Tfar.-KBj;:^!! r*r-" ¦YiMJE-WanVERSirTY- « iyiiaiiy&]gy • Bought with the income of the William C. Egleston Fund 19M CREEDS OR NO CREEDS? TO MY DEAR WIFE AND SON CREEDS OR NO CREEDS? •>• '¦ t A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BASIS OF MODERNISM BY CHARLES HARRIS, D.D. ... EXAMINING CHAPLAIN TO THE BISHOP OF LLANDAFF, RECTOR OF COLWALL LATE LECTURER IN THEOLOGY IN ST. DAVID'S COLLEGE, LAMPETER AUTHOR OF "PRO FIDE, A TEXT-BOOK OF MODERN APOLOGETICS" AND "THE CREEDS AND MODERN THOUGHT" WITH FOREWORDS BY NThe Right Rev. THE LORD BISHOP OF LICHFIELD and THE WARDEN OF WADHAM COLLEGE, OXFORD NEW YORK E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY 1922 FOREWORD By the Bishop of Lichfield Some of us are sanguine enough to believe that there is a growing agreement on the foundations of the Christian faith among men whose outlook is widely different. 'Catholic,' 'Evangelical,' 'Liberal,' need not- be party labels ; the man who lays stress on apostolic order and loyalty to sound tradition has no cause to quarrel with his brother who is jealous to maintain the personal access of the individual soul to God in Christ ; neither need either of them resist the call for real freedom of thought. Indeed, we may claim all three titles — catholic, evangelical, liberal — without lacking clearness of intellect or strength of will. But there are differences which cut deep, and this book renders good service by its vigorous challenge to clear thinking on fundamental questions of Christian belief. The vital question is surely this : are we groping after a partial truth, always admixed with error ? or has God indeed visited and redeemed His people ? Has He spoken to us in His Son, and is that Son as divine as the Father and as human as ourselves ? In a word — are the truths set forth in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds valid for all time ? That is the question with which this book essays to deal ; and it handles its great subject (I venture to say) ably and decisively. Dr. Harris would be the first to admit that human language can never give a perfectly adequate expression to divine truth. " We see through a glass darkly." vi FOREWORD But it is obvious that a great part of the Creeds deals with alleged historical facts. The Virgin Birth of our Lord (for example), and His Resurrection in the com pleteness of our human nature, are true or not true. If they are true, they are true for all time. Doubtless new light may be thrown on the evidence ; and the investiga tion of the evidence cannot be too thorough or too searching ; but it is clear enough that recent reluctance to accept the evidence arises, not from new knowledge, but from certain presuppositions and prejudices which cry aloud for searching criticism. Such criticism is supplied by this book faithfully and effectively. As to the statements made in the Nicene Creed on the mystery of our Lord's Person, it must be strongly emphasized that the Creed simply guards the truth that our Lord is really God and really man. It does not attempt to define the relation of His humanity to His Deity: that is a subject for investigation by reverent students. But we must protest against the unintelligent repetition of the statement that the Nicene Creed is expressed in terms of an obsolete metaphysic. The only metaphysical term is homoousios ; and, after all, any metaphysical system requires some word to express ' being.' No doubt the Church may give fresh expres sion, if it can, to the old truths. But the attempts recently made at formulating new Creeds are not encour aging! It is, indeed, obvious that the Creeds must be inter preted to meet the needs of each generation. There is, as Dr. Harris shows, a true doctrine of 'development.' He has no quarrel with a sane ' modernism.' We must be modern, if we are to speak to the men of our own time : Christian teachers are bound to show how the truths of the Creeds are related to modern ideals and aspirations, and (above all) how they provide the only solution to the ethical and social problems of modern life. But " modern ' is nota synonym for ' true ' ; and FOREWORD vii there are elements in the modern thought of to-day which are likely to be the laughing-stock of the modern thought of to-morrow. I believe that the author of this book is right in maintaining that the vagaries of certain Modernists are the result of a false philosophy. Dr. Harris himself evidently has leanings towards the ' New Realism ' ; but, as an obstinate Platonist, I am sure that his position is consistent with Idealism — i.e. the belief that all reality must be expressed in terms of mind. Our two enemies are Subjective Idealism, which cuts at the root of natural science as well as of theology, and the Pantheism which finds no place for the transcendence of God : it is a commonplace of theology that man is akin to God ("made in the image of God "), but we have to be on our guard against theories which blur the distinction between the creature and the Creator. There are other points to which I am tempted to refer. But a preface should not be a full recapitulation. I will content myself with expressing heartfelt satisfaction that this book is an appeal, not to authority, but to sound and accurate thought. No doubt there is a place for authority. It represents the concentrated experience of the Christian Society ; and age-long tradition requires the bishops of the Church to be its mouthpiece : they are called on to say what the Church has always believed and held. But it is not very reasonable to call on the bishops, every six months or so, to reaffirm their belief in the Creeds ; and it is more than doubtful whether the use of force is likely to free the Church from alien elements. Authority, as Dr. Figgis used to say, is not to be confounded with the policeman ! The right way to deal with any who seem to deny or pervert the truth is to prove their error. The ' Modernists ' can lay claim to some good scholars and thinkers ; but they have no monopoly of sound philosophy or of accurate scholar ship. The only effective method is to criticize the critics, to meet learning with learning and scholarship viii FOREWORD with scholarship. That is what this book endeavours to do. It does not profess to be the last word on the truth and value of the Christian Creed. But I believe it to be a strong and valuable contribution to the right appre hension of a profoundly important subject. I hope that it will be widely read, and (seeing that the author is the last to fear criticism) acutely criticized. Its purpose is to find and to establish the Truth as it is in Jesus. To be sure of the Truth about Him is the first step to knowing Him, ' quem nosse est vivere.' J. A. Lichfield. FOREWORD Bv the Warden of Wadham College, Oxford My old friend and pupil, Dr. Harris, meets the Modernist views, of which we now hear so much, from a new point of view. Usually the question raised is — can they be reconciled with the Faith ? He rightly raises the pre liminary question — can they be justified by the principles of philosophic and historic criticism on which they profess to be based ? On his philosophic discussions I do not pretend to express an opinion ; I only know that he was considered, when a scholar here, to have one of the most acute and original philosophic minds of his time, and also that for thirty years he has continued to study the great problems of thought. For myself, I can only judge at all of the historical and critical methods of Modernism, as I have had occasion to study them when applied to Ancient History ; there I have often found a marked tendency to confuse the merely possible with the probable, and to refuse to accept the obvious meaning of evidence because it does not square with the a priori conclusions of the ' critic' Dr. Harris shows with a vigorous pen the same weak nesses in argument in many of the critics of the New Testament narrative ; his work deserves careful con sideration, both elsewhere and especially in the Univer sities, where there is a natural tendency to adopt new views, even without sufficient evidence, because the old ix x FOREWORD views are known to everybody, and therefore it shows no ingenuity or learning to accept them. Dr. Harris's work appeals to University men as a piece of criticism ; I feel sure that it will repay careful examination. J. Wells. AUTHORS PREFACE Early in the present year (1921) I was invited by the Society of ' Free Catholics ' to meet the Rev. F. E. Hutchinson (author of Christian Freedom) at their Annual Conference at Birmingham, and to debate with him the important subject of ' Creeds or no Creeds ? ' with special reference to the Nicene Creed, regarded as the necessary and sufficient doctrinal basis for the Reunion of Christendom. After a long general discussion, in which an admirable temper prevailed, opinion seemed so evenly divided that a definite decision was wisely postponed. My first intention was merely to publish my speech as delivered, together with replies to objections ; but upon reflection the subject seemed so vitally important that I decided in the end to write a full book, discussing in considerable detail the philosophical and critical principles which underlie the Modernist Movement. This seemed all the more necessary, because since 1899, when Professor Percy Gardner published his important pioneer work, Exploratio Evangelica, a Survey of the Foundations of Christianity (2nd edition, 1907), there has not been, in England at least, any adequate discussion on either side of fundamentals as distinguished from details.1 At the Birmingham debate it came out clearly that the difference between the Orthodox and the advanced 1 There has been a war of pamphlets, small books, and review articles, but no important work which has gone, like Gardner's treatise, to the root of the matter. Xll PREFACE Modernist positions is a difference, not so much of attitude towards particular doctrines, as of incompatible philosophies, and indeed of entire Weltanschauung. Mr. Hutchinson and myself were at issue, not merely as to what particular doctrines a Christian ought to believe, but as to whether the Christian Church ought to have any credenda at all. Nay, more : we were not even agreed as to what kind of knowledge (if any) it is possible for the human mind to possess, or what is meant when it is affirmed that a proposition — even a secular propo sition — is ' true.' The fundamental problem of philo sophy since the days of Kant has been Pilate's, What is truth ? and we were not even agreed about that. When divergence has reached so extreme a point, the only thing to be done is to put details aside for a time and discuss first principles. There are certain Modernists — a few on the Continent and more in England — who consider that Modernism has no first principles, or at least none of a philosophical or theological kind. Thus the Rev. H. D, A. Major contends that Modernism is a ' method,' not a ' system,' or at any rate not a philosophical or theological system. It is obvious, however, that every " method ' must be based upon some underlying principles or other, other wise it would lack justification. It is not, of course, necessary for everyone who uses a ' method' to know the theory of it. It is not necessary, for instance, for everyone who works a multiplication sum or extracts a square root to know the somewhat recondite principles which underlie these operations. It is sufficient for him to know and apply the ' methods.' Nevertheless, these underlying principles (which are metaphysical as well as mathematical) exist, and unless they can be justified, the ' methods ' cannot be justified either. Or to take a more apposite instance : a new ' method ' of dealing with the text of the New Testament was introduced by Westcott and Hort in their famous edition PREFACE xiii of 1881. But their ' method ' was also a ' system ' — it was, in fact, an imposing body of critical doctrine based upon certain first principles expounded by Hort in the second volume of Introduction. In this case, so close is the coherence of ' method ' and ' system,' that it is commonly impossible for a critic to attack any particular reading approved by Hort, without also delivering an assault upon his whole Introduction. The extremely negative character of Modernism by no means prevents it from being a ' system.' There are systems of negation as well as of affirmation ; such, for instance, as the Kantianism of the First Critique, the extremely negative character of which does not prevent it from being one of the most elaborate ' systems ' in the whole history of philosophy. By general consent, the jnain philosophic basfejaf Modernism is the Kantian doctrine of ' Immanence,' or (to use the more intelligible term) the Relativity of Human Knowledge ; nor do I think it possible to resist the contention of Professor Gardner, and indeed of most philosophic Modernists, that, given Kantianism, Modernism necessarily follows. Accordingly, the main object of this book is to refute the doctrine of Immanence, whether in its original Kantian form, or in the slightly modified forms which it has assumed in Hegelianism, Neo-Kantianism, Euckenism, Bergsonism, and Prag matism. Only three chapters are expressly devoted to this subject, but from cover to cover the book is an attempt to discredit Immanence both as a theoretical and a practical principle, and it must stand or fall by its success or failure in this direction. Christianity is not inseparably allied with any one system of philosophy, but there are some systems which are incompatible with it, and of these Kantianism is one. If Kant is right in holding that the human mind is incapable of knowing ' things-in-themselves,' i.e. of knowing Nature and God and the Eternal Moral Law, xiv PREFACE as they really are in their own essential natures ; if human knowledge, even at its best, is purely ' phenomenal,' ' symbolic,' ' provisional,' ' mutable ' — in technical language, ' relative ' and not ' absolute,' then there is an end, once and for all, of Orthodox Christianity. Orthodox Christianity is built upon the firm persuasion (which it shares with all philosophical systems earlier than Kant's),1 that human knowledge, though partial, is in principle (and, at its best, in practice also) absolute knowledge, i.e. knowledge which apprehends its object as it really is. Truth (even partial truth) was re garded as something fixed and unchangeable, and it was believed that a proposition, once true, is true for evermore. Under such circumstances it was perfectly natural for the Christian Church, believing that it had absolute (if partial) knowledge of God and man and of their mutual relations, to state its beliefs in fixed and unchanging creeds. Belief in absolute and immutable truth led naturally and necessarily to the formulation of immutable dogmas. If, however, the ' Copernican revolution ' of Kant is accepted, this is no longer possible. Man's rehgious beliefs — even the most fundamental — become ' phe nomenal,' provisional, and changeable. Belief is no longer determined by the nature of its object (which according to Kant is essentially unknowable), but by the nature and structure of the human mind, and by its subjective needs and desires. Truth itself becomes a relative, not an absolute thing. It is, in fact, as Pragmatists continu ally insist, a ' manufactured article ' — an instrument forged by the human mind to satisfy its own subjective 1 With the unimportant exception of Pyrrhonism, which the ancients regarded as mere sophistry. Hume belongs to the Kantian Movement, and it is doubtful whether he really believed his own sceptical doctrines. He speaks of scepticism as a ' malady' and a philosophic ' delirium,' and declares that he only was able to be happy when he forgot his own arguments. PREFACE xv wants, theoretical and (more usually) practical.1 It follows that doctrines which were ' true ' in the fourth century (those of the Nicene Creed, for instance) in the sense that they then exactly suited the average man's outlook upon life, are much less true now, seeing that that outlook has considerably changed. Indeed, so unstable a thing is Kantian and Modernist ' truth,' that in some cases what is ' true ' (i.e. suitable) to-day, may be false (because unsuitable) to-morrow. I should hardly have been able to take up so decided a Une against Kantianism (or at least not with so much confidence) had it not been for the remarkable revolution which has taken place during the last few years in the chief centre of English philosophy, Oxford, mainly, I think, owing to the influence of Professor Cook Wilson and Mr. T. Case.* Oxford, which since the days of T. H. Green has been the special home of Idealism (mainly of the Kantian and Hegelian, but partlyalso of the Berkeleian type), has now gone over to Realism, which if not precisely the Realism of Aristotle, is at least the kind of doctrine which he would probably have taught had he been alive to-day. The Hegelian and Pragmatist assaults upon the Aristotelian logic seem also definitely to have failed, and such able works as Mr. H. W. B. Joseph's Introduction to Logic mark a welcome return to the genuine Aristotelian tradition. The connexion between the Aristotelian logic (which is the logic of common-sense) and orthodox Christian theology is, of course, most intimate ; and a successful attempt to replace it by the Logic of Hegel or of Prag matism would have inflicted a most damaging blow 1 Of all Pragmatists Bergson undervalues the human intellect most. He ranks it below instinct, and sees in it only a practical instrument for dealing with matter. * Mr. Case laid the foundations of the Realist Movement in a powerful, original, and still valuable book. Physical Realism, published as far back as 1888. The influence of Professor Cook Wilson was exercised entirely through his lectures. xvi PREFACE upon the latter. A fundamental principle of Hegel's Logic is that all partial truth involves error ; and since all human truth is partial, it follows that even the most fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion — even those defined in the Catholic Creeds — are partly false, and are consequently liable to revision, alteration, and change of meaning, as knowledge advances. I am glad to notice that one of the greatest English authorities on the Hegelian Logic, Mr. McTaggart, has recently declared that this feature of Hegel's doctrine is indefensible, and that he has abandoned it.1 He has also abandoned the doctrine of ' degrees of reality ' which Bradley has done so much to popularize in England. He has only now to give up the equally indefensible doctrine of ' degrees of truth,' in order to cease altogether to be an Hegelian logician. The Modernist will not be able to object to the philo sophical basis of this book, that it is behind the times. It represents, at any rate, the type of philosophy now dominant in England. The Immanentism advocated by Modernism may be true — the most recent doctrine is not always the truest ; but at any rate, whether true or not, Immanentism is not the latest thing : it is no longer in the philosophic fashion. The sceptical philosophy of Kant, and its sequel the philosophy of Hegel, who, though he retired from some of Kant's more extreme positions, was faithful to the doctrine of Immanence, led naturally to a sceptical movement in historical and textual criticism, both in the theological and in the classical fields. It became the fashion to deny the authenticity of all ancient works, the evidence for whose authenticity was not demonstrative, 1 " In this point we shall depart from what was Hegel's principle. . . . Each characteristic demonstrated in the course of our [dialectical] process will remain at the end of the process. None of them, of course, will be the whole truth, but that will not prevent all of them from being quite true" (The Nature of Existence (1921), vol. i, p. 46). PREFACE xvii to assign to them as late a date as possible, to suppose their contents to be as unhistorical and legendary as possible, and to assume that their texts are grossly corrupt, full of perverse emendations, deliberate falsifica tions, and extensive interpolations of copyists. These views, and the methods of criticism based upon them, have been out of fashion among classical scholars for nearly two generations, but they are still retained, with a conservatism almost pathetic, by Liberal Protestants and Modernists. The ' vigour and rigour ' with which such eminent exponents of Modernism as M. Le Roy, M. Loisy, Canon Charles, and Dean Rashdall deal with the text of the New Testament, moulding it to suit their private views, and deleting all passages which contradict them, recalls the days of the last century, when out of thirty-five dialogues of Plato only two still remained unquestioned by scholars of weight and authority ; when the Platonic Epistles had not a defender in Europe but Grote; when it was maintained by most scholars that the Dialogue on Oratory could not possibly have proceeded from the pen that wrote the Histories and Annals of Tacitus, and by some that the Annals were forged by Poggio in the fifteenth century; when prac tically all scholars rejected as spurious Cicero's speeches Post Reditum and the Pro Marcello, some also the Pro Archia, and Orelli even the obviously genuine orations ii-iv Against Catiline ; and when a morbid suspicion of interpolation was so prevalent, that Madvig and Halm (the former more confidently than the latter) excised from the Pro Ccelio, upon the evidence of the first hand of a single manuscript, a large number of passages, some of which were absolutely necessary to the sense. Such arbitrary methods of criticism have become obsolete in the classical field, partly owing to papyrus discoveries, which since 1875 and especially since 1895 have been numerous and important, and partly owing to the development of more refined instruments of 2 xvi PREFACE upon the latter. A fundamental principle of Hegel's Logic is that all partial truth involves error ; and since all human truth is partial, it follows that even the most fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion — even those defined in the Catholic Creeds — are partly false, and are consequently liable to revision, alteration, and change of meaning, as knowledge advances. I am glad to notice that one of the greatest English authorities on the Hegelian Logic, Mr. McTaggart, has recently declared that this feature of Hegel's doctrine is indefensible, and that he has abandoned it.1 He has also abandoned the doctrine of ' degrees of reality ' which Bradley has done so much to popularize in England. He has only now to give up the equally indefensible doctrine of ' degrees of truth,' in order to cease altogether to be an Hegelian logician. The Modernist will not be able to object to the philo sophical basis of this book, that it is behind the times. It represents, at any rate, the type of philosophy now dominant in England. The Immanentism advocated by Modernism may be true — the most recent doctrine is not always the truest ; but at any rate, whether true or not, Immanentism is not the latest thing : it is no longer in the philosophic fashion. The sceptical philosophy of Kant, and its sequel the philosophy of Hegel, who, though he retired from some of Kant's more extreme positions, was faithful to the doctrine of Immanence, led naturally to a sceptical movement in historical and textual criticism, both in the theological and in the classical fields. It became the fashion to deny the authenticity of all ancient works, the evidence for whose authenticity was not demonstrative, 1 " In this point we shall depart from what was Hegel's principle... . . . Each characteristic demonstrated in the course of our [dialectical] process will remain at the end of the process. None of them, of course, will be the whole truth, but that will not prevent all of them from being quite true" (The Nature of Existence (1921), vol. i, p. 46). PREFACE xvii to assign to them as late a date as possible, to suppose their contents to be as unhistorical and legendary as possible, and to assume that their texts are grossly corrupt, full of perverse emendations, deliberate falsifica tions, and extensive interpolations of copyists. These views, and the methods of criticism based upon them, have been out of fashion among classical scholars for nearly two generations, but they are still retained, with a conservatism almost pathetic, by Liberal Protestants and Modernists. The ' vigour and rigour ' with which such eminent exponents of Modernism as M. Le Roy, M. Loisy, Canon Charles, and Dean Rashdall deal with the text of the New Testament, moulding it to suit their private views, and deleting all passages which contradict them, recalls the days of the last century, when out of thirty-five dialogues of Plato only two still remained unquestioned by scholars of weight and authority; when the Platonic Epistles had not a defender in Europe but Grote ; when it was maintained by most scholars that the Dialogue on Oratory could not possibly have proceeded from the pen that wrote the Histories and Annals of Tacitus, and by some that the Annals were forged by Poggio in the fifteenth century; when prac tically all scholars rejected as spurious Cicero's speeches Post Reditum and the Pro Marcello, some also the Pro Archia, and Orelli even the obviously genuine orations ii-iv Against Catiline ; and when a morbid suspicion of interpolation was so prevalent, that Madvig and Halm (the former more confidently than the latter) excised from the Pro Ccelio, upon the evidence of the first hand of a single manuscript, a large number of passages, some of which were absolutely necessary to the sense. Such arbitrary methods of criticism have become obsolete in the classical field, partly owing to papyrus discoveries, which since 1875 and especially since 1895 have been numerous and important, and partly owing to the development of more refined instruments of 2 xviii PREFACE research, particularly the study of prose-rhythm. In almost all cases the effect of the new discoveries and the new methods has been to confirm tradition. It is not now considered safe, except in the rarest and most peculiar circumstances, to reject as spurious any work which was unanimously accepted in antiquity ; or even to tamper seriously with its text. Practically the whole of the Platonic Canon endorsed by the Academy is now accepted by modern critics. Even the Platonic Epistles are again coming into favour, and are defended by a majority of scholars. Interpolations in ancient books are now regarded as rare, and for the most part as unimportant. No scholar would now defend the rash excisions of Madvig just mentioned,1 and lately even the long ' interpolation ' in the 7th Epistle of Plato, which even the defenders of its genuineness have hitherto regarded as spurious, has found a brilliant and convincing defender in Mr. A. E. Taylor.' Nor does the nineteenth-century habit of questioning every unconfirmed statement of an ancient historian, and assuming that his work contains a maximum of legend and a minimum of fact, any longer hold the field. So many historical facts, denied or doubted by nine teenth-century critics, have recently been confirmed by papyrus discoveries, that Prof. A. S. Hunt (than whom there is no higher authority) is perfectly justified in writing : " Let us remember, for example, the case of Anthropus, the Olympian victor, who has risen from the grave in an Oxyrhyncus papyrus to confute the modern critics who, refusing to accept the evidence of the early commentators on Aristotle, denied his existence. ... It is a grave mistake ... to treat such reports of ancient historians cavalierly. ... To neglect their affirmations, 1 Recent papyrus discoveries have shown that the omitted passages are genuine. > See Mind, 1912, pp. 347 ff. Even the Christian ' interpolations ' in Josephus are now defended, not only by Professor Burkitt, but also by Harnack and Zahn. Personally I am not yet convinced. PREFACE xix or to dismiss them without strong conflicting evidence, is not consistent with the principles of sound criticism. At any rate, those who are minded to flout early testi mony will do well to wait until the period of papyrus discovery is safely over." x Modernists and Liberal Protestants are most unwisely perpetuating in the theological field a type of arbitrary and subjective criticism which the consensus of scholars has long condemned in the classical. They may of course be right — majorities are often wrong ; nevertheless it is important to realize that the textual and historical criticism of Modernism is behind the times, not merely by one, but by two generations. No classical scholar with a reputation to lose would dare to deal with the text and subject-matter of an ancient historian as even the more moderate Modernists deal with the Gospels — even the Synoptics. With regard to the theology and Christology of Modernism, it seemed until quite lately — until the Girton Conference, in fact — not only to the ordinary churchman, but even to most Modernists, that they had not yet lost touch with historical Christianity, and that in spite of their denial of miracles, and their extreme kenoticism, which seemed to reduce the power and knowledge of the Incarnate One almost to an ordinary human level, they still accepted the fundamental doctrine of the Incar nation in something like its orthodox sense. Doubtless many Modernists do so still ; certainly Bishop Henson does,' and as for Dean Rashdall, in spite of the difficulty created by his Cambridge paper, I for one unreservedly 1 Papyri and Papyrology (1914). 1 " There must be a true and apparent identity between the oldest Christology and the youngest. In both alike the plenary Lordship of Jesus Christ, His unique and incommunicable Godhead, must be corre lated with His Perfect Manhood, affirmed and justified. If this character of any proposed Christology be absent, the Church can have no use for it. It is a formula of apostasy, not of faith " (Sermon at the Church Congress, 1921). xxii PREFACE I am specially grateful to the Warden of Wadham College for endorsing, from the point of view of a recog nized authority on ancient history, the general attitude towards historical and literary criticism taken up in this volume ; and not less to the Bishop of Lichfield, who, writing as an Idealist, finds himself able to accept — and even powerfully to reinforce — the main philosophical arguments of a Realist like myself. One can only criticize a system effectively from one's own philosophical standpoint, and mine is Realism ; nevertheless, my aim throughout has been, not to prove Realism true as against Idealism, but simply and solely to establish the full objectivity, immutability, and ' absoluteness ' of human knowledge at its best against all agnostic theories on the subject based on the Rela tivity and Subjectivism of Kant's First Critique. With this general aim all Berkeleians and many English Hegelians and other Idealists will find themselves in sympathy. Accordingly, I have been careful, in the philosophical discussions which follow, to lay the chief stress upon arguments which Idealists as well as Realists are able to accept. I should be the last to advocate the policy (popular in some quarters) of attaching Christianity irrevocably to a single philosophical system, even that of the Angelical Doctor, good in general as I believe it to be. Philosophy is a progressive science, and to put the clock back to the thirteenth century, as if nothing important had been discovered since, seems to me a mistaken — even a fatal — policy. Charles Harris. Christmas 192 1. CONTENTS FOREWORD BY THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD . . p. v FOREWORD BY THE WARDEN OF WADHAM COLLEGE, OXFORD P- « AUTHOR'S PREFACE P- » CHAPTER I. — THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND CRITICAL ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM Conservative Modernism (Continental and English). Advanced Modernism (Continental and English). Philosophical basis of Modern ism. Influence of Kant and Hegel on Theology and Biblical Criticism. Doctrinal position of Liberal Protestantism. Its influence on Modern ism. Is Modernism a stable position ? . . . . p. I CHAPTER II. — THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE The New Testament implies development without essential change. Traditional view of development. Views of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Vincent of Lerins. Newman's ' organic ' theory of development. The Modernist view as represented by Gunther, Loisy, Le Roy, and Tyrrell. Exaggerations of the amount of development. Alleged chasm between the teaching of Christ and that of the Apostles p. 22 CHAPTER III. — EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE Evolution as taught by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Darwin, and Spencer. Theory of a Universal Flux. Identity in Change. Development of Individual Organisms.' The Permanent Factor in Human Belief. Can Religious Dogmas be permanent ? Normal Development of Doctrine. Abnormal (Discontinuous) Development P- 44 xxiij xxiv CONTENTS CHAPTER IV. — THE NATURE OF TRUTH Theories of Knowledge. The ' Correspondence ' Theory. The Kantian Theory of ' Immanence,' or the Relativity of Human Know ledge. Kant's three Critiques. Religious and Moral Consequences of Kantianism. Kantian ' Experience.' Kant's ' Antinomies." Hegel's criticism of Kant. His Theory of Knowledge. His identification of Logic with Metaphysics. Truth as ' Coherence," or ' Consistency." Does partial truth involve error ? Hegel's Logic. Views of McTaggart and Joachim. Hegel's Logic and the Catholic Creeds. Present position of the Aristotelian Logic p. 58 CHAPTER V. — PRAGMATIST VIEWS OF TRUTH Relation of Pragmatism to Kant. Pragmatic Truth. Views of C. S. Peirce, Wm. James, F. C. S. Schiller, Boutroux, Blondel, Le Roy, Croce, Bergson. Schiller's theory of ' Hyle.' The ' Irrationalism ' of Pragmatism. Pragmatism and ' Experience." Truth as ' Utility." Bergson's ' Intuition." The Pragmatist assault upon Logic . p. 94 CHAPTER VI. — M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA His purely ' practical ' view of Dogma. His denial of its intellectual or theoretical validity. M. Le Roy as a Christian Apologist. His views on the Resurrection and Divinity of our Lord . . p. 112 CHAPTER VII. — IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION Final judgment upon Kantian ' Immanence." Criticism of Professor Gardner's Neo-Kantian position. Modernist estimates of the value of Religious ' Experience.' Dr. Rashdall's criticism of the Modernist proposal to base Theology upon Psychology. Theological (or Religious) Immanence. Its distinction from Hegelian Immanence. Modernist confusion between Immanence and Identity. Immanence and the Incarnation. The Christology of Immanence. Dr. Rashdall's Chris tology. Varieties of immanental theory , . . . p. 129 CHAPTER VIII. — MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE Initial assumptions of the argument. ' Continuous ' and ' discon tinuous ' development. Definition of ' the Order of Nature.' The probative force of positive and negative evidence compared. Hume's argument against miracles. It overestimates the force of negative evidence. Miracle and Natural Law. Divine Immanence in the CONTENTS xxv Universe. The Universe regarded as an ' Organism." Application of the ' organic ' view to the problem of miracles. The identity of the Supernatural and the Miraculous. Psycho-physical Parallelism regarded as a cosmic principle. Evolution an essentially miraculous process. Miracles and the Incarnation ...... p. 150 CHAPTER IX. — MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM Influence of Kant and Hegel upon Classical and Biblical Criticism. Negative Classical Criticism of the Nineteenth Century. Homeric criticism and Pentateuchal criticism. The criticism of the Canon of Plato compared with that of the Canon of the New Testament. Recent criticism of the Platonic Epistles. The movement ' Back to Tradition." The evidence of Papyrology and Prose-rhythm. Views of Professors A. S. Hunt and A. C. Clark. Application to Biblical criticism. The ' received ' books of the New Testament. The Pastoral Epistles ; I Peter ; St. Luke ; The Acts. The Johannine question. The Apocalypse. The Fourth Gospel. External evidence. Recent dis covery. Testimony of Irenseus, Justin, and Polycrates. Internal evidence. Evidence of the appendix. Summary . . p. 187 APPENDIX I— JOHANNINE DIFFICULTIES . . p. 216 APPENDIX II— DR. RASHDALL'S BAMPTON LECTURES p. 222 CHAPTER X. — THE FUNCTION OF DOGMA Secular Dogma. Dogmas of the State. Dogmas of Parties. Sym bolical interpretation of Dogmas. Freedom of Thought and Speech. Freedom of Combination. Modernists and the Creeds. Modernists and the Pulpit. Unitarianism and Christianity. The Primary Dogmas of Science. Immutability of these Dogmas. Secondary Dogmas of Science. Science and Dogmatic Tests . . . p. 231 CHAPTER XI. — THE CATHOLIC CREEDS Suggested modem creeds. The Catholic Creeds. Their insistence upon morality. Their authority. Their doctrine of God, of Creation, of the Fall, of Original Sin, of Redemption, of the Incarnation. Cen- trality and fundamental importance of the Incarnation. The Judg ment to come. Present and future judgment. Human Immortality. Symbolical interpretation of credal articles. The Resurrection of the ' flesh.' The Ascension. The Descent into Hell. The Conceptions of Heaven and Hell. The Resurrection of Jesus. The traditional view. The Modernist view. Summary and conclusion . p. 247 APPENDIX— THE VIRGIN BIRTH . . . . p. 291 xxvi CONTENTS CHAPTER XII. — THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM Earlier attitude towards Creeds. Present attitude, as illustrated by the views of Mr. Major and Mr. F. E. Hutchinson. The test of discipleship. The non-dogmatic principle examined. Its theoretical and practical absurdities both at home and in the Mission Field. The latest Modernist Christologies, as expounded at the Girton Conference. Mr. Major's Christology and that of Paul of Samosata. Views of Dr. Bethune-Baker and Canon Barnes. Assumptions of the following argument. The Perfect Being of Orthodoxy. The God of Modernism. " The Divinity of Man." Theory of Apotheosis. Pantheistic and semi- pantheistic views of the Incarnation. Effect of these views upon character and worship. The orthodox doctrines of the Incarnation and the Holy Trinity compared with those of Modernism. God as Love. Modernism and the Moral Law. The Freudian Psychology. Modernism and Sexual Morality. Modernism and Moral Authority. Conclusion p. 300 APPENDIX I— THE CHARGE OF TRITHEISM . p. 362 APPENDIX II— MR. MAJOR'S THREE CHRISTOLOGIES p. 3<56 BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 369 INDEX p. 377 CREEDS OR NO CREEDS? CHAPTER I the philosophical and critical antecedents of modernism Conservative Modernism The term Modernism is used in two entirely different senses. Sometimes it denotes the attitude of that impor tant body of orthodox Churchmen who maintain that the outlook of the modern Church ought to be modern (not medieval or ancient), and that accordingly it is the duty of the theologians and teachers of the Church to study modern science and philosophy with appreciative sympathy, to assimilate into the Church's current teaching such modern ideas as are sound and helpful, to use modern methods of criticism and exegesis in their study of the Bible, the Fathers, and Ecclesiastical History, and (above all) to commend the Church's essential message to our age, by translating it, where needful, from the little understood forms of thought of the Creeds, and Councils, and Schoolmen into the better understood categories employed by modern thinkers. To this useful and well-understood programme of Con servative Modernism there can be no possible objection, even from the point of view of the strictest orthodoxy, provided always (i) that the meaning of the Church's message is faithfully preserved, and not altered, in the process of translation, and (2) that the Creeds and the 2 THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM definitions of the Ecumenical Councils are still regarded as authoritative. Many of those who are popularly classed as Modernists do not really aim at more than this. The Abb6 Duchesne, for instance, whom many French Modernists regard as the real founder of their movement, and whose able and candid work, L'histoire ancienne de I'eglise, was placed on the Index in 1912 for its supposed dangerous tendencies, seems to have said and written nothing inconsistent with the strictest orthodoxy. He gave offence because he was the prime mover in introducing modern methods of criticism, and popularizing them in the French Church, but he also showed by his brilliant example that these methods can be as effectively used in defence of ortho doxy as against it. Nor does it appear that M. Fonsegrive, who is known throughout Europe as a Christian philosopher and apolo gist, has had any other end in view, in all that he has said and written, than the reconciliation of orthodox Catholicism with the thought of our age. It is true that he has criticized with some asperity the extremely sweeping condemnations of the Encyclical Pascendi (" the deed which Pius X has done," he wrote, " is the rupture of the diplomatic relations between the Church and the age"), and that he has deeply offended the ultra-traditionalists by claiming that it is possible to be a good Catholic without altogether accepting the official philosophy of St. Thomas, but nowhere has he put forward opinions which can fairly be called unorthodox. Something similar may be said of M. Maurice Blondel, who in the minds of many contests with M. Le Roy the claim to be ' the Philosopher of Modernism.' His ingenious but obscure work, L' Action (1893), which French readers seem to find as difficult to understand as English, is considered by the ecclesiastical authorities to be unsound and dangerous ; but I am unable, even with the FRENCH MODERNISTS 3 help of M. de Tonqueclec's elaborate refutation,1 to find either in it or in its successor, Histoire et Dogme (1904), anything definitely unorthodox even from the strictly Roman standpoint. M. Blondel, like nearly all French Modernists, is something of a Pragmatist, and looks for the proof of the Christian verities rather to the evidence of two thousand years of Christian life and experience, than to purely intellectual arguments. He may merit in some measure M. de Tonquedec's rebuke for his under valuing of logic and objective fact in the sphere of religion, but undoubtedly in L' Action he declares his adhesion to the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation in most orthodox language,' and in Histoire et Dogme his belief in at least the leading Gospel miracles, both as facts, and as possessing apologetic value.' Few ecclesiastics in France have given deeper offence to the ultra-orthodox party than the Abb6 Laberthonniere, and it must be candidly confessed that he has been ex tremely unwise in appropriating, as he has, the entire vocabulary of extreme Modernism, and speaking, for example, of " the Christ of history,' and ' the Christ of faith,' as if there was a radical difference between them. Nevertheless, so far as I can understand the matter, he seems substantially orthodox, not merely with regard to doctrines of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, but 1 Joseph de Tonquedec, Immanence, Essai critique sur la doctrine de M. Maurice Blondel, 1912. * " Initiating us into the secret of His intimate life, the hidden God reveals to us the divine processions — the generation of the Word by the Father, the spiration of the Spirit by the Father and the Son. Then, by love. He invites all men to the participation of His Nature and of His Beatitude. Adopted by the Father, regenerated by the Son, anointed by the Spirit, man is by grace what God is by nature, etc." (p. 407). * After deprecating the almost exclusive stress laid by orthodox apologists upon the argument from miracles, he proceeds : "It ought to be superfluous to note that I do not deny altogether the reality or the probative force of signs and miracles ; I criticize only the imperfect use which certain apologists make of them." 4 THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM even with regard to the Gospel miracles. He speaks frequently of the ' symbolical ' interpretation of certain articles of the Creed, but, unlike our English Modernists, he insists that the literal sense must first be accepted before the ' symbolical ' interpretation is built upon it. Speaking of the Virgin Birth and Resurrection of our Lord, he says expressly : " We could never, without completely misunderstanding the nature of Christian doctrine, affirm that the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection are only symbols, because in that case Christ would lose His character, and would cease to appear as the life of God inserting itself into the life of humanity. The dogmas would be nothing but myth in place of realities." * Many other contemporary French theologians might be mentioned who unite progressive views, and an en lightened appreciation of the principles of modern science and criticism, with substantial orthodoxy — e.g. Messeig- neurs d'Hulst, Le Camus, and Mignot, and the Abbes Batiffol and Birot. In England this type of Modernism, which is more usually called Liberal Catholicism, is not only well known, but has actually been the predominant type of theology in the Anglican Church for more than a generation. It found classical expression as far back as 1890 in Lux Mundi, a courageous and yet cautious work of outstanding merit, which has profoundly influenced all subsequent rehgious thought. Even the essays in Foundations (1912) represent chiefly this type of Modernism, for though the editor, Canon Streeter, belongs to the more advanced (but not most extreme) school, and argues in his essay against the historic truth of Christ's bodily resurrection, yet most of the other contributors seem to accept both this and the other leading Gospel miracles as literal facts. To prophecy is always dangerous, but it seems probable that it is this, rather than the more extreme type of 1 Le rtalismt chrttitn, p. 63. MODERATE MODERNISM 5 Modernism, which has the future before it in England. England and the English Church are averse from extremes, whether of Traditionalism or of Liberahsm. Conservative Modernism seems best calculated to effect the desired reconciliation of the old with the new. It desires, by as similating the most assured results of modern philosophy and science, to effect a well-balanced synthesis of Christian faith with sound learning. It fully accepts the methods of modern Biblical criticism so far as they are really sound and objective, but rejects with good reason the purely subjective assumptions of the more extreme Continental criticism, which rules out the entire miracu lous element of Christianity as beyond the sphere of profit able discussion. Moderate Modernism of this type does justice both to the permanent and to the developing elements in Christian belief. While fully orthodox, it recognizes that the Holy Ghost has still much to teach the Church, and that the Church must not be slow to learn it. It admits development, and yet maintains that the fundamental meaning of the Church's doctrines has never altered. It admits the utility and even the need of ' re-statement,' but by this it means merely the translation of the Church's message into terms of modem thought, not in any degree the alteration of its meaning, still less its supersession by a message entirely new. It holds firmly to the principle of the supernatural and the miraculous, maintaining quite reasonably that inasmuch as the Incarnation is a unique and miraculous event, having no historical or scientific parallel, its circumstances must not be measured by analogies drawn from ordinary human lives, but that on the contrary there is a presump tion in favour of, and not against, such lesser miracles as are asserted on good evidence to have accompanied it, and which have certainly helped to win credit for it, both in the first and in all subsequent ages. In contrast with mere Traditionalism, such a position may be suitably described as Progressive Orthodoxy, and 6 THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM it is from this point of view that the more advanced types of Modernism will be criticized in the following pages. Advanced Modernism More usually, however, the term Modernism is used to describe the views of a much more advanced school of theologians, who, while agreeing with orthodox Church men in accepting the doctrine of the Incarnation (usually in a somewhat minimizing sense), and also in many cases (but by no means in all) the doctrine of the Personal Trinity, have so far diverged from orthodoxy, as to have accepted from the Liberal Protestantism of the Continent at least the two following theological positions : (i) That all the doctrines of the Church, even those formulated in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, so far from being absolutely true and immutable (as has always hitherto been assumed), are subject to correction and even rejection, as human knowledge advances.1 (2) That miracles, if not absolutely impossible, are at least in practice incredible, and that therefore even the great miracles connected with the Person of Christ, and defined as vital in the Creeds — viz. the Virgin Birth, the Bodily Resurrection, and the Bodily Ascension of Jesus Christ — are not historic facts. These are the two most important principles upon which the distinctive system of Modernist theology (for system it is, in spite of all denials) is reared. As the discussion proceeds, it will become manifest that both these principles are based ultimately upon the meta physical system of Kant, especially upon the doctrine of ' Immanence,' or the ' Relativity of Knowledge,' which a large number of later schools, which in other 1 " Where [the Modernist] differs from the Traditionalist," says the Rev. H. D. A. Major, " is in claiming the right ... to reinterpret and even reject any statement of the Creed which may become incredible as the result of reVerent research." (See the full discussion of this position in ch. xii.) ITALIAN MODERNISM 7 respects diverge widely from his type of teaching (e.g. Hegelianism, Euckenism, Pragmatism, and Bergsonism) have derived from him. This fundamental doctrine of Immanence takes Protean forms, and ramifies in all directions. We shall be concerned with its developments in almost every chapter, but the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh are especially devoted to it. The first subject that requires discussion is the Per manence of Dogma, a principle to which orthodox Christianity is absolutely pledged. The Doctrine of Evolution Modernists argue that no truly enlightened mind can any longer believe in the permanence of rehgious dogma, because the establishment of the Doctrine of Evolution, first as a philosophical and later as a scientific principle, has rendered incredible the permanence of any human beliefs whatsoever. To imagine that even the most fundamental human beliefs are fixed and unchangeable is to reject the dynamic view of truth, characteristic of all modem thinking, and to return to the static view, characteristic of ancient and medieval thought, but ren dered impossible for all truly modern minds, first by the philosophy of Kant, and secondly by the establishment of Evolution as a cosmic principle by Hegel and Darwin. Evolution, it is urged, means change — radical and far-reaching change, both in the universe as a whole, and in all its parts, and since human beliefs form part of the universe, it is impossible but that they should change with it. " There is no fixed truth," says what is perhaps the most authoritative document of Italian Modernism,1 " no unalterable precept. Everything in the history of Christianity has changed — doctrine, hierarchy, worship. . . . Such a criticism [as ours] of the substance of Christ's » The anonymous // Programma dei Modernisti (Rome, 1908), a reply to the Encyclical Pascendi of Pius X ; English translation by A. L. Lilley. 3 8 THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM teaching does away with the very possibility of finding in it even the embryonic form of the Church's theological teaching. . . . The conclusions of such a method, applied to the history of Catholicism, are simply disastrous to the old theological positions. Instead of finding from the first at least the germs of those dogmatic affirmations formulated by Church authority in the course of ages, we have found a sort of religion which was originally formless and undogmatic, and which came gradually to develop in the direction of definite forms of thought and ritual owing to the requirements of general inter course. . . . Christianity felt free in the early ages to give expression to its faith in the language of any specu lative system current among the faithful for the time being. . . . Explanations and theories had but a relative value in its eyes. . . . The Church, which lay beyond the horizon of Christ's outlook, bounded as it was by the Second Coming [which He regarded as imminent], grew up by a natural process among His followers. . . . Criticism has made us see how Catholic dogma has sprung entirely from the need of setting experience in harmony with the mind of the age." The authors (who appear from the account they give of their education to be priests) consider that the only permanent thing about Christianity is " its Spirit, which," they say, " has remained unchanged through the ages " ; though how even this can have resisted change, if the entire universe is in a state of flux, is not clear to me, nor (I venture to think) to them. Another Italian manifesto states even more clearly than II Programma, that all human truth whatsoever — scientific and mathematical, equally with rehgious truth — is of the same relative, provisional, and ' symbolic ' character.1 The agnosticism of Kant, radical as it was, 1 Anon., Quello the vogliamo (Milan, 1907), translated by A. L. Lilley as " What we want. An open letter to Pius X by a group of priests." ITALIAN MODERNISM 9 did not deny the objective existence of external things. It only declared them unknowable. The authors of What we want out-Kant Kant himself, by denying even the existence of external things, and maintaining that the human mind creates its own objects of knowledge? " It is our mind," they say, " which by its operations creates the things, whose appearances only at a given moment we can register, whose relations only we can seek to establish by means of categories, which are them selves fashioned by our mind for the practical needs of hfe. Verifications, registrations, and categories make up our science, which is therefore not an objective knowledge of reality, but only its mental representation elaborated by us at a given moment, and so subjective, relative, and capable of transformation and variation in accordance with the evolution of the human spirit, which is in a continual state of becoming " (i.e. flux or change). Modernism and Philosophy The authors of // Programma naively complain that they are accused in the Encyclical Pascendi of holding certain philosophical doctrines of an agnostic kind, from which, as from first principles, they deduce all their pecuhar historical and theological conclusions. This accusation, they protest, is most unjust. They disclaim altogether the character of philosophers, and profess only to be critics. Starting without any philo sophical principles at all, and devoting themselves entirely to Bibhcal and historical criticism — criticism, moreover, not biassed like that of the Catholic Church, but of a purely neutral and ' objective ' kind, they have arrived, only at the end of their studies and as a result of them, at those philosophical principles^ of a Neo- Kantian type, which the Encyclical so severely condemns. They do 1 M. Blondel has been accused of teaching the same doctrine in V Action, but he energetically denies it. io THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM not deny that they hold these principles 1 ; they only insist that they are rather the result, than the source, of their critical methods. The question, however, arises, from whom did they learn these critical methods ? and they give their whole case away, when they admit that they learnt them from the Liberal Protestants, the great majority of whom, they further admit, are complete rationalists in religion. But then, " their conclusions are not founded on their ration alism, but on their reasons, on their vast knowledge, above all on their conscientious investigations of texts and facts." Moreover, a certain number of them are Christian be lievers, notably " Dr. Charles Briggs, the iUustrious critic and philologist, well known for his Catholic tendencies." As examples of the purely ' objective ' character of this Liberal Protestant criticism, they instance the discrimination of the component documents of the Penta teuch by such objective tests as style, and varying phraseology, especially with regard to the titles of God; and the attempts to solve the Synoptic problem by a careful study of the vocabulary, style, order, and contents of the first three Gospels. In these cases, of course, the methods used are really ' objective,' and for this reason are employed equally by all critics, orthodox and unorthodox. There is nothing distinctively Liberal or Modernist about them. The Influence of Hegelianism The authors, however, are entirely mistaken in imagin ing that objective principles of this kind are the only ones accepted by Liberal Protestantism. Liberal Protes- 1 " It cannot be denied that our postulates are inspired by the principles of Immanentism. . . . We accept the criticism of pure reason which Kant and Spencer have made. . . . We find ourselves undoubtedly in harmony with one of the fundamental tendencies of contemporary philosophy, one which is considered the very condition of the possi bility of philosophy, viz. the immanental tendency." HEGELIAN INFLUENCE ir tantism itself is a creation of Kant, who sketched its entire programme (including the unessential character of miracles and of the Incarnation) as far back as 1793 in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, and once more emphasized his Rationalism in Der Streit der Facultdten (1798). Its second founder is Hegel (the Hegel of the unorthodox Left and Left-Centre, not of the more orthodox Right), whose influence upon Liberal theology and criticism has been profound both in Germany and England. To pass by the earher critical movement inspired directly by Kant, the modern era of Liberal Protestant criticism of the New Testament (with which we are chiefly con cerned) dates from the appointment of F. C. Baur as professor of theology at Tubingen in 1826. At the time of his appointment, he had recently abandoned the teach ing of Fichte and ScheUing for that of Hegel, whose enthusiastic disciple he soon became. As a thorough going adherent of the Hegelian School, his aim was to show that the history of the Church both in the Apostolic and in subsequent ages conformed to the stages of Hegel's philosophy of history. One of his sayings was : " With out phUosophy, history is always for me dead and dumb." Starting with an a priori theory of a radical and irrecon cilable contradiction between Petrine and Pauline Christianity, lasting until at least the middle of the second century, he did not hesitate to condemn as spurious all the New Testament documents that seemed inconsis tent with it — that is to say, all but 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, Galatians, and the Apocalypse. Another of the founders of the Liberal School, D. F. Strauss, was also a prominent Hegehan, and his two chief works, the Leben Jesu (1835) and Die christliche Glaubens- lehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung (1840-1), are entirely dominated by Hegehan principles interpreted in a pantheistic sense. The latter work in particular is full, not only of Hegel's ideas, but also of his technical terms. 