This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.
| identifier | question |
|---|---|
| 37358 | And how does increasing capacity express itself? |
| 37358 | And is not the cultivation of character, therefore, an absurd futility? |
| 37358 | And why urge people to make an effort in this or that direction if everything, including the effort or its absence, is determined? |
| 37358 | And, asks the Professor, can science tell us which is correct? |
| 37358 | Are we then to discard the use of such a word as"freedom"altogether? |
| 37358 | But, asks Professor James, looking outwardly at these two universes, can anyone say which is the accidental and which is the necessary one? |
| 37358 | But, it is further asked, how can this be aught but an illusion if I am not the real and determining cause of my conduct? |
| 37358 | C. C. DETERMINISM OR FREE- WILL? |
| 37358 | DETERMINISM OR FREE- WILL? |
| 37358 | Determinism OR Free- Will? |
| 37358 | Determinism, he says, professes that"those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree( Why''appoint''and''decree''? |
| 37358 | Eliminate from this all that is matter of common agreement between Determinists and Indeterminists, and what have we left but sheer verbal confusion? |
| 37358 | Finally, if the above be granted, can we longer attach meaning to the expression that man forms his own character? |
| 37358 | How does he acquire it? |
| 37358 | How is the Determinist to meet the attack? |
| 37358 | How shall we determine what his motives were? |
| 37358 | In Mill''s words, can we exchange the necessity to do wrong for the necessity to do right? |
| 37358 | Is it any more than an expression of our ignorance of the power of particular factors, and a consequent ignorance of their resultant? |
| 37358 | Must I not conclude that I am no more the determining cause of my conduct than a stone determines whether it shall fall to the ground or not? |
| 37358 | Now in thus tracing the course of a voluntary action are we doing any more than observing the action of desire in consciousness? |
| 37358 | One need only ask, by way of reply, Why does the"will"declare in favour of one desire rather than another? |
| 37358 | Or as Hume put it more elaborately:--"What is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions? |
| 37358 | The question is, What does consciousness really tell us, and how far is its testimony valid? |
| 37358 | The question really is, Why have we chosen thus or thus? |
| 37358 | The question then becomes,"What is his character? |
| 37358 | The real nature of morality is best seen if one asks oneself the question,"What is morality?" |
| 37358 | The real question is why do I choose this rather than that? |
| 37358 | What do we mean by character? |
| 37358 | What is it that constitutes an act of volition, or supplies us with the fact of will? |
| 37358 | What is it that people have in their minds when they speak of the"Freedom of the Will"? |
| 37358 | What is it, now, that has occurred? |
| 37358 | What is the use of praising or blaming if each one does what heredity, constitution, and environment compels? |
| 37358 | What is, then, the testimony of consciousness? |
| 37358 | What would then be the scope and character of morality? |
| 37358 | What, now, is the insuperable dilemma which Professor James places before upholders of Determinism? |
| 37358 | What, then, is meant by ability to appreciate consequences? |
| 37358 | Why does the"will"pronounce in favour of one desire rather than another? |
| 37358 | Why hold him responsible for the expressions of a character provided for him, and for the influence of an environment which he had no part in forming? |
| 37358 | Why is there a choice or selection of things or actions? |
| 37358 | Why not let things drift? |
| 37358 | Why not the impersonal word''determine?'') |
| 37358 | Why punish a man for being what he is? |
| 37358 | Why should it have this effect? |
| 37358 | Would there be any moral laws or moral feelings left? |
| 37358 | Would there even be a man left under such conditions? |
| 37358 | [ 8] And whence the varieties of character?" |
| 58682 | Am I going to die? |
| 58682 | And after? |
| 58682 | And if I refuse? |
| 58682 | Are you certain that it is not the contact Wagner imposed on you? |
| 58682 | But if it''s true, are your ideals strong enough to help us kill him? |
| 58682 | But would n''t it be better to use it as soon as possible? 58682 By the way,"Wagner inquired,"have you any idea why you did n''t die?" |
| 58682 | Can you move your limbs yet? |
| 58682 | Did you learn anything that might help us, Clifford? |
| 58682 | Do we have any way out? |
| 58682 | Do you feel that its purpose might be much the same as ours, and that it will attempt to convince us of that? |
| 58682 | Do you mean to say that you''d help us kill your own father? |
| 58682 | Does it seem to you that perhaps we could n''t kill you-- that it would prevent us? |
| 58682 | Have the doctors found a remedy for the Plague yet? 58682 How were you able to circumvent the disaster that so nearly befell me?" |
| 58682 | In other words, you want me to act as the Judas ram? |
| 58682 | Is there any chance of a similar recurrence? |
| 58682 | Make a small- time hero of yourself with this grandstand play? |
| 58682 | May I offer a compromise? |
| 58682 | So you''re not so tough, after all? 58682 So?" |
| 58682 | That means you''d automatically become the government head if the General died? |
| 58682 | Then how would I know what Oliver said? |
| 58682 | Then you''re not his son? |
| 58682 | What are you trying to do? |
| 58682 | What can we do? |
| 58682 | What comes next? |
| 58682 | What do you have to suggest? |
| 58682 | What do you think, Clifford? |
| 58682 | What do you want me to say? |
| 58682 | What would I be expected to do? |
| 58682 | What''s his name? |
| 58682 | What''s that got to do with it? |
| 58682 | Who are you? |
| 58682 | Who is it? |
| 58682 | Why is it necessary to kill him, especially now that Wagner is dead? 58682 Will the sickness come again?" |
| 58682 | Would you attempt to stop us if we tried to kill you? |
| 58682 | You feel then,Cecil Cuff, the other man in the room, said,"that you''re in the grip of something over which you have no direct control?" |
| 58682 | You realize the risk you''re taking, coming with me, Cecil? |
| 58682 | You wanted to see me, Sir? |
| 58682 | Am I correct?" |
| 58682 | And the Weapon? |
| 58682 | Are you deliberately trying to get yourself back in trouble by being stubborn?" |
| 58682 | As Buckmaster started back, the thought struck him: Was he merely a pawn being moved by this inner power? |
| 58682 | Can you control what you let him learn through you?" |
| 58682 | Could he be hurt by someone like Wagner? |
| 58682 | Could he fit them into the pattern, if he but knew how? |
| 58682 | Did he have all the pieces? |
| 58682 | Did he no longer have freedom of action? |
| 58682 | Do you have any explanation?" |
| 58682 | Do you understand the importance of that command?" |
| 58682 | Do you want me to leave him here with the dying ones?" |
| 58682 | Had the war been lost? |
| 58682 | I only ask you this: If you can see your way clear to attain your ends without killing him, will you let him live?" |
| 58682 | Is there anything I can do to help?" |
| 58682 | Just how unusual was the difference he had discovered in himself? |
| 58682 | Now what if it is also the essence of life in all its forms, and even of"inanimate"matter? |
| 58682 | Or must he need to learn more? |
| 58682 | So they refuse to recognize it.__ Your obvious question is, How can I tell you this? |
| 58682 | Still not very interested, Buckmaster asked,"Why should I?" |
| 58682 | Tell me, were your creatures aware that they were figments of your mind?" |
| 58682 | That is correct, is it not?" |
| 58682 | Therefore, what course should he take? |
| 58682 | Was his will still his own? |
| 58682 | What did I do that was not right?" |
| 58682 | What have you got to lose?" |
| 58682 | Who am I-- the writer of this essay? |
| 58682 | Why should I trust you?" |
| 58682 | Why should the General''s son be hiding me?" |
| 58682 | Would he gain, or would he lose the last chance for ultimate victory by setting off the explosive? |
| 58682 | You fully understand, I hope, that if you ever have to use it, your mission will certainly be fatal to yourself?" |
| 58682 | You see now why it must be used only as a last resort?" |
| 55761 | ( 2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there? |
| 55761 | ( 2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there? |
| 55761 | ( 2) Where are they united? |
| 55761 | ( 3) When two persons are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there? |
| 55761 | ( 3) When two persons are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there? |
| 55761 | And if not, with what other question must it necessarily be connected? |
| 55761 | And why are these feelings to be eliminated? |
| 55761 | Are the actions of men really all of one kind? |
| 55761 | But are we to trust to good luck, and experiment about until we hit by accident upon the right line? |
| 55761 | But how about the possibility of social life for men, if each aims only at asserting his own individuality? |
| 55761 | But how am I to know, prior to all knowledge, that the objects given to me are ideas? |
| 55761 | But how are we to make the actual calculation? |
| 55761 | But how else can this happen except we assign a content to the purely formal activity of the Ego? |
| 55761 | But is it justifiable to lump together actions of this kind with those in which a man is conscious not only of his actions but also of their causes? |
| 55761 | But is it not possible to make the old a measure for the new? |
| 55761 | But is this reflection capable of supporting any positive alternative? |
| 55761 | But what if this"thing- in- itself,"this whole transcendent ground of the world, should be nothing but a fiction? |
| 55761 | But what of the claim that this view is based on experience? |
| 55761 | But what of the freedom of an action about the motives of which we reflect? |
| 55761 | But what right have we to say that in the absence of sense- organs the whole process would not exist at all? |
| 55761 | But, is not precisely this actually the case with pure concepts and ideas? |
| 55761 | But, what if they are not valid at all? |
| 55761 | Can I say of it that it acts on my soul? |
| 55761 | Can we regard man as a whole in himself, in view of the fact that he grows out of a whole and fits as a member into a whole? |
| 55761 | Does freedom of will, then, mean being able to will without ground, without motive? |
| 55761 | Does not the world cause thoughts in the minds of men with the same necessity as it causes the blossoms on plants? |
| 55761 | Have I, then, any right at all to start from it in my arguments? |
| 55761 | Have they any intelligible meaning? |
| 55761 | Have we any right to consider the question of the freedom of the will by itself at all? |
| 55761 | He asks, How much can we learn about them indirectly, seeing that we can not observe them directly? |
| 55761 | He can not will what he wills? |
| 55761 | How comes it that the simple real manifests itself in a two- fold manner, if it is an indivisible unity? |
| 55761 | How do we come to differentiate ourselves from what is"objective,"and to contrast"Ego"and"Non- Ego?" |
| 55761 | How does Matter come to think of its own nature? |
| 55761 | How does the matter appear when we recognise the absoluteness of thought? |
| 55761 | How is it possible for my thought to be relevantly related to the object? |
| 55761 | How is it possible to start knowledge anywhere at all? |
| 55761 | How is it that we are compelled to make these continual corrections in our observations? |
| 55761 | How should I make of my thought an exception? |
| 55761 | How should Mind be aware of what goes on in Matter, seeing that the essential nature of Matter is quite alien to Mind? |
| 55761 | How should it matter to me whether I can do a thing or not, if I am forced by the motive to do it? |
| 55761 | How, in any case, is it possible for me to argue from my own subjective view of the world to that of another human being? |
| 55761 | How, then, do I know that he and I are in a common world? |
