
stork or the young lion or the infant when it nestles for the
mother's breast ? Why, then, shall it mislead us ? This mighty
Presence which ever draws us, why shall we not follow ? Our
greatest inevitability, why shall it not prove our greatest good ?
This all-embracing current, which sweeps on from the cradle
to the grave, why shall it not bear us to the sea, the Hmitless
ocean, of our desires ? Why shall not our souls, wise as irra
tional things, with the sagacity of the day-old infant, go straight
to the breast where its nourishment lies ? The panting roe
hunts the water-brook ; even the sunflower turns to the sun.
Are they deceived ? A deeper impulse draws us. Shall we
alone, of all things living, follow to find but a phantom — a
fountain without water, a breast without nourishment, a sun
without beams, a mirage of illusive promise ! Or, following
the matchless instinct, shall we not rather find the inexhausti
ble, perennial, infinite Fountain of all good at its end ? that
that which is our necessity is also our sufficiency ? that the God
whom we cannot escape is also the God who will satisfy all
our longings, and fill the boundless measure of our desires ?
Coming at last to him, and laying our weary souls upon his
breast, as the hungry infant puts its lips to the maternal fount-

Sources of Theological Truth. 303
ains, shall we not find appeasement of the thirst which drives
us thither, and rest in the enfolding arm which mysteriously
attracts us ? If the needle no more certainly points to the
magnet than the magnet attracts the needle, the latter discov
ering itself by the invisible action of the former, may we not
affirm, with equal show of reason, that the invariable and inev
itable turning of the soul in its affections and thoughts to the
Unseen proclaims the power and reality of the mysterious
magnet which draws it ? The tendency is inexplicable without
this end.
These yearnings proclaim the essential and ineradicable re
ligious nature of man. Religion is not an invention or cun
ning device artificially imposed, and theology a Man e83ential.
framework wrought for its support ; it is native to ly reUKl0US-
the soul of man, and theology, as truth and practice, is its ex
pression and fruit. As subjective, it is an immanent power in
the soul, which invests God with such attributes and relations
as to inspire reverence and worship, love and fear. Object
ively, it consists in those acts and forms which are invented to
express the subjective states. Its essence is an aspiration after
communion with and the favor of God. If viewed as having
its source in God, it descends upon the soul as a law. It com
mands an inward and outward life as condition of favor. H
viewed as having its origin in the soul, it is a recognition of
dependence, and an effort to propitiate.
It must be obvious that it will be variable in its expression,
and that its character must depend on the concept of God
which the soul may have. If a false concept, the expression
wUl be false ; if true, the expression will be true ; but in both
cases the root-principle in the soul is identical. It is the soul
aspiring to its God. It is the same principle, whether it sends
the Mohammedan to his mosque, the Brahman to his temple,
the Jew to his altar, the Christian to his cross, or the coarse

304 Studies m Theology.
heathen or pagan to his idol shrine or meaningless fetish. But,
while springing from the same root-principle, it would be a
most disastrous mistake to imagine that there is no difference
of value in the multiform expression. As from the root of the
affections there spring either a pure and holy love or a base
and corrupt passion, so from this root of reUgion in the nature
of man may spring a beautiful and sublime faith, full of all
holy and divine fruits, or a corrupt and corrupting supersti
tion, full of impurities and sins. There is a true and false
expression possible in the affections and in the Hfe, and which
will be determined by the idea of the object of worship. See
" Philosqphy of the Plan of Salvation."
This universal fact shows the importance of a right creed
now, and also the absolute need of a revelation. Under the
influence of depraved affections and degenerate moral con
sciousness the mind, if left to itself, will fashion itself a god
after its own likeness and lusts — a distorted image of the true
God. To this source may be traced all the gross and hideous
systems of religion that have distressed the ages. Any true
idea of God must descend from himself into the soul of man
in some way of supernatural deliverance — some way that will
control the tendencies of degenerate faculties. The true relig
ion must be heaven-born, must come into the soul capacitated
by its nature to receive it, but incompetent, by reason of its
fall, to originate it. If the true be not given, a distortion will
spring up spontaneously. It is not a question whether man
shall have a religion; that is inevitable. The question is,
Shall it be true or false ? , " You may see towns without laws,
or coins, or literature, but no one has ever yet seen a people
without a God or prayer ; without religious ceremonies or sac
rifices." " This phenomenon has been pointed out by number
less writers of antiquity, and the testimony has been contra
dicted, but never confuted, by those of later inquirers." It is

Sources of Theological Truth. 305
not sporadic, it is universal. " With full confidence we call
man a religious being, just as he may be called a social being.
We do not thereby declare that aU men are actually religious,
but that man is so potentially, and, as such, is originally designed
and born for rehgion. He has a native feeling of religion,
just as he has a feeling of beauty or truth. The spiritual vis
vitalis, the central function of personal life, is reUgion. Re
Ugion is the deepest, or the absolute, relation of man." This
ineradicable religious sense, or consciousness, is an everlasting
and universal proclamation and attestation of God.
Religion, founded on the nature and corporate in the very
essence of mankind, occupies a place quite peculiar in the inner
life of man. The seat of the religious principle is not either
exclusively the reason, or the will, or the feelings, or the con
science. In the inmost sanctuary of the soul, where these are
stiU originally one and undivided, is found the fountain-head
of the spiritual Hfe, and especially the God-life, of mankind.
Starting from this center, religion embraces, penetrates, and
directs in the truly rehgious man his entire internal and external
existence. It is in this central position which religion occupies
that the secret of its power, the cause of its conflict, the war
rant of its imperishable stabfiity and future triumph, lies.
" The heart is the seat of religion. Therein lies the secret
of its power ; for that which is the most deeply seated, and
from thence embraces and penetrates the whole Hfe, Heart tne sesA
of course exercises the most powerful influence. otTeU&on-
Consciously or unconsciously the religious question Hes at the
bottom of every question, for ' really the conflict between belief
and unbeHef is the deepest, the sole problem of the history of
the world.' — Goethe. Here, then, we find the reason for that
conflict which has been carried on in the heart and the world
by religion more than by any other thing. Religious hate is
the bloodiest and deepest of aU, and no wonder, since no other

306 Studies ln Theology.
discord seizes thus directly and powerfully on the most hidden
principle of life ; man only struggles then for that which is the
very highest life of the soul. Here is the warrant for the
duration of religion and its future triumph. The reUgious
principle cannot possibly be entirely blotted out of the heart of
mankind, for, if so, man would lose that which distinguishes
him from other creatures. If, in the conflict of the present
century, religion were to be finally defeated, superstition would
always have at least one chance of life more than unbridled
unbelief. Take away from man his God, and he will not rest
until you have given him a godhead back again — it may be in
the form of an idol.
" The result thus gained has a very varied importance. It
is of importance for psedagogics. The reUgious feeling cannot
be instilled, but must be called out as much as possible. The
want of it generally arises from this, that while the brain suffers
from hypertrophy, the life of the heart is not sufficiently devel
oped. Of importance to apologetics, religion cannot be proved
to demonstration, nor be recommended by mere intellectual
motives. 'The heart has its reasons which reason does not
know.' — Vinet. Of importance for dogmatics. It will be
treated in a thoroughly different manner, just as the question
as to the seat of religion is differently answered. A faulty
psychology will be injurious to the whole of theology. On
the contrary, the deeper we dig into the domain of the inner
life the more certainly we attain the spot where we cannot
touch religion without wounding the tenderest sensibilities. ' In
a certain sense the expression consciousness, soul, etc., avails
for an allowed, though only a provisional escape from the
conflict.' — Nitzsch. On the other hand, it is ever more and
more seen that that which is the finest and deepest can never
be anatomized and sounded. It is, therefore, doubly neces
sary to see that while we continue our investigations into the

Sources of Theological Truth. 307
essence and seat of religion, we never lose sight of its final
object. " Every manifestation of the religious sense is either con
sciously or unconsciously founded on a striving after an object,
which, however, is differently conceived according to different
degrees of development. The object at which the truly relig
ious man of God aims can be as little to render God a service,
in the literal sense of the word, as merely to seek in the com
munion with him profit and enjoyment to himself. The final
object of this communion with God is personal union with
him, whereby he is glorified, and the heart of man is com
pletely satisfied. The object, however, is only reaUy attainable
in connection with a theistic conception of God.
"Every sound manifestation of religious life seeks personal
union with God — that is, one in which our individuality is not
lost in the contemplation of God, but, on the contrary, is pre
served, emancipated, and purified. . . . Communion is only con
ceivable when the individual life of those between whom it is
held is retained, and so personality ought not to be considered
as a hinderance, but, on the contrary, as the sine qua non of the
highest of all religious life. The warmest love, even, will only
lose itself in the loved object to find itself soon again in that
beloved object ; the contrary would be the death of love, which
{Plato) is nothing less than the striving after immortality. The
religious man is in relation to God, not as the dew-drop which
is dried up by the sun, but as the sunflower which turns toward
and opens itself before its light. This, indeed, is the glory of
God, that he demands the sacrifice of our heart, but not of our
individuality ; and only accepts the first to give it back again,
at rest and purified. Inasmuch, however, as this object is only
imperfectly attained here below, is life in communion with
God the pledge of an eternal future, in which he will be all in
deed, but in all — that is, without destroying their personal life.

