HJ 3 9002 1 1326 1 02 LOG BOOK Csrbb(Cecil Beaton) BRIEFING Belore each raid the bomber crews are allotted their indi- vidual tasks and are taken inch by inch over their objec- tives with the help of a giant map and photographic repro- ductions of the site. When they come to make the raid they are already familiar with the objective and know pre- cisely where to find their target. REPORTING On their return their first job is to make a report of the raid. This they give verbally, and the officer whose job it is to record the reports as they come in questions them ex- haustively. Later, when the various reports are co-related, they furnish a detailed and reliable picture of the raid. (Cecil Beaton)LOG BOOK An unbroken record of growing power In the pages of the individual log-books of the pilots and obser- vers of the Royal Air Force is recorded the history of Britain’s growing mastery of the air. From a synthesis of these un- dramatic, laconic, factual notes of raids, combats, patrols and reconnaissance flights emerges the shape and pattern of the eventual victory of the United Nations. The unshakable foundations of the R.A.F. superiority were laid during those tense, eventful months in the autumn of 1940 when the Luftwaffe made its mighty concerted onslaught against the indomitable British Isles. This attempt to defeat and ground Britain’s fighter squadrons was the prelude to the pro- mised invasion of England—the invasion that was to end the war. Battle ensued for eighty-four days, more than twice as long as Germany had taken to overrun and conquer Holland, Belgium and France. But neither weight of numbers nor per- sistence of attack could daunt or break the courage of the British people, or the great bulwark of defence put up by a mere handful of R.A.F. fighters. At the end of three months struggle, the outcome of which amazed the whole world, British “Spitfires,” “ Hurricanes ” and “ Defiants ” still rode masters of the air, while a shattered and broken armada of German bombers and fighters gradually retired from the combat. The confidence of the Luftwaffe in its powers was permanently shaken, and its ranks had been depleted by at least 2,375 aircraft.BATTLE OF BRITAIN 4 the record of the Fighter 4! Command of the R.A.F. ^ 4 4 4- 4 4 4 4- 4- 4- 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 -4 -4 -4 4 -4 4 -4 4 4 4 4 4- 4 4 4 4- -4 -4 4 4- -4 -4 4 4- 4- -4 -4 4- 4- 4 4- -4 4 4 -4 4 4 -4 4 4 -4 4 4 -4 4 4 -4 4 4 -4 4 4 4- 4 4 4 -4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4- 4. ^ zd Cq; "IQ- < >■ w < Z 2 D This chart shows the numbers of German machines shot down and certainly destroyed over Britain and the surrounding seas by fighter-aircraft only, during 1940, contrasted with losses of British fighters during the same period. Each black symbol represents 20 German aircraft (with an average crew of over four) and each white symbol represents 20 British fighters, mostly single- seaters, the pilots of many of which parachuted safely down to fight again. Over 6.000 trained German airmen were killed or captured in these battles. 4Since that crucial turning point, when the German time-table was put awry for the first time, the war in the air has resolved itself into a grim race by Britain to overhaul Germany’s long lead in air strength. In this war of mobility, lightning thrust and counter thrust, air power is a master force. In three years of war, that master force has been transferred from Germany to Britain. British aircraft production is already slightly higher than Germany’s. Soviet Union production exceeds that of Italy and Japan together. The United States already produces 4,000 aircraft every month and production there is increasing rapidly. From the very first the superb efficiency of British planes and pilots was evident—given superiority of numbers also, Fighter Command, Coastal Command and Bomber Command could clearly point the way to victory. Britain’s war workers, plus the great aircraft industry of America, have made this superiority of numbers a certainty. How the R.A.F. is putting its growing strength to account is told in this brief story of the three Air Commands at work. Smoke circles over London as dog-fights develop during a daylight raid on the city.FIGHTER COMMAND From the defensive to the offensive When the Luftwaffe found that the attempt to force a quick decision by mass day attack was thwarted, it changed its tactics. Mass day raids gave place to mass night raids. Bombs fell on towns and countryside throughout the length and breadth of Britain. For a time the outcome again hung in the balance. But in darkness as in daylight, British fighters gradually assumed the upper hand. Many months of painstaking practice were needed to work out the new technique of tracking the night raider. With the perfection of the British invention of Radio- location the greatest difficulties of the task were overcome. The invisible bombers were accurately positioned stalked by night fighters and, in rapidly increasing numbers, shot down. Here are the figures for the first five months of 1941. In January, 15 raiders were destroyed, in February, 16 ; in March the total had jumped to 44. In April, 87, and in May, no fewer than 144 German bombers fell flaming through the night sky, victims to the armour-piercing bullets of British “ Beau- fighters,” “ Havocs ” and “ Defiants.” So, in its turn, concentrated night bombing began to dwindle away. The R.A.F. had won a second victory against German air strength. 