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WORKS OF RANDOLPH S. FOSTER, I

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Studies in Theology —V

GOD

NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES

RANDOLPH S. FOSTER, D.D., LL.D.
in
A Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church

npos TO <J>S22

NEW YORK: EATON & MAINS
CINCINNATI: CURTS & JENNINGS
1897

Copyright by
EATON & MAINS,
1897.

to

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TT&t

Eaton & Mains Press,
150 Fifth Avenue, New York,

PREFATORY STATEMENTS.

In a former treatise by the author, the second volume in
the series of Studies in Theology, it was shown that the out
come of rational thought is the certainty of the existence of an
eternal personal Cause as ground and source of the universe.
In that discussion the sole aim was to educe evidence in support
of that position. The argument necessarily involved statements
and reasonings which in a general way have bearings on the
deeper questions of the nature and attributes of that causal Be
ing. The existence of a first cause, and the nature and attri
butes of the Being who is that first cause, are closely related
subjects ; but they are also distinct, and require distinct treat
ment. The present volume is occupied wholly with the second
question. In the former discussion the argument was educed
from nature — the cosmos was alone interrogated. In the dis
cussion now to be conducted nature and revelation will jointly
furnish the materials of the argument and conclusion ; and it
will be shown that, while each in its own way contributes its
specific material, the two lead to precisely the same finding.
What revelation affirms of the nature and attributes of God is
found to be implicit in the Creator of the universe.
It will be of service to the reader to reexamine, if within his
reach, the treatise on Cosmic Theism before taking up the
discussions conducted in this volume. The two discussions are
so related that neither is complete without the other ; but lest it

vi Prefatoby Statements.
may not be convenient to recur to the former treatise some
points of essential bearing are repeated here with sufficient full
ness to preserve the completeness of the argument.
The present discussion proceeds upon the conceded grounds
that God is not an object of immediate cognition either as to
being, nature, or attributes. He does not appear at all, either
initially or at any time, as an object of perception. Reason
sees him only as he is mediated as ground of phenomena of
persons and things. Thus he is discovered by the reason as
existing, and thus his attributes become known. Revelation
adds its light, but never contradicts these primary outgivings of
the intelligence itself.
Cause is as fully known by the effects which it produces as
if the Being who is cause were an immediate object of cognition.
Since our knowledge of God concededly comes thus through
his works, or through effects of which he is cause, and not by
immediate visions, through his works we must arrive at the
knowledge of his attributes ; but the knowledge thus acquired
is no less real than if he were a direct object of vision in his
substance and essence. In his works he is not seen, but it is
seen that he is the worker. This knowledge is intuitive, imme
diate. The work is seen, and is thus known. The worker is not
seen, but it is seen that he is, and it is seen that he has inherent
in him all the attributes manifested or of necessity required for
the work performed.
The quality of a true science has been denied to theology on
the ground that it rests on the fact of an infinite and absolute
True science Being. This, it is said, can never be matter of
theology. knowledge, and so the whole superstructure must in
the necessity of the case be a superstructure of belief merely,
without warrant of reality of any kind. When theologians and

Prefatory Statements. vii
philosophers present a series of definitions, notions, detailed
propositions, and dogmas with reference to this world of mys
tery, in which the existence, personality, and interior nature of
the absolute and its relation to the finite world are laid down
with a show of systematic precision, and we are asked to accept
this as entitled to rank as knowledge beside the sciences of ob
servation and experience, we are informed that the claim can
not be accepted. "Natural Theology," says one eminent scientific
authority, " is a science falsely so called. ... It seeks to weigh
the infinite in balances of the finite. ... It is to the scientific
man a delusion, to the religious man a snare." "If," says another,
" religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconcilia
tion must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts —
that to us the power the universe manifests is utterly inscrutable."*
" We not only learn by the fruitlessness of all our efforts that
the reality underlying appearances is totally and forever incon
ceivable by us, but we also know why from the very nature of
our intelligence it must be so." f " The office of theology," a
third writer declares, " is now generally recognized as distinct
from that of science. It confesses its inability to furnish knowl
edge with any available data. It restricts itself to the region
of faith, and leaves to philosophy and science the region of
inquiry." %
Now, there is much in this view of the distinctive provinces
of science and religion which we may, without giving up any
thing worth contending for, be ready to admit. If Distinctive
it means merely that the science of religion is not provlnce3 °*
* ° science and
of the same order, dealing with the same class of religion.
objects, and reaching its results by the same method as the
physical sciences — in other words, that it is an inductive science —
this may readily be conceded. For it means no more than this,
* Spencer, First Principles, p. 46. f Lbid., p. 98.
% Lewis, History of Philosophy, p. IT.

Vlll

Prefatory Statements.

that the objects of religious knowledge cannot be perceived by
the senses or generalized out of the facts and phenomena which
sense perceives. It means that God cannot be 6een or touched
or handled, and that by no mere generalization from the finite
could you ever reach the infinite. But if the implied assertion is
that human knowledge cannot transcend the objects which exist
in space and time, and take cognizance of that which eye hath
not seen, nor ear heard, nor imagination in its highest con
structive efforts can conceive, and that theology and specula
tive philosophy, in so far as they pretend "to the possession of
such knowledge, are fictitious and spurious sciences, this is a view
which cannot, without surrender of the most cherished convic
tions, be surrendered. It may be that the labor of countless
thinkers in this province of inquiry has also been labor in vain,
that the intellectual instincts which age after age have attracted
the highest minds to it have been mere illusions, and that the
results they seem to have reached are altogether deceptive
and worthless ; but if this be so, the very extent and persistency
of the delusion demand the most careful scrutiny of the argu
ments of those who claim to have exposed it.
Of the view to which I have now referred, Caird says : " The
limitation of science to things finite, and the impossibility of
any such science as theology, or philosophy of religion, while
held perhaps in a vague and uncritical way by many, has re
ceived its fullest and ablest exposition in the writings of
Herbert Spencer ; and to his treatment of this subject, resum
ing, as it does, the arguments of previous writers, and restating
them with much freshness of thought and fidelity of illustra
tion, I shall in what follows confine myself. His thesis is that
the provinces of science and religion are distinguished from
each other as the known from the unknown and unknowable.
Science deals with ascertained phenomena, their order and rela
tions, and comprehends all knowledge that is definite and posi-

Prefatory Statements. ix
tive. But positive knowledge does not and cannot embrace the
whole possibilities of existence. Every addition to the gradu
ally increasing sphere of science does but bring it into wider
contact with the sphere of nescience, with the unknown and
unknowable background in which lie the origin and explanation
of all things, the unascertained something which phenomena
imply, but do not reveal. Now, this dark, impenetrable back
ground beyond experience is the possession of religion. But the
attitude of mind which alone is possible with respect to this
is not intelligence, but silent reverence for the unknowable ;
and this, Mr. Spencer maintains, is the common essence of all
religions, and that which gives to religion the widest and purest
sphere of action. The more completely our notion of the
unknown reality is purified from earthly analogies, from an
thropomorphic conceptions and images — the more, in short, we
approximate to the state of simple awe before the altar of the
Unknown and Unknowable, the nearer do we come to the
perfect ideal of religion.
" The grounds on which this thesis is maintained are two
fold. Human intelligence can be proved to be incapable of
any absolute knowledge, (1) empirically, by pointing out that
every attempt to press our knowledge beyond certain limits,
every ultimate conception, religious or scientific, which we try
to frame, gives rise to ' alternative impossibilities of thought ; '
(2) rationally, by an examination of the nature of human in
telligence, which issues in a demonstration of the relativity of
all human knowledge. The empirical or intuitive proof, how
ever, when closely examined turns on the same principle with,
and is resolvable into, the deduction. I shall treat, therefore,
mainly of the latter.
" Mr. Spencer here adopts and carries to its logical results
the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, which, de
rived, as it is supposed, from Kant, has been reproduced in

x Prefatory Statements.
this country, with special application to theology, by Sir Wil
liam Hamilton and Mr. Mansel. It is, in substance, this : that
inasmuch as to think is to ' condition,' to think or know the
' unconditioned,' or the infinite and absolute, would be simply to
think the unthinkable. ' Infinite ' and ' absolute ' are merely
terms expressive of the negation of the conditions under which
thought is possible. Take the first of these terms : The very
nature of thought implies distinction, and therefore limitation.
A thing can only be thought of by being distinguished from
other things, defined as possessing what others lack, lacking
what others possess. But the infinite cannot be thus limited,
and is therefore unthinkable. ' A consciousness of the infinite
necessarily involves a self-contradiction, for it implies the
recognition by limitation and difference of that which can only
be given as unlimited and indifferent.' Take the other term,
the absolute, and the same incompetency of thought will be
seen to apply to it ; for thought is only possible as the relation
of the thing thought to the thinker, and an object of thought
can only be known or enter into consciousness in relation to
the thinking subject. All human knowledge is, therefore,
necessarily relative. Things in themselves, as the absolute,
or God as he is in himself, we can never know. ' The conception
of the absolute thus implies at the same time the presence and
absence of the relation by which thought is constituted.' A
science of nature, of man, of all that this finite world contains,
we may have ; but a science of God and things divine is noth
ing less than a contradiction in terms.
" With this proof of the inherent incapacity of human in
telligence to know the absolute Mr. Spencer, however with
what consistency we shall see in the sequel, attempts to com
bine the assertion that we are constrained to believe in the
existence of the absolute, and that we can in a vague manner
not amounting to positive thought, have a certain 'conscious-

Prefatory Statements. xi
ness ' of it. ' Though the absolute,' he says, ' cannot in any
manner or degree be known in the strict sense of knowing, yet
we find that its positive existence is a necessary datum of con
sciousness, and that so long as consciousness continues we
cannot for an instant rid it of this datum? * < Eeality, though
not capable of being made a thought, properly so called, be
cause not capable of being brought within limits, neverthe
less remains as a consciousness that is positive, is not regarded
negative by the negation of kinds.' f
" On the foregoing argument I offer the following observa
tions : First, the two elements of the theory are inconceivable.
It is impossible to hold at once that human intelligence is lim
ited to the finite and that it is cognizant of an existence beyond
the finite ; or, otherwise expressed, that all knowledge is relative
and yet that we know the existence of the absolute. It is,
indeed, easy to understand the genesis of this theory, which
forced the mind of the author to the combination of two ele
ments which, when closely examined, are seen to be contradic
tory. The assertion that man's knowledge is limited to the
finite and relative would have no meaning save by a tacit refer
ence to an infinite and absolute object to which his knowledge
does not extend. When we say that a thing is only a phe
nomenon or appearance, a quality or attribute, we of course
imply that there is something which is not mere appearance,
but reality, not a mere quality, but a substance, with whose
deeper nature we place the former in contrast. In order to
pronounce that we only know phenomena we must needs be
aware that there is something other than phenomena ; we must
know at least of the existence of things in themselves, realities
lying behind phenomena, from the knowledge of which, in the
full sense of the word, our intelligence is debarred. If we
knew no other than finite and phenomenal existences, then we
* Spencer, First Principles, p. 29. f Essays, vol. iii, p. 273.

xii Prefatory Statements.
should never know or be able to characterize them as finite and
phenomenal. To pronounce, in short, that our knowledge is,
in any sense, limited, we must have access to some standard to
which that limited knowledge is referred ; we must be aware,
at least, of the existence of something beyond the limit, which
is to our intelligence inaccessible.
" But, while the two elements — consciousness of the limits of
human intelligence, and consciousness of that which transcends
these limits — are correlative and inseparable, it is impossible,
except by a tour deforce, for a theorist who holds that human
knowledge can ever transcend the finite to bring these two ele
ments together. If we start with the assertion that thought is
by its necessary conditions subjective and finite, or, on the other
hand, that the absolute is only another name for that which is
out of relation to thought, we cannot, save by an act of violence,
drag in a consciousness, in any sense, of the absolute in order to
meet the exigencies of our theory. We cannot, in other words,
deny all consciousness of the absolute in order to maintain that
human knowledge is limited, and in the same breath assert a
consciousness of the absolute in order to justify our cognizance
of that limitation. In so far as the lower animals are devoid of
reason they are unconscious of their irrationality, and it is only
we, in virtue of our rational, intelligent nature, who can dis
cern their lack of it. So, it might be possible for another and
higher intelligence, an observer of human nature possessed of
absolute knowledge, to pronounce that man's knowledge is
purely relative, that there is a region of realities from which
human thought is shut out ; but it is not possible for one and
the same consciousness to be purely relative and conscious of
its relativity. Grant the fundamental assumption of the theo
rist, and it follows that humanity is not only hopelessly igno
rant of reality, but absolutely unconscious of its ignorance." *
* Caird, Philosophy of Religion, vol. i, pp. 10-18.

Prefatory Statements. xiii
subject and attribute.
In the discussion conducted in the following pages we shall
find occasion to use the term subject, as distinguished from at
tribute. It is important that we understand precisely what the
distinction is. For the term subject other terms are frequently
used, as essence, substance, being, nature.
From necessity the mind when it cognizes any object posits
being, that is, substance of it. Thought necessitates one who
thinks; cognition, one who cognizes and that which is cog
nized. If the object of thought be simply an idea, the idea
necessitates a subject whose idea it is; if it be a feeling, it neces
sitates the existence of one who feels ; if of a force, it necessi
tates the existence of that which exerts the force.
By subject we always understand a real being. By attribute
we understand some permanent and essential property or power
which cannot be abstracted and the subject retain its identity.
The attribute is not the subject, but the subject does not exist
without the attribute.
The relations of a subject may change, and it may vary its ac
tivities, and the subject may yet retain its identity ; but an attri
bute pertains in such forms to its essence that if it could be
obliterated the subject itself would become another and differ
ent being or kind of being, or would become extinct. An at
tribute differs from secondary powers, which may not pertain
to a subject, but may be product of habit merely ; it differs
from quality, which may be superinduced by use of attributes ;
and it differs from acts, which are results of exerted attributes.
The nature of a being depends upon its attributes, or vice
versa; the attributes depend upon the nature and are exponen
tial thereof. The being and attributes do not exist apart, that
is, there is not a subject without attributes or attributes with
out a subject ; and yet the attributes are not the subject, nor the

xiv Prefatory Statements.
subject the attributes, but the subject possesses the attributes,
and is not without them ; the attributes are in the subject, not
by it. The mind cannot conceive pure being, that is, subject
simply as such apart from attribute ; nor can it conceive pure
attribute, that is, attribute apart from subject. To conceive at
all, or to propound existence of any kind, it must unite in the
conception and predication subject and attribute.
Shedd thus puts it : " The attributes are not part of the es
sence of which this latter is supposed. The whole essence is in
each attribute and the attribute in the essence. We must not
conceive of the essence as existing by itself and prior to the
attributes, and of the attributes as an addition to it. God is not
essence and attributes, but in attributes. The attributes are
essential qualities of God. Hence Augustine, the schoolman,
Calvin, and Melanchthon say, 'Divinse virtutes sunt ipsa es
sentia.' Turretini (iii, 5-7) remarks that 'attributa dei non
possunt realiter differere ab essentia, vel inter se tanquam res
et res.' " *
That which is not being or substance, by not being a sub
stance is nothing ; and of a pure nothing it is not possible to
predicate attributes, properties, activities, or modes of any kind.
Whenever we affirm existence we predicate of a subject, or of
that which implies a subject.
In every case the attributes determine the nature of the sub
ject. Attributes of one kind show a subject of one kind. No
subject ever directly shows itself. It appears in some manifes-
Attributesde- tation of its attributes. To think the subject we
Sreoitt.e must taink it; under some manifestation of some
subject. attribute, and to describe it we must recite its at
tributes, or some mode of action of its attributes. This is a
universal fact. * Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, p. 334.

Prefatory Statements. xv
" Attributes," says Fleming, " are always real qualities, es
sential and inherent, not only in the nature, but even in the
substance of things. ' By this word attribute,' says Descartes,
in his letter to Regius, ' is meant something which is immova
ble and inseparable from the essence of its subject, as that which
constitutes it' (by this he did not mean creates it, but that
without which it is not), ' and which is thus opposed to mode.''
Thus nnity, identity, and activity are attributes of the soul ; for
I cannot deny them without at the same time denying the
existence of the soul itself. In God there is nothing but attri
butes, because in God everything is absolute, involved in the
substance and unity of the necessary being." *
I quote from Dr. Miley, in his recent excellent work, Sys
tematic Theology. No author has written on the subject in
hand more luminously :
" In a general sense an attribute is anything which may
be affirmed of its subject. This wider sense may include
what is accidental as well as what is essential. In the more
definite sense an attribute is any quality or property which is
intrinsic to the subject, which characterizes and differentiates
it, and by virtue of which the subject is what it is.
" Attribute, property, quality, faculty, power are in common
use much in the same sense, though mostly with some distinc
tion in application. Thus extension, solidity, divisibility are
properties or qualities of body ; intellect, sensibility, will are
faculties or powers of mind ; omniscience^ goodness, omnipotence
are attributes of God. We do not allege an invariable uniform
ity in such distinctions of application, yet we think them com
mon. We certainly do not use the term faculty in application
to either body or God, while it is the common term in applica
tion to the human mind.
" Qualities are neither possible nor thinkable as separate or
* Fleming, Vocabulary of Philosophy, art. " Attribute."

xvi Prefatory Statements.
self-subsisting facts. For both thought and reality body is
more than its properties, mind more than its faculties, God
more than his attributes. Sensationalism or positivism may,
in a helpless agnosticism, be content with the surface of things
or with the merest phenomenalism ; but for deeper thought,
the thought without which there is neither true science nor
philosophy, properties, faculties, attributes must have a ground
in essential being. The necessity is as absolute as that of a
subject to its predicate in a' logical proposition.
" Physical properties must have a ground in a material sub
stance. Reason equally determines for the mental faculties a
necessary basis in mind. For the divine attributes there must
be a ground in essential divine being. Reason is in each case
the indisputable authority. The distinctive sense of being in
God is that it is the ground of his attributes.
" As there is no empirical grasping of essential being, so
there is no such grasping of the connection of attribute and
subject. Even reason cannot know the mode of this connec
tion. But reason can and does affirm it to be most intrinsic.
The connection is in no sense a loose or separable one. Being
is not as a vessel in which attributes may be placed and from
which they may be withdrawn ; not as a ground on which
they may repose as a building upon its foundation or a statue
upon its pedestal, and which may remain after their removal.
The connection must be most intrinsic, so that neither is nor
can be without the other. Being and attribute are separable
in abstract thought, but inseparable in reality. Neither can
exist without the other. While extension must have a basis
in material body, such body must exist in extension. While
intellect must have a ground in mind, mind must have the
faculty of intelligence. In the present conditioning relation
of a nervous organism to the activities of the mental powers
their^ normal working may be interrupted or temporarily sus-

Prefatory Statements. xvii
pended, but they must ever exist potentially in mind, because
necessary to the very notion of mind. In the very being of
God are all his attributes. Without them he would not be
God. " While attribute and being are correlatives of thought and
inseparable in fact, they are separable in abstract thought, and
for clearness of view must be so separated. Only thus can we
attain to the truer notion of attribute and subject respectively,
and in the unity of being." *
MATTER AND SPIRIT.
Attributes determine the nature of the subject, but they do
not preexist and create the subject. They coexist with and
in the essence of the subject. There are two classes of sub
jects in existence, and but two. They are of divers natures,
differentiable and determined by dissimilar and unassimilable
attributes, matter and spirit. The two have nothing in com
mon but existence.
" The two substances, matter and spirit, are wholly diverse,
and have nothing in common, except that each is the base
of certain properties and the ground of certain phenomena.
These properties and phenomena, being different in kind,
prove that material substance and spiritual substance differ
specifically and absolutely. Matter cannot think, and mind
cannot be burned. Spiritual substance is known by its qual
ities and effects. In this respect it is like material substance,
which is cognized only by its qualities and effects. Neither
matter nor mind can be known apart from and back of its
properties. That these are two substances and that each has
its own peculiarity is a common belief of man." f
If we define subject or substance, as Plato does, as " that
* Miley, Systematic Theology, vol. i, p. 159, et al.
f Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, p. 160.

xviii Prefatory Statements.
which possesses any sort of powers to affect another or to be
affected by another," or as " that which has the power of
doing and suffering in relation to some other existing thing,"
which seems to reduce the idea of substance to that of power,
which in fact he says it is, we do not get clear of the idea that
substance is something which exists and has the property of
being — of a that which has power and acts. Indeed, there is
no escape from the idea of a subject so long as we predicate
of a power, or an act, or a possibility merely. Entity underlies
all, and entity underlies even the idea itself of power, for the
idea does not and cannot exist without an entity which has it.
We are so accustomed to think of substance as something that
is solid, tangible, visible, figured, that to most minds unaccus
tomed to close and critical thinking it is difficult to conceive
of substance, or real being of any kind, which does not mani
fest itself in these forms. Positivism, or " dirt philosophy,"
boldly declares that that which does not disclose itself to the
senses directly is nothing. It is admitted that- spirit substance
does not so disclose itself, cannot. It is therefore, according
to this philosophy, nothing. Even matter itself, reduced to
its ultimate, the atom, becomes invisible and intangible, and
ceases to manifest itself in any way to sense by any aid in our
reach. Aggregation reveals it, and discloses the fact that ex
tension is fundamental to it ; it is a substance of which exten
sion is an inseparable attribute ; but which neither in the
atom nor in any aggregation or composition discovers intelli
gence or self-determination as belonging to itself. There are
those who doubt the existence of any such substance — ideal
ists ; but the doubt is possible only to a few minds.
Like matter reduced to its primary forms, spirit is a sub
stance which is not cognizable by any sense ; but unlike matter

Prefatory Statements. xix
there is no process by which it can become cognizable to sense,
and unlike matter it is a substance which discloses itself as ex
isting, but not as extended, but as intelligent and self-deter
mined, by effects which it produces and by self-consciousness.
The proof of its real existence is more direct and conclusive
than the proof of the existence of matter, if it be possible
that there are degrees in the strength of proofs which alike
compel conviction.
Dr. Shedd has well remarked on this point : " The Westmin
ster Confession " (and so do all Christian creeds) " defines God
to be a most pure Spirit, without body, parts, or passions."
These qualifying clauses define, so far as is possible, the idea of
spiritual substance. The invisibility of spirit, as previously re
marked, would not itself differentiate it from matter and mate
rial nature. The forces of gravity, the chemical forces, elec
tricity, magnetism, and the like, are as invisible as God himself
or the soul of man. Heat, according to the ancient theory, is
the invisible motion of invisible molecules. There is an invis
ible ground of the visible and tangible. Back of the world of
ponderable physics, which we apprehend by the five senses,
there is an unseen world which is natural still, not moral ; phys
ical still, not spiritual. Who ever saw, or ever will see, that
principle of life of which outward and material nature is but the
embodiment or manifestation % When we have stripped the
visible world of its visibility and ponderability, and have re
solved it into unseen forces, we have not reached any higher
sphere than that of nature and matter." *
In saying that God is a pure Spirit, and is " without body,
parts, or passions," a definite conception is conveyed by which
spirit and matter are sharply distinguished ; not because one is
invisible or unapproachable by sense, but because matter may
have bodily form and be divisible, and be wrought on by other
* Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, pp. 163, 164.

xx Prefatory Statements.
ponderables. But none of these characteristics can belong to God
or any spirit ; the predicables of the one case never, under any
circumstances, become the predicables of the other ; there is an
absolute and immutable difference between the attributes of
the two natures.
A most fundamental distinction between spirit and matter is
noted by Cud worth, in his great discussion, The True Intellectual
System of the Unwerse. " There are," he says, " two kinds
of substance in nature : the first, extension or magnitude, really
existing without (that is, exterior to) the mind, which is a thing
which hath no self -unity at all in it, but is infinite alterity and
divisibility, as it were mere outside and outwardness, it having
nothing within, nor any other action belonging to it, but only
locally to move when it is moved ; the second, life and mind,
or the self -active, cognitive nature, an inside being, whose action
is not local motion, but an internal energy within the substance
or essence of the thinker himself or in the inside of him." Dr.
Shedd, from whom I take quotation, adds with great pertinence :
" Material substance is moved ab extra / spiritual substance is
moved ab intra, that is, is self-moved. This is, perhaps, the
most important distinction between mind and matter. Mind
moves voluntarily ; matter is moved mechanically." *
Clearly nothing is more plain than that the two positions taken
are correct, namely, that there is invincible ground for the dis
tinction between subject and attribute, and that two kinds of
subjects or substances are known to us which are fundamentally
different, neither possessing any attribute which is possessed by
the other.
"As the notion of essential being is conditioned on some
knowledge of properties, so the notion of a distinction of sub
jects must be through some known distinction of properties.
As an attribute requires a subject, so it requires a subject
* Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, p. 168.

Prefatory Statements. xxi
answering in kind to its own distinctive quality. The latter re
quirement is as absolute as the former. For the two kinds of
facts classed as the properties of body and the faculties of mind
reason must imperatively determine essentially distinct and dif
ferent subjects. Empirical science can allege nothing of any
weight against this position. It may gratuitously deny any real
distinction between the two classes of facts or assert the iden
tity of the mental with the physical ; or it may pronounce for
agnosticism in respect to the nature of matter, and then by the
covert assumption of a most pretentious gnosticism proclaim a
new face of matter which accounts for the facts of mind. No
assumption could be more gratuitous, no assertion more ground
less. It is a dogmatizing which would shame the method of the
most positive theology. Reason is still the decisive authority.
While a material ground can answer for the properties of body,
only a spiritual ground can answer for the faculties of mind.
The divine attributes must have their ground in spiritual being."
Though there is a real distinction between subject and attri
bute, the human mind has no power to discern pure subject ; it
can only see the subject by way of its attributes. The attri
bute, like the essence, does not appear to any sense, Subject only
but becomes known to reason by external signs of j,^rn™£.
its presence, and by the same signs discovers the ex- tributes.
istence of the subject ; it does not even know itself as subject,
except through its attributes in visible manifestation in effects.
Pure being is not subject of pure cognition. It cannot even
be conceived. To bring any object en rapport with our finite
faculties it must report itself in some mode of phenomena —
some attribute or property or quality must project itself upon
us in effects. Thus the object or subject becomes known and
takes form in thought. It is a law of mind, that is, an abso
lute necessity, that when brought into contact with phenomena
of any kind it should posit some underlying subject. It is

xxii Prefatory Statements.
compelled to assert that the phenomena are phenomena of
something. Through the phenomena the mind reaches the idea
of substance, and proceeds to determine the kind of sub
stance. Dr. Pope says truly : " What is true of all the objects
of our knowledge is true also of the Highest. Save in his
qualities and attributes God is not revealed to his creatures.
The Eternal unclothed in these is not a definite object of
thought at all. On the other hand, the entire divine essence is
made known in his qualities predicated of it." * The truth of
this position will appear if we consider how we became aware
of any existence. We know as a fact that we are conversant
with phenomena. The phenomena which we discover are
phenomena of the self and of the not self. Of the self the
phenomena are those of feeling, thought, volition. These are
caused in us by the impingement upon us in some form of ob
jects which are of the not self. Those objects do not discover
themselves to us in their essence, but in their phenomena. The
immediate result is self -consciousness, which gives us the knowl
edge of the self, or is self-cognition. The knowledge so ac
quired is that we who are so affected have essential being. We
are compelled to posit ourselves as affected. But we are no
more compelled to posit ourselves, as real beings, than we are
compelled to posit that behind the phenomena which affect us
there is real substance. This arises from a law of mind.
But now how do those phenomena of self and not self dis
cover to us another Being of which they are not phenomena?
how do Pne- We say of which they are not phenomena, for the
nomena dls- x '
cover God? phenomena of the self and of the not self are not
phenomena of God's essence or being. There are no phenomena
of these. God's essence never appears, not even the essence of
* Com. of Theology, vol. i, p. 287.

Prefatory Statements. xxiii
the self or not self, but is simply a predicative of the reason
as a necessary implication of the phenomena. God certainly
does not appear as the subject of the phenomena which we
behold; that is, the phenomena of the sensible object and of
the self are not phenomena of God. In them he does not ap
pear as subject. How then do we arrive at the knowledge of
him through these phenomena ? The answer is that we are
compelled to posit a cause of the existence of the self and of the
not self. This is a demand of the reason as absolute and uni
versal as the demand that phenomena shall have a subject as
their ground. Thus God emerges as cause of the self and not
self. The phenomena which do appear show him as cause of
the things whose phenomena affect us, that is, as the cause of
the self and not self. He does not emerge in our knowledge
as an immediate object of cognition, either as to his essence
or attributes, any more than the self and not self so emerged,
but he emerges in the reason as cause of the entire effect.
But if he does not appear in his essence he must appear
in his attributes, which are employed in producing the
effect. What are the attributes which appear in the effect ?
Reason compels the answer (a) that as phenomena point to a
real substance, so cause points to a real Being ; {b) that the
real Being who is cause of all must himself be eternal and
uncaused ; (c) that as causation implies power he must be a
Being in whom power inheres ; (d) that as the effect shows
knowledge and wisdom he must be a Being that is wise and
knowing ; (e) that as the effect shows ethical quality he must
be a moral Being. Thus the attributes which emerge in the
effect compel us, by the same law of mind which compels us to
posit substance behind phenomena, to posit substance behind
these attributes which appear in the effect. As the self and the
not self are substantial beings manifested by phenomena, God
is also a substantial Being who manifests himself in effects.

xxiv Prefatory Statements.
The effects, in showing his attributes, show us what kind of a
Being he is. CREATORSHIP.
In revelation creatorship is ascribed to God. The universe
furnishes in itself proof that it was created. Revelation de
clares what kind of a being God is, and points out certain
attributes which inhere in his nature and are of his essence.
The universe declares to reason that the Being who created it
must, in nature and attributes, be identical with the Being
thus posited in revelation.
It is quite important that we fix the meaning of the term
create. Creation differs from emanation.* Emanation means
to flow from, an effluence from a substance, and involves sim
ilarity of essence. According to several systems of philosophy
and religion which have gained greater or less prevalence, all
the beings of which the universe is composed, whether matter
or spirit, have proceeded from and are parts of the divine Be
ing or substance. This doctrine of emanation found expres
sion in the systems of Zoroaster, the Gnostics, and Neoplatonists.
It still exists in modified form in modern pantheistic thought.
Creation differs from evolution, which, in its absolute form,
supposes the universe to be evolved from eternally existing
matter and inhering forces, but in a modified form allows that
possibly evolution is a mode of creation — a method in which
God produced and is still modifying cosmic facts. It is ad
mitted by those who hold the theory that it may be either
atheistic or theistic. It is the popular fancy of a class of sci
entists. " Creation is not production from any previously extant sub
stance. It is not a modification of an eternal material sub
stance. * See Creation: God in Time and Space, by the author.

Prefatory Statements. xxv
"The old theologians distinguished between the first and
second acts of creation : the first, the creation from nothing,
indicated in Gen. i, 1, 2 ; the second, the work of the six days,
bringing all into shape and order, and implying, what is per
haps correct, a distinction between the creation of the prime
material and its specific arrangement and organization."*
Pantheism has assumed two forms, both and equally contra-
dictive of the Scripture idea of creation : (a) that there was a
primordial condition of eternally existing matter which uncon
sciously grew into cosmic order and developed into conscious
ness ; (b) that spirit, not matter, is primitive, but spirit was un
conscious and unintelligent, containing tendencies merely, — a
sort of impersonal or semipersonal affections, longings, uneasi
nesses — which developed matter and the material universe
without intending it; and with a growing intelligence in it
self there came orderly forms, and finally intelligence and self-
consciousness, f
Creation denies the eternity of the universe, whether cosmic
or atomic. " The cosmic form of the theory as anciently held
taught that the cosmos itself, that is, the organized world,
with all its phenomena as to form, order, relation, law, and in
fluence which we now behold, had existed from eternity.
There never has been chaos or noncosmos. This view is at
tributed to Aristotle. He, indeed, like Plato, speaks of un
formed matter; but according to his fundamental principle
this could only exist in conception, never in fact." %
Over against all these and all other possible theories of the
origin of the universe creationism affirms that a personal God,
who alone is eternal, by an exercise of power raised all things
?Smith, System of Christian Theology, p. 92.
f See Lord's Christian Theology, p. 206.
\ See Lord's Christian Theology, p. 204 ; also Dollinger's GentUe and Jew, vol. i,
p. 334 ; also Shedd's Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, pp. 462-626, the entire chapter-
exhaustive and valuable.

xxvi Prefatory Statements.
into existence. This is the biblical theory.* It is also the
theory to which reason is compelled to come. It matters
nothing that we cannot conceive how power can create ; we are
compelled to assent that it has created. The instrumental
forces with which we are familiar, by which changes are
wrought, have no such power. The direct force or power of
which we are the conscious possessors is inadequate to any such
result. But that the Eternal by a volition raised out of non
existence all things we are under a rational necessity to admit.
He not only raised the structure of the universe, inorganic and
organic, from foundation to finial, but he created the substance
itself. " He spake, and it was done ; he commanded, and it
stood fast."
The properly creative act was the production of the substances
of the universe. The formation of matter into various colloca
tions is sometimes and very properly styled a secondary creation,
not simply because it is subsequent, but because it is in great
measure effected by instrumental or secondary causes concreted
in the created substances, or exerted in them — called material
forces or agents, but really divine energizings. It is sometimes
affirmed that proper primary creation as here defined is impos
sible, as implying a contradiction of the ancient and, properly
understood, impregnable maxim, Ex nihilo nihil fit; but this
arises from a misinterpretation of the maxim. It assumes the
meaning of the maxim to be that there is no power which can
confer existence. Were that true it would necessarily fol
low, indeed, it would in effect be the direct affirmation, that
whatever is must be eternal. The meaning of the maxim is
not that ; but it is this, that from nothing it is impossible any
thing should come ; that is, had there once been nothing in
existence there never could have been any existence. The
*Gen. i, 1; Col. i, 16 ; John i,3; Heb. xi, 3; Psalm xix, 1; cxxiv, 8; Heb.
iii, i ; Acts xvii, 24.

Prefatory Statements. xxvii
maxim so understood is impregnable. But given a Being of in
finite power, creation is not causeless effect. If it were true
that creation is impossible, the assumption of it and inferences
derived from it as to the nature of the cause would be ground
less. It is necessary, therefore, to clear the point before passing
to the argument.
The doctrine of creation ex nihilo is not only clearly the
doctrine of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, but it is orig
inal to them. It was either unknown or directly CTeMon ex
contradicted by all the ancient cosmogonies. The nMo-
eternal existence, or chaos of matter, was the common founda
tion of all their theories. Plato, Aristotle, Philo, and all the
schools of philosophy held substantially this view. When they
seemed to affirm creation it was always a creatio mediata, ex
praeexistente materia, and not immediata. They did not be
lieve in the production of matter itself from nothing. God,
with them, was merely a builder, not the creator, of the world.*
The germs of modern evolutionism are transmitted from these
ancient sources, and without improvement in their more scientific
form. If they do not wholly dispense with God, they construct
the universe by the operation of natural forces, and in their
most objectionable forms as completely displace him as did the
older materialists, reducing him to a mere demiurge, or possible
factor in and with matter, rather than a creator. Development
theories, spontaneous generation, pantheistic conception, and
kindred fancies have the same origin or remote parentage — of
eternal matter with a possible copartner in the formation of the
cosmos. Absolute creation, if not formally denied, finds no
necessary place in any of them, and is in effect left out as a
working idea.
The Bible alone presents the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
* Vide Knapp, Christian Theology, chap, ii, sec. 47 ; also Shedd, Dogmatic Theol
ogy, vol. i, p. 464.

xxviii Prefatory Statements.
Its account of origins is succinctly expressed in a single phrase,
which has the majesty of a maxim and also the impregnability
of a primary truth of reason : " In the beginning God created
the heaven and the earth." That the creation here predicated
refers to the material substance of the entire universe is found
in the fact that the detailed account of the process goes on to
show that the fashioning of the substance into an orderly cos
mos follows the creative act, and is not called a creation, but a
making up or arrangement. He first created, then arranged.
This is a most important and surprisingly delicate discrimina
tion, considering the brevity of the statement. Both acts are
ascribed to God, but they are not only different, but imply rad
ically discriminate modes of action which have come to be of
great and fundamental significance.
The primal act was the creation of the material substance of
the universe, that is, the causing it to exist, the only proper
idea of creation. In the creative act nothing comes between
the effect and the cause. The effect is product of an immedi
ate exercise of the power of the cause. There is not a subject
in which, or, in any way, by means of which, the creative
power is exercise, deflecting a change of some kind, but the
creative power produces the subject itself.
The precise posture of the case is that until the Creator acted
he alone existed. There was not a something else for him to
act on, or in, or by, or through, but, as the direct result
of his act, another order of substance, or kind of being,
was raised into existence. After the exertion of his power
there were two kinds of being in existence — Creator and
created; any further action of the Creator must consist in
working changes in the thing created. This mode of action
would be radically different from that which preceded,
and might be by mediate or secondary causation vested in,
the thing created ; that is, the thing created might now

Prefatory Statements. xxix
become a factor in effects of change and construction, as, in
fact, it is ; but not by its own power, but by a power vested
in it, or of which it is media.
To see the full significance of the foregoing statement we
must linger yet for a further expansion. We have said that
the creative act gave existence to the material substance of the
universe, that is, to matter. We find matter existing in vast
masses — worlds. If we should understand by matter these vast
aggregations and collocations, as they are now found, and
thence infer that the creative act which gave matter its exist
ence gave it existence in mass or masses as we find it, which
is no doubt the popular idea, and if we should impute that
idea to the Bible, we must soon discern that both ourselves
and the Bible become entangled in inextricable difficulties.
Masses of matter are not created as masses ; that is, the man
is not created in collocation. Matter is reducible to the atom,
invisible and impalpable, but an entity, or something which
has real substance of being. Masses, all worlds, are com
pounded of these infinitesimal atoms ; the universe is built of
these invisible and impalpable constituents. The atoms are
differentiable among themselves. They are innumerable.
They are impersonal. They are indestructible, save by the
power which created them. They are centers of force. Each
atom is vested in its essence with a definite power of interac
tion on all related or contiguous atoms. Strictly speaking, the
forces which are manifest in matter are not entities created,
but modes of divine efficiency immanent in matter. The es
sence of the atom and its definite force, which is inseparable
from its essence, the force not acting without the atom nor the
atom existing without the force, are unchangeable and incapa
ble of disruption. The forces of all the atoms interacting ac
cording to fixed and immutable laws produce collocations and
masses. Neither the essence of the atom nor the force inher-

xxx Prefatory Statements.
ent is personal or intelligent, but the atom and the force alike
are outcomes of the action of a person, and the action of atoms
upon each other is declarative of an intelligence and person
whose force it is ; the force is not a person, but it is of a per
son, personal. If they are to be viewed as agents they can
only be viewed in a secondary sense. No atom or force, how
ever impersonal, is so removed from the personal agency in and
present with it as to enable it to exist for a moment or achieve
anything which is not under the direction and control of per
sonality. Both the creation of the atom and the collocations
effected by it are traceable to the immediate or mediate agency
of God. Quifacitper alium facit per se*
If the ground held by creationists as here defined be true
there are certain implications which must also be accepted as
true, and it is wise to take note of them, to see whether they
can rationally be accepted. Every theory must be answerable
for all that is implied in it.
Of the maxim, Ex nihilo nihil fit, Shedd says : " It is true
in the sense that nothing comes from nothing, (a) by finite
power; (b) as the material out of which something is pro
duced ; (c) by the mode of emanation, generation, or evolu
tion, because this supposes existing matter. Lucretius lays
down the position (i, 151), Nullam, rem e nihilo gigni divmitus
unguam. The reason which he gives why even by divine power
(divinitus) nothing can be produced from nothing is, that in
this case there could be no need of a seed or egg ; and that,
consequently, everything might be produced out of everything;
men could be originated out of the sea, and fishes and birds out
of the earth. Lucretius does not conceive of the seed or the
egg as created, but as eternal. His reasoning is valid against
pseudo-evolution or evolution defined as ' the transmutation of
* See Cosmic Theism, by the author, pp. 162-226, 255-284.

Prefatory Statements. xxxi
the homogeneous into the heterogeneous.' Everything may
be originated out of everything upon this theory. The ho
mogeneous vegetable may develop into the heterogeneous
animal, the homogeneous animal into the heterogeneous man.
And the process may be downward as well as upward, because
either process is alike the transmutation of a homogeneous
substance into a heterogeneous one. If it were possible by the
operation of merely natural law to convert the inorganic min
eral into the organic vegetable, it would be possible by the same
method to convert the organic vegetable into the inorganic
mineral. The rule would work in both ways. As plausible an
argument might be constructed out of the deterioration and
degradation of some of the human family, to prove that man
may be evolved downward into an anthropoid ape, as that which
has been constructed to prove that he has been evolved upward
from one.
" Spinoza's definition of ' substance ' was intended to exclude
the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. He defines substance as
' that which exists of itself ; ' that is, the conception of which
does not require the conception of anything else. But the con
ception of a creature is the conception of a substance that re
quires another substance to account for it. A created substance,
consequently, is precluded by Spinoza's definition of substance.
Descartes had previously defined the absolute and primary
substance as ' that which so exists that it needs nothing else for
its existence.' But Descartes added a definition of created or
secondary substance, as ' that which requires the concurrence —
concursus — of God for its existence.' . . . Fichte says that ' the
assumption of a creation is the fundamental error of all false
metaphysics and philosophy.' Hegel explains the universe of
matter and spirit as an ' immanent process of God, a material
efflux out from the absolute which is retracted again as an imma
terial spirit.' . . . Kant, on the other hand, asserts that ' the

xxxii Prefatory Statements.
proposition that God, or the universal first cause,- is the cause
of the existence of substance, can never be given up without at
the same time giving up the notion of God as the Being of all
beings, and thereby giving up his all-sufficiency, on which
everything in theology depends.' " *
The maxim, Ex nihilo nihil fit, is false in reference to the
supernatural and omnipotent power of God. The Supreme
Being can originate entity from nonentity. The following are
the characteristics of creation from nothing : 1. Creation had
a beginning. It is not eternal emanation of an eternal sub
stance, or the eternal evolution of an eternal germ. 2. Creation
is optional, not necessary, for God. It proceeds from free
will, and is expressed by fiat. 3. Creation originates another
new substance; but emanation and evolution produce only
modifications of an old and existing substance.
Creation ex nihilo is the only true idea of creation, but the
arranging and building of the universe into an orderly cosmos
is no less ascribable to the immediate power and wisdom of
God than the creation of the substances of which it is built. If
not properly a creative act, it is nevertheless a divine act. The
employment of natural forces primarily created to that end
makes God not only the cause, but the sole cause. It is he that
originates the forces and that determines their effects. They
do not exist without him. They are not accidental properties
of the substances which he creates, which proceed to evolve
collocations and organisms, either fortuitously or intelligently,
but they do precisely what he made them to do, and are power
less to any other effects. The cosmos is his product in all stages
of its development, as really as it would be were each effect the
result of his immediate agency without the atom. The forces
are not natural in the sense of springing from created sub
stances themselves, but are so simply because he has vested
* Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, p. 467.

Prefatory Statements. xxxiii
them, or better yet exerts them, through the creative substance
as a permanent mode in which he works out predetermined
ends. Throughout he is the worker. He is immanent in the
created substances, and they have no existence and no power
apart from him, while they are not parts or modes of his being.
The formation of the universe is properly called a mediate
creation or a secondary process in the creative scheme. The
account of creation uniformly set forth in the Scriptures, be
ginning with the Genesis story, recognizes this fact. There is
an immediate and mediate creation. How completely the uni
verse was formed by the divine fiat at once does not appear.
The nebular hypothesis, which has much plausibility, makes
nothing against that account. For aught that appears, God hav
ing primarily created the atoms and stored them with forces to
that end, the worlds were built through their instrumentality
in infinite ages ; but whether or not, he was the great builder.
The popular theory that the work was immediately com
pleted, the inorganic and organic alike, the text does not re
quire, and science discredits it. That there have been other
immediate creations than the substances of matter and without
the instrumental agency of forces working in matter, is not
only clearly taught in the Bible, but is rationally certain.
Whatever life is, it is an immediate product of divine agency
in its beginnings. This is the dictum of science through its most
accredited representatives. Life is not a spontaneity of mere
matter. It appeared ages removed from the creation of ma
terial substance. Immediate divine agency is necessary to its
production. Later still the entity of human spirits has required a direct
creation. This is required, whichever theory of the origin of
souls, creationism or traducianism, be adopted.

xxxiv Prefatory Statements.
The original mass of matter cannot be accounted for on the
theory of evolution. The mass was created without the media
tion of material forces.
The organic universe was at first instituted by direct divine
power, and now exists through divine agency exerted. But no
act of immediate creation is now necessary to its continuance.*
The world of life is renewed and carried forward through es
tablished instrumentalities, but by the creative agent. Each
new organism is a secondary creation, but it could not have
Ibeen so at the first. Nor must it be supposed that this estab
lished order runs itself or in any way disconnects God as direct
cause from each' individual life. Intermediates are not causes,
but instruments merely. There is one Cause of all things, even
though his agency reaches effects through a thousand various
channels. The great fact stands that the universe was devised, when
it was not, by an infinite mind ; and that when it was
not, it was created from no existing substance, and is being
sustained and carried forward by the same power which cre
ated the substance of matter and spirit which are found in it.
The doctrine of creation, immediate and mediate, or primary
and secondary, is as ancient as any Christian dogma. It ap
pears early in theological writings, and continues throughout
all the controversies which have existed. Augustine clearly
made the distinction in substance. He says : " God created a
chaotic matter that was next to nothing, that is, the most ten
uous and imponderable form of matter. This form of mat
ter was made from nothing before all days; that is, in that
given period marked by the words ' in the beginning.' This
chaotic unformed matter was subsequently formed and ar
ranged." " Creation is divided into prima or immediate, or secunda or

Prefatory Statements. xxxv
mediate. The immediate creation is that which took place
when God first gave existence to all the variety of things,
when before there was nothing. The mediate creation is that
which is seen since the original creation was completed, in the
production of plants, the generation of animate creations, and
the whole natural propagation of the various kinds of beings.
God works since the creation is completed, not immediately,
but generally by means of the powers of nature which he him
self has bestowed and regulated." *
On the subject of mediate and immediate creation Dr.
Hodge says : " While it has forever been the doctrine of the
Church that God created the universe out of nothing by the
word of his power, which creation was instantaneous and im
mediate, that is, without the intervention of any second causes,
yet it has generally been admitted that this is to be understood
only of the original call of matter into existence. Theologians
have, therefore, distinguished between first and second, or
immediate and mediate creation. The one was instantaneous,
the other gradual ; the one precludes the idea of any preexist
ing substance and of cooperation ; the other admits and im
plies both. There is evident ground for this distinction in the
Mosaic account of creation." f
Creation as an effect includes all existences, all beings, and
all cosmic laws and arrangements, both in the spiritual and
material universe. The biblical formulation is, " the heaven
and the earth." " In the beginning God created the heaven
and the earth." The phrase is intended to comprehend all
existence : " the heaven "—all celestial bodies, and all inhab
itants thereof ; " the earth " — the globe and all organic beings
dwelling upon it — all things wherein is life. In many differ
ent phraseologies all existence is ascribed to God. It is im-
* Knapp, Christian Theology, chap, ii, sec. 47.
f Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. i, p. 556.

xxxvi Prefatory Statements.
possible to conceive of any existence without him. The signs
of creaturehood are upon all, from the primitive atom to the
highest organism — mutation and change. God only is eternal.
The thing made declares the maker — not only that he is, but
also shows what he is. There is no other way by which we
can know him than through his works and any word revela
tion he may have given of himself.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

_. _ PAGE
Prefatory Statements  v
God is a Spirit  3
Unity of God  8
Eternity of God  12
God is Absolute, Unconditioned Being  23
God is a Person  37
Freedom of God  48
Moral Nature of God  72
Divine Attributes  81
Omnipresence of God  120
Omnipotence of God   133
Omniscience of God  145
Goodness of God  320
Justice of God  265
Truth a Divine Attribute  274

NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

NATURE OF GOD.

GOD IS A SPIRIT.

lm- are

As seen in the pages immediately preceding, attributes i
ply a substance or subject. Though subject and attribute
inseparable in fact, neither existing without the other, they are
not identical. In thought and in logical order, though not in
being, the subject is precedent and conditioning to the attri
bute — underlies it.
We have seen that there are two kinds of substance, and but
two, matter and spirit. All attributes are attributes of one or
the other of these subjects, substances or essences or natures,
by whatever term the being is designated.
Of the two, we postulate, God, in nature and substance, is
spirit, not matter. This is the categorical statement of the
Bible : " God is a Spirit." The position is affirmed in every
possible form, by implication and assertion, throughout the
Scriptures. No one who has any knowledge of the Bible
doubts that it is the doctrine of the inspired volume. As this
is an undisputed point there is no occasion for supporting it by
adducing further proof. The fact that it is a doctrine of the
Bible may not prove to some minds that it is a true doctrine.
That, therefore, remains to be proved.
We now, therefore, affirm that what is thus taught in the
Scriptures is the necessary outcome of rational thought. This
will appear as we examine the attributes which are requisite to,
and exhibited in, the creation and government of the universe.
The attributes determine the nature of the subject, and the

4 Studies in Theology.
attributes discoverable in the existence and constitution of the
universe declare that its Creator is a spiritual being.
The spirituality of God is denied only by materialists — athe
ists, who deny his existence ; and pantheists, who identify him
with the universe of matter and take from him personality.
For the refutation of these theories the reader is referred to
Cosmic Theism, by the author, where the subject is fully dis
cussed and the theories shown to be, not simply unsupported,
but absolutely irrational, self-subversive, and involving contra
dictory implications which it is impossible should be true.
That God is spirit without body, pure spirit without partici
pation in matter, is proved by the following considerations :
1. He is intelligent. Intelligence is an attribute, not of
matter, but of spirit. This has been disputed by pure volition,
not by reason. No one pretends that there is any proof that
matter has either power to know or will. The proof is posi
tive that it has no such power. To pretend that it has is irra
tional. But there is a subject which manifests these powers
and therefore possesses them. We know of the existence of
such a subject, for we are conscious that we ourselves are such
a subject. We are conscious of power to think and know and
will. The universe is proof that God is such a subject. For
anyone to doubt that He who created the universe, with its
wondrous adaptations and manifold evidences of design, to
gether with the minds which are found in it, is himself intelli
gent, borders so nearly on self-stultification as to render argu
ment inapplicable. Creation implies three things: (a) The
existence of the being who creates ; (b) An archetypal idea of
the thing to be created; (c) Free self-determined forthput-
ting of power by which the effect is produced— each of which
is proof absolute that the Creator is a spiritual being. The
effect is impossible without such a cause. On this point the

God is a Spirit. 5
Bible is explicit ; it not only categorically and without excep
tion affirms that he is spirit, but it also expressly denies to him
any of the properties of matter, and most explicitly that which
is the absolutely fundamental property, without which matter
cannot exist — the property of extension or form. Anthropomor
phic and anthropopathic ascriptions to him of organs, as eyes
and ears, and hands and feet and wings, and other things liken
ing him to man, are well known to be figurative and in accom
modation. Rational thought harmonizes with revelation, in
absolutely refusing to him any of the properties of matter.
Difficult as it is to think a subject without extension, mind
finds itself compelled to affirm such a subject when it thinks
of the Creator of the universe.
2. There is an ethical nature in God. He will do nothing
which his moral nature does not approve. His wisdom and
omnipotence must forever do homage to his holiness and work
in its service. Love of the right and the good sits on the
throne and holds empire over the ineffable perfections. He
determines all, but determines nothing but at the instigation
of love ; all divine choices and all divine efficiencies wait the
bidding or have their inherent sources in love. The ethical
nature of God proves that he is a spiritual being. Matter is
unethical. Try to think of an atom feeling moral obligation
or differentiating between right and wrong. The perfect
knowledge of the right and good is an inherence of the essen
tial, that is, of the eternal omniscience of God ; the choice of it,
and the efficient determination of himself to it, is a free choice
of his will, and constitutes the perfect and changeless holiness
of his nature. The standard of the perfectly right and good
is not something objective to him, but is an inherence of his per
fect knowledge and infinite love— is subjective in him. Here,
as in every other respect, he is unconditioned and absolute.

6 Studies in Theology.
The ethical can only be predicated of the spiritual nature,
and is inseparable from personality. Let anyone attempt to
affirm any moral quality of an impersonal substance, and the
absurdity appears. Let him attempt to eliminate ethics from
the universe, and his conscience and reason at once raise a pro
test which it is impossible to silence. There are moral laws
and moral beings. Conscience is witness to the former ; con
sciousness affirms the latter. Their existence demonstrates the
ethical nature of God, in whom they have their sources. The
inevitable outcome is that God is purely a spiritual being.
The differentiation between matter and spirit is so absolute
that neither has anything in common with the other, and
neither can by possibility acquire anything belonging to the
other; alike they are incapable of transmutation or assimila
tion. Spirit is invisible and impalpable ; matter is visible and
tangible. Spirit is formless ; matter has necessary extension.
Spirit is self-determining ; matter can only act as acted upon.
Spirit is intelligent; matter is unintelligent. Spirit thinks,
wills, feels ; matter does nothing, but is so made as to have
and exhibit color, weight, form. Spirit is simple, indivisible,
uncompoundable ; matter is various, divisible, and compound-
able. Spirit is personal and responsible ; matter is impersonal
and irresponsible. Spirit has the power of growth, increase,
perfectibility ; matter is inert, dead, and incapable of self -im
provement. Spirit has hope, aspiration, and endeavor ; matter
is impassive, unaspiring, and incapable of desire. Spirit loves,
appreciates, approves ; matter is attracted, combined, molded.
Spirit is conscious of worthiness, dignity, power ; matter can
make no such distinction. Spirit feels shame, remorse, sor
row, grief, despair, desert of punishment, joy, gladness, rap
ture, delight, ecstasy, desert of reward ; matter can experi
ence no emotion of any kind. Spirit discerns truth, beauty,

God is a Spirit. 7
virtue, has insight, discrimination, seeks out hidden secrets,
invents, subordinates nature to its service, builds laws, govern
ments, institutions, learnings, civilizations, religions ; matter is
a servant, drudge, slave. Spirit may degenerate, be degraded,
debased, become a slave to passion and vice, but it can never
change its nature so as to be mere matter ; matter cannot de
base or refine itself, nor be refined so as to become spirit.
Thus there is an absolutely impassable gulf between the two
substances. There is not a single point of union between
them. They have relations, but no common qualities or
properties. The relations are those of creator and created, su
perior and inferior, master and servant. The gulf can neither
be filled up nor bridged ; the separation has the diameter of
infinity — absolute otherness.

Studies in Theology.

UNITY OF GOD.
The next implication is that God is one. If there be proof
that God exists, that he is a spirit, that he is a person, and if
reason or revelation requires that we should so think him, the
same reason and revelation require that we should think him
one. By unity is meant that (a) in his nature is essential
unity — he is not complex or divisible; (b) there is but one
being who possesses the attributes which constitute Godhead ;
(c) he is so one that it is impossible there ever should be an
other being of the same kind. His unity is absolute, necessary,
and eternal. Other spirits are one in simplicity of essence, but
there are many of the same kind. He alone is so one that it is
impossible even to himself that there should be a duplicate —
eternity, necessary existence, independence, underived infinite
perfection were not participated by a plurality of distinct
essences originally, but belonged to a single being, and as there
was originally but one eternal, there never could be another
by creation. The original perfections are not communicable.
This glory of exclusive Godhead can never be alienated or
shared. " The primary law of thought that predicates the in
finite and the absolute of the divine Being demands his eter
nal unity as a necessary postulate." * " In God there is abso
lute soleness, soleitas, though what lies hidden in the mystery
of this essential oneness we know but partially." f
This doctrine excludes polytheism and dualism — the doc
trine of many gods, and the doctrine of two eternal beings or
principles. God is the sole unitary ground of all existence.
Eevelation is explicit: "Hear, O Israel : The Lord our God is one
Pope, Cliristian Tlieology, vol. i, p. 253. f Hem.

