Questions

This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.

identifier	question
36434	_ Cloth boards_ 2 6 Unsettled for Life; Or, What shall I be?
16055	( To whom will my sad song go, and in whose ears will its accents sound?)
16055	14, l. 83): Was this the face that launched a thousand ships And burnt the topless towers of Ilium?
16055	DIAMOND That diamond upon your finger, say, How came it yours?
16055	PEARLS Why, sir, what''cerns it you if I wear pearl and gold?
16055	PEARLS Will you have me, or your pearl again?
16055	ROCK- CRYSTAL To what, my love, shall I compare thine eye?
16055	The opening lines of Cervantes are: A quien yra mi doloroso canto O en cuya oreja sonara su acento?
16055	What can we learn from them of Shakespeare''s knowledge of the source, quality, and use of these precious stones?
16715	1826?
16715	2 vols., London, 187?
16715	In his"Reply to Blackwood''s Edinburgh Magazine,"Byron wrote:"What have we got instead[ of following Pope]?
16715	In the seventeenth stanza he changes,"A better rose will never spring Than him I''ve lost on Yarrow?"
16715	In the sixth stanza Scott changes the lines,"O ir ye come to drink the wine As we hae done before, O?"
16715	Paris, 1840?
16715	Scott wrote to Lockhart, May 30, 1826,"What do you about Shakspeare?
16715	Shakspeare[ edited by Scott and Lockhart?
16715	Was it because Scott''s genius clung to Scotland and Lamb''s to London, that the two seemed so little to notice each other?
16715	to"O come ye here to part your land, The bonnie forest thorough?"
37711	Wostow nat wel the olde clerkes sawe, That''who shal yeve a lover any lawe?'' 37711 Allas, fro whennes may this thing procede? 37711 And was it not Arcite''s duty and solemn pledge to help and not hinder him in his love? 37711 Did he not love the beautiful lady first and trust his secret to his cousin and sworn brother? 37711 How are both promises to be fulfilled? 37711 How mightestow for reuthe me bigyle? 37711 I, Nature, Thus can I forme and peynte a creature, Whan that me list; who can me countrefete? 37711 Is ther no grace, and shall I thus be spilt? 37711 Shal thus Criseyde awey, for that thou wilt? 37711 The question is simply, can the moon move from the 2nd degree of Taurus to the 1st of Cancer( through 59 degrees) in four days? 37711 What have I doon, what have I thus a- gilt? 37711 how maystow in thyn herte finde To been to me thus cruel and unkinde? 37711 what mayst thou seyn, That in the paleys of thy disturbaunce Art left behinde, in peril to be sleyn? 40841 ''And are etceteras nothing?'' 40841 ''Come we to full points here?'' 40841 Again, would Costard have so gratuitously used a typographical idea, had not the Poet''s mind been teeming with them? 40841 But where could Shakspere have picked up the word if not in the Printing- office? 40841 But why bring in the name of Richard Field? 40841 Does he call this to mind in Sonnet XVII? 40841 Might not the above works have been the mine from which he obtained his knowledge? 40841 Or what strong hand can hold Time''s swift foot back? 40841 Or who his spoil of beauty can forbid? 40841 Then, again, to a Printer''s widow, not over young, what more telling than the following reference? 40841 They were frequently libellous and grievously personal, and hence the point of Pistol''s remark: Fear we broadsides? 40841 Where did Shakspere learn his Italian, which, although then a court language, he quotes but rarely, and in an awkward manner? 40841 Wherefore stand you on nice points? 40841 _ Tit._ Lucius, what book is that she tosseth so? 40841 and are etceteras nothing? 63022 And now-- where is Hilda? 63022 And what sort of a house did Hilda live in? 63022 And what would Mr. Galsworthy see? 63022 And who are the judges of reality? 63022 But how was I to transmit it to you? 63022 But now with your Mrs. Brown-- how are we to believe in her? 63022 But, I ask myself, what is reality? 63022 Can we doubt that the walls of Doulton''s factory would take his fancy? 63022 Do you ask for more solemn instances of the power of the human race to change? 63022 Does not Mr. Bennett write novels himself? 63022 George will be there on Tuesday?
63022	How can she be alive?
63022	I asked them-- they are my elders and betters-- How shall I begin to describe this woman''s character?
63022	I presume to invent Mr. Bennett?
63022	It''ll be all right?
63022	What can Mr. Bennett be about?
63022	What was it composed of-- that overwhelming and peculiar impression?
63022	Why, then, is it so hard for novelists at present to create characters which seem real, not only to Mr. Bennett, but to the world at large?
63022	Why, when October comes round, do the publishers always fail to supply us with a masterpiece?
28434	( 2) What they are?
28434	( 3) What they are like?
28434	( 4) Why they are?
28434	Admiral Smyth says that this noble passage is more correctly rendered as follows: Canst thou bind the delightful teemings of Cheemah?
28434	Are the two lesser stars consumed after the manner of the solar spots?
28434	But wherefore all night long shine these?
28434	Canst thou bring forth Mazzaroth in his season?
28434	Canst thou draw forth Mazzaroth in his season Or Ayeesh and his sons canst thou guide?
28434	For what God, after better, worse would build?
28434	For what purpose do those thousands of clustering orbs shine?
28434	Has Saturn, perhaps, devoured his own children?
28434	Have they vanished and suddenly fled?
28434	He then asks the following questions, and replies to them himself:( 1) Whether they exist?
28434	Knowest thou the ordinances of heaven?
28434	Or hear''st thou rather, pure Ethereal stream, Whose fountain who shall tell?
28434	Or of the Eternal co- eternal beam, May I express thee unblamed?
28434	Or the contractions of Chesil canst thou open?
28434	Or were the appearances, indeed, illusion or fraud, with which the glasses have so long deceived me, as well as many others to whom I have shown them?
28434	Shall we adventure into these deeper retirements?
28434	What then was to be done?
28434	Who can tell?
28434	canst thou set the dominion thereof in the earth?
28434	or canst thou guide Arcturus with his sons?
35721	Who is this King Lear?
35721	You wander about with a book in your hands; are you making plans?
35721	+ Dr Arne''s+ version of"Who is Sylvia?"
35721	+ Schubert''s+ setting of"Come, thou monarch of the vine"is not so successful as his"Who is Sylvia?"
35721	3, is headed with these words from_ Macbeth_:"When shall we three meet again?"
35721	After a little dialogue comes Autolycus''s last song,"Will you buy any tape?"
35721	After four bars of slow music the theme of Ophelia''s song in_ Hamlet_,"How shall I my true love know?
35721	But if there is no song like"Sigh no more, ladies,"or"Who is Sylvia?
35721	But the best setting of"Who is Sylvia?"
35721	But why call it the"Overture to_ The Comedy of Errors_"?
35721	Could he not improve on Auber''s music and produce an opera in which the action should be equally swift?
35721	For some strange reason,"Who is Sylvia?"
35721	Here a great stirring is made in the orchestra, and a cry( violin solo) is heard:--_ Macbeth_: Wherefore was that cry?
35721	In any decent production the song must be given to Feste, but how often is it?
35721	It was produced in 1885, and the_ motto_ is from_ The Tempest_, Act iii., Scene 3:"What harmony is this?
35721	So why should not Ambroise Thomas have put a ballet in_ Hamlet_?
35721	The best chorus is"Who can resist such mighty charms?
35721	The music for the appearance of Fairies is by Purcell, to words by Dryden,"Where does the black fiend ambition reside?
35721	The next number is a quintet with words from_ The Two Gentlemen{ 154} of Verona_--"Who is Sylvia?"
35721	The scene- change music before Ophelia''s first scene is founded on"How shall I my true love know?
35721	The third act is brought to a brilliant finish by Bishop''s famous glee from_ As You Like It_,"What shall he have who killed the deer?"
35721	The words begin,"Art thou afeared?"
35721	This is quickly followed by a label, Act ii., Scene 3, Sir Toby,"Shall we rouse the night owl in a catch?"
35721	What more can one desire?
35721	Why, in the name of all things musical-- why?"
35721	_ Much Ado About Nothing_ one"spots"at once under the title_ Beaucoup de Bruit pour Rien_, or_ Béatrice et Bénédict_; but why_ Hero_ or_ Ero_?
35721	_ Romeo and Juliet_ is easy to discover under the title_ I Capuletti ed i Montecchi_; but why_ Les Amants de Verone_?
35721	{ 158} THE TWO GENTLEMEN OF VERONA With the exception of the perfect lyric"Who is Sylvia?"
5827	( 2) If so, what is its nature?
5827	( 2) If so, what sort of object can it be?
5827	( 2) If so, what sort of object can it be?
5827	APPEARANCE AND REALITY Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?
5827	And if so, have we any means of finding out what it is like?
5827	Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man?
5827	Assuming that there is physical space, and that it does thus correspond to private spaces, what can we know about it?
5827	But are we to say that nothing is knowledge except what is validly deduced from true premisses?
5827	But if the reality is not what appears, have we any means of knowing whether there is any reality at all?
5827	But the real question is: Do_ any_ number of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it will be fulfilled in the future?
5827	Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms?
5827	Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely,( 1) Is there a real table at all?
5827	How are we to know, in a given case, that our belief is not erroneous?
5827	I exist, and my room exists; but does''in''exist?
5827	If any one asks:''Why should I accept the results of valid arguments based on true premisses?''
5827	If we ask''Where and when does this relation exist?''
5827	If, then, we can not trust what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we see through a microscope?
5827	In other words, can we ever_ know_ anything at all, or do we merely sometimes by good luck believe what is true?
5827	Is this belief a mere blind outcome of past experience, or can it be justified as a reasonable belief?
5827	It will be remembered that we asked two questions; namely,( 1) Is there a real table at all?
5827	The mental act is undoubtedly mental, but is there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehended is in any sense mental?
5827	The question we have to consider in this chapter is: What is the nature of this real table, which persists independently of my perception of it?
5827	The question which Kant put at the beginning of his philosophy, namely''How is pure mathematics possible?''
5827	The question which must next occupy us is this: How is it possible that there should be such knowledge?
5827	There is, however, a preliminary question which is rather less difficult, and that is: What do we_ mean_ by truth and falsehood?
5827	Thus our two questions may be re- stated as follows:( 1) Is there any such thing as matter?
5827	We have experience of past futures, but not of future futures, and the question is: Will future futures resemble past futures?
5827	What reason, then, have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects?
5827	What things are there in the universe whose existence is known to us owing to our being acquainted with them?
5827	Which of these is the''real''table?
5827	Why?
5827	and''What beliefs are false?''
5827	and''What is falsehood?''
5827	not''What beliefs are true?''
16595	& S._ 15) Original(?)
16595	''A what?''
16595	''An excellent woman, that mother of yours, Christopher,''said Mr. Swiveller;''"Who ran to catch me when I fell, and kissed the place to make it well?
16595	''And whose should you say it was?''
16595	''And wot''ud be the good of that?''
16595	''Daisy, you know-- Chigwell Church-- bell- ringer-- little desk on Sundays-- eh, Johnny?''
16595	''Did_ you_ ever hear a tom- tom, sir?''
16595	''Do they often go where glory waits''em?''
16595	''Nor a gum- gum?''
16595	''What should you say this was?''
16595	''What_ is_ a gum- gum?''
16595	''Whose?''
16595	''Wot do you mean?''
16595	And how do ye thrive, And how many bairns hae ye now?
16595	Bishop._ And has she then failed in her truth, The beautiful maid I adore?
16595	Bishop._ If I had a beau, for a soldier who''d go, Do you think I''d say no?
16595	Did they inherit this love from their father?
16595	GO WHERE GLORY WAITS THEE(_ M.C._ 11)(''Do they often go where glory waits''em?''
16595	In the proof Dickens struck out all the words after''when,''and inserted in their place the following:''King Charles the First had his head cut off?''
16595	MASTER HUMPHREY''S CLOCK,''DID YOU HEAR ANYTHING KNOCK?''
16595	O we''re a''noddin, nid nid noddin, O we''re a''noddin at our house at home; How''s o''wi''ye, kimmer?
16595	Richard?''
16595	Shall I never again hear her voice, Nor see her lov''d form any more?
16595	Smallweed?''
16595	The first verse of the song is as follows: If I''d a donkey wot would n''t go, D''ye think I''d wollop him?
16595	The word?
16595	WHAT ARE THE WILD WAVES SAYING?
16595	WHAT ARE THE WILD WAVES SAYING?
16595	WHAT ARE THE WILD WAVES SAYING?
16595	WHO PASSES BY THIS ROAD SO LATE?
16595	What art can wash her guilt away?
16595	What was John Browdie''s north- country song?
16595	What was Little Nell''s repertoire?
16595	When lovely woman stoops to folly, And finds, too late, that men betray, What charm can soothe her melancholy?
16595	Who''ll buy my grey sand?
16595	Will you, will you, will you, will you come to the Bower?
16595	Will you, will you, will you, will you come to the Bower?
16595	Would they never be still?
16595	[ Figure 3] or[ Figure 4] White sand and grey sand: Who''ll buy my white sand?
16595	_ Could_ you give us"British Grenadiers,"my fine fellow?''
16595	you''re singing, are you?''
2529	An egg for breakfast: well, what of it?
2529	( 2) DOES EVERYTHING OBSERVABLE OBEY THE LAWS OF PHYSICS?
2529	( 2) What are we feeling when we say this?
2529	( 2) What is the relation of this present occurrence to the past event which is remembered?
2529	( 3) CAN WE OBSERVE ANYTHING INTRINSICALLY DIFFERENT FROM SENSATIONS?
2529	And even if SOME image does persist, how do we know that it is the previous image unchanged?
2529	And what sort of evidence is logically possible?
2529	Buhler says( p. 303):"We ask ourselves the general question:''WHAT DO WE EXPERIENCE WHEN WE THINK?''
2529	But why should we suppose that there is some one common cause of all these appearances?
2529	Can we constitute memory out of images together with suitable beliefs?
2529	Can we say, conversely, that it consists wholly of such accuracy of response?
2529	Does the image persist in presence of the sensation, so that we can compare the two?
2529	For what is it to imagine a winged horse but to affirm that the horse[ that horse, namely] has wings?
2529	How do I know that there is awareness?
2529	How do we know that the sensation resembles the previous image?
2529	How is it possible to know that a memory- image is an imperfect copy, without having a more accurate copy by which to replace it?
2529	How, then, are we to find any way of comparing the present image and the past sensation?
2529	If we are asked"What is the capital of France?"
2529	If we suppose it effected, what would become of the difference between vital and mechanical movements?
2529	If you ask a boy"What is twice two?"
2529	Is there ultimately no difference, or do images remain as irreducibly and exclusively psychological?
2529	Is"consciousness"ultimate and simple, something to be merely accepted and contemplated?
2529	It is clear that the question turns upon another, namely, which can we know best, the psychology of animals or that of human beings?
2529	It may be said: If there is no single existent which is the source of all these"aspects,"how are they collected together?
2529	Now, what are the occasions when, we actively believe that Charles I was executed?
2529	One of the laws which distinguish psychology( or nerve- physiology?)
2529	Or that insects, in laying eggs, are concerned for the preservation of their species?
2529	Or, to state the same question in other terms: How is psychology to be distinguished from physics?
2529	Our two questions are, in the case of memory:( 1) What is the present occurrence when we remember?
2529	Suppose two children in a school, both of whom are asked"What is six times nine?"
2529	There are two distinct questions to be asked:( 1) What causes us to say that a thing occurs?
2529	What sort of evidence is there?
2529	Who can believe, for example, that a new- born baby is aware of the necessity of food for preserving life?
2529	William James''s view was first set forth in an essay called"Does''consciousness''exist?
4723	And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error?
4723	And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?
4723	Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy?
4723	BUT DO NOT YOU YOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE?
4723	But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction?
4723	But secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be?
4723	But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material SUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities?
4723	But, since one idea can not be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion?
4723	But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter?
4723	Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind?
4723	For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others?
4723	For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?
4723	For, what are the fore- mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense?
4723	If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together?
4723	May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is?
4723	Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken?
4723	What must we think of Moses''rod?
4723	What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies?
4723	What therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars?
4723	What therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion?
4723	Why does not an empty case serve as well as another?
4723	Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner?
