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I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II
Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 375
I.Kant and C.G.JunG on the ProsPeCts of
sCIentIfIC PsyCholoGy
Valentin Balanovskiy1
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
IntroduCtIon
As some researchers note (Wilber, 2000, p.viii), one of the most important stages
in the formation of scientic psychology is the publication of G.T.Fechner’s Elemente der
Psychophysik (Fechner, 1860). e revolutionary character of Fechner’s ideas consisted in the
fact that it was the rst attempt to apply mathematical methods to examine such a complex
and subtle matter as the human soul. In this way it was shown that a psyche can be an object
of exact sciences, which methods formerly seemed to be suitable only for the studying of
natural objects. In connection with this discovery I recall Kant’s words2, that “in any special
doctrine of nature there can be only as much proper science as there is mathematics therein”
(MAN, 04: 470). Immediately afterward I recall the following text in which Kant criticize
even a possibility of a scientic empirical or experimental study of the soul (MAN, 04: 470-
472). Here it should be noted that Kant’s objections have not any instrumental or historical
character, as if someday through the improvement of measurement methods psychology
could become a ‘proper’ science. Instead, these objections have a fundamental nature. If so,
how was it possible that Fechner and other generations of theorists and practicing scientists
overcame Kant’s methodological restrictions? To answer this question, it would be fruitful to
consider some ideas of C. G. Jung who, despite his own achievements in scientic psychology,
shared Kant’s views on the issue, although he used somewhat dierent arguments.
e issue concerning the scientic status of psychology is extremely complex. at is
why some common remarks are strongly required.
376 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017
BALANOVSKIY, V.
Firstly, there is a diculty of determining the criteria regarding the scientic nature
for one or another sphere of intellectual activity, particularly psychology. e fact is that
scientic criteria have crucially changed since XVIII century. at is why criteria, which
were adequate in Kant’s time, are inadequate for Jung, not to mention modern science.
at is why it may be suspected that the historical-comparative method, which I use here, is
inapplicable because of the impossibility to nd a common base for comparing Kant’s and
Jung’s views on the scientic status of psychology. But the suspicions are groundless. ere
is the criterion of proper science, common to Kant and Jung, which they applied to clarify
the scientic status of psychology. is criterion consists in the applicability of mathematical
quantitative methods to the object of one or another science. It is still subject to doubt,
whether this criterion is applicable in psychology. One of the main issues of the discussion
concerns the objective unit of measurement in psychology (like unit of force in physics),
which would help to formalize a description of every investigated phenomenon.
Secondly, the issue concerning the scientic status of psychology in some respect is
directly connected with the issue of psychophysical parallelism3. Indeed, as long as scientists
do not nd out, how exactly body and soul interact, we can believe that it is legitimate
to examine the soul through some body signals, but it would remain just a kind of belief.
Hence such methods as the pulse curve, the respiration curve, and the psycho-galvanic
phenomenon, which have an accurate mathematical apparatus, do nothing to approximate
psychology to a proper science. Also, Jung noted that polygraph data cannot be considered as
a source of information about psychic life, because polygraph detects bodily states only (Jung,
1975, pp.13-14).
It should be noted that the issue of psychophysical parallelism arose a long time ago.
For example, the Wolan follower, F.Ch. Baumeister (1789, pp.296-298, 310-319) in his
lectures on Metaphysics expressed very pessimistic views on the historical and methodological
prospects of decision the question how exactly soul and body are connected with. e same
was relevant for Platner (1772, pp.ix-xii). According to T. Sturm, Kant also shared such
pessimistic view, at least we can nd that perspective in his Lectures on anthropology of the
rst half of the 1770s (Sturm, 2008, p.499).
Since the second half of the 19th century this topic became very popular among
philosophers and psychologists of dierent schools. L.Busse (1913/2012, pp.67-118) and
other researchers (Hartmann, 1901, pp. 435-444) described this situation scrupulously.
Unfortunately, in this article I cannot consider the issue in detail, because it goes beyond my
purpose. e only thing I want to point out is that Jung many times attempted to examine
the issue of psychophysical parallelism. In the beginning he tried to avoid strict judgments
and exact answers (Jung, 1975, p.17), but later on – with the ‘invention’ of the concepts of
synchronicity and psychoid factor – his judgments became more condent and concrete.
irdly, Kant’s objections against the possibility of scientic psychology have a
fundamental, not instrumental, character. eir core lies in the radical inapplicability of
mathematical methods to the study of the soul. Paradoxically enough, Jung agrees with this
statement. Despite he was a practicing psychiatrist as well as an experimental psychologist,
I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II
Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 377
having made his major discoveries on the basis of empirical material, Jung insisted on the
impossibility of using mathematical quantitative methods in psychology (especially in studying
the unconscious4) and considered that psychology could not replicate the epistemology
of physics. ereby he shares Kant’s views on the prospects of scientic psychology. In
particular Jung writes with regret that “the tragic thing is that psychology has no self-
consistent mathematics at its disposal, but only a calculus of subjective prejudices” (Jung,
1975, p.216). Furthermore, Jung underlines another fundamental obstacle for psychology
to become a strict science, i.e., the coincidence of subject and object in psychological studies.