308 Studies in Theology.
"Although we may, while starting from a different concep
tion of God, be striving after the same object, this by no means
wfll be attained from every stand-point. When a deistic con
ception of God is professed, we cannot properly and consist
ently speak of a constant communion with God. Gojl is here
not only raised too far above the creature, but is separated too
far from him. As little is real religion conceivable where pan
theistic principles are professed, because then the personal dis
tinction between Creator and creation is done away. Only
when, from a theistic stand-point, we do justice alike to the
immanence and transcendence of God, can the highest object
of religion be sufficiently accurately defined and properly real
ized. While this observation is itself true, it likewise offers a
measure by which to determine the unequal value of the dif
ferent forms of religion." *
We have laid down the maxim, " that the only rational
ground of belief is adequate proof," and have defined adequate
proof to be a reason or reasons apprehended by the
2£axlm. mind, which, to its conviction and in fact, estab
lishes the truth of what is believed. In answer to the ques
tion, " Why do you believe ? " the mind would immediately
recur to the reasons, with the implied understanding that
these reasons are adequate proof, and do show that the
belief raised upon them is precisely according to truth. When
such reasons or proofs exist belief is rational, and the mind acts
according to the laws of reason — acts rationally in beheving.
If the reasons did not exist, belief would be irrational.
The sufficient reason for believing in the existence of an ob
ject is that it exists, and attests its existence in some manner to
some mind ; it is its own proof. The apparently sufficient rea
son is some fact which seems to demand its existence, and is so
forcible as to induce belief. When we personally perceive an
* Von Oosterzee, vol. i, pp. 84-87.

Sources of Theological Truth. 309
object, or witness an event, or have an experience, we have the
really sufficient proof or ground of knowledge. When several
persons whom we know, and whose honesty we have no reason to
doubt, and who are intelligent, testify to a fact or event or expe
rience, we have what, to the reason, must appear to be sufficient
proof, and we are compelled to believe, if we are in possession of
no counter facts. In the first case, of the really sufficient proof,
we cannot be deceived, in the latter, with the utmost care it is
possible we may be deceived, but to be governed by rational
principle we must beheve in the last case even as in the first.
A necessary condition of real proof is the truth and reality
of that which is proved, as it is impossible there A ^nam^, 0l
should be real proof of that which is not true ; the proof-
proof not only makes the truth appear, but is itself conditioned
by the truth.
There is, therefore, a distinction td be made between real
and apparent proof, as of true testimony and false testimony.
Real proof establishes the truth, at the same time that it is
ground of knowledge or rational belief. Apparent proof does
not establish the truth, or issue in knowledge, though it may
issue in rational belief. It is impossible that we should be
able in all cases to distinguish real from apparent proof. The
result is that, acting on the most approved principle of reason,
or in most perfect accord with our rational nature, we may be
led into unavoidable error. Things may appear to be what they
are not ; testimony may appear to be true when it is really
false; the conclusion which the mind is compelled to draw
under the circumstances will, of course, be contrary to the
truth. For these reasons the most perfect honesty and the
greatest care and the use of perfectly rational methods cannot
always insure us against error, though they may in most cases,
and are always necessary to that end.
It would be most irrational to refuse to believe any thing,

310 Studies tn Theology.
because we are liable to be unavoidably deceived in some
things. We must act still according to our best reason, though
it is possible we may occasionally be led astray when so acting.
So long as Christian teachers and leaders of Christian
thought are able to present unanswerable proof of their faith,
whatchristian and return a reasonable reply to objections old and
do. new, the masses will be held to faith ; but once let
the line be broken, and it is only a question of time, and of
brief time at that, when it will take its place as an obsolete
and effete system. An error once detected must immediately
perish, and of right should. No possible elements remain to
give it vitality. A stroke of Luther's pen was sufficient to
disintegrate the structure of Romanist superstition. In less than
a quarter of a century discoveries in geology were sufficient to
demolish the Christian cosmology of all the past ages ; and had
it not been that the error was found to be one of interpretation,
would have shaken the whole citadel of faith. There is no
greater mistake than that of supposing that the masses are not
affected by argument. Unable to formulate for themselves,
they understand well when an argument goes to the point.
They are quick to discern when vulgar opinions are shattered.
Christianity stands solely because its adversaries have not been
able to make a breach in its proofs, and will stand only so long
as its evidence remains invincible. Liberty of speech and
thought are guaranteed to the race, and wiU never be surren
dered. If our holy faith shaU live it must show itself able to
stand in the open ways of the world, and receive blows and
knocks from all sorts of adversaries, and by the equanimity and
subhmity of its spirit and the unanswerable logic of its replies
put them to silence, and forever reassure itself, and 60 convince
all of its intrinsic virtue and truth.
While it is true that no belief can be estabUshed or acquire
the right to exist unless supported by adequate proof, it cannot

Sources of Theological Truth. 311
be made to appear that it is practicable or necessary that each
mind should be required to pass the proof under its individual
observation, and be able to adduce it or even know what it is.
This would be to require impossibilities of the Many believe
• -K-r t..,, . , without exam-
average mind. Jno man living is able to verify all ing proof.
his verifiable beliefs. We are compelled to accept many things,
the proof of which we do not personally know. If we become
discontented with our ignorance and refuse faith, and insist on
doubt, we must expect to be branded as knaves or fools, or be
at the pains of personal examination of the proof in such manner
as to be competent to judge and render the adequate rea
son. There are men who will insist on the doubt that the
earth is spherical, but they cannot escape being classed as
ignoramuses by their neighbors, not one of whom could ad
duce the proof that the earth is round, or be made to feel
that it is important that they should be able to verify the
statement. They have an indefinable knowledge that there
is proof, and that suffices. They escape the just imputa
tion of ignorance by accepting the common belief. So we all
do in a thousand matters which we have not the time or
disposition to examine for ourselves, and no one considers this
irrational, provided there are good reasons to believe that com
petent persons have made the requisite search, and that we could
possess ourselves of the proof if we chose. On such grounds
and no other the masses constantly accept the results and
conclusions of experts in the various matters of science. Their
intelligence is not challenged until they venture upon dissent,
and thereby proclaim their stupidity. The same law obtains
in matters of religious faith. But few men have examined the
various inclusions of faith for themselves. They someiackabii-
, , , ity to decide
have neither the time nor learning to do so. As what is proof.
in the cases already referred to, they find good reasons for ac
cepting the common faith, without being at the pains to go

312 Studies rN Theology.
through the process of personal search. Here, as there, igno
rant dissent proclaims only the egotism and effrontery of the
doubter, and awakens only the contempt of the thoughtful.
No one would think of attaching importance to such doubt, or
of attempting to reason it away, as its existence is a proof of
sheer incapacity which is incurable, or of criminal inattention ;
and, as such, opinions of ignorance have no significance for
mind. These remarks with respect to the examination of
proof apply, however, only to the masses who cannot, for
want of time and means, become technical, but who are
intelligent and weU informed, and rationally, though not tech
nically, grounded in faith. They may well and wisely be con
tent without the personal labor of critical inquiry, so long as
their faith is firm ; but should doubt obtrude, there would then
arise a necessity to put themselves in the way of a thorough
search into the proof, or, failing to do that, they would become
guilty of rejecting truth, and their unreasoned disbelief might
involve the greatest possible guilt, since it might put in peril
their own greatest interests and the greatest interests of others
who should be influenced by them.
But in making this statement we do not mean to be under
stood that aU dissent is of this low kind. If there are learned
defenders of the truth there are also learned assailants. Their
arguments and doubts must be answered. They demand the
proof — it must be furnished. It is no answer to treat them as
cavillers not deserving attention, or to affect indifference to
them. They have a right to be heard. They will be heard.
The answer must be furnished, it must be adequate, it must be
respectful. The only legitimate method of dealing with men, with
omyiegitimate respect to their beHefs or ignorance, is to correct
error by presenting the truth ; and the only proper
way for the removal of mental and moral darkness is by

Sources of Theological Truth. 313
introducing the light. It is impossible to establish beliefs by
force, or to suppress error by the gag. Freedom of thought
and freedom of expression are the normal conditions of all true
mental life and progress. All forceful and repressive measures
must inevitably work evil.
Religious truth, like all other truth, is amenable to the laws
of rational investigation, and has no other support than that of
rational proof. Is it said that the heart and conscience furnish
a sufficient ground ? We reply that they furnish no ground
whatever, except as their impulses indicate to reason that there
is a real reason for them. Reason will so declare, and so dis
belief will become irrational. Beliefs, to be of any worth, or
entitled to respect, must be accredited ; and it is the function of
the religious teacher to silence objections to the doctrines he
teaches by proofs rather than by assertions. He can have no
other authority than that with which the truth invests him,
and no claim to be heard and reverenced except that which
comes from the truth and sacredness of his message as made
to appear. To have this he must be able to make it appear.
We can set up no claim for ourselves which we deny to others,
as to liberty of investigation and expression.
Theologians are not infallible. They have taught great
errors. They have no immunity from the common frailties of
men. They have often enforced their beliefs with Theologians
J have taught
unsound reasonings. Many times their methods errors.
have been unfair and tyrannical. Their faults have been the
common faults of the ages in which they have lived, and the
humanity they share with all. These facts weigh nothing with
sensible men, who make small account of the teacher but all
account of the trath— nothing of who says it, but every thing of
what is said.
But if some great and grave errors have been taught by
the spiritual guides of mankind, proving their falUbility and
31

