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THE USE AND ABUSE OF DISTINCTIVE NAMES
IN MATTERS OF RELIGION :

THE SUBSTANCE OF

TWO SERMONS,
PREACHED IN THE NEW MEETING HOUSE,
BIRMINGHAM,
ON SUNDAYS, MARCH 21 & 28, 1847;

SAMUEL BACHE:
ONE OF THE MINISTERS OF THE CONGREGATION.

PUBLISHED BY REQUEST.

BIRMINGHAM :
PRINTED BY JAMES BELCHER & SON, HIGH-STREET.
1847.

The following Discourses are published at the
request of some who heard them. They are given
in the form of direct address, in which they were
actually delivered, as what would probably be most
acceptable to those who heard them, while it would
be little, if at all, objectionable to others. The several
applications of which the principle herein maintained
is susceptible, are left entirely to the judgment and
conscience of the thoughtful reader. It is the con
stant endeavour of the Author of these Sermons,
while plainly and earnestly setting forth what he
believes to be important truth, that neither the in
tellectual nor the spiritual independence of those
whom he addresses, should suffer any indignity or
violence at his hands.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF DISTINCTIVE NAMES IN MATTERS
OF RELIGION.

SERMON I.

Acts xi. 26 part. — And the disciples were called
CHRISTIANS FIRST IN ANTIOCH.

This simple historical statement involves some very
important and instructive lessons. It teaches us who
were the persons to whom the name "Christian" was
first applied. They were the disciples of Christ: those,
namely, who looked up to Jesus the Messiah as their
teacher and Lord, who revered him as the great pro
phet of God, who confessed that he had " the words
of eternal life," who strove to conform their -minds
to his precepts and their actions to his law, who
exercised faith in his promises and hope in his salva
tion, who endeavoured to come to the Father through
him, and who recognised him, with devout gratitude
to himself and his Father, as the one great Mediator
between themselves and their invisible Creator, the
Mediator through whom it pleased the Father that all
spiritual blessings should be conveyed, and by whose
ministry, death and resurrection, our noblest spiritual
aspirations, should be encouraged and exalted. Hence
the same name is still j ustly claimed by all who recog-

6
nise in Jesus their Teacher and Lord — (Lord as well
as Teacher: John xiii. 13) — whatever be the views
which they conscientiously form of the substance of his
instructions, or of the conduct and observances which
his commands and exhortations may require. Who
ever examines the records of the ministry of Christ
and of the first establishment of Christianity, for the
purpose of ascertaining what the religion of Jesus
really is and requires, under the conviction that he
will thereby obtain truth and eternal life, and con
sequently with a fixed determination to receive the
truth and obey the command as emanating from an
immediate and special divine authority, that man,—
(whatever be his speculative views or peculiar obser
vances under this condition) — that man is a Christian.
It would have been well for the peace and unity of
the Christian world, had this fact, attested by the
historical record before us as by many other passages
of Holy Writ, been always borne in mind. Deeply is
it to be lamented that it has been so often, so all but
universally, forgotten. Melancholy have been the con
sequences resulting from the repeated endeavours of
mistaken zealots to set up their own interpretations of
the teachings and commands of the Master for those
very teachings and commands themselves ; thus inter
cepting, with a presumptuous confidence, the message
of divine grace to ignorant and sinful men, and insist
ing that it shall be received by their report alone, and
not as it is directly addressed to all who have under
standings to apprehend and hearts to feel its simple
yet sublime majesty. I know and deeply feel, my
Christian hearers, that it is impossible to exaggerate

the evils of this creed-making, creed-compelling spirit.
Better any error resulting from the free exercise of a
man's own mind, than mere verbal truth, its merely
formal enunciation by the lips, without the intelligent
and sincere assent and consent of him who utters it.
There is a divine blessing on " simplicity and godly
sincerity" which even the wildest and (as it would
appear to us) the most fatal speculative error cannot
wholly or greatly impair : as when, in the thick dark
ness of heathenism, its most abominable rites sullied,
but did not rob of all their purity, the souls of such as
observed them in unfeigned superstition :* and hence
multitudes, who had long lived in the conscientious
practice of them, were ready at once to weleome the
dawn of a clearer and holier light when it rose upon
them in the divine mission of Jesus and his Apostle.
Yes, Christian brethren! to be true to ourselves,— this
is what God requires of us ; true to ourselves in the
diligent and faithful exercise of our powers for the
discovery of truth and the performance of duty, and
especially true to ourselves in the consistent mainte
nance of our convictions, both by word and deed, so
long as they are really ours, though at the same time
we cheerfully admit our own individual fallibility, and
rejoice to believe that others whose convictions differ
from our own, are nevertheless as intelligent, as up
right and conscientious as ourselves.
In this way, and in this way only, can integrity and
charity be really united. Bigotry stands far remote
i * See, in confirmation of this statement, an observation of M. Con
stant, quoted by Milman (History of Christianity, i. 28.) which he weW
characterises "as extremely profound and just."