4723	and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?
4723	and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception?
4723	and what do we PERCEIVE BESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS?
4723	was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators?
4723	what if I can not assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word?
12890	Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased?
12890	Do you renounce the devils, and all their words and works; Thonar, Wodin, and Saxenote?
12890	_ Lear._ What hast thou been? 12890 ''Sancta Marie,''said he,''Bessie, why makes thow sa great dule and sair greting for ony wardlie thing?'' 12890 Are his words more cheerful than the heathen''s( Homer)? 12890 But at this point arises a further question to demand solution: what shall be hereafter? 12890 But how? 12890 But is it not better that somewhat too much should be written upon such a subject than too little? 12890 Can it be that evil influences have the upper hand in this world? 12890 For the devil most emphatically spoke through the witches; but how could he in any sense be said to speak through Norns? 12890 Hamlet responds to their entreaties not to follow the spectre thus--Why, what should be the fear?
12890	Have Norns chappy fingers, skinny lips, and beards?
12890	How were reasonable men to account for this manifest conflict between rigorous logic and more rigorous fact?
12890	I do not set my life at a pin''s fee; And, for my soul, what can it do to that, Being a thing immortal as itself?"
12890	If evil is supreme here, shall it not be so in that undiscovered country,--that life to come?
12890	In"King Lear,"what man shows any virtue who does not receive punishment for the same?
12890	It is not worth the living; for what power has man against the fiends?
12890	Live you, or are you aught That man may question?
12890	London: T. Harper, 1641(?
12890	May Macbeth, who would fain do right, were not evil so ever present with him, be juggled with and led to destruction by fiends?
12890	May a Hamlet, patiently struggling after truth and duty, be put upon and abused by the darker powers?
12890	May an undistinguishing fate sweep away at once the good with the evil-- Hamlet with Laertes; Desdemona with Iago; Cordelia with Edmund?
12890	Naturally alarmed, he cried out,"''In the name of God, what make I heere?''
12890	The devil would occasionally appear in the likeness of a living person; and how could that be accounted for?
12890	The first again asks,''Where?''
12890	The first begins by asking,''When shall we three meet again?''
12890	The question is, did he retain both, or did he reject one and retain the other?
12890	What are these Powers?
12890	What do the simple people then?
12890	Will it apply with equal force to Norns?
12890	[ 1] Heerewith he began to curse and to banne, saying,''What a poxe do I heare?
12890	[ 2] Live you, or are you ought That man may question?
12890	[ 3]_ Macbeth._ Speak if you can, what are you?
12890	_ What else?_ And shall I couple hell?
12890	_ What else?_ And shall I couple hell?
12890	is his hope more near, his trust more sure, his reading of fate more happy?
12890	is not your husband mad?
12890	that, be a man never so honest, never so pure, he may nevertheless become the sport of blind chance or ruthless wickedness?
34112	''Are those black doors the cells?'' 34112 ''But suppose a man were here for a twelve- month?
34112	''Did you mean to say anything, you young shaver?'' 34112 ''Do they never walk in the yard?''
34112	''Do you hear his worship ask if you''ve anything to say?'' 34112 ''Do you mean to say that in all that time he would never come out at that little iron door for exercise?''
34112	''Has the boy ever been here before?'' 34112 ''Have you anything to ask this witness, boy?''
34112	''Have you anything to say at all?'' 34112 ''Hold your tongue, will you?''
34112	''How long has he been here?'' 34112 ''I beg your pardon,''replied Mr. Pickwick,''what did you say?
34112	''I''m an Englishman, ai n''t I?'' 34112 ''Now then, where are the witnesses?''
34112	''Oh, you know me, do you?'' 34112 ''Possible?''
34112	''Pray, why do they call this place the Tombs?'' 34112 ''Sometimes, I suppose?''
34112	''Well, I do n''t mind that; it''s only a twopence apiece more,''said Mr. Martin;''What do you say now? 34112 ''What is this?''
34112	''What will you take to be paid out?'' 34112 ''When do the prisoners take exercise?''
34112	''When is that?'' 34112 ''When will he be tried?''
34112	''Will you open one of the doors?'' 34112 ''Yes''"''Are they all full?''
34112	''Childbed?''
34112	''Do n''t?''
34112	''Live down there?
34112	''Live down there?''
34112	''Lord, why did n''t you say at first that you was willing to come down handsome?''"
34112	''My friend,''said Mr. Pickwick,''you do n''t really mean to say that human beings live down these wretched dungeons?''
34112	''The regular chummage is two- and- six; will you take three bob?''
34112	''What will you take to go out?''
34112	''Where are my privileges?''
34112	''Where are they?
34112	''Would you like to hear it read?''
34112	As to escaping, what chances were there of escape?
34112	As to fire in the prison, if one were to break out while he lay there?
34112	Fagin, Fagin, are you a man?''
34112	For what offense can that lonely child, of ten or twelve years old, be shut up here?
34112	How did I know it?
34112	If it was not a trick to frighten him, and those were the real hours treading on each other''s heels, where would he be, when they came around again?
34112	It was very dark; why did n''t they bring a light?
34112	Oh, that boy?
34112	Shall we go in?
34112	This is rather hard treatment for a young witness, is it not?
34112	To everybody in succession Captain Hopkins said:''Have you read it?''
34112	To everybody in succession Captain Porter said:''Would you like to hear it read?''
34112	What availed the noise and bustle of cheerful morning, which penetrated even there, to him?
34112	What could he say or write of it that had not been said or written by him already?
34112	What right have they to butcher me?''"
34112	What says our conductor?
34112	What with motions for new trials, arrest of judgment and what not, a prisoner might be here for twelve months, I take it, might he not?''
34112	Whether a prisoner could scale the walls with a cord and grapple?
34112	Why?''
34112	Wot is this here business?
34112	replied Mr. Roker, with indignant astonishment;''why should n''t I?''
15299	Does Mr. Pitt,said he,"not know that Mr. Fox was of all persons most offensive to him?"
15299	Had not Fox always cheered the popular Government of France, and had he not always advocated peace with bloodstained rebels? 15299 Well, Hardy,"says Nelson to him,"how goes the battle?"
15299	What will Nelson think of us?
15299	Who has lived as long as he chose? 15299 Would our ancestors have done it?"
15299	And, after all, does not mine furnish, on the whole, a record which does me honour?
15299	But have I anything to resemble these?
15299	But what of Nelson?
15299	Do you not think more highly of Nelson than of the best engineers who construct fortifications?
15299	Do you suppose I did it in order that some disaster should be the result?
15299	Drake quickly disillusioned him, and demanded,"If we are not at war, why have English merchants been arrested?"
15299	For what other reason do you think I disobeyed orders?
15299	Hardy is long in coming; he fears that he may be killed, and calls out,"Will no one bring Hardy to me?"
15299	Is it an ideal ambition to bring it about?
15299	Is it possible that he knew that Nelson was her father, and believed in the purity of his friendship for Emma and himself?
15299	May not the people give their own Magistrate the name they choose?"
15299	The colonies are to France only a secondary object; and does not your Majesty already possess more than you know how to preserve?
15299	To destroy our finances?
15299	To form a coalition with some Powers on the Continent?
15299	To renew intestine troubles?
15299	To wrest from France her colonies?
15299	What business had he, as the first sailor in the world, to enter into such a compact with another man''s wife?
15299	What difference would his lack of knowledge have made?
15299	What family as numerous could make a finer impression?"
15299	What family, in similar circumstances, would have done better?
15299	What is the good of it if it turns out nothing but unrestrained confusion?
15299	What need was there for Nelson to take umbrage at and violate the treaty made by Foote in the British name?
15299	Where''s the foot will not flinch or fly?
15299	Where''s the heart that aspires the fray?
15299	Who can stop him?"
15299	Who so confident as to defy Time, the fellest of mortals''foes Joints in his armour who can spy?
15299	Why bleeds old England''s band By the fire of Danish land, That smites the very hand Stretched to save?
15299	Why ceased not here the strife, Oh, ye brave?
15299	Why"luckily"?
15299	Will they let us have any?
15299	Your nation is at the highest point of prosperity, what can it hope from war?
15299	_ 3rd Verse_: Drake, he''s in his hammock till the great Armadas come,( Capten, art tha sleepin''there below?)
47658	And suppose that he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? 47658 You have read him?"
47658	And have we in our limited experience anything that will guide us to the attainment of this object?
47658	And is their truth their correspondence?
47658	And so the question arises, how far are our ideas about things truths about reality?
47658	And to what shall we turn for truth?
47658	Are our ideas of this nature?
47658	Are they reality?
47658	Are we about to be forced to modify our conclusions?
47658	Are we, like people in a theatre queue, only able to move from behind forward as the place is vacated for us in front?
47658	But even so, the pragmatist will urge, is its truth anything else but its usefulness as shown in the practical consequences of believing it?
47658	But what was the nature of the need, and what was the method by which the postulate was called forth?
47658	Can we not, for example, have an idea of not- red just as well as an idea of red?
47658	Can we or can we not make our conceptions work?
47658	Clearly we can not claim to know it by direct experience, by acquaintance; it is not a_ that_ of which we can ask_ what_?
47658	Do we not judge its claim to truth by the practical consequences involved in accepting or rejecting it?
47658	Does it actually exist?
47658	Does not the history of science prove a continual expansion, an increasing{ 53} comprehension?
47658	Have we, in the new theory of life and knowledge of Bergson''s philosophy, an answer to the question, What is truth?
47658	He has defended that philosopher against the arguments of Plato in a polemical pamphlet entitled_ Plato or Protagoras?_( Oxford, Blackwell).
47658	He who knows, can not but know; and he who does not know, can not know.... Where, then, is false opinion?
47658	How can that which we perceive be something imperceptible?
47658	How, then, can universal illusion be consistent with the possession of truth?
47658	If the meaning the intellect assigns to truth is itself not true, how can the intellect serve us?
47658	If the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be salted?
47658	If the usefulness of the intellect consists in the active production of an illusion, can we say that the intellect leads us to truth?
47658	If, then, the understanding works illusion for the sake of action, is it thereby disqualified as an instrument for the attainment of truth?
47658	In this way, then, we may answer the perplexing question, How can there be an object of thought in a false judgment?
47658	Is a perfectly true idea one in which there exists a point to point correspondence to the reality it represents?
47658	Is it not only if we can turn away from the intellect and obtain a non- intellectual intuition that we can know truth?
47658	Is not all progress in science made by suggesting a hypothesis, and testing it by experiment to see if it works?
47658	Is the Absolute more than an idea?
47658	Is there any other verification?
47658	It is the asking_ what?_ of every_ that_ of felt experience to which the mind attends.
47658	Knowing, then, what reality is, can we say that there is any actual object of thought that conforms to it?
47658	May not this be the reason of our failure and the whole explanation of the seeming contradiction?
47658	Must we not conclude that knowledge, however useful, is not true?
47658	Or does he think of something which he does not know as some other thing which he does not know?"
47658	Our problem, then, is to know what constitutes the nature of error in any one of these examples if it is, as each one may be, false?
47658	That is the whole meaning of asking, Are they true or false?
47658	The fact of error presented a difficulty distinct from the question, What is truth?
47658	The pragmatist when he asks, What is truth?
47658	The problem of truth is only raised when we ask, What does the agreement of an idea with reality mean?
47658	The question What is truth?
47658	The_ that_--a simple felt experience-- contains a meaning, brings a message, and we ask_ what_?
47658	There is, indeed, if this be so, a deeper irony in the question, What is truth?
47658	This is the simple pragmatist test,--does the laboratory worker add to it or find it in any respect insufficient?
47658	Was it not true while it was useful, and is it not only now false, if it is false, if it is actually discovered not to be useful?
47658	What else but the practical consequences of the truth claim in the form of the hypothesis of an undiscovered planet were ever in question?
47658	What is it?
47658	What is the nature of the seal by which we stamp this knowledge true?
47658	What is true about reality?
47658	What kind of knowledge is it that we acquire by description?
47658	What, then, is error?
47658	What, we shall now ask, can it be that binds together these sense qualities so that we speak of them as a thing?
47658	When, then, we ask ourselves, What is truth?
47658	Whether the Absolute does or does not exist, is it, either in idea or reality, of any use to us?
47658	Why was it felt that they must be other than they were seen to be unless there was another planet?
47658	Why were not the observed movements of Uranus accepted as what they were?
47658	Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?...
47658	nor even, What is true about truth?
47658	was the starting point, and not, What is truth?
19676	''Dare any be so bold to sound retreat or parley, when I command them kill''?
19676	( saith the one), you keepe not time in your proportions: you sing them false( saith the other), what proportion is this?
19676	(_ a_) And will he not come a- gain?
19676	(_ a_) How should I your true love know from a- noth- er one?
19676	... Will you_ play upon this pipe_?
19676	Also in B. and F.''s_ Faithful Friends_--"_ Bell._--Shall''s have a_ catch_, my hearts?
19676	And will he not come a- gain?
19676	And will thy favour never better be?
19676	At this the rest of the company"wonder"--and some whisper to their neighbours,"How was he brought up?"
19676	Beaumont and Fletcher''s_ Coxcomb_ has"Where were the_ watch_ the while?
19676	But shall we make the welkin dance indeed?
19676	Canst thou hold up thy heavy eyes awhile, And_ touch_ thy_ instrument_ a_ strain_ or two?
19676	Do ye make an_ alehouse_ of my lady''s house, that ye squeak out your_ cozier''s catches_ without any mitigation or remorse of voice?
19676	Do you_ note_ me?
19676	Have you no wit, manners, nor honesty, but to_ gabble like tinkers_ at this time of night?
19676	How shall we find the_ concord of this discord_?
19676	If she does, she is accounted foolish( sotte), for if she does n''t want to dance, what is she sitting there for amongst the rest?
19676	Is there no respect of place, persons, or_ time_ in you?
19676	Rich.__ Music_ do I hear?
19676	Shall we do that?
19676	Shall we rouse the night- owl in a_ catch_, that will_ draw three souls out of one weaver_?
19676	TREBLE VIOL, as used in England and Italy; label inside-- Andreas(?)
19676	The first verse of''Fortune my foe''is as follows:--"Fortune my foe, why dost thou frown on me?
19676	Was it not to refresh the mind of man,_ After his studies_, or his usual pain?
19676	What dost thou mean?
19676	What hast here?
19676	What joy have ye to wander thus by night, Save that_ ill doers alway hate the light_?''
19676	What pleasure take you in this your foolishness?
19676	What should this mean?
19676	Why should we not of her learn thus To live godly?''
19676	Wilt thou, I say, for ever breed my pain, And wilt thou not restore my joyes again?"
19676	You would have them_ always_ play but_ one thing_?
19676	[ Footnote 18: What is a''woollen bagpipe''?
19676	[ To Cesario]--How dost thou like_ this tune_?
19676	[_ Music._]_ Enter Clown.__ Clo._ Why, masters,_ have your instruments been in Naples_, that they_ speak i''the nose_ thus?
19676	_ 1 Mus._ How, sir, how?
19676	_ 1 Mus._ Why"Heart''s ease?"
19676	_ 1 Page._ Shall we_ clap into''t roundly, without hawking, or spitting_, or_ saying we are hoarse_, which are the_ only prologues to a bad voice_?
19676	_ 1 Soldier._ What say you to his expertness in war?
19676	_ 4 Sold._ It signs well, does it not?
19676	_ 4 Soldier._... Peace, what noise?
19676	_ Arm._ How meanest thou?
19676	_ Bap._ How now, my friend?
19676	_ Bap._ What, will my daughter[ Kate] prove a good musician?
19676	_ Bap._ Why, how now, daughter Katherine?
19676	_ Bap._ Why, then thou canst not_ break her_ to the lute?
19676	_ Clo._ Are these, I pray you, called_ wind_-instruments?
19676	_ Clo._"Hold thy peace, thou knave,"knight?
19676	_ Countess._ Will your answer serve fit to all questions?
19676	_ Duke._ Who was it?
19676	_ Hor._ You''ll leave his lecture, when I am in tune?
19676	_ Host._ How do you, man?
19676	_ Host._ How?
