OXFORD PAMPHLETS

i

1914

¦IBRARY.

I SCANDINAVIA AND
THE WAR

BY

EDWIN BJORKMAN

Price Twopence net

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
HUMPHREY MILFORD
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW
NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY

EDITORIAL NOTE
The following articles are reprinted from the Morning
Post, by the courteous permission of the proprietor. The
author is peculiarly fitted to speak with knowledge, and
at the same time with impartiality, on the subject of
Scandinavian hopes and fears. His articles will prob
ably come as a revelation to many even of those English
men who have visited Scandinavia. In this country too
little attention has been paid to Scandinavian politics,
although the achievements of the Scandinavian countries
in literature, in sculpture, and in the sciences are better
known and more admired by Englishmen than Dr.
Bjorkman is aware.
H. W. C. D.

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR

First of all, I must point out that, literally speaking,
there is no Scandinavia as yet. There is a Scandinavian
peninsula and a Scandinavian group of nations, but
nothing that may be regarded as a political, economical,
or even geographical entity. It is convenient, of course,
to have a term that can be applied collectively to the
three northern kingdoms ; and to the world at large
such a term has more validity than the nations com
prised within it seem willing to admit. At home, in
the United States, I find it next to impossible to make
my closest and most intelligent friends remember
whether, by birth, I am a Swede, a Norwegian, or a
Dane. When I set them right, they answer commonly :
' Well, what is the difference anyhow ? ' Scandinavians
are apt to take offence at an attitude which they regard
as expressive of nothing but ignorance. To me that
attitude is a most significant symptom, indicating that
differences which seem very radical at close quarters
may seem quite negligible at a distance. And no
matter how much importance the Scandinavians them
selves attach to the divergence of their respective
natures and interests, an impartial outside observer can
only conclude that all divergences are outweighed by
their community of race and culture, their practical
community of language, their extensive, although far
from total, community of political position, and their
steadily increasing community of economic interests.
In any crisis they find themselves in a position almost

4 SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR
identical with that of Holland and Belgium, which
countries, although separated by much greater racial
distinctions, are constantly made to feel that the inde
pendence of one is essential to the independence of the
other. s
All this I grant, and the truth of it is more and more
being brought home to those whom it principally con
cerns. In fact, I hope that one of the good results pro
duced by the present upheaval will be to make the
Scandinavians fix their gaze on what they have in com
mon rather than on their differences. But, to under
stand the bearing of the great war on their countries, it
is absolutely necessary to keep in mind that they still
think and speak and act as Swedes, Norwegians, or
Danes, and not primarily as Scandinavians. All of
them are just now seriously agitated by hopes as well
as fears ; but their hopes and fears are not identical
except in one point — that they are above all desirous
of preserving their national integrity and independence.
To make clear the distinctions modifying that common,
general desire, I shall consider the three nations separ
ately in their relation to the present crisis, as well as to
the new international situation likely to spring from it.
Geographically Denmark belongs to the Continent
rather than to the Scandinavian peninsula. But for
racial differences it would form a logical part of the
German Empire. And to Germany the advantages of
such a union would be tremendous. It would turn the
Baltic into a German lake, and multiply the chances
for a bold stroke at England. It would give Germany
the sailors she so badly needs. At the same time it
would make it harder than ever for Sweden and Norway
to maintain a complete independence, even if they were
never openly attacked. In fact, Denmark would be so

