This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.
identifier | question |
---|---|
2412 | What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? |
41838 | Then, you state that silk- hats are the promoters and cause of civilization in a community? |
41838 | For instance, the question once asked a respectable citizen on the witness stand:"Have you stopped beating your mother?" |
41838 | For instance:"You assert that the more civilized a community, the more silk- hats are to be found in it?" |
41838 | Upon what grounds do we argue? |
41838 | What is this mental process? |
41838 | When Newton saw the apple fall, the anticipatory question flashed through his mind,''Why do not the heavenly bodies fall like this apple?'' |
41838 | Why? |
10731 | ***** How should a man be content so long as he fails to obtain complete unity in his inmost being? |
10731 | ***** If education or warning were of any avail, how could Seneca''s pupil be a Nero? |
10731 | ***** Why should it be folly to be always intent on getting the greatest possible enjoyment out of the moment, which is our only sure possession? |
10731 | But has any man ever been completely at one with himself? |
10731 | But when I entered into the other-- how shall I express my astonishment at what I saw? |
10731 | For example, should he defend suicide, you may at once exclaim,"Why do n''t you hang yourself?" |
10731 | For, in the first place, what can such a man say? |
10731 | How is inner unity even possible under such circumstances? |
10731 | Nay, is not the very thought a contradiction? |
10731 | Now the question is, What counter- trick avails for the other party? |
10731 | Should he maintain that Berlin is an unpleasant place to live in, you may say,"Why do n''t you leave by the first train?" |
10731 | Since this is what happens, where is the value of the opinion even of a hundred millions? |
10731 | Why is this? |
52945 | ''How do you account for memory?'' |
52945 | All these were essential to the effect-- and what has become of them? |
52945 | And if not recoverable, where at least and in what form does it exist? |
52945 | And when the target and flattened bullet have cooled down? |
52945 | Are they to be expected to see in the hare only the properties common to all the animals reviewed? |
52945 | But what is the meaning of the emphatic''when only''? |
52945 | Does he resemble a''successful and patriotic general''--a''benevolent monarch''--a''wise legislator''--a''virtuous man''? |
52945 | Does the body show any marks or traces of thought that may serve to revive ideas in the absence of objects? |
52945 | For why? |
52945 | Has a subject such or such an attribute? |
52945 | Have they also gone to warm the universe? |
52945 | How is the equivalence of energy maintained in this case? |
52945 | How then is it to be further explained? |
52945 | If a zoologist, for example, were to determine beforehand how many classes of animals there ought to be, would they not say he was acting improperly? |
52945 | Is there anything analogous to this sort of division in any science or branch of practical thought? |
52945 | The servant in piteous accents exclaimed,''What is the meaning of this treatment?'' |
52945 | The wife on seeing this said,''What hast thou done with the golden cup?'' |
52945 | To what shall it now be likened? |
52945 | Under what image is the ego figured that it should be capable of division? |
52945 | What has become of the force expended? |
52945 | What has_ place_ to do with the action of a universal law? |
52945 | What is its function in substantialism? |
52945 | What is to prevent his hearers from concluding that birds are furred animals and fishes quadrupeds? |
52945 | What sort of representation can subsist between one concrete stroke and every other concrete stroke? |
52945 | What then is_ x_? |
52945 | When the Samradian asked,''Where is the horse?'' |
52945 | Where did the information that the barometer is falling come from? |
52945 | Which are we to suppose the speaker meant us to understand? |
52945 | Why not? |
52945 | Why should a logical method be unsuitable for every sort of subject except those matters of logic that are beyond the mere elements?] |
52945 | Why then have more classes than these four? |
52945 | Would logicians themselves sanction such a classification in a natural science? |
38141 | And, if a system, does it, in particular, present such phases( such relations, categories) as Hegel shows forth? 38141 Anyway,"Dewey says,"before we either abuse or recommend genetic method we ought to have some answers to these questions: Just what is it? |
38141 | How then does, say, a case of perception with effort differ from a case of''easy''or effortless perception? 38141 What do we mean by individuality? |
38141 | What is the relation of knowledge, of theory, to that Ought which seems to be the very essence of moral conduct? 38141 [ 106] How do these specific, actual activities come to be called capacities? |
38141 | [ 188] Why is it necessary to make such a distinction at all? 38141 [ 22] This statement raises the more specific question, what is meaning? |
38141 | And to what extent would physiology illuminate the problem of the relation of the generic ideas to their appropriate objects? |
38141 | And why necessary to move back and forth between the two provisional standpoints? |
38141 | Are the categories of biology fitted to explain mind and spirit? |
38141 | But how does Dewey propose to improve upon Kant''s position? |
38141 | But how will this help to bring perception and conception into closer union? |
38141 | But the question may be asked,"Whence come the ideal elements which give to experience its meaning?" |
38141 | But what is the correct attitude toward the self? |
38141 | But where does psychology stand in this classification? |
38141 | Can it be done? |
38141 | Does the self merely trace out the meaning already present in reality, or is it a factor in the creation of meaning? |
38141 | His question is not, What is the best means of accomplishing a given purpose, but, What end is worth attaining? |
38141 | How apply them correctly to the matter in hand? |
38141 | How can the inferred reality of the star be established, considering the subjectivity of all perception? |
38141 | How does it come, then, that this particular method achieves such an effective hegemony over the other modes of reflection? |
38141 | How does it stand, then, with Dewey''s own account of the knowledge process? |
38141 | How does the proposition square up with reality or experience? |
38141 | How, it may be asked, does the''direct descriptive method''escape the limitations which it imposes upon the other forms of reflective thought? |
38141 | If man is to hold no beliefs except those proved valid by experience, how can there be any to validate? |
38141 | If the truth or falsity of an idea is not discovered by thought, then by what faculty might it be discovered? |
38141 | In view of the wider meaning of the self, Dewey asks,"Can the result of the transcendental deduction stand without further interpretation?" |
38141 | In what sense has the philosophy of the past been misanthropic? |
38141 | Is the world such a connected system as he holds it to be? |
38141 | It is well enough to feed and house human bodies, but the paramount question will always be: What kinds of souls are to dwell in these bodies? |
38141 | Just what is to come of it and how? |
38141 | Or, to put the question more explicitly, why did he retain as a fundamental assumption Kant''s''manifold of sensations''? |
38141 | That it comes''after something and for the sake of something,''namely,''direct''experience? |
38141 | The analysis of action is from the first an analysis of what is to be done; how, then, should it come out excepting with a''this should be done''? |
38141 | The difference, I repeat, shall be wholly in sensory quale; but in_ what_ sensory quale? |
38141 | This raises the question, What is theory? |
38141 | What does it mean to say that a Stoic theory of knowledge holds a monopoly in modern philosophy? |
38141 | What does the internal evidence prove? |
38141 | What is to be done with them? |
38141 | What is to be made of this intermittance of thought? |
38141 | What might be expected, then, of the essays which are primarily critical? |
38141 | What relation have ideas about morality to specific moral conduct? |
38141 | What shall be said, then, with reference to the assertion that thought operates in the interests of the non- cognitive life processes? |
38141 | What, then, is it? |
38141 | Which shall be used in dealing with the development of morals? |
38141 | Why is it that the idealists remain unimpressed by this demonstration? |
38141 | Why wait upon psychology for confirmation of a truth so obvious and important? |
38141 | [ 236]_ Ibid._, p. 17?. |
38141 | _ Is_ Humanism a product of the twentieth century? |
38141 | _ ad indefinitum_--shall be interpreted simply and entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within the doubt- inquiry process? |
6560 | ''Is Socrates a man?'' |
6560 | ''Is it possible for a man who is not writing to write?'' |
6560 | ''Well, is not an animal a body?'' |
6560 | ''Why?'' |
6560 | ''Yes,''''And are you an animal?'' |
6560 | ( 4) Is there balm in Gilead? |
6560 | ( 5) Does not his feebleness of character indicate either a bad training or a natural imbecility? |
6560 | ( 5)''Is stone a body?'' |
6560 | A cup, for instance, with precisely the same form, may be composed of very different matter- gold, silver, pewter, horn or what not? |
6560 | A full answer to the question''What is a Universal?'' |
6560 | All not- B is not- A, and followed by Subalternation? |
6560 | And again--''Can you carry this, that, and the other?'' |
6560 | And whether, therefore, the third head of indefinite propositions were not as superfluous as the so- called''common gender''of nouns in grammar? |
6560 | And why not from all? |
6560 | And why? |
6560 | Are abstract terms then, it may be asked, singular or common? |
6560 | Are there then any terms which possess no intension? |
6560 | Are you a thief and a liar too?'' |
6560 | Are_ you_ a thief and a liar too?'' |
6560 | But logicians anxious for simplification asked, whether a predicate in any given case must not either apply to the whole of the subject or not? |
6560 | But why, it maybe asked, should not the moods of the first figure equally well be regarded as indirect moods of the fourth? |
6560 | But, if you were to ask the same person''Do you mean that cows are all the ruminants that there are, or only some of them?'' |
6560 | Can the laws of thought be violated in like manner with the laws of the land? |
6560 | Do these two principles imply one another? |
6560 | Fairchild, is this true? |
6560 | For how could there be action without an agent? |
6560 | From how many of these propositions can the original one be derived? |
6560 | Granting the truth of the following propositions, what other propositions can be inferred by opposition to be true or false? |
6560 | Have you left off beating your mother yet?'' |
6560 | Here is the sort of example that Aristotle gives--''Is Plato different from Socrates?'' |
6560 | If the major term of a syllogism be the predicate of the major premiss, what do we know about the minor premiss? |
6560 | If the middle term be twice distributed, what mood and figure are possible? |
6560 | In appearance they can be, and manifestly often are violated- for how else could error be possible? |