19676	_ Host._ Why, my pretty youth?
19676	_ Jaques._ Have you no_ song_, forester, for this purpose?
19676	_ Jul._ And why not you?
19676	_ Jul._ But shall I_ hear him speak_?
19676	_ Jul._ You do not?
19676	_ Jul.__ Heavy?_ belike, it hath some_ burden_ then.
19676	_ Leon._---- still_ virginalling_ Upon his palm?
19676	_ Mal._ My masters, are you mad?
19676	_ Moth._ Master, will you win your love with a_ French brawl_?
19676	_ Pan._ At whose pleasure, friend?
19676	_ Pan._ Who play they to?
19676	_ Pandarus._ Know you the_ musicians_?
19676	_ Pandarus._ What music is this?
19676	_ Peter._ Pretty too!--what say_ you_, James_ Soundpost_?
19676	_ Peter._ Pretty!--what say_ you_, Hugh_ Rebeck_?
19676	_ Prince Henry._ Doth he still rage?
19676	_ Romeo._ How is''t, my soul?
19676	_ Sir And._ There''s a_ testril_ of me too; if one knight give a----_ Clown._ Would you have a_ love- song_, or a_ song of good life_?
19676	_ Sir To._ What is thy excellence in a_ galliard_, knight?
19676	_ Sir To._ Wherefore are these things hid?...
19676	_ Sir To._[ Drunk, and with a bloody coxcomb]--Sot, didst see Dick surgeon, sot?
19676	_ Ste._ What is this same?
19676	_ Theseus._ Say, what abridgment have you for this evening?
19676	_ Val._ Why, how know you that I am in love?
19676	_ What masque, what music?_...*****[ Reads from the paper]"A tedious brief scene of young Pyramus, And his love Thisbe; very tragical mirth."
19676	_ ballads_?
19676	_ brawling in French_?
19676	_ out of tune on the strings_?
19676	are there_ masques_?
19676	do you think I am_ easier to be played on than a pipe_?
19676	in your_ dumps_?
19676	is it a world to hide virtues in?
19676	or what are you?
19676	out of my conversation, that he dares in this manner assay me?''
19676	what say you, Simon_ Catling_?
19676	why dost thou look so pale?
19676	why dost thou not_ go to church in a galliard_, and_ come home in a coranto_?
19676	why"music with her_ silver_ sound"?
55761	( 2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there?
55761	( 2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there?
55761	( 2) Where are they united?
55761	( 3) When two persons are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there?
55761	( 3) When two persons are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there?
55761	And if not, with what other question must it necessarily be connected?
55761	And why are these feelings to be eliminated?
55761	Are the actions of men really all of one kind?
55761	But are we to trust to good luck, and experiment about until we hit by accident upon the right line?
55761	But how about the possibility of social life for men, if each aims only at asserting his own individuality?
55761	But how am I to know, prior to all knowledge, that the objects given to me are ideas?
55761	But how are we to make the actual calculation?
55761	But how else can this happen except we assign a content to the purely formal activity of the Ego?
55761	But is it justifiable to lump together actions of this kind with those in which a man is conscious not only of his actions but also of their causes?
55761	But is it not possible to make the old a measure for the new?
55761	But is this reflection capable of supporting any positive alternative?
55761	But what if this"thing- in- itself,"this whole transcendent ground of the world, should be nothing but a fiction?
55761	But what of the claim that this view is based on experience?
55761	But what of the freedom of an action about the motives of which we reflect?
55761	But what right have we to say that in the absence of sense- organs the whole process would not exist at all?
55761	But, is not precisely this actually the case with pure concepts and ideas?
55761	But, what if they are not valid at all?
55761	Can I say of it that it acts on my soul?
55761	Can we regard man as a whole in himself, in view of the fact that he grows out of a whole and fits as a member into a whole?
55761	Does freedom of will, then, mean being able to will without ground, without motive?
55761	Does not the world cause thoughts in the minds of men with the same necessity as it causes the blossoms on plants?
55761	Have I, then, any right at all to start from it in my arguments?
55761	Have they any intelligible meaning?
55761	Have we any right to consider the question of the freedom of the will by itself at all?
55761	He asks, How much can we learn about them indirectly, seeing that we can not observe them directly?
55761	He can not will what he wills?
55761	How comes it that the simple real manifests itself in a two- fold manner, if it is an indivisible unity?
55761	How do we come to differentiate ourselves from what is"objective,"and to contrast"Ego"and"Non- Ego?"
55761	How does Matter come to think of its own nature?
55761	How does the matter appear when we recognise the absoluteness of thought?
55761	How is it possible for my thought to be relevantly related to the object?
55761	How is it possible to start knowledge anywhere at all?
55761	How is it that we are compelled to make these continual corrections in our observations?
55761	How should I make of my thought an exception?
55761	How should Mind be aware of what goes on in Matter, seeing that the essential nature of Matter is quite alien to Mind?
55761	How should it matter to me whether I can do a thing or not, if I am forced by the motive to do it?
55761	How, in any case, is it possible for me to argue from my own subjective view of the world to that of another human being?
55761	How, then, do I know that he and I are in a common world?
55761	I can now ask myself: Over and above the percepts just mentioned, what else is there in the section of space in which they are?
55761	If human organisation has no part in the essential nature of thinking, what is its function within the whole nature of man?
55761	If the question be asked, What is man''s purpose in life?
55761	Is not every man compelled to measure the deliverances of his moral imagination by the standard of traditional moral principles?
55761	Is reason able also to strike the balance?
55761	Kant assumed their validity and only asks, What are the conditions of their validity?
55761	Metaphysical Realism must ask, What is it that gives us our percepts?
55761	Or how in these circumstances should Mind act upon Matter, so as to translate its intentions into actions?
55761	Our present question is, what do we gain by supplementing a process with a conceptual counterpart?
55761	Our questions are the following:( 1) Are things continuous or intermittent in their existence?
55761	Philosophers still ask such questions as, What is the purpose of the world?
55761	Seeing that, at the outset, we attach no predicates whatever to the Given, we are bound to ask: How is it that we are able to determine it at all?
55761	THE THEORY OF FREEDOM I CONSCIOUS HUMAN ACTION Is man free in action and thought, or is he bound by an iron necessity?
55761	The fundamental question of Kant''s Theory of Knowledge is, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?
55761	This being so, is any individuality left at all?
55761	This last answer does, indeed, presuppose that it is legitimate to group together in the single question,''How many tables?''
55761	This leads us to the question, What is the right method for striking the balance between the credit and the debit columns?
55761	Two questions arise:( 1) Where are the Given and the Concept differentiated?
55761	VII ARE THERE ANY LIMITS TO KNOWLEDGE?
55761	What does it mean to have knowledge of the motives of one''s actions?
55761	What does it signify for us to possess knowledge and science?
55761	What does willing mean if not to have grounds for doing, or striving to do, this rather than that?
55761	What else has he done except perceive what hundreds have failed to see?
55761	What follows from these facts?
55761	What follows from this fact?
55761	What follows?
55761	What is it that Kant has achieved?
55761	What is it that stimulates the subject?
55761	What is it that, in the first instance, I have before me when I confront another person?
55761	What is the function( and consequently the purpose) of man?
55761	What of the Spiritualistic theory?
55761	What precisely is it that is absolute in the affirmation of the Ego?
55761	What right have you to declare the world to be complete without thought?
55761	What then is a percept?
55761	When, next, the percept disappears from my field of vision, what remains?
55761	Where is the jumping- board which will launch us from the subjective into the trans- subjective?
55761	Which of us can say that he is really free in all his actions?
55761	Who does not know the pleasure which is caused by the hope of a remote but intensely desired enjoyment?
55761	Why do I not passively let the object impress itself on me?
55761	Why is it not simply satisfied with itself and content to accept its own existence?
55761	Why should this concept belong any less to the whole plant than leaf and blossom?
55761	Why, we ask, does the tree appear to us now at rest, then in motion?
55761	Yes, but what is it to do?
55761	[ 18] Are there any presuppositions in this question, as formulated by Kant?
55761	[ 45] Now let us ask ourselves, How do we come by such a view?
55761	[ 50] What does Fichte here mean by the activity of the"intelligence,"when we translate what he has obscurely felt into clear concepts?
32701	What are space and time? 32701 Whence has it[ i. e. the mind] all the materials of reason and knowledge?
32701	''How is pure mathematics possible?
32701	''How is pure natural science possible?''
32701	''What_ a priori_ judgements are essentially related to the faculty in question?''
32701	( 2)''Given that a corresponding object is possible, is it also real?''
32701	( 3)''Given that it is real, is it also necessary?''
32701	Again, given that the belief has arisen, may it not after all be illusion?
32701	Again, if we know that the object of a conception is possible, how are we to determine whether it is also actual?
32701	And, secondly, how does thought in virtue of these conceptions originate synthetic_ a priori_ knowledge?
32701	Are they real existences?
32701	But do_ a priori_ synthetic judgements satisfy this condition?
32701	But how are we to know that what we judge_ is_ the true law?
32701	But if knowing is obviously different from making, why should Kant have apparently felt no difficulty in resolving knowing into making?
32701	But when he is asking''How does the manifold of sense become unified?''
32701	But, in that case, what can be meant by a succession in the object?
32701	Firstly, how do these conceptions obtain a matter to which they can apply and without which they would be without content or empty?
32701	For how can it be possible to base the knowledge of what things are, independently of perception, upon the knowledge of what they look?
32701	For how can we advance from knowledge of what they look to knowledge of what they are but do not look?
32701	For the driving force of idealism is furnished by the question,''How can the mind and reality come into the relation which we call knowledge?''
32701	For the problem''How do we, beginning with mere sensation, come to know a spatial and temporal world?''
32701	For the question''Is a three- sided figure possible?''
32701	For the two questions, the consideration of which leads to this conclusion, are,''What is the right or real colour of an individual thing?''
32701	Further, if it is legitimate to ask,''How can we apprehend what does not belong to our being?''
32701	He asks,''How can the subject perceive itself?''
32701	He begins by raising the question,''What do we mean by the phrase''an object of representations''?
32701	He then asked,''What follows as to the nature of the objects known in mathematics from the fact that we really know them?''
32701	Hence the problem arises,''How is it possible to subsume objects of empirical perception under pure conceptions?''
32701	Hence the question,''How is pure mathematics possible?''
32701	How can I make an assertion about any individual until I have had actual experience of it?
32701	How then can I be sure that all cases will conform to my judgement?
32701	How, then, does Kant obtain something of which space and time can be regarded as really relations?
32701	How, then, does Kant reach the second result?
32701	How, then, is it possible for human reason to accomplish such knowledge entirely_ a priori_?...
32701	How, then, is it possible for the belief that things_ are_ spatial to arise?
32701	If I am asked,''How do I know that my pen is black or my chair hard?''
32701	If a question is to be put at all, it should take the form,''How is it possible to apprehend anything?''
32701	If, however, the doctrine of an internal sense is obviously untenable from Kant''s own point of view, why does he hold it?
32701	In fact, how can I anticipate my experience at all?
32701	In the first place, the very question,''What does the process of knowing consist in?''
32701	Is there, however, any relation of which it could be said that it is not given, and to which therefore Kant''s doctrine might seem to apply?
32701	It may be stated thus:''If the lines are not convergent, how is it possible even to say that they_ look_ convergent?
32701	It may, however, be objected that the question ought to mean simply''Is a three- sided figure possible?''
32701	It should now be an easy matter to understand the problem expressed by the question,''How are_ a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?''
32701	Its aim is to answer the question,''How far can reason go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience?''
32701	Its definite formulation is expressed in the well- known question,''How are_ a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?
32701	Kant introduces it in effect by raising the question,''How is it that, beginning with the isolated data of sense, we come to acquire knowledge?''
32701	Kant is therefore once more[23] forced to consider the question''What is meant by object of representations?''
32701	Moreover, since it is plain that in knowing we are active, the question is apt to assume the form,''What do we_ do_ when we know or think?''
32701	Must it not be implied that at least under_ certain_ circumstances we should perceive the lines as they are?
32701	Must there not, however, be some problem peculiar to_ a priori_ judgements?
32701	Now why does Kant think that this conclusion follows?
32701	Otherwise why should Kant have been led to suppose that his problem concerned them only?
32701	Otherwise why should the representations agree?
32701	Otherwise, why should we use the words''look''or''appear''at all?
32701	Similarly there is really no meaning in the question,''What is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge or to an idea?''
32701	The problem then becomes''What renders possible or is presupposed by the conformity of individual things to certain laws of connexion?''
32701	The question must mean''What are the kinds of unity produced by judgement?''
32701	The question''Is a triangle, in the sense of a figure with three sides and three angles, possible?''
32701	The question''Is an object corresponding to the conception of a man with six toes possible?''
32701	Thus it turns out that the problem relates to the uniformity of nature, and that the question''How are_ a priori_ synthetic judgements possible?''
32701	To the question, therefore,''What is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge and therefore distinct from it?''
32701	To the question, therefore,''Why are we justified in saying that we do know phenomena, whereas we do not know the things which produce them?''
32701	What then do we know?
32701	What then is the answer to this, the real problem?
32701	What, then, can be meant by such an object?
32701	What, then, is the cause of the unsatisfactory treatment of these problems and men''s consequent indifference?
32701	What, then, must be the representation of space, in order that such a knowledge of it may be possible?
32701	When he is asking''What is meant by the object( beyond the mind) corresponding to our representations?''
32701	Yet why should reality conform?
32701	[ 4] Hence, the question,''How is pure natural science possible?''
32701	[ 4] This is Kant''s way of putting the question which should be expressed by asking,''Are things spatial, or do they only look spatial?''
32701	and''Has it really any colour at all, or does it only look coloured?''
32701	and''How does an apprehension become related to an object?
32701	and''How is it that they are applicable to objects?''
32701	it is equally legitimate to ask,''How can we apprehend what does belong to our own being?''
32701	means''Granted the truth of mathematical judgements, what inference can we draw concerning the nature of the reality to which they relate?
32701	means''What justifies the assertion that the presuppositions of natural science are true?''
32701	really means''Is it possible for a three- sided figure to have three angles?''
32701	really means''Is it possible for three straight lines to form a figure, i. e. to enclose a space?''
32701	that which concerns sensations?
32701	the physical world?''
9662	A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections?
9662	And how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?
9662	And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature?
9662	And under what pretence can you embrace the one, while you reject the other?
9662	And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings?
9662	And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate?
9662	And what he proposes by all these curious researches?_ He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer.
9662	And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present?
9662	Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar?
9662	Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects?
9662	Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age?
9662	Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries?
9662	But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other?
9662	But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself?
9662	But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat?
9662	But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect?
9662	But what do we mean by that affirmation?
9662	But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven?
9662	But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning?
9662	But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of?
9662	But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then?
9662	By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view?
9662	By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians?
9662	Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution?
9662	Can we give any reason for these variations, except experience?
9662	Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external?
9662	Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense?
9662	For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy, upon such a supposition?
9662	For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions?
9662	For what is meant by_ innate_?
9662	For what reason?
9662	Has not the same custom the same influence on all?
9662	How could_ politics_ be a science, if laws and forms of goverment had not a uniform influence upon society?
9662	How is this remedied by experience?
9662	How is this to be accounted for?
9662	How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion?
9662	How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy?
9662	How often would the great names of Pascal, Racine, Amaud, Nicole, have resounded in our ears?
9662	How shall we reconcile these contradictions?
9662	Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition?
9662	Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him?
9662	Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy?
9662	Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other?
9662	Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an idea of reflection?
9662	Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June?
9662	May not both these balls remain at absolute rest?
9662	May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction?
9662	On what is this inference based?
9662	Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of society, is in the least concerned?
9662	The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person: Why?
9662	The question still recurs, on what process of argument this_ inference_ is founded?
9662	This begets a very natural question; What is meant by a sceptic?
9662	This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects?
9662	We need only ask such a sceptic,_ What his meaning is?
9662	What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition?
9662	What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension?
9662	What would become of_ history,_ had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind?
9662	What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter?
9662	When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make?
9662	Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it?
9662	Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods?
9662	Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other?
9662	Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact?