He wittily notices:
e psyche … observes itself and can only translate the psychic back into the psychic. Were physics
in this position, it could do nothing except leave the physical process to its own devices, because in
that way it would be most plainly itself. (Jung, 1975, p. 216-217)
Below I will predominantly focus on issues, pertaining to the third remark.
Kant on the ProsPeCts of sCIentIfIC PsyCholoGy
Many attempts to explicate Kant’s views on psychology have being undertaken since
the 19th century. One of the rst fundamental researches on the topic can be found in
J.B.Meyer’s Kants Psychologie (Meyer, 1870) and E.F. Buchner’s Study of Kant’s Psychology with
Reference to the Critical Philosophy (Buchner, 1897). Today the interest in Kant’s psychology
remains strong. For example, his attitude to rational psychology was thoroughly examined
by K.Ameriks (2000) and C.W.Dyck (2014). Kant’s views on empirical and transcendental
psychology were considered in various works by G. Hateld (1992), P.Kitcher (1990), and
C.M. Schmidt (2008). Unsurprisingly, there are specic works devoted to the issue of the
scientic status of psychology in Kant’s writings. In this respect one should mentioned several
articles by T. Mischel (1967), T. Sturm (2001, 2008), R.A. Makkreel (2001), A.C. Nayak
and E.Sotnak (1995), and V.V. Vasilyev (2010). Relying on these materials and directly on
Kant’s works, I will try to summarize the main objections against the possibility of scientic
psychology, which subsequently were reected in Jung’s ideas. Before that, two preliminary
points should be highlighted.
Firstly, when Kant writes about the impossibility of psychology as a ‘proper’ science, he
means not rational, but empirical psychology. e dierence is a crucial one. For, according to
Kant, rational psychology takes nothing from the experience, but merely the fact that human
beings have a soul. Everything else is a metaphysical cognition of the soul (Kant, 1821, p.197).
Empirical psychology, in contrast, shows how cognitive faculties are used, not how they should
be used (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.337)5. It stands on the foundation of experience, which absolutely
cannot give an apodictic reliability, while rational psychology in its ‘natural-scientic’ function
sets apodictic principles for empirical psychology (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.336). at is why Hateld
underlines that scientic rational psychology is possible (Hateld, 1992, pp.218-219). Here
are his arguments:
378 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017
BALANOVSKIY, V.
Kant admits that there are only a few principles with the required generality, but he is able to name
two: “the proposition that ‘substance is permanent’, and that ‘every event is determined by a cause
according to constant laws’…. Although Kant does not go on to give examples of these principles
as applied to inner sense, presumably the presence of the “I” as the ground of the empirical unity of
the self – not as simple, spiritual being, but merely as a permanent substance in time – is an example
of the rst principle, and the law … of association of representations is an example of the second
principle. In any event, it is evident that Kant is committed to the view that the representations of
inner sense, no less than the objects of outer sense, are subjects to universal natural laws. (Hateld,
1992, p.219)
Under the term ‘empirical psychology’ Kant, according to Vasil’ev, conceives two dierent
disciplines: the doctrine of causal connectivity of inner sense phenomena and the descriptive
doctrine of the general forms of inner sense, i.e. the faculties of soul. In this respect, Kant,
speaking about the specicity of empirical psychology, usually refers to the rst doctrine, but
factually deals with the second one (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.338)6. Such ‘double-entry bookkeeping’
somehow complicates the reconstruction of Kant’s genuine point of view.
Secondly, when Kant discusses the impossibility of scientic psychology, he means the
proper science or science in the strict sense of the word (eigentliche Wissenschaft) (MAN, 04:
468), i.e. science, whose certainty is apodictic. e last one is provided by the presence of a pure
element, which contains a priori principles (MAN, 04: 468-469). On the other hand, Kant
notes that “cognition that can contain mere empirical certainty is only knowledge improperly
so-called” (MAN, 04: 468).
So, maybe we should stop considering this topic, because the mere name of this science,
‘empirical psychology’, brings us to an analytical truth that such science like a proper science is
impossible, according to Kant’s denition. But even Kant writes that there are many dierent
types of sciences, including empirical sciences. By the way, ten years before the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science, Kant maintained in the Foreword to his lectures on psychology
that psychology is the ‘physiology of inner sense or reasoning beings’ (Kant, 1821, p.130).