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR 5
valuable as a German province that I think its conquest
would long ago have been made one of the main German
objectives but for England. Denmark fears Germany,
of course, and fears her more than any other Power.
But that fear is mixed with hatred, too — a hatred that
has lost very little of its intensity by the passing of fifty
years since the Duchies of Sleswick and Holstein were
taken by Germany. Racially and linguistically one of
those provinces, Holstein, had always been German
and could be rightly claimed by a united Germany. The
southern part of Sleswick had and has a mixed popu
lation, with the German element in ascendancy. Nor
thern Sleswick was, and practically is still, as Danish
as the island of Funen. Had Germany been content
to take Holstein and the German districts of Sleswick,
the rancour caused by that seizure might not have been of
long duration. But Germany took the whole of Sleswick ;
and what has been done during the last fifty years to
uproot all traces of Danish nationality within that pro
vince goes far beyond anything done by the Russians
in Poland and Finland, or by the Austrians in their
Slavonic and Italian provinces". And however willing
Denmark might have been to forget, the sufferings in
flicted — and inflicted in vain — on the Danes of Sleswick
have prevented it from doing so.
Though Denmark has always been akin to Germany
in civilization, and though the economical community
of interest between the two countries has been steadily
increasing, the prevailing Danish attitude toward Ger
mans remains distrustful to the verge of open hostility.
For a long period of years the political life of Denmark
was coloured and warped by the struggle between con
flicting opinions as to what could and should be done
to protect the badly exposed capital against the menace

6 SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR
of German conquest. On the other hand, Denmark has
been drawn more and more toward England, not only
because here Denmark has found one of her best markets,
but because of its keen realization that England more
than any other Great Power has an interest in protecting
a country which may be said to hold the only key to the
Baltic and one of the main keys to the North Sea. The
events of 1801 and 1807 have grown very vague in
memory ; and it is probably the Fleet of Great Britain
which more than anything else has drawn the friendship
of Denmark. At the same time, Denmark alone among
the Scandinavian countries has established friendly rela
tions with Russia. The original cause was sentiment —
and the Danes are at once very sentimental and very
practical — based on the marriage of a Danish Princess
to the Heir to the Russian Throne. But this friendship
has acquired more and more of a practical import with
the growth of Russian hostility toward Germany and
friendliness toward England. Thus it is not surprising
that in the present conflict the sympathies of the Danish
people turn almost exclusively toward the Allied cause.
But just because of these sympathies, which are not
unknown in Berlin, the little country to the north, with
a population of less than three millions, and with open
shores, that lie almost within gunshot of the German
coast, has been forced to maintain its neutrality as punc
tiliously as did Belgium. I do not think anything but
a direct invasion of her territory could bring Denmark
to forget the caution enforced by her dangerous prox
imity to the most unscrupulous of the warring Powers.
That all fears for Denmark's safety are not directed
southward will probably surprise Englishmen very much.
But several travellers recently returned from Denmark
assure me that one of the mosfc harrowing apprehen-

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR 7
sions of the Danish people is the possibility of England's
trying to establish a naval base on Danish ground.
' Harrowing ' is the word deliberately used, because the
Danes feel that under such circumstances they would
be forced to fight beside their natural enemies against
their natural friends and allies. The time when such
a fear might have been warranted is long gone by ; and
just now, when a sense of responsibility on behalf of
Belgium has so largely caused England's decision to
take up arms, such a fear is particularly groundless.
A step of that kind, however advantageous in some ways,
would in other ways prove all but fatal to the cause of
the Allies. And this fact ought to be as clear to Den
mark as I know it is to England. What, then, can
make the Danes, against their will and against all
reason, cling to this fear ? Well, here we have another
evidence of German : diplomacy '. False statements
with regard to England's intentions have no doubt
been sedulously circulated — and this has been done not
only in Denmark, but in Norway as well, where fears
of exactly the same kind have been encountered by
numerous trustworthy and well-informed travellers.
Of course, we know that, if Danish distrust of England
be explicable though unwarranted, such a fear on the
part of Norway must be held nothing less than ridiculous.
But it is there, it has to be counted with, and it should
be dispelled.
To return to the more deep-lying Danish friendliness
toward the Allies, this is probably strengthened by
a realization on the part of Denmark that this may be not
only its best but its only chance of recovering Sleswicki
But, as I have already said, the Danes are intensely
practical in spite of their sentimentality (their practical
tendency being enforced by a strongly-developed sense