9662	Where then is the power, of which we pretend to be conscious?
9662	Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens?
9662	Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a fiction and belief?
9662	Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tiger?
9662	Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a character?
9662	Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver?
9662	Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature?
9662	Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them?
9662	Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest?
9662	Why?
9662	Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans?
9662	_ Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?_ No.
30737	Ah, Miller,he has said,"what matters it how I amuse myself?
30737	And do you deem that satisfactory?
30737	Brown?
30737	But do not they themselves,I asked,"want English?"
30737	Did we not think it right,he said,"that there should be evening worship in the family?"
30737	Do you know what you are doing, Sir?
30737	Had I read Reid?
30737	In a word,we find him saying,"do not herbs, plants, roots, grains, and all of this kind that the earth produces and nourishes, come from the sea?
30737	Is it true, Hugh,he inquired,"that the lecturer Walsh ridiculed you and your poems in the Council House last night?"
30737	Is that man also pitying me?
30737	Is this you, L----?
30737	It is Click- Clack the carter,said my comrade:"oh, what shall we do?"
30737	Jack,exclaimed the old woman, seizing him convulsively by both his hands,"where''s my cousin?--where''s Hugh?"
30737	O yes,he said,"but what does that signify?
30737	Od, laddie,he said,"what ca''ye this?
30737	Oh, and what of that?
30737	Oh,he asked, after the first greeting,"have you any salt?"
30737	Protection against what?
30737	Such is the scene seen at right angles with the plane in which the planets move; but what would be its aspect if I saw it in the line of the plane? 30737 There is mark about that old- fashioned man,"I said to myself:"who or what can he be?"
30737	Well, John,I asked one evening, speaking direct, to his evident embarrassment;"what is it?"
30737	What ails you?
30737	What has happened?
30737	What is the matter with you?
30737	What poets?
30737	What sonnet?
30737	What,I inquired of my companion,"are these kind people pitying me so very much for?"
30737	Where''s the whisky, Grimbo?
30737	Would you not like, Sir,he said, addressing himself to my minister, who sat beside him--"Would you not like to be a sea- gull?
30737	_ Hume?_"Yes.
30737	''Come, tell me, Donald,''said my brother,''what you think this tree is like?''
30737	''What woman, Jack?''
30737	A man of high spirit and influence-- a banker, and very much a Whig-- at once addressed me with a stern--"By what authority, Sir?"
30737	Against whom does the inscription testify?
30737	And have ye mark''d that pillar''d wreath, When sudden struck by northern blast, Amid the low and stunted heath, In broken volumes cast?
30737	And how would you answer that?"
30737	And such was one of the more special_ Providences_ of my life; for why should I give it a humbler name?
30737	And though I knew it might be asked, Why the interposition of a Providence to save_ you_, when he was left to perish?
30737	And was it not the great sea, asks the boy, that was so vastly broad, and so profoundly deep?
30737	Are his speculations sound, or precarious?
30737	Are we eels or puddocks, that we are sent to live in a loch?"
30737	Are we to infer that they are shells of more recent origin than the widely- diffused ones?
30737	But capacious as the human imagination has been deemed, can it conceive of an area of wider field?
30737	But what else could be expected by an ungainly, dust- besprinkled mechanic in his shirt sleeves, and with a leathern apron before him?
30737	But what gude o''greevin''as lang''s we are leevin''?
30737	But what, it may be asked, was the bearing of all this observation?
30737	But would you not better bid adieu to Cromarty, and come along with me?
30737	By the way, has he not something very ingenious about miracles?
30737	Ca''ye this_ brochan_?"
30737	Can Death be nigh, When thus, mute and unarm''d, his vassals lie?
30737	Can any cause be assigned why it is not as likely to break out in the nineteenth century as in the fifteenth?"
30737	Could I do nothing for my Church in her hour of peril?
30737	Could I not do something to bring up the people to their assistance?
30737	Could a man in quest of patronage, and actually at the time soliciting a favour, possibly contrive to say anything more imprudent?
30737	Could a soul not derived from our first parents be rendered vile simply by being put into a body derived from them?
30737	Did the other men take much more than a week to learn?"
30737	Do you remember his argument?"
30737	Does he float on wind bills, as boys swim on bladders?
30737	Dost thou see yon yard sae green, Spreckled wi''mony a mossy stane?
30737	For some little time she stood beside me without speaking, and then somewhat abruptly asked,--"What makes_ you_ work as a mason?"
30737	Have I not, I asked, crept along a roof of even a steeper slope than that of the shelf?
30737	Have ye not seen, from lonesome waste, The smoke- tower rising tall and slow, O''erlooking, like a stately tree, The russet plain below?
30737	How can a man get on in the world that wants Gaelic?"
30737	How could such a man pass from earth, and leave no trace behind him?
30737	How determine the point?
30737	How, may I ask, are you yourself provided with the sinews of war?"
30737	How, then, have I my conception of the earth as a whole-- of the solar system as a whole-- nay, of many systems as a whole?
30737	I had of course to receive a few palmies additional for the speech; but then,"who cared for that?"
30737	I know it now: wert thou not placed To catch the eye of him To whom, through glistening tears, earth''s gauds Worthless appear, and dim?
30737	I said;"who cares anything for the ridicule of a blockhead?"
30737	I was addressed by the recruiting serjeant of a Highland regiment, who asked me if I did not belong to the Aird?
30737	I would, of course, lose not only the lever in the torrent, but my trousers also; and how was I ever to get home without them?
30737	In stormy autumn day, when sad The boding peasant frets forlorn, Have ye not seen the mountain stream Bear down the standing corn?
30737	In what spirit, it has been asked, would Socrates have listened to the address of Paul on Mars Hill, had he lived a few ages later?
30737	Is he facile in lending the use of his name?
30737	Is his judgment good, or the contrary?
30737	Is his sense of monetary obligations nice, or obtuse?
30737	Is it not at least natural to think so, since we are certain that all our habitable lands came originally from the sea?
30737	Is it not so with genius of a certain altitude?
30737	Is there no way of getting a divorce?"
30737	Is there to be merely a repetition of the past-- an introduction a second time of"man made in the image of God?"
30737	Marge!--What is marge?"
30737	My illustration refers exclusively to the native powers; but may it not, I ask, bear also on the acquisition of knowledge?
30737	Or shall I put back the hurt altogether till you get home?"
30737	Poor bosom, why dost heave Thus wild?
30737	See you that large island?
30737	The question with him comes always to be a sternly naked one:--Is, or is not, Mr.---- a person fit to be trusted with the bank''s money?
30737	The snow- wreath shifting place?
30737	Thy way past finding out, Thy love, can tongue declare?
30737	What are his resources?--what his liabilities?
30737	What are ye aye troubling that decent lad Mr. Stewart for?
30737	What is the use of English in Gairloch?"
30737	What is to be the next advance?
30737	What warms the poet''s lays with generous fire, To which no toil can reach, no art aspire?
30737	What would be its appearance if I saw it edgewise?
30737	What, think you, could the great Kean make of feeble stuff like that?
30737	What,"he adds,"if the sweating sickness, emphatically called the English disease, were to show itself again?
30737	Where, in the name of wonder, should I get a kilt to borrow?
30737	Who are the brave in freedom''s cause?
30737	Who taught the sage, with deepest wisdom fraught, While scarce one pupil grasps the ponderous thought?
30737	Who, after once spending even a few hours in such a school, could avoid being a geologist?
30737	Why not give her what the length of the chain permitted-- the full range of the room?
30737	Why not, in like manner, creep along it to the nest, where there is firm footing?
30737	Why smile incred''lous?
30737	Why this strange thought?
30737	and was it for me, who have so barbarously used thee, that thou hast died?
30737	and what sort of a statesman would Robert Burns have made?
30737	and will you leave me here to perish?"
30737	do you ken Peter, the taxman an''writer?
30737	ejaculated Angus, quickening his trot into a canter;"what does he know about carrying sheep''s heads to the smithy?"
30737	he exclaimed;"was the elk a native of Scotland half a century ago?
30737	of scenes where Pleasure roves, And Peace, could gentle minstrel tire?
30737	or are they merely feebler in their reproductive powers?
30737	or is his paper representative of only real business transactions?
30737	said the tinker, springing to his feet with an agility wonderful for an age so advanced as his,"Have you drunk it all?
30737	the_ Incompetent_?"
30737	when passed their brief sojourn-- When Heaven''s dread doom is said-- Beats there the human heart could pour Like mockeries o''er the dead?
30737	why hasten on?
53791	After what manner therefore do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it?
53791	And how can the floor and roof ever meet, while they are separated by the four walls that lie in a contrary position?
53791	And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them?
53791	And to what end can it serve, either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest?
53791	And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire?
53791	Are not most studious men( and many of them more than I) subject to such reveries or fits of absence, without being exposed to such suspicions?
53791	But as we here not only_ feign_ but_ believe_ this continued existence, the question is,_ from whence arises such a belief_?
53791	But can any thing be imagined more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning?
53791	But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects of_ education_?
53791	But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis?
53791	But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us?
53791	But what is the treachery?
53791	But what repose can be tasted in life, when the heart is agitated?
53791	Can I be sure that, in leaving all established opinions, I am following truth?
53791	Can any thing be supposed more extravagant?
53791	Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation?
53791	Could Mr Hume, after so many instances of disdain on my part, have still the astonishing generosity as to persevere sincerely to serve me?
53791	Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term?
53791	Do you therefore mean, that it takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule, as is peculiar and essential to a right line?
53791	Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection?
53791	Does it attend us at all times, or does it only return at intervals?
53791	First, for what reason we pronounce it_ necessary_, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause?
53791	For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness?
53791	For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it?
53791	For how can the two walls, that run from south to north, touch each other, while they touch the opposite ends of two walls that run from east to west?
53791	For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory?
53791	For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different?
53791	For if they can not, what possibly can become of them?
53791	For what does he mean by_ production_?
53791	For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions?
53791	For whence should it be derived?
53791	For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity?
53791	For why, indeed, should I have any other?
53791	For, from what impression could this idea be derived?
53791	For, supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body?
53791	From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return?
53791	Here, therefore, I must ask,_ What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point_?
53791	How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines can not have one common segment?
53791	How does he know this?
53791	How else could any thing exist without length, without breadth, or without depth?
53791	How is it possible to make a man easy or happy in a world, to whose customs and maxims he is determined to run retrograde?
53791	How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modified into that square table, and into this round one?
53791	How then shall we adjust those principles together?
53791	I first ask mathematicians what they mean when they say one line or surface is_ equal_ to, or_ greater_, or_ less_ than another?
53791	I have declared my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surprised if they should express a hatred of mine and of my person?
53791	I therefore ask, wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition?
53791	If at intervals, at what times principally does it return, and by what causes is it produced?
53791	If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what manner?
53791	Is it an impression of sensation or reflection?
53791	Is it in every part without being extended?
53791	Is it in this particular part, or in that other?
53791	Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent?
53791	Is it therefore nothing?
53791	Is the indivisible subject or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception?
53791	Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects to which we suppose solidity to belong?
53791	Now''tis certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise, why do we talk and reason concerning it?
53791	Now, what idea have we of these bodies?
53791	Now, what impression do our senses here convey to us?
53791	Now, what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible?
53791	Numquid quæ consecravimus perdidisse nos dicimus?
53791	On the back or fore- side of it?
53791	On the supposition of my entering into a project to ruin him, how could I think to bring it about by the services I did him?
53791	On the surface or in the middle?
53791	Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union?
53791	Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest?
53791	Or that''tis impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points?
53791	Pray, who knows when my door was open or shut, except Mr Hume, with whom I lived, and by whom every body was introduced that I saw?
53791	Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possessed of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression?
53791	Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation?
53791	Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received?
53791	The next question, then, should naturally be,_ how experience gives rise to such a principle_?
53791	Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time?
53791	We may well ask,_ What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body_?
53791	What beings surround me?
53791	What can he have said to them, for it is only through him they know any thing of me?
53791	What could I divine would be the consequence of such a beginning?
53791	What do they know of me, except that I am unhappy, and a friend to their friend Hume?
53791	What harm have I done, or could I do to Mr Rousseau?
53791	What have I done to Mr Walpole, whom I know full as little?
53791	What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties?
53791	What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falsehood?
53791	What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor separation?
53791	What was his design in it?
53791	Where am I, or what?
53791	Where did he see them?
53791	Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated?
53791	Which of them shall we prefer?
53791	Who could have excited their enmity against me?
53791	Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread?
53791	Why are those enemies all the friends of Mr Hume?
53791	Why should I have even them?
53791	[ 34] What have I done to Lord Littleton,[35] whom I do n''t even know?
53791	[ 34] Why indeed?
53791	[ 38] How was it possible for me to guess at such chimerical suspicions?
53791	_ What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together_?
53791	and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune should at last guide me on her footsteps?
53791	and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me?
53791	but''tis in vain to ask,_ Whether there be body or not_?
53791	did this good man borrow those eyes he fixes so sternly and unaccountably on those of his friends?
1580	), said he; did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate?
1580	Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect?
1580	And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her?
1580	And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only?
1580	And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice?
1580	And can that be good which does not make men good?
1580	And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also?
1580	And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely?
1580	And he who does so does his duty?
1580	And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these?
1580	And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous?
1580	And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness?
1580	And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad?
1580	And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far better than quietness and slowness?
1580	And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly?
1580	And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a quietness?
1580	And is temperance a good?
1580	And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject- matter of health and disease?
1580	And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of what?
1580	And the inference is that temperance can not be modesty-- if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?
1580	And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation?
1580	And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium?
1580	And the temperate are also good?
1580	And they are right, and you would agree with them?
1580	And to read quickly or slowly?
1580	And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this?
1580	And what if I am?
1580	And what is it?
1580	And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business?
1580	And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily, or quietly and slowly?
1580	And which, I said, is better-- facility in learning, or difficulty in learning?
1580	And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use?
1580	And will wisdom give health?
1580	And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business?
1580	And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another''s work, as well as in doing their own?
1580	And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good?
1580	Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom?
1580	Are you right, Charmides?
1580	But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine-- what is the subject of temperance or wisdom?
1580	But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge of medicine?
1580	But even if knowledge can know itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know?
1580	But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice?
1580	But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not?
1580	But of what is this knowledge?
1580	But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject- matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences?
1580	But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good?
1580	But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom?
1580	But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this?
1580	But where does Dr. Jackson find any such notion as this in Plato or anywhere in ancient philosophy?
1580	But which is best when you are at the writing- master''s, to write the same letters quickly or quietly?
1580	But which most tends to make him happy?
1580	But why do you not call him, and show him to us?
1580	Can you show me any such result of them?
1580	Can you tell me?
1580	Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates?
1580	Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires?
1580	Did you ever observe that this is what they say?
1580	Do you admit that?
1580	Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking?
1580	Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of good actions, is temperance?
1580	For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good common to all mankind?
1580	For why should Aristotle, because he has quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted them all?
1580	Has he not a beautiful face?
1580	Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else?
1580	He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right, in relation to health and disease?
1580	How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself?
1580	How is that?
1580	How is this riddle to be explained?
1580	How so?
1580	How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage?
1580	How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building?
1580	I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?
1580	I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also?
1580	I said, or without my consent?
1580	I said; is not this rather the effect of medicine?
1580	I was, he replied; but what is your drift?
1580	In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is Temperance?
1580	Is it of him you are speaking or of some one else?
1580	Is not medicine, I said, the science of health?
1580	Is not that true?
1580	Is not that true?
1580	Is not that true?
1580	Is that true?
1580	Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes?
1580	Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else?
1580	Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will he proceed?
1580	May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts?
1580	Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science?
1580	Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes?
1580	Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear?
1580	Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,--do they not each of them do their own work?
1580	Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half?
1580	Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort?
1580	Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them?
1580	Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general?
1580	Or of computation?
1580	Or of health?
1580	Or of working in brass?
1580	Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves?
1580	Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying;--have you or have you not this quality of temperance?
1580	Shall I tell you the nature of the difficulty?
1580	Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this?
1580	Shall we speak of the soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine or neuter?
1580	That is your meaning?
1580	The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human beings, is asked by Socrates,''What is Temperance?''
1580	Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?