6Throughout both these phases of the air war, Fighter Command, numerically the weaker force, had been mainly on the defensive. The actions, though enormously damaging to the enemy’s personnel, air strength and morale, did not strike directly at the vitals of his organisation. But behind the epic scenes of battle in the skies, despite raids and raid warnings, Britain’s air power was growing at an unprecedented pace. The aircraft industry was working at unceasing pressure to build that superiority of numbers essential to carry the war into the enemy’s camp. As the months of 1941 passed, Britain drew ever closer to parity in the air with Germany. And with this increase of hitting-power the work of Fighter Command changed its character from defence to offence. By the middle of June of that year heavy daylight fighter-offensive sweeps were being launched against Nazi-occupied France. Those sweeps have been marked by a growing fierceness and intensity until to-day British fighters in their hundreds, squadron after squadron, roar out across the Channel and swarm the skies of France. What is the strategic purpose behind these great aerial in- vasions ? Fighter Command has a threefold object in mind. First, the obvious job of escorting and protecting day bombers to their objectives—ports, transport centres, factories, air- On returning to base the pilot re-lives his air battle while a report is made.A squadron of “ Hurricanes ” flies off in forma- tion on a sweep over enemy-occupied territory. cannon are clearly visible on their wings. The latest type of 4-cannor “ Hurricanes.” The foui fields, and other important targets. Second, there is the urgent task of attacking the Luftwaffe itself, both in the air and on the ground. Third, the direct attack by “ Hurricane ” bombers or “ Spitfires ” armed with cannon on troops, work- shops, flak positions and shipping. Germany is already dan- gerously short of fighters and fighter-pilots, and these immense British sweeps force her to keep at least half her strength in the west. This tactic has had a vital effect on the course of the war in Russia. The R.A.F. visitations have also put the Luftwaffe squadrons in France in a dilemma. They dare not remain grounded, for this would lay them open to destruction from massed cannon fire or bombs. Nor dare they risk general combat so urgently do they need to eke out their fighter resources. Yet operate they must or else the British would sweep the skies unopposed, and the morale of German personnel would deterior- ate to the vanishing point. So it goes on. Exhausted pilots must stand constantly at “ readiness ” by their machines to take off against the invader. The same machines must be sent up day after day. This mounting strain does not fall on the Luftwaffe alone. British sweeps occupy the full-time services of a vast army of A.R.P. civil defence workers, both German and Laval-ite, which Germany badly needs for more productive purposes. Over a huge area of occupied Europe the Germans are kept on the defensive. Their vast organisation of detection and protection is forever stretched to the utmost. Nowhere can they feel safe. At any moment the menacing snarl of 8R.A.F. bombers go out to work with their escort of fighters. British fighters may send their troops scattering for cover; their railways, supply lorries, and those buildings which house the nerve centres of their control are all liable to attack without warning. Just as the R.A.F. commands the skies over Britain, so it now commands the skies over Northern France. Each day fresh pilots, new machines, pour forth from training centres and factories to press home the attack. Each day fresh inroads are made on Germany’s enfeebled fighter strength and war potential. Each day the area under British command increases. In the aggregate these immense fighter sweeps constitute yet another victory—a continuous, day-to-day victory, a new con- ception of the war of attrition. German air losses throughout the war have been on a consider- able scale. Between September 1939 and January 1942, a total of 8,754 German and Italian aircraft were brought down by the R.A.F. and by Dominion and Allied squadrons operating with it—or by British anti-aircraft fire; 642 more were brought down by naval and merchant vessels and the Fleet Air Arm, a total of 9,396 in addition to many thousands of planes brought down in Russia and the Far East. This aerial warfare taxes German air strength and saps German morale; conversely it gives new hope to subject nations which have been conquered by Germany. But also, day in, day out, it inflicts steady, direct losses on German supplies. 