8 SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR
of humour), and they realize no less clearly that a head:
long plunge into the whirlpool of war might at the besp
prove a very expensive way of achieving their cherished
goal. To what extent they entertain any hopes of get
ting what they want without fighting for it I do not
know. But should the Allies prove completely .victor
ious in the end, as I believe they will, it would, par
ticularly on the part of England, be good business, if
nothing more, to insist on the belated return of the
Danish part of Sleswick to the country of which it!
forms a natural adjunct.
Because of her position, sheltered by the Koelen
mountains on the one side and by the Atlantic on the 1
other, with Sweden acting as a buffer toward Russia ]
and Denmark toward Germany, Norway remains almost
unconcerned by the war as long as the two sister nations
are unaffected and England does not suddenly desert
a policy that has become expressive of one of Norway's
main ideals. I do not think much account needs to be
taken of any Norwegian fears of England, however much
Germany may strive to foster them. But it is always
better to meet such fears half-way, and England should
not deem it beneath her dignity to do so. More' than
immediate defeat or victory is at stake just now. A
new order of things is likely to emerge from this ordeal
of fire. And, when this happens, the nature of the new
order may depend in no little degree on the confidence
reposedin England by the smaller nations. Such a con
fidence takes time to develop, though it may disappear
in a moment ; and it is more determined by public
gpssip than by the inside knowledge of men in power.
Norway's fear of being dragged into the fight by one
of the other two Scandinavian countries is much more
real and much more significant. But there is a silver

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR 9
lining to this cloud. In this case German inability to
analyse human nature has again frustrated German
hopes and intrigues. For years the German Emperor
has done his best to win the heart of Norway, and I fear
he has long deemed it well won. It is notorious that,
while the Norwegians were still struggling to rid them
selves of the union with Sweden, the Emperor repeatedly
encouraged them, while at the same time he professed
the utmost love for the Swedes and his particular good
friend the aged King Oscar. I have never had any
fault to find with the desire of the Norwegians to be
completely independent (which they were not within
the Union) ; but I know that they were more than
once on the point of going to war for what could be had
peacefully, and I suspect that their trust in German
support may have had something to do with their
impetuosity. When the dissolution of the Union actually took
place in 1905, war was averted ; but relations between
the two nations became badly strained, and remained
so until not very long ago. As late as last spring several
Norwegian poets of high standing bewailed in provo
cative verses the fact that the fight with Sweden had
not come off in 1905. And one might have expected
that a fratricidal war on the Scandinavian peninsula
would be among the first results of the opportunity
offered by the general melee on the Continent. But
instead the Swedes and the Norwegians behaved as if
they had never had a single misunderstanding. They
arrived quickly at agreements meant to dispose of all
mutual fear, and to ensure a common as well as mutual
neutrality in the face of anything and everything but
the open violation of that neutrality by a third party.
It might be said that German interest in Sweden had

10 SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR
exercised pressure on Norway, directly or indirectly.
But even if such pressure might have averted an im
pending crisis, I do not think it could have produced
an understanding of the scope and completeness actually
existing. Now just as the wonderful common sense of
those two peoples — based, I think, on an unusually
developed power of imagination — had asserted itself in
1905, so it reasserted itself in this case ; and by their
action I believe that all possible German hopes of bring
ing Sweden into the fray on its own side were effectively
disposed of.
But this understanding, so helpful by ridding Sweden
and Norway of all mutual fear, might under certain
circumstances involve both of them instead of only one.
And this is the possibility which, in spite of all reassur
ances, keeps the Norwegians from feeling wholly secure.
There are two quarters from which the danger might
appear. The Russians might invade Sweden, or at
least seize a naval base on the island of Gothland. The
alleged designs of Russia on the northernmost part
of the Scandinavian peninsula are well known to every
body who gives the least attention to international
politics. I shall return to them later when discussing
the position of Sweden. For the present I can dismiss
them as buried under an avalanche of new events and
' opportunities too exciting to permit Russian attention
to dwell on the distant north. I think this has been
realized by the Norwegians, and that in so far as Russia
still figures in their apprehensions it is rather as a tempta
tion to Swedish aggressiveness than as a direct aggres
sor. And the Swedish attitude toward Russia since
the beginning of the war has gone far toward dispelling
the last vestige of this particular fear. It is the hold
of Germany on Sweden— based on circumstances to be