314 Studies in Theology.
justifying dissent when there are real grounds, it should also
be remembered that the great substance of their teaching has
come down to us with constantly increasing verifications and
vaster volume of evidence as new light has been poured
upon the great themes of their sciences ; and if they have
sometimes resorted to unsound methods under the spirit of
the times, they have, nevertheless, always, as a rule, been the
advanced men of the time ; the guides and pilots of advance
and of true progress.
While the right to challenge is to be maintained, it is well
that we keep in mind that disbelief is amenable to the same
Disbelief ^aw as belief ; it becomes an impertinence when it
th^esameeiaw ^s groundless ; it is neither a mark of wisdom, nor
as belief. tjt}e ^0 j-ggpeg^ simply as dissent. The normal
state is one of belief until doubt is suffered to find some ade
quate cause. Captious doubt is the idiot's asylum. There is
trath ; the great and good who have left their thoughts with
us, while not infallible, and many times in error, are deserving
of some respect ; or at least of so much consideration as to secure
to their beHefs candid attention. It is no mark of superior
wisdom to pass hasty and vituperative judgments on conclu
sions into which they have wrought the gravest thought
through lifetimes of labor. It is no mark of superior wisdom
to dissent even from unreasoned beliefs without reasoned
grounds, especially when, if it should be so, the unreasoned
beHefs — instinctive, it may be — have produced better fruits
than have sprung from their rejection.
What is the province of reason in matters of religious faith?
In determining the function of reason in matters of religious
faith we must have a definite idea of what we include in the
term reason. By the reason we understand the whole intellect
ual nature of man, that is, the power to apprehend, to reflect,
to consider, to compare, to differentiate, to remember, to under-

Sources of Theological Truth. 315
stand, to reason, to doubt, to disbelieve, to believe, to know.
We give it this broad meaning because all these are forms of
intellection, and pertain to the power to acquire right ideas,
which we understand to be the function of reason. The
term reason is not exhausted of its full meaning until we take
into the account all these forms of intellection. It is another
name for mind itself. It may be called intuitive, inductive,
deductive, perceptive, conceptive, reproductive, cognitive, or
by any other name that represents mental activity, but in every
case it means the same thing, namely, power to acquire ideas
and to attain to knowledge, or come to a knowing state. The
different terms simply indicate phases of reason connoting its
relations to the matters about which it employs itself. Let it
be understood, then, as being the equivalent of mind itself.
Taken in this comprehensive sense, to the question, What is
the province of reason in matters of religious faith ? we an
swer, Its function is to determine religious faith. But when
we say this we do not mean that it is the function of reason to
create, or by its own unaided effort discover even, all the true
contents of religious faith. This undoubtedly is a task too
great for it. Indeed, left to itself it can do but little in this
direction. The mind has strong religious impulses — instinctive
religious yearnings. It has a dim perception and obscure con
sciousness of divine things ; but it has no adequate power to
arrive at exact and complete apprehensions of religious truth
except as it is aided by supernatural help.
The function of reason is to examine and test, to sit in judg
ment and decide on what shall be the contents of faith. When
propositions are snbmitted, or facts made known, or expe
riences felt, or arguments propounded, or duties enjoined, or
any thing offered as counsel or doctrine, or any impulse is felt
of any kind, whether relating to things secular or rehgious,
whether pertaining to time or eternity, whether purporting

316 Studies m Theology.
to come from God or man, in the one case as much as in the
other it is the function of reason to sit in judgment on it, and
determine whether the thing proposed shaU be accepted or re
jected, or what shall be its treatment.
It may be objected that this is a dangerous enlargement of
the prerogatives of reason with regard to the matters of relig
ious faith ; that in effect it makes man the determiner of his
own law ; that practically it releases him from any obligation
except to what suits him ; that the right to reject or accept
implies the power to determine ; that it makes revelation of
no effect ; that it places man above his Maker, and practically
makes the subject the lawgiver and judge ; that it is the most
extravagant form of rationalism. A superficial view might
seem to justify these allegations, but a more careful study
corrects the hasty judgment.
The allegations named come from those who are jealous of
the rights of revelation, and who feel it important to abase
the arrogance of reason and humble the pride of man. In a
proper degree we sympathize with that feeling. We are re
minded that man is a creature of Hmited intelligence ; that
many truths are so obscure as to elude him entirely ; that withal
he is fallen, and his moral powers crippled by sin ; that his
judgment is biased, and that on all grounds he is incompetent
to decide in matters of such grave moment ; that, therefore,
the function of reason is simply to approve and obey orders —
that what is communicated is to be accepted. , Now all that
seems to be in direct contradiction to the foregoing, and it also
seems reasonable. Is there then contradiction ? If we should
discover contradiction the duty will be to determine which of
the contradictories shall be rejected, which accepted. But in
that case how is the contradiction to be discovered ? Is it not
by the reason ? What is it that determines or decides which
of the contradictories shall be accepted ? Is it not the reason ?

Sources of Theological Truth. 317
Suppose its decision were the reverse of what it is, in any
given case, what then would be duty ? Is it not this decision
of the reason that furnishes the indispensable condition for the
determination of duty? Could the decision be disregarded
and the man retain his setf-respect as a rational being, or
his sense of worthiness as a moral being? Would obedi
ence to a rule be a virtue if performed in the unalterable
decision of reason that duty was precisely the opposite ? Must
not the persuasion of the reason be that the thing is right be
fore its performance can become a duty, or be morally right ?
Can a case be conceived in which any thing can become a duty
to man on mere command ? Will he not in every case have the
right and the prior duty of determining who it is that com
mands, and the right he has to command ? And if this be ad
mitted is not reason first consulted before duty becomes duty ?
Nor does this arrogate to reason any thing dangerous or
extravagant, or in any wise oppose man's reason to his Maker's
authority, or leave him to invent and determine his own law.
It simply demands that he shall act out his nature as a reason
able being ; that he shall act as a man, not as a thing ; that he
6hall act from discernment, not from force, not from fancies,
not from superstitions, not ¦ from traditions, not from blind im
pulses, not from self-will or pride or arrogance, but from the
perception that a thing is right, either because it is level to his
capacity to see that it is right or because he feels or discerns
within him a command which he calls conscience which will
not permit him to doubt that it is right, or because he has re
ceived a command which he cannot rationally doubt is from a
higher authority, who must have reason on his side in issuing
the command ; and whether one or the other, in all these cases
alike, duty is imposed upon him by the authority and sanction
of his own reason, and without this could not become duty.
If it should be said, Yes, but in the case supposed reason

318 Studies in Theology.
only accepts and inteiprets, we answer, This is all we claim for
it. In doing that it determines what shall be believed and
what rejected ; that is, it determines that this or that proposi
tion shall be accepted as true, and that it means this or that, as
the case may be ; and, in accepting it, it does so as reason. The
whole process is one of reason in precisely the same sense as
in determining what ideas we will accept and what reject in
the every-day affairs of life, or with respect to matters and
things with which we have to do. The difference in the cases
is not that one demands that it should be treated rationally
while the other makes no such demand, but it is a difference
simply in the subjects themselves and in the kind of proof on
which the reason is called to act in determining whether it will
accept or reject.
To see that this is so it is only necessary to bring before the
mind two actual concrete cases, one in the department of relig
ious faith and one in the realm of common affairs.
Take the last first. Any proposition will do ; we select this :
" The earth is a spherical body." The first function of reason
in this case manifestly is to grasp the proposition as such, and
then to determine the meaning of the terms. Having done
that, the case may be treated in either of several ways. It
may be simply ignored, or it may be promptly rejected, or it
may be instantly accepted and finally decided, or it may be ex
amined and a conclusion be reached by experiment or some
logical process. Each of these modes of treatment is common.
If called to render a reason, one man would say, Well, really, I
do not know any thing about the matter, and I am too busy to
give it attention. I must pass it for the present ; it may be
round, it may be square, for aught I know ; it looks neither
round nor square, but flat : but I must dismiss it for the want
of time, or in fact, for the reason that I do not think that it is
a matter of any great importance, or that if I were to give it

Sources of Theological Truth. 319
attention I probably could not find out any thing about it.
Now there is a semblance of rationality in that treatment.
Nothing is professed ; there is no behef, because the person has
no known reason for belief.
Or another man would promptly reply, I don't believe a
word of it. You ask him to reason. He repUes, What is the
use to reason? I have eyes. I have common sense. Now
this is raving — as irrational as frenzy or as a clap of thunder.
Yet the man believes himself a rational being. There may
be a dim streak of reason running through his vaunting igno
rance. Calmed down he would say something like this, perhaps :
I never heard of such a thing ; nobody ever believed such a
thing : my eyes show me that the earth is flat ; if it were
round the inhabitants on the other side would fall off, and
houses and all loose substances. Thus he would go on assign
ing what he calls reasons, showing that he was so far rational
as to understand that a man ought to have a reason for his
beliefs. His trouble is not that he might not become rational
in his procedure, but that through the egotism of ignorance
he does not act rationally. The defect is moral — a perversity of
will which leaves him without excuse. Where there is really
no importance in the matter his egotistic ignorance may do
him no further harm than simply to degrade his manhood.
But if the matter were of importance it might bring serious
consequences, and as his conduct is irrational he, of course,
alone would be responsible.
In the third case, another as promptly replies, Yes, of course,
I know it ; the earth is a spherical body — there is not the
least doubt of it. To be sure, it does not appear to be so, but
of course it is so. Now if your object were for any reason
to convince this man that the earth is round you are pleased
to find him so easy a convert, or in so proper a frame of mind.
If you should, however, inquire why he believes it you might