1580	Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows?
1580	Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows?
1580	Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?
1580	Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one''s own business; not at least in this way, or doing things of this sort?
1580	Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best?
1580	Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance?
1580	Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised?
1580	Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good?
1580	Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me-- What is temperance?
1580	Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name?
1580	Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is noble?
1580	Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question-- Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something?
1580	Was he a fool who told you, Charmides?
1580	Was he right who affirmed that?
1580	Was not that your statement?
1580	Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom-- to know what is known and what is unknown to us?
1580	Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something?
1580	Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,''Modesty is not good for a needy man''?
1580	Were we not right in making that admission?
1580	What do you mean?
1580	What do you mean?
1580	What is that?
1580	What makes you think so?
1580	Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater?
1580	Who is he, I said; and who is his father?
1580	Why not, I said; but will he come?
1580	Why not?
1580	With my consent?
1580	Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?
1580	Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy?
1580	You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?
1580	and in what cases do you mean?
1580	or do all equally make him happy?
1580	or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing?
1580	the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing?
10615	And are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill or expose their parents, without any remorse at all?
10615	And are they those which are the first in children, and antecedent to all acquired ones?
10615	And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?
10615	And sensible qualities, as colours and smells,& c. what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception,& c.?
10615	And were not he that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him?
10615	And what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts, and the most reverenced by others?
10615	And what doubt can there be made of it?
10615	And what is the will, but the faculty to do this?
10615	And when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than represent the true God?
10615	And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable?
10615	And whether, in the second case, there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings?
10615	And which then shall be true?
10615	And, if considered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts?
10615	Are they such as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them?
10615	But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found?
10615	But can any one think, or will any one say, that “ impossibility ” and “ identity ” are two innate IDEAS?
10615	But how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children?
10615	But if a Hobbist be asked why?
10615	But is not a man drunk and sober the same person?
10615	But my question is,--whether one can not have the IDEA of one body moved, whilst others are at rest?
10615	But perhaps it will be said,--without a regular motion, such as of the sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such periods were equal?
10615	But the question being here,--Whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body?
10615	But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims?
10615	But will any one say, that those that live by fraud or rapine have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to?
10615	Can another man perceive that I am conscious of anything, when I perceive it not myself?
10615	Can he be concerned in either of their actions?
10615	Can the soul think, and not the man?
10615	Concerning a man ’s liberty, there yet, therefore, is raised this further question, WHETHER A MAN BE FREE TO WILL?
10615	Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves, and therefore can it be doubted?
10615	Do we not see( will they be ready to say) the parts of bodies stick firmly together?
10615	For example, what is a watch?
10615	For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will?
10615	For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate?
10615	For though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it?
10615	For, it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs?
10615	For, our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts?
10615	For, who is it that sees not that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of powers themselves?
10615	Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter?
10615	How else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep?
10615	How knows any one that the Soul always thinks?
10615	How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it, but some few of its properties?
10615	I ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity, whether their idea of duration includes in it succession, or not?
10615	I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind?
10615	I ask, is not this stay voluntary?
10615	If it be further asked,--What it is moves desire?
10615	If they say that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking, I ask, How they know it?
10615	If this answer satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the question, What determines the will?
10615	Is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man ’s self?
10615	Is there anything more common?
10615	Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity?
10615	Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:--How comes it to be furnished?
10615	May he not, with more reason, assure him he was not asleep?
10615	Must it not be a most manifest wrong judgment that does not presently see to which side, in this case, the preference is to be given?
10615	Nay, whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same, with both of them?
10615	Or a man think, and not be conscious of it?
10615	Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate?
10615	Or does the mind regulate itself and its assent by ideas that it never yet had?
10615	Or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the mind than nature did?
10615	Or rather, would he not have reason to think that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?
10615	Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths?
10615	Or the understanding draw conclusions from principles which it never yet knew or understood?
10615	Or where is that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules?
10615	POWER being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they*[ lost line??]
10615	POWER being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they*[ lost line??]
10615	The question then is, Which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations?
10615	To return, then, to the inquiry, what is it that determines the will in regard to our actions?
10615	WHETHER MAN ’S WILL BE FREE OR NO?
10615	What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not?
10615	What good would sight and hearing do to a creature that can not move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil?
10615	What is it, then, that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not?
10615	What makes the same man?
10615	What moved?
10615	What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in an body, but an alteration of the texture of it?
10615	What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they have, who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds?
10615	What was it that made anything come out of the body?
10615	Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety?
10615	Whence has it all the MATERIALS of reason and knowledge?
10615	Where is that practical truth that is universally received, without doubt or question, as it must be if innate?
10615	Where then are those innate principles of justice, piety, gratitude, equity, chastity?
10615	Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same men, though they lived several ages asunder?
10615	Which innate?
10615	Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery; which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard?
10615	Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this?
10615	Would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before?
10615	and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown?
10615	attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed?
10615	is this,--What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular motion or rest?
10615	number, whose stock is inexhaustible and truly infinite: and what a large and immense field doth extension alone afford the mathematicians?
10615	what universal principles of knowledge?
10615	why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it?
39964	And where were the others?
39964	Has the plant a soul? 39964 When a woman is strong, is n''t she strong after the same conception and the same strength?
39964	And do you not interchange the portrait for the person itself, without difficulty and misunderstanding?
39964	And how can any single brain assume to acquire all knowledge, to know everything?
39964	And how is a fact proven?
39964	And on the other hand, does not the promotion of our material interests require a penetration on our part of the wonders of creation?
39964	Are not these the concrete content of our material interests?
39964	Are there any stones that do not belong to the category of stones, or any kind of wood which is iron?
39964	Are they not simply substitutes?
39964	At best, will you not merely repeat what has long since been accomplished?
39964	Before, at, or after birth?
39964	But do not beasts, worms, and sensitive plants have that also?
39964	But how do I know what I state in such an offhand manner?
39964	But how is life infused into them?
39964	But how is that to be found?
39964	But how to explain that wonderful_ a priori_ knowledge which exceeds all experience?
39964	But is n''t it a contradiction that a special science wants to be general world wisdom?
39964	But is there anything which is absolutely good?
39964	But look here, has it not always been so?
39964	But the study of the anatomy of the hand can no more solve the question: What is writing?
39964	But was it founded on fact?
39964	But what about the question of the beginning and end of the world, or the question of the existence of God?
39964	But what else does the term material interests mean but the abstract expression of our existence, welfare, and development?
39964	But what good will it do a painter to have his special attention called to this fact?
39964	But what is there of unity that science teaches about them?
39964	But what thing is there that has any effects"in itself?"
39964	But where shall we draw the line in this comparison of images?
39964	But who claims that there are not many straight lines which are crooked at one end, which run straight on for a certain distance and then turn?
39964	But why do we call this the most essential part?
39964	By the help of brown- study from the interior of our brain, from revelation, or from experience?
39964	Can natural science do as much?
39964	Can the world be understood in a hermitage?
39964	Can we see the things themselves?
39964	Can we, by mere deduction through concepts which go beyond experience, arrive at truths?
39964	Could there not be some dogs who lacked the quality of watchfulness, and might not our pug- dog be very unreliable, in spite of all exact deductions?
39964	Do animals arise when the hot and the cold begin to disintegrate, as some claim?
39964	Do you not ask on seeing the portrait of some person unknown to you: Who is this?
39964	Does he not say explicitly that the penetration of the wonders of creation promotes our material interests?
39964	Does not this appear reasonable to you?...
39964	Does that require any explanation?
39964	Everything develops, why should not our intellects do so?
39964	For are not the effects tangible by which reason transforms nature and life?
39964	Has proud philosophy gained nothing since?
39964	Has the earth a soul?
39964	Have I now still to prove that all existence is of the same category?
39964	Have not your thoughts been connected always and everywhere with some worldly or real object?
39964	Have they a soul analogous to that of man?
39964	Have you ever seen a portrait or a copy that did not agree in some respect with the original?
39964	How are we to designate the species, how the genus?
39964	How can a man who is out of touch with the mass of the shifting population feel that he is one with the universe?
39964	How can thinkers who search for truth, being, relative causes, such as naturalists, be idealists?
39964	How can we see everything?
39964	How do we arrive at the knowledge of things which are not accessible to experience?
39964	How do we know that?
39964	How do we prove that a peach is a delicious fruit?
39964	How do we solve this contradiction?
39964	How is understanding possible?
39964	I remember reading in a satirical paper the question:"What is a gentleman?
39964	If the ancient Germans regarded the great oak as sacred and religious, why should not art and science become religious among the modern Germans?
39964	If the function of the heart may be referred to as material, why not the function of the brain?
39964	In certain shows, the clown is asked by the manager:"Clown, where have you been?"
39964	In seeking for an answer to the question: What is philosophy?
39964	In what respect are our material interests different from our mental penetration of things?
39964	Is it an idea?
39964	Is it not necessary, however, to make a distinction between poetry and truth?
39964	Is it the blood, which enables us to think, or the air or the fire?
39964	Is not everything a part, is not every part a thing?
39964	Is not general wisdom that which comprises all knowledge, all special science?
39964	Is not the air or the scent of flowers an ethereal body?
39964	Is not the material world and its understanding as essential as reason, as intellect, which bends to the task of exploring this world?
39964	Is the color of a leaf less of a thing than that leaf itself?
39964	Is the world a concept?
39964	Is this world- god a mere idea?
39964	It is the solution of the riddle of the ancient Eleatic philosophy: How can the one be contained in the many, and the many in one?
39964	It was the famous Kant who posed the question:"How is_ a priori_ knowledge possible?"
39964	May not our modern viewpoint, the category in which our present day science thinks, the category of cause and effect, be equally transitory?
39964	Mind and Matter: Which Is Primary, Which Is Secondary?
39964	Multiplicity, change, motion-- who is to split hairs about them, who will make fine distinctions?
39964	Must I not know everything in order to be world wise?
39964	Must I prove this?
39964	Now I ask: If nature, God, and absolute truth are one and the same thing, have we not learned something about the"final cause of all things?"
39964	Now you are familiar with that student''s song:"What''s Coming from the Heights?"
39964	Now, is this logic or is it theology?
39964	Or are you spiritualists who make a metaphysical distinction between the truth and the phenomenon?
39964	Or does it belong to the infinite and must it exist forever?
39964	Otherwise, how could misunderstandings arise?
39964	Our logic asks: Does wisdom descend mysteriously from the interior of the human brain, or does it come from the outer world like all experience?
39964	Scientists as well as scribes have ever embarrassed one another by the question: What is truth?
39964	Shall it be an idol or a king?
39964	Shall we use the intellect philosophically, or shall we use it empirically?
39964	Should not religion, which according to the words of a German emperor"must be preserved for the people,"also have its bounds in history?
39964	Should not that appear mysterious to it?
39964	Socrates in the market of Athens, and Plato in his dialogues, have probably said better things about the questions:"What is virtue?
39964	The fetish cult, the animal cult, the cult of the ideal and spiritual creator, or the cult of the real human mind?
39964	The great Kant has asked the plain question:"Is metaphysics practicable as a science?"
39964	The human understanding has its limits, why should it not?
39964	The next question is then: By what road do we arrive at its understanding?
39964	The philosophical celebrities and classic authorities are not even in accord on the question: What is philosophy and what is its aim?
39964	The question then arises: Which is the genuine and true division?
39964	The statements: I do, I work, I think, must be completed by an answer to the question: What are you doing, working, thinking?
39964	Thereupon Cebes asks:"Well, and what do you think of this now?"
39964	This book, its leaves, its letters, or their parts, are they units?
39964	Those sciences recognize only the phenomena of things; but where is the understanding which perceives the truth?"
39964	To analyze this idea means to solve the question, what is walking generally considered, what is the general nature of walking?
39964	What are all things?
39964	What can be more evident?
39964	What constitutes, then, this body which is distinguished from its transient form?
39964	What do I know about the shoe industry, if I know that it produces shoes?
39964	What good are all the treasures of Croesus, if health is lacking?
39964	What good is health to us, when we have nothing to bite?
39964	What is a"thing?"
39964	What is it that Lessing says?
39964	What is its beginning, what its end?
39964	What is its positive achievement?
39964	What is justice?
39964	What is justice?
39964	What is meant by political freedom?
39964	What is moral and reasonable?"
39964	What is not an image in the abstract, and what is more than an image in the concrete?
39964	What is the reason for this?
39964	What is the relation of the concrete to the abstract?
39964	What is the use of metaphysics under these circumstances?
39964	What would become of reason and language, if such a thing were to be considered?
39964	What, then, is religion and religious?
39964	Whence comes reason, where do we get our ideas, judgments, conclusions?
39964	Where and how are we to find a positive and definite knowledge of it?
39964	Where are we to begin and where to end?
39964	Where do I begin, where do I stop?
39964	Where do we find any indivisible unit outside of our abstract conceptions?
39964	Where do we find such eternal, imperishable, formless matter?
39964	Where does consciousness begin in the child?
39964	Where does the variety of science, its undecided vacillation end, and when does understanding become stable?
39964	Where is the consistent connection?
39964	Where, then, is the beginning and end, and how can we bring order into these relations?
39964	Where, who, what, is the supreme being to which everything else is subordinate, which brings system, consistency, logic, into our thought and actions?
39964	Who and what are now the objects of philosophy?
39964	Who has not heard the lament about the unreliability of the senses?
39964	Who or what is the intellect, whence does it come from, whither does it lead?
39964	Who will define to us what a line is?
39964	Who will deny that he can feel the force of heat, of cold, of gravitation?
39964	Who would be silly enough to deny that?
39964	Why do you want to be a theist, if you are a naturalist, or a naturalist if you are a theist?
39964	Why is not the"naturalistic"philosopher consistent by recognizing his special object, understanding, as a natural object?
39964	Why should not the action of the brain belong in the same category as the action of the heart?
39964	Why, then, speculate about God, freedom, and immortality, when indubitable knowledge may be obtained by the formal method of exact deductions?
39964	Would any one try to make us believe that there is a great and almighty eye that can look through blocks of metal the same as through glass?
39964	XII MIND AND MATTER: WHICH IS PRIMARY, WHICH SECONDARY?
39964	You know the old question: Which was first, the egg or the hen?
39964	You will probably ask: What has that to do with logic or the art of reasoning?
39964	than the physiological study of the brain can bring us nearer to the solution of the question: What is thought?
10616	''But of what use is all this fine knowledge of MEN''S OWN IMAGINATIONS, to a man that inquires after the reality of things?
10616	''Lead is a metal''to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for?
10616	''The whole is equal to all its parts:''what real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us?
10616	''the whole is equal to all its parts taken together?''
10616	AUT EA QUOE VIZ SUMMA INGENII RATIONE COMPREHENDAT, NULLA RATIONE MOVERI PUTET?]
10616	And if they were asked what passage was, how would they better define it than by motion?
10616	And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man?
10616	And to what purpose make them general, unless it were that they might have general names for the convenience of discourse and communication?
10616	Are monsters really a distinct species?
10616	Are not they also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea signified by the name ZAHAB?
10616	Are these general maxims of no use?
10616	But of what use is all such truth to us?
10616	But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God, who is there, that, by his own search and ability, can come to know?
10616	But what shall be here the criterion?
10616	But what shall be the criterion of this agreement?
10616	But who can help it, if truth will have it so?
10616	But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, SINCE WE CANNOT POSSIBLY CONCEIVE IT?
10616	For by what right is it that fusibility comes to be a part of the essence signified by the word gold, and solubility but a property of it?
10616	For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still: What causes rest in one, and motion in the other?
10616	For is it not at least as proper and significant to say, Passage is a motion from one place to another, as to say, Motion is a passage,& c.?
10616	For to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were by abstraction to make them general?
10616	For what is PASSAGE other than MOTION?
10616	For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species?
10616	For what need of a sign, when the thing signified is present and in view?
10616	For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree?
10616	For, if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last should we stop?
10616	For, though it may be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron?
10616	Had the upper part to the middle been of human shape, and all below swine, had it been murder to destroy it?
10616	Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident and blind chance to conduct them to their happiness or misery?
10616	He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors?
10616	Here everybody will be ready to ask, If changelings may be supposed something between man and beast, pray what are they?