| 55761 | I can now ask myself: Over and above the percepts just mentioned, what else is there in the section of space in which they are? |
| 55761 | If human organisation has no part in the essential nature of thinking, what is its function within the whole nature of man? |
| 55761 | If the question be asked, What is man''s purpose in life? |
| 55761 | Is not every man compelled to measure the deliverances of his moral imagination by the standard of traditional moral principles? |
| 55761 | Is reason able also to strike the balance? |
| 55761 | Kant assumed their validity and only asks, What are the conditions of their validity? |
| 55761 | Metaphysical Realism must ask, What is it that gives us our percepts? |
| 55761 | Or how in these circumstances should Mind act upon Matter, so as to translate its intentions into actions? |
| 55761 | Our present question is, what do we gain by supplementing a process with a conceptual counterpart? |
| 55761 | Our questions are the following:( 1) Are things continuous or intermittent in their existence? |
| 55761 | Philosophers still ask such questions as, What is the purpose of the world? |
| 55761 | Seeing that, at the outset, we attach no predicates whatever to the Given, we are bound to ask: How is it that we are able to determine it at all? |
| 55761 | THE THEORY OF FREEDOM I CONSCIOUS HUMAN ACTION Is man free in action and thought, or is he bound by an iron necessity? |
| 55761 | The fundamental question of Kant''s Theory of Knowledge is, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? |
| 55761 | This being so, is any individuality left at all? |
| 55761 | This last answer does, indeed, presuppose that it is legitimate to group together in the single question,''How many tables?'' |
| 55761 | This leads us to the question, What is the right method for striking the balance between the credit and the debit columns? |
| 55761 | Two questions arise:( 1) Where are the Given and the Concept differentiated? |
| 55761 | VII ARE THERE ANY LIMITS TO KNOWLEDGE? |
| 55761 | What does it mean to have knowledge of the motives of one''s actions? |
| 55761 | What does it signify for us to possess knowledge and science? |
| 55761 | What does willing mean if not to have grounds for doing, or striving to do, this rather than that? |
| 55761 | What else has he done except perceive what hundreds have failed to see? |
| 55761 | What follows from these facts? |
| 55761 | What follows from this fact? |
| 55761 | What follows? |
| 55761 | What is it that Kant has achieved? |
| 55761 | What is it that stimulates the subject? |
| 55761 | What is it that, in the first instance, I have before me when I confront another person? |
| 55761 | What is the function( and consequently the purpose) of man? |
| 55761 | What of the Spiritualistic theory? |
| 55761 | What precisely is it that is absolute in the affirmation of the Ego? |
| 55761 | What right have you to declare the world to be complete without thought? |
| 55761 | What then is a percept? |
| 55761 | When, next, the percept disappears from my field of vision, what remains? |
| 55761 | Where is the jumping- board which will launch us from the subjective into the trans- subjective? |
| 55761 | Which of us can say that he is really free in all his actions? |
| 55761 | Who does not know the pleasure which is caused by the hope of a remote but intensely desired enjoyment? |
| 55761 | Why do I not passively let the object impress itself on me? |
| 55761 | Why is it not simply satisfied with itself and content to accept its own existence? |
| 55761 | Why should this concept belong any less to the whole plant than leaf and blossom? |
| 55761 | Why, we ask, does the tree appear to us now at rest, then in motion? |
| 55761 | Yes, but what is it to do? |
| 55761 | [ 18] Are there any presuppositions in this question, as formulated by Kant? |
| 55761 | [ 45] Now let us ask ourselves, How do we come by such a view? |
| 55761 | [ 50] What does Fichte here mean by the activity of the"intelligence,"when we translate what he has obscurely felt into clear concepts? |
| 35958 | [ 6] We may here inquire wherein lies the necessity of a cause opposed to a contingent cause? 35958 An event proved to be necessary in relation to an individual-- is this event likewise necessary in the whole train of its relations? 35958 And how does will cause volitions? 35958 And how is that new volition or antecedent to be obtained? 35958 And is the truth of the Bible unsettled? 35958 And what answer could be given? 35958 And what is this consequence but pantheism? 35958 Are they opposed and exclusive of each other in reference to the future? 35958 Are we called upon to ascend higher? 35958 As the motive therefore determines the divine volition, what is the nature of the connexion between the motive and the volition? 35958 But do we find this distinction of natural and moral ability in the common notions of men? 35958 But has not the act of the will a cause? 35958 But have I done wrong not to be seduced by his genius, nor won and commanded by his piety to the belief of his philosophy? 35958 But how are we to know whether the motive of every volition has this characteristic of agreeableness, or of most agreeableness, as the case may be? 35958 But how do those who deny a self- determining power account for these facts? 35958 But how do we conceive of cause as producing phenomena? 35958 But how does the cause produce the phenomenon? 35958 But how does the will cause its own acts? 35958 But how opposed-- is choice contingent? 35958 But in what lies the selection? 35958 But is this necessity a necessity_ per se_, or a determined necessity? 35958 But show me, he that can, that they are not logical deductions from this system? 35958 But to a being endowed with prescience, what prevents a positive and infallible knowledge of a future contingent event? 35958 But what has determined you then? 35958 But what is the aim of this preaching? 35958 But what is the cause of volition? 35958 But what is the nature of such a cause? 35958 But what is the relation of the phenomena to the substance? 35958 But what is this idea opposed to necessity, and how does the will come under it? 35958 But what is this something opposed to necessity? 35958 But what kind of certainty is this? 35958 But what new characteristic appears in this relation? 35958 But wherein lies the deficiency? 35958 But why does he determine always according to the most reasonable? 35958 But why does it seem most agreeable to him? 35958 But why the reluctance to escape from this universal necessity? 35958 But will any man assume that necessity is the_ only_ ground of certain knowledge and conviction? 35958 Can any effect be without a cause? 35958 Can we not believe that the Judge of all the Earth will do right, although in his free and omnipotent will he have the power to do wrong? 35958 Can we not enjoy this confidence, while we allow him absolute freedom of choice? 35958 Do the abettors of this system admit that there is something opposed to necessity? 35958 Do they admit the possibility that any choice which is, might not have been at all, or might have been different from what it is? 35958 Do they affirm that choice is opposed to necessity? 35958 Do they not feel that the volition has a metaphysical possibility as well as that the sequent of the volition has a physical possibility? 35958 Do you say it represents phenomena as existing without cause? 35958 Do_ you_ likewise have a natural and spontaneous judgement against a necessitated will? 35958 Does Edwards appeal to consciousness? 35958 Does not such a proposition detract from the omnipotence of God, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his omniscience? |
| 35958 | Does the objector allege, as a palpable absurdity, that there is, after all, nothing to account for the particular determination? |
| 35958 | Does this certainty possess degrees? |
| 35958 | Every cause produces effects by exertion or acting; but what is the cause of its acting? |
| 35958 | Explain,--why do you endeavour to evade the conclusion of this system when you come to volition? |
| 35958 | Have we here anything beyond stated antecedents and sequents? |
| 35958 | How do you know this? |
| 35958 | How does Edwards prove this? |
| 35958 | How does fire burn, or the sun raise the tides? |
| 35958 | How does this prove it? |
| 35958 | How does volition raise the arm or move the foot? |
| 35958 | How is cause known? |
| 35958 | How shall we escape from these difficulties? |
| 35958 | How then can we explain the fact that it does pass out of this state of indifferency to a choice or volition? |
| 35958 | If God''s will determines in the direction of the reasonable because it is most agreeable, then we ask, why is it the most agreeable? |
| 35958 | If cause have not within itself a_ nisus_ to produce phenomena, then wherein is it a cause? |
| 35958 | In selecting one of the squares, does the will act irrespective of reason and sensitivity, or not? |
| 35958 | In this place, I shall simply inquire, how the will may be conceived as coming under the idea of contingency? |
| 35958 | In what lies the capability of actions having a moral quality? |
| 35958 | Indeed, can we conceive of God otherwise than immediately knowing all things? |
| 35958 | Indeed, what are human punishments, when properly considered, but divine punishments? |
| 35958 | Is cause visible? |
| 35958 | Is it a chimera? |
| 35958 | Is it always observed? |
| 35958 | Is it because responsibility and the duties of morality and religion are more immediately connected with the will? |
| 35958 | Is it because the particular determination is the most reasonable, that it seems most agreeable? |
| 35958 | Is it because to determine according to the most reasonable, seems most agreeable? |
| 35958 | Is it because to go in the direction of the agreeable seems most rational? |
| 35958 | Is it because to go in the direction of the rational seems most agreeable? |
| 35958 | Is it of an antecedent necessity? |
| 35958 | Is it of an antecedent necessity? |
| 35958 | Is there any ground of certain knowledge respecting future volitions? |
| 35958 | Is this a necessary connexion? |
| 35958 | Is this a possible and rational conception? |
| 35958 | Is this conception a possible and rational conception? |
| 35958 | Is this connexion a necessary connexion? |
| 35958 | Is this_ nisus_ itself a phenomenon? |
| 35958 | Must its_ nisus_, its self- determining energy, or its volition, follow a uniform and inevitable law? |
| 35958 | Now the same action may be committed by a man or by a brute-- and the man alone will be guilty: why is the man guilty? |
| 35958 | Now what is the ground of all this clamour against contingency? |
| 35958 | Now what is the simple idea of necessity contained in these two points of view, with their two- fold distinction? |
| 35958 | Now what reason can exist, in any given case, why the volition or sense of the most agreeable is not produced? |
| 35958 | Now when the will obeys the laws of the reason, shall it be asked, what is the cause of the act of obedience? |
| 35958 | Now, is it true likewise that the cause which we call will, must, under given circumstances, necessarily produce such and such phenomena? |
| 35958 | On the first supposition, the question comes up, how the different arrangements and conditions of the objects are brought about? |
| 35958 | On the second supposition, how the changes in the state of the sensitivity are effected? |
| 35958 | On the third supposition, how the changes in both, singly and mutually, are effected? |
| 35958 | Shall God then be angry at the sight of the iron link? |
| 35958 | Shall it be said that it seems most agreeable to him? |
| 35958 | Shall we adopt the psychology of Edwards, and make the will and the sensitivity one? |
| 35958 | That the will is determined by the strongest motive;--and what is the strongest motive? |
| 35958 | The argument must therefore turn upon these two points: First, is contingency a possible conception, or is it in itself contradictory and absurd? |
| 35958 | The greatest apparent good, or the most agreeable:--what constitutes the greatest apparent good, or the most agreeable? |
| 35958 | The question now arises, how this one simple capacity of volition comes to produce such various volitions? |