However, as we know, physiology is quite a proper science even through the prism of Kant’s
strict criteria of scientic knowledge, e.g. criterion of systematicity (MAN, 04: 468). erefore,
is it possible that empirical psychology has a chance to be a science in Kant’s system? To answer
this question an analysis of Kant’s fundamental objections is required.
Kant’s objections against even the possibility of scientic psychology may be reduced
to two moments. e rst is the problem of the coincidence between subject and object of
cognition in psychology. e second one is the inapplicability of mathematical methods to the
inner sense7 phenomena.
Regarding the rst objection, Kant unambiguously asserts that all attempts made by
any reasoning being to study itself as well as to study other reasoning being, are doomed to
failure, for the observation distorts and transforms the state of the observed subject (Kant
1903, p. 471). ere is another one obstacle, closely connected with the nature of the subject
itself. Hateld shows that, according to Kant, “although the ‘I’ is the logical subject of all our
thoughts, it cannot be regarded as a substance because it cannot be given in intuition, the pure
I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II
Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 379
category of substance can be properly applied only to objects that can be given in experience,
that is, to objects of possible experience (A 349-50)” (Hateld, 1992, p. 203). But if there is
no experience, then there is no possible science.
With the second of Kant’s objection the situation is more entangled. On reading the
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science it seems that, indeed, empirical psychology as a
‘proper’ science is impossible. Furthermore, it is impossible even in a status of a systematic art
or empirical doctrine, such as the ‘non-science’ called chemistry (MAN, 04: 470-471). By the
way, Kant considers more likely for chemistry to become a ‘proper’ science in the future, than
for psychology.
So, what are Kant’s arguments? As we already know, the rst is that mathematics is
inapplicable to inner sense phenomena and their laws (MAN, 04: 471). Why? Because, as
we remember, the form of inner sense is time, which has only one dimension, and time is
indivisible, unlike 3D spatial objects, for example, apples, which are obviously separated from
each other and easily counted.
e second is that “the manifold of inner observation can be separated only by mere
division in thought, and cannot then be held separate and recombined at will” (MAN, 04:
471). at is why we cannot use such an operation as systematical analysis in psychology
(MAN, 04: 471), primarily because of the indivisibility of time.
Summarizing all objections Kant concludes:
erefore, the empirical doctrine of the soul can never become anything more than an historical
doctrine of nature, and, as such, a natural doctrine of inner sense which is as systematic as possible,
that is, a natural description of the soul, but never a science of the soul, nor even, indeed, an
experimental psychological doctrine. is is also the reason for our having used, in accordance
with common custom, the general title of natural science for this work, which actually contains the
principles of the doctrine of body, for only to it does this title belong in the proper sense, and so no
ambiguity is thereby produced. (MAN, 04: 471)
Analyzing all Kant’s arguments, Buchner underlines8 that “Kant has always stood the
great champion of the valuelessness of introspection and nullity of exact methods in their
application to the inner sense” (Buchner, 1897, p.49). Makkreel and Sturm agree with him.
e rst writes that “in the Friedländer anthropology lectures of 1775-76 we see Kant beginning
to note that self-observation is much more dicult than the observation of things outside us:
‘Self-observation is dicult, unnatural, can lead to revision and must not last long’ (25:478)”
(Makkreel, 2001, p.186). Sturm, in his turn, notices that Kant “from at least the 1780s …
advances a methodological claim against introspection as the primary method of knowing the
human mind” (Sturm, 2001, p.174). Instead of introspection Kant oers to focus on human’s
behavior, which can be given for outer observation. As A.Brook underlines, “Kant’s rejection
of introspection and turn to behavior have a very contemporary feel to them” (Brook, 2014,
p. 64).
In addition, as Vasil’ev mentions, an analytical empirical psychology, i.e. the descriptive
doctrine of the general forms of inner sense, gives the material for all divisions of transcendental
380 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017
BALANOVSKIY, V.
philosophy and plays the role of a fundamental science in Kant’s system (Vasil’ev, 2010,
p.334). Kant, probably, to some extent applies an unjust treatment to empirical psychology
and, consequently, defends that for psychology to become a science it must pass through ‘the
eye of a needle’. More specically, Kant writes that mathematics is inapplicable to the inner
sense, with one single exception, i.e. application of the law of continuity to the ux of inner
sense. However, Kant adds that this “would be an extension of cognition standing to that
which mathematics provides for the doctrine of body approximately as the doctrine of the
properties of the straight line stands to the whole of geometry” (MAN, 04: 471). is notice
has an important consequence. Vasil’ev writes that in the Critique of Pure Reason the law of
continuity is closely connected with the principles of pure understanding and consequently
this law is applicable to the inner sense. It entails that a priori cognition of the soul as a
phenomenon is possible (Vasil’ev, 2010, p.336). Otherwise, the categories would have no
general validity. Hence, “all a priori concepts of the understanding, with possible exception
of Substance and Community, should be applicable to the phenomena of the inner sense”
(Vasil’ev, 2010, p.336).