* ¦

Unity of God. 9
Lord " (Deut. vi, 4). " Know therefore this day, and consider
it in thine heart, that the Lord he is God in heaven above,
and upon the earth beneath : there is none else " (Deut.
iv, 39). " Is there a God besides me ? yea, there is no God ;
I know not any " (Isa. xliv, 8). " We know that an idol is
nothing in the world, and that there is none other God but one "
(1 Cor. viii, 4). " I am the Lord, and there is none else. I
form the light, and create darkness " (Isa. xiv, 6, 7). See also
Deut. xxxii, 39, 40 ; Isa. xliv, 24 ; Eev. i, 17 ; Isa. xliv, 6 ;
John xvii, 3-5 ; Matt, xxviii, 19. There is nothing in revela
tion to oppose to these unequivocal statements — no incidental
allusion or implication. The doctrines are in accord with it.
It is everywhere assumed and implied, when unexpressed.
There is no possibility of mistake on this point. Only one
God is known to the Bible, either in the more ancient or recent
books. There is not a hint either of polytheism, or tritheism,
or dualism, or pantheism, or atheistic monism, but the un
varying assertion of one God, who is an infinite spirit and an
adorable person or persons.
Is there anything in the realm of nature — the cosmic facts —
to oppose to the doctrine ? That there is one God has been
shown to be the inevitable outcome of reason applied to evi
dence. He cannot be thought away and rationality be main
tained. Nature is full of one God. He so permeates it that
were it possible to withdraw him nature could not only not be
intelligible, but it would lapse into nonexistence. All this has
been established by many and circumstantial proofs.
What we now assert is that nature contains no hint of a plu
rality of gods. " Unity is stamped on the entire creation so
clearly that the whole system of science is based upon this pre
supposition ; its latest conclusions pointing to some one primi
tive and central force, which some in their blind enthusiasm
almost deify as the unknown God. And as it is in earthly

10 Studies in Theology.
things, so it is in things spiritual and heavenly. There is one
conscience in man, suggesting one law and Lawgiver. There
is evil and there is good ; but they both pay homage to the
supreme will behind them, which is their equal standard.
Hence the erring philosophy of the world, in the better tend
encies, has seldom been polytheistic or dualistic ; its animal
tendency toward pantheism declares its indestructible convic
tion of the unity of God. This has been its snare, to carry
the principle to the extreme of denying all personality or crea-
turely existence outside of the One and All." *
" It is, perhaps, a more decisive fact that all the demands of
reason are met by the conception of one God. An infinite
first cause, reached by whatever form of the argument, pre
cludes all need of any other such cause, if, indeed, the supposi
tion of any such other is not unphilosophical and absurd."f If
it should be assumed that there are many gods, that is, many
eternal, self-existing personal beings, or more than one, and
the proof should be demanded, it is impossible to adduce a
single proof or even hint. Everything that we know anything
about may be traced to one cause. There is no hint of multi
plicity or plurality. The supposition of plurality is groundless,
and rational thinking therefore excludes it. In the absence of
all proof it can have no other ground than imagination, or
mere irrational fancy. The gods of the Pantheon are human
fictions. Let us keep steadfastly in our minds the difference
between the ground for the admission of one God and of many
gods ; and also the difference between the grounds for the de
nial of one God and of many gods. It furnishes no proof, or
intimation even, of more than one. One God must be thought
as a necessity ; more than one has no ground but imagination.
The denial of one God is the absurdity of supposing the uni-
* Pope, Christian Theology, vol. i, p. 259.
f Lord, Christian Theology, p. 128.

Unity of God. 11
verse to exist without a cause. The denial of many gods is
the rational act of denying that of which there is no proof
whatever, and against which there is much proof. The one
God who alone is God manifests himself in all things that have
being. He confronts us which way soever we turn. He per
vades us ; he presses himself upon our consciousness, our in
tuitions, our rational thinking, our conscience. We can no
more escape him than we can escape ourselves.
The mythological divinities, whether of classic or uncultured
peoples and ages, furnish no other proofs of their existence
than the dreams of those who invented them — sometimes
beautiful, more times grotesque and hideous, always the fig
ments of fancy.
The great biblical truth of the unity of God is also the great
and ultimate truth of reason. For rational thought not less
than for Christian faith the world ground is one, and that in
effable One is a self-conscious Spirit acting with intelligence
and purpose — a personal God. To think other is to think
without reason, against reason.
4

12 Studies in Theology.

ETERNITY OF GOD.
If we find ourselves obliged to think of the world ground as
one, and that one an infinite Spirit, we are likewise compelled
to think him eternal.
What do we mean by eternal ? It is impossible to form an
abstract idea of eternity. It is strictly predicative and requires
a subject. It signifies that which has permanent existence
without beginning or end, and therefore without succession.
That which exists, not from moment to moment, but in whose
existence all moments are embraced, and whose existence
cannot be divided into, or measured by, aggregation of sepa
rate parts, and of whom it cannot be said that he was in some
past time, or is in the present time, in any sense in which he is
not also now existing in all past time and in all future time.
The term thus describes a mode of existence. " I am " is
God's own definition of the mode of his existence. He only
is the " I am." The predicate applies to no other being. It
is a predicate of mode, and must be forever exclusive. When
predicated of a being it means one whose existence is neces
sary — to whom nonexistence is impossible. It is a term of
^infinitude. Necessary existence is existence which precludes
the possibility of nonexistence, and must fill all duration.
It is in 6trict contrast with the terms time and temporal.
Time denotes measurable duration. It is predicable only of
existence which begins. The essence of the terms eternal
and eternity is unbeginningness and unendingness. The
essence of the terms time and temporal is beginningness
and endingness. Both are predicables of existence — the one
of limitless existence, the other of limited existence ; the one

Eternity of God. 13
of underived, necessary existence, the other of derived, depend
ent existence.
God is eternal. All other existence is temporal. He alone
never began and can never end. All other being began and
will end, or at any period of its existence, even though it
may never cease to exist, will be measurable. They can never
rise out of the temporal into the eternal, even though they
should be immortal. They must forever continue to be beings
who once were not, who began to be, and the quantity of
whose existence is limited between the date of their beginning
and the present moment, which period must forever be divis
ible into a definite number of years or moments. The exist
ence of the Eternal is not divisible into moments or computable
by years. The predicate is greater than our comprehension,
but it is a necessity of thought. There must be such a being,
or there could never have been any being. It is sometimes
said that " time is a part of eternity," " a fragment broken off
at both ends," and that "eternity is time indefinitely ex
tended." These are misleading conceptions. The only true way
of thinking them is to keep the essence of each term in mind
and note their radical contrast. Moments make time. Mo
ments do not make eternity.
Time can be comprehended ; eternity cannot. There is an
exact measure of actual time. It is included between the two
points now and that point in the remote past when the first
thing which had beginning began. There necessarily was such
a moment. That moment was the birth of time. Before that
there was nothing temporal — no time. If it were possible to
suppose that that first event, the birth of the time order of
being, was the creation of a world, which immediately com
menced a diurnal revolution of twenty-four of our hours, and
which it has continued without intermission until this day ; and
if we could suppose a self-registering chronometer indicating each

14 Studies in Theology.
revolution, we should be able to determine the exact number
of days and seconds of actual time, or the exact period in which
all temporal things have existed. There is just as exact a
measure of time as that, and there is no more time than that.
Behind that is the Eternal — the Unbegun ; a term in which,
more or less, minutes or days or years or cycles have no
meaning, because we have passed out of the temporal order
into the eternal, and He who alone remains, or is, gives to him
self the name " I AM."
If we keep in mind the significance of the term time, or
temporal, namely, that it denotes duration, from a point of be
ginning, through a period of successive moments, measurable
and limited, we should see at once that it cannot apply to any
thing in the being or perfections of God ; for in them there is
no beginning and no progress or change or succession of any
kind. In respect of these he is immutable. He is never more
nor less. He does not become what he was not. He does not
pass from what he was into something else that he was not.
There is nothing to denote succession. He does not add cycles
to his existence. In all respects in which he is eternal he is
strictly changeless.
Is there, then, no past or future in God ? If the term past
denote something which is gone from him, and if the term
future denote something which is yet to come to him, we must
answer, No. All that he was or will be he now is. There is
no was or will be that is not now with him, as to himself.
By the passage of time which increases the life of the creature
there is no addition to the life of God. He becomes neither
wiser nor older by the coming and going of centuries or eons.
What do we mean when we predicate of anything that it is
not eternal ? We might answer, We mean that it is a thing
of time ; but the answer is simply tautological — mere repetition
— that which is not eternal is not eternal. We do in fact have

Eternity of God. 15
a definite meaning, and it is not difficult to state it. When we
affirm noneternity of an object we simply affirm, as a first
thought, that it did not always exist, or, what is the same
thing, that it began to be ; there was a time when it was not.
The idea is plain and intelligible. We predicate it with per
fect confidence of its truth, and with the certainty that we
have a clear meaning in its use as applied to all the objects we
behold and all the events of which we have experience. Thus,
the earth itself once was not, it began to be; we ourselves
were not, we began to be ; to-day was not, it began to be ; all
things come under the same category. But we have more in
our meaning than this ; we mean, as a second thought, that it
exists in au order of succession — moment by moment.
The result formulates itself into the statement that all the
objects with which we are acquainted exist in this mode — they
are things of time ; so many moments tell how long they have
existed, and point to a moment behind which they did not
exist. The moments they have existed may amount to mil
lions, but the mode of their existence is such that they have
had but a moment in their possession during the whole process
— successively they have possessed each moment in transition.
All temporal existence is in this mode. It is a universal predi
cate of all the things we know and of all persons, except one.
How, once nonexistent, they came to be, we may not be able to
explain ; but we do not doubt the fact ; we know it is so. The
transitive mode of this existence we know. Time is the term
which describes the fact and the mode. Yesterday was and is
not. To-morrow is not, but will be. Now is, and is all of
time that is. There have been vast measures of time, and will
be ages to come ; but time, all time, is the simple aggregate of
successive nows. Things register their ages, and of some we
are able to read the record. If we had a perfect record, and
could translate it, we could read backward the history of

16 Studies in Theology.
creation to the beginning of all. We should find thousands of
events arising in the same moment and disappearing with it.
Time is thus simply a flow of consecutive events — denotes a
mode of successive existence and experience, or a duration
measurable by adding successive moments together. We use
the words past, present, and future to denote the relation of
the events to each other or to our mode of thinking them.
They exist in time, and can only be thought in this form.
They do not coexist, and they are not permanent, and under
this law we must think them. The general and universal fact
is that all individual things existing under the mode of time
have a limited and measurable existence ; and the same is true
of the whole aggregate. Time, as comprising all succession
or all things which exist in the mode of succession, is finite.
Time is not an entity or substance. It is but a name indicating
a mode or order of events. Some events have been — we use
the term past to denote that fact ; some events are now trans
piring — we use the term present to denote that fact; some
events will be — we use the word future to denote that fact.
The term time simply denotes the order of succession. Were
there no succession the several terms past, present, future, and
time would be meaningless — would indicate nothing. There
would be no mode of existence requiring their use.
The so-called river of time denotes not an entity, but a
simple succession of events. Let us suppose the succession to
begin by the creation of the world, and that its flow represents
millions of years as marked by millions of successive revolu
tions of our earth. Now let us suppose God to be a being who
exists without succession at every point along the banks of
this flowing river. We will have as the result the entire mil
lions of years permanently under his gaze, as it is. Let us
take some one spirit, who commenced his existence at that
point a million years ago, and who has continued from that

Eternity of God. 17
point until now, and whose experience has been marked by
some new thought or feeling or act each interval as denoted by
hours along the whole line ; we shall have as the result simple
succession of events, and an observer who has a perfect view
of all the incidents from the starting point to the end. The
whole line will always be present to him, as it is, beginning,
middle, and end. Add all possible millions to it, and the same
will be true. The events succeed each other and do not co
exist in the same moment. This we know is a fact which it is
impossible to change.
But, then, is there no change in the thoughts, feelings, and acts
of God, growing out of these changes in the line of events ? So
it has been sometimes affirmed, but we are compelled, both on
rational and scriptural grounds, to dissent. That which is true
is ; as to attribute and being there is no change. These belong
to his essential nature and are strictly eternal. The same is
true of the ethical quality of his nature. It changes not. There
is here no modification. He is the eternally good and holy. His
principles remain the same forever and ever ; but the changes
which emerge in the creature, and in the order of events, will
affect his feeling and actions. These are not eternal. Let us
find an illustration. Let it be that of a soul's life. At a point
in the series of events he beholds a soul emerging into exist
ence. We will designate it as A. A is a being who passes
through moral changes. God observes these changes in A.
When A is a sinner he feels toward him the appropriate ethical
sentiment of disapproval and condemnation ; when he repents
he feels toward him the appropriate sentiment of forgiveness ;
when he is a holy saint he feels toward him the appropriate
sentiment of approval and complaisance. But these different
conditions or states of A are not coexistent in time, but are
in succession. The same must be true of the feelings and
sentiments of God toward him. This is precisely what is

18 Studies in Theology.
tanght in the Scriptures, and to suppose it otherwise would be
to deethicalize God.
We must, therefore, conclude that the unchangeable with re
spect to being and essential attributes is not unchangeable with
respect to feelings and administrative acts. His immutability
here issues in modification there. He eternally hates, con
demns, and punishes sin. He eternally loves and rewards holi
ness. Man changes from holiness to sin or from sin to holi
ness. These changes in the creature issue in changed relations
to his Maker, and because the ethical nature of his Maker
changes not, the change in the creature issues in a change
of feeling and administration toward him by the altered con
ditions. On this point I quote from a recent author, who has taken
the rank of a standard among us. He says : " But the perfect
idea of eternity, as it is in the human mind, cannot tolerate
deviation or succession of thoughts as necessary to divine con
sciousness. And this is the deep perplexity of our human intel
lect, which, however, must accept the profound meaning of the
name 'I AM,' as teaching an eternal now enfolding and sur
rounding the successive existences of time. The personal
Jehovah once, and only once, declared his pure eternity. His
name is the only word which human language affords in its
poverty to express that thought; such terms as eternal and
everlasting have temporal notions clinging to them; and all
our phrases go no further than those that the Supreme fills all
space and time, that he was before them, the very word carry
ing duration with it. But ' I AM ' — before time or space was,
'I AM ' — has in it all the strength of eternity. It is literally
the assertion of pure existence, without distinction of past and
present and future ; that is, of past and present and future as
measured in time and regulated by motion in space. We must
accept this doctrine of God in all its incomprehensibleness, as

Eternity of God. 19
the only one that satisfies the mind. The Eternal in himself
knows no succession of time any more than he knows circum
scription of space ; and when he created all things his being
remains as independent of duration as it is independent of lo
cality. No attribute, however, has given rise to more discus
sion than this. The deepest thinkers of all ages have consented
to annihilate in the divine essence all that we mean by time
and succession of thought. They have agreed to think of a
duratio tota simul, of an cetemitas in which "fuisse" et
lifuturum esse" non est, sed solum "esse." And the name
Jehovah — the name of God, and of each of the three Persons
in the Godhead — demands and sanctions this. It is utterly
vain to attempt to penetrate this abyss of mystery ; it is equally
fruitless either to fight against it or to illustrate it.
" Opponents of this truth deny that there can be duration
without succession ; but duration is succession ; both words are
equally inappropriate to the Eternal, who simply is. They in
sist also that to take from a personal being the act and opera
tion of successive thinking is to destroy its personality. But
this is simply arguing from our finite nature — which cannot
think but under conditions of time and space — to the infinite,
which by the very definition knows no such limits. The only
answer possible to all such objections is the common apology
required everywhere by this subject ; we cannot search out the
divine being unto perfection, though the perfection in which
we are lost allows no past to recede before God and no future
to rise before him. When the argument takes another form,
and we are pointed to the tenor of scriptural representations
that speak of the Eternal as having purposes which have been
fulfilled and are in course of fulfillment, our reply must be
cautiously and yet boldly given. Time is the creation of the
eternal God, who made the ages. It is, with all its endless
phenomena and laws, a reality to Him who brought it into

20 Studies in Theology.
being ; and all its succession unfolds in his presence as past and
present and future. Our only difficulty is to hold fast the
truth that he sustains two relations to time. As the abiding
eternal One he views it in his place, himself absolutely uncon
nected with it. As the God who works out for the creature and
with the creature his own purposes he beholds, directs, and con
trols all things as under the law of time. This is, of course, a deep
mystery to human thoughts ; that is, to conceive of eternal will
ing* and temporal acting, of a timeless and successionless agent,
working out and watching the evolution of his plans. But the
mystery, such as it is, is only that of the incarnation antici
pated ; and as we receive this we may receive that. We may
dare to say that the Eternal inhabits eternity, and yet that in
the Son, the firstborn before every creature, he inhabits time
also. As in the incarnation God is manifest in the flesh, so
in the creation God is manifest in time. And as God
will be forever manifest in his incarnate Son, so will he for
ever have in and through his Son, the vicegerent of created
things, a manifestation in time ; that is to say, in plain words,
eternity and time will henceforth coexist. Something pertain
ing to time will cease — its changes and probation and oppor
tunity. In this sense, XP°V0S ovketi earai; but in no other
sense." f
To the same effect Dr. Hodge says : " The infinitude of
God relatively to space is in his immensity or omnipresence;
relatively to time it is his eternity. As he is free from all
limitations in space, so he is exalted above all limitations of
time. As he is not more in one place than in another, but in
every place equally present, so he does not exist during one
* There can be no eternal willing in the sense of executive or causational voli
tions, but there may be eternal willing in the sense of purposing to put forth causa
tional efficiency. God's purposes are eternal, but the carrying of them out is and
must be in succession and in time.
f Pope, Christian Theology, vol. i, pp. 297-299.

Eternity of God. 21
period of duration more than another. With him there is no
distinction between the present, past, and future ; but all things
are always present to him. . . . He is, and always has been, and
always will be ; to him there is neither past nor future ; the
past and future are always and equally present to him." *
When it is said that " God inhabits eternity " the meaning
can be nothing other than that he exists in the mode of eter
nity, not in the mode of time — his name " I AM " implies this.
Eternity is in him, not in parts, for it is not divisible. It is in
its illimitable wholeness in him, and he is in it. The distinction
between him and temporal being is this : temporal being inhabits
a passing instant, . called now. No temporal being ever exists
save in the passing moment. It did exist in moments past, it does
not now exist in them. It will exist in future moments. It
does not now exist in them. It never can have more than the
moment. The time that it has existed and does exist and will
exist embraces all the moments through which it has passed, is
passing, and will pass, and is always measurable, but it can never
have more than a moment in its possession. Its home is a mov
able point — a floating, transient instant. Can this be said of
God ? Does he exist only in the passing moment ? Either
this, or his mode of existence differs entirely from the mode of
existence of any temporal being. God lives in all years. His
now is not a movable point, but is the all-inclusive eternity —
an all-embracing now. The past is still with him and in him,
not as thought, but as reality, and the future is with him, and in
him, as much as it will ever be, not mposse, but in esse or real
ity. From eternity to eternity, which only means eternally, all
things are with him. As to temporal being, there is a coming
and a vanishing ; not so with the Eternal. Here there is an
abiding, stable, immutable I AM. He does not exist moment
by moment, transferring himself from one moment to another,
* Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. i, pp. 386, 381.

22 Studies in Theology.
losing the last when he enters into the next ensuing, thus com
ing along to our time from some remote eternity. The forever
is in him always in all its fullness, " the same, yesterday, to-day,
and forever." The eternity of God is the infinite reservoir,
exhaustless, changeless. Time is the divine energizing flowing
forth, in creation and administrative acts, fertilizing the ages
of finite existence. The river issues from the reservoir, but is
not the reservoir. Pantheism turns the river back into the
sea from which it flows, and the finite becomes lost again in the
indistinguishable infinite. Theism makes the flow perpetual,
but leaves the infinite sea stationary and undiminished, while it
forever pours itself into advancing, deepening, and widening
river, every atom and increment of which it gives. The flow
ing atoms make the river, but do not measure or make the sea.

God is Absolute, Unconditioned Being. 23

GOD IS ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED BEING.
God is absolute, infinite, unconditioned being. These terms
need explanation. They play so important a part in discus
sions concerning God that they cannot be omitted. Only one
of the terms is ever employed to indicate an attribute of God.
They are predicates of his nature or being rather than of attri
butes which inhere in his essence, or of both. Both absolute
and unconditioned indicate a mode of existence out of condi
tions and relations. To predicate them of God is simply to say
that his being as such is unconditioned and independent of all
relations. His being is absolute — out of all relations. This does not
mean that God sustains no relations to other beings. This
would be to deny that he is the creator and governor of the
universe, for these acts relate him to everything that exists.
But this fact of creatorship, which brings him into such intimate
relationship to all being, is proof positive that his being in
itself is absolute and out of all relations. Creatorship necessi
tates that he should have existed in the perfection of his being
when no other being existed. His being then was absolute
and out of all relations, for there was nothing in existence with
which relations could obtain. There can be no relations to the
nonexistent, for that would be relations to nothing. The fact
of his creating other beings and thus creating relations with them,
prior to which no relations could exist, does not prove that his
being is not absolute, but rather that it is absolute ; yea, that
of necessity it must be ; for by the very terms of the proposition
he existed alone. If it should be said that the idea of the uni
verse must have existed with him from eternity, and thus he was

24 Studies in Theology.
in eternal relation to it, we answer, this does not interfere with
the absoluteness of his being, which means out of all relations
with other being, but not out of relations with himself. His idea
of a universe to be, and even his purpose to create, were not a
relation to it, for it was not ; it was but a relation to his own
thought and purpose, and left his being as purely absolute as
if the thought and purpose did not exist. God exists in rela
tions, but they are relations which he creates, and not relations
coeval with his being, or of his being as such. Voluntarily
created relations are not necessary relations ; as he once existed
out of them he might have existed out of them forever and his
being been unimpaired.
"The absolute, taken in its etymological sense, may be ex
plained as that which is free from all necessary relations; which
exists in and by itself, and does not require the prior or simul
taneous existence of anything else. The unconditioned, in
like manner, is that which is subject to no law or condition of
being, which exists, therefore, in and by itself, and does not
require the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else.
The absolute and unconditioned are also identical with the real
(not all real is absolute and unconditioned, but all absolute and
unconditioned must be real), for relation is but a phenomenon
requiring and depending on the prior existence of things rela
tive, while the true real (primary real) is unrelated.
" Mr. Calderwood defines the absolute, which he rightly
identifies with the infinite, as ' that which is free from all neces
sary relations ; ' it may exist in relation, provided that relation
be not a necessary condition of its existence. Hence he holds
that the absolute may exist in the relation of consciousness,
and in that relation be apprehended, though imperfectly, by
man. " According to Sir William Hamilton, ' The unconditioned
denotes the genus of which the infinite and absolute are the

God is Absolute, Unconditioned Being. 25
species.' According to Kant, and Sir William Hamilton agrees
with him, the absolute and unconditioned is not an object of
knowledge, but its notion is a regulative principle of the mind
itself — is more than mere negation of the conditions. Accord
ing to Schelling, it is cognizable, but not conceivable ; it can be
known by sinking back into identity with the absolute, but is
incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are
only of the relative and the different. According to Cousin,
it is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection,
under relation, difference, and plurality. Instead of saying that
God is absolute and infinite, Krause and his admirer, Tiberg-
hien, ascribe to him seite (selbheit) and totality. Totality, or
the infinite, manifests itself everywhere in nature. Nature is
made up of wholes, and all these constitute one whole. In
spirit everything manifests itself under the character of spon
taneity or seite. Spirit is always what it is by its own individ
ual efforts."
This citation shows how difficult it is for the most philo
sophic minds to attain to clearness of idea and expression when
they deal with the infinite and absolute ; but it shows also that
the existence of the incomprehensible infinite and absolute is
a necessity of thought. Behind the finite related and condi
tioned is discerned as inevitable the infinite, absolute, and un
conditioned. The finite thinks in terms of phenomena, but it
is certain of underlying substance, though it can only express
the essence in terms of attribute or quality. The attributes
come to manifestation in phenomena, but they can only exist
in the infinite and absolute. God comes to knowledge only
as related to the finite, but his existence is discerned to be
antecedent to the finite, and so is itself not to be conditioned
by the finite. God is unconditioned as to his existence. The
term unconditioned differs but little in its essential meaning
from the term absolute. The latter, as we have seen, means

26 Studies in Theology.
that which is free from all necessary relations ; which exists
and has its whole being in and by it itself, and does not re
quire the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else. The
former, unconditioned, is that which is subject to no condi
tioning law or conditioning ground of being, which exists
therefore in and by itself, and does not imply anything else to
condition its existence. For a being to be conditioned it must
be in the matter of his existence or in respect of his nature
and attributes. To be conditioned in any of these respects
there must be some other being to impose the conditions, or
something in the nature of things. Now, since God is the only
eternal and his being dates back of all other • existence, it does
not appear how he could be conditioned. There was nothing
to condition him ; he could not even condition himself, as to
his nature and attributes ; and nothing can possibly exist in time
that can condition him in these respects. As it was impossible
that he should be conditioned as to his being, which was unorig-
inated, so also he was unconditioned as to his creative acts, ex
cept as his own nature imposed conditions upon him. Nor can it
ever be possible for the creature to impose conditions upon the
Creator as to the manner of his dealing with it ; any conditions
that may arise, under the exigencies of administration, to influ
ence or determine him must still be self-imposed ; administra
tion, as much as creation, must forever be his purely personal
acts. As by creating the universe he created relations of him
self to it and so brought himself personally into relations with
the thing created without affecting the fact as to the absolute
ness of his being, so any conditioning of his acts arising from
the exigencies of administration is not a conditioning of his be
ing. It might even be admitted that subsequent acts of God
to the great original act of creation are conditioned without at
all affecting the question as to whether his nature and essential
attributes are conditioned. The position held is one and sim-

God is Absolute, Unconditioned Being. 27
pie, that God is, and is what he is, wholly without exterior con
ditioning and without interior conditions. No other existence
conditions his existence, and he does not condition his own ex
istence ; as he is uncaused, so he is unconditioned. The sum of
which is that relationship and conditionedness are terms which
arise with creature existence and have no meaning whatever as
applied to the uncreated.
It thus appears that as to existence and all that is comprised
in the mere fact of being God is a pure spirit, intelligent,
self-conscious, and self-determined, absolute and unconditioned,
existing as he is from eternity and of necessity, there being no
cause of his being, no cause in any way conditioning or modify
ing it. It also thus appears that he is a person and not a thing,
or abstract force, or mere idea, or impersonal substance evolv
ing itself.
The true character of this amazing being rdmains to be elic
ited by further pointing out several predicates of him as he has
discovered himself to us. His being and his several modes of
manifestation implicate qualities and attributes. Himself is in
visible ; no eye has ever seen him ; no sense has ever discerned
him ; but reason discovers him in every visible and invisible
object ; and in his own word he declares himself ; incomprehen
sible, he is yet apprehensible.
While it is an absolute necessity that the Eternal cannot be
conditioned, the one term excluding the other, it is just as
necessary that each specific act of the Eternal should be
conditioned, otherwise we introduce into his acts absolute
fatalism. But his acts can only be conditioned by himself.
He must absolutely determine himself and cannot be deter
mined by another, since he alone exists. His self-determined
acts are not like his nature, eternal. The nature originates
them ; he is the true cause, not of himself, for himself being
eternal cannot be caused, but of every objective expression

28 Studies in Theology.
or forthputting of his nature. Every such act falls within
time, has a beginning. Creation and governance of the uni
verse in all its incidents forever and ever are acts of this
kind. They are not inherences of the unconditioned and
eternal nature, but are free expressions by the eternal nature,
self-determined and differentiable from the self, as the acts
of free mind are differentiable from and dependent on the
mind which put them forth. This we consider a most im
portant position.
Let us see to what conclusion the principle here enunci
ated leads us. The principle is that God, as to being and attri
butes, is necessary, eternal, and unconditioned ; that as to objec
tive acts, that is, acts not included in his subjective nature and
necessary to it, acts of self-consciousness, he is free to deter
mine, first, what such acts shall be, and, second, to cause them.
In both cases he is sole and self -conditioned cause ; not even his
nature necessitates them, but only makes them possible, and he
as a person determines and executes them. Until he thus person
ally acts they do not exist. If his acts were necessary outcomes
of his being we should have sheer and absolute fatalism ; but
even then the acts would not be eternal, but must exist under
time order or in succession, which is time. The principle of
necessity introduced into the divine nature as to such modes of
action destroys the divine personality.
God is infinite. This, like the terms absolute and uncondi
tioned, is a predicate both of his nature and attributes. The
three terms are affinitive, but not identical. Each has a shade of
meaning not contained in the other. The term absolute, as we
have seen, signifies that which exists apart from any necessary
relations ; which is were there nothing else ; which requires
nothing else in order to its complete being ; that which has full
ness of being in itself. Unconditioned signifies that the exist-

God is Absolute, Unconditioned Being. 29
ence of which depends upon no conditions ; which has the en
tire ground of being in itself, and does not need anything
else to the full realization of itself. It is what it is in absolute
independence of any other existence or law of any kind. The
two terms as applied to God signify that his being is so above
all, so complete in itself, that nothing can add anything to him
or subtract anything from him. He conditions all, but is con
ditioned by none. The term infinite is of the same general im
port, but with a difference. It is the antithesis of the term
finite or limited. It means, therefore, not simply the absolute
and unconditioned, but also the unlimited, He to whose per
fections there are no bounds. Absolute and unconditioned
are terms of being without reference to quality. Infinite is a
term of perfection describing not only unconditioned existence,
but limitless perfection.
The plausible objections to the infinitude of God are (a) that we
can form no conception of the term ; (b) that it includes other
being and reduces to monism ; (c) that it renders personality
impossible. To the first we answer, it is true we cannot com
prehend infinity, or picture it in thought, but it is not true that
the term conveys no idea. Though unpicturable we know
that we do have a distinct meaning when we predicate infinity
of an object, and we have the unalterable conviction that the
affirmation is true, as of eternity, power, knowledge, truth,
goodness. The term simply means that there is neither limit
nor defect. It is the equivalent of absolute perfection. We
have the unalterable conviction when we predicate infinitude of
the divine perfections that it has a true meaning and is a truth.
As in the former case, we can fix no limit to them, nor con
ceive of a possible limit. To conceive the possibility of a limit
of his duration, for example, we must be able to form the idea
of a time when he did not exist ; but this collides with his nec
essary existence, and excludes the possibility of accounting for

30 Studies in Theology.
his existence at all ; in fact, precludes the possibility of any ex
istence, since if once there had been nothing it would be im
possible there ever should be anything. Thus existence of any
kind compels the thought of unbegun existence, which is infin
itude. The same is true of other ineffable perfections of the
divine nature. We conceive that to be to which we can assign
no limit, and which we know in fact has no limit.
To the second objection we answer, the infinite does not nec
essarily include the all. The existence of some beings who
once were not does not hinder the existence of one being who
always was. The finiteness of the one does not take from the
infinitude of the other, or in any way affect it. The finite may
be and is a product of the Infinite. He does not thereby limit
himself and become less or other. His infinitude is the
ground and support of the other being. If some creatures can
know some things this does not prevent him from knowing all
things ; their possession of limited powers does not prevent
him from having all power, if the power they possess is his
gift and is in dependence upon him. The infinite is not the
all, but the ground of the all. He was once the only. There
is now a universe which is other to him. But this does
not detract from him or impose limits upon him, but simply
manifests him. There is nothing in it which is not of him, as
source. It is but an expression, of which he is the expressor ;
it cannot therefore diminish him. He is and must be forever
still the infinite cause. Nothing that is bounds him, fetters
him, transcends him, takes from him, diminishes him, defies
him, is without him, either as causing or permitting it or not
choosing to prevent it. He transcends all, is before all, limits
all, governs all, is independent of all— could, if he chose, abol
ish all by a volition. No limits can be fixed for him except
those which he imposes on himself by a free exercise of his own
choice. He cannot grow or develop into something greater

God is Absolute, Unconditioned Being. 31
than he is. Neither time nor eternity can increase him ; nor
can the mind conceive of enlargement or improvement of any
perfection of his nature.
To the third objection we answer that, if personality means
a being who is one, a self-conscious, intelligent, and volitional
being, and, it may be added, a free moral being, it is impossible
to prove that infinitude precludes this. The thesis requires us
to think of an eternal being of this description. What shall
hinder ? It is answered that such a being could not exist, be
cause self-consciousness would be impossible in such a case.
Why impossible? It is answered, because self -consciousness
demands as its ground a not self — a ground of differentiation.
This cannot be proved, and is a groundless assumption. Sup
pose, as we are compelled to admit, there were an eternal self-
existing and sole-existing being, who possessed all knowledge of
himself and of all possible things, and who had all power to
produce all possible things, and who to produce must volition-
ally act, and who was perfectly free to act according to his
own pleasure, and whose pleasure could only be to act ac
cording to certain ideas which we call ideas of right and good
ness and wisdom, what would hinder that such a being should
be self-conscious — a true personal being ? Could he not know
his own knowledge and himself as possessing it ? And would
not this be self -consciousness, and consciousness of himself as a
person ? And would not here be the absolute, infinite in self-
conscious and solitary existence? Would the fact that his
knowledge was a knowledge of possible things, and of himself
as a possible cause, be a limit to his infinitude or detract from
his absoluteness ? Would he not still be the only being, out of
all relations except personal relations to himself ? Could the
knowledge of himself and of the possibilities in himself be
pleaded as a bar to his absoluteness and infinitude ? It is answered
that the supposition itself gives, as a necessary ground of self-

32 Studies in Theology.
consciousness, the supppsable other, known as possible, and
therefore is a limitation or condition ; and so God would thus
know himself as conditioned and limited, and not as infinite
and absolute. We answer, the knowing would be simply self-
knowing — the consciousness of himself and what was possible
to himself. He would know himself in fact, and necessarily,
as the only being, as a person possessing infinite attributes.
At the same time knowing himself, he would know all possible
but nonexistent things, which he could make real and which
according to his own pleasure he would make real. The known
nonexistent possible is no more a limitation than the known
actual. The possible has no existence as possible even but by
him. He bounds it; it does not bound him. It proves his
perfection, does not limit it. To know it is simply to know
himself. In self-consciousness the mind is subject-object — it
knows itself and knows its states and subjective acts. In self-
consciousness God from eternity, when nothing but himself
existed, knew himself as subject-object, as possessing power for
the production of the nonexisting things, as proposing to make
them or not make them ; but this does not limit him, while
it does prove him to be an eternally self-conscious being or
person. Personality is a necessity as much as existence is. He
never had power to be anything else but what he is — a personal
being. But does not that lack of power set limits to him, and
prove that after all he is not infinite? We answer, No. It
proves no limitation of power that an eternal being should not
be able to make himself noneternal, since infinite power cannot
work a contradiction. There is almost an inevitable tendency
of mind, in studying the infinity of the divine being, to con
found infinity with the all of being, and immensity with un
limited extension, and eternity with continuity. Now the all
does not express the infinite, nor does unlimited extension
express the omnipresence, nor does continuity express the eternal.

God is Absolute, Unconditioned Being. 33
The ideas of time and space add to the bewilderment. Let
us affirm that as ordinarily understood there is neither time
nor space ; they are subjective forms of thought merely which
arise from perceiving succession and extension among things.
Take away the order of existence which has being moment by
moment, and the idea of acts which begin, and you remove the
possibility of the idea of time. There is nothing left to create
or answer to the idea. When the mind moves on beyond cre
ative existence and creative acts it finds no ground for the
time idea, simply because successions and beginnings have dis
appeared. So take away objects which are extended and
figured, and you remove the space idea ; the term loses its sig
nificance. God is not an infinitely extended being. The
predication of infinite extension is a contradiction ; all exten
sion is of necessity finite. This is axiomatic, as much so as,
" The whole is greater than any one of its fractions." We reach
the idea of God's infinitude of presence when we find his
presence with all being, and his potential presence with any
other being that he may create. When it is said extended
being occupies space, what is meant is that extended being has
measurable size. Extension is predicable of material sub
stances, and not of spirit and personality. Extension is not a
predicate of the infinite, but is a predicate of the finite. It
denotes a limited and bounded existence. Every possible
extension admits of more. Nothing that ends, or is bounded,
can be infinite. For the same reason infinite number is
an absurdity and self -subversive ; infinite extension is a con
tradiction and impossible. No number of atoms of time
can make eternity, and no number of extended par
ticles can make an infinite mass. Succession and extension
must forever be finite. It is strictly impossible for the human
mind to think or form a concept or idea of the utterly non
existent. All thought must be composed of what is given in

34 Studies in Theology.
reality. From the elements given in knowledge of real things
unreal things may be formulated in thought, but they must be
composed out of the elements given in knowledge ; thus we
can never think entirely away from reality— cannot create an
object of thought which is made out of elements which do not
exist— cannot think such elements. All human thinking must
therefore enter and revolve within the realm of the known.
To conceive of a being at all it must have qualities of some
thing known, and cannot have implications utterly outside of
the known, and therefore inconceivable. The concept may be
of some real being, and will have strict correspondence with
reality, or it may be of some unreal being, and have no cor
respondence with reality in the composition of its parts ; but
in this case the parts must have correspondence with known
reality somewhere, in order that it may be conceived. The
nonexistent is not reached in any of the elements, but only in
the composition of the concept.
As we cannot form a concept of the utterly nonexistent, so
it is possible there may be kinds of existence of which we have
no knowledge — kinds of existence utterly unlike the realities
we know of; but if there be such we have no power to conceive
of it — it cannot be represented in our thought. To reach the
concept of it we should have to be other kinds of beings from
what we are — should have some faculty unlike our present
faculties, or exist in conditions unlike our present conditions,
of which in both cases we are at present unable to conceive,
lying, as they do, wholly outside of experience.
Thus, in order that the idea of God may exist in our minds
at all it must either be a creation of our minds out of elements
of our knowledge of reality, and thus be a picture of the imagi
nation — an unreal composition out of known elements — or it
must be an idea of real being having qualities analogous to
those which we know. We must think him, if we form any

God is Absolute, Unconditioned Being. 35
concept at all, in these qualities ; we have no power to think
him at all in any others. He must come to our thought
through the faculties we possess, but these faculties cannot
give being or thought of being separate from what we have
known, or beyond what we know in some form of reality. We
have no power to abolish the idea of some real existence ; for
that would require us to abolish the idea of our own existence.
We cannot think there was a time when there was or might
possibly have been no existence, for that would require us to
think there is no existence now ; that is, that we ourselves do
not exist ; for the fact of present existence necessitates the idea
of eternal existence, since it is impossible for us to think even
that if there had been once no existence there ever could be
any existence ; that is, that something could come out of
nothing, or that nothing could create something.
We must think of existence with him as analogous to our
knowledge of existence. The term can have no new meaning
— it is actual being or reality. We must think him as having
materiality, that is, the qualities of existence which we find in
matter, or as not having them. If we think these qualities
away we must then think him either a figment, having no ex
istence, and of which we can have no other idea than pure non
existence, or we must think of him as a being who, apart from
any material components, thinks, wills, exerts power, is as
real as if he were material, but wholly destitute of material
qualities. Still, we can posit in him no qualities except such as
we know. He must emerge in our thoughts through our facul
ties, which can form no concepts of anything wholly unlike
what has been given in experience of consciousness. All the
predications we make of him must come under this law, for we
have no power to rise above it.
Do we predicate that he is a pure spirit ? What is the con
cept ? We can only answer, " It is that kind of being whom

36 Studies in Theology.
we know as a being who has power of knowing, feeling, and
willing. We can form no other concept or thought of it that
is not germane in these attributes. Do we predicate of him
that he is eternal ? What do we mean by it ? We mean
simply that he is without beginning. This includes the idea
that he is not dependent or derived. This we know to be a
logical necessity, but we can form no proper thought of it ; it
is a simple negation of what we find in other beings, together
with the idea of existence — the " I am " of the Bible. When
we predicate of him infinitude we mean simply that to his at
tributes there are no limits. Again, we do not form a proper
thought, for we can only think within limits. But we do con
ceive of his attributes and know what the predicate means — he
knows, he wills, he feels, he is. We fail to be able to measure
him by our thought, though we are able to think him as being,
and to think his attributes as to kind. When we predicate the
infinitude of his knowledge we do not mean that there are no
other beings that have some knowledge, but simply that he
knows all. When we predicate that he is omnipotent we
do not mean that there are no other beings that have some
power, but we do mean that he can do all that is possible to
power, and that all finite power is imparted by his infinite
power. His infinity does not exclude innumerable finites.
When we predicate of the infinitude of his being we do not
mean that there are not other beings. He would be what
he is if they were all removed. They neither add to nor
take from him, nor in any way limit his being. He is forever
the all-knowing and all-powerful source of all other existence,
but not all other existence. He was the only, he originated
the many, but he does not by originating the many limit him
self, or reduce himself from infinitude to finitude. That which
he makes does not impart something to him which he did not
have before, or make him something which he was not before.

God is a Person. 37

GOD IS A PERSON.
The term person is of frequent occurrence and of great sig
nificance in theological polemics, and not less so in psychology
and ethics. The universe is divided into two hemispheres by
a strict and invariable line, on one side of which lie impersonal,
and on the other side personal, existence. There is no possi
bility on the part of either, by any process of transmutation or
evolution or degeneration, to pass over to the other. The im
personal can never become personal, and the personal, however
it may degenerate, can never become impersonal. The differ
ence is a radical difference of substance and attributes. In the
impersonal realm the substance is some modification of matter
and inhering forces operated under a law of necessity or au
tomatism, or some semispiritual substance which can never be
raised to self -consciousness or ethical quality, however it may
be possessed of a mimicry of reason. Throughout, from the
merest brute matter to the highest animalism, it remains simply
a thing, and will admit of no other treatment than that of a
thing, but with a difference demanded by the difference which
exists between a sensate and insensate thing — between a clod
and a life. But life is not personality, whether in the lower
form of the vegetable or the highest form of the merely
animal. ,
In the personal realm the substance is pure spirit, though1
sometimes allied to and conditioned by matter. The person
has an individualized existence — is a real being. He is invisi
ble and intangible. He has a real life of his own. He knows
himself. He is self-conscious of a distinct existence apart from
every other being. He has power of self-direction. In a word,

38 Studies in Theology.
personality as predicable of a created being involves four
things : (a) A being whose substance is spirit ; (b) a being en
dowed with rational powers ; (c) a being who is self-knowing
or self-conscious ; (d) a being who has power of self-deter
mination, or who is endowed with freedom of choice.
Personality as predicated of God includes these things:
(a) The existence of God as an individualized real being;
(5) that he is a pure spirit ; (c) that he is self-conscious ; (d) that
he has infinite knowledge, power, and eternity ; (e) that he has
an ethical nature which distinguishes the ought and ought not ;
(/) that he has complete power of self-determination — is abso
lutely free. There are other predicates of him, but these are
essentials of his personality, and having these the supreme
Author and Ruler of the universe is a personal Being, and
were he not such the universe itself could not exist. Personality
is thus seen not to be a development, but a form, of existence.
Supreme personality belongs to God and is the eternal and
primary form of existence. Finite personality is being created
in his image and answerable to him for the use of conferred
existence and powers. Impersonal being is a divine creation
for the service of the finite personal universe or individual cre
ated personalities. On this point Dr. Miley, in his Systematic
Theology, says :
" There are mighty forces in physical nature ; but they can
act only on the proper adjustment or collocation of material
things, and thereon must necessarily act. Their action is with
out consciousness or aim as well as under a law of necessity.
Such forces, however great in potency or wonderful in opera
tion, can have no quality of personality. Life, with its mar
velous agency in the vegetable kingdom, still makes no advance
beyond the purely physical realm toward any intrinsic personal
quality. " In the animal orders, notably in those of the higher grades,

God is a Person. 39
there are instinctive impulses toward ends, and a voluntary
power for their attainment, but no evidence- of other essential
requisites of personality. We cannot study the psychology of
animals as we can that of minds like our own, because we
cannot place the facts of the former in the light of our own
consciousness as we can the facts of the latter. Yet strong in-
stinctive impulses and strong voluntary power are manifest
facts in animal life. But there is no evidence of such rational
intelligence in the conception of ends and such freedom in the
choice of ends as must combine in the constitution of per
sonality. " Pure intellect, intellect without any form of sensibility,
however great, could not constitute personality. Conceptually,
such an intellect is a possibility, though its sphere of knowledge
could not be universal. A deeper analysis must find in the
sensibilities a necessary element of knowledge in many spheres.
Such a mind might have great intuitive power and a clear in
sight into the abstract sciences, but it could have no interest in
their study. Neither could there be for it any eligibility of
ends. For such a mind the mightiest potentiality of will would
be useless for the want of all motive or reason of use. The
only possible action would be purposeless and purely spon
taneous. Personality is intrinsically a free rational agency.
This is impossible in pure intellect, however great — impossible
even with the complement of a will potentially very strong.
"Rational or moral motives are a necessity to personal
agency, and therefore to personality. Such motives are not
mere instinctive impulses toward action, but forms of con
scious interest in ends of action, which may be taken up into
reflection and judgment. Motives are possible only with a ca
pacity for conscious interest in ends. This capacity is broader
and deeper than can well be expressed by the term sensibility.
The profounder motives arise from the rational and moral na-

40 Studies in Theology.
ture rather than from what we usually designate as the feelings.
There can be for us no eligibility of ends, and therefore no
rational choice, except through motives arising in some form
of conscious interest in ends. But rational choice is the central
fact of rational agency, and the only difference between rational
agency and personal agency is a difference of verbal expres
sion. With the power of personal agency there is personality.
It follows that for the constitution of personality an emotional
nature, with a capacity for rational interest in ends, must com
bine with rational intelligence.
" Will is the central power of personal agency, and therefore
a necessary constituent of personality. Without the will there
could be no voluntary use or direction of the mental faculties,
no voluntary action of any kind. In such a state man would
be as incapable of personal agency as an animal or even as any
force of physical nature.
" The result of the previous analysis is that rational intelli
gence, sensibility, and will are essential requisites of person
ality. But such a complex of faculties does not in itself com
plete the idea of personality. There must also be the freedom
of personal agency. Such agency means, not merely the free
dom of external action, but specially the free rational choice of
the ends of action. The freedom of external action requires
simply the freedom of the bodily organism from interior im
potence and exterior restraint, and may be as complete in an
animal as a man. The bodily organism is merely instrumental
to the external action, and can be free only as a freely usable
instrument. The mere freedom of external action can have no
higher sense. The true freedom must lie back of this in the
personal agency, and must consist in the power of free rational
choice. With this there is true personality.
" There is still a profound question which vitally concerns
the reality of personality. It is the question of the relation of

God is a Person. 41
motive to choice, or, more properly here, the decision of the
mind with respect to an end — more properly, because whether
such decision be a choice or not depends upon the relation of
the motive to the mental action. That motive is a necessary
condition of choice is a plain truth — so plain that the main
tenance of a liberty of indifference may well seem strange.
Any voluntary decision in a state of indifference must be a
purely arbitrary volition, and therefore cannot be a choice.
Choice in the very nature of it is the rational election of an
end. For its rationality there must be a motive. But what is
the action of the motive upon the elective decision ? This is
the question which vitally concerns the reality of personality.
If the motive is simply a solicitation or inducement which may
be taken up into reflection and weighed in the judgment, per
sonality is secure. But if the motive is a causal efficience
which determines the decision to the end, then there is no
choice, nor the possibility of one, and personality sinks with
personal agency beneath an absolute law of determinism.
"Only as rational intelligence, sensibility, and will com
bine in the constitution of free personal agency is there the
reality of personality. There must be rational intelligence for
the conception of ends, sensibility as the source of motives
with respect to ends, and will in combination with intelligence
and sensibility as the complement of power in choosing be
tween ends. With these facts there is personality. Our own
personality is in this complex of powers.
" With moral reason and a capacity for moral motives, mo
tives sufficient for the choice of the good against the evil, there
is a moral personality. Conceptually, there might be a rational
personality without the necessary powers of a moral person
ality. These powers might be an original omission, or the
rational might remain after the moral were sunken beneath a
law of necessitation. Moral personality must sink under a

4:2 Studies in Theology.
moral necessity to evil, just as rational personality must sink in
the want of its essential requisites. There is no deeper moral
necessity, none more exclusive of moral personality, than an
incapacity for the motives necessary to the choice of the good.
For complete moral personality there must be free moral
agency. " There can be neither human nor angelic personality, nor
even a divine personality, without this complex of essential
requisites. There is no need and no purpose of asserting a
complete parallelism in all personalities. There is no such im- '
plication. As we ascend through the orders of higher intelli
gences, angels and archangels, even up to God himself, there
may be, and in the divine must be, large variations from such
a parallelism. The variations may be not only in the grade of
faculties, reaching to the infinite in the divine, and particularly
in the forms of sensibility, but there may be other powers,
now wholly unknown to us. The position is that the complex
of requisites in our own personality is a necessity for all per
sonality. Neither angel nor archangel is or can be a person in
the true, deep sense of the term without these powers, what
ever their grade in such higher intelligences, whatever variation
in the forms of sensibility, or whatever other powers they may
possess. The same law of requisites must hold for the divine
personality. But this application must be treated under a dis
tinct heading.
"Any conception of the divine personality irrespective of
our own is for us impossible. It does not follow that our own
must be the measure of the divine. We have previously dis
claimed any necessary complete parallelism between human
and angelic personalities, and pointed out how profoundly this
is true as between our own and the divine. Still, there may be
a likeness between the former, with its finite powers, and the
latter, with its infinite perfections, which is greatly helpful to-

God is a Person. 43
ward a truer and clearer notion of the divine. There is a deep
truth in our creation in the image of God. With the revela
tion of this truth there is no rashness in looking into our own
personality for the likeness of the divine. Nor is it, after a
recognition of the difference in the grade of powers and the
forms of sensibility between the two, open to the reprehen
sion, 'Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as
thyself.' Personality is the deepest truth of our likeness to
God. Our vision of his personality is in the reflection of his
image in our own.
" There must be in God the three forms of power which con
stitute personality in us. In the lack of any one he could not
be a person. Such perfections as omniscience, omnipotence,
and immutability, in however complete a synthesis, could not
of themselves constitute a divine personality. There must be
even for God the eligibility of ends and freedom in the choice
of ends. These are the absolute requirement of personal
agency, which is the central fact of personality. But, as we
have previously seen, the eligibility of ends can arise only with
some form of conscious interest in them. This conscious in
terest cannot arise either from pure intelligence or from the
will — not even from an infinite intelligence or an omnipotent
will. There must be motivities of the divine nature, as in dis
tinction from intellect and will — rational and moral motivities
as the necessary ground of interest in ends. With the powers
of intellect, sensibility, and will, and the freedom of rational
and moral self-determination with respect to ends, there is a
divine personality."*
The same proofs which establish that God is spirit establish
that he is a person. Mind is self-conscious. In knowing
he must know himself as knowing — know that he knows.
Knowledge implies subject and object and includes both.
* Vol. i, pp. 166-1TO.

44 Studies in Theology.
This is self-consciousness. If now we add self-determina
tion, that is, power in the subject to determine his own acts,
we have personality — a free self-governing and self-knowing
being. As neither of these is possible to matter, it follows
that the subject in which they inhere is not matter, but spirit,
and it also follows that a being of pure materiality cannot
be a person, or ever attain, to personality. Matter, which has
no power of self-determination, but which acts only as acted in
or upon, can of itself account for nothing ; throughout all its
realm the law of dependence and necessitation reigns ; when
ever and wherever it exists, but especially in conditions and
under forms and relations which indicate ends, purposes, de
signs, it demonstrates coexistence with it and antecedence to
it of another subject, an intelligent, self-conscious, and self-
determining personal being.
The inevitable implication is that God is a person, or per
sonal being. We do not reach the limit of our power to think
him when we reach the idea that he is a being. If we at
tempt to think him impersonal we find it impossible. The
reason rebels against the suggestion that he is an impersonal
force. It is a necessity of rational thought that we clothe him
with personality. Person or personality stands for a thinking,
intelligent being that has reason and reflection. The seat of
intellect is a person. " This has been the uniform and con
stant sense as to this matter. Personality cannot then exist
apart from, but is constituted of and consists in, a rational
nature and faculties. Men never call an inanimate thing or
creature a person. A person is a being which has intellect,
which exercises thought, volition, and affection, and acts
in freedom ; and whoever has these attributes and puts forth
these exercises is a person. These things constitute and
therefore form personality. God is a living, conscious,

God is a Person. 45
infinite person, not a mere unconscious influence, force, or
law." *
The attempt of agnosticism to discredit the great truth of
reason, so adroitly championed by Spencer, Mansel, Hamilton,
and others, must prove a failure until they shall be able to
prove that the order of the universe is timeless, or that origi
nated processes which are packed with thought do not imply a
mind. All scientific research up to date tends the other way.
For order there must be an intelligent cause, and for a begin
ning there must be a free cause, and a free cause must be self-
conscious — must, knowing its power, consciously exert it to a
chosen end. These constitute personality.
With this teaching of reason the word agrees. As reason
demands that reason should think God a person, the revelation
represents him. The grand psalm of creation opens with the
assertion of his personality : " God said, Let there be light : and
there was light." " Let us make man in our image, after our
likeness." Thenceforth on every page he is represented as
the almighty and infinitely wise Governor of the universe, the
universal Father, the loving guide and friend. He sees, hears,
speaks, commands, approves, condemns, loves, hates, judges,
plans, executes, acts in all respects as a person. That the God
of the Bible is a person no one has ever had the temerity to
deny. But that he can be thought as a person has been denied
on several grounds by those who admit that he is so represented
in the Scriptures, and even in reason. That is, while it is ad
mitted that he must be supposed to possess the attributes of
personality, and that they are invariably ascribed to him, it is
frequently contended that it is inconceivable to thought. The
grounds of the allegation are that it is impossible to con
ceive how the infinite and absolute can be self-conscious, which
* Lord, Christian Theology, p. 127.

46 Studies in Theology.
is a necessity to personality. If the allegation were true it
would not sustain the conclusion that he is not a person, or
that he may not be so thought. There may be, and is, a neces
sity that he should be so thought, even though we should not
be able to remove the apparent contradiction. The evidence
is paramount, whatever may be the difficulties in the case. The
farthest possible point to which the objection can be carried
is that we are not able to conceive fully how it can be. Our
inability cannot be disproof — works nothing against the over
whelming support of the position. The evidence must domi
nate us, rather than our weakness of comprehension.
Thus the manner in which we are compelled to think God
is opposed to materialism on the one hand and to pantheism on
the other. Rational thinking excludes these ideas as certainly
as does revelation itself. To give either one or the other a
standing the laws of thought must be ignored. Nature and
revelation are both theistic. While the laws of though remain
unchanged all attempts to unsettle this corner stone of the
theological structure must prove abortive. An impersonal
God is no God. The one term excludes the other. The idea
of an impersonal force as the world ground has been shown to
be as irrational as it is certainly antibiblical. That which acts
is. That which acts rationally is rational. That which is ra
tional is a person. The universe is replete with proofs that a
rational being forms and sustains it. To think otherwise is to
think against the first dictate of reason, namely, that where
thought and purposes are plainly in the effect they must exist
in the cause — must have their ground in a thinking and pur
posing agent. A being that knows knows that he knows ; a
being that purposes knows that he purposes ; a being that pro
duces according to a purpose knows that he fulfills his purpose
in producing. The last result is inconceivable without the

God is a Person. 47
preceding. We know that the universe expresses thought as
well as we know that our acts express thought, and we are
compelled to put an intelligent being behind the one as much
as we are behind the other. However incomprehensible the
fact is we are thus shut up to the necessity of thinking that the
world ground is a personal Being — knowing himself, knowing
his own thoughts, acting with a purpose, and self-consciously
carrying forward the cosmic order in all its marvelous details
and still more marvelous homogeneity, from the beginning to
its highest completion.

4:8 Studies in Theology.