| 35958 | The real question at issue is, how are we to account for these facts? |
| 35958 | The will now goes in the direction of reason, and now in the direction of passion,--but why? |
| 35958 | To this stands contrasted the system of Edwards; and what is this system? |
| 35958 | We are concerned only with this:--Do_ we_ do right? |
| 35958 | We now return to the question:--Is the connexion between motive and volition necessary? |
| 35958 | Well, then, it is asked, is not this liberty sufficient to constitute responsibility? |
| 35958 | What is cause? |
| 35958 | What is liberty? |
| 35958 | What is moral inability? |
| 35958 | What is necessity? |
| 35958 | What is the meaning of this conception? |
| 35958 | What is this antecedent? |
| 35958 | What is this cause? |
| 35958 | What is this nature? |
| 35958 | What kind of certainty is it, then? |
| 35958 | What moves the will to go in the direction of the sensitivity? |
| 35958 | When nothing is required to the performance of a deed but a volition, do men conceive of any inability whatever? |
| 35958 | When the will obeys the strongest desire, shall we ask, what is the cause of the act of obedience? |
| 35958 | Where then do we observe this_ nisus?_ Only in will. |
| 35958 | Who then is God? |
| 35958 | Why does the will obey the reason? |
| 35958 | Why? |
| 35958 | Will not every one admit, that"when men act_ voluntarily and do what they please_, they do what suits them best, and what is most agreeable to them?" |
| 35958 | You exhort and persuade him to arouse himself into activity; but what is his real condition according to this system? |
| 35958 | because it is most agreeable: but why does the will obey because it is most agreeable? |
| 35958 | do_ we_ do wrong? |
| 35958 | why do you claim liberty here? |
| 38621 | In what sense,asks President Day,"is it true, that a man has power to will the contrary of what he actually wills? |
| 38621 | What is it? |
| 38621 | A question may very properly be asked here, what are these opinions, judgments, admissions, pre- judgments,& c.? |
| 38621 | A question of great importance here presents itself: By what test shall we determine whether the Will is, or is not, in full harmony with the law? |
| 38621 | Are not the commands requiring them fully met in such acts? |
| 38621 | Are they not, on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of mind, or as acts of Will? |
| 38621 | Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence, or are they exclusively phenomena of the Will? |
| 38621 | Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence? |
| 38621 | As distinguished from the action of the Sensibility, what can it be, but a voluntary state, as presented in the Old Testament? |
| 38621 | Ask him why he makes this declaration? |
| 38621 | At another, it is said to be nothing but Certainty, or moral Certainty,& c. Now the question arises, what is this Certainty? |
| 38621 | But on what ground is this conclusion warranted? |
| 38621 | But who does not see, that it is a most vicious reasoning in a circle? |
| 38621 | But yet can we not from analogy form such an idea? |
| 38621 | But, gentlemen, why must there be this contradiction? |
| 38621 | Can He not exercise the very sovereignty which infinite wisdom and love desire? |
| 38621 | Can a being who is not a_ moral_ agent sin? |
| 38621 | Can the Intelligence affirm that a state of moral impurity is better than a state of moral rectitude? |
| 38621 | Can we conceive of a greater absurdity than that? |
| 38621 | Can we conceive of a greater absurdity than this? |
| 38621 | Did ever a greater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian? |
| 38621 | Did he obey his Intelligence, or Sensibility there? |
| 38621 | Did the prior goodness of David make his acts of adultery and murder partly good and partly bad? |
| 38621 | Do we not know, however, as absolutely as we know anything, that we_ can not_ affirm perceived contradictions? |
| 38621 | Do we not necessarily affirm his virtue to be great in proportion to the strength of the propensity thus perfectly subjected to the Moral law? |
| 38621 | Does the Will never harmonize with the Sensibility in opposition to the Intelligence? |
| 38621 | Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such circumstances, and not to place himself there again? |
| 38621 | Has God given, or does our own reason give us, a standard of moral judgment of which no one can form a conception, or give us a definition? |
| 38621 | Has a God of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as that? |
| 38621 | Has not God himself affirmed in one revelation what he has denied in another? |
| 38621 | Has the Most High given two such revelations as this? |
| 38621 | Have we any reason for thus imposing upon the Deity the limitation of our own feebleness? |
| 38621 | How can Necessitarians meet this argument? |
| 38621 | How can an equal liability to two distinct and opposite courses, be a ground of assurance, that we shall choose the one, and avoid the other? |
| 38621 | How can the Necessitarian account for such facts in consistency with his theory? |
| 38621 | How do we know that these two facts are not perfectly consistent with each other? |
| 38621 | How do you remove them according to your theory? |
| 38621 | How long would it take him to compose himself to sleep in this manner? |
| 38621 | How shall we account for the absence of self- reproach in the former instance, and for its presence in the latter? |
| 38621 | How shall we account, in consistency with this theory, for the existence of this idea in the mind? |
| 38621 | How then can a mind, thus constituted, generate and confirm the habit of sinning? |
| 38621 | How then can creatures"sin_ in_ and_ through_ another"six thousand years before their own existence commenced? |
| 38621 | How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extricated from such a difficulty? |
| 38621 | How, it is asked, shall we account, on this theory, for_ particular_ volitions? |
| 38621 | If A and B are to the Intelligence, in all respects, absolutely equal, how can the Sensibility impel the Will towards A instead of B? |
| 38621 | If this is so, sin, in all instances, is a mere blunder, a necessary result of a necessary misjudgment of the Intelligence? |
| 38621 | In such an assertion, is he not wise, not only_ above_, but_ against_ what is written? |
| 38621 | In this respect, has it altogether a superiority over the doctrine of Necessity? |
| 38621 | In what sense does God purpose, preordain, and bring to pass, the voluntary conduct of moral agents? |
| 38621 | In what sense, then, have they power to will and act differently according to this doctrine? |
| 38621 | In what sense, then, is or is not, man free, according to the doctrine of Necessity? |
| 38621 | Is it in the power of the Intelligence to affirm guilt of that creature? |
| 38621 | Is it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else? |
| 38621 | Is it possible for me, in my present circumstances, to avoid sin? |
| 38621 | Is it so? |
| 38621 | Is it the doctrine really held by those who professedly agree with him? |
| 38621 | Is not the guilt of the individual aggravated in proportion to the depth and intensity of the feeling which he is endeavoring to suppress? |
| 38621 | Is not this loving with all the heart? |
| 38621 | Is not this the strangest idea of Natural Ability as constituting the foundation of obligation, of which the human mind ever tried to conceive? |
| 38621 | Is not this your real meaning? |
| 38621 | Is not your Natural Ability this, that I might obey if I did obey? |
| 38621 | Is not_ existence_ necessary to moral agency? |
| 38621 | Is there any virtue at all in such a state of mind? |
| 38621 | Is this Liberty as distinguished from Necessity the liberty which lays the foundation of moral obligation? |
| 38621 | Is this Liberty, the only liberty of man, a liberty which may be destroyed by chains, bolts, and bars? |
| 38621 | Is this a true exposition of the Government of God? |
| 38621 | Is this the philosophy of the Will pre- supposed in the Bible? |
| 38621 | Is this the philosophy pre- supposed in the Bible? |
| 38621 | Is this the philosophy pre- supposed in the Bible? |
| 38621 | Is this the principle on which the decisions of that Day are based? |
| 38621 | Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? |
| 38621 | Is this, for example, the doctrine of Edwards? |
| 38621 | It becomes a very important inquiry with us, To what extent, and in what sense, is this maxim true? |
| 38621 | It is therefore a very legitimate, interesting, and profitable inquiry-- what is the system of mental science assumed as true in the Bible? |
| 38621 | It must be so, if the doctrine of Liberty is not, and that of Necessity is, the doctrine of the Bible? |
| 38621 | Now an important question arises, By what_ standard_ shall we judge of the moral character of intentions? |
| 38621 | Now, how happens it, that no man holding the doctrine of Liberty was ever known to deny that of obligation, or of merit and demerit? |
| 38621 | Now, what are these opinions, judgments, and notions? |
| 38621 | Now, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to this scheme? |
| 38621 | Of what use can the internal revelation be, but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect to the external? |
| 38621 | Shall he plead these in excuse for sin? |
| 38621 | Shall we not then have almost inextricably lost ourselves in the labyrinth of error? |
| 38621 | The first inquiry that presents itself is this: Do Necessitarians hold the doctrine of Necessity as defined in this chapter? |
| 38621 | The first inquiry which naturally arises here is What is the proper meaning of this proposition? |
| 38621 | The public are entirely deceived by this definition, and because they are deceived as to the theory intended by it, do they admit it as true? |
| 38621 | The question is, Are these virtues or affections, presented in the Bible as mere convictions of the Intelligence, or states of the Sensibility? |
| 38621 | The question is, can an individual intend to obey and to disobey the law, in one and the same act? |
| 38621 | The question is, does the belief of the doctrine of Liberty tend intrinsically to induce the exercise of this spirit? |
| 38621 | The question now arises, in the light of all these great truths, What relation do the Divine purposes and agency sustain to human action? |
| 38621 | The question now returns, Is"the Will always as the greatest apparent good,"in either of the senses of the phrase as above defined? |
| 38621 | Under such circumstances, who should not be admonished, that he should"dig deep, and lay his foundation upon a rock?" |
| 38621 | WE are now prepared to consider the question, whether each moral act, or exercise, is not always of a character purely unmixed? |
| 38621 | Was not the conflict between the two, and did not the latter prevail? |
| 38621 | Was the Intelligence deceived in this instance? |
| 38621 | We are now prepared to meet the question, To which of the relations above defined shall we refer the phenomena of the Will? |
| 38621 | We may properly ask the Necessitarian whence he obtained this knowledge, so vast and deep; whence he has thus"found out the Almighty to perfection?" |
| 38621 | What do such facts indicate? |
| 38621 | What excuse have you for not yielding to that conviction?" |
| 38621 | What if a philosopher, for that reason, should form his theory of optics by looking at the stars? |
| 38621 | What if he should with all possible intensity will to walk? |
| 38621 | What if the decisions of our courts of justice were based upon data from which the testimony of all material witnesses has been formally excluded? |
| 38621 | What if the devil, and all creatures called sinners, had always done the same thing? |
| 38621 | What if, from the fact, that the Will has its law, it should be assumed that Liberty is that law? |
| 38621 | What individual that has ever perpetrated such deeds has not said, and can not say with truth,"I know the good, and approve it; yet follow the bad?" |
| 38621 | What is an event without a cause, if this is not? |
| 38621 | What is self- denial but placing the Will with the Intelligence, in opposition to the Sensibility? |