9Giant R.A.F. “ Sunderland ” flying boats have covered thousands of miles in their work of patrolling for Coastal Command. COASTAL COMMAND We search and strike While Fighter Command has achieved mastery of the skies above England and Northern France, Coastal Command has been hammering the Nazi on the sea, in his harbours and by his coastal defences. It is difficult to grasp the immensity of the task which this Arm of the R.A.F. has to perform. Its daily patrols are flown over an area of 600,000 square miles—from the far Northern tip of Norway down the whole European coastline to the Pyrenees, and beyond to Africa. Nothing keeps Coastal Command from carrying out its patrols. In two and a half years’ operations not one day has been a non-flying day. Despite fog, storms and the sourest Atlantic weather known for two generations, it carries on. The work is as varied as it is widespread. Spotting and attacking U-boats, aircraft and surface raiders; guarding convoys; patrolling, watching and photographing the enemy’s coastline, his troop concentrations and supply ship movements ; bombing, 10torpedoing, minelaying—all these and many other duties fall within the range and scope of the daily job. Here are figures that give some idea of Coastal Command’s versatility and importance; 7,500 convoys have been escorted, entailing 27,000 operational sorties ; 710 attacks have been made on enemy naval units and supply vessels ; 240,000 tons of supply ships and oil tankers have been sunk or seriously damaged (this figure includes only those attacks the results of which could be definitely verified); 256 U-boats have been attacked. In all, Coastal Command aircraft have flown over 50,000,000 miles since the beginning of the war. Individual planes, particularly long range “ Sunderland ” and “ Catalina ” flying boats, have in their log-books remarkable records of more than 2,000 hours’ operational flying; per- formances without precedent in range and endurance. In addition to these routine operations, aircraft of this Command have also shared in such outstanding episodes as the “ Altmark ” incident, and in attacks on the German capital ships “ Scharn- horst,” “ Bismarck ” and “ Tirpitz.” The Atlantic Battle does not figure very conspicuously in the new spotlight, but nevertheless it is being continuously waged and is a battle of major importance. The effort needed to combat U-boats, air and surface raiders striving to cut Britain’s life line is a tremendous one, none the less vital because so few details of its progress are published. In combination with the Royal Navy, Coastal Com- mand keep the German attack on this front at bay. There is ample evidence of their great success in the well-being of Britain’s people, and the flourish- ing growth of Britain’s fighting strength. The American-built “ Catalina ” flying boat. Its very long range makes it a formidable weapon in the Battle of the Atlantic. 11 1 The Avro “ Lancaster,” long-distance weight-carrier of the R.A.F. Among other things it was used on the famous daylight raid on Augsburg. B BER COMMAND A crescendo of attack Bomber Command is Britain’s spearhead of attack on Germany itself. As early as September 3rd, 1939, British bombers flew in daylight to Wilhelmshaven to reconnoitre and find the German fleet. They bombed warships at Brunsbuttel on the 4th. There- after, for a time warships were the main target. Then came the nightly reconnaisance flights far over Germany and occupied territories. Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, all the great German towns were visited. Leaflets were dropped, the defences tested, and most important of all, our men were trained under actual fighting conditions and in all weathers for the coming attack. When Holland, Belgium and France were invaded, Bomber Command took up the challenge in earnest. It went to work to destroy bridges and to disperse troop concentrations in tactical co-operation with the Army. At the same time the famous long-term policy of attacking industries and communi- cations within the borders of Germany—strategical bombing— was initiated. At first they were only small forces that flew nightly to the targets so carefully chosen for them. But they were highly- 12trained, highly skilled forces and they aimed accurately at the weakest spots in the German economic machine. The vulnerable synthetic oil plants, so essential to Ger- many’s war effort; railway marshalling yards—the no- torious Hamm junction fore- most among them—those bottle-necks of Germany’s internal transport system; the vital centres of armament industry in the Ruhr and at other points; power stations; these and many other targets were regularly and systema- tically bombed. In November, 1940, Berlin experienced its first heavy attack—a foretaste of the large-scale raids which were to come—and throughout that winter raids of increasing severity were made on other large German cities. Britain was beginning to pay back in kind some of the blows she had suffered. Nor was daylight bombing neglected. Coastal shipping between Germany and the invaded countries, the Chan- nel invasion ports, gun em- placements, barracks, were constantly harried by fast “Blenheim” bombers. Then, with escorts of protecting fighters, Bomber Command began the attack on those Guided unerringly by bis navigaior tne bomber pilot flies his craft through foul weather, “ flak ” or enemy fighter inter- ference straight to the target