FREEDOM OF GOD
The term "will " plays so important a part in both philosophy
and theology that it becomes quite necessary that we have a
definite idea as to its meaning. It would sometimes seem, from
the use made of it, to represent a thing in itself, instead of an
attribute or faculty or mode or capability of a being — a sort of
despotic master which enslaves a person, instead of a subjective
quality or attribute of the person himself.
Personality means a being who has capacities which manifest
himself to himself and to other beings of the same kind in three
forms. These are : (a) He has the power of intelligence, that
is, power to think, to know, to understand, to reason, to re
member, to imagine, and of self-identification and differen
tiation from other objects — self-consciousness. These several
terms represent modes of activity of the person. It is he who
thinks, knows, and does all these things. (5) Capacities or capa
bilities of sensibility or feeling ; that is, power or ability to be
impressed by external objects, and to experience subjective
feelings, as joy or sorrow, love or hate, delight or disgust,
pleasure or pain, sense of right or wrong, feeling of obliga
tion, fear, dread, hope, and the almost innumerable emotions
of which the person is conscious. All these are simple
forms of personal experience which arise under appropriate
conditions, (e) Capacity of self-determination in certain forms
of activity. This capacity takes the name of will. Rightly
understood, the term simply means the power the person has
over himself. It is not the will that wills and determines
the person. It is the person who wills and determines
himself. The act of will is his act of self-determination. It

Freedom of God. 49
differs both from feeling and knowing, as they differ either
from the other, but it is conditioned by them. To know is one
phase of personal experience ; to feel is another form ; to will or
determine the self to a given end is still another ; but in each
case it is the person who acts or has the experience.
The law of the soul, which is only another name for the
person, is that it should (a) act as intelligent ; some object must
first, either by external impingement or internal reflection,
memory, or imagination, be present to it as a cognition or con
ception, (b) The object being present awakens, or is accompanied
by, some kind of feeling, (c) The knowledge of the object and
the feeling become the occasion of some kind of self-determi
nation, or some action of the person with respect to the object.
The will has thus, though itself always remaining inactive until
an object, conceptive or actual, has been presented and a feeling
created, been called the active power of the mind — the power
by which the person determines himself to or against the object
which is presented and which has awakened feeling of some kind.
The object and the feeling which have possession of the mind,
and on occasion of which the person determines himself either
to or against, has taken the name of the motive or mover or
instigator to the person to act. So far all is plain, and there is
no dispute. But here a vexed question emerges, which has
filled the ages with wrangle and debate, both in the philosophic
and theological ranks, but with the greatest vehemence in the
theological. That question is whether the motive determines
the man, or the man determines himself ; whether his will-act
is free or necessitated ; or, perhaps, what presents the real issue
better, whether, all the circumstances considered, the man when
he determines himself one way could at the same time have
determined himself the other ; in a word, whether when he
sins he might have avoided it.
If the view we have presented be correct — and we do not see

50 Studies in Theology.
how it can be escaped — the world ground must be, for rational
thinking, an eternal Being, therefore having necessary existence,
therefore independent and self-sufficient, to account for all other
existences. He must possess infinite wisdom and almighty
power ; must pervade all with his presence, and include all in
his knowledge — be omnipotent and omniscient. There must
be no limit to his energy, or decay of his power, or abatement
of his interest. So much is necessary to him as eternal and as
cause of the material cosmos. Nor would even these endowments
suffice to account for material nature alone. Going no further,
we should have to add the highest sign of personality — self-deter
mination. The world ground must have necessary existence ;
but to it, that is, to the effect, he must also be free — free not
simply from outward constraint, but also from inherent necessity
— must be able to determine his own act, and select the manner
and end of his energizing. It is impossible that he should be
constrained from without, since there is nothing in existence
besides himself to constrain him. It is impossible to suppose
immanent necessity, since that would require that the creative
act should be eternal, since any necessity inherent in his exist
ence enforcing creative activity must have been eternally in
herent, and the necessity must always have existed ; the act
therefore must also be eternal, for if necessary it could not not
be, which is a contradiction, since any creative activity must of
necessity have a beginning, as it is in the very nature of an
effect that it is the coming to pass of that which was not in ex
istence ; and, also, it is contrary to demonstrable facts. The
world ground must therefore be, to rational thinking, a free
cause. In this absolute freedom is found not only the soul
source of causational activity, but also the basis of his eternal
nature and personality. The universe of which he is the sole
cause and free cause is throughout what he, self-moved and
freely, chose to make it. All the reasons for its existence are in

Freedom of God. 51
himself, freely acting thereto ; and the same freedom which was
exercised in its creation is exercised in its entire ordering and
ongoing. It is impossible that he who has the ground of all
existence in himself should ever come under the law of ne
cessity or constraint of any kind. He must forever be self-
determined. Thus absolute freedom is eternally integral to the
nature of God. Herein is found the essential and necessary
condition of true causality. There can be no true ultimate
causality without a free personality. Thus we come again by
a necessity of thought upon the great discovery that the world
ground is a personal Being.
We dwell for a moment upon the point here made, that
causality necessitates absolute freedom in the cause. To cause
is to begin action. Eternal causation is a contradiction. The
eternal Being has the power to become cause, but not the power
to be an eternal de facto cause ; that is, the causal act must have
a beginning, antecedent to which it was not performed. This
we have already shown to be among the necessary truths. But
if a causal act must have a beginning, he himself who origi
nates it must be free, and must also be eternal.
When we predicate freedom of God it will at once be per
ceived that, being eternal, his existence cannot be a matter
of choice or a thing with relation to which he is free. That
would involve absurdity. And as his essential attributes are
inseparable from his being the same is true of them. The
sphere of freedom relates, not to being or perfections, but to
the manner of handling himself. He does not choose to be
eternal, self-existent ; he is so. He does not choose to have in
finite wisdom ; he has it. He does not choose to be omnipo
tent ; he is omnipotent. He does not choose to have power of
self-determination ; he has it. He does choose how he will use
his wisdom and omnipotence. Herein is the proof that among
his perfections is that of a will, or power of willing — of voli-

52 Studies in Theology.
tionation — and herein is the sphere of his freedom. Necessary,
not necessitated, as to his being, he governs his acts volitionally,
and is without restraint or constraint, either internal or external.
If it should be asked, What determines him to choose as he
does ? the answer is already given : He determines himself, not
under the law of necessity, but under the law of freedom. The
principles which furnish the grounds of his self-determinations,
not the necessitation of them, are his essential perfections of
wisdom and love, and he freely chooses to obey their behests.
The free cause of the universe uses his power in creating and
ordering it according to the dictates of infinite love and wisdom.
Might he use his power otherwise than the dictates of wisdom
and love prescribe, or might he decline to use it according to
their dictates ? If he could not so employ it, or if he might
not decline to use it at all, wherein is his freedom ? If he
might so employ it, or refuse to employ it, what becomes of his
wisdom and love ? The only possible answer to the apparent
dilemma must be that if we suppose him to have a moral nature
at all he must be free, and, if free, must have ability to the
alternative of acting according to the dictates of his eternal
attributes, or adversely — must be able to renounce himself or
revolutionize his own eternal perfections. That he remains
loyal to himself must be a free self-determinatiorl^else-God
himself and the universe are bound up in mere fate.
Will he so use his freedom ? The answer is : His will, by his
own free self-determination, immutably follows the dictates of
his infinite wisdom and love, but does so in absolute freedom^
His wisdom and love are among his eternal perfections, and
cannot change, since that which is eternal has the quality of
necessary existence. His will-acts, whatever may be his power
to the contrary, are immutably certain to'honor these ineffable
perfections. " I am the Lord, I change not," is the testimony
he gives of himself.

Freedom of God. 53
The intelligibles or thoughts of the Infinite are necessary
inherences of his eternal nature. They are not acquired, but
exist ; not growth of knowledge, but infinite knowing. Such
of these eternal intelligibles as he chooses are transformed into
objectified realities by self-originated volitional activity, and are
the concrete cosmic order, or phenomenal world. The voli
tional activity is under form of time and space, which have no
existence apart from it. It is permanent in all objective
reality as the ground of its existence. It may be questioned
— as it is, with great learning, in Professor Bowne's recent
books, and by many other able thinkers — whether the ob
jective reality is anything else than a mode of volitional
energizing. Thus the Infinite is forever present with and
immanent in all cosmic phenomena, and it is a perpetual ren
dering of his own eternal thought ; it is forever known to him
in all its multiform and ever-changing history. Omnipres
ence and omniscience are necessary concomitants of the divine
will. As will, he can never act except in the presence of
these attributes and with reference to the ends which they
furnish. If now we ask why he acts with reference to the objects,
giving reality to some rather than others, we answer, not simply
because he chooses so to do, but because there is in him the
ethical sense that that which is the highest ideal of wisdom and
love ought to be, or has a right to be. These ideals are the
abstract conceptions of right, or they are the rule of right, for
all ethical being forever. As right, he wills their actualization
immutably. This constitutes his eternal righteousness, or his
righteousness is the immutable coexistence in him of these
ideals, and a free determination of himself to their actualiza
tion. The free and immutable purpose that they should be is
a permanent state of his will, and his will becomes causational
of them when and as he continues forever to put forth voli-

54 Studies in Theology.
tional energy, thereby giving them objective existence or real
izing to himself all cosmic phenomena.
It emerges as a necessity of rational thinking that the world
ground should be conceived as an ethical being. Translating
or interpreting him from our own self-consciousness, which
furnished the only key by which we can interpret him at all,
we are compelled to impute to him moral feelings and motives.
They alone explain the working of his power. For the pur
pose of translation we have to begin with his work and read
backward to the motive. The concept of an end, and the
conscious power to realize it, are not adequate to solve the
problem. Another factor is needed. There must be found
something in the nature of the eternal being to explain why he
shall work at all, and why he should work to one end rather
than another. The choice of the end reveals the deepest fun-
damenta of his nature— the bottom and governing principles,
the principles which subordinate power and wisdom itself.
The motives to creative and providential activity in every
form lie in the region of ethical sensibility. Were there not an
ethic in the world ground there could be no world. The logical
order for thought is : (a) An eternal mind ; (5) the conception
of a world order ; (c) the intuition of power to create ; (d) mo
tive or some form of desire to induce the exercise of creative
power ; (e) the volitional determination or choice ; (f) the ex
ecutive act of will by which power is exerted and effect pro
duced ; (g) for an end proposed ; (h) freedom to the end ; (i) a
motive in ethical sensibility ; (J) executive or creative voli
tion. It is the final member of the series that dominates the
whole, and so furnished the highest expression of the ineffable
nature underlying all cosmic phenomena. There could be no
creative volition without a motive. There could be no motive
without a sensibility to be moved. The sensibility could not
be moved without an end, first in the perception, and second

Freedom of God. 55
in the sensibilities. There could be no such end without a
perceiving or knowing mind. There could be no effect without
power. There could be none of the series without being.
With respect to the will of God, by which we mean his
power to determine his own acts — first, to choose what he will
do ; second, to realize his choices by a volitional exercise of en
ergy to that end — this is the sum of our findings :
1. God is an eternal being possessed of the eternal inhering
perfections of omnipotence, omniscience, wisdom, and good
ness, with absolute freedom of will as to his choices and ex
ecutive volitions.
2. While absolutely free in the exercise of will, the ground,
not the necessitation, of every act of will lies in his perfections
of wisdom and goodness — his rational and ethical sensibility.
He cannot act at all volitionally without motives drawn from
the logically antecedent, but really coincident, action of these
perfections ; though being free, he possesses the power to act
adversely thereto.
3. His will-acts, like his nature, are immutable and irreversi
ble ; what he chooses once he chooses forever ; what he con
demns once he always condemns, and what he approves once
he forever approves ; but this does not mean that changes of
character in creatures do not work changes of feeling and action
toward them, but the very opposite. The immutability of the
principles on which he determines his will-acts is the very
ground of change of attitude toward creatures who change.
The change in the creature brings it into new relations to the
unchangeable will.
4. The divine will is the organ of divine energizing. Om
nipotence is simply a mode of volitional action. What he
wills is effectuated simply by the willing. The act of creation
ascribed to God can be explained in no other way and on no
other principle than the exertion of energy directly by simple

56 Studies in Theology.
volition ; the same is true of the upholding and ongoing of the
universe. 5. Acts of will must be differentiated from more permanent
states of disposition, inclination, desire, pleasure. God would
have every man to be sr.ved ; it would be pleasing to him ; he
is favorably disposed to it ; but he wills only the salvation of
those who can be saved on immutable ethical principles. No
will-act of God can ever override or abolish what is immutable
in his nature. There is a strict propriety in the phrase, "He
wills as he pleases," which is to say that whatever his voli
tional act, whether of choice or executive energizing, he is
pleased to do ; but this is not the equivalent of denying that
if the circumstances were different it would be pleasing to him.
His pleasure may arise from the obligations of righteousness
eternally recognized by him, or from delight in well-being.
He would have, that is, it would delight him to have, universal
happiness ; but he cannot will, that is, choose or efficiently
cause, the same happiness to attend sin as he causes to attend
virtuous obedience.
6. God's will, that is, that which he wills, constitutes his
essential righteousness — his perfect holiness. Did he will dif
ferently his moral character would be wholly changed. The
perfect conforming of his will to the dictates of his infallible
wisdom and immutable love of the good constitutes the guar
antee of right, or absolutely just, dealing with the universe, and
is the crown and glory of his moral nature.
There are some things or facts of the finite self over which
it is certain the person has no power — with respect to which he
neither does nor can act as a will or determine himself. With
regard to them he exists under the strict law of necessity —
neither consenting nor dissenting, nor in any way exercising
any self-determination. This includes a large class of personal
experiences and activities.

Freedom of God. 57
It is quite common to make the distinction between persons
and impersonal things that the former implies freedom and
the latter necessity or necessitation ; a thing has no power over
itself or over its relations to other things, a person has perfect
power of self-determination, or power over his acts. The dis
tinction is too broad and leads to error.
There are experiences over which a person has no more
power of self-determination than a thing has. In some respects
the personal being is as much under the law of necessity as is a
clod or a stone.
It will be of service to call attention to the matters in which
personalities exist under the strict law of necessity, with respect
to which they do not at all act in the form of willing. These
are : (a) In the matter of existence. The person does not de
termine himself to exist ; he cannot determine himself not to
exist. It is impossible for him to exercise himself as a will on
the subject. It transcends his choice ; it cannot be effected by
his volition ; in fact, he has not the power to volitionate at all
about it. He may determine to destroy his body, and may so
do ; he may determine to misuse his powers and pervert his
own being, but he has no power to abrogate or annihilate him
self, any more than to create himself, (b) The same thing is
true with regard to many of his mental acts and states, such as
perception, or when an object is before the mind, as thoughts,
feelings, memories. These are purely involuntary states with
respect to which the person has no power, (c) The same thing
is true with regard to instinctive and natural feelings, as
pleasure when an object is present which excites it, or disgust,
or love, or hate, or joy, or sorrow, or fear, dismay, terror, and
such like. Over such the person has no power ; they are not
subject to the will. The same is true of self-consciousness in
general, (d) The same is true of hereditary tempers, dispo
sitions, all natural and instinctive desires and preferences.

58 Studies in Theology.
These are given with existence, or fall under the law of neces-
sitation and impersonal states and conditions. As such they in
volve nothing of moral or ethical character, (e) The same is true
of all physical traits, inherent lusts, and tendencies. They are
not products of the will, nor subject to the will. Over all this
realm necessity reigns, and with regard to it there is and can be
no personal responsibility or ground of merit or demerit any
more than there is for hunger or thirst, or any other inevitable
state or condition. They are never made the subject of com
mand or prohibition. They belong to the nature of things
which God has established as much as the tides or gravitation.
What, then, is the sphere of the will ? To this we answer : The
sphere of the will is that of personal self-control or self-deter
mination with respect to ends to which the person is free,
whether ethical or unethical. Not all self-determinations are
ethical, but only those which relate to duty or right. A man
determines to walk instead of ride, to sit instead of stand, to
speak or be silent. There is nothing ethical in such determina
tions in themselves considered, but there is proper will action.
The sphere is strict and limited to those things with respect to
which the person has power of self-determination.
While the person acts in the mode of a will with respect to
things which have no ethical significance, all ethical require
ments or moral laws have respect to those things only which
are subject to or under the power of self-control, and are ad
dressed to and imposed upon the person as a will. The seat
of moral character is strictly the person acting as a free will —
neither the understanding nor the sensibilities as such, nor any
thing but the will. The will determines moral character, and
yet the moral character does not leave out the understanding or
the affections. We have said that certain mental states and
activities exist wholly irrespective of the will, and as such have
no ethical significance — mean nothing morally — as perception,

Freedom of God. 59
self-consciousness, and memory, and such like. We now say
that this does not mean that the person, as a will, has no func
tion with respect to these uses of the mind. It is found that
he, while he cannot help but perceive when the object of per
ception is present, nevertheless has large will power over the
states and acts of the mind, as he can determine, and does
determine, whether he will keep himself aloof from low and
vile imaginings, or will seek to banish these and bring before
his thought better things; whether he will be studious or
idle ; whether he will busy himself with high or debasing
subjects of meditation and contemplation. There is a sphere
for self-determination, and so he may and does come under
the law of freedom and ethical obligation with respect to the
condition and action of the mind ; that is, of himself in matters
that pertain to the mind. The same is true with regard to his
feelings. He can have no direct power over them, but as a will
he has power over those feelings which are discovered to be
evil and wrong ; if not immediately to banish them or prevent
their existence, he has power to disapprove them, to restrain
them, to seek deliverance from them, to refuse action to which
they prompt, and thus to deliver himself from the evil of them,
and the still better power to seek forgiveness of them when
they have been indulged, and by grace to have them purged
away. So far as they are natural, such as pleasure and pain
under certain conditions, he can have no power over them ; so
far as they are improper he can correct them ; so far as they
influence the will and come under the law of morality he can
refnse to indulge them ; so far as they are polluting he can
avail himself of divine power to purge them by regeneration.
It is not an uncommon thing in writers on the will to repre
sent the will as being involved in states of the mind and of the
affections which exist wholly irrespective of it, and over which
the person has no control at all, as disposition and preference.

60 Studies in Theology.
To prefer a thing or be favorably disposed to it is considered
an act of the will. What is meant by this ? A man prefers
pleasure to pain, one odor to another, beauty to deformity. Is
the will involved in such preferences ? Who will pretend it ?
The preference means simply that one thing is more agreeable
than another. If the object be a moral object, the preference of
an evil to good discovers a debased state of the affections. In
herited depravity may be the source of such a condition ; in that
case the will has nothing to do with its existence ; but it becomes
involved in its indulgence and continuance, if a remedy be within
its power. A bias to evil, an inclination, a predisposition is
found to be natural to fallen and hereditarily depraved human
beings. As natural and inherited the will has nothing to do with
such states any more than it has with hereditary physical dis
ease, and there is no more guilt in the one case than in the other.
The sphere of the will is strictly limited to matters which
are under the control of the person, or with respect to which
he has power of self-determination. Now, what are these
matters ? The correct answer to this question is of the utmost
moment. We discover by self -consciousness two forms of will
action, or power in us to govern our actions of self-determina
tion in two ways, and the will-act is always purely subjective.
It relates often, indeed generally, to some external object, but
itself is entirely internal. The two forms in which we act as
will are choice of an end, that is, objects are before the mind
which awaken in us a sense of obligation to act with reference
to them in a given way, or which awaken a desire, or which
furnish the opportunity merely for some personal act with re
gard to them ; the possible or suggested act may be ethical or
indifferent. The primary act of the will or the person is an
act of choice — not of preference, which is not an act, but a state
antecedent to choice, which itself may not suppose any ante
cedent will-act ; an act of choice by which the person elects an

Freedom of God. 61
end — determines himself to that end. The next act of the will
is the putting forth of energy, an executive volition to realize
the end chosen. Both these forms of act are subjective, but
both have an end which is objective. The first act chooses the
objective end, the second effectuates it.- This is the complete
account of the will. The primary act may be a general one,
or it may be specific. In the first place the person deliberately
determines to a general course of conduct, without reference to
any particular thing. He decides, that is, chooses, say, to give
himself up to a life of lust, of sinful indulgence, to deny him
self no pleasure ; to disregard all restraints of conscience ; to
live as he lists. This choice is fundamental and radical. As
such it involves the total overthrow of all virtue and the utter
ruin of character. It is not necessary that there should be a
single act of choice of some specific wrong to involve him in
utter guilt. But in point of fact this self-determination to a
general course of sin is followed by specific acts of choice
when specific opportunities of indulgence arise. He chooses in
each case the indulgence to which by a general choice he has
already determined himself. There is not a single case in
which he does not put forth a choice ; and not a single case
when there is not an executive volition to carry out to its end
the thing chosen, the fair opportunity being given. His will
attitude is that simply of waiting the opportunity and of readi
ness to embrace it on all occasions when possible.
With respect to all such acts the person is free cause both in
the first and second form — free to choose and free to execute,
that is, so far as the subjective act is concerned. Hindrances
external may prevent the carrying out of the executive volition
— such as want of opportunity, physical inability, fear of conse
quences — a thousand things — but the will has acted in the fixed
determination and choice, and is in the attitude to put forth
power to the end when opportunity offers.

62 Studies in Theology.
With regard to all such acts the person is free, that is, does
not act under necessity — has power to choose or not choose.
The act is his own, and not that of some constraining force ex
ternal to himself.
Choice is always preceded by conditions. To choose there
must be an object of choice. The will does not instigate action
without an end. A perceived object does not become insti
gator simply as object. If it be totally devoid of interest to
the mind, it passes out of observation as a thing indifferent, de
manding no action and leaving no impression. To elicit any
determination of the self with respect to it, it must have power
in some way to move the mind — must be a motive. There are
a thousand ways in which a perceived object becomes a motive.
It is pleasing to the taste, or inviting to the passions, or offers
gain, or awakens a sense of duty, or creates desire, or excites
disgust, or fear, or shame ; attracts or repels ; falls in with
inclination, preference, disposition ; the mind is impressed —
moved ; the influence is strong or weak. The mind must act
one way or another with respect to it ; must accept or reject it.
There is absolutely no escape from action. There is no ne
cessity more absolute. One can no more refuse to know what
is known, or feel what is felt, than it can refuse to act as will
in such a case. It must choose for or against, or postpone de
cision for the present, which is an action of the will. The
question remaining is, Is it free in the matter of its final de
cision ? To this we answer : If by freedom be meant a total
absence of all influence, both internal and external, impelling,
attracting, inclining, repelling, then there is no free being in
the universe — neither God, man, nor angel. It is no more cer
tain that matter under all circumstances is under the dominion
of necessity than it is that mind under all circumstances acts
under influences subjective or objective. As there is no mo
tion in matter without a mover, so in mind there is no action

Freedom of God. 63
without a motive. Perception is excited by an object ; self-
consciousness is awakened by something which stirs the mind to
think or feel ; feeling has a cause ; so every act of will must
have an occasional cause in some internal or external influence.
If by freedom be meant unembarrassed action, or equal ease
of action one way or the other, then again there is no such
thing as freedom in the universe. Necessity is always equal.
Any necessity is just as strong in every respect as any other
necessity, and always implies the absolute impossibility of the
opposite ; on the other hand, freedom does not imply equal ease
of action one way or the other, or, if it be supposed to mean
that, freedom does not exist. Matter acts only as acted upon —
its reaction is always fixed and determined by law ; it can do no
otherwise. Will acts directly toward an end, and is impotent
without an end. Choice is choice of something. Executive
volition is to realize something. Freedom of will signifies the
power of a person to determine himself to or from any object
of choice, under whatever pressure of influence one way or the
other, either internal or external.
When the power does not exist, no difference from what
cause, the choice or action of the will comes under the law of
necessity, and the act ceases to have ethical significance. Up
to the point when influence is converted into necessity respon
sibility continues. At the point where necessity begins respon
sibility ends, or the remaining responsibility is for antecedent
abuses which resulted in loss of freedom. So long as the person
has power over his acts, responsibility may be proportional to
the difficulty ; the greater the difficulty the higher the obliga
tion and the more meritorious the free act.
There can be no moral being where freedom does not exist ;
no obligation where there is not corresponding power ; no desert
of praise or blame for acts over which the person has no deter
mining control, and none where the mind has no means of

64 Studies in Theology.
knowing the right or wrong in the case. Free choices of ends
which are indifferent— that is, neither right nor wrong— have no
moral significance, and neither indicate nor affect moral char
acter. Every act in which the mind supposes the quality of
right or wrong to exist, whether or not the act has the quality
imputed, is a moral act and reflects moral character. Worthi
ness or unworthiness, or moral character, depends on the inten
tion of the person acting, on his absolute freedom to the act
performed, and on the worthiness of the end chosen. These
principles are of universal application in the moral universe.
To determine the moral character of a moral being, environ
ments must be considered, not as absolutely causative, but as in
a degree modificative. It is, indeed, the being who acts and who
is sole cause, and the moral quality of the act is found in the
purpose of the actor ; but environment must be taken into the
account as showing the pressure under which the purpose is
formed and executed. The same act and the same motive do
not determine that the moral quality of the action is precisely
identical in worthiness. Under one set of environments the
act would be easy and natural, and its performance does not
show that the performer has such a quality of moral integrity as
would endure a great strain of temptation to the opposite, or as
would overcome or persist if beset with actual and severe trial.
The quality of character is good, but possibly not strong.
Great inducements to a wrong act addressing the person on
every side, and great embarrassments, hindrances, and suffer
ings of one kind and another lying in the way of the right act,
were the right still adhered to would prove a higher quality of
character and a correspondingly superior degree of worthiness
than if the circumstances were precisely opposite. Environ
ment, including in the term internal and external facts, must
be taken into the account in fixing the moral quality, if not the
moral status, of the actor.

Freedom of God. 65
Freedom is the indispensable condition, but other things
have relative bearings. As there may be a perfectly free being
and perfectly free acts which are totally void of significance,
because void of every moral intention and required by no law,
so there may be moral acts which, under some circumstances,
have less moral significance than the same acts would have
under another set of circumstances.
All moral goodness — and the same is true of moral badness —
does not determine that the actors are equal in good or bad
character, however they may determine that they belong to the
one class or the other. Not every wrongdoer is a devil, nor
every rightdoer a saint or a hero ; or, may we say, possessed of
power to be so. To be possessed of a moral character at all
he must be free, and have power over his acts or choices, in the
circumstances in which he is placed ; but this does not imply
that he could lead a forlorn hope in a moral struggle, under
the greatest possible strain, in which the greatest issues are in
volved. This we deem a point of great importance. Free be
ings are responsible only when their power equals the strain
put upon them. They are responsible to that limit.
We come now still further to apply this principle as related
to the Infinite and the finite. As applied to God : What is it
that determines the infinite holiness of God ? The answer is :
He determines it himself, by choosing from among all possibles
the absolutely best. It is that free self-determination which is
his essential and perfect holiness.
For a clearer understanding of this, recur for a moment to all
the circumstances of the case. These are : (a) We have before us
the only Being in existence — there is as yet no universe, no
single creature, but God alone, (b) This solitary Being is a
Being of infinite wisdom and power and freedom ; that is, he
can do as he pleases or whatever he chooses to do. By his

66 Studies in Theology.
infinite wisdom he knows innumerable possible things. Among
these are all sorts of harmful or evil things, all sorts of good,
better, and best things. His power is equal to the creation of
any of them, for there is nothing impossible to it — it is infinite.
Which among these known possibilities shall he make real ?
It is obvious that he alone must answer that question, for there
is none other even to counsel, much less determine, him. It must
be determined by his own free will. He has power to this or
that or the other. Which shall it be ? Just that which he
chooses. What shall determine his choice ? He alone must
determine it. Is it said, No, his own eternal perfections will
determine it. We answer: His eternal perfections are only
another name for himself. What they determine is himself
determining. But then it is said, In any event if he determines himself,
then either whatever is is best, or he shows himself to prefer
that which is not the best ; but then he cannot be absolutely good.
We answer : Whatever he chooses and does is best ; but this does
not prove that whatever is is best. He is not the only being.
There are other beings who have introduced marring and evil
into the perfect system of good, or the best possible which he
made. But is it said, Why, then, did he make beings who could
mar his creation, or why did he not prevent them? We
answer : It could be for no other reason than that it was a part
of the best possible system that there should be beings who
could introduce evil. Well, then, evil must be best. Not at
all. The existence of a being who might cause evil might be
the highest possible proof of goodness, but that would not prove
that the evil he caused was the best ; but, on the contrary, it
would be proof of the ideal best which might have been but
for his marring. The real best possible required the existence
of the finite personal existence, despite the evil which might
thereby find entrance into the universe.

Freedom of God. 67
The term love is the all-inclusive term. "God is love." To
reach its full content it must be analyzed into the several forms
of its manifestation, and it must appear that it is a necessity to
rational thinking that the world ground be clothed with this
attribute. Revelation is full of it, but does the problem of be
ing require it in order to its solution ? Were revelation closed
up, should we still find the need of it ? It cannot be pretended
that by mere insight it would be possible to develop a com
plete idea of the nature of the Infinite, any more than that we
are able to comprehend it when it is made known by revela
tion. But may we not find evidence on the point in ques
tion? This is a question for rational thought. The precise
thesis we lay down is : God is a Being of infinite goodness.
This attribute is inherent and eternal. It is not elicited by
created being, but it is itself the deepest fountain of created
being. It is a necessity of thought that the Eternal be conceived as
once existing alone. The concept leads us into a region dark
with mystery. Why did the Infinite not continue to dwell
alone? We have said that it is impossible that he should
have been moved by some ab-extra necessity, or even some
ab-intra necessity ; and yet he must have acted from some mo
tive under some powerful impulse. The possible motive to
rational thinking must have been one or several of the follow
ing : either (a) he was moved by mere caprice ; or (b) he was
moved by purely selfish considerations; or (c) he was
moved by a purpose of pure malignity ; or (d) he was moved
by a mixture of malevolence and benevolence ; or (e) he was
moved by infinite and unmixed benignity. Every other con
ceivable motive is resolvable into one or other of these. The
result and his own testimony in the premises must interpret
him. How are we compelled to think him from these com
posite sources of evidences ? We shall not be able to get all the

(58 Studies in Theology.
evidence, and our faculties will not rise to the height of the
problem ; but we are able to go far enough in the solution to
reach a conclusion which, for rational thinking, will be satis
factory. It is of no small value as a determining factor that even be
fore the investigation begins we instinctively reach a conclusion.
Corporate with our rational existence is an invincible convic
tion, sometimes obscured, but in the end asserting itself.
The soul of man may be debauched by superstitions and per
verted by sin, may miss its way and lose hold of its Maker
and Eternal Father, and may come under self-accusings and sink
into despair, but it will still in its deepest self be loyal to the
instinct that God is good, that somehow he is infinite love.
Driven about by the scourges of self-conscious guilt, and loaded
down with fear and dread and dismay, it still feels that the fault
is within itself. No sophistries, however plausible or ingen
iously wrought, can rub out of the heart the sense of the
Eternal Fatherhood. The prodigal amid the swine — hungry,
naked, forsaken, friendless — has still, amid the embers of a
wasted and wicked life, the instinct of home and the love that
reigns there. Amid the moral ruins of the most abject
heathenism there are evidences that something of the thought
and feeling of this deep truth still remains. Obscured, distorted,
almost obliterated, still in the soul of man archaic memorials
remain impelling to worship and a feeling after the lost treas
ure. All seeking after God conies from the dim feeling that
his favor may be found and his love secured.
But there are difficulties. No one can dispute it. Perhaps
they cannot be explained. Suppose we admit it. Will there,
then, be no rational alternative but doubt of the infinite love ?
May we not rather think of our insufficiency to measure the
meaning of a plan which so transcends us in every respect?
What are the difficulties ? Are they inherent in the idea itself ?

Freedom of God. 69
Is there intrinsic absurdity in the affirmation, God is love ? So
some have thought. If it could be made to appear to reason it
would forever close the discussion, and only a dumb, irrational
instinct could survive, which would make an intelligent faith
impossible. Under the force of such a demonstration religion
would perish from the earth.
What are the inclusions of the idea, God is love ? They are
these : That He who made the world was moved thereto by a
principle of benevolence ; that is, that (a) there was in his nature
a feeling of good will toward the creatures which he made ;
(b) that before he made them, when they as yet were only in his
thought, he was moved to make them real, simply out of good
will toward them ; (c) that he so made them as that they
should receive good from him ; {d) that in their good he
finds enjoyment ; and (e) that he continues forever to take in
terest in their welfare — that a loving heart, as well as an omnip
otent will and omniscient mind, is at the foundation of the uni
verse ; that they coexist with the thought of the universe, which
we have found must have been coexistent with the eternity of
his own being and an inherence thereof. To this benevolent im
pulse toward creation and to this impulse of good will, as fun
damental as either omnipotence or omniscience, the universe
owes its existence. This is God's own account of it. Is there
anything in the conception intrinsically absurd or contradic
tory to right reason ?
Having now found that God is a Spirit, and as such a per
sonal being, we are prepared to consider the question, What may
we predicate of him ? There is a difference between predicates
and attributes. We have seen that attribute is some quality
which inheres in the very essence of a subject, without which
the essence does not exist. The essence does not create it,
but includes it ; thus figure is a necessary inclusion of mat
ter, and intelligence, a necessary inclusion of spirit ; each abso-

70 Studies in Theology.
lutely requiring its respective subject ; there is nothing with
form that is not material, and nothing material that has not
figure. But while an attribute is inseparable from a subject and. an
inherence of its essence, it is found also that any subject must
have modes of existence of some kind — cannot exist without a
mode of some kind ; but while mode is a necessity, and even a
given mode is a necessity to a given subject, and peculiar to it,
mode cannot be considered an attribute, but is simply a pred
icate — possibly an invariable and peculiar predicate, denoting
and characterizing the subject as really as an essential attribute
does. For illustration, an atom is matter ; it is the minutest
particle of matter, but minuteness does not enter into its essence ;
it is simply a mode or predicate of it ; thought is a fact of mind,
but it is not an attribute, but an exercise. Not every predicate
of God, even when it is a necessary predicate, and entirely
peculiar to him, denotes an attribute. God is, but existence is
not an attribute ; God is a spirit, but spirit is not an attribute
of him ; both are true predicates, but neither denotes an attri
bute. The same is true of other predicates, as : God is one,
God is a trinity, God is unconditioned, God is absolute, God is
self-existent, God is independent, God is necessary being, God
is a person. These are all true predicates, but not one of them
denotes an attribute. They each and severally point either to
modes or facts of his existence, but not to attributes of his
being ; but all of them have been treated as attributes. The
explanation is simple. Many writers and thinkers fall into the
blunder of supposing that whatever can be truthfully affirmed
of a subject imports an attribute of it, and especially if it can
be affirmed of no other being. It is descriptive ; it is attributed ;
this leads to the idea that it is an inherence of the essence.
Even acts are thus raised by some into the eligibility of attri
butes. Creation has been styled an attribute of God, because

Freedom of God. 71
he alone creates. No mere mode or exercise, or fact originated
in or by a subject, however descriptive of it, can be ranked
as an attribute of it, but may be declarative or predicative.
It is even questionable whether eternity can be classed prop
erly as an attribute of God, though he is eternal, and the only
Eternal.

72 Studies in Theology.

MORAL NATURE OF GOD.
The same considerations which prove the spirituality of God
are in proof of his moral nature. Mentality primarily distin
guishes spirit from matter. Where mental phenomena are
spirit is. Mentality is the necessary condition of morality or of
an ethical nature. The prime quality of an ethical nature is
sensibility ; mentality is its conditioning antecedent. The sense
of a good and the feeling of obligation thereto are the complete
proof of an ethical subject. Freedom or power of self-deter
mination — a will — lies implicit in obligation and the sense
of it. Where these facts exist, the facts of mentality, sensibil
ity to the good and the feeling of obligation thereto, and the
power of self-determination, we have a perfect idea of a spirit
ual subject and of a moral nature. The proofs that these coex
ist in God are abundant.
If the material universe, by its order and manifold harmo
nies, compels us to impute power guided by wisdom to him, the
conscience within us (1) which makes the distinction of right
and wrong, or evil and good, and enforces the obligation of the
one and prohibits the other, compels us to impute moral ideas and
sensibilities to him. The moral law is as universal and regnant
in the spiritual realm as gravitation in the material. The
presence and permanence of the law can be explained only by
its presence, not only in idea, but in fact, in the nature of its
Author as an original inherence. It would be forever impossi
ble for him to act as a will choosing an end were there not
motive in him to act. The motive must be inherent. There
can be no motive where there is no sensibility. When the end
chosen is always the good of being, the proof is that the author

Moral Nature of God. 73
is himself pleased with the good and averse to its opposite.
Thus love, justice, holiness are as much shown to be qualities
of God as power, wisdom, and eternity.
The sense of right and the feeling of obligation thereto in
us necessitates its presence in the Author of our being. The
law which imperates the right can be viewed as nothing else
than an expression of his will. If he wills the right, and en
forces it with high sanctions, there can be no higher proof of
his moral nature and of its absolute perfection. That he does
will it is in proof both in his revealed law and in conscience.
The history of moral beings is a history of moral administration
over them, that is, an administration which is based on moral
ideas and feelings. The sovereign thus proves that he is gov
erned by moral ideas and feelings.
We have found that God is a Spirit ; that he has absolute
and unconditioned being ; that in nature and perfection he is
infinite ; that he is one ; that he is a person.
These predications we have made of him as terms of being
rather than as designating attributes — terms which are applica
ble in common to his attributes rather than themselves names
of specific attributes. They are sometimes classed as attributes.
We prefer to use the term predications of being. This seems
to be the view taken by the elder Hodge. He says : " To the
divine essence, which in itself is infinite, eternal, and unchange
able, belong certain perfections revealed to us in the constitu
tion of nature and in the word of God. These divine perfec
tions are called attributes, as essential to the nature of the divine
Being, and necessarily involved in our idea of God." *
Dr. Shedd says : " The divine attributes are of two classes,
according as they denote a passive relation of the essence or an
active operation of it. The essence considered as passively re
lated to itself is self-existent and simple ; as passively related
* Theology, vol. i, p. 368.

74 Studies in Theology.
to duration is eternal, to space is immense, to number is
one. Self -existence, simplicity, eternity, immensity, and
unity are not active operations of the divine essence, but in
active relationships of it. Eternity, immensity, unity, and
simplicity, and the like, are not modes of energizing, but of
existing." *
This we understand as precisely the equivalent of the view
above expressed. They are not attributes, but predicates of
modes of existence. When the essence is considered as active in
any form of energizing it discovers inhering powers — not mere
passive modes or qualities of existence. These are more properly
attributes. Omnipotence, omniscience, love, goodness — compre
hensively holiness, the all-inclusive moral power of God — and
their active powers and implications are the only attributes of
the divine personality. If, as we properly may, we separate
the divine ubiquity or immensity from the divine omnipres
ence so as that the latter shall signify God's active presence in
and with all being, omnipresence should be added to the list
of attributes proper as showing an actual energizing in all be
ing. Omnipotence is a direct exertion of the divine will, when
related to things, a power of creating, sustaining, and efficiently
ordering or carrying forward the material universe. The will
is the seat of all efficiency and morality. Omniscience com
prehends all intellectual activity in the divine nature, whether
of wisdom or forms of knowledge, as perfect knowledge of
himself and of all other being and all events, past, present, and
future, and all possibilities. Love or goodness designates all
forms of activity which emanate from the will and the moral
affections, as desire for and choice of what ought to be — ap
proval of right in creatures, disapproval of wrong; justice^
mercy, sympathy, and whatever is involved in the perfect holi
ness of God. * Dogmatic Theology, pp. 338, 336.

Moral Nature of God. 75
This will appear as we proceed with the more extended state
ment of these several attributes.
" The older theologians distinguished the attributes of God
(a) from predicates which refer to God in the concrete and in
dicate his relations to his creatures as Creator, Preserver, Ruler,
etc. (b) From properties which are technically the distin
guishing characteristics of the several persons of the Trinity.
There are certain acts or relations peculiar to the Father, others
to the Son, others to the Spirit. And (c) from accidents or
qualities which may or may not belong to a substance, which
may be acquired or lost. Thus holiness was not an attribute
of the nature of Adam, but an accident, something which he
might lose and still remain a man ; whereas intelligence was
an attribute, because the loss of intelligence involves the loss
of humanity." * The older theologians distinguished between
the essence of God and the attributes, not as things different
in reality, but as different modes of our thought of him — things
different non re, sed ratione. This is explained by saying
that things differ ex natura rei, when they are essentially dif
ferent, as soul and body ; while a difference ex ratione is
merely a difference in us, that is, in our conceptions. Turretini
says the attributes are to be distinguished not realiter, but
virtuoliter / that is, there is a real foundation in the divine
nature for the several attributes ascribed to him. f The dis
tinction between the divine essence and attributes is the same
which is found in every other case. There is a difference, but
it is impossible to define it, for the reason that when we come
to describe the subject we must simply employ a name, or recite
the attributes which inhere in the being — the essence of being
refuses to be expressed in any other terms ; yet we cannot doubt
that there is a subject, or that which these attributes display.
* Hodge, vol. i, p. 368.
f Mxamen Theologicum, edit. Leipsic, 1763, p. 235.

76 Studies in Theology.
In considering the moral nature of God there are several
words used confusedly in common discourse and by authors as
synonymous, which differ widely in meaning. It is important
to clear thought that the student should discriminate carefully
between them. The words are : quality, faculty, attribute,
property, mode, predicate; not unfrequently subject is mis
called attribute, and accidents and acts are raised to the grade
of attributes. Whatever in any form can be predicated of God,
especially if it is peculiar to him and differentiates him from
any other being, is often classed as an attribute. Nothing can
properly be styled a divine attribute but a power which in
heres in the very being of God, and which, if taken away,
would abolish the being or so change it as to constitute it
another being — which, in fact, it is impossible should be taken
away, since it belongs to the eternal essence.
Nothing which implies an act of God in order to its exist
ence can be classed as an attribute. He does not create his
attributes any more than he creates his being. Attributes are
not products, but inherences of the nature itself.
Spirituality is not an attribute of God, but is the substance or
essence of his being ; the attributes are inherences of it. Cre
atorship is not an attribute of God, but an accident or incident.
He is God before and without it as much as after it ; it does
not in any sense pertain to his being, but is a result merely of
a mode of his energizing in time.
Attributes are not elementary ingredients or component
parts of the subject. Elementary ingredients exist apart from
the substance which by uniting they constitute. The union
forms a compound subject. Thus water is a compound ma
terial substance. Its essence is matter of which extension and
figure are attributes. Its ingredients are oxygen and hydrogen
gas ; these are not attributes of it, but component parts of the sub
stance. Fluidity, solidity, and vapor are possible accidents of it,

Moral Nature of God. 77
not attributes. Whether in one form or another it is the same
compound substance. The form is an accident occasioned by
degrees of temperature. The properties did exist alone and
may again be dissevered, and their disseverance would abolish
the compound substance, but not the two substances which
made it. The attributes of God are not of this nature. They
are not elementary ingredients which uniting create him. He
is not a compound.
The attributes are not identical. Power is not wisdom.
The simplicity of the subject does not reduce the attributes to
unity, but each diverse attribute inheres in the one indivisible
and uncompounded subject.
God is the essential subject or being — not one, but all the
attributes. He is not power, but he is not without power ; he
is not wisdom, but does not exist without wisdom ; and so
through all the circle of his attributes. He is not one or all of
the attributes, but he is the being who possesses them all, and
who has no existence apart from them entire.
We study the mind in its phenomena, and thug reach a
knowledge of its endowments. This is the common method of
science. We thus find the mind to be rationally constituted.
This is one of the certainties of psychology. In like manner
we determine the several forms of intellectual faculty. In the
same manner we find the mind to be constituted with sensibil
ity, and distinguish the different forms of feeling. Further,
we find the choosing of ends and voluntary endeavors toward
their attainment determine the mind to be endowed with
a faculty of will. The several classes of mental phenomena
are conclusive of these several forms of mental endowment.
No phenomena of mind are more real or constant or common
than the phenomena of conscience. But conscience means a
moral nature, and can have no psychological explication with
out such a nature. Thus with the utmost certainty of scientific

78 Studies in Theology.
induction we reach the truth of a moral constitution of the
mind. The phenomena of rational intelligence, of feeling, and
of volition, which reveal themselves in the consciousness, no
more certainly determine the mental endowments of intellect,
sensibility, and will than the phenomena of conscience determine
the moral constitution of the mind. Further statements may
set this truth in a yet clearer light.
The history of the ages, the religions of the world, philos
ophy and poetry witness to the profound facts of conscience in
human experience. The profoundest students of our mental
nature unite in this testimony. Conscience is present in all
minds, and asserts its right to rule all lives. This right is not
disputed, however its authority may be resisted. In the sensi
bilities there are many incitements to action and in the absence
of a supreme law the question as to which should prevail would
be merely a question of secular prudence. "But there is a
superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man,
which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart,
as well as his external actions ; pronounces determinately some
actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in
themselves evil, wrong, unjust : which, without being advised
with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him,
the doer of them, accordingly." " Thus that principle by which
we survey, and either approve or disapprove, our own heart,
temper, and actions is not only to be considered as what is in
its turn to have some influence ; which may be said of every
passion, of the lowest appetites : but likewise as being superior ;
as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all
others : insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty,
conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintend-
ency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the
faculty itself, and, to preside and govern, from the very
economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it

Moral Nature of God. 79
strength, as it has right ; had it power, as it has manifested au
thority, it would absolutely govern the world." " Every man
has conscience, and finds himself inspected by an inward censor,
by whom he is threatened and kept in awe (reverence mingled
with dread) ; and this power, watching over the law, is nothing
arbitrarily (optionally) adopted by himself, but is interwoven
with his substance."
While conscience is thus at once the central fact and the
proof of a moral nature in man, it is the clear proof of a moral
nature in God. " Hence, while the direct function of conscience
is to discriminate the right and wrong in actions, while its im
mediate sphere is the human will, it goes far beyond this. In
fact, it can perform those functions only in this way. It car
ries the soul outside of itself, and brings the will before a bar
independent of its own impulses. It inevitably awakens in the
soul the perception of a moral law, universal, unchangeable,
binding under all circumstances; in short, of a moral order of
the world analogous to the physical order which it is the prov
ince of science to trace and illustrate. The moral conscious
ness of man refuses to stop short of this conclusion. Man feels
himself, not merely related to physical laws, but even more
closely and more vitally related to moral laws, laws which not
only enter into the structure of his own being, and go to form
the framework of human life, but laws which extend beyond
himself and his own hopes and struggles, and assert themselves
as everywhere supreme. Such recognition of the moral order
of the world is not only the highest, but the only conclusion
that can satisfy the educated moral consciousness of mankind."
"Now it is in these phenomena of Conscience that Nature
offers to us far her strongest argument for the moral character
of God. Had he been an unrighteous being himself, would he
have given to this, the obviously superior faculty in man, so
distinct and authoritative a voice on the side of righteousness ?

80 Studies in Theology.
. . . He would never have established a conscience in man, and
invested it with the authority of a monitor, and given to it
those legislative and judicial functions which it obviously pos
sesses ; and then so framed it that all its decisions should be on
the side of that virtue which he himself disowned, and con
demnatory of that vice which he himself exemplified. This
is an evidence for the righteousness of God, which keeps its
ground amid all the disorders and aberrations to which human
ity is liable."
Thus in the moral consciousness of man there is the recogni
tion of a moral law of universal obligation, and also of a su
preme moral ruler to whom we are responsible. The moral
nature of man is thus the manifestation of a moral nature
in God. In the cosmological argument we found in the
existence of the cosmos, as a world originating in time, conclu
sive proof of the existence of an eternal and infinitely potential
being as its only sufficient cause. On the same grounds we
found that this being must possess the power of self -energizing
— must indeed possess an infinite potency of will. In the tele-
ological argument we found in the adaptations of means to
ends the proofs of a divine intelligence as their only sufficient
cause. Then in grouping these truths thus attained we already
have the proof of the divine personality. This same truth is
confirmed by the nature and faculties of the mind as presented
in the anthropological argument. The moral nature of man is
his highest endowment and the crowning proof of his divine
original. It is specially the manifestation of a moral nature in
God ; and the truth of a moral nature in God is the truth of his
holiness, justice, goodness.

Divine Attributes. 81

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.
By writers of eminence the divine attributes have been put
in two classes : as, " active and passive ; immanent and transi
tive ; positive and negative ; communicable and incommuni
cable ; natural and moral." The elder Hodge very justly re
marks : " That so many different principles of classification
have been adopted, and that each of these principles is carried
out in so many different ways, shows the uncertainty and diffi
culty attending the whole subject." * On the general subject
of classification of the attributes he can be read with profit, f
He adopts for his own : " (1) God is a spirit ; (2) that as such
he is infinite, eternal, and immutable ; (3) that he is infinite
(a) in his being; (b) in all that belongs to his intelligence,
namely, in his knowledge and wisdom ; (c) in all that belongs
to his will, namely, his power, holiness, justice, goodness, and
truth.":}: This is a good working scheme in treating of the
divine Being, but it confounds subject and attributes, and so far
lacks clearness.
Shedd, after some valuable statements on the subject of
classification, adopts as his working scheme, deriving it from
the same source which Dr. Hodge acknowledges, the West
minster Confession : " incommunicable and communicable." §
It has, as we think, the same fault as that of Dr. Hodge, in
confounding the nature with the attributes, and much greater
fault, in fact, a serious blunder, in classing some of the attri
butes of God as communicable. In doing so he follows many
distinguished writers, but none the less commits himself to a
* Systematic Theology, Vol. i, p. 3T6. f PP- 3,?5. 3<?6-
% P. 376. § Dogmatic Theology, p. 338.

82 Studies in Theology.
great error. The attributes of God are infinite attributes of
an infinite nature, and can be no more communicated to a
creature than the nature itself. In treating the subject he
abundantly recognizes this truth. Why, then, adopt a termi
nology which is misleading and calls for constant correction ?
Dr. Pope seems to us to have propounded the most scientific
classification yet reached ; if not faultless, it is the nearest ap
proach to perfection. He says : " Revelation in every possible
form, directly and indirectly, explicitly and implicatively,
affirms the being of God. It declares his essence and attri
butes; his works and his relations; his creatorship and
sovereignty over the universe. It places him beyond all things
and above all things, and makes all things subject to him and
dependent on him for the beginning and continuance of their
existence. It differentiates between him and all things. The
universe is by him, but is in no sense a part of him. It is in
him and of him as its causal ground, so that it could not exist
without him, but it is not an evolution of his essence, but a
product of his will. It is dependent on him, but he is inde
pendent of it. Once it was not. He forever has been. It might
be abolished. He forever must continue to be. This is the
teaching of the holy oracles concerning the being of God. It
affirms not only that he is, but it imputes to him a unique
quality and quantity of being. In quality his being is neces
sary, absolute, unconditioned. It is the only possibility of
all contingent existence, the support of all actual being, so
that nothing is or can be without him. His being is true
and sole source of all being ; but other being is not constitu
ent of his being and does not spring out of it as an effluence
of his essence. The majestic prologue with which revelation
opens asserts the doctrine which is maintained throughout the
great discourse : ' In the beginning God created the heaven
and the earth.' "

Divine Attributes. 83
There is another peculiarity of this classification. Under the
common terms or general conceptions, as above stated, the
things classed are essential, individual existences ; whereas the
attributes are neither essential nor individual existences, but
are concrete realities of the divine personality.
With these profound differences we may still observe a
scientific method in the treatment of the divine attributes.
Such a method requires their classification on the ground of
what is the deepest in God as their subject. This law must
exclude all predicables which, however true of God, are not
distinctively attributes. It follows that a catalogue of divine
predicables, however complete and true, is not a classification
of the divine attributes. Nor is any division on grounds which
do not thoroughly differentiate the several groups a proper
classification. A neglect of these principles results in artificial
distinctions, of which there are many instances.
Dr. Miley says : " It will help us to a clearer view of the
question if we notice a few instances of such artificial distinc
tions and groupings.
" Such is the division of the attributes into the natural and
the moral. Instances of the kind are so common that it is
needless to give any special reference. It might be proper to
distinguish the spheres of the divine agency into the natural
and the moral, but such a distinction of the attributes is ground
less. God acts in the physical and moral spheres, but not by
two distinct sets of powers. Such a distinction in the spheres
of his operation cannot be carried back into the powers of his
agency. "A grouping of the attributes as positive and negative is
equally artificial. It is artificial because this distinction in the
terms marks no real distinction in the attributes. The negative
terms have just as positive a sense as the class of positive terms.
Infinity and immutability express the reality of the limitless

84 Studies in Theology.
and changeless in God, just as omniscience and omnipotence ex
press the absolute plenitude of his knowledge and power. It
thus appears that there is no ground for this classification of
the attributes. It is a grouping without any real distinction.
It will further appear that the divine predicables which we ex
press negatively are not distinctively attributes.
" There is no scientific advance on the ground of a distinction
between what God is in himself and in his manifestations : ' the
Majesty which he has in himself, and the glory which he out
wardly manifests ; the inner brightness, consequently, and the
outward radiance of the light ; the attributes which relate to
his mode of existence, and those which become known to us in
his mode of operation? There is no ground for such a dis
tinction. In any proper sense in which some attributes are re
lated to the mode of the divine existence all must be so related.
Hence they cannot be thus divided into distinct classes. Further,
all are eternally complete in God ; hence no manifestation of
a part in the mode of his operation can constitute a ground of
classification. "We may present together two instances of analysis and
classification which, with verbal differences, are substantially
the same. Dr. Pope gives, as the result of his analysis : ' First,
the attributes pertaining to God as absolute or unrelated being ;
then, those arising out of the relation between the Supreme
and the creature, which indeed require the creature for their
manifestation ; and, finally, those which belong to the relation
between God and moral beings under his government, with
special reference to man.' Dr. Cocker gives the result of his
analysis and the grounds of his classification thus : ' 1. As re
lated to our intuition of real being ; by abstraction from all
other being or personality — the immanent attributes of God.
2. As causally related to finite, dependent existence ; by elimi
nation of all necessary limitation — the relative or transitive

Divine Attributes. 85
attributes of God. 3. As ethically related to finite personal
ity ; by elimination of all imperfection— the moral attributes
of God.' It will readily appear, on a comparison of the two
instances, that the three divisions of the one are the same in
principle and method as the three divisions of the other. They
are both specially formal endeavors toward a scientific attain
ment. We must think the method a mistake and the aim a
failure. In the grouping of the attributes according to the
three divisions certain divine predicables are placed in the first
which are not distinctively attributes. We may instance spirit
uality, which is of the very essence of God and not an attribute
of his being; eternity, which is in no proper sense an attribute
of the absolute being of God, and no truer of his absolute being
than of his personal attributes which are grouped in the second
and third divisions ; immutability, which is not distinctively a
truth of the essential being of God, as it is equally true of all
his attributes ; self-sufficiency, which, instead of being a dis
tinct truth of the very essence of God, can be a reality only
with his omniscience and omnipotence. In the second and third
groupings, on a distinction of relations to the creature and to
moral beings, with a resulting distinction of attributes as the
transitive and the moral, it was impossible to complete the sec
ond division without placing in it some attributes which are
necessary to the third — impossible, because that distinction is
scientifically insufficient for the separate groupings. Omnis
cience, omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, which could not be
omitted from the relation of God to the creature, are equally
necessary in his relation to moral government. The insuffi
ciency of these distinctions may be further noted, particularly
in the analysis of Cocker. The transitive attributes of his
second division are as immanent in God as the attributes of
the first, and no more transitive than those of the third. In
both instances the distinction between the second and the third

86 Studies in Theology.
divisions is really the same as that, previously noticed, between
the natural and the moral attributes, and is open to the same
insuperable objections.
" In the true method of science classification is open on .the
ground of what is most determinate in the subject. This is the
natural method in distinction from the artificial. The same
method should be observed in the classification of the divine
attributes. Personality is the most determinate conception of
God, and the truest, deepest sense in which he can be viewed
as the subject of his own attributes. Personality is the only
conception of God which immediately gives his attributes.
Any other ground of classification must result either in a mere
catalogue in which subject and attribute are confusedly jumbled,
or in groupings without any sufficient ground of 'distinction.
Personality gives all attributes which are properly such in dis
tinction from what God is as their subject.
" Our method omits from this category certain divine predi
cables usually classed as attributes. Of these there are several
classes. Some belong to God as subject, not as attributes.
Some, however true of God, are in no proper sense his attri
butes. Others result from the perfection of attributes, but are
not distinctively attributes themselves. We have previously
noted spirituality as belonging to the first class. Eternity and
unity belong to the second. Immutability and omnipresence
belong to the third.
" As God in personality is the subject of his own attributes,
so therein we must find their true category. This category
must be determined by the constitutive and essential facts of the
divine personality. These essential facts are the divine attri
butes. " Intellect is in both common and philosophic use for the
power or capacity of rational intelligence in the human mind.
It includes all the cognitive faculties, but signifies simply the

Divine Attributes. 87
capacity for knowledge, while knowledge itself must be an ac
quisition through their proper use. There is the reality of in
tellect in God ; and, so far, there is a likeness of powers in the
human and the divine personalities. Knowledge in God, how
ever, is not an acquisition, but an eternal possession. This pro
found distinction requires the use of another term for the ex
pression of the whole truth in God. Intellect well expresses
the power of knowledge in the human mind, but cannot express
the plenitude of the reality in the divine mind. No term is
more appropriate than omniscience — the one long in theological
use. Omniscience implies the profoundest sense of intellect as
a power of knowledge, but omits all implication of a process of
acquisition, while it expresses the infinite plenitude of the. di
vine knowledge.
" Sensibility is the term in philosophic use for all forms of
mental feeling. It is also used without any qualification for all
forms of divine feeling. It seems more appropriate for a phi
losophy grounded in sensationalism than for a philosophy which
gives a proper place to the higher rational powers and to origi
nal truths. The profoundest motives of life arise with the activ
ities of the philosophic and moral reason. Sensibility seems
but a poor term for the expression of these higher motivities.
Yet it is the term in philosophic use ; nor have we another with
which to replace it. It seems still more inappropriate and in
sufficient for the expression of the forms of feeling in the mind
of God, and necessary to his personality. But the difficulty of
replacing it with a better still remains. The term feeling is
deficient in definiteness, and includes much of human sensibility
which can have nothing analogous in the divine consciousness.
Affection and emotion are in philosophic use for distinct forms
of sensibility, and hence are too specific and narrow for the
present requirement. Even love, while the deepest truth of
the divine nature, does not include all the forms of divine feel-

88 Studies in Theology.
ing. It seems necessary still to use the term sensibility. But
we here use it only in the sense of the higher forms of feeling,
particularly the rational and moral, which render man the image
of God. These feelings are the response of his motivities to
the objects of his conception, and constitute the motives of his
providence. Without such motives he could have no reason for
any action. Neither teleology, nor justice, nor love could have
any place in the operations of his providence. There could be
no divine providence. Neither could there be a divine per
sonality. " Will is the third and completing attribute of personality.
It is the necessary power of personal agency, of rational self-
determination, of rational action with respect to motives and
ends. The will is not sufficient for personality simply as a
power of self -energizing for the attainment of the ends of one's
impulses and appetences. Such a power is no higher than the
self -energizing of an animal. It must be central to the person
ality, that it may be the working power of the rational personal
agency. It is thus the power of election with respect to ends,
and the executive power whereby one may give effect to his
choices. The will is thus a necessary attribute of personality.
It is such an attribute in God." *
There must be a best way of arranging the attributes, a
most logical and philosophical order, one would think, but
scarcely any two of the great writers agree as to the principles
"upon which the classification should proceed. This arises from
the fact that the attributes of the divine nature, like its essence,
are eternal, neither more essential than the others as to the
divine nature. They equally partake of the dignity and
worthiness of the nature itself. And yet there is a logical
order in their manifestation. While it is true that the whole
nature moves in every expression and manifestation, some one
* Systematic Tlieology, vol. i, pp. 175-1 "79.

Divine Attributes. 89
attribute takes the initiative in every act. There is thus a
logical order in the exercise of the attributes. The nature
and attributes which are of it are alike immanent and eternal,
but all forms of causational activity and manifestation neces
sarily come under the conditions of time and succession.
If we can in thought place ourselves back of all created ex
istences with God alone, and endeavor to find out the logical
order in his modes of procedure in the great movement which
he is about to inaugurate, we may possibly obtain some light
on the problem of the logical relations of the attributes in car
rying forward the movement. Most fundamental is the being,
the essence. Can anyone doubt what the order would be?
Would not the idea take logical precedence ? But if so the
omniscience, which in the form of wisdom gives the idea, would
be the logical first subjectively. But could the idea of the
proposed creation exist apart from the idea of the best pos
sible ? If not, then as a part of the idea would be an ethical
affirmative; or the personal subjective action would involve
the moral nature. Having now the idea of the best, can we
doubt that the next subjective movement in logical order was
the choice or determination of the whole nature acting in the
form of will to it ? Having so determined an act purely sub
jective, to realize the end does anyone fail to perceive that the
logical next is an efficient or creative volition, by which the
idea takes form in a real creation, or a forthputting of power
objectively ? Thus the first outward expression of God is in
a creative act which is an act of omnipotence, manifesting wis
dom ; and as wisdom is the discernment of that which is best,
the creative act also involves his moral nature in the choice of
the best.
In studying the problem of the concurrent action of the
divine attributes from our standpoint, as we are able to see
their expression, the logical order is first his omnipotence.