12 THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM German Liberalism has modified or abandoned not a few of Baur's and Strauss's original positions, but it stiU retains the fundamental character which Baur im pressed upon it of ' tendency ' criticism. No criticism can altogether dispense with presuppositions, but no important critical school has ever carried subjectivism and apriorism to such extreme lengths as Baur and his Liberal Protestant successors. In spite of a reaction in certain quarters (notably among the followers of Hamack), the Liberal School is still unduly dominated by subjective ideas, and many of its present-day repre sentatives (particularly those of the Eschatological Group of J. Weiss and Schweitzer) are guilty of extravagances hardly less than Baur's own. From Hegelianism Liberal Protestantism has derived (among others) the four following important principles : (i) A theory of Radical Evolutionism which denies the permanence of aU (human) truth ; (2) A pecuhar theory of error, according to which all partial (and therefore aU human) truth is partially erroneous and false ; (3) A denial of the credibility (or at least of the impor tance) of miracles (a principle which Hegel shared with Kant) ; and (4) A distinction between the non-miraculous ' Christ of history' and the miraculous and largely mythical ' Christ of faith.' This distinction, already clearly drawn by Baur, was developed to extreme lengths by Strauss, who dissolved a great part of the Gospel narra tives into myths and legends. PracticaUy everything that the most recent Modernism has to say upon this subject is already anticipated in his Der Christus des Glaubens und der Jesus der Geschichte (1865), a reply to Schleiermacher's comparatively conservative Life of Christ. From Liberal Protestantism, Modernism has derived these four principles, together with the fundamental one KANT AND HEGEL 13 of Philosophic Immanence, which is common to Hegel and Kant. Since all these principles existed in philosophy before they existed in Biblical criticism, and since those who first introduced them into the latter acknowledged that they derived them from phnosophy, it is impossible to accept the Modernist contention that Liberal and Modernist criticism is not based upon philosophy. It is as plain a fact of history that the metaphysics of Kant and Hegel lie at the root of Liberal Protestant (and therefore of Modernist) Biblical criticism, as that Napoleon was defeated by Wellington at Waterloo. Of course, very few Modernists derive their critical principles directly from the works of Kant and Hegel. Usually they derive them indirectly and unconsciously from the study of critical works of the German Protes tant School, in which they are not stated explicitly as philosophical principles, but are implied in the methods used. But though only imphed, they influence and often dictate the results reached ; and unless they can be proved to be true by metaphysical arguments, the critical methods characteristic of Modernism have no basis in reason. The Religious Influence of Kant and Hegel It is impossible to decide peremptorily whether Kant or Hegel has exerted the greater influence upon Liberal Protestantism, and (by consequence) upon Modernism. In many things the two philosophers were in agreement. Both laid great stress upon the doctrine of Immanence, though Hegel amended Kant's doctrine by abolishing ' things-in- themselves.' Both adopted the same attitude towards miracles, which was one of disparagement, and of denial that the miraculous element in religion is of the shghtest importance. " Whether at the marriage at Cana," says Hegel, " the guests got a little more wine or a little less, is a matter of absolutely no importance ; not is it any more essential to determine whether or not the man who had the withered hand was healed. . . . 14 THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM Curiosity of this sort reaUy has its origin in unbelief." " The spiritual, as such, cannot be directly verified or authenticated by what is unspiritual and connected with sense [i.e. miracle]. The chief thing to be noticed in connexion with this view of miracles is that in this way they are put on one side." l Neither Kant nor Hegel absolutely denied them as facts, but without determining whether they were facts or not, they considered them as beneath the serious notice of a philosopher. Most of their f oUowers (the Hegelian Left in a particularly aggres sive manner) took up the position that miracles are incredible or impossible, and it is fairly clear that this result was contemplated by the philosophers themselves. Kant regarded the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Holy Trinity as entirely unimportant, and probably disbelieved them both. Hegel, on the other hand, re garded them as vital, not only to Christianity, but also to phflosophy. It is exceedingly difficult and probably impossible (in spite of Hegel's own opinion upon the subject) to bring his doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation into even tolerable harmony with those of orthodox Christianity; but the fact that he thought the two most distinctive Christian dogmas to be of metaphysical as weU as rehgious value is significant, and may lead to important results in time to come. The system of Hegel is a pantheistic one, and, as such, in strict logic excludes the very possibihty of an Incarna tion. If God and the world are identical to start with, then God is man,' and it is difficult to see how at any par ticular time and place He can become man. It is usual, and perhaps correct, to say that, according to Hegehan principles, God is imperfectly incarnate in matter, more perfectly in plant and animal life, still more perfectly in the human race, and most perfectly of all in man's best representative, Jesus Christ. 1 Philosophy of Religion, English translation, i, p. 219 ; ii, p. 338. 2 He is also animal, and plant, and stock, and stone, HEGEL ON SIN 15 If this is Hegel's meaning, then Incarnation is a matter of degree, and God's Incarnation in Jesus differs only in degree, not in kind, from His Incarnation in aU other men. Such a doctrine has obvious affinities with the semi- pantheistic view of the Incarnation advocated by several leading Modernists at the recent Cambridge Conference.1 There is, however, one important difference between Hegel and these Cambridge Modernists. The latter (or most of them) agree with Kant and orthodox Christianity in regarding the distinction between moral good and evil as fundamental. Some of them lay the utmost stress upon the sinlessness of Jesus, and will not admit that any being can be consubstantial with God, unless or until he is sinless. This was not Hegel's point of view by any means. In his philosophy, both good and evil are in God Himself, and the distinction between them is only one of degree. Evil is only a lesser kind of good, and a necessary means to its attainment. In Hegel's triadic system, sin is the second member of a triad of which innocence is the first and virtue the third. Innocence can only raise itself to the higher stage of virtue by passing through the stage of sin. Sin is, therefore, a necessary part of the structure of the universe, and in its own place, and for its own purpose, good. It is actuaUy superior to innocence, though inferior to virtue. Reverence, and respect for Christian feeling, prevented Hegel from expressly apply ing this principle to the case of Jesus, but the logic of his philosophy requires it. Obviously a system which requires evil to be in God as a necessary part of His perfection, cannot exclude it from the Person of the Redeemer. As long as Modernism refuses to aUow that evil can be in God or in the Redeemer, it is perhaps fairer to caU it semi-pantheism than pantheism. Kantianism, in contrast with Hegelianism, emphasizes the transcendence and absolute hohness of God. To 1 See the discussion in ch. xii. 16 THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM Kant the distinction between good and evil is irreducible, and the Moral Law immutable. It has often been pointed out that such ' absolute' doctrines as these are entirely irreconcilable with the pure relativity and subjective agnosticism of the Critique of Pure Reason, and are in fact illogical survivals from the earlier philosophic tradition, and from orthodox Christianity. Kant, however, was convinced that these dbctrines (together with the Freedom of the WiU, and the Sub stantiality and Immortality of the Soul) are both important and true. Accordingly, rather than abandon them, he invented a new faculty for man, the ' Practical Reason,' endowed with the strange power of knowing several vital truths, which in the earlier Critique had been pronounced unknowable. Incoherences and con tradictions were thus introduced into the very heart Of the Kantian system. A far better course would have been to withdraw the first Critique from circulation, and rewrite it upon less agnostic principles. Doctrinal Position of Liberal Protestantism Of late years the Christology of Continental Pro testantism has been influenced considerably more by Kant than by Hegel. For nearly a generation the doctrine of the Incarnation, as well as of the Trinity, has been abandoned by nearly aU who have a right to speak in the name of Liberalism. We may roughly date the completion of this momentous change of view, in France by the pubhcation of Sabatier's Esquisse d'une philosophic de la religion in 1897, and in Germany by the delivery of Harnack's famous lectures, Das Wesen des Christentums, in 1900. A smaU number of German Liberals, particularly of the ' Modern Positive ' School (e.g. Th. Kaftan, R. Seeberg, R. H. Griitzmacher, K. Beth, and F. Loofs), still profess to adhere to the KANT AND HARNACK 17 doctrine of the Incarnation, usually in a much attenuated sense. A few of them, notably Beth, have attempted to rehabilitate certain of the Gospel miracles.1 Even these, however, regard themselves as having broken definitely with orthodox Christianity, and Loofs informs us, " there is hardly a single learned theologian — I know of none in Germany — who defends orthodox Christology in its unaltered form." The great majority of Liberals have definitely lapsed into Unitarianism, or in some cases into Pantheism. Such a typical book as Harnack's Das Wesen des Christentums represents the completion of the Liberal programme sketched by Kant over a century before in his fiercely assailed Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. As Harnack finds the whole essence of Christ's message in His moral teaching concerning the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, so Kant reduces Christianity to ethics ; as Harnack dismisses miracles as incredible and meaningless to the modern mind, so Kant writes, " Moral religion tends eventually to displace and dispense with all miraculous beliefs whatsoever, for men betray a culpable state of moral unbelief when they refuse to acknowledge the paramount authority of those claims of duty which from the beginning have been inscribed in their hearts, unless they see them accredited and enforced by miracles — ' Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe ' " ; and as Harnack rejects the Incarnation as being inconsistent with the modern non-miraculous view of Christianity, so Kant, whfle admitting that this doctrine may have been of some use in the primitive period, when the ethical system of Christianity had to struggle for existence against other systems having strong prestige, regards it as having now ceased to be vital or important. " We may concede," he says, " to such aUeged facts [as the Incarnation, the 1 Beth's Die Wunder Jesu aims at being a general defence of the Gospel miracles, but it leaves the physical miracles open questions. 18 THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM Resurrection, and the Ascension] whatever worth they claim, and even venerate them as the vehicle which has popularized a doctrine which now needs neither sign nor wonder for its credentials, being inscribed indefaceably on every human soul . . . provided that these historic documents [i.e. the Gospels] are not perverted into elements of rehgion, and mankind taught that the knowing, believing, and professing their contents is in itself something wherewith we can render ourselves acceptable to God." It will be noticed that the repudiation of the Incarna tion and its associated miracles is not quite absolute ; but those who realize how difficult it was for a man holding Kant's position to deny exphcitly doctrines held to be vital both by his own university and by the govern ment, will not make the mistake of attributing his in- definiteness of expression to orthodox faith rather than to its true cause, a prudent ' economy.' Modernism and Liberal Protestantism Attempts have occasionaUy been made to find for Modernism a basis in the tradition of the Historic Church, but without the least plausibihty. In all cases its origin is due to the influence of the Kantian and Liberal Pro testant tradition. This is true even of its earliest definite form, Guntherianism, which, while professing to combat Hegelianism, adopted almost entire its doctrine of the Trinity, certain features Of its doctrine of -the Incarna tion, and almost without change its theory of the relative, changing, and provisional character of rehgious dogma. It is true also of recent French Modernism, of which the most representative document, Loisy's L'tvangile et I'Eglise, is not so much a reply to Hamack's Das Wesen des Christentums, as a surrender at discretion to the critical principles of German Liberalism, which Loisy is MODERNISM AND LIBERAL PROTESTANTISM 19 prepared to carry much further in a negative direction than Harnack, whom he professes to repute. The Italian Modernists also, as we have seen, openly declare themselves disciples of German Protestantism in their criticism, and of Kant and his successors in their philosophy. It is hardly necessary to prove at length that English Modernism does not derive any of its principles from the traditions of the English Church or of English scholarship. It confessedly leans almost entirely upon German Liberal criticism, and many of its representative works, such as Dr. Latimer Jackson's The Eschatology of Jesus (1913) and The Problem of the Fourth Gospel (1918), are little more than centos of the dicta of recent German critics and theologians. It might be argued that the acceptance by the bulk of Roman and Anglican Modernists of the doctrine of the Incarnation constitutes a fundamental difference between their rehgious position and that of Liberal Protestantism, and so for the time being it does. In spite of what I have said elsewhere,1 I do not now (after carefully re reading a large part of his writings) question that even Loisy^ in spite of his dangerously minimizing language, accepts this doctrine in a more than nominal sense.' 1 Pro Fide, p. xxx, and in a recent speech referred to in ch. xii. 2 Loisy in his L'Avangile et I'liglise rejects as unauthentic the leading Christological passages of the Synoptic Gospels such as Matt. xi. 27, Luke x. 22 (see pp. 79 ff.), and in L'livangile selon Marc (1912) he deletes even Mark xiii. 30 ; nevertheless he says distinctly [Autour d'un Petit Livre, pp. 116 ff.) that Jesus, though true man, differed from other men, not only in being sinless, but also in virtue of " the intimate and indefinable mystery of His relation to God. This relation expressed itself in the Messianic idea ; and this idea, in the Gospel, was like a secret which was to be manifested through the manifestation of the celestial kingdom. The disciples believed this mystery. Jesus, by virtue of His Resurrection, became for them ' the Lord.' . . . The divinity of Christ is a dogma which has grown (grandi) in the Christian consciousness, and was not expressly formu lated in the Gospel. It existed only in germ in the notion of the Messiah, the Son of God." ao THE ANTECEDENTS OF MODERNISM Nor do I question, in spite of many disquieting utter ances at Cambridge, which are discussed in the last chapter, that the majority of English Modernists still hold this doctrine firmly. What I do question is, whether such an attitude can possibly be permanent. It seems not only to orthodox Christians hke myself, but even to prominent members of the Churchmen's Union (Dr. Lake and Dr. Foakes- Jackson, for instance, and even Prof. Bethune-Baker) that the ordinary Modernist position, so far from being stable and secure, is " only a bridge from the past to the present," which the more active spirits have already passed over, and are " exploring the country beyond." These words of Dr. Bethune-Baker express the situa tion admirably. Modernism is a mere temporary phase in the transition from Orthodoxy to Liberal Protestantism. Modernism has taken the grave step of adopting the Liberal Protestant premisses (including the all-important one of the incredibility of miracles), and having done so cannot avoid carrying them to their logical conclusion. The statement that Jesus is the consubstantial Son of God (unless denuded of meaning by Mr. Major's strange theory that aU men are or may become consubstantial sons of God in the same sense) affirms a unique and miraculous fact about Jesus, viz. that He is the God- man. Obviously a personality at once human and divine is a miracle — a miracle both psychical and physical, and as such a contradiction of non-miraculous Modernism. At the present moment Modernists are upon the horns of a dilemma, from which they can only escape by ceasing to be Modernists. In the near future a momentous option wiU be forced — it is even now being forced — upon them. Either they will have to take their belief in the Incarnation seriously, in which case they will have to give up their principle that miracles are incredible ; or else they wiU have to take their principle of the in credibility of miracles seriously, in which case they wiU INSTABILITY OF MODERNISM 21 have to deny the Incarnation, and sever the last link that still binds them to Historic Christianity. Already the Liberal Protestantism of the Continent has made its choice. It has rejected the Incarnation. A generation ago the movement in Germany passed through precisely the same phase that it is now passing through in England. In the late eighties, and with more insistence in the nineties, the German Liberals demanded permission to understand the clauses of the Apostles' Creed, which affirm the Virgin Birth and Resurrection of Jesus, in the ' symbolic ' sense advocated by English Modernists. Many of the German leaders maintained, in the same manner as their English followers, that the granting of this demand would strengthen, not weaken, the Church's hold upon the doctrine of the Incarnation. The permission was granted, and we now see the result. To-day in the Prussian State Church Unitarianism is the dominant creed. Can any reasonable person doubt that, the attitude toward the miraculous of German Protestantism and English Modernism being the same, the granting of this permission in England would have the same deplorable result that it has already had in Germany ? The real difficulty is, not to believe in the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection (as so many Modernists aUege), but to beheve in the Incarnation. It is a great venture of faith, possible only by the help of grace, to believe that the Almighty Ruler of the universe has humbled Himself to become man in the Person of Jesus of Nazareth, and to die upon the cross. If this belief is once accepted, the accessory miracles, which are its outward signs and tokens, become in comparison almost natural events. CHAPTER II THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE No Christian in our day denies the development of doctrine, perhaps no Christian who has reflected upon the subject has ever denied it. In the Fourth Gospel, the Doctrine of Development is taught exphcitly by Christ Himself (" I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when He, the Spirit of Truth, is come, He will guide you into aU [the] Truth," xvi. 12). The context shows that the guidance of the Spirit is promised to the Apostles and their successors collectively, so that here Christ definitely contemplates development, not merely in the teaching of individual theologians, but in the official and authoritative teaching of the Christian Church. In the Synoptic Gospels, Christ teaches the same doc trine implicitly, as when He compares Christian teaching to a seed planted by a Sower (i.e. Himself), which grows and matures and brings forth fruit, and to a grain of mustard-seed, which becomes a great tree which over shadows the earth. On the other hand the teaching of Christ is represented as absolutely true, and therefore unchangeable (" heaven and earth shaU pass away, but My words shall not pass away," Mark xiii. 31). Accordingly, Christian truth is a treasure to be guarded, a tradition to be faithfuUy kept, a ' deposit of faith ' for which an account must be rendered (" O Timothy, guard the deposit, turning away from the profane babblings and oppositions of the knowledge falsely so caUed," 1 Tim. ORTHODOX VIEW OF DEVELOPMENT %% vi. 20, cf. 2 Tim. i. 12-14). Neither St. Paul nor St. John can possibly have been unaware that their own teaching represents a development of the explicit teaching of the Master, nevertheless each regards his own teaching as identical with the original Gospel preached by Christ. St. Paul even insists that the meaning of the original Gospel cannot be changed without apostasy (" Though we, or an angel from heaven preach any other Gospel unto you, than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed," Gal. i. 8). The Scriptural idea of development is, therefore, develop ment without change. This is undoubtedly a paradox, but by no means a contradiction, as wiU appear later. Traditional View of Development The traditional view of development, stiU held by the majority of Christians, may be stated somewhat as f oUows : Christ and His Apostles committed to the Church a definite body of doctrine, * the Deposit of Faith,' to be faithfully guarded. This Deposit, as being a revelation from the Truth Himself, is absolutely true, and therefore immutable and irreformable. To depart from the original meaning of this Deposit is to depart from the Christian Faith, and to incur the anathema of the Apostle (Gal. i. 8). Nevertheless this Deposit, though its fundamental meaning cannot change, is a living, moving, and dynamic thing, developing through the ages in accordance with its original specific nature, somewhat as a seed develops into a plant, or an infant into a grown man. It de velops partly through individual and corporate experience, which causes its true significance gradually to become more fuUy understood ; partly through logical inferences being drawn from it ; partly through controversy, the effect of which commonly is to define truth more clearly 4 24 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE in contrast to error ; partly by the assinulation from age to age of philosophical and scientific principles, which are in harmony with it and serve to illuminate it ; partly by the practical application of its principles in every age to new problems, whereby new light is often thrown upon the principles themselves ; lastly, by the systematiza- tion of the faith in the form of scientific theology, the object of which is to exhibit every article of Christian belief in its rational and organic connexion with every other article, and to determine the true relation of the Christian religion as a whole to secular science and philosophy. The classical exponents in early times of this compre hensive view of development were the Alexandrian theologians, Clement and Origen. The Alexandrian School preached Christianity to the educated classes of antiquity as the perfect gnosis or philosophy. They claimed for it the possession (actual or potential) of aU truth, and formed the ambitious design of convert ing the entire Roman Empire by absorbing into the New Faith aU that was valuable in the culture of ancient Greece and Rome. Of all Christians, before or since, Clement and Origen were probably the most convinced believers in the progressive character of Christianity, and in its unlimited power of absorbing new ideas. But with all their liberal and progressive ideas, Clement and Origen were as convinced as Irenseus and Tertulhan that the Faith itself cannot change. They tell us, not once or twice, but many times, that all new developments must be tested by their agreement or disagreement with the original Deposit of Faith, and that this Deposit is inviolable. As some attempt has recently been made to claim the great name of Origen for the more extreme Modernist view of development, it may be worth while here to transcribe a passage from the preface to the De Principiis, in which he expressly disclaims it. Although in the work itself he indulges in some very venturesome ORIGEN ON DEVELOPMENT 25 speculations, as even the Bowdlerized Latin version of Rufinus sufficiently testifies, he fully recognizes (even if he does not fully practise) the duty of testing them by the unerring touchstone of apostolic tradition. " Since many," writes Origen, " of those who profess to beheve Christ differ from one another, not in smaU or trifling matters, but also on subjects of the highest moment, ... it seems necessary on this account first of all to fix a definite limit, and to lay down an unmistakable rule. . . . Seeing, then, that there are many who think that they hold the doctrines of Christ, and yet some of them think differently from theirpredecessors, while yet theteaching of theChurch, transmitted in orderly succession from the Apostles, and stiU remaining in the churches to the present day, is stiU preserved, let that alone be accepted as truth which differs in no respect from the ecclesiastical and apostolic tradition (iUa sola credenda est Veritas, quae in nuUo ab ecclesiastica et apostohca, discordat traditione)." Neither the Alexandrian Fathers nor any of the ancients regarded the development of doctrine as inconsistent with its substantial identity. Clement and Origen were at once thorough-going progressives and thorough-going traditionalists ; and the fact that they saw no inconsis tency between these two standpoints, is evidence, not of lack of logic, but of profound philosophic insight into the nature of truth and its development,1 quite remark able for that age. A sinular view of development (though less fuUy ex pressed) is found in other ancient theologians of a more conservative temper, notably in Vincent of Lerins, whose Commonitorium is the classical expression of the view that the Deposit of Faith is absolutely unchangeable. He is careful to explain that his doctrine of the Immu tability of Truth in no way interferes with its due growth 1 See Origen 's profound and all too brief remarks on Development in De Principiis, i. 3. I have discussed the Alexandrian view more fully in The Creeds and Modern Thought, pp. 26 ff. 36 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE and development. He speaks of development with approval, and compares it with the growth of a seed into a plant, and of a child into a man.1 He expresses with the utmost clearness the principle, supposed by many to be entirely modem, that Christian doctrines may become explicit in the course of development which at first were only implicit. He says, for example, " The limbs of infants are small, those of young men large, yet they are the same. Young children have as many joints as men, and *'/ there are any parts of the body which are not actually formed until more mature years are reached, yet even these were virtually planted from the beginning in the manner of seed, so that no new thing is ever produced subsequently in old men, which was not already latent in them as children. " In this profound conception of develop ment, Vincent already anticipates the main point of Newman's Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1845). This famous essay, composed just before, and published shortly after Newman's reception into the Roman Church, will always remain a classic, not only for the perfection of its style, but also for the value and originality of the ideas which it contains. It is hardly possible to realize, in reading it, that Newman wrote fourteen years before 1 " But perhaps someone will say, Shall there then be no develop ment (profectus) of religion in the Church of Christ ? Assuredly there should be development, and/ as much as possible. For who is so malicious towards men and hateful to God as to attempt to hinder it ? But let it take place in such sort that the faith develops indeed, but is not radically changed ; for the nature of development is this, that each thing grows while remaining in its own nature, whereas the nature of change is that a thing is transmuted into something else. Let therefore the intelligence, knowledge, and wisdom both of indi viduals and of the Church at large continually grow and develop to the utmost possible extent through the ages, but always according to its kind, i.e. preserving the same dogma in the same sense and meaning. Let the religion of our souls imitate the growth of our bodies, which, although in the progress of years they develop and evolve their due proportions, yet always remain identically the same with what they previously were " (xxii). VINCENT AND NEWMAN 27 the pubhcation of the Origin of Species, and in entire ignorance of the evolutionary theories of Fichte, ScheUing, and Hegel. In discussing development, Newman lays the chief stress, not on logical development, though he admits its importance, especially as a test of true development,1 but on what may be called organic or vital development. Though a rehgious, dogma is an inteUectual proposition intellectually apprehended, it is also, he contends, far more. It is something which is lived even more than thought, and by being lived both itself grows and trans forms the characters of individuals and of peoples. "When," says Newman, " some great enunciation, whether true or false, ... is carried forward into the public throng of men, and draws attention, then it is not merely received passively in this or that form into many minds, but it becomes an active principle within them, leading them to an ever new contemplation of itself, to an appli cation of it in various directions, and a propagation of it on every side. ... At first men will not fully reahze what it is that moves them, and wiU express and explain themselves inadequately. . . . After a whfle some definite teaching emerges. ... It will, in proportion to its native vigour and subtlety, introduce itself into the framework and detafls of social hfe, changing public opinion, and strengthening or undermining the foundations of estab lished order. Thus in time it will have grown into an ethical code, or into a system of government, or into a theology, or into a ritual according to its capabilities." Newman emphasizes the point, which has sometimes 1 " A doctrine professed in its mature years by a philosophy or religion, is likely to be a true development, not a corruption, in pro portion as it seems to be the logical issue of its original teaching " (P- J95)- " Minds develop step by step, without looking behind them, or anticipating their goal, and without either intention or promise of forming a system. Afterwards, however, the logical character which the whole wears becomes a test that the process has been a true development " (p. 19°). 28 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE been denied, that a doctrine develops not only from within, but also from without, feeding upon and incorporating into itself the substance of other doctrines which have affinities with it. " It grows when it incorporates, and its identity is found, not in isolation, but in continuity and sovereignty. . . . Whatever be the risk of corruption from intercourse with the world around, such a risk must be encountered if a great idea is duly to be under stood and much more if it is to be fully exhibited. It is elicited and expanded by trial and battles into perfec tion and supremacy" (ch. i.). Much of the essay is taken up with a discussion (vital to Newman's special purpose in writing, viz. the justifica tion of modem Roman developments) of the difference between true and false developments. He enumerates seven tests of true doctrinal development, all of consider able value : (i) Preservation of its type ; (2) Continuity of its principles ; (3) Its power of assimilation ; (4) Its logical sequence; (5) Anticipation of its future; (6) Conservative action on its past ; (7) Its chronic vigour. Newman's doctrine of development is of a much more radical type than has usually found favour in the Roman Church, of which the typical representatives (Franzelin, for instance) usually admit only logical development. Nevertheless, since Newman admits that the original dogmas do not change their meaning in the process of development, his doctrine is clearly of the orthodox, not of the Modernist type. It does not differ essentiaUy from Vincent's, who also admits organic development and uses some of the same iUustrations. Modernist View of Development The essential difference between the traditional view of development and that of Modernism, is that whereas the former assumes development from first principles which have never changed, and have controlled the process throughout, the latter assumes that the first principles MODERNIST VIEW OF DEVELOPMENT 29 themselves have changed, are changing, and will change yet more, the only permanent thing about Christianity being its ' spirit,' or ' idea,' or ' orientation.' In deed, Modernists usually hold, not merely that dogmas may change, but that they may even be transmuted, in Hegehan fashion, into their opposites, as when the article of the Creed which affirms Christ's birth of a Virgin is ' developed ' in the Modernist system into an express denial of His Mother's virginity, and the article which affirms His Resurrection into an express denial that His buried body ever rose. Common to all forms of Modernism is the denial of the fact (and in most cases also of the possibility) of a fixed Deposit of Faith retaining an absolutely identical mean ing throughout the process of its development. " The history of the creeds teaches us," says Canon Glazebrook, " how modern Christians ought to regard them. They are not a ' deposit ' given to be guarded, but a plant whose growth is to be fostered. So long as the Catholic Church was vigorous and intelligent, the creeds were being con tinually modified to suit new conditions of thought and hfe. What brought their development to an end was not a conviction that they were perfected, but the invasion of the barbarians, which reduced thought to impotence, and life to a struggle against mere brutality. ... So the words of the two creeds remain unchanged to this day, yet their meaning is not unchanged." 1 Simi larly, Tyrrell, following Loisy, teaches that what has re mained identical throughout development has not been any " inteUectual concept " or belief, but simply a non- intellectual " idea as a spiritual force or impetus." " To find our present theological system in the first century," he says, " is as hopeless as to find our present civUization there. No one attempts it any longer. It was possible only for those early generations whose divergencies from the Apostolic age were comparatively slight, or ylTh* Faith of a Modern Churchman, p. 76. 30 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE for these later generations, from whom their palpable divergencies from Apostolicity were hidden by their ignorance of the past." He admits that those who hold the traditional doctrine of the Deposit of Faith must necessarily agree with Pius X in condemning Modernism as " the compendium of all heresies,"for where as " former heresies have questioned this or that dogma, this or that ecclesiastical institution, Modernism criticizes the very idea of dogma, of ecclesiasticism, of revelation, of faith, of heresy, of theology, of sacramentalism." He defines his theory of development as being " one of bio logical rather than of dialectical [i.e. logical] development, organic rather than architectural." l This denial of the permanence of dogma goes back to the earliest form of Modernism known as Giintherianism, which had a large and influential following in the Roman Communion (especially in Germany and Austria) from 1826, the date of Giinther's first important treatise, till 1857, when the system was condemned at Rome ¦ ; and even later, for Giintherianism retained important adher ents tiU 1870, when the Vatican CouncU formaUy declared the meaning of Cathohc dogma to be immutable, though it admitted development in the orthodox or Vincentian sense (De Fide Cath., ch. iv, can. 3). Anton Giinther (1785-1865), hke Loisy, came forward as a champion of Cathohcism against Liberal Protestant ism. He did good work in asserting the Transcendence and true Personality of God against the Pantheism of ScheUing and Hegel. * Nevertheless, he adopted as correct 1 Christianity at the Cross Roads, pp. 33, 28, 30, 2 The reasons for the condemnation may be seen in Denzinger's Enchiridion Symbolorum (extract from the brief ' Eximiam tuam," addressed to Cardinal de Geissel). 8 Giinther's first important work, in which he laid the foundations of his philosophic system, was Vorschule sur speculativen Theologie des posiliven Christenthums (Vienna, 1826, 2nd edition, 1846). From 1849 to 1859 the organ of the school was Lydia, edited by Gtinther himself and J. E. Veith. GUNTHER ON DEVELOPMENT 31 many of the leading principles of Hegel. Thus in the Guntherian system God creates the world by ' contra position ' ; the Trinity is evolved after the manner of an Hegehan Triad, the Father being the ' thesis,' the Son the ' antithesis,' and the Holy Ghost the " synthesis.' Above all, he adopted the Hegehan principle that all partial truth contains some error, and from this he deduced the characteristically Modernist doctrine that there is no fixed and unchanging truth (at least for man), and that accordingly even the most fundamental doctrines of Christianity change their meaning from age to age, as human thought progresses. The Church is indeed in fallible, but this only means that it is infallibly guided to state the truth in the form most suited to the age in which the definition is made. In a later age the Church may not only expand or explain its definitions, but may even have to correct them, because all human dog matic definitions, being partial and inadequate statements of truth, contain necessarily some error. Dogma, in its passage through history, not merely changes its meaning (in Giinther's opinion, changes it for the better), but even receives positive increments of new truth by incorporating and assimilating the progressive results of philosophy and science.1 The Apostles' knowledge of the Christian dogmas was rudimentary, that of the Fathers and School men, though more developed, was far inferior to ours, because we have the advantage of modern phflosophy and science. In his exposition of Christian doctrine, Giinther started, not from revelation, but from reason, maintaining that such dogmas as the Trinity and the Incarnation, which earlier generations accepted entirely upon faith, can now (owing to the progress of phUosophy) be demonstrated by reason. The primacy which he 1 Gunther here confuses dogma with theology. It is of course true that theology receives such positive increments. Not, however, dogma, which is the unchanging basis upon which theology is built up. 32 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE gave to philosophy over theology was one of the chief causes of the condemnation of his system.1 The Orientation of Dogma The Giintherian doctrine of an infaUibflity of tendency, in virtue of which the doctrine of the Church, though never absolutely true, tends always towards the truth, and is always truer than any rival doctrine, is now generally expressed by saying that Christian doctrine has preserved from the beginning an identical ' orienta tion ' or ' direction,' in virtue of which it has achieved an ever-increasing " penetration into the real.' This is the point of view of some of those whose general theological standpoint is quite orthodox — that of Mr. WiU Spens, for instance, who writes : " Christian Theism is a system which does not claim to be a complete metaphysic, but merely the expression of a growing insight into ultimate reality " (Belief and Practice, p. 62). Nevertheless, this theory of the identical ' direction ' of Christian doctrine involves a contradiction, unless it is held in connexion with the orthodox view that this identical direction is maintained by the continuous operation of identical first principles. Just as in dynamics identical direction is only maintained so long as the operating forces remain identical, so it is also in theology and in every science. Besides, there must be in theology, as in dynamics, certain fixed points, by reference to 1 Giintherianism was preceded by, and in part prepared for, by the earlier rationalistic system of Georg Hermes (1775-1831), who drew his philosophic principles mainly from Kant and Fichte, and (like Giinther) aimed at a synthesis of Catholicism with modern philosophical thought. Hermesianism had a considerable following until its con demnation in 1835 by Gregory XVI, and even for some time later. Neither Hermes nor Giinther denied the possibility of miracles, or the truth of the miracles ascribed to Christ in the Gospels. A useful criticism of Giinther's view of dogma and tradition will be found in Franzelin's Tractalus de Divina Traditions, pp. 240 ff. ORIENTATION OF DOGMA 33 which direction is determined. If everything is moving, there can be no determination of direction at all. The ' direction ' of any growing system of doctrine, rehgious, philosophic, or scientific, remains the same so long as the fundamental dogmas on which it is based remain unchanged. For instance, the ' direction ' or ' orientation ' of the science of astronomy remained the same from Ptolemy to Copernicus, because, although new facts were always being discovered, and new hypo theses invented to explain them, all the new hypotheses were subordinated to and consistent with the fundamental dogma of the Ptolemaic system, that the sun revolves round the earth. When, however, Copernicus established the rival doctrine that the earth revolves round the sun, the ' orientation ' of the science was fundamentally changed. With the disproof of the fundamental dogma, the sub ordinate hypotheses of ' cycles,' ' epicycles,' and ' eccen trics ' disappeared also. The science was reconstructed from its foundations, and assumed the new ' direction,' from which it has never since been deflected, even by the epoch-making discoveries of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton. SimUarly European phUosophy preserved a uniform ' direction ' from its earliest days until those of Kant, because before him practicaUy all phflosophers, even the most sceptical,1 assumed that, the world being rationaUy constituted, the human mind corresponds in a rational way with external things, and is therefore capable of knowing things as they really are, or (to use Kantian language) of knowing ' things-in-themselves.' Kant's ' Copernican revolution ' consisted in his hmitation of human knowledge to ' phenomena,' or sub- 1 We may except Hume, who, according to Kant's own admission, " awoke him from his dogmatic slumber," and also Berkeley, whom Kant used without completely understanding. These philosophers, however, did not really belong to the old era. They were the fore runners and in part the anticipators of Kantian agnosticism. 34 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE jective appearances, and his denial that the human mind has power to know external things as they reaUy are. Whatever may be thought of the correctness of the Kantian system, of its effect there can be only one opinion. It has deflected from its path and given a new orientation to the main stream of European phflosophy, and if that philosophy is ever to recover its original orientation, as the present reaction against Kant suggests that it may, it can only be by returning to the pre- Kantian view that the human mind is capable of true objective knowledge.1 The same principle may be illustrated from the history of most of the sciences. Darwin's epoch-making theory has given a new ' orientation ' to aU the biological sciences, and has necessitated the entire reconstruction of some of them. Even Einstein's Theory of Relativity, should it prove true, will alter appreciably (though to a less extent than is sometimes supposed) the ' orientation ' which the discoveries of Newton gave to physics. It seems, then, a universal law, apphcable to all sciences, that whfle the fundamental principles of a science remain unchanged, its ' orientation ' remains unchanged. On the other hand, every change of fundamental doctrine brings about a change of ' orientation ' proportional to the amount of that change. In the case of Christianity, the ' orientation ' is admitted — even by many Modernists — to have remained unchanged from the beginning. It follows that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity have also remained unchanged from the beginning, and are professed now by modem Christians, in spite of much development, in the identical sense in which the first Christians professed them. 1 Modern Oxford, under the influence of Professor Cook Wilson and Mr. Thomas Case, has become predominantly anti-Kantian and anti- idealist. For a destructive and most penetrating criticism of Kant's principal positions (with which I am in general agreement), I would refer to Mr. H. A. Pritchard's Kant's Theory of Knowledge (1909). TYRRELL ON THE CHRISTIAN 'IDEA' 35 The Identity of the Christian ' Idea ' We have seen that an important section of Modernists (including Loisy, Le Roy, and TyrreU) regard the identity of Christianity from age to age as consisting not so much in its doctrine, or even in the ' direction ' of its doctrine, as in the identity of its ' idea.' By ' idea ' they mean not an intellectual idea or ' concept,' stiU less a doctrine, but a " vital impulse,' operating very often blindly and instinctively, urging men to perform certain acts and to seek certain ends, the nature of which they hardly or not at all understand. It is not in any way necessary that this * vital impulse ' should find inteUectual expres sion in a doctrine though it may do so. " The ' idea,' " says TyrreU, " is akin to the Augustinian ' seminal notion,' with which every living germ seems to be animated, and which works itself out to full expression through a process of growth and development. It does not change in itself, but is the cause Of change in its embodi ment. ... It is rather a vohtion than a concept. Every volition, however blind and instinctive, is directed by the idea of an end to be reached. That idea is imphed in the volition, but it is not necessarily given to the clear consciousness of the person who wiUs. Animals obey instincts without any knowledge of the ends with which they are pregnant. The meaning of many of man's spiritual and rational instincts is revealed to him only gradually, as he follows them step by step. In most cases their full meaning wiU never be clear to him." 1 Tyrrell's and Loisy's theory of a ' vital impulse ' is a useful supplement and corrective to the purely logical view of development which stiU largely prevails in orthodox quarters, particularly in the Roman Church. It is derived, of course, from Newman's Essay, of which it is one of the most original and valuable features. It is perfectly true that both men and animals are often 1 Christianity at the Cross Roads, p. 62. 36 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE swayed by instincts and impulses which they do not in the least understand, and of whose results they have not the least prevision. It is also true that Christian doctrine is far more than a number of intellectual propositions, hke the axioms of geometry, which have undergone a process of purely inteUectual development in the course of Christian history. Christianity is far more than a doctrine ; it is a life — " The words that I speak unto you they are spirit, and they are life" (John vi. 63). To be a Christian is primarily to have the Spirit of Christ, not merely to have His doctrine. Christianity develops both in the indi vidual and in the history of the Christian society, not primarily as the thirteen books of Euchd develop logically from their axioms, but rather as a seed develops into a plant, as an infant develops into man, and as leaven (which is a hving thing) propagates itself through a mass of dough. The immanent impulse by which the hfe of Christ expands itself in the soul and in the Church is something different from the inteUectual impulse to argue correctly from given premisses. Loisy has done a real service to religious thought by maintaining that the development of Christian theology is to a large extent the outward expression of the development of Christian experience, which it strives to interpret, and upon which it is dependent. Loisy, however, in his recoil from mere inteUectuahsm, forgets the correlative truth, that just as rehgious experience sometimes generates dogma, so dogma some times generates rehgious experience. A man may obviously come to believe the existence of God in two distinct ways. He may either beheve it in Loisy's way, as the result of some vivid religious experience which he has had (in which case the experience generates the doctrine), or else he may come to beheve it in a purely inteUectual way, as, for instance, by reading Aristotle's Metaphysics or Flint's Theism, and becoming convinced LOISY ON 'EXPERIENCE 37 that the arguments of these writers are sound. As a result of his inteUectual conviction he may begin to pray and worship, to receive the sacraments, and to practise works of piety and charity, with the result that he may attain to vivid forms of rehgious experience, which may greatly confirm his faith. In such a case the doctrine generates, or at least mediates the experiences, for unless he had first had the doctrine, he would not have had the experiences. Accord ingly we must supplement Loisy's formula that Experi ence generates Dogma by adding the complementary truth that Dogma generates (or mediates) Experience. A more serious error is involved in Loisy's assumption that the same vital ' idea ' or impulse may be clothed indifferently in a number of distinct inteUectual expres sions or formulated doctrines. As a rule the relation between an idea and its expression is unique and organic, like that between a soul and its body. As Aristotle taught long ago, it is impossible to put a soul into a new body (" like a passenger into a boat "), for the simple reason that a body is the unique outward expression of a unique individual soul. In a similar way each ' idea ' or ' vital impulse ' has usuaUy its own individual character, which can be correctly expressed, in terms of the inteUect, in one way only. This is the case even with the irrational instincts of animals. For example, the instinct of the hen to hatch out her chicks and protect them from enemies until they can take care of themselves, can only be in- tellectuaUy expressed in terms that imply that Nature provides not only for the welfare of individuals, but also for the propagation and welfare of the race. Any intel lectual formulation of the nature of the instinct which denied, or did not recognize this, would be false. SimUarly, the blind instinct which leads even animals and young children to learn from experience, and to ex pect sinular events to lecur under similar circumstances, 38 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE can only be intellectually expressed in some such phrase as the following, ' Like causes produce like effects.' Any other expression of it would be false or inadequate. Or to take a more important instance : both M. Loisy and M. Le Roy admit that " the idea of Christ " has remained unchanged from the beginning of Christianity until now. " All Catholics," says M. Le Roy, " whether ignorant men or philosophers, whether men of the first or of the twentieth century, have always had, and will always have, the same practical attitude towards Jesus " — he means, of course, that they have always worshipped Him and prayed to Him.1 But when they inform us that this unchanging devo tional attitude towards Jesus Christ does not rest upon a single unchanging belief about His nature, but can be equally well justified by an indefinite number of alter native beliefs, it is hard to yield assent. Surely for all genuine theists, whether of the first or of the twentieth or of the ten thousandth century, there can be one and only one intellectual theory which can justify the worship of Jesus, and that is the theory that He is very and eternal God. Any theory which makes Him less or other than this, makes Him a creature, and for a theist to worship a creature is the greatest of all imaginable sins. Exaggerations of the Amount of Development Another capital error of Loisy, and of Modernists in general, is their exaggerated estimate of the amount of development of doctrine which has actually taken place. If we set aside such late developments as the Immaculate Conception of Mary and Papal Infallibility, and con fine ourselves to the doctrines which the whole of Catholic Christendom accepts, those namely of the Creeds and the Ecumenical Councils, it is difficult to find a single one which is not taught explicitly, as well as implicitly, in the New Testament itself. 1 See Dogme et Critique, pp. 33-34, also 263-273. THE AMOUNT OF DEVELOPMENT 39 If the Apostle Paul were presented with a copy of the Nicene Creed, and asked whether the doctrine of the Homoousion, or Consubstantiality of the Son, therein contained, had ever been taught by himself, he would probably reply (when he had learnt the meaning of the term) : " You will not indeed find the precise word 6poov Op. cit., p. 181. 3 Op. cit.i p. 181. 90 THE NATURE OF TRUTH quietly abiding within its own limits ' ; that it never negates or denies itself by being at the same time anything ' other than itself,' and that above aU the metaphysical conjuring trick by which it is supposed to ' turn suddenly into its opposite ' is a fiction. The Hegehan case against the Immutability of Finite Truth accordingly breaks down, and with it one of the most plausible of the Modernist arguments against the immutability of the Cathohc Creeds. If finite as weU as infinite truth is immutable in its own nature, it follows that these Creeds, if true originaUy, are true now, and true for evermore. They may be supplemented by the advance of knowledge, but they can never be altered or shown to involve error. Mr. McTaggart's Views I am glad to be able to quote, in support of the general position here taken up, the considered judgment of the weU-known Hegehan, Mr. McTaggart. Mr. McTaggart has hitherto shown himself one of the most faithful and consistent of the English followers of Hegel, and his notable works, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (1896), Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (1901), and above all his Commentary on Hegel's Logic (1910), are indispensable to every serious student of the Hegehan system. In his latest work, however (The Nature of Existence, vol. i, 1921), he abandons practically every principle of the Hegehan Logic except ' degrees of truth.' He gives up the triadic system, and entirely denies both ' degrees of reality,' and its twin doctrine, the erroneousness of ' finite ' truth. He even doubts whether he ought stiU to caU himself an Hegehan. " Reality," he says, " is not a quahty which admits of degrees. A thing cannot be more or less real than another which is also real." With regard to the Hegehan doctrine of the falsity of finite truth, he says : " According to the general principles of McTAGGART AND JOACHIM 91 Hegel's system, we can be certain, with regard to any category in the system except the Absolute Idea, that the assertion of its validity, though not completely false, is not completely true. ... In this point we shaU depart from what was Hegel's principle, and also his usual practice. Each characteristic demonstrated in the course of our process will remain at the end of the process. None of them, of course, will be the whole truth, but that will not prevent all of them from being quite true. ... If we take all these differences together, it must be pronounced, I think, that our method is not characteristicaUy Hegehan. ... On the other hand, it will stand much closer to Hegel's method than to that of any other philosopher" (pp. 4. 5. 45. 