quadgram

This is a table of type quadgram and their frequencies. Use it to search & browse the list to learn more about your study carrel.

quadgram	frequency
on the th of	695
the army of the	655
army of the potomac	409
the morning of the	374
on the morning of	336
morning of the th	301
of the united states	282
of the army of	282
the night of the	278
at the same time	244
night of the th	215
for the purpose of	175
the mouth of the	170
the city of mexico	165
the north side of	151
of the th corps	147
north side of the	145
on the night of	137
the th of may	131
in front of the	129
the th of march	125
on the part of	121
on the d of	118
the south side of	118
side of the river	114
on the th i	106
to the command of	105
the th of april	105
of the james river	105
the close of the	103
south side of the	101
the rest of the	101
the line of the	101
the command of the	100
army of northern virginia	97
the secretary of war	93
side of the james	93
it would have been	92
on the st of	92
as soon as the	90
the army of northern	90
up to this time	90
on the north side	88
at the end of	88
the th and th	88
as soon as he	87
of the th of	86
the rear of the	86
on the south side	85
the th of june	85
to the united states	84
the th of february	82
the part of the	82
in rear of the	81
command of all the	81
the evening of the	81
in command of the	80
of the rio grande	80
the afternoon of the	79
the hands of the	79
the remainder of the	78
the end of the	78
into the hands of	77
the th of august	76
at the head of	76
on the th he	75
the th of september	74
and on the th	74
that the enemy had	73
the th of july	73
army of the tennessee	72
as soon as possible	71
on the other hand	70
the head of the	70
army of the cumberland	69
to the north side	69
with the exception of	68
bank of the river	68
the left of the	67
at the mouth of	66
during the night of	66
as soon as it	65
the right of the	64
the surrender of the	64
army of the james	63
in the way of	63
to the left of	63
in the midst of	63
force of the enemy	63
the arrival of the	62
on the evening of	62
as well as the	62
siege of vera cruz	62
that he could not	61
a part of the	61
by the th of	61
the right and left	60
a great deal of	60
with a view to	60
to the right and	59
resaca de la palma	59
the th of january	59
a large number of	59
a portion of the	59
by the way of	59
with the army of	58
the crossing of the	58
i do not know	58
of the enemy and	57
in the absence of	57
the balance of the	57
the department of the	57
on the road to	57
on the rio grande	56
in the rear of	55
on the th the	55
the beginning of the	55
of the two armies	55
the th of december	55
command of the army	55
in the mexican war	55
the memphis and charleston	54
division of the th	54
to the army of	54
the th of october	53
the point where the	53
a day or two	53
afternoon of the th	53
the enemy on the	53
on the other side	53
evening of the th	53
the fire of the	53
to the right of	52
along the line of	52
of the mississippi river	52
on the th and	52
as far as the	52
at siege of vera	51
the course of the	51
in consequence of the	51
would have to be	51
the officers of the	51
to the south side	51
after the battle of	51
of the th and	51
on the east side	50
the capture of the	50
on their way to	50
a few hundred yards	50
under the command of	50
the armies of the	49
under cover of the	49
under cover of night	49
from the army of	49
in the direction of	49
in the course of	49
after the fall of	48
east of the mississippi	48
of the mexican war	48
as soon as i	48
one of the most	48
at the beginning of	48
on the afternoon of	48
that it would be	48
for the protection of	48
the virginia central railroad	48
in the face of	47
to the rio grande	47
of the enemy was	47
the hudson bay company	46
the protection of the	46
in the united states	46
at the time of	46
had been sent to	46
it was impossible to	46
a large amount of	46
it was necessary to	45
the banks of the	45
army of the ohio	45
that part of the	45
two divisions of the	45
on the west bank	45
in the neighborhood of	45
the advance of the	45
the latter part of	45
i have no doubt	45
of the th the	44
in regard to the	44
for the use of	44
the top of the	44
the government of the	44
as soon as they	43
there was not a	43
as i have said	43
at molino del rey	43
the west bank of	43
the use of the	43
of the state of	43
to the rear of	43
about the middle of	43
in the hands of	42
of all the troops	42
the edge of the	42
on the right of	42
the middle of the	42
was one of the	42
in the valley of	42
close of the war	42
in advance of the	42
of the tennessee river	42
the destruction of the	42
early on the morning	42
the mobile and ohio	42
to the james river	42
in the vicinity of	42
on the pacific coast	41
on account of the	41
about the same time	41
the north bank of	41
of the city of	41
morning of the d	41
the movements of the	41
a mile and a	41
north bank of the	41
the th of november	41
had been ordered to	41
west bank of the	40
of the th infantry	40
i do not believe	40
mile and a half	40
missing in original page	40
would not have been	40
the front of the	40
the united states and	40
for the first time	40
he would have been	39
fell into the hands	39
period missing in original	39
the fact that the	39
pieces of artillery and	39
to the close of	39
in a few days	38
of the nez perces	38
out of the way	38
i was ordered to	38
the capital of the	37
so far as to	37
the remainder of his	37
the position of the	37
in the presence of	37
with a force of	37
of the engineer company	37
on the way to	36
to take advantage of	36
soon as it was	36
an officer of the	36
of the potomac and	36
with the th corps	36
to the support of	36
in possession of the	36
south bank of the	36
the south side railroad	36
the east side of	36
was assigned to the	36
the troops in the	36
was a man of	36
north of the james	36
the armies operating against	36
memphis and charleston railroad	36
the south bank of	36
and went into camp	36
to the city of	35
the head of his	35
one hundred and fifty	35
on the same day	35
west of the mississippi	35
had been in the	35
he was a man	35
the possession of the	35
the time of the	35
with the remainder of	35
early in the morning	35
the direction of the	34
in a few minutes	34
the junction of the	34
there would be no	34
that there would be	34
battle of cerro gordo	34
the people of the	34
up to that time	34
from time to time	34
the authorities at washington	34
so as to be	34
the command of a	34
assigned to the command	34
that the enemy was	34
in command of all	34
by way of the	34
in a short time	34
the lines of the	34
to the point where	34
to be sent to	33
the commander of the	33
to get possession of	33
from the north side	33
th and th corps	33
until the th of	33
of one of the	33
mouth of the rio	33
and a half miles	33
the other side of	33
it was found that	33
i do not think	33
the th army corps	33