90 Studies in Theology.
Creation discloses to us the idea of an all-powerful Being. As
we study its structure and constitution it discloses to us an all-
wise Being. As we detect its tendency and the laws under
which it exists and is governed, we detect an omnipresent agent,
and as we follow it to its final outcome we detect a being acting
from the inspiration of love, the basis of the moral nature,
and ground of justice, mercy, and sympathy, and of absolute
holiness. To us any attempt to think logically of God, that is, to fol
low the order in which the mind proceeds, requires, first, that
we should conceive of him as eternal Being, and, so conceiv
ing, that we should next determine or find what kind of
being he is, that is, whether he is a spirit or material. This,
of course, requires us to bring into view his attributes, for
these are determinative. They are only introduced as proofs
of the nature or kind of his essence.
The subject being thus brought before the mind as a real
existence or entity, the mind proceeds in logical order to find
what predicates may and must be made of this Being to give
his real and true differentiation. To do this it must consider
his work. He is not an object of sense, and so it is impossible
to describe him by sensible qualities; that is, we cannot describe
him in thought, as a form, in terms of size, or figure, or color,
or texture, or anything of this kind. These attributes or prop
erties or qualities do not belong to him, or at least do not ap
pear. Thus we eliminate all material predicates.
But as we do not cognize him as an object of sense the
question arises, How do we cognize him at all ? And we are
compelled to answer, We cognize him only as he manifests
himself, in things, to the reason as cause of things. When we
find his being as cause— for to be a cause we intuitively know
he must have being— the mind at once is logically thrown back
on the question, What is involved in cause, that is, what predi-

Divine Attributes. 91
cates must be true of this Being in order that he may be
cause — what attributes must he possess ?
The logical order of the mind's movement is to ask, What
must be the necessary predicates of such a Being, that is, what
are the attributes with which we must of necessity invest him,
and which of necessity he must possess ? And following the
line of rational thought we find as our first thought that he
must be real, that is, have the quality of real being ; as our
second thought, he is cause of all, and therefore is not himself
caused — he is not a creature ; as our third thought, he is un
conditioned and absolute. But then he must be eternal. Thus
we reach what we may call the first predicate of this
Being, namely, that of necessary existence — or eternity — self-
being — underived independent existence. But now, return
ing to the ground of this affirmation, namely, that he is
cause of all things, we are logically driven to ask next, What
must we suppose of him in order that, being eternal, he may
also be cause ? And we are compelled to answer, He is an om
nipotent being, for only a being of absolute and unlimited
power can create all other being. Thus we reach what might
be called the first in logical order, discovered essential attri
bute. But now, examining the effect caused or originated, we
discover that it is a system of orderly arranged parts in order
to infinitely ingenious ends ; but these facts point to a mind
of infinite wisdom. Thus we are driven to ascribe infinite in
telligence or omniscience to the cause. He is eternal, omnipo
tent, omniscient.
If now we conceive the divine nature to be eternal and to
include in it the attributes of absolute omniscience and om
nipotence, not to name others, and the being possessing these
attributes to be self-conscious and absolutely free, thus raising
him into personality, we have the whole idea of what the Eter
nal is.

92 Studies in Theology.
What does omniscience and self -consciousness give? They
give the absolute and perfect knowledge of himself, of every
attribute of his nature. Self-consciousness is knowledge of the
self ; perfect self-consciousness is perfect knowledge of the
self. But perfect knowledge of the self includes a perfect
knowledge of each attribute of the self, and of all the pos
sibilities in these attributes ; otherwise the knowledge and self-
consciousness would be limited and imperfect. But perfect
knowledge must also include the knowledge of all that will
become actual, by the exercise of these attributes ; otherwise we
again reach limitation and the knowledge is imperfect.
But now this last form of knowledge, that is, of what will be
come actual, must include not simply a knowledge of what God
himself will do and whatever will necessarily flow therefrom ;
but, if there be effects which will not necessarily flow from his
acts, but other effects or results which will flow from the free acts
of other free beings whom he will create, his knowledge must
also include this or it will be an incomplete knowledge of the uni
verse which he caused to exist ; and so again we have not omnis
cience, but limited and imperfect knowledge, and a knowledge
which cannot at any time be complete. But to know what he
will do at any time, or what necessary effects will follow any of
his acts, is not to know that he has already performed the acts
and that the effects have already taken place, but is to know
the very opposite ; that is, that both his acts and necessary ef
fects which will flow therefrom are yet in the future.
With these principles present in our thought we are pre
pared to .examine the question, Is succession predicable of God ?
The principles are, succession is movement, and movement is
temporal. Existence without movement is fixed, and stable or
fixed being is eternal. Time as movement must be a product
or creation, for without movement it could not exist. It is not
predicative of stable, permanent existence. There must be

Divine Attributes. 93
stable being in order to movement, or there would be no cause
of movement. Time implies and necessitates the eternal. The
existence of movement involves the existence of the mover.
The temporal demonstrates the nontemporal. To the question,
then, Does the Eternal exist in the mode of succession ? we
have to answer, as to being and the essential perfections, No.
In these respects he must simply exist in stable equilibrium.
He is the I AM. If, now, he should translate his perfections
into action or movement, this would be a mode of succession,
and would be temporal, or under the conditions of time ; but
the succession or temporal thus reached, and predicable, would
not be a predicate of his being or perfections, but of their
mode of manifestation or exercise. Thus God would be seen
to be eternal in his being and perfections, but temporal in the
mode of their manifestation. As to mode, by action he
would bring himself under conditions of time ; in that respect
he conditions himself and in turn is conditioned by the things
made, but not in respect of being and perfections. Before
acting he eternally possessed himself, and with himself the
power to act ; he forever knew all the contents of his power ;
he was forever conscious of all the moral principles impli
cated in his movement. These are eternal, and do not come
and vanish, but are fixed and abiding. But the movement or
manifestation must necessarily be temporal. The movement
is creative and the product is successive events, and the suc
cession is time. He therefore created time by movement, or
the movement is time. Time denotes and measures the ac
tive mode of divine existence with relation to creative ex
istence — it measures the act, not the actor. Dr. Shedd says:
" God's acts of power are successionless. God creates all things
from eternity by one act of power."* There could be no balder
contradiction. If he creates from eternity, the thing created
* Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, p. 345.

94 Studies in Theology.
is eternal ; for when the creative act is performed the effect is.
The entire section is remarkable for its fallacious reasoning.
What is true of any act or manifestation is true of his acts or
manifestations ; they begin and are completed. They were not,
they are, they will be. With respect to them there is a past, a
present, a future. In the manifestation he acts under the mode
of past, present, and future. There can be no properly eternal
act, if by act we mean a movement, by which something is
brought to pass that was not before existent. The divine crea
tive and sequent providential movement must be regarded in
thought, and must necessarily be in reality, a movement under
the conditions of past, present, and future — current, successive,
begun, progressing, completed, or advancing without comple
tion. An eternal agent exists, that is, a being with power to act ;
but an eternal effect producing action is a contradiction in terms.
How then does the movement of God in manifesting or trans
lating his perfections stand related to his being and eternity ?
The answer must be that though not present as acts before they
took place, that is, though he is not eternally acting in each sev
eral act, each act is eternally with him, as known or purposed to
be, or as having been, or as now being or possible to be. In this
sense all his movement, though successive, is present with him
from eternity. As to purpose, and knowledge, and all other
implications of being, and agency, and potency, all events stand
forever in his consciousness, as an eternal now, or present ; as
to the manifestation or expression, it is known as it will be in
an orderly succession. There is a succession in the events
themselves, and there is a succession in his acts, which is
ground of the succession of the events, and he knows the suc
cession in its exact order, and purposes to act in the exact
order that will produce it. Thus he knows himself as acting
progressively or successively. Thus we must conceive him as
eternal in his- being and perfections, and all his acts as forever

Divine Attributes. 95
present with his consciousness as known and purposed; but at the
same time we must conceive the acts of the series as progress
ive movement or themselves progressive, and himself as for
ever acting in some mode of energy. The hypothesis of an
eternal volition, which is eternally efficient or productive of
effects, has in it this difficulty : It makes the system of effects
eternal ; for, if there be an eternal acting cause, there must be
an eternal effect. We think this impossible, since beginning-
ness seems to be the very essence of the term effect, and so of
the mode of agency which produces them. Eternal being is
necessary to agency and to effect, but it may be doubted
whether eternal being and power must necessarily be eternally
active as efficient cause.
Thus when we ascribe eternity to God we do not ascribe eter
nity to his acts necessarily or probably. Acts are not attributes,
and attributes do not necessarily imply acts. The attribute of
omniscience does imply the actual knowing of all things. It
cannot be viewed as a mere power to know. This will appear
in the statement of the doctrine on that subject. So likewise
the predicate of immutability does not imply the power to be
immutable, but actual immutability. So likewise the attribute
infinity, if it be ranked as an attribute, does not imply the
power to be infinite, but actual infinitude. But if now we con
sider the attribute of omnipotence, we discover at once that it
implies the power to do all things doable, but it does not imply
the actual doing of them. The attribute may exist and not be
in exercise to its full expression, or to any extent at all. The
omnipotence of God does not necessarily imply that he does all
doable things, or that he will do them, but that he has the power
to do them. It might exist in perfection though in fact he did
nothing. It did so exist before it was exercised. That is be
fore there was any creation. It has never been fully exercised.
There is no evidence that he ever will do all that by possibility

96 Studies in Theology.
he might do. The power to do is the attribute. The doing is
its exercise. It may never be exhaustively exercised. What
power he will exert depends on other attributes. He will do
what his wisdom and holiness prompt him to do at any given
time in the future. To these promptings he is free. Thus an
eternal being might possess the perfection of omnipotence with
out manifesting it. If for any reason he should determine to
manifest it, the act of manifestation would not be eternal, but
would be an event denoting a new mode of an eternal attribute.
The attribute, as an essential inhering perfection of the being,
would undergo no change, but its mode would undergo a
change. This is precisely what would have to occur in order
to the creation of other beings, and what necessarily must have
occurred in the production of the universe. Thus all effect-
making acts of the Eternal must come under the conditions of
time, and whatever activity of this kind must be historic under
the time order. In these respects there is a time order of suc
cession in God, and the order of succession in events of his
causation denotes an order of succession in his causal activity.
This is clearly the doctrine of revelation. He created and
rested — ceased from creation. He inspired the holy men of
old ; he wrought miracles ; he providentially orders affairs ; he
hears prayers and answers them ; he forgives sin ; he sets up
one and puts down another ; he will raise the dead and judge
the world. In all these and many other respects he acts under
the conditions of time ; but in all the process himself undergoes
no change as to being or perfections. It is in vain to attempt
to revoke this by assuming some one eternal act, not to speak
of the absurdity of an eternal act. It is the eternal Being who
acts, but his acts are not eternal.
If we are to think God as eternally having in his conscious
ness his own movement while yet it is progressive, the same is
true of the effects which successively unfold as manifestations

Divine Attributes. 97
thereof. These are always present, but in their time order.
Those past are present with him as past ; those now existing
are present to him as now existing ; those to come, present with
him as to come. The present are incessantly becoming past,
and those future are constantly becoming present and past, and
he notes the change in themselves or the movement ; but they
do not pass out of the present as permanent matters of knowl
edge with him, but only change their relation, and he knows
the change. They are present in his knowledge all the time ;
they are present as actually existing only when they do actu
ally exist. The whole order of succession lies under his gaze
or in his consciousness perpetually, but just as it is in fact, as
to itself, that is, as past, present, or future ; and as to himself
the past and future are always present as knowledge. There
is, then, in the divine consciousness, that is, in his knowledge
an eternal coexistence of all the events of time, while there is
not a coexistence of the parts of the series, either as to them
selves or the causal acts which produce them. It could not be
predicated of the separate events that they coexist in a present
moment, for they do not ; some are past, some are present,
some are future ; but it could be predicated of them that they
do coexist in his consciousness all the time as known. Thus in
reality they are successive, but in his knowledge they coexist,
but as they are in reality. The procession of events is rela
tively to themselves, and does not imply a procession in him,
except as to his acts and relations. He changes not. But
while there is no change in him his knowledge or conscious
ness forever conforms to the changing facts. The stream of
events might be compared to a line stretched out on the bosom
of immensity, of which the first event in the successive series is
the beginning, and the event occurring the end. The first
point is fixed, the second or the point at any time present or
now existing movable and forever moving, and so the line is

98 Studies in Theology.
forever lengthening. Time is that lengthening line. But
however projected, it is still a line with two ends, and can
never, either in thought or reality, become anything else, or
make the slightest approach to a line without ends— can never
become infinite, but must forever be like a fragment on its
measureless surface ; and as the line had a beginning and end,
so time had a beginning antecedent to which time was not ;
that is, time is not eternal. To-day marks a point on the line
which is now its hither end ; it may be millions of millions of
ages from its thither end. To-morrow it will recede, and a
¦ period will come when to-day will bisect the line, divide it
into two equal parts, our now being its middle point. That line
will at date forever be the length of time, never will approach
eternity. It will be the chronology of events, but not the
chronology of divine existence. What means it, " One day is
with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one
day ? " Suppose now an omniscient eye of such power as to
scan eternity at a glance, which, in fact, is the eye of divine
consciousness, it would then forever behold that line at a single
view from beginning to end. Suppose diamond-points thiekly
set along it, indeed touching each other, denoting successive
events ; then that eye looking upon it would behold all the
events in a single moment, and looking before it forever would
forever see them as coexisting in the vision, though not in
themselves. The events as to themselves would forever be
coming and vanishing, and the line as to itself would be for
ever lengthening. The events as to themselves would be
characterized as past, present, and future. As to them the
words would have meaning, as to the omniscient eye they
would alike always be present, but present in the exact order
of the events among themselves. He represents the eternity
over whose measureless bosom the line of events stretches like
a golden thread.

Divine Attributes. 99
The treatment of this point by Mr. Watson, while in the main
agreeing with the authors quoted, is in some respects at variance.
Mr. Pope must have had the theologian of his own Church in
mind, and very justly I must think dissents from a portion of
his view. Mr. Watson says : " Duration, as applied to God, is
no more than an extension of the idea as applied to ourselves."
He says : " It follows, therefore, from this, that either we must
apply the term duration to the divine Being, in the same sense
in which we apply it to creatures, with the extension of the idea
to a duration which has no bounds and limits, or blot it out of
our creeds, as a word to which our minds, with all the aid they
may derive from the labors of metaphysicians, can attach no
meaning." "But it may be said that eternal duration, con
sidered as succession, is only an artificial manner of measuring
and conceiving of duration ; and is no more eternal duration
itself than minutes and moments, the artificial measures of time,
are time itself. Were this granted, the question still would be
whether there is anything in duration, considered generally, or
in time considered specially, which corresponds to these artificial
methods of measuring and conceiving of it. The ocean is
measured by leagues ; but the extension of the ocean and the
measure of it are distinct. They nevertheless answer to each
other. Leagues are the nominal divisions of an extended sur
face, but there is real extension, which answers to the artificial
conceptions and admeasurements of it. In like manner days
and hours and moments are the measures of time ; but there is
either something in time which answers to these measures, or
not only the measures, but the thing itself is artificial — an
imaginary creation. We apply the same argument to duration
generally, whether finite or infinite. Minutes and moments, or
smaller portions, for which we have no names, may be artificial,
adapted to aid our conceptions ; but conceptions of what ? Not
of anything standing still, but of something going on. Of dura-

100 Studies in Theology.
tion we have no other conception ; and if there be nothing in
nature which answers to this conception, then is duration itself
imaginary, and we discourse about nothing. If the duration
of the divine Being admits not of past, present, and future, one
of these two consequences must follow — that no such attribute
as that of eternity belongs to him, or that there is no power in
the human mind to conceive it." " But we are told that the
eternity of God is a fixed eternal now, from which all ideas of
succession, of past and future, are to be excluded ; and we are
called upon to conceive of eternal duration without reference
to past or future, and to the extension of the idea of that flow
under which we conceive of time. The proper abstract idea of
duration is, however, simple continuance of being, without any
reference to the exact degree of it, because in no other way can
it be equally applicable to all the substances of which it is the
attribute. It may be finite or infinite, momentary or eternal
but that depends on the substance of which it is the quality,
and not upon its own nature. Our own observation and experi
ence teach us how to apply it to ourselves. As to us, duration
is dependent and finite ; as to God, it is infinite ; but in both
cases the originality or dependence, the finity or infinity of it,
rises not out of the nature of duration itself, but out of other
qualities of the subjects respectively." *
Watson's treatment fails utterly to distinguish between the
radical implication of the two terms time and eternity. The
terms duration, continuance, succession, flow, are all temporal
terms of precisely the same import. They signify nothing in
themselves. They describe nothing that is. They must be affixed
to a subject, and then they imply simply a process of change in
the subject. Until a changing subject is found the words are
meaningless. If there were no such subject there would be
nothing to be named by the terms. Duration seems to be the
* Theological Institutes, vol. i, pp. 57-59.

Divine Attributes. 101
nearest approach to the name of something, but it simply means
something which persists in being, or continues, or flows on into
successive states. The very terms thus import change. Like
time, of which they are equivalents, they describe a persisting
but changing subject. And were the subject eradicated they
would vanish. There would be no duration, no succession, no
continuance, no flow — no time, if the changing subject were
abolished. Eternity of being, on the contrary, describes a form
of existence that does not flow — changeless existence. Contin
uance implies a kind of existence which can be atomized
into moments, and which carries along from one moment to
another. Composed of moments, it is resolvable into moments.
Not such is the existence of the Eternal. The difference is not
that there are more moments in one than in the other, but
that the one is a flow or progress through moments and the
other is not — moments exhaust the one but do not affect the
other. If we recur to Watson's illustration the case will be plain :
" The ocean is measured by leagues ; but the extension of the
ocean and the measure of it are distinct. They nevertheless
answer to each other. Leagues are the nominal divisions of an
extended surface, but there is real extension, which answers to
the artificial conceptions and admeasurements of it." In this
illustration he evidently intends to compare the ocean to a some
thing which he calls duration or time, and by enlargement
eternity. But here is where its weakness appears. The ocean
has a limit, and hence, however extended, it can be expressed in
leagues, and league therefore has meaning as a term of measure
ment. But take away the bounds, and the measure cannot
measure it and ceases to be a measure. So moments are a true
measure of time or changing existence, but they are not terms
of measurement for limitless and changeless existence. The
measure cannot measure the subject, and is meaningless. Eter
nity is not duration, as consisting of moments indefinitely
/

102 Studies in Theology.
extended. He is not made of moments, and moments represent
nothing that is in his essence. But he creates moments by
creating beings who exist in succession, or moment by moment.
There is no other succession in him than the idea or knowl
edge of succession as it appears in things which exist under the
form of succession, and these successive acts of his which give
existence to things and are evoked in their governance and
ordering. His own nature is such that there is in him a fixed
and eternal comprehension of himself and of all beings and
events of time, so that he is forever with them as knowing
them, and they are forever coexistent in him as objects of
knowledge in their exact order of past, present, and future alike.
In them he beholds the relation of past, present, and future.
He sees their continuance and flow, he knows the temporal
order of their existence ; he is conscious of his own successive
acts, and he knows them as successive and puts himself so far
under the time order ; the entire moving procession is in him,
and he exists in all and through all without partaking, as to his
being and perfections, of the motion or flow. Our now is an
instant vanishing ; that is, our existence is always limited to a
point. His now for himself is eternity, for he inhabits eternity.
Our now could never, by multiplication, make his now. There
may be a continuance or a flow of moments, but they must
necessarily be limited between points, which mean only a series
of successive events or becomings. The unlimited cannot flow.
It is but another form of the absurdity of an infinite series, or
an infinite composed of finite or measurable parts.
If we must predicate of the existence of God that it is in
the form of duration or continuance similar to our own, in
which there is a true past, present, and future, it will become
us to consider what the words mean and whither the supposi
tion will carry us. The words must be taken in their real im
port. The term " present " means this instant of time. The

Divine Attributes. 103
term "past" means all the instants of time that once were
present but are now gone. The term "future" means all the
instants of time that will become present and will vanish into
the past. A being who exists according to this order never
can have more than a moment's existence in his possession.
The past he has no hold on. The future is not his. The mode
of his existence is to flow from one instant to another, or to pass
through successive stages ; the continuity makes the unbroken
whole of his existence. If we suppose him to transfer himself
whole and entire from point to point it is easy to see how the
being would be the same at each successive moment in the
consecutive chain, however extended. It is thus that our per
sonal identity is preserved, though our existence is always lim
ited to the passing instant. If it is possible that our identity
could be thus carried along without suffering impair it may be
asked, Could not the integrity of the divine Being also be pre
served under like conditions, and so may not the divine ex
istence be limited likewise to the passing instant if he carry
his unimpaired and immutable perfections along with him from
eternity to eternity ? Is there any need that we should sup
pose that his now should be larger than our now ? Would not
all the demands of the case be met by simply indefinitely ex
tending the consecutive instants ? We answer : (a) The fault
of the conception is that it supposes that which is impossible,
namely, that eternity is divisible into instants, or that by com
position of measureable atoms of time he should be able to
reach the timeless. This, we must think, is fatal to it. But
(b) it labors under the further fatal difficulty that it supposes
the actual existence of God to be constantly extending or en
larging. Moments add to the length of his life. In the
amount of actual existence he employs he is variable, having
more and more as time progresses. But we answer further, if
the thing supposed could be allowed it would not alter the

104 Studies in Theology.
fact that eternity would be an eternal now — a tota simul — the
nunc stans, or punctum stans, of the schoolmen. The assump
tion is that he exists only in the present moment — now — but
that he transfers his unimpaired being and consciousness to the
next and all succeeding moments, which become now, so that
each moment is now. If we consider what is the unimpaired
personality which is thus transferred, we shall find it to consist
in changeless being and perfection. In this Being is a change
less consciousness of himself, and of all beings and events — the
same millions of ages ago that it is to-day; the current mo
ment, millions of ages ago as it is now ; the events of millions
of ages to come are as vivid in his consciousness now as they
will be when they become now. Thus, all events coexist with
the same vividness in his consciousness forever. In him they
are eternally present — tota simul. Nothing is added, nothing
is taken away. There is no successive flow. He is " the same
yesterday, and to-day, and forever." There is no past, no fu
ture. This is his true eternity, not parceled out in moments.
But if now we pass to consider his efficiency or objective
expression and manifestation, by which these forever present
events are made real, we at once pass under the conditions of
time ; and He who is eternal in himself comes under the condi
tions of time in the manifestation of himself. Here, then, is
true succession. The manifestation is in a measurable duration
to which we give the name " time," and is under the form of
a successive and continuous movement, moment by moment.
There was a beginning ; the line is ever lengthening, will
never be endless, cannot become eternal. He is in the move
ment, forever unfolding what from eternity is in his conscious
ness as changeless purpose and knowledge. His eternal ex
istence envelops it. It is in him, but it is not the measure of
his existence, but it is the measure of a mode of his manifesta
tion under the conditions of time or consecutive movement or

Divine Attributes. 105
working. His being is thus a nunc stans of changeless full
ness of perfection. His manifestation is a continuous flow
from a beginning point. The manifestation must have the
being before or antecedent to it. What was he in that ante
cedent to all event ? What was his consciousness ? All future
events were with him, or they were not. If they were witli
him, he did not reach them by continuance. They did not
exist as events, but they were present as cognitions as really as
when by his act they became real. The true Eternal antedates
time, and cannot be reduced to the time order. God is
eternal. His acts are temporal. All beings and events that
have their origination from him are temporal. Their coming
and flow create or are time. When they were not, time was
not. Time is a creation. Eternity is unoriginated. To beings
who exist under the time order — that is, the order of continu
ance and succession — the flow is discovered in the succession.
But for this the time idea could not arise ; there would be
nothing to answer to it. There are two chronometric laws.
The one is in the regular recurrence of phenomena external to
the mind but observed by it — such as the uniform revolutions
of the earth or the uniform recurrence of the seasons. This
enables us to have common measures of the flow, denoted days
and years. Take if away, and there would be no such periods
and no such common measure. There could be no common
means of determining the relations of events. The other is in
the processes which go on in the mind itself — in the alternations
of the mental life, in the processes of thought and feeling and
other mental expressions. These are chronometric only to the
extent of discovering to us successive states or continuance, not
to the extent of a common standard. We could not tell
whether a given state lasted for a minute or for years— whether
it was long or short. This fact is often apparent now— a tran
sient agony seems long. The mind absorbed in a thought

106 Studies in Theology.
reduces a day to a few minutes. The phenomena of dreams
furnish illustration. The dream of minutes seems to extend
over days, or even years. In essential Godhead there can be
no such phenomena, and no corresponding consciousness. To
him there is no such chronometer as regularly recurring phe
nomena to denote how his years are flying away — no such
source of the consciousness of regular flow. The existence of
the external phenomena and its regular recurrence make this
flow ; remove it, and there is none. To him, likewise, there
can be no such chronometric order in his consciousness, without
we suppose he is such a being as ourselves. But this would be
manifestly to detract from his perfection. He can only be
conscious of these things as they appear in the finite. They
arise not from something in himself, but from things objective
to himself. They represent nothing of his own essential life,
but only those processes which he sets into motion in things.
Thus, by setting up a finite universe, he puts himself under
conditions of time as to it, not as to his own nature. He notes
time as he creates it in others. He unites himself with it in
the life of others, but himself lives in the changeless ineffable-
ness of a being and perfections which do not vibrate, and only
thus can he be eternal.
The doctrine on this point is thus expressed in the Scriptures :
" In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth "
(Gen. i, 1). Creation necessitates eternal being in the cause.
" Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst
formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to ever
lasting, thou art God " (Psalm xc, 2). " Of old hast thou laid
the foundation of the earth : and the heavens are the work of
thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure : yea, all
of them shall wax old like a garment ; as a vesture shalt thou
change them, and they shall be changed : but thou art the
same, and thy years shall have no end " (Psalm cii, 25-27).

Divine Attributes. 107
" I am the first, and I am the last ; and besides me there is no
God" (Isa. xliv, 6). "The high and lofty One that inhabiteth
eternity " (Isa. Ivii, 15). "A thousand years in thy sight are
but as yesterday when it is past " (Psalm xc, 4). " One day
is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as
one day " (2 Peter iii, 8). " The same yesterday, and to-day,
and forever " (Heb. xiii, 8). " Which is, and which was, and
which is to come " (Rev. i, 4).
Taking these sacred utterances as the divine exposition of
his own eternity, it would seem to embrace unoriginated be
ing, changeless perfections, and actual possession of himself
forever ; and the permanent coexistence in him, that is, in his
self-consciousness or knowing, of all events that ever have
occurred or will occur, whether it be events of his own
origination direct, or events arising from secondary causes, or
events effectuated by other created wills. Their presence in
him and his presence with them forever and ever denotes how
it is that he is the Eternal—" the high and lofty One that in
habiteth eternity " — " with whom a thousand years are as one
day " — " with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turn
ing " — " the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever."
With these sublime teachings of Holy Writ reason is obliged
to agree. It is impossible to escape the thought and convic
tion that behind all phenomena there exists an eternal causal
ground. The existence of these temporal manifestations neces
sitates the ante-temporal cause.
There are implications of this doctrine which should be
noticed. Among these are : (a) the necessary existence of God ;
(J) his absolute independence ; (c) his self-sufficiency ; (d) the
dependence of all being upon him, and universal creatorship
and proprietorship ; (e) absolute sovereignty ; (/) immuta
bility. By necessary existence cannot be meant necessitated exist-
10

108 Studies in Theology.
ence, but the very opposite. Necessitated existence implies a
necessitating cause as the ground of it. Necessary existence
implies the absence of any cause as ground of it. Necessitated
existence is effect. Necessary existence is the true eternal
Cause. He does not cause himself, for that would be a contra
diction. He simply is, and cannot but be. It were a contra
diction to suppose him not to be. " I AM" is his name. The
acceptance of the fact is a necessity of thought, however its
incomprehensibility amazes us. There must be such a Being
— self-existing impossible not to exist. That which is unbegun
must be unending. The idea transcends us, but we cannot
escape from it. God is, and, being, he is necessarily.
By independence we must mean that the grounds of his ex
istence are wholly in himself, not in his will, but in his essence.
He is absolute, unconditioned being. There is nothing outside
of himself to limit him, or condition him, or cause him to be,
or to be what he is.
He is self-sufficient. As there is nothing outside of himself to
determine anything that is of himself, so he is sufficient to him
self. There is no necessity that there should be anything besides
himself, as a complement of his existence. There need be no
other Eternal. He is self-sufficing to exist alone. In his eternity
and all other perfections he does exist alone. " The loneliness
of God " is one of the amazing facts of his existence. He must
forever be alone and self-sufficing. His resources are all within
himself. He can borrow nothing. There is no one with whom
he can share his thoughts or feelings. He must forever be his
own counselor, his own lawgiver, his own companion. In the
limitless expanses of his consciousness he must forever find
himself alone. Of the majesty and eternal grandeur of his
own thoughts and purposes and works he must forever be the
solitary beholder. A lonely, self-sufficing, companionless God,
" who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no

Divine Attributes. 109
man can approach unto ; whom no man hath seen, nor can see "
(1 Tim. vi, 16).
The dependence of all being upon him is a necessary impli
cation of his eternal solitary existence. He alone is cause.
All other being is effect. They are and must forever be what
and as he makes them. Any agency they exert, either as
secondary causes or free, spontaneous powers, is derivative.
The universe has nothing apart from him.
The idea of self-sufficiency does not imply that there is not
in the ineffable and independent nature of God a demand for
the existence of other beings, or that he is such a being that he
should forever find in his solitariness the perfect realization of
his utmost idea or desire. The fact that he has become the
Creator of a universe proves that this is not so. There was
nothing outside of himself to move him to create. The reason,
therefore, must be found within his nature. What is meant
is that in himself are the adequate and sufficient grounds for
the utmost realization of his ideals and desires. He has no un
realized or to him unrealizable desires. He needs no help, and
can have no help outside of his own resources. He is ade
quate to his own plans.
Upon this point I quote from Mr. Pope : " Although this
immanent and absolute attribute " (he names self-sufficiency an
attribute) "by its very name shuts out the creature, and points
to a Being who needs nothing to complement or complete his
perfection, it nevertheless implies that in the infinity of his re
sources are all the possibilities and potentialities of the created
universe. When we exchange the terms necessary, independent,
self-sufficient for that of all-sufficient we begin to think of the
eternal resources that are in the Deity — of his eternal power
and Godhead. The word nothing vanishes both before his
essence and his power. His sufficiency knows no limit but
what he himself by word or act assigns to it. Of an eternal

110 Studies in Theology.
creation we dare not think; but we may speak of the eternal
possibilities of creation. . . .
" By self-sufficiency we understand all that philosophy means
by the notions of the absolute and the unconditioned. No rela
tion in which the Supreme may place himself— he only becomes
the Supreme by relation— thro ws any limitation around his being.
No relation is a necessary relation. In saying this we say all that
is needful. Some current definitions of the absolute have literally
no meaning. The philosophy which admits that the finite can
not comprehend the infinite, yet asserts that the infinite cannot
be a person, cannot be conscious of itself, because it can have
no object over against itself as subject, is philosophy falsely so
called. It must issue either in pantheism or in atheism. It has
never been proved, it can never be proved, that self-conscious
ness necessarily implies consciousness of something not self.
Even granted that it is so in the creature, the leap in the infer
ence from the creature to the Creator is as unreasonable as it
is certainly unscriptural." *
A further implication is his unlimited sovereignty. He who
is sole cause of the universe must be sovereign in it and over it.
There is nothing, there ean be nothing, in it which he does not
either create, or order, or permit and limit, or which could exist
even without him. It cannot pass out of his hand or transcend
his control. He must forever determine the metes and bounds
of all its forces and agencies. Nothing that is made can suc
cessfully dispute or divide the throne with him. The powers
which are derivative from him, and subsist only by his con
servation, cannot take an independence and rivalship. The
possession of himself involves the proprietorship of all things
and the ultimate disposition of all things, according to his own
immutable purpose. The bearings of this indisputable truth
will be developed when we come to discuss the mode of divine
* T/ieology, vol. i, pp. 300, 301.

Divine Attributes. Ill
sovereignty over moral beings. To suppose that he is not
sovereign is to suppose that he has originated a being greater
than himself — that the effect rises above and dominates the
cause — or that he voluntarily abdicates his own supremacy and
of choice abandons the government of his own creatures. It is
obvious that the first supposition is absurd and the second im
moral. The doctrine is clearly taught, not only by rational
inference, and the intuition of reason and the moral nature, all
of which bow before the imperative of his law, but also, most
fully, by revelation. Nature never mutinies. Moral rebels
cannot evade the law or defy the sovereignty which enacts and
executes its mandates or the alternative of its penalties.
A further implication of eternity is immutability. What
ever is eternal is necessarily immutable, and conversely. What
ever is mutable cannot be eternal. When we predicate eternity
of God it is predicating immutability in the same respect, and
vice versa. The terms are equivalents. God is immutable in
all respects in which he is eternal, and eternal in all respects
in which he is immutable. In what respects is God immutable ?
(a) He must, as eternal, be immutable with respect to his essen
tial being. He never began to be. He never had less being,
and will never have more, than he now possesses. The inhering
attributes are unmodifiable, and undergo no change. He is
" the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever." His being is the
ground of his infinite perfections, and his perfections are in
herent in his being. Neither admits of change by diminution
or increase. There is no change in his knowledge. "His un
derstanding is infinite ; " " Known unto God are all his works
from the foundation of the world." His purposes are immu
table. "I am the Lord, I change not." Mutation is change.
If we could conceive of God as changing it must be in respect
of being or perfection, that is, inhering attributes, or governing
principles, or mere modes of manifestation. To suppose change

112 Studies in Theology.

of being is to suppose that he becomes some other kind of be
ing — is to introduce into his nature a principle of disintegra
tion — is to eliminate the idea of eternity entirely. This is not
supposed by any. Here his eternity is admitted to be strict
and his immutability absolute. It is an inherence of necessary
existence. To suppose his attributes to change has the same
consequence, for his attributes are requisites of his being, and
make it what it is. To change they must become something
other than they are — must augment or diminish ; but this
would be to make him other than he is. If perfect, there can
be no augmentation by change. If they become less than per
fect he ceases to be God. There can, therefore, be no change
in these respects. The Eternal must forever remain the un
changing, infinitely perfect God. But if his attributes do not
change the governing principles of his life cannot change.
The same unchanging perfections cannot introduce new, better,
or worse, or contradictory governing laws, or purposes, or ex
pedients, or plans. He must forever remain the same " high
and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity." Thus neither in
being nor perfection nor plan can he ever change. "With
whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning," must
forever be true of him. (b) In respect of his modes of activity
or efficiency, and of his manifestations and relations, immuta
bility cannot be predicated. Modifications here do not imply
change or mutability of either being, or perfection, or plan.
When he becomes a Creator, or puts forth his omnipotence, there
is no change in his being, or attributes, or plan. When he
administers over the beings he creates there is no change in
these respects— no change in him, either as to power or pur
pose. In the entire expression, however varied, he but reveals
what was eternally in him. The change is one in mode merely.
His attributes eternally implicate the temporal expression they
receive. There is every reason to suppose that the Infinite will

Divine Attributes. 113
forever continue to evolve in new and varied forms the mys
tery of his eternal purpose. We are certainly but in the dawn
of the expression. As the illimitable ages roll away new and
more marvelous revelations may be expected to burst upon the
vision of adoring beholders. In the far-off places of creation
there may be even now transpiring wonders of power and
wonders of grace, displays of the divine glory, which we shall
not reach until we have advanced through celestial cycles. In
the far-off times still greater discoveries of an eternal plan may
ravish angelic hosts, which will require the developed faculty of
countless cycles for us to reach. We have only to remember
that we are in the ongoings of an infinite and endless movement —
that it is God who is unfolding the mystery of his own thought
and love on a scale commensurate with his own perfections.
Martensen well says : " As the Being who has life in himself
(John v, 25), in whom is contained all fullness, God is the
Eternal. In the eternal God are all the possibilities of ex
istence — all the sources of entire creation. The Eternal is the
one who is the I AM, who is the Unalterable and Unchange
able. But his unchangeableness is not a dead unchangeable-
ness, for it is to produce himself with infinite fruitfulness out
of himself. His eternity is, therefore, not an eternity like that
of the 'eternal hills;' it is not a crystal eternity, like that
of the eternal stars, but a living eternity, blossoming with
never-varying youth. But his self-production, his becoming
(Werden), is not the fragmentary growth or production we wit
ness in time. Created life has time outside of itself, because
it has its fullness outside of itself. The Eternal lives in the
inner, truer time, in a present of undivided power and fullness,
in the rhythmic circle of perfection. The life he lives is un
changeably the same, and yet he never ceases to live his life in
something new, because he has in himself an inexhaustible
fountain of renovation and of youth."

114 Studies in Theology.
This quotation shows how difficult it is for our finite facul
ties to reach the height of this great mystery, or to intelligibly
formulate a statement of it. We are simply driven back to
the conception of a timeless Being who manifests himself under
conditions of time.
" While it has ever been seen that the apparently most
simple questions are at the 6ame time the most profound, this is
certainly the case with that which now arises : when did the
universe come into existence ? Assuredly, that which God willed
from eternity he has called into being in a certain moment of
time ; but nothing, perhaps, is more difficult than to conceive of
a period in which the All arose out of the Nothing. The doc
trine of a so-called eternal creation has therefore been defended
in different ways during all ages. Not to speak of the Mani-
chseans, we see this idea rigorously defended in the Alexandrine
school, and above all by Origen. Without regarding matter —
which he considered to be the seat of the evil one — as an inde
pendent power, he assumed an eternal creation of countless ideal
worlds, partly as having taken place before this of ours, partly
as to be looked for after this, since he could not conceive of an
inactive God {De Princ., iv, 16). Although rejected by the
orthodox Church, this idea continued to live on in various forms,
especially where the influence of the Platonic philosophy made
itself felt. Erigena (Duns Scotus) defended it, and the pan
theistic mysticism of the Middle Ages regarded the whole of
creaturedom as a sort of decadence from God. While the
Reformation confessed with fresh alacrity the creating of the
universe in time, and a later scholasticism sought even to de
termine the day and the hour of creation, the newer theology
and philosophy, on the other hand, under the influence of
Spinoza, has declared itself ever more distinctly in favor of an
eternal creation. Kant regarded the whole alternative as a
cosmological antinomy, the solution of which surpassed the

Divine Attributes. 115
power of theoretical reason. And even among believing theo
logians of our own day we observe here and there a hesitation
on this point, which certainly pleads for their modesty, but no
less really shows the difficulty of this question.
" Yet, as far as we can see, the idea of an eternal creation is
not less self-contradictory than that of a square circle ; for to
create, in the proper sense of the word, is nothing else than to
bring into existence that which hitherto had no existence. ' No
creature can exist,' as has been well said by Quenstadt, ' unless
after previously not existing ' — Nulla creatura esse potest,
nisi post non esse. By the theory of an eternal creation —
Strauss, also, has acknowledged this — the idea of creation is
thus, in fact, destroyed ; and he who favors this view would do
better, for the avoiding of misunderstanding, no longer to
speak of a creation at all. Moreover, the above-mentioned
theory is in irreconcilable conflict as well with the Christian
idea of God as with the nature of the cosmos. It may be de
fended, indeed, from the dualistic or pantheistic standpoint, but
never from the supranaturalistic theistic one. The universe
presents itself to our vision as something which is not absolute,
but relative, contingent, exposed to all kinds of variation ; in
a word, not as existing from eternity, but as having at one time
begun to be. That with the opposite mode of view the doctrine
of a creation out of nothing also disappears has scarcely need of
proof ; the nihilum in this case exists nowhere else than in the
imagination alone. No wonder, accordingly, that profound
thinkers — a Nitzsch, for example — maintain the idea of a be
ginning, however difficult to comprehend, as absolutely nec
essary. The pure idea of history is sacrificed so soon as its
starting point must be relegated to the list of fictions. Every
teleological view of the world at once loses its support, since
the final aim (reXog, terminus ad quern) presupposes a beginning
{apx% terminus a quo). If the world is without a beginning it

116 Studies in Theology.
will also continue to exist without end ; and what is thus in
itself eternal and independent needs for its infinite revolutions
no longer a center in the personal and living God.
" On the ground of all this it must be maintained that God
was, indeed, from eternity God, but not from eternity the Creator
of the world. If it is said that in this case a change must have
taken place in the Infinite, the fact is overlooked that a change
in the working of God by no means compels us to speak of a
variation in his nature. Or must God, then — to speak after a
human manner — never be able to create anything new, lest
thereby the unchangeableness of his being should "be brought to
an end ? Assuredly we cannot possibly conceive of an inactive
God ; but we need not do this, if we again revert to the doc
trine of the divine plan of the world as seen in Section lv.
[The part referred to we introduce here : " If God is eternal
and omniscient he must also have foreseen what happens in
time, have foreseen, yea, even have determined and ordained, or
the whole world would not be unconditionally dependent upon
him. If he is wise, and holy he must have had, also, a perfect
aim before his spirit, and must will the attaining of this end
by means worthy of himself. If he is supreme and sovereign
he must be absolute disposer of all that exists ; and if nothing
of an arbitrary kind is to be ascribed to this Sovereign he must
have a plan in regard to the world. The existence of such a
world plan is a postulate of the thinking mind, but, at the same
time, of the religious feeling, which cannot possibly rest satis
fied with the conception of an inactive God. Certainly the
question what God was doing before the creation of the world
has often been put in an unbecoming manner, and in that case
has deservedly been discountenanced. But this question can
not always be answered by authoritative utterances, and the
dogmatics of the Church has acknowledged its relative right in
treating the doctrine of God's decrees before that of his works.

Divine Attributes. 117
It felt the necessity to make for itself a representation of God
as from all eternity thinking, willing, determining, preparing
that which should take place in the course of time. As well
earlier as later philosophers, in so far as they have approached
to the recognition of the personality of God, have admitted this
element in their notion of God, and the earlier ecclesiastical
conception of a ' counsel of peace ' also originated in this
necessity. Nothing is easier than contemptuously to mock at
all teleology ; but if this be wholly denied there results a natu
ralistic view, which only too easily slides into practical atheism.
If we are not to assume that the universe has no higher ground
and aim than that which is to be found in itself, then the
purely sesthetical view of the world must alternate with an
ethical-teleological one ; that is, we must seek to comprehend
creation as the work of a Being who from all eternity had con
ceived it in his mind. Naturally this will and counsel of God
is not to be separated from his essential being, which, on the
contrary, is therein shadowed forth and expressed. But al
though (in point of fact) one therewith, this counsel and will
must be able to a certain extent to disclose itself to the eye of
thoughtful believers. It is, as it were, the inner work of God
which precedes his activity without " (p. 296).]
" Or does anyone stumble at the difficulty of not being able
to conceive of a point in eternity at which time has begun ?
Augustine has already expressed this difficulty in the well-
known words, ' Nor could the ages revolve before thou hadst
made the ages' — Nee prceterire potuerunt tempora, antequam
faceres tempora — but he afforded at the same time the only
tolerable solution, when he reminds us that the world was
called into being not m, but with, time — non in sed cum
tempora — or, to speak more exactly, time with the world.
Time, indeed, is the succession of moments for finite things ;
so long, thus, as these latter did not exist there could be no

118 Studies in Theology.
room to speak of the former. A time before creation did not
exist ; then it was only eternity. Or yet better, with Augus
tine : ' If before heaven and earth there was no time, why is it
asked, What wast thou then doing ? For there was no then
when there was no time. And thou dost not in time precede
the ages ; but thou art raised above all the past by the height of
thine ever-present majesty.'
" To bring the matter into greater clearness we must care
fully distinguish between the two senses of the word " creation."
It signifies, namely, as well the proper creative act of God as
the whole of created objects themselves which are called forth
by this act. In the former case we can say that the creation
is an eternal act, because the Creator himself is, in his living
and working, exalted above all time (?). In the latter case we
must assume that that which is created at some time — when,
is for us now a matter of indifference — received a beginning,
since it could not otherwise be spoken of as created. The
world began to be so soon as this was willed by God, who placed
it in time, and for it — at its birth {wording) — gave to time a
beginning. On this account time has existed precisely as long
as the world, and the world precisely as long as time. And
time ? This is God's secret ; but enough — natural science pro
claims it as well as Holy Scripture — the realm of creation at
some time received a beginning, precisely because it is essen
tially distinguished from the eternal Creator." *
It is evident from this quotation that the learned author
employs the term duration as the equivalent of existence.
When he affirms that "there is no eternal now," that "the
terms are contradictory," he says what seems to be true ; but
if from eternity God knew all things, all moments were always
present with him — which is the exact meaning of an eternal
now, or an all-embracing now, in his consciousness ; there is no
* Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics, vol. i, pp. 303-305.

Divine Attributes. 119
contradiction in the thought. That is precisely the truth ; all
transient passing nows are encompassed by his permanent
now. When he says, " being must exist in duration," he can
not mean that it is forever a flowing existence. He cannot
mean that the Eternal exists in moments, or by enduring from
moment to moment. The Eternal cannot so exist, or it could
be reduced to moments. God is — not has been — not will be.

120 Studies in Theology.

OMNIPRESENCE OF GOD.
Immensity, ubiquity, omnipresence, are terms applicable to
God. They practically represent one and the same attri
bute. We, in our thought, associate these with the idea of
something which we call space, and which we conceive as lim
itless. It is clear enough that it is not an entity of some kind.
If we should conceive that God were annihilated, and with
him, as a necessity, that created beings were annihilated, and
should then raise the question, What would be left ? we should
be compelled to say, Nothing. The sum of all being is God
and the forms of being which he originates. If some one
would say, Yes, eternity and infinite space would remain, we
answer, These are not beings, but only predicates of a kind of
being. When we predicate of him, or when he predicates of him
self, that he is omnipresent, we are not to attempt to conceive
of an immense place, and to suppose that he is diffused through
it — infinitely extended. Such an attempt would be both mis
leading and abortive. All terms of place relate to finite
things, or to God's relation to finite things, not to God him
self. When we predicate immensity of God we mean this,
that he is such a Being that he has power to make a universe
of extended things, and also unextended beings, and that his
presence is commensurate with them; that he could repeat
the creation, ad infinitum, and would be still present with
each atomic part and with the whole, however extended. They
are practically terms of relation to created being. All being is
within him, and there never can be any being without or
beyond him. If we were to conceive a myriad of angels to

Omnipresence of God. 121
start from the rim of the universe and fly for myriads of cen
turies with the rapidity of thought in every direction, they
would still be within him, not because he is extended, but
because his power would still uphold them, without which
they could not exist ; and at the points which they should reach
by their immeasurable flight he could build new universes
vaster than now exist. Where does he live ? With himself,
and wherever other beings are posited by him. This is prac
tically the doctrine of omnipresence, and any other conception
serves no purpose of thought or end of doctrine. Where
being is God is, and he is such that he might indefinitely
extend being where now nothing is, and were he to do so he
would be there also — is there in the possibilities of his power.
This idea of omnipresence is free from the idea of extension
of substance, which is materialistic, arid to be rejected. This
is the doctrine of revelation : " Whither shall I go from thy
Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence ? If I ascend
up into heaven, thou art there : if I make my bed in hell, be
hold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and
dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea ; even there shall thy hand
lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me." " Do not I fill
heaven and earth ? saith the Lord." " Am I a God near at
hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off ? " " Thus saith
the Lord, The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my
footstool." " Behold, the heaven and heaven of heavens can
not contain thee." " Though they dig into hell, thence shall
mine hand take them ; though they climb up to heaven, thence
will I bring them down." "In him we live, and move, and
have our being." "He filleth all things." It is obvious
enough what all these passages mean, namely, that there is no
possibility of escaping by distance from the presence of God ;
that wherever being is, or should go, it would still find him
present. It is no limitation of unextended being, that is,

122 Studies in Theology.
being that has not the property of form or extension, to de
clare that there is nothing in it which answers to that idea.
That which thought demands is that the eternal cause shall be
present wherever effects are, and that as infinite it should be
able to manifest itself everywhere, and that wheresoever it
does manifest itself the eternal Agent is, in all forms of pres
ence of which unextended being is capable, or which may be
predicated of it.
It has been the fashion to distinguish between the im
mensity of God and his omnipresence. Dr. Hodge says :
" These are not different attributes, but one and the same at
tribute, viewed under different aspects. His immensity is
the infinitude of his being, viewed as belonging to his nature
from eternity. He fills immensity with his presence. [" He
fills immensity with his presence " is a phrase without mean
ing, or a contradiction.] His omnipresence is the infinitude
of his being, viewed in relation to his creations. He is equally
present with all his creatures at all times and in all places.
He is not far from any one of us. 'The Lord is in this
place,' may be said with equal truth and confidence every
where. Theologians are accustomed to distinguish three
modes of presence in space. Bodies are in space circum-
scriptively. They are bounded by it. Spirits are in space
definitely. They have an ubi. They are not everywhere, but
only somewhere. God is in space repletively. He fills all
space. [This phrase is absurd and self-subversive.] In other
words, the limitations of space have no reference to him. He
is not absent from any portion of space, nor more present in
one portion than in another. This, of course, is not to be un
derstood of extension or diffusion. Extension is a property
of matter, and cannot be predicated of God. If extended he
would be capable of division and separation ; and part of God
would be here and part elsewhere. Nor is this omnipresence to

Omnipresence of God. 123
be understood as a mere presence in knowledge and power. It
is an omnipresence of the divine essence ; otherwise the essence
of God would be limited. [How can that which has no exten
sion be limited by extension ; or how can that which is not
extended be conceived under terms of extension ? To fill space
makes space a receptacle and puts God in it.] • The doctrine,
therefore, taught by the older Socinians, that the essence of
God is confined to heaven (wherever that may be), and that
he is elsewhere only as to his knowledge and efficiency, is in
consistent with the divine perfections and with the represen
tations of Scripture. As God acts everywhere he is present
everywhere ; for, as the theologians say, a being can no more
act where he is not than when he is not." *
Mr. Pope says: "The omnipresence of God is no other
than his immensity referred to the creature and restricted, so
to speak, within the universe. There are three ways in which
we may regard this attribute, as we find it everywhere present
in Scripture, {a) It is the actual presence of the Deity in
every part of created nature. ' Do not I fill heaven and
earth? saith the Lord.' This is one aspect, and it asserts
that the divine essence, though not extended nor diffused, is
to be regarded as present to every portion of the universe,
whether more material or more spiritual. God is not present
by circumscription of space, nor by the occupation of any one
locality rather than another. He is present in every force or
energy of created things ; nor can he be absent from any re
gion of the universe or any act of the beings he has created.
This, with all its inevitable consequences, may be called his
absolute or, so to speak, natural omnipresence, {b) But there
is another view of the matter which we may profitably take :
'In him we live and move and have our being;' which makes
God's omnipresence the presence of every creature to him.
* Systematic Theology, vol. i, pp. 383, 384.
11

124 Studies in Theology.
The relation is rather of the creature to him than his relation
to the creature, (o) There is yet another, which connects it
specially with the divine omnipresence : ' Whither shall I go
from thy Spirit ? or whither shall I flee from thy presence ?
If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there : if I make my bed
in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the
morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea ; even there
shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me '
(Psalm cxxxix, 7-10). This makes the God of the universe
present wherever the special operation of his power is. Thus
we may speak of him as present in the mightiest and gentlest
forces of nature, which no physical science can account for or
explain without this fundamental supposition. . . . All these
must be combined in our reverent study of this attribute. God
is in all things ; all things are present to him ; and his energy is
everywhere felt, though not everywhere alike felt. Thus the
attribute is protected from pantheism on the one hand and
from every limitation of the divine essence on the other." *
Knapp says : " The omnipresence of God is that power by
which he is able to act everywhere. This attribute, when cor
rectly viewed, cannot be distinguished from the divine omnip
otence and omniscience taken in connection ; and so it is ex
hibited by Morus. We justly conclude that He who knows
all things^ and whose power is so unlimited that he does what
ever he will, must be present in all things and cannot be
separated from them by time or space. In thinking on this
subject we have need to guard against gross conceptions, and
especially against the danger of predicating of God what can
only be said of presence of body. This caution is especially
necessary here, since we are apt to transfer the forms of time
and space, which are applicable to the sphere of sense, into the
world of spirits, and, in so doing, to come to conclusions
*Theohgy, vol. i, pp. 314, 315.

Omnipresence of God. 125
which are false and contradictory and dishonorable to the
purely spiritual nature of God.
" Extension is not predicable of God, who is spirit; to say,
therefore, that he is in infinite space, or, with Philo, the
Cabalists, and many modern writers, that he is himself infinite
space, is altogether erroneous. Such expressions necessarily
involve a material and limited nature. Space is a mode of
thought, in which, as in a frame, we must range everything
which belongs to the sphere of sense, but within which noth
ing relating to the spiritual or moral world can be brought.
The omnipresence of God was often mentioned by the ancient
philosophers, who ascribed to him a corporeal nature, or who
regarded him and the world as composing one whole.
" By the presence of a spiritual being with us we mean that
he thinks of us, and in this way acts upon us. But in order
to this we need not suppose his local presence or the approxi
mation of the spiritual substance. . . . If we attempt to go
beyond this we fall at once into fruitless subtleties. We would
be content to say with Moses, Deus rebus prcesens, est Deusin
res agens."*
"In order to set forth clearly the whole truth of the doc
trine a threefold distinction has been made. Thus God is every
where, per scientiam, per potentiam, per essentiam — by his
knowledge, by his power, and by his essence. Turretini pre
sents this distinction with his usual clearness and ability. In
accordance with it Calovius defines the omnipresence of God
as the attribute by which he is present with his creatures, not
only by the propinquitate — nearness of his essence — but also
by his knowledge and power.
" It would seem to the common mind that the rational and
scriptural view of this subject is that which has gained the
general assent of the Church, which predicates the omnipres-
* Christian Theology, pp. 106, 106.

126 Studies in Theology.
ence of God, not only of his knowledge and power, but also of
his being. God himself, in a way congruous to his spiritual
nature, fills the universe. One source of error in the matter
probably exists, as Hahn has remarked, in confounding the idea
of body and substance. By denying to God a body, and thus
avoiding the error of pantheism, they have at the same time
denied to him being or substance. They have thus changed
God into an unessential thought, and placed him at some point
beyond the universe, whence he surveys it and acts upon it,
being present in it only by his knowledge and by such influence
as he can exert through second causes." *
I have quoted these several authors for the purpose of
pointing out the intrinsic obscurity of the subject, and to show
how learned mind has attempted to grapple with it along the
ages of thought. Finite mind will probably never reach a
clear and perfectly satisfactory conception, so long as it must
think under conditions of space and time. These are probably
predicates exclusively of being which exists only under forms
of succession and extension, and which can never be employed
of the essential Infinite, but only of him as by creation he
brings himself under their conditions. As he exists in time, he
exists in space.
All agree that, whatever we mean by his immensity, he is
not to be thought under terms of extension. All agree that he
is truly present with all being, and that he has power to
multiply being. This is as far as our faculties will carry us.
All words and sentences which attempt to go beyond this are
probably mere sounds, which have nothing for thought. The
sum of all our knowledge is : He has created a universe ; he has
power to create others ; he is, and must forever be, present
with all created existence ; there is nothing to limit him ; and
there is no spatial limit to his existence. Spatial limits, or
* Christian Theology, p. 135.

