This is a list of all the questions and their associated study carrel identifiers. One can learn a lot of the "aboutness" of a text simply by reading the questions.
| identifier | question |
|---|---|
| 1171 | And then the young-- how could I corrupt them by habituating them to manliness and frugality? 1171 Why do you weep now? |
| 1171 | And if to these be added the consciousness of failing powers, the sting of self- reproach, what prospect have I of any further joy in living? |
| 1171 | And when Hermogenes asked him,"How?" |
| 1171 | And when he perceived those who followed by his side in tears,"What is this?" |
| 1171 | Can you name another man of more independent spirit than myself, seeing that I accept from no one either gifts or pay? |
| 1171 | I ask you, is there any one[ 28] else, you know of, less enslaved than myself to the appetites[ 29] of the body? |
| 1171 | If in all I have said about myself no one can convict me of lying, is it not obvious that the praise I get from gods and men is justly earned? |
| 1171 | Whom have you any right to believe to be more just[ 30] than one so suited with what he has, that the things of others excite no craving in him? |
| 1171 | Why should these stories, if true, as no doubt they were, be omitted?] |
| 1171 | Why, what else do those who make use of the cries of birds or utterances of men draw their conclusions from if not from voices? |
| 1171 | [ 51] Do you not know that for many a long day, ever since I was born, sentence of death was passed upon me by nature? |
| 1171 | [ Footnote 44:{ eipein auton[ autos(? |
| 1171 | [ Footnote 51:"Why precisely now?"] |
| 1171 | do I not seem to you to have spent my whole life in meditating my defence?" |
| 1171 | he answered again:"Strange, do you call it, that to God it should seem better for me to die at once? |
| 1171 | your own selves aside, by comparison with those whom you believe to be the wisest authorities on military matters?" |
| 1677 | ALCIBIADES: And how long must I wait, Socrates, and who will be my teacher? |
| 1677 | ALCIBIADES: Certainly not: for then what use could I make of them? |
| 1677 | ALCIBIADES: How do you mean? |
| 1677 | ALCIBIADES: How do you mean? |
| 1677 | ALCIBIADES: How in the world, Socrates, do the words of the poet apply to him? |
| 1677 | ALCIBIADES: Of what do you suppose that I am thinking? |
| 1677 | ALCIBIADES: What is that, Socrates? |
| 1677 | ALCIBIADES: Why, Socrates, how is that possible? |
| 1677 | ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates, but you are speaking of a madman: surely you do not think that any one in his senses would venture to make such a prayer? |
| 1677 | And was not his prayer accomplished, and did not many and terrible evils thence arise, upon which I need not dilate? |
| 1677 | But perhaps we may consider the matter thus:-- ALCIBIADES: How? |
| 1677 | Can ignorance possibly be better than knowledge for any person in any conceivable case? |
| 1677 | Consider, my dear friend: may it not be quite otherwise? |
| 1677 | Did we not? |
| 1677 | Do you not speak of one who knows what is best in riding as a good rider? |
| 1677 | For tell me, by heaven, do you not think that in the city the wise are few, while the foolish, whom you call mad, are many? |
| 1677 | For we acknowledged that there are these two classes? |
| 1677 | In such a case should we not be right if we said that the state would be full of anarchy and lawlessness? |
| 1677 | May we not take an illustration from the artizans? |
| 1677 | Or do you believe that a man may labour under some other disease, even although he has none of these complaints? |
| 1677 | Or do you think that Orestes, had he been in his senses and knew what was best for him to do, would ever have dared to venture on such a crime? |
| 1677 | Or is there a difference between the clever artist and the wise man? |
| 1677 | Or what is your opinion? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: A man must either be sick or be well? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And again, there are some who are in health? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And both to the person who is ignorant and everybody else? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And every disease ophthalmia? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And if he do the contrary, both he and the state will suffer? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And if you made many attempts, and each time failed to recognize Pericles, you would never attack him? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And in a similar way you speak of a good boxer or a good flute- player or a good performer in any other art? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And is every kind of ophthalmia a disease? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And must every sick person either have the gout, or be in a fever, or suffer from ophthalmia? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And some men seem to you to be discreet, and others the contrary? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And that there is no third or middle term between discretion and indiscretion? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And there can not be two opposites to one thing? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And there is still another case which will also perhaps appear strange to you, if you will consider it? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And they are not the same? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And would you accept them if you were likely to use them to a bad and mischievous end? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And you regard those as sensible who know what ought to be done or said? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: And you use both the terms,''wise''and''foolish,''in reference to something? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Are you going, Alcibiades, to offer prayer to Zeus? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: But how could we live in safety with so many crazy people? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: But is it necessary that the man who is clever in any of these arts should be wise also in general? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: But ought we not then, think you, either to fancy that we know or really to know, what we confidently propose to do or say? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: But were you not saying that you would call the many unwise and the few wise? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Did you not acknowledge that madness was the opposite of discretion? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: For you designed to kill, not the first who offered, but Pericles himself? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: He did not intend to slay the first woman he came across, nor any one else''s mother, but only his own? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: He must be either sane or insane? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Ignorance, then, is better for those who are in such a frame of mind, and have such ideas? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Madness, then, you consider to be the opposite of discretion? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Nor again, I suppose, a person who knows the art of war, but does not know whether it is better to go to war or for how long? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Nor are there any who are in neither state? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Nor would any one else, I fancy? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: So I believe:--you do not think so? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: That ignorance is bad then, it would appear, which is of the best and does not know what is best? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: The latter will say or do what they ought not without their own knowledge? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: The many are foolish, the few wise? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: The senseless are those who do not know this? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Then madness and want of sense are the same? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Very good: and do you think the same about discretion and want of discretion? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: We are agreed, then, that every form of ophthalmia is a disease, but not every disease ophthalmia? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Well, and are you of the same mind, as before? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Well, but if Orestes in like manner had not known his mother, do you think that he would ever have laid hands upon her? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: While others are ailing? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Would you call a person wise who can give advice, but does not know whether or when it is better to carry out the advice? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: Yet you would not accept the dominion and lordship of all the Hellenes and all the barbarians in exchange for your life? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES: You acknowledge that for some persons in certain cases the ignorance of some things is a good and not an evil, as you formerly supposed? |
| 1677 | SOCRATES:--If, then, you went indoors, and seeing him, did not know him, but thought that he was some one else, would you venture to slay him? |
| 1677 | Surely, they are not the only maladies which exist? |
| 1677 | Their envoys were also to ask,''Why the Gods always granted the victory to the Lacedaemonians?'' |
| 1677 | We acknowledge that some are discreet, some foolish, and that some are mad? |
| 1677 | We think that some are sick; do we not? |
| 1677 | What do you think? |
| 1677 | You would distinguish the wise from the foolish? |
| 1584 | --or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue which is concerned with the use of weapons--''What is Courage?'' |
| 1584 | Am I not correct in saying so, Laches? |
| 1584 | And I will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? |
| 1584 | And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths? |
| 1584 | And is not that generally thought to be courage? |
| 1584 | And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous? |
| 1584 | Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions? |
| 1584 | But a better and more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask,''What is Virtue?'' |
| 1584 | But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning to speak-- the art of fighting in armour? |
| 1584 | But why, instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the education of the youths? |
| 1584 | Do you imagine that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none? |
| 1584 | Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man? |
| 1584 | Do you not agree to that, Laches? |
| 1584 | Do you now understand what I mean? |
| 1584 | Do you or do you not agree with me? |
| 1584 | For how can we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we are wholly ignorant? |
| 1584 | For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better? |
| 1584 | Had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed? |
| 1584 | How is this contradiction to be solved? |
| 1584 | In all things small as well as great? |
| 1584 | In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue--''What is Courage?'' |
| 1584 | Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful? |
| 1584 | Is that a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed? |
| 1584 | Is this a slight matter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? |
| 1584 | LACHES: How flying? |
| 1584 | LACHES: I have but one feeling, Nicias, or( shall I say?) |
| 1584 | LACHES: Indeed I do: who but he? |
| 1584 | LACHES: To what extent and what principle do you mean? |
| 1584 | LACHES: Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some things? |
| 1584 | LACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates? |
| 1584 | LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates? |
| 1584 | LACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say? |
| 1584 | LYSIMACHUS: Why do you say that, Nicias? |
| 1584 | LYSIMACHUS: Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort? |
| 1584 | LYSIMACHUS: Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do? |
| 1584 | Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires,''What sort of intelligence?'' |
| 1584 | Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know the dangers of disease? |
| 1584 | May not death often be the better of the two? |
| 1584 | Must we not select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to conduce? |
| 1584 | NICIAS: And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who had better die, and to those who had better live? |
| 1584 | NICIAS: What is that? |
| 1584 | NICIAS: Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And are we right in saying so? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end is the soul of youth? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And for this reason, as I imagine,--because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And is this condition of ours satisfactory? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And shall we invite Nicias to join us? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who fights flying, instead of remaining? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present view? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And the knowledge of these things you call courage? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And would you do so too, Melesias? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: But as to the epithet''wise,''--wise in what? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: But what would you say of a foolish endurance? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we want to find the masters? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, Laches? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Great care, then, is required in this matter? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: How so? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage-- for it is not noble, but courage is noble? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: What is it, Nicias? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the majority? |
| 1584 | SOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches? |
| 1584 | Should we not select him who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers? |
| 1584 | Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? |
| 1584 | Tell me, my boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken? |
| 1584 | There is this sort of courage-- is there not, Laches? |
| 1584 | What do you say to that alteration in your statement? |
| 1584 | What do you say, Socrates-- will you comply? |
| 1584 | What do you say? |
| 1584 | Who are they who, having been inferior persons, have become under your care good and noble? |
| 1584 | Would you not say the same? |
| 1584 | do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear? |
| 1584 | or are the physicians the same as the courageous? |
| 1584 | or do the courageous know them? |
| 1600 | ''And how, Socrates,''she said with a smile,''can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?'' |
| 1600 | ''And is that which is not wise, ignorant? |
| 1600 | ''And is this wish and this desire common to all? |
| 1600 | ''And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?'' |
| 1600 | ''And what does he gain who possesses the good?'' |
| 1600 | ''And what may that be?'' |
| 1600 | ''And what,''I said,''is his power?'' |
| 1600 | ''And who are they?'' |
| 1600 | ''And who,''I said,''was his father, and who his mother?'' |
| 1600 | ''And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?'' |
| 1600 | ''And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?'' |
| 1600 | ''But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?'' |
| 1600 | ''But who then, Diotima,''I said,''are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?'' |
| 1600 | ''But why of generation?'' |
| 1600 | ''By those who know or by those who do not know?'' |
| 1600 | ''Do you know what I am meditating? |
| 1600 | ''How can that be?'' |
| 1600 | ''Hush,''she cried;''must that be foul which is not fair?'' |
| 1600 | ''Right opinion,''she replied;''which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge( for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? |
| 1600 | ''Still,''she said,''the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?'' |
| 1600 | ''Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further,''she said,''what is the manner of the pursuit? |
| 1600 | ''Then love,''she said,''may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?'' |
| 1600 | ''To which must be added that they love the possession of the good?'' |
| 1600 | ''What are you meditating?'' |
| 1600 | ''What do you mean, Diotima,''I said,''is love then evil and foul?'' |
| 1600 | ''What is he, Diotima?'' |
| 1600 | ''What then is Love?'' |
| 1600 | ''What then?'' |
| 1600 | ''What then?'' |
| 1600 | ''Why, then,''she rejoined,''are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them? |
| 1600 | ''Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels? |
| 1600 | ''Would you desire better witness?'' |
| 1600 | And I remember her once saying to me,''What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire? |
| 1600 | And Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said: Tell me, son of Acumenus, was there not reason in my fears? |
| 1600 | And am I not right in asserting that there are two goddesses? |
| 1600 | And are you not a flute- player? |
| 1600 | And as you have spoken so eloquently of his nature, may I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing? |
| 1600 | And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires? |
| 1600 | And first tell me, he said, were you present at this meeting? |
| 1600 | And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity? |
| 1600 | And now, said Socrates, I will ask about Love:--Is Love of something or of nothing? |
| 1600 | And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said:''Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another''s company? |
| 1600 | And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not? |
| 1600 | And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?'' |
| 1600 | And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty? |
| 1600 | And you would say the same of a mother? |
| 1600 | Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him? |
| 1600 | Are we to have neither conversation nor singing over our cups; but simply to drink as if we were thirsty? |
| 1600 | But Love desires the beautiful; and then arises the question, What does he desire of the beautiful? |
| 1600 | But before the many you would not be ashamed, if you thought that you were doing something disgraceful in their presence? |
| 1600 | But first tell me; if I come in shall we have the understanding of which I spoke( supra Will you have a very drunken man? |
| 1600 | But what have you done with Socrates? |
| 1600 | But why again does this extend not only to men but also to animals? |
| 1600 | By Heracles, he said, what is this? |
| 1600 | By all means; but who makes the third partner in our revels? |
| 1600 | Can you tell me why?'' |
| 1600 | Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest? |
| 1600 | Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes? |
| 1600 | Eryximachus said: What is this, Alcibiades? |
| 1600 | First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man? |
| 1600 | For he who is anything can not want to be that which he is? |
| 1600 | For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? |
| 1600 | He desires, of course, the possession of the beautiful;--but what is given by that? |
| 1600 | He must agree with us-- must he not? |
| 1600 | I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words-- who could listen to them without amazement? |
| 1600 | I asked;''Is he mortal?'' |
| 1600 | I said,''O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well; but, assuming Love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to men?'' |
| 1600 | I was astonished at her words, and said:''Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?'' |
| 1600 | I will also tell, if you please-- and indeed I am bound to tell-- of his courage in battle; for who but he saved my life? |
| 1600 | Is he not like a Silenus in this? |
| 1600 | Is that the meaning of your praise? |
| 1600 | Is there anything?'' |
| 1600 | Man may be supposed to act thus from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings? |
| 1600 | May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he is the most blessed because he is the fairest and best? |
| 1600 | Of what am I speaking? |
| 1600 | On his appearing he and the host jest a little; the question is then asked by Pausanias, one of the guests,''What shall they do about drinking? |
| 1600 | Or shall I crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? |
| 1600 | Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? |
| 1600 | Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say? |
| 1600 | See you how fond he is of the fair? |
| 1600 | She said to me:''And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?'' |
| 1600 | So I gave him a shake, and I said:''Socrates, are you asleep?'' |
| 1600 | Socrates asks: Who are his father and mother? |
| 1600 | That is, of a brother or sister? |
| 1600 | The same to you, said Eryximachus; but what shall we do? |
| 1600 | Then Love wants and has not beauty? |
| 1600 | Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good? |
| 1600 | Then it must have been a long while ago, he said; and who told you-- did Socrates? |
| 1600 | Then would you still say that love is beautiful? |
| 1600 | Then, said Glaucon, let us have the tale over again; is not the road to Athens just made for conversation? |
| 1600 | What are you about? |
| 1600 | What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour? |
| 1600 | What do you think, Eryximachus? |
| 1600 | What do you think? |
| 1600 | What do you want? |
| 1600 | What say you to going with me unasked? |
| 1600 | Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing? |
| 1600 | Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? |
| 1600 | Who would not sooner have these children of the mind than the ordinary human ones? |
| 1600 | Who, if not you, should be the reporter of the words of your friend? |
| 1600 | Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? |
| 1600 | Why then is there all this flutter and excitement about love? |
| 1600 | Why, my dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse? |
| 1600 | Will that be agreeable to you? |
| 1600 | Will you drink with me or not?'' |
| 1600 | Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? |
| 1600 | Would he who is great, desire to be great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong? |
| 1600 | Would that be an ignoble life?'' |
| 1600 | Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning: Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something? |
| 1600 | You were quite right in coming, said Agathon; but where is he himself? |
| 1600 | and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?--what say you?'' |
| 1600 | and was I not a true prophet when I said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that I should be in a strait? |
| 1600 | and what is the object which they have in view? |
| 1600 | do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?'' |
| 1600 | etc.)? |
| 1600 | said Alcibiades: shall I attack him and inflict the punishment before you all? |
| 1600 | said Socrates; are you going to raise a laugh at my expense? |
| 1600 | what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? |
| 1642 | ''Are they really true?'' |
| 1642 | ''Is all the just pious?'' |
| 1642 | ''Then what part of justice is piety?'' |
| 1642 | And must you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? |
| 1642 | Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro? |
| 1642 | As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman''s art they are benefited and improved, are they not? |
| 1642 | But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me-- clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? |
| 1642 | But Socrates would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the question,''What is piety?'' |
| 1642 | But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return? |
| 1642 | But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? |
| 1642 | But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young? |
| 1642 | But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is''piety''? |
| 1642 | But may there not be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the gods? |
| 1642 | But what is the charge which he brings against you? |
| 1642 | But what is the meaning of''attending''to the gods? |
| 1642 | Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum? |
| 1642 | Do you dissent? |
| 1642 | Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing? |
| 1642 | Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them? |
| 1642 | Do you not agree? |
| 1642 | Do you not agree? |
| 1642 | Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: And who is he? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? |
| 1642 | EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates? |
| 1642 | For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished? |
| 1642 | Have you forgotten? |
| 1642 | How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? |
| 1642 | I suppose that you follow me now? |
| 1642 | Is it not so? |
| 1642 | Is not piety in every action always the same? |
| 1642 | Is not that true? |
| 1642 | Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship- builder with a view to the attainment of some result? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them-- do you see? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And of what is he accused? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And well said? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And what is your suit, Euthyphro? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house- builder with a view to the building of a house? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: But for their good? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: But what differences are there which can not be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety-- that I can not away with these stories about the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object-- would you not say of health? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Of whom? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me-- what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil- doer ought to be let off? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: What is the charge? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Who is he? |
| 1642 | SOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings? |
| 1642 | Shall I tell you in what respect? |
| 1642 | Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? |
| 1642 | Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner:''Is all the pious just?'' |
| 1642 | Surely you can not be concerned in a suit before the King, like myself? |
| 1642 | Tell me, then-- Is not that which is pious necessarily just? |
| 1642 | To what end do we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? |
| 1642 | Was not that said? |
| 1642 | Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? |
| 1642 | What are they? |
| 1642 | What do you say? |
| 1642 | What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? |
| 1642 | What should I be good for without it? |
| 1642 | What then is piety? |
| 1642 | Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them? |
| 1642 | Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better? |
| 1642 | You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies? |
| 1642 | and what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? |
| 1642 | are you the pursuer or the defendant? |
| 1642 | my companion, and will you leave me in despair? |
| 1642 | my good man? |
| 1642 | or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious? |
| 1181 | Laws,831 C. If it be pleaded that persuasion is his instrument, not violence; is that no reason rather for a deeper loathing? |
| 1181 | Rep.521 A;"Laws,"678 C. And you, Socrates, yourself( their host demanded), what is it you pride yourself upon? |
| 1181 | Where will he find a teacher to instruct him in that wisdom? |
| 1181 | ( 13) Does not this worthy person strike you as somewhat like a bully seeking to pick a quarrel? |
| 1181 | ( 16) But what( he added, turning to Critobulus) do you most pride yourself upon? |
| 1181 | ( 2) Was it not enough to set before your guests a faultless dinner, but you must feast our eyes and ears on sights and sounds the most delicious? |
| 1181 | ( 31) Now all is changed, and who will be at pains to ask me out to dinner any more? |
| 1181 | ( 32) Philippus would seem to have anticipated Mr. Woodward; see Prologue to"She Stoops to Conquer": Pray, would you know the reason I''m crying? |
| 1181 | ( 39) Are not all these the outward tokens of true loveliness? |
| 1181 | ( 56) Is Antisthenes thinking of Callias and Hermogenes? |
| 1181 | ( 6) Is that your statement? |
| 1181 | ( 70) Is not Xenophon imputing himself to Socrates? |
| 1181 | ( 8) Or,"Have you the knowledge also how to play the king?" |
| 1181 | ( 83)( Socrates exclaimed, when he heard that), what crime can they conceive your boy is guilty of that they should wish to make an end of him? |
| 1181 | ( 86) Is it not at your house that their noblest citizens are lodged as representatives of a foreign state? |
| 1181 | ( 90) Are you agreed to that? |
| 1181 | ( 92) Are you agreed to that? |
| 1181 | ( 98)( 98) Or,"going to give up business, and hand on the trade to me as your successor?" |
| 1181 | ( cried Antisthenes); and pray how? |
| 1181 | 142 D. You have not forgotten( interposed Antisthenes), perhaps, that besides yourself there is not a rhapsodist who does not know these epics? |
| 1181 | 158 C. The company were charmed to hear him speak, and turned and looked; and some one asked: On what is it then, Autolycus? |
| 1181 | And I must needs believe you, for are you not all honourable men? |
| 1181 | And amongst all animals, you will tell us that the crab has loveliest eyes? |
| 1181 | And did you ever come across a sillier tribe of people than these same rhapsodists? |
| 1181 | And do you pretend to make their souls more righteous by putting money in their pockets? |
| 1181 | And how do you do that, good sir? |
| 1181 | And if his name died on my lips, think you my mind would less recall his memory? |
| 1181 | And if that happened, you on your side, it appears, believe the boy will be corrupted? |
| 1181 | And is he the better go- between who can make his clients pleasing to one person only, or can make them pleasing to a number? |
| 1181 | And is there anything more transcendental than the gods? |
| 1181 | And now you, Lycon, tell us, wo n''t you( asked Antisthenes), what it is you take the greatest pride in? |
| 1181 | And now, sir, if you do not like this frigid( 10) argument, why do you cause me trouble? |
| 1181 | And pray, do they repay you these same moneys? |
| 1181 | And there are words that bear the stamp of hate, and words that tend to friendliness? |
| 1181 | And this friendship, what is it? |
| 1181 | And to this his very name bears witness, for is it not written in Homer? |
| 1181 | And what may that be? |
| 1181 | And what use will you make of them? |
| 1181 | And whence shall a man obtain this chrism? |
| 1181 | And why? |
| 1181 | And you, Hermogenes, on what do you plume yourself most highly? |
| 1181 | And, further, that towards agreeableness, one step at any rate consists in wearing a becoming fashion of the hair and dress? |
| 1181 | Are you agreed it is the business of a good go- between to make him( or her) on whom he plies his art agreeable to those with them? |
| 1181 | Are you agreed? |
| 1181 | Are you aware that you at present are annoying us by silence? |
| 1181 | Are you that person commonly nicknamed the thinker? |
| 1181 | At this remark they turned their eyes upon the speaker, and several spoke together, asking: Will you make them known to us? |
| 1181 | At which sight Callias, turning to the father: Do you know you are the richest man in the whole world, Lycon? |
| 1181 | But consider, a snubness of the nose, how is that more beautiful than straightness? |
| 1181 | But how is it that you alone, Antisthenes, you misanthrope, love nobody? |
| 1181 | But if my tongue is not to wag, whatever shall I do to earn my dinner? |
| 1181 | But the lover who depends upon the body,( 41) what of him? |
| 1181 | But what can he expect, who stretches forth an eager hand to clutch the body, save to be treated( 47) as a beggar? |
| 1181 | But what is it you keep on laughing at-- the wish on my part to reduce to moderate size a paunch a trifle too rotund? |
| 1181 | But whence, then? |
| 1181 | Can you explain to us? |
| 1181 | Can you tell me, then, what need is satisfied by our eyes? |
| 1181 | Did ever man anoint himself with oil of myrrh to please his fellow? |
| 1181 | Do you consider that the quality of beauty is confined to man, or is it to be found in other objects also? |
| 1181 | Do you hear that, my son? |
| 1181 | Do you hesitate? |
| 1181 | Eh, bless my ears, what''s that? |
| 1181 | First, why should love- for- love be given to such a lover? |
| 1181 | For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? |
| 1181 | Have you the cramp? |
| 1181 | Here Callias demanded: And when our friend( Antisthenes) essays to cross- examine people( 3) at a banquet, what kind of piping( 4) should he have? |
| 1181 | Here Lycon interposed: That may be well enough for youths, but what shall we do whose gymnastic days are over? |
| 1181 | How can you boast of so discredited an art? |
| 1181 | How is it possible that things, in no respect resembling one another, should each and all be beautiful? |
| 1181 | How so? |
| 1181 | How value less the gods, not more, if being above us they make the void of use to send us rain, and cause their light to shine on us? |
| 1181 | How, in the first place, is it possible for him to hate a lover who, he knows, regards him as both beautiful and good? |
| 1181 | Is it not from want? |
| 1181 | Is that conclusive? |
| 1181 | Is that the source of merriment? |
| 1181 | Must I discourse to you in answer to the flute? |
| 1181 | No doubt, upon the boy? |
| 1181 | Oh, Socrates( he answered, deprecatingly), will you not leave it to the arbitrament of Cleinias? |
| 1181 | Or would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? |
| 1181 | Pray how? |
| 1181 | Pray( interposed Antisthenes),( 7) do you also know the way to be a king? |
| 1181 | Pray, do you find it so ridiculous my wishing to improve my health by exercise? |
| 1181 | Pray, where''s the wonder? |
| 1181 | Sausage Seller.... What for? |
| 1181 | Shall we feast on perfumes also? |
| 1181 | Since when, then? |
| 1181 | Since when? |
| 1181 | So beautiful you claim to rival me, you boaster? |
| 1181 | Socrates replied: Do you suppose the sad condition of the patient dates from the moment only of our intimacy? |
| 1181 | The good go- between will therefore make his choice between them, and teach only what conduces to agreeableness? |
| 1181 | The other( in a tone of deep vexation): Pray, what thing of the sort are you aware I ever perpetrated? |
| 1181 | Then Callias: What ails you, sirrah? |
| 1181 | Then Socrates: Will you never tire of repeating that one name? |
| 1181 | Then you possess large property in land? |
| 1181 | They could hear the question asked by Dionysus, did she love him? |
| 1181 | This is obvious; or else, why do states and nations, one and all, inquire of the gods by divination what they ought to do and what they ought not? |
| 1181 | To come to our two noses, which is the more handsome, yours or mine? |
| 1181 | To which the host: And that reminds me, a supply of unguents might not be amiss;( 3) what say you? |
| 1181 | Was Cleinias there as a"muta persona"? |
| 1181 | Well then, do they requite your gifts of gold with gratitude? |
| 1181 | Well, and what is it you pride yourself upon, Antisthenes? |
| 1181 | Well, let that be( the other answered); answer me one question: How many fleas''feet distance is it, pray, from you to me? |
| 1181 | Well, on what then? |
| 1181 | What can it be, you laughter- making man, except to set folk laughing? |
| 1181 | What does it seem? |
| 1181 | What fragrance is left for us? |
| 1181 | What have you to say to justify your choice? |
| 1181 | What is your belief on this point? |
| 1181 | What( Socrates rejoined), shall you be able to maintain that by your beauty you can make us better? |
| 1181 | What, then, to nothing, and to nobody? |
| 1181 | What, whilst you are talking? |
| 1181 | What, would you have me imitate Nicostratus( 1) the actor, reciting his tetrameters( 2) to the music of the fife? |
| 1181 | What, would you have me then compare him to worse villains? |
| 1181 | When shall I find my willing heart All taken up by Thee? |
| 1181 | Whereat Socrates turned to the silent man, and thus accosted him: Hermogenes, what is a drunken brawl? |
| 1181 | Whereat Socrates: When will you have done with your gibes, Callias? |
| 1181 | Whereupon Hermogenes inquired: Had he then a large amount of money? |
| 1181 | Which surely is a better fate than to be called a thoughtless person? |
| 1181 | Whom do we choose to bear the sacred olive- shoot( 31) in honour of Athena?--whom else save beautiful old men? |
| 1181 | Why do men steal? |
| 1181 | You can render people just to all the world, but towards yourself you can not? |
| 1181 | You do n''t spend nights with him? |
| 1181 | and with the same tongue and lips and voice may speak with modesty or boastfulnes? |
| 1181 | and you, sir( turning to the Syracusan), what do you pride yourself upon? |
| 1181 | are you going to pass on the business? |
| 1181 | because, forsooth, he bestows upon himself what he desires, and upon his minion things of dire reproach? |
| 1181 | by teaching them some base mechanic art? |
| 1181 | exclaimed another; to which a third rejoined:"Why should it not be learnt as well as other things?" |
| 1181 | he there-- caught me only the other morning in the act of dancing? |
| 1181 | is it likely( he replied), considering I had to listen to them almost daily? |
| 1181 | or is it the sort of exercise I set my heart on? |
| 1181 | or teaching them nobility of soul? |
| 1181 | or that what he hastens to exact, infallibly must separate that other from his nearest friends? |
| 1181 | or to enjoy my victuals better? |
| 1181 | the toothache? |
| 1181 | to sleep better? |
| 1181 | what ampler greatcoat than the tiles above my head? |
| 1181 | what? |
| 1181 | why break burglariously into houses? |
| 1181 | why hale men and women captive and make slaves of them? |
| 1181 | will you devolve this art of yours on me as your successor, Socrates? |
| 1181 | you do n''t say so? |
| 1580 | ), said he; did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? |
| 1580 | Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect? |
| 1580 | And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her? |
| 1580 | And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only? |
| 1580 | And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice? |
| 1580 | And can that be good which does not make men good? |
| 1580 | And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also? |
| 1580 | And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely? |
| 1580 | And he who does so does his duty? |
| 1580 | And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these? |
| 1580 | And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous? |
| 1580 | And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness? |
| 1580 | And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad? |
| 1580 | And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or sharpness are far better than quietness and slowness? |
| 1580 | And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly? |
| 1580 | And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, and not a quietness? |
| 1580 | And is temperance a good? |
| 1580 | And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject- matter of health and disease? |
| 1580 | And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of what? |
| 1580 | And the inference is that temperance can not be modesty-- if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good? |
| 1580 | And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation? |
| 1580 | And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium? |
| 1580 | And the temperate are also good? |
| 1580 | And they are right, and you would agree with them? |
| 1580 | And to read quickly or slowly? |
| 1580 | And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this? |
| 1580 | And what if I am? |
| 1580 | And what is it? |
| 1580 | And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? |
| 1580 | And which is better, to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily, or quietly and slowly? |
| 1580 | And which, I said, is better-- facility in learning, or difficulty in learning? |
| 1580 | And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? |
| 1580 | And will wisdom give health? |
| 1580 | And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business? |
| 1580 | And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another''s work, as well as in doing their own? |
| 1580 | And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good? |
| 1580 | Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? |
| 1580 | Are you right, Charmides? |
| 1580 | But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine-- what is the subject of temperance or wisdom? |
| 1580 | But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge of medicine? |
| 1580 | But even if knowledge can know itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know? |
| 1580 | But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice? |
| 1580 | But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not? |
| 1580 | But of what is this knowledge? |
| 1580 | But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject- matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences? |
| 1580 | But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good? |
| 1580 | But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? |
| 1580 | But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this? |
| 1580 | But where does Dr. Jackson find any such notion as this in Plato or anywhere in ancient philosophy? |
| 1580 | But which is best when you are at the writing- master''s, to write the same letters quickly or quietly? |
| 1580 | But which most tends to make him happy? |
| 1580 | But why do you not call him, and show him to us? |
| 1580 | Can you show me any such result of them? |
| 1580 | Can you tell me? |
| 1580 | Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? |
| 1580 | Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires? |
| 1580 | Did you ever observe that this is what they say? |
| 1580 | Do you admit that? |
| 1580 | Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking? |
| 1580 | Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of good actions, is temperance? |
| 1580 | For is not the discovery of things as they truly are, a good common to all mankind? |
| 1580 | For why should Aristotle, because he has quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted them all? |
| 1580 | Has he not a beautiful face? |
| 1580 | Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else? |
| 1580 | He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right, in relation to health and disease? |
| 1580 | How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? |
| 1580 | How is that? |
| 1580 | How is this riddle to be explained? |
| 1580 | How so? |
| 1580 | How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage? |