a good deal of	33
if it had been	33
that of the enemy	33
two and a half	33
with the loss of	33
with the view of	33
in the old army	33
and directed him to	32
president of the united	32
but he did not	32
within a few miles	32
at an early hour	32
it had not been	32
the walla walla valley	32
at the close of	32
out of range of	32
the side of the	32
the troops that had	32
soon as he could	32
and the army of	32
on the opposite side	32
the summit of the	32
other side of the	32
a part of his	32
did not wish to	32
rear of the enemy	32
to the end of	31
the d and th	31
rest of the army	31
with two divisions of	31
he was directed to	31
night of the d	31
the valley of mexico	31
on the left of	31
of the potomac was	31
of the red river	31
the condition of the	31
in charge of the	31
the th of the	31
in killed and wounded	31
the character of the	31
hands of the enemy	31
side of the tennessee	30
night of the st	30
in addition to this	30
in the latter part	30
in the shenandoah valley	30
on the james river	30
the war was over	30
the object of the	30
the greater part of	30
the guns of the	30
if they had been	30
surrender of the army	30
in view of the	30
a few days before	30
the battle of shiloh	30
armies operating against richmond	30
east side of the	30
the officers and men	30
of the th he	30
end of the city	30
and in a few	29
i told him that	29
the rank and file	29
he could not be	29
a force of the	29
would be able to	29
the valley of the	29
of the enemy to	29
of range of the	29
the foot of the	29
that there was no	29
in the capture of	29
a few miles of	29
east bank of the	29
with a view of	29
in the hope of	29
under the protection of	29
a member of the	29
the east bank of	29
seems to have been	28
of molino del rey	28
fell into our hands	28
the news of the	28
could not have been	28
morning of the st	28
the whole of the	28
the united states service	28
in the afternoon of	28
close up to the	28
with the aid of	28
in the regular army	28
with the rest of	28
that he had been	28
as well as to	28
the centre of the	28
the annexation of texas	28
the attention of the	27
the majority of the	27
of the confederate army	27
the battle of the	27
by the united states	27
the terms of the	27
a few days after	27
the nature of the	27
to take charge of	27
and there was no	27
is one of the	27
of the engineer corps	27
the th the enemy	27
in addition to the	27
occupied by the enemy	27
found that the enemy	27
on his way to	27
of the d corps	27
the bitter root valley	27
the base of the	27
held by the enemy	27
the exception of the	27
fire of the enemy	27
military division of the	27
the national troops were	27
the defence of the	27
mobile and ohio railroad	27
to the point of	27
close to the enemy	27
government of the united	27
the garrison of vicksburg	27
was ordered to send	27
the military division of	27
the enemy out of	27
a base of supplies	27
of the national troops	27
bank of the tennessee	27
general of the army	26
head of the column	26
the rio grande and	26
of the hudson bay	26
for the safety of	26
for a long time	26
hundred yards of the	26
was ordered to move	26
if he had been	26
of the capture of	26
a large part of	26
as we have seen	26
i have the honor	26
it was known that	26
the result of the	26
to take part in	26
to return to the	26
on the th a	26
at the foot of	26
to the east of	26
on the west side	26
as far as possible	25
the loss of the	25
to the rank of	25
to the mouth of	25
to that of the	25
a short time before	25
to go into the	25
on the following day	25
a mile from the	25
about the th of	25
of the mouth of	25
on the banks of	25
some of his troops	25
and many of the	25
of all the armies	25
the movement of troops	25
the d of july	25
that he did not	25
he would have to	25
to get to the	25
the gulf of mexico	25
on the line of	25
was on his way	25
it could not be	25
get possession of the	25
the enemy had been	25
more than a mile	25
after the capture of	25
two divisions of cavalry	25
as much as possible	24
of the enemy on	24
there would have been	24
of the war department	24
of the surrender of	24
of the tennessee and	24
the th corps and	24
to the number of	24
from the rapidan to	24
on the subject of	24
the main body of	24
by the left flank	24
had not yet been	24
he was ordered to	24
that he was not	24
was at this time	24
i did not know	24
the condition of affairs	24
miles south of the	24
division of the mississippi	24
thought it would be	24
that it was impossible	24
the enemy was driven	24
on the red river	24
was in command of	24
balance of the army	24
in favor of the	24
divisions of the th	24
and the th corps	24
up to the point	24
in the possession of	23
fall into our hands	23
he was obliged to	23
would have been the	23
took possession of the	23
and the united states	23
of the battle of	23
as he could get	23
the members of the	23
th of the month	23
i was very much	23
end of the war	23
they were ready to	23
the preservation of the	23
and the next day	23
the presence of the	23
there had been a	23
to the best of	23
and the troops were	23
and the city of	23
the war with mexico	23
and it was not	23
in the city of	23
at resaca de la	23
a few days later	23
this was the first	23
head chief of the	23
have the honor to	23
officers of the army	23
all along the line	23
for the sake of	23
an immense amount of	22
at the battle of	22
in the mean time	22
i had been at	22
the enemy did not	22
in reference to the	22
all the troops in	22
in the month of	22
to take command of	22
line of the enemy	22
as a matter of	22
the time of which	22
but it was not	22
movements of the enemy	22
to the secretary of	22
the crest of the	22
on our extreme left	22
to send a force	22
into the united states	22
for the benefit of	22
in which he was	22
of some of the	22
object of the expedition	22
to make the assault	22
armies of the united	22
the opposite side of	22
under the direction of	22
lines of the enemy	22
take part in the	22
the command of all	22
that there was a	22
for more than a	22
in the army of	22
to the vicinity of	22
the cause of the	22
of the right wing	22
to the front to	22
to the enemy as	22
part of the state	22
of the mormon battalion	22
it would be impossible	22
of the city and	22
battle of buena vista	22
at this time the	22
part of the country	22
crossed to the north	21
battle of molino del	21
about the first of	21
so long as they	21
to enable them to	21
and one division of	21
to the pacific coast	21
for the preservation of	21
was so great that	21
the st of may	21
front of the enemy	21
to raise the siege	21
from vera cruz to	21
the return of the	21
camp and garrison equipage	21
by the fact that	21
within a few hundred	21
movement by the left	21
march to the sea	21
received a dispatch from	21
of the north anna	21
of san juan de	21
the rapidan to the	21
in accordance with the	21
did not want to	21
fall into the hands	21