Omnipresence of God. 127
any space relations whatever, to a subject which has not the
property of figure or extension, that is, to a being whose
essence is spirit without admixture of matter, is not only an
impossible conception, but also an absolute impossibility.
God has no other relations to space than that of having
created the idea of it by creating material substance. His
presence is not simply a presence of knowledge and power, but
is a personal and essential presence. When he energizes or
exerts power he is, but he is an unspatial, unextended, spiritual,
absolute, infinite Being, energizing under conditions of time
and space. For all practical ends, and for thought and in
accordance with the word of revelation, this is the import of
the predicate omnipresence. The other terms in frequent use,
immensity, ubiquity, if they have other, wider, and truer
meanings, have nothing for our finite thinking.
When we think of the vastness of the universe, spread forth
in the infinite abysm of what we call space, itself immeasur
able, and of the illimitudes of time through which its history
extends, and attempt to conceive of a Being whose mysterious
presence fills all, so that no atomic part or increment is without
him; whose presence and power touch all, and always; who
lives and moves through all, holding the stars in his right
hand, moving the most delicate tissues of the minute life cell ;
painting the tint of each perishing flower; supporting the
infant's breath, and guiding the archangel on his adventurous
flight ; bearing the whole magnificence on the shoulders of his
unwearying power forever and forever, we may well be filled
with awe and wonder. It is not more a doctrine of revelation
than a necessity of thought that there is such a Being. We
fail to comprehend him, but we are certain that he is, and that
every atomic part of the vastness is full of him. He hides
himself, but our eyes behold the tokens of his presence. We
do not touch him, but we touch nothing which does not report

128 Studies in Theology.
of him as pervasive ground and cause. " For all things were
made by him and for him, and by him all things consist." The
doctrine rests upon revelation and upon reason also, as do
all truths. The reasons of the doctrine aside from the
teachings of the word are these : {a) Where there is action we
are compelled to posit a being that acts. This we do not
simply spontaneously, or from the force of habit, but we do it
necessarily. The laws of thought are such that we cannot
do otherwise, {b) We cannot think that this is a mere law of
thought, but by the same necessity we are compelled to think
that the reality is as the thought affirms. The necessity is not
simply that we should so think, but that it should so be. All
attempts to conceive that there is no such reality are abortive.
(c) The same necessity compels us to connect the act with the
being who acts, that is, he must be present to it, must be in it
and with it. There can be neither temporal nor spatial discon
nection. He can no more act where he is not than he could
act if he were not. The power which acts must be at the
point where the effect is produced, and must be resident in the
agent who exerts it at the same moment. If disconnected
from the agent it is nothing, and if disconnected from the
effect there is nothing effected. The cause must be con
terminous with the effect, that is, must pervade it. There
can be no part of the effect without the cause. These
necessary principles of reason determine the conclusion that
the unitary ground of the cosmos must be omnipresent with
the entire cosmic order in every atom and part thereof, forever
and forever. The tendencies and outcome of all scientific
investigations are in accord with the biblical teaching, that a
unitary world ground is forever acting and permanently
present throughout the entire system, continuously realizing
his idea, thus proving that God is an omnipotent person.
But, it is answered, whatever the necessities of the case are

Omnipresence of God. 129
in point of fact, we cannot think a being of this kind, that is,
pure, changeless, unextended being — a bodiless, omnipresent
agent. There is thus an alleged contradiction. We are brought
face to face with the inadmissible implication of a necessity to
think what it is impossible we should think. Is there ground
for this allegation ? We answer, If by thinking such a being
be meant either conceiving a mental image of him, or under
standing how he exists, it must be admitted that we cannot
think him. But these are not the things we are required to
think. No necessity of thought requires us to conceive the
image of an agent, or how he exists or acts, before we can
admit thai he exists and acts. The proof to us of his being is
that he acts, and it is completed, whether we can f orm a thought-
image of him, or understand the how of his act or not. That
which we are required in this case to do is to think an agent
who possesses adequate power to build the universe and per
petuate and govern it. This we can do, and cannot as rational
beings escape doing. If we go beyond this and undertake to
figure him, or form an image of him, or to explain how he
exists, or how he handles himself, our minds immediately refuse
to think at all, for we have broached the unthinkable.
Here, there, and yonder are terms of limitation. They can
be predicated only of limited existences ; of the unlimited they
are meaningless, except as they are applied to his agency. They
apply to things which exist here, there, and yonder, and to the
exertion of power here, there, and yonder, but they do not apply
to an essence which is not spatial. To God there is only here, for
all things with him are here, and nothing there or yonder ; that
is, all things are present with him, and nothing is apart from
him. Though unextended himself, and without spatial exist
ence as to his essence, he has spatial relations in energizing
6patial things — his power is manifested with and in things of
space, and where his power is he is present exerting it. The

130 Studies in Theology.
same is true of the term everywhere. It simply includes all
limited points — limited by the presence of finite things. As
predicates of God they mean simply in every place where things
are. He is present with them. If nothing exists which occu
pies space and is limited or circumscribed by space, they mean
nothing. God's relations to such points arise from the fact
that he creates substances which with relation to each other
give meaning to the terms here, there, yonder, everywhere.
The terms are relative as applied to him, as well as applied to
the finites of which they are proper predicates. Does God
exist, then, nowhere ? That which exists nowhere is nothing.
To this we answer, If these terms imply presence by extension,
God is nowhere. There is no north side, or east side, or south
side, or west side to a pure spirit — no up or down, or right or
left to it any more than there is to thought or power. He
creates all terms of place when he creates things which have a
place. To say that God fills immensity of space is simply to
say that he fills nothing, for space is nothing but an idea,
which idea could not exist were it not for finite things ; it is
purely relative, and its conditions are created. The immensity
of God means simply that liis power is not limited within the
boundaries of the finite creation. He is such a Being that out
beyond creation in any direction he could energize new crea
tions, and would be present with them where he so energized.
If more than this be supposed there is no escape from the idea
of extended substance, and no extended substance can be in
finite. The terms are strict contradictions. A pure spirit is
unextended, and fills no place, but creates places by creating
extended objects, and is in place relations only by making
things which are limited and figured. " The omnipresence of
God is that power by which he is able to act everywhere. . . .
To say that he is in infinite space, or, with Philo, the Cabalists,
and many modern writers, that he is himself infinite space, is

Omnipresence of God. 131
altogether erroneous. Such expressions necessarily involve a
material and limited nature. Space is a mode of thought, in
which, as in a frame, we must arrange everything which be
longs to the sphere of sense, but within which nothing relating
to the spiritual or moral world can be brought." *
Perhaps the best idea we can get of what is called the im
mensity of God as a form of his infinitude or plenitude of be
ing is that he is such a Being as is without shape or figure, body
or parts ; this he discloses of himself ; and such that his entire
perfections are concentrated in his entire essence, and not di
visible in parts ; and such that he pervades the entire universe
and is wholly present at every point in it ; and such that the
universe does not circumscribe or include him, but is circum
scribed by him ; and such that out beyond the limits of the
limitable he so is as that in any point in any direction and at
all points in all directions he could without spatial modifica
tion of his essence exercise and manifest all of his infinite per
fections in creative and providential and administrative acts,
both moral and natural, as they are now exercised within the
limits of the created universe. Vide Hodge, Shedd, Knapp,
and Smith on the Immensity of God.
* Knapp, Christian TJieology, pp. 105, 106.

132 Studies in Theology.

THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD.
Omnipotence is the term employed to designate the power
of God. It is of primary importance that we have a clear idea
of the import of the term power. In strict signification it is
simple adequacy to effects ; that is, it is that attribute of an
agent to or by which effects are possible. It has close affinity
to the terms cause, causality, causation, and agency. A cause
is a being to whom effects are possible ; causality is an exer
cise of power ; power is an attribute of the being by which he
is able to produce effects ; causation is the exertion of the
power by which effects are produced. Thus power is seen to
be an attribute which, considered simply in itself, may be a
latent inherence of a being, but which, considered in relation
to effects, is active. " The general idea of cause is that with
out which another thing, called the effect, cannot be." * " Cau
sality, in actu primo, is the exerted energy in the cause by
which it produces the effect. Causality, in actu secundo, is
causation, or the operation of the power by which the cause is
actually producing the effect."f Thus it appears that a cause
is something which not only precedes, but has power to produce,
the effect. And when it has been produced we say it is in con
sequence of the power in the cause having been operated. The
idea of power is not given in sense perception. It is primarily
given in consciousness. We are conscious of power in our
selves to produce effects. We are conscious of having exerted
power when we produce effects. We intuitively cognize the
connection and relation between our exercise of power and the
* Metaphys., lib. i, chap. iii.
teeming, Vocabulary of Phil, pp. 75-77.

The Omnipotence of God. 133
effect. The intuition broadens into the maxim, " There can be
no effect without a cause."
" The sensuous school of philosophers deny that there is any
efficiency or power in existence. Their principle is that knowl
edge is derived from the senses, and consequently that, as we
cannot know anything of which the senses do not take cogni
zance, it is unphilosophical and unreasonable to admit the exist
ence of anything else. Our senses, however, do not take cogni
zance of efficiency. It cannot be seen, or heard, or tasted.
Therefore it does not exist. A cause is not that to which an
effect is due, but simply that which uniformly precedes it. All
we can know, and all we can rationally believe, is the facts which
affect our senses, and the order of their sequence, which order,
being uniform and necessary, has the character of law. This is
the doctrine of causation preferred by Hume, Kant, Brown,
Mill, and virtually by Sir W. Hamilton, and it is this principle
which lies at the foundation of the positive philosophy of
Comte." *
" Now, that our idea of power cannot be explained by the
philosophy which derives all our ideas from sensation and reflec
tion is true. Power is not an object of sense. All that we
observe is succession. But when we see one thing invariably
succeeded by another we not only connect the one as effect and
the other as cause, and view them under the relation, but we
frame the idea of power, and conclude that there is a virtue, an
efficacy, a force, in the one thing to originate or produce the
other, and that the connection between them is not only uniform >
and unvaried, but universal and necessary. This is the common
idea of power, and that there is such an idea framed and enter
tained by the human mind cannot be denied. The legitimacy
and validity of the idea can be fully indicated."!
* Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. i, p. 408.
f Fleming, Vocabulary of Phil., pp. 394, 395.

134 Studies in Theology.
" In the strict sense power and agency are attributes of mind
only ; and I think that mind only can be a cause in the strict
sense. This power, indeed, may be where it is not exerted, and
so may be without agency or causation ; but there can be no
agency or causation without power to act and produce the effect.
In intelligent causes the power may be without being exerted ;
so I have power to run when I sit still or walk. But in inani
mate causes we conceive no power but what is exerted, and,
therefore, measure the power of the cause by the effect which
it actually produces. The power of an acid to dissolve iron is
measured by what it actually dissolves. We get the notion of
active power, as well as of cause and effect, as I think, from
what we feel in ourselves. We feel in ourselves a power to
move our limbs and to produce certain effects when we choose.
Hence we get the notion of power, agency, and causation, in
the strict and philosophical sense ; and this I take to be our first
notion of these three things."
That we do have the idea of power and causality cannot be
disputed, except on the most arbitrary grounds. The philoso
phy which denies it can allege nothing in support of its position
but the inadmissible postulate that we can form no idea of any
thing not given in sense, {a) It contradicts our consciousness
— we know that it is not true by directly cognizing in ourselves
that which it denies, {b) It contradicts the most certain and
positive intuition of the mind, namely, that an effect is impossible
without the action of a cause, (c) It takes all meaning out of
the connection of events which we behold transpiring around
us every moment of our conscious existence. Succession ex
plains nothing, {d) The connection of effects with our acts,
consciously exerted to that end, is such that it is impossible we
should believe that there is nothing in the one causal of the
other. Antecedently, we believe, we know, that we can do cer
tain things. We consciously put forth the power and do them.

The Omnipotence of God. 135
We do this in order to a given effect which we believe will fol
low ; we see that the expected and purposed effect does follow.
To say that all we discover in the case is one thing following
another is what the human mind can never believe, while the
laws of thought remain and reason and consciousness are per
mitted to be heard.
There is such a thing, then, as power, and we consciously
possess and exert it. But we no less consciously know that our
power is narrow and limited and its exercise restricted and con
ditioned in many ways. We express all this by giving to it the
general name finite. Inanimate things seem, likewise, to pos
sess power. To this we give the name secondary cause, by
which we mean that the power is not original to them, but to
the agent constitutive of them. To them is appointed the func
tion of making visible the real ordering cause, who himself does
not directly appear. These, like ourselves, are circumscribed.
Toihe power of God is given the name Omnipotence — which
strictly means all power. But this is not to be so construed as
to imply that there is no other power than the power of God,
any more than the infinitude of God is to be so construed as to
imply that there is no being but the being of God. Such a
construction would resolve all things into God and mere modes
of his acting, and thus reduce to sheer pantheism. Things are
real and have real power. But they have neither being nor
power in themselves. They are products of the Infinite, and
their powers are derivative and conferred. They are created
with limited powers which they cannot transcend, and which it
is their nature to exert, and which they cannot refrain from
exerting. The constraint is in them as an inherence of their
existence and dower of their being. When we rise out of
things which thus have limited powers under the law of neces
sity to the contemplation of mind we detect a higher range of
powers, which are exerted in freedom, but these, while real, we

136 Studies in Theology.
are compelled to trace to God as original source ; so that there
are no powers which do not ultimately emanate from him. He
sets them up and determines their limits, whether they act
under the law of freedom or necessity. If they exist under the
law of necessity he creates them to that end, and they can but
fulfill the function of their existence. It is the sun that
shines and warms and vivifies ; the atom that attracts ; and they
can do nothing other than that which they are created to do.
If, on the other hand, they exist under the law of freedom, they
can do with freedom certain things, but they are limited and
restricted within certain bounds, in which they were created to
move. He not only creates all finite powers, but he determines
their kind and fixes their limits.
There are such concreated powers — powers given and im
parted to created things. We cannot get on with thought with
out admitting and recognizing this. Every atom is a throne of
power which, in a sense, is its own to exert. It does instrumen-
tally exert it. The whole universe quivers with interaction — is
alive with contending and yet coworking forces. They work
to an end, but to an end which they do not propose or under
stand. Science discerns that they work according to laws fixed
and universal ; laws of whose existence they know nothing, yet
which they obey with infallible and undeviating fidelity. The
reason is obvious. They were created to work for those unknown
ends, and for nothing else. The ends are apprehended by their
Creator, and their existence is given simply to accomplish them.
The story which they relate to discerning science is not simply
of their existence and working, but beyond that of the Infinite
whose will and purpose they were made to serve — of the Infi
nite from whom come both their power and its working. All
other powers are thus witnesses of the omnipotence of their
source and unitary ground.
Omnipotence is viewed under two aspects by philosophers

The Omnipotence of God. 137
and theologians, and with some advantage to the clearer com
prehension of the subject. A distinction is made between the
power which is exercised in creating and that which is ex
ercised in the ongoing of things — not that there are two kinds
of power, but two modes of exercising the same power, or two
forms of manifestation. To the former they give the name
ahsoluta, or potentia absoluta, or potestas absoluta; to the lat
ter ordinata, or potentia ordinata, or potestas ordinata. This
distinction is found to be serviceable in many ways. Of this
Dr. Hodge says: " By the latter is meant the efficiency of God,
as exercised uniformly in the order of creation of second
causes ; by the former, his efficiency, as exercised without in
tervention of second causes. Creation, miracles, immediate
revelation, inspiration, and regeneration are to be referred to
the potentia absoluta of God ; all his works of providence to
his potentia ordinata. This distinction is important, as it draws
the line between the natural and supernatural, between what
is due to the operation of natural causes, sustained and guided
by the providential efficiency of God, and what is due to the
immediate exercise of his power." *
Knapp, on the same point, says : " The absolute omnipotence
of God is that immediate miraculous exertion of his power
which is seen in the creation of the world. His omnipotentia
ordinata is that common, regular exercise of his power by
which he makes use of the course of nature, which he himself
has established for the promotion of his own designs. Thus he
produces the warmth of the atmosphere, rxotper potentiam ab-
solutum, but ordinatum, in causing the sun to shine. The same
thing is expressed by saying he acts per causas secundas."\
Dr. Pope holds similar language. " Once more," he says, " the
wisdom and goodness of the Supreme conditionates his omnipo
tence. Here there is a twofold range of suggestion, one more
* Systematic Theology, vol. i, p. 410. f Christian Theology, p. 102.

138 Studies in Theology.
simple and comprehensible ; the other bringing us to the thresh
old of unfathomable mystery. It is not difficult to understand
that in the providential arrangements of the universe omnipo
tent agency is limited by wisdom. There is a definite and clear
distinction between what is sometimes called the potestas abso
luta, or the absolute power that creates all at first and places
it under the government of secondary laws which represent the
potestas ordinata. This distinction between the supreme and
the economical omnipotence of the Creator is important in
many applications. It does justice to the regular, orderly, un
interrupted process of created things, in which occasional inter
ventions are rare, and, indeed, no more than exceptions to general
rule. But it gives room for these interventions in creation
itself, and in the miracles which sometimes introduce a new
creation into the world. The one idea of the divine omnipo
tence reconciles the two and harmonizes with both. But there
is another aspect of the subject, before which the human mind
must bow down in amazement. In the infinite wisdom of God
things contrary to his will in one sense are permitted by his
will in another. This leads us up to the original mystery, that
Omnipotence created beings capable of falling from him ; and
down again to the present mystery, that Omnipotence sustains
in being creatures opposing his authority ; and then forward to
the same mystery in its consummate form, that Omnipotence
will preserve in being, not, indeed, active rebels against his au
thority, but spirits separated from himself. It is the awful
peculiarity of this attribute, in common with wisdom and good
ness, as we shall see, that is traversed and thwarted, so to speak,
by the creatures which owe to it their origin." *
We cannot doubt either the justice of this distinction in the
mode of divine efficiency or its importance in interpreting the
relations of the Infinite to the world order. Nothing is more
*Theology, vol. i, p. 313.

The Omnipotence of God. 139
certain than the affirmation that the absolute power of the
Eternal unitary cause must have been exerted, with immediate-
ness of efficiency, in creating and establishing the world order.
It is not an inference, but a necessity. The effect is a direct
product of the cause. There can be no intermediates. In
order to the effect all requisite power must be found in the
cause absolutely. We thus by necessity of thought trace causa
tion to its ineffable source, and find in the Infinite the home of
omnipotence, and from the Infinite its direct expression. The
existence of the universe cannot otherwise be accounted for.
Reason joins with revelation in the postulate that the universe
is product of absolute power directly exerted. All capable
scientists admit it in effect.
So nothing is more certain than that in conserving the world
order, in its ongoing, the same omnipotence or infinite power
employs second causes, or makes the creature itself the medium
of efficiency — makes it serve ends by forms of power which it
was created to exert. It is his power which makes the sun to
shine, but the sun shines, and by its warmth and light vivifies
things which grow out of the earth. The secondary form of
power is as dependent on him as the primary, but differs in
mode. He is as really in the ongoing of things as in their
origination, but in a different manner. The universe could no
more continue without him than it could begin without him,
but the modes or forms of power employed in its continuance
are not identical with the mode employed in its production. It
is the same omnipotence which works in all and through all,
now originating, thenceforth conserving.
The rational, as well as scriptural, idea of omnipotence is that
it is that power of God whereby he is able to do whatsoever he
wills to do — a power which nothing external to himself can
hinder or limit. Restraints to the exercise of his unlimited
power do not arise from external impedimenta, but are restraints
12

140 Studies in Theology.
employed by coordinate perfections of his own nature. It is
by removing all the limitations of power, as it exists in us, that
we rise to the idea of omnipotence of God.* It is no limitation
to power to say that it cannot do the impossible, that it acts only
by choice, that its exercise is determined by coordinating per
fections. We reach the highest idea of infinite power when we
ascribe to God power to do whatsoever his infinitely perfect
nature determines, or whatsoever he pleases to do.
In defining the omnipotence of God to be the power whereby
he is able to do what he wills to do there are several things
to be observed, as, {a) the distinction which is made between
his causality and his will ; (b) the seeming limitation that he
can only do what he wills ; (c) whether he must will to do all
that he has power to do ; {d) whether the willing and the do
ing are not identical. On these points we have to remark :
{a) That the will of God is that perfection of his nature by
which he determines himself to certain ends, that is, by which
he purposes certain ends ; as such it is always coordained by
wisdom and goodness. (J) It is also the perfection of God by
which he effectuates his chosen ends by a forthgoing of ef
ficiency or power ; power is thus in the will and of the will.
(c) The form of the will, which is determined to ends, is purpose
in harmony with the coordinate perfections of wisdom and
goodness ; he wills to do all that he ever will do in the sense
of a choice or purpose to do it, and he never will do anything
else, or other, than he purposes to do. {d) The form of will,
which consists in the forthgoing of causality, is under condi
tions of time, and is his infinite will exerted constantly to the
realization of its purposes in time, {e) The will as efficient or
causational can never transcend the will as purposing ; when
soever he puts forth causational energy or power it will be in
accord with his purpose, and it will be by an act of will under
* Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. i, p. 407.

The Omnipotence of God. 141
the conditions of time. (/) The forthgoing of causational
energy is not exhaustive of causality or of the infinite power
as power, but will be exhaustive of infinite power coordinated
by wisdom and goodness. To infinite power, as infinite power,
many things are possible which will never take place, simply
because the infinite will, coordinated by love and wisdom, does
not choose them as ends, and not from lack of power in him to
cause them.
And now, having sufficiently cleared the term of false and
crude meanings and determined its true significance, that
is, that power whereby the Infinite can do whatsoever he
chooses to do — a power inherent and eternal — we are prepared
to attend to the proofs that he does possess such power, that he
truly is omnipotent.
In the foregoing statement the divine omnipotence has been
postulated. It remains that we more distinctly point out the
grounds which have been intimated in the course of the state
ment, but the proofs of which are yet to be developed. The
proofs are in two parts and from diverse sources, as, {a) those
reached by the reason and arrived at from the study of na
ture ; {b) those derived from revelation, each supporting the
other. If the so-called positive philosophy, which limits our knowl
edge to sense perceptions, were true, we could know nothing
of God nor have any proof of his existence or of any of his
attributes. Neither he nor they come into the range of sense
cognition. God is strictly invisible. His works and word
furnish the only sources of knowledge of him. In his works
we comprise all created mind and all forms of material ex
istence. We have shown in former discussions that these are
his product — that he is the eternal unitary ground of the world
order, or all cosmic phenomena.
From this established fact we deduce his omnipotence in

142 Studies in Theology.
two ways : {a) As the universe is wholly his creation, all the
power that is in it or implicated by it, of every degree and
kind, is derivative from his power, and as such can in no sense
transcend its source, but of necessity must come within it. His
power thus embraces, and is the equivalent of, all the power
that is. In this sense he is omnipotent, {b) As he is the only
absolute Being there is nothing to impose limits upon him or
restrict any of his perfections. His necessary existence involves
the infinitude of his attributes. He who limits all cannot him
self be limited. When once the mind rises to the apprehen
sion of eternal cause it intuitively excludes all limitations and
ascribes infinity. It is seen not only to account for everything,
but in order thereto is conceived as perfect. Over against the
finite, the imperfect, the dependent, the conditioned, there
arise in thought the Infinite, the Perfect, the Independent,
the Unconditioned, the Absolute. To his power reason re
fuses to set bounds, and assumes and irrevocably insists that
there can be no bounds. The feeling that he can do whatso
ever he will, that his power is absolute, is a mental instinct
which has all the force of an intuition. It cannot be reasoned
down. It is ineradicable. The limited forces of nature often
make us tremble, but that which pervades the thoughtful mind
with profoundest awe is the consciousness of a power which
transcends all local and visible forces — a power out of whose
grasp it is impossible we should escape, which may either pre
serve or destroy us— on the sole decision of whose will our des
tiny, the destiny of all things, depends. There is a mysterious
sense of the Infinite in the soul of man, which is forever find
ing us in unexpected forms and overwhelming us in unex
pected moments. We feel the swell and hear the sounds of
the infinite sea. Of nothing are we more conscious than the
idea and dread of eternal power or hope in it. Our own insuf
ficiency and sense of dependence — absolute helplessness— begets

The Omnipotence of God. 143
in us, over against itself, the idea of absolute, self-sufficient,
infinite power, and without an effort we believe there is an
answering reality. When, if ever, we would disenchant our
selves of the thought, we become conscious that it holds us
with the unrelaxing grip of necessity.
Creatorship implies unlimited power. The proof rises to its
highest point when we contemplate the extent of the creative
act measured by the extent of the created product. Power to
create an atom implicates power to create a world. In its
nature it is limitless. " The power displayed in the act of cre
ating not only exceeds all finite comprehension, but is plainly
so great as to exclude every rational limitation. It is impos
sible to believe that the power which originally gives existence
cannot do anything and everything, the doing of which in
volves not a contradiction."* But if our minds, in their feeble
ness, fail to grasp the abstract principle, we have but to turn to
the concrete fact of the universe to feel the force of the argu
ment. Think for a moment of its vastness, only a part of
which, and with its high probability only an infinitesimal part,
as compared with the reality, is yet known to man. It is in
timated that, within the sweep of the largest telescopic instru
ment, there are thousands of millions of solar systems the solar
centers of which are visible, and which indicate planetary ar
rangements bike those of our own. Think of the immeasur
able spaces where those solar centers burn and shine — an abyss
so deep and broad that it requires millions of years for a ray of
light to traverse it, flying at the velocity of twelve millions
of miles in a minute of time. Think of the velocities of those
ponderous bodies themselves, moving in vast orbits, at a rate
of speed equal to thousands of miles in a second, or almost un-
appreciable moment. Think of the unfailing energy which
supports them and guides them in their courses from age to
* Dwight, Theology, vol. i, p. 152.

144 Studies in Theology.
age, so that no one fails. The illustration is scarcely less im
pressive if we turn from these stupendous exhibitions to the
minutest parts. Think of the interplay of the atoms, the con
structive force pervasive of each organism, the abiding energy
which holds each particle in its place — which elaborates the
completed and perfect whole from the rudimental germ.
Surely the power which originated the vast system and carries
it forward over such limitless spaces in exact and complete
harmony through infinite ages is omnipotence — is inclusive of
all the forces which play in the wondrous system.

Omniscience of God. 145

OMNISCIENCE OF GOD.
In discussing the subject of divine omniscience it is impor
tant that we preliminarily have definite understanding of what
we mean by knowledge and the conditions of knowing. For a
full discussion of this subject the reader is referred to Treatise
I of this series, Prolegomena, pp. 74-184 ; but for convenience
we present the following points here :
{a) Knowledge or knowing is an act or state of mind in which
it is intuitively possessed of truth, that is, a concept of reality
as it is. {b) In order to knowledge there must exist a knower
and a thing known — subject and object, (c) The subject and
object may be identical or different, {d) When identical the
knowing is simply self -consciousness of the subject as to his own
state or act ; the knower knows himself, that is, he knows that
he is, and in a degree what he is — what is in him as essence and
attribute, and what he can do and will do — everything that can
be predicated of. his being and of his doing. When the object
is different from the subject the knower knows the object and
himself in the same act — self-consciousness is integral to all
knowledge. In the first case, in order to knowledge there is
no need that there should exist any other being than the sub
ject — any objective of any kind external to the subject. In the
second case, there must exist an object of knowledge external to
the subject, or other than the subject.
Omniscience is the eternal and exhaustive knowledge the sub
ject has of himself ; and the complete and the perfect knowl
edge he has of everything other than himself.
The Omniscient is himself the only eternal object — subject-
object. In the knowledge of himself is the perfect knowledge

146 ^Studies in Theology.
of his own nature and attributes, and what is contained in him
self ; and in knowing these he must know all his concepts and
purposes with respect of as yet nonexistent objects. Thus non
existent things may be eternally known, as they will be.
Thus God himself as subject-object furnishes the conditions
of eternal knowledge. There is besides himself a universe which
did not eternally exist. Omniscience requires that this also
should be eternally known. But if there cannot be knowledge
without an object, how could that which at a time had no ex
istence be matter of knowledge ? If we attempt to answer this
by affirming that they really do exist in him we can only mean
that they exist in him from eternity as concepts, or as concepts
which he purposes shall become real. We thereby affirm that
they are yet not real, and have for the matter of knowledge,
not the objects, but simply the concepts and purposes of God.
We may say that the one statement is the equivalent of the
other ; but we can never convince ourselves of the truth of the
affirmation that a universe existing merely as a concept in the
mind of God, and which he purposes shall become real, has the
quality of existence before it in fact exists — is identical with
the actually existing universe. The one part of the statement,
that is, that the concept is eternal, may be true, but its truth
proves the nontruth of the other, that is, that there is a cor
responding reality. That which he knows is simply himself,
his concepts and his purposes ; and of all possible concepts he
will give real existence to some and not to others. Nothing is
eternally known to be real, that is, to have real existence, but
himself and what is purely subjective to himself. That the uni
verse may be known to be real, it must be real ; but its reality
is not eternal. Knowledge of a universe which once was not
must be conditioned on its having become real or the certainty
that it will become real.
Two things enter into the conditioning ground of knowledge,

Omniscience of God. 147
namely : {a) his purpose to make the universe and knowledge
that his purpose will be effectual to the end; (b) the actual
existence of the reality. The first part {a) may be eternal, but
the second part {b) must be in time. The first part {a) furnishes
ground for the knowledge of what will be ; the second part {b)
furnishes the knowledge of what is.
According to the Calvinistic philosophy, God's knowledge of
what will be has its ground in his knowledge of his purpose.
He eternally knows all that ever will be because he purposes it
shall be, and he knows that his purpose cannot fail.
To this philosophy there are these objections : it grounds all
futuritions in the purposes of God, and thus at the same time
denies freedom to man, and makes God the efficient cause and
author of sin.
The position we hold and maintain is that God's eternal
knowledge of himself in self -consciousness is, among other things,
the knowledge of his purposes with respect to nonexistent events,
and that so far as his purposes are efficient thereto he knows
future events in this way. But further we hold that there are
innumerable future events which he never did purpose, and
especially that any purpose with respect to them was not effi
cient to them, and that these are also matters of his eternal
knowledge ; but if so his purpose is not the only ground of his
prescience. His eternal purpose is one ground of knowledge of
some things, but it is not the only ground, even with respect to
those same things. His purpose to create a universe was a
ground of knowing precisely what kind of a universe he would
create ; but it was not the only ground. He lives with the uni
verse, and it is eternally open to him as a thing to be, and he
thus knows it, not simply by knowing his own purpose, but by
actual cognition of the universe itself ; and this before it existed.
This last sentence needs special attention. A postulate laid
down afewpages back was this: In order to knowledge there must

148 Studies in Theology.
be a knower and a thing known. The above sentence seems to
contradict this postulate. If it does it is false. Does it contra
dict it? The seeming contradiction is that when the universe
did not exist it was open to his observation as an existing reality ;
he knew it not as something purposed merely, but as something
actually under his observation. We are free to admit that the
supposition has all the appearance of a direct and bald contra
diction. How can it be reconciled ? We answer : That there
was an indefinite period during which the universe itself did
not in fact exist is certain. This is admitted by all the parties
in this contention. The position taken here is that during this
period when it did not exist in fact it was even then open to
God as if actually existing ; and we affirm that the position is
not contradictory ; and the explanation is this : We have found
in the discussion on the eternity of God that his mode of ex
istence is such that he exists in all time, nay, that he inhabits
eternity ; not that existing in one time he looks forward through
all time, but that he exists in all time. There is no time when
he is not. Now, if this be true, then he was actually existing
from eternity, at the point of time when creation arose, and in
all the time which creation occupies ; but if he was and is pres
ent himself or existing in all that time, then the events of that
time were always matters of real and direct cognition. As to
themselves, there was a time when they did not exist, and in
that time he knew them as nonexistent, but as to be ; but as he
was at that very time also existing in all coming time, he knew
them in that coming time as existing. If the mode of eternal
existence is permanent existence in eternity, and not a passing
from one time into another, which we have seen it must be, the
position here taken is irresistible. Things not existing at one
time, and existing at another, are always under his gaze as real
ity. If we could suppose ourselves to be existing to-day, in a
day a million years hence as well as to-day, we should then see

Omniscience of God. 149
what now is, for it would be under our present gaze ; but we
would also to-day see what will be nonexistent for a million
years, for by supposition we are also to-day existing in that day a
million years hence, and are seeing as real and present to us the
events of that day. This represents what we are compelled to
believe is the actual mode of divine existence. Things that
will be are to him who now lives in the time when they will
be. Thus, because of the mode of divine existence, things that
are not in themselves existing are under his gaze ; and however
in themselves they are transient, in his knowledge, that is,
direct vision, they are forever with him. Past and future now
are with all their contents in his cognition. This point will be
fully developed as this argument progresses. Thus God's pur
poses are not the only ground of knowledge. He knows by
direct cognition of what is.
The importance of this point is found in its bearing on the
question of how God could know from eternity the acts of free
beings. The Calvinistic answer which ascribes his knowledge
to his purposes, as we shall see, absolutely excludes all such acts
from existence. To its theory, however it may affirm freedom
of creatures, the fact must remain that freedom does not exist.
Some of those who deny the theory as subversive of the idea
of freedom, not seeing how prescience can be in any other way,
find refuge in the denial of prescience.
We contend both for prescience, or absolute knowledge of
all events of time from the eternity which precedes time, and
also that among the eternally known events many are brought
about in absolute freedom. The position we hold requires us
to deny that God can only know future events by having fixed
the occurrence in inevitability by his efficient purpose that they
shall be. If among the all things known from eternity as cer
tain to occur are some things which are not efficiently caused
by his purpose, the grounds of the knowing must be different

150 Studies in Theology.
from the knowledge of his efficient purpose that they shall be.
But if he does not know them by knowing himself as cause of
them, there can be no other ground of knowing but the actual
existence of the things known. To have this knowledge he
must be present with them at the time of their actual exist
ence, and they must be under his observation. His eternity
explains his prescience ; or prescience is simple knowledge of
what is in fact matter of observation. The knowledge of God
as to things created and caused by him is the knowledge of
himself as cause arid the perfect knowledge of the thing caused.
It is not exhausted by the knowledge of his act, but also in
cludes the effect in all its contents. He knows, not simply that
the effect exists, but what it is — its innermost essence, all its
properties and potencies and relations and collocations forever
and ever ; nothing in it or in its history is hid from .him for a
moment. Thus every atom in existence is forever open and
naked to his ever-present gaze. As it derives its existence from
him, it can have no existence without him. He is as much
present with it each moment as he was present with it the
moment he called it into being, and as directly observant of it.
He lives in it and with it in all its history, as really as he lives
in himself and with himself. It is not himself, but it has
nothing apart from him.
Was there no knowledge of the real universe in the eternal
omniscience? If we must so conclude, then there was no
knowledge of all those events of the real universe which were
not actually product of the divine purpose and causation,
that is, all the free acts of free beings. His only ground
of knowledge was the existence in him of concepts and
purposes. There could be no other ground of knowledge of
nonexistent things if they were not purposed. It would so
seem, but can we be certain that it is really so? By con
cession the objective universe did not exist ; but he who did

Omniscience of God. 151
exist existed in a mode of eternity, that is, not in a mode of
succession. The omniscience of God is thus as to events absolute presci
ence. He knows them from eternity or before time; not
simply because he knows his purposes with respect to them,
but because the time when they will be is, as included in his
eternity, present with him.
With respect to events which are not immediately caused by
God's agency, and so cannot be foreknown because foreor
dained, the question how he can be prescient of them is an
swered in the fact that, as above stated, he is present with
them, and knows them, as we know events by beholding them.
The eternity of God is the solution of prescience. He is with
all events coexistent. Events are not coexistent with his
eternity, but his eternity is coexistent with all events. The
man of sixty years is coexistent with every day of his sixty
years; but no day of the sixty years is coexistent with the
sixty years.
If God's omniscience includes the knowledge of all events,
it includes the knowledge of the thoughts, feelings, motives,
and purposes of all minds. Prescience of them is in no respect
more difficult to explain than the knowledge of them at the
time when they exist. The whole difficulty is in explaining
how they can be known at all ; and arises from the fact that
we have no such power by which to interpret them. We see
or know through observable phenomena. Spirit itself to us is
only seen by some external act. He discerns the thoughts of
the heart. How prescience stands related to freedom will
appear as we progress.
Omniscience is the term employed to designate the knowl
edge of God. The term defines itself in its simple etymolog
ical import. It signifies all knowledge, or the knowledge of
all things; that is, first the perfect knowledge of himself,

152 Studies in Theology.
absolute and perfect self-consciousness of all that is in him,
and the perfect knowledge of all that exists or shall exist apart
from him, whether by creation or otherwise. The term knowl
edge is well understood. Those who find the worldground in
matter, or impersonal force, logically deny any knowledge
back of the universe, or in the eternal impersonal cause, and
consistently hold that the evolution implies no mind.
This is what the human mind will never admit. It is impos
sible to conceive of such an unfolding without preexisting and
pervading intelligence in the causation. We are compelled to
construe the system under laws derived from our own con
sciousness. These necessitate the belief that mind is in, or
rather is, the primitive world ground. Mind, as we find it in
ourselves, attains to knowledge in a limited degree and under
fixed laws. Its primary condition is that of a being who has
faculties of knowledge. It will acquire knowledge under given
conditions ; and, under favorable environments, it will forever
enlarge the scope of its knowledge. It is impossible that we
should conceive of God as a being of this kind. With all his
essential attributes his knowledge must be eternal and perfect,
for from whom, or what, can he, who alone is eternal, derive
anything ? Knowledge may be viewed as wisdom and cogni
tion. The distinction should be made. Omniscience includes
perfect wisdom, that is, the knowledge of best ends and the
best means thereto, and the knowledge of all existences and of
all events.
Infinite wisdom cannot be viewed as an acquisition, but must
be viewed as an attribute of the infinitely perfect. What is
that attribute ? Can it be anything else than the inherent knowl
edge of the best possible creation ? As he, alone, is source of
all things, all the implicates of wisdom in things must come
from himself. Can the things which he has made teach him
anything ? Do they contain anything which he did not know-

Omniscience of God. 153
ingly bestow ? How can they have any secrets which he did
not confide ? Do they not, so far as they are intelligible, that
is, construable in thought, represent antecedent concepts accord
ing to which they are formed ? The entire mentality expressed
by them of necessity preceded them in the cause. The attempt
to confound the power which builds with the idea according to
which it builds, or to suppose that the cause unfolds itself sim
ply as force according to perfectly intelligible forms, without
admitting a knowing along with the process, and, so, in the
cause, which exerts the power different from the power exerted,
and giving direction to it, is not only contrary to all experience
and consciousness, but is absurd. Nothing can be more certain
than that the cause was a knowing cause before it became a pro
ducing cause. The knowing was original, inherent, and eternal.
The power which gave expression to the knowing must have
also been inherent and eternal, but its exercise, of necessity,
could not be eternal, but under conditions of time.
If we consider the world process we are forced to the follow
ing conclusions : {a) The process itself is in time ; {b) as such it
is an effect ; (c) in order to it there must have been a preexist
ing cause ; {d) the process evinces intelligence ; (<?) the intelli
gence must reside in the preexisting cause; (f) the process
evinces power or causation ; {g) the power must reside in the
cause ; {h) the action of the power is according to thought, and
is not the thought itself; {i) the thought must be presupposed,
in order to the exertion of the power, in the form and manner
in which it was exerted ; (J) the thought must be original to the
cause, and eternal, since there was no source from which it could
be derived but the Eternal himself ; {k) the exercise of the power
must be subsequent to the idea which it expresses, and necessarily
under the conditions of time, since the effect is in time and must
be contemporaneous with the exercise of the power which pro
duces it. The result of which is that an eternal personal being

154 Studies in Theology.
who possessed the knowledge of it, in the form in which it
should be, and who possessed the power to realize it or create
it, but which power was not eternally in exercise but was ex
ercised at the moment when the evolution of the world process
began, must have existed before the universe. Thus, while intel
ligence and power are both attributes of the cause, they are dis
tinct and differentiable. Knowledge selects the ends and the
times, and determines the order — fashions the archetypes or
ideals; power produces according to the pattern. Which is
only saying that the universe was primitively a thought, after
ward it became reality. In the eternal, mind was eternal as a
thought ; in the power of God, eternal as a possibility ; in itself,
as a realized idea or product of power, an effect — and in time.
If we should undertake to suppose that power built without a
mind directing we must encounter the difficulty of accounting
for the most perfect result of wisdom by mere chance. If we
deny the eternity of the ideals we must encounter the difficulty
of accounting for the origin of the most perfect wisdom with
out a cause. Either dilemma must be fatal to the supposition.
The only alternative is the admission of the ideals in the builder
himself — not made or derived, but unoriginated and eternal.
Thus it appears that the eternal Cause must have a perfect knowl
edge of all his works, so far forth as they emanate from him,
and fill out the measures of his thought and changeless purpose.
Implicit in a universe which once did not exist, but which
afterward does or did exist, is its cause, or a being who created
it. Implicit in the cause is the idea of that which passed from
nonexistence into existence. If the cause be conceived as a
being of infinite perfections of power, wisdom, and goodness, it
is implicit that there should be coexistent with these perfections
an idea of something to which these attributes stand related.
There is no meaning to the term power, and no function for the
attribute apart from an object, for the realization of which it is

Omniscience of God. 155
power ; there is no wisdom apart from an end ; there is no good
ness that is not for a good. The perfections are subjective, but
they demand a conceptive object. The object is implicit in the
attributes, first as idea of nonexisting reality, then as reality
wrought by, and exponential of, the attributes exerted in its
existence, and in the procurement of its good when it became
actual. The idea is as eternal and necessary as the perfections
themselves — implicit in their existence. It is the idea of a pos
sible other than the sole existing Infinite ; possible not without,
but to, the Infinite. The idea is complete and perfectly definite
in all its inclusions. It is not the idea of one thing, but of a
far-reaching plan — a plan covering infinite areas and infinite
time, that is, endless successions and limitless extension. Thus
the one only universe that ought to be is in idea coexistent with
its eternal Cause — the only one possible, because the best possi
ble, and because infinite wisdom, power, and goodness will per
mit only the best possible, even in idea. The possible best
may not be the ideal best, for it may not be possible to realize
the ideal best. There are things conceivable which are impossible
even to infinite power, because not objects of power. The idea
of the possible best, and also the idea of the ideally perfect, have
actual existence in the infinite mind ; but neither the possible
best nor the ideally perfect have the reality of being. The
universe that is was potentially the best possible, but the possi
ble is marred so as not to be equal to the ideal best. Free be
ings have caused it to fail to realize the ideal.
The possible is contingent — may become actual. Will it be
come actual ? That depends on the will of God. It can only
acquire the reality of being by a creative act ; but if it shall
become real it will conform to the eternal idea, and as the con
tents of that are perfectly known to the Infinite the correspond
ing reality is forever perfectly known in all its contents ; thus
eternal prescience covers the whole domain of possible existence.

156 Studies in Theology.
The idea of the possible best exists simply in the divine con
sciousness and is the basis of eternal self-consciousness, that is,
the consciousness of the self over against the not self. In the
idea the future reality is present as a thought, but not as a
reality. The divine knowledge corresponds precisely with that
fact ; it includes an ideal that is present, and a reality that is
not at present existing. The knowledge of reality is prescience
of something that is not, but that will be, and exactly as it
will be. There are two modes of eternal knowing. The
eternal knowledge with respect to an as yet nonexisting real
ity does not make it real. It makes the idea real. Its exist
ence remains contingent upon the exercise of the creative will.
That is something which has not taken place. The power is
eternal, but its exercise comes under conditions of time, that is,
of a beginning and eternally future progressive movement.
Henceforth the eternal Absolute wills with and in the contingent
finite, and brings himself under conditions of succession and ex
tension, called time and space. The knowledge of the idea re
mains an ever-present knowledge, but the creation and order
ing of real existence is the occasion, not of the changes of the
substance of knowledge, but of the mode of it. From eternity
he knew that he would act creatively. He now knows that he
does act as before he knew he would. The act was before
present in the divine mind as something to be ; it is now pres
ent as an accomplished and accomplishing fact, and the knowl
edge conforms to the fact. There is thus a permanent now in
the prescience, but a transient now in the realization.
The idea or plan of the finite is an eternal fact and change
less, but the act which realizes it has a beginning, and is unin-
termittently continued forever. Thus God has in the finite a
life of ever-varying activity — a life in which there is a true
past and present and future, a continuous becoming ; and this
is matter of self-consciousness. He knows himself as having

Omniscience of God. 157
done certain things. Concerning these he knows himself as
not now active. He knows himself as doing in the present
moment what occupies him at the time, and, knowing the
changeless plan which he has, he knows just what he will do
when the time comes for doing it.
A contractor engages to build a road across a continent. He
has carefully charted the route he is to pursue. He knows
every tunnel, every bridge, every winding of the way. Make
his knowledge perfect. He would then know precisely what
is to be done each day — would then know exactly how it will
come out. All is present with him in his perfect plan. The
reality will correspond precisely with the plan. But he also
knows that the plan is not the road, and he knows that in order
to the road work is to be done, and he knows that the work
must be begun and continued, and he knows that work will
fill out the plan. If his knowledge were absolutely perfect he
would know from the start, yea, before he commenced, just
what work he would be doing each moment to its completion.
The work would keep him busy from its inception to its end.
The case is in no respect different when we think of God as
founding and ordering the universe, except as he is infinitely
perfect. Here we have first an eternal plan of a work to be
accomplished in time. The work has not been done, though
in him the knowledge of it is complete. It is a vast plan, ex
tending over infinite ages, and of infinite extent. He who pos
sesses it engages his infinite wisdom, power, and goodness to
carry it out. His prescience sees it from beginning to end, or
forever, for it has no end. The plan is thus forever present
with him in all its minutiae as an idea. He knows all the
tunnels and bridges and incidents. He knows that the plan
will not execute itself. He knows that work is required — that
each moment in the future will call for its specific work. He
knows what the specific work for the moment will be, and that

158 Studies in Theology.
he will be or is to do it. So much is included in his eternal
prescience. But he also knows that the work that the plan
calls for must be begun, and until it is begun he knows that it
has not begun. When begun he knows that it is just begun
and not completed. The mode of his knowledge, but not its
contents, changes as the work progresses ; he knows yester
day's work has been done and is past ; he knows to-day's work
is being done; he knows to-morrow's work remains. There
are sunrisings and sunsettings in his work, and in the mode of
his knowledge, but not in its substance. The ages come and
go and find him busy ; busier to-day than yesterday ; busier
to-morrow than to-day— busy forever, and finding his joy in
seeing the walls go up ; doing to-day what he did not do yes
terday, because the time had not come, and doing to-mor
row what he does not do to-day, because the conditions do not
exist. His infinite happiness is thus found in thus realizing his
eternal idea. It is an eternal plan, but the joy and fact of its
realization are in the processes of time. The corner stone has
been laid. It exists as a pleasing mode of changeless knowl
edge. The walls are partly up and are progressing. The
under courses have been laid in beauty and are viewed with
delight ; some great arches are now being lifted and keyed, and
each added stone brings new pleasure. The dome is in the per
spective of far-off ages, but in due time will be set, with shout
ings of " Grace, grace unto it," and in all the process the works
of his hands will glorify him ; the finished universe will be his
everlasting crown. In the ongoing the finite changes, parts be
come obsolete and fall away, like useless scaffolding, needful
once, but no more required ; new parts appear, for which the old
was preparation ; but he changes not, but tirelessly works and
will forever work to realize his idea and immutable purposes.
We have said that in creating the universe he brought himself
under conditions of extension and succession called time and

Omniscience of God. 159
space. Prior to the creative act nothing existed of which ex
tension or succession could be predicated. The idea of a uni
verse included the idea of extension and succession, but it did
not include the fact of either extension or succession, for these
are not predicable of an idea. There was no extension or suc
cession in the idea, and nothing in the essence or attributes of
the Infinite of which these modes of being could be predicated.
But the creative act began a series of divine activities and
effects which were successional. Things created existed mo
ment by moment, and new phases constantly emerged; this
was succession as a law of things. The divine acts which pro
duced the changes in things were also a series of activities, and
as to acts the divine Being came under the law of succession.
There was no succession in him, but there was succession by
him. He was, in essence and attribute, " the same yesterday,
and to-day, and forever ; " but he acted yesterday as he does not
to-day, and to-day as he does not forever. This does not imply
any change in him, but only in the mode of handling of himself.
He is " the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever " — the same
when he acts and when he does not act, as the man is the same
whether he is passive or active, when he walks as when he
rests. So, also, there was nothing in the idea of creation of
which extension could be predicated. But the creation of mate
rial substances, of which extension is an essential attribute, not
only created extension in the thing, but brought the Creator
under conditions of extension. He exists with and in extended
things, and acts in them as he does not act where they are not.
As extended things have an area or scope, God's presence
pervades that scope, and as working in certain ways is bounded
by it. He is thus omnipresent with being. We know of no
other form in which extension can be predicated of him. The
universe does not contain or limit him, but it proclaims his
presence in it and in a mode in which he does not exist out-

160 Studies in Theology.
side of or beyond it. His acting is bounded, but not his
power to act.
There is a difference between a purpose and an idea, and also
a difference between a purpose and an effect-producing act.
The idea exists in the intelligence, and is an inherence of the
eternal and unoriginated wisdom of the cause. We cannot
conceive of it as an evolution or product of volition. It is of
the essence of the infinitely perfect in the same sense as power
is. He does not exist without it — he does not originate it.
Purpose is an act of the will, and if there be freedom in God it
is a free act, and if free it cannot be among the necessary in
herences of his being. Even Dr. Hodge says that " God was
free to create or not create." But how could he be free not to
create if creation was eternal ? There is a difference between
the being and essential attributes of God and the acts of God.
The former are eternal and necessary ; the latter are sequent and
self-determined. Certainly there is a logical necessity that the
idea of a thing and consciousness of power to realize it should
exist antecedently to the determination to realize it. Is the
necessity simply logical, or also real ? There is a difference be
tween the eternal idea of the good and the choice of it or the
purpose to realize it ; and such may be the perfect nature of
God,1 that along with the idea the purpose may exist as a free
choice. The purpose may have the quality of eternity in it
without the quality of necessity.
Purpose is used in the sense of choice of, or self-determination
to, an end. The end must first be apprehended. After the end
is apprehended is there a necessity that the purpose to realize
it should exist, and, if it exist, must it^ not be originated, and, if
originated, was there not a time when it did not exist ? Is there
any reason why the purpose should not exist in immediate con
nection with the existence of the idea and the discernment of
its wisdom and goodness ?

Omniscience of God. 161
The universe we absolutely know is not eternal. What is
gained by assuming that the purpose of it existed eternally be
fore it was created ? The eternal purpose accomplished nothing.
In order to the realization there must be an executive volition.
Why separate the purpose and the executive volition by the
breadth of an intervening eternity ? Does it not answer all the
demands of the problem to say that the divine Being anteced
ently to all existence purposed— determined to create a uni
verse after the pattern of infinite wisdom which existed in him?
It is true that purpose as choice of an end logically precedes
volition to attain to it or to realize it, and also that there may
be any amount of intervening time ; it may be a purpose not to
do a thing now, but at some future time, near or remote. In
this case, if we suppose the purpose to be eternal, the interven
ing time is a past eternity during which the purpose remained
fallow. But the phrase, "Eternitas a parte ante," and its coun
ter, " a eternitas a partis post," is itself misleading and mean
ingless, or false. Eternity is not a line which can be bisected
so as to make two eternities. At the imaginary point of bisec
tion we have an end beyond which the past does not extend ; but
a line which has one end must have two. Eternity has no end
— is beginningless and endless, and must include past and
future, or is rather that which properly has no past nor future.
Past and future are temporal terms, and can only relate to
things which have beginning and end. However inexplicable
the idea, we have seen that God is a being whose existence and
perfections are beginningless and endless — who does not pass
out of a past into a future, but whose existence is in the for
ever of all past and all future, or is beginningless and endless.
Such may be the nature of God that with the presence of all
possible things in his consciousness there is also in his conscious
ness an eternal choice of that which is best, and an eternal pur
pose to realize it, and that choice may be an immediate and

162 Studies in Theology.
immutable self-determination. We do not doubt that such is
the fact. It is the free, spontaneous, preferential state of the
divine nature.
Dr. Shedd says : " The instantaneous vision and successionless
unchanging consciousness of the divine Omniscience, in compar
ison of the gradual view and successive increasing knowledge
of the creature, have been thus illustrated. A person stands at
a street corner and sees a procession passing whose component
parts he does not know beforehand. He first sees white men,
then black men, and lastly red men. When the last man has
passed he knows that the procession was composed of Europeans,
Africans, and Indians. Now, suppose that from a church tower
he could see at one glance of the eye the whole procession.
Suppose that he saw no one part of it before the other, but that
the total view was instantaneous. His knowledge of the pro
cession would be all-comprehending and without succession.
He would not come into the knowledge of the components of
the procession, as he did in the former case, gradually, part by
part. And yet the procession would have its own movement
still, and could be made up of parts that follow each other.
Though the vision and knowledge of that procession, in this in
stance, are instantaneous, the procession itself is gradual. In like
manner the vast sequences of human history, and the still vaster
sequences of physical history, appear all at once, and without
any consciousness of succession, to the divine Observer." *
This is an admirable illustration, but we should have to make
one criticism upon it. The last line, we think, is not exactly
true, "without any consciousness of succession to the divine
Observer." The exact truth is the divine Observer would be
conscious of the succession in the component parts thereof, for
that conforms to the fact, but he would not be conscious of any
succession in his knowledge of the component parts. There is
* Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, pp. 344, 345.

Omniscience of God. 163
no succession in his knowledge, but there is a succession in parts
of the moving line. The knowledge is simultaneous, but parts
of the procession pass a given point at different times.
But the next position taken by the learned author we think
entirely erroneous, namely : " Not only is God's act of knowl
edge eternal and successionless, but his act of power is so like
wise. God creates all things from eternity by one act of power,
as he knows all things by one act of knowledge, and as he decrees
all things by one act of will." *
This statement is a strict contradiction. No creative act can
be eternal. The power to create must be eternal; it isa divine
attribute, but the creative act cannot be eternal, for the reason
that the effect cannot be eternal. The effect is simultaneous
with the creative act. There can be no creative act without a
creative product, but we know that the universe is not, and can
not be, eternal, as its Maker is. All effect-producing acts must
be in time. Acts are not attributes. His reasoning on the sub
ject is by no means satisfactory. On this subject Dr. Hodge
says : " We know that God is constantly producing new effects,
effects which succeed each other in time ; but we do not know
that these effects are due to successive exercises of divine effi
ciency." \_They can be due to nothing else.] It is indeed incom
prehensible that it should be otherwise. The miracles of Christ
were due to the exercise of divine efficiency. We utter words
to which we can attach no meaning when we say that these
effects were due, not to contemporaneous acts of volition of the
divine mind, but to an eternal act, if such a phrase be not
solecism." f
Nothing can be more certain than that both reason and reve
lation imply the idea that God does work successively and con
tinuously in the creation and ongoing of the universe. If Dr.
* Dogmatic Theology, vol. i, p. 347.
f Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. i, p. 388.