area. {Cecil Beaton) Down they go—the deadly bomb loads, aimed with precision at the heart of the target. Each month now sees these loads growing more heavy. The bombs have done their work. This photograph reveals widespread damage in a section of the modern part of Cologne city. 13THE INCREASING HITTING SIZE OF HEAVY BOMBER FORCES (Each equals 20 Bombers) 100 planes 300 planes 1,000 planes French industries that had become absorbed into the enemy’s war machine. More and heavier aircraft were flung in. Four- engined “Stirlings,” “ Halifaxes ” and “ Lancasters ” and the American “ Liberators ” and stratosphere “ Flying Fortress ” bombers joined the offensive, doubling and re-doubling British hitting power. Germany and occupied France are now being more fiercely, more heavily attacked than ever Britain was at the height of the Luftwaffe’s indiscriminate night raids. Up to August 31st, 1942, the R.A.F. had delivered 8,09$ separate attacks on 1,441 Axis targets on land excluding the Far East. To do this its machines have flown over 30,000,000 miles. The following figures will show how rapidly Bomber Command has strengthened the power and weight of its onslaught. During 1941 over 220 per cent, more tons of bombs were dropped on Germany than during 1940, and more than 250 per cent, on occupied territories. The total tonnage dropped was over 300 per cent, greater than in 1940. In the first three months of 1942, 140 per cent, more tons of bombs were dropped on Germany than in the same period in 1941 and 200 per cent, more over occupied territories. At the same time the speed, range and carrying power of the R.A.F. bombers was increasing. The maximum bomb load has been quadrupled since 1940, from two to eight tons. A heavy bomber now carries six times the average load carried in January-March, 1940, and the heaviest bomb to-day is approximately eight times greater than the heaviest bombs used at that time. A single bomb will weigh more than 14POWER OF THE R.A.F. MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD (per heavy bomber) 2 TONS 6 TONS 8 TONS the whole load carried in 1939. In individual raids the weight of bombs dropped and the number of bombers engaged has also risen sharply. Here are some examples of the sort of punish- ment now meted out to German industry and German war potential. In four raids on the Ruhr during April 5th-ioth, 1942, 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped. In a three-hour raid on Liibeck, Bomber Command dropped i\ times the weight of bombs dropped on Coventry in an all-night raid by the Germans (340 tons against 225). On the first two raids on Rostock 400 tons were dropped. On April $th, 1942, 300 bombers visited Cologne. On May 30th, 1942, over 1,000 bombers dropped their loads on the city in the space of an hour and a half. This last raid was the greatest of the war. But it did not mark a culminating point. It was just one landmark in the general crescendo of attack. To-night a thousand bombers take off for one raid. To-morrow, when Britain’s air forces are joined by those of America, it may be 2,000 or 5,000—there is no limit in sight to the numbers that will be mustered to wing their way to the attack. And however great the weight or concentration of strength, Bomber Com- mand is always striking serious, considered blows. Each power- ful thrust is interlinked—made to an exact point of strategical importance. By battering the enemy’s factories, his production centres, power plants, shipyards, aircraft factories, warships— Bomber Command is winning unanswerable victories with every major raid.“ Hurricanes being refuelled for patrol duties in the Western Desert.” THE R.A.F. OVERSEAS The R.A.F. has not been content to strike only near home and in Europe. Wherever the war has spread British bombers and fighters have been in the forefront of battle. In the Middle East the R.A.F. has had to operate on many different fronts—the Western Desert, Eritrea, Abyssinia, Iraq, Syria, Malta and Gibraltar. In each of these individual theatres of war, air power has helped Britain. The Italian power in Abyssinia and Eritrea has fallen, Syria has been saved from Axis dominion. Gallant little Malta has been defended with skill and vigour and is now hitting back with increasing effect —by the beginning of August, 1942, her defenders had accounted for nearly 800 Axis aircraft. Gibraltar, western bastion of the Mediterranean, is still a stronghold. At the outbreak of hostilities in the Western Desert the Italian air force outnumbered the Allies by four or five to one. These 16formidable odds never for a moment dismayed Allied pilots. They sailed into the offensive with gusto and gallantry. Quickly they gained ascendency over the Italians and when General Wavell’s troops made their great sweeping advance across hundreds of miles of territory to Benghazi, it was the R.A.F. which led the attack, hammering enemy communications and destroying aircraft on the ground and in air combat, smashing ports and supply ships, acting as heavy artillery for the Army. One thousand one hundred Italian aircraft were found abandoned and useless on captured airfields, scores of ships had been sunk in the ports. In Tobruk