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR 11
related further on — which continues to cause anxiety
to the Norwegians, in spite of the practically perfect
guarantee furnished by the understanding between the
sister nations. And this is just the point where the
futility of the German intrigues shows itself. In spite
of the North Cape excursions of the German Emperor,
in spite of the glowing Pan-Germanism of the late
Bjornstjerne Bjornson (whose ideas I do not mean to
belittle by this reference), and in spite of the employ
ment of Bjorn Bjornson as the Emperor's principal
Scandinavian press agent, the Norwegians do not trust
the Germans very much. Perhaps a reason for this
anomalous and ungrateful attitude on their part ma
be furnished by what happened at the time when
Norway, after the separation from Sweden, was pre
paring to start a completely new Government of its
own. The democratic and republican tendencies of the
country are too well known to need mention. Yet
a Monarchical Government was decided on ; and it is
pretty well understood that this concession was the
price paid for Germany's acceptance of the new state
of affairs.
Be this as it may, the fact remains that the Nor
wegians find it hard to believe that Germany may not
force Sweden into the fight after all. The silver lining
to this cloud — though it may .not appear as such to
Englishmen for the time being — is that the Norwegians
seem to take it for granted they must fight on the same
side as the Swedes. I think this feeling on their part
bodes well not only for the future but for the present,
as it will go far toward quieting the Swedes. The sum
and substance of all this is that the Norwegians do not
want to fight anybody, and that they would be particularly
chagrined at having to fight for Germany against the

12 SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR
English. Their sympathies are beyond all doubt with
the Allies. And with England Norway has probably
more in common than with any other non-Scandinavian
nation. To England, and to its Fleet, Norway, like
Denmark, would instinctively look for support in a
moment of dire need. I insist that promise of such
support should be given before the fatal moment
arrives, and that it should be given in the most un
equivocal terms.1 Her independence is what Norway
cherishes above anything else. An assault on it is the
one thing she fears. She stands more outside than her
sister nations, with less to fear and less to gain from
the events that are now shaking Europe to its founda
tions. Her incentive to neutrality is the more potent
because she has recently entered on a career of indus
trial development that promises great things for her
future. Like Sweden, she is bound to be of tremendous
importance to England during the rest of this century,
provided she is permitted to grow in peace and in
accordance with her own nature. For this reason, if
for no other, England should spare no effort to dispose
of whatever fears may be still haunting her.
II
Sweden now remains to be considered. I have on
purpose put Sweden last, because she needs to be dealt
with at somewhat greater length. Her position is more
difficult than that of Norway or even of Denmark.
Her problem is more acute. Her attitude has seemed
more questionable. The sympathies of Denmark are
undoubtedly with the Allies, no reservation being made
against Russia. The sympathies of Norway are in the
1 The Belgian Grey Book shows that the offer of support has been
made by England [Ed.].

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR 13
main with England, though Norwegians view Russia
with some apprehension. The sympathies of Sweden
are to a large extent with Germany, although this
implies no animosity toward England, and is coupled
with a great deal of genuine love for France. The key
to the situation is that Sweden does not love Germany
so much as she fears, and for that reason hates, Russia.
The main features of Sweden's geographical situation
are in themselves an explanation of the Swedish state
of mind. Sweden and Norway are joined along four-
fifths of their entire length, and the Koelen Ridge, which
screens Norway so effectively, is of little use to Sweden
in this respect, a difference rising out of the conformation
of the peninsula. The sound between Sweden and
Denmark is only a mile and a half wide at one point.
From Germany to the southern coast of Sweden is only
a short cruise. The Island of Gothland, on the eastern
coast of Sweden, projects far into the Baltic, offering
an equal temptation to Russia and Germany. The
Aland Islands practically form a bridge from Finland
to the Swedish coast just north of Stockholm. There
are a dozen points along the northernmost half of
Sweden where a landing of troops from Finland could
be easily effected. And finally, Sweden and Russia
meet at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, at a point
"*whence a railway starts across the Koelen Mountains
to an ice-free harbour on the Norwegian coast. And
the region tapped by that railway contains unlimited
stores of some of the best iron ores known to the world,
not to mention other mineral resources and a wonderful
wealth of timber.
Let us also recall a few historical data. When
Sweden lost Finland to Russia in 1809 the two countries
had been at war for more than two hundred years,