164 Studies in Theology.
Shedd's meaning in the above statement is that " God creates
all things from eternity by one act of power" continuously
carried forward without cessation in successive forthputting, it
would be nearer the truth ; but this is manifestly not his thought,
if so be he has a thought ; but even then it would be a solecism,
as intimated by Dr. Hodge. There can be no eternal creative
act as above stated, simply because no effect can be beginning
less, or eternal, and the creative act must be contemporaneous
with the effect. Of nothing can eternity be predicated but
God's existence and essential attributes ; and his creative acts are
not an attribute, but exercise.
God possesses his purposes and executes them, and priority of
existence and power to do so is a necessary implicate. We must
constantly remember that the purposes of God are not an attri
bute of God, but an act of will or self-determination. This is
a most important fact in this discussion. Attributes are eternal,
as coexisting with the essence ; acts are not. They emanate from
the being, but are not of the being, but by him. Prior, log
ically, if not really, to the possession of his purpose, not only
must he exist, but his pnrposes must be the outcome of princi
ple of goodness in him and of wisdom. His purposes are acts
which precede executive volitions and condition them. Neither
the choice nor the executive volition, which means exercise of
causational agency, are of the essence. All his purposes which
relate to the existence of the universe antedate its existence, and
are purposes of an eternal being which are determined by him
self, and which therefore are independent of all other beings ;
and they are purposes which will not change, but will stand
fast forever, not of necessity, but of free choice, being in har
mony with infallible wisdom and irreversible goodness and per
fect knowledge. In respect of unchangeableness they are eter
nal, but in respect of existence they are originated. They are
not an attribute, but a free exercise of an attribute, in harmony

Omniscience of God. 165
with other attributes. We do not see how it is possible to make
the purposes of God eternal in the same sense that his being is
without annihilating his personality, and at the same time im
parting necessary existence to things eternally purposed. There
is, by supposition, an absolute necessity that things should be as
purposed, and the purpose partakes of the eternal and necessary
existence of the being who purposes, and so created existence
partakes of the necessity of the eternal Being. Where, then, is
the freedom of God, and where is his absoluteness ? There is no
escape from the dilemma but by allowing that God has absolute
power over his purposes which involves alternatively to create or
not to create — to create now or farther on. The alternative
power belongs to the nature, and the free choice or purpose is
in accord therewith. As being he is eternal, absolute, out of all
necessary relations to any possibilities. He is spirit, which is
intelligent self-consciousness. As self-conscious he knows him
self, his power, his freedom ; that he has power to do as he
may will. Things cognized by self-consciousness as possible to
his power, if freedom belong to him, that is, if he have the at
tribute of personality as a positum of his necessary existence —
a quality of his essence, that personality which consists of intel
ligent freedom must now assert itself in answer to the question
which now confronts him, Shall the possibilities be made ac
tual ? It is entirely certain, however it may be with respect of
purpose, that executive volition which is necessary to effectuate
purpose must fall within time and have a beginning. This ab
solute necessity is discernible in the fact that executive volition,
wherever it exists, connects with the effects which it produces,
and does not exist antecedently to the effect, but contempo
raneously ; but every effect must have a beginning, a time when
it becomes, and behind which it did not exist. The executive
volition of God cannot be eternal.
The answer to the question, What will he choose to do,

166 Studies in Theology.
that is, what will he purpose ? must be freely self-determined,
and it will determine whether the unconditioned will condition
himself by bringing himself into relations to a universe which
he will create.
The logical requirement with respect to God's relation to the
contingent is first to posit the eternal as absolute and out of all
relations ; to posit him as a being of infinite power, intelli
gence, and freedom — as a person unrelated and unconditioned
and self-conscious, having the sense of power to do as he will,
that is, to determine himself. Thus existing he has ideas of
nonexisting things possible to be, that is, possible to be made
by his power. Will any of them ever become actual ? That is
contingent upon his free self-determination. If he shall so
choose, they will ; otherwise, not. Let us keep in mind that
the problem is concerning the free act of a perfectly free being
with respect to nonexisting things. There is nothing outside
of himself to condition his act ; nothing to necessitate him ; he
alone exists. The ideals have no power to necessitate him, for
they are merely subjective states of his eternal wisdom. Will
his own nature necessitate him ? If so, the necessitation is
eternal, for his nature is eternal ; then freedom vanishes from
the universe. There is no contingent existence, for the neces
sity which determines his choice and purpose binds all up in
absolute necessity. If this be true, then there was a mistake
when we started with the supposition that there were some
things known as possible merely ; when necessity binds all it
matters nothing what kind of necessity, there is nothing con
tingent or merely possible. The universe so originating,
and every incident in it, is as necessary as God. True, it did
not in fact exist, but the necessity of its existence is abso
lute, and is as eternal as the nature of God which compels
its existence.
There is no escape from this reflection on the nature and char-

Omniscience of God. 167
acter of the eternal Being, but in the admission that his plan
of the universe, and his purpose to create it, emanate not from
a necessitated nature, but from self-active intelligence and from
a free choice and act of self-determination.
To be free himself God must have power over his own self-
determinations. But if his self-determinations are eternal, it
is impossible he should have power over them any more than
he could have power over his own existence, for no power can
reach behind eternity or be operative as condition of that which
is eternal, or be determinative of that which is eternal. Thus,
under the supposition, freedom in any respect is eliminated
from God. He never possessed the power to do anything which
he does not do, or to avoid doing anything which he does do,
or to vary the shadow of a shade in any respect with regard
to any of his acts or purposes. It is said, in answer, that that
is precisely what is implied in his infinite perfection and
immutability. We answer that such an implication destroys
his infinite perfection, since it absolutely deprives him of an
ethical nature and character, and reduces him to the grade of
unfree being, and imparts to him impossible immutability.
He can only be immutable in respect to what is eternal inherit
ance of his being ; but his acts, which proceed from him and
produce effects, cannot be eternal without eternalizing effects,
which is a contradiction. He is not immutable, therefore,
with respect to acts ; for there is a time when he acts and
when he does not act with regard to such effects. His immu
tability is of nature and attribute, not of acts, and is not con
trary to his freedom. His ethical principles are immutable.
But if the supposition with which we started destroys his
own freedom, much more does it do away with the freedom of
any created being. Given the postulates, God's purposes are
eternal, and his purposes effectuate or cause all futuritions ;
and his purposes are that every act of every being shall accord

168 Studies in Theology.
therewith ; absolute and strict necessity and divine necessitation
binds all events. Freedom exists only in name.
There may be eternal possibilities to eternal powers, but the
things that are possible cannot themselves be eternal. The fact
that they are possible only proves that there may not be. A will-
act that is only possible does not exist; if it did exist eternally
it never could not be, or be different, and freedom is shown not
to exist. God's own character depends upon the power he has
over his purposes. There is no such thing as an ethical char
acter or ethical being without power of self-determination, or
in the absence of the exercise of that power. There is nothing
ethical in spirit simply as such, or in absolutism, or in eternity, or
in intelligence, or in self-consciousness, or in the power of self-
determination. These are the inclusions of an ethical nature,
but they only furnish the possibilities of an ethical character ;
that depends upon the free act of determining himself to an
end, and not upon anything included in his necessary existence.
A perfect ethical nature, such as the infinitely perfect being
possesses, requires that there should be in him the idea of right
and the feeling of good will, which, whenever contingent ex
istence should be created by him, would find in him a disposi
tion to beneficence — pure and perfect love, or delight in its
welfare, and a disposition in every way possible to provide for
its greatest good. That perfect notion was eternal in him ; it
was of his nature, as much as power, wisdom, intelligence was
of his essence. It belongs to a perfect nature. But he was a
person as well as a nature, that is, he had power of self-deter
mination. His ethical character as the actually good and holy
did not consist simply in his nature, but for its completion re
quired action. His primal unchangeable act of free self-deter
mination was to the good of being and his own as well. He
chose the good and thus passed from a perfect nature to the
character of a holy person. His choice is final, so that his holi-

Omniscience of God. 169
ness is eternal as to the future, and before temporary things as
to the past. Self-consciousness of a being who possesses all
power gives him the necessary knowledge of all possibilities.
The ethical intelligence indicates what among the possibles is
best ; it is called wisdom or the discernment of best ends and
best methods or means to realize the best ends ; so far the essen
tial nature carries, but now the being confronts a question which
he, as free, must as a person determine, whether he will choose
the best — the good which wisdom points out. His character
depends upon that choice and the efficient volitions which
freely follow it. As every other being to acquire ethical char
acter must be under this law, so must the highest. His purpose
to create a universe and the kind of universe chosen, if gov
erned by the highest wisdom and the purest beneficence, and if
unchangeable, all of which we know to be, constitute him the
perfectly and unchangeably holy God. Purposes condition and
make ethical quality.
The free act of determining to regulate his handling of him
self according to the dictates of wisdom and goodness gives
eternal worthiness in an infinite degree to the divine charac
ter. It was the initial, primary act of the eternal will— but it
was a free act and was not an inherence of necessary being,
as no determining act of a free and therefore moral being can
be. A perfect nature necessarily existing can have no personal
merit in it ; it has a kind of worthiness, but not moral quality.
Moral quality depends upon freedom, but is not inherent
in freedom. It must be personal, and is created by a per
sonal act ; it cannot exist in a thing ; it cannot exist of ne
cessity. A driven machine cannot be ethically good or evil.
God is perfect goodness and absolutely holy, because he freely
determines himself to the perfectly good. The infinite glory
of his character does not arise from the fact of eternal ex
istence and the inhering attributes of his unchosen nature.

170 Studies in Theology.
It is impossible that these should constitute him personally
worthy of homage or love. That must depend, as in the
case of every other being, upon how he freely uses his power.
" He is glorious in holiness," because of his determination of
himself to goodness, righteousness, and truth. To assume that
his necessary perfections are such that he could not determine
himself otherwise is not to show that he has a perfect moral
character, or even moral nature, since moral nature implies
freedom, but that he has no moral nature at all. He is good
because he wills to be good. He is infinitely good, that is,
there is absolutely no defect in his moral character ; not because
it is impossible he should will otherwise, but because he freely
and unchangeably determines himself to be absolutely good.
Being infinitely wise he can make no mistake ; his knowledge
is perfect ; he has absolute power over his acts, and power to
accomplish the choices he makes — to do whatsoever he wills ;
he is immutable in his nature and unchangeable in his self-
determination to the good. This is the ground of confidence
that all his creative and administrative acts are, and will forever
be, perfect in goodness and righteousness. It is his glory that
he is the unchangeably good. It could be no glory if it were
not a free choice — if it were like gravitation, a necessity. The
universe might be safe if it were possible that impersonal force
working infallibly to ends of safety and welfare reigned over
it, but the supposition is inconceivable ; but were it possible, it
would forever be impossible to feel toward the impersonal sov
ereignty the sentiments of reverence, worship, love. Such a
sovereignty could be a fate, but could not be viewed as ethical.
It could beget confidence of safety, but it could not beget in
the soul the feeling that the administration springs from a holy
personality. The moral nature— the conscience and heart of
man— and reason itself demand that a person shall be on the
throne of the universe ; a person that can be loved, adored, and

Omniscience of God. 171
worshiped ; a friend, a sympathizer ; one who feels, and who
understands the feelings of his creatures ; not an irresistible fate,
but a loving Father. Banish personality and leave mere force,
no matter how beneficently it works, the heart becomes an arid
waste, and the affections shrivel and perish ; hope dies ; prayer,
the last refuge of the soul, becomes impossible ; there is no
more place for gratitude ; praise ceases ; not a single flower of
the affection blooms in the desert waste of life.
It answers all the demands of theology, natural and revealed,
and accords with the dictates of the highest reason, and the
teaching of revelation, to say that all finite existence is by the
will, and under the domain of an absolutely holy Being — holy
before all creative acts and unchangeably holyforever and ever,
but self-determined in his holiness.
Dr. Pope is responsible for the paradox that " absolute ne
cessity is perfect freedom."* We assert that a balder paradox
was never penned. If we suppose his meaning to be that the
absolutely perfect must act in accordance with absolute perfec
tion or he could not be the absolutely perfect, we answer that
by bringing him thus under the law of necessity we not only
contradict the position that he is the most free, but we con
tradict the position that he is the most perfect, for we de
prive him of that which is the highest perfection, namely, a
moral nature and personality. That which ought to be affirmed
is that the most perfect will, not must, infallibly, but not of ne
cessity, act according to his perfect wisdom and goodness. This
is the only position which will admit of freedom and moral
perfection in the divine nature, and the only one that is con
sistent with personality and a holy character in God.
But it is affirmed by some of the ablest thinkers that after all
it is possible that a free purpose can be as eternal as the attri
bute of freedom itself ; that there is no impossibility in the posi-
* Compendium Christian Theology, vol. i, p. 309.
14

172 Studies in Theology.
tion that any act, even a creative act, may be eternal or coex
istent with an eternal being. That an eternal being may have
a form of activity which is of his essence is not disputed. Being
implies it. If intelligence be an inherent attribute of his essence,
self-consciousness is an implicate of his exfstence. These are
eternal forms of activity. If power, wisdom, love, and freedom
are of his essential being, self-consciousness is active with respect
to them, and the feeling that he can do whatever he wills to do
is a form of eternal activity which belongs to being itself. The
range of pure subjective activity to the most perfect nature may
be as infinite as the nature itself. Solitariness does not produce
sterility ; for in the infinitely perfect there is infinite potential
variety and infinite enjoyment of existence. The actual infinite
is excluded as unnecessary to him and as forever other from
him : it is nonexistent and he is existent ; it can never be
without him, but he is without, it. Without that mode of ac
tivity which would issue in finite existence there might be a
true thought life, and a true moral life, simply in subjective ex
ercises ; all possibles, conceptions, and ideals would be open to
him, and the moral approval of the good and disapproval
of the evil which the ideals suggest, which approval and disap
proval would be moral affections and of the nature of moral ac
tion — self-determinations. Thus there is a necessary distinction
between God and his free purposes. He is not his purposes,
but cause of them. They are contingent upon his free act ; he
is not contingent upon his act. They are purely subjective and
unconditioned, except as he conditions them ; he as to being
and attributes is necessary and unconditioned even by himself,
as he cannot condition his own existence any more than he could
create himself. And no more can he condition his own eternal
perfections. He does condition his own acts. They are not
of his necessary nature, and are not necessitated by it, but are
his creation and are free.

Omniscience of God. 173
But if now we pass beyond these purely subjective exercises,
and conceive an act by which nonexisting things are created, we
come to an act which is conditioned by the thing to be made,
and pass beyond the merely subjective to the objective. It is
impossible that this act of efficient causation of the new exist
ence should be eternal. Any objective movement toward the
nonexistent involves contingency and excludes necessity and
eternity. Whatever is eternal includes the quality of the neces
sary, and excludes the quality of the contingent^ merely pos
sible and free, since whatever is eternal cannot not be.
The purposes of God are grounded in his wisdom, power, and
goodness. He has no purposes which are not in accord with
and which do not arise from these eternal attributes, by a free
act of self-determination. That he has perfect knowledge of
these only implies that he is self-conscious — is a person.
The knowledge of himself is as eternal as his self-conscious
ness is, and as perfect and exhaustive. It leaves nothing, so far
as his infinite being and attributes are concerned, to be known.
And his omniscience includes the knowledge of all events which
will flow from his purposes. Thus there is nothing that can
ever come to pass in the remotest future, which is in fulfillment
of his purposes, which is not from the time of his purposing
fully and perfectly known to him as certain to occur and be as
purposed. He needs only to know himself to know all things
which he purposes to effect, in the exact order in which they
will arise. Present knowledge of his purposes before creation
began was absolute prescience of all events connected therewith
and predetermined thereby.
But it must be observed that this form of omniscience re
lates simply to self-knowledge and effects produced by pre
determined personal agency; that is, it is knowledge of his
attributes and of what he himself will do directly or by neces
sitated second causes. It is a complete knowledge of the

174 Studies in Theology.
universe in all its history, so far as it is a created and necessi
tated product.
What appears with perfect clearness is that for rational
thought the world ground is a being of infinite wisdom. The
proof of this is found in the continuance and ongoing of the
system. But a popular theological idea of omniscience includes
more than this. All but the most obtuse mind must advance
so far. But the common theological idea goes further. It holds
to absolute omniscience. It adds to the idea of a wisdom which
is capable of devising the world order, and providing for its
harmonious and faultless ongoing, absolute knowledge of all the
events of its history. It goes yet further, and believes that this
knowledge is not simply a knowledge of events caetaneously
with the occurrences, but a perfect prescience of them, in their
exact relations of space and time, from eternity. It ventures
even beyond this, and does not doubt that all possibilities are
likewise known unto God, and that all this infinite knowledge
is immutably in his consciousness.
The attribute of omniscience is not, in theological thought, the
power to know all things, but the conscious knowing of all
things. There is this difference between the attribute of om
niscience and the other ineffable attributes of the Infinite na
ture. Omnipotence does not imply its exercise in order to its
existence. The eternal consciousness with respect of it is the
consciousness of ability to do all things that can be done. It
might be complete, and was complete, before he put forth a
single act or exertion of it. Not so with the attribute of omnis
cience. The consciousness in this case, it is assumed, is not a con
sciousness of ability to know, but of de facto knowledge of all
things. There is doubtless a difference between the power to
know, and knowing, and a difference between a consciousness
of a power to know, and the consciousness of actual knowledge.
This is a difference which appeals to our consciousness. We are

Omniscience of God. 175
conscious of a power to acquire knowledge, even as we are
conscious of knowing some things. But this is the conscious
ness of a limited and improvable intelligence. If such were
the consciousness of God, it is assumed that it would degrade
him at once from the All-perfect to the grade of a finite and
imperfect being. It is not necessary that he should do all
things in order that he should be infinite in power ; but it is
necessary that he should actually know all things in order that
he should be perfect in knowledge.
There is a phrase in extensive use among theologians, even
those who are most careful of statement, in treating of om
niscience to this effect, and often in these exact words : " Om
niscience is that attribute of God by which he eternally knows
all things and all possibilities." The phrase " all possibilities "
is so employed as to imply that God is eternally conscious of
everything that is possible to his power, and all things that
might by possibility arise from any other source. Rightly
guarded it might represent a truth, but it is frequently so put
as to convey the idea that there is forever present in concep-
tional form an infinite number of things that never did have,
and never will have, existence. It is sufficient to say that om
niscience is the perfect knowledge of what has been, is, or ever
will be.
But does the answer to the question which has now been
reached satisfy the demands of the question, What is meant by
the divine omniscience ? It has been simply affirmed that God
perfectly knows himself and of all forms of existence and of
all events which he efficiently purposes shall be. Is this all ? So
a popular form of theology has long taught. It declares that
there is nothing of being or event that God has not determined
shall be, and therefore to know himself and his purposes is
omniscience. It is an easy explanation of infinite knowledge,
but for many reasons we find ourselves unable to receive it.

176 Studies in Theology.
There is a universe of free beings. These, like the universe
of things, he created, and to know of them, therefore, as to
their existence he needs only to know his purpose that they
should be — the time and place when and where they should
have their existence and the kind of beings they will be, the
external environments in which they should pass their time and
their providential allotments. But he endowed them with
freedom — power of self-determination, and other high emolu
ments of responsibility. Was he prescient, also, of how these
beings would use their freedom ? This is an entirely different
question. To know necessitated things he needs only to know
of his own acts, but to know of the determination of free wills
is to know of the non-necessitated acts of other beings. It is
obvious that this latter case is a much more difficult concep
tion than the former. Are we to suppose it impossible ? So
many have thought, and for the thought they have alleged
many plausible reasons. But the reasons alleged we are com
pelled to think collide with indisputable facts.
The difficulties embarrassing the idea of prescience, it thus
appears, all relate to contingent, that is, non-necessitated, events.
With respect to things which are comprised in a plan which is
predetermined, and which God himself is to work out by his
own direct agency, the doctrine presents no difficulty whatever,
since it requires only that he should know his own purposes,
which he will certainly carry out. Any idea of prescience
which leaves God nothing to do in the ongoing of the universe
but to stare at it as a fixed and finished piece of mechanism is
no more to be tolerated than the idea that he acquires new
ideas and forms new plans ; both are equally false. What is
perfectly clear is that his knowledge of his own work, and all
that emanates from him, is so complete and perfect that it per
mits of no mistake or fault of any kind, and will admit of no
improvement ; is such that he will encounter no surprises and

Omniscience of God. 177
need to make no corrections ; what he at first purposed he will
carry out.
But when, now, we pass from the realm of things in which
his efficiency is alone cause, and in which his wisdom is the
sole determiner, to the realm of personalities, prescience be
comes a much more perplexing problem. The Calvino-Augus-
tinian theory that here, as in the realm of things, he fixes every
act of every free agent by an unchangeable decree in such
manner that the event must fulfill the decree simplifies the
problem of prescience, but it does so at the sacrifice of the
character of God and the utter overthrow of moral govern
ment. If the theory of divine prescience can be sustained on
no other ground it must be at once abandoned as simply blas
phemous. There is certainly great difficulty in any view we may take
of the question, but it is the common difficulty which we en
counter whenever we attempt to deal with matters which lie
in the obscurities of the infinite. Some things we can see must
be ; some we clearly know cannot be ; others we imperfectly
understand. Reason halts and hesitates for the want of clear
light. The ablest minds do not reach absolute certitude. It is
not modest to pretend that this is not a question of this kind.
I quote from a few of the leading minds who call the doctrine
in question ; who either absolutely deny prescience of free acts,
or who affirm doubt.
On the relations of the divine omniscience to the events of
time Dorner says : " We have been obliged to affirm, if there
is a world, no mere negative relation of God to it, to space and
time, and their contents, but a positive relation, and thus the
necessity has been proved to us that in the mode in which God
knows everything not merely an eternal uniformity may be
thought, but that there must be a movement in the divine
knowledge in order that it may be a true knowledge, because a

178 Studies in Theology.
movement is seen in things, a decay and a birth> and thus God
cannot always know the same things as present. But we? were
not able to discover as yet, in the ethical essence of God, how
to combine this with his eternal self -identity. Growth and
change cannot certainly be supposed in the divine knowledge
in the sense that an absolutely new and unforeseen thing may
present itself to him even by the agency of human freedom.
For nothing can become real which was not possible ; and the
possibilities of all things are known in God from eternity.
But still it is insufficient to think of God as not merely know-.,
ing everything at all times from eternity to eternity, but in
spite of growth and decay simply knowing in the same way,
as existing or present in eternal uniformity. For the divine
knowledge is not in reality eternally similar, otherwise decay
would be a semblance as growth would be. . . .
" Consequently in the interests of the truth of the divine
knowledge, as well as in the interests of a living idea of God,
there must belong to that divine knowledge, which alike eter
nally comprises everything necessary and possible, and which
will be at any time existent, a knowledge also relative to time,
and the present constitution of the world, individually and col
lectively, and concomitant with that constitution. The divine
knowledge accompanies, step by step, so to speak, advancing time
and the development taking place therein, which in the ultimate
resort is certainly conditioned by Him who alone has deity.
We must, therefore, say that God even knows what is past as
past, and not as present, and knows the future as not yet being,
and that only by that means does he know of the world of his
tory ; and can he have a relation there towhich is not eternally
identical and rigid ? " *
On the relation of the divine prescience to the free acts of
the creature he says : " It is allowable to think the divine knowl-
* Dorner, System of Christian Doctrine, vol. i, pp. 329-331.

Omniscience of God. 179
edge in the sense of a knowledge which is historical, and which
advances with history, so that God does not know at all before
hand the free acts which will actually take place in the future,
as such acts as will come to be realized before they have been
freely done in time ; or it is that which is eternally possible, but
which has not yet become realized, immediately separated in
God, who knows eternally everything possible, from those pos
sibilities which attain realization by the agency of free causali
ties. . . . But if God's knowledge embraces different things
to his will or himself, the question comes : Is God, in such
knowledge, so dependent upon the thing known that only by
the realization of free acts does he at all perceive that they will
take place, or does he know the certainty of their realization
previously ? "*
His summing up to these questions is as follows : " At this
stage we are only able to lay down the following points as sug
gestive positions relative to this question :
" 1. Predestinationism is to be excluded, as well as the denial
of all creaturely causalities, if freedom is to remain ; but no
less, if the absoluteness of God is to be preserved, must a falsely
ethical and deistic mode of thought be excluded.
" 2. Since God eternally knows all that is possible, future
free acts are not to be excluded in every case from the divine
prescience ; God at any rate comprehends them as what is pos
sible, since only the possible can become real ; by virtue of his
scientia media he knows in allcir cumstances his own actions
proportionally to the acts of the creature, however it may
fall out.
" 3. All that is real is at all times illuminated by the divine
knowledge. " 4. But whether there is to be supposed in God a prescience
of what free acts will really come to pass, or only a privity to
* System of Christian Doctrine, vol. i, p. 333.

180 Studies in Theology.
those acts when realized, at any rate God does not become con
scious of their actual being before they have become present.
He does not know them as present before they have become
present ; just as, on the other hand, he is previously prepared by
his scientia media for every possibility of realization." *
It is clear from the whole tenor of Dorner's treatment of the
subject that his mind was in doubt as to God's prescience of un
realized free acts, with a preponderating tendency against the
idea. The same is probably true of Rothe, while it is certain
that Martensen entirely discarded the idea. He says : " The
contradiction which has been supposed to exist between the idea
of the free progress of the world and the omniscience of God
rests upon a one-sided conception of omniscience as a mere
knowing beforehand, and an ignoring of the conditional in the
divine decrees. An unconditioned foreknowledge undeniably
militates against the freedom of the creature, so far as freedom
of choice is concerned, and against the undecided, the contin
gent, which is an idea inseparable from the development of free
dom in time. The actual alone, which is in and for itself ration
ally necessary, can be the subject of unconditional foreknowledge;
the actual, which is not this, cannot be so ; it can only be
foreknown as possible, as eventual. But such an unconditional
foreknowledge not only militates against the freedom of the
creature ; it is equally opposed to the idea of a freely working
God in history. A God literally foreknowing all things would
be merely the spectator of events decided and predestined from
eternity, not the all-directing Governor in a drama of freedom
which he carries on in reciprocal conflict and work with the
freedom of the creature. If we would preserve this reciprocal
relation between God and his creatures we must not make the
whole actual course of the world the subject of his fore
knowledge, but only its eternal import, the essential truth it
* Dorner, System of Christian Doctrine, vol. i, pp. 336, 337.

Omniscience of God. 181
involves. The final goal of this world's development, to
gether with the entire series of its essentially necessary
stages, must be regarded as fixed in the eternal counsel of
God ; but the practical carrying out of this eternal counsel,
the entire fullness of actual limitations on the part of this
world's progress, in so far as they are conditioned by the free
dom of the creature, can only be subject of a conditional fore
knowledge ; that is, they can only be foreknown as possibilities,
as futurabilia, but not as realities, because other possibilities
may actually take place. In thus asserting that God does not
actually foreknow all that actually occurs, we by no means
imply that every event is not the subject of his penetrating
cognizance. God is not only before his creatures, he is also
with and in his creatures in every moment of their develop
ment. While God neither foreknows, nor will foreknow, what
he leaves undecided, in order to be decided in time, he is not less
cognizant and privy to all that occurs. Every moment of his
creatures, even their most secret thoughts, is within the range
of his all-embracing knowledge. His knowledge penetrates the
entanglements of this world's progress at every point ; the un
erring eye of his wisdom discerns in every moment the relation
subsisting between free beings and his eternal plan ; and his
almighty hand, his power, pregnant of great designs, guides and
influences the movements of the world as his counsels require."*
Dr. McCabe, Professor of Philosophy in one of the leading
universities, and an orthodox of the orthodox of Arminian faith,
has written two very learned and able works in which the doctrine
is called in question, and indeed as to the contingent acts of wills
prescience is declared to be impossible. See his treatises onDivine
Foreknowledge and on Divine Nescience. They are worthy of
a careful reading, and present all the difficulties of the doctrine
in their full strength. But it is not a question to be settled by
* Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, pp. 218, 219.

182 Studies in Theology.
authorities. The position of Dr. Adam Clarke is well known as
among the rejecters of the doctrine. The denial of the doc
trine of decrees as held by the Calvinistic Churches has been so
closely associated with the doctrine of prescience that all who
deny the former are classed by some writers who ought to know
better as denying the latter. In fact, Wesleyan Arminianism
has held as firmly to the doctrine of prescience as Calvinists,
but upon entirely different grounds. No abler defense has ever
been made of the doctrine than that of Richard Watson, long
regarded as the highest authority by Arminian divines. There
can be no doubt that the imagined impossibility of prescience
without some mode of fixing future events in inevitability in
some such way as the doctrine of decrees does, has been the
chief occasion for the revolt against the doctrine of prescience
of the acts of free beings ; but it is not the only ground. Many
minds, and among them some of the most philosophical, reject
it on other grounds. It must be regarded as an open question,
though so almost universally supposed to be closed. There are
difficulties which no theory successfully relieves ; but there are
also, it must be said, real difficulties, and, we must think, greater,
which beset the rejection of the doctrine.
The position we hold, and shall attempt to defend, is this :
God is an absolutely and eternally perfect Being, to whom
nothing can be added, and from whom nothing can be taken
away ; who, therefore, is immutable and unchangeable in es
sence and attribute. Among his ineffable perfections is that
of knowledge, which is so perfect that from eternity he has a
perfect knowledge of all possibles and he has known all that
he ever will or can know— all, whatsoever, that ever can be
matter of knowledge ; that, antecedently to creation, he not
only knew himself as to all his powers and attributes, with
all the primary and secondary effects that would be caused
by him to exist; but, further, that such, from his eternity of

Omniscience of God. 183
being, including in himself all time, is his relation to all free
beings that he knows not only what they do and all that they
do at the time of its occurrence, but has, before they had exist
ence, and, indeed, before there was any being but himself,
known all their free acts, as well as all their feelings, thoughts,
notions, and purposes — that so his knowledge of events was
originally all prescience as to events themselves. All events
were as to themselves once nonexistent ; as to Him who is
eternal they are forever existent in knowledge as they will be
when they become real in fact. Thus, if our position is sound,
omniscience covers all beings and all events, whether free or
necessitated. The events are known in themselves, and not sim
ply in their causes. They are forever present as cognitions in
the consciousness of God as they are, that is, as having been,
being, or to be, the mode of the knowledge being determined
by the actual case. The mode of the knowledge differs, as the
objects differ, but its substance does not improve or increase.
The ground of omniscience here affirmed is found in the
eternity and infinite intelligence of God. His eternity is such
as to include all time history as forever present with him, but
also as progressing in themselves in a time order.* It is a
difficult, but absolutely necessary, conception. His omnipres
ence connects him in real presence with every event. Noth
ing occurs from which he is absent. It occurs not in every
case by his agency, but it is in every case in his actual presence
and under his observation. Nothing is, ever was, or ever can
be hid from him, or wholly apart from him. Thus filling all
time, and having all parts of time in his undivided and indi
visible eternity, and filling all the boundaries of finite exist
ence with his absolute presence, his infinite intelligence is cog
nizant forever of all events which transpire. The knowledge
of all is simultaneous and permanent — it is simply beholding
* See discussion of the Eternity of God.

184 Studies in Theology.
what is present and what can never escape from him. If he is
everywhere, and if he is eternal, thus filling all time and all
space, and if he is infinitely intelligent, it is obvious that he
must know all things and know them eternally — know them
as really and truly before they have existed as afterward.
Their f uturition is clasped in his abiding now. It is not nec
essary that they should actually exist in order to be known.
If at some future time they will exist, and if the infinite
Knower has a mode of existence which makes that future time
present with him, then the event now nonexistent will be
known to him as then actually existent. Nonexistent itself,
it is not nonexistent to a knowledge which covers the time
when it will be existent. The knowledge in the case is pre
scient as to the object ; that is, it is a knowledge of it before it
exists, and a knowledge of what it will be, but to, God it is a
knowledge of what is, because his present now or mode of
being includes that future ; but while known as existing in a
time now present to God, it is also known as yet to be in itself
nonexistent until it comes to be. In attempting to interpret
omniscience — the all-embracing knowledge of the Infinite  we
must remember that we cannot interpret his knowledge, or the
mode of it, by our knowledge. All of his knowledge is direct,
perfect, intuitive, independent; ours is indirect, superficial,
dependent. We know things externally by observation, and
only so much as they give us by perception, that is, phenom
ena; we know minds by witnessing the effects they produce,
or by manifestations external. He knows things and minds
internally in their constitution and essence. He is in all and
pervades all, and directly cognizes all. He discerns thoughts,
motives, unexpressed feelings, purposes, will-acts, as we dis
cern things. To him as objects of knowledge, because of his
eternity, they are real and actual before they exist. His in-
sighUs exhaustive and complete, leaving nothing for future

Omniscience of God. 185
discovery. Prescience is only another form of his knowledge,
which transcends ours, and is in no respect more inscrutable.
The moralities all ultimately lie in the interior action of free
wills, and the power to cognize such actions is no more expli
cable to us than is prescience of them, when we remember that
He who cognizes them by his absolute eternity is as really
present with them, though in the far-away future, as he is
when they are actually transpiring. But he must have this
power, or it is impossible that he should know the real moral
character of his creatures, and therefore impossible that he
should administer in righteousness.
The difficulty of the problem of prescience as a mode of
divine omniscience is not to understand how it is possible for
him to be prescient of all events which are predetermined and
fixed in necessity by his immutable purpose that they should be.
Of all such events it is only necessary that he should know his
own purposes and efficiency to be certain of their futurition.
But the difficulty here is to know the future acts of beings
who do not yet themselves exist ; who, when they are brought
into existence, are perfectly free as to their acts, being deter
mined thereto by no constitutional necessity, and by no exter
nal agency, either divine or creaturely.
The question assumes that there are such beings— beings who
are constituted so that they act in absolute freedom ; who in
any case have the power when they choose one course of action
to have chosen another, and whose choice is one of pure self-
determination. Whether there are such beings or not is a mooted
question, and whether there is any such freedom is matter of
dispute ; but allowing that there are such, the question is, Could
their free choices be matter of prescience ?
The position we maintain is that such free acts are prescient
to God's omniscience.
The question is, Is it impossible to God to be prescient of the

186 Studies in Theology.
free acts of free beings, or must he wait upon the action of free
beings to know what they will be ? If we answer in the affirm
ative, then we have this as the result : God can only be pre
scient of such acts and events as are necessitated. Then, if
there are free beings, he can know nothing of their future con
duct and destiny. He cannot know that a single angel in
heaven will not turn rebel against his throne and heaven itself
become depopulated. He cannot know that any soul of man
will ever be saved. He cannot know that the atonement will
not prove utterly in vain. He cannot know that all intelli
gences will not ultimately sink into endless perdition. To se
cure certainty of knowledge of any event it must be brought
about by necessitation. We think that it must appear that the
principle is not a rational working principle. There must, to
justify the existence of free beings, that is, the existence of a
moral universe, be a possibility of prescience of the outcome,
and a knowledge that it would not prove utterly disastrous.
But to know this requires that it should be known that some
free beings would so conduct themselves as to make being a bless
ing to them ; that is, it must be possible to be prescient of the
fact that they would act in such a way as to secure blessedness.
But if prescience of some free acts is possible the prescience of
all free acts is possible.
If there were no difficulties of sequence, it must still be ad
mitted that the concept itself at first view seems incredible.
In this respect it may not differ from other infinite attributes,
but it lacks that overpowering obvious proof which make
seeming impossibilities less. The idea of a mind that can
grasp all present and past facts and hold them forever is amaz
ing to us — a mind that penetrates the universe at a glance, so
as to know it all perfectly : all atoms of matter— all their past
mutations and present condition ; and all minds— all their past
thoughts, imaginations, feelings, purposes— their entire history

Omniscience of God. 187
to the minutest circumstance, so that nothing will ever be for
gotten. The idea of such a mind, when we reflect on the ex
tent of the universe in both time and space — the myriads of
myriads of intelligent beings, each having a complex experience
each moment of time — the millions of millions of changes oc
curring at the same instant — to think of a mind that can note
all these and preserve the record complete so that all will stand
in ,exact order in a permanent consciousness, is so amazing that
nothing of difficulty is added when we project the thought fur
ther and assume that he also knows the future free acts of free
beings as well as the past. If the first supposition can be true,
the second may. It has no force to say that the knowledge of
things that have not yet transpired seems impossible, since the
other admitted fact seems equally impossible. Both facts
awaken in us the consciousness that the Being of whom they
are predicated is infinite, incomprehensible — out of comparison
with finites such as we are — exists in a mode and is invested
with powers that can never have adequate representation in our
thought — is the topmost end of an ascending series, between
which arid the next is the impassable abyss of infinitude. His
methods of knowledge differ from ours, as he differs from us.
We cannot reason from one to the other. We can understand
as well how he can know future events as how he can know
thoughts. In fact, we know that in some way he does possess
both kinds of knowledge. The knowledge of things contingent
adds nothing of difficulty that is not already implied in the for
mer facts. The whole subject of the manner of his presence
with us and his power of cognition is involved in mystery, and
the fact only is known.
I think it just to say that prescience of contingent events
does not seem to my own mind absolutely necessary to a just
and perfect administration of the universe. I can conceive
how the Infinite might perfectly conduct the affairs of the
15 6

188 Studies in Theology.
universe by having an immediate and perfect knowledge of all
events as they arise, by adjusting the administration to the
exigency as it occurred. But evidently such is not his method,
and were it practicable it would not seem so fitting or credit
able as that he should have foresight of the results of his own
plan, and not be under the necessity of adopting expedients
necessitated by comparative defects of knowledge. It is not
an answer to say that there would be no defect of knowledge,
when there was nothing in fact existing to be known, which is
the case with regard to events prior to the time of their occur
rence. In one sense it is true ; in another, it is not. But the
supposition must be rejected on the grounds that it ultimately
reduces *God, as to his highest perfections, to the law of suc
cession, and leaves him at the starting point of his moral ad
ministration in absolute ignorance of the tendency and outcome
of his own work ; and for the reason that his knowledge is in
finite — that known unto him are all his works from the foun
dation of the world — and from the fact that he has shown
perfect prescience of the thoughts, free volitions, and deeds of
man, in innumerable instances, ages before the men themselves
lived, as appears from the prophecies contained in the holy
record ; and in the fact that the scheme of redemption ante
dates creation, showing perfect foresight of the events that
would arise. Along with the doctrine of omniscience, which
is necessary to the current administration of the affairs of the
universe, and to the final | just awards for moral deeds, we ac
cept the doctrine of prescience, even though it is incompre
hensible to us.
The attempt to explain it by the Calvinistic scheme we must
reject as impossible on moral grounds. That explanation is
in substance this : God from eternity determined upon a plan
of the universe so minute as to comprehend with perfect
exactness all things and events that were to be — the detail of

Omniscience of God. 189
the plan was so minute as to include the slightest changes in
the worlds both of matter and mind. This plan he determined
should become real, and in order thereto he decreed the occur
rence of whatsoever comes to pass, so that nothing comes to pass,
or can, but according to his decree. What he decrees he effi
ciently causes, so that it cannot fail. In the world of matter
he operates all the decreed effects by power and according to
natural laws, which are only his fixed methods of action. In
the world of mind he operates by motives and according to the
laws of mind or freedom, but with the same inevitability of
the event. Prescience, therefore, is simply the knowledge of
his own changeless decrees, which must make certain the
event — to know all is simply to know himself. It is a simple
explanation, and makes it easy to understand how all events
could be foreknown — in fact, it strips the difficult subject of
prescience of its mystery. It differs, advantageously in some
respects, from the theory of materialistic fatalism. That theory
necessitates all events by reducing them all to the categories of
cause and effect, so that each event is chained to its antecedent
by inevitable causational force, and reduces mind and matter
to unity, so that to know all future events would be simply to
know the first cause, in its endless necessary evolutions — im
plying nothing more than power to look along a line of me
chanical effects. In the end the theories are the same as to the
certainty and inevitability of events. The one may or may
not admit a God. If it allow of his existence, it reduces his
method of creation and government to mechanical fate, and
confessedly denies all freedom. The other makes God the
only efficiency, and distinguishes between his method of
securing the certainty of events in the two realms of mind
and matter, reducing the latter to mechanical fixity, but assert
ing the law of freedom for the other, in an impossible and con
tradictory form. We reject both as immoral, and in the end,

190 Studies in Theology.
as we shall see, substantially one. But it is just that we should
admit that we have no theory for explaining the how of pre
science at all comparable to either of them, as to ease of under
standing. Foreknowledge is an accommodated use of language. In
the real fact there is no foreknowing, but simply knowing.
The state of the Infinite mind is an abiding state of simple
knowing. The event which is known is future, and hence the
knowing is called foreknowing, or foreseeing. Suppose an eye
could be so adjusted as to see all the time the events of a thou
sand years. The result would be simple seeing ; in it there
could be no difference, such as past seeing, or future seeing,
but simple seeing of the entire series all the time. The series
would have before and after, but the seeing would not. So
of knowing ; if it is perfect and includes all events forever, in
it there is no difference. But in the events there is a differ
ence. At any time some part of the series has elapsed, some
part is elapsing, some part has yet to come. The knowing is
not affected by this circumstance. Even if we add the idea
that the knowing is a knowing that some part of the events, as
to themselves, are past, and some present, and some in future,
this does not change the quality of the knowing. It is still
simple knowing, and results not from some peculiar exercise of
the power to know, denoted by a looking into the future.
There is with the Infinite and Eternal no looking back and
forward, but a simple seeing— no past, no future. That is,
with him there is a coexistence of all time— no past, no
future, but the fullness of all things and events forever in his
knowledge. The coexistence in him of all things always
makes the mystery of his omniscience. The seeing the whole
universe at a glance would be to see it at a given moment as
it then is. To see it from beginning to end as it will be for
ever in all its flow of changes, and hold the vision from eternity

Omniscience of God. 191
to eternity, is omniscience. The former implies an inconceiv
able power. The latter is only inconceivable. We can com
prehend the one just as well as the other.
To some minds it is extremely difficult to conceive that an
event may be foreknown as certain and yet not be inevitable.
To them the doctrine that God foresaw all events from eternity
is equivalent to the statement that he fixed them in absolute
inevitability. But the one fact does not at all involve the
other. If certainty did involve inevitability, it would then be
true that no event has ever occurred, or ever will occur, that
might not have been, for whatever will be was certain from
eternity to be, whether foreseen or not. But it is impossible
for the human mind to believe that all events, great and small,
are inevitable — might not be otherwise ; that no word has been
spoken, no act performed, that might not have been omitted.
The certainty of events conforms to events, and not events to
certainty. Free beings have alternative powers, may do this
or that ; they are not shut up to inevitability. If what they will
do is foreknown, they do not do it that it may conform to a fore
knowledge which necessitates it, but the foreknowledge grows
out of the fact that they will freely do it when they have power
to the alternative.
Still, we cannot but feel that the choice of a universe with
the absolute knowledge of all events, whether they be evitable
or inevitable, does involve the Divine Being in responsibility,
and place him in the light of seeming cause, as having chosen
that whatever will be should be, that whatever is is because
he willed to have it, and would not have been had he not
willed it.
Let us try to see the exact truth. May we not conceive that
many things are caused by God directly; that many others
are caused by other beings, but according to his will ; and that
still many others are caused by other beings, but not according

192 Studies in Theology.
to his will ? May not all sins be of this last class ; nay, is it
not certain that they are ? Could they otherwise be sins ?
We cannot doubt that he has both relation and responsibility.
They are in and of his universe, and could not be here without
him. In a certain sense they owe their existence to him. Let
us endeavor to see in what sense. To ascribe them to him as
absolute Author and Cause would be blasphemous; but we
cannot wholly disconnect him from them. Had he not created
moral beings sin never could have entered his universe. He
might, then, have prevented it. He did that which made it
possible, and without which it would have been forever impos
sible. This cannot be disputed. It must be added that he
did that which made it possible, with full knowledge that it
would become actual. He knew that the creature he made
would make it to be actual. So far we go. Others go still
further. We dare not. It is difficult, even with these facts,
to see the righteousness, much more to see the goodness, of his
part in the dreadful history. The only possible ground of de
fense is that, though he knew it would come, he did not desire
or cause it ; did what he could to prevent it, without, in pre
venting it, he would cause greater harm than to permit it ; so
ordered that it could only come by abuse and misuse of his
beneficent laws ; and further, to hinder it would involve plans
and processes that would make any creation abortive. He pro
vided amply for its possible nonexistence. It serves no pur
pose of his. It is an intruder. True, it emanates from powers
which he created, but he did not create them to produce it.
He did create them to do the very opposite, and in the oppo
site to find their highest, and the highest possible, good ; and
that they might do this the possibility of the evil was permit
ted. But, it is said, after all he knew the evil would come, and
his good would be destroyed ; he ought not, therefore, to have
created, since that which he meant for good he knew would

Omniscience of God. 193
result in evil. To this there is but one possible answer : He must
have known that, despite the evil that would come, and much
as it would mar his work, and much as he wished it might not be,
it was for the greatest good that he should so create ; better
to have the system with sin, if he might not have it without,
than not to have it at all. As Cause he has no connection
with it, but only as noncause as not preventing it. As Cause
he created the being who could as cause create sin, but who as
cause also might refrain from it. The sin itself was not his
product, but that of a free, being, whom he restrained in every
possible way, without destroying his freedom, from the act. It
is here by his non-preventing, not because he preferred it, but
in violation of his express command.
Still, it is said, what he knows will be will be, and we have
no power to prevent it, and there is no use of concerning our
selves about it. The first part of the statement is true ; the
remaining parts are not true. What he knows will be will be.
That is indisputable. That we have no power to prevent it is
not true. It will be because we will have it, not because we
have no power to have it otherwise. Therefore, there is reason
why we should concern ourselves about it. If we cause the
" will be " to be evil, when we have the power to make it
good ; if we make it evil, when we are able to make it good,
and when we know that we ought to make it good, we shall find,
when too late to remedy the mistake, that there was great rea
son that we should concern ourselves about it. We shall find
that it is not God, or certainty, or prescience, or fate that
causes what will be to be, but we ourselves. For no one but
ourselves can be responsible. The only relation that God has
to it is that he so made us as to make it possible, and that he
did not interfere to prevent it. That is his responsibility.
What is the effect of it ? We are no more conscious of anything
than we are that we are cause now, sole, absolute cause of our free

194 Studies in Theology.
deeds; we but delude ourselves when we attempt to persuade our
selves of some mysterious metaphysical necessity which subtly
determines them. What consciousness attests now it will con
tinue forever to attest, that our deeds in the sphere of morality
are our own. The moral reason will continue to assert forever,
as it does now, that our sins are in no sense caused by the plan
or prescience of God, but that they are offensive to him ; that
he desired and provided for their nonexistence ; that he did
everything consistent with having a moral universe possible to
prevent them, nothing to originate them ; that whatever of
shame and odium attaches to them attaches to us. On no other
principle can an ethical universe exist. Obliterate it, and the
idea of morality expires. God becomes sole agent in the uni
verse, and his administration simply an administration of force,
for its evil he is alone responsible, and the self-accusations
existing in us are but refined methods of torture.
If the doctrine that personal acts are governed by motives
without alternative power in the actor be true, then this is true,
that no event has ever occurred, or ever can occur, that might
not have occurred. If we are to understand that he arranges
the motives, or in any way causes them, it is not possible that
anything should be different from what it has been, is, or will
be — there is absolute necessity pervasive of all being and events ;
for there can be no event of will without motive, and each
event is produced by the adequate motive, and the motive is
eternally fixed by determination of God. Motive is to the act,
cause ; it is followed by effect, as in any and every other case.
Where is the possibility that any volitional act should have
been different, if each one was necessitated by its adequate mo
tive ? There is absolutely no such thing as freedom, except
the freedom of effects to be as caused — such freedom as matter
has when it yields to gravitation. As gravitation is always
present with matter, and always adequately attracts it to the

Omniscience of God. 195
mass to make impossible that it should release itself, so motive
always precedes volition, and controls its action, so that no vo
lition can be freed from its determinating power. All beings
and events are thus locked up in the absolute fixity of necessary
sequence. The idea obliterates the whole nomenclature of
ethics as absolutely meaningless. And if yet further the motive
be under the control of and created by God, either directly or
by the constitution of the mind and its environments, so that
it emerges by a fixed law, then he is the alone cause and the
only responsible agent in the universe. If the admission of
this theory were necessary to the truth of divine prescience,
we could not hesitate a moment in renouncing the latter doc
trine. There can be no evidence adduced in support of the
doctrine of prescience of the acts and choices of free beings
of comparable strength with the proof that such an explanation
of the doctrine is false and impossible. The doctrine must
stand on other grounds, or it cannot stand at all. The know
ing a fact concurrently with its occurrence does not necessi
tate its occurrence ; no more would the knowing of it before
its occurrence. To assume that to know it before fixes it in
necessity is to attribute causation to knowledge, which we
know is not true. It is the causation of the event which ne
cessitates its occurrence, and not the observation of it. If it
should be said that in order to the knowledge of it it must
necessarily exist, again we assert the knowledge of it does not
make it necessary that it should, but simply implies that it will
certainly exist, without determining anything as to whether it
will exist by necessary cause, that is, a cause which must act,
or simply an adequate cause that will freely act. A cause
that freely acts produces effects as certainly as a cause that
necessarily acts, and the events produced by one are just as
certain of occurrence as the events produced by the other.
The only difference in the cases is that the event in the one

196 Studies in Theology.
case could not be otherwise ; in the other it might have been
otherwise, but certainly will not be otherwise. In one case
the knowledge that the event would occur might arise from
the knowledge of the necessary cause from which it would take
its rise, and the prevision would be simply the result of a
knowledge of an existing causation which would necessitate it.
This would be an easy way to account for prescience, but it
would reduce the whole ongoing of mind to the pure mechan
ism of materialistic necessity. In the other case, it supposes
a mind which sees events themselves and the operations of free
wills which give them existence. It is more difficult to con
ceive of such a mode of knowing, but it is not impossible, and
if it implies increased difficulty in this respect it escapes what
is impossible on ethical grounds in other respects.
The fundamental fact that we must keep in mind is this :
Knowledge is not causational of that which is known, and
it in no way affects the fact of the existence of what is
known ; it is simple cognition of what is. This is so whether
the fact be a present fact or a future fact — just the same in
one case as the other. Present knowledge does not cause the
existence of the thing known — has nothing whatever to do with
it. Knowledge of future events in no sense differs ; it is sim
ple cognition of what will be ; it in no sense causes it. The
knower may be cause, or he may know that he is not the cause,
and that some other agent is the cause. The cause, whether
the knower or some other agent, is not in the knowing, but in
the energy which produces the effect, and in the being who
exerts the energy. We sit quietly in our home and see through
the window what is going on in the outside street. Our see
ing is knowing, but it is in no sense cause of what is tran
spiring in the street. Now, if we had the power to see it a
thousand years in advance the case would not at all be changed ;
as our seeing when it occurred did not cause it, so our seeing a

Omniscience of God. 197
thousand years in advance would not cause it. We know things
of which we are not the cause. So God knows things of
which he is not the cause. If he is cause of all that he knows,
and if he knows all things, he is the cause of all things — or
whatever he knows he causes. If his knowing is not cause of
what he knows at present, his knowing is no more cause of
what he knows will be at some future time. Knowledge is
not agency, but is simple cognition.
But, it is said, the knowledge of an event, whether present or
future, is the certainty of its existence. Of this there can be no
question. That which is known to be is ; and that which is known
will be in the future it is certain will be. But then, it is said, its in
evitability is fixed before its occurrence — it must be. . To this we
answer, that does not follow. That certainly will be which cer
tainly will be, whether known or unknown ; but the certainty is
not the equation of necessity — events will be that might not be.
They may be certain, but not necessary. But then, it is said,
when they are known as certain to be it is impossible they should
not be — the knowledge makes the occurrence necessary. This
brings us back to the point that knowing causes nothing, and
that which does not cause an event cannot be its necessity. But
then, it is said, it would be impossible to know it as certain if it
were not fixed in necessity — if it were contingent ; to know it,
therefore, involves the necessity that it should occur even if the
knowledge does not cause it. To this we answer that what is
certain does not involve necessitation. What is certain may be
inevitable because necessitated ; but if there be free beings who
do not act from necessity, they may act as causes, and events
will follow just as certainly as if they acted from necessity ; but
their acts being free are not necessary, and so the effects which
follow are not necessary, but if they follow they are certain, and
if they could be foreknown they would be foreknown as certain,
but not necessary.

198 Studies in Theology.
The only point of difficulty is in the question, How can the free
acts of free beings be known before they occur ? When they
have perfect power to act either of two or several ways, how is it
possible to foreknow which way they will act ? To this we an
swer : Of the how of such knowledge we have no theory ; of
the fact we cannot doubt. We have no such power of knowing.
We cannot interpret the Infinite by ourselves. We see things
that are. He sees things that will be before they exist. We
see thoughts when we see them expressed. He sees thoughts
directly and forever, and so of all free acts of free beings. He
sees them not by seeing himself as determining that they shall
be, but because he is forever present with all being, as well
that which is not but will be, as that which is and has been, and
because he knows what is in mind intuitively and not simply
by manifestation. The how we do not attempt to explain.
We have no theory as to how God exists. There is positive
proof that he does exist. We attempt no explanation. We have
no theory as to how he is eternal. It is a necessity of thought
that he is eternal. We have no theory as to how he is infinitely
perfect. We cannot think him otherwise. We have no theory
as to how he created the universe. The proof is that he did
create it. We have no theory as to how he can be cognizant
of thoughts. We are compelled to think that he is. We have
no theory as to how he knows futuritions of free acts. To us
the proof is conclusive that he has such prescience. We have
seen that the difficulty in this case is no greater than in other cases
with respect to which we can have no doubt. We have seen
that the idea interferes with no other idea which we are com
pelled to accept ; that it does not involve contradiction ; that it
does not collide with the principles of moral government ; that
it leaves man free and responsible for his acts ; that it does not
cast a shade over Infinite benevolence ; that there is not an atom
of proof against it ; that any theory which seeks to escape it

Omniscience of God. 199
falls into no less difficulties than those which beset it, but really
into greater ; that the Calvinistic mode of explaining it is inad
missible on ethical grounds. So far we have progressed in the
discussion. We now allege briefly the reasons for accepting the doctrine.
These are, first, in general, that it seems to be necessary to the
absolute perfection of God ; that the opposite view reduces him
from the Infinite to the finite. Explain it as we may, it leaves
the fact that there is a large department of the universe which
he has projected, and by far the most important part, of the out
come of which he is absolutely ignorant ; he has made crea
tures whose destiny he does not, and by assumption cannot,
know. To us this seems to be a frightful conclusion — a con
clusion which seems inconsistent with both his wisdom and
goodness. If there be possible evils — and all admit there are
¦ — and if they are such as cannot be averted in a system includ
ing free beings, it would seem that at least prudence and be
neficence would require that he should know the measure
of the possible evil that would become actual, before he ven
tured upon the creation of such a system ; but this would
demand that he should know beforehand what these free beings
would do, that is, that he should be prescient of their acts, and
know that any disaster that would arise would still leave the
result such as Infinite wisdom would discern to be better than
that to be reached by any other system or by abstaining from
any. It is not enough that he should know what he would do
in any emergency that might arise. He must, to justify his
creative act, know precisely the measure of the emergency, and
know that it would involve only an evil which, despite it, would
leave the good which could not otherwise be attained so im
measurably greater than the evil that it would justify his work
as both wise and good. To be prescient of such an outcome he
must be prescient of all free acts that would in any way affect it.

200 Studies in Theology.
If we answer that God is ignorant of the acts of free beings
before they have committed them — that is, that he does not know
what they will be — it must be either because he does not choose
to know them or because he cannot. To say that he does not
know them because he chooses to be ignorant of them can
scarcely be a creditable supposition to the Infinite, especially
since it is a choice to be ignorant when it is most important
for the vindication of his character that he should choose to be
informed ; and further, to say that he chooses not to know free
acts, and therefore cannot know them, involves that he has the
power to know them if he chose to do so. To say that he
could not know them is a high judgment fqr the finite speck
that we are to pronounce upon the Infinite. We do not say
that the judgment is certainly erroneous, but that, for reasons
which will be assigned, we are constrained to an opposite con
clusion. The ablest defense of the position we have seen is that
made by Dr. McCabe in his two learned and masterly treatises,
The Foreknowledge of God and Divine Nescience. Much as
we admire their ability, and feel the force ofj his reasoning, we
have to confess ourselves not convinced, and still of an oppo
site opinion.
But, second, passing from these general grounds for reject
ing the doctrine, we come to name some facts which cannot be
reconciled to the theory — facts which show that he is prescient
of free acts. The principle would be perfectly established by a
single case, but we think revelation, which is God's personal
testimony on the point, is full of them, in both implicit and ex
plicit form.
The first case we allege in point is this : The atonement
is declared to be an arrangement in the divine plan concomi
tant with the plan to create— from the foundation of the world
(Matt, xiii, 35 ; Rev. xvii, 8 ; 1 Peter i, 19, 20). There is
every reason to believe that the human creation would not have

Omniscience of God. 201
taken place but for a prearranged redemption. But this
proves that God was prescient of human sin before it was
committed ; but it was impossible that he should know it without
prescience of the free act of transgression. Prescience of sin
was not merely prescience of the external act of transgression,
but it was prescience of the interior revolt of the will against
the divine command. For it was the interior act of the will
which constituted the essence of sin for which atonement was
needed and provided. If the atonement was prearranged from
the foundation of the world, then was prescience of sin from
the foundation of the world, that is, from the time when the
world itself was purposed to be.
Sin is a free act, that is, a purely contingent act, or it is a
necessitated act, that is, an act which was made inevitable,
either by direct necessitation of the will, or by some constitu
tional and inevitable tendency thereto in the will. If of this
latter origin, it locates the cause of the sin in God, and removes
its guilt from the transgressor. In this case, to be prescient of
the sin it was only necessary that God should be prescient of
his own act in the same way in which he is prescient of his own
act in the realm of natural events, the necessitation of which is
in him. This is practically the view of Calvinism. But is this
credible ?
But if sin was not necessitated, but was an act of pure free
dom, then the knowledge that it would occur, which is implied
in a prearranged atonement, was prescience of a purely contin
gent, that is, free, act of the will itself. It was insight into the
act of a mind which as yet had no existence. What was true
in the case of the first sin may be true in the case of every sin.
We confess ourselves to believe that it is a universal fact.
The second proof we name as compelling our assent to the
doctrine is found in the numerous prophecies contained in rev
elation and establishing the impregnable bulwark of its defense.

202 / Studies in Theology.
These are numerous and convincing. We will not burden this
discussion by the enumeration of them.*
The proof of prescience of contingent events derived from
prophecy is found in the fact that the prophecy in every case
preannounces events the occurrence of which shows absolute
prescience of acts contingent on the decisions of wills which at
the time of the announcement were not in existence, and whose
existence at any future time was itself dependent on contin
gencies of freedom.
There is no possibility of accounting for these marvelous
predictions, and their subsequent fulfillment, except by admit
ting what they constantly assume ; that is, that they are fbrth-
givings of a mind to whom the future is as open as the past or
present, and who is able to see the decisions of wills, in antici
pation, as clearly as he sees events in the chain of necessitation.
The attempt of Dr. McCabe to break the force of this argu
ment we must think is a failure, and puts him in line with the
system of Calvinian necessitationism, a system which he detests
with unmitigated abhorrence. A libertarian of libertarians, for
the sake of his argument he becomes a necessitarian, in part at
least, and lends a kind of support to the system, to avoid which
is the inspiration of both his treatises.
His argument first expends a good deal of ingenious force to
prove that the acts of the will are not always free, but are in
some respects, on occasions, under the law of necessitation ; that
it is possible for the will in some cases to be overpowered in
such measure as to be bereft of its freedom. We do not ques
tion the correctness of the position. In every such case there
is volitional action, and in no such case can there be either free
dom or responsibility — the act, though the act of a characteris
tically free being, is in no proper sense a free act. The loss of
power of freedom may be by abuse ; in that case responsibility
* See The Supernatural Book, by the author ; argument on Prophecy.