6560 | In what figures is AEE valid? |
6560 | Is the suppressed premiss in any case disputable on material grounds? |
6560 | Is the term converse here used in its logical meaning? |
6560 | Now in which of these two senses are we using the term''laws of thought''? |
6560 | Or again, that man means a rational, and does not mean a speaking, a religious, or an aesthetic animal, or a biped with two eyes, a nose, and a mouth? |
6560 | Or are they inviolable like the laws of nature? |
6560 | Roughly it may be said that the Realists sought for the answer to the question''What is a Universal?'' |
6560 | Since every term must be either abstract or concrete, it may be asked-- Are attributives abstract or concrete? |
6560 | Suppose for a moment that this law did not hold-- then what would become of all our reasoning? |
6560 | The fact is-- so subtle are the ambiguities of language-- that even such a question as''Is a thing white or not- white?'' |
6560 | The man was exhibiting a blue horse; and the distinguished stranger asked him--''With what did you paint your horse?'' |
6560 | To ask this, is to ask-- Are there any terms which have absolutely no meaning? |
6560 | To which of the heads of predicables would you refer the following statements? |
6560 | Under which of the five heads would the predicates in the following propositions fall? |
6560 | What is the only kind of conclusion that can be drawn in all the figures? |
6560 | What kind of influence have we here? |
6560 | What moods are common to all the figures? |
6560 | What moods are peculiar to the first, second, and third figures respectively? |
6560 | When the middle term is distributed in both premisses, what must be the quantity of the conclusion? |
6560 | When, for instance, a thing is half white and half black, are we to say that it is white or black? |
6560 | When, for instance, we say''If the sky falls, we shall catch larks,''what is it that we really mean to assert? |
6560 | Where would be the use of establishing conclusions about things, if they were liable to evade us by a Protean change of identity? |
6560 | Wherein then does the difference lie? |
6560 | Wherein then lies the difference? |
6560 | Why are the premisses of Fesapo and Fresison not transposed in reduction like those of the other moods of the fourth figure? |
6560 | Why can there be no subaltern moods in the third figure? |
6560 | Why do the premisses EA yield a universal conclusion in the first two figures and only a particular one in the last two? |
6560 | Why is it sufficient to distribute the middle term once only? |
4763 | And is it Nature, or Art, that is to have the credit of this happy change? |
4763 | But why is this? |
4763 | Do you mean to tell us that all these Logicians are wrong? |
4763 | So you like a doll better than a cousin? 4763 The Man in the Wilderness asked of me''How many strawberries grow in the sea?''" |
4763 | Very glad to hear it: and how do you make it out to be so? |
4763 | Well, some geraniums are red, are n''t they? |
4763 | Well, who expects to be comfortable, out shopping? |
4763 | What are you talking about geraniums for? 4763 Why, do n''t you see that it''s absurd to call him a miserly merchant? |
4763 | Why, how do you make THAT out? 4763 Why, is n''t he very rich?" |
4763 | ( Sounds nice, does n''t it?) |
4763 | ( Would n''t THAT be a charming Universe to live in?) |
4763 | ( You think I invented that name, now do n''t you? |
4763 | ----- Suppose we find it marked like this:--||| 1| What would that tell us? |
4763 | 5? |
4763 | 5? |
4763 | 6? |
4763 | 6? |
4763 | 7? |
4763 | 8? |
4763 | And how are they to work, if they do n''t know anything? |
4763 | And now what am I driving at, in all this long rigmarole? |
4763 | And what name may we give to such a Conclusion? |
4763 | And what then? |
4763 | And what then?" |
4763 | Brown?" |
4763 | But is there any great harm in THAT, so long as you get plenty of amusement? |
4763 | But what''s the good of proving anything to YOU, I should like to know?" |
4763 | But, if they put it the other way, and ask"Can an Attribute exist without any Thing for it to belong to? |
4763 | Can it mean BOTH?" |
4763 | How may we detect a''Fallacious Conclusion''? |
4763 | How may we detect''Fallacious Premisses''? |
4763 | How shall I ever repay such kindness? |
4763 | If you mean that cousins are n''t dolls, who ever said they were?" |
4763 | In marking a pair of Premisses on the larger Diagram, why is it best to mark NEGATIVE Propositions before AFFIRMATIVE ones? |
4763 | In what cases may this be done? |
4763 | In what sense do we use the word''Universe''in this Game? |
4763 | Is it Particular or Universal? |
4763 | It is true we do not know whether its inner portion is empty or occupied: but what does THAT matter? |
4763 | Now what would you make of such a Proposition as"The Cake you have given me is nice"? |
4763 | People have asked the question"Can a Thing exist without any Attributes belonging to it?" |
4763 | Taking the upper half by itself, so that our Subject is"new Cakes", how are we to represent"no new Cakes are wholesome"? |
4763 | The smaller Diagram is now pretty liberally marked:---------| 0| 1||---|---|| 1||------- And now what Conclusion can we read off from this? |
4763 | We must take, as our''Universe'', some class of things which will include Dragons and Scotchmen: shall we say''Animals''? |
4763 | What are the two kinds of''Fallacies''? |
4763 | What are we to make of this, with regard to x and y? |
4763 | What are''Individual''Propositions? |
4763 | What are''Particular''and''Universal''Propositions? |
4763 | What does this mean? |
4763 | What does"some"mean in Logic? |
4763 | What is a''Double''Proposition? |
4763 | What is an''Attribute''? |
4763 | What kinds of Propositions imply, in this Game, the EXISTENCE of their Subjects? |
4763 | What two partial Propositions make up, when taken together,"all x are y"? |
4763 | What would this tell us, with regard to the class of"new Cakes"? |
4763 | What would you make of this, I wonder? |
4763 | What, then, are you to do? |
4763 | When does this happen? |
4763 | When is a class of Things said to be''exhaustively''divided? |
4763 | When is it NOT good sense? |
4763 | When is it good sense to put"is"or"are"between two names? |
4763 | When it is NOT good sense, what is the simplest agreement to make, in order to make good sense? |
4763 | Who can tell? |
4763 | Who should know better?" |
4763 | Why is it of no consequence to us, as Logicians, whether the Premisses are true or false? |
4763 | Would it not tell us that there are SOME of them in the x y- compartment? |
4763 | You never saw"beautiful"floating about in the air, or littered about on the floor, without any Thing to BE beautiful, now did you? |
4763 | You will take its four compartments, one by one, and ask, for each in turn,"What mark can I place HERE? |
36801 | ''* But whence is to come''this drop of sound logic?'' |
36801 | ''Do you want any blood shed for you?'' |
36801 | ''Does he shed anything for you that you_ do_ want? |
36801 | ''Has the reader ever seen Mr. Macready in the character of Macbeth? |
36801 | ''Look where we will, do we not find ignorance powerful for every kind of wrong and evil? |
36801 | --and lie for the right? |
36801 | And did you not hear him say that he could have shed his blood for me? |
36801 | And why should we be delighted with Mr. Macready''s delineation, and disgusted with the ranter? |
36801 | Are these the dispensations of Providence, or the dispensations of folly and crime? |
36801 | Ay-- this state- policy? |
36801 | Bishop Berkeley may demonstrate that we are not sure of matter''s existence-- but are we more sure of any thing else? |
36801 | But by what experience did Aristotle discover the centre of the universe, so as to become aware that heavy bodies_ naturally_ tend there? |
36801 | But how would it have been with a cloddish unimaginative fellow, whom nature never intended should understand Shakspere? |
36801 | But if he should still remain in doubt, where is the harm? |
36801 | But what comprehensive reasons are these? |
36801 | But when experience affords no model on which to shape the new conception, how is it possible for us to form it? |
36801 | But why overlooks he pure mathematics-- a much higher science than arithmetic? |
36801 | Can such a proposition have facts for its support? |
36801 | Does he even shed legs of mutton for you in any decent proportion to potatoes and garden stuff?'' |
36801 | Does he shed employment for you, instruction for you pocket money for you? |
36801 | How did he ascertain the limits of that which has no limits? |
36801 | How far may not this Tertsky have proceeded-- What may not he himself too have permitted Himself to do, to snare the enemy, The laws of war excusing? |
36801 | How is this proved to be the most formidable enemy of tyranny? |
36801 | How, for example, can we imagine an end to space or time? |
36801 | I have frequently put the question-- What is consciousness? |
36801 | If men are silent concerning objects and principles, it is said they have none, and it is impatiently asked''where is their bond of union?'' |
36801 | If reason will not serve us well, will anything serve us better? |
36801 | Is it; otherwise with the Church? |
36801 | Need it be added that this knowledge is only to be had by patient observation? |
36801 | On what facts rest the measurement of the radii from our earth to the boundless circumference of space? |
36801 | On what grounds are they considered to be true by one who declines investigation? |
36801 | Said generous Rob,''What need of Books? |
36801 | Shall he stay on shore or put out to sea? |
36801 | Shall the young man enter trade or a profession without being vitiated? |
36801 | Then how many boys ought our''philosopher''to have questioned before making his vast inference? |
36801 | This is true, but is it true that arithmetic is on_ this account_ to be imitated? |
36801 | Thus I found that huge reports, inflated as balloons, shrunk like them when pricked by the pin of a question--''Will you answer for it?'' |
36801 | Thus, on any assertion being made, ask-- Why is the assertion true? |
36801 | To all who told me anything, if I attached importance to it, I made it a rule to ask--''May I mention it to the party with your name?'' |
36801 | To all written communications answer--''Please add your name and address-- and may I publish them if occasion requires?'' |
36801 | Tyranny, says Cobbett, has no enemy so formidable as the pen, Why? |
36801 | Up springs at every step, to claim a tear, Some little friendship formed and cherished here? |
36801 | Upon asking the terms of apartments, I was met, in all cases, by several preliminary questions, as for whom were they? |
36801 | Was it classical in the principal of St. Alban''s College to abandon Euclid and cleave unto Cocker or Walkingame? |
36801 | What facts support the assertion that Afflictions are dispensations of Providence?'' |
36801 | What he would do? |
36801 | What investigation would it require to shew that they were valid? |
36801 | What should be the decision in this case? |
36801 | What was this, if not imagination? |
36801 | Where now? |
36801 | Where should a man''s reputation be safe from suspicion if not in the hands of his friend? |
36801 | Who is not aware of the failures of calculation when applied to the general business of life-- to statistics, moral and political? |
36801 | Why better? |
36801 | Why should I throw away so much time and painful attention upon a thing of so little real use? |