of the st of	21
to go to the	21
in pursuit of the	21
two hundred and fifty	21
impossible for him to	21
to take possession of	21
the th he was	21
will be allowed to	21
time of which i	21
the mississippi central railroad	21
in a few moments	21
to the relief of	21
to the river below	21
of the national forces	21
middle of the afternoon	21
i had not been	21
one division of the	21
the war of the	21
line of the road	21
on each side of	21
and that he would	21
the stars and stripes	21
the same time to	21
hundred yards from the	21
both sides of the	21
from the fact that	21
of all the forces	21
after the arrival of	21
from the direction of	21
battle of the wilderness	21
for the defence of	21
in the open field	21
on the ground that	21
advance to rio grande	21
the approach of the	21
the following letter to	21
at the crossing of	21
of the military division	21
the bulk of the	21
and most of the	21
on the top of	21
on the arrival of	20
view of the enemy	20
the manner in which	20
two or three days	20
command of the department	20
the city to the	20
the operations of the	20
the d of may	20
two or three miles	20
was found to be	20
to the left and	20
of the department of	20
in the command of	20
prosecution of the war	20
to be able to	20
banks of the river	20
late in the afternoon	20
war of the rebellion	20
the troops were to	20
will have to be	20
a very short time	20
reached on the th	20
ordered to report to	20
the st of april	20
to get out of	20
greater part of the	20
will be able to	20
it would not be	20
in the battle of	20
later in the day	20
so as to make	20
made up my mind	20
in a very short	20
preservation of the union	20
in front of them	20
at that time the	20
received a letter from	20
the enemy at the	20
reason to believe that	20
hundred and fifty miles	20
in the case of	20
capture of the city	20
take charge of the	20
advance of the army	20
the last of the	20
the road to the	20
of the people of	20
to get back to	20
and at the same	20
he was able to	20
that it was a	19
the retreat of the	19
would have been in	19
that portion of the	19
with most of the	19
went into camp at	19
the mississippi river to	19
for the time being	19
of the rocky mountains	19
each side of the	19
between the united states	19
but a few miles	19
any part of the	19
take possession of the	19
to be relieved from	19
and a number of	19
the story of the	19
of the garrison of	19
the bank of the	19
on the receipt of	19
a large portion of	19
as rapidly as possible	19
to drive the enemy	19
a quarter of a	19
of the army to	19
the president and secretary	19
in the habit of	19
the st of march	19
of the regular army	19
all parts of the	19
the th day of	19
the terms upon which	19
of resaca de la	19
he did not know	19
on the side of	19
the d of march	19
have no doubt that	19
the number of men	19
the situation of the	19
on the east bank	19
were on their way	19
the interior of the	19
to go into camp	19
be in readiness to	19
in the confederate army	19
of the enemy were	19
to the grade of	19
they would have to	19
the enemy was in	19
as the army of	19
as one of the	19
that he would be	19
the work of the	19
part of the army	19
the midst of a	19
was not aware of	19
did not succeed in	19
the men who had	19
the army to the	19
a few of the	19
most of the men	19
part of the line	19
to join the army	19
and the advance of	19
that he would not	18
to be in readiness	18
at the time i	18
to the th of	18
and was ordered to	18
to take the offensive	18
the people who had	18
of the river to	18
at the time and	18
in the morning to	18
a portion of it	18
surrender of the city	18
the topography of the	18
from the front of	18
the battle of chattanooga	18
with reference to the	18
and many of them	18
before the enemy could	18
on my return to	18
from the war department	18
a leave of absence	18
the way of the	18
with my staff and	18
the virginia and tennessee	18
condition of the roads	18
of the northern route	18
armies of the potomac	18
line of the tennessee	18
the heart of the	18
but was repulsed with	18
and took possession of	18
of the country was	18
the face of an	18
i do not remember	18
communication with the north	18
that it would not	18
there was a good	18
from the time of	18
he reached on the	18
that it was the	18
at the point where	18
the rank of major	18
top of the hill	18
was on the right	18
it would be a	18
the enemy was not	18
i received orders to	18
the baltimore and ohio	18
i would have to	18
of the th i	18
your note of this	18
the tennessee and cumberland	18
side of the road	18
rapidan to the james	18
possession of the enemy	18
with the engineer company	18
to the top of	18
it would not do	18
on the south bank	18
the men of the	18
to take care of	18
against the government of	18
back in time to	18
the north end of	18
of the enemy at	18
president and secretary of	18
to be in the	18
up from the south	18
at the age of	18
the th there was	18
the potomac and the	18
to repair the railroad	18
the big black and	18
d and th corps	18
but there was no	18
it would not have	18
the james river and	18
on the road from	18
the secretary of the	18
to the big black	18
of the mexican government	18
of his troops were	18
guns of the enemy	18
the relief of knoxville	18
open to the enemy	18
the eyes of the	18
headquarters armies of the	18
the first line of	18
for a number of	18
a flag of truce	18
with that of the	18
the d corps and	18
i had been in	18
but a short time	18
to take the initiative	18
the safety of the	18
of two or three	18
found that he was	18
the camp of the	18
it had to be	18
the south side road	18
quarters of a mile	18
got off on the	18
this was going on	18
to move against mobile	18
the north and south	18
to the war department	18
department of the tennessee	18
to the north and	18
rear of the army	18
enemy out of his	18
head of his column	18
army of the mississippi	18
the headquarters of the	18
baltimore and ohio railroad	18
repulsed with heavy loss	18
on the national side	18
up the shenandoah valley	18
virginia and tennessee railroad	18
out of the state	18
in one of the	18
under the supervision of	18
of about one hundred	17
front of the city	17
for the reason that	17
the enemy in force	17
the president of the	17
could be brought to	17
and secretary of war	17
below the mouth of	17
would have to pass	17
a portion of his	17
the surface of the	17
at the hands of	17
of the north and	17
that it would have	17
to do with the	17
who had been in	17
for a day or	17
from the fire of	17
topography of the country	17
that i had been	17
to the effect that	17
it could have been	17
nature of the ground	17
on the right and	17
as prisoners of war	17
the occupation of the	17
belonging to the family	17
the division of general	17
back from the river	17
it was impossible for	17
as soon as we	17
the face of the	17
would have been to	17
daylight the next morning	17