alone there were 23 battered hulks including the cruiser “ San Giorgio.” For three months after this debacle of Italian arms not one of Mussolini’s air fleet was seen over the Desert. In the Far Eastern campaigns limited numbers of R.A.F. air- craft have done wonders in the face of enormously superior forces. They have done everything humanly possible to harry and stem the Japanese advance. When the whole story is told, the world will honour these brave men as highly as those who successfully defended Britain in her hour of need. In the fullness of time they will assuredly be avenged. A “ Blenheim ” medium bomber of the type used against Aids concentrations in the Middle East. 17From strength to strength The War has gone on for three years. The three Commands of the Royal Air Force can look backward with a sense of pride and satis- faction to a record of glorious achievements— forward with confidence and high hearts to the future. In the face of odds they have out- flown, out-gunned, out-bombed their adver- saries. They have proved that the quality of British aircraft and the ability and courage of Britain’s manhood are without equal. It has been a relentless process, slow in its beginning compared with the Luftwaffe’s long- prepared assaults-in-force, but increasing in mass and momentum as the months become years. British air-power’s daily task has gone steadily on since the famous days of the Battle of Britain, not less effective, but more effective in total result than even those victories were, although perhaps not so well understood. It is the great occasions which capture public imagination. It is the epic events which quicken the pulse. But a remorseless routine offensive by land and sea, by night and day, in the east and in the west, has ushered in the era of British air superiority. Britain now has superior numbers of machines, of trained man- power, of fighting and mechanical and arms efficiency. As she grows from strength to strength in the air, so, inevitably, the power of the Luftwaffe wanes and will continue to wane. Without an all-powerful air force German hopes of con- quering the world begin to fade. The R.A.F. by its long sequence of victories, both great and small, contributes mightily to the Allied victory. 18A squadron of “ Hurricanes ” flies off in forma- The latest type of 4-cannon tion on a sweep over enemy-occupied territory. “ Hurricanes.” The four cannon are clearly visible on their wings. fields, and other important targets. Second, there is the urgent task of attacking the Luftwaffe itself, both in the air and on the ground. Third, the direct attack by “ Hurricane ” bombers or “ Spitfires ” armed with cannon on troops, work- shops, flak positions and shipping. Germany is already dan- gerously short of fighters and fighter-pilots, and these immense British sweeps force her to keep at least half her strength in the west. This tactic has had a vital effect on the course of the war in Russia. The R.A.F. visitations have also put the Luftwaffe squadrons in France in a dilemma. They dare not remain grounded, for this would lay them open to destruction from massed cannon fire or bombs. Nor dare they risk general combat so urgently do they need to eke out their fighter resources. Yet operate they must or else the British would sweep the skies unopposed, and the morale of German personnel would deterior- ate to the vanishing point. So it goes on. Exhausted pilots must stand constantly at “ readiness ” by their machines to take off against the invader. The same machines must be sent up day after day. This mounting strain does not fall on the Luftwaffe alone. British sweeps occupy the full-time services of a vast army of A.R.P. civil defence workers, both German and Laval-ite, which Germany badly needs for more productive purposes. Over a huge area of occupied Europe the Germans are kept on the defensive. Their vast organisation of detection and protection is forever stretched to the utmost. Nowhere can they feel safe. At any moment the menacing snarl of R.A.F. bombers go out to work with their escort of fighters. British fighters may send their troops scattering for cover; their railways, supply lorries, and those buildings which house the nerve centres of their control are all liable to attack without warning. Just as the R.A.F. commands the skies over Britain, so it now commands the skies over Northern France. Each day fresh pilots, new machines, pour forth from training centres and factories to press home the attack. Each day fresh inroads are made on Germany’s enfeebled fighter strength and war potential. Each day the area under British command increases. In the aggregate these immense fighter sweeps constitute yet another victory—a continuous, day-to-day victory, a new con- ception of the war of attrition. German air losses throughout the war have been on a consider- able scale. Between September 1939 and January 1942, a total of 8,754 German and Italian aircraft were brought down by the R.A.F. and by Dominion and Allied squadrons operating with it—or by British anti-aircraft fire ; 642 more were brought down by naval and merchant vessels and the Fleet Air Arm, a total of 9,396 in addition to many thousands of planes brought down in Russia and the Far East. This aerial warfare taxes German air strength and saps German morale; conversely it gives new hope to subject nations which have been conquered by Germany. But also, day in, day out, it inflicts steady, direct losses on German supplies. 