10616	How many men have no other ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of those of the same profession?
10616	How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?
10616	I ask, Whether these general maxims have not the same use in the study of divinity, and in theological questions, that they have in other sciences?
10616	I ask, whether the complex idea in Adam''s mind, which he called KINNEAH, were adequate or not?
10616	I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence?
10616	I. I would ask them, whether they imagine that all matter, EVERY PARTICLE OF MATTER, thinks?
10616	If all matter does not think, I next ask, Whether it be ONLY ONE ATOM that does so?
10616	If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all of human species?
10616	If men should do so in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them?
10616	If not, what reason will there be shown more for the one than the other?
10616	Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce anything?
10616	Is it true of the IDEA of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones?
10616	Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea, and made part of the essence of the species that name ZAHAB stands for?
10616	Is there anything so extravagant as the imaginations of men''s brains?
10616	Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: but who knows what those ideas may be?
10616	Let them be so: what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be?
10616	Matter must be allowed eternal: Why?
10616	Objection, What shall become of those who want Proofs?
10616	Or can those be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth, which teach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey?
10616	Or is it true because any one has been witness to such an action?
10616	Or must the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font or no?
10616	Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so?
10616	Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?''
10616	Or who shall be the judge to determine?
10616	Or why is its colour part of the essence, and its malleableness but a property?
10616	Other spirits, who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge?
10616	QUID EST ENIM VERIUS, QUAM NEMINEM ESSE OPORTERE TAM STULTE AROGANTEM, UT IN SE MENTEM ET RATIONEM PUTET INESSE IN COELO MUNDOQUE NON PUTET?
10616	Shall a defect in the body make a monster; a defect in the mind( the far more noble, and, in the common phrase, the far more essential part) not?
10616	Shall the want of a nose, or a neck, make a monster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; the want of reason and understanding, not?
10616	So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other particular corporeal being, to have reason?
10616	The atomists, who define motion to be''a passage from one place to another,''what do they more than put one synonymous word for another?
10616	There are some watches that are made with four wheels, others with five; is this a specific difference to the workman?
10616	To know whether his idea of ADULTERY or INCEST be right, will a man seek it anywhere amongst things existing?
10616	To this, perhaps will be said, Has not an opal, or the infusion of LIGNUM NEPHRITICUM, two colours at the same time?
10616	Upon which, his friend demanding what scarlet was?
10616	WHAT is truth?
10616	What confusion of virtues and vices, if every one may make what ideas of them he pleases?
10616	What greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences?
10616	What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before?
10616	What is this more than trifling with words?
10616	What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and stones not?
10616	What more is contained in that maxim, than what the signification of the word TOTUM, or the WHOLE, does of itself import?
10616	What must we do for the rest?
10616	What need is there of REASON?
10616	What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract ideas of GLORY and AMBITION, before he has heard the names of them?
10616	What principle is requisite to prove that one and one are two, that two and two are four, that three times two are six?
10616	What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case?
10616	What shall we say, then?
10616	What sort of outside is the certain sign that there is or is not such an inhabitant within?
10616	What will become of Changelings in a future state?
10616	What, then, are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings?
10616	Whence comes this, then?
10616	Where is the head that has no chimeras in it?
10616	Where now( I ask) shall be the just measure; which the utmost bounds of that shape, that carries with it a rational soul?
10616	Wherein, then, would I gladly know, consist the precise and unmovable boundaries of that species?
10616	Which is nothing else but to know what OTHER simple ideas do, or do not co- exist with those that make up that complex idea?
10616	Who ever that had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of SEVEN, or a TRIANGLE?
10616	Who knows not what odd notions many men''s heads are filled with, and what strange ideas all men''s brains are capable of?
10616	Who of all these has established the right signification of the word, gold?
10616	Why do we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an herb?
10616	Will you deprive changelings of a future state?)
10616	[ The reason whereof is plain: for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold?
10616	[ What shall we then say?
10616	because you can not conceive how it can be made out of nothing: why do you not also think yourself eternal?
10616	i. c. 3), with a man''s head and hog''s body?
10616	that themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own opinions?
4705	A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: Why?
4705	After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it?
4705	An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why?
4705	And how can the floor and roof ever meet, while they are separated by the four walls, that lie in a contrary position?
4705	And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them?
4705	And how distinguish that exactly from a probability?
4705	And if they were founded on original instincts, coued they have any greater stability?
4705	And to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest?
4705	And what creature departs more widely, not only from right reason, but from his own character and disposition?
4705	And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire?
4705	And, Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object?
4705	Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct?
4705	Are they therefore, upon that account, immoral?
4705	But after what manner does it give pleasure?
4705	But can anything be imagined more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning?
4705	But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason?
4705	But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects Of EDUCATION?
4705	But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis?
4705	But in what manner?
4705	But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without an antecedent morality?
4705	But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive?
4705	But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour?
4705	But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred?
4705	But what do we mean by impossible?
4705	But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us?
4705	But what makes the end agreeable?
4705	But what passion?
4705	But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice?
4705	Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation?
4705	Do the children arise from this copulation more uniformly, than does the parents care for their safety and preservation?
4705	Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception?
4705	Do you therefore mean that it takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule, as is peculiar and essential to a right line?
4705	Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection?
4705	Does it discover a relation or a matter of fact?
4705	For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness?
4705	For from what impression coued this idea be derived?
4705	For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it?
4705	For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory?
4705	For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different?
4705	For if they can not, what possibly can become of them?
4705	For is it more certain, that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than that two young savages of different sexes will copulate?
4705	For supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body?
4705	For what does he mean by production?
4705	For what does reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious?
4705	For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him?
4705	For what is more capricious than human actions?
4705	For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions?
4705	For what reason?
4705	For whence should it be derived?
4705	For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity?
4705	For, who ever thought of forbearing any action, because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it?
4705	From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return?
4705	From whence does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions?
4705	Have you any notion of self or substance?
4705	Here therefore I must ask, What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point?
4705	How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines can not have one common segment?
4705	How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability?
4705	How else coued any thing exist without length, without breadth, or without depth?
4705	How is it possible they coued ever become objects of pride, except by means of that transition above- explained?
4705	How is this to be accounted for?
4705	How much more when aided by that circumstance?
4705	How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modifyed into that square table, and into this round one?
4705	How then shall we adjust those principles together?
4705	I Does it attend us at all times, or does it only return at intervals?
4705	I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE?
4705	I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE?
4705	I first ask mathematicians, what they mean when they say one line or surface is EQUAL to, or GREATER or LESS than another?
4705	I have declared my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surprized, if they should express a hatred of mine and of my person?
4705	I therefore ask, Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition?
4705	If at intervals, at what times principally does it return, and by what causes is it produced?
4705	If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner?
4705	If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance?
4705	If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them?
4705	Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection?
4705	Is it because it is his duty to be grateful?
4705	Is it in every part without being extended?
4705	Is it in this particular part, or in that other?
4705	Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent?
4705	Is it therefore nothing?
4705	Is self the same with substance?
4705	Is the indivisible subject, or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception?
4705	Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects, to which we suppose solidity to belong?
4705	Now after what manner are they related to ourselves?
4705	Now it is certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it?
4705	Now the question is, after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us?
4705	Now what idea have we of these bodies?
4705	Now what impression do oar senses here convey to us?
4705	Now what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible?
4705	On the back or fore side of it?
4705	On the surface or in the middle?
4705	Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality?
4705	Or if it were, is an exception to a general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason than because it is an exception?
4705	Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union?
4705	Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest?
4705	Or that it is impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points?
4705	Or, who ever performed any, that he might give rise to true conclusions?]
4705	Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private families?
4705	Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possest of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression?
4705	Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation?
4705	Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received?
4705	Should it be asked, what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other?
4705	The next question is, Of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us?
4705	The next question, then, should naturally be, how experience gives rise to such a principle?
4705	The question is, whether these intervals do not afford us the idea of extension without body?
4705	Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time?
4705	WHETHER IT IS BY MEANS OF OUR IDEAS OR IMPRESSIONS WE DISTINGUISH BETWIXT VICE AND VIRTUE, AND PRONOUNCE AN ACTION BLAMEABLE OR PRAISEWORTHY?
4705	We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?
4705	What beings surround me?
4705	What farther proof can be desired for the present system?
4705	What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas?
4705	What follows?
4705	What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family?
4705	What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I would deprive him of?
4705	What if he be a profligate debauchee, and would rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions?
4705	What if he be a vicious man, and deserves the hatred of all mankind?
4705	What more inconstant than the desires of man?
4705	What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties?
4705	What restraint, therefore, shall we impose on women, in order to counter- balance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity?
4705	What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falshood?
4705	When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable?
4705	Where am I, or what?
4705	Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated?
4705	Which of them shall we prefer?
4705	Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the 1st of January 1715, the 11th of March 1719, and the 3rd of August 1733?
4705	Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread?
4705	Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity?
4705	Why?
4705	Why?
4705	and on whom have, I any influence, or who have any influence on me?
4705	but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not?
4705	in short, what character, or peculiar understanding, is more excellent than another?
4705	whether a clear head, or a copious invention?
4705	whether a profound genius, or a sure judgment?
53792	A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: why?
53792	All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun?
53792	An action, or sentiment, or character, is virtuous or vicious; why?
53792	And are you so late in perceiving it?
53792	And by being the first, replied Demea, might he not have been sensible of his error?
53792	And for what reason impose on himself such a violence?
53792	And have you at last, said Cleanthes smiling, betrayed your intentions, Philo?
53792	And how distinguish that exactly from a probability?
53792	And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas?
53792	And if they were founded on original instincts, could they have any greater stability?
53792	And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both?
53792	And these whence?
53792	And what argument have you against such convulsions?
53792	And what creature departs more widely, not only from right reason, but from his own character and disposition?
53792	And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule?
53792	And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?...
53792	And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity?
53792	And where is the difficulty, replied Philo, of that supposition?
53792	And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience?
53792	And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite?
53792	And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious?
53792	And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals?
53792	And, after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression?
53792	And,_ Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object_?
53792	Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory?
53792	Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun?
53792	Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct?
53792	Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism?
53792	Are they, therefore, upon that account, immoral?
53792	Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than Cleanthes himself?
53792	Are you so late, says Philo, in teaching your children the principles of religion?
53792	Besides, consider, Demea: This very society, by which we surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to us?
53792	But according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess?
53792	But after what manner does it give pleasure?
53792	But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole?
53792	But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason?
53792	But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this nature?
53792	But did the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater happiness?
53792	But farther, why may not die material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity?
53792	But how is it conceivable, said Demea, that the world can arise from any thing similar to vegetation or generation?
53792	But how oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society?
53792	But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself?
53792	But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, why do they remain in life?....
53792	But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice?
53792	But if we stop, and go no farther; why go so far?
53792	But in what manner?
53792	But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former?
53792	But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible without an antecedent morality?
53792	But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance?
53792	But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive?
53792	But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience?
53792	But shall we say, upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour?
53792	But then I ask, if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred?
53792	But what do we mean by impossible?
53792	But what is the consequence?
53792	But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk, said Demea?
53792	But what makes the end agreeable?
53792	But what passion?
53792	But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals?
53792	But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice?
53792	Can the one opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so?
53792	Can we reach no farther in this subject than experience and probability?
53792	Can you explain their operations, and anatomize that fine internal structure on which they depend?
53792	Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house, find the generation of a universe?
53792	Do n''t you remember, said Philo, the excellent saying of Lord Bacon on this head?
53792	Do the children arise from this copulation more uniformly, than does the parents''care for their safety and preservation?
53792	Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form?
53792	Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception?
53792	Does it discover a relation or a matter of fact?
53792	Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference?
53792	For how can an effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause?
53792	For instance, what if I should revive the old Epicurean hypothesis?
53792	For is it necessary to prove what every one feels within himself?
53792	For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries especially in so late an age?
53792	For it is more certain that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than two young savages of different sexes will copulate?
53792	For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain?
53792	For what does reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious?
53792	For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him?
53792	For what is more capricious than human actions?
53792	For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference?
53792	For what other name can I give them?
53792	For what reason?
53792	For whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design?
53792	For who ever thought of forbearing any action, because others might possibly draw false conclusions from it?
53792	From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man?
53792	From whence does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy, and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions?
53792	From_ their_ parents?
53792	Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle?
53792	Have you any notion of_ self_ or_ substance_?
53792	Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements?
53792	Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move?
53792	How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence?
53792	How can we satisfy ourselves without going on_ in infinitum_?
53792	How could things have been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter?
53792	How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability?
53792	How is it possible they could ever become objects of pride, except by means of that transition above explained?
53792	How is this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity?
53792	How is this to be accounted for?
53792	How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations?
53792	How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases?
53792	How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites?
53792	I would fain know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted?
53792	If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance?
53792	If no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of Africa and Arabia, would the world have been dissolved?
53792	If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them?
53792	If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine?
53792	In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?
53792	Is a very small part a rule for the universe?
53792	Is he able, but not willing?
53792	Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able?
53792	Is it a rule for the whole?
53792	Is it any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life?
53792	Is it because''tis his duty to be grateful?
53792	Is it contrary to his intention?
53792	Is it from the intention of the Deity?
53792	Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former?
53792	Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon?
53792	Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion?
53792	Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre?
53792	Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow?
53792	Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance?
53792	Is there any other rule than the greater similarity of the objects compared?
53792	Is_ self_ the same with_ substance_?
53792	JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE?
53792	Justice, whether a natural or artificial Virtue?
53792	Now the question is, after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us?
53792	Now, after what manner are they related to ourselves?
53792	Now, as to the_ manner_ of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose them any wise resembling?
53792	Objects, which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for each other?
53792	Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore prà ¦ sto?
53792	Or how can order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it bestows?
53792	Or if it be possible to imagine, that such errors are the sources of all immorality?
53792	Or if the tree was once transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish?
53792	Or who ever performed any, that he might give rise to true conclusions?
53792	Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private families?
53792	Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere?
53792	Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: but how often are they defective?
53792	Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason?
53792	Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe?
53792	Should it be asked,_ what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other_?
53792	Since, therefore, this is the case with regard to property, and rights, and obligations, I ask, how it stands with regard to justice and injustice?
53792	The economy of final causes?
53792	The next question is, of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us?
53792	The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part?
53792	To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him a notion of its pleasures; whether should I conduct him?
53792	To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments?
53792	Was it_ Nothing_?
53792	What devotion or worship address to them?
53792	What farther proof can be desired for the present system?
53792	What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas?
53792	What follows?
53792	What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family?
53792	What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I would deprive him of?
53792	What if he be a profligate debauchee, and would rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions?
53792	What if he be a vicious man, and deserves the hatred of all mankind?
53792	What is the soul of man?
53792	What more inconstant than the desires of man?
53792	What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity love, anger?
53792	What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call_ thought_, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe?
53792	What restraint, therefore, shall we impose on women, in order to counterbalance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity?
53792	What then shall we pronounce on this occasion?
53792	What veneration or obedience pay them?
53792	What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest?
53792	What wo and misery does it not occasion?
53792	What_ data_ have you for such extraordinary conclusions?
53792	When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable?
53792	Whence arises the curious structure of an animal?
53792	Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects?
53792	Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena?
53792	Where then is the difficulty?
53792	Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute?
53792	Why have all men, I ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?....
53792	Why is there any misery at all in the world?
53792	Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities?
53792	Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears,& c.?
53792	Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation?
53792	Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity?
53792	Why, then, should we think, that order is more essential to one than the other?
53792	Why?
53792	Why?
53792	Would the manner of a leaf''s blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?
53792	You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, what is the cause of this cause?
53792	_ First_, It is directly contrary to experience, and our immediate consciousness?
53792	and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose?
53792	and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth?
53792	cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we?
53792	cried Demea: Whither does your imagination hurry you?
53792	et omnes Ignibus à ¦ theriis terras suffire feraces?
53792	how often excessive?
53792	in short, what character, or peculiar understanding, is more excellent than another?
53792	nay often the absence of one good( and who can possess all?)
53792	or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as Pamphilus?