| 1580 | How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building? |
| 1580 | I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same? |
| 1580 | I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also? |
| 1580 | I said, or without my consent? |
| 1580 | I said; is not this rather the effect of medicine? |
| 1580 | I was, he replied; but what is your drift? |
| 1580 | In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is Temperance? |
| 1580 | Is it of him you are speaking or of some one else? |
| 1580 | Is not medicine, I said, the science of health? |
| 1580 | Is not that true? |
| 1580 | Is not that true? |
| 1580 | Is not that true? |
| 1580 | Is that true? |
| 1580 | Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes? |
| 1580 | Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else? |
| 1580 | Let us consider the matter in this way: If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will he proceed? |
| 1580 | May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts? |
| 1580 | Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science? |
| 1580 | Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes? |
| 1580 | Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear? |
| 1580 | Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,--do they not each of them do their own work? |
| 1580 | Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half? |
| 1580 | Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort? |
| 1580 | Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them? |
| 1580 | Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general? |
| 1580 | Or of computation? |
| 1580 | Or of health? |
| 1580 | Or of working in brass? |
| 1580 | Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves? |
| 1580 | Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying;--have you or have you not this quality of temperance? |
| 1580 | Shall I tell you the nature of the difficulty? |
| 1580 | Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? |
| 1580 | Shall we speak of the soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine or neuter? |
| 1580 | That is your meaning? |
| 1580 | The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human beings, is asked by Socrates,''What is Temperance?'' |
| 1580 | Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good? |
| 1580 | Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows? |
| 1580 | Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? |
| 1580 | Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate? |
| 1580 | Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one''s own business; not at least in this way, or doing things of this sort? |
| 1580 | Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best? |
| 1580 | Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance? |
| 1580 | Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised? |
| 1580 | Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good? |
| 1580 | Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me-- What is temperance? |
| 1580 | Very good, I said; and are you quite sure that you know my name? |
| 1580 | Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is noble? |
| 1580 | Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question-- Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something? |
| 1580 | Was he a fool who told you, Charmides? |
| 1580 | Was he right who affirmed that? |
| 1580 | Was not that your statement? |
| 1580 | Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom-- to know what is known and what is unknown to us? |
| 1580 | Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something? |
| 1580 | Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,''Modesty is not good for a needy man''? |
| 1580 | Were we not right in making that admission? |
| 1580 | What do you mean? |
| 1580 | What do you mean? |
| 1580 | What is that? |
| 1580 | What makes you think so? |
| 1580 | Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater? |
| 1580 | Who is he, I said; and who is his father? |
| 1580 | Why not, I said; but will he come? |
| 1580 | Why not? |
| 1580 | With my consent? |
| 1580 | Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly? |
| 1580 | Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? |
| 1580 | You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about? |
| 1580 | and in what cases do you mean? |
| 1580 | or do all equally make him happy? |
| 1580 | or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing? |
| 1580 | the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? |
| 1579 | ''But how is this?'' |
| 1579 | After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks him a new question:''What is friendship? |
| 1579 | Am I not right? |
| 1579 | And also the vessel which contains the wine? |
| 1579 | And another disputed point is, which is the fairer? |
| 1579 | And are they right in saying this? |
| 1579 | And can he who is not loved be a friend? |
| 1579 | And did you ever behave ill to your father or your mother? |
| 1579 | And disease is an enemy? |
| 1579 | And disease is an evil? |
| 1579 | And do they entrust their property to him rather than to you? |
| 1579 | And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son? |
| 1579 | And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or hinder you from doing what you desire? |
| 1579 | And do they trust a hireling more than you? |
| 1579 | And does not this seem to put us in the right way? |
| 1579 | And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his son he will commit to us? |
| 1579 | And friends they can not be, unless they value one another? |
| 1579 | And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and object? |
| 1579 | And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a reason? |
| 1579 | And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like? |
| 1579 | And he is in want of that of which he is deprived? |
| 1579 | And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake of health? |
| 1579 | And he who loves not is not a lover or friend? |
| 1579 | And he who wants nothing will desire nothing? |
| 1579 | And health is also dear? |
| 1579 | And if dear, then dear for the sake of something? |
| 1579 | And if neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one another? |
| 1579 | And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other? |
| 1579 | And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you have any conceit of knowledge? |
| 1579 | And is he a slave or a free man? |
| 1579 | And is he a slave? |
| 1579 | And is health a friend, or not a friend? |
| 1579 | And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear nor hateful to him? |
| 1579 | And may not the same be said of the friend? |
| 1579 | And must not a man love that which he desires and affects? |
| 1579 | And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as far as we are useless to them? |
| 1579 | And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil uncongenial to every one? |
| 1579 | And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing? |
| 1579 | And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous admissions? |
| 1579 | And that of which he is in want is dear to him? |
| 1579 | And that something dear involves something else dear? |
| 1579 | And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine? |
| 1579 | And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? |
| 1579 | And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy? |
| 1579 | And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated? |
| 1579 | And the more vain- glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of them? |
| 1579 | And the same of thirst and the other desires,--that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished? |
| 1579 | And there is Ctesippus himself: do you see him? |
| 1579 | And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers? |
| 1579 | And what does he do with you? |
| 1579 | And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have you? |
| 1579 | And what of health? |
| 1579 | And which is the nobler? |
| 1579 | And who is yours? |
| 1579 | And why do you not ask him? |
| 1579 | And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous? |
| 1579 | And yet whiteness would be present in them? |
| 1579 | And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one? |
| 1579 | Answer me now: Are you your own master, or do they not even allow that? |
| 1579 | Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them? |
| 1579 | Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule hold as about your father? |
| 1579 | But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule- cart if you like;--they will permit that? |
| 1579 | But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a slave, and who can not do what he likes? |
| 1579 | But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen vessel which contains them, equally with his son? |
| 1579 | But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both together, what are we to say? |
| 1579 | But if this can not be, the lover will be the friend of that which is loved? |
| 1579 | But is not some less exclusive form of friendship better suited to the condition and nature of man? |
| 1579 | But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evil should perish with it? |
| 1579 | But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some other cause of friendship? |
| 1579 | But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good? |
| 1579 | But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this-- are we not indeed entirely wrong? |
| 1579 | But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want? |
| 1579 | But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the presence of white in them-- they would not be white any more than black? |
| 1579 | But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil? |
| 1579 | But the sick loves him, because he is sick? |
| 1579 | But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficient for himself? |
| 1579 | But then arises the consideration, how should these friends in youth or friends of the past regard or be regarded by one another? |
| 1579 | But what if the lover is not loved in return? |
| 1579 | But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or good? |
| 1579 | By heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect? |
| 1579 | Can they now? |
| 1579 | Do any remain? |
| 1579 | Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you like? |
| 1579 | Do you agree? |
| 1579 | Do you agree? |
| 1579 | Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are mutual friends? |
| 1579 | Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says that you love? |
| 1579 | Do you not agree with me? |
| 1579 | Do you not agree? |
| 1579 | Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we point out any difference between the congenial and the like? |
| 1579 | How can such persons ever be induced to value one another? |
| 1579 | How do you mean? |
| 1579 | How do you mean? |
| 1579 | How so? |
| 1579 | I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine? |
| 1579 | I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our conclusions? |
| 1579 | I shall not ask which is the richer of the two, I said; for you are friends, are you not? |
| 1579 | I turned to Menexenus, and said: Son of Demophon, which of you two youths is the elder? |
| 1579 | If he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself, or will he commit them to you? |
| 1579 | In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour or ointment? |
| 1579 | In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved? |
| 1579 | Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed by the caprices of fancy? |
| 1579 | Is not that true? |
| 1579 | Is not that true? |
| 1579 | Is not this rather the true state of the case? |
| 1579 | Is not this the nature of the good-- to be loved by us who are placed between the two, because of the evil? |
| 1579 | Is that also a matter of dispute? |
| 1579 | Is that good or evil, or neither? |
| 1579 | May not desire be the source of friendship? |
| 1579 | May we then infer that the good is the friend? |
| 1579 | Nay, but what do you think? |
| 1579 | Neither can he love that which he does not desire? |
| 1579 | Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody else, in so far as they are useless to them? |
| 1579 | No answer is given in the Lysis to the question,''What is Friendship?'' |
| 1579 | Now is not that ridiculous? |
| 1579 | Or are both friends? |
| 1579 | Or is, perhaps, even hated? |
| 1579 | Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, but not so as to be hurtful? |
| 1579 | Or rather is there anything to be done? |
| 1579 | Or rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or will not be is ridiculous, for who knows? |
| 1579 | Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love him very much? |
| 1579 | Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there? |
| 1579 | That I may make a fool of myself? |
| 1579 | The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend of the physician-- is he not? |
| 1579 | Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to one another? |
| 1579 | Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover? |
| 1579 | Then now we know how to answer the question''Who are friends?'' |
| 1579 | Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another? |
| 1579 | Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by reason of the presence of evil? |
| 1579 | Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend? |
| 1579 | Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now? |
| 1579 | Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the enemy? |
| 1579 | Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites? |
| 1579 | Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the one and not the other? |
| 1579 | Then what is to be done? |
| 1579 | Then which is the friend of which? |
| 1579 | Then you have a master? |
| 1579 | Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules? |
| 1579 | Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil will remain? |
| 1579 | Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of love or friendship? |
| 1579 | They had another perplexity: 8) How could one of the noblest feelings of human nature be so near to one of the most detestable corruptions of it? |
| 1579 | They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy? |
| 1579 | This we do know, that in our present condition hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:--Is not that true? |
| 1579 | Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of some one; is he not? |
| 1579 | Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad? |
| 1579 | What do the rest of you say? |
| 1579 | What do you mean? |
| 1579 | What do you mean? |
| 1579 | What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult? |
| 1579 | When one man loves another, which is the friend-- he who loves, or he who is loved? |
| 1579 | Who are you, I said; and where am I to come? |
| 1579 | Who is Lysis? |
| 1579 | Whom are we to call friends to one another? |
| 1579 | Whom then will they allow? |
| 1579 | Why do you say so? |
| 1579 | Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them? |
| 1579 | Will you tell me by what words or actions I may become endeared to my love? |
| 1579 | Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, and who is the favourite among you? |
| 1579 | Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? |
| 1579 | You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you? |
| 1579 | You remember that? |
| 1579 | You think not? |
| 1579 | You think that he is right? |
| 1579 | You will agree to that? |
| 1579 | You would agree-- would you not? |
| 1579 | and allow him to do what he likes, when they prohibit you? |
| 1579 | and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil? |
| 1579 | and do they pay him for this? |
| 1579 | and may he do what he likes with the horses? |
| 1579 | and may not the other theory have been only a long story about nothing? |
| 1579 | and what can that final cause or end of friendship be, other than the good? |
| 1579 | any more than in the Charmides to the question,''What is Temperance?'' |
| 1579 | but may not that which is neither good nor evil still in some cases be the friend of the good? |
| 1579 | how can you be making and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won? |
| 1579 | will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire? |
| 40435 | Disgraced in the opinion of every one,replies Sokrates? |
| 40435 | Scais- tu au moins ce que c''est que la matière? 40435 What are the conditions under which subordinates will cheerfully obey their commanders?" |
| 40435 | Wheat is the Holy, what is the Unholy? 40435 Why are you so curious to know what_ I myself_ have determined on the point? |
| 40435 | ( said he) have none of us before your time talked about the Good and the Just? |
| 40435 | 38- 39:--"The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard, What is its sanction? |
| 40435 | After the decease of these last- mentioned authors, who can say what became of their MSS.? |
| 40435 | Again, as to predicates-- when you say,_ The man runs_, or_ The man is good_, what do you mean by the predicate_ runs_, or is_ good_? |
| 40435 | And if, adopting any one of them, we reject the others, upon what grounds are we to justify our preference? |
| 40435 | Another argument of Zeno is to the following effect:--"Does a grain of millet, when dropped upon the floor, make sound? |
| 40435 | Are not you aware that the hemlock of Sokrates is in store for_ you_ also?" |
| 40435 | Are there no limits( as Hobbes is so much denounced for maintaining)? |
| 40435 | Are these virtues teachable? |
| 40435 | Are three grains few, and four_ many_?--or, where will you draw the line between Few and Many? |
| 40435 | As we know little about Plato except from his works, the first question to be decided is, Which_ are_ his real works? |
| 40435 | But can we do this with our present scanty information? |
| 40435 | But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such continuity is essential?" |
| 40435 | But is all that is just necessarily holy? |
| 40435 | But the question asked was-- What is Holiness generally? |
| 40435 | But what are those great works which the Gods bring about by our agency? |
| 40435 | But what is this_ true determinately_, but true_ upon our knowledge_ or_ evidently true_? |
| 40435 | But what other name was so natural or likely for Anaxagoras himself to choose?] |
| 40435 | But what part? |
| 40435 | Did he publish any of them during the lifetime of Sokrates? |
| 40435 | Do you imagine, that the Good is one thing, and the Beautiful another? |
| 40435 | Do you not know that all things are good and beautiful in relation to the same purpose? |
| 40435 | Eh bien( dit le Sirien), cette chose qui te paroît être divisible, pésante, et grise, me dirois tu bien ce que c''est? |
| 40435 | Erdmann,"Comment seroit il possible qu''aucune chose existât, si l''être même, ipsum Esse, n''avoit l''existence? |
| 40435 | He may have done this: but how are we to prove it? |
| 40435 | How can you properly say( he argues) that you_ know_ the compound AB, when you know neither A nor B separately? |
| 40435 | How did he get his reputation?] |
| 40435 | How happens it that no despot has ever yet done this? |
| 40435 | How much does it attenuate the value of his intentions, as proofs of an internal philosophical sequence? |
| 40435 | How therefore can it be present at all in any of them? |
| 40435 | How? |
| 40435 | How? |
| 40435 | If that were so( Ast argues), how can we explain the fact, that in most of the dialogues there is no philosophical result at all? |
| 40435 | If you speak of Man in general( he said), what, or whom, do you mean? |
| 40435 | In appreciating a philosopher, it is usual to ask, What authoritative creed has he proclaimed, for disciples to swear allegiance to? |
| 40435 | In other words, how can the One be Many, and how can the Many be One? |
| 40435 | In regard to the question, Which were Plato''s genuine works? |
| 40435 | In what manner does ministration, called_ holiness_, benefit or improve the Gods? |
| 40435 | In what then does its essence consist? |
| 40435 | In what then does its essence consist? |
| 40435 | Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment against you? |
| 40435 | Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? |
| 40435 | Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? |
| 40435 | It is that branch which concerns ministration by men to the Gods 447 Ministration to the Gods? |
| 40435 | Krobylus, one of the accusers, said to him,"Are_ you_ come to plead on behalf of another? |
| 40435 | Mais qu''est ce donc_ qu''une pleurésie_? |
| 40435 | Moreover, at the very outset of the enquiry, we have to ask, At what period of life did Plato begin to publish his dialogues? |
| 40435 | Next, by what arguments has he enforced or made them good? |
| 40435 | No.--Does a bushel of millet make sound under the same circumstances? |
| 40435 | O(/ti e)kei= noi me\n ta\ sapra\ tau= ta a)po\ dogma/ tôn lalou= sin? |
| 40435 | Or do you suppose that we can not follow out what each of them is, and that we pronounce the words as empty and unmeaning sounds? |
| 40435 | Or does the earliest of them date from a time after the death of Sokrates? |
| 40435 | Or is it holy for this reason, because they do love it? |
| 40435 | Ou)dei\s ê(mô= n pro\ sou= e)/legen a)gatho\n ê)\ di/ kaion? |
| 40435 | Qu''est- ce que la loi de la pesanteur? |
| 40435 | Quanti Platonis vel libros novêre vel nomen? |
| 40435 | Qui a démontré qu''il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons-- et qu''y a- t- il de plus cru? |
| 40435 | Quid ergo? |
| 40435 | Quotusquisque nunc Aristotelem legit? |
| 40435 | Si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto majus omnes? |
| 40435 | Sokrates asks him-- What is Holiness? |
| 40435 | Sokrates asks him-- What is Holiness?] |
| 40435 | Tell me what is the general constituent feature of_ Holiness_? |
| 40435 | Tell me-- to what end does the work conduce? |
| 40435 | That we are gainers by what they give, is clear enough; but what do they gain on their side? |
| 40435 | The first of the two is an obscure and imperfect reply to the great Sokratic problem-- What is Justice? |
| 40435 | The latter asked Sokrates,"Do you know anything good?" |
| 40435 | The like question about the hairs on a man''s head-- How many must he lose before he can be said to have only a few, or to be bald?] |
| 40435 | The question asked was, not What are the antecedent conditions or causes of rain, thunder, or earthquakes, but Who rains and thunders? |
| 40435 | The questions about which you and I and other men quarrel are, What is just or unjust, honourable or base, good or evil? |
| 40435 | This antithesis appears as an answer when we put the question-- What is the ultimate authority? |
| 40435 | This is what gives rise to the question-- What is the essential scheme for the Individual? |
| 40435 | Ti/ ga\r le/ gei? |
| 40435 | To the Sokratic question, What is the Bonum? |
| 40435 | To what did the dialogues composed by the first Aristippus refer? |
| 40435 | To what ought he to conform-- what shall he aim at? |
| 40435 | To what purpose? |
| 40435 | To what purpose? |
| 40435 | To\ poi= on dê/? |
| 40435 | Tu vois quelques attributs: mais le fond de la chose, le connois tu? |
| 40435 | Ubi apud antiquiores latuit amor iste investigandæ veritatis?" |
| 40435 | Was he right in disobeying? |
| 40435 | Were they not also in the library at the time when Kallimachus compiled his tables? |
| 40435 | What are the motives to obey it? |
| 40435 | What brings you here, Sokrates( asks Euthyphron), away from your usual haunts? |
| 40435 | What is Injustice? |
| 40435 | What is a law? |
| 40435 | What is justice? |
| 40435 | What is that common essence, or same character, which belongs to and distinguishes all holy or pious acts? |
| 40435 | What is that end which the Gods accomplish, through our agency as workmen? |
| 40435 | What is that specific property, by the common possession of which all holy things are entitled to be called holy? |
| 40435 | What is the Honourable and the Base? |
| 40435 | What is the Just and the Unjust? |
| 40435 | What number of grains make a heap-- or are many? |
| 40435 | What positive system, or positive truths previously unknown or unproved, has he established? |
| 40435 | Whence does it derive its binding force? |
| 40435 | Where are we to find a trustworthy Platonic Canon? |
| 40435 | Where was any certain permanent custody provided for them? |
| 40435 | Where, however, is the security that the undertaking would produce three oboli a day to each subscriber?" |
| 40435 | Which was in the right here? |
| 40435 | Who produces earthquakes? |
| 40435 | Why then should any one wish to read written reports of his conversations? |
| 40435 | Xenophon accordingly went to Delphi: but instead of asking the question broadly--"Shall I go, or shall I decline to go?" |
| 40435 | Yes.--Is there not a determinate proportion between the bushel and the grain? |
| 40435 | [ 119] Which of them are we to follow? |
| 40435 | [ 133] How can the Form( Man, White, Good,& c.) be present at one and the same time in many distinct individuals? |
| 40435 | [ 149]--Which of the two do you consider to live most pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled? |
| 40435 | [ 41] Otherwise, why do you not throw up your sceptre? |
| 40435 | [ 44] What is that something-- the common essence or idea? |
| 40435 | [ 49] Tell me, what is the characteristic essence of piety as well as impiety?" |
| 40435 | [ Footnote 2: Aristophanes, Nubes, 368,[ Greek: A)lla\ ti/ s u(/ei?] |
| 40435 | [ Footnote 70: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 156 D- E.[ Greek: Po/ t''ou)=n, metaba/ llei? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: A)=r''ou)=n e)sti/ to\ a)/topon tou= to, e)n ô)=| to/ t''a)\n ei)/ê o(/te metaba/ llei? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Dia\ ti/ ou)=n e)kei= noi( oi( polloi\, oi( i)diô= tai) u(mô= n( tôn philoso/ phôn) i)schuro/ teroi? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Po/ te ga\r e)n ê(mi= n au)toi= s ou)k e)/stin o( tha/ natos? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Pô= s ô)= Zê/ nôn, tou= to le/ geis? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Ti/ de\ oi( polue/ laioi? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: Ti/ s ou)=n pot''e)sti\ te/ chnê tê= s paraskeuê= s tou= mêde\n a)dikei= sthai ê)\ ô(s o)li/ gista? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: a)/xion ga\r pa= n tô= n o)/ntôn pou= ei)=nai; ei) de\ o( to/ pos tô= n o)/ntôn, pou= a)\n ei)/ê?]] |
| 40435 | [ Greek: kai\ tou= to pô= s ou)k a)mathi/ a e)sti\n au)tê\ ê( e)ponei/ distos, ê( tou= oi)/esthai ei)de/ nai a(\ ou)k oi)=den?]] |
| 40435 | [ Greek: tau= ta ga\r e)gô\ a)kou/ sas e)nethumou/ mên ou(tôsi/, Ti/ pote le/ gei o( theo\s kai\ ti/ pote ai)ni/ ttetai? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: ti/ ga\r kai\ phê/ somen, oi(/ ge kai\ au)toi\ o(mologou= men peri\ au)tô= n mêde\n ei)de/ nai?]] |
| 40435 | [ Greek: to\ o)rtha\ doxa/ zein kai\ a)/neu tou= e)/chein lo/ gon dou= nai, ou)k oi)=sth''o(/ti ou)/te e)pi/ stasthai e)stin? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: tou/ tôn tô= n pollô= n kalô= n mô= n ti e)/stin, o( ou)k ai)schro\n phanê/ setai? |
| 40435 | [ Greek: ê)\ a)rkei= u(mi= n to\ ê(de/ ôs katabiô= nai to\n bi/ on a)/neu lupô= n? |
| 40435 | [ Side- note: Ministration to the Gods? |
| 40435 | [ Side- note: When did Plato begin to compose? |
| 40435 | ]\_ Sokr._--What sort of ministration? |
| 40435 | _ Sokr._--Do the Gods love the holy, because it_ is_ holy? |
| 40435 | _ Sokr._--Then it appears that the holy is what the Gods love? |
| 40435 | _ Which_ Dionysius is meant?--the elder or the younger? |
| 40435 | _ istius vitii num nostra culpa est_? |
| 40435 | a)/logon ga\r pra= gma pô= s a)\n ei)/ê e)pistê/ mê?] |
| 40435 | and if so, which? |
| 40435 | c. 14, p. 26 D.[ Greek: ô)= thauma/ sie Me/ lête, i(na ti/ tau= ta le/ geis? |
| 40435 | c. 4, p. 20 B- C.[ Greek: ti/ s tê= s toiau/ tês a)retê= s, tê= s a)nthrôpi/ nês te kai\ politikê= s, e)pistê/ môn e)sti/ n? |
| 40435 | e)/ti de\ e(/na e)o/ nta to\n Ê(rakle/ a, kai\ e)/ti a)/nthrôpon, ô(s dê/ phasi, kô= s phu/ sin e)/chei polla\s muria/ das phoneu= sai? |
| 40435 | e)gô\ ga\r dê\ ou)/te me/ ga ou)/te smikro\n xu/ noida e)mautô=| sopho\s ô)/n; ti/ ou)=n pote le/ gei pha/ skôn e)me\ sophô/ taton ei)=nai? |
| 40435 | kai\ nê\ Di/ a pa/ lin le/ ontos kai\ kuno\s to\ tre/ chein, katêgorou= men? |
| 40435 | kai\ tô= n dikai/ ôn, o(\ ou)k a)/dikon? |
| 40435 | kai\ tô= n o(si/ ôn, o(\ ou)k a)no/ sion?] |
| 40435 | or how is it to be distinguished from other parts or branches of the just? |
| 40435 | or more specifically, What is the source of its obligation? |
| 40435 | or that Sokrates in the Philêbus and Republic is older than in the Kratylus or Gorgias? |
| 40435 | ou)de\ ê(/lion ou)de\ selê/ nên a)/ra nomi/ zô theou\s ei)=nai, ô(/sper oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi?]] |
| 40435 | the four obedient citizens, or the one disobedient? |
| 40435 | ti/ de\ oi( gnô/ mê| kai\ a)rguri/ ô| duna/ menoi chrêmati/ zesthai? |
| 40435 | ti/ de\ oi( polupro/ batoi? |
| 40435 | what are temperance and courage? |
| 40435 | what are the limits of obedience to the laws? |
| 40435 | what is injustice? |
| 40435 | what is law, lawlessness, democracy, aristocracy? |
| 40435 | what is the government of mankind, and the attributes which qualify any one for exercising such government? |
| 40435 | what number are few? |
| 40435 | where does the right of final decision reside, on problems and disputes ethical, political, æsthetical? |
| 40435 | ê)\ mê\ parakolouthou= ntes ti/ e)sti tou/ tôn e(/kaston, a)sê/ môs kai\ kenô= s e)phtheggo/ metha ta\s phôna/ s?] |
| 1636 | ''But did I call this"love"? |
| 1636 | Am I not right, Phaedrus? |
| 1636 | Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus? |
| 1636 | And are not they held to be the wisest physicians who have the greatest distrust of their art? |
| 1636 | And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law court-- are they not contending? |
| 1636 | And if I am to add the praises of the non- lover what will become of me? |
| 1636 | And if he came to his right mind, would he ever imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind? |
| 1636 | And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired? |
| 1636 | And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon the ingenuity of Lysias? |
| 1636 | And what is good or bad writing or speaking? |
| 1636 | But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians? |
| 1636 | But how much is left? |
| 1636 | But if I am to read, where would you please to sit? |
| 1636 | But if this be true, must not the soul be the self- moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal? |
| 1636 | But let me ask you, friend: have we not reached the plane- tree to which you were conducting us? |
| 1636 | But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily? |
| 1636 | But what do you mean? |
| 1636 | But what pleasure or consolation can the beloved be receiving all this time? |
| 1636 | But why did you make your second oration so much finer than the first? |
| 1636 | But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech? |
| 1636 | Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse? |
| 1636 | Can we suppose''the young man to have told such lies''about his master while he was still alive? |
| 1636 | Can we wonder that few of them''come sweetly from nature,''while ten thousand reviewers( mala murioi) are engaged in dissecting them? |
| 1636 | Do we see as clearly as Hippocrates''that the nature of the body can only be understood as a whole''? |
| 1636 | Do you ever cross the border? |
| 1636 | Do you not perceive that I am already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me? |
| 1636 | Do you think that a lover only can be a firm friend? |
| 1636 | Do you? |
| 1636 | Does he not define probability to be that which the many think? |
| 1636 | For do we not often make''the worse appear the better cause;''and do not''both parties sometimes agree to tell lies''? |
| 1636 | For example, are we to attribute his tripartite division of the soul to the gods? |
| 1636 | For example, when he is speaking of the soul does he mean the human or the divine soul? |
| 1636 | For lovers repent--''SOCRATES: Enough:--Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words? |
| 1636 | For this is a necessary preliminary to the other question-- How is the non- lover to be distinguished from the lover? |
| 1636 | For what should a man live if not for the pleasures of discourse? |
| 1636 | How could there have been so much cultivation, so much diligence in writing, and so little mind or real creative power? |
| 1636 | Is he serious, again, in regarding love as''a madness''? |
| 1636 | Is not all literature passing into criticism, just as Athenian literature in the age of Plato was degenerating into sophistry and rhetoric? |
| 1636 | Is not legislation too a sort of literary effort, and might not statesmanship be described as the''art of enchanting''the house? |
| 1636 | Is not pleading''an art of speaking unconnected with the truth''? |
| 1636 | Is not the discourse excellent, more especially in the matter of the language? |
| 1636 | Is there any principle in them? |
| 1636 | Lysias then, I suppose, was in the town? |
| 1636 | May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry.--Anything more? |
| 1636 | Might he not argue,''that a rational being should not follow the dictates of passion in the most important act of his or her life''? |
| 1636 | Might he not ask, whether we''care more for the truth of religion, or for the speaker and the country from which the truth comes''? |
| 1636 | Nor, until they adopt our method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art? |
| 1636 | Now I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why? |
| 1636 | Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non- lover? |
| 1636 | Now what is that sort of thing but a regular piece of authorship? |
| 1636 | Now, Socrates, what do you think? |
| 1636 | Of the world which is beyond the heavens, who can tell? |
| 1636 | Or is he serious in holding that each soul bears the character of a god? |
| 1636 | Or is this merely assigned to them by way of parallelism with men? |
| 1636 | Or that Isocrates himself is the enemy of Plato and his school? |
| 1636 | Or, again, in his absurd derivation of mantike and oionistike and imeros( compare Cratylus)? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: About what conclusion? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: And is this the exact spot? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: And what are these arguments, Socrates? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Do you see the tallest plane- tree in the distance? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Had not Protagoras something of the same sort? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: How do you mean? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: How so? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: How so? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: How so? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: I have never noticed it; but I beseech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: I think that I understand you; but will you explain yourself? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: In what direction then? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: In what way? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Isocrates the fair:--What message will you send to him, and how shall we describe him? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Need we? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Show what? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Then why are you still at your tricks? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What are they? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What do you mean, my good Socrates? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What do you mean? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What do you mean? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What error? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What gifts do you mean? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What is our method? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What is the other principle, Socrates? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What is there remarkable in the epitaph? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What name would you assign to them? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What of that? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What shall we say to him? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What would you prophesy? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: What? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Who are they, and where did you hear anything better than this? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Whom do you mean, and what is his origin? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: Will you go on? |
| 1636 | PHAEDRUS: You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: About the just and unjust-- that is the matter in dispute? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding, than the husbandman, about his own seeds? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul intelligently without knowing the nature of the whole? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: And how did he entertain you? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: And will not Sophocles say to the display of the would- be tragedian, that this is not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: And will you go on with the narration? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Do you mean that I am not in earnest? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Does not your simplicity observe that I have got out of dithyrambics into heroics, when only uttering a censure on the lover? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: He, then, who would deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric: have you anything to add? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of the matter about which he is going to speak? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: It was foolish, I say,--to a certain extent, impious; can anything be more dreadful? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception-- when the difference is large or small? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: May not''the wolf,''as the proverb says,''claim a hearing''? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Now to which class does love belong-- to the debatable or to the undisputed class? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I will do? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Shall we discuss the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Then as to the other topics-- are they not thrown down anyhow? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Then do you think that any one of this class, however ill- disposed, would reproach Lysias with being an author? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Then in some things we agree, but not in others? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphrodite, and a god? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: What do you mean? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Who is he? |
| 1636 | SOCRATES: Why, do you not know that when a politician writes, he begins with the names of his approvers? |
| 1636 | Shall we say a word to him or not? |
| 1636 | Socrates as yet does not know himself; and why should he care to know about unearthly monsters? |
| 1636 | Then again in the noble art of politics, who thinks of first principles and of true ideas? |
| 1636 | These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in( for what else is there to be said?) |
| 1636 | Was he equally serious in the rest? |
| 1636 | We may raise the same question in another form: Is marriage preferable with or without love? |
| 1636 | Well, the teacher will say, is this, Phaedrus and Socrates, your account of the so- called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another? |
| 1636 | What would Socrates think of our newspapers, of our theology? |
| 1636 | What would he have said of the discovery of Christian doctrines in these old Greek legends? |
| 1636 | What would he say of the Church, which we praise in like manner,''meaning ourselves,''without regard to history or experience? |
| 1636 | What would they say if they saw that we, like the many, are not conversing, but slumbering at mid- day, lulled by their voices, too indolent to think? |
| 1636 | While acknowledging that such interpretations are''very nice,''would he not have remarked that they are found in all sacred literatures? |
| 1636 | Who would imagine that Lysias, who is here assailed by Socrates, is the son of his old friend Cephalus? |
| 1636 | Who would suspect that the wise Critias, the virtuous Charmides, had ended their lives among the thirty tyrants? |
| 1636 | Who, for example, could speak on this thesis of yours without praising the discretion of the non- lover and blaming the indiscretion of the lover? |
| 1636 | Why did history degenerate into fable? |
| 1636 | Why did poetry droop and languish? |
| 1636 | Why did the physical sciences never arrive at any true knowledge or make any real progress? |
| 1636 | Why did words lose their power of expression? |
| 1636 | Why do I say so? |
| 1636 | Why do you not proceed? |
| 1636 | Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic? |
| 1636 | Why were ages of external greatness and magnificence attended by all the signs of decay in the human mind which are possible? |
| 1636 | Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong? |
| 1636 | Would he not have asked of us, or rather is he not asking of us, Whether we have ceased to prefer appearances to reality? |
| 1636 | Would they not have a right to laugh at us? |
| 1636 | Yes; but is not even a ridiculous friend better than a cunning enemy? |
| 1636 | and are they both equally self- moving and constructed on the same threefold principle? |
| 1636 | and will not Acumenus say the same of medicine to the would- be physician? |
| 1636 | or, whether the''select wise''are not''the many''after all? |
| 40438 | But will you not admit that such a man lives basely or dishonourably? |
| 40438 | Car enfin qu''y a- t- il de grand dans la connoissance des mouvemens des planètes? 40438 Is that your explanation of justice( asks Sokrates): that it consists in telling truth, and rendering to every one what you have had from him?" |
| 40438 | Nam quæ est superstitio? 40438 What then-- do you not grant farther, that he lives badly, disagreeably, disadvantageously, to himself?" |