| 38621 | What is that in which, according to the express teaching of inspiration, we learn the nature of this love? |
| 38621 | What is the evidence? |
| 38621 | What is the nature of this love? |
| 38621 | What is this but a voluntary act? |
| 38621 | What is this spirit? |
| 38621 | What is this, but a positive assertion, that a moral action of a mixed character is an impossibility? |
| 38621 | What more can be said of God, or of any being ever so pure, than that he has always done what his Intellect affirmed to be best? |
| 38621 | What more can properly or wisely be demanded? |
| 38621 | What more ought a moral agent to intend than the highest good he can accomplish? |
| 38621 | What must have been his intention in so doing? |
| 38621 | What must intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal retribution, probation based on such a principle? |
| 38621 | What other meaning can we attach to the phrase,"forsaketh all that he hath?" |
| 38621 | What shall we think of these two states? |
| 38621 | What then are the extent and limits of the Liberty of the Will? |
| 38621 | What then becomes of the objection under consideration? |
| 38621 | What then is the exclusive tendency of this doctrine? |
| 38621 | What would be the consequence? |
| 38621 | What would be the response of an assembled universe to a division based upon such a principle? |
| 38621 | What would be thought of such a treatise? |
| 38621 | What, on this supposition, is the meaning of the declaration,"How can ye, who are_ accustomed_ to do evil, learn to do well?" |
| 38621 | What, then, according to the theory of Necessity, becomes of the doctrine of Ability? |
| 38621 | What, then, is Liberty as opposed to Moral Servitude? |
| 38621 | When you say that I might obey, if I chose, I would ask, if choosing, as in the command,"choose life,"is not the very thing required of me? |
| 38621 | When, therefore, you affirm that I might obey, if I chose, does it not mean, in reality, that I might choose, if I should choose? |
| 38621 | Whence this solitary intruder in the human mind? |
| 38621 | Where is the conceivable ground for the imputation of moral guilt to them? |
| 38621 | Where is the individual that, unaided by an influence out of himself, has ever attained to a dominion over his own spirit? |
| 38621 | Where is the tendency to induce a spirit of dependence, in such a conviction? |
| 38621 | Where then is the place for error, for wrong opinions, and pre- judgments? |
| 38621 | Who believes that? |
| 38621 | Who can believe, that the pillars of God''s eternal government rest upon such a doctrine? |
| 38621 | Who does not know, that the great difficulty lies in the enslavement of the Will to a depraved Sensibility? |
| 38621 | Who would dare affirm the contrary? |
| 38621 | Who would dare to affirm, when he has any particular emotions, that all moral agents in existence are bound to have those identical feelings? |
| 38621 | Who would dare to say that there is? |
| 38621 | Who would look to such decisions as the exponents of truth and justice? |
| 38621 | Why did I not?" |
| 38621 | Why do I not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as a consequence of that injury? |
| 38621 | Why do we not blame the animal for this nature? |
| 38621 | Why may we not know, with equal certainty, whether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall under the relation of Liberty? |
| 38621 | Why should the study of the Will be an exception? |
| 38621 | Why should we doubt or deny it in the latter? |
| 38621 | Why? |
| 38621 | With such knowledge and resources, can God exercise no government, but that of a degraded sovereignty in the realm of mind? |
| 35839 | Are not cause and effect,says he,"opposite in their natures? |
| 35839 | How does it appear to be a_ fact_,asks President Day,"that the will can not act when it is acted upon?" |
| 35839 | I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner,says he;"liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action,( motion?) |
| 35839 | Is no_ activity_ given to the ball? 35839 According to this view, what does the self- determining power amount to? 35839 Admit that volition is an effect, and what can we say? 35839 All this is perfectly true, without the least reference to the question, how it came to exist, or how it will come to exist? 35839 And he illustrates the difference by saying,a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it?" |
| 35839 | And is it without a cause? |
| 35839 | And is not this enough? |
| 35839 | And is not this perfectly self- evident? |
| 35839 | And what does it amount to? |
| 35839 | And why? |
| 35839 | And why? |
| 35839 | And yet he tells us, that he uses the term in this sense( in what sense?) |
| 35839 | And, in truth, what does it amount to? |
| 35839 | Any thing to shock the common sense and reason of mankind? |
| 35839 | Are these two questions really distinct? |
| 35839 | Are we out of danger? |
| 35839 | Are we sunk in utter darkness? |
| 35839 | But as the question, in the present controversy, is, whether a man is accountable for his internal acts, for the volitions of his mind? |
| 35839 | But behind all this controversy, there is a question which has not been agitated; and that is, whether the will is determined at all? |
| 35839 | But do the arguments prove the same thing? |
| 35839 | But do you deny motive to be the cause of volition? |
| 35839 | But how can we expect this from him? |
| 35839 | But how does he show this? |
| 35839 | But how is this? |
| 35839 | But how shall this point be decided? |
| 35839 | But if the meaning be, that the will simply acts, why not present the idea in this its true and unambiguous form? |
| 35839 | But if the question be, Can an act arise and come into being, without a sufficient"ground and reason"of its existence? |
| 35839 | But is it just? |
| 35839 | But is it such an effect? |
| 35839 | But is the indissoluble connexion, or necessity, established by this argument, at all inconsistent with human liberty? |
| 35839 | But is the mind nothing? |
| 35839 | But is there no activity given to the ball? |
| 35839 | But is this so? |
| 35839 | But is this so? |
| 35839 | But no man, in his senses, ever puts forth a volition to make it rain-- and why? |
| 35839 | But suppose the argument to be sound, what does it prove? |
| 35839 | But what has this necessary connexion to do with the cause of its existence? |
| 35839 | But who ever held such a doctrine? |
| 35839 | But why dwell upon particular instances? |
| 35839 | But why fight against the doctrine of those who have laboured in the same great cause with myself? |
| 35839 | By the_ action_ of what is it produced? |
| 35839 | Can any being act, without being caused to act? |
| 35839 | Can some event, after all, begin to be without having a cause of its existence? |
| 35839 | Can there be one cause of volition, and another cause of its particular direction? |
| 35839 | Can we say, that the strongest motive may exist, and yet no volition may follow from it? |
| 35839 | Dare you assert, in the face of such teaching, that motive is not the cause of volition? |
| 35839 | Did any man, in his right mind, ever contend that"a volition could produce itself,"can arise out of nothing, and bring itself into existence? |
| 35839 | Did he expect that we should prove the non- existence of a thing by the direct evidence of consciousness? |
| 35839 | Did it not exist long before the effect then, which it produces in time? |
| 35839 | Do you affirm the mind to be the cause of volition? |
| 35839 | Does he ask himself whether it is the same in nature and in kind with a produced effect? |
| 35839 | Does he tell us, that it arises solely from our mistaking a metaphorical for a literal mode of expression? |
| 35839 | Does it not merely suffer? |
| 35839 | Does it prove that they are necessary with a_ moral necessity?_ Does it prove that they are brought to pass by the influence of moral causes? |
| 35839 | Does it prove that they are necessary with a_ moral necessity?_ Does it prove that they are brought to pass by the influence of moral causes? |
| 35839 | Does it prove them to be necessary with a moral necessity? |
| 35839 | Does it result from the prior action of mind, or of motive, or of any thing else? |
| 35839 | Does it show them to be subject to that moral necessity, for which Edwards contends, and against which we protest? |
| 35839 | Does not this expression include that which is the cause of volition in the real, in the only proper, sense of the word? |
| 35839 | Does such an absurdity really flow from the self- determining power of the will? |
| 35839 | Does the argument in question prove any more than the bare fact of the certainty of the events foreknown? |
| 35839 | Does the book before us_ cause_ us to think? |
| 35839 | Edwards frequently asks, if a volition is without a cause? |
| 35839 | Foreknowledge, I admit, infers this kind of necessity; but is this any thing to the purpose? |
| 35839 | Has any man ever ascertained the truth of this law by observation and experiment? |
| 35839 | Has any man ever seen a body put in motion, and continue to move on in a right line forever? |
| 35839 | Has he informed us that by_ cause_ he means_ occasion?_ He has done no such thing, and his language admits of no such construction. |
| 35839 | Has it a"sufficient ground and reason"of its existence? |
| 35839 | Has it become obsolete? |
| 35839 | Has not this first link, this volition of the Deity, a cause? |
| 35839 | Has volition an efficient cause? |
| 35839 | Have we no platform left whereon to stand, and to behold the glory of God, our Creator and Preserver? |
| 35839 | He finds himself possessed of a_ volition_; but does he look at this volition to see what it is? |
| 35839 | Here the question arises, Is such a thing possible? |
| 35839 | How are such illustrations intended to be applied to the phenomena of volition? |
| 35839 | How can it conflict, then, with any scheme of free- agency that ever was dreamed of by man? |
| 35839 | How can this be, if a causative act of the Almighty may exist, and yet, for millions of ages, its omnipotent energy produce no effect? |
| 35839 | How could Edwards have been more particular? |
| 35839 | How could language more clearly or precisely convey the meaning of an author? |
| 35839 | How does Mr. Locke meet this difficulty? |
| 35839 | How does it act, then? |
| 35839 | How does this show, that action and passion are not confounded, in supposing that an act is caused? |
| 35839 | How happened it, that so many ages rolled away, and this mighty causative act produced no effect? |
| 35839 | How is it then? |
| 35839 | If an effect is produced, is it not passive in relation to its cause? |
| 35839 | If his system be false, why, it may be asked, has the Inquiry so often appeared to be unanswerable? |
| 35839 | If it can be his virtue or his vice? |
| 35839 | If it is endued with an active nature, and really puts forth an act, is not this act clearly different from the passive impression made upon it? |
| 35839 | If our desires, affections,& c., operate to influence the will, how can it be free in putting forth volitions? |
| 35839 | If so, I reply it is absurd to affirm, that volition, or an act, is passive in relation to any thing? |
| 35839 | If such be the liberty of the will, what is it worth? |
| 35839 | If the action or influence of any thing produces an effect upon the mind, is not that effect merely a passive impression? |
| 35839 | If the choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition of heart, what is the character of that choice? |
| 35839 | If the question were, is a man accountable for his external actions? |
| 35839 | If they only seem to us to exist long before their effects, even from all eternity, how can this mere seeming make any real difference in the case? |
| 35839 | If they really exist just before their effects in time, and not long before them, why do they not exist in time just as much as any other volitions? |
| 35839 | If this be all that is meant, why not state the thing so that it may be acquiesced in by the necessitarian, instead of keeping up such a war of words? |
| 35839 | If this be so, what is this common property of motives, which we call their strength? |