from liberality, from Christian love, in one direction ;
it is in one of the extremes in which error, both specu
lative and practical, delights to dwell : — and in the
other extreme is Indifference, a far more injurious,
yea, a fatal form of error, equally remote from
Christian charity, equally opposed to the just recog
nition of the rights and feelings of others, with bigotry
itself, and carrying with it this additional curse for the
individual who allows it; that it makes him sceptical
(to say the least) of all truth which is not capable of
being applied to immediate and palpable uses, and
careless of the obligations which the actual possession
of such truth or of the means of gaining it, necessarily
involves. Saul of Tarsus may be quoted as the type
of honest bigotry, when he verily thought with himself
that he ought to do many things contrary to the name
of Jesus of Nazareth: (Acts xxvi. 9.) — yet, being honest,
his bigotry prevented not his conversion when greater
light was granted for the determination of his con
victions ; and, from having breathed out threatenings
and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, he
learned, in God's own due time, to thank God for the
grace bestowed on him as an Apostle of that same
Lord, and to rejoice in tribulation and in the prospect
of death for the hope set before him as the faithful
servant of Christ. Pilate, on the other hand, is the
type of careless and selfish indifference, when he hastily
demanded of his illustrious prisoner, " What is truth?"
— What have we to do with truth ? — and you all know
that the time-serving coward gave up Jesus to be
crucified, though attesting, as he bathed his trembling
hands in water, " I find no fault in him at all : I am

9
innocent of the blood of this just person: see ye to
it." (Matthew xxvii. 24.)
Yet there is a state of mind which some really up
right and virtuous persons actually cherish in their
abhorrence of bigotry, which tends to this more fatal
error of indifference, if it do not altogether maintain
it. I wish to speak of this state of mind with all
candour and with strict justice as I see it around me:
I wish to set it in what I deem its real light, and to
ask you to judge for yourselves, my Christian hearers,
whether it have not indeed the dangerous tendency
which I ascribe to it, and whether it ought not there
fore to be practically discountenanced and avoided.
The investigation will not be thought idle or merely
speculative by any who recollect the saying of the
wise man of old that " as a man thinketh in his heart,
so is he."
Now the manner in which this tendency at present
most clearly manifests itself, is in an avowed and un
qualified repudiation of all the significant names by
which various opinions are distinguished. Renounce
distinctive names, it is said, and you get rid of party
spirit and intolerance and bigotry. Thus the various
cultivators of philosophy are advised to pursue their
enquiries, to form their opinions, but to adopt no name
as significant of the results of those enquiries : and the
various denominations of Christians, in like manner,
are exhorted to renounce all the terms which express
their varying views of Christian truth and duty, and
employ only that one appellation, Christian, which is
equally appropriate to them all. Now what I affirm,
and shall endeavour very briefly to prove, is that this
£

10
advice is really impracticable, and the attempt to follow'
it, highly injurious. I shall distinguish (what many so
carelessly confound) the real element of evil in the
abuse of these descriptive names from the mere names'
themselves and the beneficial applications of which they
are susceptible; and shall show that divisions of senti-'
ment and their appropriate designations may be recog
nised, without any of what is justly denounced as inju
rious party-spirit ; while, on the other hand, all such
divisions may be confounded and all such designations
rejected, and yet party-spirit be rife in all its bitterness
and in all its malignity.
This is the position in which, as the advocate of
common sense and of Christian moderation, I take my
stand, between the opposite extremes of intolerance
and indifference : and in order that I may satisfy you
at the outset that the position is an important one, I
shall occupy what now remains of our time in a brief
exhibition of the uses of these distinctive names in
matters of religion. I say, "in matters of religion,"
because my remarks will be directed to that class of
names ; but every intelligent hearer will be aware that
such names are but a class, having much in common
with distinctive names generally, as many of my argu
ments and illustrations will abundantly show.
I suppose it will be readily granted in the outset,
that differences of opinion may lawfully, may usefully,
subsist among men. This I now take for granted,
having often heretofore endeavoured to prove it. But
if differences of opinion may subsist, may they not
also be expressed? Is it not by the expression of
them that truth is gradually elicited? Grant this

11
also— (and who of my hearers will question it?)— then,
the more concise, and clear, and definite, that expres
sion, the more distinctly is the opinion itself conceived
in the mind, the more readily referred to in the dis
cussion to which differences of opinion naturally and
usefully give rise, and the more easily brought into
comparison with other facts or opinions with which it
may be in harmony or in contrast.
This is theirs* use, then, of distinctive names; their
intellectual use ; inasmuch as they put the idea or sen
timent which they designate, clearly before the view
ofthe mind; in such definite form and dimensions, that
the mind can fully embrace it ; with such solidity and
compactness, that the mind can easily move it about,
for inspection, for comparison, for contrast, for ex
amination and discussion, without fear of losing or
changing any of its constituent elements ; or, having
laid it aside for a time, can take it up again with a
reasonable confidence in its identity.
Let me illustrate my position by a reference to an
analogous case. The science of numbers and quanti
ties, pure mathematics, is, as every one knows, the
most exact of all the sciences. Why ?— First, because
it deals with the most clear and definite conceptions
which the mind of man can entertain : — nor less,
secondly, because it deals with these conceptions by
means of appropriate symbols equally clear and defi
nite, and easily susceptible, therefore, of ready and
accurate application. The merest tyro in arithmetic
may be made sensible of the vast advantage which the
common figures, the Arabic numerals, give him over
the clumsy contrivances of Greek and Roman nume-