It turns out that even empirical psychology may hypothetically have its own pure part,
which is based on usage of the law of continuity to phenomena of the inner sense, and thus may
possess some mathematical apparatus. However, an application of exact mathematical methods
to the inner sense phenomena does not guarantee resolving the problem of inseparability of the
manifold of inner observation.
Some indications that, in the last analysis, there is no denitive answer to the question of
the possibility of scientic psychology can be found in other Kant’s works. us, for instance,
in the Preface to his Lectures on Metaphysics Kant writes on the nature of ‘I’9 that “I can be
taken in a twofold sense: I as human being, and I as intelligence. I, as a human being, am
an object of inner and outer sense. I as intelligence am an object of inner sense only” (Kant,
1821, p.131). Kant repeats this idea almost verbatim a few times in the chapter on Rational
psychology (Kant, 1821, pp.200-201). Furthermore, Kant asserts that “the soul is … not merely
thinking substance, but rather constitutes a unity insofar as it is connected with the body”
(Kant, 1821, p.131). e properties of this connection are dened by principle: “alterations of
the body are at the same time alterations of the soul, and alterations of the soul are at the same
time alterations of the body” (Kant, 1821, p.189). us a way towards psychology as ‘proper’
science can be paved through the cognition of physiological processes, something that modern
neurophysiologists try to undertake.
Maybe, there were some other possibilities for empirical psychology to become a ‘proper’
science, upon which Kant meditated in 1780s. As rightly mentions Sturm, “in a letter to
Christian Gottfried Schütz, written in September 1785, Kant promises that the Metaphysical
Foundations will treat the metaphysical foundations of the ‘doctrine of the soul’ (Seelenlehre) in
addition to that of matter (10: 406)…. It is, therefore, clear that Kant changed his mind with
regard to the scientic status of empirical psychology and that he did so between September
1785 and the appearance of the Metaphysical Foundations in 1786” (Sturm, 2001, pp.164-
165). Sturm notes that the fact “that Kant changed his mind so late and so suddenly should
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Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 381
make one cautious with regard to the question of how convinced he was by his own arguments
and, moreover, how strong an impossibility claim he really wished to make” (Sturm, 2001,
p.165).
It should be noted, that later on Kant did not change his views on the connection of
the body with the soul. For example, in the letter to S.T.Soemmerring (10 Aug 1975) On the
Organ of the Soul he writes that the study of the soul should be undertaken by two faculties:
the medical faculty and the philosophical faculty, because, on the one hand, it possesses a
sensory receptivity, and, on the other hand, it possesses a faculty of motion (Br, 12: 31). But
the agreement between the medical and philosophical faculties on the denition of a seat of the
soul is impossible, and it would be better not deal with this issue10, “since the concept of a seat
of the soul requires local presence, which would ascribe to the thing that is only an object of the
inner sense, and insofar only determinable according to temporal conditions, a spatial relation,
thereby generating a contradiction” (Br, 12: pp. 31-32).
If so, how can we answer the question of the relationship between body and soul, if
we cannot even dene a point for their connection, or an organ where the soul is present,
which would be available to be studied through scientic methods? It seems that there is no
answer to this question. at is why there will never be any agreement between the medical
and philosophical faculties, not only on the location of the soul, but also on the fundamental
properties of the interaction between body and soul. erefore, I conclude that in his later
works Kant prefers to avoid not only the issue of the ‘organ’ of the soul, but also the issue of
psychophysical parallelism in general.
Kant’s reections on the organ of the soul are interesting, showing how clearly Kant’s
evasiveness emerges over time. In one of his footnotes he strictly distinguishes, what we can
explore rationally and systematically, and what we should avoid. To illustrate it Kant allocates
two dierent meanings to the concept of ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ (Gemüt)11: “By mind one means
only the faculty of combining the given representations and eectuating the unity of empirical
apperception (animus), not yet substance (anima) according to its nature, which is entirely
distinct from that matter” (Br, 12: 32). us, it turns out that the doctrine of animus was
developed by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, while the issue of anima never extended
beyond the frames of his lectures on psychology. At least it seems to be so.