36801 | Why should not their discourse be expressed in brief, clear sentences? |
36801 | Why should they, like a certain learned politician on a public occasion, propose, as a sentiment,''The three R''s, Reading,''Riting, and''Rithmetic? |
36801 | or rather, why is it not to be considered a good? |
36801 | what number of persons? |
36801 | what station, habits, and probable stay? |
40794 | ( 1) Do ideas present themselves except in situations which are doubtful and inquired into? |
40794 | ( 3) Do they have any part to play in the conduct of inquiry? |
40794 | ( 5) And, finally, does validity have anything to do with truth? |
40794 | And how can it discriminate unless by telling by what road they got into our experience and what they do after they get there? |
40794 | And if the worlds are all private, pray who judges their likeness or unlikeness? |
40794 | And is judgment properly more than tentative save as it terminates in a known fact, i.e., a fact present without the intermediary of reflection? |
40794 | And that means what force shall the thing as means be given? |
40794 | And, if the latter, does the object, God as defined, or the notion, or the belief( the acceptance of the notion) effect these consequent values? |
40794 | And, once more, unless there is such a transition, is reasoning possible? |
40794 | Are they there? |
40794 | But how can a situation which is incomplete in fact be completely known until it_ is_ complete? |
40794 | But if the former, why should there be an idea at all, and why should it have to be tested by the fact? |
40794 | But if thought just accepts its material, how can there be any distinctive aim or activity of thought at all? |
40794 | But if we are concerned with a matter of serious analysis, one is bound to ask, Whence come these adjectives? |
40794 | But is smelling a case of knowledge? |
40794 | But they part company when a fundamental question is raised: Is all organized meaning the work of thought? |
40794 | But when thinking becomes research, when the doubt- inquiry function comes to its own, the problem is just: What is the fact? |
40794 | Can a satisfaction dependent on an assumption that an idea is already true be relevant to testing the truth of an idea? |
40794 | Can we"know that objects of sense, or very similar objects, exist at times when we are not perceiving them? |
40794 | Do they exist except when judgment is in suspense? |
40794 | Do they exist side by side with the facts when the facts are themselves known? |
40794 | Do they not all agree in setting up something fixed outside inquiry, supplying both its material and its limit? |
40794 | Do they really indicate fire? |
40794 | Do they serve to direct observation, colligate data, and guide experimentation, or are they otiose? |
40794 | Do they, therefore, already subsist in some realm of subsistence? |
40794 | Does this coequal presence guarantee an objectivity? |
40794 | Does this phase of the moon really mean rain, or does it just happen that the rain- storm comes when the moon has reached this phase? |
40794 | Except on the basis stated, what is the transition from the function of meaning to_ a_ meaning as an entity in reasoning? |
40794 | For example, my primary( and ultimate) judgment has to do, say, with buying a suit of clothes: whether to buy and, if so, what? |
40794 | Has it gained in validity in ceasing to be an independent myth, in becoming an element in systematized myth? |
40794 | Has not the lesson, however, been so well learned that we can drop reference to experience? |
40794 | How about that truth upon which we fall back as guaranteeing the credibility of other statements-- how about our major premise? |
40794 | How about their respective adaptability to the chief wearing use I have in mind? |
40794 | How can a thing be eaten unless it is, in and of itself, a food? |
40794 | How can such a standard be known? |
40794 | How can the former in any sense give a check or test of the value of the latter? |
40794 | How can this difference be explained? |
40794 | How can thought compare meanings with existences? |
40794 | How do their patterns compare? |
40794 | How do we know the same is not the case with the ideas which are the product of our most deliberate and extended scientific inquiry? |
40794 | How does it know which to eliminate as irrelevant and which to confirm as grounded? |
40794 | How does the non- pragmatic view consider that verification takes place? |
40794 | How does thought know which of the combinations are merely coincident and which are merely coherent? |
40794 | How far is it possible and legitimate to extend or generalize the results reached to apply to all propositions of facts? |
40794 | How is it, moreover, that even the act of being aware is describable as"momentary"? |
40794 | How shall it secure this? |
40794 | How shall we describe it? |
40794 | How then can its existence, even if its perception be but momentary, raise a question of"other times"at all? |
40794 | How then can value be given, as efficiency is given, until the end is chosen? |
40794 | How, after all, does even the ideally perfect valid thought apply or refer to reality? |
40794 | How, the implication runs, could reflection become generalized save by elimination of details as irrelevant? |
40794 | If the goodness of consequences arises from the context of the idea in belief rather than from the idea itself, does it have any verifying force? |
40794 | If there are, are they like those characters which books on logic talk about? |
40794 | In the end the one problem holds: How do the specifications of thought as such hold good of reality as such? |
40794 | Is a difference more than merely one of formulation? |
40794 | Is it an absolute which transcends and absorbs the difference? |
40794 | Is it an idea? |
40794 | Is not the distinction mere hair- splitting unless it is a way of smuggling in a quasi- idealistic dependence upon thought? |
40794 | Is or is not a personal factor found in truth evaluations? |
40794 | Is the agreement ultimately a matter of self- consistency of ideas? |
40794 | Is the photograph, then, to be conceived as a psychical somewhat? |
40794 | Is the way out now so simple? |
40794 | Is the_ object_ immediate or is it the object of an immediate noting? |
40794 | Is this to be taken in a static or in a dynamic way? |
40794 | It reads:"What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? |
40794 | It was hard up against its own dilemma: How can a man inquire? |
40794 | Just how does such agreement differ from success? |
40794 | More generally, what is the position of analytic realism about the future? |
40794 | Not what is the test of thought at large, but what validates and confirms_ this_ thought? |
40794 | Now is this meaning intended to_ replace_ the meaning of a"seeing force which runs things"? |
40794 | Now where does the argument stand? |
40794 | Or does it mean that, irrespective of the existence of any such object, a belief in it has that value? |
40794 | Or does it merely superadd a value to a meaning already fixed? |
40794 | Or is it intended to superadd a pragmatic value and validation to that concept of a seeing force? |
40794 | Or( if the superstition persists as to smell) is gnawing or poking a case of knowledge? |
40794 | Or, in another mode of statement:"Can the existence of anything other than our own[63] hard data be inferred from the existence of those data?" |
40794 | Pray what is this room and what defines the position( standpoint and perspective) of the two men and the standpoint"intermediate"between them? |
40794 | Shall I take it as means to present enjoyment, or as a( negative) condition of future health? |
40794 | Still the query haunts us: Is this so in truth? |
40794 | Supposing the individual stands still and attempts to compare his idea with the reality, with what reality is he to compare it? |
40794 | That is to say: Does it express the fact that a given content or meaning is_ de facto_ presented to the consciousness of all alike? |
40794 | The more specific question is: How does the particular functional situation termed the reflective behave? |
40794 | The question is worth asking: Is not the marked aversion on the part of some philosophers to any reference to psychology a Freudian symptom? |
40794 | The question which I raised in the last paragraph may then be restated in this fashion: Are there such features? |
40794 | The significance of these may be doubted: Do they_ mean_ real change in the sun or in the earth? |
40794 | Then what has become of the postulate that truth is agreement of idea with existence beyond idea? |
40794 | Then, once more, what is the test of any specific judgment? |
40794 | Truth means, as a matter of course, agreement, correspondence, of idea and fact( p. 198), but what do agreement, correspondence, mean? |
40794 | Under these conditions we get such questions as the following: What is the relation of rational thought to crude or unreflective experience? |
40794 | Unless a meaning is an inferred object, detached and fixed as a term capable of independent development, what sort of a ghostly Being is it? |
40794 | Unless there is some such conception as this, what conception of agreement is possible except the experimental or practical one? |
40794 | We have them; they exist; now what do they mean? |
40794 | What about their durability? |
40794 | What are the prices of given suits? |
40794 | What are their styles in respect to current fashion? |
40794 | What are these grounds? |
40794 | What has become of the correspondence of fact and thought? |
40794 | What is the barrier which prevents reason from complete penetration into the world of truth? |
40794 | What is the bearing of this account upon the"empirical datum"? |
40794 | What is the experience in which the survey of both idea and existence is made and their agreement recognized? |
40794 | What is the reason for using the term at all in philosophy? |
40794 | What is the relation of thought to reality? |
40794 | What is the validity of the various forms of thinking which find expression in the various types of judgment and in the various forms of inference? |
40794 | What is the value of the pleasure of eating the lobster as compared with the pains of indigestion? |
40794 | What shall we say of the validity of such processes? |
40794 | What we have to reckon with is not the problem of, How can I think_ überhaupt_? |
40794 | What will I have the situation_ become_ as between alternatives? |
40794 | What_ is_ a thing when it is not yet discovered and yet is tentatively entertained and tested? |
40794 | Whence does it derive its guaranty? |
40794 | Which of the three doctrines is to be regarded as the legitimate exponent of the procedure of thought manifested in modern science? |
40794 | Who are the"we,"and what does"own"mean, and how is ownership established? |
40794 | Why is there a task of transformation? |
40794 | Why so uneven, so partial, in your attitude toward ubiquitous relations? |
40794 | Why, it will be asked, does a man buy a suit of clothes unless that is a value, or at least a proximate means to a further value? |
40794 | but, How shall I think right_ here and now_? |
39964 | And where were the others? |
39964 | Has the plant a soul? 39964 When a woman is strong, is n''t she strong after the same conception and the same strength? |
39964 | And do you not interchange the portrait for the person itself, without difficulty and misunderstanding? |