14 SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR
clashing incessantly, as did England and France up to
the close of the Napoleonic era. Although the Finns
have neither race nor language in common with the
Swedes, Finland had never been a mere colony to
Sweden. It was an integral part of Sweden, bound to
her by innumerable ties. And to this day there remains
in Finland a Swedish-speaking population of about
250,000. Neither the long, hopeless struggle against
the unrelenting Russian advance, nor the sense of
responsibility toward the Finnish people, has ever been
forgotten by the Swedes. The union with Norway,
achieved by Bernadotte in 1814, was meant as a com
pensation for the loss of Finland. In one sense it was ;
in another sense it was not. Through many decades
that union undoubtedly meant Swedish control of
Norway's military and naval resources, as well as of
Norway's foreign policy, thus bringing to Sweden added
power and security. But almost from the first Norway
was rebellious against an arrangement which palpably
foiled her aspiration at absolute self-determination.
Of the details or merits of that long family quarrel we
shall not have to speak here. Suffice it to say that,
in spite of all quarrelling — and foolishly, perhaps —
Sweden clung to the idea of the union as a guarantee
against any aggression from a third party. And it
was only when the union broke in 1905 that Sweden
seemed to become aware of the full extent and signi
ficance of the Russian menace. Behind this realization,
warranted or not, lay undoubtedly a fear that Norway
might play into the hands of Russia.
Whether the Russian menace to Sweden has ever
existed cannot and need not be decided here. The
probability is that it has been exaggerated by the
Swedes and under -estimated by the rest of the world.

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR 15
The main facts advanced by the Swedes as grounds for
their apprehensions were the violent Russian attacks on
Finnish nationalism, the massing of Russian troops in
Finland, the revelations of Russian" espionage within
Sweden, and the building of railways through Finland
to the common border in the extreme north — railways
that could bring no reasonable commercial or industrial
advantages. The Swedes also saw an increase, rather
than a decrease, of bitterness in Norway, although the
separation had been accomplished without bloodshed
and without the open interference of any third Power.
That all these factors tended to make the position of
Sweden precarious in the extreme no one can deny.
To make matters still worse, the relationship to
Denmark seemed also to have taken a turn for the
worse — perhaps because a Danish Prince had accepted
the Norwegian Throne, and perhaps because of the
known Danish friendliness toward Russia. At this
juncture the Swedes appeared to be seized with a sense
of utter isolation. But this sense produced no discour
agement. Instead, it put them on their mettle and led
to an outburst of fierce determination to preserve their
country and their nationality at any cost. Reforms of
every kind were started or hastened. The whole people
seemed* to undergo a process of rebirth. Physical and
moral discipline became salient characteristics where
not long before laxity of every kind had reigned. A
period of feverish upbuilding followed, and not only
material but also human resources were subject to this
process. Nevertheless the Swedes felt compelled to
look abroad for help. On this point I dare not speak
with too much assurance, but I believe that the nation
as a whole would have been most inclined to turn
westward, and especially toward England, in this search.

16 SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR
Both because of her large financial interests in Sweden,
and because of her long-standing trouble with Russia,
England must at one time have seemed the logical ally
and protector. Repeatedly I have heard Swedes
declare : ' England can never afford to let Russia get
a foothold on the Atlantic' Why this natural tendency
never had a chance to make itself felt will be explained
further on.
Another possible ally was Germany, of course, and
for years a very close friendship had joined the Royal
House of Sweden to the Hohenzollerns and other
reigning dynasties. The present Swedish King is
married to a German Princess, as was his father, and
one of his sons is named after the Emperor. One of
the latter's sons is named after the late King Oscar.
Symptoms of this kind cannot be overlooked, even in
these days of constitutional government. And the
interchange of ideas has always been brisk between
Sweden and Germany. In this connexion it is not
without point that for many years no author has pushed
to the forefront in Sweden without having his works
promptly translated into German. The same is true
of Norwegian and Danish works ; and while it need
not have formed a part of any premeditated campaign
on the part of Germany, it has nevertheless* had its
inevitable effect — an effect that has been greatly
enhanced by the contrasting English indifference to all
but a small part of the Scandinavian literatures.
Considering all these circumstances, Englishmen
might well be surprised, not at the extent but at the
limitation of the pro -German sentiment in Sweden.
The situation is both curious and entertaining— from
an English viewpoint. In spite of the known leanings
of the Royal House, in spite of all overtures from