a large force of	17
the northern pacific railroad	17
to the movement of	17
halls of the montezumas	17
there could be no	17
on the field of	17
to report to me	17
and the loss of	17
there can be no	17
the engineer company and	17
with a small force	17
the place where the	17
remainder of the army	17
but i did not	17
command of the th	17
in the event of	17
i was obliged to	17
south of the city	17
by the president and	17
companies of the th	17
the breaking out of	17
the next morning the	17
and the rest of	17
a little to the	17
letter of the th	17
two companies of the	17
of the condition of	17
the treaty of peace	17
had to be done	17
beat a hasty retreat	17
the view of the	17
battle of resaca de	17
at the last moment	17
from the united states	17
i was in the	17
and the rio grande	17
of the american army	17
to the defence of	17
that some of the	17
the west side of	17
cut him off from	17
quite a number of	17
on the second day	17
a suspension of hostilities	17
from its source to	17
leave of absence for	16
the th to the	16
in time to be	16
troops in the field	16
it seems to me	16
on the north bank	16
san juan de ulua	16
brought to bear upon	16
they could not be	16
could be found in	16
with a portion of	16
in time to take	16
north of the city	16
said to have been	16
one of the ablest	16
in front of his	16
that had crossed the	16
the opening of the	16
have been able to	16
it was at this	16
of the first day	16
to break up the	16
by the morning of	16
so as to have	16
be found in the	16
been sent to the	16
on its way to	16
the field of battle	16
point on the th	16
as if they had	16
suppression of the rebellion	16
so that it was	16
the indians of the	16
to the time of	16
to return to their	16
from the rio grande	16
would have been a	16
of the armies of	16
against the united states	16
orders were given for	16
the walla walla council	16
to turn over the	16
out of the valley	16
turned over to the	16
for the surrender of	16
he was in the	16
the march of the	16
that he would have	16
soon as it is	16
i ordered him to	16
the vicinity of the	16
hundred feet above the	16
the d of february	16
the c oe ur	16
the minds of the	16
with the head of	16
than that of the	16
opposite side of the	16
on the th there	16
and he did not	16
to commence on the	16
with the united states	16
the conduct of the	16
of the army in	16
some of the men	16
and some of the	16
the st of june	16
in the walla walla	16
war between the states	16
the benefit of the	16
to do the same	16
the whole of it	16
had been able to	16
but was unable to	16
th and th of	16
th of september i	16
the command of general	16
about the st of	16
in line of battle	16
and munitions of war	16
i do not want	16
a sufficient number of	16
did not seem to	16
the pickets of the	16
to join in the	16
and that he had	16
the suppression of the	16
in the same way	16
on the th general	16
i would have been	16
in the middle of	16
asked him if he	16
the immediate command of	16
said to me that	16
on both sides of	16
attention of the enemy	16
of the men who	16
for the government of	16
the level of the	16
to be given to	16
to hold his position	16
if there had been	16
in a state of	16
the service of the	16
i told him i	16
of the enemy in	16
that could be spared	16
was by no means	16
and had to be	16
the bridge over the	16
was in possession of	16
and those of the	16
get out of the	16
as fast as they	16
the fort on the	16
not seem to have	15
compelled to fall back	15
five pieces of artillery	15
him that i would	15
as it was and	15
flank the enemy out	15
the enemy would have	15
the railroad east of	15
the tops of the	15
to the state of	15
to the west of	15
move at the same	15
i asked him if	15
there would be a	15
years at west point	15
the united states would	15
through a hostile country	15
the east of the	15
was cut off from	15
west of the road	15
up the james river	15
for the troops to	15
the white oak road	15
part of his command	15
at san cosme garita	15
was light enough to	15
the war between the	15
during the night the	15
commanding army of the	15
the d of november	15
and that of the	15
the troops on the	15
was directed to move	15
while this was going	15
the d of june	15
by this time the	15
for the relief of	15
on the th sherman	15
one of the best	15
to take up arms	15
on the th day	15
potomac and the james	15
the army and navy	15
position of the two	15
with as little delay	15
a considerable number of	15
of the d and	15
army in the field	15
on the weldon railroad	15
heavy loss in killed	15
to send a division	15
few hundred yards of	15
been at west point	15
of the big black	15
the big black river	15
from chattanooga to atlanta	15
of most of the	15
had been at west	15
the east end of	15
from grand gulf to	15
the bottom of the	15
by the south side	15
the head of column	15
four pieces of artillery	15
to remain in the	15
the great majority of	15
i had no doubt	15
up the river to	15
out of his position	15
of the memphis and	15
surrender of the garrison	15
his line of march	15
a council of war	15
drive the enemy from	15
the point where it	15
by the national troops	15
explosion of the mine	15
not be able to	15
was ordered back to	15
expedition against fort fisher	15
that they were not	15
the th i received	15
to hold the enemy	15
three or four days	15
i had never met	15
as it was light	15
the cavalry of the	15
my recollection is that	15
of cape fear river	15
to get upon the	15
troops could be got	15
members of the battalion	15
the james river to	15
to my mind that	15
west side of the	15
the road back to	15
his lines of communication	15
so that they could	15
as a base of	15
army to the south	15
a view of the	15
the james river canal	15
a number of the	15
it is not the	15
to the head of	15
would no doubt have	15
there should be a	15
cut off from all	15
our base of supplies	15
place on the th	15
from the view of	15
in a letter to	15
the battle of contreras	15
was said to have	15
the pursuit was continued	15
the success of the	15
do not want to	15
of the nez perce	15
from all communication with	15
by the rear of	15
the time i was	15
the appearance of the	15
the th corps to	15
up the south side	15
the command of his	15
vast importance to the	15
the importance of the	15
to look after the	15
from which they could	15
this condition of affairs	15
the arrival of general	15
th of february i	15
me that he had	15
take advantage of any	15
should be allowed to	15
i received a dispatch	15
tennessee and cumberland rivers	15
under the cover of	15
if there should be	15
on the virginia central	15
what was going on	15
movement of the army	15
the removal of the	15
as long as he	15
the mexican war and	15
the army of occupation	15
the nez perce country	15
of the troops were	15
an incident of the	15
of the national army	15
north and south carolina	15
right and left of	15
started on his return	15