46). Professor Joachim's Views I also note with satisfaction that a considerable amount of hesitation marks Professor Joachim's defence of the Hegehan theory of truth in his interesting and candid essay, The Nature of Truth (1906). This book contains much acute criticism of other theories, but it ends with what can only be caUed a confession of failure. " The coherence-notion of truth," he says, " may thus be said to suffer shipwreck at the very entrance of the harbour. It has carried us safely over the dangers and difficulties to which the other two notions succumbed ; but the voyage ends in disaster, a disaster which is inevitable. ... I am ending with a confession of ignorance ; but at least I have cleared my mind of much sham knowledge." Professor Joachim's book has the merit of bringing out clearly one point, which Hegel slurs over, that if the Hegelian view that all ' finite ' truth involves error is correct, it foUows that even such obvious arithmetical truths as 2 + 2=4 are not quite true. In the infancy of arithmetic they feU considerably short of being true. The advance of mathematics has rendered them truer — 92 THE NATURE OF TRUTH indeed, we may perhaps venture to hope that they are now nearly true. In the future they wUl become truer stiU. Never, however, as long as knowledge remains finite, wUl they become quite true. This foUows neces sarily from the fundamental principles of Hegehanism. To most readers of Mr. Joachim's essay this admission wiU seem a complete reductio ad absurdum of his whole theory of truth ; but even if his theory is allowed to stand, perhaps the consequences of its being correct may not be quite so fatal to the permanence of the Catholic Creeds as Modernists usuaUy imagine. For if the adoption of the Hegehan view of truth does not oblige us to beheve that the truth of the Nicene Creed has varied more in the time since it was drawn up than the truth of the proposition 2 + 2=4, there does not seem much cause for alarm that the amount of its variation during the next few million years will be great enough to be perceptible. The Aristotelian Logic The correctness of the formulation of Christian doctrine in the Catholic Creeds depends, not only upon the Christian facts and Christian experience, but also upon the correctness of the Aristotehan logic. Cathohc theology consists of a system of inteUectual propositions deduced from the Christian facts and from Christian experience, according to the principles of the Aristotelian logic, which are those of common-sense. It follows that the Cathohc dogmas can only be strictly true if the leading principles of the Aristotelian logic are strictly true. It is obvious, accordingly, that if our discussion is to be complete, we must supplement our disproof of the Hegehan logic by a proof of the truth of the Aristotehan ; for it is possible (in the abstract, at least) that both of them might be false. In the concrete, however, this will hardly be found to be necessary. It is absolutely im possible to dispense with logic* and considering that the THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC 93 logic of Hegel is the only serious competitor to that of Aristotle, the disproof of the former amounts in practice to a proof of the latter. Those who desire to pursue the subject further wUl find a sufficient vindication of the Aristotehan system (with some modem improvements) and a criticism of the Neo-Hegehan views on logic of Mr. Bradley and Dr. Bosanquet J in Mr. H. W. B. Joseph's useful Introduction to Logic (1906, second edition, revised, 1916). The Pragmatist attack on the Aristotehan logic in such works as Mr. F. C. S. SchiUer's Formal Logic (1912) cannot be taken very seriously. It will be discussed incidentally in the next chapter. 1 See F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic (1883) ; B. Bosanquet, Logic, the Morphology of Knowledge (1888, second edition, 191 1), and other works by these authors. CHAPTER V PRAGMATIST views of truth One of the most popular philosophies at the present time with Modernists, especiaUy those of the French and Italian schools, is Pragmatism. In most respects Pragmatism is in complete contrast and indeed conflict with Hegehanism and aU forms of Absolute Ideahsm, nevertheless in the end (though by an entirely different route) it comes to the same practical conclusion with regard to ' finite ' or ' human ' truth, viz. that it is variable, provisional, symbolic, always partly false, and, though capable of improvement, never capable of becoming absolutely true. According to Pragmatism, truth is not imposed on the human mind by the nature of external things with which it ' corresponds,' but is manufactured by the activity of the human mind itself, to satisfy its own subjective desires and needs. As laying stress upon the will, and the practical rather than the theoretical activities of human nature, Pragma tism may be appropriately described as Activism, though this name is generally applied only to the French and German movements, which shghtly antedated the rise of American and Enghsh Pragmatism. Bergsonism is also a form of Pragmatism, though it has original features which make it desirable to place it in a class by itself. The same may be said of the Italian movement of Croce, which has greatly influenced Itahan Modernism. Croce is a thorough-going Pragmatist, though not aU Pragmatists would accept the pecuhar system of non-metaphysical ideahsm which he advocates. 94 PRAGMATISM'S DEBT TO KANT 95 Pragmatists reject the theory of universal necessity, both in its apphcation to the physical universe and to the human wiU. The founder of American Pragmatism goes so far in his opposition to necessity as to call himself a ' Tychist.' They accept ' contingency ' as a world- principle, and emphasize the freedom and " autonomy ' of the wUl. Most Pragmatists would accept the general metaphysical standpoint of M. Boutroux, as expounded in his influential book La Contingence des Lois de la Nature (1874), which has passed through many editions. The ' Radical Contingency ' of M. Boutroux denies that even the laws of nature are ' necessary,' or (strictly speaking) uniform and permanent. Relation to Kant Pragmatism is a development of Kantianism, but rather of the Critiques of The Practical Reason and of Judgment than of that of Pure Reason. It accepts, however, and strongly emphasizes the principle of Immanence, either in its original form that external things (' things-in-themselves ') exist but are unknowable, or in its later form that they do not exist. It agrees with The Critique of the Practical Reason in making truth a postulate of the practical rather than of the theoretical reason. It regards aU human behefs (including rehgious behefs) as suggested entirely by men's practical needs, and as finding their sole justification in the fact that they succeed in satisfying them. A true theory, according to Pragmatism, is not one which corresponds with the real nature of external things (which either do not exist or are unknowable), but one which works well in practice. SimUarly, a false theory is not one which misrepresents external things, but one which works badly in practice. Truth is reduced to UtUity, and no proposition is regarded as true which has not its ' cash- value ' in terms of the useful. 96 PRAGMATIST VIEWS OF TRUTH Pragmatic Truth The founder of the Anglo-Saxon movement, Mr. C. S. Peirce, the American, first expounded the Pragmatist ' method ' (he did not call it doctrine) in The Popular Science Monthly for January 1878. His article was next year translated into French in the January number of the Revue Philosophique, with the result that French philosophers became aware for the first time that a movement simUar to their own ' new ' phUosophy of Radical Contingency had arisen in America. Mr. Peirce did not share the strong hostility to logic which soon developed itself among his foUowers. Indeed, some years later he referred to their position as " charac terized by an angry hatred of strict logic, and even some disposition to rate any exact thought ... as all hum bug." • Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that already in his earhest article he clearly defined three of the most characteristic principles of Pragmatism, viz. (1) that human behefs are merely rules for practical action ; (2) that two behefs are not really distinct unless they lead to different practical action ; (3) that aU we can know of any object is its practical action upon us, especiaUy in response to our practical action upon it. Pragmatism was popularized in America by Professor Wm. James and Professor J. Dewey; in England by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, who already in the first edition of his Riddles of the Sphinx (1891) had shown certain Prag matist tendencies ; in France (where the movement had an independent origin) by Blondel, Milhaud, Le Roy, Poincare, and Bergson ; and in Italy by Croce and Papini. In Germany cognate views are represented by Ostwald, Simnel, Mach, and Avenarius. According to James, " ' The true ' ... is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as • the right ' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. . . . 1 Hibbert Journal, October 1908. WM. JAMES AND CROCE 97 Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, realized in rebus, and having only this quahty in common, that they pay. . . . Truth is made, just as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the course of experience. . . The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, it is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process : the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification." " Pragmatism is not interested in ' absolute ' or metaphysical truth. It asks, ' What is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms ? ' and answers that this cash-value is some practical human advantage which the true belief secures, but the false behef fails to secure. To put the whole matter in a nutsheU, the ' true ' is just the useful, and a true behef is one upon which it is advantageous to act, at any rate ' upon the whole ' and ' in the long run ' " (Pragmatism, pp. 222, 218, 200, etc.). Although aU Pragmatists are agreed as to the phe nomenal, relative, symbolical, and merely practical nature of truth, they are not agreed as to whether ' things ' or ' objects ' external to the mind really exist. Itahan Pragmatists mostly deny it. Croce, for example, says : " In the ordinary view, the existence of the object becomes a datum, something as it were placed before the mind, something given to the mind, extraneous to it, and which the mind would never make its own did it not, summoning force and courage, swaUow the bitter morsel by an irrational act of faith. And yet aU phUosophy, as we go on unfolding it, shows that there is nothing outside mind, and that there are no data confronting it. The very conceptions we form of this something, which is external, mechanical, natural, show themselves to be not con ceptions of data which already are external, but data furnished by the mind itself. Mind fashions this so-called external something because it enjoys fashioning it, and escapes by reannulling it when it has no more joy in 98 PRAGMATIST VIEWS OF TRUTH it." > Consistently with this standpoint, Croce denies the existence of matter, of God, and of aU transcendental things. Philosophy is to him a mere ' methodology,' and metaphysics an impossibUity. The majority of Enghsh and French Pragmatists, how ever, seem to beheve that external things exist, though in their opinion practicaUy nothing can be known about them. Schiller's Theory of ' Hyle ' So far as I am aware, Mr. Schiller is the only Pragmatist who has attempted to give a definite theory of the' thing- in-itself,' which he assumes to exist objectively. He first outlined his views in Riddles of the Sphinx, but a more precise and detailed statement will be found in his essay ' Axioms as Postulates ' in Personal Idealism (1902). There he propounds a theory of a primitive, vague, form less, plastic substratum, or ' hyle,' which all through human history the mind of man has been laboriously moulding and shaping to suit its own desires and needs, and so has generated ' truth.' The only two definite qualities which this ' hyle ' seems to have are ' plasticity ' and some shght degree of ' resistance ' to the mind that attempts to mould it. " The truest account," says Mr. SchUler, "it would seem possible to give of this resisting factor in our experience is to revive, for the purpose of its description, the old Aristotehan conception of ' Matter ' as v\n Be/cruer/ tov etoow, as potentiality [of receiving] whatever form we succeed in imposing on it. It may be regarded as the raw material of the cosmos (never indeed whoUy raw and unworked upon) out of which can be hewn the forms of life in which our spirit can take satisfaction. . . , The world then is essentiaUy 8\n [i.e. pure indeterminate- ness] : it is what we make of it. It is fruitless to define it by what it originally was, or by what it is apart from 1 Quoted by H. Wildon Carr, in The Philosophy of Croce, pp. 12 ff. F. C. S. SCHILLER AND BERGSON 99 us (17 v\i) ayva)aTo<; ko6' avTtjv) '¦ it is what is made of it. Hence my . . . most important point is that the world is plastic, and may be moulded by our wishes, if only we are determined to give effect to them, and not too con ceited to learn from experience, i.e. by trying by what means we may do so. . . . It is a methodological necessity to assume that the world is wholly plastic, i.e. to act as though we beheved this, and will yield us what we want if we persevere in wanting it " (pp. 60, 61). Pragmatism and Reason Pragmatism carries to extreme lengths the ' Alogism,' or revolt against the authority of reason and logic, which characterizes a considerable section of contemporary phUosophy. Bergson, in particular, ranks reason lower than perhaps any other phUosopher, subordinating it to what he caUs ' intuition,' a faculty more akin to direct mystical apprehension or spiritual sympathy than to inteUect in the logical sense. In his system, Reason or InteUigence is entirely dethroned from its ancient supremacy, and degraded to the position of a mere practical aptitude which the human mind has evolved for the purpose of dealing mainly with matter. The following brief quotations from his Creative Evolu tion will give a sufficient idea, for our present purpose, of his point of view. " Our intelhgence, as it leaves the hands of nature, has for its chief object the unorganized solid." " Of the discontinuous alone does the intellect form a clear idea." " Of immobUity alone does the inteUect form a clear idea." " The inteUect is charac terized by a natural inabUity to comprehend life." " Our intellect ... is intended to think matter." " Our thought in its purely logical form is incapable of presenting the true nature of hfe." " InteUigence, in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especiaUy tools to make tools, and of ioo PRAGMATIST VIEWS OF TRUTH indefinitely varying their manufacture." " The human inteUect feels at home among inanimate objects, more especially solids ; . . . our concepts have been formed on the model of solids, and our logic is, pre-eminently, the logic of solids, and consequently our intellect triumphs in geometry." He draws an absolute hne of demarcation between ' inteUigence ' and ' intuition,' regarding them as different in kind. With regard to the relation between human ' intuition ' and animal ' instinct,' he says : " By intui tion I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self- conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object, and of enlarging it indefinitely." The nature of ' Intuition ' is most fuUy expounded in his Introduction to Metaphysics: Pragmatism and Experience Pragmatism rejects the authority both of the Logic of Aristotle and of that of Hegel, and considers that it is impossible to attain to truth by the use of inteUectual or logical arguments. It bases all truth upon experience — experience as ' pure ' (i.e. as little contaminated by inteUectual processes) as possible. SchiUer not only attempts (like John MU1 and many others before him) to derive the axioms of mathematics from experience, but even assigns to the laws of thought the same origin, considering them mere practical devices framed by the mind to suit its convenience. To all but Pragmatists, the Law of Contradiction is a law of things as well as of thought. For example, we cannot think of a round table as being also square, mainly because it seems to us objectively impossible for a round table to be also square. But, according to SchiUer, this Law has no objective validity. It only expresses the subjective demand of the human mind " that it shaU be possible to make distinctions sharp, and disjunctions complete, PRAGMATISM AND OBJECTIVITY 101 in order that we may thereby tame the continuous flux of experience."1 Criticism of Pragmatism Since the death of William James, Pragmatism has so greatly declined in prestige (at least in the English- speaking world) that it would hardly now be necessary to criticize it at any length, were it not for the powerful influence which it stiU exerts upon Modernism, English as weU as foreign. Probably the following discussion (after what has been said about Immanence in the previous chapter) wiU suffice. As accepting the Kantian doctrine of Immanentism, or the Relativity of Knowledge, Pragmatism stands or falls with Kantianism, the leading features of which have already been discussed. Every principal paradox in volved in Kantianism is also involved in Pragmatism, including the crowning absurdity of Solipsism, or the doctrine of the Non-existence of Other Persons. That this doctrine is involved in the Pragmatism of Croce is obvious, for if he is right in affirming that ex ternal ' things ' do not exist, it is obvious that other persons (who are objective things) do not exist, and that I myself am the only being in the universe. Exactly the same consequence foUows from the Prag matism of James, Dewey, and Le Roy, who hold, with Kant, that external ' things ' do indeed exist, but are unknowable. It is obvious that if they are unknowable, none of them can be known to be minds or persons. It might seem that Schiller escapes this inconvenient conclusion by means of his theory that external things are not quite (though nearly) unknowable. If, on his principles, he could only succeed in establishing the 1 Op. cit„ p. 106. 102 PRAGMATIST VIEWS OF TRUTH objective existence of other human bodies, it would seem that he might also succeed in estabhshing the existence of other human minds, because it is generally recognized the existence of other minds can be legitimately inferred from the existence of other bodies. But the' hyle' or formless 'something,' which, according to SchUler, is the only external reality which exists, is so exceedingly indeterminate, and so completely shaped by the human mind to suit its own subjective needs, that it is impossible to be sure whether the things which we regard as other bodies are really such, or whether they are merely the subjective forms into which the ' hyle ' has been moulded by our desires. The complete ' plas ticity ' of the ' hyle ' prevents us from attributing to it in its own nature any such form or shape as that of a human body. It is impossible, therefore, to prove the objective existence of other human bodies ; and. therefore we can have no assurance of the actual existence of other human minds. It ought also to be pointed out that to prove the existence of other minds from the existence of other bodies is only possible by the use of logic. It involves the whole principle of argument from analogy, which is the root principle of the logic of Aristotle. The validity of logic, however (especiaUy of Aristotehan logic), is denied by all Pragmatists. Consequently, even if they could know by direct ' experience ' the existence of other human bodies, they could not possibly (without the aid of the logic which they despise) deduce therefrom the existence of other human minds. II Pragmatists derive all knowledge from immediate or ' pure ' experience, uninfluenced by (or, as they would say, undistorted by) reason and logic. In the case of man, however (and probably even in the ALL KNOWLEDGE INTELLECTUAL 103 case of the higher animals), no such thing as ' pure ' experience exists. Even if it could exist, it would be nothing but an amorphous continuum of sensation, feeling, and impulse, entirely vague and undifferentiated, and therefore conveying no knowledge. Knowledge in aU its stages of growth is intellectual, not sensational, emotional, or impulsive. It begins with the discrimination of one thing from another in the continuum presented by ' experience.' It then studies and appre hends the nature of the things thus distinguished, frames propositions concerning them, and in many cases pro ceeds to draw inferences from them. AU these processes are inteUectual or rational. AU human cognition, of whatever kind, is an activity of reason. Even if I cognize something in the vaguest possible way as a mere ' thing,' even this involves the purely intellectual concept of a ' thing,' and probably also of an ' objective ' thing, which again imphes an inteUectual distinction between ' subject ' and ' object.' UsuaUy the inteUectual process of cognition (even in simple cases) is much more elaborate than this. If, for instance, as I walk, I start a rabbit, I instantly cognize it, not merely as a • thing ' but also as an animal, and in particular a rabbit ; and accordingly assign to it aU the qualities which essentiaUy belong to a rabbit as weU as to an ' animal ' and a ' thing.' In a simUar way, there can be no human knowledge even of inward experiences (such as pain, hope, de pression, desire, awe, wonder, and religious feehng) without inteUectual discrimination, apprehension, and judgment. ' Tmth ' resides not in mere ideas, but only in ' judg ments ' or " propositions.' Thus * man ' is an inteUectual idea or ' concept,' and so also is ' mortal,' but no * truth ' resides in either of these ideas separately considered. If, however, we combine them in a proposition, such as ' man is mortal,' then there is truth or error— truth if 9 104 PRAGMATIST VIEWS OF TRUTH the proposition truly expresses objective fact (as in this particular case it does), and error if it does not. It thus involves an impossibility to suppose (as Prag matists do) that ' truth ' is derived from or consists of mere experience uninfluenced by inteUect. In all cases (if there is to be • truth ') ' experience ' requires to be interpreted by reason and expressed in a rational judg ment or proposition. It should also be noticed that nearly all judgments are the results of a process of logical inference. For example, the proposition ' man is mortal ' is obviously not derived from mere experience (for clearly neither I nor anyone else has experienced the deaths of aU actual and possible men), but from logical reasoning from experience, with the help of such general principles (also not derived from experience) as the Laws of Universal Causation and of the Uniformity of Nature. Ill Mr. SchiUer's attempt to derive the principles of mathematics and the laws of thought from ' experience ' is a complete failure for this plain reason, that experience can never yield either absolute universality or necessity. Experience can never yield universality, because there can never be experience of all possible things ; e.g. there can never be experience of any future things whatever. Nor can experience ever yield necessity, or necessary connexion. For example, from the dawn of human experience the physical universe has always existed, yet no one imagines that it exists necessarily ; and from the same ancient date night has invariably foUowed day, yet no one regards this sequence as necessary. It is quite possible in spite of aU this experience to imagine (and even to beheve) that the universe might be annihUated, and that instead of the sequence of night and day there might be perpetual day or perpetual night. LOGIC AND 'EXPERIENCE' 105 All mathematical and logical principles are both universal and necessary principles, and therefore not derived from experience. It might be thought, perhaps, that such simple mathematical truths as 2 + 2 = 4 are derived from experience. But although I can prove the truth of this by experience (i.e. by counting) in a few particular cases, I cannot possibly thus prove it in all possible cases. But the statement that 2 + 2=4 means that it is true, not only within the limits of my or anyone's experience, but that it is true universally and necessarily at aU times, at aU places, and even in aU possible universes. That we know this is undeniable. It is equaUy undeniable that we do not know it by ex perience. With regard to logical principles, we may take the Law of Contradiction as an example. This law affirms that it is impossible for any reaUy existent thing to con tain within itself any contradiction. For example, it is impossible for a red rose to be also white, or for a hving man to be also dead. Experience teaches us that in a certain limited number of cases this law holds good, nor are any exceptions to it furnished by experience. Experience, however, can never inform us that this law holds universally and necessarily, and yet we know for certain that it does. It follows that the Law of Contradiction, regarded as a uni versal and necessary law, is not derived from experience. It might be thought that it is derived from reasoning from experience ; but even this is impossible, because it is one of the necessary presuppositions of all reasoning. It follows that it is a truth apprehended by direct intuition. IV The basing of aU human knowledge upon experience reduces it practically to a vanishing point, as we have already shown at length in our criticism of Kant. 106 PRAGMATIST VIEWS OF TRUTH Pragmatism reduces all truth to utility, rejecting with contempt the common-sense notion that it consists in correspondence between belief and objective fact. Most readers will probably regard it as amounting to a refutation of this principle if we merely state, without comment, the exact form which some of the most famihar and important of human beliefs assume when interpreted ' in terms of utility.' On the principle that truth means utility and nothing else, our behefs in the existence of matter, of other human persons, of God, of the moral law, and of moral obligation, take the following forms : (i) It is useful to believe that matter exists ; (2) It is useful to believe that other persons exist ; (3) It is useful to believe that God exists ; (4) It is useful to beheve that the moral law exists ; (5) It is useful to believe that this law binds men with a moral obligation. As most Pragmatists consider that other persons than themselves do objectively exist, and not merely that it is useful to believe that they do, they are involved in a contradiction which makes shipwreck of their whole theory of truth. VI Not merely do the Pragmatists fail to prove that utility is identical with truth, they fail even to prove that the two are coextensive. And this they are absolutely bound to do, because unless the two are coextensive in every case whatsoever, they cannot possibly be identical. It hardly requires to be stated that there are many notorious cases in which the truth (if it is very bad) would produce, were it known, great unhappiness, and is therefore wisely withheld (when this is possible) from the persons chiefly concerned. There are also other TRUTH AND UTILITY 107 cases in which an entirely false behef of a comforting kind produces happiness, even permanent happiness. Many a fond mother lives happy and dies rejoicing because she firmly believes in the honour of her son, who is really a scoundrel and a hypocrite. Such cases show clearly that truth and utility are not always identical. Pragmatists do indeed maintain that in the majority of cases, and ' upon the whole,' and especially with regard to beliefs about the universe, truth and utility coincide. But, so far as the universe is concerned, whether this is true or not, obviously depends upon what the character of the universe really is. If the universe is very good, as it must be if it is created and ruled by a perfectly wise and good and omnipotent Ruler, then (at any rate for the good man) the knowledge of the truth about the universe must produce happiness, and thus coincide with utility. On the other hand, if the universe is very bad, as it must be if it is a mindless machine, without purpose of any kind, and therefore unable to make any distinction between the bad man and the good man ; or if (worse even than this) it has mind and purpose, but a mind and purpose which are evil, then the knowledge of its true nature, so far from producing happiness, must necessarUy produce misery so intense, that the philosopher who had the penetration to discover it, would be well advised to keep his knowledge to himself. Mr. Bertrand RusseU holds such a view of the universe as this, and so far from beheving that such knowledge is useful or tends to happiness, expresses himself as follows : " Brief and powerless is man's life ; on him and all his race the slow sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter roUs on its relentless way; for man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day . . . proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for 108 PRAGMATIST VIEWS OF TRUTH a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned, despite the trampling march of unconscious power." 1 The Pragmatist may perhaps reply that to suppose such a complete divorce between truth and utility is to suppose that the universe is irrational, which no doubt is the case. But the Pragmatist of all men has the least cause to complain of this, because he is always insisting, in season and out of season, that the philosophy of Rationality is played out, that the universe is funda mentally irrational, that the laws of reason are not objectively valid, and that logical argument does not conduct to truth. Our Pragmatist friends, who are con tinually contributing articles to The Hibbert Journal and other Liberal periodicals on such subjects as ' Our Irrational Universe,' can hardly expect to escape criticism if they play fast and loose with what they profess to beheve, and are willing to exchange their fundamental assumption of Irrationality for its opposite, Rationahty, whenever it leads them into difficulties. It is a notorious fact that there are exceptions to the rule that truth coincides with utility; and if there are any exceptions at aU — even if there is only one — the identity of truth and utUity cannot be maintained. VII The subject is almost threadbare, and has been already aUuded to in the criticism of Kant, but it is impossible to pass over entirely in sUence the naivety with which every Modernist (including every Bergsonian) book reproduces Kant's transparent sophism of criticizing the instrument of knowledge — viz. reason — by means of itself. Bergson in particular, in spite of his expressed hostUity to logic, shows himself in all his works a keen logician, 1 " A Free Man's Worship," in Mysticism and Logic (1918), pp. 56, 57. BERGSON'S 'INTUITION' 109 and argues with great subtlety, employing every kind of argument known to the traditional logic — syllogism, induction, and the argument from analogy — in his attempts to establish his position that logic is not a guide to truth. He forgets that before he can thus use logic against itself, he must assume that it is trustworthy. Bergson puts his faith in ' intuition,' not in logic, and therefore he is bound in consistency to seek truth by means of ' intuition,' and not by means of logic. His principles entitle him to state his views clearly, and then to call upon his readers to exercise their ' intuition' — i.e. their immediate non-logical apprehension — upon them. They clearly do not entitle him to argue. To argue is to use logic, and to use logic is to be false to the principle of Irrationality. VIII A word may be added upon the unnatural severance — resembling a surgical amputation — which Bergson insists upon making between ' intuition ' (or instinct) and " inteUigence ' (or reason). It seems to him that motion and rest, hving things and non-living things, differ so fundamentally from one another that they cannot be known by the same faculties. Accordingly he divides the cognitive function of the human soul into two absolutely distinct faculties, differing even in kind from one another — viz. ' intuition ' which knows the moving and the hving, and ' intelligence ' (a far lower faculty) which knows the stationary and the non-living. It ought not to need to be pointed out, that the cognitive faculty in man is one and indivisible, that the traditional name for it is reason, and that it is a power of knowing (in principle at least) aU things whatsoever, including itself and God. To suppose that when the objects of knowledge differ in kind, a different faculty is required to know them (which is Bergson's assumption), no PRAGMATIST VIEWS OF TRUTH is to multiply faculties almost indefinitely, and to destroy the unity of the principle of cognition. ' Intuition,' or immediate apprehension of truth, is as clearly an operation of reason as discursive argument. The faculty which apprehends the truth of the axioms of geometry and arithmetic by immediate intuition, and that which deduces from them (let us say) the theorem of Pythagoras, and the rule for extracting cube roots, is obviously the same, viz. reason. And it is the same faculty, viz. reason, which apprehends intuitively the existence of the soul, and proves by logical arguments its (at least probable) immortahty. As for the Bergsonian paradox — for it is no more — that the godlike endowment of Reason, which elevates man above the brute creation by enabling him to know, not merely the things of sense, but himself as a spiritual substance, and the eternal moral law, and God, is a mere utUitarian faculty for making tools and deahng practically with sohds, it may be safely left to the judgment of the reader. IX Finally, the assumption of Pragmatism that tmth is identical with utility is shattered upon the undeniable psychological fact of the disinterested love of truth, which all men have in some measure, and scientists and philo sophers in unusual measure. Mr. SchUler speaks of it as " a perversion of the cognitive instinct," but not even he ventures to deny its existence. So far from this disinterested love of truth being a neghgible quantity, it is the principal source of aU science and of aU philosophy. It awakes quite early in childhood in the form of curiosity, which is an objective interest in " things,' not a subjective interest in one's own feehngs or personal advantage. At adolescence, curiosity passes into a definite desire for historical and scientific knowledge. DISINTERESTED LOVE OF TRUTH in and books on subjects of smaU practical utility, such as astronomy and palaeontology, are often devoured by young men and women merely because they are interested in knowledge as such. At the same period also an interest in metaphysics often awakes in those who have a phUosophical bent. The object of natural science is not to provide men with railways, steamships, and other useful things, but to know the physical universe theoretically. The object of mental science (psychology) is not to improve our imperfect systems of education or to cure mental disorders, but to know the nature of the human mind as it really is. As to metaphysics, it may fairly be doubted whether Comte is right in regarding it as the most useless, or Mr. McTaggart as the most useful, of the sciences ; but whichever of them is right, one thing is perfectly evident, that metaphysics is not usually cultivated for its usefulness. Common-sense and science and phUosophy are thus agreed that the love of truth for its own sake without ulterior ends is one of the strongest and most ennobling impulses of man regarded as rational ; and Pragmatism, which behttles it or regards it as a disease, thereby shows itself not so much philosophy as banausic Philistinism. CHAPTER VI M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA It will be profitable to conclude our discussion of Prag matism by criticizing in some detail what is perhaps the ablest, and is certainly the most lucid, exposition of Pragmatic Modernism yet published, the Dogme et Critique of M. Edouard Le Roy (Paris, 1907). The author is an eminent mathematician and philo sopher, a friend and adherent of M. Loisy, and a practising Cathohc. His book, we may add, has been condemned at Rome, which is hardly to be wondered at, seeing that it reduces aU the dogmas of Christianity to mere rules of behaviour or conduct, and denies that they have any inteUectual meaning. I understand that M. Le Roy, having regard to the peace of the Church, has ceased to advocate the views expressed in his book. The first part of Dogme et Critique, entitled ' Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme ? ' appeared originally as an article in the Quinzaine of April 16, 1905. The remainder consists of further elucidations of his position, and replies to criticisms. Dogma and Practice Le Roy's main point is that a religious dogma is not addressed to the reason or inteUect, and has no positive inteUectual content. It may be said to have a negative meaning, because its object is to warn the faithful against certain erroneous and imperfect views of rehgious truth (e.g. atheism, gnosticism, pantheism), but it teaches the inteUect nothing positive either about God or the things °f God. Its meaning and aim are entirely practical. It 112 DOGMA AND PRACTICE 113 instructs men what practical attitude they ought to adopt towards divine things, but by no means dictates to them what they should believe about them. Provided that Christians assume the correct practical and devotional attitude towards God and our Lord Jesus Christ and divine things, they are free to invent any intellectual theories they please to justify their action. " A dogma," says M. Le Roy, " has above all a practical meaning. It states above aU a prescription of a practical kind. It is above all the formulation of a rule of practical con duct. Therein lies its principal value, therein its positive significance. ... A Cathohc is obliged to assent without reserve to the dogmas. But what is imposed upon him is by no means a theory or intellectual representation. Such a constraint would inevitably lead to unacceptable consequences.1 . . . No, the dogmas are not at all hke that. This meaning, as we have seen, is, above all, practical and moral. The Catholic, though obhged to admit them, is only constrained by them to rules of conduct, not to particular conceptions. Nor is he con demned to accept them as mere verbal formulas without meaning. On the contrary, they offer him a meaning very definite and positive — one entirely intelligible and comprehensible. I add that this content, having to do solely with the practical, is not relative to the varying degrees of knowledge and inteUigence of different men. It remains exactly the same for the scholar and the ignorant man, for the clever and the unskilful, for the ages of advanced civilization and for races stiU barbarous. In short, it is independent of the successive stages through which human thought passes in its struggles towards knowledge, and thus there is only one faith for everybody. " This being granted, the Catholic, having accepted the dogma, retains full liberty to make such a theory or intellectual representation of the corresponding reality * He means that they could not be accepted by modern thinkers owing to their miraculous character.^ 114 M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA (e.g. the Divine Personality, the Real Presence, and the Resurrection of Jesus) as pleases him. It is open to him to accord preference to the theory that satisfies him best, to the inteUectual representation which he judges to be the best. His situation in this respect is the same as his attitude towards any scientific or philosophical theory. He can adopt the same inteUectual attitude in both cases. Only one obligation is imposed upon him : his theory must justify the practical rules enunciated by the dogma. ... As long as his theory respects the prac tical significance of the dogma, it is given carte blanche " (pp. 21, 31, 32, 33). Interpretation of Particular Dogmas Applying this pragmatic principle to particular dogmas, M. Le Roy maintains that the dogma that God is personal means only that we should behave towards Him as if He were personal J ; that the dogma that Jesus is God merely means that we should behave towards Him as if He were God * ; that the dogma of His two natures only means that we should behave towards Him on appro priate occasions both as if He were God and as if He were man • ; that the dogma of the Resurrection of Jesus means that we should behave towards Him as if He had risen 4 ; that the dogma of the Real Presence merely 1 " The dogma ' God is personal ' means, ' Conduct yourself in your relations with God as in your relations with a human person ' " (p. 25). • " The divinity of Jesus is always defined only in terms of our attitude towards Him." " The dogma of Christ's deity [in the Apostolic Age] was a belief purely lived, purely practical " (p. 264). * " To affirm that in Jesus Christ there are two natures, the human and the divine, is to affirm that we ought to have in relation to Him, at once in thought, word, and act, the practical and moral attitude which we should have towards a man and towards God " (p.| 267). He gives a similar pragmatic explanation of the dogma of the One Person in two natures. * " Similarly, ' Jesus is risen ' means, ' Be in relation to Him as you would have been before His death ; as you are now, in the presence of a contemporary ' " (p. 26). PRACTICAL MEANING OF DOGMA 115 requires us to behave towards the Blessed Sacrament as if Jesus were present,1 and so forth. M. Le Roy's attitude towards the dogma of the Holy Trinity is not very clearly expressed, but he seems to indicate that it must be ' pragmatically ' construed in terms of God's practical action upon us in a threefold way, and of a threefold practical response on our part. To complete this very brief sketch, it should be added that M. Le Roy regards miracles as incapable of historic proof, as a great offence to the modern mind, and as the gravest of all hindrances to the advance of the Christian religion. Accordingly, hke most Modernists, he rejects as unhistorical the Gospel accounts of the Virgin Birth and the Bodily Resurrection of our Lord.* So far as I have noticed, his book shows no independent acquaintance with New Testament criticism. He simply reproduces the conclusions of M. Loisy, even the most subjective and hazardous, without seeming to be aware that a large number of them are rejected, not merely by orthodox critics, but even by the majority of those of the Liberal School. This, however, I only mention in passing, because it is not so much with M. Le Roy's biblico-critical views as with his Pragmatic Theology that we are here chiefly concerned. Criticism of'M. Le Roy's Position M. Le Roy bases his theology (professedly and actually) upon Pragmatism, and accordingly, if our attempt to refute Pragmatism in the last chapter has been successful, there is no need (logicaUy at least) to refute a single one 1 " In the same way the dogma of the Real Presence means that it is necessary to exhibit in the presence of the Consecrated Host the same reverential attitude as ought to be exhibited towards Jesus Himself should He become visible " (p. 26). a Like M. Loisy, M. Le Roy considers that the Virgin Birth and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus are legends, not based on any historical evidence, but generated by the later belief in His Divinity. 116 M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA of his characteristic doctrines. If Pragmatism is a radically false system, every system of theology built upon it must be unsound, and every individual doctrine derived from it is hkely to be false.1 It may be useful, nevertheless, to foUow M. Le Roy into some of the theological conclusions which he deduces from his Pragmatism. If they involve contradictions and incredibilities, the conclusions which we reached in the last chapter wUl be thereby confirmed. If they do not, it may be desirable to reconsider some of the ques tions previously discussed. With this purpose in view, we proceed to consider some of M. Le Roy's principal doctrines. It is fundamental to M. Le Roy's position, as a logical Pragmatist, to insist that the Christian dogmas do not intend to assert (or at least are not successful in asserting) objective truth of any kind. They are ' phenomenal ' or ' symbolic ' statements only, and those who accept them are not thereby pledged to hold any particular intellectual behefs, either about God, or about Jesus Christ, or about man in his relation to God. The intel lectual content of the dogmas is nil. M. Le Roy is very emphatic about this. " We wish a dogma," says he, " to be an enunciation of a truth of the intellectual order. What does it enunciate ? No thing that can be precisely indicated. Does not this fact condemn the hypothesis ? Finally, the pretence of con ceiving dogmas as statements of which the first function is to communicate certain items of theoretical knowledge colhdes, it would seem, with impossibilities on every hand. Perhaps it must therefore be resolutely abandoned " (p. 18). 1 A true conclusion may sometimes be deduced from false premisses, but only rarely and by accident. We can have no assurance that a conclusion is true unless the premisses are true. OBJECTIVITY OF THE RESURRECTION 117 This is sound Pragmatist doctrine, but unfortunately M. Le Roy does not consistently adhere to it. Some articles of the Creed (e.g. those which speak of behef in God, in the Incarnation, in the Virgin Birth, in the Resurrection, and in the Ascension) he interprets ' pragmatically ' (i.e. symbolically), but others he certainly interprets objec tively. He does not expressly say so, because, if he did, the contradiction would be too patent, but he everywhere assumes that there once existed a real historical person, Jesus of Nazareth, who taught in Galilee, was condemned to death by the Sanhedrin for claiming to be the Messiah, and was finally crucified by Pontius PUate. He even asserts in one place that a person who does not believe aU this and more about the historical Jesus can scarcely be regarded as a Christian. It hardly needs pointing out, that every one of these beliefs is objective and intel lectual, not pragmatical.1 Indeed, it is to be feared that M. Le Roy has inadvertently admitted a certain element of ' objectivity ' and ' theoretical assertion ' even into his account of the Resurrection of Jesus. True, he regards the story of the empty tomb as a fiction (pp. 199 ff.), . and denies that the buried body ever rose ; nevertheless he is convinced that something objective happened. He declares expressly : "I believe without restriction or reserve that the Resurrection of Jesus is a fact objec tively real, a fact possessing even the highest character of reality that one can conceive. I go so far as to say that it is a fact whose plenitude and reality no human conception can adequately express (traduire) ; and I reject with energy every interpretation of my thought which would give it any other meaning " (p. 155). SimUarly he says that " the survival of Jesus is other and more than that of Mahomet or of Socrates," 1 According to M. Le Roy's expressed principles, the Church has no right to require Christians to believe that the historic person Jesus ever existed, but only to behave as if they believed it. Belief in the existence of the historic Jesus is undeniably an intellectual belief. 118 M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA and, further, that His Resurrection is " His entry into glory." What, then, becomes of M. Le Roy's assertions that " What is imposed upon [a Catholic by the dogmas of the Creeds] is by no means a theory or inteUectual repre sentation," and that " A Catholic, though obhged to admit them, is only constrained by them to rules of conduct, not to particular conceptions " ? It is obviously impossible to reduce behef in the life, death, and resurrec tion of the historical person, Jesus of Nazareth, to mere ' rules of conduct,' or to maintain that behef in these doctrines is not an ' inteUectual representation ' of ' objec tive facts.' It is undeniable, therefore, that M. Le Roy, in spite of his protestations of loyalty to Pragmatism, believes objectively, and not merely pragmatically, in at least the foUowing dogmas of the Creed, viz. that Jesus — : (i) suffered under Pontius Pilate, (2) was crucified, (3) dead, (4) and buried, (5) and also that (at any rate in the sense that His spirit objectively appeared) He rose again the third day from the dead. The contradiction between M. Le Roy's theory and his practice is thus absolute. Like so many English Modern ists, he applies the pragmatic or symbolical interpretation only to those articles of the Creeds which he dislikes, and only so far as he dislikes them, but interprets all the rest in the ordinary objective way. It is perhaps too much to expect strict logic from a Pragmatist, because he denies its validity, but we certainly should be failing in our duty to the reader if we omitted to draw attention to M. ( Le Roy's grave lapse in this matter from Pragmatic consistency. M. LE ROY AS AN APOLOGIST 119 II M. Le Roy regards himself as a Christian apologist, and considers that his novel way of interpreting the Christian dogmas as rides of conduct rather than of belief, is hkely to have the effect (if officially adopted) of recon ciling the ahenated intellectuals of the modern world to the Church, and making them practising Christians. The essence of his programme is, to require men no longer, as of old, to beheve in the objective truth of the Christian dogmas as a condition of Church membership, but only to behave as if they did. He considers that if this salutary and simple reform is only adopted, practicaUy all men of good wiU, whatever their inteUectual views, will crowd into the Church, and the painful breach between the Church and the Age wiU be ended. M. Le Roy seems to have considerably underestimated the practical difficulties involved in the process of inducing men who do not intellectuaUy beheve in the Christian dogmas to behave as if they did. In the political world, certainly, it would be far from easy to induce men who do not beheve in Free Trade, or Protection, or Communism, or Socialism, or Repubhcanism, or Prohibition, to behave as if they did; and even if the desired end could be attained, the result would be rather a system of organized hypocrisy than a system of truth. Nor do I see the slightest reason for supposing that in the sphere of religion it would be easier to bring about an analogous result. Indeed, it is not merely unreasonable, but (except in very exceptional cases) impossible to expect that an atheist, remaining such, will attend divine worship regularly; or that a Pantheist, denying God's personality, wUl pray to Him as his Father in heaven; or that a Unitarian, rejecting Christ's deity, wiU worship Him as God ; or that an anti- sacramentalist, denying the very principle of the Eucharist and of the Ministry of Reconciliation, will practise frequent communion, and seek Absolution when his conscience is burdened by mortal sin. 10 120 M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA It is, of course, true, that in certain particular cases, practice generates behef. Thus a slave may beheve that slavery is right because he has always been a slave, and a master for the opposite reason that he has always been a master. SimUarly, an habitual har may repeat the same lie so often that in the end he comes to beheve it. But such cases are plainly exceptional. In the immense majority of cases, belief generates practice, not practice belief ; and it is normaUy necessary, in order to persuade a man to adopt any course of practical action, first to persuade him that the intellectual belief which naturally leads to the action is correct. Modern psychology, it is true, insists that intellectual beliefs, like diseases, are 'catching,' and that they are often generated by other than in teUectual processes. This is true enough. For example, Europeans long resident in the East sometimes become firm believers in magic, and fate, and demons, merely through the influence of the psychological atmosphere. Nevertheless, even in such cases, the rule is that the intellectual belief must be generated before appropriate action follows. A European resident in India or China wiU not normally have his horoscope cast by an astrologer until he is intellectually convinced (however illogically) that astrology is true ; nor will he normaUy present offerings at the shrine of the local demon until he is inteUectuaUy (however foolishly) convinced that the demon exists and can injure him. M. Le Roy, like most Modernists, beheves in psychology, not in metaphysics. The above argument is an exclusively psychological one, and it would be difficult to find a single competent student of modern social psychology who would question the general accuracy of the doctrine it lays down. Ill M. Le Roy considers that it is impossible to require inteUectual assent to the Christian dogmas because ARE DOGMAS MEANINGLESS? 121 (considered as propositions addressed to the intellect) they are quite meaningless. An initial difficulty at once makes itself felt. If these dogmas are so entirely destitute of meaning, how has it come about that so many thousands of Christian martyrs have been willing to die for them, and that quite recently during the Boxer riots thirty thousand Chinese converts braved death — in many cases by torture — rather than abandon them ? We may be sure that neither the primi tive nor these Chinese martyrs died for mere rules of conduct, which, moreover, were obviously the consequence of their new faith, not the substance of it. But without further dwelling on this very serious difficulty, let us consider on their merits M. Le Roy's attempts to prove that the Christian dogmas involve contradictions, and are therefore destitute of meaning. He starts with the assertion that even the idea of God itself is meaningless ; but without dwelling at length upon this, he proceeds to ,insist that at any rate the doctrine that God is personal is meaningless. " I pass over the difficulties raised by the word ' God,' " says our author, " but let us consider the word ' personal.' How must we understand it ? If we grant that the use of this word requires us to conceive the divine personahty according to the image of our own psychical experience, and on the model of what common-sense caUs by the same name, as a human personahty ideahzed and carried to perfection, we fall into complete Anthropomorphism, and Cathohcs would certainly be in agreement with their adversaries in rejecting such a notion. . . . Shall we safe guard ourselves by saying that the divine personality is essentially incomparable and transcendent ? . . . [Then] what right have we to caU it ' personality ' ? LogicaUy it should be designated by a word apphcable to God alone . . . and [therefore] intrinsicaUy indefinable. On this hypothesis, ' God is personal ' is equivalent to ' God is A.' Is this an idea at all ? " (p. 17). 