39964 | And how can any single brain assume to acquire all knowledge, to know everything? |
39964 | And how is a fact proven? |
39964 | And on the other hand, does not the promotion of our material interests require a penetration on our part of the wonders of creation? |
39964 | Are not these the concrete content of our material interests? |
39964 | Are there any stones that do not belong to the category of stones, or any kind of wood which is iron? |
39964 | Are they not simply substitutes? |
39964 | At best, will you not merely repeat what has long since been accomplished? |
39964 | Before, at, or after birth? |
39964 | But do not beasts, worms, and sensitive plants have that also? |
39964 | But how do I know what I state in such an offhand manner? |
39964 | But how is life infused into them? |
39964 | But how is that to be found? |
39964 | But how to explain that wonderful_ a priori_ knowledge which exceeds all experience? |
39964 | But is n''t it a contradiction that a special science wants to be general world wisdom? |
39964 | But is there anything which is absolutely good? |
39964 | But look here, has it not always been so? |
39964 | But the study of the anatomy of the hand can no more solve the question: What is writing? |
39964 | But was it founded on fact? |
39964 | But what about the question of the beginning and end of the world, or the question of the existence of God? |
39964 | But what else does the term material interests mean but the abstract expression of our existence, welfare, and development? |
39964 | But what good will it do a painter to have his special attention called to this fact? |
39964 | But what is there of unity that science teaches about them? |
39964 | But what thing is there that has any effects"in itself?" |
39964 | But where shall we draw the line in this comparison of images? |
39964 | But who claims that there are not many straight lines which are crooked at one end, which run straight on for a certain distance and then turn? |
39964 | But why do we call this the most essential part? |
39964 | By the help of brown- study from the interior of our brain, from revelation, or from experience? |
39964 | Can natural science do as much? |
39964 | Can the world be understood in a hermitage? |
39964 | Can we see the things themselves? |
39964 | Can we, by mere deduction through concepts which go beyond experience, arrive at truths? |
39964 | Could there not be some dogs who lacked the quality of watchfulness, and might not our pug- dog be very unreliable, in spite of all exact deductions? |
39964 | Do animals arise when the hot and the cold begin to disintegrate, as some claim? |
39964 | Do you not ask on seeing the portrait of some person unknown to you: Who is this? |
39964 | Does he not say explicitly that the penetration of the wonders of creation promotes our material interests? |
39964 | Does not this appear reasonable to you?... |
39964 | Does that require any explanation? |
39964 | Everything develops, why should not our intellects do so? |
39964 | For are not the effects tangible by which reason transforms nature and life? |
39964 | Has proud philosophy gained nothing since? |
39964 | Has the earth a soul? |
39964 | Have I now still to prove that all existence is of the same category? |
39964 | Have not your thoughts been connected always and everywhere with some worldly or real object? |
39964 | Have they a soul analogous to that of man? |
39964 | Have you ever seen a portrait or a copy that did not agree in some respect with the original? |
39964 | How are we to designate the species, how the genus? |
39964 | How can a man who is out of touch with the mass of the shifting population feel that he is one with the universe? |
39964 | How can thinkers who search for truth, being, relative causes, such as naturalists, be idealists? |
39964 | How can we see everything? |
39964 | How do we arrive at the knowledge of things which are not accessible to experience? |
39964 | How do we know that? |
39964 | How do we prove that a peach is a delicious fruit? |
39964 | How do we solve this contradiction? |
39964 | How is understanding possible? |
39964 | I remember reading in a satirical paper the question:"What is a gentleman? |
39964 | If the ancient Germans regarded the great oak as sacred and religious, why should not art and science become religious among the modern Germans? |
39964 | If the function of the heart may be referred to as material, why not the function of the brain? |
39964 | In certain shows, the clown is asked by the manager:"Clown, where have you been?" |
39964 | In seeking for an answer to the question: What is philosophy? |
39964 | In what respect are our material interests different from our mental penetration of things? |
39964 | Is it an idea? |
39964 | Is it not necessary, however, to make a distinction between poetry and truth? |
39964 | Is it the blood, which enables us to think, or the air or the fire? |
39964 | Is not everything a part, is not every part a thing? |
39964 | Is not general wisdom that which comprises all knowledge, all special science? |
39964 | Is not the air or the scent of flowers an ethereal body? |
39964 | Is not the material world and its understanding as essential as reason, as intellect, which bends to the task of exploring this world? |
39964 | Is the color of a leaf less of a thing than that leaf itself? |
39964 | Is the world a concept? |
39964 | Is this world- god a mere idea? |
39964 | It is the solution of the riddle of the ancient Eleatic philosophy: How can the one be contained in the many, and the many in one? |
39964 | It was the famous Kant who posed the question:"How is_ a priori_ knowledge possible?" |
39964 | May not our modern viewpoint, the category in which our present day science thinks, the category of cause and effect, be equally transitory? |
39964 | Mind and Matter: Which Is Primary, Which Is Secondary? |
39964 | Multiplicity, change, motion-- who is to split hairs about them, who will make fine distinctions? |
39964 | Must I not know everything in order to be world wise? |
39964 | Must I prove this? |
39964 | Now I ask: If nature, God, and absolute truth are one and the same thing, have we not learned something about the"final cause of all things?" |
39964 | Now you are familiar with that student''s song:"What''s Coming from the Heights?" |
39964 | Now, is this logic or is it theology? |
39964 | Or are you spiritualists who make a metaphysical distinction between the truth and the phenomenon? |
39964 | Or does it belong to the infinite and must it exist forever? |
39964 | Otherwise, how could misunderstandings arise? |
39964 | Our logic asks: Does wisdom descend mysteriously from the interior of the human brain, or does it come from the outer world like all experience? |
39964 | Scientists as well as scribes have ever embarrassed one another by the question: What is truth? |
39964 | Shall it be an idol or a king? |
39964 | Shall we use the intellect philosophically, or shall we use it empirically? |
39964 | Should not religion, which according to the words of a German emperor"must be preserved for the people,"also have its bounds in history? |
39964 | Should not that appear mysterious to it? |
39964 | Socrates in the market of Athens, and Plato in his dialogues, have probably said better things about the questions:"What is virtue? |
39964 | The fetish cult, the animal cult, the cult of the ideal and spiritual creator, or the cult of the real human mind? |
39964 | The great Kant has asked the plain question:"Is metaphysics practicable as a science?" |
39964 | The human understanding has its limits, why should it not? |
39964 | The next question is then: By what road do we arrive at its understanding? |
39964 | The philosophical celebrities and classic authorities are not even in accord on the question: What is philosophy and what is its aim? |
39964 | The question then arises: Which is the genuine and true division? |
39964 | The statements: I do, I work, I think, must be completed by an answer to the question: What are you doing, working, thinking? |
39964 | Thereupon Cebes asks:"Well, and what do you think of this now?" |
39964 | This book, its leaves, its letters, or their parts, are they units? |
39964 | Those sciences recognize only the phenomena of things; but where is the understanding which perceives the truth?" |
39964 | To analyze this idea means to solve the question, what is walking generally considered, what is the general nature of walking? |
39964 | What are all things? |
39964 | What can be more evident? |
39964 | What constitutes, then, this body which is distinguished from its transient form? |
39964 | What do I know about the shoe industry, if I know that it produces shoes? |
39964 | What good are all the treasures of Croesus, if health is lacking? |
39964 | What good is health to us, when we have nothing to bite? |
39964 | What is a"thing?" |
39964 | What is it that Lessing says? |
39964 | What is its beginning, what its end? |
39964 | What is its positive achievement? |
39964 | What is justice? |
39964 | What is justice? |
39964 | What is meant by political freedom? |
39964 | What is moral and reasonable?" |
39964 | What is not an image in the abstract, and what is more than an image in the concrete? |
39964 | What is the reason for this? |
39964 | What is the relation of the concrete to the abstract? |
39964 | What is the use of metaphysics under these circumstances? |
39964 | What would become of reason and language, if such a thing were to be considered? |
39964 | What, then, is religion and religious? |
39964 | Whence comes reason, where do we get our ideas, judgments, conclusions? |
39964 | Where and how are we to find a positive and definite knowledge of it? |
39964 | Where are we to begin and where to end? |
39964 | Where do I begin, where do I stop? |
39964 | Where do we find any indivisible unit outside of our abstract conceptions? |
39964 | Where do we find such eternal, imperishable, formless matter? |
39964 | Where does consciousness begin in the child? |
39964 | Where does the variety of science, its undecided vacillation end, and when does understanding become stable? |
39964 | Where is the consistent connection? |
39964 | Where, then, is the beginning and end, and how can we bring order into these relations? |
39964 | Where, who, what, is the supreme being to which everything else is subordinate, which brings system, consistency, logic, into our thought and actions? |
39964 | Who and what are now the objects of philosophy? |
39964 | Who has not heard the lament about the unreliability of the senses? |
39964 | Who or what is the intellect, whence does it come from, whither does it lead? |
39964 | Who will define to us what a line is? |
39964 | Who will deny that he can feel the force of heat, of cold, of gravitation? |
39964 | Who would be silly enough to deny that? |
39964 | Why do you want to be a theist, if you are a naturalist, or a naturalist if you are a theist? |
39964 | Why is not the"naturalistic"philosopher consistent by recognizing his special object, understanding, as a natural object? |
39964 | Why should not the action of the brain belong in the same category as the action of the heart? |
39964 | Why, then, speculate about God, freedom, and immortality, when indubitable knowledge may be obtained by the formal method of exact deductions? |
39964 | Would any one try to make us believe that there is a great and almighty eye that can look through blocks of metal the same as through glass? |