the battle of buena	15
battle of palo alto	15
troops that had been	15
single piece of artillery	15
mexico as it was	15
to the base of	15
as close to the	15
by one of the	15
as little delay as	15
the th corps was	15
in the war of	15
the rio grande was	15
about a mile from	15
the lower end of	15
it was light enough	15
cut off from the	15
of the river at	15
of the potomac to	15
to report to him	15
important to the enemy	15
the united states had	15
on the extreme right	15
he found the enemy	15
of the th was	15
from the south side	15
to the surrender of	15
the troops that were	15
the valley of virginia	15
command of the military	15
their way to the	15
on the approach of	15
my staff and a	15
a force sufficient to	15
by the middle of	15
the movement of our	15
saying that he had	15
loss in killed and	15
the st of january	15
the enemy had taken	15
large part of the	15
importance to the enemy	15
the action of the	15
to enable us to	15
the siege of vicksburg	15
the flank of the	15
and absorption of mexico	15
of the blue ridge	15
of the cumberland river	15
to report to general	15
had been in command	15
it would be well	15
it became evident that	15
i therefore determined to	15
evident that the enemy	15
the fall of fort	15
the th or th	14
two or three hundred	14
that he was the	14
him out of the	14
drawn up in line	14
with a party of	14
it was to be	14
about three miles from	14
on the land side	14
be given to the	14
to meet the enemy	14
and rear of the	14
that many of the	14
of the d of	14
would have been impossible	14
this time the enemy	14
for him to do	14
were sent to the	14
on the crest of	14
of infantry and a	14
he had been in	14
it is probable that	14
the day of the	14
a small force of	14
with a part of	14
headquarters of the army	14
under the orders of	14
it must have been	14
fired upon by the	14
of so much importance	14
was known as the	14
the territory of the	14
by the side of	14
for the transportation of	14
of the river and	14
i found that he	14
would be obliged to	14
to the place where	14
the d of april	14
in readiness to move	14
be ready to move	14
beyond the limits of	14
with a large force	14
was said to be	14
the power of the	14
the prosecution of the	14
the progress of the	14
awaiting the arrival of	14
but on the th	14
secretary of war and	14
take command of the	14
as far as he	14
but i do not	14
off to the left	14
the line of march	14
of the secretary of	14
was still in the	14
command of the troops	14
quarter of a mile	14
turned to the left	14
out of the question	14
the forenoon of the	14
the indians on the	14
in the fall of	14
to enable him to	14
at the time he	14
in the centre of	14
the enemy and the	14
a great number of	14
on either side of	14
what should be done	14
candidate for the presidency	14
in your letter of	14
but he could not	14
for a distance of	14
and in a moment	14
of the troops in	14
i was on the	14
the southern part of	14
a distance of about	14
under the fire of	14
of the city to	14
a division of the	14
of the potomac in	14
could not see how	14
if it had not	14
the object being to	14
and that it was	14
that i could not	14
the direct road to	14
take the place of	14
early in the afternoon	14
left of the road	14
was not to be	14
in that part of	14
and under cover of	14
far as he could	14
in the heart of	14
on the following morning	14
as fast as the	13
had no right to	13
was ordered to attack	13
the minister of relations	13
was an officer of	13
as could be found	13
he did not wish	13
on the edge of	13
tired of the war	13
when he reached the	13
of the city was	13
the top of a	13
early on the th	13
the duty of the	13
history of brigham young	13
an hour and a	13
i did not see	13
the infantry and artillery	13
of the arrival of	13
in time of peace	13
the d of august	13
with a loss of	13
west of the city	13
and found that the	13
coming up from the	13
on the left and	13
north of the river	13
to fight the enemy	13
the governor and his	13
by the enemy in	13
the next day the	13
the battle of nashville	13
command in the field	13
the number of troops	13
would have been glad	13
to cut off the	13
at a time when	13
of the same day	13
of the government in	13
became evident that the	13
i had given him	13
on my way to	13
for a considerable distance	13
the troops were in	13
command of the district	13
use of the army	13
at west point with	13
in front of a	13
four or five miles	13
to move against the	13
there were but two	13
if he did not	13
a court of inquiry	13
united states and mexico	13
if there was a	13
had to be made	13
the battle of cerro	13
be taken from the	13
the approaches to the	13
and suggested that i	13
assumed command of the	13
in case of attack	13
it might have been	13
had to be protected	13
to believe that the	13
the men at the	13
and from the following	13
to get away from	13
i should not have	13
the troops could be	13
it was possible that	13
in consequence of this	13
it was difficult to	13
on the next day	13
was the only one	13
hour and a half	13
for the express purpose	13
all the rest of	13
than three thousand men	13
by the end of	13
within range of the	13
the crossings of the	13
it was too late	13
to the fact that	13
if he had not	13
the attack was made	13
section of the country	13
officers and men to	13
time to take part	13
i had no idea	13
and some of them	13
the good of the	13
the report of the	13
that they could not	13
near the mouth of	13
did not know but	13
all the officers and	13
the north and west	13
i do not wish	13
the receipt of this	13
got out of the	13
immediately in front of	13
i did not believe	13
in camp on the	13
to hold the line	13
further orders from me	13
of the army and	13
remainder of his force	13
it will be remembered	13
and the next morning	13
to add to the	13
the united states was	13
the two divisions of	13
that the enemy would	13
it was said that	13
the loss of a	13
that they should be	13
in case of an	13
all the way from	13
of the union army	13
three quarters of a	13
it seemed to be	13
it was on the	13
supplies for the army	13
its source to its	13
to effect a landing	13
corps of the army	13
during the whole of	13
face of an enemy	13
were killed or wounded	13
was not sufficient to	13
was on the th	13
up to the very	13
the neighborhood of the	13
would have been very	13
up my mind that	13
in the department of	13
as they came up	13
it was supposed that	13
to the dignity of	13
of the enemy that	13
in spite of the	13
the country through which	13
soon as the news	13
a point on the	13
so that he could	13
from the mississippi river	13
not aware of the	13
to be allowed to	13
beginning of the war	13
more than a hundred	13
to enable me to	13
the point of the	13
had to be crossed	13
there was no time	13
at the breaking out	13
a mile or more	13
to the south and	13
had come up from	13
with him in the	13
the st of july	13
on the eve of	13