122 M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA Upon the second point M. Le Roy appears to be right. To assert that God is personal in an entirely trans cendental sense beyond all human comprehension, is to assert what has no meaning. It is otherwise with his former contention that to regard the personahty of God as " personality idealized and carried to perfection ' ' involves Anthropomorphism. We do not reduce man to the level of the ape by affirming that both have intelligence, provided that we recognize that the degree of man's intelligence is immeasurably greater than that of the ape's. Nor do we reduce God to the level of man by affirming that God and man are both personal, provided that we recognize that the personahty of man is finite and imperfect, and the personality of God is infinite and perfect.1 It is true that a contradiction would be involved if we were to predicate of God any attribute of man which is inconsistent with absolute perfection. Personahty, how ever, is not one of these. If we analyse the conception of personahty (or at least of moral personality, which is the kind of personahty which the Church attributes to God) it wiU be found that the following essential elements are involved in it : (i) spirituality, (2) inteUigence, (3) knowledge, (4) self-consciousness, (5) will, (6) capacity for holiness or virtue. All these qualities are perfections, and they are also (potentially at least) infinite. There is, therefore, no incongruity in ascribing them to God. Clearly both God and man are spirit, but man is finite, and God infinite spirit ; both God and man are intelligent and possess knowledge, but man's inteUigence and know ledge are finite, and God's infinite — infinite in the sense that He knows not only all actual, but even all possible things ;l" both God and man are self-conscious, but man is 1 M. Le Roy does not fall into the mistake of speaking of God as a person." This is a Unitarian, not a Catholic, belief. God is tri- personal. * The debatable question of God's knowledge of the future free acts of beings possessed of free will may be answered either way without THE RESURRECTION NOT MEANINGLESS 123 conscious of himself as a finite, and God as an infinite being ; both God and man possess wiU, but man's wiU is limited in power, and God's adequate to the achievement of all possible things ; finally, virtue or hohness can be predicated both of God and also (potentially) of man, but the holiness of man is imperfect, that of God perfect — so perfect that He embodies in His nature, not only potentially, but also actually or equivalently, the sum of aU possible moral exceUencies to an infinite extent. We accordingly reach the conclusion that though ' personality ' is predicated of God and man in an identical sense, yet inasmuch as the perfections included in the idea of personality are realized in man only in an imperfect and finite degree, and in God in a perfect and infinite degree, the Cathohc doctrine preserves the infinite gulf which separates the Creator from the creature, and does not involve the absurdity of Anthropomorphism. M. Le Roy also maintains that the orthodox doctrine of our Lord's Resurrection involves a contradiction, and is accordingly meaningless. " What is the precise meaning," says he, " which [orthodox theology] assumes to be attached to the word ' resurrection ' ? That Jesus, after having passed through death, returned alive. What does that mean from the theoretical point of view ? Doubtless nothing but that after three days Jesus re appeared in a state identical with that in which He was before He was nailed to the cross. But the Gospel teUs us the exact contrary " (p. 18). It ought not to require to be stated that orthodox theology teaches nothing of the kind. It is not now, and never has been believed by orthodox Christians, either that Jesus rose from the dead with a natural body, or that He hved after His Resurrection a natural life. The teaching of St. Paul, that at the resurrection " we shall interfering with the general principle. In the opinion of many, such pre-knowledge, if absolute, would involve a contradiction. There is no more perplexing metaphysical problem than this. 124 M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA be changed," and that " this corruptible must put on in- corruption," has always been apphed to the case of Jesus Himself, and it has been universally beheved that at the moment of His Resurrection His natural body was transformed into a glorious and spiritual body, and that if at first sight any of the circumstances of the post- Resurrection appearances (such as the handling and the eating) seem to imply that His body still consisted of natural flesh and blood, these must be understood to have been the result of a temporary accommodation to earthly conditions for evidential purposes, and not as indicating that a spiritual body is normally perceptible to earthly senses, or requires to be nourished by food. M. Le Roy finds a further contradiction in the idea of ' hfe ' as attributed to Jesus before and after His Resur rection. We can frame, he says, no idea whatever of what ' life ' is hke after the Resurrection, and therefore to attribute it to the risen Lord is to make a statement with out meaning. We may reply to this objection by drawing a distinc tion between an adequate and an inadequate idea of a thing. Even an inadequate idea of a thing may be per fectly true so far as it goes, and if so it will never require to be corrected by subsequent fuller knowledge. This fairly obvious consideration seems to meet M. Le Roy's difficulty. If the human personality of Jesus in any sense survived death (which M. Le Roy admits), then it foUows that aU the essential (as distinguished from the accidental) attributes of His humanity also survived death. Hence we can affirm positively (with fuU comprehension of what we mean) that He continued even after death to be conscious and self-conscious, and to possess human inteUigence, human affections, human will, human memory, and human capacities for virtue. The fact that we can form no adequate conception of what the life of a risen human being is hke (owing to our lack of experience) does not prevent us from being absolutely NEGATIVE MEANING OF DOGMAS 125 certain that it must possess at least these characteristics. If it did not, it would not be a human life at all, and therefore there would be no such thing as human immortahty. IV Although, according to M. Le Roy, the Christian dogmas have no positive content, they nevertheless have a prohibitive sense — they warn against certain heresies or doctrinal errors. " A dogma," he says, " has first of aU a negative meaning. It condemns and excludes certain errors [he instances atheism, gnosticism, and pantheism] rather than determines positive truth." There is an evident contradiction in this statement. The Cathohc Creeds mention no heresies, and therefore condemn none, except by implication. The only way in which they condemn them is by teaching positive doctrines inconsistent with them. For example, they condemn atheism by teaching that God is, and pantheism by teaching that He is the Creator of the universe, and consequently not identical with it. If the propositions ' God is ' and ' God is the Creator ' present to the intellect no meaning whatever (which is M. Le Roy's assumption), then they cannot possibly contradict either atheism, or pantheism, or anything else. M. Le Roy has a strange theory (shared also, so far as relates to the doctrine of the Incarnation, by many English Modernists) that the primitive Christians were allowed an unlimited licence of constructing theoretical doctrines for themselves in order to justify the practical attitude towards God, and Jesus Christ, and Christian morality, and the Christian Sacraments, which was all that the Church then required of them. He considers that in the apostolic and sub-apostolic age the Church possessed certain practical rules of conduct, but no rules 126 M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA of belief, and that accordingly Christians were everywhere aUowed (provided they worshipped God and Jesus Christ, and in other respects behaved as practising Christians) to invent any theories they pleased to account for the practical rules they accepted. In particular he alleges that though all the primitive Christians worshipped Jesus Christ, a considerable number of inconsistent reasons for doing this were tolerated, and that the Church had no official doctrine on the subject. There is a prima facie objection to this theory, viz. that the Four Gospels — even the Synoptics, at any rate in their present form — represent Jesus Himself as teaching in broad outhne the official doctrine of the Incarnation which afterwards prevailed. To this M. Le Roy replies, that M. Loisy has demonstrated in his critical writings the unhistorical character of aU the great Christological passages in the Gospels, and that therefore there is no historical evidence that Jesus Himself taught any Christo logy at aU. The questions of New Testament criticism involved will be more conveniently discussed later J ; here it wiU be sufficient to point out the inherent improbabihties (in fact, impossibilities) involved in the theory. It is not to be denied that the same outward action may sometimes be justified by different, and indeed quite inconsistent reasons ; for example, a cheque for £1,000 may be given to a hospital out of benevolence or out of a desire to get into parhament ; also a man may be honest in business either because it is right or because it is the best policy. In a similar way it is possible, in the abstract, to justify the worship of Jesus by a variety of theories. For example, if the apostles and first Christians had happened to be heathens, they might have justified their worship of Jesus in at least the four following ways. They might have assumed : (i) That He was one of the immortal gods, who for 1 See especially ch. ix, " Modernism and Biblical Criticism." THE ONLY POSSIBLE CHRISTOLOGY 127 some sufficient reason (perhaps a Promethean love for mankind J) had humbled himself to hve on earth in a servile and despised condition, as (in the ancient legend) the god Apollo, when banished from Olympus, had served Admetus, King of Pherae, as his herdsman ' ; or (2) That He was the son of one of the immortal gods or goddesses by a mortal ; or (3) That though He was a man, yet divine powers of magic, miracle, divination, and prophecy resided within Him to such an unusual extent that He was entitled to rehgious worship * ; (4) That though He was originally a mere man, and did not exist before His conception, yet He had now become divine, because His beneficent and virtuous life had been rewarded by resurrection and assumption into heaven, foUowed by deification or apotheosis, or (to use the favourite Modernist term) ' adoption.' All these (and other) theories might have been entertained by pagans anxious to justify their worship of Jesus, but none of them were possible to the Apostles. The rigid monotheism of the Jewish and early Christian Churches regarded all these theories — the last quite as much as the others — with a disapproval amounting to positive horror ; for example, in the Apocalypse the crowning blasphemy of " the Beast ' (i.e. the Roman Emperor) is its insistence that divine honours should be paid to deified mortals. It is, therefore, a psychological impossibility that the Apostolic Church can either have beheved or tolerated belief in any of these theories, because to have done so would have involved a lapse into paganism. One theory, and only one, can possibly justify a believer 1 Cf. The Prometheus of iEschylus. 2 Cf. The Alcestis of Euripides. 8 Thus Simon Magus claimed worship as being " the power of God which is called great," probably in the sense that it dwelt within him, and enabled him to perform his prodigies. He claimed it also for his paramour Helena, whom he called the *Smw of God. 128 M. LE ROY'S VIEW OF DOGMA in monotheism, either in the first or in any other century, in worshipping Jesus of Nazareth ; and that is the theory of the Catholic Church, that He is very God as well as very man. The God of monotheism is a jealous God, and the worship that He claims is exclusive and unique. To give it to a creature is to be guilty of the deadliest sin in the monotheistic code of ethics — the sin of idolatry. If the Apostolic Christians reaUy did worship Jesus (and M. Le Roy admits that they did) then it is absolutely certain (even though we had no other evidence to confirm it) that they beheved in the Incarnation.1 It follows from this — (i) That they believed in the consubstantial Sonship of Jesus (though the technical term to express it was not yet in use) ; (2) That they believed that He had always been God, even from eternity, because to suppose otherwise would have resulted in a contradiction — a contradiction of the divine attribute of eternity. 1 The only even plausible piece of New Testament evidence in favour of Adoptionism is the peculiar version of the voice at the Baptism of Jesus given in certain early MSS. at St. Luke iii. 22. It is rejected by all the critical editors. The version of St. Mark (our earliest Gospel definitely excludes Adoptionism. CHAPTER VII IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION The special subject of this chapter is Theological Im manence, and its relation to the doctrine of the Incarna tion. But the doctrine of Philosophical Immanence, which has engaged us hitherto, is of such vital importance, and it is so necessary that the reader should be fuUy convinced in his own mind, not only that it is meta physically false but also that it is practically inadequate and even ridiculous when apphed to religion, that it is desirable to preface our principal discussion by a few final remarks upon its Modernist applications. In the first place the reader should realize that if our attempts to refute PhUosophic Immanence have been successful, we have already overthrown without further argument being necessary (and that not merely in principle, but even in the minutest detail) the whole imposing structure of negation which constitutes ordinary Modernism. Nearly aU Modernists, English and Conti nental — Dean RashdaU is one of the very few exceptions — base their system expressly or tacitly upon some form of the Kantian doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge (i.e. Immanence), and consequently, as Professor Gardner himself admits, if Kantianism is disproved, the whole fabric of Modernism collapses.1 1 As a specimen of his many admissions that it is possible to con struct a stable and unchangeable system of theology, if only Immanence is disproved, and the principle of the Validity of Objective Knowledge established, we may take the following : "No doubt, if we could find a basis outside the world of sense, if there existed any possibility 129 130 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION This is as true of the negative biblical criticism of Modernism as of its negative theology, for the former (as we have already shown) is as direct a product of the Kantian Agnosticism as the latter. Professor Gardner's Position It will be convenient if, instead of occupying space with works of less importance, we proceed at once to discuss the views of the leading English representative of Neo- Kantian Modernism, Professor Gardner, as expressed in his Exploratio Evangelica, undoubtedly the most thorough philosophical defence of Modernism as a whole which has yet appeared in this country. I hope to be able to show that the inteUectual contradictions and practical absurdities involved in the Kantian position are so extreme that even Professor Gardner is unable to adhere to it consistently in practice. We wiU begin by considering a forcible statement of the Kantian doctrine which well describes, not only Professor Gardner's own position, but that of most English Modernists. " It is clear," he says, " that in all provinces of know ledge, whether it be knowledge of the world around us, or of human beings, or of God Himself, objectivity is introduced, not by the intellect, but by the will. Observation could never overstep the adamantine limits of brain and nerve whereby it is enclosed. We can have no perception of things, save as they are reproduced to us and in us. And intellect can but combine the data of sense, can but compare and contrast, but cannot add to the original impressions."1 of taking our start from facts in regard to the Divine Being which could be proved in an objective sense and without regard to human faculties and human experience, this might give us means for formu lating a speculative and permanent theology. But such knowledge is impossible to man " (Exploratio Evangelica, p. 49 — italics mine). 1 Exploratio Evangelica, p. 31 (italics mine). Cf. also, " Objective knowledge in religion is unattainable." " If we could reach knowledge GARDNER'S INCONSISTENCIES 131 This passage contains at least two palpable contra dictions : (1) It speaks of " the adamantine limits of brain and nerve" wherein the human mind is confined, forgetting that, on Kantian principles, the mind knows only its own thoughts, and cannot possibly be aware of the objective existence of such things as ' brain and nerve.' (2) Again, the declaration that the human inteUect "can but combine the data of sense," and "cannot add to the original impressions," coUides violently with express statements made by the author only a few pages before, to the effect that the human intellect infers — and infers validly — the objective existence both of other persons and of God from the subjective data of sense. The matter is so vitally important that it is desirable to quote one of the passages in full. "If we pass by aU the physical difficulties which hang around any possible perception of an objective world about us, and aUow that our senses are sources of real and trustworthy information as to the material world,1 yet even then it is clear that they cannot immediately inform us that human beings conscious hke ourselves surround us. They can show us that we dweU amid a number of bodies formed like our own, constantly occupied with this or that, forwarding or thwarting our plans, and daily conversing with us. But they cannot by any possibility prove that these bodies are more than unconscious automata. The only wiU and thought of which we can possibly be immediately aware are our own ; if we believe that our friends also are conscious, have wiU and thought of their own, this must objectively valid from the speculative point of view, it might better satisfy our reason. But since the rise of Critical Philosophy [i.e. Kantianism] this is impossible. The change which has been produced in our thought has been well compared to the change from a geocentric to a heliocentric scheme of astronomy." " The contradictions in which metaphysical theology is at every step involved, arise, according to the views here set forth, from the fact that theological propositions or dogmas are not speculatively valid " (pp. 44, 51). 1 This, of course, is quite inconsistent with ' Immanence." 132 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION be an addition which we make to the facts of sense. If there ever lived a man who supposed himself to be the only conscious being in existence, he could probably never be confuted. But aU sane human beings have come to the belief that those about them are wUling and conscious creatures. And mainly, I think, on two grounds. First there is the ground of analogy and inference. We see in others actions and expressions which we know in our own case to accompany certain feelings, and thoughts, and vohtions ; we therefore naturaUy assume that similar effects have similar causes, and that what is in our own case the result of purpose, must be the result of purpose, and so of consciousness, in others." It is not too much to say that in this passage Dr. Gardner gives away both his own and the whole Kantian position. For he expressly aUows : (i) that matter (viz. other human bodies) exists objectively ; (2) that the law of causation (" similar effects have simUar causes ") is vahd objectively; (3) that the existence of other minds may be logically and validly deduced " by analogy and inference " from the existence of other bodies. Nor can it be said that these inferences are of so trivial a kind that they do not affect the general principle he lays down that external reality is unknowable. The beliefs in the existence of God and in that of other per sons are infinitely the most important of all human beliefs, and if these are capable of objective proof (as Dr. Gardner admits that they are) then there is an end for good and aU of the doctrine of Immanence and of the vast struc ture of theological and critical negation which in his elaborate work of over five hundred pages he has labori ously erected upon it. If the logic of the mere intellect, which he so much despises, is capable of establishing such tremendous reahties as the objective existence of other human persons and of God, a fortiori it is capable of estabhshing lesser objective truths. Professor Gardner LIMITATIONS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 133 has so neatly refuted himself (and his fellow Modernists) that really nothing more remains to be said. Religious Experience It follows necessarily from the principle of Immanent- sm, that direct rehgious experience is the only vahd source of rehgious doctrine. This subject has already been discussed at some length, but a few more illustra tions of its subversive effects upon religious beliefs — even those which Modernists would willingly accept if they could — are desirable. In the first place, not only can it not be known from experience that Jesus was born of a Virgin, and rose from the dead, and ascended into heaven, but it cannot even be known that He ever existed. If we reflect how we know that a person called Jesus of Nazareth once lived in Palestine and died upon the Cross, we perceive at once that we know it, not from experience, but from the two sources of (1) oral tradition, (2) certain ancient books, especiaUy the books of the N.T. By a process of logical inference from these two sources of information, the validity of which is contested by the extreme (or ' Mythical ') school of modern criticism, we reach the conclusion that Jesus once lived a human life upon earth. Even if it is conceded that His existence was once a matter of direct experience to His contemporaries living in Palestine (though even this is excluded by the doc trine of Immanence strictly interpreted), yet certainly it is not a matter of direct experience to anyone now. Modernists, however, who usuaUy believe that Jesus once existed, involve themselves thereby in a flagrant contradiction of their principle that aU knowledge is derived from experience.1 * See ch. iv., pp. 71 ff. *¦ 134 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION They contend, it is true, that they are aware of the existence of Jesus, because of the grace which they receive when they pray to Him, or to God through Him, which grace is to them a matter of experience. But ex perience of grace received only yields knowledge that grace is received, not knowledge of the source from which it is derived. Obviously, if it is to be known that the grace received comes from Jesus or from'iGod, and not from the hidden resources of their own subliminal con sciousness, there must be some further process of inference from experience. Moreover, even if it could be known directly by experience that grace is now given by Jesus, this would not amount to knowledge that He once hved on earth as a village carpenter, and taught in Gahlee and Jerusalem, and was crucified, and rose the third day from the dead. If these things are known, it must be by testimony, or rather by logical inference from testimony, for reason is obhged to test the worth of all testimony before receiving it. Similarly it is quite impossible to know by experience that Jesus will come again to judge the quick and the dead, or that His foUowers will here after enjoy everlasting life, for these things belong to the future, and all future things are known, not by experience, but by reasoning — reasoning either from a Priori principles or from experience. II That Reason is one of the most godlike endowments of the human race, and that by use of it the human soul can ascend to the Supreme Reason, i.e. God, and know Him as He reaUy is (not indeed completely, but truly), is the practicaUy universal belief of mankind. If any behef can be caUed Cathohc, as satisfying the Vincentian canon of " quod semper quod ubique quod ab omnibus accipitur," it is surely this. The plain man equaUy with the phUosopher beheves that he can ascend to God and THE PLAIN MAN'S 'EXPERIENCE' 135 the things of God by the use of his reason, and that is what in practice he tries to do. He has heard of the rehgious experiences of saints and mystics, and does not doubt their reahty, but such high privUeges are not for him. His own rare and evanescent rehgious experiences are too trivial to be made the basis of any definite rehgious doctrines. On the other hand, he is able to reason. He has heard many of the ordinary arguments against Christianity, and many of those in its favour, and considers the latter superior. He does not regard them as demonstrative, but he does not expect demonstration in any such matters. He considers that some place must be left in religious matters for the faculty of faith ; besides, has not Bishop Butler said that probabihty is the guide of life ? This seems to the plain man a very sensible position. The plain man, who has so httle rehgious ' experience ' that it is almost negligible, is often a very good Christian, punctual in the performance of his rehgious duties, a good husband, a good father, a good citizen, an enemy of cant (especially rehgious cant), a little unimaginative perhaps, but a thoroughly genuine person — a far better Christian very often in aU the things that reaUy matter than his more favoured brother who has a multitude of ' experiences,' on account of which he is sometimes unduly elated, and even arrogant (1 Cor. xii. 1-19). Modernism denies to the plain man, who has little or no rehgious ' experience,' the right to be a Christian at aU. It might be thought that it allows him the right to supplement his own defective experience by drawing upon the fuUer experience of other people, but this is an error. Other people's experience is not experience to him: it is only testimony. And testimony cannot be made use of without the use of reason, which determines by logical arguments its source, its meaning, and its validity. Consistent Modernism, which bases everything on ' experience,' and denies the power of logical reasoning II REASON THE JUDGE OF 'EXPERIENCE' 137 (4) It examines philosophicaUy " the origin and de velopment of the relations of humanity with the super natural world." The authors also flagrantly contradict their funda mental principle of Immanence or Relativity by affirm ing : (1) that man is directly conscious of Transcendental and not merely of Immanent Reahty; (2) that there exists objectively a ' supernatural world.' IV Orthodox Christianity does not, as is alleged by Modernists, undervalue rehgious experience. It does not now rely, nor has it ever rehed, upon abstract arguments only. It attaches the greatest importance to religious experience, especiaUy that of prophets, seers, saints, mystics. It also aUows due weight to the experience of those ordinary behevers, in whom the devotional in stinct is strongly developed. But it refuses — and rightly refuses — to buUd rehgion upon mere uncriticized feeling or irrational impulse. It regards Reason as supreme in man, and insists that all ' experience ' of whatever kind — religious quite as much as secular — must come before the bar of Reason to be judged. It is the function of Reason, not Experience, to judge what the value of any given experience is. Not till Reason has judiciaUy tested the claims of rehgious experience, has determined its precise nature, its origin, and the conclusions which may be legitimately drawn from it, can it be safely used as a basis either for a theology or for the rules of a practical Christian hfe. To deny that Reason is the supreme arbiter in all rehgious questions, even in those pertaining directly to faith — for even faith should be reasonable — is to betray the cause both of religion and of phUosophy, and to capi tulate to the forces of superstition, fanaticism, and obscurantism. 136 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION to attain to rehgious truth, condemns the plain man together with the phUosopher who is not also a saint or a mystic to hopeless agnosticism. Ill The Modernist descriptions of religious ' experience,' when given in any detail, invariably show clearly that even the attenuated rehgious behefs which Modernists accept are not derived directly from this ' experience,' but from rational ' interpretations ' of it, and logical inferences from it. For example, the authors of What we want say : " [God] reveals Himself to man working in the intimate recesses of his personal ego, manifesting Himself at first through a confused and inarticulate feeling of infinite, transcendental, incomprehensible Reality. Little by little, this feeling, becoming more intense, invites to the act of adoration, till at last the soul feels the urgent need of entering into relations with this invisible Reahty, and is led, not only to return upon itself in reflection in order to investigate the origin and seek for the value of this experience, but also to review the whole history of the past and examine in it the origin and development of the relations of humanity with the supernatural world " (P- 27). This thoroughly typical passage contains the following contradictions of the authors' professed principle that Modernist doctrines are derived only from experience. They aUege that reason, or ' reflection,' deduces the Modernist system from the raw material ("a confused and inarticulate feeling " ) furnished by ' experience,' by the following purely inteUectual processes : (1) It "investigates the origin" of the experience; (2) It " seeks the value " of the experience ; (3) It reviews the past history of man's rehgious ex perience ; 138 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION I am glad to be able to quote, in confirmation of the general position here taken up, the wise words of a very able writer, who is usuaUy classed with the Modernists because he adopts with too little reserve the usual Modernist attitude towards New Testament criticism, but who, in spite of his membership of " The Churchmen's Union," of which he is a vice-president, has at times done valuable service to Orthodoxy by exposing not a few of the more dangerous Modernist faUacies. Replying to the Modernist objection to Theological Intellectualism, on the ground that it deprives rehgion of ' immediacy,' and therefore of all warmth of personal feehng, the Dean of Carlisle writes as foUows : " Most uncultivated persons would probably be very much surprised to hear that the existence of the friend with whose body they are in contact is after aU only an infer ence. But surely, in the man who has discovered that such is the case, the warmth of friendship was never dimmed by the reflection that his knowledge of his friend is not immediate but mediate. It is a mere preju dice to suppose that mediate knowledge is in any way less certain, less intimate, less trustworthy, or less satis fying than immediate knowledge. If we claim for man the possibihty of just such a knowledge of God as a man may possess of his brother man, surely that is all that is wanted to make possible the closest rehgious communion." In speaking of the danger of the Modernist proposal to base Rehgion upon Psychology, i.e. upon men's rehgious feehngs rather than upon objective knowledge of God, he uses words hardly less emphatic than my own. " I would venture," he says, " to add a word of caution against the tendency fashionable in many quarters to talk of basing rehgious behef upon Psychology. The business of Psychology is to tell us what actually goes on in RELIGIOUS IMMANENCE 139 the human mind. It cannot possibly tell us whether the beliefs which are found there are true or false. An erroneous belief is as much a psychological fact as a true one. Religious Immanence We pass now to the doctrine of Rehgious Immanence, which, properly speaking, is entirely distinct from that of PhUosophic Immanence, but which is frequently confused with it in Modernist literature with disastrous results, inteUectuaUy and theologically. By Rehgious Immanence is meant the Indwelling of God in the universe, and especiaUy in man. " In Him," says St. Paid, " we live and move and have our being." • SimUarly Christ is said in the New Testament to dwell in the behever, and the behever in Christ ' ; and there are many references to the immanence of the Holy Spirit in man.4 This kind of immanence has properly nothing whatever to do either with Kant's or with any other theory of knowledge. It is simply the dweUing, or abiding, of one thing in another. It is obviously essential to the idea of immanence in this sense, that that which indwells, and that which is indwelt, should remain, in spite of their intimate union, absolutely distinct from one another. If the distinction between them is not preserved, there is no longer immanence, but identity. Thus we can speak of the oxygen of the air as ' immanent ' in the nitrogen, because, though intimately mixed with it, it preserves its own nature and qualities. And we can speak of the human soul as ' immanent ' in the human body because, though it pervades the body, 1 H. Rashdall, Philosophy and Rehgion, pp. no, in (italics mine). 1 Acts xvii. 28. * John xv. 14, etc. 4 John xiv. 17 ; Erek. xi. 19 ; 1 Cor. iii. 16, etc. 140 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION it is distinct from it.1 Similarly we can speak of God and Christ and the Holy Ghost as ' immanent ' in the human spirit, because they are distinct from it. We can even speak of the Persons of the Trinity as ' immanent ' in one another (though the more precise term is 7rep^a>/}i7<7t?, circuminsessio, or circumincessio), because, though they mutuaUypervade, interpenetrate, andcontainone another, they remain distinct, and function according to their respective distinct attributes. But it is impossible, without absurdity, to speak of the oxygen of the air as ' immanent ' in itself, or of the human soul as immanent in itself, or of God the Father as immanent in Himself, because the relation of a thing to itself is that of identity, not of immanence. A man is not immanent in himself : he is himself. Hegelian Immanence Yet this plain distinction between Immanence and Identity is continually ignored by Modernist theologians, and the two things are frequently confused together under the influence of the Hegelian phUosophy. It is customary to speak of the Hegelian theory of the Incarnation as a theory of Immanence, but that is precisely what it is not. In spite of aU the efforts of the Hegelian Right to give a more orthodox colour to the doctrine of their master, it is perfectly evident that Hegel was a Pantheist, and that what he teaches under the name of Incarnation is pantheistic identity. In the Hegelian phUosophy it is not primarUy in the human race, stUl less in an individual man, but in the entire universe, that God or ' the Absolute ' is primarily incarnate. And since the relation of the Universe to 1 The soul is ' virtually ' present in the body ; and, as acting on every part of it, is ' virtually ' extended. But it is not ' actually ' present in the body, or ' actually ' extended, because this would involve a contradiction — a contradiction of its being immaterial. HEGELIAN IMMANENCE 141 God is one of identity, it is obviously an abuse of language to speak of God as becoming incarnate in it. God is the Universe, and the Universe is God. That is the Hegehan position, and Hegel, to do him justice, never compromises or uses ambiguous language about it. The whole universe, in his system, is entirely divine. There is no element in it which is not absolutely and entirely God ; though, of course, no element, taken by itself, completely expresses what God is. It follows from Hegelian principles, that a mouse, or a mosquito, or even a material atom is as absolutely and completely God as a man or an archangel. The only difference is that they do not express His full nature as adequately. They are whoUy He, though He is not wholly they. Similarly, an abandoned criminal is as much God as a saint, though a saint may be said to represent more justly the totality of God. Everything whatever in the criminal, including his most ferocious and obscene and bestial traits, are as absolutely parts of God, and as necessary to His ' perfection,' as the most sublime virtues of the saint. Barabbas and Judas Iscariot, in spite of the fact that they represent God's fuU character less adequately than Jesus, are no less divine than He. " What kind of an absolute being," asks Hegel, " is that which does not contain in itself aU that is actual, even evil included ? " Unhke the semi-pantheistic Modernists, whose views were so much in evidence at the late Cambridge Con ference, Hegel does not flinch from the fuU moral conse quences of his pantheistic position. He teaches that sin is not absolutely evil, but is even relatively good — good because it is a necessary stage in the evolution of the Universe (and therefore of God Himself, who is identical with the Universe) from the lower state of innocence to the higher state of virtue. Sin is the second member (or ' antithesis ') of an Hegehan * triad,' which leads from innocence (the ' thesis ') to virtue or stable goodness 142 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION (the ' synthesis '). Thus sin, or moral evU, though inferior to virtue, is ' good as a means ' to it, and is in any case superior to mere innocence, or ignorance of good and evU. ' The exact manner in which Hegel arrives at his doctrine of a special Incarnation of God in a single \ person, Jesus Christ, is obscure, and is probably rather a concession to Christian tradition than a logical outcome of his pantheistic assumptions. Probably we shaU not do serious injustice to it if we condense it as follows. God is immanent in aU creation, but especiaUy in the rational part of it, mankind ; more adequately stUl in the noblest part of mankind, the saints ; and most adequately of aU in the best of men and most perfect of saints, Jesus Christ. There are many obscurities about the Hegehan doctrine of the Incarnation, and his followers interpret it in several different ways ; but one thing is quite certain about it, that it is not a theory of Immanence (though both Hegel and the Hegelians apply this term to it), but a theory of Pantheistic Identity. The usual Modernist confusion between Immanence and Identity has its source in Hegehanism. Immanence and Incarnation One of the most popular Modernist theories of the Incarnation is that it is a kind of ' Immanence,' and the expressed aim of many members of the School is to "interpret the Incarnation in terms of Immanence," or to " exhibit the Incarnation as the supreme example of God's immanence in man," or as " an intensification of the Divine Immanence." Nearly aU their arguments conform to a single type — the Hegehan. They start with the principle which no orthodox Christian can object to, that God is ' immanent ' in (i.e. dweUs in, without being identical with) the entire RASHDALL'S FALLACY 143 universe. Then they proceed to prove that God is specially immanent in the rational creation, i.e. in man ; then that He is particularly immanent in good men ; and finally that He is supremely immanent in the best of good men, Jesus Christ our Lord. Then, changing the meaning of Immanence without warning from indwelling to identity, they conclude by maintaining that the general result of their argument is to prove that Jesus Christ actuaUy is God, and that it is lawful to worship Him as such. Instead of selecting our example from the ephemeral and popular literature of Modernism, we wiU quote a passage from an able and valuable lecture, dehvered by Dr. RashdaU at Cambridge to a large audience of members of the University. " We cannot say intelligibly that God dwells in Christ unless we have already recognized that in a sense God dweUs and reveals Himself in humanity at large, and in each particular soul. . . . [But] men do not reveal God equaUy. The more developed inteUect reveals God more perfectly than the child or the savage ; and (far more important from a rehgious point of view) the higher and more developed moral consciousness reveals Him more than the lower, and above aU the actuaUy better man reveals Him more than the worse man. Now, if in the life, teaching, and character of Christ — in His moral and rehgious consciousness, and in the hfe and character which so completely expressed and illustrated that consciousness — we can discover the highest revelation of the Divine Nature, we can surely attach a real meaning to the language of the Creeds which singles Him out from all men that ever lived as the One in whom the ideal relation of man to God is most completely reahzed. If God can only be known as revealed in humanity, and Christ is the highest representative of humanity, then we can very significantly say, ' Christ is the Son of God, and very God of very God, of one substance 144 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION with the Father,' though the phrase belongs to a philosophical dialect we do not habituaUy use." l This thoroughly typical passage starts with Immanence in the sense of indwelling (' ' God dwells ... in humanity at large, and in each particular soul "), and if it preserved the same meaning to the end it would represent Jesus as a man in whom God supremely dwelt, which is good Unitarianism, but bad Modernism. It is in the Unitarian sense that Dr. Rashdall's words have been understood, not only by many orthodox Churchmen, but even by many Modernists. For example, Mr. Howe, a Modernist, interprets the Dean as meaning that Jesus was " perfectly indwelt by the Logos of God," * and the Rev. F. A. M. Spencer not only endorses this interpretation, but proceeds to remark : " The majority of the more advanced Liberal Christians seem to hold some such doctrine. Some would caU this Unitarian, and it is probable that most Unitarians would accept it, or something like it." His own formula of belief is very similar : " God dwelt in Jesus supremely, and in other men in various degrees." * The Dean, however, expressly states at the close, that Jesus is " very (i.e. true) God of very God," and that He is " of one (i.e. identical) substance with the Father." Furthermore, to set all doubts at rest, he has recently communicated to the Press a letter in which he declares that his Christology is essentially orthodox, and that even his recent much-criticized Cambridge paper was " an assertion of the Cathohc doctrine that our Lord is God and man," and that " there is nothing in it which is not compatible with a full acceptance of the Cathohc doctrine of the Divinity of Christ as defined by the Creeds and Councils." * We are forced, therefore, to the conclusion that Dr. 1 Philosophy and Religion, j>. 181. » The Modern Churchman, May 1921. * Ibid., June 1921. ' See The Church Times for August 19, 1921, and the daily Press of about that date. The italics are mine. CHRISTOLOGY OF IMMANENCE 145 RashdaU in the passage quoted has been guilty of the fallacy of ambiguity. He begins with Immanence in its proper sense of Indwelling, and when he has proved that Jesus was a man in whom God supremely dwelt, he considers that he has proved that Jesus actually was God. He passes without warning from Immanence in the ordinary sense of Indwelling, to Immanence in the Hegehan sense of Identity. To argue in this way is not only iUegitimate, but it actually amounts to a contra diction, for Immanence in the sense of Indwelling logically excludes Immanence in the sense of Identity. The Christology of Immanence Confusion between Immanence and Incarnation is so common at the present time, not only among ordinary persons, but even among philosophers, as the strange lapse of Dr. RashdaU is sufficient evidence, that it may be worth while to explain the distinction in greater detail. It must be obvious to every logical mind upon careful reflection, that the idea of God dwelling in man (which is what is meant by Immanence) and that of God becom ing man (which is what is meant by Incarnation) are radicaUy distinct, and indeed contradictory. Indwelling, however ideaUy perfect, can never (if logicaUy inter preted) yield any other idea than that of a man in whom God dwells, a God-possessed, God-inspired, and God- sanctified man (avdpwn-os ev9eo% oi 0eo's). Never by any possibihty can it yield the idea of a man who is actuaUy God (dedvdptoiro'i, QiavSpos). II If miracle is excluded, and the Godhead immanent in Jesus is supposed merely to illuminate and perfect His 146 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION entirely natural humanity and human consciousness, then the result is ordinary Unitarianism (or Anthropian- ism, as the Greeks expressed it). Jesus, though the best and most perfect and most favoured of aU men, is still mere man (^rt\o9 avOpmiros). Ill If miracle is admitted, and the divine element in Jesus is regarded as manifesting itself in supernatural ways, particularly in causing the consciousness and psychical powers of Jesus to be different from and superior in kind to those of other men, then the result is either Nestorianism J or one of the kindred heresies which affirm the presence of two personalities in Christ — one human and one divine. It makes no difference in principle whether the divine element in Jesus (conceived of as God, or Son of God, or Logos, or Wisdom, or Spirit, or a heavenly Mon of the gnostic type) enters into Him at His Conception, or Birth, or Baptism, or Resurrection, or Ascension. In any case, what happens is that one person enters into and dweUs within another person, not that God becomes man. The Nestorian and aUied theories make Jesus a miraculous personality, but they as de cisively exclude His actual deity as Unitarianism itself. IV Both theologicaUy and devotionally the difference between Immanence and Incarnation is enormous. If God is not man, but only dweUs in man, then He can only know human experience from outside ; He cannot know it as His own. He necessarUy knows all about it, because He is omniscient, but He cannot possibly know it with " the knowledge of direct acquaintance." 1 Nestorianism is the doctrine that there are two persons in Christ — one human, one divine. It is not necessary to discuss here whether Nestorius was really a Nestorian or not. ' CO-CONSCIOUSNESS ' 147 There is a tendency to think that the close inter communion involved in ' immanence ' (i.e. the interpene- tration of one mind by another) must necessarUy result in co-consciousness, in the sense that one or both of the minds concerned not merely knows what the thoughts of the other mind are, but actually experiences them as its own. This, however, is an illusion. In one way, and in one way only, is it even conceivable (if it is conceivable) that one mind could experience as its own the thoughts of another mind, and that is (if it were possible) by becoming that other mind. Similarly, the only possible way in which even God, omnipotent and omniscient as He is, could gain a real human experience, is by actually becoming man. This the Church believes that He has reaUy done in the Person of His Eternal Son. Modern mental science confirms this conclusion. Stu dents of abnormal psychology have long been aware (though the most striking instances have only been observed recently) that there are cases in which two or three distinct minds (or what seem to be such) inhabit a single human body. UsuaUy these distinct minds or consciousnesses alter nate with one another, but occasionaUy two of them are active at the same time. In the rare cases when this occurs, the two minds are co-conscious, in the sense that each reads the other's thoughts intuitively without communi cation by speech, nevertheless each distinguishes its own thoughts sharply from those of the other, and preserves its own psychical individuality. It is possible in such cases that the two minds, looking with the same eyes into the same shop-window, may the one like and the other dislike the same costume or hat ; that the one mind may be 148 IMMANENCE AND THE INCARNATION joyful and the other sad at the same moment ; and that their circles of friends may be different, the one mind positively dishking persons for whom the other has a strong attachment.1 VI It is, of course, possible for God to feel sympathetic joy and sorrow without becoming man, and even without becoming immanent in man. But sympathetic joy and sorrow differ, not merely in degree, but in kind, from the joy and sorrow which result from direct personal experi ence. To feel sympathetic joy because one's friend is in good health or has inherited a fortune is a very different thing from rejoicing because one's own health is good or because one has oneself inherited a fortune. SimUarly, to sympathize with parents who have lost an only son is a very different thing from mourning for the loss of one's own only son ; to sympathize with a leper is a very different thing from having leprosy ; to stand by the cross of a crucified man and to feel the pain of sym pathy is a very different thing from feeling the pain of actual crucifixion. Thus there is a world of difference between the Immanentist doctrine that God dwelt in a man who was betrayed, scourged, spit upon, and crucified, and the Cathohc doctrine that God Himself in the Person of His Son (i.e. in His own Person) suffered aU this for us. Not merely theologicaUy, but also emotionaUy and devotionally the two doctrines are so completely different that the religions of which they form the basic doctrines are wide as the poles asunder. 1 The best short discussion of this obscure subject is the presidential address of the eminent psychologist, Professor McDougall, delivered before the Psychical Research Society on July 19, 1920. His state ments of facts are admirable, but some of his metaphysical conclusions are hazardous. An excellent discussion of a recent remarkable case of co-consciousness by Dr. T. W. Mitchell will be found in the Pro ceedings of the Psychical. Research Society for May 1921 (pt. lxxix). IMMANENCE EXCLUDES INCARNATION 149 VII FinaUy, the doctrine of Immanence and the doctrine of a real Incarnation constitute different religions for the further reason that they imply different objects of worship. By no possibihty can a monotheist either in the first or in any other century worship a man in whom God merely dweUs (which is all that Jesus is, according to Immanentism), for to do so would be an act of idolatry or creature-worship. On the other hand, if Jesus is really God (which is what the doctrine of the Incarna tion means), then to worship Him is not only aUowable but is an absolute duty. Thus the objects of worship implied by Immanentism and Incarnationism are not merely different, but incom patible. The worship which the behever in the Incarna tion is bound to pay to Jesus Christ is regarded by the consistent Immanentist as blasphemy. CHAPTER VIII MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE The subject of miracles is a highly contentious one, bristhng with ambiguities as weU as inherent difficulties ; nevertheless we ought not to despair of reaching sub stantial agreement, provided that we are wise enough to take the essential precaution of starting with premisses which both sides accept. Too often the orthodox proof of miracles is based upon assumptions which Modernists reject, and which therefore for them vitiate the whole argument from the very beginning. In order to avoid this error, I propose to begin by laying down four leading principles, which not only all orthodox Christians, but also aU Modernists (or nearly aU) are agreed in accepting. It will be possible, I hope, arguing from these principles alone, to reach, if not an identical view, at least a working agreement upon the subject of the Miraculous and the Supernatural in regard to the Christian rehgion. These principles are aU cosmic principles, because our principal aim is to establish Miracle as an integral part of the constitution of the universe, not as an anomalous series of magical interferences with the Order of Nature which occurred for some incomprehensible reason for a short space of time two thousand years ago in Palestine, and which have no resemblance of any sort to the won derful works of God in any other time or place. To take up this position is neither to deny the unique ness of the Christian miracles nor the fact that they transcend all other historical manifestations whatever of 150 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ARGUMENT 151 God's miraculous working ; but it is definitely to commit ourselves to the view that the cosmic process of evolution is in itself, both in whole and in part, a miraculous pro cess, and that the miraculous events of the career of Jesus of Nazareth are merely the most striking and significant, and to us the most valuable, manifestation of a universal miraculous principle inherent in the order of the universe itself. It wiU also be our business, in connexion with our proof of this principle, to show that the usual Modernist dis tinction between a ' miraculous supernatural ' and a ' non-miraculous supernatural ' is purely imaginary, and that the Supernatural differs from the Miraculous only in the circumstance that the former is the term generally apphed to the more ordinary and less surprising, and the latter to the more dramatic and more astonishing of the supernatural acts of God in the sphere of man's religious history. Our Four Initial Assumptions Our four initial assumptions are as follows : (1) That God is ' immanent ' both in the universe and in man. Although Modernists often interpret this ' immanence ' in a more pantheistic sense than Orthodoxy approves, the difference is not important for our present purpose. (2) That in consequence of this ' immanence ' the uni verse resembles a living 'organism', rather than an in animate machine. (3) That the universe has reached its present state of perfection as the result of a process of ' evolution ' or ' development.' Without discussing the obscure question of the possible origin of ponderable matter and of the chemical elements from some assumed simpler form of matter, we shaU here take it for granted that the evolu tion of the Solar System from the Nebula to Man is an historic fact. 12 152 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE (4) That there has been a special and unique Incarnation of God in the Person of Jesus of Nazareth.1 The first proposition is accepted unreservedly by all Modernists whatsoever. The correct name for a person who rejected it would be Deist, not Modernist. The second (as we shaU see presently) is necessarily involved in the first, and cannot be logicaUy rejected by anyone who accepts it. The third is probably accepted by all Modernists, as well as by the immense majority of orthodox Christians. The fourth would perhaps be not quite so unanimously admitted. It would be rejected, for instance, by Dr. Lake and Dr. Foakes- Jackson, but the position of these scholars (though they are still members of " The Churchmen's Union ") is that of Liberal Protestantism rather than of Modernism as ordinarily understood. Probably it would be accepted (or at least not denied) even by such advanced Modernists as Mr. Major and Dr. Bethune-Baker, because although they look forward to a time when God will be incarnate in every Christian in the same sense in which He is now incarnate in Jesus Christ, I do not understand them to affirm that that time is yet. Probably, so far as this life and this world are concerned, they would admit that the Incarnation of God in the Founder of the Christian Re ligion is unique. Both of them admit His sinlessness, which certainly constitutes a fundamental difference between His humanity and ours. The Principle of Continuity I hope further to commend the argument to Modernists by laying the chief stress upon the principle of ' con tinuity ' rather than upon that of discontinuity. The conception of Miracle as an occasional ' interposition ' of the Deity in the affairs of the world from which He is 1 The New Testament, with true philosophic insight, treats the Incarnation as a cosmic event, because it is the Incarnation of the Logos, the Creator and Sustainer of the universal frame of nature. CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY 153 ordinarily absent, is mere Deism, an antiquated form of thought which is as abhorrent to present-day Modernism as it has always been to Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that it is not possible to express the essential character of the process of Evolution in terms of Continuity alone. This would be nearly (but not quite) possible if the evolutionary process consisted merely of movements of matter and of the redistribution of energy. But since Evolution consists even more essentiaUy in the emergence of ever hew (and therefore discontinuous) qualities and values, it is evident that the scheme of Continuity cannot be carried through. Nearly aU metaphysicians agree that there is no con tinuity at aU between quantity and quality, and not com plete continuity even between different kinds of quality. For example, there is a considerable ' continuity ' between different shades of green, because they aU agree completely in being green. But there is also ' discontinuity,' because all the shades are different shades, and a difference of shade is a difference of colour, i.e. of quality, not reducible to quantity. There is still more discontinuity between green and red ; more stUl between a colour and a sound or a taste ; and yet more between the nervous tremor of the brain which accompanies con sciousness and consciousness itself. Many earnest Darwinians imagine that their theory of man's origin from the ape, and ultimately from the dust of the earth, establishes ' continuity ' between man and the dust of the earth, or at least lessens the discon tinuity. This, however, is an illusion. Of course, on the theory of the instantaneous creation of man from the dust of the earth, the discontinuity is exhibited in a specially obvious and striking way. But the discontinuity is only veUed, not removed, if we suppose that the dust of the earth evolved into man in miUions of years, after passing through numerous intermediate forms of animal life. The discontinuity is not constituted by the suddenness, 154 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE or removed by the slowness of the process. It is con stituted by the fact that man differs in quality and value from the dust of the earth. It should also be noticed that recent experimental research in biology tends to substitute sudden " muta tions,' or discontinuous changes, for gradual development, as the normal method of origin of new species and varieties. Practical gardeners and breeders have always been of opinion that new varieties are usually produced, not by the slow accumulation of small differences, as Darwin imagined, but suddenly from ' sports.' 1 It is not, therefore, a vahd argument against the Christian miracles that they involve ' discontinuity,' because the cosmic process itself involves discontinuity. What is the Order of Nature ? Our subject is ' Miracles and the Order of Nature,' and a certain initial difficulty arises as to what precisely Modernists mean by the Order of Nature. If they are true to their principle of the Relativity of Human Knowledge (to which so many of them are committed), they have no right whatever to believe in any such order. If they follow Kant strictly, they must hold that the so-caUed ' Order of Nature ' is purely illusory. It is nothing but the structure of our own mind and the forms of its thought, which we falsely attribute to external ' things.' Our inquiry accordingly resolves itself into this : " Is belief in miracles compatible with the order and structure of the human mind ? " And it must be admitted that it is, for the great bulk of mankind firmly believe in miracles, and only a smaU minority disbelieve them. On the other hand, if they prefer the Pragmatist version of Kantianism, they are forced to believe that the so- called ' Order of Nature ' is not in Nature at all, but im- i- See especially H. de Vries, Species and Varieties, and The Mutation Theory. WHAT IS THE ORDER OF NATURE? 