39964 | XII MIND AND MATTER: WHICH IS PRIMARY, WHICH SECONDARY? |
39964 | You know the old question: Which was first, the egg or the hen? |
39964 | You will probably ask: What has that to do with logic or the art of reasoning? |
39964 | than the physiological study of the brain can bring us nearer to the solution of the question: What is thought? |
40665 | Is the correspondence reached between idea and object the precise correspondence that the idea itself intended? 40665 Again must we ask: On what basis is this object in the absolute system selected at all? 40665 And by the time all this is performed what sort of a representation of reality is the idea? 40665 And now, finally, what shall mark the attainment of this purpose of the idea to correspond and representits own completed form"? |
40665 | And what in their operations marks the difference between truth and error? |
40665 | Because there could be other cases of counting, and other numbers counted than the present counting process shows you, and why so? |
40665 | But does not Bosanquet himself point out a pathway which, if followed farther, would reach a more satisfactory view of the realm of knowledge? |
40665 | But granted that this is all true, what has it to do with the origin of the hypothesis? |
40665 | But has this distinction between the content of an experience and its existence solved the problem of how we_ know_ reality? |
40665 | But how can we know that the expression is"fragmentary"unless we have some experience of wholeness? |
40665 | But how did it happen that it did not take the form:"This is not cake"? |
40665 | But how do you prove it? |
40665 | But how does he know that reality is continuous, and that the real world is an organized system? |
40665 | But how is this possible if reality lies without or beyond our act of judging? |
40665 | But if all this is admitted, what becomes of the possibility of knowledge? |
40665 | But if this reconstruction and response were to follow at once, would there be any clearly defined act of judging at all? |
40665 | But if thought just accepts its material, how can there be any distinctive aim or activity of thought at all? |
40665 | But if we do test it, is not such test enough? |
40665 | But is it a question of merest chance which of these various possibilities is actualized? |
40665 | But is this necessary? |
40665 | But just where does our contact with the real occur? |
40665 | But the question to be answered first is: When would such a"statement"occur in the course of our experience? |
40665 | But they part company when a fundamental question is raised: Is all organized meaning the work of thought? |
40665 | But what precisely is the form and seat of the aphasia? |
40665 | But whence comes this restlessness and dissatisfaction? |
40665 | But why should this activity get into a condition to be described as"indefinite restlessness"and dissatisfaction? |
40665 | But why? |
40665 | But, as the first statement of internal meaning implies, how can one have a purpose to sing the melody except in and through the idea? |
40665 | Did he, then, either contribute to the proof of a general law or discover further characteristics of things already known in a more general way? |
40665 | Does this coequal presence guarantee an objectivity? |
40665 | Does this mean that the"idea"is wholly independent of the"image"? |
40665 | Does this phase of the moon really mean rain, or does it just happen that the rain- storm comes when the moon has reached this phase? |
40665 | Has it diagnosed the case properly, and is it therefore one in and through which these activities can operate and come to unity again? |
40665 | Has it gained in validity in ceasing to be an independent myth, in becoming an element in systematized myth? |
40665 | Has it not disarmed itself? |
40665 | How can conceptualism prevent the union? |
40665 | How can one maintain that in a literal and concrete physical sense gold in process of solution is the"same"as gold entering into chemical combination? |
40665 | How can the former in any sense give a check or test of the value of the latter? |
40665 | How can thought compare its own contents with that which is wholly outside itself? |
40665 | How can we ever be sure that the fact which we have discovered will stand the test of further thought- constructions? |
40665 | How do we know the same is not the case with the ideas which are the product of our most deliberate and extended scientific inquiry? |
40665 | How does it know which to eliminate as irrelevant and which to confirm as grounded? |
40665 | How does the real world get representation in experience, and what is the guarantee that the representation, when obtained, is correct? |
40665 | How does thought know which of the combinations are merely coincident and which are merely coherent? |
40665 | How otherwise can we explain, for example, the action of an expert ball- player? |
40665 | How shall it secure this? |
40665 | How shall we describe it? |
40665 | How, after all, does even the ideally perfect valid thought apply or refer to reality? |
40665 | How, the implication runs, could reflection become generalized save by elimination of details as irrelevant? |
40665 | How, then, can it serve as the subject of a judgment? |
40665 | How, then, does it obtain its characteristic of universality? |
40665 | How, then, does this fact of past assignment to uses still recognized as desirable figure in the situation? |
40665 | If it is essential, then how explain the fact that its parts do not fall outside one another in time? |
40665 | If it is not essential, then how explain the evident fact that the judgment as an intellectual process does have duration? |
40665 | If so, what is this something else? |
40665 | If the experiment with the pendulum only substituted exactness for inexactness, did the Copernican theory do anything different in_ kind_? |
40665 | In other words, what does this restlessness mean? |
40665 | In other words, what is the significance of the demand for the particular judgment? |
40665 | In the end the one problem holds: How do the specifications of thought as such hold good of reality as such? |
40665 | In the introduction we have been told, as a matter of description, that the internal meanings do seek the external meaning, but why do they? |
40665 | In the last analysis the problem always is: What is to be done here and now with the actual material at hand, under the present conditions? |
40665 | In what sense, with reference to what, is it incomplete and fragmentary? |
40665 | Is it a general claim which thought_ qua_ thought puts forth, or is it the claim of the content of some particular thought? |
40665 | Is it begging the question to speak of consciousness as exercising a selective function with reference to stimuli? |
40665 | Is the reality we now have the same that we had to begin with? |
40665 | Is this thinking? |
40665 | Is this to be taken in a static or in a dynamic way? |
40665 | Just what are we to understand by this"fragmentary"and"indeterminate"character of the internal meaning? |
40665 | Mr. Bosanquet raises the question: Are there at all ideas which are not symbolic?... |
40665 | Must we not here fall back on something like a pre- established harmony? |
40665 | Must you not just dogmatically say that that world must agree with your negations? |
40665 | Not what is the test of thought at large, but what validates and confirms_ this_ thought? |
40665 | Now, any idea that is affirmed is referred to reality, but do ideas exist which are not being affirmed? |
40665 | Now, at what point does this act begin? |
40665 | Now, how shall we discriminate the ethical and the economic aspects of the situation which we have described? |
40665 | On the other hand, if truth is to be found in the immediate experience, can it here be preserved from the blighting effects of thought? |
40665 | Or, in a word: What is the"jurisdiction"of the economic point of view? |
40665 | Perhaps some one has been startled, and asks:"What is this noise?" |
40665 | So that our question now becomes: What is the significance of this factor of restless, dissatisfied consciousness in activity? |
40665 | Still the query haunts us: Is this so in truth? |
40665 | That is to say, at this point the question is: Does the plan apply to the activities actually involved in the unrest? |
40665 | That is to say: Does it express the fact that a given content or meaning is_ de facto_ presented to the consciousness of all alike? |
40665 | The more specific question is: How does the particular functional situation termed the reflective behave? |
40665 | The purposive character of experience is of course very manifest, but what is the significance of this purposing in experience as a whole? |
40665 | The question remains: Why, if there is no opposition, should there be any uncertainty? |
40665 | The significance of these may be doubted: Do they_ mean_ real change in the sun or in the earth? |
40665 | Under these conditions we get such questions as the following: What is the relation of rational thought to crude or unreflective experience? |
40665 | Under what circumstances, then, are we conscious of stimuli in their capacity of guides or incentives or grounds of conduct? |
40665 | Under what conditions, then, is this suspense and uncertainty possible? |
40665 | We can lay out alternative courses beforehand, but the point of difficulty lies here:"But just which is he?" |
40665 | What alliance, or_ mésalliance_, may they not form, one with the other? |
40665 | What can we mean, then, by calling some of our ideas true and others false? |
40665 | What does this mean save that judgment is developmental, transitive, in effect and purport? |
40665 | What have you, then, but an elementary and primitive type of reflex action? |
40665 | What here becomes of the distinction between immediate and mediating experience? |
40665 | What is meant by"further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is B"? |
40665 | What is the agent''s apprehension of the matter? |
40665 | What is the barrier which prevents reason from complete penetration into the world of truth? |
40665 | What is the function, then, of the representative image? |
40665 | What is the matter? |
40665 | What is the relation between it and the immediate experience? |
40665 | What is the relation of thought to reality? |
40665 | What is the relative value of each in experience as a whole? |
40665 | What is the significance and basis of universality and necessity as confined merely to the realm of internal meaning? |
40665 | What is the source and the material of the purposes? |
40665 | What is the test of the reality of the bread, and the truth of the judgment? |
40665 | What is the validity of the various forms of thinking which find expression in the various types of judgment and in the various forms of inference? |
40665 | What is their relation to truth and error? |
40665 | What is to be done? |
40665 | What is, however, the ground of distinction between the presented objects? |
40665 | What kind of"research,"internal or external, can show this? |
40665 | What predicate-- so we may formulate their question-- should be given to the subject? |
40665 | What shall we say of the validity of such processes? |
40665 | What then is the nature and source of this apprehension of end or means as valuable? |
40665 | What we have to reckon with is not the problem of, How can I think_ überhaupt_? |
40665 | What, then, in this action already going on is responsible for this restlessness? |