| 35839 | If volition be not an effect, are there no effects in the universe? |
| 35839 | If you offer a guinea and a penny to a man''s choice, asks President Day, which will he choose? |
| 35839 | In other words; is it made to act? |
| 35839 | In the first place, when we ask,"what determines the will?" |
| 35839 | In view of such a case, how could the author have said, as he frequently does, that a cause necessarily implies its effect? |
| 35839 | In what sense then, let us inquire, does the knowledge of a present event prove it to be necessary? |
| 35839 | In what sense, then, does the above argument, supposing it to be sound, prove our actions to be necessary? |
| 35839 | Indeed, if a body be put in motion, and meets with no resistance, it will move on in a right line forever-- and why? |
| 35839 | Is a free, intelligent, designing cause nothing? |
| 35839 | Is choice produced by choice? |
| 35839 | Is choice_ not_ produced by choice? |
| 35839 | Is he not a great reasoner, rather than a great thinker? |
| 35839 | Is it active then in relation to any thing? |
| 35839 | Is it any thing like the assertion, that an effect has no cause? |
| 35839 | Is it brought into existence, like the motion of body, by the prior action of any thing else? |
| 35839 | Is it brought to pass by the prior action of motive? |
| 35839 | Is it in the power of motive? |
| 35839 | Is it in the uncaused volition of Deity? |
| 35839 | Is it in the will? |
| 35839 | Is it meant, that not volition itself, but the will, is passive to that which acts upon it, while it is active in relation to its effect? |
| 35839 | Is it meant, that volition itself is passive in relation to one thing, and active in relation to another? |
| 35839 | Is it necessitated? |
| 35839 | Is it produced in the mind, and is the mind passive as to its production? |
| 35839 | Is it self- contradictory? |
| 35839 | Is it supposed, that it is neither the volition nor the will, which is both active and passive at the same time; but that it is the mind? |
| 35839 | Is it true, then, that any power or efficacy belongs to the sensitive or emotive part of our nature? |
| 35839 | Is it true, then, that if the will causes its own volitions, it can cause them only by preceding volitions? |
| 35839 | Is it, like the motion of a body, the passive result of the action of something else? |
| 35839 | Is not all this true, on the supposition that the mind is the efficient cause of volition? |
| 35839 | Is not an effect, which is wholly produced in one thing by the action or influence of another, wholly passive? |
| 35839 | Is not the thing which, according to the supposition, is wholly passive to the influence acting upon it, wholly passive? |
| 35839 | Is not the whirlwind active, when it tears up the forest?" |
| 35839 | Is not the whirlwind_ active_, when it tears up the forest?" |
| 35839 | Is not this distinction properly applied? |
| 35839 | Is not this inference well drawn? |
| 35839 | Is not this inference well drawn? |
| 35839 | Is the mind nothing? |
| 35839 | Is the motion of body, then, one and the same thing with the action of mind? |
| 35839 | Is the will nothing? |
| 35839 | Is there any thing very contradictory in all this? |
| 35839 | Is there no activity in this? |
| 35839 | Is this doctrine any the less certain, because it is a matter of inference? |
| 35839 | Is this great principle given up? |
| 35839 | Is this idea absurd? |
| 35839 | Is this to consider it as merely an antecedent to volition, which exerts no influence? |
| 35839 | Is this to make motive merely the condition on which the mind acts? |
| 35839 | Is volition an effect, in the same sense that the motion of the body is an effect? |
| 35839 | It has no reference whatever to the question, Is the mind free in the act of willing? |
| 35839 | It is absurd, says the latter, to suppose that a weaker motive, or any thing else, can prevail over the stronger-- and why? |
| 35839 | It is as perfect as any syllogism in Euclid_ but what does it prove?_ It proves that all human actions are necessary-- but in what sense? |
| 35839 | It is as perfect as any syllogism in Euclid_ but what does it prove?_ It proves that all human actions are necessary-- but in what sense? |
| 35839 | It is very necessary to separate the different questions included in the general one, Is not a volition caused? |
| 35839 | It proves our actions to be necessary; but in what sense? |
| 35839 | May we not with equal, nay, with infinitely greater propriety, contend that mind just exerts its own positive influence of itself? |
| 35839 | Now does our idea of a volition correspond with this idea of an effect? |
| 35839 | Now is this logic, or is it legerdemain? |
| 35839 | Now is this so? |
| 35839 | Now what has the connexion between any two or all the propositions in the universe, to do with the controversy about acts of the will? |
| 35839 | Now who would deny this position of the learned president? |
| 35839 | Now, does not every cause of volition include the efficient cause thereof? |
| 35839 | Now, here is the distinction, but is it not without a difference? |
| 35839 | Now, how can we conclude from hence, that the volitions of moral agents are, not only certain, but rendered certain by the influence of moral causes? |
| 35839 | Now, if a volition is an effect, if it has an efficient cause, what is that cause? |
| 35839 | Now, is a volition an effect in such a sense of the word? |
| 35839 | Now, shall we fly from these mysteries? |
| 35839 | Now, what is the real import of this testimony? |
| 35839 | Now, what is this certainty in things themselves, or in human volitions, without which they are incapable of being foreknown? |
| 35839 | Or what does it signify to tell us, that a body may be caused to move? |
| 35839 | Our desires may be so strong as entirely to overcome us-- and what then? |
| 35839 | Shall we assent to it, then? |
| 35839 | Shall we conclude that there_ must_ be some cause to produce it? |
| 35839 | Shall we deny it? |
| 35839 | Shall we explain away the free- agency of man, or deny the foreknowledge of God? |
| 35839 | Shall we set to work to reform our ideas? |
| 35839 | Shall we strive to make the matter plain, in a single instance, by assigning an efficient cause to an act of the will? |
| 35839 | Suppose this to be the case, with whom has he any controversy, or to what purpose has he argued? |
| 35839 | The conclusion is inevitable; but what does it prove? |
| 35839 | The great question, according to his work, is, what is this cause? |
| 35839 | The philosophers of all ages have sought for the efficient cause of volition; but who has found it? |
| 35839 | The question still remains to be settled, what is meant by determining the will? |
| 35839 | This is all true; but is this indissoluble connexion, or necessity, at all inconsistent with the contingency of the event known? |
| 35839 | This is the question: Is motive the efficient, or producing cause of volition? |
| 35839 | To evade this, can it be pretended, that motive just exerts this influence of itself? |
| 35839 | To make this matter clear, let us consider what is precisely meant by the term cause when it is thus used? |
| 35839 | To this the necessitarian replies, what does it signify that a man has a perfect liberty in regard to the choice of"one of two peppercorns?" |
| 35839 | True, it must be an effect, if you please; but in what sense of the word? |
| 35839 | Truly, there is activity in this, in our"deep and earnest thinking"; but what is the cause of this activity? |
| 35839 | Was it because he did not wish to march up, fairly and squarely, in the face of the enemy, and contend with them in their strongholds and fastnesses? |
| 35839 | We deny that volition is an effect; and what then? |
| 35839 | What do they prove? |
| 35839 | What is the cause of an effect?--of the motion of the hand, for example? |
| 35839 | What is then, really and properly speaking, the cause of the motion in question? |
| 35839 | What is this but to inform us, that an act of volition is produced by that which produces it? |
| 35839 | What says consciousness upon this point? |
| 35839 | What shall we conclude then? |
| 35839 | What shall we do then? |
| 35839 | What shall we do, then, with this broad, this most ambiguous proposition? |
| 35839 | What then is a volition just as it is revealed to us in the light of consciousness? |
| 35839 | What then, is the precise doctrine of the Inquiry which I intend to oppose? |
| 35839 | What then? |
| 35839 | Whence, then, do we derive the ideas of cause and effect, and of the necessary connection between them? |
| 35839 | Where shall we look for it? |
| 35839 | Who can deny that a man always does what he pleases, when he does what he pleases? |
| 35839 | Who has not felt, on such an occasion, that although the passions may storm, yet the will alone is power? |
| 35839 | Who would say, that that which has the greatest influence has not the greatest influence? |
| 35839 | Why did not Edwards, then, combat this idea? |
| 35839 | Why should it be thought impossible to reconcile the free- agency of man with the foreknowledge of God? |
| 35839 | Why should the failure of other times, resulting from such a course, inspire us with despair? |
| 35839 | Why then did the world spring up and come into existence at one point of time rather than another? |
| 35839 | Why, then, will the man be certain to choose the guinea, all other things being equal? |
| 35839 | Will the one exert as great an influence over him as the other? |
| 35839 | and why do they not as much require causes to account for their existence? |
| 35839 | as"why its acts are thus and thus limited?" |
| 35839 | does the volition of God come into existence without a cause of its existence? |
| 35839 | for the movements of his body? |
| 35839 | or has it not a cause? |
| 35839 | or that it is a ground or reason, either in whole or in part, either by positive influence or not, why it is rather than not? |
| 35839 | or that they could infer any thing from this, in favour of a causal necessity-- the only question in dispute? |
| 35839 | without being an effect? |
| 17147 | ''; v. 20:''Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? |
| 17147 | ''Now what contradiction would there be if Spinoza had died in Leyden? |
| 17147 | ''What, then, will become'', he adds,''of man''s free will? |
| 17147 | (_ c_) Why should the dog ever be displeased_ spontaneously_? |
| 17147 | 7:''For who maketh thee to differ from another? |
| 17147 | ANT.--How does he know it, since I will do the opposite of what he shall have said, and I suppose that he will say what he thinks? |
| 17147 | ANT.--What? |
| 17147 | And can one be less a slave than to act by one''s own choice in accordance with the most perfect reason? |
| 17147 | And choice in virtue of what? |
| 17147 | And could not the Christian alliance be cemented by theological agreement? |
| 17147 | And is it not most often necessary that a little evil render the good more discernible, that is to say, greater? |
| 17147 | And is not an irrefutable argument a_ demonstration_? |
| 17147 | And should we not be well pleased to exchange it for sinlessness, if that depended upon us? |
| 17147 | And to cut the matter short, how comes it that he has prescribed laws for himself? |
| 17147 | And what means shall one have thereafter of demonstrating the falsity, and even the absurdity, of any opinion? |
| 17147 | And what shall be said of his justice? |
| 17147 | Are salts, metals, plants, animals and a thousand other animate or inanimate bodies aware how that which they do is done, and need they be aware? |
| 17147 | Are they any less enslaved by sensual pleasure, by ambition, by avarice? |
| 17147 | Be it so, but does it follow that there is as much reality and force in each of the two? |
| 17147 | But I ask you, what else is the permission of him who is entitled to forbid, or rather who has the thing in his own hands, but an act of will?'' |
| 17147 | But are they? |
| 17147 | But can they any better conceive how the power of God is capable of stirring a straw?'' |
| 17147 | But could God himself( it will be said) then change nothing in the world? |
| 17147 | But does physical good lie solely in pleasure? |
| 17147 | But how is it possible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideas before the operation of God''s will? |