155 posed by the human wUl upon unknowable ' things ' in order to suit its own practical needs and conveniences, and that as these needs and conveniences change, so also does 'the Order of Nature.' It would appear, therefore, that, upon Pragmatist principles, behef in miracles is merely a matter of individual taste. If a man wishes to beheve in miracles, he imposes upon ' things ' a some what elastic order which aUows miracles to happen. If, on the other hand, miracles are an offence to him, he attributes to ' things ' so rigid a system of uniformity that miracles are altogether excluded. Thus miracles are possible to one man, and impossible to another. What of it ? " There is no fixed truth." De gustibus non est disputandum. Since, however, nearly aU Modernists, when they come to discuss Miracles, forget their agnostic theories of know ledge, and assume that there reaUy is an objective Order of Nature, and that it closely resembles what common- sense and unsophisticated science suppose it to be, it wiU be convenient to conduct the argument on the assumption (which we ourselves accept) that this Order of Nature actuaUy exists. Are Miracles Possible ? Modernists are divided upon the question whether miracles are impossible or only incredible. Some, like Spinoza, consider them impossible, but the majority are content to pronounce them incredible. At first sight, the latter position seems less open to objection. If we declare miracles impossible, we clearly make a metaphysical assertion which we must be pre pared, if chaUenged, to justify by metaphysical arguments. AU assertions about the ' universe,' or about ultimate * reality ' (neither of which is an object of ordinary scientific knowledge) are necessarUy metaphysical ; and if we declare miracles impossible, we clearly assert that 156 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE the nature of ' the universe ' and of ' reality ' is such as to exclude them. On the other hand, if we only declare miracles in credible, we seem, at first sight, to avoid the pitfaUs of metaphysics, and to transport the argument to the f amiliar ground of common-sense and ' neutral ' historical criticism. Only in appearance, however ; for when the matter is carefuUy thought out, it becomes evident (as we shall pre sently show) that no one has a right to declare miracles incredible unless he is also prepared to prove them impossible, and that for this plain reason, that all the evidence against miracles is only negative evidence ; and negative evidence is not merely weaker than positive evidence, but is infinitely weaker. The whole negative experience of the human race from the beginning may easUy be overthrown by a single well-attested fact. In other words, positive and negative evidence are incom mensurable in respect of their probative force, because it is possible for an infinitesimaUy small amount of the former to overthrow an infinitely large amount of the latter. This is not only a matter of theory, but also of fact. The limits of space compel us to rest content with a few striking illustrations. The important psychological discoveries of Mesmer (1733 — 1815), which formed the starting-point of the greatest positive advance in the science of psychology which has taken place since the days of Aristotle, were derided by the orthodox science of his day because they contradicted the laws of psychology as then understood, and also (practicaUy) the whole previous experience of civilized man. Not tUl nearly a century later were the marveUous facts reluctantly and ungraciously admitted, WEAKNESS OF NEGATIVE EVIDENCE 157 with the result that the science of psychology had to be radically reconstructed in order to admit the amazing phenomena of hypnotism and of the subliminal con sciousness. II The phenomenon of ' stigmatization,' of which the first recorded instance is that of St. Francis of Assisi in 1224, was generaUy disbelieved by scientific men untU our own generation. Recently, however, a closer study of the original evidence (which, though exceedingly strong, is not coercive) and the careful investigation of several modern instances, has convinced the majority of those who have given attention to the subject that the phe nomenon is genuine, though at present physiologists are not in a position to explain it. M. Paul Sabatier, a Liberal Protestant and opponent of miracles, rejected it as incredible in the first edition of his well-known Vie de S. Francois (1894), but in his second edition he found himself forced to accept it. The reader desiring to pursue the subject further may profitably consult the cautious and severely critical but by no means negative article on "Stigmatization" (in Encycl. Brit.) by the eminent physiologist, Dr. Macalister, Professor of Anatomy at Cambridge ; also Fr. Thurston's more recent and not less judicial paper in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research for July 1921. Ill UntU quite recently it was a fixed principle of biology that without a supply of oxygen gas no living organism can exist. All experience confirmed this assumption, and not a single known fact contradicted it. Yet we now know that there is a large class of organisms, techni- caUy known as anaerobic, which not only do not require oxygen but which in some cases oxygen actually kills. 158 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE It has been necessary to revise the principles of biology in order to admit this new knowledge. IV From prehistoric times horses have been famUiarly known to the human race, and their psychical powers have been matter of continual observation ; yet, until a few years ago, no one ever suspected that they had the least capacity for reading, writing, and arithmetic. Yet now we are assured by some of the most eminent scientific men in Europe (including Professor Hackel, the agnostic author of The Riddle of the Universe) that certain Arabian stallions trained by Herr Karl Krall of Elberfeld, are able, not only to work out sums of considerable difficulty in the four simple rules of arithmetic, but even to extract the square, the cube, and the fourth roots of quite large numbers. That a horse should be able to extract a cube root, or even to understand what a cube root means, is a far more obvious contradiction of the universal experi ence of mankind (and therefore far harder to credit) than even the most amazing miracles attributed to Christ by the Evangelists. I have before me at this moment Herr KraU's extra ordinary work, Denkende Tiere (Leipzig, 1912) ; also Vol. xii. of the Archives de Psychologie (Geneva, 1912) containing an elaborate report upon " Les chevaux savants d'Elberfeld," drawn up by Dr. Ed. Claparede, Professor of Psychology in the University of Geneva, and supported by the signed declarations of Professor Dr. H. Kraemer (Hohenheim-Stuttgart), Dr. Paul Sarasin (Basel), Professor Dr. H. E. Ziegler (Stuttgart), Professor Dr. A. Besredka (Paris), Professor Dr. von Buttel-Reepen (Oldenburg), Dr. Wm. Mackenzie (G§nes), and Dr. Roberts Assagioli (Florence). With regard to Denkende Tiere, its compilation has evidently been a labour of love to the author. It de- WEAKNESS OF NEGATIVE EVIDENCE 159 scribes with feehng the sad career of his predecessor in this new realm of research, Wilhelm von Osten, who trained the first equine arithmetician in the world's history, " Der Kluge Hans," and died of a broken heart because he could induce hardly anyone to accept his theories. KraU describes in great detail his methods of educating his own learned horses, particularly Muhamed and Zarif, to speU, to write brief sentences, to learn the multiplication tables, to understand the mathematical symbols +, — , x, -4-, to perform simple operations in the four rules of arithmetic, and finally to extract roots. It is most difficult not to beheve in Herr KraU's entire sincerity. If his book is a hoax, it is the most elaborate one in history, and upon the whole it seems easier to beheve that the feats of the horses are genuine, than in what seems the only alternative, a theory of deliberate and base deception. From the report of the savants upon Herr KraU's horses, I select the following statements : (1) "It is estabhshed that the animals observed by us read either numbers or the names of numbers (written phonetically in German or in French), and by the aid of these numbers, spoken oraUy or written down, perform arithmetical operations." (2) " It is established that the horses which have only been under instruction for a few months know how to perform easy calculations, but cannot solve difficult problems." (3) " It is established that the horses which have been longer under instruction, Muhamed and Zarif, solve more difficult problems. ..." (4) " It is established that the horses know how to speU numbers as well as (proper) names, and even words which are altogether new to them, by means of an alphabetical blackboard. The orthography depends upon the sound of the word, and is often careless." (5) " It is established that the horses sometimes speak 160 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE spontaneously of things comprehensible [to them] by means of the alphabetical blackboard." (6) " It is established that in aU these performances of the horses, any transmission of signs was out of the question " (this is signed by Kraemer, Sarasin, Ziegler). Mackenzie and Assagioli add : " The horse Muhamed has solved correctly and without hesitation, in our presence, arithmetical problems prepared by us before hand, and unknown to any other person, including cube roots and fourth roots, while we sat beside and a little to the rear of the horse. We have proved that Zarif as well as Muhamed solved various problems without any person whatever being present. . . . Under these conditions Muhamed has performed difficult operations, such as the extraction of the cube and fourth roots of numbers of from five to seven figures." J Hume's Argument against Miracles The instances already given are sufficient of themselves, without further argument, to overthrow the plausible but fallacious canon of Hume, that no event ought to be believed which contradicts universal experience, because (in his opinion) it is always more probable that the witnesses to such an event are lying or are mistaken than that it reaUy happened." But inasmuch as this famous canon constitutes prac ticaUy the whole of the Modernist case against miracles (at least, there is no other which possesses anything hke its plausibility), it may be desirable to consider it in some further detaU, especially in its apphcation to 1 A very readable popular account of Herr KraU's marvellous horses will be found in M. Maeterlinck's The Unknown Guest, pp. 181 ff. 2 Hume states his case against miracles as follows : "A miracle is a violation of the laws of Nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has established those laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined " (Essay concerning Human Understanding, X), HUME'S CANON 161 natural science, the neutral ground of which affords peculiarly favourable opportunities for testing its value as a principle of investigation. The general laws of evidence are, of course, the same for all branches of human inquiry, so that results reached in science will be valuable also in theology, so far as theology is based upon evidence and not (as so much of it is) upon intuitive axioms. I hope to be able to show that Hume's canon, as apphed to science, not merely hinders the attainment of truth, but leads in many cases to positive error, and thus to discredit it both as a scientific and also as a theological principle. A Modernist professes to beheve in progress — progress both in secular and in rehgious knowledge ; but unfor tunately he faUs to recognize that the canon of Hume, to which he is so strongly attached, so far from assisting progress, is one of the most reactionary and obscurantist principles imaginable. It erects a complete barrier against all fundamental (as distinguished from detaUed) progress in science, by forbidding scientists to take cognizance of any fact which is absolutely unexampled and new. It does not prevent progress in matters of detail. It aUows new facts to be assimUated provided that they are analogous to facts already known, but it completely forbids the acceptance of all unique, anomalous, and revolutionary facts whatsoever ; and inasmuch as most of the epoch-making advances of science have been due to the establishment, against strong conservative opposition, of facts of this kind, it is obvious that the Humian principle, if seriously acted upon, condemns science to sterUity. The baneful effects of this principle (which has been far too influential in the past) are writ large upon the past history of aU the sciences. Behef in it hindered the acceptance of the physical discoveries of Roger Bacon 162 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE and Gahleo, the medical discoveries of Paracelsus and WUliam Harvey, and (as we have seen) the psychological discoveries of Mesmer. At the present time the same irrational prejudice (for it is no more) hinders, not merely the acceptance, but even the investigation, by orthodox science, of the anomalous and perplexing problems which are the subject-matter of ' Psychical Research,' such as thought-transference, premonitions, clairvoyance, phan tasms of the hving and the dead, supposed communica tions with the departed ; and alleged physical phenomena, such as fire-walking, ' levitation ' of persons, and mys terious movements of objects without physical contact.1 AU these things contradict ordinary experience, and it may be that none, or very few of them, are reaUy genuine. Nevertheless they are aU capable of being established by evidence, if evidence is forthcoming. Those who main tain that they are impossible, and therefore not worth investigating, forget that only a generation ago the now admitted facts of hypnotism, of the subliminal conscious ness, and of stigmatization were among the ' impossible ' things with which orthodox science refused to have anything to do. II It is sometimes maintained by Modernists that their true position is that it is only when an aUeged event contradicts a known law of nature, and not when it simply contradicts previous ' experience,' that they regard it as incredible. This is a correct position to take up if by * the laws of nature' are understood only the most fundamental of all, which are also laws of reason, and are known, not by experience, but by intuition or by reasoning from truths which are known by direct intuition. Thus all » Upon the last subject the following recent books by the late Dr. W. J. Crawford of Belfast are worth consulting: (i) The Reality of Psychic Phenomena ; (2) Experiments in Psychical Science. MIRACLE AND NATURAL LAW 163 events which are inconsistent with the law of causation, or the law of contradiction, or the axioms of geometry or arithmetic, are correctly described as incredible, as violating the fundamental and unchanging and necessary laws of nature and reason. The immense majority of ' the laws of nature,' however, are based merely upon experience (or rather reasoning from experience), and it is obvious that whatever is established by experience can be modified by fresh experience. Whether these secondary or ' experimental ' laws of nature are immutable or not, is a question upon which neither metaphysicians nor scientists are entirely agreed.1 But that human knowledge of them is mutable, admits of no doubt whatever. Some, it is true, have suffered little or no change since their first discovery, e.g. the law of gravitation and the law of chemical com bination in multiple proportions ; but others (such as the law of the incompressibihty of fluids and Boyle's law of the compressibility of gases) have been modified perceptibly by recent research. In some cases supposed laws of nature have actually been disproved and aban doned. Thus the physical ' law ' that nature abhors a vacuum was exploded by the experiments of TorriceUi ; the dynamical ' law,' laid down by Aristotle, that bodies fall towards the earth with velocities proportionate to their weights, was dramaticaUy disproved by Gahleo in his famous experiment at the leaning tower of Pisa ; the ' law ' that diseases originate from disordered ' humours ' has been replaced in our own time by the germ theory ; the ' law ' of the immutability of species has been replaced, since the pubhcation of Darwin's great work, by the opposite theory of their variability ; the ' law ' that all living organisms require oxygen has been 1 The older scientific view was that even the ' secondary ' laws of nature are immutable. But the most recent physical theory is, that matter has been gradually evolved from something simpler, and that accordingly the laws of matter did not exist until matter existed. 164 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE disproved by recent researches into the nature of fer mentation. We conclude, therefore, that it is unphilosophical and unscientific to pronounce an event incredible merely because it contradicts or seems to contradict one or more of the merely ' secondary ' laws of nature which rest only upon the basis of experience. The duty of the scientific investigator is to examine the evidence for the aUeged event, and, if he finds it satisfactory, to amend the supposed ' law of nature ' which it contradicts, not to disbelieve the ascertained fact. Ill It should further be noticed that to pronounce an event incredible merely because it seems to contradict the laws of nature is to assume that scientists already know all the laws of nature, which is absurd. New laws of nature are being continually discovered, and it is always a tenable hypothesis that a unique and unaccountable phenomenon is the effect of a law which has not yet been discovered. Besides, it is a fact of continual experience that the laws of nature ' interfere ' with one another, modifying or annulling effects which but for such interference would assuredly take place. Thus the microbes of health in the human body are continuaUy at war against the microbes of disease ; vaccines counteract certain maladies ; magnets raise masses of iron from the earth, and aeroplanes fly in the air, counteracting the usual effects of gravitation. Consequently it is often possible to explain an anomalous event as due to ' interference,' in which case the question of a contradiction of natural law does not arise. IV The acts of human free will (and even the spontaneous acts of animals) have never yet been reduced (and are HUME'S ADMISSIONS 165 not likely to be) to any ' laws of nature,' and are conse quently essentiaUy unpredictable. It follows that even if aU the laws of nature were known to us, aU human and many animal acts, would be incapable of explanation by any natural laws — in fact, from the standpoint of those laws they would be miracles. It follows that if we suppose (as we ought) that the action of God upon nature is analogous to that of the human will, we must expect to find in nature many facts and events which natural causation cannot explain. As J. S. Mill well says, in criticism of Hume : " The interference of human will with the course of nature is not an exception to law ; and by the same rule interference by the divine will would not be an exception either." • Hume frequently contradicts his own statement that aU evidence is opposed to miracles, and none is in their favour, without noticing the inconsistency. For example, speaking of the recent aUeged miracles at the tomb of the Abbe Paris, the famous Jansenist, he says : " Many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and in the most eminent theatre that is now in the world. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were everywhere talked of as the usual effects of this holy sepulchre." But if there is aU this profusion of strong evidence in favour of miracles, what becomes of Hume's assertion that "a firm and unalterable experience" has established the unvarying Uniformity of Nature, and that "the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined " ? Even John Mill admits that at this point Hume has blundered. 1 Three Essays on Religion, p. 227 166 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE VI It may be rephed that even if the preceding argument suffices to prove that a quite unexampled event ought to be accepted if it is weU attested, it by no means suffices to prove it a miracle. That is so ; but the first and usuaUy the most difficult step in proving a miracle is to prove the historical truth of the extraordinary event alleged to be a miracle. Not until the fact itself is proved does the further question arise of its origin or cause, which may either be physical or psychical, and, if psychical, either (i) human, or (2) angehc, or (3) divine, or (4) diabolical, according to its circumstances or intrinsic nature. The essential point to notice is, that if Hume's canon is false (as we trust has already been shown), none of the Gospel miracles, not even the most amazing, can be pronounced incredible in principle. We are able to examine the evidence without bias for or against it, and, if it seems to be strong, to accept it with a clear conscience, without feeling that we are doing violence to any rational principle either of science or phUosophy. With regard to the origin of the Gospel miracles (supposing them to be facts), their general benevolent character, and their close connexion with the rehgious mission of Jesus, renders their attribution to any other being than God practicaUy impossible. What Things are Impossible Before passing from this most important part of our subject, it is essential for the reader to realize that there is no event of so marveUous a nature (provided it is not absolutely impossible in the sense explained), that it cannot be proved by evidence — even by a comparatively smaU amount of evidence — provided it is of good quality. The evidence of a few rehable scientific witnesses IMPOSSIBLE THINGS 167 would suffice to estabhsh that there are sea-serpents several miles long in the Pacific Ocean, that there are fire-breathing dragons in the swamps of BrazU, that there are fakirs in the Himalayas who possess the mysterious power of ' levitation,' that there is an area in Central Africa where the weight of a pound is reduced to an ounce and men can jump over palm-trees ; nay, even that there are in unexplored regions of the earth centaurs, and phoenixes, and satyrs, and mermen, and hippogriffs, and cyclops, and monsters like ScyUa. Such discoveries would necessitate the entire reconstruction of the sciences, especiaUy the biological ; but in the past there have been several reconstructions of an extremely drastic kind, and it is impossible to forecast with certainty what amount of. reconstruction future discoveries may necessitate. On the other hand, if the same witnesses (or if thou sands of witnesses) were to assert that they had visited a country where two plus two amounted to five, and the diameters of aU circles were longer than their circum ferences, and physical objects were capable of being in several places at once, they would not be credited, \ for the very sufficient reason that^the things asserted a are impossible, as contradicting not merely empirical laws of nature, but laws of nature which are also laws of reason, and as such absolutely immutable. Other Arguments against Miracles Besides Hume's, the only other arguments against miracles worth mentioning are (1) the Naturalistic or Materiahstic, (2) the Pantheistic, (3) the Deistic. We need not here deal with the first, because it is rejected by Modernists as decisively as by orthodox Christians ; nor with the second, because it is only those forms of Pantheism which deny God's personality which are reaUy inconsistent with miracles, and these forms 13 168 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE are rejected by Modernists ; nor with the third, because the Deistic conception of the imiverse as a machine (a clock, for instance), which God constructed and wound up long ago and left to the operation of its own mechani cal laws, is as hateful to present-day Liberalism as it has always been to Orthodoxy. The Universe as an Organism Our positive proof of the reahty of Miracle as a cosmic fact and principle starts with the assumption (common to Orthodoxy and Modernism) that the Universe is in dwelt by the Spirit (or the Logos) of God, and there fore resembles a living organism rather than a lifeless machine. It is not, of course, an ordinary organism, or even an organism at all in the strictest sense of the term. In all ordinary organisms, the psychical element or ' soul ' is incomplete (and perhaps cannot even exist) without the body in which it finds outward expression. This is the case even with man, for though the human soul is capable of existing (as in the Intermediate State) without the body, its complete and perfect life does not begin until the Resurrection. God, on the other hand, is complete without, the Universe, which He infinitely transcends. He does not need it for His self-expression, and it reveals but an infinitesimal portion of His infinite perfections. He has made it out of pure bounty and benevolence, for the benefit of His rational creatures, not for His own. Nevertheless, the least inadequate way of conceiving of God's relation to the Universe or Cosmos, is to think of it as analogous to an organic relation. This, at any rate, is nearer the truth than to think of it as similar to the external relation of a clockmaker to his clock, or of an engine-builder to his engine. The famous hnes of Pope — "We are but parts of one stupendous whole, Whose body Nature is, and God the soul" — THE WORLD AS AN ORGANISM 169 are a poetic exaggeration of the Christian standpoint, but they represent the truth of things far more nearly than the machine-theory of the Deists, or even the less mechanical transcendentahsm 01 Aristotle. Both machines and organisms are the expressions of a rational principle and purpose ; but whereas in the case of a machine the rational principle is situated outside it in the mind of its designer or maker, in the case of an organism the rational principle is situated within it. It foUows that no degree of spontaneity is possible to a machine. All its movements being predetermined, they repeat themselves with monotonous regularity, and are incapable of adjustment to changed conditions. An organism, on the other hand, however humble — even one as simple as the amoeba, which consists of a single ceU and apparently possesses no organs of sensation — has always some degree of spontaneity and adaptability. Its rational principle being immanent within it, adjust ment to changed conditions is always possible. This is especiaUy evident in the case of the higher organisms, which possess organs of sensation and movement, a clear indication of a more developed consciousness. It is now generaUy agreed among physiologists and psychologists, that although mechanical and chemical principles are involved in the movements and functions of organisms, mechanics and chemistry are insufficient of themselves to explain them. Such movements and functions seem to be directed by an indwelling teleological principle, which seeks the proper good both of the indi vidual and of the race. Thus some actions of organisms are the result of an implanted instinct of self-preservation, and others (especiaUy those connected with sex) are obviously directed towards the preservation of the race. In neither case is a full explanation of the actions in terms of mechanics and chemistry possible. Still more obviously in the case of man, who is endowed with reason, free will, and some degree of apprehension 170 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE of the good, the beautiful, and the true, does the purely mechanical and chemical explanation of his actions and works break down. The distinctive works of man — e.g. schools, colleges, churches, pictures, statues, books, microscopes, telescopes, hospitals, orphanages, asylums — are aU physical facts, but their causes are spiritual, not physical. Among them may be mentioned, love of God, love of knowledge, love of artistic beauty, and disin terested love of the human race. The laws of physics and chemistry are not violated by such human works as these, but they are certainly transcended. Animal organisms unconsciously, human organisms consciously, use the substances and forces of physical nature to attain their own non-mechanical ends. It follows that not even the mechanical (much less the spiritual) future of the universe is predictable, even in principle. If Laplace's imagined omniscient calculator had been located in the original Nebula from which the Solar System originated, he would not have been able to predict the emergence of the human mind, and there fore not of the works of the human mind, such as clothes, houses, tools, machinery, roads, bridges, and canals, which, though physical facts, have no physical causes or explanations.1 According to modern ideas, no function or act of any organism is entirely determined by mechanical or chemical laws. The ' routine ' functions of an organism, such as the beating of the heart, the expansion and contraction of the lungs, the separation from the blood of the secre tions, the digestion and assimilation of food, and the whole class of what are ordinarily called ' reflex ' actions, may seem to be purely mechanical or chemical, but 1 An excellent popular refutation of the mechanistic psychology and physiology will be found in J. S. Haldane's Mechanism, Life, and Personality (1914). For more technical discussions see especially H. Driesch, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, and E. B. Wilson's classical work The Cell*, particularly the remarkable passage on P- 433- THE WORLD AS AN ORGANISM 171 inasmuch as they aU form part of a rational and teleo logical ' system,' whose primary aim is the proper good of the organism and of the race, and which directs and controls them in these interests, it is certain that the mechanical explanation even of these functions is in sufficient. What possible mechanical or chemical ex planation, for instance, can there be of the blush of shame at wrongdoing, or of tears of repentance for sin, or of the inhibiting of sensual thoughts and acts by the virtuous wUl, or even of the more rapid circulation and respiration brought about by the mental resolution to walk faster or to run ? In all these cases the determining causes are psychical, not physical, and the mechanical explanations, so confidently offered by nineteenth-century Naturahsm, seem now to the majority of scientists (as they have always seemed to common-sense and to nearly all philosophers) simply preposterous. Application to Theology The apphcation of this (now generaUy accepted) theory of the relation of the soul to the body, to the relation of God to the Universe, is vitally important to theology in many ways, but we are only concerned with it now from the point of view of the hght which it sheds upon the obscure problems connected with miracles, providences, and answers to prayer. I It follows necessarily from the assumption of God's immanence (unless His immanence is regarded as entirely inert, and therefore not worth assuming at aU), that the life of the Universe, as indwelt by the Spirit of God, re sembles the spontaneous and purposive life of an organism, not the predetermined and monotonous functioning of a souUess machine. Upon the hypothesis of Immanence, which Modernists 172 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE as weU as Traditionalists accept, God is free in His own Universe, not indeed. to violate His own laws1 (which there is no evidence that He ever does, though the possi- bUity of it can never be excluded), but certainly free to direct and use them for the attainment of His own righteous ends, with even more than that lordship and sovereignty with which man in his lower estate uses them for the attainment of his more limited ends. If man can so freely control and use the forces of nature without violating natural law — if he can use sunlight for the purposes of photography, electricity to light his dwellings and carry his messages, heat to raise the steam which propels his locomotive engines and steamships, winds and streams to turn the mills which grind his com; if, further, he can change the flora and fauna and physical condition of the earth which he dominates, cutting down forests, draining fens, reclaim ing land from the sea, deciding what plants shall grow or be eradicated, and what animals shall be preserved or be exterminated ; if he can even (though as yet only to a limited extent) control the climate and alter the weather — then it is evident that God the Creator not only can, but actuaUy does perform on a large scale such acts of dominion over matter as man performs on a limited scale : viz. direct the whole of the physical forces of nature towards the attainment of universal good, the good of man being a not unimportant part of that good. II It follows, further, from the doctrine of Immanence, that we ought to regard God, not so much as a Great Engineer or Great Carpenter, or even as a Great Archi- 1 If God is personal, it is possible in the abstract that God (like an earthly sovereign) may sometimes suspend His own laws (i.e. those laws which are contingent, not necessary) to suit particular cases or emergencies. But this supposition is rejected by nearly all theologians, and is not required for the proof of miracles. GOD AS CREATIVE ARTIST 173 tect, but rather as the Supreme Creative Artist, who did not exhaust His originahty and fertihty of imagination in the initial act of creation, but who is the Creator still, fashioning every moment something unique, the hke of which never was before and never will be again, weaving day by day upon the vast loom of the universe some entirely new design, and continuaUy producing from the inexhaustible stores of His creative fertihty absolutely new and unexampled forms of goodness, beauty, and tmth. It is this free, artistic, and entirely non-mechanical aspect of God's creative activity (so different from the crude mechanical theories of nineteenth-century Natural ism) which Bergson has so firmly grasped and vividly portrayed in his greatest work, L'Evolution Creatrice (Paris, 1907, E.T. 1911). If we substitute for Bergson's vague, elusive, and apparently impersonal elan vital, the more definite and satisfactory conception of a personal God who is immanent as well as transcendent, we reach a theory of the universe and its development which is at once orthodox and modern — a theory which both Traditionalists and Modernists will be wise if they accept as approximately true. Ill The cosmology of Bergson resembles that of traditional Christianity in laying the chief stress upon the idea of ' the good ' rather than upon mere physical ' fact,' as Naturalism does. To Bergson, as also to Croce (who in this respect is more Christian than he knows), the evolu tion or development of the universe consists essentially of the continual emergence of new qualities and values, eesthetic, spiritual, and moral, not, as to Herbert Spencer and other exponents of Naturahsm, in the unending movement and mechanical redistribution of an unchanging matter and force. The Bergsonian phUosophy hinges upon the conception of spontaneity or creative free will, 174 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE which it attributes both to man, and in fuller degree to the immanent elan vital of the universe, which is the Bergsonian equivalent for God. It regards the course of the world's history, not as rigidly determined before hand, but as freely created from moment to moment by the spontaneous acts of God (or rather, the elan vital), and of inferior minds like man's. It is obvious that such a conception of the universe as this leaves ample room for belief both in answers to prayer and in miracles — «ven physical miracles. The history of the world being not made already, but being continually in the making, it is evident that it is possible for God to respond to prayer by immediate voluntary acts, which may take the form either of internal move ments of grace, or of outward providences, or even of miracles, which are nothing, upon the theory we are defending, but providences of a speciaUy dramatic and striking kind. The Supernatural and the Miraculous The reader will already have noticed that upon this view of the relation of God to the Universe there is no difference whatever in principle between God's super natural acts and His miraculous acts. The Supernatural or the Miraculous (whichever name is preferred) is not an occasional intrusion into the order of the universe, which at other times is purely natural and mechanical, but rather a permanent element in that order, resulting from the fact that the Spirit of God is immanent within it. Just as the immanence of the human soul or spirit in the human body makes it a living organism, with the result that not a single act or function of the human body — not even those functions which seem of a purely • routine ' character, such as digestion — are determined by purely physical causes ; so the immanence of God in the universe brings with it as a necessary result, that there is not a single purely mechanical fact in the entire THE SUPERNATURAL AND MIRACLE 175 universe, and that even the motions of the winds and the tides and the revolutions of the heavenly bodies do not obey quite strictly the abstract laws of mechanics, but, as forming part of the living organism of the universe, are controlled by the indwelling Spirit of God in such a way that their motions subserve the good of the entire system of the universe, and especiaUy of the rational part of it, to which man belongs. If it be rephed that the motions of the heavenly bodies, at any rate, appear to be mechanical,1 the reply is that so also do most of the internal functions of the human body. Indeed, brain-physics, for its own pecuhar pur poses, usuaUy treats the movements of the brain-ceUs as mechanical ; and physiology, in the interests of simplicity of treatment, usuaUy explains digestion, assimUation, and secretion in terms of chemistry, though no competent physiologist whose conception of physiology is typicaUy modern would be hkely to assert that the physiology of the organism can be entirely explained in terms of mechanics and chemistry. He would probably admit that inasmuch as an organism has a psychical as well as a physical aspect, its actions and reactions must be psycho-physical, and not merely physical, and that inasmuch as the organism is a teleological system in which the parts are subordinated to the whole, probably not a single function of the organism — not even the functions of respiration or secretion — are purely mechanical. The Theory of Parallelism The tendency of Modernism is to admit spiritual miracles (or providences), but to deny physical miracles (or providences). For example, the typical Modernist 1 Our most refined methods of observation are unable to detect small changes, but even to these methods the motions of the heavenly bodies do not in all cases even appear to be uniform. For instance, during the last few years the moon's motion has become distinctly accelerated for no reason which science has yet been able to detect. 176 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE wiU maintain that it is right and reasonable to pray for grace, but wrong and unreasonable to pray for rain. He does not reahze that in taking up this position he is involving himself in a palpable contradiction — a contra diction of the fundamental principle of Immanence. If he treats this principle seriously (as he is bound to do if he wishes to rank as a thinker) he is absolutely compelled to hold that the universe resembles a living organism, and that the material part of it is as directly moved and controUed by the Spirit of God immanent within it as the human body is moved and controlled by the human spirit immanent within it. If God is immanent in the universe, it follows that He is immanent in matter, and therefore that He moves matter — moves it purposively, as spirit always does, not mechanically as one piece of matter moves another. We are compelled to believe this unless we make the grotesque assumption that His immanence in matter is merely nominal and produces no effect. Upon one, and only upon one theory of the relation of soul (or mind or spirit) l to body, is it possible to affirm spiritual miracles (such as those of conversion and grace) whUe denying physical miracles (such as answers to prayers for rain), and that is the theory, once popular but now largely discredited, of Psycho-physical Parallelism. According to this theory, credible enough in the days of mid- Victorian Materiahsm, but hardly credible now (though it stUl lingers here and there in Modernist and Liberal circles), there is no causal interaction of any kind between mind and body. Mind cannot act upon body, nor body upon mind. Though so closely connected together, as forming a single living organism, they exercise not the slightest influence of any kind upon one another. The body's movements are determined, not by 1 The same substance or entity (but from different points of view and emphasizing different activities) is described by the three terms soul, spirit, mind. PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM 177 acts of wUl, which are powerless to produce physical effects of any kind, but only by previous physical move ments, the causation being thus of a purely mechanical kind. Similarly the mind's thoughts are determined neither by external objects which are apprehended by the senses, nor by the internal states of the brain and nervous system, but simply and solely by the previous thoughts of the mind. Thus each of the two chains of causation, the physical and the psychical, is complete in itself, and neither of them has or can have the slightest effect upon the other. As Professor W. K. Clifford once forcibly put the matter, " If anybody says that the [human] wiU influences matter, the statement is not untrue, it is nonsense." 1 Of course, if Parallelism is true — if mind cannot act upon matter, nor matter upon mind — it follows logicaUy that God, even if immanent in the world, can produce no physical effects in it, and that therefore both physical miracles and physical providences are impossible. But it is possible to purchase the right to deny physical miracles at too heavy a cost — a cost so enormous that I doubt whether (upon reflection) even the most ardent of Modernists wUl be found ready to pay it. For if Parallel ism is true, the following (among other) absurdities follow : that toothache is not caused by decayed teeth, but by previous anticipations of toothache ; that the pain of a schoolboy's thrashing is not caused by the schoolmaster's rod, but by the boy's anticipatory fears ; that it is impossible for a man by an act of will, however strong, to move his arms or legs or to direct his eyes toward an object which he wishes to observe ; and that it is not the devout Christian's resolution to take part in public 1 Lectures, vol. ii, p. 33. Tyndall, Huxley, and even Shadworth Hodgson have also espoused this strange theory, which Herbert Spencer (though like them a semi-materialist) had the penetration to reject. It is also decisively rejected by Wm. James in his Principles of Psychology, by J. Ward (art. "Psychology," Encycl. Brit.), and by Bergson. 178 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE worship which carries his body to church on Sundays, but simply and solely his body's automatic action. I am glad to be able to quote, as on my side in this matter, so representative a Modernist as Dean Inge. He declares expressly in Contentio Veritatis that the only real argument against physical miracles is the theory of Parallelism, and that if this can only be disproved, physical miracles are credible : " Many thinkers," he says, " who are not writing in the interests of Christian dogma, maintain this interaction [of soul and body] against the rival hypothesis of psycho-physical paraUehsm. Once admit this possibility, and there is no bar to accepting [physical] miracle, if it is well attested." Since these words were written (1902), the " many thinkers " who reject ParaUehsm have become the majority, and the present tendency of psychologists is to regard it as a mere belated survival of nineteenth-century Naturalism. It has probably received its final coup de grdce in the exhaustive work (Mind and Body, 1911) of Professor Wm. McDougaU, who certainly has no theo logical axe to grind, and to this the reader is referred for further information. I have myself attempted to expose some of the unspeakable absurdities (no weaker description is adequate) to which this theory necessarily leads in an earher work.1 ' The Argument from Evolution It is now time to redeem the promise made at the beginning of this chapter to prove the possibihty and fact of miracles (even of physical miracles) from that very principle (viz. of Evolution or Development) which is popularly supposed to exclude them. The following argument in proof of this turns upon the question whether Evolution is a natural or a supernatural (i.e. a miraculous) process. If it is a natural process, Pro Fide, pp. xvi, 185-193. EVOLUTION A MIRACLE 179 then there is a presumption (not overwhelming, but strong) against special miracles occurring in the course of it ; if on the other hand the process is supernatural (or miraculous), then there is a presumption of the opposite kind. I Until the pubhcation of Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859, the scientific (as distinct from the philosophical) argument against miracles can hardly be said to have existed. Scientists almost universaUy believed in the Linngean doctrine of the Immutability of Species, and were thus committed to the belief that every one of the many thousands of existing and extinct species of plants and animals had once been formed from the dust of the earth by a special miracle of instantaneous creation. No miracles recorded in the Gospels are of so amazing a character as the sudden production out of the earth of the first pairs of lions, horses, oxen, and other animals, in which practicaUy every scientist (except Lamarck) of the pre-Darwinian age firmly believed. When, however, Darwin had proved, or at least ren dered probable, that species are not immutable, but have originated in the course of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of years, from some very simple primitive germ or germs by a process of gradual development, under the influence of the entirely non-miraculous law of Natural Selection ; and especially when in his subsequent work, The Descent of Man (1871), he had explicitly applied the same principle of explanation to the origin of the human species, it seemed to the advocates of Naturalism, among whom should be reckoned not only thorough going materialists like Hackel and Biichner, but also semi-materialists like Spencer and Huxley, that the entire process of development of the solar system from the Nebula to Man might be explained by purely natural (i.e. mechanical and chemical) causes, without assuming any miracle. 180 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE II The argument that the evolutionary process is a natural one, is ordinarily stated as follows. It is conceded that had the production of Man from the Nebula been an instantaneous, or even a very rapid process, it could not be naturaUy explained. But it is contended that if the process be regarded as spread over a practicaUy infinite period, each upward step becomes so exceedingly small that natural causes are sufficient to account for it. But if each step regarded separately can thus be naturaUy explained, it seems to follow that the whole process can be naturaUy explained. Ill This argument evidently turns upon the question of the causal efficacy of time, and there can be no doubt that, as a general rule, the efficacy of causes can be indefinitely increased by increasing the time during which they operate. For example, a pumping-engine which could not fiU a reservoir in one day, might fill it in a week or a month ; an express train which could not reach Worcester from London in one hour, might do so in two ; and a lesson which could not be learnt by a pupil in five minutes, might be learnt in ten or twenty. But in every case in which time thus increases the efficacy of the cause, the cause is naturaUy adapted to pro duce the effect required. If it is not so adapted, it will not produce the effect, even if it operates through infinite time.1 For example, an entirely unmusical person will not produce such an opera as Don Giovanni or Lohengrin even if he devotes his whole hfe or even eternity to the task. Similarly, a person without humour could not possibly write such a book as The Pickwick Papers, nor 1 That is, through time indefinitely prolonged. As explained above, the idea of absolutely infinite time probably involves a contradiction. EVOLUTION A MIRACLE 181 could an inartistic person paint such pictures as Turner's, nor an undramatic person write such a play as Macbeth, nor a fool or commonplace person produce any work of genius whatever, however long the time which he chose to occupy in the attempt. Similarly, a force of attrac tion, like gravitation, could never, however long it acted, produce the effect of repulsion ; nor could the forces of international jealousy and hatred ever produce inter national peace and goodwiU. The task, therefore, which the advocates of Naturalism have to undertake, if they wish to prove Evolution a natural process, is to show that the causes which existed in the original Nebula (viz. matter and energy) were of a kind fit and sufficient to produce the final effect, viz. Man. Of course, if matter is the kind of cause which is naturally adapted to produce mind, they may hope to prove their case ; but if they cannot, their argument cannot even begin. The principle of Causality requires us to assign to every effect, not merely a cause, but an adequate cause ; and by an adequate cause is meant one which in magnitude and excellence is at least equal to the effect. Mind is more excellent than matter, and therefore that mind should produce matter (as in the case of the creation of the universe by God we beheve it has actually done) is perfectly credible, and involves no contradiction. But it involves an absolute contradiction — in fact, an absurdity — to suppose that matter under any circumstances by its own unaided powers could generate mind. To suppose that the absolutely uninteUigent and lifeless gases of the Nebula could have produced without supernatural assis tance the mind of an Aristotle, or a Shakspere, or a Newton, is as great an absurdity as to suppose that an absolute imbecile could have written Paradise Lost. Indeed, it is a greater absurdity, because even an imbecile possesses some inteUigence, but the Nebula ex hypothesi possessed none. 182 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE IV It is pleaded that though inteUigence was not actually in the Nebula, it was there potentially ; in other words, that though intelhgence was not present at first, it came to be present afterwards, and that by a purely natural process. Upon this argument (if it can be caUed one) two observations may be made. First, that to be something actuaUy is far better than to be something potentiaUy. For example, it is far better to be an actor, or mathe matician, or philosopher, or saint actually, than to be one only potentiaUy ; for to be one only potentiaUy, is not to be an actor, mathematician, philosopher, or saint at aU. It foUows that even if there is such a thing as ' potential inteUigence,' and if ' potential inteUigence ' was reaUy present in the Nebula, it cannot possibly have been the cause of the actual intelhgence of Aristotle and Shakspere and Newton, because what is merely potential is not only inferior in excellence to what is actual, but infinitely inferior. Secondly, there is no evidence that intelligence was in the Nebula at all, either actuaUy or potentiaUy. It is only assumed to have been there, in order to afford a starting-point for the Naturahstic argu ment, to which, however, it affords no real help. The only rational way of accounting for the upward course which Evolution has uniformly pursued from the Nebula to Man is to assume that a Supernatural Cause at least equal to (in fact, infinitely greater than) the mind of Man co-operated with the purely physical forces present in the Nebula to produce the final effect, Homo sapiens. To beheve in Evolution without beheving in God as its efficient cause involves a palpable contradiction — a contradiction of the principle of Causality, one of the root principles not only of science and phUosophy, but also of common-sense. J. M. THOMPSON'S OBJECTION 183 Evolution a Perpetual Miracle How absolutely miraculous the entire evolutionary process is, may perhaps be rendered clearer by a famihar illustration. Suppose that the statue of the Apollo Belvidere in the Vatican Gallery were suddenly to warm into living flesh and blood (as in old time Pygmalion's ivory statue is said to have done through the miraculous power of the goddess Venus),1 and, descending from its pedestal, were to walk about and talk, no one would hesitate to caU the event a miracle. But would the process be less a miracle if it occupied a week, a year, a century, or even a thousand years ? Assuredly not. However long it took, it would remain a miracle — a miracle as great and undeniable as though it had occupied only a moment.- The miracle of the evolution of Man from the Nebula is a miracle of the same order, involving precisely the same degree of supernaturalism as the legendary miracle of the transformation of Pygmalion's statue into the woman whom he married. The one miracle took longer than the other to effect, but the same degree of supernaturalism is involved in both. We may conclude, therefore, confidently, that the evolutionary process is an irreducible miracle — a miracle at once physical and spiritual ; and that therefore the occurrence of lesser miracles in the course of it is alto gether credible: The Rev. J. M. Thompson's Objection The Rev. J. M. Thompson does indeed contend a that the statement that all events are miraculous, is equiva lent to a statement that aU events are natural, but it is difficult to attach any distinct meaning to his words. If 1 See Ovid, Metamorphoses, x, 243 ff. % Miracles in the New Testament, pp. 2-5, etc. 14 184 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE they are meant seriously, it follows from the principle they assume, that to be always in pain is equivalent to being never in pain, to be always happy is equivalent to being never happy, and to be entirely green equivalent to not being green at all. Mr. Thompson does not seem to reahze that Naturahsm and orthodox Christianity take entirely different views of the nature of the facts which constitute the Universe. Naturalism regards the Universe as a machine, and all the facts occurring in it as mechanically determined. Christianity regards it as a living organism, not a single function of which (in its whole nature) is mechanicaUy determined. Naturalism regards answers to prayer, pro vidences, and the Christian miracles as impossible, Christianity regards them as facts. Naturahsm denies human and divine free will, Christianity affirms it. But we need not elaborate the numerous differences in detail. What has been already said is sufficient to prove that the mechanical and the organic views of the universe differ toto ccelo from one another, and are quite incom patible. Miracles and the Incarnation Modernists profess to believe in the Incarnation, seldom reflecting that in so doing they commit themselves to the whole principle of the miraculous. The Incarnation is an obvious miracle, a psychical miracle, because its result is a personality divine as well as human ; a physical miracle, because the God-man assumed a body which performed acts which it would not have performed had it been the body of an ordinary man. Modernists labour to reduce the miraculous element involved in the Incarnation to a minimum, but they cannot ehminate it. The more extreme of them teach that aU Christians wiU one day be Incarnations of God MIRACLES AND THE INCARNATION 185 in the sense in which Jesus Christ now is, but even they admit that, so far as this world is concerned, God's Incarnation in Him is unique, i.e. a miracle. Moreover, they believe in His sinlessness, an obvious miracle, and one far more difficult to credit than any of the physical miracles which He is aUeged by the Evangehsts to have wrought. It is more difficult to credit, first of all because it is hard to understand upon what possible adequate evidence (if the behef is to be based upon evidence) so far-reaching a conclusion can be based ; secondly, because there is some (though not very strong) evidence against it ; for instance, He submitted to John's Baptism of Repentance, and declared that God only is good (Mark x. 18) ; lastly, sinlessness is contrary to all human experience, and is not claimed even for the greatest saints, not even for the founders of the great ethnic rehgions, such as Moses, Mahomet, Buddha, and Zoroaster. It is very much easier to beheve (if evidence is to decide) that Jesus walked upon the waves than that He was sinless, because there is a considerable, if insufficient, volume of evidence in favour of ' levitation,' which is aUeged of saints like St. Teresa and St. Joseph of Cupertino, of the gymnosophists of ancient India (who, however, ac cording to Philostratus, made no display of their amazing accomplishment, and did not consider it important :), and of ' mediums ' like Home, who was never detected in fraud, and to one of whose most remarkable ' levita- tions ' we possess the written testimony of three actual eye-witnesses. On the other hand, there is no evidence whatever, except in the case of Jesus, of human sinless ness. If therefore we make up our minds to beheve in the major miracle of the Incarnation, and its equaUy unique accompanying miracle of sinlessness, it seems altogether unreasonable to disbelieve (or raise captious objections against) the minor miracles which are asserted on good 1 Life of Apollonius, Bk. iii. 15. 186 MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF NATURE evidence to have accompanied it. For in the first place it is natural and almost necessary to suppose that a life which (if Jesus was reaUy God as weU as man) was a continuous miracle from beginning to end, contained special miraculous incidents of a striking kind ; and in the second place these special miracles (especially those selected for insertion in the Creeds) are so thoroughly harmonious with the theory of the Incarnation itself that they lend it strong confirmation. Thus the Virgin Birth marks at once the continuity of the nature of Jesus with that of ordinary humanity, and also (and stUl more strikingly) its discontinuity, as being the nature of one who was also God. SimUarly, the Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus harmonize admirably with the theory of His divine origin, and (according to the records which we possess) were among the most potent of the causes which generated behef in it among the first disciples. Of course, in the abstract it is possible to believe in the divinity of one whose works were purely human ; but it is not possible in the concrete — at least, not possible for many, nor for long. It is the custom of common-sense to argue from effects to their causes. A purely human Christ may be able to dispense with miracles. A divine Christ cannot. From a divine Christ, divine works, ex ceeding the measure of ordinary humanity, are impera tively demanded ; and if they are not forthcoming, sober reason wiU be inclined to conclude that the ' divine ' Christ is not really divine. CHAPTER IX modernism and biblical criticism Authority and Criticism The Scriptures of the Old and New Testament form a portion — a very smaU portion — of the ancient literature which has been transmitted to us, and Modernists are quite right in insisting that the very same principles of ¦ textual ' and ' higher ' criticism,1 which are apphed to the secular writings of antiquity, should also be applied to the Bible. This demand should not be contested even by those Christians who attach the highest value to the doctrine of Biblical Inspiration. Indeed, the more strongly a Christian believes in Inspiration, the more anxious he ought to be to ascertain (i) the true text and (2) the true interpretation of the Bible, which he can only do by making use of ' textual ' and ' higher ' criticism. Even if, foUowing tradition, he regards the Church as the only authoritative and final interpreter of Scrip ture,' still the fact remains that the Church has not actually done more than lay down a few very broad and general rules to guide interpreters of Scripture (as, for instance, that Scripture must be interpreted as not contradicting the doctrines defined in the Creeds and 1 The * lower ' or ' textual ' criticism of the Bible aims at deter mining its true text ; the ' higher ' criticism concerns itself with the subject-matter, also with questions of date, authorship, and literary character. 