| 40438 | What? 40438 -- Pô= s dê= ta di/ kês ou)/sês, o( Zeu\s ou)k a)po/ lôlen, to\n pate/ r''au(tou= dê/ sas? 40438 10), citing Aristobulus and Numenius, says[ Greek: Ti/ ga\r e)/sti Pla/ tôn, ê)\ Môu+sê\s a)ttiki/ zôn?] 40438 243; of all three parts of soul? 40438 27; is it teachable by system? 40438 333 E:[ Greek: Ou)k a)\n ou)=n pa/ nu ge/ ti spoudai= on ei)/ê ê( dikaiosu/ nê, ei) pro\s ta\ a)/chrêsta chrê/ simon o)\n tugcha/ nei?]] 40438 447; not a right traffic between men and gods, 448; is it holy? 40438 A)/llo ti ou)=n, e)/phê, kai\ su\ ou(/tô poiê/ seis? 40438 Are they one thing, or two separate things? 40438 Are you going to give me one of those answers which I forbade? 40438 Are you satisfied that their courage( or self- command) shall be lame or one- sided-- good against pains, but not good against pleasures? 40438 But do there really exist any such Forms or Ideas-- as Fire_ per se_, the Generic Fire-- Water_ per se_, the Generic Water, invisible and intangible? 40438 But how can such restriction be enforced, since no individual paternity or maternity is recognised in the Commonwealth? 40438 But how can we implant such unanimous and unshaken belief, in a story altogether untrue? 40438 But how is such activity to be obtained? 40438 But is it the fact that there are in each man three such mental constituents-- three different classes, sorts, or varieties, of mind? 40438 But is it true that women are competent to the function of Guardians? 40438 But tell me, Sokrates( asks Adeimantus), what do_ you_ conceive the Good to be-- Intelligence or Pleasure, or any other thing different from these? 40438 But we must ask him farther-- Proper and suitable-- how? 40438 But what is Good? 40438 But what is Good?] 40438 But what is this Something, midway between Ens and Particulars Non- Ens, and partaking of both-- which is the object of Opination? 40438 But what_ is_ the good and honourable-- or the bad and dishonourable? 40438 Can you specify in what particular transactions the just man has any superior usefulness as a co- operator? 40438 Do the names in the first triplet mean substantially the same thing, only looked at in different aspects and under different conditions? 40438 Do you wish me not to be happy? 40438 Does the internal reason and sentiment of the agent coincide with that of his countrymen, as to what is just and unjust? 40438 Does there exist nothing really anywhere, beyond the visible objects which we see and touch? 40438 First, What is Justice? 40438 For when a man says that Intelligence is the Good, our next question to him must be, What sort of Intelligence do you mean?--Intelligence of what? 40438 Here then the question is opened, Which of the three is in the right? 40438 Holiness, what is? 40438 How are philosophers to be formed? 40438 How can we expect that such a man should prefer justice, when the rewards of injustice on its largest scale are within his reach? 40438 How is it( says the Athenian) that you deal so differently with pains and pleasures? 40438 How is the Platonic colony to be first set on its march, and by whom are its first magistrates to be named? 40438 If you ask men-- How much is twelve? 40438 If you say that the agreeable course is the happiest, what do you mean by always exhorting me to be just? 40438 Illud ab hoc igitur quærendum est, quid sit amari Tantopere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem Cur quisquam æterno possit tabescere luctu? 40438 In a word, whenever a man is effective as a guard of any thing, is he not also effective as a thief of it? 40438 In boxing or in battle, is not he who is best in striking, best also in defending himself? 40438 In like manner, the cases must be specified in which justice renders what is proper and suitable-- to whom, how, or what? 40438 In regard to disease, is not he who can best guard himself against it, the most formidable for imparting it to others? 40438 In the body of Guardians or Soldiers 35 Where is the Temperance? 40438 Interroganti porro illi, Quid hoc? 40438 Is he essentially homogeneous with his countrymen( to use the language of Plato in the Gorgias[57]), a chip of the same block? 40438 Is not the general who watches best over his own camp, also the most effective in surprising and over- reaching the enemy? 40438 Is the female nature endued with the same aptitudes for such duties as the male? 40438 Is the just man happy in or by reason of his justice? 40438 Is the unjust man unhappy by reason of his injustice? 40438 It resides in the few elder Rulers_ ib._ Where is the Courage? 40438 Kai\ mê\n to/ ge ê(du\ e)n psuchê=| gigno/ menon kai\ to\ lupêro\n ki/ nêsi/ s tis a)mphote/ rô e)/ston? 40438 Kai\ pô/ s a)\n tau= ta/ g''e)/ti xugchôroi= men? 40438 Kakourgi/ an de\ tê\n megi/ stên tê= s e(autou= po/ leôs ou)k a)diki/ an phê/ seis ei)=nai? 40438 Meat and drink-- or true opinions, knowledge, intelligence, and virtue? 40438 Nevertheless the avowed purpose of the treatise is, not to depict the ideal of a commonwealth, but to solve the questions, What is Justice? 40438 Now as to the question, What Good is? 40438 Now tell me-- In what manner are the objects here defined ensured by the institutions of Apollo and Zeus at Sparta and Krete? 40438 Now which of these two judgments shall we pronounce to be the truth? 40438 O(/pôs? 40438 Or do they mean three distinct things, separable and occurring the one without the other? 40438 Or is it profitable to him to be unjust, if he can contrive to escape detection and punishment? 40438 Or that which embraces the mortal, the transient, and the ever variable-- being itself of kindred nature? 40438 Ou)kou= n e)peidê\ du/ o, kai\ e(\n e)ka/ teron? 40438 Ou)kou= n, o(/, ti a)\n au)tô= n eu(/rômen e)n au)tê=|, to\ u(po/ loipon e)/stai to\ ou)ch eu(rême/ non?] 40438 Pain, Evil, Unhappiness? 40438 Poi/ an? 40438 Poi= on ti? 40438 Pô= s ou)=n o)rthô= s e)/sti to\ mê\ a)lgei= n ê(du\ ê(gei= sthai, ê)\ to\ mê\ chai/ rein a)niaro/ n? 40438 Question-- How are Happiness and Misery apportioned among them? 40438 Question-- How are Happiness and Misery apportioned among them?] 40438 Quo audito, Chalifam ab eo quæsivisse, Quidnam Bonum esset? 40438 Quærenti Chalifæ quid hoc esset? 40438 Secondly, To which of the three classes of good things does Justice belong? 40438 Superiors rule and Inferiors obey_ ib._ Where is the Justice? 40438 Tell me for what want or acquisition justice is useful during peace? 40438 That which embraces the true, eternal, and unchangeable-- and which is itself of similar nature? 40438 The professed subject is-- What is Justice? 40438 There is perfect unanimity between them as to the point-- Who ought to command, and who ought to obey? 40438 Thirdly, wherein resides the Temperance of the city? 40438 Ti/ de/? 40438 Ti/ de/? 40438 To his own judgment? 40438 To\ de\ mê/ te ê(du\ mê/ te lupêro\n ou)chi\ ê(suchi/ a me/ ntoi kai\ e)n me/ sô| tou/ tôn e)pha/ nê a)/rti? 40438 Tripartite distribution of Good-- To which of the three heads does Justice belong? 40438 Tripartite distribution of Good-- To which of the three heads does Justice belong?] 40438 Under what circumstances is Justice useful? 40438 Under what circumstances is Justice useful?] 40438 We must decline the problem, What Good itself is? 40438 What are the characteristic points of difference, by reason of which Virtue sometimes receives one of these names, sometimes another? 40438 What are those modes of jointly employing money, in which the just man is more useful than others? 40438 What course of life are they likely to choose? 40438 What good_ can_ he possess, apart from pleasure? 40438 What if the powerful man mistakes his own advantage? 40438 What if the powerful man mistakes his own advantage?] 40438 What is Injustice? 40438 What is that common object? 40438 What is the common property, or point of similarity between Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice-- by reason of which each is termed Virtue? 40438 What is the explanation which he himself gives( in this very Republic) of the primary origin of a city? 40438 What is the relation between Pleasure, Good, and Happiness? 40438 What is the supreme object of knowledge? 40438 What necessity was there to copy the worst parts of the Generic Animal as well as the best? 40438 What other Sophist, or what private exhortation, can contend successfully against teachers such as these? 40438 What penalty will you then impose upon yourself? 40438 What restriction is to be placed upon his power of making a valid will? 40438 What then is the object of Opining? 40438 When Plato speaks of the just or the unjust man, to whose judgment does he make appeal? 40438 Where is its Justice? 40438 Where is its Justice?] 40438 Where is the motive, operative, demiurgic force, ready to translate such an idea into reality? 40438 Wherein does the Justice of the city reside? 40438 Which of the three varieties of pleasure and modes of life is the more honourable or base, the better or worse, the more pleasurable or painful? 40438 Which of the two exists most perfectly? 40438 Which of the two is most existent? 40438 Which of the two partakes most of pure essence? 40438 Which of the two will have the happiest life? 40438 Who is to fix the limit of admissible divergence between the various compositions of a man like Plato? 40438 Whom does Plato intend for the fourth person, unnamed and absent? 40438 [ 100] Long- haired men are different from bald- heads: but shall we conclude, that if the former are fit to make shoes, the latter are unfit? 40438 [ 13]_ T._--What will you say if I show you another answer better than all of them? 40438 [ 186] But what are the highest studies? 40438 [ 195] What then is this Real Good-- the Noumenon, Idea, or form of Good? 40438 [ 221] Now what cognitions, calculated to aid such a purpose, can we find to teach? 40438 [ 290] By what criterion, or by whose judgment, is this question to be decided? 40438 [ 295] How is he to carry out this maxim in his laws? 40438 [ 367] Now which of the two( asks Plato) directs the movements of the celestial sphere, the Sun, Moon, and Stars? 40438 [ 63] You agree with me in this, do you not? |
| 40438 | [ 66] Or is this mere unfounded speech? |
| 40438 | [ 67] He obtains praise and honour:--Is_ that_ good, but disagreeable-- and would the contrary, infamy, be agreeable? |
| 40438 | [ 7][ Footnote 5: Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 D.[ Greek: ê( ou)=n dê\ ti/ si ti/ a)podidou= sa te/ chnê dikaiosu/ nê a)\n kaloi= to?]] |
| 40438 | [ Footnote 129: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 C.] How is the father to know his own daughter( it is asked), or the son his own mother? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Bou/ lei ou)=n e)/nthende a)rxô/ metha e)piskopou/ ntes, e)k tê= s ei)ôthui/ as metho/ dou? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n mousikê/ n ge pa= sa/ n phamen ei)kastikê/ n te ei)=nai kai\ mimêtikê/ n?]] |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n tau= ta pa/ schoi a)\n pa/ nta dia\ to\ mê\ e)/mpeiros ei)=nai tou= a)lêthinô= s a)/nô te o)/ntos kai\ e)n me/ sô|? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Plê/ rôsis de\ a)lêtheste/ ra tou= ê(=tton ê)\ tou= ma= llon o)/ntos? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Pou= ou)=n a)/n pote e)n au)tê=|( tê=| po/ lei) ei)/ê ê(/ te dikaiosu/ nê kai\ ê( a)diki/ a? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Ti/ de\ dê/? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: Ti/ ga/ r e)sti to\ e)rgazo/ menon, pro\s ta\s i)de/ as a)poble/ pon?] |
| 40438 | [ Greek: ei)/th''o(/stis o(mologei= tau= ta, u(pome/ nei mê\ theô= n ei)=nai plê/ rê pa/ nta?]] |
| 40438 | [ Greek: to\_ de\ dê\ loipo\n ei)=dos_, di''o(\ a)\n e)/ti a)retê= s mete/ choi po/ lis, ti/ pot''a)\n ei)/ê? |
| 40438 | [ Greek: ê)= kai\ dialektiko\n kalei= s to\n lo/ gon e(/kastou lamba/ nonta tê= s ou)si/ as?]] |
| 40438 | [ Greek: ê)\ tou= to me/ n i)/sôs a)\n xugchôrê/ saite, to/ ge ai)schrô= s( zê= n)? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Explanation by Polemarchus-- Farther interrogations by Sokrates-- Justice renders what is proper and suitable: but how? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: First, where is the wisdom of the city? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: How is such a fiction to be accredited in the first instance? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Question-- How is the scheme practicable? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Where is the Courage? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Where is the Justice? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Where is the Temperance? |
| 40438 | [ Side- note: Why are not the citizens tested in like manner, in regard to resistance against the seductions of pleasure?] |
| 40438 | _ S._--But is not a man often mistaken in this belief? |
| 40438 | _ S._--How can I possibly answer, when you prescribe beforehand what I am to say or not to say? |
| 40438 | _ S._--In what matters is it that the just man shows his special efficiency, to benefit friends and hurt enemies? |
| 40438 | _ S._--Who is it that is most efficient in benefiting his friends and injuring his enemies, as to health or disease? |
| 40438 | _ S._--Who, in reference to the dangers in navigation by sea? |
| 40438 | _ S._--Why not similar? |
| 40438 | _ S._--You mean, then, that it is just to hurt unjust men, and to benefit just men? |
| 40438 | _ T._--Is that what you intend to do? |
| 40438 | _ ib._ First, where is the wisdom of the city? |
| 40438 | _ ê(\ chalepo\n eu(rei= n belti/ ô tê= s u(po\ tou= pollou= chro/ nou eu(rême/ nês_? |
| 40438 | and at the same time say-- Don''t tell me that it is twice six, or three times four, or four times three-- how can any man answer your question? |
| 40438 | e)n au)tê=| tê=| po/ lei pô= s a)llê/ lois metadô/ sousin ô(=n a)\n e(/kastoi e)rga/ zôntai? |
| 40438 | e._ things good_ per se_, and good also in their consequences? |
| 40438 | e._ things not good_ per se_, but good only in their consequences? |
| 40438 | ei) ou)=n o(/moios a)nê\r tê=| po/ lei, ou) kai\ e)n e)kei/ nô| a)na/ gkê tê\n au)tê\n ta/ xin e)nei= nai?] |
| 40438 | et n''en sçavons nous pas assez présentement pour régler nos mois et nos années? |
| 40438 | in what cases, proper? |
| 40438 | in what cases, proper? |
| 40438 | in what cases? |
| 40438 | or to which of the numerous other dissentient judgments? |
| 40438 | p. 376 E.[ Greek: Ti/ s ou)=n ê( paidei/ a? |
| 40438 | p. 376 E.[ Greek: Ti/ s ou)=n ê( paidei/ a? |
| 40438 | p. 412 C.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n phroni/ mous te ei)s tou= to dei= u(pa/ rchein kai\ dunatou\s kai\ e)/ti kêdemo/ nas tê= s po/ leôs? |
| 40438 | p. 415 C- D.[ Greek: Tou= ton ou)=n to\n mu= thon o(/pôs a)\n peisthei= en, e)/cheis tina\ mêchanê/ n? |
| 40438 | p. 415 C- D[ Greek: Tou= ton ou)=n to\n mu= thon o(/pôs a)\n peisthei= en, e)/cheis tina\ mêchanê/ n? |
| 40438 | p. 505 D.][ Side- note: What is the Good? |
| 40438 | p. 521 C.[ Greek: Ti/ a)\n ou)=n ei)/ê ma/ thêma psuchê= s o(lko\n a)po\ tou= gignome/ nou e)pi\ to\ o)/n?]] |
| 40438 | p. 532 D.][ Side- note: Question by Glaukon-- What is the Dialectic Power? |
| 40438 | p. 584 C.[ Greek: Nomi/ zeis ti e)n tê=| phu/ sei ei)=nai to\ me\n a)/nô, to\ de\ ka/ tô, to\ de\ me/ son? |
| 40438 | p. 664 D.][ Side- note: Pleasure-- Good-- Happiness-- What is the relation between them?] |
| 40438 | paideu/ ein de\ teleô/ tata kai\ a)perga/ zesthai oi(/ous bou/ lontai ei)=nai kai\ ne/ ous kai\ presbute/ rous kai\ a)/ndras kai\ gunai= kas?]] |
| 40438 | po/ then a)/llothen ê)\ e)k tô= n a)natomô= n?]] |
| 40438 | qui gradus? |
| 40438 | quæ harum species? |
| 40438 | quæ[ Greek: a)theo/ tês]? |
| 40438 | ti/ a)\n oi)/ei au)tou\s a)pokri/ nasthai? |
| 40438 | ti/ ga\r dê\ dikai/ ô| chôrizo/ menon ê(donê= s a)gatho\n a)\n gi/ gnoito?]] |
| 40438 | to whom? |
| 40438 | to\ kai\ a)êdô/ s kai\ mê\ xumphero/ ntôs au)tô=|? |
| 40438 | to\ kai\ kakô= s? |
| 40438 | whatever consequences may befall him? |
| 40438 | Ê)= kai\ dunato\n to\ mêde/ tera o)\n a)mpho/ tera gi/ gnesthai? |
| 40438 | Ê)\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti to\n mê\ peitho/ menon a)timi/ ais te kai\ chrê/ masi kai\ thana/ tois kola/ zousin? |
| 40438 | Ô)= thauma/ sie, su\ de\ dê\ poi= skopei= s? |
| 40438 | ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40438 | ê)\ ou)ch ou(/tô plou/ tou a)retê\ die/ stêken, ô(/sper e)n pla/ stiggi zugou= keime/ nou e(kate/ rou a)ei\ tou)nanti/ on r(e/ ponte?] |
| 40438 | ô(=n e)gô\ a)pei= pon, tou/ tôn ti a)pokrinei=? |
| 1591 | ''And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?'' |
| 1591 | ''And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? |
| 1591 | ''And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy?'' |
| 1591 | ''Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? |
| 1591 | ''But how,''he will reply,''can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good''? |
| 1591 | ''But in what will he be better?'' |
| 1591 | ''By what?'' |
| 1591 | ''Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all?'' |
| 1591 | ( 3) Again, would parents who teach her sons lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of citizens? |
| 1591 | --and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against me? |
| 1591 | --how would you answer him? |
| 1591 | --they would acknowledge that they were not? |
| 1591 | --they would agree to the latter alternative, if I am not mistaken? |
| 1591 | --they would assent to me? |
| 1591 | --we should answer,''Yes,''if I am not mistaken? |
| 1591 | Again we knocked, and he answered without opening: Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows? |
| 1591 | And are justice and holiness opposed to one another?'' |
| 1591 | And are not these confident persons also courageous? |
| 1591 | And because of that ignorance they are cowards? |
| 1591 | And by what is he overcome? |
| 1591 | And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? |
| 1591 | And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better? |
| 1591 | And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom? |
| 1591 | And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief? |
| 1591 | And do you think that the ode is a good composition, and true? |
| 1591 | And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness? |
| 1591 | And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent? |
| 1591 | And does not the poet proceed to say,''I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly can a man be good''? |
| 1591 | And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not? |
| 1591 | And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance? |
| 1591 | And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice? |
| 1591 | And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers? |
| 1591 | And have you an answer for him? |
| 1591 | And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, and yet confident about them? |
| 1591 | And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides?--how should we answer him? |
| 1591 | And if honourable, then good? |
| 1591 | And if not base, then honourable? |
| 1591 | And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? |
| 1591 | And in opposite ways? |
| 1591 | And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? |
| 1591 | And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good? |
| 1591 | And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters? |
| 1591 | And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly? |
| 1591 | And is the good that which is expedient for man? |
| 1591 | And is there anything good? |
| 1591 | And is there not a contradiction? |
| 1591 | And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things? |
| 1591 | And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly? |
| 1591 | And shall I argue with them or with you? |
| 1591 | And suppose that he turned to you and said,''Is this true, Protagoras? |
| 1591 | And suppose that he went on to say:''Well now, is there also such a thing as holiness?'' |
| 1591 | And suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, and asked him,''In what shall I become better day by day?'' |
| 1591 | And temperance is good sense? |
| 1591 | And temperance makes them temperate? |
| 1591 | And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness? |
| 1591 | And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites? |
| 1591 | And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite? |
| 1591 | And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly? |
| 1591 | And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately? |
| 1591 | And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly? |
| 1591 | And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence? |
| 1591 | And the ignorance of them is cowardice? |
| 1591 | And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is opposed to the ignorance of these things? |
| 1591 | And the reason of this is that they have knowledge? |
| 1591 | And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice? |
| 1591 | And then after this suppose that he came and asked us,''What were you saying just now? |
| 1591 | And there is the acute in sound? |
| 1591 | And therefore by opposites:--then folly is the opposite of temperance? |
| 1591 | And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness? |
| 1591 | And they are all different from one another? |
| 1591 | And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not temperate? |
| 1591 | And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science? |
| 1591 | And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites? |
| 1591 | And we said that everything has only one opposite? |
| 1591 | And what am I doing? |
| 1591 | And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant? |
| 1591 | And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know? |
| 1591 | And what is your purpose? |
| 1591 | And what sort of well- doing makes a man a good physician? |
| 1591 | And what will he make of you? |
| 1591 | And what will they make of you? |
| 1591 | And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul? |
| 1591 | And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate? |
| 1591 | And when you speak of being overcome--''what do you mean,''he will say,''but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?'' |
| 1591 | And who have confidence when fighting on horseback-- the skilled horseman or the unskilled? |
| 1591 | And who when fighting with light shields-- the peltasts or the nonpeltasts? |
| 1591 | And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras? |
| 1591 | And would you wish to begin the enquiry? |
| 1591 | And you think otherwise? |
| 1591 | And you would admit the existence of goods? |
| 1591 | And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure? |
| 1591 | Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant? |
| 1591 | Are these the things which are good but painful?'' |
| 1591 | Are they not the confident? |
| 1591 | Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?'' |
| 1591 | Are you not of Homer''s opinion, who says''Youth is most charming when the beard first appears''? |
| 1591 | Are you satisfied, then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain? |
| 1591 | Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability; and you say Where are the teachers? |
| 1591 | But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler? |
| 1591 | But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that case have lived well? |
| 1591 | But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true? |
| 1591 | But shall I tell you a strange thing? |
| 1591 | But short enough? |
| 1591 | But some one will ask, Why? |
| 1591 | But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself? |
| 1591 | But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? |
| 1591 | But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice? |
| 1591 | But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the contrary, are base? |
| 1591 | But what matter? |
| 1591 | But what sort of doing is good in letters? |
| 1591 | But what would you like? |
| 1591 | But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing? |
| 1591 | But who is to be the umpire? |
| 1591 | But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? |
| 1591 | But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them? |
| 1591 | By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist? |
| 1591 | COMPANION: And do you just come from an interview with him? |
| 1591 | COMPANION: And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than the son of Cleinias? |
| 1591 | COMPANION: But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one? |
| 1591 | COMPANION: Of what country? |
| 1591 | COMPANION: Well, and how do matters proceed? |
| 1591 | COMPANION: What do you mean-- a citizen or a foreigner? |
| 1591 | COMPANION: What is the meaning of this? |
| 1591 | COMPANION: Where do you come from, Socrates? |
| 1591 | Delightful, I said; but what is the news? |
| 1591 | Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that''Hardly can a man become truly good''? |
| 1591 | Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens? |
| 1591 | Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions? |
| 1591 | Do you admit the existence of folly? |
| 1591 | Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying? |
| 1591 | Do you know the poem? |
| 1591 | Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice? |
| 1591 | Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the company? |
| 1591 | Does he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is overcome by passion? |
| 1591 | First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one? |
| 1591 | For Socrates admits his inability to speak long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short? |
| 1591 | Has Protagoras robbed you of anything? |
| 1591 | Has anything happened between you and him? |
| 1591 | Have you been visiting him, and was he gracious to you? |
| 1591 | He and his fellow- workmen have taught them to the best of their ability,--but who will carry them further in their arts? |
| 1591 | How is this to be reconciled? |
| 1591 | How should we answer him, Socrates? |
| 1591 | How so? |
| 1591 | How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you? |
| 1591 | I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? |
| 1591 | I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to Protagoras? |
| 1591 | I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? |
| 1591 | I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing? |
| 1591 | I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill? |
| 1591 | I said; or shall I begin? |
| 1591 | I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous? |
| 1591 | I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the matter? |
| 1591 | If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? |
| 1591 | If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed? |
| 1591 | Is Protagoras in Athens? |
| 1591 | Is not that true, Protagoras? |
| 1591 | Is not that true? |
| 1591 | Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer? |
| 1591 | Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil''? |
| 1591 | May I employ an illustration? |
| 1591 | Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands? |
| 1591 | Now is that your view? |
| 1591 | Now when there is all this care about virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught? |
| 1591 | Now who becomes a bad physician? |
| 1591 | Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful? |
| 1591 | Or if a man has one part, must he also have all the others? |
| 1591 | Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers? |
| 1591 | Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all? |
| 1591 | Protagoras has spoken of the virtues: are they many, or one? |
| 1591 | SOCRATES: And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend? |
| 1591 | SOCRATES: What of his beard? |
| 1591 | Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough? |
| 1591 | Shall I, as an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I argue out the question? |
| 1591 | Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil? |
| 1591 | Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me:''Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject?'' |
| 1591 | Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well? |
| 1591 | Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going? |
| 1591 | That is my opinion: would it not be yours also? |
| 1591 | The honourable work is also useful and good? |
| 1591 | The world will assent, will they not? |
| 1591 | Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring? |
| 1591 | Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? |
| 1591 | Then against something different? |
| 1591 | Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice or courage? |
| 1591 | Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is danger? |
| 1591 | Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more? |
| 1591 | Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is? |
| 1591 | Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice? |
| 1591 | Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them? |
| 1591 | Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately? |
| 1591 | Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil? |
| 1591 | Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist? |
| 1591 | Then who are the courageous? |
| 1591 | Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness? |
| 1591 | Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? |
| 1591 | Then, my friends, what do you say to this? |
| 1591 | Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you? |
| 1591 | This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, is now taken up and cross- examined by Socrates:--''Is justice just, and is holiness holy? |
| 1591 | To which the only opposite is the evil? |
| 1591 | To which the only opposite is the grave? |
| 1591 | To which the only opposite is the ugly? |
| 1591 | Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go-- against the same dangers as the cowards? |
| 1591 | What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term''hard''? |
| 1591 | What do you mean? |
| 1591 | What does he think of knowledge? |
| 1591 | What else would you say? |
| 1591 | What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent? |
| 1591 | What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him? |
| 1591 | What would you say? |
| 1591 | When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature? |
| 1591 | Which of these two assertions shall we renounce? |
| 1591 | Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing-- should we not say so? |
| 1591 | Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? |
| 1591 | Why do I say all this? |
| 1591 | Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both? |
| 1591 | Will Protagoras answer these objections? |
| 1591 | Will you be so good? |
| 1591 | Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement? |
| 1591 | Would not the art of measuring be the saving principle; or would the power of appearance? |
| 1591 | Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature?'' |
| 1591 | Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? |
| 1591 | Would you not answer in the same way? |
| 1591 | Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his arrival? |
| 1591 | You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek? |
| 1591 | You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust? |
| 1591 | You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue? |
| 1591 | You, Socrates, are discontented, and why? |
| 1591 | and about what? |
| 1591 | and do you bring any news? |
| 1591 | and do you call the latter good? |
| 1591 | and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position?'' |
| 1591 | and in causing poverty do they not cause pain;--they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken? |
| 1591 | and what sort of doing makes a man good in letters? |
| 1591 | and what will he make of you? |
| 1591 | and why do you give them this money?--how would you have answered? |
| 1591 | and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour? |
| 1591 | are they parts of a whole, or different names of the same thing? |
| 1591 | he said: how am I to shorten my answers? |
| 1591 | how is he designated? |
| 1591 | how would you have answered? |
| 1591 | or does he hold that knowledge is power? |
| 1591 | or shall I repeat the whole? |
| 1591 | shall I make them too short? |
| 1598 | ''And are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?'' |
| 1598 | ''And dictation is a dictation of letters?'' |
| 1598 | ''And do they learn,''said Euthydemus,''what they know or what they do not know?'' |
| 1598 | ''And he is not wise yet?'' |
| 1598 | ''And what did you think of them?'' |
| 1598 | ''And you acquire that which you have not got already?'' |
| 1598 | ''And you know letters?'' |
| 1598 | ''And you see our garments?'' |
| 1598 | ''But are there any beautiful things? |
| 1598 | ''But,''retorts Dionysodorus,''is not learning acquiring knowledge?'' |
| 1598 | ''Cleinias,''says Euthydemus,''who learn, the wise or the unwise?'' |
| 1598 | ''Crito,''said he to me,''are you giving no attention to these wise men?'' |
| 1598 | ''Do they know shoemaking, etc?'' |
| 1598 | ''Do you see,''retorts Euthydemus,''what has the quality of vision or what has not the quality of vision?'' |
| 1598 | ''Is a speaking of the silent possible? |
| 1598 | ''What did I think of them?'' |
| 1598 | ''What does the word"non- plussed"mean?'' |
| 1598 | ''What was that?'' |
| 1598 | ''You want Cleinias to be wise?'' |
| 1598 | A noble man or a mean man? |
| 1598 | A weak man or a strong man? |
| 1598 | All letters? |
| 1598 | Am I not right? |
| 1598 | Am I not right? |
| 1598 | Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots? |
| 1598 | And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man? |
| 1598 | And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? |
| 1598 | And an indolent man less than an active man? |
| 1598 | And are not good things good, and evil things evil? |
| 1598 | And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts? |
| 1598 | And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters? |
| 1598 | And are not these gods animals? |
| 1598 | And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing? |
| 1598 | And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you? |
| 1598 | And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold? |
| 1598 | And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere? |
| 1598 | And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? |
| 1598 | And clearly we do not want the art of the flute- maker; this is only another of the same sort? |
| 1598 | And did you always know this? |
| 1598 | And did you not say that you knew something? |
| 1598 | And do all other men know all things or nothing? |
| 1598 | And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not? |
| 1598 | And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm? |
| 1598 | And do you know of any word which is alive? |
| 1598 | And do you know stitching? |
| 1598 | And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand? |
| 1598 | And do you know with what you know, or with something else? |
| 1598 | And do you please? |
| 1598 | And do you really and truly know all things, including carpentering and leather- cutting? |
| 1598 | And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man? |
| 1598 | And doing is making? |
| 1598 | And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers? |
| 1598 | And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus? |
| 1598 | And have you no need, Euthydemus? |
| 1598 | And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not? |
| 1598 | And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the addition of''when you know them''or not? |
| 1598 | And he has puppies? |
| 1598 | And he is not wise as yet? |
| 1598 | And he who says that thing says that which is? |
| 1598 | And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other? |
| 1598 | And if a man does his business he does rightly? |
| 1598 | And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them? |
| 1598 | And if there are such, are they the same or not the same as absolute beauty?'' |
| 1598 | And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold? |
| 1598 | And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk-- in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one? |
| 1598 | And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness-- a wise physician, or an ignorant one? |
| 1598 | And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not? |
| 1598 | And is Patrocles, he said, your brother? |
| 1598 | And is he not yours? |
| 1598 | And is that fair? |
| 1598 | And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing? |
| 1598 | And is this true? |
| 1598 | And knowing is having knowledge at the time? |
| 1598 | And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly? |
| 1598 | And may there not be a silence of the speaker? |
| 1598 | And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time? |
| 1598 | And now answer: Do you always know with this? |
| 1598 | And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness? |
| 1598 | And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge? |
| 1598 | And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do? |
| 1598 | And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible? |
| 1598 | And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth? |
| 1598 | And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us? |
| 1598 | And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father? |
| 1598 | And speaking is doing and making? |
| 1598 | And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them? |
| 1598 | And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? |
| 1598 | And that is a distinct thing apart from other things? |
| 1598 | And that is impossible? |
| 1598 | And that which is not is nowhere? |
| 1598 | And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that? |
| 1598 | And the dog is the father of them? |
| 1598 | And they are the teachers of those who learn-- the grammar- master and the lyre- master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners? |
| 1598 | And to have money everywhere and always is a good? |
| 1598 | And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also? |
| 1598 | And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn? |
| 1598 | And were you wise then? |
| 1598 | And what does that signify? |
| 1598 | And what is your notion? |
| 1598 | And what knowledge ought we to acquire? |
| 1598 | And what other goods are there? |
| 1598 | And what things do we esteem good? |
| 1598 | And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning? |
| 1598 | And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast? |
| 1598 | And who would do least-- a poor man or a rich man? |
| 1598 | And whose the making of pots? |
| 1598 | And why should you say so? |
| 1598 | And would not you, Crito, say the same? |
| 1598 | And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? |
| 1598 | And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? |
| 1598 | And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own? |
| 1598 | And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?'' |
| 1598 | And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense;--what do you say, wise man? |
| 1598 | And you admit gold to be a good? |
| 1598 | And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased? |
| 1598 | And you also see that which has the quality of vision? |
| 1598 | And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are? |
| 1598 | And your mother, too, is the mother of all? |
| 1598 | And your papa is a dog? |
| 1598 | Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless? |
| 1598 | Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked one? |
| 1598 | Are you not other than a stone? |
| 1598 | Are you prepared to make that good? |
| 1598 | Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant? |
| 1598 | At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that? |
| 1598 | Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? |
| 1598 | But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? |
| 1598 | But can a father be other than a father? |
| 1598 | But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing? |
| 1598 | But can wisdom be taught? |
| 1598 | But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking? |
| 1598 | But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is impossible? |
| 1598 | But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another? |
| 1598 | But if he can not speak falsely, may he not think falsely? |
| 1598 | But if you were not wise you were unlearned? |
| 1598 | But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches-- would that be the art which would make us happy? |
| 1598 | But what need is there of good fortune when we have wisdom already:--in every art and business are not the wise also the fortunate? |
| 1598 | But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothing-- is there any contradiction? |
| 1598 | But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters? |
| 1598 | But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the silent? |
| 1598 | But why should I repeat the whole story? |
| 1598 | CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge? |
| 1598 | CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this? |
| 1598 | CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates? |
| 1598 | CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? |
| 1598 | CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates? |
| 1598 | CRITO: Well, and what came of that? |
| 1598 | CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? |
| 1598 | CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? |
| 1598 | CRITO: Why not, Socrates? |
| 1598 | Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one''s own land, are goods? |
| 1598 | Certainly; did you think we should say No to that? |
| 1598 | Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father? |
| 1598 | Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied? |
| 1598 | Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they do not know? |
| 1598 | Do you agree with me? |
| 1598 | Do you agree? |
| 1598 | Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing? |
| 1598 | Do you not know letters? |
| 1598 | Do you not remember? |
| 1598 | Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father? |
| 1598 | Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not? |
| 1598 | Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth? |
| 1598 | Does not your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake? |
| 1598 | Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not? |
| 1598 | Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not? |
| 1598 | Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie? |
| 1598 | For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited? |
| 1598 | For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked? |
| 1598 | For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns? |
| 1598 | For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all? |
| 1598 | Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus? |
| 1598 | How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not? |
| 1598 | I can not say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men? |
| 1598 | I did, I said; what is going to happen to me? |
| 1598 | I said, and where did you learn that? |
| 1598 | I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? |
| 1598 | I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? |
| 1598 | Is not that your position? |
| 1598 | Is not the honourable honourable and the base base? |
| 1598 | Is not this the result-- that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil? |
| 1598 | Is that your difficulty? |
| 1598 | Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? |
| 1598 | Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat this dog? |
| 1598 | Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? |
| 1598 | May we not answer with absolute truth-- A knowledge which will do us good? |
| 1598 | Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak? |
| 1598 | Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things? |
| 1598 | Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not? |
| 1598 | Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant? |
| 1598 | Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter? |
| 1598 | Of their existence or of their non- existence? |
| 1598 | Of what country are they, and what is their line of wisdom? |
| 1598 | Or a speaking of the silent? |
| 1598 | Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? |
| 1598 | Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? |
| 1598 | Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer? |
| 1598 | Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own? |
| 1598 | Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are unjust? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the subject arts-- what does that do? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers? |
| 1598 | SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? |
| 1598 | Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? |
| 1598 | Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good? |
| 1598 | Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest? |
| 1598 | Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others? |
| 1598 | That makes no difference;--and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things? |