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR 17
Germany, in spite of military admiration of Prussian
methods, in spite of the reckless agitation carried on
by men like Sven Hedin, the Swedes have found it
extremely hard to become enthusiastic about the
Germans, whose arrogance, smug self-complacency, and
unfailing tactlessness are constantly grating on them.
During the war of 1870-1, for instance, Swedish sym
pathies were overwhelmingly with France. For all
their hatred of official Russia, the Swedes have never
hated the Russians as individuals. On the other hand,
the feeling against the individual German has at times
been so strong that I have heard of German travellers
in Sweden speaking English or French in order not to
reveal their nationality. Toward the Prussian military
spirit and methods the people of Sweden have always
manifested a profound distrust and dislike. Although
strongly individualistic, the Swedes are at bottom very
democratic. What, then, has given Germany the hold
on Swedish sympathies which undoubtedly it has
to-day ? The answer is very simple : the rapproche
ment between Russia and England. As long as those
two Powers remained mutually suspicious of each other,
Sweden felt comparatively secure. The understanding
between England and France was probably a dis
appointment, and the effect of it was augmented by the
simultaneously increasing hostility between Germany
and Russia. But it was only the final completion of the
Triple Entente that was felt as a direct blow — the worst
one received by Sweden for a long time. For with
England tied to Russia, not only by diplomatic engage
ments but by the exigencies of her own situation, what
hope could there be for Sweden in a case of Russian
aggression ?
If we also bear in mind the dismay caused in German

18 SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR
circles by the Entente — even though its full value to
France may never have been realized until after the
war had broken out— and the incessant activity of
Germany's intriguing diplomacy, with its established
policy of international embroilment and its disingenuous
methods, we can hardly wonder at the attitude of
Sweden to-day. By their isolation within the Scan
dinavian group, by the apparent or real threats of
Russia, by the combination of English and Russian
interests, by the intrigues of Germany, and, finally, by
the violent agitation of a socially influential pro-German
group at home, the Swedes have simply been driven to
look upon Germany as their only remaining friend.
No Englishman who has grasped this combination of
powerful influences, all of them pressing in the same
direction, can fail to respect and admire the restraint
shown by the Swedish people since the beginning of
the present crisis. No matter what the sympathies of
individuals or groups may have been, the behaviour
of the nation as a whole has been scrupulously correct,
nothing being undertaken in the way of mobilization,
for instance, but what was absolutely required for the
protection of Swedish neutrality at an extremely
critical period. Nor have the Swedes at any time been
betrayed into any resentment against England. On the
contrary, I have been told by several Englishmen, who
have recently passed through Sweden on their way to
or from Russia, that they were passed the moment their
nationality became known, while the passports and
luggage of Germans as well as Russians were carefully
examined. To be perfectly frank, however, I do not
know what might have happened if the present war had
not been preceded by that awakening of the Swedish
nation already referred to. The Swedes present a