Omniscience of God. 203
would remain not for the nonuse of power which had ceased to
exist, but for the free course of abuse which had destroyed the
power. Where there is no such loss of power, it is conceivable
that a combination of influences may in some cases be such as
to overpower a finite will. So much is freely granted.
Proceeding upon this principle, the argument explains the
whole scheme of prophecy by denying that it implies any pre
science of contingent events. The prophecy is not foresight of
what will be by cognition of the free acts of those who are its
subjects, but it is simply knowledge of a system of influences
which God, together with environment, will bring to bear, which
will constrain actions, and thus secure their fulfillment. I quote,
that the author may represent his own somewhat peculiar theory.
He says, in The Foreknowledge of God, pages 37-40 :
" The moment divine or diabolical influences are brought to
bear on an individual will which are out of exact proportion to
its strength of resistance, the will loses its freedom and comes
under the power of the same law that rules material forces.
True, the will requires occasions for its action. These occasions
are reasons presented to the intellect, or motives presented to
the sensibilities. These occasions of human volition, these influ
ences, without which the will does not act, are, in the normal
state of the soul, merely influential, but not causal ; they are
testing, but not controlling. But there are limits to our men
tal and moral forces, to our powers of endurance and of resist
ance, just as there are limits to our physical strength. Now, when
these testing influences are out of proportion to the strength of
the will, the will is simply overpowered, and its freedom of ac
tion, in that instance, is prevented ; it acts under constraint, and
its accountability therefore is annihilated. These influences, in
such cases, then cease to be merely testing or occasioning, and
become causal. In these instances the reason of the will's action
is not in the will itself, but outside of itself in causal antecedents.
10 •

204 Studies in Theology.
" Hosts of perplexities have arisen from a failure to make
this manifest and pregnant distinction. ' Because the will does
sometimes act under constraint, under the law of cause and
effect, therefore it always acts under that law ; ' and ' because
the will does sometimes act under the law of liberty, therefore
it always acts under that law,' are the hasty conclusions which
have sadly bewildered theologians, especially in their interpre
tations of Holy Scripture. Doubtless both these kinds of cau
sation are found in the action of the human will. Sometimes
it acts freely from its own voluntary choice, sometimes con-
sentingly, because objective influences overmaster its capacities
of resistance or endurance. When the will acts freely, the in-
cipiency of the volition is in the will itself ; that is, the incipi-
ency of the volition is subjective, and the will is active. When
the will acts only consentingly, the incipiency of the volition is
in the objective, and the will is not positively active, but passive,
rather. In the free action of the will, the occasions of its voli
tions are merely influential, merely afford the necessary test.
In the consenting action of the will, the occasions of its voli
tions are causal, controlling, and necessary.
" Strikingly in harmony with this rigid teaching of philoso
phy, the inspired apostle declares, ' God is faithful, who will
not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able, but will
with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may be
able to bear it.' In this passage, God assumes that reasons,
motives, influences, and occasions for disobedience do exert a
testing influence upon a free agent in his choices. He as
sumes that without these influences there could be neither loy
alty nor manifestation of character worthy of reward ; that they
are indispensable to test adherence to the right ; that it is possi
ble to make a choice worthy of reward, or of punishment, when
these influences are in due proportion to the moral strength of
the free agent ; and that the moment these influences are in

Omniscience of God. 205
excess of the strength of any person's will his free agency disap
pears, and his accountability for his choices ceases. He there
fore pledges, in this passage, that on the arena of probation for
eternity, in the actions involving responsibility, these influences
shall never be disproportionate to the strength of the free
agent. The moment the choices of a being are not the choices
of a free agent, they become strictly the effects of causes ab
extra, and can involve no moral character.
" Man is so constituted that his will can be brought under
the law of cause and effect by bringing overpowering influences
to act upon his reason and his sensibilities. God, therefore, can
use him as an instrument in his hands. He can make use of
him as easily as he can make use of fire, water, light, air, sun,
moon, or stars. To deny that God can place man in such cir
cumstances that his choices would not have or involve any moral
character, or to deny that God can use man merely as an instru
ment, would be to limit Omnipotence, and prevent the possibility
of a superintending providence. God uses the material uni
verse, the animal and vegetable kingdoms, in carrying out his
own various plans and purposes. He spake to Balaam through
the month of a dumb beast, and he commanded the stars in their
courses to fight for his chosen ones. So in like manner he uses
intelligent beings with the same wise and benign designs.
When he wishes to accomplish any end through intelligent be
ings he may bring such influences to bear upon them, or offer
to them such suggestions, or mysteriously so lead them by
some of the resources and instrumentalities within his almighty
embrace, that the action of their wills shall be under the law
of cause and effect. Such influences may be brought to bear
upon them as to interfere with their free agency.
"In those acts of the will which involve moral character
there must be occasions for the action of the will in choosing.
If upon such occasions there be nothing to exert an influence

206 Studies in Theology.
over the choice, there could be neither test, character, nor re
ward. But if there be in them anything to coerce the choice,
then there could be neither freedom nor accountability. The
moment that degree of intensity is reached in the force of these
occasions which determines the choice, free agency and moral
character disappear from the arena of human action.
" Hence, if God desired a certain providential work to be ac
complished five hundred years hence, he could predict it with
absolute certainty. All that would be necessary would be to
influence the will of some one then living with the requisite in
tensity to secure a consenting volition, or, as in many cases, an
unconscious instrument. The volitions of such an agent would
be necessary and foreseen, because forefixed. They would not
be free, but in violation of the law of liberty."
He further says, pages 52, 53 :
" Prophecies are certain ; human actions, when free, are
contingent. The reader, however, may reply that God fore
sees, with certainty, the future free actions of his prophetic
instruments. If this be so, it must be either by looking di
rectly at the human will, or at the objective attractions which
may be presented to that will. But if you affirm that God
foreknows future actions by knowing the objective attractions
which may be presented to that will, you annihilate at once the
distinction between the law of liberty and the law of cause and
effect. The moment a future act is perceived only through
the objective, in lieu of the subjective; the moment its secnra-
tive cause is discovered and located in the objective surround
ings, or in the motives addressed to either the reason or the
sensibilities, in place of discovering and locating its incipiency
in the subjective self, in the free causative will, that moment
you inevitably sink human freedom into necessity, and make
man a mere creature of circumstances. For, under such con
ditions, you are compelled to regard the will as acting under

Omniscience of God. 207
the constraint of the law of cause and effect, and not under
the law of liberty ; and you infer with certainty its action
upon knowing merely the occasions of its acting. This men
tal proceeding is inevitable in regard to all events in the realm
of material forces, of cause and effect. And this was precisely
Jonathan Edwards's procedure when he bound fast the human
will under the strongest motive. And after doing that, all the
liberty he could claim for man was only the semblance of liberty,
an irritating mockery of freedom — a will with the incipiency of
all its volitions located in the objective. The uniform testi
mony of the philosophy of the current age supports our position.
" If it be possible for God to previse and to declare with
certainty the future volitions of a free spirit, while acting un
der the law of liberty, it can only be by looking not at the
occasions of the will's action, but at the source where alone its
certainty can originate; namely, at the human will itself.
But the free will of a future free spirit has as yet no existence
whatever. Its future free choices are bound up in no existing
causes. No existing causes can now give the slightest indi
cation of what those future choices will be."
There is much truth in this statement, but we think that it
is made to do more service than the element of truth in it war
rants. That there may be an element of providential control
in bringing about the fulfillment of some of the prophecies
may be admitted ; but that it overrides freedom is certainly
not allowable. The scheme of prophecy is so broad as
to cover almost the entire history of events, and to imagine
that it involves an interference with the freedom of human
agency in every case is an impossible conception, without en
dangering the doctrine of freedom itself, and introducing the
idea of divine efficiency into almost the entire realm of hu
man action. But its chief fault is the assumption on which it
is based, namely, that it is impossible that free acts should be

208 Studies in Theology.
known, and therefore this explanation. Take that assump
tion away, and the whole ground for the theory is taken from
under it. That assumption is without warrant. It is often
alleged by Calvinists in the assertion that God knows the fu
ture because he has decreed it, and his power is pledged to
effectuate it. The principle is precisely the same, only where
Calvinism applies it to all events this theory only applies it to
some. The principle, we think, is false, whether applied uni
versally or limitedly. It is an infringement of Omniscience
in either case. He may know events because he has prede
termined them ; he may know them because he purposes to
bring them about by overpowering freedom, and by bringing
human wills thus under the law of necessitation ; but that he
cannot otherwise know them is a restriction which is hazard
ous in the extreme, and which lacks convincing proof. The
reason given in the closing sentences of the above extract is
that future volitions are nonexistent, and therefore cannot be
objects of knowledge. " No existing causes can now give the
slightest indication of what their future choices will be." It
is true that future choices of minds which at present do not
exist cannot be known to finite mind, but to a Mind whose
eternity lifts him above the limitations of time, who embraces
the entire future in his existence, to whom the limitations of
time do not apply, there is no future. God is not to be — he
is. Things are to be — they are not ; that is, those which are to
exist hereafter. The future of things is present with him and
in him, because he is in the future now as really as when it
arrives. He does not wait for it to make revelations ; to him
it is here and now. It will give him nothing which he does
not already possess. It cannot enlarge him. To suppose that
it can is to make him finite and dependent, like one of us. In
what respect does his knowledge differ from ours, if it bring
him under the conditions of acquisition and growth ?

Omniscience of God. 209
On the principle on which the theory is built, that the
free acts of wills cannot be known, that only those act3
can be known or become matters of prophecy and promise
in which he interferes and overpowers wills to secure their
fulfillment, how are we to understand such promises as these :
" I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the
uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession," and all such
passages as predict the universal prevalence and triumph of
the Gospel ? *
In all these predictive promises the event was in the remote
future. There were no existing facts upon which they were
based, or from which they could be deduced as conclusions.
The Scriptures are replete with explicit affirmations and im
plicit teachings which necessitate the belief that God knows
the future as the past ; that thoughts and interior secrets of
minds are known to him as things are ; that his knowledge
is forever perfect; and that in this respect, as in all other
respects, he differs from all finite intelligences as infinitude
differs from finitude.
Are we to suppose that these predicted results are to be
brought about by coercion of human wills ? Calvinists might
consistently take that position. It harmonizes perfectly with
their system, or with any system of necessarianism. It explains
perfectly how God could be prescient of the results. He need
only know his own eternal decrees and his own efficiency to
their realization to foreknow the fulfillment. In effect it is the
doctrine of predestination in its worst form, including both elec
tion and reprobation as inevitable sequences.
But if we discard the doctrine how are we to interpret these
promises? Must we suppose that they are mere guesses or
sanguine conjectures % Either that or we must accept them as
*See Psalm ii, 8; Gen. xlix, 10; John xi, 52; xii, 32; Isa. xi, 10; liv, 3 ; lx,.
3, 5 ; Jer. xvi, 19 ; Mai. i, 11.

210 Studies in Theology.
the utterances of real knowledge — real prescience. If we ac
cept them as such, then it follows that God is prescient of the
actions of free causes ; he sees with absolute certainty what dis
tant generations of free beings will do. That he did so is in
proof in the progressing fulfillment. The assertion that pre
science in such cases is impossible is shown not to be true by
the facts. It signifies nothing that we cannot understand how
prescience is possible. The difficulty is not at all peculiar.
Most certainly Dr. McCabe is confused in his use of the
word contingent when he criticises Mr. Watson and attributes
confusion to him in his use of the term.* Mr. Watson cor
rectly uses the word, not in the sense of doubtful or uncertain,
but to describe a free, and not a necessitated, action. That is
its philosophical use. To say that a thing could be known as
certain which is not certain is absurd. Mr. Watson was guilty
of no such absurdity. What he asserted, and what all respect
able writers on the subject have held and do hold, is, that a
free action may be known to be as certain of occurrence as if it
were a necessitated action. The question is upon that point.
The word contingent is used as synonymous of free or unneces-
sitated action. It is unfortunate that it should have been in
troduced, as it has two meanings running so nearly together
that it is sometimes by even careful and usually clear writers
and thinkers used interchangeably, and confusion is introduced.
A free action to be may be this or that. When the word
contingent is used with respect to it, it means precisely that.
How — that is, which way — a free mind will act is not deter
mined by necessity, but is contingent on his self-determination.
In fact, he will act one way or the other, and whichever way he
will act, it was eternally certain to the divine mind that he would
act that way ; but if, as was postulated, he was free to either,
it was as eternally certain that he might have acted the other
*See Foreknowledge of God, pp. 301, 302.

Omniscience of God. 211
way. Now, what is affirmed is, that the divine mind is eter
nally prescient of which way he will act, when he had the power
to act otherwise. If we use the word contingent to describe the
act, we mean by it that it was not necessitated, that is, that it
was free, and not to imply that it was doubtful. The predi
cation would then be that God is prescient of free, that is, non-
necessitated, actions. Dr. McCabe affirms that such prescience
is impossible, and therefore introduces his argument on the sub
ject of prophecies. These do not imply prescience of free
actions, he says, for in such cases God overpowers the will, that
is, destroys its freedom and necessitates its action. Mr. Wat
son affirms the very opposite, and is consistent in the affirma
tion. Contingency is not opposed to certainty, but is opposed
to necessity.
But, once more, Dr. McCabe objects to prescience of free
acts that the terms are contradictory ; that is, that the foreknowl
edge or prescience of an act fixes it in necessity, makes it im
possible that it should be otherwise. Here, again, we think,
he falls into confusion, but the point is one of great difficulty.
This is what he says :
" Richard Watson pronounces with much confidence that the
argument that ' certain prescience destroys contingencies ' is a
mere sophism, and that ' the conclusion is connected with the
premise by a confused use of terms.' ' The great fallacy in
this argument lies,' he says, ' in supposing that contingency and
certainty are the opposites of each other. If the term contin
gent has any definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral
actions of men, it must mean their freedom, and stands opposed,
not to certainty, but to necessity. The question is not about
the certainty of moral actions — that is, whether they will or
will not happen — but about the nature of them, whether they
be free or constrained. The opponents of foreknowledge care
not about the certainty of actions, whether they will take place

212 Studies in Theology.
or not, but they object to certain prescience of moral actions,
because they think such prescience renders these actions neces
sary.' [1]
" And this is the best reply that one of the ablest of our theo
logians can give in answer to the argument that certain pre
science destroys contingency. He charges ' confusion in the use
of terms ; ' but in his refutation he himself is full of the same
kind of confusion. His argument is not only a sophism, but it
is one of the least reputable. It is a plain case of irrelevant
conclusion. For, when we affirm that certain prescience de
stroys contingency, we are not then looking at the nature of the
future act, whether it be a free or whether it be a necessitated
act. A certain event is an event that will come to pass. That
event may be in its nature either free or necessary. It may be
the act of the Creator or the act of some one of his creatures.
In this place, and in proving the proposition that prescience
annihilates the distinction between certainty and contingency,
we refer not to the nature of the future act nor inquire by
whom it shall be performed, whether God, angel, man, or
demon. We are simply looking at it as a certainty. If fore
knowledge be true, every future event is now certain in the
divine mind, and if certain in the divine mind it must be certain
in itself. For perfect knowledge of a thing must correspond
to the nature of that thing ; and the thing must correspond
to the perfect knowledge of it. [2] If I have a perfect
knowledge of a reality, there must be a perfect correspondence
between the reality and my knowledge of it.
"A contingent event is defined by all authorities to be one
that may or may not come to pass. [3] Now, if God foreknows
that such an event will be, how can that event ever be different
from his present knowledge of it ? "
The statement of Mr. Watson (see 1, above) is strictly correct.
He is arguing for the freedom of events, and against the idea

Omniscience of God. 213
that prescience of the certainty of their occurrence is opposed
thereto ; and he properly says that certainty does not involve
necessity ; that is, that they may be certain and yet not nec
essary, but contingent, that is, free. It is perfectly apparent
that he does not use contingent in the sense of not certain or
doubtful, but in the sense of not necessitated, and in this he is
exactly right.
Dr. McCabe's statement, that " For perfect knowledge of
a thing must correspond to the nature of that thing ; and the
thing must correspond to the perfect knowledge of it " (see 2,
on page 212), is perfectly correct — it is simply the equivalent
that knowledge must accord with truth. But the question
is, What is the knowledge in the case of a free act of a free
being ? and the answer to it is precisely that ; that is, it is
the knowledge that the free being will act precisely as pre
science sees he will act ; but the knowledge in the case is not
that he had not the power to act otherwise, but is the very
opposite of that.
The next statement made by Dr. McCabe (see 3) is not
strictly correct. It would improve the statement to say, A
contingent event is one which is not necessitated, and there
fore that might have been otherwise. This correction en
tirely destroys the force of the statement which follows :
" Now, if God foreknows that such an event will be, how
can that event ever be different from his present knowledge
of it ? " The answer is the simplest possible : When God
foreknows that an event will be, his knowledge cannot be
different from what it is ; but his knowledge in the case is
that the event itself might have been otherwise, and then his
knowledge would have conformed to that fact. The knowl
edge of it does not in the slightest degree make it necessary,
but does show that it will, not that it must, take place.
" A contingency is a thing that may or may not be. But

214 Studies in Theology.
can there be ' any ' may or may not be ' between a perfect
knowledge of a thing and that thing itself ? God cannot know
anything contrary to the fact ; and a fact, when once a matter
of certain knowledge, is unchangeable by any power, human
or divine. If the treachery of Judas was foreknown it was
certain ; and if it was certain it could at no period be uncertain
as to its coming to pass. Thus we see that one of the ablest of
thinkers cannot rescue contingency from destruction, if certain
prescience be maintained.
" And here we must be careful to distinguish between con
tingency as to the nature of an event and contingency as to its
coming to pass. An event that is necessary in its nature may
be contingent as to its happening. If I take forty grains of
morphine my death will ensue necessarily* But there is a con
tingency as to the happening of my death as the result of
taking morphine, because there is a contingency as to my tak
ing the morphine ; that is, my taking the morphine is an
event that may or may not be. But as soon as my death,
as the necessary result of my taking the morphine, is fore
known by Omniscience, there is no longer any contingency as
to the happening of the latter event, nor as to my death com
ing to pass. An event, therefore, that is necessary in its
nature may be contingent as to its happening. Moreover, an
event that is contingent in its nature is contingent also as to
its happening. A choice of my will is an event that is either
free or necessary in its nature. We readily admit that the
event is free in its nature ; but the question is as to the hap
pening of the event. We have no question as to the contin
gent nature of the event should it ever occur.
" If God foresees that A will forge a check to-morrow, while
there will be a freedom in the nature of the act when it oc
curs, there is now no contingency as to its happening. If that
choice of A be now foreknown, there is no contingency in the

Omniscience of God. 215
mind of God as to its happening. Its happening is a certainty
to him. Even if the oft-repeated affirmation that foreknowl
edge can have no influence over the exercise of our freedom
were true, it has not the slightest pertinence as to the question
now before us. Even supposing that that knowledge has no
influence over, nor any connection with, the freedom of the
creature, with the free nature of his actions, it has all influ
ence over, and a perfect connection with, the contingency of
the happening of those actions, if they are foreknown. If
God foreknows our choices, there is now no contingency as to
their happening. The event will be free in its nature, but
there can be now no contingency as to its coming to pass."
The whole of this reasoning, we think, evinces confusion on
the subject of contingency, and loses sight of the real question.
The assertion that " God cannot know anything contrary to
the fact ; and a fact, when once a matter of certain knowl
edge, is unchangeable by any power, human or divine," is per
fectly true ; but the question is precisely that we have just
stated : What is the knowledge ? It is not simply that an
event will occur, but that when it does occur it might have
been otherwise, and then the knowledge would not be what it
now is, but different. The time of the possible other was
when the event occurred, not afterward.
But then, it is said, the knowledge of it necessitates it ; it
must now be. Why must it now be? Because of the pre
science of it ? It has no connection with it to make it neces
sary. It does not at all affect the question of its existence. It
is simple cognition. That which exact truth warrants us in
saying is : It will be ; it might have been otherwise.
The thing to be remembered is this : There is a perfect dis
tinction between a free event and a necessitated event. Either
may be foreknown, but the foreknowledge does not and never
can obliterate the distinction between certainty and necessity.

216 Studies in Theology.
When an event that might have been otherwise is known to be
as it is or will be, it will certainly come to pass ; but it will
always be true that it might not have been. If we suppose a
mind that was prescient of it a thousand years before, but who
had no connection whatever with its occurrence except to fore
see it, it remains and must remain a fact forever that it is not
an event that might not have been otherwise. God's knowl
edge of what will be may be a knowledge that he will cause it
to be. In that case the knowledge involves the fact not only
that it will be, but must be — he will cause it to be ; or it may
be a knowledge that some other being who had power to cause
or not to cause it will cause it. In this case the event is not,
and cannot be, necessary, and his knowledge will always cor
respond with that fact. It is, therefore, not true that fore
knowledge or prescience of an event makes it necessary that it
should occur, but it is true that it makes it certain that it will
occur. If it will occur, it will occur, and it was forever certain
that it would, whether known or unknown, in the one case just
as much as in the other. If at the time of its occurrence it was
possible for the cause of it not to have caused it, it will forever
remain true, whether known or unknown, in the one case as
much as in the other, that it was not a necessary event, but
might have been otherwise.
We now come to examine directly what has been supposed
to be the real difficulty in the way of this doctrine. It is sup
posed to interfere with the doctrine of human freedom. The
difficulty is to reconcile the two ideas of prescience in God and
freedom in man. It might not be possible for us to reconcile
them, and yet they might both be true. Our inability alone
would not, therefore, be a sufficient ground of denial, unless
we make our ability to harmonize truth the measure of truth,
which it is presumed we are not vain enough to pretend. The

Omniscience of God. 217
two ideas may be respectively supported by such indubitable
proof that we could not rationally reject either, and yet to our
faculties they might seem to be irreconcilable. We should in
that case be compelled to accept them, confessing at the same
time that they seemed to be inharmonious. This is precisely
the state of fact with regard to the doctrine of the omnipres
ence of God, and yet his non-relations to space ; the infinite
love of God, and yet the certainty that he will punish some
souls that he has made to all eternity — the eternal certainty of
acts which are contingent. The difficulty lies not in the facts
themselves, but in the limitations of our faculties. In such
cases we are not at liberty to deduce conclusions from our in
firmities. Any system that predicates foreknowledge of the
actions of human wills on the ground that they are causation-
ally determined beforehand is inconsistent with the doctrine of
human freedom ; but that is not so of simple prescience. Knowl
edge is not causation, and has in it nothing of the nature of
causation. The whole supposed difficulty arises from confound
ing certainty with necessity. The two terms are not equations,
having nothing in common. Any future event is certain in
precisely the same manner and degree, whether known or un
known. No event has ever occurred, or ever will, that it
was not certain from eternity would occur, irrespective of its
being known or unknown. An act or event perfectly free in
itself is as certain as if caused by absolute necessity — certain, in
the one case, as emanating from freedom ; in the other, as caused
by necessity ; but in both cases always certain. The Infinite
knows necessary things as necessary, free things as free. The
knowledge of an event has nothing whatever to do with its oc
currence ; whether it be foreknowledge in no way affects it. The
act is the act of one mind ; the cognition is the perception of
another mind ; and the two minds are wholly disconnected, or
individual units, persons, in their respective acts. Nothing is

218 Studies in Theology.
more certain than this, and nothing more important. It is said :
Yes, but if an event or act of one mind is foreseen by another
mind, it must necessarily come to pass. We answer : No, that
does not follow. It follows that it will certainly come to pass,
but that is not the same as saying it must necessarily come to
pass. It may come to pass freely, and be just as certain as if it
came to pass necessarily ; and in that case, if the foreknowledge
were perfect, it would embrace precisely this state of facts. The
event will certainly come to pass freely, and not necessarily.
Being free, it might not have come to pass, and prescience would
then be precisely opposite to what it is — would be that the event
will not come to pass. If the event is a necessary event, the
prescience would be the event will certainly come to pass, and
necessarily. But in either case the knowledge would have no
influence whatever on its contingency or necessity. The sources
of contingency or necessity are wholly independent of the fact
of knowledge. Knowledge simply sees what is — causes nothing.
Place an eye up in heaven, and let it look down upon the earth,
and it, if open, will behold what is going on among men ; but
the transaction will go on all the same if it be shut ; its being
open or shut causes nothing. It is precisely so of the omniscient
eye of God. What is free it sees as free ; what is necessary, as
necessary. Certain events are not inevitable, if free. They might be
otherwise — there is nothing to hinder or prevent that they
should be ; there is power sufficient to have made them so, and
if that power had been used differently from what it is, and it
might have been, there being nothing to hinder, the certainty
would have been different, and prescience would have seen it
otherwise. There is not, therefore, the slightest difficulty in
reconciling the foreknowledge, or, better, the simple knowl
edge, of God and the freedom of man. There may be other
difficulties growing out of the doctrine of prescience. This is

Omniscience of God. 219
not one. Is it said that what is foreknown as certain cannot
be changed — men cannot make things different from what
they will certainly be ? We answer : This implies, if it mean
anything, that men are not able to make their acts different
from what they are. This we deny. They freely make
things as they are, and they could make them otherwise ; and
they are conscious of that fact. They make the certainty, and
they have the power, in every case in which they make it as it
is, to have made it different from what it is. That it is as it
is is their fault or praise, and not the fault or praise of some
necessitating power that dominates them.
17

220 Studies in Theology.

GOODNESS OF GOD.
The question arises, How could a good and merciful God not
simply permit evils, but, what is infinitely more inconceivable,
organize a universe with the foresight of them ? Foreseeing
them, why did he not estop their occurrence by withholding
existence in all such cases ? How could he impose existence
when he knew, whether necessary or not, it would in fact be
only curse ? There is no escaping the feeling that at a super
ficial view it seems discreditable and impossible — a procedure
which we would condemn as abhorrent in a creature such as
we are, much more in a Being of infinite resources. We shall
not pretend that we do not feel the difficulty, or that any ex
planation of which we know is perfectly satisfactory ; but we
see no way of escaping the belief of the apparently conflicting
doctrines, and must therefore offer such relief as is possible,
which, if it do not satisfy, may nevertheless mitigate in some
degree; assured, meanwhile, that ultimately, whatever be the
fate of the doctrines, infinite goodness will be vindicated.
But before passing we assert that the difficulty is not relieved
by denying prescience, but is rather increased. To create be
ings who might become exposed to eternal evil is the real dif
ficulty. The knowledge that they would adds nothing to it.
Take that away, and then it would remain that he created with
the possibility that every soul would be lost. It is a relief
that, being prescient, he knew that the large majority would
be saved.
The first method of reconciliation offered is that the divine
goodness is in no way responsible for the evil in question, since
the creature incurs it by his own voluntary misdeeds — it simply

Goodness of God. 221
declares his own ill-deserts. Being was conferred for a benev
olent end ; his endowments were bestowed as means to utmost
good ; the scheme was fitted with infinite pains and perfect
adaptation to the ends of well-being. That evil ensues is be
cause of voluntary abuse of goodness for which the sufferer is
alone responsible. Suffering never exists for itself's sake, but as
unavoidable incident or possibility of the good, and in that case
it becomes a possible concomitant of good, though not a good
in itself. If, for example, it should be a fact that, incident to
the creation of a universe in which a vast amount of happiness
should be secured, some suffering would be certain, it might
not only not be cruel to create, but it might be cruelty not to
create. If it were certain that a moral creation would be on
the whole productive of the greatest possible amount of good,
and also perfectly certain that some beings would abuse their
freedom and come to utmost evil, the question then would be,
Would goodness demand that the certain happiness of the virtu
ous and deserving should be prevented, in order to prevent the
self-superinduced evil of the vicious ? It is doubtful whether
any consciousness would so affirm, and especially if the creation,
on the whole, to a vast portion should be a good, and to a small
part only be made a curse by their own wickedness. It must be
apparent that in such a case creation would be the imperative
dictate of love, since it would be the best thing possible to infin
ite wisdom and power, and since the attendant evil would be not
attributable to the Creator, but to the sinning and consequently
suffering creature. The utmost demand that can be made on
goodness is that it should secure the greatest possible good
with the least possible evil. This we cannot doubt is the
precise case. Foreseen evil is permitted on no other ground
than that it cannot be hindered under a system which
assures the greatest amount and highest quality of possible
good, and is also not a part of the system itself, but the result

222 Studies in Theology.
of its wicked abuse, and so not chargeable to the Author of
the system.
But the remaining difficulty seems still more embarrassing.
It is the difficulty of explaining the conduct of the divine Being,
as described in the Scriptures ; namely, in employing means and
methods to dissuade men from the acts which he eternally
knows they will certainly commit, and then charging the fail
ure of the means against them as crimes, and making it the
ground of deeper punishment. This, it is alleged, is not only
inconsistent, but is a species of disingenuousness unworthy of a
great and holy Being. At first view it must be confessed that
it has that appearance. But is it so ? What is the real case ?
It is this : A soul is created and placed under law to God,
which law prescribes right conduct, to which the soul is bound.
It promises good to the obedient and threatens evil to the dis
obedient. It is within the power of the soul put under law to
obey or disobey, as it may freely choose. It is so constituted
that it can be influenced. Is it not the duty of God to employ
all suitable influences to secure obedience ? Could he be ex
cused for neglect ? Would the fact that he foresees failure in
some cases excuse him for not making use of every proper
influence, and thus relieving himself of the otherwise inevita
ble charge of criminal indifference ? In other words, is not the
only ground on which failure could be permitted precisely the
ground on which he places it, that he did all in his power to
prevent it ? He tried his utmost to save, and the sinner would
not permi£ him. Must he not, as the infinitely good, employ
all means proper to induce the free being to pursue such a
course as would insure his well-being, and must not failure be
permitted only when it could not be hindered ? That the blame
of failure may rest with the culprit all possible opportunities
must be furnished him. He can have no fair trial without

Goodness of God. 223
this ; and the fact that the Sovereign knows that he will not be
influenced does not excuse him from furnishing the opportunity
of giving proof thereof. Nor does the knowledge that efforts
will fail imply disingenuousness in using them. The knowl
edge is that they ought not to fail, and that their failure is
crime. The invitation and entreaty are not rendered insincere
because they are rejected.
Foreknowledge or ignorance of the result determines noth
ing as to the sincerity or insincerity of the invitation. The case
is this : The thing required is a thing right in itself — a thing
that must be required. The party on whom the requisition is
made is perfectly able to comply. The party making the requisi
tion sincerely desires compliance. Influences are employed which
ought to prevail with the responsible party. The influences
ought to be used. This is the whole case. The moral govern
ment of the world must proceed on principles of righteousness,
precisely as if the issue were wholly unknown. The knowl
edge of the outcome has no connection whatever with the case,
and cannot in justice influence the relation of the parties.
These are determined on other grounds. The case is not the
same as is often assumed — that in which the result is fixed by
decree. In that case there would be manifest insincerity in the
use of means and persuasions to the contrary, since the decree
makes the contrary impossible. The Author of the decree could
not be sincere in employing means to induce acts which he him
self by sovereign decree rendered impossible.
Fundamentally, moral being must be put on trial. The trial,
to be fair, must be under the best and most favorable circum
stances. Some will fail. They must incur punishment. The
Infinite from eternity is cognizant of all the facts as they are — ¦
the fact of his own desires, his elations to the subject, his gra
cious helps furnished, the subject's circumstances in minutiae,
his temptations and ability to resist them, his willful and per-

224 Studies in Theology.
6istent sin, his consequent ruin. We may not suppose that his
certain ruin being foreseen all the antecedents are useless and
might be omitted. The destiny of a moral being cannot be
separated from all the antecedents that contribute to it. The
knowledge that a given case will eventuate in a given way,
favorably or unfavorably, does not furnish a reason why the
destiny should be fixed without the antecedents.
Here we rest the doctrine of divine omniscience. It is
clearly the teaching of revelation. It is not in conflict with
the freedom of created moral beings. It is not inconsistent
with the goodness of God. It is not inharmonious with his
conduct in the administration of moral affairs. It is exhibited
in the permanence and accuracy of all law6 in the natural and
moral realms. It is indispensable to the righteous government
of the universe. No moral being can be justly judged and
recompensed without it. Each thought and motive and feel
ing and deed, together with the modifying circumstances of
natural organization, association, education, amount of faculty,
opportunities of knowledge, with all other things of every
kind that influence character and action, of each of all the
million souls whom he shall judge, must be perfectly known,
in order to a just and righteous decision. Nothing short of
absolute omniscience will be equal to the mighty task. And
as all things are in him and of him forever and forever we
may be assured that not the slightest defect or failure can occur
in his administration throughout eternity. If the thought be
bewildering to us we have only to reflect that we are dealing
with the Infinite — the actual Author of all being — the eter
nal Spirit, of whose power and wisdom the universe itself is
but a feeble reflection. Mites that we are, we can but worship
with speechless wonder, evermore rejoicing that He whom
we adore so transcends our utmost thought, and yet so shelters

Goodness of God. 225
us in the bosom of his love, and so guards us with the over
shadowing and encircling segis of his power and omniscience.
In conclusion, we recapitulate what seem to us the conclu
sions fairly reached on the subject of divine omniscience :
1. That it includes the knowledge of all events from before
the beginning of creation. 2. That its source is in the eternal
self-consciousness of God, which possesses him of a perfect
knowledge : (a) Of himself as to nature and attributes from
eternity ; in this respect and so far forth his perfect knowledge
is complete and also eternal ; that is, there never was a time
when he did not possess it ; it is an inherent and essential
attribute of his being, (b) In the same eternal self-con
sciousness is also a complete and perfect knowledge of his
purpose with respect to his own acts which will occur in
time or under conditions of succession, and of all the effects
that will flow from his acts in their exact order and content in
the endless future ; which, in effect, is simply the knowledge
of his purpose and acts in perpetuation or continuance, (c) In
the same eternal self-consciousness is also a complete and per
fect knowledge, but arising from observation, of all events
brought into existence by the action of free beings other than
himself ; which, together with the knowledge of his own acts,
embraces the knowledge of all events that ever have occurred
in all past time, and also events that ever will occur in all
future time.
Thus his knowledge of himself as to his being and included
attributes is simple self-consciousness of what is immutably
permanent, and is not in any sense prescience, or knowledge
of what will be; but his knowledge of what he will do is
eternal prescience of his own acts as they will arise in time,
but which are not existent from eternity, as his being is.

226 Studies in Theology.
His eternal knowledge of other creatures and of their acts is
primarily prescience, as to themselves ; that is, it is a knowledge
of what will be and not what is, which changes its mode as
the events come to realization, and becomes the knowledge of
what is, and when past becomes the knowledge of what has
been, but in substance is identical, conforming to the order
of events. There is no defect in his knowledge, and no addi
tion to it ; but its mode changes as events change from what at
first was knowledge of what will be to what is or what has
been. The power thus to become possessed of prescience of
events from all eternity, brought about by creatures in time, is
by simple observation, and not by causation of them, and
arises from the peculiar mode of his existence, which is eternal
and not successional. He eternally possesses the entire of his
existence — a perfect sphere — in which there is no past or fu
ture. All events of time which exist successively exist within
this all-encompassing sphere, and so are forever present, or in
observation, with him, even when, as to themselves, nonexist
ent. In a deep and true sense things that are not are — are in
his knowledge. With respect to themselves he knows them as
not being, but to be, or as being, or as having been, as the fact
is, when the predication is made.
For illustration : Suppose an eye endowed with intelli
gence, possessed with a power to observe all time, and to be
forever open and observant of all that is in time, we should
have as the result in permanent open vision and cognition all
events included in time's history. The vision would have no
past or future, but would be simple permanent vision, from
which nothing ever escaped. Now, suppose that in fact there
was in the events themselves an order of succession, some
events being present in time, some past, some future. And
suppose the intelligence of the observing eye to be such as to
know this time or successional order of events in themselves,

Goodness of God. 227
we should then have all the events permanently present to the
observing eye, but in themselves some as past, some as present,
some as future, and known so to be by the observer. In the
intelligent observing eye the whole scheme of events would
have existence in their order, but in themselves they would
be coming and vanishing.
Now, as nearly as possible, this is what we suppose to be
true of the mode of divine Omniscience and of the mode of
God's relation to events of time. But you are, or someone is,
ready to say that the supposition is that of an impossibility.
How do you know that ? That is precisely what God says is
true : " All things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him
with whom we have to do " (Heb. iv, 13). " Hell and destruc
tion are before the Lord : how much more then the hearts of
the children of men ? " (Prov. xv, 11 ; Isa. xlvi, 9, 10.)
We can think of but one thing more that needs relief : The
idea of the existence of all events in the divine knowledge
each moment of time seems to involve this consequence, that
all contradictory emotions with respect to the same being must
exist in the divine mind at the same time. This was evi
dently Dorner's trouble. But does this follow ? The case is
put thus : At the same moment and forever is the observation
of A, and all the events of history. But at a time {a) A is an
innocent and lovely child, and as such must be beloved of the
Lord ; at time {b) he is a prodigal youth, guilty of all evil
and sin ; at time (c) he is a penitent seeking forgiveness ; and
at time {d) he is an eminent saint. What must be the feeling
of God toward A ? As a guilty prodigal he must be angry
with him ; as a penitent he must pity and forgive him ; as a
saint he must love him ; and as he is seen to be all these all the
time these contradictory feelings must coexist at the same
moment with regard to him. Is this a fair or necessary put
ting of the case ? If so, it must be fatal to the theory.

228 Studies in Theology.
To our mind it seems this way : While all events are present
in the divine knowledge at the same moment the events them
selves do not coexist in the same moment ; and the divine
knowledge of them is according to the order in which they
exist ; that is, it is conformable to the facts. A is not at the same
time all of these. God's emotions or feelings with regard to A
do not exist from eternity, but exist when the occasions exist to
call them forth. When A is an innocent child God loves him.
A becomes an outcast, a guilty sinner. God is angry with him.
A repents. God forgives him. A becomes an eminent saint.
God communes with him in holiest love. There is not a saved
soul that was not once under condemnation. The feelings or
emotions of God, on immutable ethical grounds, must be ap
propriate to their occasions, and must therefore vary with the
occasions. Both his knowledge of events caused by free be
ings and his feelings toward free beings arise from their acts
and agree with their acts. The knowledge is observation of
what is, but may be prevision, and is never causation. The
feeling exists when the occasion exists, and not before. His
feelings are as variable as the causes. Thus God has a true fife
with the creature of successive emotional experiences and of
successive activity toward the creature. These are not immu
table states, as his nature and attributes are, nor do they imply
any changeableness in God as to his knowledge and immutable
principles. Against this view it is alleged (a) that it makes God
changeable in his emotional states — that it is anthropomorphic,
imputing to God feelings and passions like our own ; (b) that
it raises the question, Why, with such an impulse to create, did
he delay creation so long ? {c) that it is inconsistent with that
absolute self-sufficiency which must be found in the Eternal.
We answer by asking, Is sensibility to the good a defect, or
is it a defect in an infinite Spirit that he should be supposed
to have attributes analogous to those with which he clothes a

Goodness of God. 229
finite spirit made in his own image ? Would he be more or
less perfect were he a being of infinite love ? Does the im
plication help or hinder the problem of existence ? The answer
to these questions can only be one, and it relieves the first
ground of objection.
With reference to the second we ask, Does the implication
of benevolence in the Creator as an internal impulse to create
add anything to the difficulty of accounting for the delay?
Could the finite be brought into existence at all without leaving
the question in its full force ? Would any sooner be really sooner
to the Eternal ? If these are answered as they must be it will
be seen that the objection implied is only seeming, not real.
To the third we answer by asking, If God was self-sufficient
in the sense in which the questions imply, how can we ac
count for creation at all ? There must have been something in
his own nature which demanded it, or it could not be. But if
there must be something, what better than a benevolent impulse
or an eternal prompting of love ?
The only alternative is to depersonalize the world ground and
assume either the materialistic theory or its twin absurdity of
pantheism. The impossibility of these solutions of the world
problem has already been shown. There is nothing, then, in the
idea itself which can be ground of rational rejection. Its pos
sibility is indisputable, and as it furnishes the only rational so
lution it becomes a necessity of thought. When we add to
this that it is the uniform and unequivocal teaching of revela
tion itself it becomes an essential doctrine of Christian faith
and sound philosophy alike. The world ground is neither the
material mass, nor an impersonal force, nor the all in a process
of necessary unfolding, but is an eternal free personal Cause,
who contains in himself the power, wisdom, and motive by which
all things exist. As his wisdom is forever seen in things
revealing its existence in him, so his power is forever pervasive

230 Studies in Theology.
of them, asserting his perpetual presence with them ; and his
love is forever declared by them, as sole ground why he caused
them to be. One no more than the other is thus seen to be an
eternal inherence of his essential and ineffable nature.
But, it is said, there are facts which are irreconcilable with
this view, and that the contradiction offsets the instinctive and
apparently rational conclusion. The objection rests upon the
implied assumption that a true theory must be able to account
for all the facts, or at least must not be in contradiction of the
facts. The principle must be accepted. It is undoubtedly true..
But it is not true that the reconciliation must always be possible
to us before we can accept the theory. The evidence may be
clear and conclusive, despite remaining obscurities. A suffi
ciency of facts may be present to compel faith, while for want
of others, or for the want of deeper insight, there may be real
embarrassment to a complete understanding. The obscurity
does not arise from a contradiction, but for the want of under
standing, or for the want of a knowledge of all the elements of
the solution. Larger time and a broader view may be all that
are needed to a complete clearing up of perplexities. The
function of rational thought is to determine in any case whether
the known grounds are sufficient to warrant the conviction that
higher knowledge and further developments will establish ex
isting conclusions and remove apparent contradictions. But
what, then, are the alleged facts which are irreconcilable with
the doctrine that "God is love," or that essential goodness
reigns in and over the universe. Whether explicable or not
they should be examined. It is answered, There are evils in
the system which contradict the idea.
In order to compare a fact with the good of being, so as to
be able to know whether it is itself a good, or, if not a good in
itself, condition of a good, and if condition of a good, the best

Goodness of God. 231
condition possible, it is necessary that we should have a definite
idea of the good. If evil is a something which is opposed to the
good of being, which hinders or hurts it, to know that we
must know what the good of being is, and know that the given
fact is harmful thereto. And yet further, in order to determine
whether the cause of a fact is himself good, whether the fact
be a good in itself, or condition of an ultimate good, we must
be able to know how the fact stands related to the cause. The
quality of goodness in the cause is not determined simply by
goodness in the effect either as ultimate or conditional, but in
.the fact of the freedom of the cause, and the motive to the effect.
Though there be a good, if the cause did not freely produce it,
and intend it as a good, it does not show the cause to be good ;
and vice versa, though there be evil in the effect, if it be not a
freely chosen effect, it does not show want of goodness in the
cause. A cause working to an end which is good or productive
of well-being is good as so working ; that is, it actually produces
good as well-being, and so must be accounted good ; but if it be
merely a blind power working under the law of necessity, how
ever beneficent the effect, the cause itself can have no quality of
ethical goodness in it. To have this quality it must have per
sonality ; that is, it must be a cause that perceives an end of
good, and freely chooses it and then produces it.
What, then, do we mean by a good ? A good implies exist
ence of some kind. It is impossible to predicate good of non-
being or nonexistence. It may be better that a given thing
should not be than be, but the good in the case is a good only
for that which is, and not for that which is not. Good must be
the good of some being. But while there can be no good
without a being of some kind, mere existence or being is not it
self a good necessarily. When we predicate of a given thing
that it is good the question immediately emerges, How good
— good for what ? and the explanation points out precisely what

232 Studies in Theology.
we mean by a good — or good. A thing is good as means to
an end when it serves the end ; if it minister to the end in the
best way and the highest degree possible, it is good as a means
in a superlative degree — the best possible. A thing is good as
an end when there is good in itself, not as a means to an end,
but as an end ; and in this case the term is equivalent to realized
welfare — happiness — perfect content of being. The different
degrees of which good in this sense can be predicated of created
being depends on the different degrees of capacity for welfare.
Some beings have more capacity for good than others. Thus
things are to be viewed as good when they are means to welfare,
or realized welfare, and as subordinate and ultimate. Subordi
nate goods are goods in themselves, but not of the highest kind.
Subordinate goods may give way when ultimate goods are at
tained. It is not necessary that that which is a good should be
permanent. It may be necessary that a subordinate good for
the time should be repressed or even entirely abolished, in order
to ultimate welfare. Its continuance might become an obstruc
tion, and it would cease to be a good and become an evil. The
result is that the essence of the idea of a good or the good is
that which is valuable to the enjoyment of sensitive existence,
or that which is welfare or makes for welfare. Goodness in
God implies that he who is the cause of all with unmixed in
tent works for the welfare of being.
What, then, are the facts in the light of which we are to de
termine whether goodness is an attribute of the world ground,
which must be considered in the solution of the great prob
lem ? It might be deemed sufficient to rest it entirely on the
instinctive conviction, without any attempt at explanation. Or
it might be solved simply in the light of revelation. In either
case the difficulties, if there be any, would be left unexplained
and ignored on the ground that whatever they are, explicable
or inexplicable, they are sufficiently answered in the positive

Goodness of God. 233
teaching of instinctive reason or authoritative revelation, and
therefore require no further attention. To justify this proceed
ing it might be said that, owing to the limitations of our pow
ers and the inadequacy of our circumstances, we are not com
petent to judge in the premises, and therefore that it is the
better wisdom not to meddle with questions which are too high
for us — that we but increase our embarrassments by attempting
to relieve them. There is plausibility in this view. There can
be no doubt that a sufficient ground for faith is laid in the in
stinctive reason conformed with the divine testimony, though
there should be difficulties which we cannot wholly remove.
We may have adequate ground for faith, even when the under
standing is insufficient to a perfect comprehension ; and there
may be difficulties which for the present cannot be fully re
moved. Belief in such a case is not irrational, necessarily. It is
also a conceivable thing that difficulties may be so insoluble that
the attempt would only engender doubt and discouragement,
and might, therefore, be better omitted. But how shall we
know the true state of the case without thorough examination ?
It would seem to be the wiser course for the theologian to
take the full measure of all the possible embarrassments of his
positions, and, if need be, confess his inadequacy to meet them,
and then point out the grounds on which, notwithstanding, he
demands faith. The question will then turn on the sufficiency
of the grounds, and reason will have fair play. Possibly, after
all, the facts may be explained, at least so far as to show that
they would be found illustrative, rather than destructive.
There is a theodicy. God is not at variance with himself.
No facts are at war with his goodness. Assured of this, it be
comes us to look the difficulties squarely in the face, and find
their real significance as far as possible, without doubt of the
outcome. In this way only can we be self-respecting as rational
beings.

234 Studies in Theology.
The facts which bear on the problem are few and simple, and
can be stated with perfect clearness :
First fact. The universe is God's product. Such as it is he
made it. There is no being or force or law in it that is not
from him as source. There never can be in it any being or
force or law of which he will not be the source. There is no
self-created and self-existing thing or force or law. No crea
ture has any more being or power or law than it has got from
its creator. There is no side door by which, in these respects,
more has got into the universe than God puts in it, that is,
more of being, power, law.
Second fact. There are no limitations which are not im
posed by the Creator. He gives so much ; he gives no more.
This determines the limit. Why he fixes the limits as he
does ; why he makes as he does ; why he makes no more, no
less ; why the peculiar forces, powers, laws, are points which
at present we do not consider. The fact we posit is simply
this one : He limits himself. He determines what he will put
in, what he will leave out, what the content of the work
shall be. He might have put more ; he might have put less ;
he might have made differently ; he might not have made at
all. That he made at all, and made as he did, is of his own
motion purely.
Third fact. A large part of what he has made has no en
joyable existence whatever. From it, for some reason, the
capacity of enjoyment of any kind has been excluded. The
entire insensate universe comes under this class. As to bulk,
it is infinite as compared to sensate existence.
Fourth fact. To a small fraction of what he has made he
has given a limited capacity of enjoyment of one kind or an
other. To the larger part, as to number and extent quanti-
tively considered, the power of enjoyment seems to be merely
sensational, and is wholly limited to the physical ; it is a good

Goodness of God. 235
of physical enjoyment — the healthy exercise of physical func
tions. Whether there is any self-conscious subject, that is, a
subject knowing itself and knowing its enjoyments, is inde
terminable by any light we have. There are sensations, with-
ont doubt. There are appetites, and pleasurable delights in
their gratification. They must be viewed both as means and
ends — means to the development of the economy of life. '
Without them life itself would lapse, or, in any event, would
not propagate itself. As an end they give a measure of zest
and enjoyment to life, and have in them a good, though of
an inferior order.
The smaller fraction, as to number, has a higher capacity, or
capacity for higher forms of enjoyment. To the enjoyment
of sensational pleasures or physical delights they add the de
lights of reason and of conscience. Even the lower forms are
taken up in self-consciousness, and acquire more than mere
sensational character ; but while means to an end of physical
good, and in themselves a certain form of good or enjoyable-
ness, they have their chief value in their higher relations, and
the subject of them, in them and through them, finds more
than mere sensational delight. But that which especially char
acterizes this smaller fraction of enjoying and enjoyable exist
ence is the capacity for a good of happiness which transcends
the physical — the delight of conscious knowledge and right
eousness. The subject knows himself, perceives good, knows
it as such, appreciates the good as an end, pursues it, finds in
it satisfaction.
Fifth fact. Along with the capacity for enjoyment he has
incorporated a capacity of suffering, and has placed the beings
so capacitated in such conditions and environments of expo
sure that they are always in peril of more or less distress, and
do many times come into extreme suffering.
Sixth fact. The higher the capacity for enjoyment the
18 " " ' 5

236 Studies in Theology.
greater the capacity for suffering, and the greater the liability
and peril. That the suffering incident to mere sensational
being is apparently great often cannot be disputed, but that it is
really great cannot be known. That there is no such suffering
with merely brute life as there is in the higher form of self-
conscious life is most evident.
These facts must all be taken into account in framing a the
odicy, or in any attempt to reconcile God's dealings with the
universe to the principle of absolute goodness in him. It
must be shown how, that is, on what principle, a being of infi
nite goodness, wisdom, and power could make such a uni
verse ; why so large a part of being should exist without capac
ity for good of any kind, absolutely without any enjoyment ;
why so large a fraction should have mere sensational life ; why
there should be such susceptibility to suffering in it ; why there
should be suffering at all ; why, especially, in ascending into
the highest forms of all, there should be found here the great
est amount of suffering.
It is assumed that the facts are such as to render a theodicy
impossible. The ground of the assumption is that there are
admitted evils. It is argued that if God is a being of infinite
knowledge he knows how to prevent evil, and if he has infi
nite power he is able to prevent it? and if he is a being of
infinite love he would have prevented it ; but since, by admis
sion, it exists, therefore he is destitute of either the requisite
knowledge or power or goodness to prevent it. Or, again, it
is argued that as all things are his free product, and evil is a
fact, therefore he must have chosen its existence, and so he
cannot be good, or evil itself is an inclusion of good. It must
be obvious that the argument thus formulated depends for its
force on the meaning of the term evil, and on the validity of
the implications that evil exists, and on the relation which
God sustains to its existence causationally or permissively. If

\ Goodness of God. 237
that which is denominated evil be not so in fact, or if it be a
necessary incident in attaining a good, or if it be wholly inde
pendent of God, or if it be something which he will finally
eliminate, the argument would wholly lose its force.
It may be proper to indicate what facts of the system seem
to show that goodness does preside over the universe. These
may be grouped under the following heads : (a) The adjustment
of means to ends of good ; {b) the creation of beings capable of
enjoying good ; (c) the changeless law in the conservation of
means and ends ; {d) the infinite patience and long-sufferingness
of God with transgressors ; {e) the gift of himself in sacrifice
for sin ; {f) his readiness to forgive ; (g) the eternal happiness
he has promised for them who will accept it.
Let us assume, for the present, the truth of the doctrine that
infinite benevolence underlies all the divine movement — an as
sumption everywhere honorable to the Infinite. How, might
we suppose, under the operation of such a principle, would he
proceed ? By supposition he possesses all wisdom and all power.
What would pure benevolence move him to do ? It is plain
that, actuated by that principle, he would carefully consider all
possibilities ; that from among them he would select those, to
be made real, which would most adequately satisfy his benevo
lent wish. It is certain that he would exclude all things which
imply malevolence ; for the infinitely Benevolent could not be
malevolent. He could not be cruel or unjust. He could not
make suffering an aim. He could not permit suffering, except
as means to a beneficent end or as an unavoidable incident in
the best plan for reaching the most beneficent ends. The aim
and outcome of his movement must be the attainment of the
greatest possible good with the least possible evil — the greatest
possible happiness with the least possible suffering.
It will be observed that the argument rests upon the assump
tion that infinite goodness could not create a universe in which

238 Studies in Theology.
evil should find place ; that, therefore, either there is no evil or
there is a lack of goodness in the Cause.
The difficulty has been met in various ways. It has been
argued by some that what is called evil is not so in fact ; that
whatever is is best— is an element of good. It has been argued
that if there is evil God is not the cause, and so its existence
does not bear against either his power, wisdom, or love. It has
been argued that though his love is opposed to it it is not pos
sible for wisdom and power combined to prevent it, and so its
existence does not imply either lack of love, wisdom, or power.
None of the answers have given complete satisfaction, and it may
be that no future attempt will be more successful. It may for
ever remain impossible for the finite so to comprehend the
plan and purpose of the Infinite as to understand how it is that
he has permitted evil to invade his system ; and the whole prob
lem may continue to be shrouded in impenetrable mystery, to
be accepted by faith, rather than be construed by reason.
It is certain that in some way evil has gained a foothold in
the universe. It is here by the permission of God, or despite
him. Permission does not mean acquiescence or consent, neces
sarily, but may mean simply nonhindrance. The facts are as
they are, and we cannot ignore them if we would.
Either he is their source or he is not. They are reconcilable
with his goodness or they are not. If we must take the
ground that he is sole Author of the universe we must seek
to determine his relations to evils which are in it. If they are
not reconcilable to his love, then they prove that he is malev
olent. This alternative is one which the human mind will
never admit.
The implication underlying the objection is that a universe
emanating from a being of infinite power; wisdom, and love
should be free from evil. That is by no means as clear as at
first sight it appears. Suppose it should turn out that things

Goodness of God. 239
which viewed in themselves are evil nevertheless are incidents
of a progress to an end that is infinitely good, not otherwise to
be realized, is it clear that such evils might not exist by the im
mediate act of an infinitely good being — much more, might be
permitted to invade his system temporarily or permanently ?
Is there no way to vindicate the goodness of God except that his
universe be absolutely free from evil ? Must the actual be the
realization of the absolutely best to rescue his attributes of love,
wisdom, and power ? Can nothing fall below his ideal without
clouding his perfections ? We must think the assumption can
not be sustained.
Can we assert with the confidence of certainty more than
this: Given a God of infinite wisdom, power, and love : {a) If
he create other beings he must not create unwisely or un-
lovingly ; that is, he must not dishonor either his wisdom or
his love, {b) To avoid this the thing created must be for an
end of goodness, and must be well adapted to attain the end —
he must purpose the highest good which his wisdom can discern,
and he must put into operation the best possible means to at
tain the end. These conditions being met, would not the result
be a complete vindication of himself as infinitely wise and good ?
{c) If it should so be that the highest possible good would in
clude some possible evil, which it was foreseen would become
actual, in the realization of the good, would the existence of
some evil necessarily cloud the divine goodness? We must
think not. The actual best thing possible may not be the ideal
best, and if the ideal best should be for any cause unrealizable
might not goodness accept the best possible, even if it involved
some actual evil ?
The things which we complain of as evil are suffering and
sin. They have been classified as natural and moral evils. By
natural evils is meant defects, pains, and sufferings of every
description which pervade sentient existence, which seem to

240 Studies in Theology.
have no moral cause. By moral evil is meant sin, with its at
tendants of guilt and punishment.
Let us look them up in their order, and endeavor to see
what lessons they will teach us : First, let us look at the fact
of natural evil. There should be no attempt to change the
fact itself. We must endeavor to see it just as it is, neither
diminishing nor exaggerating it. And in order to keep things
apart which are dissimilar let us first consider the sufferings of
the unmoral world. This comprises all the realm of life below
man which has sensibility. The problem is to reconcile God's
dealings with this great department to the idea of his absolute
goodness. That there is suffering here cannot be disputed,
but it is also impossible that we should know the measure of
the suffering. The precise nature of brute consciousness is an
impenetrable mystery. It doubtless excludes all properly ses-
thetical, rational, and moral elements. The sufferings which
come from these causes cannot be supposed to exist here.
This is an important fact, which should never, for a moment,
be lost sight of in discussing the problem of natural evil. The
sufferings which remain are reduced to the two classes of
physical and emotional distresses. But here, again, we have
no means of knowing, even proximately, their degree, or the
nature of the consciousness of them. If there be no evidence
that brutes, or mere sensate life, have any proper self or self-
consciousness, suffering may be reduced to mere automatism,
mere physical motion, or if not to this it passes into a grade
of intensity infinitely below what, interpreting it from our
self-consciousness, we suppose it to be. It may, like the satis
factions of such a form of life, be simply functional to the con
tinuance and preservation of the organism, and so be classed
with the appetites which simply conserve existence. It is
highly probable that real suffering and real enjoyment are
capabilities only of a self-conscious subject, and so are to be

Goodness of God. 241
found in a rational and moral nature exclusively. It is certain
that in lower natures they can only exist in such modified
form as to essentially change their character. Each form of
life has its law. The insensate vegetable automatically or me
chanically follows its tendencies and develops according to its
law without feeling of any kind. Animal life in its lowest
types can scarcely be distinguished in any respect, except as to
functional arrangements of the parts and outcomes of the or
ganism, from the insensate plant. The higher forms of animal
life develop under a law in which sensation plays an important
part, but it is impossible to know how real the sensations are,
or whether they are anything else than mere physical and or
ganic changes, working to the ends of developed existence —
the exuberance of the life principle. That there is any proper
feeling, any consciousness of suffering or enjoyment, any
proper ego to realize such experiences, lies beyond our knowl
edge. As there is in every atom a tendency which we call
gravitation, and in some atoms affinities for other atoms, but
without any feeling or consciousness of such tendencies, so it
is possible that in that obscure principle which we call life,
which constructs this or that ' organism, under this or that set
of laws, and with or without signs of sensation, there may be
the same absence of any proper feeling, but only tendencies
and movements which simulate sensations, all having a rela
tion to the building of the structure and its uses and ends, In
any event, the absence of a self-conscious knowing subject
must differentiate any feeling that may exist from feeling as it
exists in a self-conscious, knowing subject.
But, if it should be known to him that the greatest possible
good could be attained only by executing a plan that would
involve the evil of suffering to some degree of every being
in it capable of suffering, then infinite benevolence might
prompt him to execute that plan, and the sufferings them-

242 Studies in Theology.
selves, though brought about immediately by his own agency,
would not cloud his goodness. They would be chosen and
caused, not for themselves, not because he took pleasure in
them, for that would be contrary to goodness, but because,
by introducing them, he could attain that which benevolence
desired — the greatest good. It is plain that the least possible
suffering would be accepted that the aim might be reached,
for that which is not desirable in itself to benevolence could
only be allowed in order to the ends of benevolence, and in
the smallest degree possible.
Again, if it should be known to God that the greatest possi
ble good would be secured by creating beings who would all
of them suffer in some degree forever, but the good of whose
being would vastly transcend their suffering and be somehow
conditioned by it, infinite benevolence might prompt him to
create them. But the suffering, not being chosen for its own
sake, could only be introduced in the smallest possible degree,
and for the sake of a transcendent good. The attainment' of
the good would be the only aim of benevolence, but suffering
would be accepted by it as an unavoidable incident.
Again, if it should be known to God that the greatest possi
ble good of some beings could be promoted by some suffer
ings of some other beings, infinite benevolence might proceed
upon a plan that would involve the suffering of some for the
sake of the good of others. Thus the good of the infant
might be conditioned on the suffering of the mother.
Again, if the Infinite saw that for the attainment of the
highest possible good of any being it was necessary that he
should be so constituted and so posited that he might possibly
by a free act of his own miss of his good and incur great mis
ery, and if he should know that out of a vast number of such
beings some would plunge themselves into misery, he might
be compelled on the principle of pure benevolence to create

Goodness of God. 243
such beings ; nor would the misery of those who had equal
chances with the others cloud his benevolence, even if the
misery should be unmitigated and should last forever.
Again, infinite benevolence might create beings whose good
should bean attainable prize, and who, to reach it, would have
to undergo some suffering.
Again, infinite goodness might create beings who, by wick
edly refusing to attain their good by submitting to some suf
fering, should be punished with the loss of the good which was
in their reach, and with greater suffering than would have been
required to reach it. If, for the interests of the ultimate greatest
good of the whole, such infliction of suffering on the incorrigi
bly rebellious should need to be perpetual, it would not be in
consistent with infinite benevolence that it should be so, only
so that the sufferings were not greater in measure than the
interests of good required.
Again, infinite love is not inconsistent with infinite displeas
ure against acts and beings who interfere with the attainment
of its ends — it might exist. The principle of wrath is a modifi
cation of the principle of love. The same impulse which makes
good a cherished end makes that which prevents it an object
of resentment in the same degree — it is energetic action in two
directions, for the good and against the evil.
Again, it is not contrary to infinite benevolence that some
beings should have capacities and opportunities for good which
others do not enjoy, or that some should have peculiar liabili
ties or experiences. Such a circumstance does not imply more
love in the one case than in the other. Such a difference, either
in races or individuals, may be necessary integers in a universal
economy of infinite love. The only requisite is that no individ
ual or race shall be unduly limited or exposed, and that such
good as they are made capable of be secured to them in the best
possible manner, and that each in its place have the measure

244 Studies in Theology.
of good which universal benevolence allots it. It is not a
partiality inconsistent with love that some creatures are beasts,
some men, some angels, though thereby some have a capacity
of good which others do not have, and that some are exposed
to evil from whicli the others are secured. It cannot be shown
that love requires a dead-level uniformity or shuts up the In
finite to a single allotment for every being. Precisely the same
measure of love may place two beings in different conditions.
Again, infinite benevolence does not require that all races
should be regarded with the same kind of affection. He may
love men more than he does beasts, as he may feel toward one
man differently from the feeling which he has for another, the
difference being caused by the freely chosen characters of the
men themselves. In the former case he makes the difference
himself by creating the grounds of it in making beings of dif
ferent capacities. In the latter case the creature makes the dif
ference by himself creating the grounds of it. Thus love may
originally discriminate in the matter of its favors without ceas
ing to be love, and it may subsequently discriminate by reason
of a free creature's action without ceasing to be love.
But infinite benevolence could not arrange a system to pro
duce suffering as an ultimate end. It could not create any be
ing simply that it might suffer. It could not inflict sufferings
on some beings for the wrongs of others, though it might per
mit the wrongdoing of one to bring suffering on the other. It
could not inflict sufferings on a being for his own wrongs with
undue measure and severity. It could not perpetuate an exist
ence simply for the purpose of inflicting suffering upon it.
Suffering must, if it exist at all, be means to good, and to a good
not otherwise attainable ; or it must be the outcome of abuse
of good ; or it must be inflicted as penalty for wrong, to main
tain an economy which has good at its end.
These principles we believe to be all maintainable and sound,

Goodness of God. 245
and they show how suffering may be corporate in a system of love
without fault of any kind, anywhere, and how other forms of
suffering may be interjected into an economy of infinite love,
without detriment to the love which establishes the economy it
self, so that sufferings in the universe are not, in themselves con
sidered, any proof that the Founder is not infinitely benevolent.
There are forms of good which the infinite wisdom and power
of God can infallibly secure. They are wholly within his im
mediate control. If these stood alone any failure would imply
want of benevolent purpose on his part, and were such failure
discovered it might justly cloud his love. It is possible that he
could have made beings capable of a degree of enjoyment and
without any liability to suffering whatever ; at least it would
seem possible ; we do not know that it is impossible ; but such
a creation could only be on the plane of sensational enjoyment
and under the conditions of necessity. The system might have
been so organized, so perfectly adjusted, that every object would
please and the enjoyment be perpetual, and, so far as we see,
eternal. If such a form of good would have met the highest
ideal of his love, then might there never have been pain or suffer
ing of any kind. The earth might have been so adjusted that it
would have been eternal summer, and living things might have
been so constituted and environed that they would have drunk
in only ecstasy and exuberance of life, and the anthem of peace
and content might have rolled on forever. There need have
been no births, no deaths, no hunger, no want, no care, no fear,
no unsatisfied desire, no freezing cold, no scorching heat, no
desert wastes, no destructive tempests or desolating earth
quakes, no subtle poisons, no disturbing humors or fretting
nerves or ferocious tempers. For aught that we can see He who
had power to create might have spread forth creation over the
same wide areas of space as he has chosen to occupy with just
such conditions of universal enjoyment.