8 9THE INCREASING HITTING POWER OF THE R.A.F. MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD (per heavy bomber) 2 TONS 6 TONS 8 TONS JT JLmW‘ v I SIZE OF HEAVY BOMBER FORCES (Each equals 20 Bombers) 100 planes 300 planes 1,000 planes French industries that had become absorbed into the enemy’s war machine. More and heavier aircraft were flung in. Four- engined “Stirlings,” “ Halifaxes ” and “ Lancasters ” and the American “ Liberators ” and stratosphere “ Flying Fortress ” bombers joined the offensive, doubling and re-doubling British hitting power. Germany and occupied France are now being more fiercely, more heavily attacked than ever Britain was at the height of the Luftwaffe’s indiscriminate night raids. Up to August 31st, 1942, the R.A.F. had delivered 8,095 separate attacks on 1,441 Axis targets on land excluding the Far East. To do this its machines have flown over 30,000,000 miles. The following figures will show how rapidly Bomber Command has strengthened the power and weight of its onslaught. During 1941 over 220 per cent, more tons of bombs were dropped on Germany than during 1940, and more than 250 per cent, on occupied territories. The total tonnage dropped was over 300 per cent, greater than in 1940. In the first three months of 1942, 140 per cent, more tons of bombs were dropped on Germany than in the same period in 1941 and 200 per cent, more over occupied territories. At the same time the speed, range and carrying power of the R.A.F. bombers was increasing. The maximum bomb load has been quadrupled since 1940, from two to eight tons. A heavy bomber now carries six times the average load carried in January-March, 1940, and the heaviest bomb to-day is approximately eight times greater than the heaviest bombs used at that time. A single bomb will weigh more than the whole load carried in 1939. In individual raids the weight of bombs dropped and the number of bombers engaged has also risen sharply. Here are some examples of the sort of punish- ment now meted out to German industry and German war potential. In four raids on the Ruhr during April 5th-ioth, 1942, 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped. In a three-hour raid on Liibeck, Bomber Command dropped i\ times the weight of bombs dropped on Coventry in an all-night raid by the Germans (340 tons against 225). On the first two raids on Rostock 400 tons were dropped. On April 5th, 1942, 300 bombers visited Cologne. On May 30th, 1942, over 1,000 bombers dropped their loads on the city in the space of an hour and a half. This last raid was the greatest of the war. But it did not mark a culminating point. It was just one landmark in the general crescendo of attack. To-night a thousand bombers take off for one raid. To-morrow, when Britain’s air forces are joined by those of America, it may be 2,000 or 5,000—there is no limit in sight to the numbers that will be mustered to wing their way to the attack. And however great the weight or concentration of strength, Bomber Com- mand is always striking serious, considered blows. Each power- ful thrust is interlinked—made to an exact point of strategical importance. By battering the enemy’s factories, his production centres, power plants, shipyards, aircraft factories, warships— Bomber Command is winning unanswerable victories with every major raid. 14 15From strength to strength The War has gone on for three years. The three Commands of the Royal Air Force can look backward with a sense of pride and satis- faction to a record of glorious achievements— forward with confidence and high hearts to the future. In the face of odds they have out- flown, out-gunned, out-bombed their adver- saries. They have proved that the quality of British aircraft and the ability and courage of Britain’s manhood are without equal. It has been a relentless process, slow in its beginning compared with the Luftwaffe’s long- prepared assaults-in-force, but increasing in mass and momentum as the months become years. British air-power’s daily task has gone steadily on since the famous days of the Battle of Britain, not less effective, but more effective in total result than even those victories were, although perhaps not so well understood. It is the great occasions which capture public imagination. It is the epic events which quicken the pulse. But a remorseless routine offensive by land and sea, by night and day, in the east and in the west, has ushered in the era of British air superiority. Britain now has superior numbers of machines, of trained man- power, of fighting and mechanical and arms efficiency. As she grows from strength to strength in the air, so, inevitably, the power of the Luftwaffe wanes and will continue to wane. Without an all-powerful air force German hopes of con- quering the world begin to fade. The R.A.F. by its long sequence of victories, both great and small, contributes mightily to the Allied victory. is