| 1598 | That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is? |
| 1598 | Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball:''Who are they who learn dictation of the grammar- master; the wise or the foolish boys?'' |
| 1598 | Then are they not animals? |
| 1598 | Then do you see our garments? |
| 1598 | Then he is the same? |
| 1598 | Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know? |
| 1598 | Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good- fortune but success? |
| 1598 | Then tell me, he said, do you know anything? |
| 1598 | Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are? |
| 1598 | Then there is no such thing as false opinion? |
| 1598 | Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact? |
| 1598 | Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have? |
| 1598 | Then we must surely be speaking the same thing? |
| 1598 | Then what are they professing to teach?'' |
| 1598 | Then what is the inference? |
| 1598 | Then why did you ask me what sense my words had? |
| 1598 | Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them? |
| 1598 | Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything? |
| 1598 | Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? |
| 1598 | Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes? |
| 1598 | Then, my good friend, do they all speak? |
| 1598 | Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters? |
| 1598 | Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only who does not know letters learns? |
| 1598 | Upon what principle? |
| 1598 | Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to have one shield only, and one spear? |
| 1598 | Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom-- among the goods or not? |
| 1598 | Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness? |
| 1598 | Well, I said; but then what am I to do? |
| 1598 | Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing? |
| 1598 | Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? |
| 1598 | Well, have not all things words expressive of them? |
| 1598 | Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise? |
| 1598 | Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful? |
| 1598 | What am I to do with them? |
| 1598 | What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish? |
| 1598 | What can they see? |
| 1598 | What do I know? |
| 1598 | What do you mean, Dionysodorus? |
| 1598 | What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing? |
| 1598 | What do you mean? |
| 1598 | What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? |
| 1598 | What is that? |
| 1598 | What is that? |
| 1598 | What knowledge is there which has such a nature? |
| 1598 | What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? |
| 1598 | What of that? |
| 1598 | What proof shall I give you? |
| 1598 | What then do you say? |
| 1598 | What then is the result of what has been said? |
| 1598 | What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this? |
| 1598 | What, before you, Dionysodorus? |
| 1598 | What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own? |
| 1598 | What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals? |
| 1598 | What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus? |
| 1598 | What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent? |
| 1598 | What, said he, is the business of a good workman? |
| 1598 | When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?'' |
| 1598 | When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all things? |
| 1598 | When you were children, and at your birth? |
| 1598 | Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse? |
| 1598 | Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things? |
| 1598 | Why do you say so? |
| 1598 | Why not? |
| 1598 | Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are? |
| 1598 | Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing? |
| 1598 | Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? |
| 1598 | Will you not cease adding to your answers? |
| 1598 | Will you not take our word that we know all things? |
| 1598 | Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? |
| 1598 | With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul? |
| 1598 | Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? |
| 1598 | Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings? |
| 1598 | Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea- urchins then? |
| 1598 | You admit that? |
| 1598 | You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming? |
| 1598 | You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us? |
| 1598 | You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning? |
| 1598 | You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one? |
| 1598 | You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is? |
| 1598 | You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant? |
| 1598 | and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? |
| 1598 | and teach them all the arts,--carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them? |
| 1598 | and was not that our conclusion? |
| 1598 | and will you explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? |
| 1598 | for you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these gods life? |
| 1598 | has he got to such a height of skill as that? |
| 1598 | if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? |
| 1598 | or are you the same as a stone? |
| 1598 | tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering? |
| 1643 | ''If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and where are the teachers?'' |
| 1643 | ''To whom, then, shall Meno go?'' |
| 1643 | ''what is courage?'' |
| 1643 | ''what is temperance?'' |
| 1643 | ( To the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double line? |
| 1643 | ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates? |
| 1643 | ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself? |
| 1643 | ANYTUS: Why single out individuals? |
| 1643 | Am I not right? |
| 1643 | And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly? |
| 1643 | And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him? |
| 1643 | And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno''s slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal? |
| 1643 | And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know? |
| 1643 | And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue? |
| 1643 | And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four? |
| 1643 | And yet, if there are no universal ideas, what becomes of philosophy? |
| 1643 | And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? |
| 1643 | Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used? |
| 1643 | But I can not believe, Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into existence? |
| 1643 | But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is? |
| 1643 | But how, asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does not know? |
| 1643 | But is virtue taught or not? |
| 1643 | But what has been the result? |
| 1643 | But whence had the uneducated man this knowledge? |
| 1643 | But where are the teachers? |
| 1643 | Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion? |
| 1643 | Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave? |
| 1643 | Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds? |
| 1643 | Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such confusion? |
| 1643 | Can you teach me how this is? |
| 1643 | Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him? |
| 1643 | Could you not answer that question, Meno? |
| 1643 | Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good? |
| 1643 | Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue? |
| 1643 | Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught? |
| 1643 | Do you remember them? |
| 1643 | Do you think that I could? |
| 1643 | Have there not been many good men in this city? |
| 1643 | Have you not heard from our elders of him? |
| 1643 | Health and strength, and beauty and wealth-- these, and the like of these, we call profitable? |
| 1643 | Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak? |
| 1643 | How could that be? |
| 1643 | How would you answer me? |
| 1643 | How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? |
| 1643 | If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide? |
| 1643 | Is he a bit better than any other mortal? |
| 1643 | Is there any difference? |
| 1643 | Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? |
| 1643 | It was the natural answer to two questions,''Whence came the soul? |
| 1643 | Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once? |
| 1643 | Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,--in that case will it be taught or not? |
| 1643 | Let us take another,--Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man? |
| 1643 | Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man? |
| 1643 | MENO: And did you not think that he knew? |
| 1643 | MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? |
| 1643 | MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour? |
| 1643 | MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is-- what sort of answer would you have given him? |
| 1643 | MENO: How can it be otherwise? |
| 1643 | MENO: How do you mean, Socrates? |
| 1643 | MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens? |
| 1643 | MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue? |
| 1643 | MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound? |
| 1643 | MENO: Well, what of that? |
| 1643 | MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue? |
| 1643 | MENO: What do you mean by the word''right''? |
| 1643 | MENO: What do you mean, Socrates? |
| 1643 | MENO: What do you mean? |
| 1643 | MENO: What have they to do with the question? |
| 1643 | MENO: What of that? |
| 1643 | MENO: What was it? |
| 1643 | MENO: Where does he say so? |
| 1643 | MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates? |
| 1643 | MENO: Why do you think so? |
| 1643 | MENO: Why not? |
| 1643 | MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these? |
| 1643 | MENO: Why? |
| 1643 | MENO: Will you have one definition of them all? |
| 1643 | MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? |
| 1643 | Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too? |
| 1643 | Now, has any one ever taught him all this? |
| 1643 | Now, to whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? |
| 1643 | Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously? |
| 1643 | Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught? |
| 1643 | Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? |
| 1643 | Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue? |
| 1643 | Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are the teachers? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: A square may be of any size? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And desire is of possession? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill- fated? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And does he really know? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect each of these spaces? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And for this reason-- that there are other figures? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And four is how many times two? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And four times is not double? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And how many in this? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action-- there we were also right? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And is not that four times four? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men''divine''who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute- playing, and of the other arts? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is two feet-- what will that be? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And so forth? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine-- do they not? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing can not be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only professors? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown- up person, in a woman or in a man? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you not think so? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill- fated? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father was? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But how much? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must have had and learned it at some other time? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three times three feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his-- had he not? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But why? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen-- are they not? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine that-- MENO: What did they say? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom( or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was taught? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the''torpedo''s shock,''have we done him any harm? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo''s touch? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not know? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then virtue can not be taught? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: What are they? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: What do you mean? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet;--do you see? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: What, Anytus? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Why simple? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Would you say''virtue,''Meno, or''a virtue''? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people whom mankind call Sophists? |
| 1643 | SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus( Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your country? |
| 1643 | Should we not send him to the physicians? |
| 1643 | Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? |
| 1643 | Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? |
| 1643 | Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn? |
| 1643 | There is another sort of progress from the general notions of Socrates, who asked simply,''what is friendship?'' |
| 1643 | This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught? |
| 1643 | Were not all these answers given out of his own head? |
| 1643 | Were we not right in admitting this? |
| 1643 | Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? |
| 1643 | What is the origin of evil?'' |
| 1643 | What makes you so angry with them? |
| 1643 | What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? |
| 1643 | When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited? |
| 1643 | Whom would you name? |
| 1643 | Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? |
| 1643 | Will Meno tell him his own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias? |
| 1643 | Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue? |
| 1643 | Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends among the Athenians and allies? |
| 1643 | Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is''the power of governing;''but do you not add''justly and not unjustly''? |
| 1643 | and do they agree that virtue is taught? |
| 1643 | and do they profess to be teachers? |
| 1643 | and who were they? |
| 1643 | or is there anything about which even the acknowledged''gentlemen''are sometimes saying that''this thing can be taught,''and sometimes the opposite? |
| 1643 | or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught? |
| 1643 | or, as we were just now saying,''remembered''? |
| 1643 | would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand? |
| 40437 | But if any one demand here, where this[ Greek: a)ki/ nêtos ou)si/ a], these immutable Entities do exist? 40437 Du reste, quand même cette ressemblance serait aussi réelle qu''elle est fausse, en quoi prouverait- il l''identité nécessaire des intelligences? |
| 40437 | Indem wir Denken und Sein unterscheiden, fragen wir, wie ist es möglich, dass sich i m Erkennen Denken und Sein vereinigt? 40437 Quid ipsum Bonum? |
| 40437 | Would you choose? 40437 Would_ you_ be satisfied( he asks Protarchus) to live your life through in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? |
| 40437 | ( replies Sokrates) must he have cognition not only of the true line and circle, but also of the false, the variable, the uncertain? |
| 40437 | --423 D:[ Greek: ou) kai\_ ou)si/ a dokei=_ soi ei)=nai e(ka/ stô|, ô(/sper kai\ chrô= ma kai\ a(\ nu= n dê\ e)le/ gomen? |
| 40437 | 1, where he deals with the like confusion--[Greek: a)=r''ei) mê\ dikai/ ôs poli/ tês, ou) poli/ tês?]] |
| 40437 | A)lla\ tino/ s? |
| 40437 | After all this debate( continues Kleitophon) I addressed the same question to yourself, Sokrates-- What is Justice? |
| 40437 | Ai( de\ pra/ xeis e)pha/ nêsan ê(mi= n ou) pro\s ê(ma= s ou)=sai, a)ll''au(tô= n tina i)di/ an phu/ sin e)/chousai? |
| 40437 | Are all sensible objects, even such as are vulgar, repulsive, and contemptible, represented in this higher world? |
| 40437 | Are the Forms or Ideas mere conceptions of the mind and nothing more? |
| 40437 | Are they not eternal, unchangeable and stationary? |
| 40437 | Are we to pass our whole lives in stimulating those who have not yet been stimulated, in order that they in their turn may stimulate others? |
| 40437 | But how can any one conceive the non- existent? |
| 40437 | But how can anything be distinct from both? |
| 40437 | But how can anything be distinct from both?] |
| 40437 | But how can false opinions be possible? |
| 40437 | But how can false opinions be possible? |
| 40437 | But how do Socher and Stallbaum know that this extreme minuteness of subdivision into classes_ was_ a characteristic of the Megaric philosophers? |
| 40437 | But how far is writing, even when art is applied to it, capable of producing real and permanent effect? |
| 40437 | But how if the theory be not true? |
| 40437 | But how is it possible that he should confound a non- cognition with a cognition, or_ vice versâ_? |
| 40437 | But how is such alternation or change intelligible? |
| 40437 | But what about the other doctrine, which he declares to be a part of the same programme--_Homo Mensura_--the Protagorean formula? |
| 40437 | But what do they mean( continues the Eleate) by this"holding of communion"? |
| 40437 | But what ground have we for presuming that Plato''s views on the subject were more correct? |
| 40437 | But when we ask Intelligence,_ of what_? |
| 40437 | But( asks Plato in reply) what do you mean by"the mind holding communion"with the intelligible world? |
| 40437 | Can it be taught upon system or principle? |
| 40437 | Can it be taught upon system or principle? |
| 40437 | Can not we make advance towards virtue and get full possession of it? |
| 40437 | Could you not have reached this point by a shorter road?" |
| 40437 | Do you mean that Unum is identical with Ens-- and are they only two names for the same One and only thing? |
| 40437 | Do you mean that existence is something belonging to both and affirmed of both? |
| 40437 | Does not an angler belong to the general class-- men of art or craft? |
| 40437 | Does not he know the one from the other? |
| 40437 | Enquirers often ask--"How can the One be Many? |
| 40437 | Equality is in all equal objects: but how can a part of the Form equality, less than the whole, make objects equal? |
| 40437 | First, Do such unities or monads really and truly exist? |
| 40437 | He spares no labour in investigating-- What is man in general? |
| 40437 | How are they to be mixed? |
| 40437 | How are they to be mixed?] |
| 40437 | How are we to explain these three different modes of handling the same question by the same philosopher? |
| 40437 | How are we to set to work in regard to the learning of justice? |
| 40437 | How can a man who opines or affirms, opine or affirm falsely-- that is, opine or affirm the thing that is not? |
| 40437 | How can a thing appear to be what it is not? |
| 40437 | How can any man judge or opine falsely? |
| 40437 | How can any one, then, choose such an evil willingly? |
| 40437 | How can any thing be neither in motion nor at rest; standing apart from both? |
| 40437 | How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely? |
| 40437 | How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely?] |
| 40437 | How can knowledge betray a man into such error? |
| 40437 | How can pleasures or pains be either true or false? |
| 40437 | How can the Form, essentially One, belong at once to a multitude of particulars? |
| 40437 | How can the Many be One? |
| 40437 | How can the Many be One? |
| 40437 | How can the Many be One? |
| 40437 | How can the One be Many? |
| 40437 | How can the One be Many? |
| 40437 | How can the same thing be both One and Many?" |
| 40437 | How can these four propositions all be true--_Unum est Unum_--_Unum est Multa_--_Unum non est Unum_--_Unum non est Multa_? |
| 40437 | How can this be possible? |
| 40437 | How can we conceive Non- Ens: or confound together two distinct realities? |
| 40437 | How can we conceive Non- Ens: or confound together two distinct realities?.] |
| 40437 | How can we know that a forty- horse power is always equal to itself, unless we assume that all horses are of equal strength? |
| 40437 | How can we know that one pound and one pound make two pounds, if one of the pounds may be troy and the other avoirdupois? |
| 40437 | How does this One become Many, or how do these Many become One? |
| 40437 | How far is there any natural adaptation, or special fitness, of each name to the thing named? |
| 40437 | How is a false proposition possible? |
| 40437 | How is he distinguished from other persons or other things? |
| 40437 | How is the Universal Beautiful( The Self- Beautiful-- Beauty) in all and each beautiful thing? |
| 40437 | How is this possible? |
| 40437 | How then can either of them become either greater or less? |
| 40437 | How will Sokrates or his friends answer the corresponding question in their case? |
| 40437 | How( asks Parmenides) can such participation take place? |
| 40437 | How( to use Aristotelian language[28]) can the essence be separated from that of which it is the essence? |
| 40437 | How, for example, does Plato prove, in his Timæus, the objective reality of Ideas or Forms? |
| 40437 | If I am not allowed to judge of truth and falsehood for myself, who is to judge for me? |
| 40437 | If Many, how Many? |
| 40437 | If Many, how Many? |
| 40437 | If he knows A, and knows B-- how can he mistake A for B? |
| 40437 | In answer to the question put by Sokrates-- What is Knowledge or Cognition? |
| 40437 | In replying to those objectors,[1] he enquires, What is meant by long or short-- excessive or deficient-- great or little? |
| 40437 | In the Menon also the same question is broached as in the Protagoras, whether virtue is teachable or not? |
| 40437 | In the first place-- Are the three really distinct characters? |
| 40437 | In what is it that they both agree? |
| 40437 | In what other dialogue has Plato answered them? |
| 40437 | Is Good identical with pleasure, or with intelligence, or is it a Tertium Quid, distinct from both? |
| 40437 | Is each of them dispersed and parcelled out among countless individuals? |
| 40437 | Is existence any thing distinct from Hot and Cold? |
| 40437 | Is it not an action or a passion produced by a certain power of agent and patient coming into co- operation with each other? |
| 40437 | Is it really impossible for a man to conceive, that a thing, which he knows, is another thing which he does not know? |
| 40437 | Is the Universal Man distributed among all individual men, or is he one and entire in each of them? |
| 40437 | Is the entire Form in each individual object? |
| 40437 | Is this distinction your own? |
| 40437 | Is this to be all? |
| 40437 | It is declared by Aristotle to be the question first and most disputed in Philosophia Prima, Quid est Ens? |
| 40437 | It will be found, however, that when Parmenides comes to question Sokrates, What[ Greek: ei)/dê] do you recognise? |
| 40437 | Its teaching province is plain enough-- to maintain the succession of just men: but what is its working province? |
| 40437 | Kai\ ti/ e)/stai e)kei/ nô| ô(=| a)\n ge/ nêtai ta)gatha/? |
| 40437 | Lastly, who, if any, are the opponents thus intended to be ridiculed? |
| 40437 | Le feu ne manifesterait plus aucune des propriétés que nous lui connaissons: que serait- il? |
| 40437 | Likeness and Unlikeness-- One and Many-- Just, Beautiful, Good,& c.--are all these Forms absolute and existent_ per se_? |
| 40437 | Logical maxim of contradiction 239 Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato-- How do we know that one is true, the other false? |
| 40437 | Ne faut- il pas plutôt admirer l''opiniâtre vitalité des différences originelles qui résistent à tant de causes de nivellement? |
| 40437 | Next, assuming that they do exist, how do they come into communion with generated and perishable particulars, infinite in number? |
| 40437 | No time can be assigned for the change: neither the present, nor the past, nor the future: how then can the change occur at all? |
| 40437 | No true or pure pleasure therein 350 Can pleasures be true or false? |
| 40437 | Now this_ knowing_, is it not an action-- and is not the_ being known_, a passion? |
| 40437 | Now what is the end to be attained, by this our enquiry into the definition of a Statesman? |
| 40437 | O)/ntos ê)\ ou)k o)/ntos? |
| 40437 | Of Hair, Mud,& c.? |
| 40437 | Of Hair, Mud,& c.? |
| 40437 | Of Man, Horse,& c.? |
| 40437 | Of Man, Horse,& c.? |
| 40437 | Of the Just and Good? |
| 40437 | Of the Just and Good? |
| 40437 | Or are these two-- Same and Different-- essential appendages of the three before- named? |
| 40437 | Or are they external, separate, self- existent realities? |
| 40437 | Or do we want anything more besides? |
| 40437 | Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack? |
| 40437 | Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?.] |
| 40437 | Orelli):--"An vero, inquit, voluptates corporis expetendæ, quæ veré et graviter dictæ sunt à Platone illecebræ et escæ malorum? |
| 40437 | Ou)ch e(no/ s tinos, o(\ e)pi\ pa= sin e)kei= no to\ no/ êma e)po\n noei=, mi/ an tina\ ou)=san i)de/ an? |
| 40437 | Ou)kou= n kai\ o( Chaire/ dêmos, e)/phê, e(/teros ô)\n patro/ s, ou)k a)\n patê\r ei)/ê?] |
| 40437 | Ou)kou= n kai\ poio/ n tina au)to\n ei)=nai dei=?] |
| 40437 | Ou)kou= n kai\_ poi= o/ n tina_ au)to\n ei)=nai dei=?]] |
| 40437 | Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas 60 What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? |
| 40437 | Plato himself, in many passages, insists emphatically upon the dissensions in mankind respecting the question--"_Who are_ the good and wise men?" |
| 40437 | Po/ teron o( E)/rôs e)kei/ nou ou(= e)/stin e)/rôs, e)pithumei= au)tou= ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40437 | Prô= ton me\n, a(plou= n ê)\ polueide/ s e)stin, ou(= peri\ boulêso/ metha ei)=nai au)toi\ technikoi\ kai\ a)/llon dunatoi\ poiei= n? |
| 40437 | Pô= s ga\r ou)/? |
| 40437 | Quid igitur? |
| 40437 | Quid ipsum Pulchrum? |
| 40437 | Quis autem bonâ mente præditus, non mallet nullas omnino nobis à naturâ voluptates esse datas?" |
| 40437 | Si_ Unum non est_, what is true about Cætera? |
| 40437 | Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus 110 Question raised by Sokrates-- What is knowledge or Cognition? |
| 40437 | The interpreters are dissentient; and which of them is to hold the privilege of infallibility? |
| 40437 | The main question canvassed is, What is Knowledge-- Cognition-- Science? |
| 40437 | The passage does not prove this; but if it did, what did Protagoras teach in the book? |
| 40437 | The second of these propositions( says Plato) affirms_ what is not_, as if it were, respecting the subject But how do we know this to be so? |
| 40437 | Then what is the characteristic function of each? |
| 40437 | Theories of various philosophers about Ens_ ib._ Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non- Ens 201 Whether Ens is Many or One? |
| 40437 | Through what bodily organ do we derive these judgments respecting what is common to all? |
| 40437 | Ti/ de/; i(kano\n ta)gatho/ n? |
| 40437 | Ti/ de/? |
| 40437 | Ti/ ou)=n? |
| 40437 | Ti/ ou)=n? |
| 40437 | To what does the lawgiver look when he frames a name? |
| 40437 | To which of the four above- mentioned Genera( says Sokrates) does Pleasure belong? |
| 40437 | To which of the four does Intelligence or Cognition belong? |
| 40437 | To whom does Plato here make allusion, under the general title of the Fastidious([ Greek: oi( duscherei= s]) Pleasure- haters? |
| 40437 | Upon which Simplikius remarks, What are these few things? |
| 40437 | We have thus, in enquiring-- What is Knowledge or Cognition? |
| 40437 | What can this Something be? |
| 40437 | What circumstances are we at liberty to suppose to be suppressed, modified, or reversed? |
| 40437 | What common property in all of them, is it, that you signify by the name_ good_? |
| 40437 | What constitutes happiness and misery? |
| 40437 | What constitutes right and legitimate Name- giving? |
| 40437 | What constitutes right or legitimate sociality? |
| 40437 | What do these philosophers mean by saying that Ens is double or triple? |
| 40437 | What do they mean by existence, if this be not so? |
| 40437 | What do you mean by saying that Hot and Cold_ exist_? |
| 40437 | What do you mean( asks Protarchus) by true pleasures or pains? |
| 40437 | What else is there worth having( says Sokrates), which these professors teach? |
| 40437 | What is a Sophist? |
| 40437 | What is a philosopher? |
| 40437 | What is a politician or statesman? |
| 40437 | What is it here? |
| 40437 | What is there in like manner capable of serving as illustrative contrast? |
| 40437 | What mental condition is it which bears that name? |
| 40437 | What number and variety of these intelligible Forms do you recognise--(asks Parmenides)? |
| 40437 | What other professions or occupations are there analogous to those of Sophist and Statesman, so as to afford an illustrative comparison? |
| 40437 | What sort of exercise must I go through? |
| 40437 | What then is the purpose or value of the dialogue? |
| 40437 | What would have been_ his_ answer? |
| 40437 | What_ are_ Virtue, Courage, Temperance? |
| 40437 | When foreigners talk to us in a strange language, are we to say that we do not hear what they say, or that we both hear and know it? |
| 40437 | When unlettered men look at an inscription, shall we contend that they do not see the writing, or that they both see and know it? |
| 40437 | Wherein do they differ from each other or from other things? |
| 40437 | Wherein does the difference consist? |
| 40437 | Which of the three dialogues represents Plato''s real opinion on the question? |
| 40437 | Which of the two do you choose? |
| 40437 | Which varieties of knowledge, science, or art, are the purest from heterogeneous elements, and bear most closely upon truth? |
| 40437 | Which way are we to turn then, if these Forms be beyond our knowledge? |
| 40437 | Who is to judge whether this process has been well or ill performed? |
| 40437 | Why do you stray so widely from your professed topic? |
| 40437 | Why should a Megaric author embody in his two dialogues a false pretence and assurance, that they are sequel of the Platonic Theætêtus? |
| 40437 | Why should so acute a writer( as Socher admits him to be) go out of his way to suppress his own personality, and merge his fame in that of Plato? |
| 40437 | Why? |
| 40437 | Will such a combination suffice to constitute Good, or an all- sufficient and all- satisfactory existence? |
| 40437 | Would_ any one_ be satisfied?" |
| 40437 | Y- a- t- il lieu de nous enquérir si nous percevons_ les choses telles qu''elles sont? |
| 40437 | Yet how can such a confusion be possible? |
| 40437 | Yet how can this be? |
| 40437 | You talk about true and false opinions: but how can false opinions be possible? |
| 40437 | [ 113] The Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias consoles the speechless men by saying-- What does this signify, provided you are just and virtuous? |
| 40437 | [ 145] But to what Items does Sokrates intend the measure to be applied? |
| 40437 | [ 14] How? |
| 40437 | [ 2] You asked them,"Whither are you drifting, my friends? |
| 40437 | [ 61] Is there any art or systematic method, capable of being laid down beforehand and defended upon principle, for accomplishing the object_ well_? |
| 40437 | [ 75] Are not such existences real? |
| 40437 | [ 7]"To what does all this tend? |
| 40437 | [ 82] But what is the cause that it is so? |
| 40437 | [ Footnote 27: Plato, Philêbus, p. 29 C. 30 A:[ Greek: To\ par''ê(mi= n sô= ma a)=r''ou) psuchê\n phê/ somen e)/chein? |
| 40437 | [ Footnote 4: Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 C. 20 C- D:[ Greek: Tê\n ta)gathou= moi= ran po/ teron a)na/ gkê te/ leon ê)\ mê\ te/ leon ei)=nai? |
| 40437 | [ Footnote 74: Plato, Phædrus, p. 270 D.[ Greek: A)=r''ou)ch ô(=de dei= dianoei= sthai peri\ o(touou= n phu/ seôs? |
| 40437 | [ Footnote 8: Plato, Politikus, p. 285 D.[ Greek:_ Xen_.--Ti/ d''au)=? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: A)/llo ti ou)=n e(/teros, ê)= d''o(/s]( Dionysodorus),[ Greek: ô)\n li/ thou, ou) li/ thos ei)=? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Bou/ lei ou)=n e)pi\ tê\n u(po/ thesin pa/ lin e)x a)rchê= s e)pane/ lthômen, e)a/ n ti ê(mi= n e)paniou= sin a)lloi= on phanê=|?]] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: O( E)/rôs e)/rôs e)sti\n ou)deno\s ê(\ tino/ s? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ou)d''a)/ra e)pistê/ mên u(podêma/ tôn suni/ êsin, o( e)pistê/ mên mê\ ei)dio/ s? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n ei)ko/ s ge ou)/te chai/ rein theou\s ou)/te to\ e)nanti/ on? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n tê\n au(tou= a)\n pseudê= xugchôroi=, ei) tê\n tô= n ê(goume/ nôn au)to\n pseu/ desthai o(mologei= a)lêthê= ei)=nai?]] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Phe/ re, o( e)rô= n tô= n a)gathô= n, ti/ e)ra=|? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ti/ e)/stin ai)/tion tou= sugkatati/ thesthai/ tini? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ti/ na de\ ta\ o)li/ ga e)sti/ n, e)ph''ô(=n a(/ma tô=| e)pistêtô=| ê( e)pistê/ mê e)sti/ n? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: Ti/ nes ou)=n oi( philosophou= ntes, ei) mê/ te oi( sophoi\ mê/ te oi( a)mathei= s? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: de/ xai''a)\n su/, Prô/ tarche, zê= n to\n bi/ on a(/panta ê(do/ menos ê(dona\s ta\s megi/ stas?] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: e)re/ sthai ei) prosepi/ statai kai\ ou(sti/ nas dei= kai\ o(po/ te e(/kasta tou/ tôn poiei= n, kai\ me/ chri o(po/ sou?]] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: o( gignô/ skôn gignô/ skei ti\ ê)\ ou)de\n? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: ou)kou= n tau= ta me\n a(/panta ê( maieutikê\ ê(mi= n te/ chnê a)nemiai= a/ phêsi gegenê= sthai kai\ ou)k a)/xia trophê= s?]] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: spouda/ zei tau= ta Sôkra/ tês ê)\ pai/ zei?] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: ti/ ga\r matho/ nt''e)s tou\s theou\s u(bri/ zeton, kai\ tê= s selê/ nês e)skopei= sthe tê\n e)/dran?] |
| 40437 | [ Greek: to\ d''e(/teron, o(\ du/ natai poiei= n ê(mi= n e)/rgon o( di/ kaios, ti/ tou= to/ phamen? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: ê( de\ par''ê(mi= n e)pistê/ mê ou) tê= s par''ê(mi= n a)\n a)lêthei/ as ei)/ê? |
| 40437 | [ Greek: ê)\ e)kei= no ê(mi= n thaumaste/ on ma= llon, ô(s i)schuro/ n ti po/ lis e)sti\ phu/ sei?]] |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Can pleasures be true or false? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Enquiry-- What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato-- How do we know that one is true, the other false?] |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Holding communion-- What? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Question raised by Sokrates-- What is knowledge or Cognition? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Second Question-- Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: What causes the excellence of this mixture? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: What is the Good? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Whether Ens is Many or One? |
| 40437 | [ Side- note: Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? |
| 40437 | _ But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?_ This therefore is nothing to the purpose. |
| 40437 | _ Menex._--Could you recollect what Aspasia said? |
| 40437 | _ Menex._--What would you have to say, if the duty were imposed upon you? |
| 40437 | _ Menex._--Why do you not proceed with it then? |
| 40437 | _ Si Unum non est_, what is to become of_ Cætera_? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--But you are here assuming that there_ are_ false opinions? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--If you are asked, With what does a man perceive white and black? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--Shall we admit, that when we perceive things by sight or hearing, we at the same time_ know_ them all? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--Well then, do n''t you admire her? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._--What have you been doing at the Senate- house, Menexenus? |
| 40437 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? |
| 40437 | _ Ti/ tou)nteu= then_? |
| 40437 | and are you not grateful to her for the harangue? |
| 40437 | and how any virtue can exist, when there are no special teachers, and no special learners of virtue? |
| 40437 | and if the name- givers were mistaken on this fundamental point? |
| 40437 | and if they are not possible, what is the meaning of_ true_, as applied to opinions? |
| 40437 | and is that cause more akin to Reason or to Pleasure? |
| 40437 | and that etymologies which to them appeared admissible, would be regarded by him as absurd and ridiculous? |
| 40437 | and what are the attributes, active and passive, which distinguish man from other things? |
| 40437 | and what proof can be furnished that he was able to answer them? |
| 40437 | do you think you would be competent to deliver the harangue yourself, if the Senate were to elect you? |
| 40437 | et même, vu le caractère indéterminé des causes que nous concevons dans les corps, y- a- t- il quelque chose de plus à savoir? |
| 40437 | kai\ au)= e(ka/ stê ê( par''ê(mi= n e(pistê/ mê tô= n par''ê(mi= n o)/ntôn e(ka/ stou a)\n e)pistê/ mê xu/ mbainoi ei)=nai?] |
| 40437 | kai\ au)= e(ka/ stê ê( par''ê(mi= n e)pistê/ mê tô= n par''ê(mi= n o)/ntôn e(ka/ stou a)\n e)pistê/ mê su/ mbainoi ei)=nai?] |
| 40437 | kai\ e(/teros ô)\n chrusou=, ou) chruso\s ei)=? |
| 40437 | kai\ ou(/tô me\n a)\n ple/ on ti poioi= men kai\ o)noma/ zoimen, a)/llôs de\ ou)/?] |
| 40437 | or how can either_ really be_ so, when they were not so before? |
| 40437 | or indeed of having art applied to it at all? |
| 40437 | or is it found, whole and entire, in each individual, maintaining itself as one and the same, and yet being parted from itself? |
| 40437 | p. 132 D.[ Greek: ou)k a)na/ gkê, ei) ta)/lla phê\| tô= n ei)dô= n mete/ chein, ê)\ dokei= n soi e)k noê/ mata o)/nta a)no/ êta ei)=nai? |
| 40437 | p. 135 E.][ Side- note: What sort of exercise? |
| 40437 | p. 136) says respecting the Jewish Cabbala:--"Que dirai- je de leur_ Cabale_? |
| 40437 | p. 254 E.[ Greek: ti/ pot''au)= nu= n ou(/tôs ei)rê/ kamen to/ te tau)to\n kai\ tha/ teron? |
| 40437 | p. 256 D.[ Greek: ou)kou= n dê\ saphô= s ê( ki/ nêsis o)/ntôs ou)k o)/n e)sti kai\ o)\n, e)pei/ per tou= o)/ntos mete/ chei?]] |
| 40437 | p. 300 C.[ Greek: A)ll''ou) tou= to e)rôtô=, a)lla\ ta\ pa/ nta siga=| ê)\ le/ gei? |
| 40437 | p. 387 C.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n kai\ to\ o)noma/ zein pra= xis ti/ s e)stin, ei)/per kai\ to\ le/ gein pra= xis tis ê)=n peri\ ta\ pra/ gmata? |
| 40437 | p. 418 C.[ Greek: Oi)=stha ou)=n o(/ti mo/ non tou= to dêloi= to\ a)rchai= on o)/noma tê\n dia/ noian tou= theme/ nou?] |
| 40437 | p. 429 B- C._ Sokr._[ Greek: Pa/ nta a)/ra ta\ o)no/ mata o)rthôs kei= tai?] |
| 40437 | p. 439 D.[ Greek: A)=r''ou)=n oi(=on te proseipei= n au)to\ o)rthôs, ei) a)ei\ u(pexe/ chetai?]] |
| 40437 | pha/ nai, e(\n e(/kasto/ n e)sti tô= n noêma/ tôn, no/ êma de\ ou)deno/ s? |
| 40437 | pô= s a)/rchesthai dei= n phame\n dikaiosu/ nês peri\ mathê/ seôs?]] |
| 40437 | that there are two distinct existing elements-- Hot and Cold-- or three? |
| 40437 | to\ ginô/ skein ê)\ gignô/ skesthai phate\ poi/ êma ê)\ pa/ thos ê)\ a)mpho/ teron?]] |
| 40437 | tou/ toin de\ duoi= n o)/ntoin kai\ e)me\ kai\ se\ kai\ ta\ a)/lla a(\ dê\ polla\ kalou= men, metalamba/ nein?]] |
| 40437 | what are the numerical ratios upon which they depend-- the rhythmical and harmonic systems? |
| 40437 | what is the work which the just man does for us? |
| 40437 | you will answer, with his eyes: shrill or grave sounds? |
| 40437 | Ê( de\ par''ê(mi= n e)pistê/ mê ou) tê= s par''ê(mi= n a)\n a)lêthei/ as ei)/ê? |
| 40437 | ê)\ a)na/ gkê a)/ma ê(mô= n lego/ ntôn a)/llo au)to\ eu)thu\s gi/ gnesthai kai\ u(pexie/ nai, kai\ mêke/ ti ou(/tôs e)/chein? |
| 40437 | ê)\_ a)po\ kunêgesi/ ou tou=_ peri\ tê\n A)lkibia/ dou ô(/ran?] |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: At what? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: But what can we do? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Did I, then? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by''how,''Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: How could we? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: How so? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: How was that? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates,--can you tell me? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: In what respect? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to ask you the very same question-- What do you want? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What are they? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What caution? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What is it? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What is that? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What qualities? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: What was that? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Why is that? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust? |
| 1676 | ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there? |
| 1676 | And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? |
| 1676 | And do you know whether you are a freeman or not? |
| 1676 | And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another? |
| 1676 | And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak? |
| 1676 | And what is their aim? |
| 1676 | And what is your motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming? |
| 1676 | And who do them? |
| 1676 | At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage? |
| 1676 | But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them? |
| 1676 | But has he the knowledge which is necessary for carrying them out? |
| 1676 | But to be good in what? |
| 1676 | But to command what-- horses or men? |
| 1676 | But what business? |
| 1676 | But when is a city better? |
| 1676 | Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking? |
| 1676 | Can you tell me why? |
| 1676 | Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings? |
| 1676 | Does Alcibiades know? |
| 1676 | Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands? |
| 1676 | Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet? |
| 1676 | Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him? |
| 1676 | Does not the art of measure? |
| 1676 | Equestrian affairs? |
| 1676 | For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? |
| 1676 | Have you not remarked their absence? |
| 1676 | He is going to persuade the Athenians-- about what? |
| 1676 | How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance? |