320 Studies m Theology.
find him without any reasons. In that case his faith would be
just as irrational as the raving disbeliever's non-faith ; the only
difference between the two being that one happened to be right
and the other happened to be wrong — both alike irrational,
but not, possibly, both alike harmful, nor, perchance, alike in
moral quality. If asked the reason of his ready assent he
might say, It is generally believed ; or, I read it in a book ; or
this or that, having no significance whatever as proof. But
in this case, as in the other, the attempt to allege some kind
of a reason, however absurd, has in it a faint hue of reason.
It proclaims the law of rational existence. It shows that the
mind demands a reason — that in any belief which it entertains
it supposes there is a good reason, something that justifies it,
and that it could not tolerate an idea except as it assumes that
there is proof of its truth.
But there is still another case — that of the man who does not
dismiss the subject, who also does not beUeve, neither disbe
lieve. He neither denies because he is ignorant of the fact,
nor accepts because others believe or affirm. He says, I do
not know ; I am open to proof. When I have all the evidence
in the case, or sufficient evidence, I will declare my position.
Now let us change the proposition from the realm of com
mon affairs to that of religious belief. Will the change of
subjects change the law ? Let the proposition be, " Jesus
Christ by the grace of God tasted death for every man," or
any other essential doctrine of the Christian religion. The
question is, What relation has reason to this proposition ? On
what ground must it be accepted or rejected ? What is the
function of reason with regard to it ? Precisely the same four
attitudes of mind might, and certainly often do, appear here as
in the former case.
The subject must be approached precisely as in the other
case, and, so far as we can perceive, precisely the same process

Sources of Theological Truth. 321
must be observed. The first thing to be done is to apprehend
the proposition, and then to fix exactly the meaning of the
terms or of the proposition itself.
There is a peculiarity in the matter propounded as compared
with the matters of daily occurrence or the common affairs
with which we have to do. In the case of matters in the
common affairs of life we can by inquiry have personal
knowledge, or we may obtain information on testimony of
those who know. The subject is within our reach. The
process is simple. In the former case this is not so. We
have no means of personally knowing the truth of the mat
ter we are required to believe. It confessedly lies beyond
us. We have no means of establishing it by testimony of
those of our fellow-men who could have personal knowl
edge. This must be admitted. Then on what ground are we
to receive it ? The enthusiastic believer deems it a sufficient
answer to say, The book says it ; that is enough ; to doubt or
refuse is to be damned. " He that believeth 6hall be saved,
and he that believeth not shall be damned." The underlying
assumption is, that the book is God's declaration, and that man
has no right to go behind that, or demand proof of it, or even
wait to understand it — there is nothing to do but without
questionings of reason to accept it. God is sovereign, and hu
man pride must bow. We deny that this is the proper an
swer. On the other hand, we affirm that, allowing that God
is the author of the declaration in question, that circumstance
does not remove the venue from the court of reason — it does
not demand that reason shall have no voice, or that its voice
6hall not be final — it does not demand that faith shall stand on
mere authority.
The demand is precisely the same as in any other case.
Man is a rational creature, and he may never be treated in any
other way than as such. His Maker so framed him, and he

322 Studies in Theology.
cannot outrage his own work. He must recognize and honor
the constitution himself has founded. His creature cannot be
required to act in contravention of the nature he has given
him. What, then, is the proper answer ? It is this : A prop
osition is laid before the mind ; the function of the mind is
to become aware of the proposition and then to find its mean
ing. Until that is done nothing further can be done or re
quired. The mind cannot be required to act on a subject
wholly unknown to it. It cannot be required to accept or be
lieve a proposition to which it attaches no meaning, or the
meanings of which it cannot determine. That which is matter
of belief, by a law of the mind, is some meaning which it
attaches, and it is impossible that behef should be any thing
else. The subject-matter thus brought before the mind raises this
question : How shall it be treated ? Who must answer that
question ? The mind itself as reason, that is, according to rea
son, _and not unreason. Its decision is not made for it, or en
forced as the action of a thing is forced. The function of
reason is to take note, to acquaint itself with data on which its
conclusion should be reached. This is what it is for. This is
that which differentiates it from things and inferior creatures.
This is written in its constitution as its maker's law, binding
both it and him. No law can ever reverse or override this
demand. Becoming acquainted with the data which are to enter into the
grounds of its conclusions it, the reason, now advances to the
question, How shall the matter be treated ? Shall it be ignored ?
Shall it be accepted? Shall it be rejected? Or shall it be
examined, and shall the final disposition of it be determined
according to reason ? Who must decide ? The reason. In
reaching its decision as to the final disposition of the matter,
the reason must examine all the facts which are within its

Sources of Theological Truth. 323
reach having any bearing on the case. If it finds itself unable
from any known data to reach a conclusion, it must so affirm.
If help is offered it from what purports to be some superior
reason, it must examine and decide for itself what the proposed
help is, and whether it deserves acceptance, and in both cases
its decision must be final — that is, the mind cannot go against
its decision without treason to the law written in its nature.
The reason must answer the question, Why am I to believe that
the help offered is from some superior reason ? If his reason
decides that there is no adequate proof, he must so affirm ; and to
maintain his status as a rational being his conduct must accord
with this decision of his reason. If all the facts, duly weighed
— facts of his need, facts of his moral nature, facts attending
the deliverance — all the facts in the case tend to the conviction
that it is certain, or even highly probable, that the matters
which he could not himself unaided determine have been an
swered by a superior reason, then his reason must decide that
the answer so rendered must be respected. His faith becomes,
in this case, rational in the same degree as if the doctrines were
of his own discovery. The ground of his belief is the adequate,
reason, as in every other case. Not to believe would declare
him irrational, because it would show that in discarding the
doctrine he discarded reason itself.
The finding is, that Christianity is a system of doctrines su
perior to human reason in its source, but attested to human
reason by its evidences, and obligatory on human reason, not
on any ipse dixit merely, but on proof, and, therefore, binding
as a faith and authoritative as a law.
Suppose its teachings should be rejected and its precepts dis
regarded, what then ? How does the theory we have advanced
affect this question? A hasty and superficial judgment might
be offered to the effect that in such a case no guilt is incurred,
inasmuch as the reason was but exercising its indefeasible right

324 Studies in Theology.
in the rejection and refusal to obey. In any event, it might
be alleged, the position taken loosens up the sense and fact of
obligation and unsettles the foundations of morality — in effect,
vacates the divine law. That were a grievous result indeed.
Is there any foundation for the charge? A little reflection
will show that it is entirely groundless.
The facts are these : The infinite and glorious Founder of the
universe made man a rational being — that is, endowed him with
power to discern truth when brought into right relation to it,
and so constituted him as to feel obligation to the proper use
of his faculties and to be constrained to respect and accept the
decisions of his reason. He also made him a free being, self-
determining, so that failing to act according to his rational
nature he should incur a sense of guilt and unworthiness and
should be held to answer. He also instituted definite laws for
the government of his life, regulating his relations to his fel
low-creatures and his Maker, and imposing duties upon him.
These laws were, a part of them, indicated by invariable nat
ural impulses, which were so plain and explicit as to be impos
sible to escape observation ; parts were more obscure and dim,
requiring thought and reflection ; parts, and the most important
of all, were tooobscure for his unaided reason, and for his most
perfect development required more explicit expression and
publication in an added revelation. The general law under
which he held his existence was, and is forever : that under
whatever circumstances he might be providentially placed he
should sincerely desire to find out what was trath and duty,
and should use all possible diligence to that end, and then
should obey implicitly the last dictate of his highest reason
in view of all the light given. That is the constitutional law
of the moral universe, never revoked and never to be changed
— the very foundation of the divine government, the eternal
compact between God and his moral creationj perennial in

Sources of Theological Truth. 325
the divine nature, and forever voiced in the conscience of
man; the one perpetual ray that lighteth every man that
cometh into the world, and the one law by which every man
shall finaUy be judged, and which must continue to prevail
over all moral beings in all possible exigencies and in all
worlds from eternity to eternity.
Now, it will be observed that under this divine constitution
God is the infinite source of all truth, whether in nature or
revelation. Man makes no truth; his function is to discern
and obey, not to originate. Religious faith is the belief of the
truth with respect to man's moral and spiritual relations to his
Maker. That truth is contained in nature and revelation ; God
is its author and source. It is man's duty to find out what it
is and obey it. His reason is the God-given power by which
he is to make the discovery. Its dictate as to what is truth
and what not is final for him. His responsibility is to be
sincere, honest, and diligent. This met, whatever his mistakes
may be, he stands acquitted ; this violated, whatever his right
opinions, he stands condemned.
Thus, in the final analysis, we find the source of truth is
God ; the judge of truth for man is human reason ; that which
gives authority to truth is its author ; that which is required to
give sanction to truth so as to make it obligatory on faith and
practice is the discernment of reason.
The relation of reason to a revelation, if our position is well
taken, is, then,
First : It needs a revelation ; because of the fact that it is in
adequate without a revelation to the complete demands of a
moral and spiritual being in that it cannot, of itself— by the
mere light which nature furnishes— come to the knowledge of
facts and principles which are required to be known in order to
the completest perfection of such a being; revelation is as
needful to these higher wants as nature is to the common and