12
ration ; for they enable him to perform with ease, and
by mere unaided thought, what the Greeks and Ro*
mans accomplished with difficulty, by means of cumr
brous tables. The conception of elementary numbers
was as clear to the Greeks and Romans, as it ever can
be to us ; but for want of the appropriate symbol, the
concise distinctive designation or written name, that
conception was with difficulty brought into combina
tion with others, or employed in processes of thought
for the discovery of new and valuable truth. It is the
clear, short, compact numeral, — in other words, the
simple distinctive designation of each elementary num-t
ber, which gives us our vast superiority.
And for the same reason, and by a similar process
of condensation or generalization, does that science
which has been denominated " Universal Arithmetic,"
(I mean Algebra) enable us to deal with the mere relai
tion of numbers and quantities, though those numbers
and quantities are themselves absolutely unknown,
with the same clearness and accuracy as though they
were known : thus giving us comprehensive and general
conclusions, with the same ease and certainty, as, in
ordinary arithmetic, we gain the conclusions belonging
only to the particular case ; and teaching us to gene
ralize our ideas in a most useful and wonderful manner.
Hence also various formulas, as they are called, that is
short, compact exhibitions of general truths, which the
practical mathematician applies with all the ease and
certainty with which he uses the simplest numbers,
and by which the most astonishing results, unattain*
able by any other means, have been attained.

13
And let it not be supposed that this condensation
in the expression of thought leading to the condensa
tion of thought itself, exists only in abstract science.
To name even physical objects, is so important to a just
knowledge of them, that in the simplicity of the
Hebrew language, to call a thing by its name often
means, not simply to know it, but to have it completely
subject to your authority :* and I need only instance the
science of Chemistry, in the prosecution of which, such
great advances are now continually being made, as
an example of the wondrous power which a correct
and concise system of nomenclature gives us over the
subjects and objects to which it is appropriate.
With these indisputable and universally admitted
facts clearly before me, I have a right to affirm, (and
the affirmation involves no mere assumption or dog
matism) that distinctive names are very important
to clearness, accuracy, conciseness, compactness of
thought, and to the various applications, for com'
parison or contrast, of which thought is eminently
susceptible. And the illustration furnished by my text
strengthens the affirmation. Various and discordant
as are the ideas which different persons bring together
under the designation " Christian," and violent and
rancorous as are too often still the disputes about its
essential meaning, it has answered, and always will
answer one very important purpose, and secure one
capital advantage ; viz., that the idea of Christ, and of
some reverence for him, will be maintained in the
minds of all those who take it upon themselves : — this
reference at least will be secured, with whatever ad-
* See Genesis ii. 19, 20, Isaiah xl. 26, xlv. 3, 4.

14
juncts, and amidst whatever strangeness of inconsist
ency. Christian implies Christ; and brings Christ,
in some way or other, before the mind; it preserves
the specific idea, which might otherwise be lost in
vague generalisation, or changed unconsciously by
some intellectual caprice to which the undisciplined
or ill-disciplined mind is peculiarly subject.
This course of remark abundantly sustains the im
portance of distinctive designations, to the minds of
individuals and their associates : — and in conjunction
with the illustration just given, it suggests to us to
notice, in the
Second place, The use of every such distinctive
designation for the preservation of its appropriate idea
for those who are not our personal associates ; in other
words, the use of distinctive names for the preserva
tion and transmission and diffusion, throughout both
space and time, of clear and important truth. With
out any impropriety, I think we may be permitted to
call this, their historical use; inasmuch as they aid in
transmitting and diffusing to others, the truths which
they comprehend.
They thus serve, in the intellectual and spiritual
economy, that important purpose which Paley (Natural
Theology, ch. 20) ascribes to the winged seeds of plants
in the vegetable economy : — they scatter while they
continue the species. — What striking illustration, what
powerful confirmation, does the incident recorded in
my text suggest — "The disciples were called Christians
first in Antioch." Who first called them so, we know
not. It has been conjectured that it was not them
selves, they being content with the name disciples,