However, concerning the issue of application of the quantitative methods in psychology,
we should consider another of Kant’s works, in which about a hundred years before Fechner’s
Elemente der Psychophysik he describes such mechanism as the repression of one content of the
psyche by another to an unconscious area12. I mean his Versuch den Begri der negativen Größen
in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1763). In this work Kant considers a phenomenon of forgetting
through the prism of a conservation law (NG, 02: 194-197) that allows us to conceive not a
simple disappearing or coming-away of some contents of consciousness, when they are fading
because of the inuence of other more bright and vital contents, but rather a negative emergence
or negative coming-to-be by analogy with the concept of negative magnitudes in mathematics
(NG, 02: 190). at is why, Kant says, we can remember and recall contents of our psyche,
which we are not holding in our consciousness at every moment of our life.
382 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017
BALANOVSKIY, V.
us, I cannot condently assert that Kant possessed a rm position on the issue
concerning the possibility of application of mathematical methods in psychology and,
consequently, the possibility of a scientic empirical psychology (unlike rational psychology,
which seems to be a ‘proper’ science, based on a priori principles). For example, in the Essay
on the maladies of the head (1764) and in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by the Dreams
of Metaphysics (1766) Kant appears as an adherent to the physiological determinism of the
psychic processes, which is consistent with the scientic worldview. Later, in the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science (1786) he becomes strictly against even a possibility of empirical
psychology as a ‘proper’ science. At last, in his reections on the organ of the soul (1795) Kant
avoids the issue on the interaction between the body and the soul at least from a physiological
or natural-scientic point of view.
As surprising as it may be, it is true that many directions, which Kant pointed as ‘dead
ends’, led to revolutionary discoveries in dierent realms. is happened with an ‘improper’
science called chemistry, which D.I. Mendeleev provided with a priori principles leading to
the construction of the system of chemical elements, his famous periodic table. e same
happened with logic, which was ‘condemned’ by Kant to eternal stagnation. So, is it possible
that psychology had the same lucky fate? To answer this question, let’s turn to Jung’s ideas.
JunG on the ProsPeCts of sCIentIfIC PsyCholoGy
On the relation between Kant – a champion in the study of conscious processes – and the
philosophical and psychological theories on the unconscious two collective monographs have
been written in the recent past (Nicholls, A., Liebscher, M., 2010; Giordanetti P., Pozzo R.,
Sgarbi M., 2012). After reading these monographs, it becomes obvious that “with the possible
exception of Leibniz, Immanuel Kant arguably determined the way in which unconscious
phenomena were understood in nineteenth-century German thought more than any other
philosopher of the eighteenth century” (Nicholls, A., Liebscher, M., 2010 p.9).
I should add that Kant and Leibniz in general determined the way in which unconscious
phenomena were understood not only in the 19th century in Germany, but also in some
respect in the 20th century all over the world. is assertion is based on the fact that Jung
was deeply inuenced by Kant’s philosophy13. I note briey that Kant and Jung had in
common their apriorism, which gave rise to Jung’s concept of the archetypes of collective
unconscious – a priori conditions of any psychic experience. Also both of them shared the
methodological presupposition, according to which a clear distinction between constructive
and regulative usage of notions and ideas is strongly required. In addition, Kant and Jung
inclined to avoid denite assertions, when they dealt with the reective power of judgment.
Furthermore, both of them were against innatism. ere were many other features common
to Kant and Jung. One of them was the negation of the possibility of scientic psychology.
Although Kant’s and Jung’s arguments were somewhat dierent (mostly because of the sharp
dierences in their scientic and cultural contexts), the general features of their arguments
were quite similar.
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Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 383
When Jung writes on the impossibility of psychology as a ‘proper’ strict science, he
allocates the same fundamental diculties as Kant. e rst one is the coincidence of subject
and object, and the second consists in the impossibility of using mathematical quantitative
methods to study the psyche. Some of Jung’s arguments were presented above. ey are very
characteristic for Jung, and we can nd them in many places of his works. I will show another
few examples below.
On the rst diculty Jung writes that “there is no medium for psychology to reect
itself in: it can only portray itself in itself, and describe itself” (Jung, 1975, p.217). at is
why Jung is forced to determine psychology as “the coming to consciousness of the psychic
process, but it is not, in the deeper sense, an explanation of this process, for no explanation
of the psychic can be anything other than the living process of the psyche itself. Psychology is
doomed to cancel itself out as a science and therein precisely it reaches its scientic goal” (Jung,
1975, p.223).
In this fragment Jung’s typical position is expressed. According to him, psychology is not
an empty abstraction, or a school discipline, or an exact science indierent to its subject, but
rather it is the goal, the way and the essence of the psychic process. e last sentence from the
citation above, at rst sight, looks like a Buddhist kōan or one of Heidegger’s misty assertions.