326 Studies in Theology.
lower wants of existence ; it is necessary that it should furnish
the data on which reason is to act with respect to some things.
Second : The truths of revelation, to be of any value to man,
must, as in every other case, come with appropriate signs and
tokens that it is a revelation. The revelation is of no value
without these. Its voice is impotent and its authority nil
in their absence. The function of reason is to discern them,
and give its sanction to faith.
Third : Without this discernment and sanction it is impossi
ble that the so-called revelation should be known to be such, or
that it should be rationally received or virtuously obeyed.
Fourth : The duty of the reason is to honestly aim at truth,
to be diligent in its pursuit, to use its utmost vigilance not to
be misled, to examine impartially all the known or knowable
facts bearing on the case.
Fifth : The duty of reason, having accepted the revelation on
what it deems adequate proof, is to interpret the revelation
and find its meanings ; that is, it must determine what it teaches.
Sixth : It is the duty of reason to receive whatever it finds
to be the meaning of the revelation, however mysterious or in
explicable, always with the provision, first, that that interpreta
tion shall always have the preference which is least objection
able to reason if the text and general tenor of the revelation
will permit it, even though some other interpretation of the
words might be possible or even more natural ; second, pro
vided nothing shall be obligatory which is absurd, or, according
to the best judgment of the reason, a contradiction, or for any
reason impossible or even so highly improbable as to appear to
be absolutely irrational.
If any part of these functions of reason be neglected, a strict
accountability will be demanded. It will serve no purpose of
excuse or exculpation that the disbeliever and disobedient plead
that they did not know, or that their reason was not convinced,

Sources of Theological Truth. 327
unless they are able also to show that they were sincere lovers
of truth, sincere and diligent seekers of truth, that they were
not indisposed to receive the truth, and that their unbelief was
not self-superinduced by disinclination to its demands.
We affirm that it is both a law of the mind as rational, and
of ethics, that faith can never be required without the adequate
reason being furnished to the person on whom the obhgation is
imposed : the adequate reason may be either the evidence
directly furnished to the mind that the proposition is true or
the thing required proper in itself, or the proof that one who
has the right to command is the author of the command or
teaching. The highest reason is religious. Religious faith
is the embodiment of the highest reason. God's law is addressed
to reason. Reason apprehends the law as God's law. God's
law becomes binding on men when, and not until, it is appre
hended by reason, or might be if the reason were properly
exercised. If it were not apprehensible by reason it never
could become man's law by mere command. There is a strict and
perfect harmony between human reason and divine revelation.
One never collides with the other. Man may accept the law
without knowing the reason why he does or should accept it ;
but it is never without a reason why it should be accepted.
Whether man has a revelation or not, man must decide.
Whether man will accept what purports to be a revelation, man
must decide. For his decision he will be required to answer to
the author of his reason, and of the revelation. He will not
be condemned because he did not believe and obey a revelation
of which he had no knowledge, but for disobeying a revelation
of which, had it not been for some criminal neglect, he might
have had knowledge ; or, for rejecting and disobeying a reve
lation of which he either had knowledge, or of which there
was ample means of knowledge in his reach, and which, if he
had acted rationally, he would have found abundant and ade-

328 Studies in Theology.
quate reason for accepting and obeying. His condemnation
will be because in rejecting and disobeying he acted in unreason.
AU sin is in its essence abuse or misuse of reason; and all
willful or voluntary misuse of reason is of the nature of sin, and
when it leads to immoral practices is of the essence of sin — is
itself a violation of the moral law which imposes obligation to
the right exercise of reason for the determination of the beliefs
of the mind and practices of the Hfe. To this law man is
strictly amenable, and for its neglect, as much as for its direct
violation, he is responsible. That this is a just law no one can
doubt with reason. The duty it imposes is for adequate reasons,
and it is neither unduly rigorous nor capricious. It exalts
reason to the function for which it was created, and it holds it
to equitable obligations and accountability.
The only possible ground in opposition to this is to assume
that reason is to be ignored entirely in matters of religious
faith. Either it is to apprehend and pass judgment or it can
have no function. But if it is to be ignored, that is, denied
any function, see into what a dilemma we are plunged. If we
ignore reason, how are ideas to be apprehended ? If it might
be possible that we should be able to receive commands or be
come aware of propositions, how can we come at the meanings
of either ? But if it is the reason which supplies the meanings
we are to put in the terms, and which we are to accept as true,
is it not the reason that determines what the contents of our
faith shall be — the very things we are to accept and believe ?
That is, does not faith becomes faith by the sanction of reason ?
From the nature of the case all questions remain open, and
must so remain. Each mind has its own individual and inde-
Questions re- feasible rights. No rational being can, as rational,
main open. accept any creed except on some supposed adequate
ground. What that adequate ground is, it must decide for
itself. There can be no authority until the authority has been

Sources of Theological Truth. 329
established in the individual reason. The only service one
generation can do to another is to hand over its best thought
to its successor, to be reintegrated by being the best thought
the new generation can attain, or to be' refuted or modified as
the discovered need may be.
It is thus that all progress has been attained in the past
along Hnes of human endeavor. It is thus that all progress
will be made in the future in every department of How. pr0Kreas
thought. There are no breaks in the ladder which te attained-
lays its top against the highest sky. It must be ascended
rung by rung, and there is no rang reachable by man that has
not another above it.
It has been necessary in times past often to return upon the
rungs up which we had labored long and hard ; finding our
selves on the wrong track, we had to begin again. Motion is
necessary to progress, but motion is not always progress. Bet
ter go wrong in the honest endeavor to go right than stand
stiU in error. There is hope in effort. There is only stagna
tion and death in unaspiring ignorance. It will be in the future
as in the past. It may be we will find backward motion
necessary to advanced position. If true to reason the outcome
will be, after all returns and changes and struggles, onward
movement and final elevation.
Is nothing, then, established ? Are all beliefs to be looked
upon with suspicion and doubt, liable to be reversed and
changed by each new age, or each individual mind? Must
the assault and defense be peipetual ? Can there be no finality
reached ? These anxious misgivings spontaneously arise in
every mind. We weary of debate. We have the feeling that
some things ought to be considered settled beyond further
questioning. A little reflection will be helpful and quieting.
Truth is settled. It is not uncertain. Nothing ever changes
it. " The eternal years of God are hers : " the unrest is ours.
22

330 Studies ln Theology.
In the nature of the case it must be perpetual for the race,
what is estao- however it may be otherwise with the individual.
"shed. We are not born into truth : it must be acquired.
Each mind must make the acquisition for itself. It is impos
sible that it should be otherwise. The questions, What must I
beUeve, and why must I believe ? meet each new mind at the
threshold of Hfe ; and the same process must be repeated as
long as the world stands and men are born into it. The same
old questions wiU emerge in some form determined by the
age every time, and the same answer and counter answer wiU
have to be wrought out. New elements will constantly be
coming into the controversy, which may be either disturbing
or reUeving. The struggle implies nothing of uncertainty in
truth, and nothing necessarily of the invalidity of conclusions
reached, but simply denotes the normal want of finite mind
in the pursuit of truth.
There wiU always be idiot believers and idiot unbeHevers
decrying each other, putting forth travesties of truth, uttering
rash, foolish, and absurd ideas, repeating old saws and fables.
These are perennial incidents in such a world as ours. It must
be expected that folly will sometimes get the advantage of
wisdom. Fools wiU vex and trouble the wise and outvote
them. Truth will often be trampled down and draggled in
the mire. What happened to the Prince of truth will stUl
happen to truth itself : it will be crucified, now by this party
now by that, but the trath wiU not suffer by crucifixion. It
still Hves, and will be sure to have a resurrection.
In conclusion : availing ourselves of all possible sources of
light, interrogating aU facts, prying into every open and un
locking or breaking open every closed door, rum
maging every secret drawer of universal nature and
rifling her of her most hidden secrets, plundering every realm
of existence of its treasures of trath and tearing away as much

Sources of Theological Truth. 331
as we can its enswathments of mystery, calling to our aid all
helps of possible revelations, gathering up the best results of
all former labors of the world's best and ablest minds and dis
encumbering ourselves of all rubbish of superstition and preju
dice and bigotry and ignorant cant, it is for us to go forward
in the glorious pursuit of truth, emulating each other, helping
each other, encouraging each other, rejoicing in aU successes,
at whatever cost of surrenders, never wearying, never doubting
of the outcome. There will be advance. It will be slow. In
the f ar-on ages the world will be insphered in light.