| 1676 | I who put the question, or you who answer me? |
| 1676 | Is he good in the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? |
| 1676 | Is it not disgraceful? |
| 1676 | Is it not true? |
| 1676 | Is not that clear? |
| 1676 | Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not? |
| 1676 | Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil? |
| 1676 | Now is this courage good or evil? |
| 1676 | Or did you think that you knew? |
| 1676 | Or is self- knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: All just things are honourable? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And I in talking use words? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And I was right? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And as much as is best? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And as much as is well? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And at such times as are best? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And by how much greater? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And can not you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And happiness is a good? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And how can you say,''What was I to do''? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And how does this happen? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic- master? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And is self- knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child-- were you not? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And private individuals? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And self- knowledge we agree to be wisdom? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you know? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the good is expedient? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the soul rules? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow- citizens? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And when did you discover them-- not, surely, at the time when you thought that you knew them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant-- if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And when it is better? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the unwise? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And you the answerer? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, in as much as courage does a good work? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow- singers? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in virtue? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal- men who give the time to the rowers? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: As I am, with you? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But good counsel? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But if we have no self- knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But over men? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about what? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute- players, who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?--with whom but with me? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: He uses his hands too? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: How? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--is that the reason? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, equally? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not wish to be as good as possible? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Nor about divination? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Nor an economist? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker,--the questioner or the answerer? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Or on a voyage? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then he is good in that? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good can not be happy? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then how can they teach them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then the money- maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one''s friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then what affairs? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then who is speaking? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge( would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making his sons wise? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and things? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: What is he, then? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: What is the inference? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: What sort of affairs? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: What things? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: When it is well to do so? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: When they are sick? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Who are good in what? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner? |
| 1676 | SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason-- because you would know? |
| 1676 | Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply''two''? |
| 1676 | Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow- sailors,--how would you answer? |
| 1676 | Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body? |
| 1676 | Surely not about building? |
| 1676 | Then has he enquired for himself? |
| 1676 | They can not, of course, be those who know? |
| 1676 | To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle? |
| 1676 | To what does the word refer? |
| 1676 | Was not that said? |
| 1676 | Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and enquiry? |
| 1676 | What do you say to a year ago? |
| 1676 | What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered? |
| 1676 | Who is he? |
| 1676 | Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? |
| 1676 | Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined? |
| 1676 | Will you tell me how? |
| 1676 | Would not his meaning be:--That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself? |
| 1676 | You would say the same? |
| 1676 | and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone? |
| 1676 | and if men, under what circumstances? |
| 1676 | and when does he take care? |
| 1676 | are they not agreed if you ask them what they are? |
| 1676 | if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not? |
| 1676 | what art can give that agreement? |
| 13726 | A soul, therefore, since it is not more or less this very thing, a soul, than another, is not more or less harmonized? |
| 13726 | And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for the things of which we have just now been speaking? |
| 13726 | And do we know what it is itself? |
| 13726 | And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Simmias himself? |
| 13726 | And from stronger, weaker? 13726 And if it becomes smaller, will it not, from being previously greater, afterward become smaller?" |
| 13726 | And is the contrary to this the idea of the even? |
| 13726 | And that beauty and goodness are something? |
| 13726 | And that by magnitude great things become great, and greater things, greater; and by littleness less things become less? |
| 13726 | And that that which is neither more or less harmony is neither more nor less harmonized: is it so? |
| 13726 | And that they are produced from each other? |
| 13726 | And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical? |
| 13726 | And the invisible always continuing the same, but the visible never the same? |
| 13726 | Answer me, then,he said,"what that is which, when it is in the body, the body will be alive?" |
| 13726 | Are we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of? 13726 Before, then?" |
| 13726 | But did the odd make it so? |
| 13726 | But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our other senses? |
| 13726 | But does that which is neither more or less harmonized partake of more or less harmony, or an equal amount? |
| 13726 | But heat is something different from fire, and cold something different from snow? |
| 13726 | But how does it appear to Cebes? |
| 13726 | But how shall we bury you? |
| 13726 | But now,said Cebes,"what think you of these matters?" |
| 13726 | But we speak of things which are visible, or not so, to the nature of men; or to some other nature, think you? |
| 13726 | But what as to such things as these, Simmias? 13726 But what as to the body?" |
| 13726 | But what do you say these are, Socrates? |
| 13726 | But what is this evil, Socrates? |
| 13726 | But what of the soul? 13726 But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom? |
| 13726 | But what, Simmias,said he,"if you consider it thus? |
| 13726 | But what, are not those among them who keep their passions in subjection affected in the same way? 13726 But what,"said he,"of all the things that are in man? |
| 13726 | But what? 13726 But what? |
| 13726 | But what? 13726 But what?" |
| 13726 | But whence, Socrates,he said,"can we procure a skillful charmer for such a case, now that you are about to leave us?" |
| 13726 | But, Cebes,said Simmias, interrupting him,"what proofs are there of these things? |
| 13726 | But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had a knowledge of abstract equality? |
| 13726 | Come, then,he asked,"is there anything else belonging to us than, on the one hand, body, and, on the other, soul?" |
| 13726 | Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? 13726 Do not all men, then, Simmias,"he said,"seem to you to know these things?" |
| 13726 | Do they remember, then, what they once learned? |
| 13726 | Do we, then, admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a certain manner it is reminiscence? 13726 Do you know,"he said,"that all others consider death among the great evils?" |
| 13726 | Do you not think, then,he continued,"that if a contest in wickedness were proposed, even here very few would be found pre- eminent?" |
| 13726 | Do you wish, then,he said,"that, if we are able, we should define what these things are?" |
| 13726 | Do you with those that relate to your nurture when born, and the education with which you were instructed? 13726 Do you, then,"he said,"describe to me in the same manner with respect to life and death? |
| 13726 | Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike? |
| 13726 | Does not the soul, then, when in this state, depart to that which resembles itself, the invisible, the divine, immortal and wise? 13726 Does not, then, the soul of the philosopher, in these cases, despise the body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within itself?" |
| 13726 | Does not, then,he said,"that which is called fortitude, Simmias, eminently belong to philosophers?" |
| 13726 | Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias? |
| 13726 | Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it occupies? |
| 13726 | From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be equally good, if, at least, they are by nature equally this very thing, souls? |
| 13726 | How can it, from what has been already said? |
| 13726 | How do you mean? |
| 13726 | How mean you? |
| 13726 | How not? |
| 13726 | How not? |
| 13726 | How not? |
| 13726 | How not? |
| 13726 | How say you? |
| 13726 | How say you? |
| 13726 | How should I not? |
| 13726 | How should it be otherwise? |
| 13726 | How should it not be? |
| 13726 | How should it not? |
| 13726 | How should it not? |
| 13726 | How should it not? |
| 13726 | How so, Socrates? |
| 13726 | How so? |
| 13726 | How, Socrates? |
| 13726 | In this state of affection, then, is not the soul especially shackled by the body? |
| 13726 | In what respect are these the most happy? |
| 13726 | Is it any thing else than the separation of the soul from the body? 13726 Is it not a shame?" |
| 13726 | Is it not, then, evident,he continued,"as to the rest, whither each will go, according to the resemblances of their several pursuits?" |
| 13726 | Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them? |
| 13726 | Is it, then, invisible? |
| 13726 | Is not this, then, always the case? |
| 13726 | Is the soul, then, immortal? |
| 13726 | Is this, then, called death, this deliverance and separation of the soul from the body? |
| 13726 | It is, then, far from being the case that harmony is moved or sends forth sounds contrariwise, or is in any other respect opposed to its parts? |
| 13726 | It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not? |
| 13726 | Must it not, then, be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the things that really are become known to it? |
| 13726 | Must we not, then, of necessity,he continued,"speak thus of that which is immortal? |
| 13726 | Now, then, have you ever seen any thing of this kind with your eyes? |
| 13726 | Of those, then, who maintain that the soul is harmony, what will any one say that these things are in the soul, virtue and vice? 13726 Shall we say, then, that this has been now demonstrated? |
| 13726 | Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, can the soul, since it is immortal, be any thing else than imperishable? |
| 13726 | Such, then, being its condition, it can not partake of a greater degree of discord or harmony? |
| 13726 | The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three? |
| 13726 | The number three is uneven? |
| 13726 | The same as snow and fire? |
| 13726 | The soul, then, is more like the invisible than the body; and the body, the visible? |
| 13726 | The soul, then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it, as has been already allowed? |
| 13726 | Then, do the brave among them endure death when they do endure it, through dread of greater evils? |
| 13726 | Therefore, does not the soul admit death? |
| 13726 | Therefore,he proceeded,"if there is such a thing as to revive, will not this reviving be a mode of production from the dead to the living?" |
| 13726 | These equal things, then,he said,"and abstract equality, are not the same?" |
| 13726 | Three, then, has no part in the even? |
| 13726 | To which species of the two, then, both from what was before and now said, does the soul appear to you to be more like and more nearly allied? |
| 13726 | To which species, then, shall we say the body is more like, and more nearly allied? |
| 13726 | We did allow it,he replied,"for how could we do otherwise?" |
| 13726 | We have then,he said,"sufficiently determined this, that all things are thus produced, contraries from contraries?" |
| 13726 | We may assume, then, if you please,he continued,"that there are two species of things; the one visible, the other invisible?" |
| 13726 | What is this? |
| 13726 | What next? 13726 What, then, Socrates,"said Simmias,"would you go away keeping this persuasion to yourself, or would you impart it to us? |
| 13726 | What, then, as to this? |
| 13726 | What, then, is produced from life? |
| 13726 | What, then, shall we do? |
| 13726 | What, then, shall we say of the soul-- that it is visible, or not visible? |
| 13726 | What, then,said he"is produced from death?" |
| 13726 | What, then,said he,"Cebes, if it were necessary for the uneven to be imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?" |
| 13726 | What, then,said he,"is not Evenus a philosopher?" |
| 13726 | What, then? 13726 What, then? |
| 13726 | What, then? 13726 What, then? |
| 13726 | What, then? 13726 What, then? |
| 13726 | What, then? 13726 What, then? |
| 13726 | What, then? |
| 13726 | What? |
| 13726 | What? |
| 13726 | What? |
| 13726 | When did our souls receive this knowledge? 13726 When, then,"said he,"does the soul light on the truth? |
| 13726 | Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? 13726 Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing them? |
| 13726 | Whether, then, is there any thing contrary to life or not? |
| 13726 | Whether, then,he continued"do you reject all our former arguments, or some of them only, and not others?" |
| 13726 | Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we had formerly known? |
| 13726 | Which, then, does the soul resemble? |
| 13726 | Who is he? |
| 13726 | Why so? |
| 13726 | Why, then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to kill one''s self? 13726 With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of them very clear? |
| 13726 | You say truly, Cebes,said Socrates,"but what shall we do? |
| 13726 | ''Why, then,''reason might say,''do you still disbelieve? |
| 13726 | --do you think that he cared for death and danger? |
| 13726 | --what should we say, Crito, to these and similar remonstrances? |
| 13726 | And Socrates, on seeing the man, said,"Well, my good friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?" |
| 13726 | And do we abide by what we agreed on as being just, or do we not? |
| 13726 | And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? |
| 13726 | And how is not this the most reprehensible ignorance, to think that one knows what one does not know? |
| 13726 | And if I should ask,"For what reason?" |
| 13726 | And if this be so, do you think that there are equal rights between us? |
| 13726 | And if this is so, that the living are produced again from the dead, can there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? |
| 13726 | And if we do not obey him, shall we not corrupt and injure that part of ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by injustice? |
| 13726 | And in saying that this is to remember, should we not say rightly?" |
| 13726 | And is this affection of the soul called wisdom?" |
| 13726 | And should you do so, will it be worth your while to live? |
| 13726 | And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not? |
| 13726 | And what character can be more disgraceful than this-- to appear to value one''s riches more than one''s friends? |
| 13726 | And what will become of those discourses about justice and all other virtues? |
| 13726 | And why should I live in prison, a slave to the established magistracy, the Eleven? |
| 13726 | And, at the same time looking at Cebes,"Has anything that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?" |
| 13726 | And, in this way, which of the two appears to you to be like the divine, and which the mortal? |
| 13726 | Are these able to instruct the youth, and make them better? |
| 13726 | Are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?" |
| 13726 | Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think about it? |
| 13726 | Are you willing that we should converse on these points, whether such is probably the case or not?" |
| 13726 | As, for instance, when any thing becomes greater, is it not necessary that, from being previously smaller, it afterward became greater?" |
| 13726 | At length Socrates, perceiving them, said,"What think you of what has been said? |
| 13726 | At what price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and Musæus, Hesiod and Homer? |
| 13726 | But answer me: does it appear to you to be the same, with respect to horses? |
| 13726 | But answer to this at least: is there any one who believes that there are things relating to demons, but does not believe that there are demons? |
| 13726 | But at what other time do we lose it? |
| 13726 | But do you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may rear and educate them? |
| 13726 | But does it not appear to you to be disgraceful, and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you never took any concern about the matter? |
| 13726 | But he said,"What are you doing, my admirable friends? |
| 13726 | But how, Cebes, and by what arguments, shall we appease this Cadmus? |
| 13726 | But if the generality of men should meddle with and make use of horses, do they spoil them? |
| 13726 | But now will you not abide by your compacts? |
| 13726 | But now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to choose for them? |
| 13726 | But tell me, friend, who makes them better? |
| 13726 | But these are chiefly visible objects, are they not?" |
| 13726 | But what do we call that which does not admit death?" |
| 13726 | But what further? |
| 13726 | But what was said after this? |
| 13726 | But what will you do in Thessaly besides feasting, as if you had gone to Thessaly to a banquet? |
| 13726 | But why did you come so early? |
| 13726 | But why do some delight to spend so long a time with me? |
| 13726 | But with respect to demons, do we not allow that they are gods, or the children of gods? |
| 13726 | But, then, what will a person who holds this doctrine, that the soul is harmony, say of virtue and vice in the soul? |
| 13726 | By departing hence without the leave of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? |
| 13726 | Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for the things that he knows, or not?" |
| 13726 | Can these hearers make them better, or not? |
| 13726 | Can we do otherwise than assent? |
| 13726 | Can we say any thing against this, my dear Cebes, to show that it is not so?" |
| 13726 | Come, then, Melitus, tell me, do you not consider it of the greatest importance that the youth should be made as virtuous as possible? |
| 13726 | Consider, then, which of these two statements do you prefer-- that knowledge is reminiscence, or the soul harmony?" |
| 13726 | Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? |
| 13726 | Did we not first give you being? |
| 13726 | Do I deserve to suffer, or to pay a fine? |
| 13726 | Do I not, then, like the rest of mankind, believe that the sun and moon are gods? |
| 13726 | Do all men make them better, and is there only some one that spoils them? |
| 13726 | Do not stones that are equal, and logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at another not?" |
| 13726 | Do not the bad work some evil to those that are continually near them, but the good some good? |
| 13726 | Do they not seem so to you?" |
| 13726 | Do we admit this, or not? |
| 13726 | Do we allow that there is such a thing as equality? |
| 13726 | Do we lose it, then, at the very time in which we receive it? |
| 13726 | Do we not?" |
| 13726 | Do we say that justice itself is something or nothing?" |
| 13726 | Do we think that death is any thing?" |
| 13726 | Do you admit such a cause?" |
| 13726 | Do you admit this or not? |
| 13726 | Do you call heat and cold any thing?" |
| 13726 | Do you design any thing else by this proceeding in which you are engaged than to destroy us, the laws, and the whole city, so far as you are able? |
| 13726 | Do you not perceive that of all such things the extremes are rare and few, but that the intermediate are abundant and numerous?" |
| 13726 | Do you not say that life is contrary to death?" |
| 13726 | Do you not say that, by teaching these things, I corrupt the youth? |
| 13726 | Do you not think so?" |
| 13726 | Do you say so? |
| 13726 | Do you see, Melitus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say? |
| 13726 | Do you think as they do?" |
| 13726 | Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? |
| 13726 | Does equality itself, the beautiful itself, and each several thing which is, ever undergo any change, however small? |
| 13726 | Does it appear to you correct?" |
| 13726 | Does it appear to you to be becoming in a philosopher to be anxious about pleasures, as they are called, such as meats and drinks?" |
| 13726 | Does it appear to you to have been proved sufficiently? |
| 13726 | Does it not also seem so to you?" |
| 13726 | Does it not appear to you to be natural that the divine should rule and command, but the mortal obey and be subservient?" |
| 13726 | Does it not seem so to you?" |
| 13726 | Does it not seem so to you?" |
| 13726 | Does such a man appear to you to think other bodily indulgences of value? |
| 13726 | For do you doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?" |
| 13726 | For if living beings are produced from other things, and living beings die, what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?" |
| 13726 | For when I heard this, I reasoned thus with myself, What does the god mean? |
| 13726 | For you know, surely, that whatever things the idea of three occupies must of necessity not only be three, but also odd?" |
| 13726 | For, come, what charge have you against us and the city, that you attempt to destroy us? |
| 13726 | Has the ship[6] arrived from Delos, on the arrival of which I must die? |
| 13726 | Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?" |
| 13726 | Have you not perceived that this happens so?" |
| 13726 | How do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of the even?" |
| 13726 | How ever, some one may say, are not the multitude able to put us to death? |
| 13726 | How, then, can such a man be afraid of death? |
| 13726 | How, then, will this argument accord with that?" |
| 13726 | How, therefore, may we consider the matter most conveniently? |
| 13726 | However, tell us, Melitus, how you say I corrupt the youth? |
| 13726 | I ask then, by Jupiter, do I appear to you to believe that there is no god? |
| 13726 | If any thing becomes worse, must it not become so from better? |
| 13726 | If, then, any one of you is more prompt than I am, why does he not answer, for he seems to have handled my argument not badly? |
| 13726 | In the next place, do you not see how cheap these informers are, so that there would be no need of a large sum for them? |
| 13726 | Instead of this, shall I choose what I well know to be evil, and award that? |
| 13726 | Is death any thing else than this?" |
| 13726 | Is it not clear that it will be such as I deserve? |
| 13726 | Is it not so? |
| 13726 | Is it not so?" |
| 13726 | Is it not very early? |
| 13726 | Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not? |
| 13726 | Is it visible or invisible?" |
| 13726 | Is not every harmony naturally harmony, so far as it has been made to accord?" |
| 13726 | Is not he the person, Simmias, if any one can, who will arrive at the knowledge of that which is?" |
| 13726 | Is not this rightly resolved? |
| 13726 | Is not this the case, Melitus, both with respect to horses and all other animals? |
| 13726 | Is the body an impediment, or not, if any one takes it with him as a partner in the search? |
| 13726 | Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are human affairs, but does not believe that there are men? |
| 13726 | Is there any one who does not believe that there are horses, but that there are things pertaining to horses? |
| 13726 | Is there any one who wishes to be injured? |
| 13726 | Is there any one,"I said,"or not?" |
| 13726 | Is there any thing else that you say bears rule except the soul, especially if it be wise?" |
| 13726 | Is there some one person who can make them better, or very few; that is, the trainers? |
| 13726 | Must we affirm that it is so, Cebes, or otherwise?" |
| 13726 | Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of some we should, and of others not? |
| 13726 | Of what kind, then, is this wisdom? |
| 13726 | Or can you mention any other time?" |
| 13726 | Or did not the laws, ordained on this point, enjoin rightly, in requiring your father to instruct you in music and gymnastic exercises?" |
| 13726 | Or do you say outright that I do not myself believe that there are gods, and that I teach others the same? |
| 13726 | Or does the case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? |
| 13726 | Or is it on no account either good or honorable to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former occasions, and as we just now said? |
| 13726 | Or is this nothing? |
| 13726 | Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?" |
| 13726 | Perhaps, however, some one may say,"Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have pursued a study from which you are now in danger of dying?" |
| 13726 | Perhaps, however, some one will say, Can you not, Socrates, when you have gone from us, live a silent and quiet life? |
| 13726 | Perhaps, one of you may now object:"But, Socrates, what have you done, then? |
| 13726 | Say, then, do you find fault with those laws among us that relate to marriage as being bad?" |
| 13726 | Shall I choose a fine, and to be imprisoned until I have paid it? |
| 13726 | Shall I choose imprisonment? |
| 13726 | Shall I, then, award myself exile? |
| 13726 | Shall we say this, or what else? |
| 13726 | Shall we say to them that the city has done us an injustice, and not passed a right sentence? |
| 13726 | Should you not be afraid of this?" |
| 13726 | Simmias expresses his surprise at this message, on which Socrates asks,"Is not Evenus a philosopher?" |
| 13726 | Tell us further, Melitus, in the name of Jupiter, whether is it better to dwell with good or bad citizens? |
| 13726 | That the laws speak the truth, or not? |
| 13726 | Through fear of what? |
| 13726 | To do evil in return when one has been evil- entreated, is that right, or not? |
| 13726 | To this Simmias said,"What is this, Socrates, which you exhort Evenus to do? |
| 13726 | What I mean will perhaps be clearer in the following examples: the odd in number must always possess the name by which we now call it, must it not?" |
| 13726 | What else can one do in the interval before sunset?" |
| 13726 | What enigma is this? |
| 13726 | What say you? |
| 13726 | What shall we say to these things, Crito? |
| 13726 | What shall we say to this, Crito? |
| 13726 | What then? |
| 13726 | What treatment, then, do I deserve, seeing I am such a man? |
| 13726 | What was said and done? |
| 13726 | What was the reason of this, Phædo? |
| 13726 | What, then, do I suppose to be the cause of this? |
| 13726 | What, then, do they who charge me say in their charge? |
| 13726 | What, then, does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? |
| 13726 | What, then, is meant by being dispersed but being dissolved into its parts? |
| 13726 | What, then, is suitable to a poor man, a benefactor, and who has need of leisure in order to give you good advice? |
| 13726 | What, then, is that? |
| 13726 | Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? |
| 13726 | Where else can we say such souls go?" |
| 13726 | Whereupon Simmias said,"How mean you, Socrates? |
| 13726 | Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting, and contradict myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me? |
| 13726 | Whether, if you go to Thessaly, will they take care of them, but if you go to Hades will they not take care of them? |
| 13726 | Whither does it tend, and on what part of him that disobeys will it fall? |
| 13726 | Who is there skilled in the qualities that become a man and a citizen? |
| 13726 | Why, then, shall I not do this? |
| 13726 | Will he call them another kind of harmony and discord? |
| 13726 | Will you take them to Thessaly, and there rear and educate them, making them aliens to their country, that they may owe you this obligation too? |
| 13726 | Will you, then, avoid these well- governed cities, and the best- ordered men? |
| 13726 | _ Cri._ But what was this dream? |
| 13726 | _ Cri._ How can it be otherwise? |
| 13726 | _ Cri._ How should he not? |
| 13726 | _ Cri._ Whence do you form this conjecture? |
| 13726 | _ Ech._ And what, Phædo, were the circumstances of his death? |
| 13726 | _ Ech._ But what is this ship? |
| 13726 | _ Ech._ But who were present, Phædo? |
| 13726 | _ Ech._ How should I not? |
| 13726 | _ Ech._ Was any one else there? |
| 13726 | _ Ech._ Well, now, what do you say was the subject of conversation? |
| 13726 | _ Ech._ Were any strangers present? |
| 13726 | _ Ech._ What, then, did he say before his death, and how did he die? |
| 13726 | _ Echec._ How was that? |
| 13726 | _ Phæd._ And did you not hear about the trial-- how it went off? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ About what time? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ And are not the good those of the wise, and the bad those of the foolish? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ And does this hold good or not, that to live well and Honorable and justly are the same thing? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ And what of the senators? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ But can we enjoy life when that is impaired which injustice ruins but justice benefits? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ But of more value? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ But what is this evil? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ But what? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ But why, my dear Crito, should we care so much for the opinion of the many? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ But, Melitus, do those who attend the public assemblies corrupt the younger men? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ Can we, then, enjoy life with a diseased and impaired body? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ Come, then, whether do you accuse me here, as one that corrupts the youth, and makes them more depraved, designedly or undesignedly? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ Come, then: how, again, were the following points settled? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ Have you just now come, or some time since? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ How say you, Melitus? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ I do not ask this, most excellent sir, but what man, who surely must first know this very thing, the laws? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ I say next, then, or rather I ask; whether when a man has promised to do things that are just he ought to do them, or evade his promise? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ Is there any one that wishes to be injured rather than benefited by his associates? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ O wonderful Melitus, how come you to say this? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ Therefore we should respect the good, but not the bad? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ What tidings? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ What, then? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ Whether all, or some of them, and others not? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ Why have you come at this hour, Crito? |
| 13726 | _ Socr._ Why, then, did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting down by me in silence? |
| 13726 | about the pleasures of love?" |
| 13726 | and are they not temperate through a kind of intemperance? |
| 13726 | and did not your father, through us, take your mother to wife and beget you? |
| 13726 | and from slower, swifter?" |
| 13726 | and if more just, from more unjust?" |
| 13726 | and is this said with truth?" |
| 13726 | and on what terms does he teach?" |
| 13726 | and that two cubits are greater than one cubit by half, and not by magnitude( for the fear is surely the same)?" |
| 13726 | and whatever we attempt to do to you, do you think you may justly do to us in turn? |
| 13726 | and who of his friends were with him? |
| 13726 | and, again, swift or slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? |
| 13726 | award myself? |
| 13726 | for between a greater thing and a smaller there are increase and decrease, and do we not accordingly call the one to increase, the other to decrease?" |
| 13726 | for to die surely is clear, is it not?" |
| 13726 | have not you and Simmias, who have conversed familiarly with Philolaus[26] on this subject, heard?" |
| 13726 | he continued;"shall we not find a corresponding contrary mode of production, or will nature be defective in this? |
| 13726 | he said"And is it not evident that such a one attempts to deal with men without sufficient knowledge of human affairs? |
| 13726 | is one soul said to possess intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another folly and vice, and to be bad? |
| 13726 | lest I should suffer that which Melitus awards me, of which I say I know not whether it he good or evil? |
| 13726 | or do they all make them better? |
| 13726 | or does quite the contrary of this take place? |
| 13726 | or equality inequality?" |
| 13726 | or how think you?" |
| 13726 | or who does not believe that there are pipers, but that there are things pertaining to pipes? |
| 13726 | or would not the magistrates allow them to be present, but did he die destitute of friends? |
| 13726 | said I,"and whence does he come? |
| 13726 | said Socrates,"has life any contrary, as waking has its contrary, sleeping?" |
| 13726 | were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus present? |
| 13726 | would not this be ridiculous?" |
| 1687 | ''And can they hear the dialogue?'' |
| 1687 | ''And do you suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?'' |
| 1687 | ''And of human beings like ourselves, of water, fire, and the like?'' |
| 1687 | ''And what kind of discipline would you recommend?'' |
| 1687 | ''And who will answer me? |
| 1687 | ''And would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain one?'' |
| 1687 | ''And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good?'' |
| 1687 | ''And would you say that each man is covered by the whole sail, or by a part only?'' |
| 1687 | ''But how can individuals participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have mentioned?'' |
| 1687 | ''But must not the thought be of something which is the same in all and is the idea? |
| 1687 | ''How do you mean?'' |
| 1687 | ''I quite believe you,''said Socrates;''but will you answer me a question? |
| 1687 | ''If God is, what follows? |
| 1687 | ''In the same sort of way,''said Parmenides,''as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many-- that is your meaning?'' |
| 1687 | ''Then how do you know that there are things in themselves?'' |
| 1687 | ''Then the beautiful and the good in their own nature are unknown to us?'' |
| 1687 | ''Then the ideas have parts, and the objects partake of a part of them only?'' |
| 1687 | ''Then will you, Zeno?'' |
| 1687 | ''Welcome, Cephalus: can we do anything for you in Athens?'' |
| 1687 | ''What difficulty?'' |
| 1687 | ''What is that?'' |
| 1687 | ''Why not of the whole?'' |
| 1687 | ''Yet if these difficulties induce you to give up universal ideas, what becomes of the mind? |
| 1687 | Again, how far can one touch itself and the others? |
| 1687 | Again, is the not- one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one? |
| 1687 | Again, let us conceive of a one which by an effort of abstraction we separate from being: will this abstract one be one or many? |
| 1687 | Again, of the parts of the one, if it is-- I mean being and one-- does either fail to imply the other? |
| 1687 | Again, the like is opposed to the unlike? |
| 1687 | Am I not right? |
| 1687 | And a multitude implies a number larger than one? |
| 1687 | And all the parts are contained by the whole? |
| 1687 | And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one? |
| 1687 | And also in other things? |
| 1687 | And also of one? |
| 1687 | And are not things of a different kind also other in kind? |
| 1687 | And are not things other in kind unlike? |
| 1687 | And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation? |
| 1687 | And because having limits, also having extremes? |
| 1687 | And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself? |
| 1687 | And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one? |
| 1687 | And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being? |
| 1687 | And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing? |
| 1687 | And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality? |
| 1687 | And change is motion-- we may say that? |
| 1687 | And could we hear it? |
| 1687 | And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being? |
| 1687 | And do not''will be,''''will become,''''will have become,''signify a participation of future time? |
| 1687 | And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one? |
| 1687 | And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger? |
| 1687 | And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really exist? |
| 1687 | And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being? |
| 1687 | And greatness and smallness always stand apart? |
| 1687 | And has not- being also, if it is not? |
| 1687 | And have we not already shown that it can not be in anything? |
| 1687 | And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,--in any such case do I not speak of both? |
| 1687 | And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate? |
| 1687 | And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole? |
| 1687 | And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three? |
| 1687 | And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree? |
| 1687 | And if the world partakes in the ideas, and the ideas are thoughts, must not all things think? |
| 1687 | And if there are not two, there is no contact? |
| 1687 | And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three? |
| 1687 | And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge? |
| 1687 | And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them? |
| 1687 | And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be? |
| 1687 | And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two? |
| 1687 | And in either case, the one would be many, and not one? |
| 1687 | And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not? |
| 1687 | And in that it was other it was shown to be like? |
| 1687 | And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many? |
| 1687 | And inequality implies greatness and smallness? |
| 1687 | And is each of these parts-- one and being-- to be simply called a part, or must the word''part''be relative to the word''whole''? |
| 1687 | And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself? |
| 1687 | And is not time always moving forward? |
| 1687 | And is not''other''a name given to a thing? |
| 1687 | And is the one a part of itself? |
| 1687 | And it is older( is it not?) |
| 1687 | And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others? |
| 1687 | And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many? |
| 1687 | And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?--Where is the wonder? |
| 1687 | And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two? |
| 1687 | And not having the same measures, the one can not be equal either with itself or with another? |
| 1687 | And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one? |
| 1687 | And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole? |
| 1687 | And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness? |
| 1687 | And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence? |
| 1687 | And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is? |
| 1687 | And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it? |
| 1687 | And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity? |
| 1687 | And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity? |
| 1687 | And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things? |
| 1687 | And so when he says''If one is not''he clearly means, that what''is not''is other than all others; we know what he means-- do we not? |
| 1687 | And surely there can not be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest? |
| 1687 | And that is the one? |
| 1687 | And that which contains, is a limit? |
| 1687 | And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are? |
| 1687 | And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest? |
| 1687 | And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger? |
| 1687 | And that which is older is older than that which is younger? |
| 1687 | And that which is older, must always be older than something which is younger? |
| 1687 | And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge? |
| 1687 | And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming? |
| 1687 | And the one has been proved both to be and not to be? |
| 1687 | And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all? |
| 1687 | And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less? |
| 1687 | And the one is the whole? |
| 1687 | And the one was also shown to be the same with the others? |
| 1687 | And the other to the same? |
| 1687 | And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction? |
| 1687 | And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the extremes? |