Actually, Jung discerns the goal of psychology as a science in revelation of the entity of psychic
process, but this revelation may be achieved only within the psychic process, to which nothing
is external. e nal or ultimate goal of this process is the individuation – a special stage of
one’s psyche development, in which a constructive integration of conscious and unconscious
contents of the psyche occurs (Jung, 1975, p.223).
Following Kant’s anthropological revolution and his concept of inner sense, Jung writes
that psychic reality – esse in anima – is “the only form of being we can experience directly. We
can distinguish no form of being that is not psychic in the rst place. All other realities are
derived from and indirectly revealed by it” (Jung, 1992, p.60). In other work he adds that even
“mathematical thinking is also a psychic function” (Jung, 1975, p.217).
Developing Kant’s argument that in psyche’s cognition the observation distorts and
transforms the state of the observed subject, Jung extends this argument also to the material
world. He writes that “the psyche is the world’s pivot: not only is it the one great condition for
the existence of a world at all, it is also an intervention in the existing natural order, and no one
can say with certainty where this intervention will nally end” (Jung, 1975, p.217).
Also, Jung insisted on the necessity of creating a new model of being, which would
take into account a great scale and degree of intervention of the psychic factor into the ber
of everything that exists. is model should consider “the uncontrollable eects the observer
has upon the system observed, the result being that reality forfeits something of its objective
character and that a subjective element attaches to the physicist’s picture of the world” (Jung,
1975, p.229).
By the way, Jung’s ideas that psyche inuences matter and that there is not only one
‘standard’ causal type of relationships between events, but also an acausal (synchronistic),
384 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017
BALANOVSKIY, V.
trans-temporal and trans-spatial, type of relationships, provides a convergent horizon between
analytical psychology and quantum physics. is fact was examined by W.Pauli’s and P.Jordan’s
works (Jung, 1980, p.473).
As for the objection that mathematical methods of measurement are inapplicable to the
cognition of psychic processes, Jung is not less categorical than Kant. First of all, such bold
position is explained by the specicity of the unconscious. Particularly, Jung underlines that a
psychological theory cannot “be formulated mathematically, because we have no measuring rod
with which to measure psychic quantities. We have to rely solely upon qualities, that is, upon
perceptible phenomena. Consequently psychology is incapacitated from making any valid
statement about unconscious states, or to put it another way, there is no hope that the validity
of any statement about unconscious states or processes will ever be veried scientically” (Jung,
1975, p.214).
erein lies the main dierence between physics and psychology, since while “physics
determines quantities and their relation to one another; psychology determines qualities
without being able to measure quantities” (Jung, 1975, p.232). At the same time, Jung focuses
on the fact that regardless this fundamental dierence and other diculties, physicists and
psychologists tend to converge in their ideas (Jung, 1975, p.232). If so, has Jung considered
somewhat possible for psychology to become a ‘proper’ science, as Kant did?
Jung writes that in psychology a precise measuring of the quantities is replaced by
an approximate measuring of the degree of intensity of psychic processes. For this, unlike
physicists, psychologists use the function of feeling or valuation (Jung, 1975, p.234). In order
for psychology to become a ‘proper’ science, Jung maintains, following the Russian philosopher
and psychologist N.Grot (1898, p.266), that we should consider the psyche in its dynamics
and thereby be able to apply the energy formula to the cognition of psyche (Jung, 1975, p.234).
Only then would some quantitative aspect of the psyche become accessible for research.
Nevertheless, the main diculty remains: it is impossible to break through the boundaries of
the psychic process and convert its content into a form, convenient for exploration.
Regarding the possibility of psychology becoming a strict science, it should be noted
that years of research and observation led Jung to the awareness that psyche is not chaos, but an
objective reality, which can be researched by the means of natural sciences (Jung, 1975, p.233).
Moreover, in one of his articles he insists that psychology is not a kind of worldview, but a
science (Jung, 1975, p.376). However, it is necessary to clarify that in this context analytical
psychology is presented as a science in order to avoid the merely spiritual stance of those
who perceived psychology as a way of self-improvement in an excessively dogmatic way. Jung
ironically notes that “there are many people today who think they can smell a Weltanschauung
in analytical psychology. I wish I were one of them, for then I should be spared the pains of
investigation and doubt, and could tell you clearly and simply the way that leads to Paradise”
(Jung, 1975, pp.376-377).