APPENDIX,

NOTE -A.. 3P. S"7.
Essence (essentia, from mens, the old participle of esse, to be — introduced into
the Latin tongue by Cicero.
" Sicutab eo quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia; sic ab eo quod est esse, vocatu/r
essentia." — Augustine, "De Civ.,'' lib. xii, c. 11.
" Totum Mud per quod res est, et est id quod est." — Chauvin, Lexicon Philosoph.
" Essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it ia what it
is." — Locke, " Essay on Human Understanding," book iii, chap. 3, sect. 15.
Mr. Locke distinguishes the real and the nominal essence. The nominal essence
depends upon the real essence ; thus the nominal essence of gold, is that complex
idea which the word " gold " represents ; namely, a body yellow, heavy, malleable,
fusible, and fixed; but its real essence is the constitution of its insensible parts,
on which these qualities and all its other properties depend, which is wholly
unknown to us.
" The essence of things is made up of that common nature wherein it is founded,
and of that distinctive nature by which it is formed. This latter is commonly
understood when we speak of the formality or formalis ratio (the formal consider
ation) of things ; and it is looked upon as being more peculiarly the essence of
things, though 'tis certain that a triangle is as truly made up in part of figure, its
common nature, as of the three lines and angles, which are distinctive and peculiar
to it.
" The essence of a thing most properly and strictly is what does first and funda
mentally constitute that thing, and that only is strictly essential which is either
the whole or some part of the constituent essence ; as, in man to be a living
creature, or to be capable of religion : his being capable of celestial happiness,
may be called essential in the way of consequence, or consecutively, not con-
stituently." — Oldfield, " Essay on Eeason," p. 184.
" Whatever makes a thing to be what it is, is properly called its essence. Self-
consciousness, therefore, is the essence of the mind, because it is in virtue of
self-consciousness that the mind is the mind — that a man is himself." — Ferriek,
" Inst, of Metaphys.," p. 245.
" All those properties or qualities, without which a thing could not exist, or

Studies in Theology — Appendix. 333
without which it would be entirely altered, make up what is called the essence of
a thing. Three lines joining are the essence of a triangle ; if one is removed,
what remains is no longer a triangle."*
The essential attributes, facuint esse entia, cause things to be what they are.
The Greeks had but one word for essence and substance, namely, oiaia. The
word im6araai; was latterly introduced. By Aristotle oiaia was applied  1. To
the form, or those qualities which constitute the specific nature of every being.
2. To the matter, in which those qualities manifest themselves to us — the sub
stratum or subject (iiro iceipevov). 3. To the concrete or individual being
(oivofoni), constituted by the union of the two preceding.
In the scholastic philosophy a distinction began to be established between
essence and substance. Substance was applied to the abstract notion of matter —
the undetermined subject or substratum of all possible forms, rb vrro xeluevov;
essence to the qualities expressed in the definition of a thing, or those ideas which
represent the genus and species. Descartes defined substance as " that which
exists so that it needs nothing but itself to exist,1' a definition applicable to
Deity only. Essence he stripped of the logical signfication, and made it the foun
dation of all those qualities and modes which we perceive in matter. Among
the attributes of every substance there is one only which deserves the name of
essence, and on which the others depend as modification — as extension, in matter,
and thought in mind. He thus identified essence and substance. But extension
supposes something extended, and thought something that thinks. With Lieb-
nitz essence and substance was the same, namely, force or power.
Essence is analogically applied to things having no real existence ; and then it
retains its logical sense and expresses the qualities or ideas which should enter
into the definition ; as when we speak of the essence of an equilateral triangle
being three equal sides and three equal angles. This is the only sense in which
Kant recognizes the word. In popular language essence is used to denote the
nature of a thing, f * Taylor's " Elements of Thought."
f " Principles of Philosophy," par. 4, sec. 1.

334 Studies is Theology— Appendix
NOTE IB. I3- 144.
The attempts to prove that reason is essentially self-contradictory have
never proved any thing but the philosophical incompetency of those who made
them. It is very easy to find contradictions in the spontaneous metaphysics of
common sense; but reason itself always suffices to detect and correct such
errors. In the failure of this method the skeptic adopts another. He claims
that rational principles cannot be proved even in the mind; still less can
they be proved to have objective validity. He admits that they must control
our thinking, and that we cannot conceive them false ; but he urges that this
proves only a subjective necessity, aud does not prove an objective necessity. He
suggests, therefore, that these principles do not hold for the external world, or
for what he is pleased to call " things in themselves."
This skepticism seems fair and rational; let us look at it more closely. And
first, we examine the demand for proof of first principles. If by proof the
skeptic means deduction, it is clear that he is right in saying that rational or
first principles cannot be deduced, for deduction implies something more funda
mental than the conclusion. Since Jacobi wrote the "Faith Philosophy," there is
no reason for calling this truism a discovery. But if the skeptic means that what
cannot be deduced is, therefore, uncertain, we shall find it necessary to inquire
what proof is. Now the essence of logical proof consists in so combining prop
ositions which we know that we fiually see some other proposition to be a
necessary admission, which was not seen as such before. That is, we reach a
feeling of certainty in affirming the proposition which we did not have; and then
the proposition is said to be proved. But the essence of the proof consists in just
this certainty, and not in the number or nature of the steps taken. If now the
proposition should be directly seen at the start to be necessary, we should need
no proof: (1) because we should have the essence of proof — the feeling of cer
tainty; (2) because the longest argument could give us nothing more than this
feeling ; and (3) because the certainty arising from a logical demonstration can
never be greater than that of the principles on which it rests. If the mind is
able to see some truths to be self-evident, or to know some things without a
process, it is mere logical pedantry to demand further proof. It is more than
pedantic ; it is absurd. The self-evident, in its very notion, is that which is able
to stand alone. To demand proof of it is to declare that it is not self-evident.
It is plain that the ultimate test of truth must be the mind itself, and its faith in
its own power to know. The skeptic is unwilling to admit the dicta of reason,
and insists on having their validity in some way established. But it is plain,
again, that these dicta can be tested only by assuming some more ultimate dictum
as a standard ; and this final standard, can be known as such only by the self-

Studies m Theology — Appendix. 335
evidence with which it appeals to the mind. But the demand for proof can be
repeated here with equal justice, and the same senseless round might be renewed
forever. The skeptic's demand for proof, beyond the feeling of self-evidence and
certainty, is one which in its very nature cannot be met by any intelligence what
ever. Angel or archangel would be in exactly the same condition as we are, in
this regard. The skeptic is commonly supposed to be of all men the most acute,
but surely there is nothing very brilliant in making an irrational demand, and
then triumphing because it has not been met. When asked, then, for the ulti
mate warrant of rational principles, we do not hesitate to declare it to be reason
itself. Whatever appears as truly self-evident and necessary, the mind will
always feel justified in regarding as true. It is clear that it must come to this at
last, not only for human intelligence, but for all intelligence. Every rational
being must at bottom trust his rational insight. To call this a circle, and quibble
over it, is mere pettifoggery. The trust of the mind in itself can be shaken only
by showing inconsistency in its intuitions. The complete test of truth, then,
might be stated as self-evidence and necessity at the beginning, with consistency
in the outcome. The skepticism which is based upon contradictious in details is
rational and valuable for details, and the course of the mind in such cases is to go
over its work in the light of rationality, and bring the warring details into har
mony. But a skepticism of reason itself, based, not on inner contradiction, but
solely on the possibility of verbal denial, is something which busy and sincere
men may justly ignore. To ask some questions is a proof of mental power. To
ask some others is a proof of mental weakness and confusion. To the latter class
belong all skeptical demands for proof of rational principles.
But the skeptic rejoins that if the rationalist's argument were allowed it
would only prove the subjective, not the objective, validity of these principles.
He declines, therefore, to believe that they are objectively valid. It is plain
that a skepticism of this sort is forever irrefutable, resting, as it does, solely on
the possibility of stating a verbal doubt. Whatever objective necessity there may
be can appear in the mind only as a subjective necessity, an impossibility of
thinking otherwise, etc., and even objective reality exists for us only as it is con
ceived. We can test the value of this objection by applying it. A straight line is the
shortest distance between two points ; things respectively equal to the same thing
are equal to one another; every event or change must have a cause. The ration
alist says that such principles are as valid for things as for thought ; but the
skeptic objects, because the necessity with which they appeal to the mind produces
only a subjective necessity of admitting them ; and a subjective necessity is no
proof of objective fact. It is evident that reason runs no serious risks from attacks
like these, for while the declaration of the doubt is forever possible, it is forever
equally baseless and barren. It appeals not to reason, but from reason, and may

336 Studies ln Theology — Appendix.
rightly be left to its own irrationality. One grave disadvantage of language is that
it allows men to speak without saying any thing. There is no difficulty in fram
ing such phrases as square circle, straight curve, and the like, but there is a strict
impossibility of thinking any thing under them. We are persuaded that skepti
cism would play a much less prominent part if the skeptic were forced to make
his hypothesis intelligible. This he always neglects to do, but furnishes himself
rather with phrases which cannot be construed in thought, as if the first demand
upon a hypothesis were not that it be at least thinkable. When Mr. Mill sug
gested that two and two may make five in some other world, it was an oversight
not to tell us why five, instead of fifty or five thousand, or three only, or even
nothing. We are clear that in the same world four might equal five. It might
also equal three. It might equal any thing. It might also equal nothing. In
deed, it might equal any thing and nothing at the same time. Any of these
propositions are just as rational as the far-famed one of Mr. Mill. Unfortunately,
a certain half-hearteduess on Mill's part leaves us in doubt whether his proposi
tion is any thing but a truism expressed in a most extraordinary form. He was
not prepared to deny the law of identity, or A=A. Hence four equals four, and
five equals five, but four does not equal five. But as two and two do equal four, and
four is not five, it follows that the five which in some other world they equal is
not five as we understand it, but is really what we mean by four. Either this
fantastic platitude, or the law of identity must be abandoned. But here,
again, we are puzzled by the fact that at times MiU seems to have meant by five
what we all mean by five; for he quotes approvingly the hint of a barrister who
suggested a way of conceiving that two and two should really make five. The
barrister said, that if there should be some law of association whereby, whenever
we add two and two an additional unit should be suggested to the mind, then
the sum of two and two would always seem equal to five. Both Mill and the
barrister fail to see that in that case not two and two make five, but two and two
plus the new unit. Here, then, it would seem as if Mill meant to deny the law of
identity. If a theologian should utter such wisdom, no one would hesitate to
pronounce him imbecile; but as no theologian has ever won such glory, let us
recognize the utterance as that of a great and accurate and candid thinker. It
is also suggested by the skeptic that there may be worlds where the law of
causation does not hold. We are quite clear that in those worlds things create
themselves, and vanish into the void whenever they tire of existence. By hy
pothesis, nothing produces an event or change, and yet the event and the change
do come to pass. They arise from nothing, and vanish into it. No one can tell
whence they come nor whither they go. There is no whence and no whither.
Things are and are not, and probably both at once. These propositions again
are just as rational as the denial of causation. If reason be repudiated, there is