15
believers, saints, brethren : — neither, again was it the
Jews ; for they preferred the scornful epithet Nazarene
or Galilean, and were little likely to suggest a name
implying the actual Messiahship of Jesus. In only
two other places does it occur in the New Testament :
— once when Agrippa said unto Paul, " Almost thou
persuadest me to be a Christian." — (Aets xxvi. 28) ;
and again when Peter exhorts, " If any man suffer as
a Christian, let him not be ashamed ; but let him
glorify God on this behalf." — (I. iv. 16.) It may there
fore have been a term of contempt originating with the
Romans — (for it has a Latin termination) — and sub
sequently adopted, in honourable defiance, by the
followers of Jesus ; or it may have originated, as a
descriptive name, with the Gentile converts at Antioch
themselves. But be this as it may, one thing is certain,
that through the name, the knowledge of Christ and of
his Gospel was more widely diffused, and more faith
fully maintained, than it probably would or could
otherwise have been.
It is to this name, I think, that we are indebted for
the very brief but valuable notice of the Christians in
the time of Nero, which we find in Tacitus. On the
name, his brief history altogether hangs. " Nero, (he
says) inflicted exquisite punishment on those people who
were commonly known by the name of Christians" —
and then he goes on to tell us that these Christians
"had their denomination from Christus, who in the
reign of Tiberius was put to death as a criminal by the
Procurator Pontius Pilate."— (Tacit. Annal. xv. 44.)
If you would fully appreciate the importance of this
brief notice, remember only what sovereign contempt

16
the Romans felt for the Jews, how little likely their"
distinguished writers were to notice a hateful and bar*
barous nation so remote from themselves, and how
improbable it is that such a man as Tacitus should evef
have heard of a mere sect of this despised people, had
it not been for the name by whicli they were dis
tinguished, and which seems to have awakened and
guided his enquiries.
Remarkable also is it, that his less accurate and
enquiring contemporary, Suetonius, has caught the
name indeed, but confounded the facts : for he tells us
that the emperor Claudius " banished all the Jews
from Rome because they were continually making
disturbances, Chrestus being their leader." (Sueton.
Claud. 25.) He had heard, I doubt not, of some
disputes at Rome between the Jews and Christians at
the time when, as we also read in the Acts of the
Apostles, (xviii. 2) "Claudius had commanded all Jews
to depart from Rome," and hastily concluded that
Christus, or Chrestus, himself was personally a leader
in the tumult.
Let me instance only a third example, — that afforded
by the Proconsul Pliny ; who in his Letter to Trajan,
A.D. 107, asks specifically, whether the mere name
Christian, or overt criminal acts committed by those
who bore the name, should be punished ; adding that
he had hitherto treated the mere name as penal.
And the notice of this fact in Pliny's Letter,
suggests to me,
Thirdly, The moral uses which a distinctive name
may serve, and to which all our other quotations
directly point.

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When the name embodies an important truth or
principle, it becomes itself a simple and effectual test
of the integrity of those who hold that truth or prin
ciple. When a proposition is stated diffusely, a man
may quibble about its terms : but the conciseness of a
distinctive designation, wisely chosen, clearly under
stood, and fairly applied, admits less easily of equivo
cation or self-deception : as the wine and frankincense,
or the few grains of salt sprinkled on the altar before
an idol, were accepted as an unequivocal testimony of
the renunciation of the Christian faith, while the con
fession of the name Christian was regarded as an equally
unequivocal testimony of adherence to it. The trial is
thus removed out of the merely intellectual court, and
set before the awful tribunal of conscience, of moral
obligation. It turns on the simple question of in
tegrity, and is felt to be within the province of faith
and duty alone. Inasmuch as a concise distinctive
designation aids this transfer, and permits us to dis
cern and feel the moral and spiritual obligations which
accompany the possession of important truth, so far
does it tend to the culture of simplicity and godly sin
cerity; so far are conscience, duty, faith, our eternal
hope, bound up in a mere name: and who that has any
sense of the value of truth, or of his duties and destiny
as a man and a Christian, would slight or evade the
obligation ?
Meditate, then, Christian brethren, on these intellec
tual and spiritual uses of distinctive names in their just
and appropriate application. I have other suggestions
to offer in connexion with the abuses of which these
names are susceptible. It is enough for me at this
c

18
time thus to have vindicated their use. I have shown
that they are favourable, if not indispensable, to intel
lectual progress and attainment, to the maintenance
and diffusion of truth, to the culture of the spirit of
simplicity and godly sincerity. Use them thus, and
you will have reason to bless God for the intellectual
powers which they extend and exercise, and for the
faith and virtue which, by judicious exercise, they
elevate and confirm.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF DISTINCTIVE NAMES IN MATTERS
OF RELIGION.

SERMON II.

Acts xi. 26 part. — And the disciples were called
CHRISTIANS FIRST IN ANTIOCH.

When last I addressed you from these words, I
endeavoured to suggest to you some of the uses of
distinctive names in matters of religion. Assuming
that differences of opinion must exist among men, and
that the existence of them is favourable to the pursuit
of truth and the culture of a benevolent spirit, — assu
ming also that the expression of an opinion is neces
sary to the investigation and discussion of it, — we found
an abundant vindication of the use of distinctive names
expressive of distinctive opinions, in the fact that by
their concise and clear and compact form, they present
the opinion more distinctly before the mind, render it
easy of comparison or contrast, and more ready for
reference than it would be in its more diffuse form of a
proposition. This we called the intellectual use of dis
tinctive names. By a farther reference to these same
qualities of conciseness, clearness, and compactness, we
exhibited, in the second place, their historical use, and
confirmed the statement by bringing forward the three