| 1687 | And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it? |
| 1687 | And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not? |
| 1687 | And therefore is and is not in the same state? |
| 1687 | And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be attributed to it? |
| 1687 | And therefore not other than itself? |
| 1687 | And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it? |
| 1687 | And they are unequal to an unequal? |
| 1687 | And things that are not equal are unequal? |
| 1687 | And three are odd, and two are even? |
| 1687 | And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to itself or other? |
| 1687 | And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others? |
| 1687 | And we have not got the idea of knowledge? |
| 1687 | And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other? |
| 1687 | And we surely can not say that what is truly one has parts? |
| 1687 | And what are its relations to other things? |
| 1687 | And what are the relations of the one to the others? |
| 1687 | And what is a whole? |
| 1687 | And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend? |
| 1687 | And what of that? |
| 1687 | And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? |
| 1687 | And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all? |
| 1687 | And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized? |
| 1687 | And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea? |
| 1687 | And when we put them together shortly, and say''One is,''that is equivalent to saying,''partakes of being''? |
| 1687 | And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another? |
| 1687 | And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? |
| 1687 | And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated? |
| 1687 | And who will answer me? |
| 1687 | And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not- one? |
| 1687 | And will not knowledge-- I mean absolute knowledge-- answer to absolute truth? |
| 1687 | And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself? |
| 1687 | And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, be an idea? |
| 1687 | And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it? |
| 1687 | And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not? |
| 1687 | And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water? |
| 1687 | And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men? |
| 1687 | And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end? |
| 1687 | And you may say the name once or oftener? |
| 1687 | And''is,''or''becomes,''signifies a participation of present time? |
| 1687 | And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way? |
| 1687 | And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being? |
| 1687 | Because every part is part of a whole; is it not? |
| 1687 | But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these? |
| 1687 | But as I must attempt this laborious game, what shall be the subject? |
| 1687 | But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger, what shall we say? |
| 1687 | But can all this be true about the one? |
| 1687 | But can all this be true? |
| 1687 | But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing? |
| 1687 | But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being? |
| 1687 | But can one be in many places and yet be a whole? |
| 1687 | But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions? |
| 1687 | But does one partake of time? |
| 1687 | But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible? |
| 1687 | But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round? |
| 1687 | But how can not- being, which is nowhere, move or change, either from one place to another or in the same place? |
| 1687 | But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or have anything else the same? |
| 1687 | But if anything is other than anything, will it not be other than other? |
| 1687 | But if it be not altered it can not be moved? |
| 1687 | But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same age with itself? |
| 1687 | But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and can not be none? |
| 1687 | But if one is, and both odd and even numbers are implied in one, must not every number exist? |
| 1687 | But if one is, what happens to the others, which in the first place are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way? |
| 1687 | But if one is, what will happen to the others-- is not that also to be considered? |
| 1687 | But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another? |
| 1687 | But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion? |
| 1687 | But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all? |
| 1687 | But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact? |
| 1687 | But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another? |
| 1687 | But is the contradiction also the final conclusion? |
| 1687 | But is the one other than one? |
| 1687 | But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? |
| 1687 | But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm? |
| 1687 | But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place? |
| 1687 | But reflect:--Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same time? |
| 1687 | But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to it? |
| 1687 | But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future? |
| 1687 | But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it can not change from one place to another? |
| 1687 | But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest? |
| 1687 | But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation? |
| 1687 | But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and can not have? |
| 1687 | But the one did not partake of those affections? |
| 1687 | But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike itself or other? |
| 1687 | But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything? |
| 1687 | But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained? |
| 1687 | But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things? |
| 1687 | But to speak of the others implies difference-- the terms''other''and''different''are synonymous? |
| 1687 | But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:--so we said? |
| 1687 | But what do you say to a new point of view? |
| 1687 | But when do all these changes take place? |
| 1687 | But why do you ask?'' |
| 1687 | But why? |
| 1687 | But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not, and what is the consequence? |
| 1687 | But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would not be in the middle? |
| 1687 | But, consider:--Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another? |
| 1687 | But, surely, it ought to be one and not many? |
| 1687 | But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere? |
| 1687 | But, then, what is to become of philosophy? |
| 1687 | Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible? |
| 1687 | Can there be any other mode of participation? |
| 1687 | Do not the words''is not''signify absence of being in that to which we apply them? |
| 1687 | Do they participate in the ideas, or do they merely resemble them? |
| 1687 | Do you see my meaning? |
| 1687 | Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute? |
| 1687 | Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts? |
| 1687 | Does the one also partake of time? |
| 1687 | For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others? |
| 1687 | For can anything be a whole without these three? |
| 1687 | Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole? |
| 1687 | Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being? |
| 1687 | Further-- is the one equal and unequal to itself and others? |
| 1687 | Here is the great though unconscious truth( shall we say?) |
| 1687 | How can he have ever persisted in them after seeing the fatal objections which might be urged against them? |
| 1687 | How can he have placed himself so completely without them? |
| 1687 | How can it? |
| 1687 | How can there be? |
| 1687 | How can they be? |
| 1687 | How can we conceive Him under the forms of time and space, who is out of time and space? |
| 1687 | How can we imagine His relation to the world or to ourselves? |
| 1687 | How could they investigate causes, when they had not as yet learned to distinguish between a cause and an end? |
| 1687 | How could they make any progress in the sciences without first arranging them? |
| 1687 | How could they? |
| 1687 | How do you mean? |
| 1687 | How do you mean? |
| 1687 | How do you mean? |
| 1687 | How do you mean? |
| 1687 | How get rid of such forms and see Him as He is? |
| 1687 | How is that? |
| 1687 | How is that? |
| 1687 | How is that? |
| 1687 | How is that? |
| 1687 | How not? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How so? |
| 1687 | How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than anything, or have the same age with it? |
| 1687 | How then, without a word of explanation, could Plato assign to them the refutation of their own tenets? |
| 1687 | How, while mankind were disputing about universals, could they classify phenomena? |
| 1687 | How? |
| 1687 | How? |
| 1687 | I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing? |
| 1687 | If God is not, what follows?'' |
| 1687 | If it be co- extensive with the one it will be co- equal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one? |
| 1687 | If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? |
| 1687 | If one is, being must be predicated of it? |
| 1687 | If one is, he said, the one can not be many? |
| 1687 | If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself? |
| 1687 | If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two? |
| 1687 | If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole? |
| 1687 | In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of the many? |
| 1687 | In the first place, the others will not be one? |
| 1687 | In this way-- you may speak of being? |
| 1687 | In what way? |
| 1687 | In what way? |
| 1687 | In what way? |
| 1687 | Is it or does it become older or younger than they? |
| 1687 | Is it or does it become older or younger than they? |
| 1687 | Is not that true? |
| 1687 | Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you? |
| 1687 | Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions-- if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed? |
| 1687 | Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part? |
| 1687 | Is this true of becoming as well as being? |
| 1687 | It can not therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of nature? |
| 1687 | It is otherwise with the objection which follows: How are we to bridge the chasm between human truth and absolute truth, between gods and men? |
| 1687 | Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike? |
| 1687 | Let us see:--Must not the being of one be other than one? |
| 1687 | May we say, in Platonic language, that we still seem to see vestiges of a track which has not yet been taken? |
| 1687 | Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature? |
| 1687 | Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one? |
| 1687 | Nor as like or unlike? |
| 1687 | Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is, and that which is not can not be reckoned among things that are? |
| 1687 | Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it? |
| 1687 | Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must always be in one and the same spot? |
| 1687 | Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there had been, it would partake of being? |
| 1687 | Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others? |
| 1687 | Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand still? |
| 1687 | Now there can not possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others? |
| 1687 | Of something which is or which is not? |
| 1687 | Once more, Is one equal and unequal to itself and the others? |
| 1687 | Once more, can one be older or younger than itself or other? |
| 1687 | Once more, if one is not, what becomes of the others? |
| 1687 | Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in regard to one? |
| 1687 | Once more, let us inquire, If the one is not, and the others of the one are, what follows? |
| 1687 | One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion? |
| 1687 | One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist? |
| 1687 | Or can thought be without thought?'' |
| 1687 | Other means other than other, and different, different from the different? |
| 1687 | Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class? |
| 1687 | Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others? |
| 1687 | Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis the one? |
| 1687 | Shall I propose the youngest? |
| 1687 | Shall I propose the youngest? |
| 1687 | Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise? |
| 1687 | Since it is not a part in relation to itself it can not be related to itself as whole to part? |
| 1687 | Since then what is partakes of not- being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be? |
| 1687 | So that the other is not the same-- either with the one or with being? |
| 1687 | Suppose the first; it will be either co- equal and co- extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one? |
| 1687 | The expression''is not''implies negation of being:--do we mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is? |
| 1687 | The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite? |
| 1687 | The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion? |
| 1687 | The one then, since it in no way is, can not have or lose or assume being in any way? |
| 1687 | The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole? |
| 1687 | The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself? |
| 1687 | The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others? |
| 1687 | The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised? |
| 1687 | The thought must be of something? |
| 1687 | Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences? |
| 1687 | Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? |
| 1687 | Then can the motion of the one be in place? |
| 1687 | Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many? |
| 1687 | Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? |
| 1687 | Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change? |
| 1687 | Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be either one or many? |
| 1687 | Then if one is, number must also be? |
| 1687 | Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it can not either exceed or be exceeded by them? |
| 1687 | Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable? |
| 1687 | Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes? |
| 1687 | Then it can not be like another, or like itself? |
| 1687 | Then it can not move by changing place? |
| 1687 | Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time? |
| 1687 | Then it has the greatest number of parts? |
| 1687 | Then it is never in the same? |
| 1687 | Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be destroyed? |
| 1687 | Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself? |
| 1687 | Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not? |
| 1687 | Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others? |
| 1687 | Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is? |
| 1687 | Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact? |
| 1687 | Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge? |
| 1687 | Then not by virtue of being one will it be other? |
| 1687 | Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many? |
| 1687 | Then now we have spoken of either of them? |
| 1687 | Then one can not be anywhere, either in itself or in another? |
| 1687 | Then one can not be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself or with another? |
| 1687 | Then one is never in the same place? |
| 1687 | Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not- one, is the same with it? |
| 1687 | Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time? |
| 1687 | Then smallness can not be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only? |
| 1687 | Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself? |
| 1687 | Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them? |
| 1687 | Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part? |
| 1687 | Then the inference is that it would touch both? |
| 1687 | Then the least is the first? |
| 1687 | Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us? |
| 1687 | Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself? |
| 1687 | Then the one and the others are never in the same? |
| 1687 | Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it? |
| 1687 | Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion? |
| 1687 | Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself? |
| 1687 | Then the one can not have parts, and can not be a whole? |
| 1687 | Then the one can not possibly partake of being? |
| 1687 | Then the one can not touch itself any more than it can be two? |
| 1687 | Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another? |
| 1687 | Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number? |
| 1687 | Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward in time? |
| 1687 | Then the one is not at all? |
| 1687 | Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present? |
| 1687 | Then the one must have likeness to itself? |
| 1687 | Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it? |
| 1687 | Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind? |
| 1687 | Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered? |
| 1687 | Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither perishes nor becomes? |
| 1687 | Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion? |
| 1687 | Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become? |
| 1687 | Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others? |
| 1687 | Then the one will be other than the others? |
| 1687 | Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it? |
| 1687 | Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other? |
| 1687 | Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts? |
| 1687 | Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two? |
| 1687 | Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a straight or of a circular form? |
| 1687 | Then the one, being moved, is altered? |
| 1687 | Then the one, being of this nature, can not be in time at all; for must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself? |
| 1687 | Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited? |
| 1687 | Then the one, if it is not, can not turn in that in which it is not? |
| 1687 | Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being? |
| 1687 | Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is? |
| 1687 | Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness? |
| 1687 | Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time? |
| 1687 | Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality? |
| 1687 | Then the other will never be either in the not- one, or in the one? |
| 1687 | Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another? |
| 1687 | Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number? |
| 1687 | Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one? |
| 1687 | Then there is always something between them? |
| 1687 | Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor knowledge of it? |
| 1687 | Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity? |
| 1687 | Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part? |
| 1687 | Then they are separated from each other? |
| 1687 | Then they have no number, if they have no one in them? |
| 1687 | Then we can not suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist? |
| 1687 | Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never moves? |
| 1687 | Then we will begin at the beginning:--If one is, can one be, and not partake of being? |
| 1687 | Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same? |
| 1687 | Then will they not appear to be like and unlike? |
| 1687 | Then will you, Zeno? |
| 1687 | Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one? |
| 1687 | Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one? |
| 1687 | Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not have parts? |
| 1687 | Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other? |
| 1687 | Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts? |
| 1687 | Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered? |
| 1687 | Then, that which is not can not be, or in any way participate in being? |
| 1687 | There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three? |
| 1687 | There is a natural realism which says,''Can there be a word devoid of meaning, or an idea which is an idea of nothing?'' |
| 1687 | There is an ethical universal or idea, but is there also a universal of physics?--of the meanest things in the world as well as of the greatest? |
| 1687 | They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present? |
| 1687 | Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not- being? |
| 1687 | Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself? |
| 1687 | Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself? |
| 1687 | Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible? |
| 1687 | We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one? |
| 1687 | We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is? |
| 1687 | We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is? |
| 1687 | Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens? |
| 1687 | Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or of the same age with it? |
| 1687 | Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it? |
| 1687 | Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one? |
| 1687 | Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not? |
| 1687 | Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both? |
| 1687 | Well, but do not the expressions''was,''and''has become,''and''was becoming,''signify a participation of past time? |
| 1687 | Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question? |
| 1687 | Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other? |
| 1687 | What difficulty? |
| 1687 | What direction? |
| 1687 | What do you mean, Parmenides? |
| 1687 | What do you mean? |
| 1687 | What do you mean? |
| 1687 | What do you mean? |
| 1687 | What is it? |
| 1687 | What is the meaning of the hypothesis-- If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis-- If the not one is not? |
| 1687 | What may that be? |
| 1687 | What of that? |
| 1687 | What question? |
| 1687 | What thing? |
| 1687 | What would you say of another question? |
| 1687 | What? |
| 1687 | When does motion become rest, or rest motion? |
| 1687 | When then does it change; for it can not change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time? |
| 1687 | Whenever, then, you use the word''other,''whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name? |
| 1687 | Where shall I begin? |
| 1687 | Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown? |
| 1687 | Why not, Parmenides? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why not? |
| 1687 | Why so? |
| 1687 | Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre? |
| 1687 | Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask? |
| 1687 | Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? |
| 1687 | You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many-- is not that your meaning? |
| 1687 | and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not- being of one? |
| 1687 | and is this your own distinction?'' |
| 1687 | and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? |
| 1687 | and where are the reasoning and reflecting powers? |
| 1687 | for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being? |
| 1687 | for the same whole can not do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will be no longer one, but two? |
| 1687 | is the one wanting to being, or being to the one? |
| 1687 | or do we mean absolutely to deny being of it? |
| 1687 | or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being? |
| 1687 | or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once? |
| 1687 | or of the same age with itself or other? |
| 1687 | would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole? |
| 17490 | A merchant,replied Nicomachides,"knows how to get money as well as he; and does it follow from thence that he is fit to be a general?" |
| 17490 | And are not they, who behave themselves unworthily, the same as they who know not how to behave themselves? |
| 17490 | And are not weakly children bad ones? |
| 17490 | And are not,continued Socrates,"oatmeal, bread, the clothes of men and women, cassocks, coats, and other the like manufactures, things very useful?" |
| 17490 | And are you an honest man? |
| 17490 | And are you surprised at it? |
| 17490 | And as for wisdom,pursued Socrates,"what shall we say it is? |
| 17490 | And because they are free and your relations,said Socrates,"do you think they ought to do nothing but eat and sleep? |
| 17490 | And can not the pencil imitate all this likewise? |
| 17490 | And do not the persons at your house know how to make any of these things? |
| 17490 | And do they who do what the laws command, do what is just? |
| 17490 | And do they who live as they ought live well? |
| 17490 | And do they,said Socrates,"who live together according to those laws, live as they ought?" |
| 17490 | And do you believe,said Socrates,"that it is in the power of a man to know everything?" |
| 17490 | And do you know any men who do otherwise than they believe they ought to do? |
| 17490 | And do you know,said Socrates,"why they are called so?" |
| 17490 | And do you think it possible,said Socrates,"to know what a democracy or popular State is without knowing what the people is?" |
| 17490 | And do you think, you fool,added Socrates,"that kisses of love are not venomous, because you perceive not the poison? |
| 17490 | And do you think,replied Socrates,"that the good and the beautiful are different? |
| 17490 | And do you think,said Socrates,"that the gods make laws that are unjust?" |
| 17490 | And does he who knows how to live well with men understand well how to govern his affairs? |
| 17490 | And does not every man behave himself as he believes he ought to do? |
| 17490 | And doing wrong to one''s neighbour? |
| 17490 | And have you any knowledge in those things, too? |
| 17490 | And he who serves the gods as he ought is pious? |
| 17490 | And how can a man be happy without them? |
| 17490 | And how can it be that the things which compose good fortune should not be infallibly good? |
| 17490 | And how did he find himself upon the road? |
| 17490 | And how do you know,pursued Hippias,"that they will have bad children? |
| 17490 | And how is it possible that two beautiful things should be contrary one to the other? |
| 17490 | And how much longer,said Socrates,"do you think you shall be able to work for your living?" |
| 17490 | And how shall I be able to make them sensible of this? |
| 17490 | And if one of them were sick, would you take care of him, and send for physicians to endeavour to save his life? |
| 17490 | And if there be any art that teaches to overcome our enemies, to which of the two is it rather reasonable to teach it? |
| 17490 | And if you had been to carry what he did, what would have become of you? |
| 17490 | And if you were travelling with any man, either by sea or land, would you count it a matter of indifference whether you were loved by him or not? |
| 17490 | And if you would engage him to take care of your affairs in your absence on a journey, what would you do? |
| 17490 | And if you would have a foreigner entertain you in his family when you come into his country, what method would you take? |
| 17490 | And is it not likely to be true that the cause of the contrary effects is good? |
| 17490 | And is it not likewise commanded everywhere to honour one''s father and mother? |
| 17490 | And is it not true,continued Socrates,"that he who knows one way of serving the gods believes there is no better a way than his?" |
| 17490 | And is this all? |
| 17490 | And is what the populace decree, without the concurrence of the chiefs, to be counted a violence likewise, and not a law? |
| 17490 | And selling of free persons into slavery? |
| 17490 | And shall we write none of all these,said Socrates,"under the head of justice?" |
| 17490 | And tell me,added Alcibiades,"do they ordain to do what is good, or what is ill?" |
| 17490 | And they who do what is just are just likewise? |
| 17490 | And what are they who fear what is not to be feared? |
| 17490 | And what have you seen him do,said Xenophon,"that gives you reason to speak thus of him?" |
| 17490 | And what is the people? |
| 17490 | And what is this punishment,said Hippias,"which it is impossible for fathers, who marry with their own children, to avoid?" |
| 17490 | And what means must I use to persuade you? |
| 17490 | And what say you of courage? |
| 17490 | And what say you,pursued Socrates,"to the Senate of the Areopagus; are they not all of them persons of great worth? |
| 17490 | And what the chief citizens ordain, without procuring the consent of the greater number, is that likewise a violence? |
| 17490 | And when a man knows what he ought to do, do you think he believes that he ought not to do it? |
| 17490 | And when can it ever happen,said Euthydemus,"that health is the cause of any ill, and sickness the cause of any good?" |
| 17490 | And when he circumvents his enemies in the war, does he not do well? |
| 17490 | And when he ravages their land, and takes away their cattle and their corn, does he not do justly? |
| 17490 | And where can one learn these words? |
| 17490 | And wherein have you observed this capacity in me? |
| 17490 | And which is the best? |
| 17490 | And which is the worst of all slaveries? |
| 17490 | And who is a pious man? |
| 17490 | And will he not be careful how he does otherwise? |
| 17490 | And will you not have an eye likewise on the troopers? |
| 17490 | And would it not be the advantage of both to get the better of them? |
| 17490 | And you,replied Socrates,"how many crosses did you give her in your infancy by your continual bawling and importunate actions? |
| 17490 | Are there not some small animals whose bite is so venomous that it causes insufferable pain, and even the loss of the senses? |
| 17490 | Are they all like one another? |
| 17490 | As how? |
| 17490 | But can we, by this same way of comparison, judge of the nature of good? |
| 17490 | But do you believe it to be of use in occasions of little moment? |
| 17490 | But do you know no other charms? |
| 17490 | But do you not know,replied Socrates,"that some bodies are well- shaped and others not?" |
| 17490 | But have you seen men who are fit for nothing( for that is the question we speak of) get any friends of consequence? |
| 17490 | But have you,resumed Socrates,"thought on the means to make yourself obeyed? |
| 17490 | But he who serves the gods as the laws direct, serves them as he ought? |
| 17490 | But how can we be certain of all this,said Critobulus,"before we have tried him?" |
| 17490 | But if I let them see that I am most worthy to command, will that be sufficient to make them obey me? |
| 17490 | But supposing they do not dissuade us, how are we to take this precious prey? |
| 17490 | But tell me whether what is reputed beautiful for one thing has the same relation to another as to that to which it is proper? |
| 17490 | But what is that,said Socrates,"in comparison of the many other duties incumbent on a general? |
| 17490 | But what then is violence and injustice? |
| 17490 | But where,said Socrates,"will you find any employment in which a man is absolutely perfect, and altogether free from blame? |
| 17490 | But which of the two,said Socrates,"would you teach to leave eating before he was satisfied, to go about some earnest business?" |
| 17490 | But you said,replied Socrates,"that he who can read is more learned than he who can not read?" |
| 17490 | But, granting this to be as you say,added Euthydemus,"you will certainly allow good fortune to be a good?" |
| 17490 | But,continued Socrates,"if a man takes delight to eat his meat without bread, do you not take him to be, indeed, a flesh- eater?" |
| 17490 | But,continued Socrates,"who sees not of how great advantage this knowledge is to man, and how dangerous it is to be mistaken in this affair? |
| 17490 | But,said Critobulus,"when we have found a man worthy of our choice, how ought we to contract a friendship with him?" |
| 17490 | But,said Socrates,"he who acts justly is just, and he who acts unjustly is unjust?" |
| 17490 | Can you represent likewise,said Socrates,"what is most charming and most lovely in the person, I mean the inclination?" |
| 17490 | Did you not take notice,said Socrates,"that somewhere on the front of the temple there is this inscription,''KNOW THYSELF''?" |
| 17490 | Do not men sometimes cheat? |
| 17490 | Do not the very looks of men,replied Socrates,"confess either hatred or friendship?" |
| 17490 | Do not you think,said Socrates,"that the anger of a beast is much more difficult to support than that of a mother?" |
| 17490 | Do they not usually,said Charmidas,"laugh at those who speak best?" |
| 17490 | Do you believe likewise,continued Socrates,"that debauchery does not only hinder from doing good, but compels to do ill?" |
| 17490 | Do you believe that a man who is a slave to sensual pleasures, and finds himself incapable of doing good, enjoys his liberty? |
| 17490 | Do you believe that the same thing may be profitable to one and hurtful to another? |
| 17490 | Do you believe that they agree better among themselves? |
| 17490 | Do you consider what happens to you after you have kissed a beautiful face? 17490 Do you imagine,"said Socrates,"that he will be able to execute his office without speaking a word? |
| 17490 | Do you know, too, who are the rich? |
| 17490 | Do you mean anything that is good against hunger? |
| 17490 | Do you mean to be a reciter of heroic verses? |
| 17490 | Do you not know,pursued Socrates,"what the laws in a State are?" |
| 17490 | Do you think it of great advantage in dangers,continued Socrates,"not to perceive the peril we are in?" |
| 17490 | Do you think, then,added Socrates,"that it was all mankind that made them?" |
| 17490 | Do you think,added Socrates,"that any men are valiant in such occasions except they who know how to behave themselves in them?" |
| 17490 | Do you think,said Socrates,"that one may learn to be just and honest, as well as we learn to read and write?" |
| 17490 | Do you think,said Socrates,"that the same thing is profitable to all men?" |
| 17490 | Do your servants,said Socrates,"find any inconvenience in drinking it, or in bathing in it?" |
| 17490 | Have not both of them enemies? |
| 17490 | Have you never heard,continued Socrates,"of certain laws that are not written?" |
| 17490 | Have you never reflected, Euthydemus, on the great goodness of the Deity in giving to men whatever they want? |
| 17490 | Have you not read in Homer,answered Socrates,"what the Syrens said to enchant Ulysses? |
| 17490 | Have you not taken notice likewise that having need of nourishment, they supply us with it by the means of the earth? 17490 He, then, who keeps these laws will know how he ought to serve the gods?" |
| 17490 | He, then, who knows the laws that ought to be observed in the service of the gods, will serve them according to the laws? |
| 17490 | How do you mean? |
| 17490 | How do you show it? |
| 17490 | How, then,continued Socrates,"can you make a well- shaped suit of armour for an ill- shaped body?" |
| 17490 | I allow it,said Nicomachides;"but what will economy be good for when they are to come to blows?" |
| 17490 | I conjure you, then, to tell me,replied Socrates,"what is the first service that you desire to render the State?" |
| 17490 | I think, therefore,said Socrates,"ingratitude is a kind of injustice?" |
| 17490 | If a tyrant then ordain anything, will that be a law? |
| 17490 | If you desired that one of your friends should invite you to his feast when he offered a sacrifice, what course would you take? |
| 17490 | In our private capacity, likewise, how advantageous is it to obey the laws? 17490 In those ages, then, we ought not to get children?" |
| 17490 | In what do they who are educated in the art of government, which you seem to think a great happiness, differ from those who suffer through necessity? 17490 In what does this make consist?" |
| 17490 | Is it an excellent thing? |
| 17490 | Is it because they know not how to build a house, or to make shoes? |
| 17490 | Is it lawful,added Socrates,"to serve the gods in what manner we please?" |
| 17490 | Is it not likewise true,continued Socrates,"that he who obeys these ordinances does justly, and that he obeys them not does unjustly?" |
| 17490 | Is it not the same with what is beautiful? 17490 Is it not true that the Boeotians are not more numerous than the Athenians?" |
| 17490 | Is it possible,replied Socrates? |
| 17490 | Is it said of them because they are learned or because they are ignorant? |
| 17490 | Is it,continued Socrates,"warmer to drink than that of the temple of AEsculapius?" |
| 17490 | Is wisdom anything but what renders us wise? |
| 17490 | It follows, then, my dear Euthydemus,said Socrates,"that temperance is a very good thing?" |
| 17490 | It follows, then,said Socrates,"that every man is wise in what he knows?" |
| 17490 | It is likely I should? |
| 17490 | It is true,said he,"but how shall I gain that point of them?" |
| 17490 | It is very great,said Socrates;"for what can be more afflicting to men, who desire to have children than to have very bad ones?" |
| 17490 | It is, then, impossible,said Socrates,"to find a man who is wise in all things?" |
| 17490 | It were well you could do this,said Socrates,"but does not your office oblige you to have an eye on the horses and troopers?" |
| 17490 | Know you not,said Socrates,"that in all things men readily obey those whom they believe most capable? |
| 17490 | May not he,replied Socrates,"who knows how to do anything that is useful be said to know a trade?" |
| 17490 | Must not a younger brother give the precedency to the older? 17490 Must not both of them take care to employ every one in the business he is fit for? |
| 17490 | Nor are they either braver or stronger? |
| 17490 | Now, do you believe,said Socrates,"that some men obey the laws without knowing what the laws command?" |
| 17490 | Or for sore eyes? |
| 17490 | Ought you not likewise,replied Socrates,"to keep a man who were able to drive away all those that trouble you without cause?" |
| 17490 | Perhaps I might,said Charmidas;"but why do you ask me this question?" |
| 17490 | Perhaps,said Socrates,"it is because they understand not the trade of a smith?" |
| 17490 | Rather,said Socrates,"how can a man be happy with things that are the causes of so many misfortunes? |
| 17490 | Shall we own, then, that he does an act of justice? |
| 17490 | Shall we say, then, that they who behave themselves ill know how they ought to behave themselves? |
| 17490 | Since then you know the rank which either of these two sorts of men ought to hold, amongst which would you have us place you? |
| 17490 | Such, therefore, as indulge their lust in such untimely fruition will have very weakly children? |
| 17490 | Suppose he be so,said Socrates:"but be your own judge, and tell me, which of you two deserves rather to be punished for those faults?" |
| 17490 | Tell me further,continued Socrates,"is it lawful for men to behave themselves to one another as they please?" |
| 17490 | Tell me, Xenophon, what opinion have you hitherto had of Critobulus? 17490 Tell me, further,"said Socrates,"is it not an universal law to do good to those who have done good to us?" |
| 17490 | Tell me, then, in what consists the revenue of the State, and to how much it may amount? 17490 Tell me, then, who are the rich and who are the poor?" |
| 17490 | Tell me, then,continued Socrates,"how strong our forces are by sea and land, and how strong are our enemies?" |
| 17490 | Tell me,said Socrates,"can we know who are honest men by what they do, as we know what trade a man is of by his work?" |
| 17490 | Tell me,said he to Euthydemus,"what piety is?" |
| 17490 | Then a general,added the other,"ought to study the art of speaking well?" |
| 17490 | Then is it not the good that is profitable? |
| 17490 | Then''whatever is of any use is reputed beautiful in regard to the thing to which that use relates?'' |
| 17490 | Then,said Socrates,"as architects show us their works, can honest men show us theirs likewise?" |
| 17490 | Then,said Socrates,"men are wise on account of their knowledge?" |
| 17490 | There can be no doubt,answered Euthydemus,"but that it is in consideration of what they know; for how can a man be wise in things he knows not?" |
| 17490 | They, then, who know the laws that men ought to observe among themselves, do what those laws command? |
| 17490 | They, therefore, who know how to behave themselves, are they who behave themselves well? |
| 17490 | This, then, may be painted likewise? |
| 17490 | Thus, then,said Socrates,"we have the true definition of a pious man: He who knows in what manner he ought to serve the gods?" |
| 17490 | Under which head shall we put lying? |
| 17490 | Undoubtedly,answered Lamprocles,"if my mother had done all this, and an hundred times as much, no man could suffer her ill- humours?" |
| 17490 | Was not he loaded? |
| 17490 | We may, therefore, well conclude,said Socrates,"that the just are they who know the laws that men ought to observe among themselves?" |
| 17490 | We must then infer,said Nicomachides,"that a man who knows well how to give a comedy knows well how to command an army?" |
| 17490 | Well, then,added Socrates,"do you not take him to be just who commits no manner of injustice?" |
| 17490 | Well, then,pursued Socrates,"is it not scandalous for a man to be taken in the same snares with irrational animals? |
| 17490 | Were you alone? |
| 17490 | What are you then afraid of,added Socrates? |
| 17490 | What course must they take now,said Pericles,"to regain the lustre of their ancient virtue?" |
| 17490 | What course will you then take,continued Socrates,"to get good horses?" |
| 17490 | What do you take that to be? |
| 17490 | What harm would it be to you? |
| 17490 | What is the reason,said Socrates to him,"that you are so much afraid of walking, you, who walk up and down about your house almost all day long? |
| 17490 | What say you,continued Socrates,"to their having given us water, which is so necessary for all things? |
| 17490 | What, then, ought we to do? |
| 17490 | Where shall we put cheating? |
| 17490 | Which,added Socrates,"do you take to be the most ignorant, he who reads wrong on purpose, or he who reads wrong because he can read no better?" |
| 17490 | Who, then, do you think gave us these laws? |
| 17490 | Why do Apollodorus and Antisthenes,answered Socrates,"never leave me? |
| 17490 | Why do you ask me leave,said Critobulus,"as if you might not say of me whatever you please?" |
| 17490 | Why do you complain of poverty, since you know how to get rich? 17490 Why do you lay this to my charge,"said Socrates,"since I am continually showing to all the world what are the things I believe to be just?" |
| 17490 | Why do you not put them in mind,said Socrates,"of the fable of the dog? |
| 17490 | Why not? |
| 17490 | Why not? |
| 17490 | Why so? |
| 17490 | Why? |
| 17490 | Will you be an architect, then? |
| 17490 | Will you give me your word likewise,said Socrates,"that you will not even give them a kiss?" |
| 17490 | Wisdom therefore is only knowledge? |
| 17490 | Would not the way to enrich the Republic,replied Socrates,"be to increase its revenue?" |
| 17490 | Would you have me break the ice; I, who am the younger brother? 17490 Would you say,"pursued Aristippus,"that the same thing may be beautiful and ugly at once?" |
| 17490 | You allow, then, that to do good is to be free, and that to be prevented from doing it, by any obstacle whatever, is not to be free? |
| 17490 | You believe, then,said Socrates,"that debauched persons are not free?" |
| 17490 | You can then make hatred and friendship appear in the eyes? |
| 17490 | You know, then, who are the poor? |