Studies in Theology — Appendix. 337
no longer any thing irrational. The one measures the other. The skeptic, then,
ought to stop at nothing in the way of absurdity. There is nothing to forbid any
notion except reason itself; and as the skeptic has victoriously overcome reason,
the road is fully open to any and every whim and superstition. A half-way
skeptic is a sorry sight But the trouble with the propositions we have men
tioned is, that mental palsy results from any attempt to construe them in thought ;
and as long as this is so, we shall hold that skepticism of rational principles is
really credulity or bravado. In either case, it belongs to the department of
mental pathology. ,
But it may be asked, iu mitigation of this severe judgment, did not Kant deny
that rational principles, which are at bottom only rules of mental action, apply in
any way to things in themselves? He did, and thereby destroyed his own
system. He first proved that there are forms of thought which are regulative in
the mental life. This was his great service in philosophy. Then, without any
warrant of any sort, he concluded that these forms were not also valid for things.
In this way he transcended his own premise, which would never warrant any
thing more than doubt. Dogmatic denial is impossible to a consistent Kantian.
In this way, also, he made the Idealism of Fichte a logical necessity. For the
categories he declared to be subjective only. Among these he placed causality
and reality. The denial of the former made his " things in themselves " useless.
They do nothing; they do not even produce phenomena. Hence they account
for nothing, and sink into metaphysical ghosts. By denying the objectivity of
the category of reality, we are forbidden to call "things in themselves" real.
They are then nothing. Phenomena are the only realities, and absolute dogma
tism is reinstalled. Tn short, one cannot become a Kantian without a "thing in
itself," and one cannot remain a Kantian with " a thing in itself." Reason will
always revenge itself upon any theory which limits rational principles to subject
ive application, by denying the irrational reality outright. Such a thing is not
merely the unknowable— it is more, it is the unaffirmable. It was Kant's sub
jectivism which produced the absolute philosophies of Germany. The later forms
of phenomenalism have been constantly pressed with the same difficulty. By
denying that phenomena are proper manifestations of things, and that things can
be truly known through phenomena, they have made things unnecessary for the
explanation of phenomena; and thus phenomena become the only reaUty. Con
sistent phenomenalism must lead to absolutism.

338 Studies m Theology— Appendix.
3XTOTEJ O. IF*. 1S2.
The statement that the reality of knowledge is independent of its extent,
deserves further emphasis. It has been strangely enough assumed, by both be
hever and skeptic, that the reahty of knowledge can be maintained only by prov
ing that aU perceptive beings must see aU things alike. Of course such a proof
is forever impossible, and the skeptic wins an easy triumph. But this question,.
also, must be ruled out as irrelevant. The point is not whether other beings see
things as we do, but whether the powers and relations which we find in them are
really there, independent of our thought. Touch is not contradicted by vision,
though each gives some elements which are impossible to the other. The ques
tion whether angels or animals see things as we do, is a perfectly idle one.
Sextus Empiricus based a skeptical argument on the fact that cat's eyes have
oblong pupils, while men's eyes have round pupils. It will probably be impos
sible for us to teU how cats view things until cats become able to think or speak,
or until we become cats without losing our human faculties. Both events seem
quite unlikely, and the advance of knowledge in that direction is barred. The
attempt to find how angels, or some hypothetical beings, may regard things,
appears equally hopeless. Be it far from us to say what such beings might see
and think. All such suggestions are irrelevant, unless it be claimed that their
knowings contradict ours ; and in that case we should ask, what ground there is
(1) for assuming that these hypothetical beings are real ; (2) for saying that their
knowledge contradicts ours ; and (3) for assuming that, in case of contradiction,
these imaginary beings must be in the right? The last assumption is plainly
gratuitous, for they would not contradict us any more than we Bhould contradict
them ; and hence, after all, we should have to decide the question by appealing
to our own reason. Although this fashion of appealing to imaginary beings, in
the interests of skepticism, has the support of Descartes, it must, nevertheless, be
regarded as unworthy a rational being, because it is both gratuitous and inde
cisive. The fact that the reality of knowledge is independent of its extent also con
tains an explanation of the pretended antithesis of absolute and relative knowl
edge. This antithesis has no meaning from the side of the subject For the
knower there is either certainty or uncertainty concerning a fact or proposition ;
and he may either know it to be true or false, or he may believe it to be true or
false, or he may be in doubt concerning it These are the possible mental states
of the knower, and for him the distinction of relative and absolute has no assign
able meaning. We must, then, seek the meaning of the distinction in the object ;
and here we come upon the following fact : We know things only in relations
either to ourselves or to other things. This perfectly true statement is, then,

Studies in Theology — Appendix. 339
illicitly transformed into another, which is entirely different, namely, that we know
only relations. When something is known to exist as this or that, relations may
also be known to exist between it and other equally known things; but that we
should know the relations of essentiaUy unknown objects is a contradiction in
psychology. Knowledge may go deeper and deeper, but so long as the word
represents any thing inteUigible, it will always consist, not in being the thing
known, but in forming conceptions about the thing. Such a deepening of knowl
edge would not displace what we know, but only extend it. Even in the realm
of rational principles, it is possible that our knowledge does not reach the ulti
mate. They lie in our mind as mutually independent data. The law of identity,
or of causation, carries with it no necessity that the mind should also have an
intuition of space. The understanding is conceivable apart from the moral
nature. This mutual independence in our experience leads the mind to surmise
that in the ultimate ground of being there may be an interdependence of these prin
ciples, so that aU may flow from one root. German philosophy has made great
efforts to show such a relation, but the success has not been great. But if such
a relation existed, it would not in any way affect the validity of rational principles :
we should only have a deeper knowledge. Theoretical mechanics has advanced
through successive generalizations until the whole science is reduced to an inter-
pre tat ion of a single principle ; but no knowledge is disturbed by the advance.
In like manner, if space were found to be only a form of manifestation, our knowl
edge of space would remain just as it is. The science of space relations would
continue to be valid : we should only discover that there is something deeper
than space, and not that space is delusion. The current thought that the ideality
of space implies that space is merely a human delusion, is one of the many mis
understandings found in the popular speculations. That doctrine denies that God
is limited in any way by space, as if space were a thing like other things ; but it
does not deny him a knowledge of space relations, as if something in the world
of the thinkable were unknown and unknowable to the Source of aU thought and
knowledge. Again, with regard to things, a deeper knowledge does not discredit real
knowledge. If it should turn out that the chemical elements are compound, it
would leave our present knowledge where it is. A profounder insight into their
structure would not overturn their known laws. Where, then, is the opposition
between absolute and relative knowledge ? The true antithesis is that of more
or less, and not that of relative and absolute. Absolute knowledge is greatly to
be desired, and its unattainability is a great loss, no doubt ; but stiU a large re
ward might be safely offered for any definition of it which would not reduce
either to an unintelligible chimera or else to exhaustive knowledge. But no one
ever claimed an exhaustive knowledge of any thing for any finite mind.

340 Studies in Theology — Appendix.
NOTE ID- I3- 190.
" The human mind is practical rather than speculative. It lives and acts and has
experiences long before it speculates and theorizes. In its practical unfoldings it ad
justs itself in a measure to the universe, but in a still greater measure, it adjusts the
universe to itself. In so doing, it makes a great variety of practical postulates and
assumptions which are not logical deductions, but a kind of modus vivendi which
the mind has established with the great world of things. The mind does not ask
whether it has a right to live, but it lives, and in living it develops a frame-work
of principles which represent the conditions of its fullest life. It has not time to
speculate — it assumes. It has not time to theorize— it takes for granted. The
pressure of practical existence is upon it, and it must adjust itself practicaUy be
fore it can attend to speculative problems. Thus man did not begin by inquiring
into the implications of ethical existence, and by settUng all the metaphysical
difficulties involved therein, but he began by being ethical, and by implicitly
assuming all that that implies. He did not know that he had a right to be
ethical, but found himself such. He did not resolve the metaphysical puzzle in
the notion of freedom, but he found himself compelled to regard himself and his
fellows as responsible, and hence as free. Likewise man did not begin by
demonstrating the possibility and obligation of religion, and by proving that the
object and relation which it implies exist, but he began by being religious and by
assuming those objects and relations. They were implied in being religious, and
he was as sure of them as he was of his religion. No more did man begin by
¦theories of knowledge and by ranting all skeptics and agnostics; but he began
by knowing as a matter of course. No one can hope to understand the mind
who regards it as a logic machine. It is rather a living organism, with manifold
interests and necessities; and without thought of logic it proceeds to assimUate the
universe to them. The result is an outgrowth of beliefs which are the outcome,
not of logic, but of life. They are not reasoned truths, but represent the tenden
cies of our nature, or a mental concordat of existence.
"These considerations, however, only refer to the origin of belief, and do not
establish its truths. We may allow that belief has a highly complex genesis,
which admits of no very clear presentation ; but we must not affirm that there
fore belief has no accountability to logic. That men do believe does not prove
that they have a right to believe. Hence after the genesis of a belief has been
described, its truth remains an open question. It is, therefore, the province of
logic to go through the luxurious growths of credulity and cut down such as can
not prove their right to live. This brings us to the distinction between the causes
and the grounds of belief, and raises the question, What constitute the grounds
of behef?