20
most striking and impressive testimonies which heathen
antiquity affords, in the earliest age of the Christian
church, to the wonderful and important facts on which
that church is built; all which testimonies exhibit a
clear and marked dependence upon the distinctive name
by which as Christians we are called. — In conclusion,
we considered the moral bearing ofthe distinctive name,
as affording a simple and effectual test of integrity, by
removing the subject to which it belongs out of the
merely intellectual court, and setting it before the
awful tribunal of conscience, of moral obligation : and
our previous reference to the experience of the early
Christians, illustrated and enforced the suggestion.
For these three reasons, at least, then, distinctive
names in matters of religion, as in matters generally,
are truly valuable and important ; namely, because
they stamp the truth, thus preserve and diffuse it, and
present it fully before the conscience as demanding the
just fulfilment of whatever obligations the possession
of it may involve. Who will deny these names, then,
their uses ? Who that has any just sense of the value
of truth, of the importance of clear ideas, of the vast
consequence that truth and its elements should be pre
served and diffused, of the primary Christian duty of
faithfully bearing witness to the truth, could think for
a moment of denouncing these most valuable, these
indispensable aids to our intellectual, moral, and spi
ritual culture ? Were a man to propose to do away
with the names of things altogether, he would be
thought mad. How are we to make known what we
think or need, if we may not speak of it by its name ?
And it is only because this is so entirely a material and

21
mechanical age, that many persons who make great
pretensions to spiritual excellence, are yet bound so
fast in its fetters, that they cannot raise themselves to
the consideration of even the simplest elementary
truths of intellectual and moral science, that so absurd
and mischievous a suggestion as that of the complete
annihilation of distinctive names, especially in matters
of religion, has ever for a moment gained the public
attention. If you are never to think on religious truths
at all, or if you are to think on such truths only as are
established in the common consent of mankind, and in
the way in which men in general think on them, then
you may do away with all distinctive names in matters
of religion : but if you are to use and improve your
noble privilege and capacity for religious contempla
tion as rational, moral, and accountable beings, — if
God and his providence, life and its destiny, duty and
its motives, are ever to engage your thoughts and affec
tions, — if you may think on these subjects freely, fully,
fearlessly, and devoutly, — then most certainly the dis
tinctive terms by which distinct ideas are expressed,
will be welcome to your minds, and you will gladly
give your testimony to obnoxious truth by taking, on
yourselves the obnoxious name in which it is embodied,
rather than slight the obligation and evade the obloquy
which Christian integrity requires you to bear.
Hence it seems to me as clear as any truth possibly
can be in mind and morals, not only that distinctive
names in connexion with important subjects ought not
to be abolished, but that they cannot be abolished.
The wants, the processes of the mind itself, forbid the
abolition of them and demand them for their uses.

22
We cannot think, or reason, or investigate, or witness
a good confession without them. But they are abused.
And what useful thing is not ? But the abuse of them
is productive of the greatest mischiefs. And is it not
almost a proverb among thinking men, that the
greater the use of anything, the more mischievous is
the abuse of it ? The existence of the abuse, the mis
chiefs of the abuse, then, are no arguments against the
continued use of that which is essentially useful, nay
even indispensable to human welfare. It is mere
childishness and folly to decline an aid or enjoyment
which God's gracious providence freely offers to our
acceptance, simply because it is necessarily susceptible
of abuse. There can be no such thing as mental or
moral vigour, or even life, under the influence of such
a sentiment as this.
The argument, then, against the entire abolition of
distinctive names in matters of religion, is not at all
affected by the abuses to which such names are liable.
It is conclusive for the necessity of using those names,
be the abuses what they may. Let us look however
at the abuses, and our arguments for the use will be
strengthened ; for we shall find that the abuses do not
originate in the names themselves, but in something
quite independent of all names, and which will require
equally to be repressed, whether distinctive names be
recognised or repudiated.
A name being the appropriate designation of a
thing, or object, or sentiment, can only be abused (in
strictness of speech) when it is applied to some thing
or object or sentiment to which it does not properly
belong :— as were an ignorant man to call the scientific

23
study of the heavens, astrology ; or another, to restrict
the term theology to religious speculations of a doubtful
and disputed character, to the entire exclusion of the
fundamental, vital truths on which all religious faith
and duty eternally rest. Of course, wherever this
abuse is the result of sheer ignorance, all that you
have to do is to give accurate knowledge, and the
abuse is at an end. — But the abuse of distinctive
names arising from sheer ignorance alone, need not
be regarded. It is not ignorance alone that usually
leads to it. The common source of sueh abuse is
bigotry — bigotry which may ally itself with ignorance
it is true, and which often does so ; but which will
often urge its unhappy victim to sin against light and
knowledge, whenever these are opposed to the main
tenance of its own selfish and wilful determinations.
Now what is bigotry ? I answer briefly, it is a blind,
an excessive zeal: — a blind zeal, when it leads a man by
his prejudices ; an excessive zeal when it causes him to
demand from others, for even just and rational senti
ments or objects, a greater deference than those senti
ments or objects themselves can enforce from then-
own understandings or consciences. Now observe
that in both these cases, it is the sentiment or object
(whether expressed by a name or not) wliich is the
subject matter of bigotry, the occasion of blind or
excessive zeal ; and that consequently the mere mode
of expression may be varied indefinitely, and yet the
bigotry still remain. Thus Mr. Hallam tells us, in his
History of the Literature of Europe, (Vol. iii. p. 68)
that Calixtus, an eminent philosopher and religious
reformer of the seventeenth century, " was accused by