| 17147 | But if I am free to give these six degrees of goodness to the object, am I not permitted to give it more goodness? |
| 17147 | But if so, why does Leibniz keep saying that the harmony is_ pre- established_, by special and infinitely elaborate divine decrees? |
| 17147 | But if that is so, why shall we not give to the object all the goodness conceivable? |
| 17147 | But in so applying the scheme of choice to God''s act, have we not invalidated its application to our own? |
| 17147 | But in this case, would it be proper for God to grant it to all, that is, always to act miraculously in respect of all rational creatures? |
| 17147 | But is it not better, notwithstanding, that health should be usual and sickness the exception? |
| 17147 | But of what is the environment of each made up? |
| 17147 | But should he? |
| 17147 | But someone will say to me: why speak you to us of''permitting''? |
| 17147 | But someone will say, why did not God refrain from producing things, rather than make imperfect things? |
| 17147 | But then again, how can we take it seriously? |
| 17147 | But this objection is exactly as if I were to ask why a father of a family does not give himself gold when he has need thereof? |
| 17147 | But what sort of a theology? |
| 17147 | But what then will Sextus say? |
| 17147 | But whence came Leibniz''s more strictly metaphysical objections? |
| 17147 | But whence comes this new election? |
| 17147 | But who does not see that that only proves a hypothetical impossibility? |
| 17147 | But( M. Bayle will say) God having power to avert innumerable evils by one small miracle, why did he not employ it? |
| 17147 | Can I not come to be a good king? |
| 17147 | Can he commit so many crimes? |
| 17147 | Can he have so many evil tendencies? |
| 17147 | Can one believe it? |
| 17147 | Can one conclude from this that the State has no anxiety about this irregularity, or even that it desires it? |
| 17147 | Can one form any falser notions of a universal providence? |
| 17147 | Can one, then, leave it or give it to another? |
| 17147 | Can supreme goodness produce an unhappy creature? |
| 17147 | Can they also both exist? |
| 17147 | Can we adapt our scheme of choice to the description of God''s creative decrees? |
| 17147 | Certe Deus ipse numquid quia peccare non potest, ideo liberum arbitrium habere negandus est?'' |
| 17147 | Choice between what? |
| 17147 | Could I have resisted his will? |
| 17147 | Could Sextus reply: It is you who are the cause, O Apollo; you compel me to do it, by foreseeing it? |
| 17147 | Could he not have established others of a kind not subject to any defects? |
| 17147 | Could not the Christian princes sink their differences and unite against the infidel? |
| 17147 | Do men relish health enough, or thank God enough for it, without having ever been sick? |
| 17147 | Do not the Thomists say, that there are as many species as individuals in angelic nature?'' |
| 17147 | Do we not see that all these advantages or disadvantages spring from the idea of the thing, and that the contrary would imply contradiction? |
| 17147 | Do we say then that these things are not because the common herd does not know of them? |
| 17147 | Do you consider such a faculty, sir, to be the richest present God can have made to man, and the sole instrument of our happiness? |
| 17147 | Does it also come from mere indifference? |
| 17147 | Does our authority over our ideas more often fall short than our authority over our volitions? |
| 17147 | Does the internal and active virtue communicated to the forms of bodies according to M. Leibniz know the train of actions which it is to produce? |
| 17147 | Does the will of God form the ideas which are in his understanding? |
| 17147 | For can I know and can I present infinities to you and compare them together? |
| 17147 | For if the soul is perfectly indifferent in its choice how is it possible to foresee this choice? |
| 17147 | For what foundation can God have for seeing what the people of Keilah would do? |
| 17147 | For what other legitimate reason for rejecting an opinion can one find, if an invincible opposing argument is not such an one? |
| 17147 | For what possibility is there of giving these six degrees of goodness to the object? |
| 17147 | For who hath resisted his will? |
| 17147 | For why should the law of justice, which states that reasonable promises must be kept, be more inviolable for him than any other laws? |
| 17147 | Have they less bodily suffering? |
| 17147 | Have they less tendency toward true or apparent goods, less fear of true or imaginary evils? |
| 17147 | He adds fittingly in the same passage:''Qui potest provideri, quicquam futurum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam, neque notam cur futurum sit?'' |
| 17147 | How could he be a true Protestant who treated the differences with the Catholics as non- essentials? |
| 17147 | How could he have touched pitch and taken no defilement? |
| 17147 | How do we know that? |
| 17147 | How does it do that? |
| 17147 | How many of these rudimentary''minds''will there be in my body? |
| 17147 | How many times do men permit evils which they could prevent if they turned all their efforts in that direction? |
| 17147 | How then can it be the vehicle and instrument of my conscious soul? |
| 17147 | How then explain the actual conformity of their mutual representation, without recourse to divine fore- ordaining?'' |
| 17147 | How then shall we overcome the obstinacy of a Stratonist?'' |
| 17147 | How, then, shall we understand that he wills to save all men and that he can not do so? |
| 17147 | I am then not free? |
| 17147 | If it were others, would there not be the same appearance of evil? |
| 17147 | If not, where does it come from? |
| 17147 | If the real universe is what you say it is, why do our minds represent it to us as they do?'' |
| 17147 | If there is a consciousness attached to human bodies, then why not to systems of clockwork? |
| 17147 | If they say so, how can they own that Adam sinned? |
| 17147 | Ignorance, error and malice follow one another naturally in animals made as we are: should this species, then, have been missing in the universe? |
| 17147 | Is a bee no more essentially one than a swarm is? |
| 17147 | Is it also something arbitrary, and would he have acted wisely and justly if he had resolved to condemn the innocent? |
| 17147 | Is it not God that doeth the evil and that willeth it? |
| 17147 | Is it not rather an obstacle to our felicity? |
| 17147 | Is it possible, said M. Bayle, that there is no better plan than that one which God carried out? |
| 17147 | Is it to be desired that God should not be bound to be perfect and happy? |
| 17147 | Is it without remainder transubstantiated from sheep into dog? |
| 17147 | Is it? |
| 17147 | Is not Leibniz the victim of a familiar fallacy, that of incompletely stated alternatives? |
| 17147 | Is not that recognizing that goodness is the object and the reason of his choice? |
| 17147 | Is not that true? |
| 17147 | Is not this much more incomprehensible than the navigation I spoke of in the foregoing paragraph? |
| 17147 | Is our condition, which renders us liable to fail, worth envying? |
| 17147 | Is the life of a living animal indistinguishable from the rhythm of a going watch, except in degree of complication and subtlety of contrivance? |
| 17147 | Is the wholeness of a living thing the mere resultant of the orderly operations of its parts? |
| 17147 | It is not in my power to follow virtue? |
| 17147 | It is with regard to them that M. Bayle discusses this question: whether there is more physical evil than physical good in the world? |
| 17147 | LAUR.--What would you have me do? |
| 17147 | LAUR.--You innocent? |
| 17147 | May they not be sufficiently acute to disturb the sage''s tranquillity? |
| 17147 | Must God spoil his system, must there be less beauty, perfection and reason in the universe, because there are people who misuse reason? |
| 17147 | Must a drop of oil or of fat understand geometry in order to become round on the surface of water? |
| 17147 | Next the question is asked: Will God create such and such a thing, and wherefore? |
| 17147 | On the example of the dog:(_ a_) How should it of itself change its sentiment, since everything left to itself continues in the state in which it is? |
| 17147 | On the problem, how can the simple act otherwise than uniformly? |
| 17147 | Or is it to be identified with the activity and fortunes of a single atomic constituent of my body, a single cog in the animal clockwork? |
| 17147 | Or rather, would not these others be those known as We? |
| 17147 | Out of the consideration of an infinity of ideas, how can God arrive at a choice? |
| 17147 | Prudentius in his_ Hamartigenia_ presented the same difficulty:_ Si non vult Deus esse malum, cur non vetat? |
| 17147 | SEXTUS-- Why must I renounce the hope of a crown? |
| 17147 | Shall God not give the rain, because there are low- lying places which will be thereby incommoded? |
| 17147 | Shall not supreme power, united to an infinite goodness, shower blessings upon its work, and shall it not banish all that might offend or grieve?'' |
| 17147 | Shall the sun not shine as much as it should for the world in general, because there are places which will be too much dried up in consequence? |
| 17147 | Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?'' |
| 17147 | Should we not find it more imperfect and more unhappy than if it had not this freedom of indifference? |
| 17147 | Someone will say: so much the worse for them; if they know not how to enjoy the advantages of nature and fortune, is that the fault of either? |
| 17147 | That we are conscious of it, I say, in such a way that we should for ever remain ignorant of the cause of our being if other knowledge did not aid us? |
| 17147 | The first question will be: Will God create something or not, and wherefore? |
| 17147 | The question is asked first of all, whence does evil come? |
| 17147 | The wise mind wills only the good: is it then a servitude when the will acts in accordance with wisdom? |
| 17147 | The young man will complain: I have brought you a royal gift, O Apollo, and you proclaim for me a lot so unhappy? |
| 17147 | Then is my soul homeless? |
| 17147 | Thus why should not one say, equally, that the Mysteries are against our feeble reason, and that they are above our feeble reason?'' |
| 17147 | To give to a hundred messengers as much money as is needed for a journey of two hundred leagues? |
| 17147 | To imprison actually ninety- eight of these messengers on the moment of their return? |
| 17147 | Very well; but does this consideration really drive us into theology? |
| 17147 | Well, what constitutes the officer an officer? |
| 17147 | What conclusions have been reached? |
| 17147 | What happens to the mutton? |
| 17147 | What is to choose? |
| 17147 | What material does the finite mind supply for an analogical picture of the infinite mind making choices or decrees? |
| 17147 | What necessity is there for one always to be aware how that which is done is done? |
| 17147 | What then constitutes its superiority or dominance, and makes it a mind_ par excellence_? |
| 17147 | What was Leibniz thinking of when the new principle flashed upon him? |
| 17147 | What was he_ not_ thinking of? |
| 17147 | What will become of the consideration of our globe and its inhabitants? |
| 17147 | What would an intelligent creature do if there were no unintelligent things? |
| 17147 | What would it think of, if there were neither movement, nor matter, nor sense? |
| 17147 | What, then, is the relation of the assimilated materials to the dog- form which assimilates them? |
| 17147 | What, then, shall we say of bodily sufferings? |
| 17147 | What, then, was to be done? |
| 17147 | What? |
| 17147 | Whence comes this distinction, someone will say, and wherefore does his goodness appear to be restricted? |
| 17147 | Where had he learned that standard of metaphysical adequacy which showed up the inadequacy of the new metaphysicians? |
| 17147 | Where is, then, his justice[ 60]( people will say), or at the least, where is his goodness? |
| 17147 | Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?'' |