Studies in Theology — Appendix. 341
" This question, also, can best be answered by observing the actual procedure of
the mind. Beliefs fall into two classes, which are psychologically very different.
Beliefs of the first class are those which are deduced from facts, either as their
explanation or as their consequences. They are not knowledge, because they do
not compel acceptance, but they may be rational, because the probabilities are in
their favor. Scientific theories are examples, and so are the manifold assump
tions and expectations which make up what we call common sense. A physicist
believes in the ether, or a chemist believes in the atoms because the phenomena
seem to call for the assumption. A man says, " I think it will rain to-morrow ; "
or, " I think there wiU be a financial crisis or a European war before long." AU of
these beliefs have a double peculiarity. First, they are founded on objective facts,
and are offered either as explaining the facts or as resulting from them. Second,
their strength varies directly with the objective evidence. If new facts are
found which do not fit easUy into the scientific theory, doubt begins. If the
clouds grow thinner or the barometer rises, we are not so firm in our expectation
of rain. If we hear that the crops are turning out better than we expected, we
begin to think of postponing the crisis. All such beliefs belong to the realm of
probability, that is, our belief rises and falls with the amount of objective evi
dence. We take aU the facts into account, and our belief is the resultant
average. Beliefs of the second class are not founded on objective facts, but are
subjective interests, and express only subjective interests or postulates. They are
not inferences from given facts, either as their explanation or as their conse
quence. They are rather the implication of our nature itself, or its reaction
against our total experiences. They are also psychologically different from the
preceding class of beliefs, in that they are not matters of probability, and our
conviction does not rise and fall with each new fact experienced, but only with
the intensity of the emotion which produced it. In the realm of probabUities
opposing facts weaken belief, but here they are set aside as something not under
stood, and do not weaken our faith.
" The belief in God illustrates both classes of belief, as it is really a compound of
both. Theistic faith has a double root in our mental life. First, God appears as a
hypothesis to explain the facts of experience, or to satisfy the demand of the
reason for a sufficient cause. As thus conscious theism belongs to the realm of
probabUities, and our faith should vary directly as the evidence. Second, God ap
pears as the impUcation of our esthetic, moral, and religious natures, or as satisfy
ing certain subjective interests, tendencies, and emotions. From this stand-point,
our faith in God is less an inference than a volition ; or rather, it is an act of pure
faith, which varies with no estimate of probabilities, but only with the strength of
the feeling which produced it. When these feelings are very strong the faith is
called an intuition, and the proposal to prove the Divine existence by argument

342 Studies its Theology— Appendix.
is derided as needless, and perhaps resented as sacrilege. Every step toward
argument is viewed as a step away from that being apprehended of God, in which
only he can be fuUy known. Sometimes this exalted state of feeling is erected
into a special organ, or faculty, which is the true medium of spiritual vision or of
divine revelation. But apart from these extravagances, theistic faith cannot be
understood without taking account of its double sense. Most writers on natural
theology have theoretically recognized only the argumentative source of theism.
They proposed to demonstrate the existence of God, or at least to render it ration
ally probable,* by an objective consideration of facts. Their apparent success is
largely due to a verbal identification of the being reached by their argument with
the living God of Christianity. Where power and skiU in a somewhat indefinite
degree have been made probable, this has been viewed as a proof of the divine
existence in a religious sense. The esthetic demand for perfection and the moral
and religious nature come in so naturally and spontaneously to expand this pure
result into a divine ideal that the flaw in the logic is overlooked. That this is so
especially appears from the statement of the problems of evil and of the divine
goodness. A purely objective study of the facts, without any admixture of sub
jective interests, would certainly stop short of the conception of God, as divine,
self-centered omnipotence, and perfect holiness and goodness. Such a study would
aim only to find a causal explanation of the facts, and it cannot be shown that
only a perfectly good and aU-powerful being would be a sufficient cause. The
argument for the divine holiness and goodness is based partly on the happiness of
sensitive beings, but mostly on the moral nature of man. These facts, it is said,
demand a moral and benevolent cause. Unfortunately, the argument rests on
picked facts, and ignores the rest But over against the facts of happiness are
the facts of misery, and these are neither few nor insignificant They cannot be
shown to be due to any eternal truths of reason, or to any ontological necessity.
So far as we can see, they are contingent upon an order which might have been
otherwise to advantage. Likewise over against the facts of man's moral nature
are those features of the cosmic process which make against all our ideas of right
eousness. If not positively opposed to morality, the world-order is at least
awfully indifferent to our moral ideals. To such an extent is this true, that the
common judgment of the race has been that a future life is absolutely necessary
to serve the divine justice and the divine goodness. Manifestly, the divine good
ness cannot be concluded from these facts, and yet they belong to the facts which
must be taken into account to a purely causal explanation. If such an explanation
only were needed, an epicurean indifference to finite well-being, or an element of
moral caprice in the first cause, would be an adequate hypothesis. They are not
rejected because they are metaphysically inadequate, but because they are esthet-
icaUy and religiously obnoxious. We demand an explanation which shaU satisfy

Studies ln Theology — Appendix. 343
the conscience as well as the intellect. Accordingly, we interpret the first cause
morally; and the facts which make against this view are set aside as something
not understood. We believe in a solution whose probabUity we cannot now com
prehend. Hence the chief strength of the argument for the divine goodness is
devoted to showing that the fact of evil and suffering are not incompatible there
with. If we have the idea, we may hold it fast even in the face of the world's
pain and sorrow and sin ; but the positive sense of the idea is not to be found in
any aetiological study of the facts of existence, but rather in the unwillingness to
be put to any such moral and rational confusion as would result from allowing a
fundamentally immoral, capricious, or malignant God. Hence the claim often made
by Christian writers, that speculative arguments for the existence of God are relig
iously worthless, though exaggerated is not without some justification. Tie
same fact appears also in the development of Christian theology. The necessity
of finding a conception of God which should be satisfactory to our moral nature
has been the great spring of theological progress. Our conceptions both of God
and of human destiny have been greatly modified by this fact ; and the result has
been the abandonment of many views which were logical enough, but which did
violence to conscience. These facts in the natural history of belief show that
belief is by no means always born of a logical contemplation of facts with the
aim of discovering either their causes or their consequences, but that it is often an
experience of the entire soul in which each tendency of our nature aims to assert
for itself its proper field and object
" But these considerations only show that there are two sources of belief: first,
the objective study of facts ; and, second, the subjective interests and tendencies
of the soul itself. They do not decide, however, their relative, logical worth.
On this point, too, there is a very considerable argument among thinkers, that
beliefs of the second class must be rejected as wishes turned into assertions, or
a3 hopes which have mistaken themselves for truths. Sentiment of no sort must
be aUowed to influence us in deciding what to believe. There is stiU a difference,
however, among those who hold this view as to what the facts are upon which
objective beliefs shall be based. Some hold that the moral and religious nature is
a fact which points to God as its only adequate explanation. That the conscience
seeks after God as its implication and support proves nothing. That rehgion in
man only implies an object, and faUs into contradiction without it, also proves noth
ing. But the existence of conscience and religion demands an explanation, and
this must finally be found in God. Others, however, wUl not allow such a sug
gestion until aU the resources of the associated psychology have been exhausted;
and as these are supposed to be inexhaustible, we may well believe that both con
science and rehgion have a much less august origin. Accordingly, they are un-
wUling to recognize any thing as ground- of-belief senses. These give us the

344 Studies in Theology — Appendix.
world of facts, of experiment, observation, and verification. Whatever can be de
duced from them is knowledge; whatever they make probable is rational belief;
whatever falls outside of these lines is fable, fiction, falsehood." — Bourne.
Having now found the differentiations between knowledge and belief, and having
determined the grounds and relative value of each as to thevalidity of their con
tents, we are prepared to compare and test our religious beliefs, aud decide how far
they have a right to maintain their existence.
It is common among a certain class of minds to decry religious beliefs as "old
wives' fables," and mere dreams of superstition and ignorance; and there is, 1
think, a general assumption among Christians themselves, in common with others,
and even with theologians, that the religious beliefs do not rest on the same
kind of grounds as ordinary rational beliefs do. They are supposed to spring up
in the mind as a sort of spontaneous growth, without any exercise of the rational
powers ; or to be the irrational offspring of unsupported authority, and when inr
terrogated they are supposed to be dumb as to the reason, or a reason which sup
ports their existence ; and, in the absence of any reason, to persist even against
proof to the contrary. I think the manner in which the subject is sometimes
treated even by theologians of repute justifies this view. There is a tacit assump
tion that the call for evidence is in a measure disloyal to faith. It is even some
times assumed that to question is a sin ; and it is boldly declared, that with
regard to the most fundamental questions proof is impossible.
What are the facts in the case, and what is the true ground to be taken ? There
is scarcely a more important question before the age than this — precisely what is
the present state of the religious problem? How do religious beliefs arise? Have
they ground for continuance? Is there any thing in them which men of intelli
gence ought to respect ? or, should they be treated with indifference or contempt,
or be brushed away with a sneer ? Has tbe reason a right to set up a demand
for content in every case ; or, may a belief exist of right without the consent of
reason, or even where the reasons are adverse ?

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