3 " The Church hath . . . authority in Controversies of Faith " . . . and is " a witness and keeper of holy Writ " (Articles of Religion, XX). 187 188 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM Councils) and has left aU detailed comment to the private enterprise of individual scholars. Moreover, it is necessary to remind ultra-traditional ists, that the Church has never yet, in any of its Creeds or Ecumenical decisions, pronounced officially or ex plicitly upon the authorship, date, or literary character (as distinguished from the Inspiration J) of any of the Sacred Books whatever, wisely leaving these and other kindred matters to the judgment of experts. Strange as it may appear, there is not any ecumenical definition even of Biblical Inspiration. No orthodox Christian is now, or ever has been, required to beheve as part of his faith, either that the Bible is free from historical and scientific errors, or that it contains no human element, or that it is equally inspired in all its parts, or that God is its ' Author ' (auctor) in a literary sense. Indeed, inasmuch as Christ criticized with great severity certain features of the Mosaic law (e.g. free divorce, the lex talionis, and, by implication, polygamy), and declared that they had been permitted merely for the hardness of men's hearts, it seems certain that the Old Testament (unless interpreted in the light of its general tendency, and of the fuller revelation for which it prepared the way) actuaUy contains moral error, a blemish at least as serious, in the judgment of orthodox Christians, as theological error. Furthermore, it is part of the traditional view of the Bible, that the Old Testament, being only a preparatory dispensation, is much less perfect than the New, and that in all cases where the two differ (or seem to differ) the New is to be preferred. Indeed, the Old Testament itself in not a few places explicitly recognizes its own provisional and imperfect character, and looks forward to the time when it wiU be superseded (in the Messianic 1 The statement in the Nicene Creed that the Holy Ghost " spake by the prophets " refers to both Testaments, and has special reference to the Canonical Books of Scripture. CLASSICAL CRITICISM 189 age) by a perfect and eternal covenant between God and man (Isa. Iv. 3 ; Jer. hi. 1, 31 ; xxxii. 40 ; Ezek. xxxvii. 26 ; xi. 19). So vast is the superiority of the New Dispensation over the Old, that the greatest representa tive of the Old, John the Baptist, is declared by our Lord to be inferior to the ' least ' (fwcpoTepos, literally ' a meaner member ') in the New Kingdom (Matt. xi. 11 ; Luke vii. 28). The Principles of Classical Criticism The principles of textual and higher criticism are best learnt in the classical field, and that for two reasons : (1) the field of classical criticism is far wider and more varied than the Biblical, and (2) it is neutral territory, in which there is httle danger of conclusions being influenced by theological proclivities. One of the principal causes of the present unsatisfactory state of New Testament criticism is that hardly any of the German theological specialists (to whose conclusions undue weight is attached in England) have received a sufficient preliminary train ing in the wider field of classical scholarship and criticism. The classical scholarship of Germany is indeed excellent, but unfortunately a full command of it is seldom pos sessed by German theologians. Only in the very few cases in which a German classical scholar migrates to the theological faculty of his University do the condi tions arise which are needful for fruitful and reaUy reliable work in the field of New Testament criticism. The twenty-seven short works which make up the canon of the New Testament are neither long enough nor varied enough to permit reliable critical principles to be deduced from them alone. Yet, as a rule, it is only of these, and of the history of the criticism of these, that the average German New Testament critic possesses any accurate knowledge. The narrowness which results from undue speciahsm is at present the evil genius of German theology, 190 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM and indeed of all theology which takes its principles from Germany. Under existing circumstances it wiU not be time wasted if we devote a few pages to sketching in broad outline the main principles of textual and historical criticism as they are at present accepted by classical scholars at home and abroad, the more so as they differ very widely indeed from those which unfortunately stiU find favour with nearly all Modernists. I The philosophic agnosticism of Kant contributed (as has been already explained) to a widespread rejection of traditional views, not only in the realm of theology, but also of classical learning. ParaUel with the negative movement in Biblical criticism, which culminated for the Old Testament in Vatke, Reuss, and Graf, and for the New Testament in F. C. Baur, Strauss, and Bruno Bauer,1 there arose a similar movement in the classical field. It became the fashion to deny or doubt the authorship of a large number of classical writings which had never been questioned before ; to favour ' partition ' theories of authorship ; to dispute the authority of the entire manuscript tradition (especially by assuming extensive interpolations in the received text) ; and to dissolve a large number of well-attested historical events into legends or ' tendency ' fictions. 1 K. H. Graf opened the modern period of Pentateuchal criticism by proving that the whole priestly document, previously regarded as the Grundschrift (or oldest portion), is the most recent. Vatke and Reuss had previously taught that the Prophets are older than the Law, and the Psalms more recent than both. F. C. Baur, the founder of the modern ' tendency ' criticism of the New Testament, reduced its genuine documents to five (Romans, i and 2 Corinthians, Galatiaris, Revelation). Strauss developed the ' mythical ' theory of the Gospel history. Bruno Bauer, starting as an orthodox Christian and an adherent of the Hegelian ' Right," gradually lapsed into extreme views, denying first of all that Jesus claimed to be the Messiah, and finally. His very existence. He ended by rejecting all the New Testament documents, even those accepted by Baur. HOMERIC CRITICISM 191 II The negative school of classical criticism scored one notable success which seems likely to be permanent. A long line of Homeric critics, beginning with F. A. Wolf, whose epoch-making Prolegomena (Halle, 1795) marks the real re-opening 1 of ' the Homeric question ' in modern times, seem to have estabhshed at least the two foUowing negative conclusions : (1) that the Iliad and the Odyssey are not by the same author ; (2) that neither is a complete literary unit, both poems (especially the Iliad) being considerably interpolated. Modern critics profess to discover in Homer a still greater multiplicity of ' documents ' and ' sources,' and more evident indications of ' redaction ' and late editing than the school of Graf and Wellhausen discovers in the Hexateuch.' A view of the Iliad now widely current regards its original nucleus (which may fitly be termed the Achilleid or Wrath of Achilles) as consisting only of books 1, 8, 11, 16, and 22, and perhaps not of the whole of these. Wolf broke up the two great poems into a number of short lays, which he regarded as origi nally distinct. W. Christ detected no less than forty of these lays in the Iliad alone. Even such a conservative scholar as Monro is inclined to surrender the whole of the tenth book of the Iliad, and to admit somewhat extensive interpolations in other books. With regard to the Odyssey, which has much more coherence and unity than the Iliad, most modern scholars 1 There were a few scholars even in antiquity who on critical grounds assigned the Iliad and the Odyssey to different authors. They noticed that in the former Hephaestus's wife is one of the Graces, in the latter Aphrodite ; and that the Iliad makes Iris, the Odyssey Hermes, the messenger of Zeus. They also noticed differences in points of grammar and various archaeological discrepancies. The arguments (or perhaps the authority) of Aristarchus, who wrote against these ' Separators,' finally prevailed. 2 I.e. the Pentateuch and Joshua, which, according to modern ideas, form one work. 192 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM are inclined to reject the whole of the nth book (de scribing Ulysses' adventures among the dead), and even Monro, who accepts the book as a whole, admits that hnes 565-627 are interpolated. PracticaUy all modern critics acquiesce in the opinion of Aristarchus and Aristophanes, that Odyssey, xxiii. 296, is " the end of the Odyssey," and that the rest of the poem is by a later hand. They also accept the judgment of the ancient Museum that aU the other poems attributed to the bard are spurious, even the fine hymn to the Dehan ApoUo, which Thucydides accepted without suspicion. Ill But in practicaUy every other case the conclusions of the negative critics of the nineteenth century have failed in the end to commend themselves to scholars, and that for a fairly obvious and sufficient reason. The epic poetry of Greece (in dealing with which alone negative criticism has achieved its successes) belongs to the pre historic and legendary period, and consequently has no continuous literary tradition. The actual literary history of ' Homer ' begins not earlier than the recension of Pisistratus (sixth century B.C.), which A. Ludwich x is probably right in identifying with the ' vulgate ' (or ' textus receptus ') of Homer, which accordingly dates from the middle of the sixth century B.C. , and not (as has usuaUy been taken for granted until recently) from the later period of the Alexandrian grammarians (the third cen tury B.C. onwards). In the days of Pisistratus (c. 605- 527 B.C.), ' Homer ' was already a legendary figure, and 1 See especially his important work, Die Homer-vulgata als vor- Alexandrinisch erwiesen (Leipzig, 1898), the main results of which are accepted by T. W. Allen (see The Classical Review for 1899, pp. 39 n\. 334 **•)> a's0 by Monro, and by Leaf, who says : " The Peisis- tratean text is identical with the vulgate, which has held its own through all time," THE PLATONIC CANON 193 authentic details concerning his hfe and writings were no longer procurable. x With regard to the fuUy historical period of Greek and Roman history, it may be said without fear of con tradiction, that only in the rarest and most exceptional cases has modern criticism succeeded in shaking per manently the credit of works which antiquity unani mously accepted. Already in the Preface some striking instances have been given, in which recent criticism has entirely reversed the verdict of nineteenth-century scholars. It would be easy to add largely to these individual instances, but it will probably be more inter esting to the reader, and certainly more likely to throw hght upon our main subject of inquiry, if we proceed to discuss in some detaU the recent revolution of critical opinion which has taken place with regard to that group of classical writings which most closely resembles the New Testament, the Platonic Canon. The Platonic Canon The Platonic Canon bears a close resemblance to the New Testament in at least the four following respects : (1) In being a Canon, i.e. a defined body of literature, which all the followers of Plato, including in Christian times the Neo-Platonists, regarded as sacred and almost inspired. (2) The canonical works of Plato were committed to and jealously guarded by a philosophic school founded by him (the Academy),8 in much the same way as the 1 I only indicate here, without discussing, the perplexing problem presented by the ' eccentric ' text of Homer found in certain ancient quotations, and in the pre-Christian papyri, some of which date back as far as the third century b.c. It differs mainly from the ' vulgate ' text in being longer, in which particular it resembles the so-called ' Western ' text of the New Testament, and offers a similar problem to criticism. 2 Plato committed his writings to his nephew Speusippus, who in 347 b.c. succeeded him as head of the Academy His successors were 194 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM Apostolic Scriptures were committed to and jealously guarded by the Christian Church. (3) In consequence of this, the canonical writings of Plato share with those of the New Testament the weU- grounded reputation of being among the best attested works of antiquity, Vergil's alone, in all probability, having anything like the same amount and quality of external attestation. (4) Outside the Platonic Canon were various ' Platonic ' writings of lesser authority, which were valued by many, and were sometimes circulated along with the undisputed works (e.g. such dialogues as the Axiochus, the Sisyphus, and the Eryxias). Similarly, alongside the ' undisputed ' writings of the New Testament, there were ' disputed ' writings on the very border of the Canon (such as Revela tion, James, Hebrews, Jude), which ultimately gained admission, and also certain ' ecclesiastical ' writings (e.g Prima dementis and the Pastor), which were occasionally treated in early times as having at least semi-canonical rank. The Platonic Canon consists of thirty-six dialogues (counting the Epistles as one), and of these, when the tide of negative criticism reached its height in the fifties and sixties, there remained only two, according to Socher, which were not contested by critics of credit and authority. Socher himself rejected thirteen, Hermann, StaUbaum, and Steinhart nine each, Ueberweg seven at least, Ast as many as twenty-two ; and as these critics were by no means agreed as to which of the dialogues were spurious, nearly the whole of the canon of Plato fell under suspicion. The most important weapon employed by these negative Xenocrates, Polemo, and Crates, with which last the period of ' the Old Academy ' closes. It should be noticed that the ideas of ' suc cession ' and ' tradition ' in the philosophical schools and in the Chris tian Church closely resembled one another. The Christian bishop of an apostolic see was usually regarded as succeeding to the teaching chair of the apostolic founder, whose doctrinal tradition he was bound to (and usually did) maintain. THE PLATONIC EPISTLES 195 critics was discrepancy of doctrine between the dialogues, which in some cases was real, in others imaginary. At the present time the general tendency of critics (represented, for example, by Blass) is to accept practi caUy the whole of the dialogues as genuine. There is hardly a single one which has not strong defenders. For example, C. Ritter, a critic of far less conservative tendencies than Blass, accepts unreservedly twenty-five (which occupy 2,000 pages of text in the Teubner edition), regards as " not fully secure, but probable," the Hippias Major (36 pages), and rejects as spurious only six (Platon, sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre, 1910, vol. i, pp. 197-283). The Platonic Epistles Both in this work and in his Neue Untersuchungen iiber Platon (1910), Ritter discusses the genuineness of the thirteen Platonic Epistles, which practicaUy every nine teenth-century critic, except Grote, rejected, Jowett voicing the general judgment when he described them as "unworthy of Plato" and "flagrantly at variance with historical fact." " These letters," says Ritter, " have been entirely rejected by criticism, but lately famous scholars have again taken them entirely into favour. It appears to be made out from my separate investigations, that three letters of the collection, the third, the seventh (i.e. apart from a certain section which I must treat as an interpola tion), and in its kernel-contents the eighth, were either written by Plato's own hand or proceed at least from one of his most intimate friends. In that case they are witnesses of the first rank." More conservative critics, such as H. Rader and Blass, accept practically the whole of them as genuine, except the supposed interpolation dealing with iirio-Trjfvq in the seventh (pp. 3420-344^) . Even this has recently found 196 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM a thorough-going and persuasive defender in A. E. Taylor (see his able article in Mind, 1912, pp. 347-370), and I am inclined to think that he has made out his case. On the other side must be set that exceUent authority, the late H. Richards, who, writing in The Classical Review (1900), rejects the whole of them. Even he, however, admits that their style is entirely Platonic, and gives as practically his sole reason for rejecting them that their contents are unworthy of Plato. This argument, though not without weight, cannot be regarded as convincing, because it assumes (1) that an author must always be at his best, and (2) that the same degree of perfection is to be expected in mere letters as in such highly elaborate works of art as the Platonic dialogues. The Evidence of Papyrology The new evidence afforded by papyri is continually renderingmore and more impossible the uncritical practice, widely current in the nineteenth century, of questioning the authorship of universally received documents ; of requiring demonstration of authorship (a thing scarcely ever possible in the case of ancient writings, many of which are attributed to their authors solely on the authority of their MS. titles) ; of assuming that the current text is untrustworthy and largely interpolated ; and of rejecting for little or no reason a large number of uncorroborated statements of ancient historians. The discoveries of the last quarter of a century have established beyond all possibihty of doubt the extraordinary fidelity to his exemplar, both of the ancient and even of the much-abused medieval scribe. For example, it is now certain that the text of Homer has descended to us, with scarcely a single alteration, from the remote days of Pisistratus, when the first known recension of the text was made. As Dr. Leaf truly says : " Such as the vulgate [text of Homer] was before the days of Aristarchus, such it still remains. EVIDENCE OF PAPYROLOGY 197 . . . The great addition to our knowledge of the tradition made by the discoveries of papyri has shown how wonder fully tenacious and correct was the medieval scribe." Or as Professor A. C. Clark forcibly puts the matter : " The combined evidence seems to show that the sciolus, or the mala manus, that demon, sometimes foolish, sometimes cunning, but always malignant, who was supposed to haunt [the scribes of] the Dark Ages, was merely a phantom which has vanished in the daylight of further knowledge." Professor A. S. Hunt's View Professor A. S. Hunt thus sums up the general effect of recent papyrus discoveries upon classical criticism : " The chief lessons to be learnt from a study of the early evidence [of papyri] for the Greek classics, are, I think, three. First and most important, the general confirma tion of tradition. Our classical texts are found to be substantially the same as they were at the beginning of the Christian era. . . . Secondly, I think that on the whole they tend to justify the methods of the best modern scholarship. . . . Thirdly, the papyrus texts ... do not as a rule tend to support a single MS. or group of manuscripts. Editors must beware of pinning their faith to any one MS. or group." l After giving a considerable number of instances in which historical statements made by ancient writers, but doubted by modem critics, have been confirmed by new evidence furnished by papyri, he continues : " It is a grave mistake, therefore, to treat such reports of ancient historians cavalierly. They are not, of course, free from confusions and corruptions, against which it is right enough to be on guard ; but to neglect their affirmations, or to dismiss them without 1 The thorough-going supporters of the text of Hort, which rests practically upon a single manuscript, with some support from a very small group, should take note of this most important result of recent discoveries. rg8 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM strong conflicting evidence, is not consistent with the principles of sound criticism. At any rate, those who are minded to flout early testimony, will do well to wait until the period of papyrus discovery is safely over " (Papyri and Papyrology ; see also the Preface to this book). Prose-Rhythm Within the last few years an entirely new weapon of criticism has been forged which has already achieved important results. It has been discovered (or rather re-discovered) that most ancient prose is definitely rhythmical, and that by carefuUy studying an author's rhythm it is often possible to ascertain whether a reputed work of his is reaUy from his pen, and also whether a suspected passage is or is not an interpolation. Cicero is the author whose rhythm has been most exhaustively studied as yet,1 and the general result of investigation has been to confirm tradition . For example, the evidence of prose-rhythm has definitely proved spurious such works as the Invective against Sallust, the Oratio . . . antequam iret in exilium, and the Consolatio, which there are independent reasons for rejecting ; but it has triumphantly vindicated the Pro Archia, the two orations, Post Reditum, the Pro Marcello, and the last three speeches, In Catilinam, which were rejected or doubted by eminent nineteenth-century critics for very insufficient reasons. As Professor Clark truly says : " The discovery of papyri has been termed a divine judgment for sceptical critics. Their discomfiture has been completed by a new weapon. I refer to the science of prose-rhythm. . . . We are now in possession of Cicero's thumb-marks, and can decide with certainty whether a suspected work is authentic or not. Here again we have to notice the bankruptcy of subjective criticism. From the time of i The pioneer works are Norden, Die antike Kunstprosa (1898) and Zielinski, Das Clauselgesetz in Ciceros Reden (1904). EVIDENCE OF PROSE-RHYTHM 199 Markland (1745) it was fashionable to reject as spurious the speeches post reditum. The objections were mainly based on matters of language and style. The speeches were termed weak, periphrastic, and unworthy of Cicero. Also, their Latinity was impugned. It is now shown that the numeri conform exactly to the Ciceronian canon. The artist's hand is attested by his private mark." l Professor Clark also draws attention to the numberless cases in which passages bracketed or omitted by nine teenth-century editors have lately been rehabilitated by the double witness of papyri and prose-rhythm. The rule Prcestat brevior lectio ' has now been proved to be liable to so many important exceptions that it is doubtful whether it ought any longer to be regarded as a rule at aU. It certainly seems to be an established fact that the average ancient and medieval scribe was much more prone to omit than to add to his text,3 from which it follows.that in many cases the longer text is preferable to the shorter. Innumerable instances could be given, if space permitted, in which recent classical editors prefer the longer text. Application to Biblical Criticism A modem classical scholar, approaching the question of Biblical criticism from outside, without knowledge of (or without interest in) the theological controversies which for over a century have divided Biblical scholars into hostUe camps, would arrive almost immediately at the foUowing provisional conclusions, which he would expect perhaps to be slightly modified by subsequent detailed investigations, but not to be fundamentally changed. 1 Recent Developments in Textual Criticism (1914). 2 This rule is of more ancient lineage than is generally supposed. It goes back at least to Aristarchus, who applied it with a rigour which would have satisfied Hort himself. 8 See A. C. Clark, The Descent of Manuscripts (1918), especially1 ch. i, " Omissions in Manuscripts." 15 200 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM With regard to the Old Testament documents, which belong in large part to an early and almost prehistoric date, he would recognize that the results of the more moderate school of advanced criticism, those, for example, of Robertson Smith, Driver, Burney, and of Hastings' Bible Dictionary (not those of Cheyne and The Ency clopedia Biblica) are likely to be approximately correct. He would cordiaUy approve, both in principle and in detail, of the methods upon which the literary analysis of the Hexateuch is based ; he would also agree that much of the patriarchal history, and some even of the Mosaic (especiaUy that which is recorded only in the later documents) is legendary ; though he would probably be inclined to conjecture that the nucleus of genuine Mosaic legislation is larger than is generally supposed. He would point out that the recent discovery of the Code of Hammurabi confirms the tradition that Moses delivered to Israel a written law, and would contemplate as possible and even probable that a substantial portion of this original legislation (doubtless considerably modified to suit later conditions) stiU survives embedded in the compilation known as the Books of Moses. Similar considerations would lead him to acquiesce in modem views of the origin of the Psalter, and of the relative values of the books of Kings and Chronicles. With regard to Daniel, as soon as he recognized its apocalyptic character, he would regard it as improbable that it was written by the prophet himself. Classical scholarship has its own apocalyptic problem in The Sibylline Oracles, and scholars have long been aware (ever since, in fact, the critical edition of this work by C. Alexandre in 1841) that apocalyptic authors write usuaUy under assumed names, and deal mainly with contemporary or nearly contemporary events under very thin disguises. Consequently he would regard it as antecedently 'ACCEPTED' BOOKS OF NEW TESTAMENT 201 probable that the author of Daniel was a Jew who lived in Palestine in the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes (176- 164 B.C.), in whose persecution of observers of the Law he shows so absorbing an interest, and that accordingly his work has probably as httle connexion with the prophet Daniel as The Sibylline Oracles have with the Cumaean or any other Sibyl.1 II But such a scholar, summoned to pronounce judgment upon the New Testament books, would begin by declaring such extremely negative views as those of Schmiedel and Loisy, and even those of Harnack and Jiilicher, quite unacceptable. He would point out that with regard to the fully historical period (to which the books of the New Testa ment belong), modem critics are agreed that only in rare and quite exceptional cases is it possible to challenge the ancient ascription of authorship. He would therefore insist, prior to all detaUed investigation, that it is practi cally certain that all, or nearly aU, the New Testament books which the ancient Church unanimously received (viz. the Four Gospels, the thirteen Pauline Epistles, including the Pastorals, but omitting Hebrews ; also 1 Peter, 1 John, and Acts) are genuine documents. Nor would he admit as likely the hypothesis of indirect authorship now so largely favoured by the mediating Liberal school, except in the single case of the First Gospel, where the tradition itself assigns only the ground work to St. Matthew, leaving the exact relation between 1 The Sibylline Oracles, originally a purely heathen compilation, became in its later redactions almost entirely Jewish and Christian Vergil's magnificent fourth Eclogue is obviously based on a Jewish redaction, steeped in Messianic ideas. Of the purely heathen oracles we possess less than 100 lines, mainly preserved by Phlegon (second century a.d.). 202 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM St. Matthew's original Hebrew (or Aramaic) ' Logia ' and the present Greek Gospel quite undetermined.1 Ill He would further deny that differences of style, or internal difficulties, or even inconsistencies between a given work and the aUeged author's other works, ought to be aUowed to outweigh the unanimous attestation of antiquity, unless they were of so extreme a character as to render it moraUy impossible'to believe that the reputed author reaUy wrote it. Accordingly, if he were asked his opinion upon the somewhat marked difference of style between the Pastoral and the earlier Pauline Epistles, he would be likely to reply that it is not so great as that between the Dialogue and the Annals of Tacitus, the unity of authorship of which all recent critics have come to admit. Considering that the Pastoral Epistles are freely used by Polycarp (a.d. no), and that there are distinct echoes of them even in Clement of Rome (95), he would hold that the chances are decidedly in favour of their genuineness. If, further, it were pointed out to him that the theology of these Epistles (especially the attitude of the author towards the Law and good works), differs considerably from that of St. Paul's earlier Epistles, particularly Galatians, he would be inclined to argue that it is possible that St. Paul graduaUy changed his views (or at least his emphasis) as the controversy concerning circumcision died down, and the Church's real peril was seen to be, not legalism, but antinomianism. The canon of advanced criticism which refuses an author permission to change his opinions (or even his 1 The venerable tradition that St. Matthew compiled the oracles (' logia ') of the Lord in Hebrew, and that " each one interpreted them as he could," ascends almost certainly to the Presbyter (or Elder) of Papias, i.e. possibly the Apostle John (see below). 'ACCEPTED' BOOKS OF NEW TESTAMENT 203 emphasis), or ever to contradict himself even on minor matters, has produced deplorable results in the classical field (notably in the criticism of Plato), has introduced chaos into the criticism of the Pauline writings, and if apphed to modem works would produce results equaUy absurd. For example, it would require us to beheve that George Salmon, who wrote The Human Element in the Gospels (1907), was a different person from the George Salmon who, at an earlier date, wrote the well-known Introduction to the New Testament. A trained classical critic would make short work of the chief Liberal argument against the Petrine authorship of 1 Peter, viz. its use of the Pauline Epistles. He would dismiss as mere prejudice the supposition that the early antagonism between Peter and Paul, aUuded to in the Epistle to the Galatians,1 was lasting. Arguing from the entirely credible primitive tradition (already clearly stated in Clement of Rome) that the two Apostles co operated harmoniously at the close of their lives in the great work of consolidating the Roman Church, he would argue that there is nothing improbable in the supposition that St. Peter was an admirer of St. Paul's writings, and therefore quite likely to make use of them in his own Epistle. He would regard it as an outrage upon criticism to reject, or to attribute to Silvanus (as is usual now in Liberal and Modernist circles) an Epistle with which the short Letter to Polycarp (A.D. no) offers no less than fourteen close coincidences, which was quoted by Papias ; and against which the only piece of definite evidence that can be produced is, that it is not mentioned in the frag mentary (and corrupt) Muratorian Canon (c. a.d. 200). If 1 Peter is not to be regarded as Petrine, the credit of hardly a single ancient document can stand. 1 Criticism seems to be gradually moving towards the view (which has much to recommend it) that Galatians is the earliest Pauline Epistle. 204 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM The Johannine Question Passing by the problem of the authorship of Luke and Acts, which, since the adhesion of Harnack and other Liberals to the traditional view, can hardly now be said to exist for reasonable criticism, we come to the most vexed of all New Testament questions, the origin of the Johannine writings. I leave undiscussed, for lack of space, the origin of the disputed Apocalypse, merely remarking that if, in spite of its being an apocalypse and being disputed, it is reaUy (by a unique exception) by its nominal author,1 it seems just possible (though very difficult) to assign it (as Harnack does) to the same writer as the Gospel. We may account for the remarkable difference of style between the two works by supposing : (i) that the author employed different amanuenses ; (2) that there was a wide interval of time between the two books ; (3) that the Apocalypse is written in the author's usual vernacular style, abounding in solecisms of a kind usual in non-hterary papyri, whereas the Gospel represents an attempt (only moderately successful) to write the simplest possible literary Greek ; (4) that the peculiar style of the Apocalypse is partly due to a basic document upon which the author worked, and the diction of which he imitated. External Evidence A classical scholar, asked for his opinion upon the authorship of the Fourth Gospel and the closely related 1 The early evidence for the Apostolic authorship of the Apocalypse is so strong that it is not altogether unreasonable to hold that it counter balances the undoubted difficulty of assigning it to St. John. Justin ascribes it to "a certain man among us, named John, one of the Apostles of Christ " (Dial., 81) ; Irenasus, wishing to. establish the correct Number of the Beast, appeals not only to ancient copies, but to the testimony of those elders " who saw John face to face " (Iren. v. xxx. 1 ; the Greek in Euseb. E, H. v. 8). ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL *oj First Epistle of John (which is almost certainly by the same writer), would inquire first of aU concerning the external evidence, and when he learnt that it was classed by Eusebius without hesitation among the ' undisputed ' books ; that Origen, the most learned and critical of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, had no doubt about its authenticity; that Clement of Alexandria and Tertulhan of Carthage (c. a.d. 200) accepted it and used it freely ; that it is attested by the Muratorian Canon (A.D. 200) ; that already to Irenaeus, who wrote about a.d. 180 in Gaul, but who in youth had lived in Asia Minor and received instructions from the venerable Polycarp, the disciple of the Apostle, it was not only Johannine, but also canonical, and had been so ever since he could remember 1 ; that Polycrates, Bishop of Ephesus (c. a.d. 190), clearly assigned it to the Apostle ; that it was ascribed to John by name by Theophilus (a.d. 175), and used by Justin Martyr (c. 155) ; that Papias (c. 130) also knew it, for Irenaeus quotes (obviously from him) an explanation by certain ' elders ' of our Lord's words, " In my Father's house are many mansions " (John xiv. 2) * ; that Polycarp (c. no) (and also Papias) quote the First Epistle of John, which is a work by the same author ; that the seven genuine 1 Irenaeus even tries to prove that there can be only Four Gospels. Whatever we may think of his argument, it is a clear proof that, ever since he could remember, the Church had acknowledged only the present- four. " It is not possible," he writes, " that the Gospels can be either more or fewer in number than they are. For since there are four zones of the world in which we live, and four all-pervading winds, and since the Church is scattered over all the earth, and the Gospel is ' the pillar and ground of the Church," and the spirit of life ; it is fitting that she should have four pillars, breathing forth immortality on every side, and giving new spiritual life to men." After comparing the Gospels to the four-faced cherubim, he continues : " And therefore the Gospels are in accord with these [cherubim], among whom Christ is seated. For the [Gospel] according to John relates His original and effectual and glorious generation from the Father, saying, In the beginning was the Word, and all things were made through Him, etc." (in. xi. 18). 2 See Iren. v. xxxvi. r, 2. He has mentioned Papias just before. We also know from Euseb. E. H. iii. 19, that Papias made use of the closely related I John. GOSPEL OF PETER 207 Recent Discovery He would also leam that, although aU recent Con tinental criticism is unfavourable to apostohc authorship, and even some conservative critics are inchned to com promise by adopting theories of indirect authorship, nevertheless every recent discovery of fresh ancient evidence has confirmed tradition. The most important of these is a large fragment of The Gospel of Peter, a docetic work of the former half of the second century, the limits of date of which lie between a.d. 100 and 140. The author uses (and abuses) our present Four Gospels, and apparently no others, from which we may conclude with confidence that already at the very early date of A.D. 120-130, our present Four Gospels had already been singled out as especially trust worthy, and were weU on their way towards a canonical position. The Rev. L. St. Alban WeUs, who (in agree ment with Harnack) assigns the Gpspel of Peter to the period 100-110, speaks of its " strong Johannine flavour." " Though entirely parallel with the Synoptic accounts of the Passion, it contains no fewer than twenty-nine addi tions to the Markan narrative . . . and both in its verbal and in its historical variations it is largely (Harnack gives eight examples) influenced by the corrections found in the Fourth Gospel, e.g. the date of the Crucifixion is Nisan 14, as in John xix. 14 and 31." x Similarly, Dr. Armitage Robinson says : " The unmistakable acquain tance of the author with our four Evangelists deserves a special comment. He uses and misuses each in turn. He lends no support to the attempt which has been made to place a gulf of separation between the Fourth Gospel 1 Article, Gospels, Apocryphal, in Hastings' Encycl. of Rel. and Eth. The most thorough proof of the author's use of St. John (which is gener ally acknowledged) is Professor C. H. Turner's article in The Journal of Theological Studies, Jan. 1913. Harnack dates the Gospel of Peter quite early in the second century, Sanday 125, Zahn 130. 206 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM Epistles of Ignatius (a.d. no) are full of echoes of it 1 ; furthermore, that its authority was admitted by nearly aU the Gnostics of the second century except Marcion, whose only Gospel was a mutilated Luke, e.g. by the very early Naasenes and Peratae, by Basihdes (c. 120-130), by the Valentinians and probably Valentinus himself ' (c. 140), to all of whom the author's leading doctrine that the Word was made flesh, and his strong anti-docetic * tendency, were most distasteful, and when he learnt further that the only persons who are known to have rejected it were an obscure and quite unimportant group called the ' Alogi,' of whom almost the only definite piece of information procurable is that they acknowledged the antiquity of the Gospel which they rejected, by assigning it to St. John's opponent Cerinthus ; he would certainly consider that external evidence of genuineness of such exceptional strength as this could only be refuted by the production of internal evidence of demonstrative strength that the Apostle could not have written it. 1 Even Dr. Latimer Jackson considers Ignatius's use of the Fourth Gospel " highly probable " (Problem of the Fourth Gospel, 1918, p. 16). Ignatius speaks of Jesus as the Logos (Word), the Door of the Father, the Shepherd of the Sheep, the Giver of Living Water. The very phrase " He knoweth whence he cometh and whither he goeth " (John iii. 8) occurs. The Eucharist is the flesh (, literally witnessed)." The passage in Origen is fortunately extant (tomus xii, ch. vi, a diffuse comment on our Lord's prophecy to the two brothers, Matt. xx. 20 ff.). It affirms, indeed, that John ' witnessed," but by suffering, not by death. From the hint of Georgius, we are enabled to restore the misunderstood passage of Papias somewhat as follows : " James was killed by the Jews, and John his brother (ful filling the Lord's prophecy that he should drink of His cup) also witnessed " (i^aprvprjo-tv or fidprvs iyivtro, these expressions not being restricted in early times, as they became later, to blood-martyrdom). The reader is advised, before hastily crediting the most improbable statement of Philip, to read and ponder what Socrates (Eccles. Hist., vii. 26 ff.) and Photius, one of the most learned and impartial of all ancient critics (Cod. 35), have to say about the worthlessness of his character, both as a man and as a historian. AU the early authorities who allude to the subject state positively that St. John died a natural death in JOHN THE 'PRESBYTER' 217 extreme old age at Ephesus, and when we consider how strong was the tendency in early times to attribute to aU Apostles the crowning glory of martyrdom, we shall find good reason to distrust these two late and untrustworthy witnesses. In any case, there is no evidence whatever for the favourite Liberal hypothesis of a Palestinian martyrdom. If the evidence of Georgius is of any value at all, it is evidence for an Ephesian martyrdom of the apostle in extreme old age, " after having composed the Gospel according to him." John the Presbyter It is now customary in Liberal (and not altogether unusual even in orthodox) circles to ascribe the Fourth Gospel (directly or indirectly) to a supposed ' Presbyter ' John, distinct from the Apostle.1 Some even regard the ' Presbyter ' as the teacher of Polycarp, rejecting the express statement of Irenaeus (confirmed by the consensus of all ancient authorities) that he was the Apostle. No ancient authority earlier than Eusebius mentions this ' Presbyter,' and Eusebius's entire knowledge of him is derived, not from tradition, but from his own dubious exegesis of a single obscure passage quoted by him from the preface to Papias's lost work.8 The passage from Papias makes excellent sense, if the Apostle John and the ' Presbyter ' or ' Elder ' John there mentioned are understood (as they are by G. Salmon, in his Introduction, pp. 83, 268 ff., and by Dom, J. Chapman in his John the Presbyter, pp. 33 ff.) to be the same person. Considering that no earlier reader of Papias (whose work was much studied) finds any mention of two Johns in his writings, but that they all, on the contrary, identify the ' Presbyter ' (or ' Elder ') with the Apostle, it seems to me that Salmon's and Chapman's interpretation of the passage is probably correct. But even if Eusebius is right, and there really was a ' Presbyter ' John, distinct from the Apostle, still there is no evidence whatever connecting him with the Fourth Gospel, or even with Asia. It should be noticed, also, that the title ' Presbyter ' (which in this case is probably a title of office in the ministry) suggests that he was a person of no great prominence in the Church, and is decidedly un favourable to the supposition that he was a kind of episcopus 1 Harnack makes the ' Presbyter ' the author, but regards him as a disciple of the Apostle John. Sanday (in Hastings' E. R. E.) leaves the choice open between the Presbyter and the Apostle, with a prefer - ence for the Apostle. ' See E. H., iii. 39. 218 MODERNISM AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM episcoporum in Asia, such as the Ephesian John, even if not the Apostle, undoubtedly was.1 No evidence whatever for the existence of this ' Presbyter ' can be gathered from Dionysius of Alexandria (a.d. 250), who, on the ground solely of difference of style, assigns to a different author the Apocalypse, which in his day was a seri ously disputed book. He expressly identifies the ' Presbyter ' who wrote 2 and 3 John with the Apostle, and says that he knows nothing whatever from tradition of the John who he supposes wrote the Apocalypse. He mentions, indeed, on the evidence of mere hearsay, two ' memorials,' or possibly two tombs, of John at Ephesus, but not the slightest reliance can be placed upon this statement, for Polycrates, who is a much earlier authority, and a much better one, for he was actually bishop of Ephesus, knows of only one tomb.2 Christology of the Gospel It used to be alleged that the Fourth Gospel cannot be apostolic, because its Christology is not merely more developed than that of the Synoptics, but is even inconsistent with it. Of late, however, there has been a retreat from this position all along the line. Gardner and RashdaU, for instance, unite with Loisy and Le Roy in eliminating a large number of leading Christological passages from the Synoptics, as being " Johannine interpolations" or as "reflecting the later con sciousness and experience of the Church." They thus admit — and a very significant admission it is — that St. John's Christology is not really inconsistent with the Synoptics as they stand, but only with these Gospels as expur gated by Modernist critics, in order to bring them into forced accord with their own attenuated Christology. If we take the text of the Synoptic Gospels as it appears 1 The historical authority of the Fourth Gospel is not greatly weak ened by the supposition that the ' Presbyter ' wrote it. For this ' Presbyter,' on the authority of Papias, was a disciple of the Lord, and (on the authority of the Gospel itself) was the Beloved Disciple, who leaned on the Lord's breast at the Last Supper. The supposition that the Beloved Disciple, though present at the Last Supper, was not an Apostle, but a wealthy (and probably young) adherent of Jesus from among the aristocracy of Jerusalem, seems to me infinitely improbable. 2 See Eusebius, E. H., vii. 25. It is not clear that Dionysius speaks of two tombs (riTa re iirip iip-uv), but He also came down from heaven and became incarnate for us (rbv St' r\p.at rois avBptiirovs, xal Sti. ttjx ^pxripav triDTrjptav xareKBivTa ix twv obpavSiv, (col aaptcwBivra ix HveiptaTOS 'Aylov xaX Maplas ttjs vapBivov, Kal ipcwBpunrrjcravra). 262 THE CATHOLIC CREEDS Atonement is taught by the Church as a fact, but no theory of it has ever been officiaUy adopted or prescribed as necessary. Redemption is primarily from sin and from spiritual death, and the result of it is remission of sins and eternal life .in God. Redemption, like the FaU, is a corporate act, though it is necessary for each individual on coming to years of discretion to appropriate it by repentance and faith. It changes the whole status of the human race in the sight of God, and introduces a New and Eternal Covenant between God and the children of men. This is expressed in theology by saying that Christ became not merely a man (though this is not false), but also man for us, i.e. He assumed the essential humanity of the whole race, of which He is the Head. With the same implication of meaning, Scripture speaks of Him as the Second Adam, in whom as its Second Progenitor the faUen race rises once more (i Cor. xv. 20 ft.).1 The Incarnation A simUar wise reserve is shown in the credal definitions of the Incarnation. They contain no more, and also not less, than what is necessary. They guard against the purely heathen theories of ' Apotheosis ' or ' Adop tion ' (which are the very negation of a real Incarnation) by making it clear that it is the Son of God who becomes man, not a human person who becomes the Son of God. 1 The doctrine of racial solidarity, though most mysterious, and for that reason often regarded as incredible by nineteenth-century scientists, is by no means out of harmony with the results of recent researches into the relations obtaining between individual organisms and the races to which they belong. The tendency of recent biology certainly seems to be to regard the race as a ' super-organism,' to which the individuals which compose it are united by a bond which, though not physical, may be conceived of as in a sense ' organic' The best short treatment that I know of this very difficult subject is J. S. Huxley's suggestive book The Individual in the Animal King dom. M. Maeterlinck's The Life of the Bee should also be consulted. THE INCARNATION 263 As against Arianism, which denied the Incarnation in another way, by making the Son of God, who became man, a creature, the Nicene Creed declares Him to be consubstantial with the Father, i.e. of the same nature, essence, glory, and majesty — in fact, one God with Him. The doctrine of Arius, that the Son of God is a creature and yet ought to be worshipped, is essentially poly theistic, and the Church in condemning it was clearly combating an attempt to supplant monotheism by polytheism. That the definition of Nicaea saved Chris tianity from lapsing into Paganism is generaUy admitted and is absolutely true. The word homoousios, used in the Nicene Creed to express the fact that the Son of God is not a creature or inferior divinity, but is one in nature and essence with the Supreme God, is not found in Scripture, but the doctrine which it expresses certainly is, and that not only in the Fourth Gospel (x. 38 etc.) and in St. Paul (see especiaUy PhU. ii. 6, where the pre-existent Son is regarded as subsist ing in the essential form [nopfyfj] of God, and on a footing of equality [ehai laa 8em]), but also in the Synoptics, where not only are there numerous passages asserting the superangelic nature of the Son, but two at least, the Baptismal formula (Matt, xxviii. 19) contained in every ancient manuscript and version, and the Logion, Matt. xi. 27 = Luke x. 22, assigned by critics to the primitive ' Logia ' of St. Matthew, which are decisive for consub stantiality. A Being who, as stated in Matt. xi. 27, is of so exalted a nature that the Father alone can compre- hand it, cannot be a creature, but must be divine in the fuU Athanasian sense. It appears, therefore, that the Christological doctrine of the Nicene Creed does not in any way (except in ex pression) go beyond the clear teaching, not merely of the Epistles, but even of the Synoptics. The Synoptic Gospels, not less than the writings of St. Paul and St. John, assert a consubstantial Sonship, and also the doc- *9 264 THE CATHOLIC CREEDS trine of our Lord's pre-existence, as the title Son of Man of itself convincingly testifies. It is one of the most assured results of recent Synoptic criticism (Liberal as weU as orthodox) that the title Son of Man imphes pre-existence, and that not merely impersonal or ideal pre-existence, but actual and personal pre-existence in a state of divine glory and majesty with the Father in heaven.1 Accordingly, if Jesus ever used it of Himself, as the Synoptics testify that He did, then it is certain that He must have beheved, not that He was a mere man (as Dr. RashdaU, Dr. Bethune-Baker, and Mr. Major suppose), but that He was a pre-existent Divine (or at least superangelic) Person, sharing as of right the throne and attributes of God, who out of love for us miserable sinners stooped from heaven to become man. Thus the teaching of the Synoptic Christ about Himself corresponds substantiaUy with that of the Johannine. The only apparent way of avoiding this inference is the quite desperate one of denying that Jesus ever applied to Himself this title, which, according to the Synoptists, was His favourite name for Himself, and which they represent Him as using of Himself no less than seventy- one times.' The Synoptic Gospels lend no countenance to Mr. Major's extravagant supposition that Jesus was only consubstantial with God in the same sense in which every man is or may become consubstantial with God ; and that if He reaUy existed at aU before His conception, it was only in the same way in which all human souls may be conceived of as so pre-existing.* It lies on the very surface of the Synoptic Gospels, that the pre-existence of the Son of Man is the pre-exist- 1 See above, p. 220. a See further, ch. ix, appendices I and II. 3 The pre-existence of souls was a common Rabbinical doctrine in our Lord's time, and is alluded to in John ix. 2. Among Christians, Origen hazarded the speculation that it may be true, but it has been rejected with practical unanimity iii all ages. THE INCARNATION 265 ence, not of an ordinary human soul, but of an Awful Superhuman and Superangehc Being, who from the beginning had shared the divine glory and power, who even on earth was able to exercise the divine prerogative of pardon, and who is the destined Judge of quick and dead. The gulf which separates this unique Son of Man from aU other sons of men is clearly not finite but infinite. Modernists profess to believe in the primitive (i.e. the Synoptic) conception of the Divine Sonship and Incarna tion of Jesus. In that case, they ought to be wiUing to accept the statements of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, which do not in substance go beyond that conception. The credal statements are obviously minimal ones. They contain none of the later theological and philo sophical refinements and developments. Nothing, for example, is said as to the exact relation between the divine and the human natures of Christ, nothing as to the extent and nature of His human knowledge, nothing as to the development of His consciousness and personahty. Many important points are left open for reverent inquiry. Indeed, so broad and general is the definition of the Incarnation in the Creeds that it is obvious that it contains nothing which genuine believers in that doc trine wUl ever find it necessary to question, much less to disavow. Nevertheless the Catholic Creeds, while omitting all that is not essential to behef in the Incarnation, contain aU that is. They make it clear, for example, that by the Incarnation is meant God becoming Man, not (as is main tained by supporters of the theory of Apotheosis or ' Adoption ') a mere man becoming God. The Nicene Creed teaches quite clearly that the Son of God is a pre existing Divine Being who " for us men and for our salvation " came down from heaven and was made man in the Virgin's womb. Further, the use of the term op,oov{ indicates the body in whole or (occasionally) in part : i Cor. v. 5 ; vii. 28 ; xv. 39 ff. ; 2 Cor. vii 1 ; v. ; Gal. iv. 13, 14 ; Eph. ii. 11 ; v. 29 ; Phil. i. 22, 24 ; Col. i. 24 ; ii. 1, 5. 13 ; 1 Pet. iii. 18 ; iv. 1, 6 ; cf. Matt. xix. 5, etc. As distin guished from aup.a, which emphasizes organization, cap!; lays stress on the material of the body, but it indicates the same object. Other New Testament meanings of [v}q6n],1 are usually wiUing to con cede that the author obliquely aUudes to and endorses it, for he speaks of the supernatural birth of Christians in terms which suggest that he is comparing it with the supernatural birth of Christ.3 The Creed and the Virgin Birth It was probably not until definite heresy had arisen with regard to our Lord's Person that the doctrine of His Vir ginal Conception attained that position of central importance in the rehgious consciousness of the Church which it has ever since retained. The circumstances of its elevation to full dogmatic rank are fairly well known. After the destruction .of Jerusalem in a.d. 70 there arose in Peraea, and presently spread to other places, a Judaising sect of .Ebionites (or Peratici), who denied the divinity of Jesus, and with it its outward token, the Virgin Birth.8 Justin Martyr speaks of them as " men of our [or of your, i.e. 1 Zahn and Peake also accept this reading. The fullest and best discussion of it that I know is in Zahn's Introduction to his Com mentary on St. John. 2 See this well argued by B. I. D. Smith, in The Parting of the Roads (edited by F. J. Foakes-Jackson), p. 263 ; also by F. H. Chase, in Belief and Creed., pp. 66 ff. 8 A more orthodox school of Ebionites, afterwards called Nazarenes accepted these beliefs. 21 296 THE CATHOLIC CREEDS the Jewish] race, who admit that Jesus is the Christ, while holding Him to be man of men." J Irenaeus teUs us that they agreed in Christology with Cerinthus and Carpocrates, re garding Jesus as a mere man, the son of Joseph and Mary by natural generation.8 TertuUian says that they aUowed Jesus to be nothing more than a Solomon or a Jonah.* Of the Ebionites and Ebionizers of the Apostolic Age we know most about Cerinthus, who once at least visited Ephesus, where he was opposed by St. John. According to Irenseus, Cerinthus taught that Jesus was a mere man, begotten in the course of nature by Joseph and Mary, but that He differed from other men in being more righteous, prudent, and wise than they. After His Baptism, ' the Christ ' descended from the Supreme Ruler upon Him in the form of a dove, and He thereupon proclaimed the Unknown Father, and worked miracles. But before the Passover ' the Christ ' departed from Him, and only the man Jesus died upon the Cross and rose again, the heavenly ' Christ ' remaining impassible, as being a spiritual being.4 Putting together our somewhat fragmentary information, we may be reasonably certain that during the period a.d. 70 to 100 there came into existence two main types of Ebioniz- ing heresy : one which was adoptionist or electionist in principle, and regarded Jesus as a man who was permanently exalted to become the Son of God at His Baptism and was in a manner deified ; and another which was immanentist, and maintained that Jesus was a man upon whom " the Christ " (or Spirit or Logos) of God descended at His Bap tism, and having remained within Him during His ministry, deserted Him before His Passion, leaving Him mere man as before. Both these types of Ebionism denied His birth of a Virgin, and regarded Him as only " man of men " before His Baptism. As orthodox Christians reflected on these and kindred heresies, they realized more clearly than before the intimate connexion obtaining between the historic fact of the Virgin Birth and the orthodox doctrine of Christ's person. The ' Adoptionists ' or ' Electionists ' maintained that Jesus had become the Son of God at His Baptism. Some possibly postponed His ' adoption ' till His Ascension. In any case their theory was. not the orthodox one that God had become 1 Dialogue with Trypho, xlviii. The reading being doubtful, it is uncertain whether Justin classed them as Christians or Jews, 2 V. i. 3 compared with I. xxvi. 2. * De Came Christi, xviii. 