part of our line	13
in honor of the	13
to the capital of	13
i had with me	13
between them and the	13
back with heavy loss	13
to the north of	13
to within a few	13
seemed to be the	13
the enemy from the	13
the right wing of	13
the day after the	13
were not to be	13
for a few days	13
in the shape of	13
by the use of	13
that i had not	13
if he could not	13
the troops under general	13
to take the place	13
to be ready to	13
a mile of the	13
command of the whole	13
breaking out of the	13
in the spring of	13
and i determined to	13
capture of vera cruz	13
hundred and sixty miles	13
placed in charge of	13
the united states to	13
about the time the	13
on the confederate side	13
for the united states	13
which he could not	13
source to its mouth	13
capital of the state	13
for two or three	13
which he had to	13
to this time he	13
the arrival of reinforcements	13
told him that i	13
of the position of	13
the presence of an	13
the th a reconnoissance	13
the secretary of state	13
battle of james island	13
i came to the	13
i returned to my	13
in such a manner	13
the history of the	13
line in front of	12
i should have been	12
was in full view	12
to the mexican war	12
ten or twelve miles	12
would have given us	12
in their respective fronts	12
the troops of the	12
troops that were to	12
i was prepared to	12
one division of cavalry	12
the battle of belmont	12
an assault on the	12
but most of the	12
the san cosme road	12
miles to the south	12
by the secretary of	12
secretary of the navy	12
doubt in my mind	12
troops that had crossed	12
to flank the enemy	12
by an attack on	12
up to that point	12
miles and a half	12
from san antonio to	12
manner in which the	12
chief of staff of	12
on the th with	12
from the command of	12
the night the enemy	12
later in the war	12
i want to see	12
send a force to	12
up to the enemy	12
of the new york	12
return to their homes	12
i wanted him to	12
that if he had	12
will be sent to	12
superintendent of indian affairs	12
to send one division	12
one of the first	12
two hundred and sixty	12
the government at washington	12
line over which to	12
loss to the enemy	12
of the baltimore and	12
at all events the	12
in the morning of	12
would have had to	12
one side of the	12
until the war was	12
before the enemy had	12
in sight of the	12
the point of land	12
would not only have	12
it was better to	12
to move to the	12
he started on his	12
the halls of the	12
i had known general	12
for supplying the army	12
to cut loose from	12
it was possible for	12
making it difficult to	12
cavalry of the army	12
about ten thousand men	12
i had been a	12
in this way he	12
all communication with the	12
a single piece of	12
the object of this	12
heavy growth of timber	12
was and as it	12
to me that the	12
more than a week	12
at that time was	12
in some way or	12
a division of cavalry	12
and one hundred and	12
was to be made	12
the state of mississippi	12
tariff for mexican ports	12
the big black at	12
the defence of richmond	12
in the state service	12
that he had not	12
west of the alleghanies	12
of the enemy as	12
the th i ordered	12
my mind that the	12
he was in command	12
to prepare for the	12
that could be brought	12
all the troops he	12
to hold a line	12
the th i had	12
was directed to send	12
was the first to	12
where he found the	12
for three years or	12
could be sent to	12
the offensive against the	12
some way or other	12
be brought to bear	12
was grown up with	12
a map drawn by	12
of white oak road	12
had been assigned to	12
command of a corps	12
hopelessness of further resistance	12
join the army of	12
might be expected to	12
and as it is	12
at amelia court house	12
grand movement of the	12
north of the tennessee	12
no time during the	12
battle of white oak	12
it was not a	12
as i have stated	12
to attend the council	12
it had been a	12
that could have been	12
rations in their haversacks	12
under these circumstances i	12
up to within a	12
that he was a	12
on the big black	12
the position of our	12
a matter of course	12
full view of the	12
we were in the	12
there was a large	12
would be sent to	12
to run the batteries	12
united states until properly	12
to move up the	12
as to make it	12
put an end to	12
that i should be	12
place he reached on	12
ground in front of	12
fallen into our hands	12
on one of the	12
in the state of	12
it is possible to	12
the brigade to which	12
palo alto and resaca	12
of being able to	12
the campaign against vicksburg	12
for the accomplishment of	12
loss of the enemy	12
the district of south	12
to the junction of	12
reported to me that	12
and on the st	12
the south and south	12
we would have to	12
with one of the	12
light enough to see	12
have been obliged to	12
castle of san juan	12
the war department to	12
crossing the big black	12
east end of the	12
i had known him	12
corinth on the th	12
to make an attack	12
in a position to	12
to take the field	12
main body of the	12
as far as i	12
at the white house	12
the soldiers of the	12
was out of the	12
had been captured by	12
on the way from	12
the th corps will	12
the north of the	12
in the same direction	12
so as to command	12
hold themselves in readiness	12
he could hold out	12
it was hoped that	12
the forces in the	12
and ordered him to	12
as early as the	12
in north and south	12
many of the people	12
put in command of	12
those of the enemy	12
which i now write	12
the termination of the	12
directly to his front	12
on his return from	12
in a single day	12
of the war to	12
when i came to	12
in case of war	12
it would be better	12
there were quite a	12
th a reconnoissance was	12
we came to a	12
down the river on	12
but little doubt that	12
reached the point where	12
down the river to	12
th of may and	12
on the mississippi river	12
who was in command	12
by the st of	12
of the weldon railroad	12
department of the ohio	12
i was afraid that	12
the good faith of	12
staff of the army	12
the hopelessness of further	12
received the news of	12
for a considerable time	12
in a few hours	12
he would like to	12
portion of the army	12
to cross the tennessee	12
he was forced to	12
it is to be	12
would have been obliged	12
three years or the	12
the th and st	12
which to draw supplies	12
emptying into the tennessee	12
the intersection of the	12
in order to get	12
of the road from	12
themselves in readiness to	12
that the army of	12
the railroad back to	12
a depot of supplies	12
that i would send	12
the attack on the	12
the bulk of his	12
the plan had been	12
flank of the enemy	12
i have often heard	12
as soon as you	12
of which i now	12
of the road to	12
position of the enemy	12
mark missing in original	12
resistance on the part	12
the road we were	12
the terms of surrender	12
to leave the country	12
of the line of	12
after the close of	12
condition of the army	12
the james and appomattox	12
by a circuitous route	12