But there is another moment that explicitly and obviously indicates the possibility of
scientic psychology in Jung’s doctrine. It is connected with an idea, according to which spirit
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Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 385
and matter interact closely between each other. A similar idea can be found in Kant’s lectures
on psychology. However, Jung goes much further than Kant. In his late works Jung formulated
the concept or doctrine of unus mundus (Jung, 1977, pp.533-543). e general meaning of
this concept was borrowed from alchemists and can be reduced to the postulate, according
to which physical and psychic processes obeyed one and the same principles, because these
processes take place in the initially united Universe, where separation between the physical
and psychic is most likely the result of our imperfect perception. e phenomenon of acausal
connection between contents of the psyche and events of the objective reality, which Jung calls
synchronicity, relies upon the fact that the psychic element can manifest itself as physical and
vice versa.
Of course, critics may say that the necessity of introducing such a misty principle as
synchronicity may harm psychology as a science. But we should remember that the soul is not
a material point, moving uniformly in a straight line in vacuum. In this sense, the requirements
for psychology to be a science must dier from those presupposed, for instance, by physics.
I try to assume that Jung did not see any hard problem in the fact that cognition of
the psyche is dierent from cognition of the material world, because psychology can satisfy a
crucial methodological principle, such as comprehension or understanding. Here Jung (at least
he seems to think so) turns to Kant’s denition of ‘comprehension’, which means “to cognize a
thing to the extent which is sucient for our purpose” (Jung, 1982, p.181).
But as we already know, psychology is the way of revealing that psyche has one
purpose – individuation, and in the process of achieving this purpose we gain enough data for
comprehension. So, in this respect analytical psychology can be represented as the practical
science of individuation, in which comprehension replaces the characteristic features of
knowledge produced by natural sciences.
Last but not the least, Jung, much like Kant, thought that the future of psychology as
a ‘proper’ precise science would be closely connected with nding the way to make psychic
processes and contents intuitive and presentable a priori in space, despite the fact that, according
to Kant, they exist only in time. e point here is that Jung was inuenced by representatives
of the energy theory, rst of all by Grot14. e energy theory takes an important place among
Jung’s ideas. At the rst time it is brightly revealed in the article On the Psychic Energy (1912),
and then in On the Nature of the Psyche (1947, republished in 1954). Such devotion to the
energy theory may be explained by the assumption that the mature Jung tried to avoid Kant’s
restrictions, concerning the possibility of mathematical cognition of the contents of inner
sense, which are given only in time. As we remember, according to Jung only the application
of the energy formula can allow us to resolve this task, “since mass and energy are of the same
nature, mass and velocity would be adequate concepts for characterizing the psyche so far as it
has any observable eects in space: in other words, it must have an aspect under which it would
appear as mass in motion” (Jung, 1975, p.234).
However, it should be noted that if psychologists would be able someday to nd a
principle for representing the psychic processes in space, they should decide what to do with
386 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017
BALANOVSKIY, V.
synchronicity and, consequently, with the trans-temporal and trans-spatial nature of the psyche
as it really is, not as it appears to us. On the other hand, this task is not topical, because it goes
beyond the transcendental area and refers to the transcendent, given that its decision is closely
connected with the psychoid factor15, which delimits the borders of the phenomenal world and
the sphere of possible experience.
Jung perfectly realized that any direct correspondence between the principles of physics
and those of psychology is impossible. However, he believed that the study of analogies
between them had a great heuristic potential, and that these analogies “are signicant enough
in themselves to warrant the prominence we have given them” (Jung, 1975, p.234).
At the same time, according to Jung, there was nothing to discuss seriously in his
epoch: he had a very low opinion of the level of modern scientic psychology. Jung compared
psychology with medicine in the 16th century, when there was no physiology at all, and with
natural sciences in the 13th century, when the rst experiments took place (Jung, 1975, p.356).
So, what should new generations of psychologists do? Jung gave only a common
principle. He wrote that if at the end of the 19th and beginning of 20th century psychology
were focusing predominantly on the physiological determination of psychic processes, the task
for future psychology should be to clarify how psychic processes are governed by the spirit, e.g.
by archetypes and archetypical plots.
ConClusIon
Kant’s and Jung’s in their works considered explicitly the issue of possibility of the
scientic psychology. After a brief analysis it seems obvious that both thinkers share the
position, according to which psychology as a ‘proper’ science is impossible. Moreover, they rely
on similar arguments.
Firstly, Kant and Jung thought that a serious obstacle for psychology to become a ‘proper’
science lies in the coincidence between subject and object of cognition, which makes almost
impossible even such a fundamental scientic procedure as observation, because the observer
can distort and transform the state of the observed subject.