4 I, xxvi. 1. THE TYPES OFEBIONISM 297 man, but the quite different one that a man had become God (or in some vague sense ' divine '). It was vital, there fore, for Orthodoxy to maintain that Jesus had been the Son of God from the first moment of His earthly existence. If for a single moment (even in His mother's womb) He had ever been mere man, then He could not possibly have pre existed personaUy as the Eternal Son of God. The historical fact which clearly and unambiguously carries back the Divine Sonship of Jesus to the very begin ning of His human existence, and so makes a real Incarna tion possible, is His Virginal Conception ; accordingly, belief in this, even before the first century closed, became the touchstone of orthodoxy. It is remarkable how early it was taken for granted, both by defenders and opponents of Orthodoxy, that the Virgin Birth was the significant symbol (and even to some extent the proof) of the pre-existence and divine personality of the human Jesus. For example, aU through Justin's Dialogue with the Jew Trypho, it is assumed as self-evident by both disputants that Justin's doctrine that Jesus was born of a Virgin implies a high Christology (viz. the pre-existence and divinity of Jesus, in other words, the Incarnation of God) ; and that the denial of it implies a low Christology, viz. the doctrine that the human Jesus had been ' elected ' or ' adopted ' to be the Messiah or Son of God, a supposition which Trypho at times declared himself not altogether dis inclined to entertain. StiU earher than this, in The Apology of Aristides, we find the pre-existence and divinity of Jesus very closely connected with His birth of a Virgin.1 Theory of Apotheosis The advocates of the lower types of Christology discreetly veiled their novel theories under the fair-sounding and Scriptural titles of " Election " and " Adoption." But the orthodox perceived from the first that the whole idea of a man becoming God is Pagan, not Christian, and involves, when logically thought out, the heathen abomination of apotheosis and creature-worship. Apotheosis was repugnant, not only to their religious feelings, but also to their reason. It fla grantly contradicted three of the fundamental attributes of God, as then conceived — His Completeness or Perfection, His 1 " The Christians derive their race from the Lord Jesus Christ. He is Himself Son of God on high, who was manifested pf [by] the Holy Spirit, came down from heaven, and being born of a Hebrew Virgin, took on His flesh from the Virgin, and was manifested in the nature pf humanity the Son of God." 298 THE CATHOLIC CREEDS Immutability, and His Eternity. To admit that God had assumed into His ' Substance ' a Being who was not God before, was to admit that the Divine Substance is capable of increase, and therefore imperfect and mutable. To admit that Jesus was God now, without having always been so, was to deny that God is eternal. Accordingly Adoptionism (i.e. Apotheosis) was rejected with contempt as being irra tional, and with horror as involving the blasphemy of creature-worship. The Docetic Heresy It was perceived also that the doctrine of the Virgin Birth was a valuable weapon against the opposite type of heresy of the Docetae, who also denied it. Docetism, which is aUuded to in the latest books of the New Testament (2 John 7 ; cf . r John iv. 2), and by Ignatius (a.d. no), became the accepted theory of nearly all the Gnostics of the second century. It is the theory that Jesus was a divine, or at least a celestial, being who (owing to the inherent evil of matter and His unwillingness to abandon His divine impassibility) did not really become man, but only assumed a phantom or ' seem ing ' body (hence the name, Docetism), which was entirely unreal, could not be handled, and (above all) could not suffer. The Docetae, like the Ebionites, denied the Virgin Birth of Christ. Some, like Basilides * and Marcion,8 denied Him any birth at all, even a ' seeming ' one, and represented Him as appearing suddenly on earth in the outward appearance of an adult. Others, like Valentinus, admitted an ' apparent ' Birth, but regarded His mother as the mere channel by which He passed into the world (" like water through a pipe "), without partaking of her substance. All denied that He took human flesh of His earthly mother. Against such false teaching, as subversive of a real In carnation as Ebionism itself, the Church insisted that the Redeemer took human flesh and human nature in the womb of His mother Mary of her substance, and is thus as truly consubstantial with us through His human conception, as He is consubstantial with God through His eternal genera tion. Accordingly it was against Docetic as well as Ebionite 1 " He taught that the Saviour was not born, was incorporeal with out shape, and was only apparently a visible man " (Irenaeus, i. 24, 2). 1 Marcion taught that the Saviour descended suddenly in a phan tom body and began to teach at Capernaum (Tertullian,- Against Marcion, iv. 7). He omitted the Birth narrative from his mutilated version of St. Luke, the only Gospel which he received. THE VIRGIN BIRTH TO-DAY 299 denials of the Incarnation that the dogma of the Virgin Birth was polemically directed in the first instance, and inserted in the earliest draft (not later than a.d. 100) of the Apostles' Creed. It was contained in the Creed of Ignatius (a.d. no), who frequently lays stress upon it, and also of Aristides, and from at least a.d. 100 was the orthodox watchword against the errors of the day. As Dr. J. A. Robinson remarks : " Everything that we know of the dogmatics of the early part of the second century agrees with the belief that at that period the Virginity of Mary was a part of the formulated Christian belief. Nor need we hesitate ... to give the doc trine a place in the Creed of Aristides." x The Virgin Birth To-day The Ebionite peril, to guard against which the doctrine of the Virgin Birth was originaUy inserted in the Creed, has not yet left us. Indeed, there has lately been a remarkable recrudescence of ' Adoptionist ' theories identical in prin ciple and sometimes even in detail with those of the early centuries. With these we shaU have to concern ourselves in the final chapter. It is sufficient here to remark that in this as in the primitive period they are usually associated with denial of the Virginal Conception of our Lord, and that the article of the Creed which affirms it to be an historic fact remains to-day as valuable a safeguard of the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation as it was then. 1 See his edition of The Apology of Aristides, p. 25. CHAPTER XII THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM The most disquieting feature of the Modernist movement — disquieting even to some of those (Bishop Henson, for instance) who until recently were among its most promi nent adherents — is its steady and now even rapid ' drift to the left ' in its attitude (i) towards the Creeds and the dogmatic principle, (2) towards the Person of Christ, (3) towards the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and (4) towards the binding and immutable character of Christian morality. This ' drift,' long denied, or attributed, when un deniable, to irresponsible and unrepresentative extremists only, is now openly acknowledged, and even gloried in. So distinguished a Modernist as Prof. Bethune-Baker said quite openly at the Cambridge Conference : " We must absolutely jettison the traditional doctrine that His [Christ's] personality was not human, but divine. ... I do not for a moment suppose that Jesus ever thought of Himself as God." Earlier Attitude towards Creeds Only a few years ago the accepted Modernist standpoint (in England at any rate) was that creeds are good in prin ciple, and that the existing Creeds, the Apostles' and the Nicene, are admirable confessions of faith. AU that was desired, even by the Churchmen's Union, was permission to understand two articles only, those affirming our Lord's Birth of a Virgin and His Resurrection, in a ' symbohcal ' sense, which, we were assured, would preserve their fuU ' spiritual value.' 300 CREEDS AS TESTS 301 Present View of Creeds Within the last three years, however, a complete revolu tion of opinion has taken place. It is now the accepted Modernist position that creeds are bad in principle, and even the minority of Modernists, who are willing to acquiesce in their use, do so, for the most part, only on condition that they shaU cease to be used as ' tests.' Since it was entirely to serve as " tests ' of corporate and individual orthodoxy that creeds first came into being, and since this is stiU their chief and almost only function, it is evident that even this second more moderate demand is equivalent in effect to a demand for their entire abolition.1 As it is difficult for the ordinary Christian to believe that so extreme a policy of negation is seriously advocated by reasonable men, it is desirable to exhibit a few extracts from recent utterances (all within the year 1921) of representative Modernists. " I should keep the Te Deum and drop the ' Three Creeds,' " is the pronouncement of Dean Inge. " [The Creed] certainly should not be used as a test of individual orthodoxy, either for laity or ministers," is the opinion of the Rev. C. H. S. Matthews. " I submit that the whole idea of Credenda to be required of members of Christ's Church is foreign to the mind of 1 It was entirely as ' tests ' that creeds came into being in the first instance. This was the case even with the earliest recorded creed, " I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God ' (Western text of Acts viii. 37) ; also with the Apostles' Creed, which from the first was an abjura tion, not only of heathenism, but also of Ebionism and Gnosticism ; and with the Nicene Creed, which was polemically directed against Arianism in the first instance, and in its complete form also against later Christological heresies. The Western including the Anglican Church stresses the individual assent of every adherent, by adopting the form "/believe "instead of the Eastern" Webelieve." At Baptism each candidate. is required to express his individual assent (in person or by proxy) to each article of the Apostles' Creed recited separately ; and the dying Christian is examined by his parish priest as to his faithful and detailed adherence to the Creed of his Baptism. No part of the Church — certainly not the Anglican — has ever taken the view that the Catholic Creeds are less binding on the laity than on the clergy. 302 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM Christ. . . . No intellectual agreement among the disciples of Christ is to be expected. Our age is not only incom petent to revise or rewrite the Creeds, it even questions the rightfulness of a formula as a test of membership," says Rev. F. E. Hutchinson. 1 "A creed should not be regarded as a ' test ' which must be accepted by individuals, whether laity or clergy, as a condition of membership or office," is the present judgment of the Rev. C. W. Emmet.' " A credal formula is neither necessary nor desirable," writes Dr. Bindley. " It does not seem possible or desirable to revise or rewrite any one of the ancient Creeds, nor to continue to use them for any other purpose than as devo tional canticles and historical landmarks," says Prof. Bethune-Baker. " I look upon their proper use as devotional ; certainly not as a test. The world is ripe, and over-ripe, for the abolition of religious tests," says Mr. G. G. Coulton. " It ought to be left entirely to the individual to adjust himself, as best he may, to particular doctrines. He ought not to be asked, do you believe this point ? do you believe that ? " says the Rev. N. E. E. Swann.' But perhaps the most instructive recent statement is that of the Rev. H. D. A. Major, whose representative character, as editor of The Modern Churchman and Principal of Ripon HaU, wiU not be denied. Writing to correct what he regards as a ' curious misrepresentation ' contained in a recent public speech of my own delivered in London,4 he gives a thoroughly typical and almost authoritative statement of the present Modernist attitude towards dogma : " Where he [the Modernist] differs from 1 Christian Freedom, p. 141. " Mr. Emmet has somewhat ' drifted ' since 1918, when he wrote : " There are many who are asking themselves whether we are wise in continuing to use them as tests. The question is a difficult one, and cannot be discussed here " (Conscience, Creeds, and Critics, p. 78). * Most of the above quotations are from The Modern Churchman for January and February 192 1. « Reported fully in The Church Times of June 24, 1921. MR. MAJOR'S PARADOXES 303 the traditionalist," says Mr. Major, " is in claiming the right and duty under the progressive revelation of the Holy Spirit to reinterpret and even to reject any statement in the Creed which may become incredible as the result of reverent research." 1 Mr. Major's Paradoxes I thank Mr. Major for his correction of my pubhc state ment, which, coming from so good an authority, I of course accept ; but I am sorry to say that its effect is to make the Modernist position even worse (from my point of view) than I had previously imagined. For if Mr. Major's words are to be construed literally (as he assures us that he intends),' then it foUows, from the principle laid down by him, that the Modernist claims liberty to reject any statement in the Creed : (1) That the Modernist claims liberty to deny the existence of God ; (2) and His Personality, (3) and His love for humankind, (4) and His Incarnation in the Person of His Son, (5) and the historical existence of such a person as Jesus of Nazareth, (6) and human immor tahty, (7) and the holiness of the Church, (8) and the need of a holy life for Christians. Or to put the matter positively, the Modernist claims hberty (according to Mr. Major) to teach (1) Atheism, (2) Pantheism and Materialism, (3) God's indifference to the needs of His creatures, (4) Unitarianism and kindred forms of Humanitarianism, (5) the mythical theory of the origin of Christianity, (6) the doctrine that the soul perishes with the body, (7) the doctrine that the Church exists for the encouragement of vice, also to advocate (8) Polygamy, the Community of Wives, Antinomianisni; and the ethics of the ' left-hand ' worshippers of Siva and Durga. AU these consequences follow logicaUy and necessarily 1 The Modern Churchman for July 1921 (italics mine). « gee The Modern Churchman for October 1921, 304 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM from Mr. Major's principle, and unless they are admitted his principle is false. MR. Major's Provisos Although these consequences have been pointed out to Mr. Major in the pages of The Modern Churchman, he adheres firmly to his principle (" the sentence quoted by our correspondent expresses our conviction exactly "), but insists strongly on the sufficiency of his safeguards. What are these safeguards ? They are that the denials in question must be made (i) under a conviction of " the progressive revelation of the Holy Spirit," and (2) as " the result of reverent research." Mr. Major has read the records of the Church to very httle purpose if he is not aware that practicaUy every heretic in history — including every immoral heretic — from Simon Magus in the Apostolic Age to the Shakers in this, has claimed that his research was ' reverent ' and that he was specially guided by the Holy Ghost. To omit multitudes of earlier instances, it is a notorious fact that within the memory of men now living, polygamy was introduced into the State of Utah as the result of a supposed ' revelation ' made to the American, Joseph Smith, on July 12, 1843 (this ' revelation ' being also a ' progressive ' one, for it contradicted the revelation of the original Book of Mormon, published in 1830) ; also that the Englishman, Henry James Prince, founder of the Agapemonites, claimed to be the earthly organ of the Holy Ghost, and pleaded in defence of his polygamous " spiritual marriages ' and of his luxurious and voluptuous ' abodes of love ' a direct revelation from the all-holy God. Prince, like Smith, upheld the principle of ' progressive ' revelation, for he acknowledged the reahty (albeit the imperfection) of the older revelation given to the world by Jesus Christ. Among the heathen also the most vicious and even criminal practices are justified as divine and holy. Thug- MR. MAJOR'S PARADOXES 305 gism, suttee, and human sacrifice are all justified by sup posed revelations. Even the ' left-handed ' worshippers of Siva claim that their bestial orgies are ' holy,' and attribute ' holiness ' to their god. If, therefore, it is to be left to the individual to decide whether or not his research is ' reverent ' and ' holy,' the evidence of history (as weU as logic) assures us that Mr. Major's provisos are entirely Ulusory. If, on the other hand (foUowing the Apostle's injunction),1 he admits that, not the individual, but the Church in its collective and authoritative capacity must decide whether or not the research is ' reverent ' and ' holy,' then he abandons his principle of individual liberty and asserts that of ecclesiastical authority. His Principle Self-contradictory Mr. Major's principle has the additional disadvantage (as the discerning reader will have already noticed) of being radicaUy incoherent and self-contradictory. For on the one hand it affirms the right of the Modernist to deny any article of the Catholic Creed, and therefore to deny the existence of the Holy Ghost and of divine revelation, whereas on the other hand it requires him to affirm the reahty of both, for it requires him to reach his results under a conviction of " the progressive revelation of the Holy Spirit." The effect of this contradiction, which is flagrant, is, of course, to undermine Mr. Major's whole position. For if it is lawful to require a Modernist to believe in the Holy Ghost and in revelation (and Mr. Major admits that it is), then no reason can be offered (in principle at least) why he should not also be required to believe in God the Father, 1 St. John says : ' ' Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God : because many false prophets are gone out into the world." He also insists upon the application to all supposed revela tions of the dogmatic test of agreement with the orthodox faith : " Hereby know ye the Spirit of God : Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God," etc. (1 John iv. 1 ff.). 306 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM and in the Son of God, and in the Incarnation, and in the Resurrection and Ascension, and in the life of the world to come — in fact in the entire Creed. If once the principle of dogma is admitted (and Mr. Major admits it), then it is most unreasonable to confine its application to two articles of faith only — articles, moreover, which have hardly any meaning, if divorced from the body of the Christian faith, of which they form part. Creeds or No Creeds ? Mr. Major objects to the title of this book (Creeds or No Creeds ?), as falsely implying that those who think with him aim at the abolition of creeds.1 In order to give the reader an opportunity of forming his own judgment upon the matter, I transcribe verbatim Mr. Major's own concrete proposal : " WUl they [the orthodox] concede to modern Churchmen the right to modify the use of the Creeds, and to produce, if they will, alternative Creeds for use in parishes where they are desired by the parishioners, provided always that this is done in a wise, loving, and orderly fashion, and with the authority of the Bishop ? " ' The word ' Creed ' has a perfectly definite meaning, consecrated by centuries of use. It means a confession of faith, not of a local Church, still less of a particular diocese or parish, but of the Church Universal, defining the minimum amount of belief which justifies a man in calling himself a Christian and claiming membership in the Historic Church. Of such Creeds there is (in the fuU and official sense) only one, viz. the Nicene ; * and this has been declared by a succession of Ecumenical CouncUs to be both necessary and sufficient. For many ages past 1 Hibbert Journal for January 1922. * The Modern Churchman for September 1921, p. 200. 3 The Apostles' Creed, originally the baptismal creed of the Roman Church, is now accepted by the whole West, and informally acknow ledged in the East. THE TEST OF DISCIPLESHIP 307 every religious body claiming membership in the Church Catholic has recited it in the Liturgy of the Eucharist, and its abandonment as necessary by the Church of England or by any other religious body would be equivalent to resignation of membership in the Church Universal. The Test of Discipleship The Rev. F. E. Hutchinson, with whom I had the pleasure of discussing the subject at Birmingham, and whose sincerity and self-sacrifice ¦ in the cause of what he regards as " Christian Freedom ' every orthodox Christian respects, agrees with Mr. Major that all dog matic tests ought to be abolished, but sees more clearly than he that a ' test ' of some kind there must be, if the Church is to stand for any principle whatever. He proposes, therefore, to substitute for Creeds a declaration of Discipleship of Jesus. " Why ask for unity," he writes, " in anything else but a confessed dis cipleship of Christ ? The Church of Christ has no right, indeed, to ask for less, but has it the right to ask for more ? " This test is perhaps not quite so undogmatic as it looks, for literally interpreted it requires adhesion to two dogmas of very great importance : (1) that Jesus once existed, and (2) that we know enough about His life and teaching to become effectively His disciples. Insistence upon these two dogmas would certainly exclude from Church membership a considerable number of devout and weU-meaning men who regard themselves as Christians, e.g. W. B. Smith, A. Drews, A. Kalthoff, Loman, Pierson, Naber, and Dr. Anderson of Dundee. But since Mr. Hutchinson is " for excluding none " and for "¦ unconditional fellowship," he would probably explain his formula to mean that it pledges those who accept it to 1 He resigned the valuable living of Leyland in 1920 for conscientious reasons. 308 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM become disciples of the character delineated in the Gospels, leaving it an open question whether it is historical, or literary only. We may take it, therefore, that Mr. Hutchinson's test is strictly non-dogmatic, and intended to admit every one into Church feUowship who says that he is a disciple of Jesus. If the Church, not the individual, is to decide whether a man is a genuine disciple or not, then clearly some standard of discipleship must be fixed, defin ing what minimum amount of conformity to the theo logical and moral doctrines of Jesus constitutes a disciple, and this would be to assert dogmas. It might be thought that the Church could impose a moral without also imposing a dogmatic test, but this also is impossible, for every moral test implies a moral dogma. For instance, it would be impossible to exclude even a thief or a polygamist from communion without asserting that honesty and monogamy are Christian dogmas. Admission of Unitarians One immediate result of the adoption of Mr. Hutchin son's ' discipleship ' formula would be the admission of Unitarians to membership and office in the Church ; and this is in fact Mr. Hutchinson's avowed objective. AU Unitarians regard themselves as ' disciples of Christ,' and would subscribe his formula without difficulty. This proposal involves a complete revolution in ecclesi astical policy, even from the Modernist point of view. Only a few years ago we were continuaUy assured by representative Modernists that the aUeged tendency of the movement towards, at the very least, toleration of Unitarianism was imaginary; and that they, equaUy with the orthodox, regarded the Incarnation as articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesice. All this is altered now. Many leading Unitarians see no difference at all between the Christology of the Cambridge Conference ADMISSION OF UNITARIANS 309 (which wUl presently engage our attention) and their own. Mr. Major himself admits that the charge of Unitarianism is " serious." " It stands," he says, "upon a different foot ing. It is a serious one, and deserves serious attention. A weU-known Unitarian layman recently wrote of the principal speakers at the Cambridge Conference, that he could not see where their position differed from his own. ... I do not doubt that a number of Unitarians believe that Modern Churchmen ought, on moral grounds, to secede from the English Church and join the Unitarian body " (Hibbert Journal, January 1922). These Unitarians may possibly be wrong upon the exact point at issue (though they are unquestionably good judges), but, at any rate, it is clear (1) that the attenuated Christology of the advanced Modernists is so much like Unitarianism that typical Unitarians mistake it for such, and (2) that advanced Modernists no longer regard the Incarnation as an essential doctrine to be insisted upon at aU hazards. Effect on Worship The effect (or the antecedent condition) of admitting Unitarians to Church membership would not be confined to the abolition of the Creeds, but would involve the radical transformation of the Church's worship. Consistent Unitarians, as is well known, regard Jesus of Nazareth as a mere man, and His worship as idolatry. Consequently, in order to render the worship of the Church acceptable (or even possible) to them, it would be neces sary, not merely to abolish the Creeds, but to excise from the Prayer Book every reference to the Deity of our Lord, every act of prayer and worship addressed to Him, and every act of homage to the Holy Trinity. Thus it would be necessary to omit the entire Litany, which consists whoUy of invocations of the Trinity and of our Blessed Lord, the whole of the Te Deum, which consists almost entirely of acts of devotion to the Trinity 310 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM and the Incarnate Son, and of course the Lesser Litany and Gloria Patri ; also to recast in drastic fashion the collects and prayers, which are fuU of allusions to the Incarnation and the Three Divine Persons ; indeed, it would probably be necessary to rewrite the Prayer Book from cover to cover in order to adapt it to Unitarian worship. The question is, do Modernists seriously regard these changes as desirable or possible ? and further, do they realize what the consequences would be ? Both reason and experience inform us, that it is both psychologically and theologicaUy impossible for orthodox Christians and Unitarians to worship together, and that for the con clusive reason that the former regard it as an absolute duty to offer to Jesus an adoration which the latter regard as a sin. It follows that the immediate result of admitting Unitarians into the Church would be to drive every sincere believer in the Incarnation out of it, leaving it a purely Unitarian and Modernist body. Is this what the Modern ists really desire ? Admission of Agnostics Not only aU Unitarians, but also a large number of Agnostics, Pantheists, and even Atheists would be both able and wUling to pass Mr. Hutchinson's elastic test of ' discipleship.' Of course, for many years, owing to natural con servatism, the abolition of dogmas would not produce its full effect. Probably during the lifetime of the men who initiated the non-dogmatic revolution, applications for Church membership f rom agnostics and stiU more from atheists would be rare. Nevertheless, as soon as it was fully realized by the public mind (as it would be in a generation or two) that aU dogmatic tests had been entirely abolished, not a few of those agnostics and atheists who respect Jesus as a supreme moral and social ADMISSION OF AGNOSTICS 311 reformer and as the greatest of aU benefactors of our race would declare themselves ' disciples ' and crowd into the Church. Those who are familiar with the work of the various ' Ethical Societies ' scattered up and down the country are aware of the deep veneration (no weaker phrase is adequate) with which many of their members (even the most agnostic) regard our Lord. This feeling is shared even by some among the English and Scottish Communists. I have before me, as I write, the number of The Communist, An Organ of the Third (Com munist) International for June 11, 1921. Of its eight pages, five are devoted to the glorification of Jesus as the perfect communist and ideal proletarian agitator. Speak ing with some knowledge of the advanced thought of this country, I am able to state positively that a very con siderable section of the better type of agnostics would be ready and even anxious to unite with a Church that had sincerely renounced dogma, on the basis of ' discipleship of Christ.' They regard Jesus as hampered indeed by the conditions of His time, and as sharing some of its foohsh superstitions (such as behef in God and human immor tality), but on the ethical, the social, the humanitarian, and the political side they are wiUing to declare them selves His sincere and enthusiastic disciples. Comte, who was an atheist, would have accepted with joy the ' discipleship ' test. I cannot see how, on his principles, Mr. Hutchinson can reject such men. He cannot require them to beheve even in God and in human immortality, for that would be to assert two important dogmas. If he were to attempt it, they would plead (in the words of his book) " not to be excluded for any defect of belief, so long as they still look to Christ for the inspiration of their lives." Effect in the Mission Field In the mission field the insufficiency of the non-dog matic principle becomes (if possible) even more evident. 22 312 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM I am entirely unable to see, for instance, how the Church can ever hope to make headway against polytheism, degraded ideas of divinity, idolatry, such moral abuses as the organized prostitution of the heathen temples, and such abominations as human sacrifice, cannibalism, abortion, and infanticide, unless it teaches definitely, dogmaticaUy, and uncompromisingly, (i) that there is only one God, (2) that He is morally perfect, (3) that idolatry is sinful, (4) that chastity is a necessary virtue, and further that (5) human sacrifice, (6) cannibalism, (7) abortion, and (8) infanticide are deadly sins, involving perdition. I feel sure that Mr. Hutchinson, equaUy with orthodox Christians, desires these false beliefs and degrad ing practices to be ended. He owes it, therefore, to his fellow-Christians to explain how, without breach of the non-dogmatic principle, it can be done. It seems to me that the missionary of a non-dogmatic Church (say in India) is likely continually to find himself not merely in difficult but even in impossible positions. For example, if an inquiring heathen comes to him, and says, " Our wise men tell us that there are thirty miUion gods, how many does your Church believe in ? " is he to answer, " My Church, having adopted the non-dogmatic principle, has no opinion upon this important subject ; but, if I may venture to give you my private opinion (which you must take for what it is worth, and not as in any way involving the Church), there is only one " ? Or if another inquirer comes and asks, " What does the Church teach about Jesus Christ ? Is He God Incarnate, and therefore to be adored, or is He a mere human prophet like Mahomet, and therefore only to be obeyed ? " is the missionary to answer, " I deeply regret that my Church has no opinion to offer upon this vital matter. In my personal belief, He is God Incarnate, and there fore you ought to adore Him ; but my reverend brother in charge of the next mission station unfortunately teaches that He is a mere man, and that the practice of wor- NON-DOGMATISM IN THE MISSION FIELD 313 shipping Him is sinful — is in fact the very sin of heathen idolatry from which I am anxious to reclaim you " ? Or to take as a last example a moral problem. Suppose that an Indian prince with a hundred wives, who has been refused baptism at the neighbouring station of the Orthodox Church on the ground that monogamy is a Christian dogma, comes to the station of the non-dogmatic Church, declaring himself and his wives ' disciples of Christ ' and demanding baptism. It seems to me that the prince's action (which is a conceivable and even hkely one) places the missionary in an awkward dilemma. Either he must baptize the prince and his hundred wives, and so betray the moral standard not merely of Christi anity but of civUized man ; or else he must admit that the non-dogmatic principle is false, and that monogamy is after all a fundamental dogma of Christianity. Non-Dogmatism and Syncretism We are not even yet at the end of the difficulties of working the non-dogmatic principle. As every student of ancient Church history and of modern missions knows, one of the greatest difficulties of the missionary is to guard against syncretism, i.e. the tendency of the average heathen attracted to Christianity to content himself with merely adding Jesus as an extra divinity Or teacher to those he already possesses. Almost immediately, therefore, the non-dogmatic mis sionary wiU be faced by the problem, Am I to interpret the formula of discipleship in an inclusive or an exclusive sense ? in other words, Am I to require my heathen con verts to renounce Hinduism and Mahometanism and Buddhism and Confucianism and every other non- Christian system, or can I permit them to combine dis- - cipleship of Christ with discipleship of the Hindu doctors, of Mahomet, of Buddha, and of Confucius ? For the orthodox missionary the problem does not exist. It is self-evident, both to him and to every 314 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM heathen whom he instructs, that inasmuch as there is only one God, and Jesus Christ is His sole incarnation, the claims of Jesus on the believer are necessarily exclu sive and unique. But this is not so evident either to the undogmatic mis sionary or to his converts. If Jesus is only a human prophet like Mahomet (and the undogmatic missionary cannot affirm authoritatively that He is more), then it seems hardly reasonable to hmit aU wisdom and all prophetic inspiration to Him. A Mahometan convert may very plausibly argue, that He is more hkely to attain to the fullness of truth by combining the teaching of both prophets, than by becoming a disciple of Jesus alone. He wiU assure the missionary that he has learnt already from the Koran that Jesus is the greatest of aU prophets except Mahomet, and that He was born of a Virgin and rose from the dead and ascended into heaven (miracles which the missionary, being a Modernist, probably rejects), and, further, that he has come to beheve (since hearing the missionary) that Jesus is a prophet as great as or even greater than Mahomet. Under the circumstances, he asks for permission to become a Christian without ceasing to be a Mahometan, and he promises, if aUowed to do so, to endeavour to spread a knowledge of Christ among his feUow-Mahometans, and to work for ' reunion ' (or rather ' union ') between the Christian and Mahometan Churches. I do not see how the plea of the Mahometan can be effectively resisted, except by asserting either (i) the Deity of Jesus, or (2) at least His practicaUy exclusive pos session of divine truth, both which assertions are dogmas: The missionary of a reaUy non-dogmatic Church would soon receive attractive proposals of union from the doctors of Hinduism. The Hindu and the Christian Trinities would be identified. The neglected worship of the first person, Brahma, the Creator (who would be identified with the Father of Jesus), would be revived. In deference to Christian sentiment, the non-human incarnations of NON-DOGMATISM AT HOME 315 Hindu mythology (the Fish, the Boar, and the Man-lion) would be dropped, and Jesus of Nazareth would be recognized as the last (and probably the greatest) incar nation of the god Vishnu, sharing this honour with the heroes Rama and Krishna and the wise teacher Buddha. The moralities of the two religions would also be adjusted and combined. The moral standard of Hinduism would be slightly leveUed up, that of Christianity very much leveUed down, and the general result would be — Paganism as before. I do not contend that these results would actuaUy happen, because I regard it as much more probable that the missionaries of the non-dogmatic Church, before they had been in India long, would be converted to Orthodoxy ; but I do contend such things would happen if the non- dogmatic principle were strictly adhered to. There is one, and only one effective barrier against syncretism, and that is the fearless assertion of positive dogma. Non-Dogmatism at Home At home the non-dogmatic principle, if seriously adopted, would produce results hardly less grotesque. We may ask Mr. Hutchinson to solve the following problem, adhering strictly to non-dogmatism. A bereaved husband, in deep sorrow, comes to a parish priest of the (now) non-dogmatic Church, and begs him earnestly, as a mmister of the Church of God, to assure him that his wife stiU hves and that he may hope to meet her again. Is he reaUy to say (as he must if he adheres strictly to principle), " You address me as a minister of ' the Church of God.' You forget that since the great Modernist Reformation the Church has renounced aU dogma, and does not believe in God. You also ask me in the name of the Church to assure you that your wife stiU hves. If I did so, I should be asserting another dogma, viz. human immortality, a thing no less impossible. Of course, if you merely ask me, as a man and a brother, to 316 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM comfort you with these assurances, I wiU do my best ; but I regret to say that in my official capacity as a minister of the non-dogmatic Church, I have no comfort whatever to offer you " ? If Mr. Hutchinson replies that he expects a little com mon-sense to be used in carrying out his principle, then the obvious retort is that this is only another way of saying that the principle is so unsound that he relies upon common-sense not to carry it out consistently. If space permitted, hundreds of other striking instances could be given where the strict application of the non-dogmatic principle leads to absurdity. Non-Dogmatism and Liberty Mr. Hutchinson champions "Christian freedom," but it is a freedom so unequally distributed that the indi vidual Christian gets the whole of it and the Church none at aU. It is hke the ' liberty ' of anarchism, which asserts the unlimited liberty of the individual citizen, but denies the State liberty even to punish crime. Mr. Hutchinson's conception of ' liberty ' works out in practice as a liberty of licence for the individual Christian and abject slavery for the Church. However much the Church may desire to teach some important doctrine — e.g. the Existence of God or the Immortality of Man — it is prevented by this principle from doing so. On the other hand, this one-sided principle allows the individual Christian to deny every article of the Christian Faith and every principle of Christian morality. Whether this state of things is reaUy ' freedom ' or anarchic individualism may be left to the judicious reader to decide. The Newest Christology As a typical example of ' the drift to the left ' in Christo logy we may instance Dr. Bethune-Baker, who, as Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, is entmsted DR. BETHUNE-BAKER'S VIEWS 317 with the responsible task of instructing candidates for ordination in Christian doctrine. In his case we see a steady and most lamentable declen sion from the full orthodoxy of his really beautiful essay on " Christian Doctrines and their Ethical Significance " in Cambridge Theological Essays (1906), in which he main tains the vital and necessary connexion between the standard of Christian morality and the orthodox doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity as defined in the Catholic Creeds, and his complete volte-face at the Cam bridge Conference of Modem Churchmen (1921). As late as 1918 he could stiU write, " No one who does not retain the conviction that found expression in the doctrine of the Incarnation can justly caU himself a Christian," and even, " I much prefer to state my own beliefs, ' theological ' and ' Christological,' in the terms of the Athanasian Creed. It is the only Creed that precludes the tritheistic ideas always latent in the faith of Christians, and reaUy states the Trinitarian — that is the Christian doctrine of God. ... To the trained theologian its asser tions on these points ring as true to-day as ever " (The Faith of the Apostles' Creed, p. 67). This book, however, already contained indications of what was coming, as, indeed, did his earlier pamphlet The Miracle of Christianity (1914), which, while maintaining strongly that the Incarna tion is a fundamental Christian dogma, yet suggested (with an inconsistency which has ceased to excite surprise in the case of a Modernist) that Unitarians should be admitted into the Christian ministry. A further stage of declension is represented by his sermon before the Churchmen's Union in 1920, in which he urged it to " take action ... to put an end to the ' articling ' which pursues the clergy aU their lives, and to put the emphasis on the hving contents of faith, rather than on belief as to facts in the past." 1 He now speaks of his earlier view of the Person of 1 See The Modern Churchman for August 1920. 318 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM Christ (which he had not quite abandoned even in 1918) as " only a bridge from the past to the present, and we ought perhaps to be content if most of our [Modernist] friends get on it and stay there safely, refusing to foUow the more active among us, who are exploring the country beyond." His present view he expressed at Cambridge as foUows : " We must absolutely jettison the traditional doctrine that His [Christ's] personahty was not human but divine. To our modern categories of thought such a statement is a denial of the doctrine of the Incarnation. ... I can make no use of the traditional behefs in either His miracu lous birth or His personal pre-existence. ... I do not for a moment suppose that Jesus ever thought of Himself as God. Jesus was av6parrrop,a of the Divine Nature ") ; but I doubt whether the Samosatene (although it is logicaUy involved in his system) would have admitted it. His acceptance of the Virgin Birth suggests the ' uniqueness ' of Jesus, and had he denied this ' unique ness,' his foUowers would probably have deserted him. The most likely view is that Paul accepted, along with the heathen doctrine of Apotheosis, the doctrine of ' grades ' of divinity, and regarded Jesus as exalted to a higher ' grade ' of divinity, than will ever be attained by any other mortal. I doubt also whether Paul would have gone quite so far as Mr. Major in the identification of the divine and the human substances of Christ. Instead of saying baldly with Mr. Major, " The ' Substances ' of the Deity and of 1 Our chief authorities for Paul and his doctrine are Eusebius vii. 27-30 (where the epistle of the bishops who condemned him is quoted) ; the remains of the proceedings and acts of the Council of Antioch which condemned him, collected in Routh, Reliquia Sacra, vol. iii. pp. 287 ff. (of which not the whole is trustworthy) ; Epiphanii, Contra Hcereses, lxv. (to be read with caution) ; and scattered references in Athanasius, Hilary, Gregory of Nyssa, and other Fathers. CANON BARNES'S VIEWS 325 the Humanity are not two but one," he would have said that the human substance of Jesus was so similar and closely allied to the Divine Substance, that it was capable of passing into and becoming it. By drawing a stronger distinction than Mr. Major between the substance of the Creator and the substance of creatures, he would have been able to affirm the doctrine of creation in a some what more orthodox sense. Canon Barnes's Views In justice to the Conference, it seems desirable to give some account of the teaching of its most orthodox member, Canon Barnes, who was prominent both as the reader of an interesting paper and as the eloquent preacher of the final sermon. Canon Barnes spoke as an Evangehcal (" I am an Evangelical ; I cannot call myself a Modernist. As you know, I answer aU the questions just asked in the old way ") ; nevertheless ordinary Evangelicals may be pardoned if they feel that the quality of his Evangelicalism has suffered some deterioration owing to the company which he has lately been keeping, especiaUy when they notice that he closed his ' Evangelical ' sermon with an earnest appeal for funds for the support of that institu tion (Ripon Hall) over which Mr. Major presides, instruct ing candidates for ordination how " to adjust their orthodoxy to the orthodoxy of the future " rather than of the past, or (as it would seem more appropriate to say, considering the nature of Mr. Major's actual opinions) to that heresy of the past which he hopes wiU become the orthodoxy of the future. Even so comparatively friendly a critic as Dr. Foakes- Jackson doubts the proof quality of Dr. Barnes's Evan gelicalism, and, indeed, considers that every genuine Evangelical would repudiate it. " The tone of [his] paper," he says, " is one of pious rationalism disguised in beautiful language " ; and commenting on his description 326 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM of the personality of the historical Jesus, he remarks, " The portrait is that of a rehgious genius, obviously human, and the terms employed strike one as slightly patronizing." ' Dr. Barnes's contribution to the orthodoxy of the Conference was to identify Jesus with the Holy Spirit : " Can we say further, that He [Jesus] was central as Redeemer and Saviour ? I think that we are forced to do so if, and only if, we accept St. Paul's identification of the living Christ and the Holy Spirit ; " " We identify the Lord with the Spirit ; " " When after death His human limitations were transcended, the hving Christ became one with the Holy Spirit ; " "In the end I feel no hesitation in affirming that Jesus rose from the dead to become the Living Christ, One with the Holy Spirit." Before we can venture to claim Canon Barnes as even in principle a supporter of the orthodox theory of a Divine Incarnation, as distinct from and opposed to the heterodox theories of Immanence, Pantheistic Identity, and Apo theosis, which dominated the Conference, we have first to assure ourselves of two points : (i) Was Jesus, in the Canon's view, identical with the Holy Spirit from the moment of His Conception,' or only from His Resurrec tion ? and (2) Is the Holy Spirit, in the Canon's view, a personal or an impersonal being ? Two of Dr. Barnes's expressions (" After death . . . the living Christ became one with the Holy Spirit," and " Jesus rose from the dead to become one with the Holy Spirit ") might easily be taken to imply that Jesus did not become identical with the Holy Spirit until His Resurrec tion, in which case they affirm, not the Incarnation of God, but (as Dr. Foakes- Jackson evidently thinks they do) the apotheosis or deification of a mere man. Moreover, not a single expression in his paper shows clearly and un- 1 Hibbert Journal for January 1922. * Canon Barnes, I am glad to say, adheres to the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. CANON BARNES'S VIEWS 327 ambiguously that he regards the Holy Spirit as personal, or indeed as anything more than the Redeeming Power of God. But, giving Dr. Barnes (as is only fair) the benefit of the doubt on both points, let us see what we can make of his theory of the Incarnation. The first thing that strikes an orthodox Christian, Evangehcal or other, is that the Canon's theory appears to assert that the Third, not the Second, Person of the Holy Trinity became man, a view neither Evangehcal nor orthodox. The other alternative, that he identifies the Second and Third Persons, is equally heterodox, for it re duces the Trinity to a Duality. Satisfactory criticism of his statement is difficult, because he does not make it clear which of these two views, or what other view,heholds. He asserts, however, with great confidence (though without giving any reasons) that St. Paul supports his theory of the identity of Jesus with the Holy Spirit, evi dently referring to the weU-known passage 2 Cor. iii. 17-18 : " Now the Lord is the Spirit ; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is hberty," etc. Here he is on particularly treacherous ground, for this passage, so far from being clear, is perhaps the most obscure, both in grammar and meaning, in the whole New Testament. The word ' spirit ' (irvevp-a) itself is a very nest of ambiguities. For example, the substance of God being ' spirit ' (John iv. 24), it foUows that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are aU alike ' spirit.' There is also the human ' spirit,' which is usuaUy identified with the ' soul ' (Luke i. 47, etc.), but by St. Paul sometimes distinguished from it, in what sense is not clear (1 Thess. v. 23). FinaUy, St, Paul uses ' spirit ' in a special ' moral ' sense, meaning the human spirit as guided and influenced by the Holy Spirit. In aU these seven distinct senses (and more might be mentioned) ' spirit ' was in Jesus. One reaUy hesitates to offer a decided opinion upon the exact meaning of a passage of such appaUing ambiguity 23 328 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM (perhaps the view that ' Spirit ' is the pre-existent Son of God who became incarnate in Jesus is as good as any i), but whichever of the several fairly reasonable and prob able interpretations be adopted, one thing is perfectly certain, that St. Paul neither asserts in it an incarnation of the Holy Ghost, nor identifies the Holy Ghost with the Son of God. This is absolutely certain, because at the close of the Epistle which contains this passage there occurs a quite unambiguous statement that the three Persons of the Trinity are distinct (" The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you "). Since, therefore, St. Paul continuaUy in his writings affirms that the Son became incarnate, and, moreover, distinguishes the Spirit from the Son, it foUows that he denies Dr. Barnes's doctrine of the Incarnation of the Holy Spirit. One of the leading principles of the scientific interpreta tion of documents is to interpret what is ambiguous in the light of what is clear. Canon Barnes exactly reverses this principle. Instead of interpreting what is ambiguous in the hght of what is clear, he interprets what is clear in the hght (or rather darkness) of what is ambiguous. The Assumptions of the Argument To proceed now to the fuller discussion of the important issues raised by the Cambridge Conference, it seems desir able to begin by laying down certain agreed principles. Unless disputants start from common principles, they wUl never agree. It wUl not be necessary to lay down more than the foUowing, few, if any, of which wiU be chaUenged by any considerable number of Modernists : (i) That Christian and phUosophic tradition is right in regarding God as the absolutely Perfect Being. 1 This is a by no means unusual manner of expression. For instance, we read in the so-called Second Epistle of Clement, " Christ, the Lord who saved us, first being Spirit, then became flesh (£>v p.h ri irpHrrov Trvcvpiu, iyhero aapt)," ix. This usage is frequent in Tertullian. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ARGUMENT 329 (2) That the tme nature of God cannot be inferior to the highest idea men can form of it. (3) That of two views ascribing to God, the one an inferior, the other a superior degree of Perfection, we must choose the latter. (4) That since Christianity is primarily an ethical theism, greater weight ought to be attached to ethical than to purely metaphysical arguments. (5) That the logical principles of common-sense, especi aUy the law of contradiction, are trustworthy, and that consequently any doctrine which contains a plain contra diction must be false.1 On the other hand, it should be remembered that we are dealing with mysterious subjects, hard to grasp clearly, and that we should therefore be careful not to mistake mere difficulties or paradoxes for contradictions. The created universe is so extremely mysterious and involves so many apparent contradictions, that we ought not to be surprised if we find mysteries and apparent contradictions in God. The Perfect Being of Orthodoxy The first question for solution is, whether the orthodox or the semi-pantheistic Modernist view of the Divine Nature harmonizes better with the accepted principle that God is the absolutely Perfect Being. The orthodox view, which ascends in the line of pro phecy at least to the Second Isaiah, and which has the independent support of the accepted philosophic tradition, may be briefly stated as foUows : The nature of God is spiritual (i.e. rational and moral, not material) ; also infinite, self-existent, self-sufficing, absolute, 1 It should be noted that not even Hegel (as superficial students of his system sometimes imagine) really denied the prinoiple of contra diction. In fact he used it continually to demonstrate the falsity, or partial falsity, of ordinary ' finite ' beliefs. Hegel often found contra dictions where they do not exist, but that is another matter altogether. He assumed and worked with the principle of contradiction from the beginning to the end of his Logic. 330 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM and supremely blessed. He has His being beyond space and time in eternity, by which is meant duration, not only without beginning or end, but also without succession or change. His " substance ' or " essence ' is one and indivisible, admitting (as being absolutely perfect) of neither addition, diminution, nor change. It is also ' unique,' for although akin to that of creatures made in His image, it differs from theirs, not merely in degree, but in ' kind.' As the Perfect Being, God possesses not merely potentially, but also ' actually,' all possible per fections, moral, intellectual, and metaphysical, and that from eternity and to an infinite degree. As Creator, He is the source both of the existence and also of aU the perfections exhibited by creatures. The highest of these perfections (e.g. the ' pure ' perfections of wisdom, love, justice, power, free-will, self-consciousness) He possesses ' actually ' and ' eminently,' for they are all potentially in finite and worthy of Him. The lower of creaturely perfec tions, which are not worthy to be ascribed to Him literaUy, may be ascribed to Him ' equivalently.' For instance, al though it is not possible to ascribe the virtue of ' courage ' literally to God, we may be certain that there belongs to His nature some ' equivalent ' higher perfection, which is the ' ground ' of it. Indeed, we may almost venture to assert that at the creation He exhibited something like courage, for He certainly ' took risks ' for noble ends, when He created beings gifted with free-will. In relation to creation, God is both transcendent and im manent. His Immeasurable Being transcends it to an infinite extent. It is not in the least degree necessary either to His Perfection or His Blessedness. Indeed, the whole of it, vast and glorious as it is, exhibits only an infinitesimal fraction of His unlimited Majesty and Perfection. Not for His own sake, but for that of His rational creatures, did He call the world into being. Creatures great and small owe their existence, not to any need of self-expression on His part, but to His pure bounty and benevolence. They need Him, but He does not need them. The sum of the power and perfection manifested in creation is not to be thought of as something added to or subtracted from the unlimited power and perfection of God. Just as the THE GOD OF ORTHODOXY 331 power of the magistrates of an absolute earthly monarch is not power added to or subtracted from the monarch's power, but is that very power exerted in a particular way, so, when God created the world, He did not part with, but exercised His power in a particular way, and that, not for His own sake, but for that of His creatures. The act of creation made Him neither more or less powerful, nor more or less perfect than before. As immanent, God sustains the world, and is its principle of life and rational order. So completely is it dependent upon Him, that were His sustaining will even for a moment with drawn, it would be instantly annihilated. AU wisdom and knowledge, as well as power, are His. His omnipotent wiU can achieve all that is metaphysicaUy and moraUy possible ; His freedom is limited only by His Perfections. But the most admirable and adorable of aU His attributes is His Holiness or Moral Perfection, which is unbounded. He hates evil with an infinite hatred, and loves good with an infinite love. Every ' pure ' moral perfection is His infinitely and absolutely. For instance, He is perfectly just, and is the just Judge of all creation. But above all He is Love. He loves His rational creatures as their Father in heaven, and wills their temporal and eternal good. It is true that the higher creatures, such as angels and men, are akin to Him, and made in His image, but between them and His immeasurably transcendent Being yawns a gulf which even the Incarnation, though it bridges, cannot fill. To Him, the Infinite and Absolute Good, is due from creatures a love, and adoring homage, to which no limits whatever can be set. The God of Modernism The Modernism of the Cambridge Conference exagger ates the doctrine of the divine image in man into a doctrine of ' the Divinity of Man,' i.e. an actual or potential identi fication between God and man. Thus we are informed that: (1) " Creatures are as necessary to the existence of God 332 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM as He is to theirs. Neither is complete without the other"; that (2) "The 'Substances' of the Deity and of the Humanity are not two but one " ; and that (3) " Jesus does not unite to God those who are by nature different from Him, but those who are essentiaUy partakers of the Divine Nature." If " creatures ... are as necessary to the existence of God as He is to theirs," and " in them He hves and moves and has His being," it foUows that both His existence and His perfection are absolutely dependent upon creatures, and that He advances towards perfection in and with them. It foUows further that He is not yet perfect, partly because the creatures which are necessary to His perfection have not yet aU been created, partly because even the most exceUent of them (men, for instance) are extremely imperfect. AU men are more or less sinful, and some of them — tyrants and adulterers and murderers, for instance — are exceedingly sinful. Accordingly, until the rational part of creation becomes "perfect after its kind," i.e. sinless and moraUy excellent, it is a plain contradiction to maintain that a God who is dependent upon creatures can be perfect in any sense at ah. Modern thought regards the world as evolving and pro gressing, and orthodox Christians unite with Modernists in hoping that its present extremely unsatisfactory condi tion — a condition so unsatisfactory that at times, as in the late Great War, moral evU seems actually to outweigh moral good — may improve, and that good may win a decisive triumph over evil. But until it does, it is not even plausible to maintain that a God dependent upon creatures is perfect. We may concede to the Modernists that their God is evolving with the world (upon which He is dependent) THE GOD OF MODERNISM 333 towards a greater degree of perfection, and that, like Mr. Wells's ' finite God,' He is ' doing His best ' under diffi culties ; we may go further, and grant that He is even aiming at that standard of ' absolute ' perfection which the God of Orthodoxy possessed from eternity ; but it is scarcely possible to concede that a God whose perfection depends upon creatures can hope ever to reach so exalted a standard. II The theory that God is able to be or to become perfect, without having been so always, violates one of the most fundamental laws of all thinking, the principle of causality. This principle (as aheady explained ') requires us to assign to every effect, not merely a cause, but an adequate cause, i.e. a cause at least equal, both in magnitude and excellence, to its effect. It is not sufficient to attribute to God originaUy only ' potential ' perfection, if He is to realize it actuaUy. To be something actually is far more excel lent than to be something only potentially. For instance, it is far more excellent to be an actual saint than a potential one, i.e. a sinner ; and to be an actual mathe matician than a potential one, i.e. a person unskilled in mathematics. Similarly, if the Modernist God is ever to realize actual perfection, it is not sufficient to endow Him originaUy with mere ' potential ' perfection, which of course implies actual imperfection. Just as water cannot rise above its source, nor ignorance generate know ledge, so it is impossible for a God who was not perfect originaUy ever to become so. The Modernist God, as we have seen, is not yet perfect. It foUows rigorously that He never can become so. Ill It is not my intention to maintain that Modernists do not actuaUy worship the same God as orthodox Christians. 