24
his bigoted opponents of being both a Papist and &
Calvinist ; reproaches equally odious in their eyes, and
therefore fit to be heaped on his head : — the inconsist
ency of calumnies being no good reason with bigots
against uttering them." Does any one suppose that
if these distinctive names of religious parties had not
existed, no names or terms would have been found for
the expression of this violent bigotry? Could any
terms have been more completely inapplicable than
these which are self contradictory ? How absurd then
is it to make the question of the abuse of distinctive
names turn upon the mere names themselves, and not
upon the spirit of bigotry which causes the abuse!
What shallow reasoning is it which would lead us to
renounce the names which are useful as the only
means of getting rid of the mischievous principle
wliich exists independent of them and by which they
are, in fact, perverted! Surely this is to give to names
a far greater influence than really belongs to them ; to
exalt them in importance at the very same time that
you purpose to annihilate them ! It is not for me to
reconcile such inconsistencies.
But again : Let names be altogether renounced and
annihilated. Is bigotry therefore eradicated? Is it
deprived of all means of expression ? Let me remind
you of the creeds and articles in which this same
bigotry more diffusely manifests itself, and you will be
convinced in a moment that the sentiment, not the
word, the proposition, not its abbreviated symbol, is
the subject matter of bigotry; and that you must re
press thought and expression and purpose altogether,
would you take away the material on which blind and

25
excessive zeal may exercise its injurious power. Surely
no mischiefs caused by bigotry could compare with
those of the terrible annihilation thus required.
But though the abuse of distinctive names can in no
degree or way require or justify the entire and absolute
renunciation of them, it certainly should make us judi
cious and careful in the use of them, in order that such
abuse may be avoided. Let us then turn our atten
tion to the abuse itself, and to the way in which it is
to be avoided.
We have already seen that bigotry, which we have
defined as being a blind and excessive zeal, is the
chief cause of this abuse. Zeal itself, when it is
rational and enlightened and proportioned to the im
portance of its object, is so far from being cen
surable, that it is highly praiseworthy. " It is good
to be zealously affected always, (says St. Paul) in a
good thing :" — (Gal. iv. 18.) — " towards that which is
good," he means, whether in persons or principles.
But men are often seduced by their prejudices or pas
sions or supposed interests, into an undue attachment
to some particular sentiment or object ; and are thence
prompted to take unjust and uncharitable means for
its maintenance and promotion : and this not only in
their individual capacity, but in association with others.
Now the common action and the common power of an
associated body of men, increase the temptation to an
excessive zeal, and to the excercise of an unjust power
in support of the common sentiment or prosecution of
the common object. Hence the bigotry of the indi
vidual is generally multiplied by his union with a
D

20
party ; and party spirit more frequently degenerates
into party bigotry, than does individual zeal into indi
vidual bigotry; because the sense of responsibility is
weakened by being shared with others, and hence
looser laws are supposed to regulate the dealings of a
corporate body than such as are ordinarily recognised
by the individuals who compose it. Hence party names
are almost always assumed to indicate the unjust spirit
of party, though it is certain that they may, and often
do, exist without such a spirit : but if they be mere
watchwords, that spirit is indeed already rife, and its
mischiefs will not easily be estimated or restrained.
With the view of preventing such perversion and evil,
let me, in conclusion, suggest two or three plain prac
tical rules, whereby the distinctive designations even of
whole bodies or parties of men may be employed with
out the risk of fostering bigotry, on the one hand, or
laying snares for integrity, on the other.
1.) Define clearly both your sentiment or object,
and its name; and see that the name be appro
priate. By observing this rule, you not only know exactly
what your sentiment or object really is, but you are
thereby enabled to form a more just estimate of its
relative position and importance. And as regards the
name, if you define the name, and see that it is appro
priate, you make a due provision in the name itself for
retaining that just estimate of your specific sentiment
or object which you have originally formed, and for
continuing to regard it in its true position and cha
racter. More than half the bigotry in the world arises

27
from that self conceit which delights in what is vague
and mystical; which, under the vain notion of freedom
of thought, refuses to deal in clear and exact terms and
statements, forgetting that we can only reason from
what we know; and which sets up therefore its own
arbitrary symbol as the test and standard of other men's
opinions or conduct. Thus whole generations of bigots
and fanatics have boasted themselves, in their genera
tion, of some " new light," and treated with the most
supercilious contumely, those who could not or who
would not join in their vague and mystical phraseo
logy. Definition and argument, they have always with
good reason decried : they might well be afraid of
them : while, on the contrary, the most illustrious
teachers and leaders in truth and righteousness have
always, like our great Master, appealed to the judg
ment, the reason, the understanding of their hearers;
rested on that appeal and the kindred appeal to our
common human sympathies, their exhortations and
instructions, and demanded of their disciples to be,
like themselves, " wise as serpents, and harmless as
doves." And let it not be alleged that, by such a proceeding,
any undue check is imposed on the warm and generous
sentiments of the heart. So far otherwise, that the
only way to preserve them truly warm and generous,
the only way to guard them from the infection of
bigotry, is to view the object which calls forth our zeal
in its true and distinctive characters, and so to define
it, as that our zeal may neither fall short of nor exceed
the just measure of its importance, but may be always