40665 | What, then, is the real difference between hypothesis and expectation? |
40665 | When is the correspondence and representation true? |
40665 | When is this purpose of the idea to correspond with its absolute, final, and completed form fulfilled, or partially fulfilled? |
40665 | When we ask,"What rains?" |
40665 | Why does it seek an object? |
40665 | Why does it want to cross the chasm? |
40665 | Why have we to reckon with it at all? |
40665 | Why is there a task of transformation? |
40665 | Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe? |
40665 | Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us and not the history of theirs?" |
40665 | Why suppose that by distorting reality we get it in shape to affirm_ of_ reality? |
40665 | Why would they not all remain in conflict and continue to check any positive result? |
40665 | Why, then, should there be a demand for the external meaning, for a further object? |
40665 | Why? |
40665 | Will it enable me to support and educate my family? |
40665 | Will it permit me to devote sufficient attention to their present care and training? |
40665 | Will this life of social agitation really be quite"respectable,"and befitting the character of a sober and industrious man? |
40665 | [ 186] But what is it that we"experience within"which makes us call this judgment necessary? |
40665 | [ 198] If at this point one asks: Whence this absolute system of ideas? |
40665 | _ The predicate as hypothesis._--Suppose, then, the hypothesis is a predicate; is the predicate necessarily a hypothesis? |
40665 | but, How shall I think right_ here and now_? |
31796 | An honest man''s the noblest work of God: Z is an honest man: therefore, he is-- what? |
31796 | Are good administrators always good speakers? |
31796 | But you have admitted that it is possible for Socrates not to fly? |
31796 | Can you tell me in the face of chronology,a leading statesman once asked,"that the Crimes Act of 1887 did not diminish disorder in Ireland?" |
31796 | Do? 31796 Doing what, did you say? |
31796 | Has the practice of excessive drinking ceased in your part of the country? |
31796 | Have all ratepayers a vote? |
31796 | Have you left off beating your father? |
31796 | How do I feel? 31796 How do you do?" |
31796 | I mean, how do you feel? |
31796 | Is it possible for Socrates to fly? |
31796 | Is it possible for him to walk? |
31796 | Is not the honourable honourable, and the base base? |
31796 | No, no; I mean, how do you find yourself? |
31796 | Then why did you not say so? 31796 When you say that it is possible for a man to do anything do you not believe that it is possible for him to do it?" |
31796 | ( 1)_ Are they properly called Syllogisms?_ This is purely a question of Method and Definition. |
31796 | Ailing? |
31796 | All at once or step by step? |
31796 | An experiment is a proof or trial: of what? |
31796 | And is not, therefore, the proper form of proposition Some S is P? |
31796 | And who is to instruct us in the full meaning? |
31796 | And why is there this complete agreement? |
31796 | Are we to include it in the Predicate term or in the Subject term? |
31796 | But according to what differences? |
31796 | But any logical advantage-- any help to thinking? |
31796 | But do they hang together? |
31796 | But do we in reality conclude it from the proposition, All men are mortal?" |
31796 | But how, it may be asked, can the concept remain the same? |
31796 | But is this principle really all that we assume? |
31796 | But there are cases where friends are deceived for their own good: are these cases of injustice? |
31796 | But what of propositions that the plain man would at once recognise as Verbal? |
31796 | But who was the founder of the New Logic? |
31796 | But why did Aristotle consider it necessary to lay down a principle so obvious? |
31796 | But why did he desire to concatenate this with the old Logic? |
31796 | But why is it that a man can not get rid of an idea? |
31796 | But, Whately argued, how do we know that this, that and the other-- the individuals we have examined-- constitute the whole class? |
31796 | CAN ALL PROPOSITIONS BE REDUCED TO THE SYLLOGISTIC FORM? |
31796 | Calling this unity, this one in the many, the Universal(_ Universale_,[ Greek: to pan]), what is the Universal_ ontologically_? |
31796 | Can a fallacy in argument be detected at once? |
31796 | Can it be accounted for most probably by supposing the event stated to have really occurred with all the circumstances alleged? |
31796 | Can the definition be that a man who deceives his friends is unjust? |
31796 | Can the leopard change his spots? |
31796 | Can those degrees be measured numerically? |
31796 | Common nouns are put in the First Category because they are predicated in answer to the question, What is this? |
31796 | Do we not assume that what belongs to the individuals examined belongs to the whole class? |
31796 | Do what?" |
31796 | Does Logic shelter the quibbler who trades upon it? |
31796 | Does any analogous use for the Syllogism remain? |
31796 | Does common- sense inspect the argument in a lump or piecemeal? |
31796 | Does he admit this? |
31796 | Does it help to prevent error, to clear up confusion? |
31796 | Does it lead to firmer conceptions of the truth? |
31796 | Does the ox ruminate? |
31796 | Does this mean that it is not possible for Socrates to fly, or that it is possible for Socrates not to fly? |
31796 | Does this not come to the same thing? |
31796 | Does this theory not do away with all possibility of defining and fixing concepts? |
31796 | E 5 concentric circles of S and P- P in centre I?] |
31796 | Each of them probably works some fraction of the total change observable, but how are they to be disentangled? |
31796 | Especially to the presence of lime or magnesia? |
31796 | For example, what is the meaning of injustice? |
31796 | For what purpose? |
31796 | Ginger- aleing?" |
31796 | Given perplexity as to the cause of any phenomenon, what is our natural first step? |
31796 | Good seed was sown: whence, then, come the tares? |
31796 | Has the unity that it represents among individuals no existence except in the mind? |
31796 | Have such names a connotation? |
31796 | His question was, When is a Respondent bound to admit a general conclusion? |
31796 | How are men to be brought to accept loyally the judgment of the expert in public affairs? |
31796 | How did the Aristotelian Logic originate? |
31796 | How do we know that the nineteen moods are the only possible forms of valid syllogism? |
31796 | How do you proceed? |
31796 | How is it conceived? |
31796 | How is it continued? |
31796 | How is it to be averted? |
31796 | How is its signification conceived? |
31796 | How is the unity maintained? |
31796 | How then, do we ordinarily proceed in conceiving, if we can not picture the common attributes alone and apart from particulars? |
31796 | How would it proceed? |
31796 | How? |
31796 | How? |
31796 | If we refuse the name of Induction to the general proposition of fact, what are we to call it? |
31796 | If you admit the first two, are you bound in consistency to admit the third? |
31796 | If, proceeding on this, I go on to ask:"Then they are paved with granite or asphalt, or this or that?" |
31796 | In how many ways may this relation be established through a third term? |
31796 | In ignoring this implication, does Logic oppose this implication as erroneous? |
31796 | In the case of Mill''s system we have to ask: What first moved him to formulate the methods of scientific investigation? |
31796 | In what circumstances did Aristotle invent these? |
31796 | In what circumstances did it originate? |
31796 | In what form would it be so? |
31796 | Is Logic then really useless, or even misleading, inasmuch as it ignores the definite implication of negatives in ordinary thought and speech? |
31796 | Is S in or out of P, and is it wholly in or wholly out or partly in or partly out? |
31796 | Is common- sense sufficient? |
31796 | Is it a copy of some particular impression, or a confused blur or blend of many? |
31796 | Is it good then to be disillusioned? |
31796 | Is it one of that class? |
31796 | Is it the case that no man can live without sleep? |
31796 | Is it, then, impossible to decide between these alternative possibilities of causation? |
31796 | Is the explanation then to be found in some special adaptability of the religious system to the character of the people? |
31796 | Is the predicate applicable to All victories or only to Some? |
31796 | Is the subject of the conclusion contained in the subject of the general principle when the two have identical predicates? |
31796 | Is the truth of the conclusion a necessary consequence of the truth of the premisses? |
31796 | Is there a place for it as a safeguard against error in modern debate? |
31796 | Is there any advantage in this? |
31796 | Is there then no way of ascertaining historical fact? |
31796 | Is this not, it may be asked, to confuse thought and being, to resolve Socrates into a string of words? |
31796 | Is war one of the things that increase taxation? |
31796 | It is to be observed that for this operation we do not practically use the syllogistic form All S is P. We do not raise the question Is All S, P? |
31796 | Must we reject history as altogether unworthy of credit? |
31796 | Now the psychological question about the Universal is, What is this conception? |
31796 | Occam himself speaks of the subject as the primary signification, and the attribute as the secondary, because the answer to"What is white?" |
31796 | Passing by these remoter questions, we may give the answers of the three extreme schools to the ontological question, What is a Universal? |
31796 | Psychologically, then, the theory is sound: what is its logical value? |
31796 | Put the question"Is Socrates wise?" |
31796 | Romeo must be in love: for is he not seventeen? |
31796 | Should he coin new names, or should he take old names and try to fit them with new definitions? |
31796 | Should this be expressed as A or I? |
31796 | Such a decrease took place_ post hoc_; was it_ propter hoc_? |
31796 | Suppose a man deceives his enemies, is there any injustice in that? |
31796 | Suppose we doubt whether a given agent is or is not capable of producing a certain effect in certain circumstances, how do we put it to the proof? |
31796 | Suppose we want to know whether a particular conclusion is consistent with our memorandum, what have we to look to? |
31796 | Suppose yourself the Questioner, where did he profess to help you with his mechanism? |
31796 | The categories are exhaustive, but do they fulfil another requisite of a good division-- are they mutually exclusive? |
31796 | The first thing that an inquirer naturally asks when confronted by numerous instances of a phenomenon is, What have they in common? |
31796 | The goat? |
31796 | The logical question is, Has the view any advantage for logical purposes? |
31796 | The psychological question is, Is this a correct theory of how men actually think when they make propositions? |
31796 | The question has been raised, For how long can oral tradition be trusted? |
31796 | The question has sometimes been asked, Where should we begin in Logic? |
31796 | The question, Who are to be placed together? |
31796 | The sheep? |
31796 | The statement at least is extant: our first question is, What is the most rational way of accounting for it? |
31796 | The type of a general proposition in Syllogistic terminology is the Major Premiss, All M is P. What is the type of the particulars that it sums up? |