| 17490 | You know,said Socrates,"what things are good and what are bad?" |
| 17490 | You mean,said Hippias,"that to observe the laws is to be just?" |
| 17490 | You say true,continued Critobulus;"but did not they say as much to the others, to stop them too?" |
| 17490 | You seem to be of opinion, my dear Socrates, that virtue is much estranged from our Republic? 17490 You will say, then, that it is beautiful in regard to the thing for which it is proper?" |
| 17490 | You would accustom both of them,said Socrates,"to eat and drink at a certain hour?" |
| 17490 | ), is it not certain that the Republic was extremely obliged to him, and that she ought to have paid him the highest honours? |
| 17490 | Among private men themselves, do not the stronger and more bold trample on the weaker?" |
| 17490 | And Hermogenes asking him what he meant by saying so? |
| 17490 | And are not most of the inhabitants of Megara in good circumstances enough by the trade which they drive of coats and short jackets?" |
| 17490 | And are the fathers themselves, who are daily with their children, guilty of their faults, if they give them no ill example? |
| 17490 | And by what other way can we more easily obtain it, than by making ourselves acceptable to them? |
| 17490 | And do you believe that the human race would have been thus long abused without ever discovering the cheat? |
| 17490 | And do you value so little all these misfortunes, which constantly attend an ill habit of body, and do they seem to you so slight? |
| 17490 | And does not this happen in buildings that front towards the south? |
| 17490 | And for the pleasures of the taste, how could we ever have enjoyed these, if the tongue had not been fitted to discern and relish them? |
| 17490 | And how can we better make ourselves acceptable to them, than by doing their will?" |
| 17490 | And how doth Demeas, of the village of Colyttus, get his livelihood? |
| 17490 | And if he who has received a favour neglect to acknowledge it, or return it ill, does he not incur their hate by his ingratitude? |
| 17490 | And if, to complete my misery, I should have no sense of my wretchedness, would not life be a burden to me? |
| 17490 | And is it not more reasonable for a man to work than to be with his arms across, thinking how he shall do to live? |
| 17490 | And this being fact( and fact it is, for who can deny it? |
| 17490 | And why does the same poet praise Agamemnon likewise for being--''At once a gracious prince and generous warrior''? |
| 17490 | And would it not be ridiculous in him to spend his estate to ruin his reputation? |
| 17490 | And yet, finding his advantage in preserving their goodwill, is it not to them that he makes his court with most assiduity?" |
| 17490 | And, on the other hand, say I had a sense of it, would it not afflict me beyond measure? |
| 17490 | And, though I go barefoot, do not you see that I go wherever I will? |
| 17490 | Another time he asked a general, whom the Athenians had lately chosen, why Homer calls Agamemnon the pastor of the people? |
| 17490 | Another time, meeting with Eutherus, one of his old friends, whom he had not seen for a great while before, he inquired of him from whence he came? |
| 17490 | Are not the fore teeth of all animals fitted to cut off proper portions of food, and their grinders to reduce it to a convenient smallness? |
| 17490 | Are you afraid to present yourself before dyers, shoemakers, masons, smiths, labourers, and brokers? |
| 17490 | But have you weighed this point, whether a man can excel in that science without being an honest man?" |
| 17490 | But how come you to know that the garrisons behave themselves so ill? |
| 17490 | But now, when you find yourself incapable of aiding a private man, how can you think of behaving yourself so as to be useful to a whole people? |
| 17490 | But tell me, when this master showed you the different ways of ordering an army, did he teach you when to make use of one way, and when of another?" |
| 17490 | But what is it you find so strange and difficult in my way of living? |
| 17490 | But when I see a man endeavour to disoblige me all manner of ways, shall I express any goodwill for that man? |
| 17490 | But where, in all the world, can we find a man more innocent of all those crimes than Socrates? |
| 17490 | But who will ever blame me because others have not confessed my innocence, nor done me justice? |
| 17490 | But, tell me, did you ever observe that the cold hath hindered me from going abroad? |
| 17490 | By what means can we more certainly avoid punishments, and deserve rewards? |
| 17490 | Can any man lay to his charge that he ever detained his estate, or did him or it the least injury? |
| 17490 | Can there subsist a true and lasting friendship amongst the ungrateful, the idle, the covetous, the treacherous, and the dissolute? |
| 17490 | Chaerecrates objected:"But when I have done what you say, if my brother should not be better tempered, what then?" |
| 17490 | Could we believe that such a commander would be capable to defend us and to conquer our enemies? |
| 17490 | Critobulus continued,"What was it that Themistocles did to make himself so esteemed?" |
| 17490 | Did they believe them to be useless things, and had they resolved never to put them in practice? |
| 17490 | Do not you observe how wealthy Nausicides is become, what numerous herds he is master of, and what vast sums he lends the Republic? |
| 17490 | Do you forget that among all nations the honour to begin is reserved to the elder?" |
| 17490 | Do you intend to be a physician? |
| 17490 | Do you not become a slave? |
| 17490 | Do you not engage yourself in a vast expense to procure a sinful pleasure? |
| 17490 | Do you not lose your liberty? |
| 17490 | Do you observe that they, who live thus idle and at their ease, lead more comfortable lives than others? |
| 17490 | Do you think we might likewise set prices upon friends?" |
| 17490 | Does nobody speak well of him?" |
| 17490 | For against whom have the laws ordained the punishment of death? |
| 17490 | For are not they the best friends who do kindnesses whenever they are desired? |
| 17490 | For how can they who commit crimes be in good amity with those that abhor them? |
| 17490 | For is it not extravagant in such men to imagine that a brother does them wrong because they enjoy not his estate? |
| 17490 | For, can you say that a body or a vessel is beautiful and proper for all the world?" |
| 17490 | For, who would suffer in his family a man who would not work, and yet expected to live well? |
| 17490 | From whom can we rather hope for a grateful return of a kindness than from a man who strictly obeys the laws? |
| 17490 | Has she bit you, has she kicked you, as beasts do when they are angry?" |
| 17490 | Have you been the better for this admonition? |
| 17490 | Have you been upon the place, have you seen them?" |
| 17490 | Have you ever heard of a certain sort of men, who are called ungrateful?" |
| 17490 | Have you ever seen me choose the cool and fresh shades in hot weather? |
| 17490 | Have you given yourself the trouble to consider what you are?" |
| 17490 | Have you not observed, that whenever he gave a comedy to the people, he always gained the prize?" |
| 17490 | Have you placed him in the rank of the temperate and judicious; or with the debauched and imprudent?" |
| 17490 | He began with him thus:--"You have a mind, then, to govern the Republic, my friend?" |
| 17490 | How many men are there who, for want of strength, perish in fights; or have recourse to dishonourable means to seek their safety? |
| 17490 | I would fain know by what art you imprint upon them this wonderful vivacity?" |
| 17490 | If it were to take any money, ought he not to make the most covetous march in the front? |
| 17490 | If you yourself, my friend, had a worthless slave, would you not take the same measures with him?" |
| 17490 | In like manner, if any one would appear a great general, or a good pilot, though he knew nothing of either, what would be the issue of it? |
| 17490 | Is it a greater piece of wisdom to sit still and do nothing, than to busy oneself in things that are of use in life, and that turn to account? |
| 17490 | Is it because he would be less capable to serve the Republic, if he had virtuous associates in the administration of affairs? |
| 17490 | Is it because you imagine that she wishes you ill?" |
| 17490 | Is it not for thieves, for robbers, for men guilty of sacrilege, for those who sell persons that are free? |
| 17490 | Is not the state of man who is plunged in voluptuousness a wretched condition both for the body and soul? |
| 17490 | Is not this a great neglect? |
| 17490 | Is there any species but man that serves and adores him? |
| 17490 | Is to govern in this manner the way to preserve himself? |
| 17490 | Know you not that the things that are beautiful are good likewise in the same sense? |
| 17490 | Must he not punish those who do amiss and reward those that do well? |
| 17490 | Must he not rise up when he comes in, give him the best place, and hold his peace to let him speak? |
| 17490 | Must not both of them keep those that are under them in submission and obedience?" |
| 17490 | Must they not make themselves be esteemed by those they command? |
| 17490 | Now what made this man so rich? |
| 17490 | Now would you have me to set them to work?" |
| 17490 | Now, in this sense, is it not true to say:--"Blame no employment, but blame idleness"? |
| 17490 | Of what advantage would agreeable scents have been to us if nostrils suited to their reception had not been given? |
| 17490 | Or do you not care for any man''s favour and goodwill, neither for that of a general, suppose, or of any other magistrate?" |
| 17490 | Or do you study geometry or astrology?" |
| 17490 | Or if you were asked whether twice five be not ten, would you not always say the same thing?" |
| 17490 | Or, on the contrary, was it with design to employ themselves in those matters, and to get something by them? |
| 17490 | Ought a man who has not strength enough to carry a hundred pound weight undertake to carry a burden that is much heavier?" |
| 17490 | Ought they not alike to strengthen themselves with friends to assist them upon occasion? |
| 17490 | Ought they not to know how to preserve what belongs to them, and to be diligent and indefatigable in the performance of their duty?" |
| 17490 | Ought we not to look out for a man who is not given to luxury, to drunkenness, to women, nor to idleness? |
| 17490 | Shall I tell you my mind, Aristarchus? |
| 17490 | Socrates added:"And if a young man ask me in the street where Charicles lodges, or whether I know where Critias is, must I make him no answer?" |
| 17490 | Socrates continued,"What strange thing has she done to you? |
| 17490 | Socrates replied,"Does not this proceed from what I am going to say? |
| 17490 | Socrates replied,"Does your brother give offence to all the world as well as to you? |
| 17490 | Socrates said to him,"Do you keep dogs to hinder the wolves from coming at your flocks?" |
| 17490 | Socrates urged him yet further, and asked him:"Have you ever heard say that some men have abject and servile minds?" |
| 17490 | Socrates went on:"For which have you most esteem, for Ceramon''s slaves, or for the persons who are at your house?" |
| 17490 | Socrates went on:--"And may we not ascribe the contrary effects to temperance?" |
| 17490 | Socrates went on:--"And that fathers and mothers should not marry with their own children, is not that too a general command?" |
| 17490 | Socrates went on:--"Have you never considered of what nature this injustice is? |
| 17490 | Socrates, having done what he proposed, continued thus his discourse:--"Do not men tell lies?" |
| 17490 | Socrates, meeting one day with Diodorus, addressed him thus:--"If one of your slaves ran away, would you give yourself any trouble to find him?" |
| 17490 | Socrates, why will not you help me to friends?" |
| 17490 | Tell me whether are men said to be wise in regard to the things they know, or in regard to those they do not know?" |
| 17490 | Tell me, in short, do you believe you ought to have any reverence or respect for any one whatever? |
| 17490 | Then how could he teach impiety, injustice, gluttony, impurity, and luxury? |
| 17490 | This proposition being granted, he pursued:"Is it not a pleasure to have a house that is cool in summer and warm in winter? |
| 17490 | Thus, if we know not in what manner to behave ourselves toward our brother, do you think we can expect anything from him but uneasiness?" |
| 17490 | To which Socrates replied:"Do you believe I have done anything else all my life than think of it?" |
| 17490 | To whom should we with greater confidence trust our estates or our children, than to him who makes a conscience of observing the laws? |
| 17490 | To whom will the allies more readily give the command of their armies, or the government of their towns? |
| 17490 | To whom will the enemy rather trust for the observing of a truce, or for the performance of a treaty of peace? |
| 17490 | Upon which somebody else taking the word said,"What think you of him who, with a little bread only, eats a great deal of flesh?" |
| 17490 | Was he ever so much as suspected of any of these things? |
| 17490 | What makes Menon live so comfortably? |
| 17490 | What other animals do, like us, make use of horses, of oxen, of dogs, of goats, and of the rest? |
| 17490 | What service would you be able to do the State?" |
| 17490 | What shall hinder them, if they are virtuous themselves, from having children that are so likewise?" |
| 17490 | What then? |
| 17490 | What would you have them do to convince you of the contrary?" |
| 17490 | When will they be obedient to the magistrates, they who make it a glory to despise them? |
| 17490 | Which now, in your opinion, are the most happy? |
| 17490 | Which of the animals can, like him, protect himself from hunger and thirst, from heat and cold? |
| 17490 | Who can deserve more of his country? |
| 17490 | Who would assist you in your necessity, or what man of sense would ever venture to be of your mad parties? |
| 17490 | Who would ever give any credit to anything that you say? |
| 17490 | Whose condition, think you, is most to be desired, that of the nations who rule, or of the people who are under the dominion of others?" |
| 17490 | Why do you scruple to begin to practise those methods? |
| 17490 | Why say they not likewise, that all the world does them wrong, because they are not in possession of what belongs to the rest of mankind? |
| 17490 | With whom would we rather choose to make an alliance? |
| 17490 | Would it not, then, be a great ignorance, and at the same time a great misfortune, to turn to our disadvantage what was made only for our utility? |
| 17490 | Would we trust our flocks and our granaries in the hands of a drunkard? |
| 17490 | You are not, I persuade myself, ignorant that you are endowed with understanding; do you then think that there is not elsewhere an intelligent being? |
| 17490 | and do you not think that a man who is to command others ought to inure himself to all these hardships?" |
| 17490 | and have you considered that temperance and sobriety alone give us the true taste of pleasures? |
| 17490 | and, by consequence, to whom will men be more ready to do good turns, than to him of whose gratitude they are certain? |
| 17490 | and, if he believed they did so, how can it be said that he acknowledged no gods? |
| 17490 | continued Alcibiades;"is it not when the strongest makes himself be obeyed by the weakest, not by consent, but by force only?" |
| 17490 | how much affliction in your illnesses?" |
| 17490 | how much trouble by night and by day? |
| 17490 | or rather, is it not the certain means to hasten his own ruin?" |
| 17490 | said Socrates,"and do you then doubt whether the animals themselves are in the world for any other end than for the service of man? |
| 17490 | said Socrates,"in the weight, or in the largeness of the arms? |
| 17490 | said Socrates;"is it not better to serve a man like you, and to receive favours from him, than to have him for an enemy? |
| 17490 | says Socrates,"if I would buy anything of a tradesman who is not thirty years old am I forbid to ask him the price of it?" |
| 17490 | whether it be more eligible to take an experienced pilot than one that is ignorant? |
| 17490 | whom can she more safely entrust with public posts, and on whom can she more justly bestow the highest honours, than on the good and honest man? |
| 17490 | why do Cebes and Simmias forsake Thebes for my company? |
| 40436 | But what intelligence do we want for the purpose? 40436 It shall be done"( answered Kriton);"have you any other injunctions?" |
| 40436 | Quæstio est, Virtusne doceri possit? 40436 Suppose however that any one impugned this hypothesis itself? |
| 40436 | Well, Sokrates, what do you think now of all these reasonings of yours? 40436 Where then can we find such an art-- such a variety of knowledge or intelligence-- as we are seeking? |
| 40436 | [ 12][ Footnote 12: Plato, Lachês, 190 D- E.][ Side- note: Question-- what is courage? 40436 --must be regarded as secondary and dependent, not capable of being clearly understood until the primary and principal question--What is virtue?" |
| 40436 | 114 E.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n ei) le/ geis o(/ti tau= th''ou(/tôs e)/chei, ma/ list''a)\n ei)/ês pepeisme/ nos?]] |
| 40436 | 130 D.[ Greek: Ê(ni/ ka de/ soi parege/ neto( ê( du/ namis), po/ teron matho/ nti par''e)mou= ti parege/ neto, ê)/ tini a)/llô| tro/ pô|? |
| 40436 | 159 C--160 D.[ Greek: ou) tô= n kalô= n me/ ntoi ê( sôphrosu/ nê e)sti/ n? |
| 40436 | 174 E.[ Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/ as e)/stai dêmiourgo/ s? |
| 40436 | 230 E.[ Greek: dia\ ti/ pote a)mpho/ tera au)ta\ ke/ rdos kalei= s? |
| 40436 | 375 D.[ Greek: ê( dikaiosu/ nê ou)chi ê)\ du/ nami/ s ti/ s e)stin, ê)\ e)pistê/ mê, ê)\ a)mpho/ tera?]] |
| 40436 | 39 Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it-- What is the Beautiful? |
| 40436 | A man, who endures the loss of money, understanding well that he will thereby gain a larger sum, is he courageous? |
| 40436 | A)/llês ga\r ê)=n te/ chnês u(gi/ eia? |
| 40436 | A)/llês ga\r ê)=n te/ chnês u(giei/ a, ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40436 | A)/llês; Ou)d''a)/ra ô)phelei/ as, ô)= e(tai= re; a)/llê| ga\r au)= a)pe/ domen tou= to to\ e)/rgon te/ chnê| nu= n dê/; ê)= ga\r? |
| 40436 | A)=r''a)\n o(mologoi= en oi( a)/nthrôpoi pro\s tau= ta ê(ma= s tê\n metrêtikê\n sô/ zein a)\n te/ chnên, ê)\ a)/llên?]] |
| 40436 | A)r''ou)=n kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n kalo/ n,--ê)=| de\ kako\n ai)schro/ n? |
| 40436 | A)tha/ naton a)/ra ê( psuchê/? |
| 40436 | About what is Rhetoric as a cognition concerned, Gorgias? |
| 40436 | About_ what_ is it that the Sophist forms able speakers: of course about that which he himself knows? |
| 40436 | All law is the same,_ quatenus_ law: what is the common constituent attribute? |
| 40436 | All law is the same,_ quatenus_ law: what is the common constituent attribute?] |
| 40436 | All these are the writings of persons, knowing in each of the respective pursuits? |
| 40436 | All this is greatly expanded in the dialogue-- p. 128 D:[ Greek: Ou)k a)/ra o)/tan tô= n sautou= e)pimelê=|, sautou= e)pime/ lei?] |
| 40436 | Am I to proclaim this respecting you, when I go home? |
| 40436 | Am I to tell him, it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing? |
| 40436 | And again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things evil, so far forth as they are painful? |
| 40436 | And is it not in this ignorance, or stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible-- that cowardice consists? |
| 40436 | And then what is meant by_ intelligent_? |
| 40436 | And thus( concludes Sokrates) the answer to the question originally started by Menon--"Whether virtue is teachable?" |
| 40436 | And what are we to understand by the Profitable? |
| 40436 | And when you possessed it( I asked), did you get it by learning from me? |
| 40436 | Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies, colours, figures, voices, pursuits,& c., so denominated from some common property? |
| 40436 | Are not most of those who undertake these pursuits ridiculously silly? |
| 40436 | Are there_ any_ matters or circumstances in which it is better for a man to be ignorant, than to know? |
| 40436 | Are they at bottom one and the same thing under different names? |
| 40436 | Are they homogeneous, differing only in quantity or has each of them its own specific essence and peculiarity? |
| 40436 | Are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same intelligent mind? |
| 40436 | Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a stupid estimate of things terrible? |
| 40436 | Are they not the writings of those who know how to govern-- kings, statesmen, and men of superior excellence? |
| 40436 | Are those things good, which are profitable to mankind? |
| 40436 | Are we on the right scent? |
| 40436 | Are we to say for that reason that he is not temperate? |
| 40436 | Are you of the common opinion on this point also? |
| 40436 | Are you worthy of freedom? |
| 40436 | But by what measure are we to determine_ when_ a man is in a good or bad mental state? |
| 40436 | But does the well- doer always and certainly know that he is doing well? |
| 40436 | But how can there be intelligence respecting the future, except in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and the past? |
| 40436 | But how does Plato explain this? |
| 40436 | But if this be all that temperance can do, of what use is it to us( continues Sokrates)? |
| 40436 | But if your opponent impugns the hypothesis itself, how are you to defend it? |
| 40436 | But in what sort of virtue? |
| 40436 | But is it really true, Sokrates, that you do not know what virtue is? |
| 40436 | But is their belief well founded? |
| 40436 | But is there any real difference between what is akin and what is like? |
| 40436 | But now comes the important question-- In what sense are we to understand the words Good and Evil? |
| 40436 | But shall I, like an old man addressing his juniors, recount to you an illustrative mythe? |
| 40436 | But should we for that reason do well and be happy? |
| 40436 | But tell me farther: do they allow you to direct yourself-- or do not they even trust you so far as that? |
| 40436 | But tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much, that is gain? |
| 40436 | But then the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good different from the beautiful? |
| 40436 | But what are we to understand by the_ Good_, about which there are so many disputes, according to the acknowledgment of Plato as well as of Sokrates? |
| 40436 | But what is it that he does, as your director? |
| 40436 | But what is that common, generic, quality, designated well as good by the word_ gain_, apart from these two distinctive epithets? |
| 40436 | But what is the peculiar of the philosopher? |
| 40436 | But what is the work which this art performs? |
| 40436 | But when Sokrates tries to determine, Wherein consists this Law- Type? |
| 40436 | But when you talk about_ better_, in wrestling or singing, what standard do you refer to? |
| 40436 | But who are the[ Greek: ei)dô= n phi/ loi], attacked in the Sophistês? |
| 40436 | But worse, for whom? |
| 40436 | But( replies Sokrates) are they not all the same,_ quatenus_ virtue? |
| 40436 | By his own feelings? |
| 40436 | By my judgment? |
| 40436 | By the judgment of by- standers? |
| 40436 | By what tests is the right order to be distinguished from the wrong? |
| 40436 | Can not I know about justice and injustice, without a master? |
| 40436 | Can that be made out, Kritias? |
| 40436 | Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful? |
| 40436 | Courage therefore must consist in knowledge or intelligence? |
| 40436 | Did he mean the same as mankind generally? |
| 40436 | Did the capacity( I,_ Sokrates_, asked Aristeides) forsake you all at once, or little by little? |
| 40436 | Did you ever know any predication that had a soul?" |
| 40436 | Do n''t you admit this? |
| 40436 | Do not good Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities? |
| 40436 | Do not the enactors enact it as the maximum of good, without which the citizens can not live a regulated life? |
| 40436 | Do not they, like despots, kill, impoverish, and expel any one whom they please? |
| 40436 | Do not you know what are the usual grounds and complaints urged when war is undertaken? |
| 40436 | Do they and their elegant spokesman Protagoras, know what virtue is? |
| 40436 | Do you admit that this is the case? |
| 40436 | Do you affirm that the rhapsodic art, and the strategic art, are one? |
| 40436 | Do you call these latter_ good_ also? |
| 40436 | Do you deny that these others( those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really pleasures? |
| 40436 | Do you intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters, or about harp- playing, or about gymnastics? |
| 40436 | Do you intend to qualify yourself for becoming a schoolmaster or a professor?" |
| 40436 | Do you mean shorter than the case requires? |
| 40436 | Do you mean that unjust is essentially the friend of just-- temperate of intemperate-- good of evil? |
| 40436 | Do you mean that virtue is a Whole, and that these three names denote distinct parts of it? |
| 40436 | Do you mean, to all things alike, great as well as little?" |
| 40436 | Do you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about pleasure and pain? |
| 40436 | Do you still adhere to that opinion? |
| 40436 | Do you still think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely stupid, but extremely courageous? |
| 40436 | Do you think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress? |
| 40436 | Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with moderation? |
| 40436 | Does he who loves, become the friend of him whom he loves, whether the latter returns the affection or not? |
| 40436 | Does it not partake of the essence and come under the definition, of what is fine or and honourable? |
| 40436 | Does not the arithmetical teacher, and every other teacher, produce persuasion? |
| 40436 | Does the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer? |
| 40436 | Does the man want to know what is a beautiful thing? |
| 40436 | Does the temperate man know his own temperance? |
| 40436 | Du/ namis me\n a)/ra kalo/ n-- a)dunami/ a de\ ai)schro/ n?]] |
| 40436 | Ei) a)ph''e(te/ rou e(/teron e)nnoou= men? |
| 40436 | Ei) de\ kala/, kai\ a)gatha/?]] |
| 40436 | Ei) de\ mê\ ai)schra/, a)=r''ou) kala/? |
| 40436 | Emotions of Sokrates 153 Question, What is Temperance? |
| 40436 | Even if you do find it, how can you ever know that you have found it? |
| 40436 | For example-- From what cause does a man grow? |
| 40436 | For the persons who suffer by his proceedings? |
| 40436 | For the spectators, who declare the proceedings of Archelaus to be disgraceful? |
| 40436 | For what is meant by_ right use_? |
| 40436 | From whom have you learnt-- or when did you find out for yourself? |
| 40436 | Good is the object of the Regal or political intelligence; but what is Good? |
| 40436 | Have any of them ever injured you? |
| 40436 | Have mankind generally one uniform meaning? |
| 40436 | Have you done any wrong to your father and mother? |
| 40436 | Have you frequented some master, without my knowledge, to teach you this? |
| 40436 | He first enquires from the athletic Erastes, What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon? |
| 40436 | He surprised me by the interrogation-- How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful, and what are ugly? |
| 40436 | He urges continuance of search by both 237 But how is the process of search available to any purpose? |
| 40436 | He will ask us-- Upon what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? |
| 40436 | He will ask you whether a wooden soup- ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold,--since it is more suitable and becoming? |
| 40436 | He will laugh at your answer, and ask you-- Do you think, then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as a sculptor? |
| 40436 | He will say-- Is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing also? |
| 40436 | Health,_ quatenus_ Health, is the same in a man or a woman: is not the case similar with virtue? |
| 40436 | Here is the same error in replying, as was committed by Euthyphron when asked, What is the Holy? |
| 40436 | Hipparchus-- Question-- What is the definition of Lover of Gain? |
| 40436 | How are they distinguished from Rhetoric? |
| 40436 | How are we to distinguish which of them? |
| 40436 | How are we to explain or define it? |
| 40436 | How can I tell( rejoins Charmides) whether I possess it or not: since even men like you and Kritias can not discover what it is? |
| 40436 | How can good men care much for each other, seeing that they thus neither regret each other when absent, nor have need of each other when present? |
| 40436 | How can the two objects, which when separate were each one, be made_ two_, by the fact that they are brought together? |
| 40436 | How can there be any cognition, which is not cognition of a given_ cognitum_, but cognition merely of other cognitions and non- cognitions? |
| 40436 | How can there be reciprocal love between parties who render to each other no reciprocal aid? |
| 40436 | How can you distinguish a true solution from another which is untrue, but plausible?" |
| 40436 | How could any of us live safely in the society of so many mad- men? |
| 40436 | How do you know, or where have you learnt, to distinguish just from unjust? |
| 40436 | How do you mean_ fine_( replies the athlete)? |
| 40436 | How does each of them describe and distinguish the permanent elements, and the transient elements, involved in human agency? |
| 40436 | How does the Rhetor differ from them? |
| 40436 | How far is he to question, or expose, or require to be proved, that which the majority believe without proof? |
| 40436 | How far justice is like to holiness? |
| 40436 | How far justice is like to holiness? |
| 40436 | How is Menon to learn virtue, and from whom? |
| 40436 | How is he to be treated by the government, or by the orthodox majority of society in their individual capacity? |
| 40436 | How is the business of mental training to be brought to a beneficial issue without him? |
| 40436 | How say you? |
| 40436 | How( they asked) does it happen that this reminiscence brings up often what is false or absurd? |
| 40436 | However, answer me once more-- Is not justice either a certain mental capacity? |
| 40436 | I should say that it was just: what do you say? |
| 40436 | I think it is some thing: are you of the same opinion? |
| 40436 | If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best-- should we call him wise? |
| 40436 | If any men embark in these dangers, without such preliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? |
| 40436 | If by its results, by_ what_ results?--calculations for minimising pains, and maximising pleasures, being excluded by the supposition? |
| 40436 | If not_ then_, upon what other occasions will you tender your counsel? |
| 40436 | If punished, the wrong- doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things fine or honourable, in so far as they are just? |
| 40436 | If so, does it confer every variety of knowledge-- that of the carpenter, currier,& c., as well as others? |
| 40436 | If so, how can you reconcile that with your former declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any other part? |
| 40436 | If so, is it dear to us on account of evil? |
| 40436 | If so,_ how_ do they know it, and can they explain it? |
| 40436 | If such reminiscence exists( asked Straton) how comes it that we require demonstrations to conduct us to knowledge? |
| 40436 | If that be meant, we must go and consult horse- trainers or mariners? |
| 40436 | If then we are asked, What is that, the presence of which makes a body hot? |
| 40436 | If this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of pleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? |
| 40436 | If virtue is not acquired by teaching and does not come by nature, how are there any virtuous men? |
| 40436 | If we say, that we shall render other men_ good_--the question again recurs,_ Good_--in what respect? |
| 40436 | If you fall sick will you send for one of_ them_, or for a professional physician? |
| 40436 | If you know matters belonging to military command, do you know them in your capacity of general, or in your capacity of rhapsode? |
| 40436 | If, then, we see some doing this, are we to declare them knowing or ignorant? |
| 40436 | Ignorance of what? |
| 40436 | Ignorance of_ what?_ Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.] |
| 40436 | Ignorance of_ what?_ Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always_ ib._ Wise public counsellors are few. |
| 40436 | In like manner, the question being asked, What is that, which, being in the body, will give it life? |
| 40436 | In the art of mensuration, or in the apparent impression? |
| 40436 | In the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,[133] we find him proclaiming, that the first of all problems to be solved was, What virtue really is? |
| 40436 | In what does the analogy or the sameness consist? |
| 40436 | In what manner does one man become the friend of another? |
| 40436 | In what relation does it stand to the Pleasurable and the Painful? |
| 40436 | Intelligence of what? |
| 40436 | Intelligent-- of what-- or to what end? |
| 40436 | Is a man''s bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or as much nourishment, as possible? |
| 40436 | Is he a powerful speaker himself in the Dikastery? |
| 40436 | Is he, in your opinion, happy or miserable? |
| 40436 | Is it Isokrates? |
| 40436 | Is it Isokrates?] |
| 40436 | Is it because they impart pleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and other such things, for the future? |
| 40436 | Is it not the same art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best distinguishes the good from the bad? |
| 40436 | Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art? |
| 40436 | Is it possible then, Lysis, for a man to think highly of himself on those matters on which he does not yet think aright? |
| 40436 | Is it the blood through which we think-- or air, or fire? |
| 40436 | Is it the blood, or air, or fire, whereby we think? |
| 40436 | Is it the dominant agency in the mind? |
| 40436 | Is it the dominant agency in the mind? |
| 40436 | Is it then true( continues Sokrates) that good is our_ primum amabile_, and dear to us in itself? |
| 40436 | Is it true that evil is the cause why any thing is dear to us? |
| 40436 | Is it_ all_ intelligence? |
| 40436 | Is not ivory also beautiful, and particular kinds of stone? |
| 40436 | Is not the good man, so far forth as good, sufficient to himself,--standing in need of no one-- and therefore loving no one? |
| 40436 | Is not the wise man, he who knows what it is proper to say and do-- and the unwise man, he who does not know? |
| 40436 | Is not the wooden ladle, therefore, better than the golden? |
| 40436 | Is not this the case with gymnastic, commercial business, rhetoric, military command? |
| 40436 | Is such very great quantity good for the body? |
| 40436 | Is that which they esteem, really virtue? |
| 40436 | Is there any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be Archelaus than any other man in Macedonia? |
| 40436 | Is there any other reason, or any other ulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be evil? |
| 40436 | It is about this as a whole that I ask you-- What is Law? |
| 40436 | It is intelligence or knowledge,--But_ of what_? |
| 40436 | It is not the custom of the country for the Spartans to do right, but to do wrong? |
| 40436 | It must surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which they display? |
| 40436 | It relates to Law, or The Law--_ Sokr._--What is Law( asks Sokrates)? |
| 40436 | It was a second question-- important, yet still second and presupposing the solution of the first-- Whether virtue is teachable? |
| 40436 | Its single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers? |
| 40436 | Kai\ pô= s a)\n? |
| 40436 | Kalliklês defends the negative 343 Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? |
| 40436 | Moreover, must we not superadd the condition, to command justly, and not unjustly? |
| 40436 | Nevertheless the question which we have just discussed--"How virtue arises or is generated?" |
| 40436 | Next, granting it to be possible, in what way do we gain by it? |
| 40436 | No tenable definition found 83 Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word_ gain_**? |
| 40436 | No way out of it is shown, and how is he to find one? |
| 40436 | Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen performs his own special duties? |
| 40436 | Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time was there when you did not believe yourself to know? |
| 40436 | Now then that we are to go in all this hurry to Protagoras, tell me who he is and what title he bears, as we called Pheidias a sculptor? |
| 40436 | Now then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias( continues Sokrates), I turn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false? |
| 40436 | Now upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public counsellors? |
| 40436 | Now what is that, of which temperance is the knowledge,--distinct from temperance itself? |
| 40436 | Now, Protagoras, what are these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt? |
| 40436 | Now, if to do wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be because it has a preponderance either of pain or of evil? |
| 40436 | O(/ti Stra/ tôn ê)po/ rei, ei) e)/stin a)namnêsis, pô= s a)/neu a)podei/ xeôn ou) gigno/ metha e)pistê/ mones? |
| 40436 | O(\ d''a)\n tha/ naton mê\ de/ chêtai, ti/ kalou= men? |
| 40436 | Of course, this implies that we know what virtue is: otherwise how can we give advice as to the means of acquiring it? |
| 40436 | Of leather- cutting, brazen work, wool, wood,& c.? |
| 40436 | Of these three relieving forces, which is the most honourable? |
| 40436 | Or are the three names all equivalent to virtue, different names for one and are the same thing? |
| 40436 | Or are there any pleasurable things which are not good? |
| 40436 | Or are they like the parts of gold, homogeneous with each other and with the whole, differing only in magnitude? |
| 40436 | Or are they not distinct, in each of the three cases-- and is not Law also one thing, the various customs and beliefs another? |
| 40436 | Or are they to be apportioned in a certain dose to every man? |
| 40436 | Or for Archelaus himself? |
| 40436 | Or how can it have any object at all? |
| 40436 | Or is Protagoras the man to supply such a demand? |
| 40436 | Or is he only a composer of discourses to be spoken by others? |
| 40436 | Or is it necessary that he who possesses one part, should possess all? |
| 40436 | Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? |
| 40436 | Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? |
| 40436 | Or is reciprocity of affection necessary, in order that either shall be the friend of the other? |
| 40436 | Or is the person loved, whatever be his own dispositions, the friend of the person who loves him? |
| 40436 | Or is there any one single variety of intelligence, by the possession of which we shall become good and happy? |
| 40436 | Or is this true only of some things and not of all-- so that cognition may be something in the latter category? |
| 40436 | Otherwise what can be meant by this charge of"cunning reticence or keeping back?" |
| 40436 | Ou)d''a)/ra ô)phelei/ as, ô)= e(/taire; a)/llê| ga\r au)= a)pe/ domen tou= to to\ e)/rgon te/ chnê| nu= n dê/; ê)= ga/ r? |
| 40436 | Ou)kou= n a)ei\ tou= to ou(/tôs e)/chei? |
| 40436 | Ou)kou= n ou)deno\s dida/ xantos a)ll''e)rôtê/ santos e)pistê/ setai, a)nalabô\n au)to\s e)x au)tou= tê\n e)pistê/ mên?]] |
| 40436 | Ou)kou= n tê\n me\n ê(donê\n diô/ kete ô(s a)gatho\n o)/n, tê\n de\ lu/ pên pheu/ gete ô(s kako/ n?]] |
| 40436 | Ought he not to do as he would do if he wished to learn medicine or music: to put himself under some paid professional man as teacher?" |
| 40436 | Persons of the Dialogue 232 Question put by Menon-- Is virtue teachable? |
| 40436 | Persuasion about what? |
| 40436 | Plato, Menon, p. 78 C._ Sokr._[ Greek: A)gatha\ de\ kalei= s ou)chi oi(=on u(gi/ eia/ n te kai\ plou= ton? |
| 40436 | Po/ teron d''e)/sti ti zôê=| e)nanti/ on, ê)\ ou)de/ n? |
| 40436 | Pô= s ga\r ou)/?]] |
| 40436 | Pô= s ga\r ou)/?]] |
| 40436 | Pô= s ga\r ou)chi/? |
| 40436 | Pô= s ou)=n ô)phe/ limos e)/stai ê( sôphrosu/ nê, ou)demia= s ô)phelei/ as ou)=sa dêmiourgo/ s? |
| 40436 | Pô= s ou)=n ô)phe/ limos e)/stai ê(sôphrosu/ nê, ou)demia= s ô)phelei/ as ou)=sa dêmiourgo/ s? |
| 40436 | Question-- What is the characteristic property connoted by the word[ Greek: No/ mos] or law? |
| 40436 | Question-- What is the characteristic property connoted by the word[ Greek: No/ mos] or law?] |
| 40436 | Questions of Sokrates to him-- How happens it that you can not talk equally upon other poets? |
| 40436 | Questions of Sokrates to him-- How happens it that you can not talk equally upon other poets? |
| 40436 | Respecting what subject? |
| 40436 | Shall he be required to profess, or to obey, or to refrain from contradicting, religious or ethical doctrines which he has examined and rejected? |
| 40436 | Shall we say that good is of a nature akin to every one, and evil of a nature foreign to every one? |
| 40436 | Since you are in a condition so disgraceful, can you think life better for you than death? |
| 40436 | So that though you said-- The Self- Beautiful is Gold-- you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more beautiful than fig- tree wood? |
| 40436 | Sokrates asks Hippias what sort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at Sparta? |
| 40436 | Sokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking Polus,[45] which of the two is most disgraceful-- To do wrong-- or to suffer wrong? |
| 40436 | Sokrates questions the slave of Menon 238 Enquiry taken up-- Whether virtue is teachable? |
| 40436 | Some of the fallacies in the dialogue([ Greek: Po/ teron o(rô= sin oi( a)/nthrôpoi ta\ dunata\ o(ra=|n ê)\ ta\ a)du/ nata? |
| 40436 | Still how does this prove that there can be cognition of non- cognition? |
| 40436 | Such being the case, what is that common quality possessed by both, which induces you to call them by the same name_ Gain_? |
| 40436 | Such discriminating intelligence, which in this dialogue is called the Regal or political art,--what is the object of it? |
| 40436 | Such then being the care bestowed, both publicly and privately, to foster virtue, can you really doubt, Sokrates, whether it be teachable? |
| 40436 | Sugchôrei= s ou(/tôs e)/chein? |
| 40436 | Suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold acquires two pounds of silver, is it gain or loss? |
| 40436 | Suppose a man to know every thing past, present, and future; which among the fractions of such omniscience would contribute most to make him happy? |
| 40436 | Surely not_ all_ endurance( rejoins Sokrates)? |
| 40436 | Ta/ xeis, a)reta/ s, o(pli/ seis a)ndrô= n? |
| 40436 | Tell me again, do you think that the pleasurable and the good are identical? |
| 40436 | Tell me in like manner, what is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage? |
| 40436 | Tell me what the Beautiful is? |
| 40436 | Tell me-- is justice some thing, or no thing? |
| 40436 | That by which men manage chariots? |
| 40436 | That gain is the opposite of loss: that to gain is the opposite of to lose? |
| 40436 | That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to his inquisitive feelings 404 Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What is a cause? |
| 40436 | That loss( to be a loser) is evil? |
| 40436 | That to gain, as being the opposite of evil is a good thing? |
| 40436 | That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when you believed yourself not to know? |
| 40436 | The dialogue is begun by Menon, in a manner quite as abrupt as the Hipparchus and Minos:[ Side- note: Question put by Menon-- Is virtue teachable? |
| 40436 | The former topic of enquiry is now resumed: but at the instance of Menon, the question taken up, is not--"What is virtue?" |
| 40436 | The main subject of this short dialogue is-- What is philosophy? |