28
worthy the interests for which it is exercised. Thus,
let a man distinctly understand that unpopular doe-
trine which goes by the name of Unitarianism, let him
see exactly on what considerations the belief in this
doctrine rests, let him observe also on what other con
siderations and by what other course of reasoning the
opposite doctrine of Trinitarianism is established in the
minds of those who embrace it, and what are the
respective inferences and consequences deducible from
each, I think he is in a favourable condition, not only
for determining for himself which doctrine is true, but
also for maintaining that truth with firmness, with in
tegrity, with zeal, with charity, and bearing and using
its appropriate designation in the same spirit of truth
and love. But let him take up the name or the doc
trine without some such examination, and while he
maintains them, he will maintain them with a blind
intolerance, and when he rejects them he will reject
them with an equally blind intolerance of what he
before blindly extolled. For bigotry, be it remem
bered, may ally itself with any sentiment, with any
name, and is much more easily transferred from
one side to its opposite, than altogether got rid of.
Vague and mystical terms are its ordinary shibboleth ;
it makes an exchange of such terms almost uncon
sciously ; and while seducing its victim to congratulate
himself even on " a new birth," on the strength of such
an exchange, does but the- more firmly and widely
exert its malignant tyranny over his soul. Think
clearly, speak clearly, speak appropriately, and your
distinctive names will strengthen your integrity and

29
zeal, in proportion to the value of their several objects,
and will never allow you to forget what is due from
yourself to the integrity and zeal of others.
2.) Distinctive names and the subjects to which they
belong, should be reserved for their appropriate occa
sions. Dr. Priestley, in his pamphlet entitled, " A view of
the Principles and Conduct of the Protestant Dis
senters with respect to the Civil and Ecclesiastical
Constitution of England," thus writes : — " As men of
"letters, we make no distinction of clergy or laity,
" Christians, Jews, • Mahometans, or Heathens. In
"company with philosophers, it shall not be known
"what our religious sentiments are: but if, without our
" guiding it, the conversation should turn upon that
" subject, it might appear that, together with a taste
" for the liberal arts, we are also zealous Christians,
" steady Protestants, and warm Dissenters." (Works,
vol. xxii. p. 360.)
By this wise and Christian moderation, by this just
restriction of his distinctive sentiments and their appro
priate designations to suitable occasions, Dr. Priestley
did more to inculcate just views of religion and awaken
among the careless a desire to come to the knowledge
of it, than could ever have been effected by an indis
criminating zeal: and as his devotion to truth and duty
cannot be questioned, his mild forbearance in the exer
cise of that spirit is worthy of all imitation. Let us,
Christian hearers, endeavour to imitate it. Let us
never force the introduction of distinctive names or
their subjects upon occasions to which they do not
properly belong. Let us never, for instance, counte-

30
siance the application of the distinctive terms Celt or
Saxon to our fellow subjects, except in the natural
course of historical or antiquarian enquiry. Especially
on objects of general benevolence or general usefulness,
let us resist the temptation to engraft our own denomi
national views or names; assured that by such forbear
ance, we shall be in a far better position for asserting
and maintaining both when suitable occasions arise,
and shall preserve at once our integrity and our
Christian love, pure and inviolate. Let our principle
of action be that of sympathy and accordance, to the
very farthest extent which conscience will allow. Dif
ferences will unavoidably spring up between us and
our brethren, and occasions will continually arise when
those differences must show themselves, if we be but
faithful to our convictions : and it will then be a great
recommendation of us and of our distinctive views to
others, if they have previously seen in us a mild, a
conciliatory, a conformable spirit ; because they will
be at once aware that nothing but strength of convic
tion (the more important as manifested in connexion
with such a temper) can have compelled us to avow
the fact of disagreement of sentiment, while we mani
festly endeavour " to keep the unity of the spirit in the
bond of peace," and in righteousness of life.
Hence once more —
3.) Distinctive names should generally, if not always,
be as much as possible expressive of some principle or
fact or sentiment, and not of the person by whom it
has been proclaimed.
Personal names are almost always peculiarly inap
propriate ; if for no other reason at least for this, that