31796 | To raise the question: What is the proper form for a Modal of Possibility, A or I? |
31796 | Was it due to the character of the drinking- water? |
31796 | Was it due to the geological formation? |
31796 | We may ask, further, What is there in nature that the general name signifies? |
31796 | We see the nature of the proof relied upon when we ask, How far must elimination be carried in order to attain proof of causal connexion? |
31796 | What about the selection of the names? |
31796 | What are the exact attributes signified by the names? |
31796 | What cat''s averse to fish? |
31796 | What corresponds to it in the real world? |
31796 | What does a general name signify? |
31796 | What follows? |
31796 | What is a belief? |
31796 | What is he ailing? |
31796 | What is implied in saying"No"to such propositions put interrogatively? |
31796 | What is in the mind when we employ a general name? |
31796 | What is its relation to reality? |
31796 | What is meant by giving the answer"No"to a proposition put interrogatively? |
31796 | What is the Universal psychologically? |
31796 | What is the conclusion, and in what Figure and Mood may the argument be expressed? |
31796 | What is the interpretation of"No"? |
31796 | What is the respondent committed to thereby? |
31796 | What is the signification_ psychologically_? |
31796 | What is there in our minds corresponding to the general name when we utter it? |
31796 | What is this concept in thought? |
31796 | What meanings of"custom"and of"sensibility"will reconcile these apparently conflicting examples? |
31796 | What principle of sound conclusion was involved in it? |
31796 | What use did he contemplate for them? |
31796 | What will be the issue of a coming war? |
31796 | When are propositions incompatible? |
31796 | When do they imply one another? |
31796 | When do two imply a third? |
31796 | When is the opponent bound to admit that all horned animals ruminate? |
31796 | When is this inductive argument complete? |
31796 | When it is said that"Victories may be gained by accident,"is the predicate made concerning All victories or Some only? |
31796 | When we say,"This is a man,"do we not declare what sort of a thing he is? |
31796 | Whence did he derive his materials? |
31796 | Where did Aristotle begin? |
31796 | Where did the founder of Logic begin? |
31796 | Where does the common pattern come from? |
31796 | Where is the fixed scheme of division there? |
31796 | Which party will win in the next election? |
31796 | Why are things essentially like one another? |
31796 | Why describe Logic as a system of defence against error? |
31796 | Why did he give his scientific method the form of a supplement to the old Aristotelian Logic? |
31796 | Why do we believe more confidently in some uniformities than in others? |
31796 | Why do we dip our pens in ink, and expect the application of them to white paper to be followed by a black mark? |
31796 | Why do we not look for it in another wall? |
31796 | Why does it force itself upon him as a belief? |
31796 | Why is it endemic in some localities and not in others? |
31796 | Why is this? |
31796 | Why lay down principles so obvious, in some interpretations, and so manifestly sophistical in others? |
31796 | Why not rather say, as is now usual, that its end is the attainment of truth? |
31796 | Why say that its main end and aim is the organisation of reason against confusion and falsehood? |
31796 | Why would a reported breach of one be regarded with more incredulity than that of another? |
31796 | Will a patient in the crisis of a given disease recover or not? |
31796 | Would you call these men unjust? |
31796 | Would you say that the man who cheats or deceives is unjust? |
31796 | You know how each of them lies toward the third: when can you tell from this how S lies towards P? |
31796 | _ Best_ for what purpose? |
31796 | _ Examples for Analysis._ Scarlet flowers have no fragrance: this flower has no fragrance: does it follow that this flower is of a scarlet colour? |
31796 | do we not declare his Quality? |
31796 | or"Is this paper white?" |
1598 | ''And are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?'' |
1598 | ''And dictation is a dictation of letters?'' |
1598 | ''And do they learn,''said Euthydemus,''what they know or what they do not know?'' |
1598 | ''And he is not wise yet?'' |
1598 | ''And what did you think of them?'' |
1598 | ''And you acquire that which you have not got already?'' |
1598 | ''And you know letters?'' |
1598 | ''And you see our garments?'' |
1598 | ''But are there any beautiful things? |
1598 | ''But,''retorts Dionysodorus,''is not learning acquiring knowledge?'' |
1598 | ''Cleinias,''says Euthydemus,''who learn, the wise or the unwise?'' |
1598 | ''Crito,''said he to me,''are you giving no attention to these wise men?'' |
1598 | ''Do they know shoemaking, etc?'' |
1598 | ''Do you see,''retorts Euthydemus,''what has the quality of vision or what has not the quality of vision?'' |
1598 | ''Is a speaking of the silent possible? |
1598 | ''What did I think of them?'' |
1598 | ''What does the word"non- plussed"mean?'' |
1598 | ''What was that?'' |
1598 | ''You want Cleinias to be wise?'' |
1598 | A noble man or a mean man? |
1598 | A weak man or a strong man? |
1598 | All letters? |
1598 | Am I not right? |
1598 | Am I not right? |
1598 | Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots? |
1598 | And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man? |
1598 | And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? |
1598 | And an indolent man less than an active man? |
1598 | And are not good things good, and evil things evil? |
1598 | And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts? |
1598 | And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters? |
1598 | And are not these gods animals? |
1598 | And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing? |
1598 | And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you? |
1598 | And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold? |
1598 | And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere? |
1598 | And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? |
1598 | And clearly we do not want the art of the flute- maker; this is only another of the same sort? |
1598 | And did you always know this? |
1598 | And did you not say that you knew something? |
1598 | And do all other men know all things or nothing? |
1598 | And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not? |
1598 | And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm? |
1598 | And do you know of any word which is alive? |
1598 | And do you know stitching? |
1598 | And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand? |
1598 | And do you know with what you know, or with something else? |
1598 | And do you please? |
1598 | And do you really and truly know all things, including carpentering and leather- cutting? |
1598 | And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man? |
1598 | And doing is making? |
1598 | And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers? |
1598 | And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus? |
1598 | And have you no need, Euthydemus? |
1598 | And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not? |
1598 | And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the addition of''when you know them''or not? |
1598 | And he has puppies? |
1598 | And he is not wise as yet? |
1598 | And he who says that thing says that which is? |
1598 | And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other? |
1598 | And if a man does his business he does rightly? |
1598 | And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them? |
1598 | And if there are such, are they the same or not the same as absolute beauty?'' |
1598 | And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold? |
1598 | And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk-- in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one? |
1598 | And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness-- a wise physician, or an ignorant one? |
1598 | And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not? |
1598 | And is Patrocles, he said, your brother? |
1598 | And is he not yours? |
1598 | And is that fair? |
1598 | And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing? |
1598 | And is this true? |
1598 | And knowing is having knowledge at the time? |
1598 | And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly? |
1598 | And may there not be a silence of the speaker? |
1598 | And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time? |
1598 | And now answer: Do you always know with this? |
1598 | And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness? |
1598 | And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge? |
1598 | And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do? |
1598 | And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible? |
1598 | And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth? |
1598 | And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us? |
1598 | And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father? |
1598 | And speaking is doing and making? |
1598 | And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them? |
1598 | And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? |
1598 | And that is a distinct thing apart from other things? |
1598 | And that is impossible? |
1598 | And that which is not is nowhere? |
1598 | And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that? |
1598 | And the dog is the father of them? |
1598 | And they are the teachers of those who learn-- the grammar- master and the lyre- master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners? |
1598 | And to have money everywhere and always is a good? |
1598 | And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also? |
1598 | And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn? |
1598 | And were you wise then? |
1598 | And what does that signify? |
1598 | And what is your notion? |
1598 | And what knowledge ought we to acquire? |
1598 | And what other goods are there? |
1598 | And what things do we esteem good? |
1598 | And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning? |
1598 | And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast? |
1598 | And who would do least-- a poor man or a rich man? |
1598 | And whose the making of pots? |
1598 | And why should you say so? |
1598 | And would not you, Crito, say the same? |
1598 | And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? |
1598 | And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? |
1598 | And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own? |
1598 | And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?'' |
1598 | And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense;--what do you say, wise man? |
1598 | And you admit gold to be a good? |
1598 | And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased? |
1598 | And you also see that which has the quality of vision? |
1598 | And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are? |
1598 | And your mother, too, is the mother of all? |
1598 | And your papa is a dog? |
1598 | Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless? |
1598 | Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked one? |
1598 | Are you not other than a stone? |
1598 | Are you prepared to make that good? |
1598 | Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant? |