Secondly, the fundamental impossibility of using strict quantitative mathematical
methods to the psyche cognition prevents psychology to become a science.
irdly, the still unresolved issue of psychophysical parallelism creates a ‘grim’ background
for any eorts aimed at creating a rigorous scientic psychology.
e agreement between Kant and Jung in these and many other issues, regarding the
science of psyche, despite the dierence between their epochs and their belonging to very
dierent intellectual contexts, is very impressive. If Kant focused predominantly on the
theoretical aspect of the fundamental impossibility of psychology as a ‘proper’ science, because
he could not know for sure what results would be supplied by psychology a century later, Jung,
for his part, had the opportunity to make sure de facto that all recent discoveries had failed to
put psychology on a solid foundation.
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aBstraCt: is study aims to show a similarity of Kant’s and Jung’s approaches to an issue of the possibility of
scientic psychology, hence to explicate what they thought about the future of psychology. erefore, the article
contains heuristic material, which can contribute in a resolving of such methodological task as searching of
promising directions to improve philosophical and scientic psychology.
To achieve the aim the author attempts to clarify an entity of Kant’s and Jung’s objections against even the possibility
of scientic psychology and to nd out ways to overcome those objections in Kant’s and Jung’s works. e main
methods were explication, reconstruction and comparative analysis of Kant’s and Jung’s views.
As a result it was found, that Kant and Jung allocated one and the same obstacles, which, on their opinion, prevent
psychology to become a science in the strict sense. ey are: 1) coincidence of subject and object in psychology; 2)
impossibility to apply quantitative mathematic methods in psychology; 3) pendency of the issue of psychophysical
parallelism. However, Kant and Jung indicated ways to resolve formulated by them fundamental diculties. All
those ways lay through the searching a principle of interaction and connection between the psychic and the physical.
I. Kant and C.G. Jung on the Prospects Artigos II / Articles II
Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 375-390, Jan./Jun., 2017 389
Keywords: I. Kant, C.G. Jung, science, empirical and rational psychology, analytical psychology, mathematic
methods in psychology
notes
1 Valentin Balanovskiy (PhD) is a researcher, Executive Director of the Academia Kantiana at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal
University (Russia)
2 Here and below I use the Cambridge edition of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Kant, 2004).
3 A more rigorous treatment of psychophysical parallelism is oered in Balanovskiy (2015).
4 See, for example, Jung (1975, pp. 9-10:213-215).
5 Schmidt gives a similar denition (2008, p.462).
6 Vasil’ev proposes to call the rst doctrine synthetic empirical psychology, and the second one analytical empirical psychology.
7 e inner sense is a way by which the subject observes itself and its own internal states (KrV, 04: 37). e form of inner sense
is time (KrV, 04: 37), which has only one dimension, that is why objects of the inner sense (i.e. contents of the psyche with
the possible exception of intuition of outer objects) cannot be intuited and presented a priori in space. But the last condition is
necessary in order to establish a ‘proper’ science (MAN, 04: 471). At the same time, the inner sense is closely connected with
the transcendental unity of apperception, without which the individual ‘I’, separated from other things, is unthinkable, and,
consequently, psyche as such is unthinkable too. us, the diculties in the cognition of inner sense phenomena automatically
become diculties in the science of human psyche.
8 Buchner notes that Kant could not keep in mind self-observation or introspection in the modern methodological sense (Buchner,
1897, p.47).
9 Here and below I use the Cambridge edition of Kant’s lectures on Metaphysics L1 (Kant, 1997).
10 Here and below I use the Cambridge edition of Kant’s works (Kant, 2007).
11 According to Makkreel, the distinction between mind (Gemüt) and spirit (Geist) can be found in Friedländer anthropology
lectures (1775). He writes that “mind is dened as ‘the mode in which the soul is aected by things’, whereas spirit ‘is the subject
that thinks, and is active’” (Makkreel, 2001, p. 193).
12 Sturm maintains that Kant had impact on the formation of the main idea developed by Fechner’s Elemente der Psychophysik,
namely that the intensity of subjective perceptions can be measured by mathematical means (Sturm, 2001, pp. 167-168).
13 More information on the topic in Balanovskiy (Con-Textos Kantianos, 2016).
14More information on the topic in Balanovskiy (Voprosy Filosoi, 2016).
15 According to Jung, the ‘psychoid’ or ‘psychoid factor’ is the transcendent psychical, the bridge between the matter and the pure
spirit (Jung, 1975, p.216). To be precise, this is the very border itself between matter and spirit, because animate and inanimate
nature is available for our direct research, as pure ‘spirit’ or mental constructions (like ideas and notions) do. At the same time, the
psychoid factor, like a thing-in-itself, always remains beyond the frames of possible cognition.
Recebido / Received: 22.12.16
Aprovado / Approved: 04.02.17