south of vera cruz	12
and to go into	12
the tennessee river to	12
that we would have	12
two pieces of artillery	12
of the same name	12
in the interest of	12
the same time that	12
the tennessee and the	12
a portion of our	12
in front of petersburg	12
and did not know	12
he met the enemy	12
and had served with	12
further resistance on the	12
of the virginia central	12
city point on the	12
the tennessee river at	12
south of the enemy	12
brigade to which i	12
to the conclusion that	12
to advance on the	12
and it was a	12
to hold themselves in	12
of the indian war	12
my object was to	12
states until properly exchanged	12
this part of the	12
with heavy loss in	12
that the enemy were	12
the case of the	12
of the great father	12
that the united states	12
would have been no	12
the enemy made a	12
the legislature of virginia	12
before the arrival of	12
of food and forage	12
the east and west	12
up by an attack	12
mouth of the yazoo	12
large number of prisoners	12
country was covered with	12
that it was my	12
the ground in front	12
of further resistance on	12
armies of the u	12
south was a military	12
immediate command of the	12
the ground over which	12
was a military camp	12
on the danville road	12
had served with him	12
of the armies operating	12
between him and richmond	12
be called upon to	12
i sent word to	12
to make the charge	12
i directed him to	12
bank of the cumberland	12
at the junction of	12
seem to have been	12
quotation mark missing in	12
the administration of president	12
to destroy the railroad	12
this time i had	12
without the loss of	12
the capture of petersburg	12
that it would take	12
all the troops that	12
it was and as	12
him from the field	12
that he had made	12
time to be of	12
which had been sent	12
from the river above	12
i determined to make	12
he said to me	12
by the time i	12
to the defences of	12
on the extreme left	12
the battle of resaca	12
enabled the enemy to	12
preparations were at once	12
to be retained by	12
which place he reached	12
it is not probable	12
the enemy fell back	12
little delay as possible	12
up his line of	12
the assault was made	12
years or the war	12
the enemy was found	12
he was unable to	12
of the most important	12
for the most part	12
water from the river	12
about a mile and	12
close of the rebellion	12
that he was in	12
most strenuous efforts to	12
at the rate of	12
until the d of	12
the army in the	12
received your note of	12
do not know what	12
the enemy in his	12
the south side and	12
i received the following	12
on the tennessee river	12
to the commanding officer	12
of his staff officers	12
to move by the	12
he replied that he	12
the enemy south of	12
was on its way	12
sent a staff officer	12
the mississippi river was	12
the enemy as possible	12
to make an assault	12
for some little time	12
he seems to have	12
to the north bank	12
and several hundred prisoners	12
of the war and	12
of his artillery and	12
they will be sent	12
the d of september	12
informing him of the	12
took up his line	12
crossed the big black	12
possession of the city	12
in front of these	12
anything of the kind	12
the young prairie merchant	12
bank of the james	12
to the extent of	12
of the potomac had	12
opinion as to the	12
the state of the	12
could have been taken	12
at all events he	12
side of the appomattox	12
but as soon as	12
to the right to	12
the united states until	12
i did not want	12
all points of the	12
the fall of atlanta	12
along the banks of	12
to be used in	12
about one hundred and	12
there at the time	12
the top of lookout	12
that they would not	12
to move at the	12
was at that time	12
the james river by	12
rear of the th	12
the dead and wounded	12
the republican party was	12
the enemy had come	12
hands of the national	12
of officers and men	12
the left bank of	12
may be able to	12
the rio grande to	12
on the th to	11
about half a mile	11
the battle of chantilly	11
service of the united	11
it is impossible to	11
to fall back to	11
with the idea that	11
that we did not	11
were made by the	11
chief of the nez	11
soon as they could	11
the strength of the	11
would be ready to	11
the great mass of	11
san juan de ulloa	11
and as soon as	11
just in time to	11
and there was a	11
east of the mountains	11
of the first importance	11
could not be expected	11
if i had been	11
in the army and	11
the enemy would not	11
he could not have	11
the approval of the	11
and the condition of	11
of the state and	11
a crossing of the	11
in order to save	11
such a manner as	11
still farther to the	11
there was no more	11
the credit of the	11
i am glad to	11
that as soon as	11
officer of the army	11
it will be seen	11
there was a little	11
that i was not	11
of the territory of	11
went so far as	11
the experience of the	11
on top of the	11
at any one time	11
the weather was very	11
would like to have	11
the president and his	11
but he was not	11
the battles of the	11
the st of february	11
it was but a	11
he was afraid that	11
there must have been	11
of the th michigan	11
what he was doing	11
come to the conclusion	11
by means of a	11
knew that he was	11
from corpus christi to	11
the roof of the	11
with more or less	11
mustered into the united	11
it will be better	11
i did not think	11
the left of our	11
the early part of	11
the completion of the	11
had not gone far	11
had been so long	11
a short time after	11
to me that i	11
of that part of	11
the heads of the	11
his way back to	11
would be impossible to	11
the commanding officer of	11
but they were not	11
an attack on the	11
a heavy fire of	11
for the support of	11
as if he had	11
of the country from	11
as well as a	11
some of them were	11
to the foot of	11
driving the enemy from	11
and a detachment of	11
it was evident that	11
had no power to	11
officers and men were	11
had to be taken	11
i received a letter	11
in consequence of a	11
with the right wing	11
on one side of	11
and advance to rio	11
the execution of the	11
of all the officers	11
the th new york	11
i am aware that	11
the site of the	11
it was possible to	11
but it would have	11
evacuation of the city	11
be done with the	11
many of them were	11
the castle of san	11
during the winter of	11
there is but little	11
was supposed to be	11
to the assistance of	11
of those who were	11
of the union forces	11
proved to be a	11
in the evening the	11
to him that he	11
and on the d	11
a good part of	11
upon the enemy at	11
a short distance above	11
an hour or more	11
edge of the woods	11
they would have been	11
it could not have	11
put a stop to	11
the battle of palo	11
as if they were	11
of the fact that	11
moved to the left	11
it is possible that	11
to make a reconnoissance	11
in behalf of the	11
the army would have	11
advance of the enemy	11
in a moment more	11
a position from which	11
the troops and the	11
as far south as	11
to enable the troops	11
on the ground of	11