53792	quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?''
53792	qui minstri tanti muneris fuerunt?
53792	qui vectes?
53792	quà ¦ ferramenta?
53792	quà ¦ machinà ¦?
53792	quà ¦ molito?
53792	then is he malevolent Is he both able and willing?
53792	to a ball, to an opera, to court?
53792	whence then is evil?
53792	whether a clear head, or a copious invention?
53792	whether a profound genius, or a sure judgment?
53792	why not stop at the material world?
37284	A bad son, I am afraid?
37284	Ai n''t there really, though?
37284	All of''em, ma''am?
37284	And did none of them ever die?
37284	And did none of them ever grow older?
37284	And did the money never melt away?
37284	And do you always lock the babies up when you go out?
37284	And do you live alone here with these babies, Charley?
37284	And do you often go out?
37284	And do you suppose_ he_ minds such things as crocuses?
37284	And have the children looked after themselves at all, sir?
37284	And how do you do, sir?
37284	And how do you live, Charley? 37284 And is that why you would put tables and chairs upon them, and have people walking over them with heavy boots?"
37284	And please, what''s hulks?
37284	And so, Phil,says George of the Shooting Gallery, after several turns in silence,"you were dreaming of the country last night?"
37284	And what are you thinking about me?
37284	And what,asked Mr. Gradgrind in a still lower voice,"did you read to your father, Jupe?"
37284	And when did mother die? 37284 And which is Oliver?"
37284	And yet,said Mr. Dombey,"you are two or three and thirty, I suppose?"
37284	And you''ll soon be grown up now?
37284	Are you there?
37284	Art in Heaven-- is the light a- comin'', sir?
37284	But can you, oh, can you really believe that this delicate boy has been the voluntary associate of the worst outcasts of society?
37284	But what makes you say this along of Rob, father?
37284	But you''re coming back to speak to me, when you have seen the gentleman away?
37284	But-- but do you think it did Edward good?
37284	Can you read?
37284	Come in,he said,"come in; what is the child afraid of?"
37284	Corporal punishment dispensed with?
37284	David,he said, making his lips thin, by pressing them together,"if I have an obstinate horse or dog to deal with, what do you think I do?"
37284	Do n''t know?
37284	Do you hear, Paul?
37284	Do you hear?
37284	Do you know who I am?
37284	Do you mean pretending to go there, and not going?
37284	Do you remember when he did this?
37284	Do you remember when in his inheritance of your nature, and in your pampering of his pride and passion, he did this, and disfigured me for life? 37284 Do you see this?"
37284	Do you think it did Edward harm, Clara?
37284	Driven to do it, were you?
37284	Eh?
37284	Excepting what?
37284	Father-- when''s he coming home?
37284	Formed his daughter on his own model?
37284	Given to government, Joe?
37284	Had n''t he better let it go?
37284	Have you anything to say?
37284	Have you as many as eight vacancies?
37284	Have you nothing to say to me?
37284	Have you-- did anybody-- has nothing been heard-- about me?
37284	He ai n''t got to be at all secretlike-- has he, Polly?
37284	He did n''t take any notice of you, I suppose?
37284	He is a nice- looking boy, is he not?
37284	His daughter? 37284 How can you ask such things, sir?
37284	How could you give me life, and take from me all the inappreciable things that raise it from the state of conscious death? 37284 How did you know it was the country?"
37284	How old are you, Phil?
37284	How old are you?
37284	I suppose,said Mr. Toodle, relishing his meal infinitely,"as our Biler is a- doin''now about as well as a boy_ can_ do, eh, Polly?"
37284	I surprise you, sir?
37284	I wonder who''s put into prison ships, and why they''re put there?
37284	If the bull was mad,said Paul,"how did he know that the boy had asked questions?
37284	In numbers, how many?
37284	Is every boy here?
37284	Is he, indeed?
37284	Is yours a strong constitution?
37284	It sounds unnatural, do n''t it?
37284	Jo, can you say what I say?
37284	Just fill that mug up with lukewarm water, William, will you?
37284	Master Briggs?
37284	Miss Dartle,said I,"if you can be so obdurate as not to feel for this afflicted mother----""Who feels for me?"
37284	Mrs. Joe,said I, as a last resort,"I should like to know-- if you would n''t much mind-- where the firing comes from?"
37284	My dear Steerforth, what is the matter?
37284	My dear love,said the elder lady, as she folded the weeping girl to her bosom,"do you think I would harm a hair of his head?"
37284	Not if it should happen to have been a tame bull, you little infidel?
37284	Not polite?
37284	Not so much as one short prayer?
37284	Nothing, I suppose?
37284	Nothing, sir?
37284	Now, Dombey,said Miss Blimber,"how have you got on with those books?"
37284	Now, Marigold, tell me what more do you want your adopted daughter to know?
37284	Now, do you want any more?
37284	Shall we make a man of him?
37284	Shall we make a man of him?
37284	So long as that?
37284	So you would carpet your room-- or your husband''s room, if you were a grown woman and had a husband-- with representations of flowers, would you? 37284 That is to say,"said Arthur, with a growing admiration of his quiet companion,"you are not fully discouraged even now?"
37284	The country,says Mr. George, plying his knife and fork;"why, I suppose you never clapped your eyes on the country, Phil?"
37284	The town''s enough for you, eh?
37284	Then what did you say''nothing''for, sir?
37284	Then why do n''t you learn?
37284	Then why do n''t you let me have some money of my own?
37284	Then why do n''t you shut him up? 37284 There''s no harm in that, I hope?"
37284	They? 37284 This fellow,"said Mr. Carker to Polly, giving him a gentle shake,"is your son, eh, ma''am?"
37284	This is most extraordinary,says the gentleman;"is it possible that you have been her only teacher?"
37284	This is two penn''orth of milk, is it, waiter?
37284	Tired? 37284 To keep''em safe, sir, do n''t you see?"
37284	To the wery top, sir?
37284	To whom, then?
37284	Trouble?
37284	Vice,sighed the surgeon, replacing the curtain,"takes up her abode in many temples; and who can say that a fair outside shall not enshrine her?"
37284	Was you, indeed, commander?
37284	What am I like, Mr. Young Jackson?
37284	What am I like, Mr. Young Jackson?
37284	What am I like, Young Jackson?
37284	What are you bothering about there, Smike?
37284	What are you crying for?
37284	What can this mean?
37284	What do I remember if not you? 37284 What do you mean by we?"
37284	What do you see in it?
37284	What does that mean?
37284	What is that?
37284	What is the matter? 37284 What it was like?"
37284	What marshes?
37284	What was it like?
37284	What were the swans doing on the grass?
37284	What would you ride, sir? 37284 What''s gone of your father and your mother, eh?"
37284	What''s that, sir?
37284	What''s that, sir?
37284	What''s that?
37284	What''s the report of this boy?
37284	What''s your name, boy?
37284	What?
37284	What_ have_ I done?
37284	Where are they?
37284	Where do you live?
37284	Who cried stop?
37284	Who said that?
37284	Who''s firing?
37284	Why do n''t you want to see him, then?
37284	Why not?
37284	Why that''s the proper time for me to talk, is n''t it?
37284	Why?
37284	Why?
37284	With anything?
37284	With chalk, sir?
37284	With some money, of course?
37284	Wondering again?
37284	Would you have doomed me, at any time, to the frost and blight that have hardened and spoiled me? 37284 Write?"
37284	You do n''t believe it, sir?
37284	You have a bad father, have you?
37284	You have a son, I believe?
37284	You know you''ve got no father or mother, and that you were brought up by the parish, do n''t you?
37284	You remember Me, Mr. Young Jackson?
37284	You remember me, Mr. Young Jackson?
37284	You remember me, Young Jackson?
37284	You see that fellow? 37284 You sleep in my room, do n''t you?"
37284	You''re the waxwork child, are you not?
37284	*****"Berry''s very fond of you, ai n''t she?"
37284	A wild ass or zebra would be too tame for you, would n''t he, eh, sir?
37284	An''t my place dirty?
37284	And that''s how I know how; do n''t you see, sir?"
37284	And what did it matter?
37284	And what do you mean by pulling up the crocuses and snowdrops, eh, sir?"
37284	And when I says to the Major,"Major, ca n''t you by_ any_ means give us a communication with the guard?"
37284	Are they obliged to sit mumchance, and to be ordered about till they are the laughingstock of young and old?
37284	Are you going to kill the wintner, sir?"
37284	Are you ready?"
37284	Are you rewarded,_ now_, for your years of trouble?"
37284	Bishop said, dubiously, did he really think so?
37284	But have you been very dutiful to me?"
37284	But what about the hundreds of thousands of minds that have been deformed forever by the incapable pettifoggers who have pretended to form them?
37284	But what is a man to do?
37284	But why was Miss Monflathers always vexed and irritated with the poor apprentice-- how did that come to pass?
37284	But will you promise to have me took there, sir, and laid along with him?"
37284	Charley,"said my guardian, turning his face away for a moment,"how do you live?"
37284	Come back harder?
37284	David said:"It is laborious, is it not?"
37284	Dickens makes the artist in Somebody''s Luggage say:"Who are you passing every day at your competitive excruciations?
37284	Did Louisa see these things of herself?
37284	Did it bite, hey?
37284	Did it bite?
37284	Did you ever know a prayer?"
37284	Do I understand that he asked for more, after he had eaten the supper allotted by the dietary?"
37284	Do n''t they, Tom?"
37284	Do n''t you know that the harder you are at work, the happier you are?"
37284	Do you ever see horses walking up and down the sides of rooms in reality-- in fact?
37284	Do you mind?"
37284	Do you want to see the country, Phil?"
37284	Do you?"
37284	Dombey?"
37284	Every teacher should ask himself every day,"Am I a child- queller?"
37284	Had it a deep prong, hey?
37284	Have they no liberty, no will, no right to speak?
37284	He doctors sick horses, I dare say?"
37284	He then showed me the cane, and asked me what I thought of_ that_, for a tooth?
37284	Hey?
37284	Hey?"
37284	Hey?"
37284	Hey?"
37284	Hey?"
37284	How can you ask?"
37284	How could he?
37284	How did I know it?
37284	How do you communicate with her?"
37284	How do you like it, and what do you think of gin, instead?
37284	How much those benighted teachers who so tragically ask"What_ can_ you do with bad boys, if you do_ not_ use corporal punishment?"
37284	How old should you think my father was, cousin?"
37284	How would he do it?
37284	I am a very little boy, sir; and it is so-- so----""So what?"
37284	I began it, when I was but a child, because it brought me and other children into company, do n''t you see?
37284	I believe young people are quick enough to observe and imitate; and why or how should they respect whom no one else respects, and everybody slights?
37284	I know what you''re a- going to say, Pip?
37284	I understand you to have been in the habit of reading to your father?"
37284	I wonder where they_ do_ go, by the bye?
37284	Inspired?
37284	Is my daughter a- washin''?
37284	Is there any light a- comin''?"
37284	Jellyby''s?"
37284	Joey asked, when Mr. Wilding unfolded his plan:"Is all to live in the house, Young Master Wilding?
37284	Like a sort of rebel, do n''t you see?"
37284	Look at your boy: he is yourn, ai n''t he?
37284	Louisa sat looking at the fire so long that Tom asked,"Have you gone to sleep, Loo?"
37284	My childhood had no grace of childhood, my youth had no charm of youth, and what can be expected from such a lost beginning?"
37284	My misfortunes all began in wagging, sir, but what could I do, exceptin''wag?"
37284	Nickleby?"
37284	No?
37284	Now let me ask you girls and boys, would you paper a room with representations of horses?"
37284	Of what?"
37284	On leaving, Mr. Dombey said to Paul:"You''ll try and learn a great deal here, and be a clever man, wo n''t you?"
37284	One day he said to them:"Why are you not interested here?
37284	People that met us might stare a bit and laugh, but what did_ I_ care if she caught the idea?
37284	Perhaps your overhearing my little scholars sing some of their lessons has led you so far astray as to think me a good teacher?
37284	Redlaw, in The Haunted Man, said to the poor boy who came to his room:"What is your name?"
37284	Rosa Dartle asked Steerforth about"That sort of people-- are they really animals and clods, and beings of another order?
37284	Shall I tell you what I consider those eyes of hers that were here just now, to have always looked at, to get that expression?
37284	Spell it?
37284	The fortunate candidates whose heads and livers you have turned upside down for life?
37284	The happiness of the little"minders"at old Betty Higden''s is in sharp contrast to the misery of the boarders of the respectable(?)
37284	The two other cellarmen, the three porters, the two''prentices, and the odd men?"
37284	Thee wish to be made acquainted with the cage, dost thee-- the cage, the stocks, and the whipping post?
37284	They used to say to one another, sometimes, Supposing all the children upon earth were to die, would the flowers, and the water, and the sky be sorry?
37284	This early trial of yours, that is fit to make your little heart burst and your very eyes come out of your head with crying, what is it?
37284	Was Dickens consciously and intentionally an educator?
37284	Was it a double tooth, hey?
37284	Was it a sharp tooth, hey?
37284	What burying- ground, Jo?"
37284	What can I do to save him, sir?"
37284	What can you possibly want to know of circuses then?
37284	What childhood did you ever leave to me?
37284	What could a boy do but hate him?
37284	What do you mean, boy?"
37284	What does she make a sham for, and pretend to give me money, and take it away again?
37284	What else did you expect?"
37284	What escape have I had from problems that could be demonstrated, and realities that could be grasped?"
37284	What have paupers to do with soul or spirit?
37284	What have you done, O father, what have you done, with the garden that should have bloomed once, in this great wilderness here?"
37284	What is it?
37284	What is your father?"
37284	What more natural or more logical than the practice of checking the outflow of a child''s inner life if we believe his inner life to be depraved?
37284	What now?"
37284	What''s amiss, old boy?
37284	What''s come of all the boys?
37284	What''s home?
37284	What''s that?"
37284	What_ could_ the boy be crying for?
37284	When Edith upbraided her mother for practically compelling her to marry Mr. Dombey, her mother asked angrily:"What do you mean?
37284	When Guster, Mr. Snagsby''s servant, got him some food, she said:"Are you hungry?"
37284	When Lady Dedlock met Jo, she asked him:"Are you the boy I''ve read of in the papers?"
37284	When were travellers by wheels and hoofs seen with such red- hot cheeks as those?
37284	Where are the graces of my soul?
37284	Where are the sentiments of my heart?
37284	Where dost come from?"
37284	Where''s his religion, I should like to know, when he goes flying in the face of the Bible like that?
37284	Who are you?
37284	Who does not know what must be the central point of all the happiness of such a child?
37284	Who is that girl?"
37284	Who would exchange this rapid hurry of the blood for yonder stagnant misery, though its pace were twenty miles for one?
37284	Why are you fond of your sister Florence?"
37284	Why do you call it_ my_ allowance, and never let me spend it?"
37284	Why do you use me like this?
37284	Why would n''t you?"
37284	Why would you?"
37284	Will you hold that noise, sir?"
37284	Will, purpose, hope?
37284	Would you like to feel it?
37284	Would you use a carpet having a representation of flowers upon it?"
37284	You do n''t mind sleeping among the coffins, I suppose?
37284	You have been in the habit of reading to your father and those people I found you among, I dare say?"
37284	You have found it out at last, have you?
37284	You know you''re an orphan, I suppose?"
37284	You ordered that thick bread and butter for three, did you?"
37284	You remember?"
37284	You''d like to ride a roaring lion, would n''t you, sir, eh, sir?
37284	Your father breaks horses, do n''t he?"
37284	echoed my sister,"trouble?"
37284	he said to Mr. Dombey;"and how is my little friend?"
37284	it was n''t your fault; it was mine, I suppose-- eh?"
37284	it''s you, is it?"
37284	retorted Joe sorrowfully;"why do n''t you, father?
37284	said Edith, looking at her;"when was I a child?
37284	said Mr. Gradgrind, leading each away by a hand;"what do you do here?"
37284	sneezed, did you?"
37284	that''s all, is it?"
37284	that''s the milk and water, is it, William?"
37284	the Major says, quite huffy,"No, madam, it''s not to be done"; and when I says,"Why not?"
37284	what does it all mean?"