| 17147 | Who knows what the ultimate constituents really are? |
| 17147 | Who shall then say, wherefore hast thou done so?'' |
| 17147 | Why does he not act without general laws, in accordance with all his power and all his goodness? |
| 17147 | Why has God established laws that give rise to so many difficulties? |
| 17147 | Why have you condemned me, O great God, to be wicked and unhappy? |
| 17147 | Why not allow that there is two- way traffic-- by one relation the mind represents the members, by another the members represent the mind? |
| 17147 | Why not reverse the relation, and make the members represent the mind as the mind represents the members? |
| 17147 | Why not? |
| 17147 | Why shall we not even go as far as twenty- four carats of goodness? |
| 17147 | Why should he not, then, just as well be the evil principle of the Manichaeans as the single good principle of the orthodox? |
| 17147 | Why should not a form of conscious life so interact with what would otherwise be dead matter as to''indwell''it? |
| 17147 | Why should not one go as far as he? |
| 17147 | Why should not we take this seriously? |
| 17147 | Why then does he punish me? |
| 17147 | Why then should one boast of a good action, or why should one be censured for an evil one, if the thanks or blame redounds to fortune or hazard? |
| 17147 | Why, then, do men not give themselves this indifference( he says), if they are masters in their own house? |
| 17147 | Will he not break forth into complaints against the Gods? |
| 17147 | Will he not say? |
| 17147 | Will it never disturb the correspondence of those changes with the changes of the soul? |
| 17147 | Will it not be something incomparably less than a physical point, since our earth is as a point in comparison with the distance of some fixed stars? |
| 17147 | Will there not have been necessity and fatality for Adam to sin? |
| 17147 | Will you be doubtful whether the will of the latter is less complete than the will of the former? |
| 17147 | With what regrets would one not be torn, in that case, if the determination made had an ill result? |
| 17147 | Would Nature then have been less perfect, less wise, less powerful?'' |
| 17147 | Would it be possible that vice alone had offered him this means? |
| 17147 | Yet could he have been unaware that there is no possibility of an insuperable objection against truth? |
| 17147 | _ Dextrum Scylla latus, laevum implacata Charybdis__ Obsidet._ Everything comes back in the end to this: Did Adam sin freely? |
| 17147 | _ Si Deus est, unde malum? |
| 17147 | and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?'' |
| 17147 | and what sufficient reason will one be able to find for the knowledge of a[440] thing, if there is no reason for its existence? |
| 17147 | less apprehensive? |
| 17147 | less envious? |
| 17147 | that in a plane six equal circles may touch a seventh? |
| 17147 | that of all equal bodies, the sphere has the least surface? |
| 17147 | that some are more fitted than others for forming battalions, composing polygons and other regular figures? |
| 17147 | that the number six has the advantage of being the least of all the numbers that are called perfect? |
| 17147 | that[ 429] certain lines are incommensurable, and consequently ill- adapted for harmony? |
| 17147 | the God will say, do you mean then that I am a liar? |
| 17147 | v. 4:''What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? |
| 17147 | why ants are not peacocks? |
| 17147 | why has it not four? |
| 17147 | why should not two have sufficed for it? |
| 43466 | ''A live mouse? 43466 ''Have you many mice?'' |
| 43466 | But does not the free will come in when I decide whether to do good or bad things? |
| 43466 | But,the penal moralist will demand,"if you propose to abolish blame and punishment, what do you propose to put in their place?" |
| 43466 | Do you mean to say that tramp could not help doing that? 43466 Do you understand it? |
| 43466 | I know--how do I know anything? |
| 43466 | What? 43466 A Mrs. Manningdying game"--alas, is not that the foiled potentiality of a kind of heroine too? |
| 43466 | A genius is a"sport"; and the question we are to answer here is: How does heredity account for genius? |
| 43466 | All his family for a hundred generations back certified as having united"the manners of a marquis and the morals of a Methodist"? |
| 43466 | And God is"The First Great Cause,"and how then can God justly punish any of His creatures for being as He created them? |
| 43466 | And how can we expect the badly bred, badly trained, badly taught degenerate to succeed like the well- bred, well- trained, and well- taught hero? |
| 43466 | And how can we say of John Smith that he is"good"or"bad"? |
| 43466 | And how should they know, when their teachers in the church do not know? |
| 43466 | And if a child gets bad training, how can free will save it? |
| 43466 | And if he only bears prickles or poison, who is to blame? |
| 43466 | And if men are"persuaded"to try, and succeed, to whom is the victory due? |
| 43466 | And is it not clear that they are held to be good because they are felt to be unselfish? |
| 43466 | And now what do we mean by the words"good"and"bad,""moral"and"immoral"? |
| 43466 | And we? |
| 43466 | And what is that persuasion, but a part of their environment? |
| 43466 | And what is this charge of audacity which Dr. Aked brings against me for denying sin? |
| 43466 | And what makes one man a sportsman and another a humanitarian? |
| 43466 | And what pleasures have these people: what culture and beauty in their lives? |
| 43466 | And when the doctrine of hell- fire was first assailed, what did the Dr. Akeds of the time declare? |
| 43466 | And which is the better, to go back for a dozen generations blaming parents, or to begin now and teach and save the children? |
| 43466 | And who in a game of whist would blame his partner for holding no trumps in his hand? |
| 43466 | And why did he want to be safe? |
| 43466 | And would he have been to blame? |
| 43466 | And, when the change came, what was it that brought that change about? |
| 43466 | Are facts true? |
| 43466 | Are the wise men of all ages agreed that the possession of great wealth is a good environment? |
| 43466 | Are we never to deviate from the beliefs of our forefathers, be the evidence against those beliefs never so strong? |
| 43466 | Are you men? |
| 43466 | As for the children-- why do not their parents take care of them? |
| 43466 | As we do not blame a man for being born with red or black hair, why should we blame him for being born with strong passions or base desires? |
| 43466 | Because it can not Why does a French peasant never speak English? |
| 43466 | But are we to suppose that the first speech would discourage a boy who wanted to be a painter? |
| 43466 | But did he? |
| 43466 | But do we take any the less trouble to fight against diphtheria? |
| 43466 | But he would have a conscience? |
| 43466 | But is it any use? |
| 43466 | But to drive our fellow- creatures into disgrace and crime beyond redemption, and then to hate them or to hang them; is that just? |
| 43466 | But what causes him to wish? |
| 43466 | But what had free will to do with it? |
| 43466 | But what of Dick, the healthy baby? |
| 43466 | But what of the other victims of heredity: the criminal, or immoral"degenerate"? |
| 43466 | But what of the variation amongst brothers and sisters? |
| 43466 | But what settles the choice? |
| 43466 | But who did say anything so silly? |
| 43466 | But, it may be asked, how do you account for a man doing the thing he does not wish to do? |
| 43466 | But, my Christian friends, how do you find your system work? |
| 43466 | But, someone asks,"where was his pride; where was his sense of duty; where was his manhood?" |
| 43466 | CHAPTER FOUR-- THE BEGINNINGS OF MORALS WHAT do we mean by the words"sin"and"vice,"and"crime"? |
| 43466 | CHAPTER SIX-- ENVIRONMENT WHAT is environment? |
| 43466 | CHAPTER THIRTEEN-- THE FAILURE OF PUNISHMENT DOES it do a man any good to hang him? |
| 43466 | CHAPTER THREE-- WHERE DO OUR NATURES COME FROM? |
| 43466 | CHAPTER TWELVE-- GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY? |
| 43466 | Can He not give man the power to create actions as God creates stars? |
| 43466 | Can He, in short, create a kind of little God-- an"imago Dei?" |
| 43466 | Can he bear wheat or roses? |
| 43466 | Can not I please myself whether I drink or refrain from drinking?" |
| 43466 | Can not a man be honest if he choose?" |
| 43466 | Can social systems sin against man?" |
| 43466 | Can we blame it for having no purple nor white beads in its composition? |
| 43466 | Can we blame this"child"bottle for being made up of red, blue, black, and yellow? |
| 43466 | Deprive virtue of its"dare nots,"and how many"would nots"and"should nots"might survive? |
| 43466 | Did he ever do any work? |
| 43466 | Did he make no dangerous friendships? |
| 43466 | Did he read no bad books? |
| 43466 | Did his father watch over him, or let him run wild? |
| 43466 | Did his mother nurse him, or neglect him? |
| 43466 | Do I speak truth, or falsehood? |
| 43466 | Do we blame"the vegetable bacillus"? |
| 43466 | Do you know Thomas Carlyle''s burning words concerning these tragic fates? |
| 43466 | Do you mean to say I can not be good if I try?" |
| 43466 | Do you mean to say he is not to be punished?" |
| 43466 | Do you mean to say he is not to blame? |
| 43466 | Does John deserve censure, and do his brothers deserve praise? |
| 43466 | Does it do us any good to hang him? |
| 43466 | Does it ever set him wheeling clay up a plank? |
| 43466 | Does it tend to the moral elevation of a man to be like the"Chough"in Shakespeare,"spacious in the possession of dirt"? |
| 43466 | Does not common experience support the charge? |
| 43466 | Does not that show free will?" |
| 43466 | Dr. Lydston, in_ The Diseases of Society_, says: The prospective criminal once born, what does society do to prevent his becoming a criminal? |
| 43466 | GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY? |
| 43466 | Gentlemen of the jury, is it nothing to you? |
| 43466 | Has it not been often so? |
| 43466 | Has it not been often so? |
| 43466 | Has society not injured him? |
| 43466 | Have law and morality not injured him? |
| 43466 | He can give His force; can He give a little of his sovereignty? |
| 43466 | Here is a rough sketch of the women in the East End slums: WOMEN IN THE METROPOLIS OF THE WORLD"Have you any reverence for womanhood? |
| 43466 | Here is one reply given by an angry witness: Do you think it womanly work to push with a twenty- foot pole a boat laden with 30 tons of coal? |
| 43466 | Hitherto all the love, all the honours, all the applause of this? |
| 43466 | How Does Heredity Make Genius? |
| 43466 | How can God blame man for the effects of which God is the cause? |
| 43466 | How could there be white or purple beads in this bottle, when there were no white nor purple beads in the bottles from which it was filled? |
| 43466 | How do cattle- breeders improve their stock? |
| 43466 | How does he know that whisky is dangerous? |
| 43466 | How is he to"overcome his environment and become good"? |
| 43466 | How is it mediocrity does sometimes beget genius? |
| 43466 | How is it that genius does not always beget genius? |
| 43466 | How is it that genius does not always beget genius? |
| 43466 | How is it that mediocrity breeds genius? |
| 43466 | How many men have been hanged or sent to prison who ought to have been sent to lunatic asylums? |
| 43466 | How was it that his will to fish changed to his will not to fish? |
| 43466 | How was it that same manhood now served to raise him above the environment? |
| 43466 | How was that theory met by the Dr. Akeds of the time? |
| 43466 | How will he decide? |
| 43466 | How, then, came he to reform his life, and to write his wonderful book? |
| 43466 | How, then, can God justly blame man for the acts that reason or power"creates"? |
| 43466 | How, then, can he be blamed if his ancestors give to him a bad heredity, or if his fellow- creatures give to him a bad environment? |
| 43466 | How, then, can it be just to blame him for being that which he_ must_ be? |
| 43466 | How, then, can we believe that free will is outside and superior to heredity and environment? |