| 40436 | The medical art is dear to us, because health is dear: but is there any thing behind, for the sake of which health also is dear? |
| 40436 | The question here raised is present to Plato''s mind in other dialogues, and occurs under other words, as for example, What is good? |
| 40436 | The question still continues, What is virtue? |
| 40436 | The question then stands thus--"Is virtue knowledge?" |
| 40436 | The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is teachable? |
| 40436 | The questions are put to him by Sokrates--"Is virtue teachable? |
| 40436 | The regal art can thus impart no knowledge except itself; and what is_ itself_? |
| 40436 | The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? |
| 40436 | The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? |
| 40436 | The same man thus, in your view, will be both good and bad? |
| 40436 | The valuable is that which is valuable to possess: is that the profitable, or the unprofitable? |
| 40436 | There is thus some common constituent: tell me what it is, according to you and Gorgias? |
| 40436 | Though the subject of direct debate in the Menon is the same as that in the Protagoras( whether virtue be teachable?) |
| 40436 | Though there are many diverse virtues, have not all of them one and the same form in common, through the communion of which they_ are_ virtues? |
| 40436 | Thus when Lachês, after having given as his first answer( to the question, What is Courage?) |
| 40436 | Ti/? |
| 40436 | To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question,"What is good?" |
| 40436 | To just and unjust 3 How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? |
| 40436 | To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible 8 But good-- for what end, and under what circumstances? |
| 40436 | To what ends are the gifts here enumerated to be turned, in order to constitute right use? |
| 40436 | To what standard, or to what end, do you refer? |
| 40436 | To\ poi= on, ê)=n d''e)gô/? |
| 40436 | Turpe is defined to be either what causes immediate pain to the spectator, or ulterior hurt-- to whom? |
| 40436 | Upon points which you know better than they? |
| 40436 | Upon this Sokrates asks-- In which of the cities were your gains the largest: probably at Sparta? |
| 40436 | Upon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross- examine:_ Sokr._--Do you think that good men are useful, bad men useless? |
| 40436 | Upon what ground do we call these few wise? |
| 40436 | Upon what ground do we call these few wise? |
| 40436 | Upon what matters is he competent to advise? |
| 40436 | Upon what matters is he competent to advise?] |
| 40436 | Upon what points do you intend to advise them? |
| 40436 | Upon what then can the Rhetor advise-- upon just and unjust-- nothing else? |
| 40436 | Upon which of them can you discourse? |
| 40436 | Was it last year? |
| 40436 | We must fight those whom it is better to fight-- to what standard does better refer? |
| 40436 | We must fight those whom it is better to fight-- to what standard does better refer? |
| 40436 | Were not your lectures calculated to improve the Spartan youth? |
| 40436 | What again is meant by_ knowledge_? |
| 40436 | What alteration has happened in their nature? |
| 40436 | What are the five different parts of virtue? |
| 40436 | What are the separate parts of virtue-- justice, moderation, holiness,& c.? |
| 40436 | What did Plato mean by them? |
| 40436 | What does he intend to advise them upon? |
| 40436 | What does he intend to advise them upon? |
| 40436 | What function does each of them assign to the permanent element? |
| 40436 | What good does it effect? |
| 40436 | What good does self- knowledge procure for us? |
| 40436 | What good does self- knowledge procure for us? |
| 40436 | What good, or what harm, can like do to like, which it does not also do to itself? |
| 40436 | What ground have you for complaining of him? |
| 40436 | What has he learnt, and what does he know? |
| 40436 | What has he learnt, and what does he know?] |
| 40436 | What in this last case do you mean by_ better_? |
| 40436 | What is Beauty, or the Beautiful? |
| 40436 | What is Beauty, or the Beautiful?] |
| 40436 | What is Law, or The Law? |
| 40436 | What is Law, or The Law? |
| 40436 | What is it, that a man must know, in order that his justice or courage may become profitable? |
| 40436 | What is it? |
| 40436 | What is its province and purport? |
| 40436 | What is its province? |
| 40436 | What is its province?] |
| 40436 | What is likely to be his character, if compelled to suppress all declaration of his own creed, and to act and speak as if he were believer in another? |
| 40436 | What is that object towards which our love or friendship is determined? |
| 40436 | What is that, the presence or absence of which makes_ better_ or_ worse_? |
| 40436 | What is the art or science for realising it? |
| 40436 | What is the best conjecture? |
| 40436 | What is the best conjecture? |
| 40436 | What is the common attribute which in all these cases constitutes Courage? |
| 40436 | What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? |
| 40436 | What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? |
| 40436 | What is the object known, in this case? |
| 40436 | What is the object known, in this case? |
| 40436 | What is the proper treatment of the mind? |
| 40436 | What is the regal or political art which directs or regulates all others? |
| 40436 | What is the relation which they bear to each other and to the whole-- virtue? |
| 40436 | What is there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction? |
| 40436 | What is this friendship or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become good men? |
| 40436 | What mode of persuasion does he bring about? |
| 40436 | What other exchangeable value can there be between pleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity-- greater or less, more or fewer? |
| 40436 | What product does it yield, as the medical art supplies good health, and the farmer''s art, provision? |
| 40436 | What reason is there to determine, on the part of the indifferent, attachment to the good? |
| 40436 | What reply will you make, in the case of the city? |
| 40436 | What sort of workmanship does he direct? |
| 40436 | When one man loves another, which becomes the friend of which? |
| 40436 | Where then can you find a lover of gain? |
| 40436 | Wherein consists the process called verification and proof, of that which is first presented as an hypothesis? |
| 40436 | Whether all varieties of desire are good? |
| 40436 | Whether all varieties of desire are good? |
| 40436 | Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous? |
| 40436 | Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous?] |
| 40436 | Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical? |
| 40436 | Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical?] |
| 40436 | Which of the two does the Rhetor bring about? |
| 40436 | Which of your admissions do you wish to retract-- That all men desire good things? |
| 40436 | Who can admit this? |
| 40436 | Who can your disputatious friend be? |
| 40436 | Who have been their fellow- pupils? |
| 40436 | Who is the judge to determine this measure? |
| 40436 | Who is the judge to determine this measure?] |
| 40436 | Who is to be called a friend? |
| 40436 | Who is to be called a friend? |
| 40436 | Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and communication on these very subjects? |
| 40436 | Why are you so bitter against the Sophists? |
| 40436 | Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions-- their law forbids_ ib._ Question, What is law? |
| 40436 | Why? |
| 40436 | Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and the wooden ladle turn it out good? |
| 40436 | Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for one who gives directions about the treatment of a sick man, better than the physician? |
| 40436 | Will they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible? |
| 40436 | Would it be that by which he knew the art of gaming? |
| 40436 | Would not the objectors themselves acknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of mensuration? |
| 40436 | Would they all contribute equally? |
| 40436 | Would you say the same? |
| 40436 | Yet where is he to be found? |
| 40436 | You beat your dog sometimes? |
| 40436 | You defined law to be the decree of the city: Are not some decrees good, others evil? |
| 40436 | [ 100]_ Sokr._--You call those things pleasurable, which either partake of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? |
| 40436 | [ 102] What is your opinion about knowledge? |
| 40436 | [ 108] Or can you indicate any other end, to which men look when they call these matters evil? |
| 40436 | [ 10] How does it happen( asked Sokrates) that you have so much to say about Homer, and nothing at all about other poets? |
| 40436 | [ 10] Would you call_ Gain_ any acquisition which one makes either with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all? |
| 40436 | [ 111] How can it be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? |
| 40436 | [ 121]_ Prot._--How can this be? |
| 40436 | [ 124]_ Sokr._--Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into war, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? |
| 40436 | [ 125] On the contrary, cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both fear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions? |
| 40436 | [ 127]_ Sokr._--Why will you not answer my question, either affirmatively or negatively? |
| 40436 | [ 13] But is this true? |
| 40436 | [ 14]_ Sokr._--If this be so, it will of course be a knowledge of ignorance, as well as a knowledge of knowledge? |
| 40436 | [ 15]_ Sokr._--Do you think, then, that discourse is, the things spoken: that sight is, the things seen? |
| 40436 | [ 18]_ Lachês._--Where is there any such man? |
| 40436 | [ 18]_ Sokr._--But what do you mean by_ better_? |
| 40436 | [ 1] Does he do this( asks Sokrates) knowing that the things are worth nothing? |
| 40436 | [ 21]_ Sokr._--Of course he will; there is nothing surprising in that: but towards_ what_, and about_ what_, will he make progress? |
| 40436 | [ 23] How are we to know our own minds? |
| 40436 | [ 23]_ Sokr._--In like manner, what are the laws respecting the government of a city? |
| 40436 | [ 25][ Footnote 25: Plato, Ion, 536 E.][ Side- note: Homer talks upon all subjects-- Is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon all of them? |
| 40436 | [ 25]_ Polus._--Then Archelaus is miserable, according to your doctrine? |
| 40436 | [ 25]_ Sokr._--But according to knowledge, of_ what_? |
| 40436 | [ 27] Do you think that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been defeated in his conspiracy and punished? |
| 40436 | [ 28] or shall I go through an expository discourse? |
| 40436 | [ 28]_ Polus._--How say you? |
| 40436 | [ 31] Hermês asked Zeus-- Upon what principle shall I distribute these gifts among mankind? |
| 40436 | [ 33] How does a man become the object of friendship or love from another? |
| 40436 | [ 34]_ Sokr._--In what manner is he profited? |
| 40436 | [ 36] Does the regal art then confer knowledge? |
| 40436 | [ 36]_ Alk._--When shall I be able to learn this, and who is there to teach me? |
| 40436 | [ 3] But you doubtless recollect, and can tell me, both from yourself, and from him, what virtue is? |
| 40436 | [ 47] The like may be said about the fallacy in page 284 D--"Are there persons who speak of things as they are? |
| 40436 | [ 4] Sokrates accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is? |
| 40436 | [ 4]_ Nikias._--Surely the point before us is, whether it be wise to put these young men under the lessons of the master of arms? |
| 40436 | [ 4]_ Sokr._--We are going to pay him then as a Sophist? |
| 40436 | [ 5]_ Sokr._ How, then, can we say that the multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely dispute about it among themselves? |
| 40436 | [ 6][ Footnote 6: Plato, Lysis, 210 D.[ Greek: Oi(=o/ n te ou)=n e)pi\ tou/ tois, ô)= Lu/ si, me/ ga phronei= n, e)n oi(=s tis mê/ pô phronei=? |
| 40436 | [ 6]_ Sokr._--You think philosophy not only a fine thing, but good? |
| 40436 | [ 70]_ Sokr._--Do you mean those things which are not profitable to any_ man_, or those which are not profitable to any creature whatever? |
| 40436 | [ 77] But upon what criterion is the scientific man to proceed? |
| 40436 | [ 7] It is for you therefore, Lysimachus, to ask Nikias and Lachês,--Who have been their masters? |
| 40436 | [ 7]_ Menon._--How do you mean? |
| 40436 | [ 7]_ Sokr._--But what? |
| 40436 | [ 7]_ Sokr_--Do you then profess to know what is expedient or inexpedient? |
| 40436 | [ 83][ Footnote 83: Plato, Phædon, p. 105 C- E.[ Greek: A)pokri/ nou dê/, ô(=| a)\n ti/ e)gge/ nêtai sô/ mati, zô= n e)/stai? |
| 40436 | [ 8][ Footnote 6: Plato, Menon, p. 73 D.][ Footnote 7: Plato, Menon, p. 73 E.[ Greek: Po/ teron a)retê/, ô)= Me/ nôn, ê)\ a)retê/ tis?]] |
| 40436 | [ 8]_ Sokr._--But what can your father do for you better than this, Theagês? |
| 40436 | [ 94]_ Sokr._--Do you consider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and honourable? |
| 40436 | [ 9] Tell me, What is this same common figure and property in both, which makes you call both of them figure-- both of them colour? |
| 40436 | [ Footnote 40: In regard to the question, Wherein consists[ Greek: To\ Kalo/ n]? |
| 40436 | [ Footnote 58: Plato, Phædon, p. 101 B- C.[ Greek: ti/ de/? |
| 40436 | [ Footnote 5: Plato, Gorgias, p. 449 E.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n peri\ ô(=nper le/ gein, kai\ phronei= n? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: A)=r''ou)=n panto\s a)ndro/ s** e)stin e)kle/ xasthai poi= a a)/gatha\ tô= n ê(de/ ôn e)sti\ kai\ o(poi= a kaka/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: A)=ra e)rôtta=|s ei)/ tina e)/chô ei)pei= n lo/ gon makro/ n, oi(/ous dê\ a)kou/ ein ei)/thisai? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Kai\ mê\n du/ o ge u(penanti/ a e(ni\ pra/ gmati pô= s a)\n ei)/ê?] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: O(/ti Bi/ ôn ê)po/ rei peri\ tou= pseu/ dous, ei) kai\ au)to\ kat''a)na/ mnêsin, ô(s to\ e)nanti/ on ge, ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n ei) a)ei\ ê( a)lê/ theia ê(mi= n tô= n o)/ntôn e)sti\n e)n tê=| psuchê=|, a)tha/ natos a)\n ê( psuchê\ ei)/ê?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n ê( a)lêthê\s do/ xa tou= o)/ntos e)stin e)xeu/ resis? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ou)kou= n, ê)\n d''e)gô/, ei)/per kalo\n kai\ a)gatho/ n, kai\ ê(du/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Po/ teron de\ ta\ plei= on e)/lkonta baru/ tera nomi/ zetai e)ntha/ de, ta\ de\ e)/latton, koupho/ tera, ê)\ tou)nanti/ on?] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Tau= ta ou)=n pote\ me\n ô)phelou= nta pote\ de\ bla/ ptonta, ti/ ma= llon a)gatha\ ê)\ kaka/ e)stin?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ti/ dai/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: Ti/ ou)=n a)/llo no/ mos ei)/ê a)\n a)ll''ê)\ ta\ nomizo/ mena?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: a)gatha\ de\ poi= a a)/ra tô= n o)/ntôn tugcha/ nei ê(mi= n o)/nta? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: ai( e)pi\ tou/ tou pra/ xeis a(/pasai e)pi\ tou= a)lu/ pôs zê= n kai\ ê)de/ ôs, a)=r''ou) kalai/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: e)n e(ka/ stê| tou/ tôn tou\s pollou\s pro\s e(/kaston to\ e)/rgon ou) katagela/ stous o(ra=|s?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: e)peidê\ no/ mô| ta\ nomizo/ mena nomi/ zetai, ti/ ni o)/nti tô=| no/ mô| nomi/ zetai?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: e)peidê\ no/ mô| ta\ nomizo/ mena nomi/ zetai, ti/ ni o)/nti tô=| no/ mô| nomi/ zetai?]] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: i)/thi dê/, kai\ to\ en tô=| polemei= n be/ ltion kai\ to\ en tô=| ei)rê/ nên a)/gein, tou= to to\ be/ ltion ti/ o)noma/ zeis? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: kai\ ti/ s a)/llê a)xi/ a ê(donê=| pro\s lu/ pôn e)sti\n a)ll''ê)\ u(perbolê\ a)llê/ lôn kai\ e)/lleipsis? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: kai\ tou= to pô= s ou)k a)mathi/ a e)sti\n au(/tê ê( e)ponei/ distos, ê( tou= oi)/esthai ei)de/ nai a(\ ou)k oi)=den?] |
| 40436 | [ Greek: su\ de/, ê)=n d''e)gô/, pro\s theô= n, ou)k a)\n ai)schu/ noio ei)s tou\s E(/llênas sauto\n sophistê\n pare/ chôn? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: ti/ de/? |
| 40436 | [ Greek: ti/ n''a)\n tro/ pon eu(rethei/ ê_ au)to\ to\ au)to/_?]] |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word_ gain_? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: But good-- for what end, and under what circumstances? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: But how is the process of search available to any purpose? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: But intelligence-- of what? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What is a cause? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind-- how far correct?] |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Enquiry taken up-- Whether virtue is teachable? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Hipparchus-- Question-- What is the definition of Lover of Gain? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Know Thyself-- Delphian maxim-- its urgent importance-- What is myself? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: On what occasions can such second- best men be useful? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it-- What is the Beautiful?] |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Question put by Sokrates-- What is philosophy? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Question, What is Temperance? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Question, What is law? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Questions by Sokrates-- Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what?] |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: The Good-- the Profitable-- what is it?--How are we to know it? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well- doing or happiness? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Who is the person here intended by Plato, half- philosopher, half- politician? |
| 40436 | [ Side- note: Worse or better-- for whom? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--But what if I had no master? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--How? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--Oedipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up such a prayer? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--Was there not a time when I really believed myself not to know it? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--What am I to do, now that I have made it? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._--You mean, whether justly or unjustly? |
| 40436 | _ Alk._[ Greek: Ti/ ou)=n to\n ai(stho/ menon chrê\ poiei= n?] |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--How do you mean? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--Perhaps you mean the Lacedæmonians and Lykurgus? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--Respecting what sort of Law do you enquire( replies the Companion)? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--What is it that Homer and Hesiod say about Minos? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--What should Law be, Sokrates, other than the various assemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs? |
| 40436 | _ Comp._--Whom do you mean: and what do you mean? |
| 40436 | _ Hip._--How, Sokrates? |
| 40436 | _ Kall._--But if he does not liken himself to the despot, the despot may put him to death, if he chooses? |
| 40436 | _ Krit._--What do you say to their reasoning, Sokrates? |
| 40436 | _ Lysis._--Allow me? |
| 40436 | _ Lysis._--How can it be possible? |
| 40436 | _ Lysis._--How can you imagine that they trust me? |
| 40436 | _ Menon._--But how are you to search for that of which you are altogether ignorant? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._--Cannot you tell without that, whether he is happy or not? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._--How can that be? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._--How? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._--Then you will not call even the Great King happy? |
| 40436 | _ Polus._[ Greek: A)=r''ou)=n dokou= si/ soi ô(s ko/ lakes e)n tai= s po/ lesi phau= loi nomi/ zesthai oi( a)gathoi\ r(ê/ tores? |
| 40436 | _ Prot._--But who is to be judge of the brevity necessary, you or I? |
| 40436 | _ Prot._--Do you wish to ta]k to me alone, or in presence of the rest? |
| 40436 | _ Prot._--What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--About what discourses? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--According to your doctrine then, all men are lovers of gain, the good men as well as the evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--And of course, whoever is a good general, is also a good rhapsode? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--And what are you to become by going to him? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--And who is the competent judge, how much of either is right measure for the body? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Are not things which weigh more, accounted heavier; and things which weigh less, accounted lighter, here, at Carthage, and everywhere else? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Are you then also the best general in Greece? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--At what moment did you first find it out? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Ay, but what kind of business? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But about what affairs of their own? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But are there not other persons besides the Rhetor, who produce persuasion? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But can you not say which among the Greeks have the most ancient laws? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But does any one else direct you? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But doubtless, I imagine, they trust the team of mules to your direction; and if you chose to take the whip and flog, they would allow you? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But each thing can have but one opposite:[27] to be unwise, and to be mad, are therefore identical? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But how can there be unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of them knows, and the other does not know? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But if from the banquet you acquire health, would that be gain or loss? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But if going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also pleasurable? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But if he passes his life pleasurably until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But surely they would do right, in educating their children better and not worse? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But the profitable is good? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But to command whom or what-- horses or men? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life, or to damage yourself by the employment of it? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But what men, and under what circumstances? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But what men? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But what sort of intelligence? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But which of them most of all? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But whom do they allow, then? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But would not you be ashamed of presenting yourself to the Grecian public as a Sophist? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But you do maintain, that whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--But you yourself stated that evil men love all gains, small and great? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do not all men in all communities, among the Persians as well as here, now as well as formerly, think so too? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do not you yourself love good-- all good things? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do they become losers by gain, or by loss? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you know any public speakers who aim at anything more than gratifying the public, or who care to make the public better? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you know then what you are going to do? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you know those good kings of Krete, from whom these laws are derived-- Minos and Rhadamanthus, sons of Zeus and Europa? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you see then to what danger you are going to submit your mind? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you think any man happy, who is a slave, and who is not allowed to do any thing that he desires? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a small point of analogy between them? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Do you think_ that_ a sufficient reason for avoiding all these pursuits yourself, and keeping your son out of them also? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Does it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--For example, if after being at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an excellent dinner, you acquire an illness? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--From what provocation is it, then, that they prevent you in this terrible way, from being happy and doing what you wish? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Has it a preponderance of pain? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Holiness also is some thing: is the thing called_ holiness_, itself holy or unholy? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How can we say, therefore, that they are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who have learnt from no other teachers? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How is this, by Heraklês? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How is this? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How is this? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How say you? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How say you? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How so? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How then can you know about this matter, how far it is good or bad, if you have no experience whatever about it? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--How? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--If I am right, then, you think that the Kretans have more ancient laws than any other Greeks? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--If more ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--If most honourable, it confers either most pleasure or most profit? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--If you stand in need of a teacher, you do not yet think aright? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--In what way can it benefit us? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is he a slave or free? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is he a slave? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is it virtue-- or is it one particular variety of virtue? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is not temperance a fine and honourable thing? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is not the case similar with men? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Is not this badness of mind the greatest evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--It appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers of gain? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--It is not about all discourses? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--It seems, then, that honourable things are accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable things dishonourable? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Justice being admitted to be just, and holiness to be holy-- do not you think that justice also is holy, and that holiness is just? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Nor friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Now if a man be punished for wrong doing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher does what is just? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Now this thing which you call_ justice_: is it itself just or unjust? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Now, about the question, What is just and unjust-- are the multitude all of one mind, or do they differ among themselves? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be defined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Or that by which he knew the art of computing? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Or that by which he knew the conditions of health? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Ought they not to rule themselves as well as others:[67] to control their own pleasures and desires: to be sober and temperate? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Physicians write respecting matters of health what they account to be true, and these writings of theirs are the medical laws? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you will send for first and by preference? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--The Many; is it_ they_ who know what truth is? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--The Spartans therefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to confide to you their sons? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--The unwise man will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or done? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then it is the Kretans who have the most ancient laws in Greece? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then it must have a preponderance of evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then my friend will ask you in return, whether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of Gods, as the pot to the maiden? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then when you spoke about_ better_, in reference to war or peace, what you meant was_ juster_--you had in view justice and injustice? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Then you have no experience whatever about the Sophists? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--This unanimity, of what nature is it? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--To do wrong therefore is worse than to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Under what circumstances? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to give advice? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--We affirm ourselves therefore to know what virtue is? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--We have seen that they will be better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully, than if they do so unwillingly? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Well, then two years, three years,& c., ago? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Well, then, Gorgias, on what matters will the Rhetor be competent to advise? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What about the courageous man? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What good does this knowledge procure for us? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What is meant by a man_ taking care of himself_? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What kind of person is this censor of philosophy? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What men? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--What then is that, about which the Sophist is himself cognizant, and makes his pupil cognizant? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--When men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--When men are in social and political communion, to what purpose does the art of commanding them tend? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--When they thus view with confidence things dishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from ignorance and stupidity? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which are those who do? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which of the two is it, who( you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an honourable and good thing? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which of the two is the most disgraceful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer wrong? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Which of them then would contribute most? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, how much seed is right measure for sowing a field? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Whom then do you mean, when you talk of_ the good_? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Why is it, then, that they do not hinder you in this last case, as they did in the cases before mentioned? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Why, the Lacedæmonian laws are hardly more than three hundred years old: besides, whence is it that the best of them come? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Wisdom and courage then, both of them, are parts of virtue? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Wise men are only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you really think them mad? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--Yes, but_ good_, in what matters? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You affirm besides, that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You are yourself the best rhapsode in Greece? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You desire wisdom: but what kind of wisdom? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You do not admit, then, Nikias, that lions, tigers, boars,& c., and such animals, are courageous? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You do not think then that the good-- and the fine or honourable-- are one and the same; nor the bad-- and the ugly or disgraceful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You knew, then, even in your boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You mean when they are discussing the question with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You see that neither does your father love you, nor does any man love another, in so far as he is useless? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You think philosophy a fine thing? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You think that philosophers, as you describe them, are useful? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other gain evil? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._--[Greek: O(ra=|s ou)=n? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: A)meinon de\ dioikei= tai kai\ sô/ zetai ti/ nos paragignome/ nou ê)\ a)pogignomenou?]] |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ou)kou= n kai\ tô= n mathêma/ tôn ka/ llos ô(sau/ tôs?] |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ou)kou= n nu= n pa/ nta ta\ ke/ rdê o( lo/ gos ê(ma= s ê)na/ gkake kai\ smikra\ kai\ mega/ la o(mologei= n a)gatha\ ei)=nai?] |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ou)kou= n to\ ai)schro\n tô=| e)nanti/ ô|,_ lu/ pê| te kai\ kakô=|_?] |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ti/ de/? |
| 40436 | _ Sokr._[ Greek: Ti/ de\ dê\? |
| 40436 | _ Theag._--Why will not you take me yourself, Sokrates? |
| 40436 | _ ib._ Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? |
| 40436 | _ useful_--for what purpose? |
| 40436 | a)=r''ou) tou= to me\n a(plou= n, o(/ti tau/ tên ê(/tis ê(ma= s o)nê/ sei?]] |
| 40436 | a)=ra ê( metrêtikê\ te/ chnê, ê)\ ê( tou= phainome/ nou du/ namis? |
| 40436 | and a beautiful lyre as well? |
| 40436 | and do they give him pay besides for doing so? |
| 40436 | and how is it that no man can play on the flute or the harp without practice? |
| 40436 | and is not the honourable deed, good and profitable? |
| 40436 | and that Minos and Rhadamanthus are the best of all ancient lawgivers, rulers, and shepherds of mankind? |
| 40436 | and under what modifications of persons and circumstances? |
| 40436 | and which of them has ever made the public better? |
| 40436 | as medical knowledge procures for us health-- architectural knowledge, buildings,& c.? |
| 40436 | business relating to horses, or to navigation? |
| 40436 | but, why( he will ask) do you single out these pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? |
| 40436 | but--"Is virtue teachable or not?" |
| 40436 | di''ou)de\n a)/llo tau= ta kaka\ o)/nta, ê)\ dio/ ti ei)s a)ni/ as te a)poteleuta=| kai\ a)/llôn ê(donô= n a)posterei=?]] |
| 40436 | do they permit a hireling, in preference to_ you_, to do what he wishes with the horses? |
| 40436 | do you concur with the generality of people in calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good? |
| 40436 | do you think that just things are just and unjust things are unjust? |
| 40436 | do_ they_ govern you also, these teachers? |
| 40436 | does all happiness consist in that? |
| 40436 | does not he affront or go at what is more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? |
| 40436 | e)moi\ me\n ga\r dokei=; ti/ de\ soi/?]] |
| 40436 | have you not seen Gorgias at Athens, and did not he appear to you to know? |
| 40436 | how are we to use it? |
| 40436 | i)/dômen dê/, ê( ei)s ti phro/ nimos; ê)\ ê( ei)s a(/panta kai\ ta\ mega/ la kai\ ta\ smikra/?]] |
| 40436 | i)/dômen dê/,_ ê( ei)s ti/_ phro/ nimos; ê)\ ê( ei)s a(/panta kai\ ta\ mega/ la kai\ ta\ smikra/?]] |
| 40436 | in other words, to mensuration, art, or science? |
| 40436 | is no one allowed to flog them? |
| 40436 | is the opposite essentially a friend to its opposite? |
| 40436 | is there any difference between one law and another law, as to that identical circumstance, of being Law? |
| 40436 | kai\ chrusi/ on le/ gô kai\ a)rgu/ rion kta= sthai kai\ tima\s e)n po/ lei kai\ a)rcha/ s? |
| 40436 | kai\ di/ kên dê\ kai\ ai)dô= ou(/tô thô= e)n toi= s a)nthrô/ pois, ê)\ e)pi\ pa/ ntas nei/ mô? |
| 40436 | kai\ ti/ ê( a)logi/ a? |
| 40436 | kai\ to\ di/ pêchu tou= pêchuai/ ou ê(mi/ sei mei= zon ei)=nai, a)ll''ou) mege/ thei?]] |
| 40436 | kai\ to\ kalo\n e)/rgon, a)gatho/ n te kai\ ô)phe/ limon?]] |
| 40436 | keeping you the whole day in servitude to some one, and never your own master? |
| 40436 | knowledge of what? |
| 40436 | ma/ lista peri\ au)tô= n diaphe/ resthai?] |
| 40436 | mê\ a)/ll''a)/tta le/ geis ta)gatha\ ê)\ ta\ toiau= ta?] |
| 40436 | not considered? |
| 40436 | o( no/ mos a)/ra bou/ letai tou= o)/ntos ei)=nai e)xeu/ resis?]] |
| 40436 | oi)/ei tina ei)de/ nai mo/ rion a)retê= s o(/ ti e)/stin, au)tê\n mê\ ei)do/ ta? |
| 40436 | oi)o/ menoi a)/meinon ei)=nai ê(mi= n tau= ta ê)\ mê/? |
| 40436 | or all which do not belong to one or the other? |
| 40436 | or both together? |
| 40436 | or did not the Spartans desire to have their youth improved? |
| 40436 | or else knowledge? |
| 40436 | or govern horses? |
| 40436 | or had they no money? |
| 40436 | or in what other way? |
| 40436 | or not knowing? |
| 40436 | or pilot ships? |
| 40436 | or the ignorant? |
| 40436 | or( which is the same thing) when each citizen acts justly? |
| 40436 | ou)k oi)=den, e)/phê, pri\n soi\ suggene/ sthai, oi(=on ê)=n to\ a)ndra/ podon?]] |
| 40436 | ou)kou= n ê( psuchê\ to\ e)nanti/ on ô(=| au)tê\ e)piphe/ rei a)ei\ ou) mê/ pote de/ xêtai, ô(s e)k tô= n pro/ sthen ô(molo/ gêtai? |
| 40436 | p. 288 D.[ Greek: ti/ na pot''ou)=n a)\n ktêsa/ menoi e)pistê/ mên o)rthô= s ktêsai/ metha? |
| 40436 | p. 292 D.[ Greek: A)lla\ ti/ na dê\ e)pistê/ mên? |
| 40436 | p. 312 D.[ Greek: poi/ as e)rgasi/ as e)pista/ tês? |
| 40436 | p. 320 C.[ Greek: po/ teron u(mi= n, ô(s presbu/ teros neôte/ rois, mu= thon le/ gôn e)pidei/ xô, ê)\ lo/ gô| diexelthô/ n?] |
| 40436 | p. 330 C.[ Greek: tou= to to\ pra= gma o(/ ô)noma/ sate a)/rti, ê( dikaiosu/ nê, au)to\ tou= to di/ kaio/ n e)stin ê)\ a)/dikon?]] |
| 40436 | p. 351 C.[ Greek: To\ me\n a)/ra ê(de/ ôs zê= n, a)gatho/ n, to\ d''a)êdô= s, kako/ n? |
| 40436 | p. 352 B- C.[ Greek: po/ teron kai\ tou= to/ soi dokei= ô(/sper toi= s polloi= s a)nthrô/ pois ê)\ a)/llôs? |
| 40436 | p. 353 D.[ Greek: ponêra\ de\ au)ta\ pê=| phate ei)=nai? |
| 40436 | p. 354 B- C.[ Greek: Tau= ta de\ a)gatha/ e)sti di''a)/llo ti ê)\ o(/ti ei)s ê(dona\s a)poteleuta=| kai\ lupô= n a)pallaga\s kai\ a)potropa/ s? |
| 40436 | p. 359 E.[ Greek: po/ teron kalo\n o(\n i)e/ nai( ei)s to\n po/ lemon) ê)\ ai)schro/ n? |
| 40436 | p. 360 D.[ Greek: Ou)kou= n ê( tô= n deinôn kai\ mê\ deinô= n a)mathi/ a deili/ a a)\n ei)/ê? |
| 40436 | p. 474 D.[ Greek: e)a\n e)n tô=| theôrei= sthai chai/ rein poiê=| tou\s theôrou= ntas?]] |
| 40436 | p.290 C- D.][ Side- note: Where is such an art to be found? |
| 40436 | pa= s ga\r a)\n ê(mi= n ei)/poi o(/ti to\ ploutei= n a)gatho/ n?]] |
| 40436 | pro\s ti/ teinei to\ e)n tô=| ei)rê/ nên te a)/gein a)/meinon kai\ to\ e)n tô=| polemei= n oi(=s dei=?] |
| 40436 | prô= ton me\n to\ toio/ nde; ê( dikaiosu/ nê pra= gma/ ti/ e)stin? |
| 40436 | pô= s de\ ou)dei\s au)lêtê\s ê)\ kitharistê\s ge/ gonen a)/neu mele/ tês?]] |
| 40436 | says Menon,"am I really to state respecting you, that you do not know what virtue is?" |
| 40436 | should we not wish to have our own minds as good as possible? |
| 40436 | sick men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in what occupations? |
| 40436 | such as inform sick men how they are to get well? |
| 40436 | that a man can know both what he knows and what he does not know? |
| 40436 | that hearing is, the things heard? |
| 40436 | that is, only as a remedy for evil; so that if evil were totally banished, good would cease to be prized? |
| 40436 | the knowing? |
| 40436 | those in a state of sickness-- or those who are singing in a chorus-- or those who are under gymnastic training? |
| 40436 | ti/ ga\r dê\ dikai/ ô| chôrizo/ menon ê(donê= s a)gatho\n a)\n ge/ noito?] |
| 40436 | ti/ tau)to\n e)n a)mphote/ rois o(rô= n?]] |
| 40436 | tou\s dê\ toiou/ tous ti/ s mêchanê\ peri\ pollou= poiei= sthai a)llêlous?]] |
| 40436 | v. p. 528) respecting an allusion made by Pindar to Hesiod--"Num malé intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba Hesiodi? |
| 40436 | what did you say about doing wrong and suffering wrong? |
| 40436 | what is the definition of rhetoric? |
| 40436 | what it is that he teaches? |
| 40436 | whether applied to one, few, or many? |
| 40436 | whether the most beautiful maiden will not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess? |
| 40436 | Ê( psuchê\ a)/ra o(/, ti a)\n au)tê\ kata/ schê|, a)ei\ ê(/kei e)p''e)kei= no phe/ rousa zôê/ n? |
| 40436 | Ê( sophi/ a a)/ra tô= n deinô= n kai\ mê\ deinô= n, a)ndrei/ a e)sti/ n, e)nanti/ a ou)=sa tê=| tou/ tôn a)mathi/ a|?]] |
| 40436 | Ê)= ou)ch oi(=o/ n te sigô= nta le/ gein?] |
| 40436 | Ô)/nêto a)/ra narkê/ sas?]] |
| 40436 | ê(=| ti/ chrêso/ metha? |
| 40436 | ê)/ o( a)mathê\s ei)s logismou\s du/ nait''a)\n sou= ma= llon pseu/ desthai boulome/ nou? |
| 40436 | ê)\ e)/chete/ ti a)/llo te/ los le/ gein, ei)s o(\ a)poble/ psantes au)ta\ a)gatha\ kalei= te, a)ll''ê)\ ê(dona/ s te kai\ lu/ pas? |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou) chalepo\n ou)de\ semnou= a)ndro\s pa/ nu ti ou)de\ tou= to e)/oiken ei)=nai eu(rei= n? |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou)/? |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou)/pô katamantha/ neis o(\ le/ gô?] |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou)de\n pra= gma? |
| 40436 | ê)\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti e)ristiko/ s e)sti? |
| 40436 | ê)\ technikou= dei= ei)s e(/kaston? |
| 40436 | ê)\n su\ kalei= s eu)bouli/ an, ei)s ti/ e)stin?] |