37284	what''s parents got in their heads?
37284	when were they so good- humouredly and merrily bloused?
37284	where''s ma''s duty as a parent?"
1726	''And he who remembers, remembers that which he sees and knows?''
1726	''And he who sees knows?''
1726	''And if you say"Yes,"the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, as Euripides would say?''
1726	''But Protagoras will retort:"Can anything be more or less without addition or subtraction?"''
1726	''But if he closes his eyes, does he not remember?''
1726	''Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving?''
1726	''That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?''
1726	''What do you mean, Socrates?''
1726	''What do you mean?''
1726	''What may that be?''
1726	''Why, Socrates, how can you argue at all without using them?''
1726	( b) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux?
1726	( c) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant?
1726	--That will be our answer?
1726	Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new- born child, of which I have delivered you?
1726	Am I not right?
1726	Am I not right?
1726	And could you repeat the conversation?''
1726	And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth?
1726	And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which the analogous word logos tends to create, of a proposition and a definition?
1726	And how can any one be ignorant of either of them, and yet know both of them?
1726	And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be right; or are they both right?
1726	And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous term''elements,''or''letters''?
1726	And now, what are you saying?--Are there two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define knowledge to be the true?
1726	And so we must ask again, What is knowledge?
1726	And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else?
1726	And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?
1726	And the same of perceiving: do you understand me?
1726	And therefore let us draw nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires; and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not?
1726	And what other case is conceivable, upon the supposition that we either know or do not know all things?
1726	And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting?
1726	Are its movements identical with those of the body, or only preconcerted and coincident with them, or is one simply an aspect of the other?
1726	Are not these speculations charming, Theaetetus, and very good for a person in your interesting situation?
1726	Are you so profoundly convinced of this?
1726	Are you still in labour, or have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth?
1726	But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this is untrue?''
1726	But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before we have found knowledge?
1726	But did you ever say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good?
1726	But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?
1726	But have we not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater?
1726	But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion possible?
1726	But how can he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one to be the other?
1726	But how can the syllable be known if the letter remains unknown?
1726	But how is false opinion possible?
1726	But if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the false in such cases?
1726	But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge?
1726	But may there not be''heterodoxy,''or transference of opinion;--I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be another?
1726	But still an old difficulty recurs; we ask ourselves,''How is false opinion possible?''
1726	But tell me, Socrates, in heaven''s name, is this, after all, not the truth?
1726	But then, as Plato asks,--and we must repeat the question,--What becomes of the mind?
1726	But what is SO?
1726	But what is the third definition?
1726	But when the word''knowledge''was found how was it to be explained or defined?
1726	But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?
1726	But would this hold in any parallel case?
1726	But, as we are at our wits''end, suppose that we do a shameless thing?
1726	But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is?
1726	Can a man see and see nothing?
1726	Can a whole be something different from the parts?
1726	Can two unknowns make a known?
1726	Can we answer that question?
1726	Can we suppose one set of feelings or one part of the mind to interpret another?
1726	Could he have pretended to cite from a well- known writing what was not to be found there?
1726	Did Protagoras merely mean to assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind?
1726	Did you ever hear that too?
1726	Do we not seem to perceive instinctively and as an act of sense the differences of articulate speech and of musical notes?
1726	Do you agree?
1726	Do you know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based?''
1726	Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument?
1726	Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non- existing things?
1726	Does it differ as subject and object in the same manner?
1726	Does not explanation appear to be of this nature?
1726	EUCLID: Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion?
1726	Even in sleep, did you ever imagine that odd was even?
1726	For an objection occurs to him:--May there not be errors where there is no confusion of mind and sense?
1726	For how can the exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion?
1726	For how can we know a compound of which the simple elements are unknown to us?
1726	For if the Heraclitean flux is extended to every sort of change in every instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an instant?
1726	For must not opinion be equally expressed in a proposition?
1726	He asks whether a man can know and not know at the same time?
1726	How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it?
1726	How can you or any one maintain the contrary?
1726	How is this?
1726	How will Protagoras answer this argument?
1726	I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?
1726	I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?
1726	I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation?
1726	I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in time of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples?
1726	I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes?
1726	I will make my meaning clearer by an example:--You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?
1726	If all that exists in time is illusion, we may well ask with Plato,''What becomes of the mind?''
1726	In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus?
1726	Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed?
1726	Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?
1726	Is it not so?
1726	Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals?
1726	Is not this a"reductio ad absurdum"of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception?
1726	Is the introspecting thought the same with the thought which is introspected?
1726	Is the mind active or passive, or partly both?
1726	Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?
1726	Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather incline to think, two?
1726	Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes them?
1726	Let us grant what you say-- then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion-- am I right?
1726	Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non- existence of things that are not:--You have read him?
1726	Must he not be talking''ad captandum''in all this?
1726	Must he not see, hear, or touch some one existing thing?
1726	Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind?
1726	O Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey?
1726	O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great?
1726	Once more then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question--"What is knowledge?"
1726	Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question,''What is knowledge?''
1726	Or again, if we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them?
1726	Or are they both right?--he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician''s judgment?
1726	Or did any man in his senses ever fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one?
1726	Or did he mean to deny that there is an objective standard of truth?
1726	Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?
1726	Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him?
1726	Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing?
1726	Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts?
1726	Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike?
1726	Plato discards both figures, as not really solving the question which to us appears so simple:''How do we make mistakes?''
1726	Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same?
1726	SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all?
1726	SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all( in the plural) is there not one thing which we express?
1726	SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?
1726	SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then?
1726	SOCRATES: And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?
1726	SOCRATES: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?
1726	SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?
1726	SOCRATES: And another and another?
1726	SOCRATES: And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?
1726	SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and calculation?
1726	SOCRATES: And by wisdom the wise are wise?
1726	SOCRATES: And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?
1726	SOCRATES: And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?
1726	SOCRATES: And did you find such a class?
1726	SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them?
1726	SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean?
1726	SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?
1726	SOCRATES: And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?
1726	SOCRATES: And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?
1726	SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is?
1726	SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?
1726	SOCRATES: And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?
1726	SOCRATES: And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?
1726	SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?
1726	SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about him which are numerable?
1726	SOCRATES: And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that which is?
1726	SOCRATES: And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all?
1726	SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is?
1726	SOCRATES: And how about Protagoras himself?
1726	SOCRATES: And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours?
1726	SOCRATES: And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?
1726	SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen?
1726	SOCRATES: And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, all things must always have every sort of motion?
1726	SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other?
1726	SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not?
1726	SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?
1726	SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name?
1726	SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter?
1726	SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?
1726	SOCRATES: And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb''to know''?
1726	SOCRATES: And is memory of something or of nothing?
1726	SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent?
1726	SOCRATES: And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise?
1726	SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible?
1726	SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as just now said?
1726	SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?
1726	SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders?
1726	SOCRATES: And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?
1726	SOCRATES: And of true opinion also?
1726	SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore not- seeing is not- knowing?
1726	SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And that I myself practise midwifery?
1726	SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them one?
1726	SOCRATES: And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself?
1726	SOCRATES: And that is six?
1726	SOCRATES: And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived?
1726	SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing?
1726	SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each?
1726	SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?
1726	SOCRATES: And the race of animals is generated in the same way?
1726	SOCRATES: And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself to any one else?
1726	SOCRATES: And therefore not in science or knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished, that is to say, they move in place and are also changed?
1726	SOCRATES: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to?
1726	SOCRATES: And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal?
1726	SOCRATES: And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?
1726	SOCRATES: And what of the mental habit?
1726	SOCRATES: And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception?
1726	SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?
1726	SOCRATES: And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil?
1726	SOCRATES: And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other?
1726	SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?
1726	SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them?
1726	SOCRATES: Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?
1726	SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all?
1726	SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together?
1726	SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true?
1726	SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?
1726	SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters?
1726	SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole?
1726	SOCRATES: But is the aim attained always?
1726	SOCRATES: But is there any parallel to this?
1726	SOCRATES: But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name?
1726	SOCRATES: But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them?
1726	SOCRATES: But surely he can not suppose what he knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows?
1726	SOCRATES: But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what appears is?
1726	SOCRATES: But through what do you perceive all this about them?
1726	SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all?
1726	SOCRATES: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person?
1726	SOCRATES: Can a man see something and yet see nothing?
1726	SOCRATES: Capital; and what followed?
1726	SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says?
1726	SOCRATES: Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking?
1726	SOCRATES: Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?
1726	SOCRATES: Either together or in succession?
1726	SOCRATES: Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven?
1726	SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not''knowable''?
1726	SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O?
1726	SOCRATES: He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is?
1726	SOCRATES: He who knows, can not but know; and he who does not know, can not know?
1726	SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived?
1726	SOCRATES: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction-- What is knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that they both exist?
1726	SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument?
1726	SOCRATES: How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive?
1726	SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO?
1726	SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element?
1726	SOCRATES: If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he can not think that the one of them is the other?
1726	SOCRATES: If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux?
1726	SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception can not come to you, either through the one or the other organ?
1726	SOCRATES: If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it the same-- when unlike, other?
1726	SOCRATES: In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts?
1726	SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps?
1726	SOCRATES: Is he a geometrician?
1726	SOCRATES: Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another?
1726	SOCRATES: Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing-- for example, What is clay?
1726	SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters?
1726	SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:--There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick-- Are they like or unlike?
1726	SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds?
1726	SOCRATES: Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other?
1726	SOCRATES: Nor of any other science?
1726	SOCRATES: Of things learned and perceived, that is?
1726	SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has seen?
1726	SOCRATES: Once more we shall have to begin, and ask''What is knowledge?''
1726	SOCRATES: Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man?
1726	SOCRATES: Perception would be the collective name of them?
1726	SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?
1726	SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason?
1726	SOCRATES: Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras?
1726	SOCRATES: Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear?
1726	SOCRATES: Tell me, now-- How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else?
1726	SOCRATES: That is good news; whose son is he?
1726	SOCRATES: That is of six?
1726	SOCRATES: That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading?
1726	SOCRATES: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?
1726	SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?
1726	SOCRATES: Then do we not come back to the old difficulty?
1726	SOCRATES: Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?
1726	SOCRATES: Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing?
1726	SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?
1726	SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word''all''of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural?
1726	SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form?
1726	SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them?
1726	SOCRATES: Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body?
1726	SOCRATES: Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self- existent substance or as a predicate of something else?
1726	SOCRATES: Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:--Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?
1726	SOCRATES: Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us?
1726	SOCRATES: Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception?
1726	SOCRATES: Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?
1726	SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?
1726	SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?
1726	SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?
1726	SOCRATES: Then they must be distinguished?
1726	SOCRATES: Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not?
1726	SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?
1726	SOCRATES: Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?
1726	SOCRATES: Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way?
1726	SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge?
1726	SOCRATES: Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it?
1726	SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility?
1726	SOCRATES: We have at length satisfactorily proven beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, and shall we do as he says?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, and what is the difficulty?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term''explanation''?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all( in the plural) and the all( in the singular)?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read?
1726	SOCRATES: Well, may not a man''possess''and yet not''have''knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking?
1726	SOCRATES: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?
1726	SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views?
1726	SOCRATES: What shall we say then?
1726	SOCRATES: What was it?
1726	SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus?
1726	SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely?
1726	SOCRATES: Which is probably correct-- for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion?
1726	SOCRATES: Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?
1726	SOCRATES: Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?
1726	SOCRATES: You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another?
1726	SOCRATES: You have heard the common explanation of the verb''to know''?
1726	Shall I answer for him?
1726	Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus?
1726	Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false?
1726	Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows?
1726	Such are the lawyers; will you have the companion picture of philosophers?
1726	TERPSION: The dysentery, you mean?
1726	TERPSION: The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the conversation?
1726	TERPSION: Was he alive or dead?
1726	TERPSION: Where then?
1726	THEAETETUS: About what?
1726	THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: And how would you amend the former statement?
1726	THEAETETUS: And is not that, Socrates, nobly said?
1726	THEAETETUS: And was that wrong?
1726	THEAETETUS: And why should that be shameless?
1726	THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...?
1726	THEAETETUS: But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all?
1726	THEAETETUS: But what puts you out of heart?
1726	THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition?
1726	THEAETETUS: How can he?
1726	THEAETETUS: How could it?
1726	THEAETETUS: How do the two expressions differ?
1726	THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: How so?
1726	THEAETETUS: How?
1726	THEAETETUS: I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?
1726	THEAETETUS: I should call all of them perceiving-- what other name could be given to them?
1726	THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O. SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable?
1726	THEAETETUS: In what manner?
1726	THEAETETUS: Let us imagine such an aviary-- and what is to follow?
1726	THEAETETUS: Pray what is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question?
1726	THEAETETUS: Then what is colour?
1726	THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding?
1726	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1726	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1726	THEAETETUS: What are they?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEAETETUS: What experience?
1726	THEAETETUS: What hostages?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What is that?
1726	THEAETETUS: What makes you say so?
1726	THEAETETUS: What makes you say so?
1726	THEAETETUS: What question?
1726	THEAETETUS: What was it?
1726	THEAETETUS: What?
1726	THEAETETUS: What?
1726	THEAETETUS: Who indeed, Socrates?
1726	THEAETETUS: Who, Socrates, would dare to say so?
1726	THEAETETUS: Why?
1726	THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables?
1726	THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?
1726	THEODORUS: How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates?
1726	THEODORUS: How shall we answer, Theaetetus?
1726	THEODORUS: How so?
1726	THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen?
1726	THEODORUS: In what way?
1726	THEODORUS: Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?
1726	THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
1726	THEODORUS: What do you mean?
1726	THEODORUS: What is it?
1726	THEODORUS: What is that?
1726	THEODORUS: Who indeed?
1726	Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body?
1726	Tell me, then, what do you think of the notion that"All things are becoming"?''
1726	Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know?
1726	The mind, when occupied by herself with being, is said to have opinion-- shall we say that''Knowledge is true opinion''?
1726	The multitude may not and do not agree in Protagoras''own thesis that''Man is the measure of all things;''and then who is to decide?
1726	They would say, as I imagine-- Can that which is wholly other than something, have the same quality as that from which it differs?
1726	Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?
1726	Upon his own showing must not his''truth''depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has more or fewer of them?
1726	Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you?
1726	We are often told that we should enquire into all things before we accept them;--with what limitations is this true?
1726	Weary of asking''What is truth?''
1726	Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position?
1726	Were not you and Theodorus just now remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time?
1726	What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus?
1726	What are we to think of time and space?
1726	What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion?
1726	What say you?
1726	What say you?
1726	What then is knowledge?
1726	What then is knowledge?
1726	What then is knowledge?
1726	When he says that''knowledge is in perception,''with what does he perceive?
1726	Who can divide the nerves or great nervous centres from the mind which uses them?
1726	Who can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary?
1726	Who can separate the pains and pleasures of the mind from the pains and pleasures of the body?
1726	Who is our judge?
1726	Who is the judge or where is the spectator, having a right to control us?''
1726	Why should we not go a step further still and doubt the existence of the senses of all things?
1726	Why should we single out one of these abstractions to be the a priori condition of all the others?
1726	Will you answer me a question:''Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?''
1726	Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument?
1726	Without further preface, but at the same time apologizing for his eagerness, he asks,''What is knowledge?''
1726	Would an untrained man, for example, be as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who attended him?
1726	Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bade me be serious, and complained of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy?
1726	You remember?
1726	and another, and another?
1726	and of what sort do you mean?
1726	and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?
1726	and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition?
1726	can you tell me?
1726	do not mistakes often happen?
1726	for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us?
1726	for what reason?
1726	here are six dice; they are more than four and less than twelve;"more and also less,"would you not say?''
1726	or hear and hear nothing?
1726	or shall we aver that, seeing them, we must know them?
1726	or shall we say that we not only hear, but know what they are saying?
1726	or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows?
1726	or touch and touch nothing?
1726	or will this be too much of a digression?
1726	or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion if I take away your first- born?
1726	or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not?
1726	or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know?
1726	the sound of words or the sight of letters in a foreign tongue?''
1726	what is temperance?
1726	which of us will speak first?