1 See pp. 180-183. 334 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM As a rule, in spite of their pantheism, they do in practice (and especiaUy in devotion) regard their God as the absolutely Perfect Being. Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that they have any intellectual right to do so. If we adhere strictly to the principle that God is the Perfect Being, and that a Being that is not absolutely perfect cannot be God, it follows logicaUy that so im perfect a being as the God of Modernism, who is dependent on creatures, not only is not God now, but that He never can become so. In strict logic — I do not say in Modernist devotion and practice — the Modernist God is only a demiurge. He is not unlike a Gnostic demiurge of the better type, i.e. a being, not actuaUy evU, but only im perfect, and for whose general inefficiency and futihty at least this excuse may be urged, that He means weU and according to His lights is doing His best. During the present vogue of ' finite Gods ' He may continue to find admirers, but His present popularity can hardly last long. IV We now come to the statements that " the ' Substances ' of the Deity and of the Humanity are not two but one," and that " Jesus does not unite to God those who by nature are different from Him, but those who are essenti- aUy partakers of the Divine Nature." Broadly speaking, these are assertions of the doctrine of " the Divinity of Man " and denials of " the Incarnation of God." Much was said at Cambridge — much that was more eloquent than clear — about this " Divinity of Man." Canon Glazebrook, for instance, was eloquent in his appreciation of the foUowing dictum of "a serious thinker " : — " The error [of Dr. Denny, i.e. of Orthodoxy] does not spring from maintaining the divinity of Jesus, but from denying the divinity of man." Two theories were propounded at the Conference (and often confused together, as if they were identical) as to THEORY OF APOTHEOSIS 335 the exact nature of this ' divinity ' or ' consubstantiality ' of man. One theory was that this ' consubstantiality ' is at present only potential, not actual. Human nature, though very nearly, is not yet quite God. It is, however, capable of becoming so in the future. When it has under gone ' a process of purification, Ulumination, and develop ment ' (according to one authority, an ' immense ' process), then it wiU become fuUy ' divine ' and ' consubstantial with God,' in the very sense in which the humanity of Jesus now is. This theory {though usually veUed under such specious titles as ' adoption ' or ' election ') l is, of course, nothing else than the purely Pagan doctrine of Deification or Apotheosis, which, as we have seen, the ancient Church condemned in the person of Paul of Samosata as a heathen abomination. We shall here consider it, however, on its merits, without prejudice. The other view was that man is even now consubstantial with God, but that the ' substance ' of God in Him has either not yet attained or has deteriorated from its due divine perfection. Disciphne and moral effort and grace wiU have the effect of improving its quality, so that there is reason to hope that at least in heaven it wiU gain or regain its proper divine purity. This theory, though closely akin to, is not identical with the theory of Apo theosis. It affirms, not that man wiU one day become God, but that he is God now, even whUe he is sinning. He is, however, God in an imperfect or undeveloped condition. This theory denies the doctrine of creation, because it denies that the Creator and the creature are different substances. It regards God as 'projecting' creatures from His ' substance,' which substance, as thus projected, undergoes a certain deterioration, and is liable to imper- 1 Canon Glazebrook, more candid than some, illustrated it by the appropriate lines of Horace : Hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules Enisus arces attigit igneas. 336 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM fection and sin. This was also the theory of the second- century Gnostics, who regarded the Ultimate Reality as ' projecting ' from His being various orders of emanations or ' aeons,' in whom His substance suffered deterioration, but remained capable of redemption and restoration. This theory we shall also consider without prejudice. The doctrine of Apotheosis offends against reason in more ways than one. For example, (i) It regards God as imperfect in Himself, and as graduaUy advancing towards perfection by assuming into His substance multitudes of finite beings, upon whom (as we have seen) His own perfection is dependent. (2) It denies the immutability of the Divine Substance, which, on this theory, is receiving continual accretions. (3) It denies God's eternity, for aU the creatures assumed into His substance had a beginning : hence part of His substance is eternal and part is not. (4) Since the creatures assumed into God are only parts and not the whole of Him, it follows that the substance of God is divisible hke matter, which involves a denial of its spirituality. It should be mentioned, however, to the credit of the special form of Apotheosis taught by Modernism, that it does not involve (like the theory of the essential ' Divinity of Man ') the blasphemous doctrine that God can sin. It teaches on the contrary that man cannot become ' consubstantial with God ' unless or until he is free from sin. VI The alternative theory that man, even in his present imperfect condition, is already in fact and in principle consubstantial with God, involves many of the meta physical absurdities of the theory of Apotheosis, and this PRIDE AND HUMILITY 337 moral one in addition, that God sins in and with man. For if man is even now consubstantial with God, it follows that the substance of God lies, thieves, bears false witness, is guilty of cruel and lustful acts, and provokes aggressive and devastating wars. In whichever of these two ways the theory of human ' consubstantiality ' is held, it involves palpable contra dictions of the principle that God is the Perfect Being. It is for Mr. Major and his friends to choose upon which horn of the dilemma they prefer to be impaled. Each alternative lands them in absurdities. Effect on Character Taking the Modernist doctrine in its less offensive form, that in which it does not attribute sin to God, let us estimate its probable effect upon character. Modernists wiU probably admit that next to divine charity, humility is the most distinctive and fundamental of aU Christian virtues, and that pride is among the most Satanic of vices. By becoming man, as the Magni ficat teaches us, God "hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humble and meek." The heathen usuaUy exalted pride (or something very like it) almost to the pinnacle of the virtues. To Aristotle, for instance, " high-mindedness " (peyaXoyfrvxta) " seems to be the crowning grace of the virtues." x We ask, there fore, in which direction does the Modernist doctrine seem to lead ? in the direction of heathen pride, or in the direction of Christian humility ? A caustic but perfectly just critic once said of Hegel, that his mission in hfe was to persuade the young men of Germany that they were God, and that the young men found it exceedingly pleasant. In a similar way, the Modernist doctrine of ' the Divinity of Man ' — even His potential Divinity — ministers far more to pride which is 1 Nic. Eth. iv. 3. 338 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM heathen than to humihty which is Christian. Orthodox Christians meditate continuaUy upon the distmctive articles of their faith, and are made humble by doing so. As they compare their own imperfections and sinfulness with the awful and unapproachable holiness of God, and of that Sinless One who bought them with His Precious Blood, their cry is, " God be merciful to me a sinner. Spare me, a poor wretched creature, who, though through grace Thy son in the Beloved, am yet but dust and ashes in Thy sight." Canon ToUington may caU this ' cringing '-*- "the cringing of the slave" — but at any rate it is humihty. The Apostles (who had not the advantage of acquaintance with advanced Modernist views) positively gloried in calling themselves and their converts slaves (SovXot) — slaves of God and of their Lord and Master Jesus Christ. PersonaUy, I prefer to ' cringe ' with the Apostles and the saints of aU ages,1 than to exalt myself with the members of the Modernist Conference, not one of whom has dis avowed Canon ToUington, and of whom some have even warmly defended him.' We may fairly ask, would Modernists be equaUy humbled if they were to meditate daUy on the distinctive articles of their creed, as, for example, that " Creatures are as necessary to God as God is to creatures ; " " God cannot become perfect apart from man, and therefore not apart from me ; " " God is not yet, and perhaps never wiU be perfect ; " " Though I am not God yet, I shah be presently ; " " Jesus is the consubstantial Son of God, but so also am I, or at least shaU soon become so." It seems to me that these beliefs make far more for heathen pride than for Christian humihty, and that those who entertain them wiU often succumb to the temptation of anticipating, by interior acts of self-complacency, the coming era of their complete deification. i See i Pet. ii. 16, Rom. i. i, Jas. i. i, Jude i, Rev. i. I, and many other passages. * See, for instance. The Modern Churchman for October 1921, p. 357. CREATURE-WORSHIP 339 Effect on Worship The effect on worship of the doctrine of ' the Divinity of Man ' remains to be considered. The object of Chris tian worship is, of course, God, including (on the orthodox theory) God incarnate as Jesus Christ. On the Modernist theory, however, miUions of rational creatures (angels and men) are or will be consubstantial with God, equally with the Redeemer — indeed, since the angels have never sinned, it seems probable that they are even now consubstantial, and hence fit objects of worship. But however that may be, one thing is per fectly evident, that when hereafter aU rational creatures shaU have attained their perfection in heaven, the object of worship wiU not be merely the Triune God and His Son Incarnate, but also millions upon millions of finite creatures who like ourselves will have then attained to like con substantiality with Jesus. It is impossible to avoid this absurd conclusion by insisting, with Mr. NoWeU Smith, that such consubstantial creatures are only parts, not the whole, of God, and that it is the whole of God, not His parts, which is the object of worship. For, in the first place, this view that God consists of parts, involves a plain contradiction ; and, in the second, even if it is correct, it is quite impossible to worship a whole without worshipping every one of its parts. // even a single part is omitted, the whole is not worshipped. Consequently, it foUows with logical rigour (if the Modernist premisses are correct) that the eternal employment of Christians in heaven wiU consist in the worship (1) of the Trinity, (2) of the angels, (3) of one another, (4) of themselves. I desire those numerous Modernists who accuse ortho dox Christians of Tritheism to ask themselves seriously these three questions : (1) whether their own system, if logicaUy carried out, does not amount in practice to Unlimited Polytheism ; (2) whether the doctrine that a 340 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM necessary part of our worship in heaven wiU consist in the worship of one another and ourselves, makes for human humility ; and (3) what the Apostles and the primitive martyrs who died in torments rather than worship deified creatures would have thought of the Modernist doctrine. The Incarnation We proceed next in order to inquire whether the Orthodox or the Modernist theory of the Incarnation assigns greater perfection (especiaUy moral perfection) to God, and therefore accords better with the fundamental behef of aU genuine theists that God is the Perfect Being. It wiU be necessary to consider distinctly and separately the three chief varieties of the Modernist theory, viz. (1) the theory of Immanence, (2) the theory of Apotheosis, and (3) the theory of the natural and essential ' Divinity of Man.' According to the orthodox theory, God, without ceasing to be God, became also man in the Person of His Son as the historic character Jesus of Nazareth. As contrasted with Modernism, Orthodoxy holds (ij that God became man, not that God dwelt in a man, or that a man was or became God ; (2) that Godhead entire, not a part of God, became man ; for inasmuch as the Divine Substance is indivisible, it subsists whole and entire in each of the Three Persons, and therefore, when the Son of God became man, Godhead entire became man, and consequently in Jesus " dweUs all the fullness of the Godhead bodily " (Col. ii. 9). It should be further observed that the Incarnation of God involved " a coming down from heaven," or (to inter pret the metaphor) an actual humiliation of God, i.e. a voluntary abandonment (in the human sphere) of the exercise and enjoyment of His attributes of glory, majesty, omniscience, omnipotence, impassibility, and blessedness, not, however, of His sinlessness or inerrancy. In be coming man, God took to Himself as His own, human THE INCARNATION 341 consciousness, human wUl, human weakness, human sorrow and pain, even human death. In the Person of His Incarnate Son (i.e. in His own Person), He hungered, thirsted, was weary, was betrayed, mocked, spit upon and scourged, was naUed to the cross, died, and descended into hell. Though impassible (i.e. unable to be caused to suffer by creatures), God by His own voluntary act and out of tender love for sinners became man, and as man suffered the extremity of torture, and finaUy died to atone for sin. That is orthodox Christianity, That is what it means now to every genuine Christian. That is what it meant to St. Paul, who in what is perhaps his earhest Epistle cried from his heart, " That life which I now live in the flesh I hve in faith — the faith which is in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself up for me " ; ' to St. Peter, who knew himself redeemed " not with cor ruptible things, . . . but with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot " ; ' and to St. Thomas, who, when bidden thrust his hand into the pierced side, cried in adoring love, " My Lord and my God." « In the view of orthodox Christians, the Incarnation of God and its associated doctrines of Atonement and Redemption have a spiritual and moral value which is absolutely infinite. There is no other doctrine like it in heaven or in earth, and there never can be any. And therefore every soul that beheves it, cries with the seer of the Apocalypse in a rapture of thanksgiving : " Unto Him that loveth us, and washed4 us from our sins in His own blood, and made us to be a kingdom, even priests unto His God and Father, to Him be the glory and the dominion for ever and ever. Amen." * God was adored as the Perfect Being both by Jews 1 Gal. ii. 20. * 1 Pet. i. 18 ff. • John xx. 28. 4 Or, loosed. The reading is doubtful, the ancient authorities being very equally divided. 5 Rev. i. 5. 342 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM and by philosophers long before His Incarnation ; never theless untU that event actuaUy happened, no adequate idea could be formed of the depths of moral perfection that layx hid in God. In the Incarnation the unimaginable happened : the Absolute Lord of the Universe, to whom blessedness and adoration and homage belong as of right, made Himself a servant, did menial work, washed the disciples' feet, and finaUy died (as man) a criminal's death upon the cross — died, we are told, with words of pardon on His hps for His murderers, died, as man, for man's salvation. God thus clearly manifested, and that to an infinite degree, the two supreme virtues of (i) self-sacrificing and redemptive love, and (2) self-abasement and humihty. Neither of these perfections had ever before been ascribed to Him by anyone. The Jewish prophets (and occasionaUy heathen phUosophers) had indeed ascribed to Him the love of benevolence, but never that of self-sacrifice. As for humihty, so far was anyone from ascribing this to God, that pride (or at least fieyaXoyfrvx^a) would have seemed to the ancient world a more appropriate charac teristic. In becoming man and laying down His hfe for us, God has manifested to the world heights and depths of moral perfection undreamed of by men or angels. We have now to compare the infinite degree of moral perfection imphed in the orthodox doctrine of the Incar nation with that degree of it imphed in the Modernist doctrine. (1) According to Immanental Modernism, Jesus was not actuaUy God, but only a man in whom God supremely dwelt. It follows that God neither became man, nor did He suffer — not at least in His own Person. It is true that He dwelt in a person who suffered. But He also dweUs in other martyrs, less fuUy indeed, but in precisely the same manner, viz. that of Immanence, not of Incarnation. Immanentism aUows God to feel the pain of sympathy, THE INCARNATION 343 but that differs toto ccelo from the pain of direct personal experience. From the point of view of Immanentism, the suffering of God in sympathy with the suffering of Jesus may be compared with the suffering of a sym pathetic friend who stands by the cross of a crucified man, and must be contrasted with that of the victim.1 (2) In considering the theory of Apotheosis, two varie ties should be distinguished : one which regards Jesus as becoming God at His Resurrection, the other at His Baptism. In the former case, Jesus was not yet God when He suffered, and therefore God did not suffer, except by sympathy. In the latter case, Jesus was actually God when He suffered, and consequently God suffered — it remains to be determined in what sense. To solve this problem, we must remind ourselves that though, on this theory, Jesus was God, He shared or wiU share this privilege with thousands of miUions of other men, who equally with Himself are destined to Con substantial Sonship. Now, it is plainly impossible to hold that aU these wiU become God entire, even if we hold that they wiU aU become entirely God. For if they will all become God entire, it follows that in the future there wiU be not one, but thousands of millions of beings, who wiU all be equaUy eternal, infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, absolute, and seh-existent, which is an absurdity.2 Both common- sense and philosophy assure us that there can be only one such being. It remains, then, that they will become finite parts of God,3 and if so, comparatively unimportant parts, partly because there are so many of them, and partly because 1 For a fuller discussion, see above, pp. 142-149. 2 Part of the absurdity is that these deified creatures, being entirely God, are eternal, i.e. have no beginning. And yet, having once been creatures, they are not eternal, for they had a beginning, 3 Even this is an absurdity, see above, pp. 321, 339. 24 344 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM each of them individuaUy must be infinitely less than their Original Source or First Cause. The statement, therefore, that God suffered in (or as) Jesus, although it is true, amounts only to this, that an unimportant and indeed quite insignificant fraction of Him suffered, for Jesus was only one among miUions of actual or potential ' consubstantial sons of God.' In contrast with this minimizing (and indeed trivial and almost meaningless) theory of the Incarnation, Orthodoxy teaches quite definitely that God entire — the whole substance of God — became man in the Person of His Eternal Son, and (as man) suffered and died for us. It therefore assigns to God an infinitely greater degree of moral perfection than Modernism, which teaches that only an insignificant fraction of Him thus suffered. The necessary conclusion is that the Modernist theory is false, and the Orthodox theory true — or at least the truest yet. (3) We need not criticize in detail the more definitely pantheistic theory of the natural or essential 'Divinity of Man,' for it is obviously open to similar (and indeed to even greater) objections. The Holy Trinity No speaker at the Cambridge Conference (with the pos sible exception of Canon Barnes) supported the orthodox doctrine of the Personal Trinity, and several of them branded it as Tritheism or Polytheism. Dr. RashdaU, greatly daring, even denied its orthodoxy, and went so far as to attribute to the more philosophical of the Greek Fathers, and even to that mirror of orthodoxy, the Angelical Doctor, an impersonal view of the Trinity. Limits of space prevent me from dealing with the Fathers1 1 From what is said in Appendix I to this chapter, the discerning reader will perceive the probable reason of Dr. Rashdall's misunder standing of the Greek Fathers. Their teaching is profound, many- sided, and far from easy to interpret. THE HOLY TRINITY 345 and the Schoolmen, but it is necessary to offer a brief proof that the doctrine of a Personal Trinity is taught in Holy Scripture. It cannot be reasonably denied (nor is it denied, to the best of my knowledge, by any critic who counts) that in the Pauline theology the pre-existent Son of God, who became man for human redemption, is (1) a personal being, and (2) the object of His Father's love. He is " the Son of His Love " (Col. i. 13), whom, though the Father loved Him so dearly, He nevertheless " spared not to send " and to dehver to death for the salvation of sinners (Rom. viii. 32). This Son is also the object of an equal love, for even before the universe existed (irpb irdvTav) He was equal with God (to ehat, lea 0ew), was the ' image ' (eUmv) of the invisible God, and shared His ' essential form ' (papv) of the invisible God, He is infinitely superior. This " Son of God's love " became in carnate, but in Him even as incarnate dwelt aU the fuUness of the Godhead (irov to irX-fipmpa). He died upon the cross, and The Modem Churchman for September 1921, p. 198. 366 MR. MAJOR'S THREE CHRISTOLOGIES 367 rose again " the first-born from the dead." The effect of His death is cosmical. It has not only made atonement for human sin (v. 14), but also for the sin of the entire universe (" through Him to reconcile all things, to T-avra, to Himself, . . . whether the things on earth or the things in the [plural] heavens "). We have quite obviously in this single passage the whole Johannine doctrine of the Logos, though without the actual term. It is superfluous to add further Pauline passages, or to prove at length that Hebrews and 1 Peter are based on the same general Christological theory. We have proved to demonstration, therefore, our first point, that, in all but actual expression, the Pauline and the Johannine Christologies are not two, but one. The Synoptic Christology The Synoptic Christology, equaUy with the Pauline and Johannine, regards the Son of God (or Son of Man) as a pre-existent, divine, and personal being. The voice at the Baptism of Jesus, as reported by our earliest witness, Mark, in itself suggests this. The Father says, " Thou art (2i> ei) My beloved Son," not " I now elevate Thee to the rank of My beloved Son." Adoptionism is thus definitely excluded, as it equaUy is by the following words, " in Thee I was well pleased (eiSoKno-a)," which naturally imply pre-existence. That actual personal pre-existence is imphed is rendered certain by the Markan miracle which almost immediately foUows. It was wrought by Jesus to prove (1) that He is the divine Son of Man, and (2) that He is able to exercise, even when humbled on earth, the divine prerogative of pardoning sin, which He had previously exercised in heaven (Mark ii. 1 ff.). That in contemporary use the title Son of Man in itself implied heavenly, divine pre-existence as weU as a future coming to judgment is not denied even by Mr. Major, who says : " The new [modern] view is that the title is used ... to describe a pre-existent Heavenly Messiah hving with the Ancient of Days in heaven and ready to descend ... to inaugurate God's kingdom on earth." As pre-existent, and as sharing the Father's throne and attributes, the Son of Man is obviously God's vicegerent and agent in creating and ruling the universe, i.e. the Logos. Mr. Major would probably object that this inference, how ever obvious and necessary, was not actuaUy drawn by the Synoptists. The evidence, however, that*they did draw it is convincing. AU of them record a remarkable nature- 368 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERNISM miracle, the Staling of the Storm, which caused the awe struck exclamation : " What manner of man is this that even the winds and the sea obey Him ! " (Matt. viii. 23 ; Mark iv. 35 ; Luke viii. 22). St. Mark records the exact words used by Jesus, " Peace, be muzzled." These imply that Jesus regarded Himself as able to exercise (even as incarnate) the same absolute authority over physical nature which a man exercises over his dog or his ox when he muzzles it. The meaning of the miracle is undeniable, and is reinforced by such other physical miracles as the walking on the waves and the multiplication of the loaves. To object that the miracle of Stilling the Storm is mythical, is pointless. Even if it is a myth, it is at least obvious that those who invented it beheved that Jesus was the Logos, or the power sustaining and ruling nature. Nor can it be fairly contended that this doctrine, though found in the later Synoptics, is not found in the earlier ' Logia,' for the very first incident recorded in the ' Logia ' is our Lord's Temptation, and two of His temptations were suggestions that He should turn stones into bread and float down unharmed from the pinnacle of the Temple. It is open to Mr. Major to contend that this narrative is a fiction, but it is a matter beyond all question that the Apostle Matthew (or whoever else compiled the ' Logia ') beheved that Jesus was able to work these physical miracles, and therefore beheved that He was the Logos. The Logos-doctrine is, naturaUy, not so fuUy expressed in the Synoptics as in St. Paul and St. John, but it is there. Those apostles only filled in the details of an outline aheady clearly and firmly drawn by the Synoptists, and by the still earlier primitive source, the ' Logia.' Thus there are not reaUy three distinct and incompatible Christologies in the New Testament,, as aUeged by Mr. Major, but only one, viz. the doctrine that the pre-existent Logos, or Son of God, or Son of Man, the Father's vicegerent and agent, and as such the creator and sustainer of the universe, became man as Jesus of Nazareth.1 1 The peculiar reading of D and a few other ancient authorities in Lukeiii.22,"ThouartMySon ; to-day (ainupov) have I begotten Thee," ought not to be brought into the discussion, for it is rejected by all critical editors. The reading is clearly an assimilation to the exact textof theLXXof Ps. ii. 7. Nor is it necessarily heretical. Theuseof 01'nupovm the sense of ' eternally ' or ' in eternity ' is well established (it is found in Philo). Consequently an orthodox reader would under stand it: "Thou art My Son, I have eternally begotten Thee," cf. Heb. i. 5- BIBLIOGRAPHY The foUowing bibliography, though far from exhaustive, probably contains aU the works of any considerable interest or importance for English readers. It deals more fuUy with the English than with the foreign literature, partly because the former is more accessible, aftd stiU more because (for English men at least) it is of much more practical concern. Most of the books named I have fortunately been able to consult ; but some of them are neither in the British Museum nor in the London Library, in which cases I have usually had to be content with second-hand information. It was my original intention to include in this book a fuU sketch of the history of Modernism, but as I proceeded I found that it was impossible within the compass of a single volume to do justice both to Modernist history and to Modernist principles. I decided, therefore, to ignore the history in order to deal fuUy with the principles. The reader desiring to study the history of Modernism wUl do weU to begin with the indispensable Histoire du modernisme catholique (pp. vii, 458, Paris, 1912) of M. Houtin, which gives ample references to the original authorities, many of which are inaccessible in this country, and also refers to numerous documents not included in the list that foUows. From this list are excluded aU Liberal Protestant works, except in a few cases (hke those of Dr. Lake and Dr. Foakes- Jackson) in which the authors have lately passed from Modernism to Liberal Protestantism. Orthodox works have also for the most part been excluded, unless they are definite replies to Modernist books. EARLY PERIOD Hermesianism and Guntherianism Georg Hermes, Einleitung in die christ-katholische Theologie, Munster, 1819-29, 2nd ed., 1831. , Christ-katholische Dogmatik, Munster, 1834 (never finished). Gregory XVI's Brief of Condemnation, " Dum'acerbissimas," 369 370 BIBLIOGRAPHY Sept. 26, 1835, given in substance in H. J. D. Denzinger's Enchiridion symbolorum n, p. 430. Pius X's Encychcal " Qui pluribus," Nov. 9, 1846 (De fide et ratione), given in Denzinger as above, p. 436. Anton Giinther, Vorschule zur speculative^ Theologie des posi- tiven Ghristenthums (pt. i, Die Creationstheorie ; pt. ii, Die Incarnationstheorie), Vienna, 1828-9. , CoUected Works (9 vols.), Vienna, 1882. and J. E. Veith, " Lydia," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, Vienna, 1849-54. Pius X's Brief " Eximiam tuam," De falsa doctrina Antonii Guenther, addressed to the Cardinal de Geissel, June 15, 1857, given in substance in Denzinger u, p. 445. RECENT PERIOD I. French and Belgian A. Loisy, L'evangile et I'eglise, Paris, 1902, E.T. by C. Home, 1903, 2nd ed. 1908 (the most important of all Modernist works). , Autour d'un petit livre, 1903. , Simples reflexions sur le d&cret du Saint-Office " Lamenta- bili sane exitu," et sur VEncy clique " Pascendi dominici gregis," 1908. Etudes bibliques, 1901, 2nd ed. 1903 (the preface was suppressed by the author). -, Etudes evangeliques, 1902. -, Le quatrieme £.vangile, 1903. -, Les Evangiles synoptiques, 2 vols., 1907. -, Jesus et la tradition ivangelique, 1910. -, L'evangile selon Marc, 1912. -, Choses passees, 1913. -, Les mysteres paiens et le mystere chrStien, 1914. -, La paix des nations et la religion de I'avenir, 1919. L. Laberthonniere, Essais de philosophie religieuse, Paris, 1903 (representative of moderate Modernism). , Le realisme Chretien et I'idealisme grec (3rd|ed., Paris, 1904). E. Le Roy, Dogme et critique, Paris, 1907 (first chapter trans lated by L. G. Robinson as " What is a Dogma ? " 1918). Revue modemiste, littiraire et artistique, nos. 1-12, Dec. 1884 — Feb. 1886 (Marseihes and Paris). A. Vermeersch, De Modernismo Tractatus, Bruges, 1910 (coUects the Papal and other official documents). , Article " Modernism " in The Catholic Encyclopaedia. BIBLIOGRAPHY 371 Cardinal D. J. Mercier, Le modemisme, sa position vis-d-vis de la science, sa condamnation par le Pape Pie X, Brussels, 1908, E.T. by M. Lindsay, 1910. M. Lepin, Christologie : Commentaire des propositions 27-38 du decret du S.-Office " Lamentabili," Paris, 1908. E. V. Maumus, Les Modemistes, Paris, 1909. E. J. Mignot, Critique et Tradition, Paris, 1904. F. von Hiigel, Du Christ Eternel, et de nos Christologies succes- sives (reprinted from La Quinzaine of June 1, 1904). J. de Tonqu^dec, La notion de veritS dans la philosophie nouvelle, Paris, 1908 (orthodox). , Immanence. Essai critique sur la doctrine de M. Maurice Blontfel, 2nd ed., Paris, 1913 (do.). A. Houtin, Histoire du modernisme catholique, Paris, 1912, pp. vii, 458. , La question biblique chez les catholiques de France au XIX' siecle, 2nd enlarged edition, Paris, 1902. , La question biblique . . . au XX' siecle, 2nd ed. 1906. , L'Americanisme, pp. vii, 497, Paris, 1904. , La crise du clerge, 2nd enlarged edition, Paris, 1908. E.T. by F. T. Dickson, 1910. R. Gout, L' Affaire Tyrrell, 1910. The foUowing anti-Modernist works are also noteworthy : G. Fremont, Lettres d I'abbe Loisy sur quelques points de I'Ecriture sainte. M. Lepin, Les Theories de M. Loisy. Expose et critique, 1908. , La valeur historique du quatrieme Evangile, 1910. A. NouveUe, L'Authenticite du quatrieme Evangile, et la thhe de M. Loisy, 1905. G. Monchamp, Les Erreurs de M. Loisy, 1904. II. Italian Anon., 77 Programma dei Modernisti, Risposto all' Enciclica di Pio X " Pascendi Dominici Gregis," Rome, 1908 ; trans lated, 1908, as " The Programme of Modernism " by A. L. Lilley (the most! authoritative document of Italian Modernism). Anon., Quello che vogliamo. Lettera aperta di un gruppo de sacerdoti, privately printed at MUan, 1907 ; translated by A. L. LiUey, 1907, as " What we Want." G. Semeria, Scienza efede, Rome, 1903. , Dogma, gerarchia, e culto nella Chiesa Primitiva, 1902. Sostene GeUi (i.e. R. Murri), Psicologia delta religione, note ed appunti, 1905. 372 BIBLIOGRAPHY R. Murri, Democrazia e Cristianesimo, 1906. , La Vita religiosa nel Cristianesimo, 1907. , La filosofia nuova et V enciclica contro il Modernismo, 1908. , Delia religione, delta chiesa, e dello stato, MUan, 1910. U. Fracassini, Che cos' e la Bibbia, Rome, 1910. A. Fogazzaro, II Santo, MUan, 1905, translated by M. Prichard- Agnetti, 1906, as The Saint. , Ascensioni umani, MUan, 1899. S. Minocchi, La Crisi Odierna del Cattolicismo in Germania, Florence, 1907. 1Pius X, Errores Modernistarum de Ecclesia, Revelatione, Christo, Sacramentis (Ex Deer. S. Offic. " Lamentabili," July 3, 1907), 1 , De falsis doctrinis Modernistarum (Ex Encycl. " Pas- cendi dominici gregis," Sept. 7, 1907). 1 , Jusjurandum contra errores Modernismi (Ex Motu Proprio, " Sacrorum antistitum," Sept. 1, 1910). III. German G. Schnitzer, " Der katholische Modernismus " in Zeitschrift fiir Politik, v. i (1911). , A Modernist Anthology also entitled " Der katholische Modernismus " in the series Die Klassiker der Religion, Berlin, 1912. C. Pesch, Theologische Zeitfragen, Glaube, Dogmen, und geschichtlischen Tatsachen, Eine Untersuchung iiber den Modernismus, Freiburg, 1908. J. Kubel, Geschichte des katholischen Modernismus, Tubingen, 1909. A. Michehtsch, Der neue Syllabus, Gratz and Vienna, 1908. P. Kneib, Wesen und Bedeutung der Encyclika gegen den Modernismus, Mainz,. 1908. IV. English Percy Gardner, Exploratio Evangelica, 1899, 2nd ed. 1907 (by the President of the Churchmen's Union ; the fuUest and most authoritative statement of the English Modern ist position), , The Origin of the Lord's Supper, 1893. , The Growth of Christianity, 1907. , Modernity and the Churches, 1909. , The Religious Experience of St. Paul, 191 1. 1 Given in Denzinger, Enchiridion symbohrum. BIBLIOGRAPHY 373 Percy Gardner, The Ephesian Gospel, 1915. , Evolution of Christian Doctrine, 1918. , Evolution of Christian Ethics, 1918. H. RashdaU, The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology, 1919 (the most thorough Modernist treatment of a single doctrine). , Philosophy and Religion, 1909. C. F. Burney, The Old Testament Conception of Atonement fulfilled in Christ, 1920 (criticism of Rashdall's Bampton Lectures). C. H. S. Matthews (ed.), A. Fawkes, W. Scott Palmer, C. E. Raven, A. Clutton-Brock, H. Anson, Winifred Mercier, Faith and Freedom, 1918 (a semi-official Modernist mani festo). C. H. S. Matthews, The Faith of an Average Man, 1911. , (and Wm. Scott Palmer, H. Anson, F. L. Donaldson, D. W. A. Hankey), Faith or Fear? An Appeal to the Church of England, 1916. Six Oxford Tutors, Contentio Veritatis, 1902, 3rd ed. 1916 (semi-Modernist). B. H. Streeter (ed.), Foundations, T.tji.2. (semi-Modernist). R. A. Knox, Some Loose Stones, 1915 (criticism of Foundations). G. TyrreU, A Confidential Letter to a Friend who is a Professor of Anthropology, translated in II Corriere delta Sera for Jan. 1, 1966. , A Much Abused Letter, 1906. , Lex Orandi, 1904. , Lex Credendi, 1907. , Through Scylla and Charybdis, 1907. , Medievalism, a reply to Cardinal Mercier, 1908. , Christianity at the Cross Roads, 1909. , Letters to His Holiness Pope Pius X by a Modernist, Chicago, 1910. Maude D. Petre, Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, London, 2 vols., 1912. , George Tyrrell's Letters, 1920. , Catholicism and Independence, 1907. , Modernism, its Failure and its Fruits, 1918. Hakluyt Egerton, Father Tyrrell's Modernism, 1909. F. von Hugel, Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion, 1921. - and C. A. Briggs, The Papal Commission and the Penta teuch, 1906. J. H. Skrine, Creed and the Greeds, 1911. , Miracles and History, a study of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection, 1912. 374 BIBLIOGRAPHY J. H. Skrine, The Survival of Jesus, 1917. J. R. Cohu, The Evolution of the Christian Ministry, 1918. , The Bible and Modern Thought, 1920. W. R. Inge, Outspoken Essays, 1919. , Faith and its Psychology, 1910. , " The Person of Christ " and " The Sacraments " in Contentio Veritatis. J. M. Thompson, Jesus according to St. Mark, 1909. , Miracles in the New Testament, 1911. „ Through Facts to Faith, 1912. Alice Gardner, Within our Limits. Essays on Questions Moral, Religious, and Historical, 1913. , History of Sacrament in Relation to Thought and Progress, 1921. D. W. A. Hankey, The Lord of all Good Life, 1914. , A Student in Arms, 1916. ¦ , Religion and Common Sense, 1917. Wm. Scott Palmer (i.e. Mrs. M. E. Dowson), An Agnostic's Progress, 1906. , The Ohurch and Modern Men, 1907. , Studies in the Teaching of Religion, 1909. , The Diary of a Modernist, 1910. , The Claims and Promise of the Church, 1910. , A Modern Mystic's Way, 1914. , The Ladder of Reality, 1915. , Providence and Faith, 1917. , Christianity and Christ, 1920. R. B. ToUington, Clement of Alexandria, A Study in Christian Liberalism, 1914. , Personal Religion, Lay Views by Six Clergy, 1914. A. J. Carlyle, The Church of England, 1911. J. N. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, 1913 (criticism of Modernism). C. E. Raven, What thinkye of Christ ?igi6. H. Handley, A Declaration on Biblical Criticism, 1906. , Theological Room, 1914. R. H. Charles, The Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce, 1921. C. H. Box and C. Gore, Divorce in the New Testament, a Reply to Dr. Charles, 1921. R. H. Charles, Sermons preached in Westminster Abbey, 1917. A. Clutton-Brock, The Ultimate Belief, 1916. , Studies in Christianity, 1918. , What is the Kingdom of Heaven ? 1919. B. H. Streeter, Restatement and Reunion, 1914. — -, Concerning Prayer, 1916. BIBLIOGRAPHY 375 B. H. Streeter, Immortality, 1917. , The Spirit, 1919. and Edith Picton, Woman and the Church. A. E. J. Rawhnson, Dogma, Fact, and Experience, 1915 (mediating). Wm. Temple, The Faith and Modern Thought, 1910 (mediating). , Studies in the Spirit and Truth of Christianity, 1914. , Issues of Faith, 1917. , The Universality of Christ, 1921. M. G. Glazebrook, The Faith of a Modern Churchman, 1917. F. H. Chase, Belief and Creed, 1918 (reply to above). M. G. Glazebrook, The Letter and the Spirit, 1920 (reply to above). F. H. Chase, The Creed and the New Testament, 1920 (reply to above). F. E. Hutchinson, Christian Freedom, 1920. R. S. Moxon, The Doctrine of Sin, 1921 (mainly Freudian). H. D. A. Major, The Gospel of Freedom, 1912. , Revised Services for Modern Churchmen, Knaresborough, 1917, 2nd ed. Oxford, 1919. , Editor of The Modern Churchman since its foundation in 1911. J. Gamble, Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist, 1918. , Christ and Criticism, 1904. C. W. Emmet, Conscience, Creeds, and Critics, 1918. , The Eschatological Question in the Gospels, 1911. Bernard Lucas, The Faith of a Christian, 1904. , The Empire of Christ, 1907. , Our Task in India. Shall we proselytise Hindus or evangelise India ? 1914 (recommends peaceful penetration, not proselytization). J. F. Bethune-Baker, The Miracle of Christianity, 1914. , The Faith of the Apostles' Creed, 1918. V. F. Storr, The Divinity of Christ (mediating). H. S. HoUand, Creeds and Critics, 1908 (orthodox). — — , Miracles, 1911. — — , The Real Problem of Eschatology, 1913. T. R. WUUams, The Working Faith of a Liberal Theologian, T. K. Cheyne, The Reconciliation of Races and Religions, 1915. H. L. Jackson, The Eschatology of Jesus, 1913. , The Problem of the Fourth Gospel, 1918. , Medievalist and Modernist, Dunmow, 1920. F. J. Foakes- Jackson (ed.), The Faith and the War, A Series of Essays by members of the Churchmen's Union and others, 1915 (Modernist). 26 376 BIBLIOGRAPHY F. J. Foakes-Jackson and K. Lake, The Beginnings of Christianity, 1920 (Liberal Protestant). K. Lake, The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, 1907 (Modernist). , The Stewardship of Faith, 1915 (Liberal Protestant). , Landmdrks in the History of Early Christianity, 1920 (Liberal Protestant). Wm. Danks, The Gospel of Consolation, 1917 (mediating). W. F. Cobb, Mysticism and the Creed, 1914. W. Sanday, Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism, 1914. T. B. Strong, The Miraculous in the Gospels and the Creeds, 1914 (reply to above). W. Sanday, Form and Content in Christian Tradition, 1916. , The Position of Liberal Theology, 1920. , Divine Overruling, 1920. A. Fawkes, Studies in Modernism, 1913. A, L. LUley, Modernism, a Record and Review, 1908. , article on " Modernism " in Hastings's Encycl. of Religion and Ethics. W. J. Sparrow Simpson, Broad Church Theology, 1919 (orthodox). H. H. Henson, Sincerity and Subscription ; a plea for toleration, 1903- , The Liberty of Prophesying, 1909. , The Creed in the Pulpit, 1912. , Christian Liberty and other Sermons, 1918. , Anglicanism, 1921. Twelve Churchmen, Anglican Liberalism, 1908. E. A. Abbott, The Kernel and the Husk, 1886. „ The Message of the Son of Man, 1909. „ " The Son of Man," 1910. „ St. Thomas, his Death and Miracles, 1898 (very important). Chronicle of Convocation (of Canterbury) for April 30, 1914. — The most important words of the pronouncement upon Modernism by the Upper House on that date are the following : " The denial of any of the historical facts stated in the Creeds goes beyond the limits of legitimate interpretation, and gravely imperils that sincerity of pro fession which is plainly incumbent on the ministers of Word and Sacrament." INDEX Abortion, 254 Abrahams, jf., 221 Absolute, The (or God) in Hegel's system, 140-2 Absolute and Relative Know ledge, 62 Academy, The Ancient, 5 Activism, 94 Acts, 204 Adoption, see Apotheosis Agapemonites, 304 Agnosticism, 8 Agnostics, 310-n Alexandrian Fathers, 24-5 — Grammarians, 192 Allen, T. W., 192 Alogi, 206, 215 Alogism, see Irrationality Anaerobic organisms, 157 Anthropianism, 146 Anthropomorphism, 12 1-2 Antinomies of Kant, 74-6, 89 Apocalypse, 204, an, 218, 256 Apollo, 127 ApoUonius of Tyana, 284-5 Apologetics, Modernist, 119 Apostles, The, 294 Apotheosis, 334-40, xviii-xix, 127, 128, 296-8, 339, 343-4 A priori truths, 74 Aristarchus, 191, 192, 199 Aristides, Apology of, 208, 297, 299 Aristophanes (the critic), 192 Aristotle, 163, 169, 337 Ascension, The, 275-80 Assagioli, R., 160 Astronomy, 33 Athanasian Creed, 251, 317 Atonement, 222-30, 244, 251 Augustine, St., 277 Authority, Moral, 354-9 — of Christ, 357-9 — of the Church, 186-7. 358 B Baptism of Jesus, 225, 227 n., 368 — , Origin of, 226-7 Barnabas, Epistle of, 256 Barnes, E. W., 325-8 Basilides, 206, 298 Bauer, Bruno, 190 Baur, F. C, n, 190, 295 " Becoming," the Hegelian, 87 ft. "Being," The Hegelian, 84 ff. Bergson, 108-10, x, 7, 94, 99-100, 173-4 Berkeley, 33 Beth, K., 17 Bethune-Baker, J. F., 316-19, xviii, 20, 152, 300, 302 Biblical Canon, 255-6 — Criticism, 187-230, 9, n, 115 — Inspiration, 188-9 Bindley, T. H., 302 Bishop, The Christian, 194 Blass, F., 195 Blondel, M., 2, 9, 96 Blood, see Covenant Bosanquet, B., 93 Boutroux, E., 95 Bradley, F. H., 93 , C, 10 Cambridge (Girton) Conference, 319 ff„ xvii-xviii, 15, 20 Canon, see Biblical Case, T., xiii, 34 Catholic Creeds, see Creeds Catholicism, 8 Causation, 67, 181 ff. Celsus, 294 Cerinthus, 206, 296 Chalcedon, Council of, 252 Chapman, J., 217 Charles, R. H., 230 Christ (Jesus), Idea of, 38 — , His Human Knowledge, 7, 219, 357 377 378 INDEX Christ, The, of History and of Faith, 12 — , His Deity, 38, 218-20, 228-30, 262-7, 295-9, 340-6 — , Discourses of, 221-2 v — , Self-consciousness of, 225-6 Christ, W., 191 Christology of Fourth Gospel, 218-19 Synoptics, 367-8, 263-5 — , Modernist, 142-9, 316-44, 366- 8, xvii-xix — of Jesus Himself, 41-3, 126-8 Church, its authority, 255-6, 316 Churchmen's Union, 300, 317 Cicero, xv, 198 Claparede, E., 158 Clark, A. C„ 197, 198, 199 Classical Criticism and Biblical Criticism, 189 ff., xiv-xvii Clement of Alexandria, 24, 25, 205 Clement of Rome, 194, 202, 203 , 2nd Epistle, 326 Clifford, W. K., 177 Clutton-Brock, A., 247-9, 354-6 Co-consciousness, 147 " Coherence " Theory of Truth, 59-61 Communists, 311 Comte, 291 Confessions of sixteenth century, 251 Consubstantiality, 128, 219, 334 ff. Contingency, Philosophy of, 95 Continuity and Discontinuity, 152-4 Contradiction, Law of, 105, 329 Copernicus, 33 " Copying " theory of truth, 59- 61 " Correspondence " theory of truth, 58-61 Coulton, G. G., 302 Covenant, Old and New, 189 — Blood of the New, 228-30 Crawford, W. J., 162 Creation, 258-9 Creature-worship, 339-40, 149. xix Creeds, 247-99, 300-16, 29, 88-90 — and Morality, 252-4 — Authority of, 254-6 — , Their Scriptural character, 255 Criticism, Biblical, see Biblical — , Classical, see Classical — , Higher and Lower, 187, 198-9, see Textual Criticism of the Instrument, 77 Croce, 94, 97-8 Dalton, 243 Daniel, 200 Darwin, 179-80, 7, 163 Deification, see Apotheosis Deism, 152, 169 Demiurge, 334 Deposit of Truth, 22-6 Development, see Evolution — of Doctrine, 22-57 Dewey, J., 96 Dionysius of Alexandria, 218 Direction, see Orientation Discontinuity, see Continuity Divinity of Christ, see Christ — of Man, 334 ff. Divorce, 230, 353 Docetism, 206, 292, 298-9 Doctrine, see Development, and Dogma Dogma, 231-368 — Orientation of, 32-4 — Permanence of, 247-90, 7, 24, 34 — Le Roy's view of, 112-28 Dogmas, Secular, 231-46 — of the State, 232-3 — of Parties, 233-4 — of Science, 240-2 — , Secondary, 243-4 Dogmatic Tests, 244-6, 301 ff. Driesch, H., 170 Drummond, J., 215 Duchesne, 2 Dyothelitism, 40 Easter, The Cjuartod«ciman, 210 Ebionism, 292, 295 Ecumenical Councils, 40, 259 Einstein, 34, 243 Election, see Apotheosis Emmet, C. W., 302 Encyclical " Pascendi," 9 Ephesus, 209, 218 — , Elders of, 213-14 Eschatological School, 12 Ethical Societies, 311 Eucharist, 226-30, 248 Eucken, 7 Eugenics, 232-3 Eusebius, 205, 217 Evidence, Positive and Negative, 156 ff. INDEX 379 Evolution, Theory of, 44-57, 178- 84. 7-8, 151 — of Doctrine, see Development Experience as basis of knowledge, 100-105, 133-9, 36-7, 71-4, roo, 102-5, 133-9, 255. See Psy chology Fall, The, 250-61 Fawkes, A., 250 Fichte, 11 Finite gods, 333, 334 Florinus, 208 Flux, Universal, 46-7, 7, 9 Foakes-Jackson, F. J., 325-6, 359-60 Foester, F. W., 352 Fonsegrive, 2 Francis of Assisi, 157 Franzelin, 28, 32 Free Catholics, ix Freedom, Christian, 238-9, 316 — of Combination, 236-7 — of Thought and Speech, 236 — of the Will, 16, 123, 164-5 Future Life, see Immortality Galileo, 163 Gardner, P., ix, xi, 63, 74, 129- 133. 218, 349 Georgius Hamartolus, 216-17 German classical scholarship, 189 — theological scholarship, 189 Girton Conference, see Cambridge Glazebrook, M. G., 29, 273-6, 320, 334 Gnostics, 206, 298, 336 God, Doctrine of, 256-8 — as Immanent, 139-49, 151, 168-75, 151, 330, 342 — , Impassibility of, 257 — as the Perfect Being, 257-8, 329 ff. — as Love, 346-9 — , Personality of , 114, 121 — as Transcendent, 15, 30, 330 — see Image Gospel, The Fourth, 204-22 Gospels, The Four, 205, 207, 208 — , The Synoptic, 218-21 Graf, igo, 191 Grote, 195 Giinther, 30-2, 18 H Haldane, J. S., 170 Hardwick, S. C„ 350 Harnack, 17-19, 201, 204, 207, 217, 294-5 Headlam, A. C, 251 Heaven, 280 Hegel, 76-92, 7, 10-16, 30, 190, 329, 337 — , His criticism of Kant, 76-8 Hell, 275-81 Henson, H. H., xvii, 300, 322 Hernias, 194 Hermes, G., 32 Hexateuch, see Pentateuch Hierapolis, 210 Hilgenfeld, 295 Hinduism, 314-5 Historians, Ancient, 196-7 Hodgson, S., 177 Holy Spirit, 39-40, 326-8 Homer, 191-2, 196 — , Eccentric text of, 193 — , Vulgate text of, 192, 196 Homoousion, 263, 265-6 ; see Consubstantiality Horses, Learned, 158 Hort, 229, 230, x Houtin, A., 369 Hume, 33, 160 ff., xii Humility, 337~4°. 342 Hunt, A. S., xvi, 197 Hutchinson, F. E., ix, 266-7, 302< 307-16 Huxley, J. S., 263 n. Huxley, T. H., 177 Idea, Vital, 35-8, 29 — of Christ, 38 Idealism, xx — Absolute, 94 Ignatius, 206 Iliad, 191-2 Image, The Divine, 331, 349 Imageless thinking, 60 Immanence, Philosophical, 61-93, 129-39. 7. i°. xi See also Pragmatism, Hegel, Bergson, Croce Immanence, Theological, 139-49, 151. 342 — Hegelian, 140-2 — and Incarnation, 142-9 Immoralism, 248 Immortality, 270, 284-5 Impossible things, 166-7 38o INDEX Incarnation, The, 139-49, 262-7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 114, 152, 184-6, 239-40, 257, 339- 44 Infinity, The Kantian, 74-6 Inge, W. R., 178, 301 Inspiration, see Biblical Interpolations, in MSS., 195-6 Intuition, The Bergsonian, no Irenaeus, 208-9, 204, 205, 206 Irrationality as a World-prin ciple, 64, 99, 108 Jackson, H. L., 19, 206 James, Wm., 96-7, 177 Jerome, 218, 276-7 Jesus, see Christ Jewish Encyclopaedia, 222 Joachim, H. H., 91-2 John, St., 209-11, 216-8 — , Apocalypse, 204 — 1st Epistle, 205, 211 — Gospel, see Gospel, The Fourth John the Presbyter, 217 Joseph, H. W. B., xii, 93 Josephus, 285 Jowett, B., 195 Judgment, Future, 267-70, 253 — , Present, 268-9 Julicher, 201 K Kant, 61-78, 7, 8, 9, 10, ". 17. 18, 33. 34. 154. 190, xi, xii — , His attitude towards Religion and Morality, 68-71 — , Critique of Pure Reason, 61 ff., 16 of Practical Reason, 16, 70, 95 of Judgment, 70 — See Neo-Kantianism Kempthorne, Bp., v Knowledge, Theories of, 58-1 n — , Kantian Theory, 61 ff — , Correspondence Theory, 58- 61 — , Coherence (Hegelian) Theory, 78 ff. — , Pragmatist Theory, 94-111 — , Love of, no Krall, K., 158 Laberthonniere, 3, 271, 282 Lake, K., 359. 301 Lamarck, 179 Laplace, 170 Leaf, W., 192, 196 Le Roy, E„ 112-28, 35, 96, 282 Levitation, 185 Liberal Protestantism, 21, 292 and Modernism, 10-21 Logic, The Aristotelian, 92, 102 — , The Hegelian, 78 ff., xiv — , The Neo-Hegelian, 93 — and Metaphysics, 79 Loisy, 18, 19, 29, 35-8, 42-3, 201, 282 Loofs, F, 17 Love, God as, 346-9 Ludwich, A., 192 Luke, St., 204, 206, 293-4 Lux Mundi, 4 M Macalister, Prof., 157 Mackenzie, W., 160 McDougall, W., 148, 178, 352 McTaggart, xiv, 88, 90, 91 Madvig, xvi Maeterlinck, M., 160, 262 n. Magi and Magic, 287 Mahometanism, 314 Major, H. D. A., 302-6, ix, xviii, 20, 152, 264, 319-21, 322-5. 366-8 Malthus, 353 ; see Neo-Malthu sianism Marcion, 206, 298 Mark on the Resurrection, 288 Mathematical axioms, Origin of, i°5 Matthew, St., 201-2 Matthews, C. H. S., 301, 354 Medicine, Dogmas and Tests of, 245-6 Mesmer, 156, 246 Mill, J. S., 165 Millenarianism, 256 Miracles, 150-86, 12, 13, 17, 20, "5 Missions and Modernism, 311-15 Mitchell, T. W., 148 Modernism, Conservative or Moderate, 1-6 — , Advanced, 6 ff. — , French, 2-4, etc. — , Italian, 7-10, etc. — , English, 19, 20, etc. — and the Bible, 218-30 — and Morality, 349-59 INDEX 38i Modernism, Latest developments of, 300-68 — and the Creeds, 237-9, 300- 16, etc. — and the Pulpit, 238-9 — and the Resurrection, 283-7 — , See also Incarnation, Sym bolic Interpretation, and Liberal Protestantism Modern Positive School, 16 Monogamy, 233, 253 Monothelitism, 40 Monro, D. B., 191-2 Moral Law, the Eternal, 16, 72 Morality, Christian, 247-9 Mormonism, 304 Muratorian Canon, 203, 205 " Mutations " (biological), 154 Mythical School, 270, 307 N Nature, Laws of, 162-5 — , Order of, 150, 154-5 Nebular hypothesis, 179-83, 151, 170 Necessity, 104 Neo-Kantianism, 9 Neo-Malthusianism, 353-4 Neo-Platonism, 193 Nestorianism, 146 New Testament, Disputed and Undisputed Books of, 194 Criticism, 201-30 Newman, J. H., 26-8, 35 Newton, 243 Noumena, see Things-in-them selves O Odyssey, 191-2 Old Testament Criticism, 200-1 Organism, The Universe as an, 151, 168 ff. Orientation of Dogma, 32-4, 9 Origen, 24, 25, 203, 216, 264, 277 Original Sin, see Fall Osten, W. von, 159 Oxygen and life, 157 Pantheism, 14, 15 Papias, 205, 216, 217 Papyrology, xvi, 196-8 Parallelism, Psycho-physical, 175- 8 Paris, The Abbe, 165 Parmenides, 88 " Pascendi," The Encyclical, 9 Paul, St., 289, 295 — , and the Creeds, 39-40, 203 — , The Epistles, 201-3 — , Galatians, 203 — , The Pastoral Epistles, 202 Paul of Samosata, 322-5, xviii- xix Paulus, 291 Peirce, C. S„ 96 Pentateuch, 200, 201, 10, 191 Personality of Grod, see God — , Multiple, 147-8 Peter, St., 289 — , 1st Epistle, 203 — , Gospel of, 207 Phantasms of the dead, 286 Phenomena (Kantian), 62, 63, 76 Philip, the Apostle, 210 — of Side, 216 Philosophy and Modernism, 9-21, etc. Philostratus, 284-5, 287 Photius, 216 Pisistratus, 193, 196 Pius X, 30 Plato, 232 Platonic Canon, 193-5, xv-xvi — Epistles, 195-6 Polycarp, 202, 203, 205 Polycrates, 209-10, 205, 218 Polygamy, 253, 313 Polytheism, 257, 339 Potentiality, 182 Practice, see Pragmatism — and Belief, 121 Pragmatism, 94-128, 7, 154 Preaching, see Modernism Pride, 337-40, 342 Pritchard, H. A., 34 Programma dei Modernisti, 7 Property, Tenure of, 233 Prose-Rhythm, 199, xvi Psychical Research Society, 286 Psychology, 71-4, 120, 133-9. 350-4 ; see Experience Ptolemaic system, 33 Pygmalion, 183 Pyrrho of Elis, 58, 67-8, xii Quello che vogliamo, 8, 136 R Racial solidarity, 263 n. Rader, H., 195 Ransom Passage, 261-2 382 INDEX RashdaU, H., xvii, 138, 143-5, 218, 344, 360, 363-5 , Bampton Lectures, 222- Rationality of the Universe, 64 Real Presence, 114 Realism, xiii Reality, 90 Reason, Supremacy of, 65, no, *34-5. «37 Redemption, 261-2 Relativity, see Immanence, and Einstein Resurrection of Jesus, 281-90, 21, 29, 114, 117, 123, 124 — of the flesh, 273-5, 289 Revelation, see Apocalypse Richards, H., 196 Ritter, C, 195 Robinson, J. A., 207, 299 Rufinus, 278 Russell, B., 107 Sabatier, 16, 157 Sacraments, 226-7, 355-6 Salmon, G., 203, 217 Sanday, W., 217 ScheUing, 11, 30 Schiller, F. C. S., 93, 96, 98-9, 101-2, 104-5, IID Schmiedel, 201 Schweitzer, 12 Sensation and knowledge, 59, 60 Sermon on the Mount, 254 Sexual morality, 350-4 Shakers, The, 304 Sibylline Oracles, 200 Silvanus, 203 Simon Magus, 127, 304 Sin, 260 <— , Hegel's view, 15, 260-1 — , see Fall Sinai-Syriac version, 230 Sinlessness of Jesus, 185 Siva, 303, 305 Smith, N., 321, 339 Socrates (ecclesiastical historian), 216 Solipsism, 51, 66, 81 Son of God, 263-6 man, 219-21, 223-4, 264-6 Souls, Pre-existence of, 264 Space, 49, 75 Spens, W., 32 Speusippus, 193 " Sports," see Mutations Stanton, V. H., 212, 214 Stigmatization, 157 Strauss, D. F, 11, 190 Streeter, B. H., 4, 276, 282-3, 285, 289 " Succession," in a school, 193-4 Suicide, 254 Supernatural, The, 150, 151, 174- 5 ; see Miracles Swann„N. E. E„ 302 Symbolic interpretation of dog mas, 271-81 Synoptics, see Gospels Tacitus, xv, 202 Talmud, 294 Tatian's Diatessaron, 208, 230 Taylor, A. E., 196 Tertullian, 205, 328 Tests, see Dogmatic Textual criticism, 197, 199, 229- 3«> Theophilus, 205 Things-in-themselves, 13, 14, 62, 66, 67 Thompson, J. M., 183-4 Thucydides, 192 Thurston, Fr., 157 Time, 49, 75, 76 ToUington, R. B., 322, 338 Tonquedec, J. de, 3 Torricelli, 163 " Tradition " in a school, 193-4 Trent, Council of, 259 Trinity, The Holy, 344-9, 362- 5, 14, 16, 31, 39, 40, 115 Tritheism, 339, 362-5 Truth, Nature of, 58-111 ; cp. also 112-28, 7, xii — , Immutability of, 7, 58, 61, 90 — , Partial or Finite, 82 ff. Tychism, 94 Tyrrell, G., 29-30, 35-8 U Unitarianisn, 146, 239-40, 292, 308-10 Utility and Truth, 106-8; see Pragmatism Valentinus, 206, 298 Vatican Council, 30 Vergil, 194 Vincent of Lerins, 25-6 INDEX Virgin Birth, 291-9, 21, 29, 115 Virgin Mary, 293-4 Visions, 284-7 W " W " (Egyptian MS.), 230 Ward, J., 177 Webb. C. C. J., 347 Weiss, J., 12 Wellhausen, J., 191 Wells, J., viii 383 Wells, L. St. Alban, 207 What we Want, see Quello Wilson, Prof. Cook, xiii, 34, 61 Wilson, E. B., 170 Wolf, F. A., 191 Worship, Modernist, 309-10, 339- 40 Zahn, 213, 295 Zeno, 88, 89 Printed by Haiell, Watstn &¦ Viney, Li , London and Aylesbury, England: YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 3 9002 08867 9973