31
they mix up ideas of personal qualities with the senti
ments which they are employed to distinguish, or tend
to keep the precise sentiment altogether out of sight,
and thus, in many ways, to cultivate a bigoted spirit
of party in those who use them. Hence it is much to
be lamented, I think, that any denominations of Chris
tians should permit themselves to be called Wesleyans
er Calvinists, even though they may really embrace the
sentiments of Wesley and Calvin respectively: for such
names imply in those who bear them an undue def
erence for the authority of their respective leaders,
such deference as Christ expressly forbad when he said
to his disciples, " Call no man your father upon the
earth — neither be ye called masters." (Matthew xxiii.
9, 10) — and hence a disposition to unite as mere
members of a party, rather than from free and un
constrained accordance of sentiment and conviction.
Hence, too, had the name Socinian been really de
scriptive of the sentiments of Unitarian Christians,
(which you know it is not,) I, for one, should earn
estly and perseveringly repudiate it : and for the same
reason do I not less emphatically denounce the at
tempt which is sometimes made to designate us as
Priestleyans ; knowing as I do full well that my own
religious views as an Unitarian Christian are not de
rived from Priestley ; that in many what he would
have deemed very important particulars, they do not
at all accord with the views which he entertained ; and,
above all, that such was the humility and the unfeigned
love of religion and liberty which Dr. Priestley him
self cherished, that nothing would be more repugnant

32
to his spirit and principles or more dishonourable to
his memory, than for the successors and representa
tives of those whom he instructed in the way of truth
and freedom, to take his name, or adopt his views, as
though he had endeavoured to make himself the head
of a party, or would ever have consented to stand in
the relation of Master or Lord to any of his brethren
in Christ. There is not, nor ever has been, so far as I
know, any sect of Priestley ans : — and they have much
to learn, both of the man whose name they thus dis
honour, and of the people on whom they seek to im
pose that name, and of the principles and spirit of that
religion in the profession of which, Priestley has left
us so illustrious an example of integrity and love, who
would continue to employ a designation which is at
once inconsistent with the truth, opposed to our own
most cherished principles and feelings, and calumnious
of the honoured memory ofthe "Patriot, and Saint, and
Sage,"* whose name indeed we shall never pronounce
with other than an affectionate veneration, and scru
pulously guard from the foul dishonour to which igno
rance or prejudice, or thoughtlessness or presumption,
would thus unjustly expose it.
Am I reminded that our general designation as
Christians is of a personal character ? I reply that
Christ or Messiah was an official, before it became a
personal designation : — and I reply again, that the
name of Jesus Christ, whether the personal or the
official, " is above every name ; that in the name of
" Jesus, every knee should bow, and every tongue con-
* Coleridge's Religious Musings.

33
"fess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God
"the Father." (Philipp. ii. 9— 1 1 .)*
By an adherence to these plain and simple rules,
distinctive names may be as safely employed in matters
of religion as in any other matters. Define them
clearly, reserve them and their objects for appro
priate occasions, and avoid such as are merely per
sonal. They will then become to you, like all other
appropriate names, useful symbols of thought : they
will thus aid thought and reflection ; they will thus
aid the communication and interchange of its re
sults ; they will thus contribute to the discovery, the
* I have often heard the wish expressed that the time may speedily
arrive when no other name than that of Christian shall be known
among the followers of Jesus. — If by this be meant that all the fol
lowers of Jesus should be ready cordially to recognise each other's title
to " that worthy name," to own their common, their equal relationship
as fellow disciples to the one only Master, and to exercise towards each
other that mutual love which the Master himself has declared should be
characteristic of his followers, (John xiii. 35) and all this, notwith
standing the widest diversities of merely speculative opinion, — I heartily
concur in the wish, and desire to do all in my power to hasten the time
of its fulfilment. But if it be meant to imply the desire or expectation
of perfect and complete accordance, among all the members of Christ's
universal church, in their intellectual conceptions of every one of the
countless details included under the vast and momentous themes of the
Gospel — or that, in the absence of such complete accordance of senti
ment, there should be an outward accordance of profession, so that all
distinctive opinions, and their appropriate designations, and their pecu
liar practical obligations, where they involve any, should be entirely
banished from the Christian world, I would enter my most earnest pro
test against the wish : and would refer to the facts and arguments ad
duced in the former of these two Discourses as justifying and requiring
such a protest against what I cannot but regard as a most false and
mischievous, however specious, liberality. " The wisdom that is from
above," be it remembered, "is first pure; then — (in consequence,
mainly, of its purity, and not apart from it, still less iu opposition to it)
— then peaceable." (James iii. 17.) E

34
maintenance, the diffusion of truth and righteousness,
nor less of peace and charity ; they will thus enable
you to do honour to that worthy name by which, as
the followers of Christ, ye are all called, and to share
the promised blessings of his spiritual kingdom. Out
of the midst of the abuses of which they are suscep
tible, will a discerning mind and a loving heart thus
gather the additional use which attends the united ex
ercise of judgment, of forbearance, and of charity.
The truth will be maintained in love : the wisdom
from above will approve itself to be " first pure, then
peaceable:" the mind and soul and heart which are
subject to the influences of this wisdom will be thus
all together consecrated to the service of God and to
the glory of his holy name through Jesus Christ.
May such wisdom, such integrity, and love be ours !
May they sanctify and enlarge and elevate our souls ;
and prepare us for that kingdom of light and love
eternal, to the hope of which we are raised through
the one great Master, whose worthy name we all
equally bear.

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