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR 19
curious mixture of idealism and practical instincts.
Both as individuals and as a nation they are seized at
times by an irresistible passion for adventures, for
tremendous achievements. The spirit of Charles XII
is not quite dead in the country. From time to time
the old dreams of world-power seem to haunt the nation,
bringing it to a dangerous point of disregard for the
hard realities of the current hour.
Perhaps this spirit of adventure will never depart
entirely from the Swedish character. Perhaps its
departure would be a distinct loss not only to the Swedes
but to the world at large. But of late it has turned in
a new direction, at once safer and more promising.
The Swedes have begun to see visions of power based
not on conquest but on internal development. The
richness of their natural resources, particularly in metals,
has long been known. Up to a brief time ago there
seemed small hope of their extensive exploitation,
because the needed fuel had to be imported. The
progress of electricity has changed this situation radically.
Swedish electrical engineers are counted among the best
in the world to-day. The waterfalls, in which the
country abounds, can now be put to use. New methods
of smelting the ore have been devised and are constantly
being perfected. The ore can be used at home instead
of being shipped abroad. As I was coming across the
• ocean a few weeks ago I heard an English metallurgist
remark that men of his profession expect the Swedes
in less than fifty years to lead the world in steel pro
duction. The Swedes have firmly grasped these new possi
bilities, in which there is adventure enough to suit their
ardent souls. To make their new dreams real, they
need nothing but their own ingenuity, industry, capacity

20 SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR
for social organization, and — security against inter
ruption from without. No nation in the world is more
passionately devoted to its own independence. This
has always been true. It is now more true than ever.
Freedom to pursue their own course within their own
country is all that the Swedes care for — and the world
at large, all mankind, will be sure to profit if this desire
of theirs is not foiled. The Swedes will be neutral until
forced by open infringement of their neutrality to take
up arms. They will be friendly with every nation that
leaves them alone — even Russia. They will be grateful
for any action on the part of greater Powers tending to
rid them of the fear of unprovoked aggression that has
so long been haunting them. They are looking for no
expansion of their territory. If Finland were offered
them by the Concert of Powers to-day their answer
would probably be : ' Finland is a nation by itself and
should be subject to no other nation.' If, on the other
hand, Finland were once more to become an autonomous
member of a Russian Federation, with all its grievances
disposed of, I think the Swedes would shed three-fourths
of the nervousness that has possessed them in recent
years. They do not fear a practically free Finland, tied
to Russia by bonds of affection. They do fear a harassed
and oppressed Finland that may be prepared as a tool
against themselves.
There is in these desires of theirs no vestige of the
impossible. What they ask for is eminently practicable
and desirable from the viewpoint of every nation wedded
to democratic principles. And, as the war goes on,
I think the mood in Sweden may change considerably.
There, as elsewhere, time is fighting on the side of the
Allies. In the meantime nothing is wanted on the part
of England but patience. But, when the time comes

SCANDINAVIA AND THE WAR 21
to make peace, it would be well if England took steps
to ensure to Sweden as well as to Norway and Denmark
the neutral independence which to them means life itself.
The treaty of 1855, making England and France joint
guarantors of Swedish and Norwegian independence and
integrity, was abrogated in 1908, because Sweden and
Norway considered it injurious to their prestige. It
might, however, be wise if they now accepted some similar
agreement which should take into account the numerous
changes that have occurred since the old treaty was
signed. It would also be well, I think, if England could
depart from her customary policy of proud indifference —
to the extent of really trying to win the friendships of
the Scandinavian nations. No one is stronger than he
who can learn from his enemies. And England has
much to learn from Germany. Those Scandinavian
countries possess things that England needs, and will
need more and more. They belong naturally to the
Anglo-Saxon group — with Great Britain, the United
States, and the British Colonies — rather than with
Germany. So little will be needed to win them :
nothing but an open declaration of intentions, a firm
support of principles that have long been dear to the
English mind, and some genuine interest in the life,
culture, and aspirations of the three nations that have
lately brought mankind gifts out of all proportion to
their own numerical or political importance.

Oxford : Horace Hart Printer to the University

3 9002

WHY WE AEE AT WA1
GREAT BRITAIN'S CASE
BY MEMBERS OF THE OXFORD FACULT
OF MODERN HISTORY

E. BARKER.
C. R. L. FLETCHER.
L. G. WICKHAM LEGG.

H. W. C. DAVIS.
ARTHUR HASSALL.
F. MORGAN.

With an Appendix of Original Documents
including the Authorized English Translation
of the White Book issued by the
German Government
THIRD EDITION REVISED (NINTH IMPRESSIONl
CONTAINING THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK AND
EXTRACTS FROM THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK

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