| 43466 | How, then, can we believe that man is to blame for being that which he is? |
| 43466 | How, then, shall knowledge increase or progress be possible? |
| 43466 | I appeal to your justice, to your pity--( A voice: How much pity had he for the child?) |
| 43466 | If God can do all things, can He not make man free? |
| 43466 | If environment can not permanently improve the breed, is that any reason for making the worst, instead of the best, of the breed we now possess? |
| 43466 | If the will is free, how can we be sure, before a test arises, how the will must act? |
| 43466 | If you sow hate can you reap love? |
| 43466 | If you sow tares, can you reap wheat? |
| 43466 | If you sow wrong can you reap right? |
| 43466 | If you teach and practise knavery, can you ask for purity and virtue? |
| 43466 | In how many cases are the poor features battered, and the poor skins bruised? |
| 43466 | Is Dulcett''s fine musical ear due to any merit of Dulcett''s? |
| 43466 | Is Mr. Chesterton in a position to inform us that his bold bad peer is not a degenerate? |
| 43466 | Is Mr. Chesterton sure that he has not inherited a degenerate nature from diseased or vicious ancestors? |
| 43466 | Is any human being in the wide world edified or bettered when a man is hanged? |
| 43466 | Is it Jarman''s fault that he has no gift? |
| 43466 | Is it any answer to tell me that I am presumptuous in opposing the beliefs of great men past and present? |
| 43466 | Is it any wonder that such men, to repeat Mr. Chesterton''s poetical simile,"put forth sins like scarlet flowers in summer"? |
| 43466 | Is it any_ use_ hanging men? |
| 43466 | Is it because he would like another cigarette, but would not like another glass of whisky? |
| 43466 | Is it necessary for me to answer the charge of presumption brought against me by Dr. Aked? |
| 43466 | Is it not better to teach and to train each generation well, than to teach and train them ill? |
| 43466 | Is it not clear that these acts are approved and held good? |
| 43466 | Is it not due to the"persuasion"? |
| 43466 | Is it not evident that you must have some good in you if you wish to try? |
| 43466 | Is it not so, men and women? |
| 43466 | Is it not so? |
| 43466 | Is it not the same with personal as with racial traits? |
| 43466 | Is it reasonable to blame the one for not being like the other? |
| 43466 | Is it strange that some of our descendants should have what Winwood Reade called"tailed minds"? |
| 43466 | Is logic true? |
| 43466 | Is not that so? |
| 43466 | Is not this, to our own knowledge, the kind of thing that happens to us all, in all kinds of self- training, whether it be muscular, mental, or moral? |
| 43466 | Is the bundle of God''s making responsible for the failure of the power God made and sent to manage it? |
| 43466 | Is the skinful of propensities created and put together by God responsible for the proportion of good and evil powers it comprises? |
| 43466 | Is there a man in court can deny one statement I have made? |
| 43466 | Is there a man in court can impeach my reasoning, or disprove my facts? |
| 43466 | Is there any proof that Handel''s mother had not a good musical ear? |
| 43466 | Is there any proof that she had not, lying dormant, some special gift for music, inherited from some ancestor? |
| 43466 | Is there any quality of body or of mind that has not been_ inevitably_ evolved in man by the working of God''s laws? |
| 43466 | Is there anything illogical in that? |
| 43466 | Is there no sympathy with this unhappy victim of atavism, or of society? |
| 43466 | It is a pretty picture, is it not? |
| 43466 | It is the soul, then, that is responsible, is it? |
| 43466 | Men and women, is it not true? |
| 43466 | Men and women, is it not true? |
| 43466 | Mr. Blatchford, being anxious to fight against the doctrine of sin, builds a fatalist rampart, looks over the top, and says:"Can man sin against God? |
| 43466 | NOW, WHAT DO WE MEAN BY"HEREDITY"? |
| 43466 | No consumption? |
| 43466 | No diseases contracted through immorality or vice? |
| 43466 | No drunkenness? |
| 43466 | No gout? |
| 43466 | No insanity in the family? |
| 43466 | Now, how does the man decide whether or not he shall fire? |
| 43466 | Now, what does all this show? |
| 43466 | O, what say we, Cholera Doctors? |
| 43466 | Of how many towns and villages in Europe and America might the same be said? |
| 43466 | Of how many women are these terrible descriptions true? |
| 43466 | On what does his decision depend? |
| 43466 | Or do they not rather teach that luxury and wealth are dangerous to their possessor? |
| 43466 | Or how can it be blamed for being bad? |
| 43466 | Or should we take the sailor''s success as a matter of course, and give our pity to the landsman? |
| 43466 | Ought we to be surprised that the continual struggle for the mastery amongst so many alien natures leads to unlooked- for and unwished- for results? |
| 43466 | Practically nothing.... What is the remedy at present in vogue? |
| 43466 | Presumptuous to deny what great men in the past believed? |
| 43466 | Prove it? |
| 43466 | Shall we blame a mongrel born of curs of low degree''because he is not a bulldog? |
| 43466 | Should we blame a bramble for yielding no strawberries, or a privet bush for bearing no chrysanthemums? |
| 43466 | Should we blame a rose tree for running wild in a jungle, or for languishing in the shadow of great elms? |
| 43466 | THE BEGINNINGS OF MORALS In the Buddhist"Kathâ Sarit Sâgara"it is written:"Why should we cling to this perishable body? |
| 43466 | TO WHAT DOES ALL THIS EVIDENCE TEND? |
| 43466 | Take the case of a council, a cabinet, a regiment, composed of antagonistic natures; what happens? |
| 43466 | Talk about the trouble of bringing up children: what is that to the trouble of educating one''s ancestors? |
| 43466 | The kleptomaniac may be the most troublesome to the community; but is he more wicked than the others? |
| 43466 | Then how is it his brothers do not drink? |
| 43466 | There remains unaccounted for-- what? |
| 43466 | They have no taste for anything higher? |
| 43466 | This being so-- and we all know that it is so-- what becomes of the sovereignty of the will? |
| 43466 | This:"Were they ever so anxious to''improve their minds,''what leisure have they, what opportunity? |
| 43466 | To loathe and punish the victims of society, and never lift a hand against the wrongs that are their ruin, is that reasonable? |
| 43466 | To what extent was he free? |
| 43466 | WHAT HAD FREE WILL TO DO WITH IT? |
| 43466 | WHERE DID MORALS COME FROM? |
| 43466 | WHERE DO OUR NATURES COME FROM? |
| 43466 | Was Lady Macbeth free to choose? |
| 43466 | Was Macbeth free to choose? |
| 43466 | We can tame wild beasts, and why not wild men? |
| 43466 | We have hundreds of religions in the world; but how many teachers of true morality? |
| 43466 | We walk round behind him and say:"Can man sin against man? |
| 43466 | Well, my friends, how do we feel about a shark? |
| 43466 | Were his companions all men and women of virtue and good sense? |
| 43466 | What are the qualities that go to the making of a great composer? |
| 43466 | What are"morals"? |
| 43466 | What causes me to try? |
| 43466 | What causes the fluctuations? |
| 43466 | What causes these two free wills to will so differently? |
| 43466 | What do these gibes mean? |
| 43466 | What follows? |
| 43466 | What for?'' |
| 43466 | What goes on in his mind? |
| 43466 | What had changed the free will of Hicks from a will to work to a will to loaf? |
| 43466 | What has changed this man''s free will to work into a free will to avoid work? |
| 43466 | What is conscience? |
| 43466 | What is his defence? |
| 43466 | What is it most men strive for? |
| 43466 | What is it tells him he did wrong? |
| 43466 | What is it? |
| 43466 | What is reflex action? |
| 43466 | What is the cause of crime? |
| 43466 | What is the cause of ignorance? |
| 43466 | What is the cause of poverty? |
| 43466 | What is the common assay for moral gold? |
| 43466 | What is the lesson of Buddha, and of the Indian, Persian, and Greek moralists? |
| 43466 | What is there in that paragraph that is inconsistent with my belief? |
| 43466 | What is this"mysterious"double- self? |
| 43466 | What is"psychic atavism"? |
| 43466 | What kind of environment, what land of stamina can they give their children? |
| 43466 | What kind of reasoning can we expect from men who have been taught that it is wicked to think? |
| 43466 | What knowledge? |
| 43466 | What made one do what the other refused to do? |
| 43466 | What makes me wish? |
| 43466 | What manner of man would he have been? |
| 43466 | What says the man in the street? |
| 43466 | What were his parents like? |
| 43466 | What would they do, these women, were it not for the Devil''s usury of peace-- the gin? |
| 43466 | Whence did he derive that defect of ear? |
| 43466 | Whence, then, did Handel get his musical genius? |
| 43466 | Where was the"still small voice,"the"divine guide to right conduct"? |
| 43466 | Which is the more rational? |
| 43466 | Which of us can assess his debt to such men as Shakespeare, Dante, Shelley, Dickens, and Carlyle? |
| 43466 | Which of us does not admire and honour an innocent, graceful, and charming girl? |
| 43466 | Which of you has spoken a word or lifted a hand to prevent this wholesale wrong? |
| 43466 | Who amongst us has not fought with wild beasts-- not at Ephesus, but in his own heart? |
| 43466 | Who amongst us is so pure and exalted that he has never been conscious of the bestial taint? |
| 43466 | Who is answerable for a thing that is caused: he who causes it, or he who does not cause it? |
| 43466 | Who shall be punished for the crimes of the law and of society against him? |
| 43466 | Who would be readier to stab a rival, an English curate, or a Spanish smuggler? |
| 43466 | Who would more willingly return a blow, an Irish soldier, or an English Quaker? |
| 43466 | Who, then, is responsible for good and evil? |
| 43466 | Why did he work? |
| 43466 | Why does Dulcett play the violin so well? |
| 43466 | Why does Jarman play the violin so evilly? |
| 43466 | Why does an apple tree never bear bananas? |
| 43466 | Why does he succeed? |
| 43466 | Why does not Jones the engineer write poetry? |
| 43466 | Why does not Robinson the musical composer invent a flying machine? |
| 43466 | Why does not Smith of the Stock Exchange paint pictures? |
| 43466 | Why has conscience thus changed its tone with me? |
| 43466 | Why is John a drunkard? |
| 43466 | Why is an English labourer deficient in the manners of polite society? |
| 43466 | Why not? |
| 43466 | Why? |
| 43466 | Why? |
| 43466 | Why? |
| 43466 | Why? |
| 43466 | Why? |
| 43466 | Will He punish or reward us, then, for the acts of His agents: the agents He made and controlled? |
| 43466 | Will any man on the jury say me nay? |
| 43466 | Would he grow up with the ideas of to- day, or with the ideas of those who taught and trained him? |
| 43466 | Would it have been his fault that he had never heard good counsel, but had been drilled and trained to evil? |
| 43466 | Would it have been his fault that he was born amongst thieves? |
| 43466 | Would not the effects be very different? |
| 43466 | Would proper teaching have made a Jarman a proper player? |
| 43466 | Would such books, so read, make no impression upon his impressionable mind? |
| 43466 | Would that affect him naught? |
| 43466 | Would the fierce religious atmosphere of Cromwellian camps have no effect upon his sensitive and imaginative nature? |
| 43466 | You are not going to tell me that I am answerable or blame- able for the nature of matter and force, nor for the operations of God''s laws, are you? |
| 43466 | You who are so anxious to punish crime, what are you doing to prevent it? |
| 43466 | _ But what causes him to choose?_ That is the pivot upon which the whole discussion turns. |
| 43466 | _ Quite_ sure that his failure was not due to bad environment instead of to bad heredity? |
| 43466 | _ Quite_ sure the noble was_ not_ a degenerate? |
| 43466 | _ Why?_ Because it is_ poison_. |
| 43466 | and the tramp, and the harlot, and the sot; how were_ they_ brought up, and had they anything to love? |
| 43466 | do you mean to say-?" |
| 43466 | this suggest the wonderful possibilities of variation and atavism? |