1598 | At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that? |
1598 | Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? |
1598 | But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? |
1598 | But can a father be other than a father? |
1598 | But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing? |
1598 | But can wisdom be taught? |
1598 | But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking? |
1598 | But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is impossible? |
1598 | But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another? |
1598 | But if he can not speak falsely, may he not think falsely? |
1598 | But if you were not wise you were unlearned? |
1598 | But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches-- would that be the art which would make us happy? |
1598 | But what need is there of good fortune when we have wisdom already:--in every art and business are not the wise also the fortunate? |
1598 | But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothing-- is there any contradiction? |
1598 | But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters? |
1598 | But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the silent? |
1598 | But why should I repeat the whole story? |
1598 | CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge? |
1598 | CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this? |
1598 | CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates? |
1598 | CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? |
1598 | CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates? |
1598 | CRITO: Well, and what came of that? |
1598 | CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? |
1598 | CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? |
1598 | CRITO: Why not, Socrates? |
1598 | Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one''s own land, are goods? |
1598 | Certainly; did you think we should say No to that? |
1598 | Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father? |
1598 | Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied? |
1598 | Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they do not know? |
1598 | Do you agree with me? |
1598 | Do you agree? |
1598 | Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing? |
1598 | Do you not know letters? |
1598 | Do you not remember? |
1598 | Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father? |
1598 | Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not? |
1598 | Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth? |
1598 | Does not your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake? |
1598 | Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not? |
1598 | Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not? |
1598 | Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie? |
1598 | For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited? |
1598 | For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked? |
1598 | For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns? |
1598 | For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all? |
1598 | Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus? |
1598 | How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not? |
1598 | I can not say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men? |
1598 | I did, I said; what is going to happen to me? |
1598 | I said, and where did you learn that? |
1598 | I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? |
1598 | I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? |
1598 | Is not that your position? |
1598 | Is not the honourable honourable and the base base? |
1598 | Is not this the result-- that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil? |
1598 | Is that your difficulty? |
1598 | Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? |
1598 | Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat this dog? |
1598 | Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? |
1598 | May we not answer with absolute truth-- A knowledge which will do us good? |
1598 | Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak? |
1598 | Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things? |
1598 | Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not? |
1598 | Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant? |
1598 | Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter? |
1598 | Of their existence or of their non- existence? |
1598 | Of what country are they, and what is their line of wisdom? |
1598 | Or a speaking of the silent? |
1598 | Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? |
1598 | Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? |
1598 | Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer? |
1598 | Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own? |
1598 | Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are unjust? |
1598 | SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good? |
1598 | SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? |
1598 | SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good? |
1598 | SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power? |
1598 | SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the subject arts-- what does that do? |
1598 | SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? |
1598 | SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son? |
1598 | SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito? |
1598 | SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? |
1598 | SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? |
1598 | SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean? |
1598 | SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers? |
1598 | SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? |
1598 | Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? |
1598 | Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good? |
1598 | Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest? |
1598 | Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others? |
1598 | That makes no difference;--and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things? |
1598 | That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is? |
1598 | Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball:''Who are they who learn dictation of the grammar- master; the wise or the foolish boys?'' |
1598 | Then are they not animals? |
1598 | Then do you see our garments? |
1598 | Then he is the same? |
1598 | Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know? |
1598 | Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good- fortune but success? |
1598 | Then tell me, he said, do you know anything? |
1598 | Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are? |
1598 | Then there is no such thing as false opinion? |
1598 | Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact? |
1598 | Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have? |
1598 | Then we must surely be speaking the same thing? |
1598 | Then what are they professing to teach?'' |
1598 | Then what is the inference? |
1598 | Then why did you ask me what sense my words had? |
1598 | Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them? |
1598 | Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything? |
1598 | Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? |
1598 | Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes? |
1598 | Then, my good friend, do they all speak? |
1598 | Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters? |
1598 | Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only who does not know letters learns? |
1598 | Upon what principle? |
1598 | Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to have one shield only, and one spear? |
1598 | Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom-- among the goods or not? |
1598 | Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness? |
1598 | Well, I said; but then what am I to do? |
1598 | Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing? |
1598 | Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? |
1598 | Well, have not all things words expressive of them? |
1598 | Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise? |
1598 | Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful? |
1598 | What am I to do with them? |
1598 | What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish? |
1598 | What can they see? |
1598 | What do I know? |
1598 | What do you mean, Dionysodorus? |
1598 | What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing? |
1598 | What do you mean? |
1598 | What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? |
1598 | What is that? |
1598 | What is that? |
1598 | What knowledge is there which has such a nature? |
1598 | What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? |
1598 | What of that? |
1598 | What proof shall I give you? |
1598 | What then do you say? |
1598 | What then is the result of what has been said? |
1598 | What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this? |
1598 | What, before you, Dionysodorus? |
1598 | What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own? |
1598 | What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals? |
1598 | What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus? |
1598 | What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent? |
1598 | What, said he, is the business of a good workman? |
1598 | When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?'' |
1598 | When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all things? |
1598 | When you were children, and at your birth? |
1598 | Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse? |
1598 | Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things? |
1598 | Why do you say so? |
1598 | Why not? |
1598 | Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are? |
1598 | Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing? |
1598 | Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? |
1598 | Will you not cease adding to your answers? |
1598 | Will you not take our word that we know all things? |
1598 | Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? |
1598 | With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul? |
1598 | Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? |
1598 | Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings? |
1598 | Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea- urchins then? |
1598 | You admit that? |
1598 | You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming? |
1598 | You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us? |
1598 | You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning? |
1598 | You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one? |
1598 | You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is? |
1598 | You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant? |
1598 | and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? |
1598 | and teach them all the arts,--carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them? |
1598 | and was not that our conclusion? |
1598 | and will you explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? |
1598 | for you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these gods life? |
1598 | has he got to such a height of skill as that? |
1598 | if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? |
1598 | or are you the same as a stone? |
1598 | tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering? |