246 Studies in Theology.
But if his benevolence should demand a higher type of good,
the happiness which springs of virtue, then he must create a
different kind of beings, free, intelligent, self-conscious persons.
And if he create these he must put from himself the power
of excluding suffering. The necessities which accompany this
new form of existence may not only make it possible for it
to suffer, but may even require that, for its development and
discipline, by which alone its end may be reached, a general
order or economy of suffering, extending through all creation,
for a time may be necessary. Thus suffering, in some degree
and form, extending from and including the Creator himself,
down through all ranks of being, may be a necessary concomi
tant of any moral creation whatever. Having determined that
benevolence demands the good of moral beings — the happiness
which springs from virtue — the means thereto must be pro
vided ; that is, a universe constructed, in its inanimate parts, such
that sensate existence within it, and under its order, may be in
a degree of suffering, liable to want, and under the law of a
transitory existence, having in it some pain and ultimate death.
If the discipline requisite to establish a commonwealth of
such virtuous beings demanded this as the only method, then be
nevolence would require that it should be adopted. If the end
might be reached by adopting several methods, and this among
them, then still there would have to be some world where this
method would be tried.
It is not impossible that infinite wisdom discerns that several
methods are required by which to attain the ultimate end of
the highest good for universal consciousness or welfare. The
history enacting on our planet may be but one among many
ways in actual operation by which the end is being reached.
And by possibility it may be influential and conservative over
vast realms where the economy is different. There may be
orders untouched by moral defection, because of sin and suffer-

Goodness of God. 247
ing and redemption, which broke forth under the system of
probation here enacted. If infinite benevolence demanded a
moral realm, and the peculiar good which it makes possible, and
if to secure that a probation similar to that here initiated, with
its foreseen outcome, was necessary as a possibility and certain
as a fact, then infinite goodness would dictate that the plan
should be adopted.
The only thing necessary to infinite goodness is that it pro
pose to itself the highest ultimate good possible, and that it
freely adopt the wisest way or ways by which to reach it. This
will preclude all needless sufferings of any kind, and it will re
duce all suffering to the minimum, and carry all welfare to the
maximum of possibility.
There can be no doubt, there is no doubt, that the bliss of
holy virtue is the highest conceivable good, and that the effort
to attain it is the highest possible aim and expression of good
ness. Let us suppose that this is the ultimate aim of God, that
all things are in order to it, is it possible to conceive any greater
reach of love ? To this end he creates spirits, who may know
him, who may love him, who may be conscious of his love,
who may by a free election obey him, who in obedience may
forever grow in power and worthiness, who may enter into his
plans and emulate his goodness, who may in the fellowship of
his life and mutual fellowship of good will and holy offices of
affection among themselves to all eternity grow in happiness.
Suppose that in order to this he places them in a probation of
temporary struggle, in which they must suffer some, but with
the hope and promise of a blessed outcome ; suppose that the
general economy of such a probation should involve just such
a world as this, with inferior races conditioned just as those
are about us; suppose that some should be ungrateful and
abuse their great opportunity, would the immeasurable great
ness of his love be any the less conspicuous ? Would not the

248 Studies in Theology.
idea and effort be worthy of infinite benevolence ? This is pre
cisely what we understand to be the fact in the case. The effort
costs suffering, it may be, and possibly the greatest of all to
the infinite heart which makes it. The sufferings prove the
love, for they are only permitted and endured for the sake of
the end.
It remains that we examine the facts in the light of these
principles and see if there be anything known which absolutely
contradicts the idea of the infinite benevolence of God, or if it
is possible for us to think him in any other or different view.
Beginning with the inanimate creation, do we find any light
shed from hence on the problem ? It must be answered with
out hesitation that, in itself considered, if there were nothing
else, it reveals nothing but power guided by ingenuity ; there is
neither wisdom nor goodness in the display if it serve no end
of good. There is no wisdom in it if it be sole, since, consid
ered simply in itself, it serves no useful end ; and there can be
no kindness in that which is not profitable to a useful end.
There is no goodness manifested, since there is no good secured,
and that which has no good in it cannot manifest goodness in
its cause. If there be any good, therefore, in the existence of
the vast inanimate universe it must be in that it serves some end
of good out of and beyond itself; and that end of good beyond
itself displays the goodness of its Cause, since it supposes him
to create it for the sake of the good to which it is meant. Its
adaptation to the end proclaims his wisdom, as the end itself
proclaims his goodness. Thus both wisdom and goodness are
revealed in the inanimate creation as a system of means to wise
and beneficent ends.
Three points immediately emerge: {a) What are the ends
for which the inanimate creation exists ? (5) Are the ends bene
ficial ? (c) Are the means well adapted ?
The end for which the inanimate creation exists is apparent

Goodness of God. 249
in the end it serves. It exists not simply as a mass of inorganic
matter, but a mass ingeniously arranged into a system. The
arrangement displays marvelous skill as well as power. It is
pervaded by forces which act according to fixed and permanent
laws — electrical, magnetic, thermal, luminiferous, chemical.
These, together with the all-pervading laws of cohesive attraction
and gravitation, give it form, order, beauty, and regularity of
motion and position — stable and permanent harmony. The vast
worlds float in an infinite ocean of impalpable ether ; radiant
and tempered atmospheres fan their surfaces ; central 6ims
lighten and warm dependent planets ; aqueous floods pour
from their caverns and run along their valleys and gather into
seas and oceans in their broad basins; solar fervors vaporize
them, and the winds carry the fleecy clouds again over the con
tinents, and they return in showers over the wide surfaces of
the thirsty land. Nothing could exceed the magnificence of
the spectacle, but it is lifeless. Is it also meaningless ? So it
would have been had there been nothing more. But we soon
discern that all its deft arrangements are prophecies of yet
higher wonders. It is not an end. Every atom and each force
point onward. Life stirs in it. The inorganic furnishes the
condition for the organic. It covers itself with verdure' as
with a garment. Still, were this all we should have but mean
ingless display. We have reached no end of good — it reveals
no adequate purpose. There is proof of power, skill, taste,
adaptation, order, harmony, but absence of any good. It is im
possible that it should rest here. These succulent compounds
do not grow for nothing. The prophecy is soon explained. The
air and earth and seas teem with hungry life. The earth has
been spreading a table for them. They are ecstatic. The mys
tery of the inorganic mass is cleared up. It was for the sup
port of exultant life. Had the program ended here it would
have intimated something more than mere artistic inspiration.

250 Studies in Theology.
In the Cause we should detect some generous impulse. He
must have meant some good when he planted such ecstasy.
But the revelation is still unsatisfactory. There is too much
expenditure for such an end. The portico is disproportioned
to the building. There has been too much preparation for the
outcome. There is more display than value. It could not be
that the ultimate end should be reached at such a point, but it
does appear that the entire inorganic creation was a complex of
means to an end, and well and wisely adapted to it ; it was not
meaningless, therefore. We advance one step further. A
new type of life appears. In some respects it is not new. It
has a general resemblance to the life which has flourished for
ages. But in fact it is radically different. It owns everything.
Its first act is to lay claim to the universe. It says, "My
Father made all these things for me." We have unmistakably
reached the end of all inferior life and the whole inanimate
structure. Throughout it is a system of means to the develop
ment and welfare of this crowning work. It is the regal heir
— the child. From it we must interpret all. There is no in
stinct deeper or wider than this. The universe was made for
man and beings of his type. He stands forth as lord. The
regnant qualities are in him. He has dominion. He subdues
and subjugates all things to his service. He commands, regu
lates, and possesses all. For him the sun shines. For him life
flourishes. For him the mines are stored. For him are the
gems and precious metals and ores. For him are the lessons of
wisdom, beauty, love. For him is the consciousness of dignity,
worth, responsibility. For him is the power of knowledge,
virtue, freedom. For him is hope, foresight, wisdom. For
him is the power to transcend his present surroundings in time
and space, to live in the past and future and distant. For him
is insight into the causes, nature, and purpose of things. For
him is the invisible and intangible. For him are endless progress

Goodness of God. 251
and immortal growth. For him is the power to know and
worship and love the infinite Father, and enter into the fellow
ship of his thoughts and feeling and life. It is impossible that
there should be any more ultimate end. We have reached in
the child the grand climax of infinite power, wisdom, and love.
The infinite Father can propose nothing beyond this. The
training, complete development, and highest welfare of his
princely offspring must henceforth be the ultimate object of all
his activity forever and ever. He will do nothing contrary to
it. He will order all things to its accomplishment. Therein
shall be seen the measure of the Father's love, and it shall
appear forever and ever that creation is a simple expression
of love.
But the movement is eternal. The end is not reached per
saltum. To attain the complete possession of his inheritance
the child must pass through a period of training. His faculties
must be matured and developed by hardy exercise. His virtues
must ripen by trial. His good of happiness must spring from
worthiness. He must win his crown to enjoy it. He could not
else deserve his Father's approval or his own. The way to his
ultimate throne is dutiful obedience. To reign he must serve.
To enjoy he must first suffer.
This fact will explain the circumstances of his earthly condition
— both of his own suffering and the suffering creation about him.
The earth was fitted up, not as his ultimate home, but as his train
ing school, the gymnasium of his probation. Nothing of it enters
into his final life but the results in his character. Nothing of
it was designed for permanence, but simply as means to an end.
Everything in it is transient, destined to serve an end and pass
away. If this view be correct the suffering and death of the
inferior races are to be viewed as corporate parts of the benev
olent system. They are not accidents, but original provisions,
justified by the end they serve. It is impossible to show that
19 *

252 Studies in Theology.
they are in any proper sense evils, that is, that a higher good
could be secured to the universe if they were abolished. No
reason can be assigned why immortality of the inferior races
would be a boon, why death to them should be considered a
calamity. No one can show that it is not a good that of such
races one should subsist upon another; that one generation
should be removed to make way for another. No one can
show that the plan adopted for their propagation and destruc
tion is not on the whole the best possible. No one can show
that the plan under which they exist implies any malevolence
toward them, or any want of benevolent regard for them, in
the degree in which they are proper objects of benevolence.
Suffering and pain are incidents of arrangements for happi
ness. Happiness was the object, pain is the incident. The
provision for happiness is at its maximum, the liability to
pain at its minimum. Death is not less benignant than life.
The same love that devised the former appointed the latter.
It is impossible to find a single arrangement in the whole
realm of life which does not have for its primary end the
good of the organism in which it is found. That the inciden
tal suffering might have been avoided, and the sum total of
good increased, no one is able to prove. On the contrary, it is
certain that the fact of suffering, in many cases, conduces to the
greatest good as means to ends. Famines and pestilences and
earthquakes are not proofs of malice, nor yet of impotence.
They are increments of an economy which in the sum total
is indicative of measureless power and measureless love.
Neither the liability nor the fact of either could be eliminated
and the proof of goodness thereby be strengthened or in
creased. The abolishment of death and attendant pains would
not necessarily heighten the proof of love ; nor does it appear
that the method could be changed in any way to the advantage
of the creature. To a mind capable of taking in the whole

Goodness of God. 253
case of life and sentient existence it does not appear probable
a change in any respect could be suggested that would im
prove the evidence that love presides over all. There may be
benefits accompanying the economy of pain in all the forms in
which it exists, and death itself, among mere sentient creatures,
which could not be equaled were they excluded. It must be
remembered that mere power is not the only attribute exer
cised in conditioning good. There are forms of good which
no amount of abstract power or power alone can secure, and
this may be true of mere sentient enjoyment as really as of
moral delights. To enjoy, sentient creatures must exist, and
under certain conditions. There is no reason to doubt that the
actual conditions are not selected and determined because they
are the very best possible. That in them which works limita
tion and interruption is not proof of either defect of love or
wisdom or power. If the Infinite were adequate to devise a
universe in which neither pain nor death could exist, and
unceasing enjoyment would result from the permanence of
life, and if infinite power could make the device a reality,
which may or may not be true, it is not perfectly certain that
infinite love could choose it in preference to the present order.
The outcome of infinite ages might show the method actually
adopted the best. We do not doubt it will so appear.
When, now, we turn from the inferior races to man, the
problem becomes still more involved. Here we encounter the
same evils as are found in the inferior races, but also others
of much more serious nature. How can this be explained ?
We have reached a realm now where we can speak much more
nnderstandingly of what suffering is, and how it stands related
to God, than we were able to do when we were considering
the case of the inferior races. The sufferer here is of a very
different being from the -sufferer there. The sufferings are of
a very different kind. The problem takes on new elements.

254 Studies in Theology.
Mere pain to a man is more than it is to a beast. The great
evil that happened is sin, and the sufferings which spring from
it. It is common to connect all human suffering with sin, and
on that ground to explain the problem of suffering. It as
sumes that had there been no sin there would have been no
suffering. Man is made the sole source of his own suffering,
and God is exculpated. It is assumed that his benevolent plan
for man entirely excluded suffering of every kind. We do not
believe that truth lies in the direction of this theory, or that it
has any warrant whatever, either from reason or revelation.
Into human life has come two kinds of suffering, and their
sources are different— one class corporate with the nature of
man emanating directly from God in creation or constitution ;
another class issuing from man's sin, and of which he alone is
the guilty cause, but both arising under the government of
God, though in different ways.
Would there have been any suffering for man had he not
sinned, and if so, what ? And how would such suffering affect
the question of the infinite benevolence of God ?
That man, in common with all sentient life, would have
been liable to, and would actually have experienced, the forms
of suffering incident to such natures, we do not for a moment
doubt ; and that he would have experienced some higher forms
of suffering we find it as little possible to disbelieve. He was
connected with, and part of, a suffering system. The body
with which he was clothed was not simply an instrument for
use and help, to the development of his deeper self, but it
ministered to that end by opening to him certain avenues of
suffering. It prompted to pleasures and awakened desires
which must be repressed. It was thus that he came under the
conditions of probation, and was enabled to realize personal
worthiness, or virtue, or righteousness, or holiness, and the
ultimate high bliss which constitutes his real good as a moral

Goodness of God. 255
being. His body was an instrument by which, being sensitive,
he was able to avoid things harmful to his life ; but that it
might accomplish that end its sensitivity must take on suffering.
It is in its very nature an open avenue to pain. It exists under
conditions in which pain is inevitable. Its pains are part of a
system of means to higher ends. Mere pain is not in itself nec
essarily an evil. It may be conservative of good. It is a vain
thing to attempt to extricate man from the physical system of
which he is a part, so far forth as he is a part.
No more, we think, can it be reasonably doubted that there
are forms of suffering to which his higher nature is open, such
as an uneasy sense of limitations, unrealized and at present un
realizable desires, possible forms of emotion ; all of which were
incidents of a probationary state and occasions of good.
That nnsinning humanity would have been wholly free,
therefore, from the common sufferings of sentient existence in
the instrumental organism, and even in the higher nature, does
not appear probable to reason, and is nowhere implied in rev
elation. Nor is there any occasion of doubt of the infinite
benevolence of God on account of the fact of such suffering.
There is no occasion to attempt to find any reason for it apart
from his direct and simple purpose. There is no such evil in
it as to reflect upon his goodness. It needs no apology. But
there are aggravations of suffering which are penal, and these
must be ascribed to abuse of good for which the Author of
nature cannot in justice be held responsible, except as pro
viding for their possibility and as not preventing them. The
justification must take into account the full extent of the evil.
There are those who look upon sin as a trivial thing — a mis
take of erring creatures whose evils are small and transient,
mere incidents in the progress from lower to higher stages of
existence. The outcome, they believe, will be a permanently
holy and perfectly happy universe. To such the reconciliation

256 Studies in Theology.
is not difficult. The whole is resolved into the discipline of
love, as means to ends. The end justifies the means, on the
ground that the end can be reached in no other way. If the
outcome could be admitted the justification would be com
plete. But it does not appear that such will be the outcome.
Sin, in fact, to the view of reason and revelation both, seems
to be a deadly evil, not only blighting this world by spreading
temporary ruin and woe over the hearts and hopes of men, but
also projecting its fell shadow over eternity and desolating
many souls with final and eternal curse. The evil is not tem
porary, but eternal — not disciplinary, but penal and destruc
tive. Its hell is not a reformatory prison, from which its
unfortunate wards are to come forth purified by wholesome
cultus into the estate and happiness of virtue, but a dungeon
whose doors never open and whose victims have no prospect
of release. The problem must be as it is — a universe with an
eternal heaven for some souls, and an eternal hell for others.
How can such a state of facts be reconciled to the idea that its
Author is an infinitely benevolent being to all his creatures
alike, and without respect of persons ? It must be confessed
that the problem is difficult of solution. It is not diminished
when it is viewed in the light of prescience, as a well-known
and certain result when the scheme was projected. The the
ory that it was not only foreknown, but f oreappointed, makes
it appalling. What is the defense ? In general it is that sin
and all concomitant curse is an evil which God did not desire,
did in no sense cause, did in every proper way strive to pre
vent. It is here not by his consent, but against his positive
prohibition. It is not of his origination, but an inimical and
alien force. It is not a part of his scheme, but an enemy to it.
It is neither an end nor means of his. His universe did not
include it, as a necessary or desirable part. It serves no pur
pose of his, and is in no proper sense of him. The only sense

Goodness of God. 257
in which he is responsible for it is that he created beings with
such powers that they might produce it, and with the knowl
edge that they would, at the same time that it was declared
to be against his will that they should do so. Why did he,
then, create them ? If he did not desire sin why did he give
existence to creatures whom he knew would cause it and its
train of evils? Does he not thereby become the de facto
author of it, despite his protests to the contrary ? We do not
desire to evade the difficulty if we cannot relieve it. It is
one which we are all equally interested to study with honest
candor and humble self-distrust. We have no other desire
than to get at the truth, or as nearly as is possible to our finite
faculties. We know that he did create the universe, and that sin has
smitten it. These are facts, and must be accepted as such by
all. We cannot doubt his love or mistrust his wisdom and
power. Its presence, therefore, must be reconcilable to these
perfections, and all are alike interested to work out the recon
ciliation. He either did, or did not,, desire it ; did, or did not,
cause it. That he did in any proper sense cause or wish it we
find it on all accounts impossible to believe. Could he not,
then, have prevented it ? We are constrained to believe that
he could. He might have created just such a universe as now
exists, moral beings excepted. In that event sin would have
had no existence. He might have varied creation so as to
include other orders and kinds of being, capable of high
degrees of good, and still have left out the possibility of sin
from his plan. Possibly he might have made a moral universe
on such a plan that sin would not have arisen. We cannot fix
metes and bounds to possibilities with him. In determining
on a plan of creation all possible concepts were present with
him, however, and that which he did choose was chosen, we
must believe, because his love accepted it as the best. That

258 Studies in Theology.
which he did choose had the possibility and foreknown cer
tainty of sin in it, which to him was an objection to it, but he
preferred it, despite the objectionable portion, to any other
possible plan that did not include sin ; and the reason that his
love preferred it was that it was less objectionable, or more
desirable, with sin included, than any other possible plan was
with sin excluded — more acceptable to love with sin, because
it would reach a greater good, despite it, than could be reached
in any other system excluding it. If it were possible to make
moral beings who would certainly never sin, it would seem to
be best to make some who certainly would sin, not because it
was better they should sin than not sin — this we are certain is
not the case — but because he saw that it would be better they
should exist, even though they would sin than that they
should not exist to prevent them from sinning. Sin was not
desired, but their existence with attendant good was the thing
desired, even though to give it sin must be possible.
Having admitted that possibly a moral universe might have
been projected under such conditions that sin never would
arise, we desire now to call attention to the fact that no such
creation could be projected without the possibility of sin ; and
we add further, without the probability and de facto certainty
of sin, unless the conditions should be such as greatly to limit
its extent and the degree and kind of its virtues.
This must appear if we consider what idea we attach to the
term moral being. A moral being is one who is endowed with
intelligence, conscience, and free will ; who knows a law ; who
perceives its authority, and who has power to obey or disobey
it. It is impossible to have a moral being without these con
stituent elements. Wherever moral beings are found, there
fore, the possibility of recreance to law, or of sin, must exist.
A moral nature might be so constituted and posited as to make
the chances as a thousand to one that it would pursue a course

Goodness of God. 259
of unvarying rectitude, and, vice versa, a thousand to one that
it would go astray. What would be the relative degree of vir
tue or sin we may not be able to determine. Infinite wisdom
and love, if they exist in the Creator, must adjust the plan, in
view of the single question, What, on the whole, taking the scale
of eternity and the greatest number of moral consciousnesses,
is the best ? It might be best that the relative security of moral
races should differ ; that some should be so circumstanced as to
make the chances greatly in favor of their standing, and others
so circumstanced as to be more in danger of falling ; but in no
case could love permit the necessity of wrong-going, or the trial
to integrity to be out of proportion to the power invested in the
subject to withstand any possible temptation. The self -super
induced ruin of one might be the occasion of the safety of a
thousand. That being a possibility, love might dictate the ac
ceptance of that plan as preferable to any other. Nor let it be
said that the supposition is equivalent to the supposition that
sin is itself chosen, Or a good. The plan provides for its non
existence. The Author of the plan would prefer its nonexist
ence. It, under the plan, might not exist. That it does exist
is fault of a free being, who was obliged by provision of law
against it. He is its guilty author. He breaks his Maker's law
and brings curse that but for him would have no existence.
But now that he sins and evokes curse his Maker will extract
from his crime a virtue of influence which will fix the alle
giance of a thousand worlds. The walls of his prison shutting
him in shall be converted into walls of defense against others
coming to the same fate. Not a particle more love in the case
is shown to the saved than lost. The same love gave being to
each — planned in the same manner for the good of each —
desired in the same measure the good of each. That one is
destroyed is his own fault, when his opportunity to escape
destruction differed in no respect from that of him who did

260 Studies in Theology.
escape. If his voluntary ruin is subordinated by love to
purposes of defense and protection, that circumstance would
furnish only another proof that love works to the uttermost
against evil of every kind. The result of all that we can know
in the premises is that love dictated the creation as it is ; that not
to have created, or to have created something else, would
have been adverse to its dictate. The universe may not be,
presumably is not, the best conceivable to infinite wisdom,
but the best possible. It would have been better, we cannot
doubt, the best conceivable, projected on the present plan, if the
necessarily included possible sin had never become actual; but
it is better with sin than any other possible would be without
it. And though sin is an evil, fearful and great, infinite love
and wisdom offset it, to as great an extent as possible, by mak
ing it the occasion of a manifestation of most glorious attributes
which possibly might else have not found expression in the
same degree. It is possible that out of evil, which the Infinite
never could have desired, or caused as means, and which exists
against his will, he may yet adduce a good more than counter
balancing. It is certain that the result will be so glorious, de
spite the foil, that it will reflect infinite honor on every attri
bute of the infinitely perfect Author. The evil itself, in his
relations to it, will praise rather than dishonor him. By being
shown to be an abuse of his love it will be an eternal witness
to it. The infinite glory and happiness of those who reach the
end his love devised will forever testify to the love he bore for
all, even the lost, since it was his plan that all should attain to
the same bliss, and since he made it as possible for those who
fail as for those who succeed, furnishing them the same means,
and discriminating in nothing against them. Their failure will
recoil upon their own head, and it will be seen that for their
ruin they are themselves the only and guilty cause. They will
feel, and the universe will know, that their hapless lot is not for

Goodness of God. 261
that they were unloved, but that they crucified love. Love
opened heaven to them, invited them, died in sacrifice to win
them. They spurned the offer and, self-doomed, are excluded.
Love crowned them with blessings ; they turned the blessings
into curses.
But it is said since it was preknown that they would so de
stroy themselves love should have withheld the boon of exist
ence from any ; that it would have been better there should
have been no heaven than that any should be excluded from it ;
that, if in order to secure the happiness of many, some must be
permitted to destroy themselves, it would have been better that
the many should not have been created ; that heaven might bet
ter be blotted out than hell be a possibility ; that the raptures
of millions of angels had better be hushed than that one should
wail amid shades of woe. Who dare say that reason and con
science so affirm ? Must love extinguish the bliss of myriads of
holy and noble spirits, who might enrich eternity with their
raptures, because it is powerless, with all its ministries, to rescue
some from self -superinduced destruction? Would it be love
that should do such a deed ?
But is it said that in any event love should have withheld
being from such as it was foreknown would prove unworthy of
the boon, and have conferred it only where it would certainly
be rightly used ? If that were possible we do not doubt its
preferableness; love would have been moved thereto ; but what
if it were known to God that the very system which he has
adopted contains in it the minimum of failures and the maxi
mum of successes ? What then would have been the dictates of
love ? Who dare say that it is not so ? Does not the mani
fest love everywhere displayed warrant the belief that it is so ?
If, under any system, some will be lost, may we not reasonably
suppose that the accepted system is that which contains the
smallest number ?

262 Studies in Theology.
But is it said that at least those who show themselves un
worthy should be extinguished and their sin and woes termi
nate at once and forever ? Who is capable to determine that
such a course would be productive of greater good than that
they should continue to exist, as monuments of evil and sin ?
May we not reasonably believe that He who can only be actuated
by love will use utmost influence to limit the evils of sin and
suffering to the smallest extent possible, so that not a single
pang will be allowed to remain that by any possibility of love
might have been excluded ? Surely all that can be known of
Jehovah warrants this assuring belief.
There are peculiar phases of God's lovingness which merit
especial mention. If, primarily and generically, it is universal
good will and unchanging disposition to promote welfare it as
sumes special forms according as its objects vary in character
and condition.
For the good and deserving it adds to the desire of welfare,
and as a special means thereto, the manifestations of complai-
sancy and delight. It flows forth in benedictions. It admits
to fellowship. It communicates joy. It warms and vivifies
and exalts and ennobles its object. It feels and expresses affec
tion. Such is God's love for all pure and holy beings. They
are his " beloved," dear as the " apple of his eye," " engraved
on his hands," "precious in his sight," his "friends," "his de
lights are with them," " he dwells with them;" he uses all
terms of endearment and approval and confidence, and fills
them with exalting and rapturous sense of his regard for them ;
they are always in his thought, and are his dear children; he
guards and watches them, and when sorrows and trials menace
them he sends his angels to camp about them and comes him
self to comfort and support them ; he is tender of them and
bears them in his bosom ; he has built a beautiful heaven for
them, and will bring them away from all griefs and hardships

Goodness of God. 263
to live with himself forever and ever. So his love is for the
good. In the Scripture it is called grace — gracious favor, as
importing its freeness and fullness and spontaneity — the over
flow of infinite love to a finite creature — condescension.
For the undeserving and wicked who must always necessarily,
to an infinitely holy God, be objects of disfavor and wrath,
paradoxical as it may seem, love assumes another form. It
cannot be complaisant ; it is impossible it should approve ; it is
grieved and wounded. It assumes the form of pity and com
passion. It entreats. It 'seeks. It longs to save and secure.
It is fecund of arts to win. It restrains wrath. It stays the
blow of punishment. " It is long-suffering and kind." It is
willing to forgive slights and injuries. It is a father waiting
at the gate for the returning prodigal.
For the penitent it is " joy among the angels of God ; " it is
the smile of acceptance, the balm of forgiveness; its hands
hold out pardons ; its tongue pronounces peace ; it kisses the
prodigal ; its name is Mercy ; it spreads a feast of rejoicing ;
it puts a ring on the hand and robes on the person of the
returned prodigal, and says to him, "Thy sins, which were
many, are all forgiven. Go in peace."
Such is God's love through earth and sky: approval and
benedictions for the good ; compassion for the suffering ;
patience and long-suffering for the wicked ; mercy and pardon
for the penitent. " God is love." But these are not the only
forms of infinite love. There are that will not hear the plead
ings of love ; that grow more wicked because of its tenderness ;
that glory in their sin; that, living and dying, will never
repent. Compassion fails, patience waits in vain, long-suffer
ing is of no avail ; all means are abortive, and it becomes evi
dent that repentance is clear gone forever. What shall love
do now ?
There is but one thing left ; it must give place to retribu-

264 Studies in Theology.
tion. Nor does it cease to be love in doing this. It cannot
longer prevent punishment, but the stroke is permitted and
administered by love. The good of being at large prompts
the individual retribution. To withhold the blow would be
recreance to love. Hell itself is a monument of love. It is
the prison house love builds for the protection of those who
deserve the shelter. A father is none the less a loving father
when his kisses turn to blows if the blows are administered in
the interests of good. Just wrath is but incensed love.

Justice of God. 265

JUSTICE OF GOD.
Akin to the goodness of God is his justice. In the last
analysis they are one. Justice is but a modification of love —
love in one of its primitive and most fundamental aspects. It
is that form of love which respects rights. In God it is that
disposition which makes it impossible that he should be recon
ciled to wrong, or fail to punish it, or exact the equivalent of
punishment, and which makes it impossible that he should not
love right and defend and recompense it. It involves the per
fect concept of right, and so is akin to wisdom. Love and
wisdom are the primaries. Justice is the union of the two.
It binds the divine nature to allegiance to their joint dictates,
and is the realized essence of his righteousness. It is impos
sible that, being absolutely wise, knowing all things, and abso
lutely good, having in his essential being nothing contrary to
love, he should not be absolutely just. Many brief definitions
have been attempted ; as Stapfer defines it, " Goodness di
rected by wisdom." The idea could not be better compendi
ously expressed. That is as nearly as possible its essence — the
last thought of goodness regulated by wisdom, with respect to
rights and welfare. The definition of Cudworth, expanded, is
its exact equivalent, " Goodness administered by law ; " law be
ing the embodiment of wisdom. Knapp reaches the same in
substance : " That attribute by which God actively exhibits his
approbation of what is good, and his disapprobation of what
is evil." Justice in essence is thus the approval of what love
and wisdom determine ought to be, and in administration it is
the unchangeable and perfect application of the principle.
Dr. Lord succinctly states the more common distinctions,

266 Studies in Theology.
which ages of discussion have elicited on the subject. He
says :
" The two most general distinctions which have been made
touching the justice of God are those which resolve it into the
absolute and the relative, {a) By the absolute justice of God
is meant the perfect rectitude of his own infinite nature, or of
all that is in himself, {b) By his relative justice is meant the
perfect rectitude of all the actings of his nature with reference
to creatures and events throughout the universe.
" Theologians have divided the relative justice of God into
the rectoral, distributive, commutative, retributive, and punitive.
" {a) The rectoral justice of God is his justice viewed as that
of the moral Governor of the universe, enacting righteous
laws and righteously executing them.
" {b) His distributive justice is his justice viewed as bearing
on individuals and communities, with rewards and punish
ments, according to their deserts. He distributes these on this
ground. " (c) His commutative justice is his justice viewed as chang
ing the ground of his action in any particular case, but still
maintaining every principle and claim of righteousness, as, for
instance, when God justifies the ungodly. In this case the
ground of action is not the personal righteousness of the sin
ner ; it is the righteousness of Christ imputed to the sinner.
[This Calvinistic tenet we reject.]
" {d) His retributive justice is that which dispenses rewards
and punishments. This is essentially the same with that jus
tice noted as distributive.
" {e) His punitive justice is that which inflicts punishment
on sinners."
These distinctions are not without reason as noting the vari
ous aspects of the one principle of justice in its subjective
essence and objective expression. They all point to the one

Justice of God. 267
essential idea of rights — the rules determinative of them, and
an administration enforcing them.
The summation of which is that such is the nature of God
that he cannot himself do or tolerate wrong or fail to do right ;
that his nature is the perfect standard of right. There has
sometimes been a bootless' controversy carried on as to whether
there is a standard of right to which God conforms or
whether his will creates the standard. The answer must always
be that there is no reality of any kind apart from God ; nothing
which dominates him ; but, also, that right is eternal in him,
and could not be different from what it is by any arbitrary act
of will. He no more creates it than he creates his eternity.
He has no power to change it. Were it possible for him to re
verse his own nature he would not any more be the righteous
God that he is. Righteousness dominates him as it does every
moral creature. And this is only saying that his eternal nature
is law to him, changeless and eternal.
This eternal inhering principle of justice in the divine nature
makes it impossible, except by self-renunciation, that he should
become or be unjust. Its imperative holds him immutably.
It determines his will with relation to other beings whom he
creates or might create. But since he determines himself, and is
not determined by external agency, his justice is the free move
ment of an infinitely free nature— utmost spontaneity. That
he cannot be different from what he is does not rise from want
of freedom, but from the inevitability that an infinitely perfect
being should act perfectly by spontaneity.
As the sole Author of the universe, his own essential nature
holds him to strict responsibility for it. His justice as a form of
love was a factor in deciding him to create. It is an eternal
factor in deciding what he will do in the government of his
creation. It determines the fact that he must govern. It
determines the rules and regulations of his government. It
20

268 Studies in Theology.
makes it impossible without self-renunciation that he should
require either too much or too little of his creatures ; that the
rules which he prescribes touching their relations to himself,
or touching their relations to their own personality, and to other
persons and things, should be faulty in any way, excessive, or
defective. It necessitates a perfect law as to its requirements,
for it is perfect justice— the legislation of infinite wisdom and
goodness, neither requiring too much nor too little. It requires
that the perfect rules and regulations should have suitable sanc
tions, neither excessive nor defective ; that rewards and penal
ties should be in due measure, and be faithfully and effectively
administered. It will neither allow of excuses nor escapes, but
it will take exact account of all modifying circumstances. Its
judgment will be exactly according to truth. It will in no wise
clear the guilty. It will not be partial. It will be uniform, uni
versal, and eternal. Such, we must believe, is the infinite jus
tice of God, which is but another name for infinite love in one
of its fundamental aspects and infinite wisdom in another. The
anger ascribed to God as inspiring punishment is not of the
nature of hate or evil animus. He punishes, not because he de
lights in the suffering inflicted, but because righteousness, which
is but the principle which determines and maintains right, or but
the assertion of the good — for the good is the right, and the right
is the good, and that which maintains the good is goodness —
demands it. Any other treatment would make him recreant to
goodness. There is a necessity in his nature, if he remain the
loving and wise, that he should render according to deserts ; not
to do it would be to deny his Godhead. Sin is of such a nature
that not to punish, except for such reasons as would be the equiv
alents of punishment, answering the same ends and revealing
the same character, would be to be partaker of its evil. We
shall find in another part of this discussion the circumstances
under which justice will allow of pardon.

Justice of God. 269
The sum of which is that the infinite God infinitely and per
fectly discerns what is right, and will eternally love the right,
and administer according to the right in every case in the en
tire universe forever, without flaw or possibility of mistake,
punishing where, all interests duly considered, punishment is
for the good of being ; rewarding where it is right to reward ;
and in no case violating the principle ; the right being pre
cisely as the good, as infinite wisdom discerns it and infinite
love ordains it.
It is an essential element of justice, as love regulated by wis
dom, that it should not tolerate suffering inflicted for no end of
love or in excess of the demands of love. It may be perpetual,
but it cannot be excessive, that is, more than love requires.
That in the nature of God which requires him to resent what
ever infringes the good of being does not move him to infringe
the good of being himself, but it does require him to maintain
it. The bestowment of good may be in excess of merit — may
transcend any claim of right, may emanate from mere good
ness ; but the infliction of suffering can never be in excess of,
or in opposition to, goodness.
There are bearings of the principles of justice, in relation to
the treatment of sin, which will emerge when we come to the
doctrine of atonement, which cannot be properly treated apart
from that subject.
Under the general idea of goodness, as an attribute of God,
we have found, are included the following : {a) That it denotes
an eternal affection of his nature which seeks the greatest good
of being, moving him to create and regulate the universe to that
end ; {b) that in the case of moral beings it assumes the form of
complaisancy and esteem for those who conform to the order
which works out the good of being, or the laws which are to
that end, itself being the active principle which determines the
laws ; and it assumes the form of resentment against those who

270 Studies in Theology.
maliciously violate the same laws, thereby infringing the good
of being ; (c) in the case of those who suffer from any cause
it assumes the form of compassion and pity, rendering the
helps of support and comfort when possible ; {d) in the case of
the willfully evil, along with resentment against their sin, it as
sumes the form of desire to reclaim them, and induces all pos
sible methods of redeeming agency, forbearance, long-suffering,
patience, entreaty, chastisements, sacrifice, showing that he is
unwilling that any should destroy themselves ; {e) in the case
of repentance assuming the form of forgiving mercy and regen
erating grace ; {f) in the case of the finally incorrigible assum
ing the form of punishment, administered by love for the pro
tection of the universe ; (g) in the case of the obedient working
out for them the most exalted character and bestowing upon
them the rewards of immortal blessedness. Throughout he
shows himself a God of infinite and impartial love. If what
ever is is not best, this is not so of anything he has done, or or
dered, or purposed. It is neither defect of his plan nor fault of
his disposition. Flawless, ceaseless, infinite love sits upon the
throne of the universe. " God is love." " His mercy endureth
forever." " His tender mercies are over all his works." " Jus
tice and judgment are the habitation of his throne," but it is
justice and judgment against evil. " He is a consuming fire,"
but it is only against evil. " He is angry," but his wrath kin
dles only against the wicked. He condemns and banishes and
destroys, but only the workers of iniquity. He will forever
hate sin, but his hate is but the intensity of his love of good.
He enforces love, he pronounces blessings on every act of love,
he inspires love, he is himself the eternal fountain of love. It
is because he is love that he is an avenger, that evil trembles at
the thought of him.
His love is not a mawkish sentiment against suffering. He
does not account mere suffering an evil ; he ennobles it. His

Justice of God. 271
love does not shrink from pain ; if need be he exalts it. It is
heroic ; it hurls wrath against evil. It makes no compromises.
It hews to pieces its enemies. It is " slow to anger," but when
it rises to judgment there is no escape. It waits long and
patiently, but in the last it is a terrible avenger.
As justice is love protecting and regulating rights, so mercy is
justice tempered to the feeble and erring and suffering, or a form
of love which pities and under all possible circumstances forgives.
It has relations to weakness and guilt. To the weak it is com
passionate tenderness and helpfulness ; in kind what the pitying
mother feels for the suffering and helpless child. That such
tenderness is a mode of infinite love is a most consolatory
truth. " His tender mercies are over all his works." In ways
past finding out he ministers to the broken in spirit. He ten
derly carries them in his arms. He is the gentle Shepherd.
In all their afflictions he is afflicted. He maketh all things work
together for their good. He binds up their wounds and
soothes their sorrows. He supports them with hope. When he
ministers suffering, or bruises them with sorrow, it is not
that he is hard and cruel, or unfeeling and unsympathetic,
but it is as a father chastiseth his own son. All his disci
pline of reproof and suffering is that of compassionate love,
that it may bring forth fruits unto holiness and life. He
woos and entreats and comforts. He is a Father in his holy
habitation. His tenderness and delicacy are seen in all the ar
rangements of nature, even among dumb things, in his care of
maternity for the helpless young. It is he who coos and flut
ters in the dependent nest ; hovers with sleepless vigils around
the infant's cradle; softens the voice into soothing sweetness, and
stills the footsteps into gentleness, and draws the curtain, and
smoothes the pillow, and laves the aching temple and fevered
brow in the chamber of sickness and death ; gives to the eye
tenderness and to the hand and tongue holy ministries in the

272 Studies in Theology.
presence of sorrow and misfortune. " A Father of the father
less and husband of the widow " is God in his holy habitation.
To the guilty it is a disposition to forgive, expressed in long-
suffering patience, in persuasions to penitence, in awakening
reproofs, in provisions of grace, in atoning sacrifice. In this
case it takes the name of mercy. Mercy is not unjust, and
justice is not unmerciful. They are but reverse phases of the
6ame attribute. An unmerciful God would be an unjust God,
and an unjust God would be an unmerciful God. Redemption
by the gift unto suffering and death of his only Son is an eter
nal monument of infinite mercy and also of his justice. He
proclaims himself, as his dearest name, " the Lord God gracious
and merciful, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity
and transgression and sin." He inspires the faith of this in
every human heart. Alarmed guilt flies to him with confident
hope of pardon. Only obduracy and impenitence dread his
blow. He takes to himself the name Jesus, that is " above
every name," because he will save. Judgment is a strange
work with him. He delights not in the death of him that dieth,
but would have all men turn to him and live. Punishment is
his last resort. Whatever the severity of final retribution, it
can never be unmerciful. It will still be a merciful but just
Judge in the person of a loving Father, measuring punishment
to an incorrigible child, whom not to punish would be both un
merciful and unjust. It is the universal consciousness of this
that must forever compel the moral universe to reverence his
righteous and holy throne. " Keeping mercy for thousands,
forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no
means clear the guilty," is the mystery of his reign of coequal
justice and mercy, or perfect love to all being.
Van Oosterzee says : " It must not be passed over unobserved
that this great saying [' God is love'] is met with in the utter
ance of an apostle who certainly penetrated more deeply than

Justice of God. 273
any other into the spirit of his Master ; even the form of the
expression shows more than that God may be spoken of as lov
ing and kind. Kindness and love are certainly not converti
ble terms, although the expressions are constantly interchanged.
Kindness may be shown to irrational creatures, animals, for
instance ; love can be shown only to rational beings. Kindness
has reference to well-being in general ; love, on the other hand,
has a higher aim, the development of the rational creature to
its highest good. We may be kind even to the man whom we
heartily despise ; love to such a one is possible only in so far as
we still recognize and respect human nature in him. In a
word, kindness is one of God's attributes ; but love is, properly
speaking, the nature of him who unites all these attributes
in himself; he is love himself. All his properties must be
regarded as the attributes of love, as adjectives of this peer
less substantive. God's power is thus the power of love ; God's
knowledge is the intelligence of love ; God's righteousness is
the righteousness of love, and in its manifestation simply a
means to attain to the exalted aim his love has in view. God is
himself love, and his nature is nothing but pure love, so that if
anyone would paint and set forth God he must draw such an
image as should be pure love, representing the divine nature
as the furnace and burning point of that love which fills heaven
and earth (Luther)."

274 Studies in Theology.

truth a divine attribute.
Tkuth is an attribute of God. He is himself the true God
and the only, in contradistinction to all idols and false gods.
The essence of all deific qualities is in him. He is real and per
sonal, not a mere fancy or product of human thought. He is
the most real of all beings, having the sole essence of eternal and
and necessary existence exclusively in himself. All other being
once had no existence, and might again become nonexistent.
He always was, and never can cease to be. Other beings have
no ground of existence in themselves — are but projected shad
ows, of which he is the substance and cause. If they should
vanish he would abide — the " I am." In the deepest sense he
is reality itself. As in his being he is real, so he is incapable
of shams or dissimulations or falsities of expression. He will
not deceive or fail. " His words stand fast forever, and his
counsels to all generations." " He changes not." He is immu
tably sincere. His promises and threatenings will all be fulfilled
to the last minutiae. Implicit trust may be placed in him. No
circumstance can ever arise which might make it desirable in
him to alter his purpose or deviate from the straight line of his
preconceived plan. The notable instances in which he seems
to have altered his purpose, and to have failed in his promises
and threatenings, are not exceptions in fact.
The summation of these ineffable moral perfections is abso
lute holiness. They interblend like prismatic hues in the solar
ray, or as primary colors in the rainbow, to constitute one faultless
whole— a pure and flawless unity. In him these perfections rise to
such height that no defect or dimness blurs his glory. Nothing
can be added. Nothing is wanting. " Holy, holy, holy, Lord

Tkuth a Divine Attribute. 275
God of hosts: heaven and earth are full of thy glory," will
be the shout of all exalted intelligences forever and ever. The
higher they rise in faculty, and the more they become cognizant
of his thought, and the deeper becomes their experience of his
plans and ways, the more they will see that in him are the
rounded and inexhaustible splendors of all perfections to utmost
eternity. Wardlaw beautifully says : " The different perfections of the
divine nature might be likened to the seven primary colors of
light, brought out as splendidly to the charmed eye when the
solar rays, refracted by the intervening shower, paint a rain
bow on the opposite clouds. Each of the colors is capable of
distinct contemplations, like each of the perfections of God.
But as all blended together constitute the pure, colorless, white
light, so do all the divine excellences, combining in lovely, har
monious, and inseparable union, constitute his holiness."
Dr. Lord says: "Though usually treated as a distinct attribute,
the holiness of God is, in fact, the result and sum of all the
divine attributes, that is, the moral. It is God's moral perfec
tion, the absolute conformity of his whole being and expression
of being to that which is right, true, and good. Not only is
he free from all moral imperfection, but he also possesses all
moral excellence in an infinite degree."
Universal, absolute, and eternal sovereignty are prerogatives
resulting from these infinite perfections. The universe belongs
to God absolutely. No being possesses anything, not existence
itself, except as a loan. The primary right is in God. The
creature holds possession simply of grace. The being conferred
is upheld by God from moment to moment. If he should with
draw his hand for an instant being itself must of necessity sink
back to nothingness — nonexistence. The question has indeed
sometimes been mooted whether existence, once conferred, has
not a standing in itself, whether continuity of support is neces-

276 Studies in Theology.
sary. It has been assumed that it might and certainly would
remain if the creative power were withdrawn ; that, in fact, it
would require an omnipotent fiat to abolish it, as much as it
did to create. The controversy is to some extent a logomachy—
a wordy dispute. The universe exists by the will of God— the
reversal or abatement of his will would remove its foundations,
and it would as necessarily perish as motion would cease when
impelling force is withdrawn. As existence is evolved by voli
tion, so its continuance is determined by volition and coexten
sive with it. Being is not only of him, but in him. All things
are thus in his hands. He is sovereign over all, and renders
no account of himself to any. He has neither counselors nor
partners of his throne. "He does always and in all things
what seemeth good in his own sight." All spirits and all atoms
and forces bow to him. The entire creation is as nothing, and
less than nothing, and vanity before him. Nothing can be more
certain than this absolute supremacy of the Almighty. Nothing
of being or power can stand against his will or out of his will.
But for the aegis of his love it would excite dismay to think of
the utter helplessness of all being — how with a single volition
in a moment of time the pillars of heaven would crumble and
all created being fade away, and only silence and emptiness
reign where worlds and angels were.
But' let us not mistake the nature of God's sovereignty, as is
sometimes done. The fact of absolute sovereignty and conse
quent nonamenability to any other being does not imply non-
restraint of law. If he imposes law upon all creatures his own
nature imposes law upon himself. The perfections which de
termine the metes and bounds of created things govern the
uncreated as well. His sovereignty is that of the infinitely per
fect. The power that sways him is subjective, immanent, moral,
the last dictate of unerring wisdom and limitless love. Abso
lutely free in its obedience, it nevertheless leads his activities un-

Truth a Divine Attribute. 277
erringly as gravitation determines the marches of the universe.
Freedom with God is not freedom of imperfection, but free
dom of perfection. He has absolute power over his own acts, as
well as over the things which he creates, but his freedom will
not do violence to his wisdom and goodness. He will forever do
right. Nor let us imagine that his absolute sovereignty implies
that he reigns over persons as he reigns over things. There
his rule is of necessity ; here it is that of liberty. There he
governs by force ; here by law over free beings and moral influ
ence. In the realm of force his will is necessity. In the realm
of mind his will is law, but not causation. His sovereignty con
sists in this, that he alone gives law and he alone administers
law. Of his own will here he gives freedom to the subject to
break or keep the law which he appoints. He acts as a sov
ereign in bestowing the liberty. It is a sovereign act by which
he creates a being who shall be free from necessity, who shall
have power to be a cause himself. His sovereignty will not inter
fere with the liberty it bestows. He, by an act of sovereignty,
puts from himself the determination what the creature's act
shall be, but he does not therefore put away his sovereignty or
release the creature from subjection and responsibility. He
may do as he lists, and he will not fetter him, but he will call
him to account. The sovereignty that will not override liberty
will demand an account of its use. The laws of the two realms
differ — the subjects differ, the modes of administration differ ;
liberty reigns here, necessity there, but the same sovereign holds
the reins of universal dominion, alike in regions where atoms
form necessitated compacts and in the realms where spirits,
self-determined, select their own pursuits and elect their own
destinies. Nor does this idea of sovereignty imply that there is any
uncertainty in events — any unforeseen exigencies — any possi
bilities of facts not anticipated and arranged for at the begin-

278 Studies in Theology.
ning. The facts of freedom, as much as those of necessity,
are perfectly under the governance of law and sovereign con
trol, the difference being that in the one case the Sovereign
exerts his power to cause the immediate event, which is to
express his will ; in the other he permits a power which he has
created to act from itself, foreseeing how it will act, and from
eternity adjusting his administration accordingly. In the lat
ter case, when the free power expresses itself freely, without
causation from him, it is acting as he created it to act —
freely ; when it disobeys his command, it is acting contrary
to his law, as to the use of power, but in accordance with
the power he bestows; foreseeing that it would so act, he
holds it under government, by subjecting it to punishment.
The sovereignty over it is strict and perfect, but it is the
sovereignty of law for free beings, and not of force for neces
sary beings.
It must be obvious that so soon as we depart from this idea
of sovereignty, and adopt the idea that sovereignty implies the
sway of absolute causational force, directing all events, we
abolish freedom from the universe.
The sum of our conclusions thus reached shows that there is
perfect harmony between the teachings of the Bible and the
deepest reaches of human reason. The God set forth in the
former is the God demanded by the latter. There is no break
in the harmony — neither defect nor excess nor contradiction.
Reason has nothing to allege which revelation has omitted,
and will permit nothing to be removed which it has affirmed.
Neither science nor philosophy brings forward any facts or
principles which call for a modification of the divine state
ment. The wonderful fact is that after all the improvements
in knowledge, and growth of the power of expression, we still
are compelled to go to the ancient Scriptures for the truest
and richest delineation of the divine character. Neither

Truth a Divine Attribute. 279
reason nor fancy can improve the picture, by addition or sub
traction. What poet or sage has ever surpassed or equaled the
sublime predications of Moses, David, Isaiah, and others of the
ancient prophets, not to mention the more simple teachings of
Him in whom all the matchless attributes were incarnated ?
Astronomy has brought treasures of knowledge from the stars ;
geology has quarried into the bowels of the earth; metaphysics
has searched the deepest secrets of mind itself. Has any light
come from any quarter which has corrected any teaching of the
holy books ? We challenge the learning of the world to fur
nish the proof. There it stands, and must forever stand, as
impregnable as the geometric axioms, unchangeable and un-
modifiable. God is a spirit, eternal, absolute, unconditioned,
infinite, immutable, sole self -existing ; a person, intelligent,
self-conscious and self -determining ; omniscient, omnipotent,
omnipresent, the sole Creator in and of the universe ; abso
lutely good, just, and holy in all his principles, laws, and admin
istrative acts ; who doeth according to his own pleasure forever
and ever ; whose sovereignty is, and forever must be, one of
absolute regnancy, but regulated by love and wisdom ; whom
no one hath seen, or can see, but in whom all have their being.
In comparison with him all things are as nothing — less than
nothing — and vanity.
No thoughtful mind can think of the Almighty without
awe. The prophet of Uz well exclaimed, " When I consider,
I am afraid of him " — I stand in awe of him. " He spreadeth
out the heavens as a tent to dwell in " (Job xxiii, 15 ; Isa.
xl, 22). In vain we strive to reach the height of the great
theme ; words and even thought fail us. The awful solitude
and majesty of his being overwhelm us. We cannot but find
relief in adoring wonder, and in the more comforting thought
that his majesty is our unfailing strength. The ultimate
conclusion of reason is that God is, and in the universe is

280 Studies in Theology.
eternally at his best. It is in its progress forever the best
universe possible to omnipotent power, infinite wisdom, and
holy love.
In our helplessness we take refuge in the almost inspired
words of the German hymnist, Ernest Lange :
" 0 God, thou bottomless abyss !
Thee to perfection who can know ?
0 height immense ! what words suffice
Thy countless attributes to show ?
" Greatness unspeakable is thine ;
Greatness, whose undiminished ray,
When short-lived worlds are lost, shall shine,
When earth and heaven are fled away.
" Unchangeable, all-perfect Lord,
Essential life's unbounded sea,
What lives and moves, lives by thy word ;
It lives, and moves, and is, from thee.
" High is thy power above all height ;
Whate'er thy will decrees is done ,
Thy wisdom, equal to thy might,
Only to thee, 0 God, is known ! "

THE END.

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