after a march of	11
left bank of the	11
i was with the	11
the ranks of the	11
on the same side	11
found it necessary to	11
in advance of his	11
the brunt of the	11
it has been said	11
and could not be	11
there were a few	11
soon as he can	11
placed in command of	11
fell back to the	11
does not seem to	11
for the capture of	11
the fire from the	11
not less than twenty	11
commanding officer of the	11
number of troops to	11
brought into the field	11
by the war department	11
had charge of the	11
to come to the	11
not more than three	11
commissioner of indian affairs	11
as much as i	11
news of the capture	11
before the battle of	11
of the whole army	11
those of the other	11
in which they were	11
at the house of	11
from east to west	11
at about the same	11
the discovery of gold	11
was the duty of	11
in the history of	11
would have been an	11
and west of the	11
to get into the	11
some three or four	11
from the department of	11
great majority of the	11
many of the troops	11
the friendly nez perces	11
for which he was	11
in his official report	11
asked to be relieved	11
clearly set forth in	11
on the th was	11
more than half the	11
to be made in	11
and plan of attack	11
a vastly superior force	11
the killed and wounded	11
some distance to the	11
part of the garrison	11
he had not been	11
that it could not	11
to fall back upon	11
made up his mind	11
as if it had	11
five miles from the	11
it was expected that	11
for a short time	11
the support of the	11
they were on the	11
on the coast survey	11
the gentlemen of the	11
many of the men	11
to give up the	11
man who had been	11
plan of attack on	11
take advantage of the	11
to be in a	11
and on the other	11
after the occupation of	11
seven or eight thousand	11
loss on our side	11
to me on the	11
i would not have	11
one half of the	11
in the minds of	11
three hundred and fifty	11
the rest of his	11
resulted in the capture	11
the navigation of the	11
in front of him	10
i think it would	10
them as fast as	10
i want you to	10
the nueces and the	10
there seemed to be	10
position in rear of	10
chief of the army	10
the troops to the	10
which at that time	10
the absolute necessity of	10
the people of mexico	10
less than three thousand	10
in the interior of	10
there will be no	10
the pursuit on the	10
of the way of	10
which the enemy had	10
the establishment of a	10
in full view of	10
for him to hold	10
by the time they	10
my leave of absence	10
i would not be	10
we were able to	10
they were not pursued	10
i went with him	10
the troops would have	10
in the eyes of	10
between us and the	10
the hands of our	10
to meet him at	10
at once to the	10
molino del rey and	10
had not been in	10
of the district of	10
for more than two	10
distance to the rear	10
would be sure to	10
would probably have been	10
from the top of	10
the nez perce chiefs	10
few hundred yards from	10
a small garrison at	10
that side of the	10
to their respective commands	10
if it was not	10
there was some delay	10
until the arrival of	10
the troops had been	10
and a section of	10
have been glad to	10
did not know that	10
the month of august	10
farther to the rear	10
a mile or two	10
forced to fall back	10
with a detachment of	10
i had not the	10
at anchor in the	10
that is to say	10
the best of his	10
only a few miles	10
that time i had	10
the name of the	10
mouth of the river	10
after a few days	10
the point at which	10
part of the enemy	10
it is not likely	10
little to the rear	10
right of the enemy	10
think it will be	10
blair to van buren	10
could not be used	10
above the level of	10
brought up the rear	10
and one of the	10
as well as by	10
to his left and	10
be the signal for	10
but they did not	10
late in the evening	10
compared with that of	10
turned over the command	10
the next morning at	10
held in readiness to	10
into the interior of	10
out of the rebellion	10
was a man who	10
reports of scott and	10
the protection of our	10
which they could not	10
all the troops at	10
at that time in	10
possession of all the	10
to be prepared for	10
a man of great	10
as to what was	10
were on the way	10
to move at a	10
nueces and the rio	10
in a country where	10
crossed the river at	10
three miles to the	10
relieved of the command	10
on the th or	10
the chief of the	10
a letter from general	10
the way in which	10
me to take the	10
and in the mexican	10
of the enemy the	10
between the nueces and	10
of a few days	10
a landing on the	10
to the walla walla	10
out of the city	10
there was no further	10
the failure of the	10
it was absolutely necessary	10
part of the way	10
to be used as	10
of the enemy had	10
not far from the	10
the mind of the	10
which he had been	10
as rapidly as the	10
that i did not	10
the united states for	10
and remained there until	10
in the lines of	10
of the th instant	10
was made by the	10
the men could not	10
the united states troops	10
from one to another	10
the battle of monterey	10
up so as to	10
many of the enemy	10
within a few days	10
have come to the	10
that stage of the	10
people of the north	10
rear of the centre	10
took command of the	10
was left in command	10
of all the artillery	10
at this time my	10
we were on the	10
road to the right	10
was not a man	10
a few years before	10
the battle of port	10
at that stage of	10
out of sight of	10
the united states is	10
i said to him	10
i have already said	10
along the crest of	10
so much that he	10
to be followed by	10
until the next morning	10
he would not have	10
one hundred and eighty	10
which had to be	10
and that i would	10
the time we were	10
be relieved from duty	10
the next day we	10
were about to start	10
the payment of the	10
permitted to leave the	10
as best they could	10
to bring up supplies	10
made a reconnoissance to	10
the enemy within his	10
at the base of	10
a treaty of peace	10
he was informed that	10
was a good deal	10
the men had been	10
a squadron of cavalry	10
made by the enemy	10
been in the habit	10
so much of the	10
i was with him	10
it seemed to me	10
of the utmost importance	10
to the village of	10
chief engineer of the	10
for a time in	10
to have been the	10
obtained a leave of	10
position occupied by the	10
the men and officers	10
in case he should	10
the united states of	10
the waters of the	10
the command of major	10
during all this time	10
the question as to	10
foot of the hill	10
the way back to	10
in the morning and	10
from the th of	10
of the same month	10
to the mississippi river	10
other parts of the	10
was to be done	10
that they did not	10
some two or three	10
to the battle of	10
in the afternoon the	10
had gone to the	10
did not like to	10
men of the engineer	10
into the service of	10
of the general government	10
one hundred and sixteen	10
a section of artillery	10
the head chief of	10
personal memoirs of u	10
along the whole line	10
information as to the	10