Kantian non-conceptualism

Philosophical Studies volume 137, pages41–64(2008)Cite this article

Abstract

There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kant (1992b, p. 366, Ak 2: 378–379).

  2. 2.

    Evans (1982, p. 150).

  3. 3.

    See, e.g., Bermúdez (2003a); Evans (1982, esp. chs. 4–6); and Gunther (2003a).

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., McDowell (1994); Brewer (1999); and Sedivy (1996).

  5. 5.

    All of these arguments are covered in Gunther (2003a).

  6. 6.

    See also Hanna (1993).

  7. 7.

    Speaks (2005).

  8. 8.

    See Gunther (2003b, p. 1).

  9. 9.

    Hanna (2005).

  10. 10.

    Hanna (2006a).

  11. 11.

    Bermúdez (2003a, p. 1).

  12. 12.

    See, e.g., Evans (1982, p. 229); Peacocke (2001); and Peacocke (1998).

  13. 13.

    See, e.g., McDowell (1994, pp. 56–60, and 170–173). The Demonstrative Strategy is also endorsed by Brewer in his (1999) and by Sedivy in her (1996).

  14. 14.

    Evans (1982, pp. 44 and 74).

  15. 15.

    Evans (1982, pp. 100–105).

  16. 16.

    See Kelly (2001a, b).

  17. 17.

    See Chuard (2006).

  18. 18.

    Speaks (2005, p. 360).

  19. 19.

    Tye (2006, pp. 507–508).

  20. 20.

    Tye (2006, p. 525).

  21. 21.

    Speaks, “Is There a Problem about Non-conceptual Content?,” p. 360.

  22. 22.

    See, e.g., Campbell (2002, ch. 4).

  23. 23.

    See, e.g., Bermúdez (2003a, Section 6); Fodor (1998); Peacocke (1992); and Prinz (2002).

  24. 24.

    Many thanks to Jane Heal for suggesting to me this informal “over-the-telephone test” for conceptuality.

  25. 25.

    See also Bermúdez (2003a). Like Bermúdez, I hold that there are non-linguistic concepts and thoughts; but unlike Bermúdez, who is a relativist non-conceptualist, I do not identify non-conceptual content with the content of mental states not involving concept-possession.

  26. 26.

    See also Carruthers (1998). Like Carruthers, I hold that there is a substantive connection between conceptual thought and language; but unlike Carruthers, who is a higher-order thought theorist about consciousness, I do not think that the substantive connection between conceptual thought and language inherently constrains the nature of consciousness, which has a non-conceptual basis in sensorimotor subjectivity.

  27. 27.

    See Hanna (2006a, chs. 2–3).

  28. 28.

    See, e.g., Stalnaker (1998).

  29. 29.

    This, e.g., is Speaks’s own view of the nature of conceptual content.

  30. 30.

    See, e.g., Buroker (1981); and Van Cleve and Frederick (1991).

  31. 31.

    Kant (1992b, p. 370, Ak 2: 382).

  32. 32.

    See Hanna (2001, ch. 4).

  33. 33.

    See Kant (1992b, p. 371, Ak 2: 383); and Nerlich (1995).

  34. 34.

    One can also use the possibility of incongruent counterparts as a special kind of phenomenal inversion in order to argue for failures of materialist supervenience. See Lee (2006).

  35. 35.

    See Kant (1992b). See also Hanna (2000).

  36. 36.

    See Kant (1992c).

  37. 37.

    See Kant (1977, §13, pp. 29–30, Ak 4: 285–286). See also Hanna (2006b, ch. 6).

  38. 38.

    See Kant (1991).

  39. 39.

    Kelly (2001a, p. 398).

  40. 40.

    See Perry (1979). See also Hanna (1993).

  41. 41.

    See Strawson (1959).

  42. 42.

    See, e.g., Prigogine (1980); and Savitt (1995).

  43. 43.

    See Cussins (2003, p. 147); Gallagher (2005, esp. chs. 1–6); and Noë (2004).

  44. 44.

    See Hanna (2005, Sections IV and V).

  45. 45.

    See, e.g., Kihlstrom (1987).

  46. 46.

    See, e.g., Jackendoff (1987).

  47. 47.

    See Bermúdez (2003c). Bermúdez holds that subpersonal states have non-conceptual content, but would not agree that they are also conscious.

  48. 48.

    See Thompson (2005).

  49. 49.

    Nagel (1979, pp. 166–167).

  50. 50.

    See, e.g., Weiskrantz (1986).

  51. 51.

    Filling-in is the puzzling fact that our visual field presents itself as rich and continuous even though we have blind spots on our retinas. Various solutions to the puzzle have been offered. See, e.g., Pessoa et al. (1998). The Kantian non-conceptualist solution is that filling-in is essentially the reverse of blindsight: whereas in blindsight the subject has sensorimotor-subjective vision without self-conscious vision (=sensorimotor-subjective vision via the simpler processing mechanisms of the eyes, together with self-conscious blindness via the more sophisticated processing mechanisms of the downstream brain-body system), by contrast in filling-in subjects have self-conscious vision without sensorimotor-subjective vision (=self-conscious vision via the more sophisticated processing mechanisms of the downstream brain-body system, together with sensorimotor-subjective blindness via the simpler processing mechanisms of the eyes).

  52. 52.

    See, e.g., Mele (1997); and Hanna and Maiese (forthcoming).

  53. 53.

    See Hanna (2006a).

  54. 54.

    Speaks (2005, pp. 389–390).

  55. 55.

    See Kant, I., Critique of pure reason, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), p. 256, B151.

  56. 56.

    See Kant (1997, pp. 256–257, B151–152).

  57. 57.

    See Hanna (2006b, chs. 1–2).

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Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Monima Chadha, Philippe Chuard, Andy Clark, James Genone, Jeff Speaks, and also to audiences at the APA Pacific Division Meetings in San Francisco, in April 07, the University of Edinburgh, Monash University (Australia), University of Oxford, and the University of Tampere (Finland) for conversations and critical comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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    Robert Hanna

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Hanna, R. Kantian non-conceptualism. Philos Stud 137, 41–64 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0

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Keywords

  • Non-conceptual mental content
  • Spatial representation
  • Concepts
  • Consciousness
  • Kant